Christina Holtz-Bacha, Putting the Screws on the Press: Populism and Freedom of the Media in:

Benjamin Krämer, Christina Holtz-Bacha (Ed.)

Perspectives on Populism and the Media, page 109 - 124

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1. Edition 2020, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-5561-5, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-9739-2,

Series: International Studies on Populism, vol. 7

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Putting the Screws on the Press: Populism and Freedom of the Media Christina Holtz-Bacha When Freedom House published its 2016 annual report on the status of press freedom in the world, the organization pointed to "press freedom's dark horizon" (Dunham, 2017, p. 3) while referring to the fact that freedom of the press worldwide deteriorated once again and reached its lowest point in 13 years. Presenting its 2017 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders (2017) evoked a similar picture with an "ever darker world map." The rogue states are well known. Each year we find the same names at the end of the lists ranking almost 200 countries according to their scores on the press freedom indices: North Korea, Eritrea, Cuba, and the countries of central Asia that were part of the Soviet Union until they became independent in the early 1990s. These are autocratic and dictatorial regimes with a tight grip on their citizens, denying them human rights and civil liberties. What is new and possibly more frightening is the finding that the quality of democracy and of press freedom has also been changing recently for the worse in established democracies. This is where populism comes in. Its recent rise has been identified as a factor driving this development. The illustrations that adorned the cover of Freedom House's annual reports in the last years showed caricatures of the notorious predators of freedom of the press. In 2016, those were North Korea's Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un; Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a former highranking military officer and minister of defense; Turkey's President and former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan; Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro, who was minister of foreign affairs and vice president under President Hugo Chávez; and Russia's President Vladimir Putin. They appeared in the illustrations in the company of the Chinese Dragon and a dark figure symbolizing terrorist threats to freedom of the press. On the cover of the report published in 2017, the Russian, Turkish, and Venezuelan leaders found new companions in the persons of Serbia's President Aleksandar Vučić; the leader of Poland's ruling party PiS (Party of Law and Justice), Jarosław Kaczyński; Bolivian President Evo Morales; and Rodrigo Duterte, president of the Philippines. All of them were shown riding 109 wolves baring their teeth and circling a small crowd of journalists who were flying the flag of the Free Press but looking a bit forlorn. On the sidelines, not yet riding a wolf, stands U.S. President Donald Trump meditatively contemplating the scene. Showing Trump in a group of autocratic rulers and thus alluding to the US as a potential enemy of press freedom fits the pessimistic tone of the report's introductory chapter on the status of press freedom in the US (Abramowitz, 2017, p. 1). Against the background of an overall decline of freedom of the press in the world, the chapter ascertains that the US was never before as much in the public debate on the issue as it was in 2016/17, and this is very much due to President Trump's attitude towards the media. However, even though the US once again dropped in the global ranking as its score worsened, climbing from 21 in 2015 to 23 in 2016, the country's system of checks and balances nurtures the hope that the US will keep its status as one of the freest media systems worldwide (Abramowitz, 2017, p. 1; Freedom House, 2016; 2017). The president of the United States of America, an entrenched democracy priding itself as being the embodiment of freedom, shown in the company of autocratic leaders and observing with interest how journalists are cornered and bullied, not only reflects the status of freedom of the press in the US. The picture also symbolizes a changing attitude towards the role of the media in democratic regimes. The US is just one prominent example of how respect for freedom of the press is dwindling. What was once a figurehead of democracy can no longer be taken for granted. The diagnoses of the last years were clear and unanimous: Freedom in the world is declining, and the state of democracy is a matter of serious concern. Old certainties no longer apply. Even the US, for long time a symbol of freedom and a haven of stability, is slipping. According to the eleventh edition of the Democracy Index drawn up by The Economist Intelligence Unit for 2018, there are only 20 full democracies among 167 countries in the world (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 2). Another 55 rate as flawed democracies, a category that encompasses a variety of countries and regimes and now also includes the US, which dived under the threshold for full democracy in 2016 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 10). Even Western Europe, the region with the second-highest regional score behind North America, currently features six flawed democracies (out of 21 countries). Most of the flawed democracies reach an acceptable score for the electoral process and pluralism but show weaknesses in the functioning of the government, political participation, and political culture. The scores for the state of civil liberties in flawed democracies are mixed, ranging from 9.12 (out of 10) in countries such as Chile, Christina Holtz-Bacha 110 Portugal, and Taiwan to below 4.0 in countries close to the threshold of authoritarian regimes such as Iraq, Palestine, and Gambia, and as low as 2.35 in Turkey (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, pp. 36-37). These numbers reflect a creeping decline of democracy that has been going on for some time. When The Economist started the democracy index in 2006, it recorded 28 full democracies (Kekic, 2007). Just two years later, the report stated, "The spread of democracy appears to have come to a halt" (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, p. 1). The hopes sparked by the wave of democratization in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain were soon dampened. The transformation from authoritarian to democratic systems was bumpy and not without resistance, and it remained incomplete. A quarter of a century later, we witness a reverse development sobering the optimism that spread with the expulsion of the autocratic leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the reasons for the beleaguered status of civil liberties even in democratic countries is the recent rise of populism in Europe and the US. In the key findings of its 2019 report, Freedom House explicitly points to populism as one reason for the decline of press freedom even in established democracies (Freedom House, 2019, p. 1): "This is not because journalists are being thrown in jail, as might occur in authoritarian settings. Instead, the media have fallen prey to more nuanced efforts to throttle their independence" (Freedom House, 2019, p. 2). The direct connection that Freedom House makes here leads to the question of the relationship between populism and democracy and its ramifications for freedom of the media. Populism and Democracy Views on what populism means for (liberal) democracy are ambivalent. On one hand, populism is regarded as an invigorating and mobilizing element of democracy. On the other, populism is seen as a danger to democracy. Leaving aside here Mouffe's approach that regards the current "populist moment" as an opportunity for overcoming the neoliberal hegemony and calls for a left populism that takes up the demands of the people against those that sustain the neoliberal order (Mouffe, 2018, ch. 1; 2019), the former position mostly builds on Canovan (1999). She posits that populism is an unavoidable consequence of tensions inherent in the democratic system and populist mobilization, following democracy therefore "like a shadow" (p. 10). Along these lines, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) point out that populism can prompt other political actors to take up issues that they have neglected so far but feel they should deal with in order not 1. Putting the Screws on the Press: Populism and Freedom of the Media 111 to lose the votes of people for whom these issues are important. Some studies (e.g., Anduiza, Guinjoan, & Rico, 2019; Huber & Ruth, 2017; Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015; Webb, 2013) also suggest an increase of different kinds of political participation stimulated by populist movements, either by successfully mobilizing their own clientele, or even former non-voters, or by stirring those who oppose populist ideology, thus making headway against its further spread. For instance, the Democracy Index 2018 concludes that for the first time in three years, the overall democracy index stagnated, neither showing progress nor a decrease, despite a growth of discontent with the functioning of government and the decline of civil liberties. The deterioration of these indicators was compensated for by an improvement of the overall score for political participation measured by variables such as number of women in parliament, voter turnout, party membership, and participation in demonstrations. To a certain extent this can be regarded as a consequence of populist anti-establishment mobilization (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 7). In contrast to the position that regards populism as a warning signal, there are many voices asserting a deterioration of democracy by populism. This perspective mostly derives its arguments from the defining attributes of populism, first and foremost populists' claim to speak in the name of the people and to be the only ones who know and represent the true will of the people. The claim to sole representation of the people, who are conceived of as homogeneous, therefore disregarding minorities, exhibits an exclusionary character that is anti-pluralistic and thus anti-democratic. Moreover, populists distrust the rule of law and the constitutional intermediary institutions that provide for a system of checks and balances because they "limit the capacity of 'the people' to exercise their collective power" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 207). In an empirical study with an international perspective, Ruth-Lovell, Lührmann, and Gran (2019) assessed the relationship between populism and four different models of democracy. Based on the ideational approach and with reference to Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), they defined five populist ideas and tested the effects of populist rule in Latin America and Europe on an electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian model of democracy. The analysis covered 24 years from 1995 and 2018 and included 289 tenures in 47 countries, 28 populist and 246 nonpopulist presidents or prime ministers (Ruth-Lovell, Lührmann, & Gran, 2019, p. 15). Overall and with no differences for left and right populist rule, the study found negative effects on the electoral, liberal, and deliberative model of democracy and was not able to assess a positive relationship with the participatory and the egalitarian model. Well-established demo- Christina Holtz-Bacha 112 cracies seem to be less affected by the negative effects of populist rule than are weak democracies (Ruth-Lovell, Lührmann, & Gran, 2019, pp. 24-25). These findings corroborate the expectations of those researchers who fear deteriorating effects of populist rule on liberal values and constitutional checks and balances. However, the study is limited to populist rule and does not cover the influence of populists in opposition roles. Targeting Media and Journalists In modern liberal democracies, civil rights and liberties are guaranteed in the constitutions. Freedom of the press emanates from freedom of expression; therefore, some constitutions do not mention press freedom explicitly. In addition to guarantees in the national constitutions, some supra-national agreements and treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN; Article 19), the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe; Article 10), and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Union; Article 11) also include safeguards for civil liberties. Civil liberties are individual rights that a government cannot change. However, the long list of cases that, for instance, the European Court of Human Rights had to deal with in connection with Article 10 demonstrates recurring breaches of freedom of the press by the state even in well-established democracies (Council of Europe, 2007; Vorhoof, 2014). Whereas historically the fight for freedom of the press was directed towards the state and constitutionally established as a negative right against the state, other actors play roles that can lead to infringements of press freedom as well. Many of the factors that have an impact on the quality of freedom of the press are, for instance, reflected in the variables used for the indices compiled each year by organizations such as Freedom House and Reporters without Borders. Not all the variables are equally accessible to measurement and are therefore left to the subjective impressions of the experts whom the organizations draw on for grading. The short assessments of the situation in individual countries that Freedom House presents, in addition to the rankings, therefore often mention singular events or developments that provide more background. As referred to at the beginning of this chapter, the surge of populism repeatedly appeared among the factors that contributed to the erosion of freedom of the media even in established democracies in the last years. Political actors of every hue have an interest in achieving and staying in power. Despite the ascent of social media that allow for direct and unfiltered contact with citizens, political actors still seek the big stage of the tra- 2. Putting the Screws on the Press: Populism and Freedom of the Media 113 ditional media for addressing the electorate. Particularly during election campaigns when power is at stake, political actors intensify their efforts to get their messages into the media unaltered and to their advantage. The growing tendency to permanent campaigning and the blending of governing and campaign mode further extends the inclination towards influencing the media well beyond the pre-election period. According to the established criteria of news selection and due to the overall relevance of their decisions for all citizens, those in power enjoy a better chance of being covered by the media than newcomers and outsiders who need specific strategies to garner the media's attention and compensate for the lack of those news factors associated with incumbency and government office. If populism is made responsible for the decline of freedom of the press, the question is, what distinguishes populists from non-populists in their attitudes towards and their dealings with the media? After all, all political actors are dependent on the attention of the media and strive for favorable coverage of their activities. Therefore, if populists differ from non-populists in their approach to the media, these differences should be rooted in the populist ideology and populists' specific strategies vis-à-vis the media. Experience shows a negative correlation between populism and press freedom. The academic basis for general conclusions regarding the influence of populists on freedom of expression and of the press, however, is more than meager. There are some studies on the countries of Latin America, among them countries where (left) populists came to power and how they dealt with the media (Kellam, 2018; Kellam & Stein, 2016; Kitzberger, 2012; Waisbord, 2011; 2013). In Europe, Hungary and Poland have received special attention because these countries have fallen sharply in recent years in the democracy and press freedom rankings due to their populist governments' attacks on the constitutional courts and the media (Csaky, 2018, pp. 5-9; Giannakopoulos, 2019, pp. 15-16; Schenkkan, 2017, pp. 9-11). However, general conclusions about the consequences of populist rule for freedom of the media can only be drawn to a limited extent from those studies. As mentioned above, there are also several studies that incorporate indicators of freedom of expression and of the press into scales that measure the quality of democracy (Ruth-Lovell et al., 2019). Again, insights into the various forms of influence cannot be obtained from those studies. What we are missing are analyses based on large datasets that allow for juxtaposing the impact of populist and non-populist rule on freedom of expression and of the press, of populists in government and in opposition, and comparisons across countries. Only large-scale analyses that cover left- and right-wing populism, as well as different regions and political sys- Christina Holtz-Bacha 114 tems, would allow for generalizations about the relationship between populism and press freedom. Kenny (2019) recently presented an empirical study that comes close to meeting these requirements. Based on a concept defining populism as "the charismatic mobilization of a mass movement in pursuit of political power," Kenny (2019) posits that populist parties have a particularly strong incentive to undermine freedom of expression and to control the media due to the way they are organized. Their internal structure is characterized by a charismatic leader, and populist parties are therefore highly personalistic. Even though populist parties continue to rely on mass mobilization, they nevertheless need the mass media to connect with their supporters. As Kenny (p. 2) further argues, unlike leaders of more institutionalized parties, populist leaders cannot rely equally on party membership, civil society organizations, or clientele linkages for mass mobilization, and therefore they strive to control the media. Due to the personalistic structure and their prominent positions, populist leaders are less constrained by their parties' interests compared to leaders of non-populist parties. Populists put their personal political life first and care less about the long-time survival of their parties, which are in turn interested in keeping the institutional balance that restrains governmental power. In his study using data from 91 countries for the years 1980 to 2014, Kenny (2019) tested the association of populist rule and the decline of press freedom. Seven variables were available to measure infringements on freedom of the press: government censorship of the media and of the Internet, representation of a wide range of political perspectives, harassment of journalists, self-censorship of the media, media bias against the opposition or in favor of the government, and the extent to which the government respects freedom of expression and the media (p. 7). Except for Internet censorship, all correlations were statistically significant, demonstrating that populist rule is indeed negatively associated with press freedom. These findings are robust even when using an ideational conceptualization of populism and the dataset of Ruth (2018) that refers to populist rule in Latin America from 1979 to 2014 (Kenny, 2019, p. 12). The quantitative studies on the relationship between populism and indicators for the quality of democracy mostly refer to populist rule and thus do not capture how populists in an opposition role or extra-parliamentary populist movements relate to the media. Populists in power have wider opportunities for directly impinging on the media than do those in an opposition role because they can take legislative actions to transform the media environment. There are many examples of media reforms and the restructuring of the media market that were driven by populist leaders. This Putting the Screws on the Press: Populism and Freedom of the Media 115 is particularly the case in the Latin American countries with their presidential systems, but by now it can also be observed in some European countries where populist parties hold a majority in parliament and are part of the executive. Measures include concentration rules, (partial) takeovers of media companies by the state or the leaders' cronies, nationalization, influencing appointment to key positions in media companies, and withdrawal or re-direction of state funding. Whereas the consequences of new media laws are mostly accessible for measurement, the systematic assessment of more indirect but not necessarily subtle strategies that are supposed to curb the media is more difficult. In this case, we are left with everyday experiences and observations. However, taken together they reveal patterns in the relationship between populists and the media. One such pattern concerns general attacks on (mainstream) media and another, more specifically, on individual media and journalists. U.S. President Donald Trump’s tweet cannonades labeling the East Coast media as fake news and declaring them the enemy of the American people are legendary. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), an NGO based in the United States, analyzed the tweets Trump released since January 2015 when he entered the campaign until January 2019 and found that about 11 percent targeted journalists and the news media (Sugars, 2019). Over time, Trump's media-related tweets shifted from singling out individual journalists and newsrooms during his campaign to more general verdicts on the media as a whole after he took office. Since his inauguration, a majority of his tweets have targeted the media as fake news and denounced them as an enemy of the American people (Sugars, 2019). In a similar vein, the right-wing PEGIDA movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) in Germany revived the term Lügenpresse (lying press) that derives from folkish-German and National Socialist ideology and was taken over by the populist Alternative for Germany (AfD). In another version but with the same meaning, then AfD party leader Frauke Petry spoke of the Pinocchio press (e.g., Herwartz, 2015). Like fake news, the term Lügenpresse spread internationally, and accusing the press of telling lies became a common reaction to critical reporting. In Italy, in view of uncomfortable reporting, ministers of the then coalition government of Lega and M5S (Five Star Movement) suggested measures such as the reduction of state support, which would strike at the financial foundations of the press (Migge, 2018). Angered by critical newspaper coverage, the White House canceled subscriptions to the New York Times and the Washington Post and pushed other federal agencies to terminate their subscriptions as well (e.g., Grynbaum, 2019). Christina Holtz-Bacha 116 As part of what the AfD also likes to call Systemmedien (mainstream media), the party particularly targets public service broadcasting that is regarded as belonging to the corrupt elite and accused of serving government interests. Like the AfD, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), which takes a similar stance on public service broadcasting, attacks the financial basis of the public corporations and calls for the abolishment of what they refer to as Zwangsgebühren (compulsory fees). Boris Johnson, leader of the British Tories, questioned the financing system of the BBC following a clash with the broadcaster in which the politician denied the BBC an interview (e.g., Das Gupta, 2019; Hughes & Nilsson, 2019). Financial cuts have become a common tool for tightening the strings on public service corporations and putting them on a leash. Allern (2019 and personal communication) describes how the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) pressure for financial restrictions on Swedish public broadcasting and stronger control of its programs. "Fascinated" by the developments in media policy in Poland and Hungary, the Sweden Democrats are also inspired by the example of Denmark, where in 2018 the then Liberal Conservative government, with the support of the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti), drastically reduced the budget of the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR). As a result, DR had to dismiss numerous employees and close some channels. In a neoliberal approach and because of their new political alliance with the Sweden Democrats, the Swedish Conservatives (Moderaterna) and the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) now argue for the same policies. In Italy, apart from attacking journalists generally as the "the worst brood," calling them a "red gang," and lumping them together with the judges and prosecutors of the country, then Interior Minister and Lega Chief Matteo Salvini drove changes among the personnel in top positions in the public broadcasting corporation RAI (Schlamp, 2018). In addition to those measures that affect the structure of the media system, restrictions on journalistic work and attacks on individual journalists serve to silence critics and undermine their credibility. Again, the U.S. president provides several examples of this strategy. Overall, since Trump took office, the number of White House press briefings dwindled until they vanished completely in the course of 2019 (e.g., Phelps, 2019; Yourish & Lee, 2019). Trump's press secretary put the blame for this on the White House correspondents themselves because they had used the press conferences for becoming famous (Flood, 2019). Among others, this reproach was addressed to Jim Acosta, the CNN White House correspondent whose accreditation had been withdrawn after a controversial back-and-forth (e.g., Baker, 2018). Only about two weeks after the incident in early November 2018, a Putting the Screws on the Press: Populism and Freedom of the Media 117 court ruled that Acosta would retain his approval (e.g., Grynbaum & Baumgaertner, 2018). Acosta (2019) published a book titled, The Enemy of the People, that contained an account of, as the subtitle says, "a dangerous time to tell the truth in America." After the court decision, the White House announced rules to ensure orderly press conferences, and the president pondered reducing his public appearances (Grynbaum & Baumgaertner, 2018). To avoid uncomfortable questions and critical coverage, Trump also blocked people from following his Twitter account. However, a court ruled that his action violated the Constitution because he also used Twitter for government purposes, and the people should not be excluded from this debate (e.g., Savage, 2019; Schneider & Polantz, 2019). The sensitivity of the U.S. president to criticism is also evident in the exclusion of Bloomberg journalists from his campaign appearances since Michael Bloomberg made his candidacy for the 2020 presidential election public (e.g., Oprysko & Calderone, 2019). Singling out individual journalists by name, denigrating their work, and attempting to intimidate them are not within the purview of the U.S. president. In Austria, Armin Wolf, a prominent journalist of the public service ORF, was caught in the crossfire by the FPÖ because of his confrontational interviews, and they repeatedly demanded his dismissal (e.g., Al-Serori, 2019). In Germany, a journalist of the public service WDR received death threats after a critical TV commentary on the AfD (e.g., Huber, 2019). Conclusion "One thing Donald Trump would like is freedom from the press" (Edsall, 2018). This statement reflects the U.S. president's attitude towards the media, but it is probably something most political actors would subscribe to as well. The watchful eye of a free press and its critical scrutiny of political decisions are uncomfortable for those in or on the way to power. Therefore, complaints about the media and unfavorable, biased, and exaggerated coverage are common, particularly in election campaigns. However, populism goes beyond the usual lamentation about the media to the extent that press freedom has come under severe pressure, which raises the question of whether it can still fulfill its democratic role. In democratic systems, a free and independent media is among the institutions that establish and control the boundaries of power. Claiming to represent the people and to speak in the name of the people, who are constantly betrayed by the corrupt elite, implies populism's distrust of those 3. Christina Holtz-Bacha 118 institutions that provide for checks and balances. Where populists have the legal resources, they restrict the media or bring them under control; where they cannot easily change the law, they de-legitimize the media and denigrate those who work for them. The verbal attacks aim to undermine the credibility of the media, an important basis for their democratic function. The attacks seem to have an impact. The Reuters Institute's 2019 Digital News Report (Newman et al., 2019) shows that in many countries trust in news is eroding (pp. 20), while in only 6 out of 37 countries a majority of people agree that the news media monitor and scrutinize the powerful (p. 52). In Germany, a poll on the reputation of various professions (Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung, 2019) showed that journalists and politicians have lost considerable respect in recent years. Both groups traditionally ranked at the bottom of reputation scales, but now 25% and 42% of the respondents, respectively, said they had more respect for journalists and politicians in the past (p. 5). Negative changes were highest for AfD and among those with a party preference for The Left (Die Linke) that also ranks as (leftwing) populist on international lists of populist parties (p. 27). These findings fit with what Freedom House contends in its 2018 "Nations in transit" report: "The U.S. administration’s ongoing denigration of the media has reinforced the sense in Europe that politicians no longer need to treat journalists with respect" (Freedom House, 2018, p. 2). And there is more. In a recent critique of Trump's attacks on the media in general but particularly on individual journalists, the executive director of the New York Times "accused Donald Trump of putting his reporters' lives at risk by subjecting them to personal abuse and describing them as 'enemies of the people'" (Waterson, 2019). In fact, online harassment of journalists with "threats and insults on social networks that are designed to intimidate them into silence" (Reporters without borders, 2018, p. 3) has become a worldwide problem and can have chilling effects. In a speech asking, "When does populism become a threat to democracy?", Diamond (2017) contends that this happens "when it is culturally exclusionary (not to mention racist); when it yields to its hegemonic pretensions, exhibiting contempt for pluralist notions that intrinsically respect differences and opposition; and obviously when it seeks to restrict basic freedoms of the press, association, and so on" (p. 6). 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This volume assembles a wide range of perspectives on populism and the media, bringing together various disciplinary and theoretical approaches, authors and examples from different continents and a wide range of topical issues. The chapters discuss the contexts of populist communication, communication by populist actors, different types of populist messages (populist communication in traditional and new media, populist criticism of the media, populist discourses related to different topics, etc.), the effects and consequences of populist communication, populist media policy and anti-populist discourses. The contributions synthesise existing research on this subject, propose new approaches to it or present new findings on the relationship between populism and the media. With contibutions by Caroline Avila, Eleonora Benecchi, Florin Büchel, Donatella Campus, María Esperanza Casullo, Nicoleta Corbu, Ann Crigler, Benjamin De Cleen, Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, Nayla Fawzi, Jana Goyvaerts, André Haller, Kristoffer Holt, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Marion Just, Philip Kitzberger, Magdalena Klingler, Benjamin Krämer, Katharina Lobinger, Philipp Müller, Elena Negrea-Busuioc, Carsten Reinemann, Christian Schemer, Anne Schulz, Christian Schwarzenegger, Torgeir Uberg Nærland, Rebecca Venema, Anna Wagner, Martin Wettstein, Werner Wirth, Dominique Stefanie Wirz


Der Band vereint ein breites Spektrum von Perspektiven auf das Thema Populismus und Medien. Er bringt verschiedene fachliche und theoretische Ansätze, Beitragende und Beispiele von mehreren Kontinenten und ein breites Spektrum aktueller Themen und Herausforderungen zusammen. Die Kapitel behandeln den Kontext populistischer Kommunikation, Kommunikation durch populistische Akteure, verschiedene Typen populistischer Botschaften (populistische Kommunikation in traditionellen und neuen Medien, populistische Medienkritik, populistische Diskurse zu verschiedenen Themen), Wirkungen und Konsequenzen populistischer Kommunikation, populistische Medienpolitik, aber auch antipopulistische Diskurse. Die Beiträge systematisieren vorhandene Forschung, schlagen neue Ansätze vor oder präsentieren neue Befunde zum Verhältnis von Populismus und Medien. Mit Beiträgen von Caroline Avila, Eleonora Benecchi, Florin Büchel, Donatella Campus, María Esperanza Casullo, Nicoleta Corbu, Ann Crigler, Benjamin De Cleen, Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, Nayla Fawzi, Jana Goyvaerts, André Haller, Kristoffer Holt, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Marion Just, Philip Kitzberger, Magdalena Klingler, Benjamin Krämer, Katharina Lobinger, Philipp Müller, Elena Negrea-Busuioc, Carsten Reinemann, Christian Schemer, Anne Schulz, Christian Schwarzenegger, Torgeir Uberg Nærland, Rebecca Venema, Anna Wagner, Martin Wettstein, Werner Wirth, Dominique Stefanie Wirz