Content

Gerrit B. Koester, Bibliography in:

Gerrit B. Koester

The political economy of tax reforms, page 169 - 185

An empirical analysis of new German data

1. Edition 2009, ISBN print: 978-3-8329-4131-4, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-1609-6 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845216096

Series: Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie, vol. 5

Bibliographic information
169 VII Bibliography Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Alesina, Alberto and Howart Rosenthal (1996). A Theory of Divided Government, Econometrica. 64: 1311-1341. Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini and Gerald D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Alt, James E. (1983). The evolution of tax structures, Public Choice. 41: 181-222. Aly, Goetz (2005). Hitlers Volksstaat. 5. Auflage. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer. Atkinson, Anthony B. and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1976). On design of tax structure: direct versus indirect taxation, Journal of public economics. 6: 55-75. Auerbach, Alan J. and Daniel Feenberg (2000). The significance of federal taxes as automatic stabilizers, Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14 (3): 37-56. Auerbach, Alan J. and James Hines (2002). Taxation and economic efficiency, in: Auerbach, Alan and Martin Feldstein (eds.). Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 3: 1347-1421. Auerbach, Alan J. (2006). Why have corporate tax revenues declined? Another look. NBER Working paper No. 12463. Boston, MA. Austen-Smith, David (1987). Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions and Probabilistic Voting, Public Choice. 54: 123-139. Austen-Smith, David (2000). Redistributing income under proportional representation, Journal of Political Economy. 108 (6): 1235-1269. Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (1988). Elections, coalitions and legislative outcomes, American Political Science Review. 82: 405-422. Bach, Stefan (2001). Internationale Entwicklungstendenzen nationaler Steuersysteme - von der direkten zur indirekten Besteuerung? Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. Bach, Stefan (2005). Mehrwertsteuerbelastung der privaten Haushalte. Working paper. DIW Berlin. Bach, Stefan and Bernd Barthomai (2001). Reform der Erbschaftssteuer notwendig: Immobilien sachgerecht bewerten, Mehrbelastungen begrenzen, in: Wochenbericht des DIW. Berlin 22/01. Ballentine, Gregory J. (1992). The structure of tax system versus the level of taxation: An Evaluation of the 1986 Act, Journal of Economic Perspectives. 6 (1): 59-68. Bareis, Peter (1999). Die Reform der Einkommensteuer vor dem Hintergrund der Tarifentwicklung seit 1934, in: Beerman, Albert, Wolfgang Jakob and Paul Kirchhof (eds.). Festschrift fuer Klaus Offerhaus. Koeln: Otto Schmidt: 1053-1069. Barro, Robert J. (1979). On the determination of the public debt, Journal of Political Economy. 87 (5): 946-971. Barro, Robert J. (1986). Recent developments in the theory of rules versus discretion, Economic Journal. 96: 23-37. Barro, Robert J. (1989). The neoclassical approach to fiscal policy, in: Barro, Robert J. (ed.). Modern business cycle theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 170 Bauer, Thomas (1998). Der Vermittlungsausschuss. Dissertation. Universitaet Bremen. BDI - Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (2004). Die Steuerbelastung der Unternehmen in Deutschland. Fakten fuer die politische Diskussion. Koeln. Becker, Gary (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 98 (3): 371-400. Belke, Ansgar (1996). Politische Konjunkturzyklen in Theorie und Empirie: Eine kritische Analyse der Zeitreihendynamik in Partisan-Ansaetzen. Tuebingen: Mohr/Siebeck. Besley, Tim and Anne Case (1995): Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition, American Economic Review. 85: 25-45. Bird, Richard M. (2003). Administrative dimensions of tax reform. Working paper. University of Toronto. Bird, Richard M. (2003a). Managing the reform process. Working paper. University of Toronto. Bischoff, Ivo and Wolfgang Gohout (2006). Tax projections in German states — manipulated by opportunistic incumbent parties? Working Paper 74. Justus-Liebig-Universitaet Giessen. Black, Duncan (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision Making, Journal of Political Economy. 56: 23-34. Blankart, Charles B. (1999). Die schleichende Zentralisierung der Staatstaetigkeit, Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften. 119: 331-350 Blankart, Charles B. (2006). Oeffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie. 6. Auflage. Muenchen: Vahlen. Blankart, Charles B. (2007). Foederalismus in Deutschland und Europa. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Blasch, Frank, Tina Klautke and Alfons J. Weichenrieder (2006). Das steuerpolitische Dezemberfieber. Steuergesetzgebung in Deutschland von 1951 bis 2004. Working Paper. Universitaet Frankfurt. Boadway, Robin, Maurice Marchand and Pierre Pestieau (1994). Towards a theory of the directindirect tax mix, Journal of Public economics. 55: 71-88. Boadway, Robin (2002). The role of public choice considerations in normative public economics, in: Winer, Stanley L. and Hirofumi Shibata (eds.). Political Economy and Public Finance: The Role of Political Economy in the Theory and Practice of Public Economics. Cheltenham U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishers: 47-68. Boix, Charles (1998). Political Parties, Growth and Equality. Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Boss, Alfred (1987). Incentives und Wirtschaftswachstum: zur Steuerpolitik in der fruehen Nachkriegszeit. Kieler Arbeitspapiere Nr. 295. Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft Kiel. Boss, Alfred (1997). Untersuchungen zur Bemessungsgrundlage und zum kassenmaeßigen Aufkommen der Steuern vom Umsatz. Kieler Arbeitspapiere Nr. 844. Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft Kiel. Boss, Alfred and Thomas Elendner (2003). Steuerreform und Lohnsteueraufkommen in Deutschland - Simulationen auf der Basis der Lohnsteuerstatistik, Die Weltwirtschaft. 4: 368-387. Breeden, Charles H. and William J. Hunter (1985). Tax revenue and tax structure, Public Finance Quarterly. 13 (2): 216-224. Brennan, Geoffrey and Alan Hamlin (1992). Bicameralism and Majority Equilibrium, Public Choice. 74: 169-179. Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan (1980). The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 171 Buchanan, James M. (1949). The pure theory of public finance: a suggested approach, Journal of Political Economy. 57 (6): 496-505. Buchanan, James M. (1954). Individual choice in voting and the market, Journal of Political Economy. 62: 334-343. Buchanan, James M. (1963). The Economics of Earmarked Taxes, Journal of Political Economy. 71 (5): 457-469. Buchanan, James M. (1967). Public Finance in Democratic Process. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Buchanan, James M. (1975). Public Finance and Public Choice, National Tax Journal. 28: 383- 394. Buchanan, James M. (1976). Taxation in fiscal exchange, Journal of Public Economics. 6 (1-2): 17- 29. Buchanan, James M. (1977). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Buchanan, James M. (1987). Tax reform as political Choice, Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1 (1): 29-35. Buchanan, James M. (1993). The political efficiency of general taxation, National Tax Journal. 46 (4): 401-410. Buchanan, James M. (2003). Public Choice - Politics Without Romance, Policy. 19: 13-18. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Buchanan, James M. and Roger D. Congleton (1998). Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards a Nondiscriminatory Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Buchanan, James M. and Roger L. Faith (1987). Secession and the limits of taxation: toward a theory of internal exit, American Economic Review. 77 (5): 1023-1031. Buchanan, James M. and Richard E. Wagner (1977). Democracy in Deficit. New York: Academic Press. Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum (eds.) (2001): Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments, 1945- 98. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buettner, Thiess (2003). Tax Base Effects and Fiscal Externalities of Local Capital Taxation: Evidence from a Panel of German Jurisdictions, Journal of Urban Economics. 54: 110-128. Buettner, Thiess (ed.) (2000). Finanzverfassung und Foederalismus in Deutschland. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2004). Uebersicht ueber die Steuerrechtsaenderungen seit 1964. Berlin. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (several years). Finanzbericht. Berlin. Burkhart, Simone and Philip Manow (2006). Veto-Antizipation: Gesetzgebung im deutschen Bikameralismus. MPIfG Discussion Paper 06/3. Koeln: Max-Planck-Institut fuer Gesellschaftsforschung. Cameron, David R. (1978). The Expansion of the public economy: A comparative Analysis, American Political Science Review. LXXII: 1243-1261. Castles, Frank (ed.) (1982). The impact of parties. Politics and policies in democratic capitalist states. London: Sage. 172 Castles, Frank and Peter Mair (1984). Left-Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgements, European Journal of Political Science. 12: 73-88. Chappell, J. and Goncalves Veiga L. (2000). Economics and elections in Western Europe: 1960- 1997, Electoral Studies. 19 (2): 183-197. Chen, Yan (2000). Electoral Systems, Legislative Process and Income Taxation, Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2 (1): 71-100. Chernick, Howard and Andrew Reschovsky (1996). The Political Economy of State and Local Tax Structure, in: Pola, Giancarlo, George France and Rosella Levaggi (eds.). Developments in Local Government Finance: Theory and Policy. Chettenham/UK: Edward Elgar: 253-272. Cnossen, Sijbren (2003). How Much Tax Coordination in the European Union?, International Tax and Public Finance. 10 (6): 625-649. Congleton, Roger (2002). The Median Voter Model, in: Rowley, Charles K. and Friedrich Schneider (eds.). The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. 2002. Congleton, Roger and William Shugart (1990). The Growth of Social Security Expenditures, Electoral Push or Political Pull?, Economic Inquiry. 28: 109-132. Conlan, Timothy J., Margaret T. Wrightson and David R. Beam (1990). Taxing Choices: The Politics of Tax Reform. Washington D.C. Coopers & Lybrand (1998). International Tax Summaries, A Guide for Planning and Decisions. New York. Corneo, Giacomo (2003). Verteilungsarithmetik der rot-gruenen Steuerreform. Working paper. Freie Universitaet Berlin. Corneo, Giacomo (2005). The rise and the likely fall of the German Income Tax 1958-2005, CESifo Economic Studies. 51: 159-186. Coughlin, Peter J., Dennis C. Mueller and Peter Murrell (1990). Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government, Economic Inquiry. 28 (4): 682-705. Cowart, Andrew (1978). The Economic Policies of European Governments, British Journal of Political Science. 8: 285-311. Creedy, John (1998). Measuring Welfare Changes and Tax Burdens. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar. Cullis, John and Phillip Jones (1998). Public Finance and Public Choice. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cusack, Thomas (1995). Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the Industrialized Democracies 1955-1989. Discussion Paper. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. Decker, Frank and Julia von Blumenthal (2002). Die bundespolitische Durchdringung der Landtagswahlen. Eine empirische Analyse von 1970 bis 2001, Zeitschrift fuer Parlamentsfragen. 33 (1): 144-165. Devereux, Michael P. (ed.) (1996). The Economics of Tax Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Devereux, Michael P., Rachel Griffith and Alexander Klemm (2002). Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition, Economic Policy. 17 (35): 451-495. Dewatripont, Mathias and Gerard Roland (1992). Economic reform and dynamic political constraints, Review of Economic Studies. 59: 703-730. Dewatripont, Mathias and Gerard Roland (1995). The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty, American Economic Review. 85: 1207-1223. Diermeir, Daniel and Roger B. Myerson (1999). Bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures, American Economic Review. 89: 1182-1196. 173 Dollery, Brian and Andrew Worthington (1996). The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion, Journal of Economic Surveys. 10 (3): 261-297. Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Drazen, Allan and Vittorio Grilli, (1993). The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms, American Economic Review. 83 (3): 598-607. Dziadkowski, Dieter (2005). 50 Jahre Reformansaetze bei der Einkommensteuer: Anmerkungen zu den Reformschritten seit der Großen Steuerreform 1955, Ifo-Schnelldienst. 58 (2): 23-29. Easterly, William and Sergio Rebelo (1993). Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth, Journal of Monetary Economics. 32: 417-58. Edgeworth, Francis Y. (1897). The pure theory of taxation, Economic Journal. VII (25): 46-70. Edwards, Jeremy and Michael Keen (1996). Tax Competition and Leviathan, European Economic Review. 40: 113-134. Eekhoff, Johann, Alexander Lepach, Beate Thiemer and Axel Wehmeier (1996). Reform der Vermoegens- und Erbschaftssteuer. Discussion paper. Universitaet Koeln. Ehrlicher, Werner (1994). Finanzpolitik seit 1945, in: Schremmer, Eckart (Hg.). Steuern, Abgaben und Dienste vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart. VSWG Beiheft 114: 213-247. Elgie, Robert (ed.) (2001). Divided Government in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Engels, Wolfram (1989). Tax reforms in Germany, in: Fels, Gerhard and George M. Furstenberg. A supply-side agenda for Germany. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer: 341-354. Engels, Wolfram and Wolfgang Stuetzel (1968). Teilhabersteuer. 2. Auflage. Frankfurt/Main: Knapp. Erikson, Robert S. (1989). Economic conditions and the presidential vote, American Political Science Review. 83: 567-83. Erikson, Robert S. (1990). Economic conditions and the congressional vote: A review of the macrolevel evidence, American Journal of Political Science. 34: 373-399. EU (2002). Europaeisches Parlament - Generaldirektion Wissenschaft: Steuerkoordinierung in der EU: der neueste Stand. Econ 128 DE. Bruessel. European Commission (2000). Tax policy in the European Union. Brussels. European Commission (2004). Structures of the taxation systems in the European Union. Data 1995-2002. Brussels. Federal Ministry of Finance (2004). Data-set on tax reforms 1964-2004. Berlin. Feld, Lars P. (2000). Steuerwettbewerb und seine Auswirkungen auf Allokation und Distribution - Ein Ueberblick und eine empirische Analyse fuer die Schweiz. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck. Feldstein, Martin S. (1976). On the theory of tax reform, Journal of Public Economics. 6: 77-104. Fernandez, Raquel and Dani Rodrik (1991). Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review. 81 (5): 1146-55. Findling, Marion (1995). Die Politische Oekonomie der Steuerreform: Eine Untersuchung der politischen Grenzen von Steuerreformen unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Steuerreform 1990. Aachen: Shaker. Fiorina, Morris P. (1981). American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press. Fiorina, Morris P. (2003). Divided Government. 2nd edition. New York: Longman. 174 Forest, Adam and Steven M. Sheffrin (2002). Complexity and compliance: an empirical investigation, National Tax Journal. 55: 75-88. Frey, Bruno S. (1975). On the Modelling of Politico-Economic Interdependence, European Journal of Political Research. 3: 339-360. Frey, Bruno S. (1978). Political Models and Cycles, Journal of Public Economics. 9: 203-220. Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider (1978). An Empirical Study of a Politico-Economic Interaction in the U.S, Review of Economics and Statistics. 60: 174-183. Fuest, Clemens and Alfons Weichenrieder (2002). Tax Competition and Profit Shifting: On the relationship between personal and corporate tax rates, ifo-Studien: Zeitschrift fuer empirische Wirtschaftsforschung. 48: 611-632. Fuest, Clemens and Bernd Huber (2000). Can corporate-personal tax integration survive in open economies? Lessons from the German tax reform, Finanzarchiv. 57: 514-524. Fuest, Clemens and Bernd Huber (2001). Tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model, Public choice. 107: 97-113. Fuest, Clemens and Bernd Huber (2002). Why capital income taxes survive in open economics: the role of multinational firms, International tax and public finance. 9: 553-566. Fuest, Clemens, Bernd Huber and Jack Mintz (2003). Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey. CESifo Working Paper Series. Fuest, Clemens, Bernd Huber and Soren B. Nielsen (2003). Why is the corporate tax rate lower than the personal tax rate?, Journal of Public Economics. 87: 157-174. Ganghof, Steffen (1999). Steuerwettbewerb und Vetospieler: Stimmt die These der blockierten Anpassung?, Politische Vierteljahresschrift. 40: 458-472. Ganghof, Steffen (2004). Wer regiert in der Steuerpolitik? Einkommensteuerreform zwischen internationalem Wettbewerb und nationalen Verteilungskonflikten. Frankfurt/Main: Campus. Garrett, Geoffrey (1995). Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy, International Organization. 49 (4): 657-687. Garrett, Geoffrey (1998). Partisan Politics and the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange (1991). Political Responses to interdependence: What’s left for the left?, International Organization. 45: 539-564. Gastil, Raymond D. (various years): Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties. New York: Freedom House. Gebhardt, Heinz (2001). Methoden, Probleme und Ergebnisse der Steuerschaetzung, RWI- Mitteilungen: 127-147. Genschel, Philipp (2001). Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Viability of the Welfare State. MPIfG Working Paper 01/1. Genschel, Philipp (2002). Steuerwettbewerb und Steuerharmonisierung in der Europaeischen Union. Frankfurt/Main: Campus. Giersch, Herbert et al. (1994). The fading miracle: Four decades of market economy in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gillis, Malcolm (1989). Tax reform: Lessons from Postwar Experience in Developing Nations, in: Gillis, Malcolm (ed.). Tax Reform in Developing Countries. Durham/NC: Duke University Press. Gottschalk, Silke and Wolfgang Peters (2003). Redistributive taxation in the era of globalization, International Tax and Public Finance. 10: 453-468. 175 Haan, Peter and Viktor Steiner (2005). Distributional effects of the German tax reform 2000 - a behavioral microsimulation analysis, Schmollers Jahrbuch - Journal of Applied Social Science Studies. 125: 39-49. Haeuser, Karl (1966). Die Teilung Deutschlands, in: Stolper, Gustav et al. (eds.). Die deutsche Wirtschaft seit 1870. 2. Auflage. Tuebingen: Mohr (Siebeck): 147 ff. Hallerberg, Mark and Scott Basinger (1999). Globalization and tax reform: an updated case for the importance of veto players, Politische Vierteljahresschrift. 40: 618-627. Hansmeyer, Karl-Heinrich (1981). Gewerbesteuer, in: Handwoerterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Bd. 3: 617-633. Haufler, Andreas (2001). Taxation in a global economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heinemann, Friedrich (2006). Planning or Propaganda? An Evaluation of Germany's Medium-term Budgetary Planning, Finanzarchiv. 62 (4): 1-28. Hentschel, Volker (1983). Steuersystem und Steuerpolitik in Deutschland 1870-1970, in: Conze, Werner and Rainer M. Lepsius (Hg.). Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Stuttgart: 256-295. Herter, Wilfried (1992). Die Unvereinbarkeitserklaerung verfassungswidriger Steuergesetze. Frankfurt/Main u.a.: Peter Lang. Hesse, Joachim J. and Thomas Ellwein (2004). Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Volume 1. 9. Auflage. Opladen: Westdt. Verlag. Hettich, Walter (1979). A theory of partial tax reform, The canadian journal of economics. 12 (4): 692-712. Hettich, Walter and Stanley L. Winer (1984). A positive model of tax structure, Journal of Public Economics. 24 (1): 64-87. Hettich, Walter and Stanley L. Winer (1988). Economic and political foundations of tax structure, American Economic Review. 78 (4): 701-712. Hettich, Walter and Stanley L. Winer (1997). The Political Economy of Taxation, in: Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.). Perspectives on Public Choice. New York: Cambridge University Press: 481- 505. Hettich, Walter and Stanley L. Winer (1999). Democratic Choice and Taxation: A theoretical and empirical analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hettich, Walter and Stanley L. Winer (2004). Explaining tax reform. Conference paper. Heyndels, Bruno and Carine Smolders (1994). An empirical test of the fiscal illusion hypothesis, Public Choice. 80 (3-4): 325-338. Heyndels, Bruno and Carine Smolders (1995). Tax complexitiy and fiscal illusion, Public Choice. 85 (1-2): 143-156. Hibbs, Douglas A. Jr. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, American Political Science Review. 71: 1467-1487. Hinich, Melvin and Michael Munger (1994). Ideology and the theory of political choice. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Holcombe, Randall G. (1998). Tax policy from a public choice perspective, National tax journal. 51 (2): 359-371. Holcombe, Randall G. (1997). Selective excise taxation from an interest group perspective, in: Shughart II, William F. (ed). Taxing Choice: The predatory politics of fiscal discrimination. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Hotelling, Harold (1929). Stability in Competition, Economic Journal. 39: 41-57. 176 Hover, Kevin D. and Steven M. Sheffrin (1991). Causation, Spending, and Taxes: Sand in the Sandbox or Tax Collector for the Welfare State?, The American Economic Review. 82 (1): 225- 248. Huber, Erwin (1999). Bewirkt der Bundesfinanzhof einen Legislativeffekt? - Urteile des Bundesfinanzhofs und Reaktionen des Gesetzgebers aus steuerpolitischer Sicht, in: Kirchhof, Paul, Wolfgang Jakob and Albert Beermann (eds.). Steuerrechtsprechung, Steuergesetz, Steuerreform - Festschrift fuer Klaus Offerhaus. Koeln: Schmidt: 241-253. Hunter, William J. and Michael A. Nelson (1989). Interest group demand for taxation, Public Choice. 62 (1): 41-61. Inman, Robert and Daniel Rubinfeld (1996). Designing Tax Policy in Federalist Economies: An Overview, Journal of Public Economics. 60: 307-334. Inman, Robert P and Michael A Fitts (1990). Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 6: 79-132. Inman, Robert P. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997). The political economy of federalism, in: Dennis C. Mueller (ed.). Perspectives on Public Choice. New York: Cambridge University Press: 73- 105. Jacobebbinghaus, Peter (2003). Welche Haushalte zahlen wie viel Mehrwertsteuer? Eine empirische Analyse auf der Basis der EVS 1998. ZEW Mannheim. Jacobs, Otto H. (ed.) (2002). Internationale Unternehmensbesteuerung. 5. Auflage. Muenchen: C.H. Beck. Jacobs, Otto H. and Christoph Spengel (2002). Effective Tax Burden in Europe. ZEW Mannheim. Johann, Ulrich (2006). Die Steuergesetzgebung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1983 bis 1998. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. Johnson, Paul, Frances Lynch and John Geoffrey Walker (2005). Income tax and elections in Britain 1950-2001, Electoral studies. 24: 393-408. Kakwani, Nanak C. (1977). Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison, Economic Journal. 87: 71-80. Kaltenborn, Bruno (1999). Streit um die Einkommensteuer: Die Reformvorschlaege der Parteien im Vergleich. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Kassner, Thorsten (2001). Der Steuerreformer Johannes von Miquel. Osnabrueck: Univ.-Verl. Rasch. Kau, James B. and Paul H. Rubin (1981). The Size of Government, Public Choice. 37: 261-74. Kau, James B. and Paul H. Rubin (2001). The growth of government: sources and limits, Public Choice. 113: 389-402. Keen, Michael (1996). The Welfare Economics of Tax Coordination in the European Community, in: Michael P. Devereux (ed.). The Economics of Tax Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 189-214. Kenny, Lawrence and Stanley L. Winer (2001). Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Collection Costs, and Political Regime. University of Florida Working Paper. Source: www.ssrn.com. Kenny, Lawrence W. and Mark Toma (1997). The Role of Tax Bases and Collection Costs in the Determination of Income Tax Rates, Seignorage and Inflation, Public Choice. 92 (1): 75-90. 177 Kernell, Samuel (ed.) (1991). Parallel politics: economic policymaking in Japan and the United States. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Kinder, Donald R. and D. Roderick Kiewiet (1979). Economic Grievances and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Discontents and Collective Judgments in Congressional Voting, American Journal of Political Science. 23: 495-515. Kinder, Donald, Gordon S. Adams, and Paul W. Gronke (1989). Economics and Politics in the 1984 American Presidential Election, American Journal of Political Science. 33: 491-515. King, Gary, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg (2000). Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, American Journal of Political Science. 44 (2): 347- 361. King, Ian, Preston R. McAfee and Linda Welling (1993). Industrial Blackmail: Dynamic Tax Competition and Public Investment, Canadian Journal of Economics. 26 (3): 590-608. Kirchgaessner, Gebhard and Werner Pommerehne (1997). Public Spending in Federal States: A Comparative Econometric Study, in: Capros, Pantelis and Daniele Meulders (eds.). Budgetary Policy Modelling: Public Expenditures. London: Routledge. Kirchgaessner, Gebhard (2002). The Effects of Fiscal Institutions on Public Finance: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence, in: Winer, Stanley and Hirofumi Shibata (eds.). Political Economy and Public Finance: The Role of Political Economy in the Theory and Practice of Public Economics. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishers: 145-177. Kirchhof, Paul and Manfred J. M. Neumann (eds.) (2001): Freiheit, Gleichheit, Effizienz. Bad Homburg: Stiftung Marktwirtschaft. Kitschelt, Herbert (1999). European Social Democracy Between Political Economy and Electoral Competition, in: Kitschelt, Herbert, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John Stephens (eds.). Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 317- 345. Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge (1994). Parties, Policies and Democracy. Boulder: Westview Press. Koch, Waldemar (1976). Die Finanzpolitischen Mittel der Stabilisierungsgesetze, in: Ott, Alfred. Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Stabilisierung. Tuebingen: Mohr-Siebeck: 38-55. Koester, Gerrit B. (2003). Partisan Politics and Taxation - evidence from the case of Germany 1950-1990. Working paper (presented at the EPCS annual meeting in Aarhus, Denmark, 2003). Koester, Gerrit B. (2005). The Political Economy of Tax Reforms - evidence from the German case 1964-2004. Working paper (presented at the EPCS annual meeting in Durham, UK, 2005). Koester, Gerrit B. (2006). The Economics of International Tax Competition. Occasional Paper 23. The liberal institute. Potsdam. Koester, Gerrit B. (2006a). Political motivation, tax policy and the development of tax structures evidence from the German case 1964-2004. Working paper (presented at the EPCS annual meeting in Turku, Finland, 2006). Koren, Stefan (1989). Steuerreformen im internationalen Vergleich. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. Kornai, Janos (1992). The Socialist System: the Political Economy of Socialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Krueer-Buchholz, Wiebke (1982). Steuerpolitik und Steuerreformen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Großen Steuerreform 1975. Bremen. Krueger, Anne O. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, American Economic Review. 64: 291-303. 178 Landfried, Christine (1992). Judicial Policy-Making in Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court, West European Politics. 15: 50-67. Landon, Stuart and David L. Ryan (1997). The Political Costs of Taxes and Government Spending, Canadian Journal of Economics: 85-111. Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1991). Divided government: America is not exceptional, Governance. 4 (3): 250-269. Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1999). Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy, in: Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds.). Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 279-296. Laver, Michael and Ian Budge (eds.) (1992). Party Policies and Government Coalitions. London: Macmillan. Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996). Making and breaking government. Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield (1990). Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laver, Michael and W. Ben Hunt (1992). Policy and Party Competition. New York: Routledge. Laver, Michael and John Garry (2000). Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts, American Journal of Political Science. 44 (3): 619-634. Ledyard, John O. (1984). The pure theory of large two-candidate elections, Public Choice. 44: 43- 47. Lehmbruch, Gerhard (2000). Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. 3. Auflage. Wiesbaden: VS. Leibfritz, Willi, Wolfgang Buettner and Ulrich van Essen (1998). Germany, in: Messere, Ken (ed.). The tax system in industrialized countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 128-158. Levitt, Steven and James Snyder (1997). The impact of federal spending on house election outcomes, Journal of Political Economy. 105: 30-53. Levy, Gilat (2004). A Model of Political Parties, Journal of Economic Theory. 115 (2): 250-277. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Martin Paldam (2000). Economic voting: an introduction, Electoral studies. 19: 113-121. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Tom Rice (1992). Forecasting Elections. Washington: CQ Press. Luigi, Bernardo and Paola Profeta (2004). Tax Systems and Tax Reforms in Europe. New York: Routledge. MacDougal, G. D. A. (1960). The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad: A Theoretical Approach, Economic Record. 36: 13-35. Mann, Hugo (1987). Theorie und Politik der Steuerreform in der Demokratie. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. Maunz, Theodor (1954). Deutsches Staatsrecht. Muenchen: Beck. McKelvey, Richard D. and John W. Patty (2001). A Theory of Voting in Large Elections. Department of Social Sciences. Carnegie Mellon University. Unpublished. Meltzer, Alan H. and Richard F. Scott (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, Journal of Political Economy. 89: 914-927. Meltzer, Alan H. and Richard F. Scott (1983). Tests of a Rational Theory of the Size of Government, Public Choice. 41: 403-418. Menck, Wolfgang (2001). Konjunktur-Schlaglicht: Einbruch bei der Koerperschaftssteuer, Wirtschaftsdienst. XII: 728-729. 179 Mendoza, Enrique G. (1997). On the Ineffectiveness of Tax Policy in Altering Long-Run Growth: Harberger's Superneutrality Conjecture, Journal of Public Economics. 66: 99-126. Mendoza, Enrique G. (2003). The International Macroeconomics of Taxation and the Case Against European Tax Harmonization, in: Helpman, Elhanan and Efraim Sadka (eds.). Economic Policy in the International Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 329-371. Mendoza, Enrique G. (2005). Why Hasn't Tax Competition Triggered a Race to the Bottom? Some Quantitative Lessons from the EU, Journal of Monetary Economics. 52: 163-204. Mendoza, Enrique G. and Linda L. Tesar (2003). A Quantitative Analysis of Tax Competition vs. Tax Coordination under Perfect Capital Mobility. NBER Working Paper 9746. Mendoza, Enrique G. at al. (1994). Effective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics: Cross Country Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Incomes and Consumption, Journal of Monetary Economics. 34: 297-323. Mieszkowski, Peter M. (1967). On the Theory of Tax Incidence, Journal of Political Economy. 75: 250-262. Mieszkowski, Peter M. and George Zodrow (1986). Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation and Under- Provision of Local Public Goods, Journal of Urban Economics. 19: 356-370. Mirrlees, James A. (1976). Optimal Tax Theory - A Synthesis, Journal of Public Economics. 6 (4): 327-58. Mirrlees, James A. (1971). An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, Review of Economic Studies. 38: 175-208. Moe, Terry M. (1997). The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in: Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 455-480. Moeller, Alex (1971). Reichsfinanzminister Erzberger und sein Reformwerk. Bonn: Stollfuss. Mueller, Dennis C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mueller, Georg (1982). Die Grundlegung der westdeutschen Wirtschaftsordnung im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat 1947-1949. Frankfurt/Main: Haag & Herchen. Muscheid, Jutta (1986). Die Steuerpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1982. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Musgrave, Richard A. (1959). The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw-Hill. Musgrave, Richard A. (1969). Fiscal Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press. Musgrave, Richard A. and Peggy B. Musgrave (1973). Public Finance in Theory and Practice. New York: MacGraw-Hill. Musgrave, Richard and Alan Peacock (eds.) (1958). Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. New York: Macmillan. Myles, Garreth D. (1995). Public Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nannestad, Peter, and Martin Paldam (1997). The Grievance Asymmetry Revisited: A Micro Study of Economic Voting in Denmark. 1986-92, European Journal of Political Economy. 13 (1): 81- 99. Nelson, Michael A. (1986). An empirical Analysis of State and Local Government Tax Structures in the Context of the Leviathan Model of Government, Public Choice. 49: 283-294. Nelson, Michael A. (1987). Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension, American Economic Review. 77: 198-204. Niskanen, William A. Jr. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine- Atherton. 180 Nordhaus, William D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle, Review of Economic Studies. 42: 169- 190. Oates, Wallace E. and Robert M. Schwab (1988). Economic Competition among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, Journal of Public Economics. 35: 333-354. Oates, Wallace E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. London: Hartcourt Brace. Oates, Wallace E. (1989). Searching for Leviathan: A Reply and Some Further Reflections, American Economic Review. 79: 578-583. Oates, Wallace E. (2001). Fiscal Competition or Harmonization: Some Reflections, National Tax Journal. 54: 507-512. Obermeier, Ralph (1999). Die Umsetzung verfassungsgerichtlicher Entscheidungen durch den Steuergesetzgeber. Berlin: Herne. OECD (1986). Personal income tax systems under changing economic conditions. Paris. OECD (2001). Tax and the economy - a comparative assessment of OECD countries. Tax Policy Studies No. 6. Paris. OECD (2002). Social Expenditures. Source: www.sourceoecd.org. OECD (2004). OECD tax policy studies. Recent tax policy trends in reforms in OECD countries. Paris. OECD (2006). Revenue Statistics 1965-2003. Paris. OECD (2006a). Fundamental reform of the personal income tax. Paris. Offerhaus, Tom (1997). Die Steuergesetzgebung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1961 bis 1983: Die Zeit von drei verschiedenen Regierungskoalitionen. Bonn: Stollfuss. Olson, Mancur (1982). The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press. Olson, Mancur Jr. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press. Paldam, Martin (1979). Is there an electional cycle? A comparative study of national accounts, Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 81 (2): 323-242. Pechman, Joseph A. (1987). Federal Tax Policy. 5th edition, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Pechman, Joseph A. (1987). Tax reform: theory and practice, Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1 (1): 11-28. Pechman, Joseph A. (1989). Tax Reform. Harvester: Simon & Schuster. Pechman, Joseph A.: (1988). World Tax Reform. Washington DC: Brookings Institution. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2002). Political economics and public finance, in: Auerbach, Alan J. and Martin Feldstein (ed.). Handbook of Public Economics. Edition 1. Volume 3. Chapter 24. Elsevier: 1549-1659. Peters, Guy B. (1991). The politics of taxation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pommerehne, Werner, Gebhard Kirchgaessner and Lars P. Feld (1996). Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition at state-local levels: Lessons from Switzerland. in: Pola, Giancarlo, George France and Rosella Levaggi (eds.). Developments in Local Government Finance: Theory and Policy. Chettenham/UK: Edward Elgar: 292 ? 330. Poterba, James M. (1991). Is the gasoline tax regressive?, in: David Bradford (ed.). Tax Policy and the Economy. 5: 145-164. 181 Profeta, Paola (2004). Public Finance and Political Economics, Tax Design and Reforms, in: Bernardi, Luigi and Paola Profeta (eds.), Tax Systems and Tax Reforms in Europe. Oxford: Routledge: 55-75. Ramsey, Frank P. (1927). A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, Economic Journal. 37: 47-61. Renzsch, Wolfgang (1991). Finanzverfassung und Finanzausgleich. Die Auseinandersetzungen um ihre politische Gestaltung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen Waehrungsreform und deutscher Vereinigung (1948 bis 1990). Bonn: Dietz. Renzsch, Wolfgang (1995). Konfliktloesung im parlamentarischen Bundesstaat: Zur Regelung finanzpolitischer Bund-Laender-Konflikte im Spannungsfeld von Administration und Politik - Vorlaeufige Ueberlegungen, in: Voigt, Ruediger (ed.). Der kooperative Staat. Baden-Baden: Nomos: 167- 193. Renzsch, Wolfgang (1998). Parteien im Bundesstaat. Sand oder Oel im Getriebe?, in: Maennle, Ursula (ed.). Foederalismus zwischen Konsens und Konkurrenz. Baden-Baden: Nomos: 93-100. Renzsch, Wolfgang (2000). Die große Steuerreform 1998/99: Kein Strukturbruch, sondern Koalitionspartner als Vetospieler und Parteien als Mehrebenensysteme. Diskussion eines Beitrags von Reimund Zohlnhoefer in Heft 2 der Zeitschrift fuer Parlamentsfragen, Zeitschrift fuer Parlamentsfragen. 31 (1): 187-191. Respondek, Erwin (1921). Die Reichsfinanzen auf Grund der Reform von 1919/20. Berlin, Leipzig: Verwaltungswissenschaftlicher Verlag. Riker, William H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Riker, William H. (1992). The Justification of Bicameralism, International Political Science Review. 13: 101-16. Ritter, Gerhard A. and M. Niehuss (1991). Wahlen in Deutschland 1946-1991. Muenchen: Beck. Rodrik, Dani (1993). The Positive Economics of Policy Reform, American Economic Review. 83: 356-61. Rodrik, Dani (1996). Understanding Economic Policy Reform, Journal of Economic Literature. 34 (1): 9-41. Roemer, John E. (2001). Political Competition: Theory and Application. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Rogers, James R. (1998). Bicameral Sequence Theory and State Legislature Evidence, American Journal of Political Science. 42: 1025-1060. Rose, Richard (1985). Maximizing Tax Revenue While Minimizing Political Costs, Journal of Public Policy. 5: 289-320. Rose, Richard and Phillip Davies (1994). Inheritance in Public Policy: Change without Choice in Britain. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. Rose, Richard and Terence Karran (1987). Taxation by political inertia. Financing the Growth of Government in Britain. London: HarperCollins. Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffrey D. Sachs (1989). Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies, European Economic Review. 33: 903-938. Samuelson, Paul (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, Review of Economics and Statistics. 36 (4): 350-356. Sandford, Cedric (1993). Successful tax reform. Wiltshire: Fiscal Publications. Sandford, Cedric, Michael Godwin and Peter Hardwick (1989). Administrative and compliance costs of taxation. Wiltshire: Fiscal Publications. 182 Sartori, Giovanni (1976). Parties and Party Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press. Scharpf, Fritz W. (1985). Die Politikverflechtungs-Falle: Europaeische Integration und deutscher Foederalismus im Vergleich, Politische Vierteljahresschrift. 26 (4): 323-356. Scharpf, Fritz W. (1998). Globalisierung als Beschraenkung der Handlungsmoeglichkeiten nationalstaatlicher Politik, in: Schenk, Karl-Ernst, Dieter Schmidtchen, Manfred Streit and Viktor Vanberg (eds.). Jahrbuch fuer Neue Politische Oekonomie. Tuebingen: 41-66. Schatz, Heribert, Robert Chr. van Ooyen and Sascha Werthes (2000), Wettbewerbsfoederalismus. Aufstieg und Fall eines politischen Streitbegriffs. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Schick, Allen (1991): The Surprising Enactment of Tax Reform in the United States, in: Kernell, Samuel (ed.) (1991). Parallel politics: economic policymaking in Japan and the United States. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Schindler, Peter (Hg.) (2000). Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949 bis 1999. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Schmidt, Manfred G. (1982). Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik unter buergerlichen und sozialdemokratischen Regierungen: ein internationaler Vergleich. Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus- Verlag. Schmidt, Manfred G. (1996). When Parties matter: a review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy, European Journal of political research. 30: 155-183. Schmidt, Manfred G. (1996a). Germany: The Grand Coalition State, in: Colomer, Josep M. (ed.). Political Institutions in Europe. London, New York: Routledge: 62-98. Schneider, Friedrich (2005). Ruecklaeufige Schattenwirtschaft in Deutschland, Oesterreich und in anderen OECD-Laendern – Fluch oder Segen? Working paper. University of Linz. Schofield, Norman (1993). Political competition and multiparty governments, European Journal of Political Research. 23: 1-33. Seligman, Edwin R. A. (1921). Essays in Taxation. 9th edition. New York: Macmillan Co. Sheffrin, Steven M. (1996). Tax reforms and the growth of government, Empirical Economics. 24 (4): 667-691. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and M.S. Bonchek (1997). Analyzing Politics. New York: Norton. Shepsle, Kenneth. A. and Barry R. Weingast (1981). Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice, Public Choice. 37 (3): 503-19. Shome, Parthasarathi (ed.) (1995). Tax Policy Handbook. Washington: International Monetary Fund. Simons, Henry (1938). Personal Income Taxation: The definition of income as a problem of fiscal policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sinn, Hans-Werner (1987). Capital income taxation and resource allocation. Amsterdam: North- Holland. Sinn, Hans-Werner (1990). Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe, European Economic Review. 34: 489-504. Sinn, Hans-Werner (1991). Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe. NBER Working Paper No. 3248. Sinn, Hans-Werner (1997). Das Selektionsprinzip und der Systemwettbewerb, in: Oberhauser, Alois (Hg.). Fiskalfoederalismus in Europa, Schriften des Vereins fuer Socialpolitik. 253: 9-60. Sinn, Hans-Werner (1997a). Deutschland im Steuerwettbewerb, CES Working Paper No. 132. Universitaet Muenchen. Sinn, Hans-Werner (1997b). Deutschland im Steuerwettbewerb, Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik. 216 (6): 672-692. 183 Sinn, Hans-Werner (2002). The New Systems Competition. NBER Working Paper No. 8747. Sinn, Hans-Werner (2003). The New Systems Competition. Yrjoe Jahnsson Lectures. Oxford. Sjoquist, David (1981). A median voter analysis of variations in the use of property taxes among local governments, Public Coice. 36 (2): 273-285. Slemrod, Joel (1990). Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, Journal of Economic Perspectives. 4: 157-78. Slemrod, Joel (2004). Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging? Journal of Public Economics. 88 (6): 1169-1186. Slemrod, Joel (ed.) (1999). Tax policy in the real world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sorensen, Peter Birch (1995). Changing Views of the Corporate Income Tax, National Tax Journal. 48 (2): 279-94. Spengel, Christoph (2003). Internationale Unternehmensbesteuerung in der Europaeischen Union. Steuerwirkungsanalyse, Empirische Befunde, Reformueberlegungen. Koeln: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft. Steinmo, Sven (1989). Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden and Britain, World Politics. 41: 500-535. Steinmo, Sven (1993). Taxation and Democracy. NewHaven: Yale University Press. Steinmo, Sven (1994). The end of redistribution? International pressures and domestic policy choices, Challenge: The Magazine of Economic Affairs. 37 (6): 9-17. Steinmo, Sven and Caroline J. Tolbert (1998). Do Institutions Really Matter? Taxation in Industrialized Democracies, Comparative Political Studies. 31 (2): 165-187. Stewart, Kenneth and Michael Webb (2006). International competition in corporate taxation: evidence from the OECD time series, Economic Policy. 21 (45): 153-201. Stockfish, Jacob A. (1985). Value-added taxes and the size of government: some evidence, National Tax Journal. 38 (4): 547-552. Stolper, Gustav u.a. (ed.) (1966). Die deutsche Wirtschaft seit 1870. 2. Auflage. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck. Swank, Duane H. (2002). Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Swank, Duane H. and Sven Steinmo (2002). The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies, American Journal of Political Science. 46 (3): 477-89. Swank, Duane H. (1988). The political economy of government domestic expenditure in the affluent democracies 1960-1980, American Journal of Political Science. XXXII: 1120-1150. Tanzi, Vito (1995). Taxation in an Integrating World. Washington D. C.: Brookings. Tanzi, Vito and Ludger Schuknecht (2003). Public Finances and Economic Growth in European Countries, in: Fostering Economic Growth in Europe. Conference volume of the 31st Economics Conference of the Oestereichische Nationalbank. Vienna: 178-196. Terhalle, Fritz (1952). Geschichte der deutschen oeffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Schlusse des 2. Weltkrieges, in: Handbuch der Finanzwirtschaft. Bd.1. 2. Auflage. 1952: 273-326. Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy. 64 (5): 416-24. Tommasi, Mariano and Andres Velasco (1996). Where are we in the Political Economy of Reform?, Journal of Policy Reform. 1: 187-238. 184 Tsebelis, George (1988). Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions, British Journal of Political Science. 18: 145-170. Tsebelis, George (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, British Journal of Political Science. 25 (3): 289-325 Tsebelis, George (2000). Veto Players and Institutional Analysis, Governance. 13 (4): 441-474. Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tsebelis, George and Jeannette Money (1995). Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France, British Journal of Political Science. 25 (1): 101-129. Tsebelis, George and Jeannette Money (1997). Bicameralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tufte, Edward R. (1978). Political control of the Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tullock, Gordon (1959). Some Problems of Majority Voting, Journal of Political Economy. LXVII: 571-79. Tullock, Gordon (1990). The cost of special privilege, in: Alt, James E. and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 195-211. Van Velthoven, Ben and Frans Van Winden (1991). A positive model of tax reform, Public Choice. 72 (1): 61-86. Vanberg, Georg (1998): Abstract judicial review, legislative bargaining and policy compromise, Journal of Theoretical Politics. 10: 299-326. Vogel, Klaus (1999). Verfassungsrechtsprechung zum Steuerrecht. Berlin/New York: Springer. Von der Lippe, Peter (1998). Steuerschaetzung: Probleme, Methoden und Ergebnisse, Steuer und Studium: 217-223. Wagner, Richard E. (1976). Revenue structure, fiscal illusion and budgetary choice, Public Choice. XXV: 45-61. Wagschal, Uwe (1999). Schranken staatlicher Steuerungspolitik: Warum Steuerreformen scheitern koennen, in: Busch, Andreas and Thomas Pluemper (eds.). Nationaler Staat und internationale Wirtschaft. Baden-Baden: Nomos: 223-247. Wagschal, Uwe (2005). Steuerpolitik und Steuerreformen im internationalen Vergleich. Muenster: Lit. Wellisch, Dietmar (1995). Dezentrale Finanzpolitik bei hoher Mobilitaet, Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck. Wilson, John Douglas (1999). Theories of tax competition, National Tax Journal. 52: 269-304. Winer, Stanley L. and Walter Hettich (1999a). Information, Coordination and Tax Policy Making, in: Bird, Richard et al. (eds). Rationality on Public Policy: Retrospect and Prospect, a Tribute to Douglas G. Hartle. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation: 19-42. Winer, Stanley L. (1983). Some evidence on the separation of spending and taxing decisions, Journal of Political Economy. 91 (1): 126-140. Winer, Stanley L. and Hirofumi Shibata (eds.) (2002). Political Economy and Public Finance: The Role of Political Economy in the Theory and Practice of Public Economics. Cheltenham U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishers. 185 Winer, Stanley L. and Walter Hettich (1998). What is missed if we leave out collective choice in the analysis of taxation, National Tax Journal. 51 (2): 373-390. Winer, Stanley L. and Walter Hettich (2003). The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters, in: Rowley, C. and Friedrich Schneider (eds.). The Encyclopaedia of Public Choice. Volume 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Wintrobe, Ronald (1997). Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in: Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.). Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 429-454. Witte, John F. (1985). The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Wittman, Donald (2004). Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters, in: Rowley, C. and Friedrich Schneider (eds). Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Volume 2. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 429-432. Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman and Ian Budge (eds.) (1993). Handbook of Democratic Government. Party Government in 20 Democracies (1945-1990). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman and Ian Budge (eds.) (1993). Political Data Handbook 1993, European Journal of Political Research – Special Issue. 24 (1). Worthington, Andrew C. (1994). The nature and extent of fiscal Illusion in Australia. Dissertation. University of New England. Zimmerer, Thomas (1996). Zur Kurzlebigkeit deutscher Einkommensteuertarife. Eine Replik ueber 50 Jahre deutsche Einkommensbesteuerung. Der Tarif T96 nur als Zwischenloesung. Regensburger Diskussionbeitraege Nr. 286. Zitzelsberger, Heribert (1990). Grundlagen der Gewerbesteuer, eine steuergeschichtliche, rechtsvergleichende, steuersystematische und verfassungsrechtliche Untersuchung. Koeln: Otto Schmidt. Zodrow, George R. (1985). Partial tax reforms: An optimal taxation perspective, The Canadian Journal of Economics. 18 (2): 335-346. Zodrow, George R. (2003). Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union, International Tax and Public Finance. 10: 651-671. Zohlnhoefer, Raimund (1999). Die große Steuerreform 1998/99: Ein Lehrstueck fuer Politikentwicklung bei Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, Zeitschrift fuer Parlamentsfragen. 30 (2): 327-345.

Chapter Preview

References

Zusammenfassung

Was bestimmt die Steuerpolitik? Welche Ziele verfolgen die Bundesregierungen bei Steuerreformen? Haben Steuererhöhungen und Steuersenkungen einen Einfluss auf die Wahlergebnisse? Auf der Basis eines neuen Datensatzes zu den fiskalischen Effekten von Steuerreformen im Zeitraum von 1964 bis 2004 zeigt das Werk Muster der Steuerpolitik auf und testet zentrale ökonomische Hypothesen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass normative ökonomische Ansätze kaum einen Erklärungsbeitrag für die zu beobachtende Steuerpolitik leisten können.

Ausgehend von wichtigen polit-ökonomischen Theorien zeigt der Autor, dass die Mehrheitskonstellationen im Bundesrat einen wichtigen Einfluss auf die Steuerpolitik haben, allerdings genau umgekehrt wie von der Blockade-Hypothese behauptet: Steuerreformen sind gemessen an ihren Fiskaleffekten bei gegenläufigen Mehrheiten in Bundestag und Bundesrat häufiger und umfangreicher. Des Weiteren gibt es keine Hinweise darauf, dass die parteipolitische Zusammensetzung der Bundesregierung einen wichtigen Einfluss auf Steuerreformen hat. Wahltaktische Terminierungen von Steuerreformen spielen aber sehr wohl eine wichtige Rolle. Eine Auswertung des Zusammenhangs von Steuerreformen und Wahlergebnissen zeigt allerdings, dass die Versuche der Bundesregierungen, ihre Wiederwahlwahrscheinlichkeit durch Steuersenkungen kurz vor der Wahl zu erhöhen, wenig erfolgreich sind: Nicht nur die Jahre unmittelbar vor den Wahlterminen, sondern die Steuerpolitik in der gesamten Legislaturperiode hat einen Einfluss auf die Bundestagswahlergebnisse der regierenden Parteien.