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The policies formulated to attain the developmental goals are the outcome of decision-making. The notion of autonomy relates to the ability of the state to define
and pursue its own goals in the form of policy-making. A prerequisite for state
autonomy is a high degree of isolation from partisan or vested interests (Skocpol
1985: 9). Within the context of the analysis of development regimes, autonomy
therefore describes the exclusion of interests outside of those represented by the
developmental agent.
Nevertheless, the examples of Ireland and Hungary show that policy formulation
was never free of external influences in the form of exogenous political and economic factors. External factors can influence the formation and the performance of a
development regime such as effects of international economic interdependence or
the influence of greater regional powers. Hence, in similarity to O’Hearn (1990: 32),
development regimes are seen as the result of exogenous pressure exerted by the
forces of economic interdependence. Thus, the autonomy of the state can be infringed externally.
However, O’Hearn’s (2001) dependency-driven analysis overemphasises the role
of external constraints in inducing a change to development policies. Although the
role of external influences on policy making is certainly valid, internal or social
dimensions remain nevertheless underestimated (Kirby 2002: 93). Dependent development is far more the result of a culmination of external and internal constraints.
Dependency is therefore the outcome and not the reason for failed development
(Elsenhans 1987b: 66). Consequently, internal events and structures also affect the
autonomy of the state to formulate the respective development policies. In this case
one can speak of internal autonomy.
2.1.2 Popular Consent and Dissent
A further influential factor determining the success of a development regime as well
as its constitution and trajectory is the issue of popular consent or dissent to the
chosen development strategy and ultimately the development regime. Hirschman’s
(1988, 1970) Exit/Voice concept outlines the two possible responses, which can be
taken by individuals in response to organisational decline. The responses are defined
by the incapability of the organisation to produce the desired goods resulting in
waning loyalty. The choice of “Exit” denotes the preference for a different social
organisation than the prevailing form. This leads to the exit of the disillusioned individual from the declining organisation. The option of “Voice” entails the voicing of
an opinion to avert decline by inducing change in the organisation in order to receive
the desired goods. Voice is only a viable option when the opportunity costs to the
individual for engaging in reform are lower than the costs for exiting the organisation (Hirschman 1988: 69-74).
Greskovits (1998: 75) shows that the forms of voice and exit depend on the context in which the individual is able to respond. Exit can take on the extreme form of
emigration, such as in the case of Ireland. In societies, where individual free move-
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ment is restricted such as in the case of authoritarian Hungary until 1990, exit can
also be seen as “going informal”. Individuals earn their livelihood in the grey or
black economy (Greskovits/Bohle 2001: 13). Furthermore, voice in democracies
obviously implies the voting out of the ruling government or protest voting. In the
case of unreceptive political institutions or authoritarian systems, voice can also take
on the extreme form of political violence, uprisings, revolts or even revolutions, as
has been repeatedly shown in Hungarian history (Greskovits 1998: 76).
Hence, popular consent/dissent influences the above mentioned variables of
autonomy and capacity. Consent is closely related to the performance of the respective development regime and, therefore, to the state’s capacity to steer the development process. A decrease in state capacity resulting from the underperformance of
the developmental agent can jeopardise the attainment of developmental goals, such
as a rise in living standards, employment and economic growth. As a result, dissent
can erode the internal autonomy of the state and eventually contribute to the development regime’s downfall by questioning its legitimacy (Greskovits 1998: 72-73).
Consequently, the state has to devise strategies to attain popular consent to the
development regime. Authoritarian political systems can simply suppress and crush
dissent. Although as will be shown in the Hungarian case, this can only be a shortterm tactic of postponement, as dissent can erupt into violent revolution (Greskovits
1998: 76). Instead, the state’s internal autonomy can be embedded into a “set of
social ties that bind the state to society and provide institutionalised channels for the
continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies” (Evans 2003: 128).
Hence, dissent is accommodated and co-opted through a communicative platform by
which consent can be attained by “providing concrete concessions to those included
(and even to those exploited)” (Ó Riain 2004a: 169).
Greskovits (1998: 137) shows how these concessions can be attained through
“politics of compensation”. Compensation is strategically used to diffuse political
tensions that could surface in case of a malfunctioning of the development strategy.
Compensatory elements are directed at thwarting the evolution of possible oppositional coalitions. These could pose a threat to the developmental strategy and question the development regime by eroding the state’s internal autonomy (Greskovits
1998: 139). However, compensation follows political justification and is, hence,
defined by political efficacy. This principle denotes that particular societal groups
are compensated on the grounds of their relevance to the state and the development
regime in terms of their threat potential or their importance to deliver the necessary
developmental inputs (Greskovits 1998: 143-144).
2.2 Hungarian Development Regimes
Beginning with the Hungarian experiences, three regimes prior to the current FDIled development strategy can be identified (Berend 2001a: 1-2). The first period
(1867-1919) is situated in the era of the Double-Monarchy after the Compromise of
1867 prompted the renewal of Hungarian policy autonomy within the context of the
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References
Zusammenfassung
Irland und Ungarn verfolgen eine Entwicklungsstrategie, die in bewusster Abhängigkeit von Globalisierungsprozessen in Form von ausländischen Direktinvestitionen steht und sich als Paradigma in der Peripherie durchgesetzt hat. Doch dieser Entwicklungspfad hat zu einer ungleichen und abhängigen Entwicklung geführt. Dies ist laut dem Autor das Resultat des mangelnden Gestaltungswillens beider Staaten, für einen gleichgewichtigen Wachstumsprozess zu sorgen. Die historische Analyse zeigt, dass eine auf ausländische Firmen fußende Entwicklungsstrategie nicht ausreicht, um traditionelle Peripheralität zu überwinden. Der Autor fordert eine Reform des Entwicklungsparadigmas, um eine gleichgewichtige Entwicklung zu ermöglichen.