Beyond Consensus

Enrico Zoffoli

doi:10.5771/9783845247960

Beyond Consensus

Public Reason and the Role of Convergence

Reihe: Studies in Political Theory

Band 4 1. Auflage 2013

Kein Zugriff

doi.org/10.5771/9783845247960
ISBN print: 978-3-8487-0506-1
ISBN online: 978-3-8452-4796-0
Nomos, Baden-Baden Nomos, Baden-Baden

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Zusammenfassung

Wie kann man ein System des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens erreichen, in dem alle Bürger als frei und gleichberechtigt respektiert werden? Der Autor gibt eine innovative Antwort auf diese Kernfrage der modernen politischen Philosophie und denkt neu über öffentliche Vernunft, die Funktion der moralischen Epistemologie und über öffentliche Legitimierung nach.

Abstract

Wie kann man ein System des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens erreichen, in dem alle Bürger als frei und gleichberechtigt respektiert werden? Der Autor gibt eine innovative Antwort auf diese Kernfrage der modernen politischen Philosophie und denkt neu über öffentliche Vernunft, die Funktion der moralischen Epistemologie und über öffentliche Legitimierung nach.

Kapitel Ausklappen | EinklappenAutorenSeiten
2–10 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 2–10
11–32 Introduction 11–32
- 11–20 I. Public reason as a theory of liberalism 11–20
  - 11–13 I. a Varieties of liberalism 11–13
  - 13–20 I. b Justificatory liberalism 13–20
- 20–32 II. Questioning the dominant view of public reason 20–32
  - 20–24 II. a Consensus and convergence 20–24
  - 24–28 II. b Overview of the argument 24–28
  - 28–32 II. c Content and method 28–32
33–98 Chapter 1: Two models of public reason 33–98
- 33–34 1.1. Overview of the argument 33–34
- 34–48 1.2. Two core principles 34–48
- 48–56 1.3. Consensus and convergence 48–56
  - 48–49 1.3.1 The concept of public justification and its conceptions 48–49
  - 49–53 1.3.2 Strong and weak consensus 49–53
  - 53–54 1.3.3 Private and public reasons 53–54
  - 54–56 1.3.4 Three levels of publicness 54–56
- 56–74 1.4. Conclusiveness as a requirement of public reason 56–74
  - 56–61 1.4.1 The role of religious reasons 56–61
  - 61–63 1.4.2 Rawls on the overlapping consensus 61–63
  - 63–66 1.4.3 Deepening the problem 63–66
  - 66–69 1.4.4 Two kinds of defeaters 66–69
  - 69–71 1.4.5 Conclusive justification 69–71
  - 71–73 1.4.6 The Conclusiveness Thesis 71–73
  - 73–74 1.4.7 A first presumption in favor of convergence 73–74
- 74–90 1.5 Can consensus models consistently exclude private reasons? 74–90
- 90–96 1.6 Two families of arguments for consensus 90–96
- 96–98 1.7 Summary 96–98
99–160 Chapter 2: Strength-based arguments for consensus 99–160
- 99–100 2.1. Overview of the argument 99–100
- 100–106 2.2. Four conceptions of objectivity 100–106
  - 100–103 2.2.1 Public reasons as objective reasons 100–103
  - 103–106 2.2.2 Four strength-based arguments for consensus 103–106
- 106–117 2.3. The top-down argument for consensus 106–117
  - 106–110 2.3.1 The basic argument 106–110
  - 110–112 2.3.2 Strong externalism 110–112
  - 112–114 2.3.3 Moderate externalism 112–114
  - 114–117 2.3.4 Internalism 114–117
- 117–122 2.4. Open justification 117–122
  - 117–117 2.4.1 Open vs. closed justification 117–117
  - 117–120 2.4.2 Open justification and internal coherence 117–120
  - 120–122 2.4.3 Rejecting the top-down argument for consensus 120–122
- 122–133 2.5. The discourse-theoretical argument: a radical version 122–133
  - 122–125 2.5.1 The basic (radical) argument 122–125
  - 125–127 2.5.2 Some important remarks 125–127
  - 127–129 2.5.3 Post-metaphysical objectivity 127–129
  - 129–133 2.5.4 Ethical discourses and open justification 129–133
- 133–144 2.6. Public reason and post-metaphysical rationality 133–144
  - 133–134 2.6.1 Are private reasons necessarily defeated? 133–134
  - 134–137 2.6.2 Validity claims 134–137
  - 137–140 2.6.3 The asymmetry between rightness claims and truth claims 137–140
  - 140–143 2.6.4 A discourse-theoretical approach to universalization 140–143
  - 143–144 2.6.5 Discourse theory and epistemic pluralism 143–144
- 144–149 2.7 Some provisional results 144–149
  - 144–146 2.7.1 Rejecting some major arguments for consensus 144–146
  - 146–149 2.7.2 A more moderate defense of consensus? 146–149
- 149–158 2.8 The discourse-theoretical argument: a moderate version 149–158
  - 149–151 2.8.1 The (alleged) priority of freestanding reasons 149–151
  - 151–154 2.8.2 What defeats what? 151–154
  - 154–156 2.8.3 Back to post-metaphysical rationality 154–156
  - 156–158 2.8.4 The scope of private defeaters 156–158
- 158–160 2.9 Summary 158–160
161–232 Chapter 3: Appropriateness-based arguments for consensus 161–232
- 161–162 3.1. Overview of the argument 161–162
- 162–176 3.2. Sincerity and public reason 162–176
  - 162–166 3.2.1 The argument from sincerity 162–166
  - 166–169 3.2.2 Intelligibility and relevance 166–169
  - 169–173 3.2.3 Why the sincerity requirement undermines convergence 169–173
  - 173–176 3.2.4 Why the sincerity requirement does not justify consensus 173–176
- 176–186 3.3. Public reason: epistemological and not political 176–186
  - 176–179 3.3.1 The role of moral epistemology 176–179
  - 179–182 3.3.2 The Commonsense View of Shareability 179–182
  - 182–184 3.3.3 The Meta-Convergence View of Shareability 182–184
  - 184–186 3.3.4 The Political View of Shareability 184–186
- 186–194 3.4. The argument from publicity 186–194
  - 186–190 3.4.1 The value of full publicity 186–190
  - 190–191 3.4.2 The role of the public sphere 190–191
  - 191–194 3.4.3 Full publicity as a justificatory device 191–194
- 194–202 3.5. Other appropriateness-based objections to convergence 194–202
  - 194–198 3.5.1 The argument from normative stability 194–198
  - 198–202 3.5.2 The argument from reasonable compliance 198–202
- 202–215 3.6 The argument from symmetry 202–215
  - 202–205 3.6.1 Framing the issue 202–205
  - 205–207 3.6.2 The Strong Burden Thesis and the Weak Burden Thesis 205–207
  - 207–210 3.6.3 Freestanding rationales and general interests 207–210
  - 210–212 3.6.4 Why the argument from symmetry seems appealing 210–212
  - 212–215 3.6.5 Why the argument from symmetry is misguided 212–215
- 215–225 3.7 From convergence to symmetrical convergence 215–225
  - 215–216 3.7.1 The Non-Coercive Rejection Thesis 215–216
  - 216–218 3.7.2 Contested property rights 216–218
  - 218–221 3.7.3 When liberty is not an available default 218–221
  - 221–223 3.7.4 The narrow symmetry objection 221–223
  - 223–225 3.7.5 The Symmetrical Convergence View of Public Reason 223–225
- 225–231 3.8 The dominant view of public reason rejected 225–231
  - 225–226 3.8.1 Against public reason’s Shareability Requirement 225–226
  - 226–231 3.8.2 A further problem 226–231
- 231–232 3.9 Summary 231–232
233–240 Conclusion 233–240
241–249 Bibliography 241–249

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