Caroline Avila, Philip Kitzberger, Populist Communication and Media Wars in Latin America in:

Benjamin Krämer, Christina Holtz-Bacha (Ed.)

Perspectives on Populism and the Media, page 145 - 160

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1. Edition 2020, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-5561-5, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-9739-2,

Series: International Studies on Populism, vol. 7

Bibliographic information
Populist Communication and Media Wars in Latin America Caroline Avila & Philip Kitzberger Populism has been studied in a variety of countries within different political contexts, but it is in Latin America where this political feature is almost endemic. Scholars have taken an interest in Latin America´s populists (Block, 2015; de la Torre, 2010; Kitzberger, 2018; Waisbord, 2014; Weyland, 2003) and have contributed to a description and some understanding of the relationship between populist leaders and media institutions. This feature of populism is of particular interest in a region with complex and highly politicized media systems. Populism is a concept immersed in controversy, and academics have yet to achieve a consensus regarding its definition (de la Torre & Arson, 2013). Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to offer a definition of populism, it is necessary to establish what we understand as populism in order to refer to its specific communication practices in Latin America. Rovira Kaltwasser (2015), in explaining the emergence of populism both in Europe and in the Americas, suggested working with a minimal concept that defined populism as a thin-centered ideology to be able to apply it in comparative analysis. To this purpose, he proposed the consideration of an ideational approach based on the concept by Cas Mudde (2004, p. 543), who defined populism, “as an ideology that conceives a society separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps: 'the true people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' where politics is the expression of the will of the people” (emphasis in the original). De la Torre and Arnson (2013) agree with Mudde (2004) that some of the central characteristics of populism, whether it is considered a form of government, a discourse style, or a political representation, revolve around the divide between “the people” and “the oligarchy.” In this context, a personalized and charismatic leader becomes a facilitator of populism (Mudde, 2004), since the direct unmediated relationship between the leader and the masses bypasses or marginalizes institutional channels of intermediation – a characteristic that has been fundamental in the emergence of populism, particularly in Latin America (de la Torre & Arson, 2013; Knight, 1998). Ernesto Laclau (2005), in his seminal work, identified the reasons and elements inherent in populism defined as a “form of political construc- 145 tion.” In his explanation of the rise of populism, he noted that, for the construction of “the people,” a discursive link is required to unify and represent existing unmet popular demands. This “equivalential chain” follows from tracing an internal frontier that differentiates these demands from the institutional order. While Laclau does not argue that personal leadership is a defining feature of populism, in his view, leaders can and often constitute the “empty signifiers” that establish and express the people as a unity. In this sense, the leader basks in the affection of the people in direct proportion to how he or she constitutes and represents the popular will. This process of symbolic representation explains the need for caudillos or leaders to use their charisma to build and represent the popular will. This effort is mainly a communication process that manifests itself in elements characterized as features of populism in the literature. These include the personalization of the charismatic leader, the Manichaean and polarizing discourse, the appeal to the people through the frequent use of direct communication without the intermediation of journalistic institutions, the ability to mobilize the masses, and permanent public exposure (de la Torre, 2007, 2010; Freidenberg, 2007). In fact, populist governments are recognized, among other things, for their prevalent use of constant and direct communication (Kitzberger, 2012; Waisbord, 2014). Latin America’s political history is filled with governments categorized as populist. Between the decades of 1930 and 1960, the governments of Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, and Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador were the main exponents of classical populism that arose as a response to the differences generated by migration from the countryside to the city, industrialization, and other features that accentuated the existing social gap (Weyland, 2001). While a wave of military governments in the region interrupted this process, the populist movement reemerged in the 1980s and 1990s with the governments of Fujimori in Peru, Menem in Argentina, and Bucaram in Ecuador. In the last decade, a rebirth of radical-national populism has emerged in the governments of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Cristina Kirchner, and Rafael Correa (de la Torre, 2010). The Media Factor and Political Communication Culture in Populist Contexts The media as an institution play a key role in the political environment because they build or produce news, interact with politicians, and affect, along with being affected by, political processes at different levels (Hallin 1. Caroline Avila & Philip Kitzberger 146 & Mancini, 2004). According to Mazzoleni, Stewart and Horsfield (2003), this is called the “media factor.” When analyzing the “media factor” in the populist experiences that emerged in Latin America, it is important to emphasize that the Latin American context has connotations that are different from European or North American models. In their comparative work on media systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) included a high level of political parallelism between media and political parties as one of the dimensions that defined the polarized pluralist model of the media systems of Italy, Spain, and France. However, de Albuquerque (2012) questions the use of this model when political cleavages are not fully defined. Given the lower weight of political parties in the system of political intermediation, the media take part in this role but are driven by their own logic and interests. In such contexts, media assume a “moderating role” in which they act as political agents, not as representatives of political partisan views, but claiming to “represent national interests in a more legitimate way than the political parties and even the formal political institutions” (p. 93). While de Albuquerque attributes this feature to the Brazilian media system, it also describes, despite differences and nuances, other Latin American media systems. Since the 1980s, with political parties and political institutions steadily losing credibility and media institutions experiencing a process of expansion and conglomeration, the latter increasingly disputed the representative claims of the political institutions. By the end of the 1990s and the eve of the populist tide, the media institutions were widely perceived as key political power players across the region. To complete the picture of Latin America’s media systems, these trends must be seen as coexisting with media patrimonialism. Waisbord (2014) described the development of the political economy of the media in Latin America as based on the consolidation of communication systems with a strong private presence, constant state intervention, and weak community media. Factors such as the informality in the processes of broadcast licensing or the existence of favoritism and patronage networks allowed those that exercised political power to maintain a hold on media power. Although the Latin American media system is comprised mainly of private commercial entities, the collusion with established political power, whether by the renewal of concessions, the granting of credits, import permits for newsprint or equipment, etc., has been a feature in the region. This explains the strong ties between media groups and traditional political and economic power groups and has been key to understanding the government-media confrontations during the latest wave of left-wing populist governments. Populist Communication and Media Wars in Latin America 147 In order to analyze the relationships between populist leaders and the media, we follow a model of populist communication1 that builds on the process of constructing a “people” described by Laclau (2005), based on the symbolic representation of the popular will embodied by the leader. This operation of political construction calls forth a radical intervention in the media system. The leader draws a line, a political frontier ‒ in Laclau´s words ‒ that opposes the de facto powers represented in some private media owned by strong economic groups, to the public interest incarnated in a government legitimized by a mobilized mass. The Populist Communication Model Political communication in populist governments comprises three components: the political system, the media system, and the communication strategy. The model of populist communication used in this chapter identifies these three components and describes how they interact. We will focus on government relations with the media system and how the communication strategy interacts with the leader, the media, and the people. The process of becoming a populist leader involves establishing a frontier that divides society into two camps, the “people” and the elite.” Therefore, populist political communication strategies permanently confirm the frontier. In this division, the established actors of the political system and the media system have mostly fallen on the side of the confronted “elite.” In Latin America, the rise of leftist-populist leaders to the presidency has occurred in the context of a crisis or collapse of traditional political parties. Thus, while still present in party organizations, in these new scenarios, the political opposition suffers from a weakened position in the electoral and legislative arenas. This implies that oppositional voices increasingly resort to the mainstream media, already critical of government, to gain access to the public sphere. This oppositional convergence reinforces the incentives of populist leaders to attribute the traditional media institutions to the role of enemies. 2. 1 The model was presented at the International Communication Association annual conference as part of the doctoral research of Avila (2018). Caroline Avila & Philip Kitzberger 148 The Media System As previously discussed, the elitist character of media systems played a significant role in the emergence and propagation of populism. Private, forprofit media historically dominated Latin American national media systems, whereas community and public media have been marginal, at best. The radical populist governments' strategy of confronting and publicly antagonizing members of the private media has called for the creation or strengthening of state-owned and private media whose newsrooms and voices aligned with the government to counter the oppositional critical media narrative. Simultaneously, populist leaders require permanent public exposure, for which their media skills and direct forms of communication are relevant. This makes them both a medium and a message (Rincón, 2016); consequently, the voice of the President and his or her acts of direct communication constitute another component of the media system. Additionally, populist political communication, in which the existing media order is questioned as undemocratic, calls for radical media policy reform agendas that incorporate new stakeholders through the legal recognition and regulation of community and market alternative media that make up a small part of the model (Kitzberger, 2012). Thus, the communication model in a government with populist traits involves a communication strategy with a radical intervention in the media system. The model considers, as a variable for analysis, the level of accommodation between the media and the government, in a continuum that ranges from adaptation to opposition. Therefore, the more the government controls the editorial agenda, the more the media will be part of the controlled media system (greater accommodation). On the other hand, if more opposition and conflict is manifested in the relationship, the media will be part of the external media system (lesser accommodation). With this criterion, populist communication shapes the media system on four fronts: the external media system, the alternative media system, the owned or controlled media system, and the direct communication system. Figure 1 summarizes the elements that comprise this model of analysis of government communication with populist traits. 2.1 Populist Communication and Media Wars in Latin America 149   Figure 1: Populist Communication Model Source: Avila (2017) The external media system is comprised of the private media, whether traditional or online, that have been identified by the government as adversaries. These media are generally owned by large business groups with ties to the political elites. In this context, by intervening as political actors, the media play a fundamental role in populist communication since they embody the opposition. As they assume this role, they reinforce the polarized relationship with the populist leadership. In the external media system of Figure 1, the communication strategy is focused on permanent conflict. That is, conflict arises from different factors (ownership of the media, corporate interests, and journalistic frames, among others). Governments, seeking to influence the construction of the news agenda, take advantage of legal resources such as obligatory quotas of information dissemination and replications or rectifications, or by simply not giving any public statements or interviews to critical media, etc. in order to exercise pressure on the external media system. Caroline Avila & Philip Kitzberger 150 Media located at the center of the adaptation-opposition continuum that are not associated with large conglomerates and receive minimal pressure from governments, form the alternative media system (Figure 1). Some of the community media with a long history in the region are part of this segment. They obtained legal recognition from the new regulations promoted by countries such as Argentina, Venezuela, and Ecuador, where a portion of the radio spectrum for this form of communication has been reserved. In some respects, their presence is a consequence of the preexisting demands to democratize communication and facilitate access for marginalized voices, which have been part of the discourse of populist governments on communication regulation. Government communication interacts with this alternative media system through the permanent monitoring and delivery of audiovisual products as part of its network of dissemination. The owned or controlled media system refers to a group of media whose relationship with the government is closer to the adaptation of the editorial agenda with official interests as a result of government influence. The relationship is exercised through the inclusion of political allies on executive boards, advertising and operational financing, the creation of new official media, and in some radical cases such as Ecuador, the seizure of media. It includes privately owned preexisting media, fueled with state resources and editorially aligned with the government, government-controlled newly created and/or preexisting public media, and official or government outlets. The strengthening of this controlled media system is fundamental, given the need felt by the populist leadership to intervene in the media system. On the one hand, they must make use of media logic in order to reach the population with their discourse. On the other hand, they must also respond to the conflict instigated against the external media. Populist communication intervenes both in news production and regular programming through the distribution of news content material and audiovisual products, the inclusion of allied voices in editorial pages, interviews and opinion programs, broadcasting of official events, imposition of broadcast, financing the production of attack programs, or responding to political criticism and audiovisual productions in general. Populist governments seek a more controlled communication system that allows them to better articulate and frame their messages, bypassing the filters of the mainstream media (Kitzberger, 2012). Populist Communication and Media Wars in Latin America 151 Evidence from Latin America Ecuador Ecuador’s media system was mainly comprised of owners from the private sector, particularly family groups and banking holdings. In 2007, when Rafael Correa won the presidency, four family groups held the majority of the media audience in the country. Very soon, Correa’s government had to struggle with hard criticism from journalism and mainstream media, particularly because of his decision to call for a plebiscite. The government started a radical intervention in the media system by creating and strengthening public media and co-opting some private media (Aguirre & Avila, 2020). At the end of the process, after Congress passed a restrictive media regulation, there were around four TV stations with a combined audience share of 26%, some radio stations, particularly Radio Pública, and two newspapers, all of them controlled by Rafael Correa’s government (Avila, 2017; Checa-Godoy, 2012; Jordan & Panchana, 2009). It was important to hold on to control of this media conglomerate because it helped to maintain confrontation against the private media that represented the de facto powers or the enemy of the people. The external media of Ecuador, according to the populist communication model, is comprised of six family groups that still kept control of media companies. Among these are the Alvarado Group with Ecuavisa (national TV station), Vistazo (magazine) and other media products; the Perez media group, owners of Diario Universo, Radio City, and Diario Súper; the Mantilla Group and Telglovision, which are still shareholders of Diario El Comercio, Diario Últimas Noticias, Radio Quito, and Radio Platinum, etc.; the Granasa group has two newspapers, and Plural TV, and is related to Egas group, owner of Teleamazonas (national TV station), and some magazines. The combined TV audience reached by the external media system corresponds to about 43% (Obitel, 2015; CORDICOM, 2014; Avila, 2017). These two media (external and controlled) were in permanent confrontation; the editorial position of one group was usually the opposite of the other group. For the purpose of populist communication, this confrontation was an unavoidable strategy. It served to identify those political actors related to some private media groups labeled as the enemy of the people. Rafael Correa sued Diario Universo for an editorial that accused him of committing a crime against humanity as he was rescued from being kidnapped during a police revolt denounced as a political coup. Every Saturday, during a weekly broadcast radio and TV program called “Enlace 3. 3.1 Caroline Avila & Philip Kitzberger 152 Ciudadano,” Correa accused journalists of being political actors for misinforming and serving a political agenda from the opposition. There is ample evidence of the permanent conflict between the private media and Correa’s populist government, which has been described in studies by various scholars (Avila, 2016; Checa-Godoy, 2012; Cerbino, Ramos & Orlando, 2013; Punin & Rencoret, 2014;). Argentina Throughout the 1990s, liberalization policies in Argentina led to the formation of a concentrated media system characterized by cross-media ownership and the formation of a few large media conglomerates. However, as in Brazil and Mexico, one became the dominant player. The Clarín Group expanded from publishing and broadcasting to a cable TV and internet provider, news agencies, audiovisual production, and to soccer transmission, among other interests. The group became one of the country’s leading economic conglomerates. Since 1999, it has been financed through international capital markets. Its undisputed ascendancy in the public agenda and opinion formation has been made possible by its multiple popular outlets and its prestigious news media's capacity to act in a coordinated fashion, headed by its newspaper and 24-hour news channel. (Kitzberger, 2017; Mastrini & Becerra, 2006; Schuliaquer, 2017; Sivak, 2015). During Nestor Kirchner’s term in office (2003-2007), despite some tensions, the government maintained a relationship of mutual accommodation with the Clarín Group. It was in 2008, with the election of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to the presidency, and in the context of a conflict with agricultural producers unleashed by a hike in export taxes, that the government shifted to an open confrontation with the Clarín Group and other established private news media. The government deployed all its political resources with the ultimate aim of radically altering power relations in the media sphere, in other words, of crushing Clarín’s dominant position (Kitzberger, 2017; Sivak, 2015). By 2009, a new Audiovisual Services Law was passed. The legislation mainly addressed plurality and diversity through structural regulations aimed at reversing media ownership and audience concentration via bans on cross-ownership, limits on broadcasting license numbers, and subscriber caps for pay-TV services, among other policy mechanisms. Under such rules, the Clarín Group and other organizations, albeit to a lesser de- 3.2 Populist Communication and Media Wars in Latin America 153 gree, would be forced to divest a number of assets.2 Simultaneously, the government bought the transmission rights for first-division soccer from the national football association to broadcast games on free-to-air television. In doing so, the government overturned the long-standing exclusive possession of these rights by a pay-per-view channel co-owned by Clarín, a key resource in the expansion of the group’s business operations. Additionally, the government unblocked the distribution of cable licenses and reduced official advertising in Clarín’s outlets, which fueled new private and state pro-government media (Kitzberger, 2017; Schuliaquer, 2017; Sivak, 2015). Venezuela By the end of the 1990s, Venezuela’s media system exhibited a fair amount of concentration in the different types of media, but with few vertical links. Three family-owned newspapers dominated the national scene (El Nacional, El Universal, and Últimas Noticias) representing 60% of circulation, while, separately, three private television networks (Venevisión, RCTV, and Televen) controlled 75% of the audience share (Cañizález & Lugo-Ocando, 2008; Mastrini & Becerra, 2006). From the outset in 1999, Chávez’s relationship with the mainstream media was tense. However, it was after the April 2002 putsch attempt, encouraged by some of the main media owners and backed by one-sided coverage from most mainstream media outlets, that the populist leader deployed aggressive policies to radically reshape the media landscape. Preexisting state-owned national radio and television stations were revamped (VTV and RNV), two new national state-controlled television stations were created (Vive TV and TVes), and a regional news network was launched, only to mention the main stateowned media-outlet expansion. Oppositional private media operations were progressively restricted. Venevisión’s owner opted to depoliticize programming, while RCTV’s more confrontational stance ended in the nonrenewal of its broadcast license in 2007. Newspapers suffered from restrictions in newsprint supply, and a 2004 sanctioned “Radio and Television Responsibility Law” set strict content regulations. Meanwhile, community media that had backed Chávez during the coup received legal recognition and public funding on a discretionary basis. (Kitzberger, 2010) 3.3 2 Clarín resisted the law’s enforcement by filing judicial complaints. Caroline Avila & Philip Kitzberger 154 The Direct Communication System A direct communication system allowed to bypass journalistic intermediation is perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the populist communication model. The official spokesperson, as previously mentioned, is the ruler. Therefore, the direct communication system facilitates permanent public exposure through regular communication spaces, accountability events, site visits, meetings of ministerial cabinets in rural areas, staged events, etc. Although the confrontation with traditional media and the control of broadcast systems is an old practice in classical populism, Venezuela installed a different form of permanent and direct communication through weekly programs broadcast by radio and TV stations (Kitzberger, 2018). This form of constant exposure allowed the ruler to saturate the public sphere with his presidential voice (Waisbord, 2014). These programs were the perfect space to emphasize the conflict against the “enemy” usually identified by critical media accused of sustaining a political agenda. Live programs like "Enlace Ciudadano" (Citizen Link) in Ecuador or “Aló Presidente” (Hello, President) in Venezuela are examples of such direct communication. Despite the mediation by the simultaneous transmission on television and radio, the effect this kind of show produces is the image that the leader is accountable to the citizenship (on a weekly basis). This sense of closeness can also be identified by the use of social networks, especially on Twitter, which has become a type of balcony 2.0, a new scenario in government communications. It is in these close spaces of communication where it is possible to reaffirm the charisma and the personalization of the leader, who takes advantage of his or her power of communication to appeal to the masses and garner support for strategic decisions. The discursive style used in the direct communication system seeks the confrontation and Manichean polarization that is a characteristic of populism. It constitutes a form of exerting pressure on the opposition through the mobilization of supporters. Regarding their strategies of direct communication, and in contrast with Correa or Chávez, the Kirchners did not experiment with regular broadcasting. Instead, they systematically resorted to controlled events in order to have an impact on non-controlled media. Ceremonies, inaugurations, or official visits developed into a routine device for delivering unmediated messages (Kitzberger, 2010). Cristina Kirchner progressively resorted to “cadenas” (mandatory broadcasts) and to the use of online media to deliver unmediated messages (Waisbord & Amado, 2017). 4. Populist Communication and Media Wars in Latin America 155 The agrarian conflict also triggered the Kirchners to go public with a discourse that framed the “dominant media” or the “corporations” as the real and unelected power that sides against the “people.” This depiction of the media gradually developed into a cultural war fought on screens, in papers, and in news media. In addition, an expanding circle of allies, popularized academics, and media-critical discourses deconstructed the ideological, corporate, and journalistic biases in dominant media narratives on a daily basis. The most successful of these communication devices was a daily television show, called “678,” aired on public television (Kitzberger, 2017). On the other side of the scenario, private mainstream media (especially Clarín’s multiple outlets) became systematically oppositional and framed the government as an authoritarian populism that threatened Argentina with becoming like Venezuela, restructuring the media system in terms of an external pluralism with polarized traits (Schuliaquer, 2015). Conclusions The central thesis of this chapter is that a populist government initiates fundamental changes to the media system. Thus, in these types of governments, media relations are handled with a confrontational strategy. This conflict is not only a response to the critics but has its roots in the historical capture of media ownership by a sector of the socio-economic elites with strong ties to political power. In Latin American populism, this confrontation derives from a radical media intervention explained in this chapter, with the creation or reinforcement of public media and the control of its newsroom. Radical intervention in the media system, along with the changes in the communication structure and the direct communication strategy, allow the reinforcement of the closeness of the leader to the population. This, in turn, satisfies the goal of populist communication, which is to boost the ability of the leader to keep the supporters mobilized (Weyland, 2001) and to counter the mainstream media’s oppositional agenda and narrative. This chapter refers to the communication of the governments of Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina, and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. A radical intervention in the media system was evident the moment these governments became interpreters of the communication process and called for the democratization of voices. The argument was used to justify this intervention in the media system with the construction of government-controlled media. The counterpower that this controlled media system offers reinforces the polarization and conflict. This 5. Caroline Avila & Philip Kitzberger 156 political environment keeps the people active, which provides public support to the populist leader. Consequences for the Media and Political System As the so-called left turn seems to be receding in Latin America, the scenario has radically changed in the region. The three populist leaders left power, and their communication strategies are discontinued. Arguably, since Chávez’s death in 2013, Venezuelan politics stepped over the regime threshold and backslid into authoritarianism. In Argentina, the kirchnerista successor candidate lost against Mauricio Macri, leading a center-right antipopulist electoral coalition governing the country since 2015. Meanwhile, in Ecuador, Correa’s successor candidate, Lenin Moreno, won the presidency in 2016, but almost immediately broke with Correa, now the government’s main opposition leader. Moreno realigned the government around center-right conservative and pro-market parties and other political anticorreísta groups. In the post-populist government contexts of Argentina and Ecuador, a polarized political communication process subsists, however, under new circumstances. The populist‒anti-populist cleavage still structures important aspects of the national media systems. The previously confronted journalistic outlets controlled by the main players in the private commercial media sector persist in their anti-kichnerista and anti-correísta editorial stances. With leftist-populist governments out of office, journalists and media voices aligned with them withdrew from the state-controlled outlets and newsrooms that depended upon the private allied news media that either disappeared or realigned pragmatically. The new incumbent governments significantly reversed many of the populist media policies, for example, reforming the bequeathed media regulatory laws, and re-approached the traditional private media owners previously confronted. The pro-populist perspectives lost standing in free-to-air television and in the mainstream press. While diminished, a polarized external pluralism subsists in the media system since they regrouped – and eventually reorganized considerable audiences – in niche media like 24/7 news channels, smaller legacy or digital-born newsrooms, some broadcast or streaming radio outlets, alternative-sector media and, especially, through the social media. In the opposition, both populist leaderships regularly use their Twitter or Facebook accounts as direct communication devices through which they keep denouncing the biases and anti-popular interests hidden behind the mainstream media’s news coverage. 5.1 Populist Communication and Media Wars in Latin America 157 Bolivia’s Evo Morales is the only remaining leftist populist in the presidency still playing a game of competitive electoral democracy. The region seems to have somewhat tilted to the right. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s election constitutes a new case of populist confrontational political communication, but this time, the governmental appeals that divide society into two antagonistic camps, in which the established media are placed on the side of the people’s enemy, respond to right-wing frames that see not the upper strata of society, but cosmopolitanism or “cultural Marxism” on the antagonist’s side. 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This volume assembles a wide range of perspectives on populism and the media, bringing together various disciplinary and theoretical approaches, authors and examples from different continents and a wide range of topical issues. The chapters discuss the contexts of populist communication, communication by populist actors, different types of populist messages (populist communication in traditional and new media, populist criticism of the media, populist discourses related to different topics, etc.), the effects and consequences of populist communication, populist media policy and anti-populist discourses. The contributions synthesise existing research on this subject, propose new approaches to it or present new findings on the relationship between populism and the media. With contibutions by Caroline Avila, Eleonora Benecchi, Florin Büchel, Donatella Campus, María Esperanza Casullo, Nicoleta Corbu, Ann Crigler, Benjamin De Cleen, Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, Nayla Fawzi, Jana Goyvaerts, André Haller, Kristoffer Holt, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Marion Just, Philip Kitzberger, Magdalena Klingler, Benjamin Krämer, Katharina Lobinger, Philipp Müller, Elena Negrea-Busuioc, Carsten Reinemann, Christian Schemer, Anne Schulz, Christian Schwarzenegger, Torgeir Uberg Nærland, Rebecca Venema, Anna Wagner, Martin Wettstein, Werner Wirth, Dominique Stefanie Wirz


Der Band vereint ein breites Spektrum von Perspektiven auf das Thema Populismus und Medien. Er bringt verschiedene fachliche und theoretische Ansätze, Beitragende und Beispiele von mehreren Kontinenten und ein breites Spektrum aktueller Themen und Herausforderungen zusammen. Die Kapitel behandeln den Kontext populistischer Kommunikation, Kommunikation durch populistische Akteure, verschiedene Typen populistischer Botschaften (populistische Kommunikation in traditionellen und neuen Medien, populistische Medienkritik, populistische Diskurse zu verschiedenen Themen), Wirkungen und Konsequenzen populistischer Kommunikation, populistische Medienpolitik, aber auch antipopulistische Diskurse. Die Beiträge systematisieren vorhandene Forschung, schlagen neue Ansätze vor oder präsentieren neue Befunde zum Verhältnis von Populismus und Medien. Mit Beiträgen von Caroline Avila, Eleonora Benecchi, Florin Büchel, Donatella Campus, María Esperanza Casullo, Nicoleta Corbu, Ann Crigler, Benjamin De Cleen, Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, Nayla Fawzi, Jana Goyvaerts, André Haller, Kristoffer Holt, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Marion Just, Philip Kitzberger, Magdalena Klingler, Benjamin Krämer, Katharina Lobinger, Philipp Müller, Elena Negrea-Busuioc, Carsten Reinemann, Christian Schemer, Anne Schulz, Christian Schwarzenegger, Torgeir Uberg Nærland, Rebecca Venema, Anna Wagner, Martin Wettstein, Werner Wirth, Dominique Stefanie Wirz