Content

Seyma Ekiz

The Role of the EU and Member States in the Arab Spring

Assessment of Interests and EU Strategy in Tunisia and Libya

1. Edition 2018, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-4919-5, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-9132-1, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845291321

Series: Studies on the European Union, vol. 13

Bibliographic information
Ek iz Studies on the European Union | 13 The Role of the EU and Member States in the Arab Spring Assessment of Interests and EU Strategy in Tunisia and Libya Th e Ro le o f t he E U a nd M em be r S ta te s in th e Ar ab S pr in g 13 Seyma Ekiz The objective of this thesis is to explain if the way the EU assesses its interests (both normative and rational) and foreign policy goals corresponds to its actions in North Africa during the Arab Spring process. It seeks to understand whether the EU’s conduct in the areas of security, economic prosperity and value projection in Tunisia and Libya is based more on material interests or on values by also taking member state involvement into consideration. Theoretically this study uses insights from neoclassical realism. The research findings are based on an extensive analysis of EU documents, expert interviews, primary sources and secondary literature. The author moved to Ankara after the completion of her doctoral studies in Cologne. Her research interests are EU foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. ISBN 978-3-8487-4919-5 Studies on the European Union Series Editor: Wolfgang Wessels Jean Monnet Chair ad personam for Political Science CETEUS | Centre for Turkey and European Union Studies University of Cologne Volume 13 Assessment of Interests and EU Strategy in Tunisia and Libya The Role of the EU and Member States in the Arab Spring Nomos Seyma Ekiz The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de a.t.: Köln, Univ., Diss., 2016 ISBN 978-3-8487-4919-5 (Print) 978-3-8452-9132-1 (ePDF) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-3-8487-4919-5 (Print) 978-3-8452-9132-1 (ePDF) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ekiz, Seyma The Role of the EU and Member States in the Arab Spring Assessment of Interests and EU Strategy in Tunisia and Libya Seyma Ekiz Includes bibliographic references. 291 p. ISBN 978-3-8487-4919-5 (Print) 978-3-8452-9132-1 (ePDF) 1st Edition 2018 © Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2018. Printed and bound in Germany. This work is subject to copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to “Verwertungs gesellschaft Wort”, Munich. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Nomos or the author. To my sons; Akif Zahid and Mehmet Sami Acknowledgments Having finished this thesis I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who encouraged me with constructive criticism and who stayed close to me in my daily life throughout this journey that seemed endless. I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels for giving me the freedom to improve on my own and for his insightful advices in times of crisis. His patience and understanding helped me overcome problems and finish this thesis. I am also grateful to my committee members and all of the team of the Jean Monnet Chair for their brilliant suggestions. I also would like to thank to advisors and officials working at EEAS, European Commission and European Parliament and especially to the political group members for adding valuable comments to my study and hosting me during my one week stay and several visits to Brussels. My special thanks go to my family. I am so grateful to my grandmother who came from Istanbul and stayed in Cologne for six months just to take care of my baby. I would like to thank my parents for their spiritual support which sustained me this far and for keeping my baby for countless times in Istanbul. My completion of this project would not be possible without the support of my husband Yusuf. Heartfelt thanks for management of our household activities when times get tough and for his constant encouragement to finish this project. 7 Table of Contents List of Abbreviations 19 Abstract 21 Introduction1. 23 The Research Question1.1 23 Importance of the Topic1.2 26 Theoretical Relevance1.2.1 26 Political Relevance1.2.2 27 Social Relevance1.2.3 28 State of the Art1.3 29 Relevant Literature1.3.1 29 Overview of the Literature1.3.2 34 . Contribution to the Existing Literature1.3.3 35 Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses2. 36 Neo-classical Realism2.1 36 Rational Theories2.2 38 Neo realism2.2.1 39 Liberal Inter-governmentalism2.2.2 39 Constructivism2.3 40 Rationalism vs Constructivism2.4 42 Concepts and Variables2.5 43 The EU as a Normative or Strategic/Pragmatic Power? 2.5.1 44 Why EU Strategy instead of EU Grand Strategy?2.5.2 45 Independent Variable: EU’s Assessment of Interests (Normative and Rational Interests) and Foreign Policy Goals 2.5.3 49 Dependent Variable: EU Policy Implementation2.5.4 50 Intervening Variable: Member State Policies2.5.5 50 Alternative Explanations (Hypotheses)2.6 51 9 Research Design3. 53 Case Selection: Selection on an Explanatory Variable3.1 56 Description of Data3.2 57 Preliminary Answer3.3 59 Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia4. 61 EU-Tunisia Relations4.1 61 Physical Security4.2 64 Migration: Weak Responses to Huge Problems4.2.1 64 Mobility Partnership: Clashing Interests4.2.2 69 Economic Prosperity4.3 75 Tunisia’s Vulnerable Economic Situation4.3.1 75 EU Support for Economic Recovery4.3.2 78 Integration of Markets and Trade Liberalization4.3.3 82 Investments of EIB and EBRD4.3.4 84 High Level Visits to Tunisia4.3.5 88 Value Projection4.4 91 EU’s New and Ambitious Support for Tunisia’s Path up to the Elections 4.4.1 91 High Level Visits to Tunisia: A Reflection of `More for More` Approach 4.4.2 96 Political and Social Turmoil in Tunisia4.4.3 106 Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia5. 112 Political Decision Making Process and A Quick Look on the West’s Position on Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution 5.1 112 The Protection of UK Nationals and the Very First UK-Tunisia Cooperation in Security 5.2.1 115 Anti-Immigrant Speeches and Policies of France and Germany 5.2.2 117 Economic Prosperity5.3 120 Member States’ Quest for Retaining Lucrative Economic Ties with Tunisia 5.3.1 120 France’s Ambivalent Response to Changing Tunisia due to High Economic Interests 5.3.2 124 Value Projection5.4 125 UK Condemning Violence in Tunisia5.4.1 125 Table of Contents 10 UK’s Arab Partnership Fund as the Main Protection against Instability 5.4.2 127 UK’s Projects on Institution and Capacity Building 5.4.3 129 France’s Inconsistent Declarations Replaced with Full Support for Democracy and Freedom 5.4.4 131 France’s Three Priorities and Development Projects 5.4.5 132 Hollande’s Visits to Tunisia in Times of Critical Political Milestones 5.4.6 134 Germany’s Investment in Good Governance Education and Capacity Building 5.4.7 137 Critical Discourse Analysis of the Articulation of the Political Identities of Member States and Tunisia 6. 141 The Construction of the Self (Europe)6.1 141 The Construction of the Other (Tunisia)6.2 142 Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya7. 143 EU Strategy in Libya7.1 143 Physical Security7.2 144 Libyan Military Intervention: Events Leading to UNSCR 1973 Resolution 7.2.1 144 EU’s Humanitarian Assistance in support of the UNSCR 1973 Resolution 7.2.2 147 The Question of Responsibility to Protect?7.2.3 151 What’s Next after the R2P Mission?7.2.4 153 Reforming EU Migration Policy: Security vs Human Rights 7.3 155 Repatriation of EU Nationals7.3.1 158 Bilateral Agreements and Resettlement of Refugees 7.3.2 159 Criticism from International Human Rights Organizations 7.3.3 161 Economic Prosperity7.4 165 Libya Contact Group Meetings7.4.1 165 Istanbul Meeting: Discussion of Libya’s Future Economy 7.4.2 167 Table of Contents 11 Value Projection7.5 170 EU’s Restrictive Measures against the Gaddafi Regime 7.5.1 170 EU’s Immediate Humanitarian Assistance after the Military Intervention 7.5.2 174 EU’s Wish for a Democratic and Stable Libya as the Next Phase and EU’s `Responsibility to Assist` 7.5.3 177 Unfreezing Libyan assets7.5.4 179 EU’s Long Term Goals in Libya: Security Sector Reform, Training Civil Society and Institution/ State Building 7.5.5 180 Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya8. 190 Decision Making Processes Leading to the Military Intervention in Libya 8.1 190 Physical Security8.2 194 Germany’s Position on Military Intervention in Libya 8.2.1 197 Horrible Results of the War8.2.2 198 Europe in the Face of Migratory Demands8.2.3 200 Economic Prosperity: Previous Economic Relations under Gaddafi vs the Current Business Deals 8.3 203 Value Projection8.4 208 Addressing the Humanitarian Needs and Rebuilding Libya 8.4.1 208 What It Means to Help Libya8.4.2 213 Calls for Supporting Libya at the G8 Summit8.4.3 215 Germany’s Assistance in Libya’s Reconstruction8.4.4 216 Critical Discourse Analysis of the Articulation of the Political Identities of Member States and Libya 9. 218 The Construction of the Self `Europe`9.1 218 The Construction of the Other `Libya`9.2 219 Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Tunisia: Discourses Matching Actions? 10. 220 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security 10.1 220 Table of Contents 12 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security 10.2 221 Conclusion10.3 222 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity 10.4 222 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity 10.5 223 Conclusion10.6 224 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection 10.7 224 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection 10.8 228 Conclusion10.9 229 Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Libya: EU Strategy between Norms and Interests 11. 232 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security 11.1 232 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security 11.2 235 Conclusion11.3 236 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity 11.4 236 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity 11.5 237 Conclusion11.6 238 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection 11.7 239 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection 11.8 242 Conclusion11.9 243 Concluding Remarks: Analysis of EU Policies, Lessons, Advices and Future Research 12. 246 The Gap between Rhetoric and Policies in Democratic Transition 12.1 246 Libya: A Test Case for EU’s Global Actorness12.2 249 EU Conditionality in Mobility and Economic Integration12.3 250 Table of Contents 13 Future Research12.4 252 Bibliography 255 Appendix I: Interviewee List 289 Appendix II: Coding Scheme 291 Table of Contents 14 List of Charts and Figures Figure 1: Causal Logic 26 Figure 2: Bilateral cooperation process in the ENP framework 62 Chart 1: Satisfaction Rates of Life Standards in Tunisia 76 Chart 2: EU Trade with Tunisia 77 Chart 3: Non-resident Entries to Tunisia between 2007 and 2011 87 Figure 3: Cooperation Programs between the EU and Tunisia 98 Chart 4: Migrants Fleeing Libya 162 Chart 5: Numeric Layout of Interests vs Values in Official Statements of EU Top Officials on Tunisia 226 Figure 4: The Articulation of the Political Identities of `the European Self` and `the Tunisian Other` by Member State Leaders 230 Chart 6: Numeric Layout of Interests vs Values in Official Statements of EU Top Officials on Libya 241 Figure 5: The Articulation of Political Identities of `the European Self´ and ´the Libyan Other´ 244 15 List of Tables Table 1: Foreign Policy Typology 48 Table 2: Concepts and Variables 51 Table 3: Hypotheses (The Correlation between Independent, Intervening and Dependent Variables Factors) 52 Table 4: Migratory Circulation of Tunisians in 2011 65 Table 5: Migration Movements during the Libyan Crisis 66 Table 6: Main Features: Physical Security 74 Table 7: Tunisia’s GDP per Capita in Years 75 Table 8: EIB Investments in Tunisia between 2011 and 2013 86 Table 9: EBRD Investment in Tunisia between 2011 and 2013 87 Table 10: Main Features: Economic Prosperity 90 93 Table 11: Freedom Ratings of Tunisia 93 Table 12: EU-Tunisia Bilateral Cooperation* 99 Table 13: Main Features: Value Projection 109 Table 14: Main Features: Physical Security 164 Table 15: Main Features: Economic Prosperity 169 Table 16: EU’s Joint Projects in Libya 183 17 Table 17: Main Features: Value Projection 188 Table 18: Decisions on Asylum Requests 201 Table 19: EU Cooperation with Libya 201 Table 20: EU arms exports to Libya (in million) 208 Table 21: Trade Volume between Libya and the Member States between 2010 and 2013 208 Table 22: Donations of Member States during the Libyan Crisis 211 Table 23: Mode of Foreign Policy Behavior of EU in Tunisia 231 Table 24: Mode of Foreign Policy Behavior of Member States in Tunisia 231 Table 25: Mode of Foreign Policy Behavior of the EU in Libya 245 Table 26: Mode of Foreign Policy Behavior of Member States in Libya 245 List of Tables 18 List of Abbreviations AA Association Agreement ACAA Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial products AFD Agence Francaise de Development AFTURD Association of the Democratic Women CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CS Common Strategy CSP Country Strategy Paper DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department EEAS European External Action Service EIB European Investment Bank ESDP European Security and Defense Policy ESS European Security Strategy ENP European Neighborhood Policy EU European Union FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FEMIP Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership IOM International Organization for Migration ILO International Labor Organization LTDH Tunisian League for Human Rights MFA Macro-Financial Assistance MTS Medium-Term Strategy NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization ND Northern Dimension NIF Neighborhood Investment Facility NIP National Indicative Paper NTC National Transitional Council 19 OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement PPC Permanent Partnership Council RCD Rally for Constitutional Democracy SPRING Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth TEU Treaty of European Union UGTT Tunisian General Labor Union UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution US United States WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WTO World Trade Organization List of Abbreviations 20 Abstract The objective of this thesis is to explain if the way the EU assesses its interests (both normative and rational interests) and foreign policy goals match EU’s actions in the North Africa region during the Arab Spring. It seeks to understand if EU’s foreign policy behavior in the areas of physical security, economic prosperity and value projection in Tunisia and Libya is based more on material interests or values. As a minor research area member state policies of the UK, France and Germany are analyzed. The aim is to search how competing rationales of member states impede or encourage EU’s neighborhood policy in the region. In order to study these issues this thesis presents broad empirical research on the EU as the community level, on the member states as the national level and on Tunisia and Libya as the two distant cases. This research is done via the extensive usage of EU documents, expert interviews, and primary sources in addition to the study of secondary literature. The research adopts an original approach using insights from neoclassical realism to identify the key explanatory variable of EU leaders’ assessment of foreign policy goals and intervening variable of member state policies and also to identify the impact of these variables on EU actions. Neoclassical realism allows us to combine structural and domestic incentives and also to combine interests and values. It then carries out a comparative qualitative analysis based on three variables and on a foreign policy typology which combines normative and rational modes of foreign policy behavior. The findings show that there is great consistency between speeches and actions of EU high officials in all three areas. The phenomenon of migration is the weak spot of Europe both in the case of Tunisia and Libya. This leads to the conclusion that both their discourses and actions are dominated more by security concerns rather than cooperation with North Africa on the management of migratory demands and on value promotion in particular humanitarian protection. When it comes to economic prosperity EU leaders follow the same path of assessing the interests and goals in economic relations in a neutral way both in Tunisia and Libya. Whereas in Tunisia EU actions are more in the category of normative while EU actions in the case of Libya are more in the category of rational. This is 21 largely the result of the difference in economic and security situation of Tunisia and Libya. On value projection, the last part of EU’s strategy, the EU pursued strongly normative policies both in Tunisia and Libya. Despite the great emphasis on `national interest` of member state leaders the EU pursued an independent policy by focusing only on transnational concerns of promotion of good governance, sustainable development, human rights, rule of law, anti-discrimination, peace and liberty. The EU, as a community, is more present in Tunisia than in Libya. The research also shows that there is a negative correlation between rational policies of member states and normative policies of the EU in the area of physical security, which cover the issues of the military intervention in Libya and migration, and in the area of economic prosperity especially in the case of Tunisia. This thesis is divided into 12 chapters. The first, second and third chapters present the key questions, research design, methodological and theoretical framework. Chapters 4 and 7 provide an analytical overview of the comparison of speeches and actions of the EU in Tunisia and Libya. Chapters 5, 6, 8 and 9 explain the speeches and actions of member states and eventually their foreign policy in the region. Chapter 10 and 11 synthesize the results and illustrate the key findings in summarizing tables. The last chapter is left for lessons and advices derived from the analysis of EU foreign policy and for ideas on future research. Abstract 22 Introduction The Research Question Middle Eastern people are demanding jobs, democracy and freedom through protests since December 2010. Long lived dictatorships, years of oppression and poor socioeconomic conditions took thousands to the streets. Public revolutions first started in Tunisia and the events jumped up to Syria. The EU has a deep interest and engagement with the regional countries as an actor claiming to be a growing global power. The EU's reaction towards the Arab Spring1 has been criticized at first for not being able formulate a common response on time. According to Behr “Internal divisions and national rivalries for a strategic stake in the post-revolutionary regional order have further prevented the EU from adopting a more coherent approach.” (Behr, 2011, p.1) However many national leaderships in the EU believe that the Middle East uprising is as important as communist Europe's revolution in 1989 in the way that it has the potential to improve economic growth and democratic governance.2 This research analyzes some of the determinants of EU’s promotion of values and interests in Tunisia and Libya from the perspective of neoclassical realism. The aim is to explain if the way the EU assesses its interests (both normative and rational interests) and foreign policy goals match EU’s actions in Tunisia and Libya during the Arab Spring process. It seeks to understand if EU’s foreign policy behavior in the areas of physical security, economic prosperity and value projection is based more on material interests or values. Despite the normative positioning of the EU and member state leaders in their discourses the apparent overlapping of member states’ domestic rationales and EU’s prioritizing of security and sometimes 1. 1.1 1 Although there are no agreed terms of whether the uprisings can be associated with the word ‘spring`, which reminds that positive economic, political and social developments are on the way in the transitional countries, the author prefers to use the term `Arab Spring` as it is the most common usage to name the regional protests. 2 An analysis of the EU’s immediate reaction to the historic Arab uprisings delivered by Edward McMillan-Scott, Vice-president of the European Parliament for democracy and human rights can be found on http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/ arab-spring-reveals-eu-weakness-analysis-502766, (accessed 18.10.2015). 23 business rather than values like human rights, democracy and civil liberties make its relations with the southern neighborhood complicated. Therefore it is important to understand how EU leaders perceive and assess their interests and what they have done in terms of policies in the region taking also into account the consistent cooperation and conflicts within the member states. This research is done via the extensive usage of EU documents, expert interviews, and primary sources in addition to the study of secondary literature. By looking at speeches, resolutions, communications and press releases we can find how EU leaders assess their normative and rational interests and foreign policy goals and we can also find whether the EU positions itself as a Normative Power or a Strategic/Pragmatic Power. (Wood 2011, Zimmerman 2007, Manners 2002). EU actions, in the areas of physical security, economic prosperity and value projection, together composes Grand Strategy. (Smith, 2011) A linkage between speeches and actions is established. It is also important to look at the internal environment, which means the impact of member states’ assessment of domestic interests and their policies on EU foreign policy, as the intervening variable. In Balducci’s words: `The EU-as-an-international-actor approach tends to only make reference to the EU and its main institutions and it overlooks the analysis of member states’ foreign policies, thus uncritically assuming that they are in line with those of the EU.` (Balducci 2010, p.36 in Wood 2011, p.245) As a minor area of research speeches and actions of the UK, France and Germany are also scrutinized along with the EU’s position. By doing so it is aimed to be found whether their competing rationales encourage or impede the EU’s neighborhood policy. These three member states (the Big Three) are chosen as they have the ability to influence EU policy with their economic and military weight. They are involved in the most important multilateral diplomatic platforms. This sovereignty of them also shows that they are not dependent on multilateral institutions as much as other member states are. (Lehne 2012, p.1) When we look at the range of high officials in the EU we see that the amount of technocrats from these three countries are quite high and this gives them enormous political power. In the EP, for instance, 20% of highest posts are from Germany and this percentage is the same with the UK. 1. Introduction 24 France is also trying to get more and more weight.3 Furthermore they have strong economic relations with Tunisia and Libya with their existing companies and with high trade volumes. They also have serious concerns on migratory demands, management of borders and extension of terrorism regarding these two countries. Germany has no military involvement in Libya unlike the UK and France but Germany is mainly active in the reconstruction processes with numerous development projects. Within this frame the assumption is that the mode of foreign policy of the UK and France in the areas of physical security and economic prosperity is strongly rational while Germany is expected to pursue strongly normative policies in the area of value projection. Neoclassical realism allows us to make assumptions from both constructivist and realist thinking. The empirical reasoning reveals that EU rhetoric in the Tunisian case, unlike the rhetoric on the Libyan case, refer more to values than interests. As for the constructivist thinking this study poses the hypothesis that if normative/value-based assessment of interests and foreign policy goals leads to normative policy implementation then the EU pursues normative policies in Tunisia whereas the EU pursues rational policies in Libya. To put it another way analyzed cases determine whether the EU inclines more to a normative position or a rational position. The second hypothesis derived from the classical realist thinking is that normative/value-based assessment of foreign policy goals, both at the community and member state level, is not positively related to normative/ value-based policy implementation, which inclines the EU to act in a normative way without resorting to coercion and without gaining wealth to the exclusion of others. (Manners 2002, Wolfers 1972 in Laidi 2008). This means that values are used for maximization of interests in the areas of physical security and economic prosperity. The last expectation is that increases in rational policies at the member state level are associated with decreases in normative policies at the EU level. This again means that national interests of member states trump EU’s normative policies in its neighborhood. 3 Int. No: 10. 1.1 The Research Question 25 Importance of the Topic Theoretical Relevance While Council conclusions, resolutions or joint communications set the parameters of EU policies in the MENA region unit level factors such as dominance of national objectives or colonial ideals of member states also determine the character of EU response to the Arab revolutions. It is fair to say that the relation between systemic level (EU) and unit level (member states) shapes foreign policy of the EU. In parallel with this idea neoclassical realism specifically seeks to explain how internal characteristics of the EU -domestic rationales of member states like avoiding migration, searching for energy resources, pursuing colonial politics- intervene between EU leaders’ assessment of interests, threats and opportunities and their actual foreign economic, security and value projection policies in the region. As illustrated in figure 1 neoclassical realism clearly links specified independent, intervening and dependent variables in a direct causal chain. (Rose, 1998, p.167) Causal LogicFigure 1: Causal Logic Internal/domestic factors EU structural incentives EU Foreign Policy Actions (EU Strategy) The Arab Revolutions are too new to the literature and this phenomena of the Middle East uprisings has not been covered so far with the above neoclassical theoretical logic. An alternative explanation is sought by asking how norms are utilized for explaining foreign policy outcomes. As Lehnert, Miller and Wonka put it, this piece contributes to the literature on the topic of EU`s foreign policy in the Arab Spring by adding to the the general stance of constructivist and rational theories. (Lehnert et al. in Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007) Whether it is a constructivist theory or a rational theory, none of these theories alone can explain the EU approach in Tunisia and Libya. There has been a conflict between constructivists and rationalists and as Kratochvil and Tulmets discuss it and this debate has gradually has given way to experiments which try to combine the two approaches in a single framework. (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2010) It depends on time and space whether the EU shifted more to norm based or material based policies or a combination of the two in their foreign policies. Exploring the formation and functioning of EU values during the course of the revolutions along with the member state interpretations adds a theoretical as well as an analytical value to the scientific discourse. (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007) 1.2.2 Political Relevance Empirically European foreign policy analysis is of great importance for the region as the region is passing through a historical change. European perspectives on the political unrests, protests and on the era of a fresh start in the Middle East has the chance to whether prove EU´s geopolitical strength or depreciate its image in the world. Since the beginning of the revolutions it has been discussed in EU circles that there is an effort to pursue normative policies towards consolidating socio-political and economic situation in Arab Spring countries but no one has ever asked if speeches and goals are matching actions. This study adds to the literature by empirically asking this question and also by testing so far untested hypotheses. (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2007:22) It is important for the EU to test its normative power without even offering a membership perspective. With the Barcelona Process, established in 1995, the EU The Arab Revolutions are too new to the literature and this phenomena of the Middle East uprisings has not been covered so far with the above neoclassical theoretical logic. An alternative explan tion is sought by asking how norms are utilized for explaining foreign policy outcomes. As Lehnert, Miller and Wonka put it, this piece contributes to the literature on the topic of EU’s foreign policy in the Arab Spring by adding to the the general stance of constructivist and rational theories. (Lehnert et al. in Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007) Whether it is a constructivist theory or a rational theory, none of these th ories alone ca explain the EU approach in Tunisia and Libya. The e has been a conflict between constructivists and rationalists and as Kratochvil and Tulmets discuss it and this debate has gradually has given way 1.2 1.2.1 Figure 1: 1. Introduction 26 to experiments which try to combine the two approaches in a single framework. (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2010) It depends on time and space whether the EU shifted more to norm based or material based policies or a combination of the two in their foreign policies. Exploring the formation and functioning of EU values during the course of the revolutions along with the member state interpretations adds a theoretical as well as an analytical value to the scientific discourse. (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007) Political Relevance Empirically European foreign policy analysis is of great importance for the region as the region is passing through a historical change. European perspectives on the political unrests, protests and on the era of a fresh start in the Middle East has the chance to whether prove EU’s geopolitical strength or depreciate its image in the world. Since the beginning of the revolutions it has been discussed in EU circles that there is an effort to pursue normative policies towards consolidating socio-political and economic situation in Arab Spring countries but no one has ever asked if speeches and goals are matching actions. This study adds to the literature by empirically asking this question and also by testing so far untested hypotheses. (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2007:22) It is important for the EU to test its normative power without even offering a membership perspective. With the Barcelona Process, established in 1995, the EU aimed to apply a normative approach towards the MENA region and to put emphasis on democratization and political reforms. However EU discourse on democracy and human rights didn’t help in practice. (Kucukkeles, 2013:5) The colonial history of Europe and its recent past, proving close relations with the dictatorial regimes are the factors that make the diffusion of EU norms hard. On the other hand there is this fact that the EU and the Arab countries need each other for different reasons. The regional countries need EU guidance for socio-economic and political transition and the EU has some concerns like avoiding migration and need for energy. So this study aims to shed light on the future relations by sorting out what the EU has claimed in discourse and what the EU has done on the field. Apart from EU’s role in the newly emerging regimes it is also necessary to explain what all these revolutions mean to member states which used to 1.2.2 1.2 Importance of the Topic 27 have considerable economic and political relations with the regional countries. This research is also providing a close look to the internal bargaining process of the EU. Member state preferences and policies compose one of the most important determinants of where the EU stands in its relations with the neighborhood. The rationales that member states bring forward in their approach towards Tunisia and Libya explain what type of relations they are going to establish with the new regimes. Member states insist on their realist agenda and they seek for their business, security and strategic interests. This shows us that they tend to have substantial leverage over EU’s foreign policy. As Zimmerman highlights the EU behaves strategically as long as it manages to have the member states on its side and it doesn’t violate member state interests. (Zimmerman, 2007, p.828) It is an endeavor to offer an alternative explanation of the transforming geopolitical and domestic environment. The civil uprisings leading to a change in their socio-political setting in the MENA region have powerful impact on the global actors as well as neighboring countries. These actors apply to different strategies in their policies in accordance with the newly establishing conjecture. There is certainly a rivalry between the intervening actors in terms of the diffusion of their influence and evaluating the opportunities. As a matter of fact instrumentalization of the Arab Spring policies occurs in a way that certain countries intervening in the region in the post-revolutionary space find the opportunity to redesign their foreign policies. This means that the Middle Eastern uprisings lead to a general transformation in the countries’ ideological and political positioning. These rationales that are analyzed in this study also explain how they affect EU policy outputs. By doing so principles that shape foreign policy measures of EU members and institutions are enlightened. Social Relevance Socially relevant studies help us to advance our understanding of a topic which has an impact on people’s lives and the course of international politics in this research. Social relevance is related with the question whether citizens and policymakers care about something. (Gerring, 2006:114) Lehnert, Miller and Wonka, alternatively, argue that the idea of being affected is a more precise criterion than people’s caring. (Lehnert et al. in Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007:26) In this regard King, Keohane and Verba suggest that for a topic to be socially relevant it needs to affect 1.2.3 1. Introduction 28 many people’s lives. They suggest that a research project should ask an important question in a way that it affects many people’s lives. (King et al.1994:15) In addition to these points practical advice is also an expected outcome for a socially relevant research project. Middle Eastern revolutions have a huge effect on people’s daily lives that it transforms the whole region just like 1989 revolutions transformed Eastern European countries and ended communism. The collapse of the authoritarian regimes with violent (Libyan revolution) and non-violent (Tunisian revolution) uprisings is the initial stage for a democratic future. EU policies, which form the focus of this research, help these countries and societies transform their political and socio-economic establishment to a democratic and a liberal one. In this way it is fair enough to say that the research question affects millions in the Middle East. State of the Art Relevant Literature Literature on the relation between the EU and the Arab Spring countries is mostly comprised of articles or books which are compilations of articles. (Peters, 2012, Bauer 2015) Some of these studies are in the form of commentaries, policy briefs, opinion papers and reports. (Kleenmann, 2010, Tocci 2011, Asseburg 2014, Leigh 2011). These research pieces, mostly released in 2011 and 2014, offer the EU a practical guidance for what is wrong with EU policies and what should the EU do in its neighborhood and focus on the causes and consequences of the uprisings. In an attempt to provide a first look to the sweeping revolutions in the Middle East two pieces from the Arab Spring literature are introduced. The first one is Dietrich Jung’s `Unrest in the Arab World: Four Questions` which looks for the answers of four questions that the Arab Spring has raised. Jung’s questions are: `Why did scholars fail to predict the recent developments? ` ‘should we throw the work on Middle Eastern authoritarianism in the garbage of academic misinterpretations?` ` In which ways can we support the move toward democracy in the region?` and `Is there a “new Middle East” in the making?` Looking from an understanding of the international and regional context Jung also questions whether there is a new Middle East born. He predicts that neither Arab culture and Islam nor international politics can serve as a sufficient analytical refer- 1.3 1.3.1 1.3 State of the Art 29 ence point. Instead analysts should better study the region as a whole especially with the potentials of the countries like their entrepreneurial classes. The second study called `The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East` is born out of the need to understand the historical transformation in the Middle East. In this respect it clearly lists the root causes among which are Arab public opinion, Islamists and the Brotherhood, the impacts of the new media, the economic dimension and terrorism. It looks at not only regional countries but also to non-Arab regional countries, Israel, Iran and Turkey, which exert important influence on events in the Arab world and also to global powers like the US, China, Russia, Europe Brazil and India. These chapters help us to see the big picture and this book especially helps us to understand what happened in the region and why it happened. Tariq Ramadan in his book named “Islam and the Arab Awakening” studies the uprisings and their root causes. He emphasizes that there were already hints of these public protests early in 2003 when the US and the Western organizations started to train young people in order to organize these protests in a peaceful way. His conclusion is that there are many unanswered questions as to how to integrate Islamic principles in these new born states and societies in the post-revolution period. Among the studies on the relations between the EU and Arab Spring countries the first one is Joel Peter’s ´The European Union and the Arab Spring´ which analyzes EU’s response to the socio-political changes occurred in the Middle East by bringing nine scholars together. Chapters of the book mainly deal with three questions: What role did the European Union play in promoting democracy and human rights in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East? How did the EU respond to the uprisings of the Arab street? What challenges is Europe now facing in its relations with the region? What is common to all chapters is the conclusion that there is a gap between rhetoric and practice in European policies in the Middle East. Schlumberger provides a close look at the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and analyzes what kind of differences the UfM brings to the present Euro-Arab relations in terms of actors, institutional arrangements, and policy contents in the article `The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations’. The author focuses on actors as the decisive forces, changes to the institutional set-up of Euro-Med relations and third comes the question of politicization/ de-politicization of Euro-Mediterranean relations. He examines whether or not the EU acts as a normative power under the new 1. Introduction 30 framework of the UfM. He concludes that the EU is no more a normative power. Tobias Schumacher, alternatively, analyzes the EU response to the Arab Spring in his article `The EU and the Arab Spring: Between Spectatorship and Actorness`. The author states that the EU resorted to incoherent activism and passivism together. The article aims to understand this dualism by shedding light on the EU’s foreign policy towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. He takes the EU’s recently adopted Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean as a reference document. Another piece on EU’s response to the Arab unrests is called `The EU and the Arab Spring: From Munificence to geo-strategy`. Youngs finds the political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) good for Europe but his assertion is that the EU needs to develop a more strategic approach over the longer term. The author lists some suggestions on how the EU can reposition itself geostrategically. He thinks that the applicable strategic doctrine is liberal realism. The EU should not only listen to local officials from the region but also should combine locally driven solutions with a clear vision of its own concerns as the EU is not only an NGO. The main argument of the article, `No Friends of Democratization: Europe’s Role in the Genesis of the Arab Spring`, is that the EU policies certainly have a role in initiating the Arab uprisings. To deepen this argument Rosemary Hollis looks at four areas of EU policy: trade and economic development, political reform, the ‘peace process’, and regional security (including migration control). Hollis finds that the EU has prioritized security interests over democracy promotion. Haghpanah and Ahmadi Lafuraki, in their article, The Arab Spring: Challenges for the European Union, discuss both the EU behavior and policies towards the MENA region. Their conclusion is that the EU needs to revise its approach if it wants to establish democracy and improve the human rights in the region. R. Young’s book, then again, ´Europe in the New Middle East´, aims to explain EU’s response to the Arab Spring and the impact of the Arab Spring on the interests of Europe within a period of three years after the revolutions started. The author bases his research on five types of governance which are cooperative `Euro-Mediterranean´ decision making between the EU and Middle Eastern Countries (Euro- Mediterranean Governance), the export of EU governance rules to the MENA region (Exported Governance), the role of linkages with non-state, civic actors (cosmopolitan governance), realist calculations of strategic self-interest and a dovetailing of the EU’s presence with the influence of other powers (De-Europeanized Governance). The author finds that EU 1.3 State of the Art 31 policies became more reformist after 2011, the Arab Spring didn’t advance or set back European interests considering also that EU didn’t have a major influence on the Arab Spring countries and member states gained power over Middle East policy. Tocci’s article, `The European Union and the Arab Spring: A (Missed?) Opportunity to Revamp the European Neighborhood Policy`, focuses on the need to rethink European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which deals with the bilateral relations with the Mediterranean countries. First outcomes of the ENP review were revealed in the Commission’s March 2011 `Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity` after which came the Commission’s New Response to a Changing Neighborhood in May 2011. She finds that more donations, engagement of conditionality and contacting more civil societies in the neighborhood are necessary. Another article analyzing the ENP with regard to the Arab Spring is `Can the EU Pressure Dictators? Reforming ENP Conditionality after the ‘Arab Spring’´ by Charles Thépaut. He argues that political conditionality came out as an unsuccessful attempt due to lack of application of values and common political will of the member states. He also finds the structural logic of the ENP weak in a way that it was unable to transform values to the region. He thinks that only ‘soft conditionality` can work with the autocratic regimes. Europe faced the second biggest migration flow after the Second World War. Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog and Joanna Parkin discuss the migration policies of the EU in the wake of the Arab Spring. They argue the issue of migration in the post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. They end up with several policy recommendations. They say that the EEAS and its external dimension of migration need to be strengthened in terms of increasing the institutional capacity and dividing responsibilities between the EEAS and Commission DGs such as DG Home and DG Devco. They should work on legal migration to ensure legal certainty, policy coherence and the necessary democratic accountability. The EU needs international agreements for cooperation and dialogue with third countries in spite of Joint Declarations. Finally EU actions in the external dimensions of migration should be more transparent and accountable. Michael Leigh, in his policy brief written for the German Marshall Fund of the US (GMF), warns that the Arab Spring is not a repetition of the events in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He thinks that a careful application of EU’s tools like Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity considering also the interest-based approaches of the member states is necessary. His advice is that outsiders 1. Introduction 32 such as the EU should apply a flexible policy approach since every Arab country needs a unique approach. Local business conditions, open markets, visa facilitation, civil society dimension and creating jobs should especially be given importance. Outsiders, whether they are European, American or Turkish need to engage in dialogue with the new reformers in accordance with their needs and aspirations. Volker Perthes puts his thoughts on what the EU should do in order to improve cooperation with the regional countries and eventually gain particular interests in the medium term in the article named `Europe and the Arab Spring`. He starts with the analysis that the EU had to accept its lack of influence over the Arab Spring events. He also addresses the important role the EU has in concerns over democratic initiatives, economic development and social stability of the regional countries. EU needs to starts his actions by organizing free elections, general legal forms, modern labor law, regulations between employers and trade unions, anti-trust legislation, rules for transparency and responsibility in business. It is also important for the EU to present itself as an open potential partner and to establish mutual confidence. Patryk Pawlak’s chapter on EU-Libya relations after the Libyan war is called ` From Protecting to Rebuilding: The EU’s Role in Libya`. He focuses on security, transitional justice, military and law enforcement. He concludes that the post-revolutionary period in Libya is an opportunity for the EU to prove itself as a global player. The EU should be ready to provide all sorts of assistance. He especially mentions security sector reform. But he also warns about the timing of lending the help that it isn’t too soon or too late. Muriel Asseburg’s article lists a number of suggestions after shortly explaining the impotency of the EU in the face of the great levels of chaos and violence in the Middle East. She explains that policies should be based on interests of the EU and its neighbors. EU needs to be more powerful on conflict prevention and address the refugee problem with also taking into account refugee rights. Tömmel’s article `The New Neighborhood Policy of the EU:An Appropriate Response to the Arab Spring?` argues that although the Arab Spring was an opportunity to reformulate the ENP and democratic reforms EU seeked more for its security interests rather than triggering high normative objectives. He adds that EU’s policies succeed only when member states share a strong interest in these policies. He analyzes whether the EU fulfills the expectations of partner countries from a neo-institutionalist view. Michoua, Michoua and Torre- 1.3 State of the Art 33 blanca, in their article ‘supporting the Transitions in North Africa: The Case for a Joined-Up Approach`, also saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity for the EU to apply a multi-dimensional approach for the region. Their conclusion is that the EU had an ambitious deep democracy rhetoric which didn’t find enough reciprocity at policy level in the fields of money, market and mobility. Rosa Balfour’s study called `EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring` sets out EU responses to the Arab Spring and the problematic sides of these responses. She looks at ´more for more´ and ´political conditionality´ approaches as her main argument is that more for more creates more problems than it creates solutions. According to her whether the EU commitments offer a paradigm shift is in question. One main obstacle in collective policy success is member states pursuing their national objectives. A more equal relationship, interdependence and responding to the demands of people are keys to establish dialogue with the changing Arab world. Overview of the Literature The EU is criticized for its late and incoherent response. The literature on the EU-MENA relations mainly makes the point that the EU remained impotent in the face of the revolutions and especially in the post-revolutionary settlement. The EU has to revise its neighborhood approach, make more donations, contact more with civil society, and has to establish dialogue and a more equal relationship with new authorities in accordance with their demands. (Balfour 2012, Tocci 2011, Haghpanah and Lafuraki 2010, Schucmacher 2011). EU’s positioning itself either as a normative power or a strategic/pragmatic power is highly discussed. Some authors assess the EU as not being able to transform values to the region but they see the EU as seeking more for security interests rather than triggering normative interests. (Schlumberger 2011, Hollis 2012, Theput 2011, Tömmel 2013). One main argument of the literature is that the tension between member states, which pursue national objectives, impede the EU to produce the intended results in collective policies. (Asseburg 2014, Balfour 2012, Tömmel 2013) The literature also finds that there is a gap in rhetoric and practice and the deep democracy rhetoric didn’t find a reciprocity at policy level. (Michoua et. Al, 2014). Arab Spring was an opportunity for the EU to reformulate the ENP, apply a multidimensional approach, act with more 1.3.2 1. Introduction 34 geostrategic concerns and to gain leverage in the region though. (Youngs 2011, Tömmer 2013) . Contribution to the Existing Literature This research fills a gap in the literature of EU foreign policy by looking at EU policies vis à vis Tunisia and Libya as the two distant cases. Most importantly the Middle Eastern revolutions are new to the international relations research field. There are no agreed terms on the impact of policies of the EU, or any other international organization, on the unique transition processes of the Arab Spring countries. For this reason the relative outcomes, successes and failures of the EU policies in the region are going to be understood only in the long term. Nevertheless one of the questions that is expected to be answered is about EU’s preferred goals and actions in the region. This project endeavors to fulfill this gap with a critical analysis on EU foreign policy in the Middle East. As a first contribution to the literature it is important to see how the EU leaders and the decision makers of the member states assess international threats and opportunities derived from the Arab Spring as the EU plans a long lasting presence in the Middle East. Are they referring more to values like democracy promotion and human rights or to interests like securing borders and energy access in justifying their goals? The follow up question is if their preferred goals are matching their actions or not. It is equally important to find out how member states with competing rationales block or encourage the EU in its collective policies. Member state preferences allow us to combine systemic level (EU) and unit level (members) variables as neoclassical realism suggests. Sorting out these determinants through this study is expected to give a clear answer on EU policy towards the Arab Spring. The second contribution to the literature is to differentiate neoclassical realism from rational and constructivist theories. This study does not compare constructivism and rationalism in their meta-theoretical foundations. It utilizes neoclassical realism as a middle ground theory between rational and constructivist theories. This study also builds on literature on EU’s neighborhood policy by looking at a newly emerging and transforming neighborhood of the EU, North Africa, in the post-revolutionary period. 1.3.3 1.3 State of the Art 35 Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses Neo-classical Realism Neoclassical realism is a more coherent approach of foreign policy and it offers a broad area of application. (Lobell et. Al, 2009 p.280-81) It departs from classical realism as “Neoclassical realism builds upon the complex relationship between the state and society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealism about the constraints of the international system”. (Taliaferro et al, p.10) It is a theory close to neorealism but at the same time it is seen as an alternative to neorealism. (Taliaferro et al, 287). It is no surprise that neoclassical realists use the main assumptions derived from classical realists in addition to the idea that the constraining character of the international system should not be missed. It should be acknowledged that protests, uprisings and regime changes trigger political and social transitions but no one can see what the future brings in terms of stability and democracy and how this affects the EU- Middle East relations. It is important to see the way the EU expresses its foreign policy goals and the way it promotes values or interests. It is also important to find how member states impede or encourage the EU in pursuing the type of strategies that increase EU interests in the region. With these questions on the table, as authors suggest, “neoclassical realism is the most useful theory in explaining foreign policy behavior where the international system provides unambiguous information about threats and opportunities but no clear guidance about how states ought to respond”. (Taliaferro et al, p.41) Neither purely rational and systemic theories that put forward static and structural explanations of international relations such as realism and neo realism nor purely constructivist theories that explain the importance of domestic variables such as norms, ideology and culture truly explain the foreign policy choices of the EU. Instead a combination of systemic and domestic variables can account for the explanations of EU foreign policy in the Middle East. This study uses the two edges of theoretical lining. The first one is rational behavior which favors interests and the second one is normative behavior which favors norms and values that are already listed in the methodology. This study theoretically was firstly based on construc- 2. 2.1 36 tivist arguments and then it was based on a comparison of constructivism and rationalism. As a final decision EU foreign policy behavior and whether the EU promotes more of values or interests is explored through the arguments of neoclassical realism. Neo-classical realism is chosen as the best option as it covers both norms and interests, domestic and structural incentives at the same time and as it stands between constructivism and rationalism. (Rose, 1998) Rather than focusing only on static, structural and power based debates neoclassical realism successfully integrates systemic and unit level variables. It is important for this study that “systemic pressures are filtered through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure.” (Rose, 1998, p. 152) The intervening variable of this study is for better explaining the relationship between independent and dependent variable. Here the intervening unit variable is member states’ perception and assessment of interests towards Tunisia and Libya. Gideon Rose reviews the books by Thomas Christensen, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth and Fareed Zakaria. These authors all explain the grand strategy of a great power at a specific time or place. The author in this study attempts to explain the strategy of the EU for the period covering the first three years after the Arab Spring broke up in Tunisia in 2010. This study is an attempt to apply neoclassical realism as a foreign policy theory standing between neorealist and constructivist theories by positing a systemic independent variable (EU’s Assessment of Interests and Foreign Policy Goals), a common set of intervening variables (Assessment of Foreign Policy Goals and Actions of Member States) and a dependent variable, (Foreign Policy Implementation of the EU). As Talieferro implies “there is no single neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy but rather a diversity of neoclassical realist theories.” (Talieferro et al, p.10) We need to talk about “the complex relationships between systemic and unit-level variables in shaping foreign policy”. (Talieferro et al, p.3) Within this line of reasoning this study is different from other works on neoclassical realist studies of foreign policy by explaining the EU, as the structure, and the member states, as the domestic level factors. International imperatives of the EU are filtered through the assessment of top officials of the member states. Neoclassical realism identifies elites’ perceptions of interests and domestic constraints as intervening variables between international pressures and states’ foreign policies. Schweller identifies these constraints as ` elite consensus or disagreement about the nature and extent of international 2.1 Neo-classical Realism 37 threats, persistent international divisions within the leadership, social cohesion and the regime’s vulnerability to violent overthrow`.(Schweller, Unanswered Threats, pp.46-68) EU’s domestic constraints are evaluated as member states’ assessment of their national interests in Tunisia and Libya in this case. It is easier to figure out the policy implications of the EU as a systemic force with really knowing the preexisting interests and motives of the member states. In other words if we take the EU as the structural variable we also have to consider member states and their goals as the unit/domestic level variable. The second objective is to differentiate neoclassical realism from neorealism and constructivism. The starting point of this study was a constructivist explanation of EU foreign policy. Secondly this study tried to combine constructivism and rational theories of neorealism and liberal intergovernmentalism. As it is complicated both on the philosophical and empirical grounds to combine these two competing theories neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy, as the middle ground between rational and constructivist theories, is found to be the most suitable theory for this study. This study also contributes to the literature which formulates that the dividing line between the domestic and international politics is disappearing. It establishes a direct link between EU’s domestic and international context to make a comprehensive foreign policy analysis on EU foreign policy behavior. Rational Theories This following section addresses the relationship among neorealism, neoclassical realism and constructivism. Rationalism is identified with particular theories. It has a broad class of theories that stress the rationality of actors and methods that use material and interest based factors over normative and value based factors and finally as Fearon and Wendt imply rationalist theories start from the position of methodological individualism. (Fearon and Wendt, 2002). Among the many definitions of rationalism the definition of Kratochvil and Tulmets is utilized. Rationalism is defined as the conviction that “social actors try to maximize their self-interest (which may be both material and ideational) and that they rationally manipulate their environment (which may also be both 2.2 2. Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses 38 material and ideational) to reach their ends”. (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2010, p.26) Neo realism Neo-realists highlight the effect of the international system, which is anarchy, on the states’ foreign policies. Anarchy as the structure of the international system shapes all foreign policy decision. According to Waltz states, which hold greater power, have greater impact on the international politics. When we talk about power it is not just military power as Morgenthau has assumed but it is a combination of different capabilities like technology and economic sources. States are considered similar in their functions but they differ from each other in their power capabilities. Waltz highlights the importance of balance of power and the absence of control mechanisms. What is missing in his theory is that he ignores the internal characteristics of units but focuses more on constraints and pressures of the structure. (Lobell et. Al, 2009) According to this theory there is no central authority or common power to enforce rules for the greater good. They acknowledge the importance of international organizations but they also argue that the effective functioning of international institutions depend on the support of major powers. Balance of power is the main control mechanism. International institutions can only produce norms and interests to manage problems of globalization. In this kind of international order major powers pursue a unilateral strategy to maximize and secure their interests and small countries use the option of joining alliances. (Baylis and Smith, 2005, p. 208-210) Neorealism deals with questions like occurrence of wars, the way states balance each other’s power, repeating patterns of world politics relating to anarchy focusing on systemic explanations. Liberal Inter-governmentalism Liberal intergovernmentalism partly deals with the impact of domestic politics on international politics. Seeing the state as a rational actor it looks at the preferences of states in the integration process. As Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig explain liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) is based firstly on the idea that “states are actors and the EU like other international insti- 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2 Rational Theories 39 tutions can be profitably studied by treating states as the critical actors in a context of anarchy.” (Moravcsik 2009, pp. 67-87) In other words political decisions are the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining but not solely of a centralized authority and enforcement of political decisions. There are costs and benefits of cooperation and participation in this cooperation is the result of calculation for the member states. They argue that cooperation has nothing to do with ideology or idealism but is founded on the rational calculations of the nation states within the global politics. (Cini, 2003, p.94) The EU in this respect coordinates policies as forming an international regime. (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 473-524) Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig acknowledge the fact that member states, as the masters of the EU, hold the power of pre-eminent decision making and political legitimacy. Secondly liberal intergovernmentalism basically suggest that states are rational and they calculate all options to maximize their interests. (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009) It means that collective outcomes come from aggregated individual actions which have previously been pursued strongly. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig summarize three stage framework for explaining international decisions as follows: (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, 68-72) “States first define preferences then bargain to substantive agreements and finally create or adjust institutions to secure those outcomes in the face of future uncertainty. EU integration is also a result of national leaders’ rational choices. Each stage is separate and each stage is explained with a separate theory. Moravcsik argues that these rational choices are shaped by economic interests of powerful member states, the relative power of states that asymmetrical interdependence causes and the role of institutions sustaining the credibility of interstate commitments.” (Moravsick 1998, 18 derived from Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009) Constructivism There are numerous definitions for constructivism and rationalism but the pragmatic interpretation of rationalism and constructivism is that these two approaches are analytical tools or lenses to theorize about world politics. What Wendt and Fearon mean with this position is as below: “These analytical lenses do not cause any ontological or empirical commitments that the researcher should make but they view the society from opposing vantage points; roughly speaking rationalism from the bottom up and con- 2.3 2. Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses 40 structivism from the top down. As a result they tend in practice somewhat different questions and so bring different aspects of social life into focus.” (Fearon and Wendt, 2002, p. 52) It is apparent that no theory alone can explain the world thoroughly. Constructivism and rationalism differ in their ontological ground on the concept of interests. Constructivists argue that interests are constructed in a social environment and this approach makes it necessary to include norms and ideas to the study of foreign policies. As this study also assumes that actors don’t behave in a wholly rational or normative way since they take different behavioral positions within time. For Checkel, “constructivism advances cross level models that emphasize the simultaneity of international and domestic developments.” (Checkel, p.94) While doing this constructivism can help shed light on local and international politics by investigating the various mechanisms connecting local to the global. What is more important in constructivist arguments is found in the definition of Fearon and Wendt: “Constructivism is centrally concerned with the role of ideas in constructing social life. The emphasis on ideas is meant to oppose arguments about social life which emphasize the role of brute material conditions like biology geography and technology. This is not to say that these have no role whatsoever but rather that their impact is always mediated by the ideas that give them meaning.” (Fearon and Wendt, p.57, 2002) In addition to this commonly accepted definition in literature we should add Kratochvil and Tulmet’s definition of constructivism that “actors’ identities require compliance with internalized norms, irrespective of whether these norms bring these actors additional benefits or not.” (Kratochvil and Tulmets 2010, p.26) There are also two variants of constructivism: the North American and European. The North American/conventional variant looks for the effect of the role of social norms and understandings and identity on foreign policy outcomes. The scholars in this group are labeled as `positivists` and uses a deductive mechanism analyzing top-down relationships. They also stress on causal mechanisms between actors, norms, interests and identity. The European type of constructivists or interpretive constructivists studies the role of language in social life. They do not explain as A causes B but rather focus on “how” questions. They prefer a bottom up research method. Apart from these differences they both work on actors and decision making which are the topics that have been central to foreign policy analysis for long. (Checkel 2007, 72-73) 2.3 Constructivism 41 Conventional constructivists also explore the role of `non-state norm entrepreneurs` (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 retrieved from Checkel 2007, p.74) Not only state preferences are important but also civil society and public opinion are necessary to focus on in terms of finding which group of interests (ideational or material) these non-governmental elements push for adoption. To put it another way foreign policy analysis in constructivist thinking goes beyond the nation state. Checkel shows that while realists are `defending` the national interests constructivists `define` them. (Checkel 2007, p.75) Within this definition non-governmental elements, which are exerting a growing influence on nations’ foreign policies, are also considered. By doing so this study widens the scale of actors involved and the suppositions about what leads them to act. Rationalism vs Constructivism The clash between rationalists and constructivists has been a major issue in European studies. A major difference is that rationalists “defend” national interest while constructivists “define” national interest. Constructivism shows how norms and discourses can lead to adopting interests. (Finnemore 1996) Simply we can say that constructivists give greater weight to the social-as opposed to the material in world politics. (Adler 2002, 95) Kratochvil and Tulmets discuss two types of frameworks that bring rationalism and constructivism together. The first one is `bridge building` which aims to make a synthesis between the two theories. The strength of this synthesis is that the two theories meet not only empirically but also at the level of their meta-theoretical statement. For Kratochvil and Tulmets the weakness of this suggestion is that it is almost impossible to deal with the metaphysical differences of the two approaches. (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2010). They find the strategy of `opticians` more useful as this approach takes the two theories as two different tools that can be applied to different empirical situations with different levels of success. Unlike opticians they do not deal with a meta-theoretical synthesis but the problem with this approach is that the researcher needs to clarify which theory (rationalism or constructivism) to choose before starting the analysis. To put it in another way the selection of the method comes first before the empirical analysis. 2.4 2. Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses 42 Kratochvil and Tulmets mean that there is actually no synthesis in this approach. (Kratochvil and Tulmets 2010, 15-25) Both opticians and bridge builders do not employ both theories in a single study. It is true that they bring the two theories closer but they claim that we have to choose one or the other when studying a particular case. Therefore Kratochvil and Tulmets develop their own approach because they reject the idea that one or the other alternative methodology should be selected. They offer a way of combining the two in each case we study. Their approach offers a pragmatic combination of rationalism and constructivism. The division of labor among the two approaches, in their words, “does not need to be defined in advance but rather follows from the empirical research and this opens a new so far rarely trodden path of research which can show not only when a particular actor employs the more utilitarian or the normative mode of reasoning and acting but also how and under what conditions this actor moves from one mode to the other or how it is possible that some actors may behave in both modes simultaneously depending on their social roles in different international settings.” (Kratochvil and Tulmets 2010, 15-25) Just like Kratochvil and Tulmets Fearon and Wendt also view rationalism and constructivism as analytical tools rather than as metaphysical tools. (Fearon and Wendt, 2002) Kratochvil and Tulmet’s method which brings constructivism and rationalism in one typology and which is to be explained below is utilized in this study for practical reasons. The expectation is that EU uses values to maximize interests in the area of security and economic prosperity from a classical realist viewpoint whereas values lead to normative policies in the area of value projection from a constructivist viewpoint. Additionally the EU is expected to be under the pressure of national interests of member states on the issues of migration and economic gains while the EU departs from the interest-based agenda of member states on the issue of the diffusion of values. Concepts and Variables This thesis studies the relation between two variables: EU’s assessment of normative and rational interests and foreign policy goals and EU’s foreign policy actions in Tunisia and Libya. Assessment of interests mean how EU leaders perceive their own and others’ interests and how such assessments are translated into foreign policy. (Rose, 1998, p.170) Assessment of inter- 2.5 2.5 Concepts and Variables 43 ests also reveal EU’s position either as a normative power or as a strategic/ pragmatic power. EU’s position depends on EU leaders’ assessment of threats, opportunities and foreign policy goals whether by referring to EU norms and values or by referring to material interests. Therefore EU’s assessment of interests and foreign policy goals are conceptualized through the EU as a Strategic/Pragmatic and the EU as a Normative Power. (Wood, 2011, Zimmerman 2007, Manners 2002). EU’s foreign policy implementation is conceptualized through Grand Strategy*. (Smith, 2011). Counterfactuals are also analyzed in order to strengthen the argument. The aim is to connect theoretical concepts and empirical reality by showing what the EU claims discursively and what they actually do in the Middle East. As Lupovici says: “Eventually, taking these steps may help to increase the generalizability of the research”. (Lupovici, 2009, p.204) This study moves back and forth between European position in terms of discourses and actions and compares them to get the most valid results and to provide general and theoretical conclusions. The EU as a Normative or Strategic/Pragmatic Power? To elaborate on the first concept we can say that the EU, as a global actor, has been identified with different labels which have a common aspect that the EU doesn’t use coercive (military) instruments. For instance, the ´civilian power` approach, developed by Duchene, European Economic Community (EEC) should remain as “a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces”. (Duchene 1973, p.19). EU’s normative power position covers EU norms that are aimed to be implemented in the Arab Spring countries. This concept is defined by three characteristics: 1) The EU itself is a normatively constructed polity 2) this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics and 3) a NPE diffuses these norms internationally without primarily resorting to coercion and military means, but by the ability to shape conceptions of `normal` in international relations. These norms embedded in EU law and policies are: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Additional four norms, which are social solidarity, anti-discrimina- 2.5.1 * The concept of grand strategy is found to be too ambitious considering EU’s limited capacity to pursue an efficient foreign policy in its neighborhood. Instead EU Strategy is used for the rest of the article. 2. Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses 44 tion, sustainable development, and good governance, come from the acquis communautaire. (Manners, 2002) European normative position is conceptualized through Manner’s Normative Power Europe definition. (Manners, 2001) EU’s Strategic/Pragmatic position, conversely, stresses the realist position that precedes interests before norms. Woods, in his article `Pragmatic Power Europe?´ evaluates pragmatism as an academic approach or philosophy and as an attitude or method of political practice. (Woods, 2011) He quotes different scholars so as to give a meaning to political pragmatism. As a method of political practice, “pragmatism is flexible, prudent, sometimes innovative, sometimes opportunist and it is oriented to achieving, from the perspective of the practitioner, optimal results.” (Staton and Vanberg, 2008 in Woods 2011). Some other authors linking pragmatism to instrumentalization claim that “pragmatism is associated with expediency, instrumentalism, even amorality” (Dickstein, 1998; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003–4; Widmaier, 2007; Tavits, 2007 in Woods 2011). EU’s foreign policy actions, the dependent variable, are conceptualized through Smith’s concept of Grand Strategy. EU’s assessment of interest and member states’ assessment of interest are the two variables affecting EU’s strategy, which is mainly foreign policy actions of the EU. Smith thinks that the EU has the ability to exercise multiple types of power and this enables it to act both strategically and normatively. (Smith, 2011) He simply defines EU Grand Strategy as “a general plan for integrating the policies and resources of the EU to protect and advance its core or vital interests” (Smith, 2011, p. 147) EU’s strategy towards its neighborhood, which is the dependent variable, is separated from its strategy in the global system and within the EU, itself. Why EU Strategy instead of EU Grand Strategy? Grand strategy is a strong concept on the grounds that it reminds the 600 hundred years old Ottoman Empire, the Roman Empire as the conqueror of the large part of Europe and Africa, the colonial history of Europe until the mid-20th century or the ambitious realpolitik of today’s United States and Russia. EU’s responses to the Arab uprisings however can be perceived as short termism rather than being ‘strategic` or `grand`. The only reason for why this concept is chosen as a starting point is because it covers all of the policy areas this study wants to explain. 2.5.2 2.5 Concepts and Variables 45 The EU showed limited capacity to pursue an efficient and independent foreign policy in the humanitarian, military and mobility spheres of influence. Intra and inter-institutional lack of coordination, lack of cooperation with international and regional actors, vaguely defined policies with hardly any indicators and incomplete knowledge of the geographical, social and economic context of the states in question basically harmed EU’s credibility in its neighborhood as a strategic player. Democratic transition and sustainable development in connection with democratic reconciliation are the mostly voiced values by EU senior officials. EU leaders’ actions of positive and negative conditionality, democracy aid, political dialogues and election observation in order to sustain these values however fell behind their speeches. Although the Arab Spring evoked the need for the EU to press more on democratic reforms the EU lacked the power to fulfill its geopolitical responsibilities in its neighborhood. On the contrary there is greater insecurity and polarization today. The EU also hasn’t done enough to increase its leverage over both the internal actors of France and the UK and the external actors of the US and Russia involved in the Arab Spring and failed to develop a grand strategy of its own. EUFOR Libya, for example, would conduct a military operation supporting humanitarian assistance in the region. This service would only be operational with the request of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) but OCHA never made a request. Considering the little credibility and impact the EU had as a relevant international actor on the revolts in its neighborhood `EU Strategy` instead of `EU Grand Strategy` is used throughout the text. The key characteristics of EU Strategy are physical security, economic prosperity and value projection. EU’s physical security elements are found in the 2003 European Security Strategy Paper. Governing borders and keeping them secure from troubled areas are in the interest of the EU. Problems that pose risks to EU borders can be summarized as weak neighbors with violent conflicts, dysfunctional societies, exploding population growth pose problems for Europe. Eliminating these problems is foreseen by economic, security and political engagement with the Mediterranean.4 Smith describes EU’s economic prosperity on the regional level as market access to non-EU members on its periphery on certain conditions. The 4 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003). The European Union Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ solanae.pdf, (accessed 29 October 2015). 2. Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses 46 goal is to form a trade area for not only states in the membership process but also for those which are not in the enlargement process. On the issue of value projection the EU extends its values to the regional area through various agreements. These values are found in EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and also the Copenhagen Criteria. (Smith, 2011) EU’s physical security in this study is identical with the explanation in the European Security Strategy Paper. It mostly means to secure its borders. As a result of the chaotic atmosphere in North Africa migrants and asylum seekers are faced with insecurity. They try hard to migrate to European countries particularly to Libya. So the EU felt the necessity of controlling its borders and keeping them safe. The EU was criticized for privileging security over the rights of migrants. Another element of EU Strategy is economic prosperity which is referred to EU’s attempts to pursue long term economic interests like having a share in the oil market and reconstruction program. The EU aims to establish deeper economic integration with Tunisia and Libya by giving advantages in trade and market access and helping them improve mutually beneficial economic relations. The focus of EU’s value projection starts from moral condemnation of human rights especially in Libya. EU leaders, as well as member state leaders, repeatedly stressed the necessity of establishing democracy, human right and the rule of law and helping Tunisia and Libya reflect these values in their future stable and prosperous sovereign and democratic states in the post revolution period. The EU invested some resources to the region to help support transition to democracy, the support for civil society and of course the economic needs of countries. There are four possible outcomes and these outcomes can be grouped either under normative (value-based) mode of foreign policy or under rational (interest-based) mode of foreign policy. The outcomes are explained in a typology which is illustrated in Table 1 and which is inspired by Kratochvil and Tulmet’s typology. (Kratochvil and Tulmet, 2010) Ideal types of typologies are appropriate for deductive studies where the author’s starting or reference point is a theory. In this study the attempt is to make the empirical evaluation of European foreign policy behavior moving from neoclassical realism. One of the goals of this research is to link previously unrelated or even competing theories and elements of research. (Kaiser, 1997:431-2) As Lehnert explains it, “any given typology provides descriptive knowledge that can be included in a number of causal accounts centering on different aspects of empirical reality.” (Lehnert: 78 in Gschwend 2.5 Concepts and Variables 47 and Schimmelfennig, 2007) The aim of an ideal typology, as this research utilizes, is “to confront empirical reality and theoretical construction.” (Lehnert: 63 in Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2007) Table 1: Foreign Policy Typology Actions Normative (Value-based) Rational (Interest-based) Discourses Normative (Value-based) Strongly Normative Policies Weakly Rational Policies Rational (Interest-based) Weakly Normative Policies Strongly Rational Policies Neutral Normative Rational No theory is able to explain the world thoroughly and neither ideational nor rational position alone accounts for policy decisions. Therefore this study takes both values and material interests into consideration. This approach allows for testing competing hypotheses. The above model is based on Kratochvil and Tulmet’s `Combination of Rationalism and Constructivism Model` which is used in the study of the relations between the EU and its external partners. (Kratochvil and Tulmet, 2010:30) This model is utilized for positioning EU’s mode of foreign policy in the Middle East. The aim is to find out the mainstream foreign policy behavior and determine timing and conditions under which actors moved between the four positions. The first position is that of strongly normative policies. This reflects the normative power of the EU. Both discourses and actions are based on internationally established norms and this provides a pure normative foreign policy type. The second one is labeled as weakly rational mode of policy. Here foreign policy goals and interests are assessed through values but the outcome is more of a rational one. This means that actors manipulate norms and values to their advantage, be it, material or ideational. They use norms and values to increase their benefits. One example of this approach is called “the strategic use of norm based arguments” (Schmelpfennig 2001, cited from Kratochvil and Tulmet, 2010:34). The third type, weakly value-based policy is the opposite of the second type. This reflects the type of behavior when an actor sets up his discourse on interests but then he bases foreign policy actions on values. This is expected to be a rare 2. Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses 48 model when compared to the second foreign policy type. Policy implementation is not aimed at maximizing interests but it is rather the type of policy that contributes to the development of milieu goals which are policies binding all parties and stressing the goals that promote international law and organizations. Nations are expected to have transnational concerns other than their own possessions. (Wolfers 1972 in Laidi, 2008) However goals expressed beforehand are derived from the actor’s costbenefit analysis. This mode of foreign policy challenges the normative emphasis of policy makers. The final position is called strongly interestbased policy. This type of foreign policy is partially what Duschene calls as `civilian power Europe`. He doesn’t advocate the use of military power but he explains civilian means of power and influence as gaining currency. (Orbie, 1988:7) It seems like the older emphasis on military power is replaced with economic power in Duchene’s work. “Being a civilian power does not imply any strong normative commitments but civilian powers prefer economic instruments over military force and international negotiations over war” (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2010:43). A final note that should be added in order to explain normative policy comes from Wolfer’s definition of “milieu goals”: “Milieu goals are out not to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries…It is one thing to be in good physical of financial condition within an orderly and prosperous community, but quite another thing to be privileged by the wealth of one state’s possession in surroundings of misery, ill health, lack of public order and widespread resentment.” (Wolfers 1972, 22th endnote in Laidi, 2008:19) Independent Variable: EU’s Assessment of Interests (Normative and Rational Interests) and Foreign Policy Goals As Geddes outlines basic characteristics of a research it is important for a scholar to select cases appropriately but it is equally important to make measurement of concepts open and clear whether measurements are quantitative or qualitative. (Geddes 2003:143) The qualitative operationalization and measurement of variables are as below: How EU leaders define their interests is measured by counting the codes which represent values and interests and by locating in which context and in connection with which concepts these codes have been used. This process of content analysis is done via MAXQDA Software program. 2.5.3 2.5 Concepts and Variables 49 These codes are found in Council and Commission documents, reports, news articles and opinion pages of the most widely read newspapers in Europe in addition to secondary literature and official speeches of EU top officials who are HR/VP Catherine Ashton, EC President José Manuel Barroso, the Council President Herman van Rompuy, EU Representative for the Middle East, The EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Commissioner Stefan Füle political leaders of Germany, France and UK. (See Appendix for Coding Sche) Dependent Variable: EU Policy Implementation EU’s policy implementation in the areas of physical security, value projection and economic prosperity towards Tunisia and Libya are measured through EU’s diplomatic, political, cultural, economic, humanitarian and military instruments. In order to measure physical security and value projection European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) practices, Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity practices, Coordinated National Actions, Aid and Sanctions, Exchange Programs, Broadcasting, Scholarships, Tempus Program for the Middle East, Mobility Partnerships are analyzed. The tools for economic prosperity are found in political dialogues (including reforms to trade), measures for improved market access and free trade areas, development assistance, financial support (any kind, disaster relief…etc) and SPRING program (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth). Similar instruments can also be found in Michael Smith’s chapter on `Implementation: Making the EU’s International Relations Work`. (Smith 2011 in Hill and Smith, International Relations and the European Union, 2011) Intervening Variable: Member State Policies In order to see in which direction member state policies go and to see if they go in the same direction of that of EU policies it is important to match their discourses and actions just like it is done at the EU level. The expectation is that member states have direct impact at the EU level when EU policies are oriented towards more interests than norms especially on the issues of migration and economic gains. Their speeches and actions are found in their press releases on the websites of Foreign Ministries of 2.5.4 2.5.5 2. Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses 50 the UK, France and Germany, on the online archives of the mostly read newspapers of Europe from both left and right ideologies and in the articles delivered by think tank organizations and academic journals. Table 2: Concepts and Variables Independent Variable Intervening Variable Dependent Variable EU’s Assessment of Interests and Foreign Policy Goals EU as a Normative or Strategic/Pragmatic Power (Wood 2011, Zimmerman 2007, Manners 2002) Member States’ Assessment of Interests and Policy Implementation EU Foreign Policy Implementation EU Grand Strategy (Smith 2011) Alternative Explanations (Hypotheses) Every theory covers interrelated set of causal hypotheses which are designed to show the causes of a phenomenon or a set of phenomena. Each hypothesis determines a relationship between variables and these variables create observable implications. (King et al: 100) King, Keohane and Verba define causality like this: “The causal effect is the difference between the systematic component of observations made when the explanatory variable takes one value and the systematic component of comparable observations when the explanatory variable takes on another value”. (King et al.:82) Neoclassical realism is put to the task of explaining EU’s role as a global actor (strategic/normative) and its increasing involvement in the international affairs. Sticking to the mainstream classical realist thought this study argues that the EU, as a pragmatic/strategic power, uses norms and ideals to maximize interests rather than value projection in North Africa. A second argument derived from a neo classical realist perspective is that external policies of the EU are in line with domestic factors, which are meant to be the national interests of the member states of UK, France and Germany. So member states’ preferences, as the intervening variable, are expected to determine the mode of the EU’s foreign policy towards Tunisia and Libya. Finally the causal relationship between EU discourses and EU actions is determined through matching them. This means that if EU’s assessment of 2.6 2.6 Alternative Explanations (Hypotheses) 51 interests is normative (value-based) then EU’s foreign policy actions are also normative (value-based). The three hypotheses are as below: – H1-The normative/value-based assessment of interests and foreign policy goals of the EU is used for the maximization of interests rather than promotion of values. / The normative assessment of interests, both at the community and member state level, is not positively related to normative policy implementation. – H2-The likelihood of EU’s promotion of values decreases when member states pursue interest-based policies. / Increases in rational/interestbased policies at the member state level is associated with decreases in normative/value-based policies at the community level. – H-3 If normative/value-based assessment of interests lead to normative policies then the EU pursues normative policies in Tunisia whereas the EU pursues rational/interest-based policies in Libya. Table 3: Hypotheses (The Correlation between Independent, Intervening and Dependent Variables Factors) EU’s Assessment of Interests (Power, Security, Normative) Member States’ Foreign Policy Implementation European Foreign Policy Implementation H1-H3 H2 2. Line of Theoretical Reasoning, Concepts and Hypotheses 52 Research Design This is going to be a small-N research design. There will be four observations. The foreign policy behavior of the EU towards Tunisia and Libya over time (2010-2013) is observed to see how important norms in contrast to interests are and how norms and interests interact. These two cases allows to test three hypotheses which are explained above. This is an X1/Y centered hypothesis testing analysis which is explanatory in nature.5 Tunisia and Libya with a set of distant characteristics, which are discussed in `case selection` part, are chosen and then probes for causal relationships. These causal relationships are the typical examples suggested by existing theories which is neoclassical realism. To put it another way, as King, Keohane and Verba explain, this is called intentional design which means that you “select observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables.”(King et. al, 1994:140) Only during the research values of the dependent variable are discovered. In other words, only at the end of the research or during the empirical analysis the impact of normative (value based) discourses on policy actions is determined and this type of methodology makes this study an open ended empirical research. The main purpose of a case study is to make generalizations about a population (events, facts or individuals) we study. However in this research the Middle Eastern countries (units) have unique characteristics and each has experienced the uprisings in a different way. Therefore no single unit or a group of units represent the population of the Arab Spring countries perfectly. Just like Gerring puts it, heterogeneity means that cases are `apples and oranges’. Each Arab Spring country is unique in its history, political and socio-economic system. These so called nation states are 3. 5 Please note that variation in the independent variable is based on not observed relationships but it is based on empirical reasoning. As Barnes and Weller also confirm expected relationships are not the same as observed relationships. Accordingly “choosing cases based on the expected X1/Y relationship does not guarantee that the selected cases will in fact feature the X1/Y relationship”. (Barnes and Weller, p. 34-35). 53 composed of different ethnicities, cultures, religions and political regimes. It doesn’t give us much idea about the underlying causal processes of the revolutions if we compare the experiences of the regional countries or the policies that have been applied to them. By the same token, conceptual stretching or unit heterogeneity, which means that X/Y relationship of interest is different in different contexts, does not let us to choose cases which are perfectly representative of the whole region. (Gerring 2007:50) Not every research includes multiple cases. For these reasons the best approach to this research is to have greater understanding of the causal patterns by examining the chosen cases, Tunisia and Libya, in detail rather than undertaking a large-N analysis and to use path dependent research strategy which tests multiple hypotheses and involves the selection of usually countries. Historical events like revolutions are then traced in each of the cases which are usually countries (Geddes 2003:139) In addition to the method of detailed case study in King, Keohane and Verba’s words this study attempts to use other `popular´ ways of doing empirical analyses. Among these popular ways are process tracing and detailed case studies as explained above. (King et. al: 86, 1994) Similarly Lupovici, in the article “Constructivist methods: a plea and manifesto for pluralism” argues that a qualitative study can start with discourse analysis, and then move to process tracing to establish causal relations and understand both the context and constitutive relations. (Lupovici, 2009). As the scholars above suggest this study adopts content analysis and critical discourse analysis before passing to process tracing. Taking the huge amount of documents that will be utilized into account qualitative content analysis has been adopted for this study. Content Analysis is defined by Krippendorff as `a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts, (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use` (Krippendorff, p.24) Tracking changes in EU policies towards Tunisia and Libya in three years and testing the hypotheses in a deductive way will be done through the methods of process tracing and content analysis. So this study employs content analysis of EU leaders’ speeches and EU’s key policy documents. Quantification of codes in two different categories which are normative interests (the eight EU values) and rational interests (economic and security interests), is done via Max QDA software program. Additionally in which context and in relation to which concepts these codes have been used are also analyzed. As for operationalization in content analysis it is necessary to create a coding scheme. For the analysis of texts derived from a population of units 3. Research Design 54 we need codes to count. This coding scheme or `dictionary´ is a set of words gathered under the categories of `norms’ and `interests.´This dictionary, which is constructed by the researcher, is called `custom dictionary` indeed. (Neuendorf, 2002, p.127) As a final note on content analysis, through the interpretation of texts the leaders’ conceptualization of EU’s interests relating to power, security and EU values are analyzed. Inferences are also an important contribution of content analysis in addition to deductive theory testing. (Krippendorff, 2013) The inferred frequencies and the order of priorities in different categories help much to the researcher to lay out her findings. As Krippendorff explains “the frequency with which a symbol, idea, reference or topic occurs in a stream of messages is taken to indicate the importance of, attention to, or emphasis on that symbol, idea, reference, or topic in the messages.” (Krippendorff, 2013, p.62) By doing so it is easy to see how EU leaders assess values and interests and how they merge these into their speeches. This methodology also helps us to see how they have represented their normative or strategic/ pragmatic identity as Hansen explains. He sees the link between identity and foreign policy as “Foreign policies rely upon representations of identity” and “….representations of identity are always employed in the legitimization of foreign policy”. (Hansen 2006, pp.1-7) Similarly Fairclough view representations and concepts as reflecting social practices. He adds that “the way people see represent, interpret and conceptualize social events or practices is a part of these realities.” (Gee and Handford eds. 2014, p.9) Both scholars of discourse analysis point to the representation of actions through different identities. The analysis of member state leaders’ speeches is done with the application of critical discourse analysis. The reason for operating critical discourse analysis rather than content analysis is because data on the official speeches of member state leaders on Tunisia and Libya is relatively small compared to the official speeches of EU leaders. Therefore delving into the analysis of how frequently certain words are stated as it was done with key policy documents and speeches of EU leaders would simply not work with member states. Hansen’s poststructuralist critical discourse analysis is picked as the best method to study the discourses of member state leaders. Hansen sees at the center of an analysis of foreign policy a link between policy and identity. (Hansen 2006, p.28). This intimate connection is best seen through discourses in the process of differentiation and linking. (Hansen 2006, pp. 27-29) Poststructuralists look for a process of link- 3. Research Design 55 ing and differentiation of signs of identity but they never look for a causal relationship. Instead they look for discursive, relational, political and social practices which together address the characteristics of a poststructuralist textual analysis. (Hansen 2006, p.6) Which identity are member states promoting for themselves and which counter identity are they producing for Tunisia and Libya through their discourses? In other words this part of the research is looking for the construction of European ‘self` and Tunisian and Libyan ´Other` and in which way these identities are enabling member state foreign policies? The goal in the end is to facilitate a better understanding of EU foreign policy by looking at member states’ position on the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya. Case Selection: Selection on an Explanatory Variable Among the cases that have passed through a wave of uprisings Tunisia and Libya are selected. Case selection is based on two points. The first point is variation on key case characteristics (Weller and Barnes, 2014:34) and the second point is variation on independent (explanatory) variable. (King et al., 1994) Firstly variation in key case characteristics means that Tunisia and Libya are the two distant cases in terms of the structure of state and society. It became clear from an interview that there was the basis of Bourgiba society meaning that there were still NGOs, trade unions and business associations in the post-revolutionary period in Tunisia. In other words Tunisia was an appropriate country for the EU or any other international organization to run social, economic and humanitarian projects or to promote business. In Libya, on the other hand, there were no political institutions and no political culture. Gaddafi used to introduce popular committees where people discussed and discussed but never decided on any issue. He had dismantled the state and there was no habit of representation. Libya was left with simply a mix of remnants of the state, remnants of the army plus multiple brigades which of course was never a problem of Tunisia which has no tribal issues.6 Secondly when we select experiments on the key causal variable, which is the independent variable, we can watch what happens to the dependent 3.1 6 Interview No: 18. 3. Research Design 56 variable, which is EU foreign policy implementation in North Africa. (King et al., 1994:137) Within this perspective selection of Tunisia and Libya differs from each other in the way the EU approaches them in terms assessment of interests and foreign policy goals. Libya is selected as a case towards which the EU pursued a security and economy based approach on the discursive level as they called for support for the UN decision to implement military intervention in Libya and as they advocated economic interests on the discursive level. Tunisia, on the other hand, is selected as a case towards which the EU pursued a value based approach as they called for a smooth transition to an efficient democracy. This study aims to draw conclusions from the cases of Libya and Tunisia by using a combination of within case analysis and cross case comparisons. The argument is induced from only these two cases. (Geddes 2002, 141) Established theories are used to explain the European impact on the Arab Spring. The eventual idea is to see how different approaches captured at a first glance towards Tunisia and Libya changed over time and to see if different ways of assessing interests and goals in discourses had any impact on actions. If we think that value-based discourses, which refer to values more than interests, lead to value-based policy implementation, which aim to diffuse values rather than interests, the difference between the degree of value-based policy implementation in Tunisia and Libya will be the realized causal effect. It is aimed to find the extent to which normative assessment of goals lead to normative foreign policy implementation. Description of Data Units, in content analysis, are used for identifying the population and drawing a sample from this population. Sampling units are `units that are distinguished for selective inclusion in an analysis`. (Krippendorff, 2013:99) The sampling units of this research come from the key policy documents of the EC and the Council covering issues especially on Tunisia and Libya and a large number of statements on Tunisia, Libya and the Arab Spring in general of relevant political actors such as presidents, commissioners, prime ministers, ministers and other dominant senior officials in the course of the Arab Spring. Of these hundreds of official documents 152 were on EU leaders’ discourses and 112 were on EU actions on Tunisia and Libya. Reports, books 3.2 3.2 Description of Data 57 and articles published by think tank organizations and news articles, opinion pages, press briefings and interviews from most widely newspapers of Europe are also systematically analyzed. These sources are selected ideologically both from left and right leaning sources so as to maintain objectivity. Some of them are BBC, DW, The Telegraph and The Guardian. As for the news from the Middle East the mostly utilized online archives are from Al-Jazeera and Al-Monitor. When it comes to member state leaders’ speeches and actions the corpus of texts on Tunisia, Libya, the Arab Spring, Middle East and North Africa is gathered systematically from the foreign ministry websites of member states in addition to the media resources mentioned above. There are two sets of interviews conducted for this study. The first round covers policy makers, policy advisors, diplomats and administrators from Brussels and the second round of interviews covers scholars and opinion makers from think tanks and universities. In the first round interviewees are selected from high ranking officials in charge of the Southern Mediterranean countries and of the European integration. The choice of EU institutions, as obvious, is limited to the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The total number of interviews are 23. A list of interviewees can be found in the appendix. The interviews cover several areas which comprise the focus of this research. Firstly they seek to find out what policy makers and their advisers have aimed and what they have actually accomplished. Secondly it sorts out when and how policy makers choose rational or normative approaches or the conditions when they shifted from one approach to the other. This part of the methodology also questions the interviewed peoples’ normative and ideational concerns. Additionally questions for the analysts working in civil society and think tank organizations seek to explain the preferred foreign policy behaviors. Chong explains in-depth interviewing as below: “One of the advantages of the in-depth interview (over the mass survey) is that it records more fully how subjects arrive at their opinions. While we cannot actually observe the underlying mental process that gives rise to their responses, we can witness many of its outward manifestations. The way subjects ramble, hesitate, stumble, and meander as they formulate their answers tips us off to how they are thinking and reasoning through political issues.” (Chong, 1993:868 derived from Gerring, 2007:45) 3. Research Design 58 Preliminary Answer With the Barcelona Process put into service in 1995 the h aims to export stability and peace to the Southern Mediterranean countries but deep improvements in society and politics are in question. For Leigh member states developed bilateral relations with rational motivations but they didn’t establish relations on the societal, economic and diplomatic level closely. (Leigh, 2011) Many analysts saw the Arab Spring as a “golden opportunity” (Leigh, 2011) for Europe to get closer to the Mediterranean region with people to people dialogue, bilateral civil society relations and deeper democratic support. However in the first few months of the revolutions the EU was criticized for not having a concrete response to the Arab Spring. This was mainly because of the internal bargaining process of the EU members. Each member state had a different agenda and EU institutions were under heavy pressure of leading profiles of the EU. This study suggests that the final outcome of the EU policies varies according to the interest or norm based policy preferences of the leading member states like France, Germany and the UK. With the past European experiences seeing the southern neighborhood as a burden (Youngs, 2011) and not supporting a real democratization process the EU is likely to pursue a geostrategic vision maximizing members’ interests. It is hard to make a prediction on where the EU stands on the normative-rational scale without really taking the grasp of background information on under which conditions the policy makers make decisions and take action. EU’s normative policies (soft power) in the Middle East are adapted to a certain extent. Limits to the application of this normative behavior are to be explored during the empirical analysis though. In other words it is the contribution of this study to explain where normative approach comes to an end and where the real-politik approach starts. EU’s reactions differed for each Arab country for two reasons: Firstly each uprising has unique characteristics. Some countries passed through violent conflicts while others had rather peaceful protests. Secondly the EU, prior to the revolutions, had different ties on the political and economic level to individual countries. On 8 March 2011 the EU responded to the phenomena of the Arab uprisings with a communication: "A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean". This was a general response demanding universal values such as political participation, employment opportunities and freedom. A violent clash occurred between the Libyan 3.3 3.3 Preliminary Answer 59 regime supporters and the opposition groups only in the second day of the uprisings in January 2011. In the next month there was a bloody suppression shooting unarmed demonstrators in Benghazi. These signals have erupted a civil war in Libya. With this picture in hand the EU adapted a series of sanctions against individuals and entities, aiming at preventing arms and money from reaching the Gaddafi regime. With UN Security Council resolution 1973 the EU got the legal justification for a military intervention. The EU member states supported this decision with active engagement. Since the beginning of the crisis the EU also provided €155 million for humanitarian support. The EU also suspended all technical cooperation and negotiations on the EU-Libya Framework Agreement. It was the economic interests, particularly having a share in oil and arms market that guided the policy preferences of the member states. France and England actively supported the military intervention but Italy and Germany remained cautious on this issue. France and England have stronger economic ties with Libya than that of Germany and Italy. In addition to economic interests it was also important for France and England to gain national and international prestige. Raising the profile in international politics would also strengthen their national identity. With regard to Tunisia considerable humanitarian support, technical assistance and funding were made available. Dialogues in mobility partnerships were also launched for Tunisia but Tunisia was expected to restrict illegal immigration to Europe in return. EU’s approach towards the Arab Spring countries, in some respects, is that the EU avoids making countries, which deal with many problems, members/neighbors. The EU wants a relatively problem-free environment and the EU commits to help the Libyans and Tunisians transform their state and society to a democratic and free one for achieving this. To speak in general existing evidences show that the EU didn’t show the leadership in exporting peace, stability and prosperity as it was expected from itself. The use of economic tools and the influence in affecting the transition to democracy remain to be questioned. 3. Research Design 60 Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia EU-Tunisia Relations Tunisia is the place where the wave of revolutions started. This makes Tunisia symbolically important as its success or failure is an example to other countries. The history between Tunisia and the EU dates back to July 1969 when the European Commission and Tunisia signed a commercial cooperation agreement. Tunisia is also the first Mediterranean country to sign an Association Agreement (AA) in July 1995 with the launch of Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Association Agreement is the first important step to build bilateral relations. (See Figure 2) The MEDA* program, which aims to help non-member countries to reform their economic and social structures, is the main instrument for Tunisia’s aid. MEDA also supports the establishment of a free trade area around the Mediterranean.7 MEDA resources are delivered through National Indicative Programs. France was the main aid provider as France has a colonial history and interests in the Maghreb. Tunisia received €458 million under MEDA I with a priority in the areas of finance and education. Tunisia is also participating fully in the Barcelona process and is an active player since 1995. Association agreements provide the basic cooperation in the categories of political dialogue, free movement of goods, economic provisions like rights of establishment and cooperation in the areas of economic, social and cultural matters. (Dandashly, 2014, p.12) They are negotiated by the Commission/European External Action Service (EEAS) and structured around the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) as a long term document and the National Indicative Papers (NIPs) as a medium term document. (Thepaut, 2011, p.7) 4. 4.1 * MEDA comes from MEsures D'Accompagnement (French for accompanying measures). 7 See MEDA Program Europe: Summaries of EU Legislation retrieved from http:// europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/ mediterranean_partner_countries/r15006_en.htm (accessed 2 April 2013). 61 Bilateral cooperation process in the ENP framework8 provisions like rights of establishment and cooperation in the areas of economic, social and cultural matters. (Dandashly, 2014, p.12) They are negotiated by the Commission/European External Action Service (EEAS) and structured around the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) as a long term document and the National Indicative Papers (NIPs) as a medium term document. (Thepaut, 2011, p.7) Figure 2: Bil teral cooperation pr cess in th ENP framework8 With the birth of the ENP Tunisia became one of the five countries in the Southern Mediterranean to adopt a European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan which came out of EU´s enlargement process as an opportunity to consolidate relations between the EU and the neighboring countries in 2005. ENP is based on mutual acceptance of basic values such as democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, market economics, free trade, sustainable development, poverty alleviation and the strengthening of political, economic, social and institutional reforms. The EU and Tunisia like other southern neighbors aim to set up political association without EU membership. As for the association agreement, it is the framework of EU-Tunisia relations providing a free trade area in the long term. It also covers issues relating to migration, human rights, democracy and political problems. Tariff 8 Thepaut´s Compilation at Thépaut, C., & Diplomacy, E. (2011). Can the EU Pressure Dictators? Reforming ENP Conditionality after the Arab Spring EU Diplomacy Papers. Belgium College of Europe ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT or PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT Legally binding Country Report Action Plan Political roadmap ENPI Autonomous financial instrument, legally binding Country Strategy Paper 7 years National Indicative Programme - 3 years 3 annual Progress Reports National Indicative Programme II - 3 years 3 annual Progress Reports Do cu m en ts n eg ot ia te d w ith be ne fic ia rie s U ni la te ra l P ro gr am m in g pr oc es s U ni la te ra l r ep or tin g of t h e Co m m iss io n/ EE AS With the birth of the ENP Tunisia became one of the five countries in the Southern Mediterranean to adopt a European N ighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Pla which came out of EU’s e largement process as n opportunity to consolidate rel tions between the EU and the neighbori g ountries in 2005. ENP is based on mutual accept ce of basic values such as democracy, the rule of law, g od governance, respect f r human rights, market economics, free trade, s stainabl development, poverty alleviation and the strengthening of p litical, economic, social and institutional reforms. Th EU and Tunisia like other southern neighbors ai to set up political association without EU membership. As for the association agreement, it is the framework of EU-T nisia relations providing a free trade area in the long term. It also covers issues relating to migration, human rights, democracy and political problems. Tariff dismantling under the Association Agreement was completed in 2008 as being the first one between the EU and a Mediterranean partner. Tariffs are going to be di- Figure 2: 8 Thepaut’s Compilation at Thépaut, C., & Diplomacy, E. (2011). Can the EU Pressure Dictators? Reforming ENP Conditionality after the Arab Spring EU Diplomacy Papers. Belgium College of Europe. 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 62 minished according to a calendar of different products and direct investment opportunities will be eased.9 Tunisia is also the Euro-Med coordinator of the Arab group. As part of the European security strategy the EU also needs to strengthen its security in its neighborhood with this program. Relations with Tunisia have developed within the framework of the EU-Tunisia Action Plan which was adopted in 2005 for 5 years. Tunisia received financial assistance in the period between 2007 and 2011 under European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). ENPI’s priority areas are economic governance, competitiveness and convergence with the EU, improved graduate employability and sustainable development including environment, energy, research and innovation. ENPI vision offers enhanced political dialogue, technical assistance and twinning schemes, opening access to certain community programs and strengthening administrative and judicial cooperation.10 Within the process that starts from the publication of ENP up to the revisions of it with documents of `A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood: A review of European Neighborhood Policy` and `Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity` Tunisia has always been in a stable relation with the EU. This partnership has been conceived as EU’s strategic response to the public protests in the Arab southern Mediterranean and foresees engagement in the areas of democratization and institution building, civil society, economic development, fundamental freedoms and judiciary. (Schumacher, 2011, p.109) There is a certain belief in the EU as a trusted partner and Tunisian elites hold values close to that of the EU. This also makes Tunisia an important partner of the EU. (Dandashly, 2014). EU’s policies towards southern neighborhood has been shaped by economic, political and social considerations. It is not new to the EU to support Tunisia in terms of financial help or opening markets for Tunisia in the face of the uprisings. Despite its relatively institutionalized relations with the EU Tunisia, just like any other Arab Spring country, became a test case for the EU. The EU aimed to secure greater participation of civil society in Tunisia and increased its 9 EU-Tunisia Relations. European Institution for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation. (MEDEA) http://www.medea.be/en/countries/tunisia/eutunisia-relations/ (accessed 5 May 2013). 10 EU-Tunisia ENP Action Plan. 2005. EU Neighborhood Library. http://www.enpiinfo.eu/library/content/eu-tunisia-enp-action-plan (accessed 5 April 2013). 4.1 EU-Tunisia Relations 63 support for democratic reforms as the Arab Spring events unfolded in 2010. Referring to the classical statements the Arab Spring is said to have been sparked by the self-burning of Muhammed Bouazizi in a small village of Tunisia. This individual protest of a young man with poor life conditions led to a wave of protests that have been sweeping the region since 2011. Tunisia’s civil uprising started on 17 December 2010 and ended with President Zainal Abidin bin Ali’s destitution on January 14, 2011. He fled the country after 23 years of dictatorship. Tunisians’ insurrection against the authoritarian regime resulted in the establishment of Constituent Assembly and the free elections on 23 October 2011. EU High Representative and Vice President of the Commission Ms Ashton announced the plan for Tunisia just after Ben Ali has been prisoned for 35 years in jail and before the national elections were held in October 2011. She explained that the EU would start negotiations on Privileged Partnership, Mobility Partnership, an asset recovery program, liberalization of trade in agriculture and the launching of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). She also added that a new, open, dynamic, democratic and prosperous Tunisia was emerging. She also announced that EU’s financial support would approach 4 billion euros over the 2011-2013 period along with support from member states and the EIB.11 Tunisia’s shortly recognized reform progress was rewarded with Privileged Partnership during the Association Council held on 19 November 2012.12 Physical Security Migration: Weak Responses to Huge Problems The migration flow of the Arab Spring forced the EU and member states to change their migration trends. More than 16 million refugees worldwide were displaced because of the wars in Syria, Libya and the conflict in Eritra. Additional 33.3 million people were displaced within the region itself 4.2 4.2.1 11 EC. (29 Sept. 2011) Comments by the HR/VP Catherine Ashton following the EU/ Tunisia Task Force. MEMO/11/650 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-650_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 5 April 2013). 12 Tunisia-Democracy Assistance Resource Page. European Partnership for Democracy, http://www.epd.eu/?page_id=5794#tab-id-4 (accessed 6 June 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 64 just to get to the countries close to Europe.13 It is fair enough to say that immigration flow from the North African countries is the biggest problem of Europe following the unrest in the Arab Spring countries. Just after the revolution Tunisia and Libya became departure points for smuggling migrants and refugees to Italy. Migration is found to be part of the response to unemployment and deteriorating sectors. Between January and September 2011, 42,807 people were recorded as entering illegally Italy by sea compared with less than 5,000 in 2010 and less than 10,000 in 2009, and an annual average of 18,788 in the preceding decade. (Fandrich and Fargues, 2012, p.4) Among these 42, 807 people 19, 036 were of Tunisian origin. (See Table 4) All the people entering Italy illegally were not necessarily running away from conflict caused by the uprisings. We should look in detail to understand the increasing number of migrants. Non-Tunisians especially Sub-Saharan Africans (47% of the total) were smuggled to Italy together with the Tunisians at the time of spring 2011 when there was no coastal control Tunisia. Italy served as the main entry point to Europe for migrants and asylum seekers from Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, Egypt and Somalia. Table 4: Migratory Circulation of Tunisians in 2011 Migratory Circulation of Tunisians in 2011 Outflow of Tunisian Nationals to Five Top14 Countries of Destination (2011) Arrivals at Sea of Tunisian Nationals in Italy Italy 19,036 Years Number of Emigrants France 11,843 2001-2005 4,284 Germany 770 2006-2010 13,534 UK 622 2011 28,047 Sweden 296 2012 (1/1-20/09) 2,025 13 Kingsley, P. (3 Jan. 2015). `Arab Spring Prompts Biggest Migrant Wave Since Second World War` The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2015/jan/03/arab-spring-migrant-wave-instability-war (accessed 7 April 2015). 14 Data elaborated from Migration Fact Sheet Tunisia (April 2013) www.migrationpolicycentre.eu, (accessed 24 October 2013). 4.2 Physical Security 65 People simply took the opportunity to arrive European shores. Their main motivation was not mainly a reaction to the crisis in the post-revolutionary period but to take that route was easy. (Fandrich and Fargues, 2012, p.4) Libyan War was another source of migrants for Tunisia. In 2011 Tunisia received the largest number of migrants escaping from the Libyan civil war. International Organization for Migration (IOM) shows that 345,238 migrants reached Tunisian borders because of the war. Following the outbreak of violence in Libya, Tunisia opened the Shousha refugee camp to accommodate those fleeing the Libyan border into Tunisia.15 (See Table 5) Table 5: Migration Movements during the Libyan Crisis16 Migration Movements during the Libyan Crisis Total Inflows from Libya: 345,238 (Country Nationality) Total Number of Repatriations of Foreign Nationals from Tunisia: 115,516 (Five Top Countries of Nationality, repatriations) Tunisia: 136,749 Egypt: 29,466 Other Countries: 208,489 Bangladesh: 23,474 Sudan: 18,232 Chad: 12,354 Mali: 9,018 European Commissioner Malmström declared on February 15, 2011 that Italy was under great pressure of app. 5500 migrants reaching Italian shores. Malmström stressed the importance of setting up a medium-term strategy against this problem following the Italian Interior Minister’s letter requesting EU assistance.17 The EU was expected to promote projects targeted at supporting income and generating jobs as well as exchange of goods, services and know-how. As part of more for more principle grater 15 Migration Policy Centre (MPC) Migration Profile-Tunisia. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. (June 2013) http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/ migration_profiles/Tunisia.pdf, (accessed 10 April 2015). 16 Data elaborated from Migration Fact Sheet Tunisia (April 2013) www.migrationpolicycentre.eu, (accessed 24 October 2013). 17 Malmström, C. (15 Feb 2011). Immigration flows – Tunisia situation, (Press Release), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-106_en.htm, (accessed 23 April 2013). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 66 facilitation of mobility, which is found in `A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood: A Review of a European Neighborhood Policy`, has been offered to countries that democratize.18 In the short term she explained that they would mobilize the European Refugee Fund for 2011 and European Border Fund. She also welcomed the member states’ voluntary support.19 Commissioner Malmström, at the same time, criticized member states for “being too event driven” and not having a long term migration policy strategy and cooperation with North African countries.20 As thousands were leaving Tunisia she visited Tunisia on March 30, 2011 with the ENP Commissioner Stefan Füle. She said that their visit was the result of the European Council’s request to enhance people to people contacts and to manage migration and mobility. She reminded that the EU would provide international protection but those who were not allowed to stay in the EU needed to be returned in accordance with the EU regulations and international law.21 Within this line European Commission established a regional protection program in December 2011 in North Africa with a focus on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Eight member states-Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden-agreed to resettle from Shousha camp in Tunisia to the extent that their existing resettlement quotas al- 18 “Increased EU support to its neighbors is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU. This enhanced support will come in various forms, including increased funding for social and economic development, larger programs for comprehensive institution-building (CIB), greater market access, increased EIB financing in support of investments; and greater facilitation of mobility. These preferential commitments will be tailored to the needs of each country and to the regional context.” A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood, p.3. 19 Malmström, Ibid. 20 Frenzen, N. (29 April 2011). Malmström: Migration Policy Should Not Be Event Driven. Migrants at Sea, http://migrantsatsea.org/2011/04/, (accessed 23 April 2013). 21 EC (30 March 2011). Joint statement by Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy and Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, on their trip to Tunisia. MEMO/11/204, http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-204_de.htm?locale=en, (accessed 24 April 2013). 4.2 Physical Security 67 lowed.22 Europe, in 2011, resettled only 700 refugees though.23 Speaking at a lecture at Harvard University Malmström stated that: “Despite the clear humanitarian need, no European State took any serious initiative to provide shelter on its own soil to those in need of international protection. While the U.S. took several thousands, the European Union and Norway, took only 700.”24 Of 5,000 refugees around 3,800 were in Shousha refugee camp. The estimated number of drowned people while trying to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean is 1500.25 In terms of people to people contacts setting up exchange programs ranked the highest and it was the easiest way of increasing mobility but that is more of a long term success rather than short term success.26 The EU preferred to accept foreigners by giving an opportunity to Tunisian students and researchers to benefit mobility via Erasmus Mundus and Tempus programs, to award scholarships and to implement joint projects. The funding for this program has been increased by €30ml in the 2011-2012 academic year. (Fandrich and Fargues, 2012) EU’s additional funding worth €10 million was also used for modernization of higher education under the special measure of ‘specific Tunisia Window under Erasmus Mundus and Tempus`27. Master and doctoral programs at European universities would offer a new vision to students and higher education would also be internationalized via international cooperation projects. On this occasion Mr Füle said "With today's decision, the EU is highlighting the importance of people-to-people exchanges and intercultural dialogues. 22 European Resettlement Network. Regional Protection Programs. European Resettlement Network http://www.resettlement.eu/page/regional-protection-programmes, (accessed 4 Nov. 2015). 23 EU: Put Rights at Heart of Migration Policy. (20 June 2011) Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/de/news/2011/06/20/eu-put-rights-heart-migration-policy, (accessed 30 May 2013). 24 Malmström, C. Responding to the Arab Spring and rising populism: The challenges of building a European migration and asylum policy. (30 April 2012), (Press Release) Speech/12/312, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-312_en.htm, (accessed 4 October 2015). 25 Ridgwell, H. (19 Sept. 2011) Europe Accused of Ignoring Libya Refugees. VOA News, http://www.voanews.com/content/europe-accused-of-ignoring-libyarefugees-130212568/158878.html, (accessed 15 Oct. 2015). 26 Int. No: 13. 27 EC Europaid. Action Fiche for a Special Measure for Tunisia in 2013, https:// ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-financing-education-tunisiaaf-20130507_en.pdf (7 June 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 68 In addition to the efforts already made to provide EU support for economic recovery and growth, to create new jobs and to reduce regional discrepancies in Tunisia."28 It was also clear in Tunisia Task Force Meetings that took place on 28/29 September that the EU would advise member states to offer Tunisians visa facilitation. The Commission announced to increase mobility and joint research programs for Tunisian students through Erasmus Mundus and Tempus program and agreed to set up a dialogue on mobility, migration and security. Finally in the longer term the EC committed to strengthen the relationship between the Task Force and the Deauville partnership in order to better coordinate the international support for Tunisia.29 Mobility Partnership: Clashing Interests Mobility options and visa facilitation were more important than real migration problems in the case of Tunisia. The EU and Tunisia began negotiations on Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security in October 2011, and an agreement on the Political Declaration for the EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership was finalized on 13 November 2013.Tunisia and the EU established a Mobility Partnership formally on March 3, 2014 with the joint declaration of Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Mr Tahar Cherif, Tunisian Ambassador to Belgium and the European Union, and the Ministers of the ten EU Member States involved in the Partnership: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This agreement aimed to ease mobility and visa procedures, manage migratory flows, cooperate in preventing human trafficking, evade immigration, establish a system for protecting refugees and asylum-seekers and to improve the safety of border management. Especially with the establishment of mobility partnership agreement Tunisia would be something like Europe’s policeman in North Africa. This also stirred up a lot of opposition not only in government but 4.2.2 28 EC. (13 May 2014). Increased education opportunities between Tunisia and EU. (Press Release). IP/13/421 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-421_en.htm, (accessed 4 October 2015). 29 EEAS. (Sept. 28-29, 2011). Meeting of the Tunisia – European Union Task Force 28-29 September 2011, Tunis. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/tunisia/docs/ 20110929_taskforce_en.pdf, (accessed 25 February 2013). 4.2 Physical Security 69 also in civil society in Tunisia. Interviewed high officials in the EC get the impression from Tunisia that people criticize European migration policies as being too much restrictive and that Northern African countries are too much left alone with migratory pressure. Taking these points into consideration one could argue that there needs to be kind of more openness. This was very much the debate in Europe.30 In addition to this partnership the EU and Tunisia would also improve the information available to Tunisians on employment, education and training opportunities available in the EU. On the issue of irregular migration there was going to be an agreement for readmission of irregular migrants and for better cooperation to prevent human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Tunisian authorities were expected to identify migrants for international protection and asylum applications and applying non-refoulement to them as part of the partnership.31 There was, however, a lack on the EU side to allow migration or for example there was unwillingness for giving access to the world market for qualified Tunisians. It was more important for the EU to control migration. On the Tunisian side there was lack of domestic regulation and legislation. There was no migration law and there was no asylum law for example in Tunisia.32 The EU proposed re-admission agreements and they were trying to negotiate them for a long time but southern countries didn’t really see their interest in that. Then they coupled it with some incentives like the visa facilitation.33Although the EU did well and moved very quickly to offer mobility partnership theEU did a mistake to link human rights so much or so tightly to mobility partnerships. It was one of the aspects directly contravening human rights and it didn’t help EU‘s leverage.34 Agreement offers on mobility were found not to be as generous as they were in Eastern neighbors. (Balfour, June 2012, p.22) There was no general rule to adopt mobility agreements meaning that only some member states, preferable the ones with special relations and contacts, would use them. It was also a problem when mobility partnerships were limited to small elite groups and most importantly 30 Interview No:12. 31 EC. (3 March 2014). EU and Tunisia establish their Mobility Partnership. (Press Release). IP/14/208 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-208_en.htm, (accessed 4 October 2015). 32 Int. No:17. 33 Interview No:14. 34 Interview No: 23. 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 70 citizens would be offered legal channels to Europe only if their governments prevented irregular migration. In the light of these points Balfour expresses that there would be highly demanding requirements for the MENA region. (Balfour, June 2012, p.22) EU’s mobility agreement was found insufficient also by some groups defending migrant rights.35 Within the frame of the partnership Tunisia was obliged to do tight border controls, cooperate with FRONTEX and sign a readmission agreement which meant returning Tunisian migrants or migrants who transited through Tunisia to countries where their rights were not guaranteed. Mobility partnership agreements foresaw that they retrieved human treatment in the countries people were sent. Whether this was true or not remained as a question.36Migration detention centers especially in Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain were accused of violating Article III of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibited inhuman or degrading treatment.37 UN Refugee Agency for example ran a research to see how asylum applications were assessed in 12 Member States. The study found that there were many improprieties in personal interviews. Applicants were not always offered personal interviews and interpreters were not always present. It was even more interesting that UNHCR found 171 identically worded interview reports in one country.38It was also clear in EC President Barosso’s words that readmission of Tunisians was necessary when he said "Emigration is not the solution to the economic challenges of this country. The long-term solution is economic and social development based on the talents and energy of the Tunisian people.”39 35 See reports of The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) https:// www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-africa-middleeast/tunisia/14960-tunisia-eu-mobility-partnership-marching-towards-the-externalisation-of and Migreurop http://www.migreurop.org/article2319.html?lang=fr , (accessed 4 October 2015). 36 Interview No:14. 37 Park, J. (23 April 2015). Europe’s Migration Crisis. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874 (accessed 7 June 2015). 38 (26 March 2010). UNHCR study finds inconsistent examination of asylum claims in EU. The UN Refugee Agency http://www.unhcr.org/4bac9ae19.html (accessed 7 June 2015). 39 EU demands Tunisia do more to stop illegal migration. (12 April 2011). BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-europe-13055153, (accessed 7 June 2015). 4.2 Physical Security 71 The EU was criticized for imposing an agreement shaped by security considerations rather than migrants’ rights. Although the partnership aimed to promote mobility it didn’t offer concrete opportunities to enter and live in the EU. One debated issue with the partnership agreement was that civil society had not been involved in the negotiating process despite the fact that this part of the society was directly relevant to the agreement. This kind of a deal obviously lacked transparency. There was a great deal of skepticism in Tunisian civil society against the mobility partnership because they rather saw security aspects of this partnership than the ability to travel more easily for example. It was before mobility partnership was signed and they were very skeptical at that time because they rather feared that this mobility partnership would lead to a situation where Tunisia would take lots of security obligations in order to help Europe to block illegal migration. They were scared that this was too much and would lead to a too much repressive approach.40The EU was expected to change its migration policy based on security considerations and externalization of migration control and not violate fundamental rights as specified in International Law41 and also the EU was expected to involve civil society organizations in the negotiation process.42 According to 2014 report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Europe was the most dangerous destination for irregular migration. National interests trumping European ones in migration and asylum also counted for EU’s weak migration policy. Only of the northern countries Sweden and Germany offered residency not to the Libyans or Tunisians but to Syrians.43 It should also be considered that many of the Mediterranean states are incapable of handling the migrants’ demands with care in the wake of economic crisis. Even Frontex budget was cut from €118 million in 2011 to €89 million in 2014.44 The European Parliament also accepted to establish a framework for a common European asylum system in June 2013. This system allowed the EU to revise some regulations and directives to make fair and quick deci- 40 Interview No:12. 41 Park, Ibid. 42 EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership : Externalization policy in disguise. (3 December 2013). Migreurop. http://www.migreurop.org/article2319.html?lang=fr, (accessed 7 June 2015). 43 Park, Ibid. 44 Park, Ibid. 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 72 sions, to ensure that detention was only applied as a last resort measure, to improve the access to rights and integration of people demanding international protection and also to ensure that asylum applicants have access to basic living conditions.45 Policy advisors on the other hand often argued that there should be a possibility for asylum seekers to request asylum while they were still in Africa. It would be better to have camps in Tunisia, in Morocco, in Libya and so forth. People in these camps would ask for asylum and so they wouldn’t leave to make it to the sea.46 All in all EU policies didn’t change much even in the face of the challenges of the Arab Spring. EU response has been mostly by granting slots for university scholarships and exchange programs of Erasmus Mundus. Europe has serious migration issues related with domestic politics of member states with the whole immigration, ethnicity, inclusion and exclusion debates.47 Similarly J. Park Deputy Director of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) thinks that it is not clear whether there will be a climate of immigration reform due to concerns of nationalist parties of member states about terrorism.48 45 EC.(12 June 2013) A Common European Asylum System, http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_MEMO-13-532_de.htm, (accessed 7 June 2015). 46 Interview No:12. 47 Int. No:13. 48 Park, Ibid. 4.2 Physical Security 73 Table 6: Main Features: Physical Security Main Features: Physical Security (Migration) Time Frame: Ex-President Ben Ali’s exile (January 2011)-Establishment of Dialogue on Migration Mobility and Security (3 March 2014) Discourses: The EU looking forward to Mobility Partnership with Tunisia Migrants not allowed to stay in the EU sent back Create jobs instead of migration Importance of people to people contacts and support for quality education No long term migration policy strategy Actions: 2011 Frontex budget cut from 118ml to 89ml December 2011 Regional Protection Program 2011 700 refugees resettled from Tunisia’s Shousha Camp 2011 Erasmus Mundus Tempus Program (Modernization of Higher Education and Scholarships) worth 30ml in 2013 `A Window for Tunisia` Erasmus Mundus Program (Mobility of Tunisian students to study in the EU) worth 10 ml June 2013 A Framework for a Common European asylum system released 3 March 2014 Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security Interviews: Migration policies driven by security concerns, not generous, impotent against surge of migrants, suboptimal Outsourcing management of migrants through the imposed readmission agreements Treatment of people sent back via readmission agreements in question North African countries left alone with migratory pressures No possibility to request asylum in North Africa Too much pressure from member states (nationalistic parties, public op. and terrorism concerns) Exchange programs as the only concrete action Not much change in the EU migration policies after the Arab Spring Content Analysis: `Migration´ is mentioned 3 times in relation with security and mobility partnership. ‘Security´ is mentioned for 10 times and half of these is dedicated to economy meaning that security can only be maintained with economy offering job opportunities Mode of Behavior: Strongly Rational 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 74 Economic Prosperity Tunisia’s Vulnerable Economic Situation It is important to look at the economic situation leading the country to the explosion point when we talk about Tunisia. Specifically it is interesting how the Tunisian population perceived classic economic measures about their country even at times when these economic indicators were not bad. To elaborate on this it seems surprising that Tunisia gained eight points in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index from 40 in 2009-2010 to 32 in 2010-2011 and GPD per capita increased in years (See Table 7) Despite this seemingly good economic conditions Tunisians defined their economic situation as “worse”.49 Their evaluation of life standards have dropped significantly in 2010.50 (See Chart 1) Table 7: Tunisia’s GDP per Capita in Years Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 GDP per Capita (USD) 2.2k 2.2k 2.3k 2.7k 3.1k 3.2k 3.3k 3.8k 4.3k 4.1k 4.2k 4.3k Data from database: World Development Indicators 4.3 4.3.1 49 TUNISIA: Analyzing the Dawn of the Arab Spring Examining Public Perceptions Leading up to the First Regional Uprising. (June 2011). Abu Dhabi Gallup Center. http://www.gallup.com/poll/157049/tunisia-analyzing-dawn-arab-spring.aspx, p.3, (accessed 7 June 2015). 50 Tunisia: Analyzing the Dawn..., Ibid. p.2. 4.3 Economic Prosperity 75 Satisfaction Rates of Life Standards in Tunisia 4.3 Economic Prosperity 4.3.1 Tunisia´s Vulnerable Economic Situation It is important to look at the economic situation leading the country to the explosion point when we talk about Tunisia. Specifically it is interesting how the Tunisian population perceived classic economic measures about their country even at times when these economic indicators were not bad. To elaborate on this it seems surprising that Tunisia gained eight points in the World Economic Forum´s Global Competitiveness Index from 40 in 2009-2010 to 32 in 2010-2011 and GPD per capita increased in years (See Table 7) Despite this seemingly good economic conditions Tunisians defined their economic situation as “worse”.49 Their evaluation of life standards have dropped significantly in 2010.50 (See Chart 1) Table 6: Tunisia´s GDP per Capita in Years Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 GDP per Capita (USD) 2.2k 2.2k 2.3k 2.7k 3.1k 3.2k 3.3k 3.8k 4.3k 4.1k 4.2k 4.3k Data from database: World Development Indicators Chart 1: Satisfaction Rates of Life Standards in Tunisia Economic prosperity in Tunisia was deceptive. Part of this illusion is the result of the aid coming from Western countries and international organizations like IMF. (Dandashly, 2014)Also Tunisians´ main problem despite economic growth was corruption and this meant that Tunisians 49 TUNISIA: Analyzing the Dawn of the Arab Spring Examining Public Perceptions Leading up to the First Regional Uprising. (June 2011). Abu Dhabi Gallup Center. http://www.gallup.com/poll/157049/tunisia-analyzing-dawn-arab-spring.aspx, p.3, (accessed 7 June 2015) 50 Tunisia: Analyzing the Dawn..., Ibid. p.2 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% Housing Healthcare Roads Schools 74% 71% 59% 73% 41% 51% 50% 67% Satisfaction Rates 2009 2010 Economic prosperity in Tunisia was deceptive. Part of this illusion is the result of the aid coming from Western countries and international organizations like IMF. (Dandashly, 2014)Also Tunisians’ main problem despite economic growth was corruption and this meant that Tunisians didn’t benefit from their country’s economic well-being. There is a growing young population in Tunisia. The government was urged to meet the demands of the youth such as education, employment and home ownership. When the government couldn´t afford to provide these economic requirements reactions like disliking and rejecting the authority occur. Considering this economic situation it is no surprise that people were discontent with the Ben Ali regime.51 Another problem behind this rising resentment was that the government was still keeping control of the economy in its hands despite the gradual liberalization. Unjustified trend of capturing rents by the ruling elites should also be noted. An improved business environment could only be maintained by eliminating governance problems like transparency and accountability instead of a top-down approach.52 Although numbers indicated that per capita revenue was rising the population was wearisome of per- Chart 1: 51 Ibid., Tunisia: Analyzing the Dawn…, p.6. 52 Tunisia: Economic and Social Challenges beyond the Revolution. African Development Bank Group, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ Publications/Tunisia%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Challenges.pdf, (accessed 8 April 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 76 sistent regional and social inequality. Investments, services and economic activities were intensely present in the coastal areas and this obviously caused disparities between the regions. Increasing capture of rents by the ruling elites caused unemployment among the educated youth population and obviously a strong feeling of unfairness.53 Despite Tunisia’s internal economic and political governance challenges the EU has a big share in Tunisia’s trade capacity. Tunisia is a WTO member and has already been in the process of implementing a free trade area with the EU through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. In 2012 EU’s total trade accounted for 62.9% of Tunisia’s trade and the next year total trade between Tunisia and EU amounted to €20.5million.54 The EU is Tunisia’s main trading partner as the EU accounts for 74.1% of Tunisia’s total exports while imports from EU to Tunisia account for 66.9 of the total import to Tunisian market.55 (See Chart 2) EU Trade with Tunisia capturing rents by the ruling elites should also be noted. An improved business environment could only be maintained by eliminating governance problems like transparency and accountability instead of a top-down approach.52 Although numbers indicated that per capita revenu was rising the population was wearisom of persistent regional and social inequality. Investments, s rvices and economic activities w re tensely present in the coastal reas and this obviously caused disparities between the regions. Increasing capture of rents by the ruling elites caused unemployment among the educated youth population and obviously a strong feeling of unfairness.53 Despite Tunisia´s internal economic and political gov rnance challe ges EU has big share in Tunisia´s trade capacity. Tunisia is a WTO member and has already been in the process of implementing a free trade area with the EU through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. In 2012 EU´s total trade accounted for 62.9% of Tunisia´s trade and the next year total trade between Tunisia and EU amounted to €20.5million.54 EU is Tunisia´s main trading partner as the EU accounts for 74.1% of Tunisia´s total exports while imports from EU to Tunisia account for 66.9 of the total import to Tunisian market.55 (See Chart 2) Chart 2: EU Trade with Tunisia Source: EC-Directorate General for Trade available online from: 52 Tunisia: Economic and Social Challenges beyond the Revolution. African Development Bank Group, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Tunisia%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Challenges .pdf, (accessed 8 April 2015) 53 Ibid., Tunisia: Economic and Social Challenges, p.12 54 Data elaborated from the EC/Trade/Policy/Countries and Regions/Tunisia, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-andregions/countries/tunisia/ (accessed 5 April 2015) 55 EC. (28 November 2012).Mission for Growth: Creating Economic Ties to Benefit Tunisia and the EU, Brussels, Memo/12/920 file:///C:/Users/sekiz/Downloads/MEMO-12-920_EN.pdf (accessed 5 April 2015) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 M io € EU Trade with Tunisia Imports Exports Balance Source: EC-Directorate General for Trade available online from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/doc /2006/september/tradoc_122002.pdf Chart 2: 53 Ibid., Tunisia: Economic and Social Challenges, p.12. 54 Data elaborated from the EC/Trade/Policy/Countries and Regions/Tunisia, http:// ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/ (accessed 5 April 2015). 55 EC. (28 November 2012).Mission for Growth: Creating Economic Ties to Benefit Tunisia and the EU, Brussels, Memo/12/920 file:///C:/Users/sekiz/Downloads/ MEMO-12-920_EN.pdf (accessed 5 April 2015). 4.3 Economic Prosperity 77 As a country epitomized as an example to the region Tunisia deserved more in its economic relations with the EU. For this reason Ms Ashton explained immediately after Ben Ali’s departure that the EU would start negotiations on liberalization of trade in agriculture and the launching of a DCFTA.56 The more Tunisia got integrated into the European market the better it would be for both sides. Tunisia was considered a gateway to Europe for a lot of other countries.57 EU Support for Economic Recovery Economic cooperation has always formed a major issue for the EU in its relations with Tunisia. Referring also to the Country Strategy Paper for Tunisia58, the priorities in Tunisia were improving the conditions for private investment, competitive business environment, open economy and social programs. EC announced two programmes on 23 August 2011 for improving economic and social conditions. The first program, which was also supported by the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the French Development Agency, targeted disadvantaged social groups to promote job creation, better governance, to reduce inequalities, to improve social and economic conditions. The second programme, which was called service competitiveness support programme, was aimed at strengthening Tunisian business capacities so that they could reach a competitive business environment on the international level. EU decision for implementing this program was published on 26 September 2011.59 The cost for these two programmes were equal to €110 million.60 EU continued to give support for eliminating the gap between the inner regions and the centre of Tunisia with different tools. For example EU’s special measure of support- 4.3.2 56 Tunisia-Democracy Assistance Resource Page. European Partnership for Democracy, http://www.epd.eu/?page_id=5794#tab-id-4 (6 June 2015). 57 Int. No:13. 58 Tunisia Strategy Paper 2007 – 2013 & National Indicative Program 2007 – 2010. European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument., file:///C:/Users/sekiz/ Downloads/enpi_csp_nip_tunisia_summary_en.pdf, (accessed 5 April 2015). 59 EC. (26 September 2011). C(2011)6826 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ documents/aap/2011/aap-spe_2011_tun_en.pdf, (accessed 5 April 2015). 60 EC. (23 August 2011). European support of €110 million for economic recovery. (Press Release), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-974_en.htm, (accessed 5 April 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 78 ing the poor regions was derived from the Joint Communication of 25 May 2011 entitled “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”. This document reflected a renewed approach to ENP insisting that each partner country would demonstrate a clear commitment to universal values.61 The fact that political events in Tunisia disrupted Tunisia’s economic growth mobilized the EU to establish this special measure. The program would support the Tunisian Government’s short term employment which financed 42,700 jobs in public sector. Secondly it aimed to renew 100,000 houses in urban areas and revitalize economy in these areas. Lastly it provided micro credits for the ones living in most underprivileged areas.62 This action was planned in complementing the economic recovery program adopted by the European Commission for an amount of €100 million last July. Large social and economic differences and unemployment within Tunisia, as explained above, became more obvious with the uprisings. This caused some part of the population to move into Tunisia’s interior and coastal regions with the hope of setting up a better life. EU’s 33 million euro program, which was be co-funded with Agence Francaise de Development (AFD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB), aimed to create socio-cultural and sports centers in over 50 of these neighborhoods to benefit young people and to set up revenue generating economic activities. This program aimed to rehabilitate 119 poorer neighborhoods and improve the living conditions of hundreds of thousands of people in those places.63 There has been certain impact of the EU to help the economy but it was not sufficient as economic challenges were very much putting the government under pressure. Much more resources were necessary to bring investment and economic cooperation in the South particularly to create youth employment in the inner regions of Tunisia.64 61 EEAS. (25 May 2011) A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood A review of European Neighbourhood Policy, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/ com_11_303_en.pdf, (accessed 5 April 2015). 62 EC. (27 September 2011) EU response to the Arab Spring: Special Measure for poorest areas in Tunisia. (Press Release). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-642_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 5 April 2015). 63 EC. (13 December 2012) The European Union is increasing its support to Tunisia’s Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods (Press Release). IP/12/1369 http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1369_en.htm, (accessed 6 May 2013). 64 Int. No:19. 4.3 Economic Prosperity 79 EU’s efforts to generate a newer approach for the ENP continued with the press release where the EU noted that they had doubled their financial assistance from EUR 80 million to EUR 160 million in 2011 for Tunisia. In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution the EU increased the amount allocated to Tunisia from 240ml to 445ml for the period 2011-2013.65This was actually the result of EU’s more for more principle that Tunisia had embarked on political reforms. Progress on both political association and economic integration was recognized by the EU. In continuation with the EU’s increased funding negotiations on DCFTA with Tunisia were to be opened with Tunisia at the end of 2012. Dialogue on migration, mobility and security has already been opened with Tunisia leading to a mobility partnership.66 At the same time the EU established an Economic Advisory Council to bring investors into contact with Tunisian authorities with the aim of clearing obstacles to European private sector investment plans in 2012. (Youngs 2014, p. 190) There were considerable doubts on free trade agreements especially in agriculture but one thing was clear that Tunisia attempted to ameliorate its economy and social programs. In order to help Tunisia towards this aim the EU rounded up the programs for improving access to basic healthcare in disadvantaged regions and developing civil society and approved another program worth EUR 68 million to intensify reforms with special attention to economic recovery and improving the Tunisian business climate. The program followed on from the previous EUR 100 million recovery support program adopted in September 2011. Mr Füle spoke on this program as follows: “In addition to backing the authorities’ efforts to boost growth so as to create jobs, reduce regional disparities and strengthen social cover, the European Union is determined to support the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law”.67 Although EU’s main role was to support political and social reforms the EU also landed micro financial assistance to Tunisia with obviously lower 65 Tunisia. European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/tunisia/index_en.htm, (accessed 4 October 2015). 66 EC. (15 May 2012). EU bolsters its support to reformers in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods, (Press Release) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-474_en.htm, (accessed 5 March 2013). 67 EC. (28 November 2012). European Union supports economic recovery in Tunisia. IP/12/1286. (Press Release). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1286_en.htm, (accessed 5 March 2013). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 80 interest rates than the interest rates private sector would offer. Tunisian economy passed through a recession because of the domestic unrest in 2011. Tunisia needed financial support considering the deterioration of the situation on the fiscal and balance of payments. So they requested Macro- Financial Assistance (MFA) worth EUR 500 million on 28 August 2013.68 Upon this request the European Commission asked the European Parliament and the Council to grant a MFA to Tunisia in the amount of a maximum of EUR 250 million. This would contribute to the adjustment and reform program of IMF and the World Bank in reducing the economy’s short term balance of payments and in particular the State Building Contract Program. (PAR)69 Although the EU also had financial crisis the EU still enjoyed easy access to low interest rates. So they lent the money to Tunisia to have them balance their budget.70 Finally Mr Füle speaking at the Conference named `EU- Nachbarschaft – Der Arabische Frühling ein Jahr danach` in Munich on February 3, 2012 evaluated the current situation in Tunisia. He pointed to the fact that the EU was supporting economic reforms but private investments were required for this aim. He also explained that there wasn’t much tension between interests and values.71 In line with Mr Füle’s declaration interviewed Mr Youngs also commented that the EU promoted its interests in its neighbourhood. EU’s values sometimes helped with those interests and sometimes they didn’t. In Tunisia interests and values were going together.72 68 This macro financial assistance package worth 300 ml was signed almost a year later on 4 September 2014. 69 EC. (5 December 2013)Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council providing macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Tunisia. COM(2013) 860 final, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/documents/commission_decision_-_mfa_tunisia_en.pdf (accessed 9 June 2015). 70 Interview No:1. 71 EC. (3 February 2012). Arab Spring Press Release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-66_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 9 June 2015). 72 Interview No:23. 4.3 Economic Prosperity 81 Integration of Markets and Trade Liberalization The establishment of the EU-Tunisia free trade area is one of the clauses of this agreement.73 The aim is to improve market access opportunities, the investment climate in Tunisia and supporting economic reforms. There are already free trade agreements for industrial goods and EU officials wanted to expand it to agriculture. On December 14, 2011 EU Foreign Affairs Council authorized the opening of trade negotiations with Tunisia along with Egypt, Jordan and Morocco and moved one step further than the Association Agreement. European Commission was expected to start negotiations for establishing DCFTAs following this decision. These DF- TAs covered mutually beneficial areas such as trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, investment protection, public procurement and competition policy.74 Liberalization of trade in agricultural and fishery products negotiations took place in the EU/ Tunisia Task Force Meetings. Eventually Tunisian economy was expected to integrate into the EU single market and legislations of the EU and Tunisia would come closer.75 Policy makers in the EC consider DCFTA as the key tool to really bring Tunisian economy closer to European economy because DCFTA, as it is seen in Eastern Europe Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and so forth, is an agreement which obliges the partner to take on board a certain part of European single market legislation. So Tunisia needed to go through a lengthy preparation process.76 Interviewed policy advisors assumed that they gave enough preparation time to Tunisia before opening up their economy to trade They told that there would be a lot of accompanying projects funded by Europe and that they were offering a real partnership with mutual interest. Some analysts think that Tunisia was less willing to integrate in some specific sectors. There was considerable reluctance on DCFTA on the Tunisian side. They thought that integration would destroy 4.3.3 73 EEAS. The EU-Tunisia Association Agreement. http://eeas.europa.eu/tunisia/association_agreement/index_en.htm, (accessed 4 October 2015). 74 EU. (14 December 2011). EU agrees to start trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. (Press Release). IP/11/1545 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1545_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 4 October 2015). 75 European Commission. Countries and Regions: Tunisia. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/, (accessed 4 October 2015). 76 Interview No:12. 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 82 the Tunisian production. They needed at least five years to implement reform.77Some other scholars think that it was the weakness of the EU that there was no concrete improvement still in 2015 in improving market access and negotiations on free trade. Tunisians needed something very practical on market access in 2011. Asymmetric liberalization would give Tunisia more access to European market before Europeans would get access to Tunisia’s market but the economy was weak in Tunisia.78 Additionally Tunisian companies couldn’t easily get visas to access the EU and Tunisians had no free mobility either.79 Weak economy was holding back the generation of employment in Tunisia. So the economic situation in Tunisia looked quite fragile in Tunisia. 80 Tunisia was in need of a lot of investments to enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship with the EU though. The research of Cheminghui and Thabet on agricultural trade liberalization in Tunisia explained the results of simulations using a computable general equilibrium model linked to household survey data. According to their findings trade liberalization and eventually eliminating all Tunisian tariffs is not profitable for Tunisian economy but it offers a chance for rural households. It has a significant effect for reducing poverty among mainly farmers in agricultural sector (olives, dates, citrus) but it doesn’t indicate an impact of increasing the level of GDP. (Chemingui and Thabet, 2007) On the discursive side Tunisia’s economic integration with EU market and foreign investors’ easy and confident access to Tunisian market are the points that EU officials often highlight in their speeches. This was also clear in the meeting of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali and the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy in Brussels on on February 2, 2012. Rompuy expressed his admiration as he saw Tunisia as the pioneer in the establishment of democratic structures. He added that a privileged partnership (an advanced status) was desired but before that it was also important for the outside world to provide better access to Tunisian market and attract foreign investment. The EU was offering the Tunisian economy 77 Interview No:17. 78 Interview No:23. 79 Building a Security Community in the Neighborhood. Zooming in on the EU– Tunisia Relations. (2014). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. file:///C:/ Users/sekiz/Downloads/NUPI+WP-836+Dandashly%20(1).pdf.. 80 Int. No: 23. 4.3 Economic Prosperity 83 the progressive integration into the EU’s internal market.81 Mr Füle, on November 19, 2012, similarly mentioned these points in his meeting with the Tunisian Transport Minister following the EU-Tunisia Association Council adding that they would also begin for open sky agreement with Tunisian transport minister.82 The goal was to integrate the Tunisian economy with the EU’s internal market and to give confidence to investors.83 Investments of EIB and EBRD European relations with Tunisia in the post-revolutionary period was mainly economic with a special focus to stimulate private investments for the obvious reason that the marginalization policies of the previous regime in Tunisia had led to social inequality and unemployment. The two biggest source of employment in Tunisia were tourism and foreign investment but the number of tourists fell deeply in 2011 and 82 enterprises of foreign investors left the country as a negative impact of the revolution on the country’s economy.(Ameur, 2012) (See Chart 3) It was important for Tunisia to recover economically to create particularly youth employment. The 2001 Nobel Prize Economist, Joseph Stiglitz said at a conference in Tunisia: “You cannot separate politics from economics”.84 In accordance with Stiglitz’s idea Europe saw Tunisia, with its quick progress in democratic transition, as the leading key player in the region. Therefore the EU supported a stronger industrial cooperation and stronger SMEs. The idea was to derive mutual benefit for both Tunisia and the EU. It was essential for the EU to create integrated markets, internationalization of SMEs and the improvement of technical infrastructure. 4.3.4 81 European Council. (2 February 2012)Press statement by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Tunisia, Hamadi Jebali (Press Release). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127781.pdf, (accessed 2 April 2013). 82 EC. (19 November 2012). Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle following the EU-Tunisia Association Council. MEMO/12/878. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-878_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 10 April 2013). 83 EC. (19 November 2012). Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle, Ibid. 84 Kobylinski, K. (21 September 2012) The Jasmine Plan: Tunisia’s Way to Economic Recovery, The North African Post http://northafricapost.com/329-the-jasmineplan-tunisias-way-to-economic-recovery.html, (accessed 9 July 2013). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 84 At the beginning of March 2011 EIB Vice President Philippe de Fontaine Vive made a visit to Tunisia and met the Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, the founder of the Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia) party. Interim Prime Minister Essebsi was responsible for forming a new transitional government and he would stay in power until the election was held. Essebsi had taken over after Muhammed Ghannouchi’s resignation. The aim of this visit was to take action for economic growth, creation of jobs, improving the quality of life and living conditions including speeding up the implementation of public projects, development of SMEs and road modernization programs. These projects would be implemented through the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), which is the key player in the economic and financial partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean region. The EU for the first time encouraged the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to bring investment and to finance the country. Within this frame the EIB promised to support the development of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with a €130 million project. EIB intended to increase financing up to €800 million in favour of SMEs. EIB has already committed more than €470 million in 2011. Payments from loans have increased by 50%. Alternatively EBRD promised an operational funding for SMEs and European Commission announced 20 million euros in contribution to EBRD’s funding.85 (See Tables 8 and 9) Three years after this visit EIB President Werner Hoyer said that EIB's investments in Tunisia exceeded 570 million dinars. He met Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa on his three-day official visit to Tunisia on December 3-5 and explained that they would support Tunisia by signing new conventions in banking, funding of small- and medium-sized enterprises, energy, transport, water, health and education. EIB is evaluated as the first financial institution in the world supporting Tunisia’s democratic transition.86 85 EC. (27 September 2011) First meeting of EU/Tunisia Task Force to support transition to democracy and economic recovery. (Press Release). IP/11/1087 http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1087_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 10 April 2013). 86 EIB investments in Tunisia exceeded 570 million dinars in past three years. (4 December 2014). Agence Tunis Afrique Presse. http://tap.info.tn/en/index.php/economy/23113-eib-investments-in-tunisia-exceeded-570-million-dinars-in-past-threeyears, (4 October 2015). 4.3 Economic Prosperity 85 Table 8: EIB Investments in Tunisia between 2011 and 2013 Project Sector Signed Amount Modernization of infrastructure transportation 24.06.2011 163,000,000 Construction of a production station for sulfur and phosphor acid in Mdhilla industry 29.12.2011 140,000,000 Restoration of infrastructure city development / infrastructure 20.12.2012 56,000,000 Restoration of infrastructure waste management 20.12.2012 3,500,000 Restoration of infrastructure water, effluent 20.12.2012 3,500,000 Restoration of infrastructure energy 20.12.2012 7,000,000 Financial support for small and medium sized companies global loan 20.12.2012 100,000,000 Loan for micro finance institute Enda Inter Arabe services 30.05.2013 4,000,000 Financial support for small and medium sized companies global loan 19.12.2013 50,000,000 Reduction of pollution of the ecosystem in the Bizerta region water, effluent 19.12.2013 20,000,000 Reduction of pollution of the ecosystem in the Bizerta region industry 19.12.2013 20,000,000 Total 567,000,000 Resource: EIB Website available online from http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/ regions/mediterranean-countries/tn.htm?start=2010&end=2014§or= 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 86 Table 9: EBRD Investment in Tunisia between 2011 and 2013 Date Project ID Country Project Ti-tle Topic Private/ Public Status 15. Nov 13 45746 Tunisia BTK -SME loan Depository Credit (banks) Private Signed 25 Oct 2013 45639 Tunisia Tunisie Leasing - SME Loan Leasing Finance Private Signed 07 Jun 13 44744 Tunisia SerinusEnergy Natural resources Private Signed 25 Oct 2012 44443 Tunisia BorgesTunisia Agribusiness Private Signed Source: EBRD Website http://www.ebrd.com/where-we-are/tunisia/data.html Non-resident Entries to Tunisia between 2007 and 201187Chart 3: Non-resident Entries to Tunisia between 2007 and 201187 4.3.5 High Level Visits to Tunisia The principal behind EU´s moves towards Tunisian economy was a win win game. With this idea in mind it was important for the EU that Tunisia aligned itself with the legislation and the infrastructure of that of the EU. This would help Tunisia to access to the Single Market more quickly. On 9th of March Industry and Commerce Minister Mr. Chakhari and European Commission Vice President Antonio Tajani, responsible for industry and enterprises would sign a joint declaration to open market access negotiations and to sign Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial products (ACAA) agreement in the future. ACAA agreements helped simply cutting bureaucracy and easing import/export processes.88 This agreement was supposed to bring the legislation of two countries closer and thereby to eliminate technical barriers to trade. It was still being negotiated with Tunisia as of November 2014 though. The first ACAA has entered into force on January 19, 2013 with Israel.89 87 www.fairobserver.com, (accessed 26 June 2016) 88EC. Jobs and Stability.. Ibid. 89 EC. (12 November 2014) Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/international-aspects/acaa-neighbouringcountries/index_en.htm, (accessed 1 October 2015) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Thousands of Non Residents Entries 6761 7049 6901 6902 1942 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 Thousands of Non Residents Entries hart 3: 87 www.fairobserver.com, (accessed 26 June 2016). 4.3 Economic Prosperity 87 High Level Visits to Tunisia The principal behind EU’s moves towards Tunisian economy was a win win game. With this idea in mind it was important for the EU that Tunisia aligned itself with the legislation and the infrastructure of that of the EU. This would help Tunisia to access to the Single Market more quickly. On 9th of March Industry and Commerce Minister Mr. Chakhari and European Commission Vice President Antonio Tajani, responsible for industry and enterprises would sign a joint declaration to open market access negotiations and to sign Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial products (ACAA) agreement in the future. ACAA agreements helped simply cutting bureaucracy and easing import/export processes.88 This agreement was supposed to bring the legislation of two countries closer and thereby to eliminate technical barriers to trade. It was still being negotiated with Tunisia as of November 2014 though. The first ACAA has entered into force on January 19, 2013 with Israel.89 European Commission Vice President Antonio Tajani, responsible for industry and enterprises, travelled to Tunisia and it was accompanied by a large business delegation at the end of November 2012. This visit, as part of “Missions for Growth”, was planned to help European companies benefit from new markets as well as to reinforce commercial partnership between Tunisia and Libya. He also participated in the Business and Technology Convention (CAT 2012), held in Tunis from November 28 to 29. Delegations of around forty European business leaders expressed a deep interest in developing ties with Tunisia.90 VP Tajani signed Letters of Intent in the fields of reduction of SME administrative burden via closer cooperation, co-operation in tourism policy, standardization -removing technical barriers to trade-, supply of raw materials to downstream industries, co-operation on satellite-based augmentation services and on agriculture. This business delegation’s visit was also part of EU-Tunisia Action Plan 4.3.5 88 EC. Jobs and Stability.. Ibid. 89 EC. (12 November 2014) Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/international-aspects/acaa-neighbouring-countries/index_en.htm, (accessed 1 October 2015). 90 Yaros, B. (30 November 2012) Europe Promotes Tunisia as Destination for European Enterprises. Tunisialive, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/11/30/eu-promotestunisia-as-destination-for-european-enterprises/, (accessed 5 July 2013). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 88 on European Neighborhood Policy to enhance bilateral cooperation and communication channels. The EU wanted to establish dialogue and exchange of information to improve economic, scientific and technical relations with Tunisia. The EU especially aimed to achieve greater liberalization in the fields of processed agricultural and fisheries products.91 The EU also supported solar energy programs through a number of projects. Renewable energy was a priority for EU Neighborhood Investment Facility (NIF). 'Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan' was launched in October 2010 in order to expand the use of renewable energy and to develop an integrated ‘Euro-Mediterranean green electricity market’. This project was planned to be operative in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory, Syria and Tunisia.92 Other projects that the EU has supported are 'Support for the Enhanced Integration and the Improved Security of the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market' (MED – EMIP) and the second phase of the project is called 'Energy Efficiency in the Construction Sector' (MED ENEC) which aim to contribute renewable energy production in the region.93EIB particularly supported the energy sector in Tunisia. The EIB signed a €230m financing agreement with the Austrian company OMV to operate a large scale project that includes the construction of a 370km gas pipeline from Nawara to Gabès, a production and a gas-processing plant in Gabès. EIB Vice-President Philippe de Fontaine Vive said that the project had a direct impact in improving the daily life as it encouraged the creation of jobs.94 91 EC. (28 November 2012). Mission for Growth: creating economic ties to benefit Tunisia and the EU. MEMO/12/920 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-920_en.htm, (accessed 5 May 2013). 92 Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan, EU Neighborhood Info Center, http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=385&id_type=10, (accessed 7 June 2013). 93 Africa-EU Partnership Mediterranean Solar Plan links North Africa to Europe. The Africa EU Partnership http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/success-stories/ mediterranean-solar-plan-links-north-africa-europe, (accessed 5 October 2015). 94 More than EUR 1bn in new finance from EIB for investment in Tunisia since January 2011. 4.3 Economic Prosperity 89 Table 10: Main Features: Economic Prosperity Main Features: Economic Prosperity Time Frame: 4 March 2011 (Meeting of EIB VP Philippe de Fontaine Vive and Tunisia PM Beji Caid Essebsi in Tunisia-28 Aug. 2013 (Tunisia´a request for Macro- Financial Assistance (MFA) worth EUR 500 million) Discourses: Intensified assistance to those who reinforce economic reforms and fundamental values Better access to Tunisian market Giving confidence to foreign investors and attracting foreign investment The EU looking forward to DCFTA and Privileged Partnership Tunisia’s economic integration with EU market Mutually beneficial agreements to Tunisia to take the adv. Of the EU internal market Less tension between values and interests Actions: Encouraged and coordinated EIB and EBRD investments in Tunisia 2011-2013 Financial assistance doubled from 80ml to 160ml for 2011-2012 and 240ml to 445ml 26 Sept. 2011 Special measure for development support for less developed areas worth 110ml 27 Sept. 2011 Funding in contribution to EBRD investment worth 20ml 28 Sept. 2011 Funding for employment worth 60ml 28 Sept. 2011 Funding for economic recovery in support of a multi-donor support program worth 100ml 28 Nov. 2012 Economic recovery program to promote Tunisian business climate worth 68ml 13 Dec. 2012 Setting up socio-cultural centers and creating revenue generating activities worth 30 ml (in coop with France Dev. Agency and EIB) Interviews: More investment and cooperation in the South More employment creation in the inner regions Tunisians’ expectations not met in 2011 and their economy is fragile Liberalization in agriculture is a burden on Tunisia’s weak economy Tunisians don’t want integration in agriculture and air traffic EU weakness in improving market access and negotiations with free trade Interests are shared by the EU and Tunisia Tunisians do not want integration in agriculture, air traffic etc.. Asymmetric liberalization offers real partnership with mutual benefits EU lends not only money but also values 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 90 Content Analysis: Economy is mentioned 49 times. 14 out of 49 is dedicated to full support for sustainable and economic development in return for Tunisia’s progress for political and economic reforms. 9 of them is mentioned in relation with politics and successful elections Open market economy is mentioned 4 times Facilitating private investment is mentioned 4 times Trade is mentioned 13 times. 6 out of 13 is dedicated to free trade agreements. That economy and politics go hand in hand is mentioned 6 times. Mode of Behavior: Normative Value Projection EU’s New and Ambitious Support for Tunisia’s Path up to the Elections Europe needed to develop policies towards supporting the emergence of a stable and democratic Tunisia while Tunisia was doing its part by setting up a newly elected government. Council of the EU made it clear that there was a `new and more ambitious` approach in its neighborhood policy that provides more support for transitional countries including Tunisia. This approach was dominated by securing economic integration as economic stability was believed to be the base of political stability and democratic transition. In terms of the adaptation of values the Council of the EU promised to secure democratization and the strengthening of relations and partnership with Tunisia.95 Tunisia entered into a new period of struggle for democracy following the process that brings an end to the Zainal Abidin’s regime on 14 January 2011. Mohammed Ghannouchi undertook the task of establishing the new government. It wouldn’t be easy to gain legitimization in the eye of the public mostly because of the old regime people who still had places in the government. Former leader of the banned Ennahda Party, Rachid Ghannouchi, criticized the harsh government responses to the protests and 4.4 4.4.1 95 Council of the EU.(14 November 2011) 3124th Council meeting Foreign Affairs (Press Release)http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/EN/foraff/126064.pdf, (27 April 2013). 4.4 Value Projection 91 added that it was Tunisian people’s right to demand change and to protest the administration.96 Protests didn’t end even after the announcement of Prime Minister Ghannouchi that a new government with no members from the Democratic Constitutional Rally, which was the ruling party in Tunisia from independence in 1956 on, was set up. On the same day PM Ghannouchi* had to resign.97 There have been protests in front of the government demanding that ministers with links to Ben Ali should be left out. Upon the protests Ghannouchi left his position but he explained that he was not running away from responsibility but he wanted to open the way for a new prime minister. The protesters played a genuine role in electing a new constituent assembly who was supposed to write a new constitution in a year.98 Ms Ashton made an announcement upon the resignation of the Tunisian Prime Minister. She welcomed the new Prime Minister and emphasized that upcoming elections would lead to a democratically elected government and the objective of deep democracy, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms would be achieved after a smooth transition process.99 Despite these hopeful statements of Ms Ashton rising protests and the security deficit in Tunisia was recognized by the EU. Mr Füle, addressing the situation in Tunisia, said that security was shaky in Tunisia 96 Tunuslular Gecis Hükümetinden Endiseli (9 May 2011) Timeturk http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2011/05/09/tunuslular-gecis-hukumetinden-endiseli.html, (accessed 8 May 2014). * Former Ennahda leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, had returned to the Arab world following the recent collapse of the recent Tunisian government on January 30, 2011. Ennahda, as the strongest opposition force in Tunisia in 1980s, was banned by the ousted Ben Ali. Ennahda is the most institutionalized and the organized centerright party of Tunisia. 97 Tunus Başbakanı: Devlet Başkanı görevlerini geçici olarak devraldım. (Jan. 14, 2011) HaberAktüel. http://www.haberaktuel.com/tunus-basbakani-devlet-baskanigorevlerini-gecici-olarak-devraldim-haberi-362237.html, (accessed 23 October 2014). 98 Another Tunisia minister quits. (28 February 2011). AlJazeera. http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011228141226499693.html, (accessed 2 October 2015). 99 EU. (27 February 2011) Statement by Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on the resignation of the Tunisian Prime Minister A 077/11 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119512.pdf, (accessed 7 October 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 92 although the new government was announced on 17 January 2011 at the European Parliament. He reiterated Tunisia’s international obligations in human rights and fundamental freedoms. He also repeated EU’s assistance to organize elections and supporting democratic transition.100 Only after the resignation and the dissolution of Rally for Constitutional Democracy (RCD), the party of ousted President Ben Ali, by court order the date for election of a constitutional council was set for 24 July.101 Speaking at the European Parliament Ms Ashton admired the positive steps taken in Tunisia as they were freeing political prisoners, allowing freedom of expression and prosecuting Ben Ali’s family for corruption. These civil liberties and freedom of expression were reiterated by the EU officials. Before the departure of Ben Ali there was a tradition of silencing the unorthodox voices especially in the media by means of different sanctions. The transitional government however declared freedom of expression in 2011. As it was obvious in the Table 11 Tunisia’s freedom rating went up within the years from 2010 to 2015 from being not free to being partly free and finally Tunisia reached the status of being free.102 Table 11: Freedom Ratings of Tunisia Freedom Ratings: TUNISIA103 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Civil Liberties 6 6 3.5 3.5 3 2 Political Rights 5 5 4 4 3 3 Freedom Rating 7 7 3 3 3 1 Status Not Free Not Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Free 100 EP. (17 January 2011)Address to the Plenary Session on the situation in Tunisia. SPEECH/11/23 file:///C:/Users/sekiz/Downloads/SPEECH-11-23_EN.pdf, (accessed 7 October 2015). 101 Another Tunisia minister quits, Ibid. 102 Tunisia. Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/ tunisia (accessed 12 June 2015). 103 Figures elaborated from the Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org (accessed 6 April 2015). 4.4 Value Projection 93 Ms Ashton also declared that the EU would provide legal advice to the transition authorities about electoral legislation.104 Cooperation with civil society carried utmost importance in Tunisia as new NGOs began to form and operate. They organized conferences and protests to gather the attention around the social issues like women’s rights and the role of religion in the state. Trade unions, which were also present during the Ben Ali era, including the Union of Tunisian Labor (UTT) and the General Confederation of Tunisian Labor (UCGT) supported the government policies and electoral candidates.105 The new government has also taken support from main opposition parties and also from these bodies. Interviewed analysts also agreed that it was easier to help a country like Tunisia where structures are in place. Civil society organizations and trade unions played an important role in the revolution. The EU would come in within all these intermediate bodies between society and the state and partner up with them.106 In their first free elections Tunisians went to the polls choosing between 81 parties. The October 23 poll gave Ennahda the highest number of seats in the constituent assembly with 89. Upon the announcement of the official results the newly elected parliament would take over all the power and would formulate the framework of the new constitution in one year. The moderate Islamist Ennahda Party forged an alliance with the moderate secular parties of the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol Party. 2011 elections results showed that the Tunisian democracy was on its way to institutionalize as the political parties coming from different ideologies were representative of the Tunisian society. (Ayhan 2012, p.89) The aim of the elections for the National Constituent Assembly was to set up a legitimate political authority that was selected by Tunisian public and that would establish a constitutional system. Tunisia’s elections have symbolic importance for Tunisia as for the first time in its history Tunisia was about to enter a democratic way nine months after the popular uprising. Tunisia had a new constitution and the constitution laid out a number of principles which were recognized by the EU. They were basically based on civil law recognizing fundamental freedoms. So EU cooperation was 104 EC. (2 February 2011). Remarks on Egypt and Tunisia. SPEECH/11/66 http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-66_de.htm?locale=en, (accessed 6 April 2015). 105 Freedom House, Ibid. 106 Int. No:14. 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 94 geared towards enshrining that they support the implementation of these values and principles.107 On 24 October 2011 Ms Ashton marked the elections in Tunisia as historic and the beginning of a new era. She paid tribute to the rights and democratic aspirations of Tunisians as they passed through fair and observable elections nine months after the revolution.108 Upon the results of the elections as a first step to democracy Ms Ashton and Mr Füle congratulated the Ennahda Party which obtained the highest percentage of votes and reiterated their wish for working closely with the new Constituent Assembly and the Tunisian authorities and institutions in responding to the Tunisian people’s demands for democracy, freedom, social justice and dignity.109 Following the elections that marked Tunisia’s political transformation the constituent assembly appointed a new government. The Congress for the Republic Party's Moncef Marzouki became president and Ennaha’s Hamadi Jebali was appointed as the Prime Minister.110 The EU performed its mission on the edge of this historic period by sending an Election Observation Mission to Tunisia for October 2011 elections. This team was composed of 130 observers to assess voting, counting and tabulation processes. Michael Gahler, leader of this team and member of the European Parliament, underlining that the Tunisian citizens would choose their representatives freely repeated EU’s support for Tunisian people’s aspiration for freedom, democracy and dignity.111 Following the appointment of the new government headed by Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, HR/VP Ms Ashton and Mr Füle found it “highly 107 Int. No:1. 108 EU. (24 October 2011)Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the elections in Tunisia. A 429/11 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/ missions/125531.pdf, (accessed 7 October 2015). 109 EU. (28 October 2011). Joint statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Commissioner Štefan Füle, on the Constituent Assembly Elections in the Republic of Tunisia http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-747_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015). 110 Tunisians Hungry for a Break with the Past (16 January 2012) AlJazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/201211513559482819.html, (accessed 7 November 2015). 111 EC (21 September 2011). Tunisia: EU to observe the Constituent Assembly elections. (Press Release). IP/11/1056 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1056_de.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015). 4.4 Value Projection 95 symbolic” that only a year after the revolution Tunisia has authorized a democratically elected government. They stated that the EU was looking forward to start a dialogue with the new government and work for mobility partnership to the possibility of establishing a deep and comprehensive free trade area and also establishing a privileged partnership. They finalized their congratulation letter by saying: “The EU attaches great importance to the consolidation of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Tunisia, as well as to progress towards sustainable and equitable economic and social development. The new Tunisian government can rely on the full support of the EU to achieve these objectives.”112 High Level Visits to Tunisia: A Reflection of `More for More` Approach EU’s general principle in its neighborhood is more for more113 and it was also reflected in the speeches and official visits of EU top officials to Tunisia that this approach was also operative in post-revolutionary Tunisia. The EU involvement in the post-revolutionary process immediately after Zainal Abidin Bin Ali’s exile started with European External Action Service (EEAS) officials’ visit to Tunisia on behalf of the HR/VP Ms Ashton. This mission was led by the EEAS Managing Director for the Middle East and Southern Neighbourhood, Hugues Mingarelli and the plan was to meet with the new temporary authorities of Tunisia as well as with representatives of former opposition political parties, representatives of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH), the Association of the Democratic Women (AF- TURD) and the Lawyers Order and the Journalists Union. They were there to contribute to the democratic reforms, free and fair elections, fight against deception and corruption and investigation of violent actions dur- 4.4.2 112 EC. (27 December 2011) Statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Fuele. MEMO/11/947 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-947_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015). 113 EEAS. ENP. European Union External Action., http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ index_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 96 ing the uprisings with the transitional and public authorities and also with the police department.114 The first Council decision via these meetings was to put restrictive measures for former authorities. Soon after this meeting the Council published this decision declaring that they had imposed the assets freeze of 48 people including former president Zainal Abidin and his wife. These decisions are based on the grounds that these people, who acquire movable and immovable property, bank accounts and financial assets in several countries, are actually subject to judicial investigation by Tunisian authorities.115 In addition, 19 persons responsible for the misappropriation of Egyptian state funds, including former President Hosni Mubarak, have had their assets in the EU frozen since March 2011. The EU quickly after the revolution continued to demonstrate its support for the new Tunisia by a series of high-level visits. The second one of these visits was on 14 February only a few weeks after the revolution when Ms Ashton went to Tunisia to meet representatives of civil society, including human rights activists, women’s groups and youth representatives at the headquarters of the Tunisian Human Rights League. During her trip to Tunisia on February 14, 2011 Ms Ashton said that there was much to do to support representatives of civil society, human right defenders, women representatives and students and for deep democracy to flourish. She reminded that the EU was Tunisia’s strong partner in its move towards democracy.116 The significant political reforms of Tunisia were recognized by the EU. Tunisia was the first and the largest beneficiary of financial support from Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING). (See Figure 3) Based on a more for more principle an initial €20ml for 2011, €80 million for 2012 and another €55 million for 2013 was allocated to 114 EU. (26 January 2011). EEAS Senior Officials’ Mission to Tunisia, (Press Release). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/ foraff/118956.pdf, (accessed 7 November 2015). 115 EU. (7 Feb. 2011). Tunisia: Council imposes assets freeze, (Press Release), http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-11-18_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015). 116 EC. (14 February 2011). High Representative Ashton visits Tunisia and wider Middle East. IP/11/151 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-151_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015) . 4.4 Value Projection 97 Tunisia.117 SPRING program offered Tunisia projects in the areas of good governance, economic growth and social development as Tunisia confirmed great progress after the revolution. (See Table 12) Many EU member states increased financial assistance to the benefits of Tunisia. Cooperation Programs between the EU and TunisiaFigure 3: Co peration Programs between EU a d Tunisia Source: Author´s compilation from EC and EEAS Scope of bilateral cooperation Before revolution 1. Employment 2. Economic Reforms 3. Competitiveness and Growth After revolution 1. Democratic and Economic Governance 2. Democratic Transition ENPI Funds Regional Programs 2011- 2013 390ml (Support 2013) Macro-ec. Stability Democratic Transition Additonal 2 Special Measures A Window for Tunisia Tech. Ass. Project in Gabes Spring Prog. 20ml for 2011 80ml for 2012 55ml for 2013 1. Neighborhood Investment Facility (NIF) 2. Twinning 3. Erasmus Mundus 4. Civil Society Fac. 5. Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) Figure 117 EC. International Cooperation and Development. Retrieved from https:// ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/tunisia_en, (accessed 7 November 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 98 Table 12: EU-Tunisia Bilateral Cooperation* Date Policy Area Topic Amount in Euros 02.02.11 Value Projection Justice/ Legal advice to transition authorities 1.2ml 21.09.11 Value Projection Election Observation Mission sent 3ml 28.09.11 Value Projection Increasing the performance of justice sector 20ml 29.09.11 Value Projection Reform Water Sector 57ml 29.09.11 Value Projection Rehabilitation of Poor regions 20ml 09.07.12 Value Projection Developing Services Sector 20ml 09.07.12 Value Projection Boosting the role of civil society 7ml 09.07.12 Value Projection Boosting the role of Civil Society 7 ml 06.08.12 Value Projection Better Access to Healthcare 12ml 15.03.13 Value Projection Preventing Gender Violence 0.55ml 15.03.13 Value Projection Increasing the performance of justice 1.8ml 26.09.11 Economic Integration Improving economic conditions in disadv. regions and strengthening business capacity 110ml 27.09.11 Economic Integration SME Investment in Contribution to EBRD Funding 20ml 28.09.11 Economic Integration Promoting Employment 60ml 28.09.11 Economic Integration Economic Recovery in Support of a 1bl multidonor support program 100ml 4.4 Value Projection 99 Date Policy Area Topic Amount in Euros 28.11.12 Economic Integration Improving Tunisian business climate 68ml 13.12.12 Economic Integration Setting up socio-cultural centers and creating revenue generating activities (in coop with France Dev. Agency and EIB) 30ml 2011-201 2 Physical Security / Migration Modernization of Higher Education and Scholarships/ Erasmus Mundus Tempus Program 30ml 2013 Physical Security / Migration Increasing the mobility of Tunisian students to study in the EU (Specific Tunisia Window under Erasmus Mundus and Tempus) 10ml *Author’s Compilation Mr Füle, during his visit to Tunisia on the 30th and 31st of March, told that Europe was on the side of Tunisia’s peaceful transition and the EU would support Tunisian partners on their way to being an open and democratic society. He emphasized that the EU was ready to support Tunisia in its democratic reforms, the independence of judiciary, fighting against corruption and developing the least advanced regions.118Following these encouraging statements from EU top officials a solid move on the way to support Tunisian transition came. EU/Tunisia Task Force, which is the first of its kind since the Arab Spring started in the Southern Mediterranean, met on 28 September 2011. The Task Force aimed to better coordinate European and international support for Tunisia’s transition. 2012 118 EC (30 March 2011). Joint statement by Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy and Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, on their trip to Tunisia. MEMO/11/204 http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-204_de.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 100 agenda of the Task Force covered review of cooperation and application of additional funds to be made available to Tunisia. The two programs planned for 2012 focused on employment (approx. €60 million) and justice (approx. €20 million). The first meeting of the joint Tunisia-EU Task Force took place on 28 and 29 September in Tunisia, under the joint chairmanship of the Tunisian Prime Minister, Beji Caid Essebsi, and HR/VP Ms Ashton. The authorities presented their economic and social development strategy for 2012-2014 (Jasmin Plan). Tunisia received pledges of continued EU support for ‘privileged partnership’ through an advanced status at the first meeting of the joint EU-Tunisia taskforce in Tunisia. This partnership would serve interests of both sides establishing dialogue and providing funding for civil society, improving the quality of higher education through Erasmus Mundus and Tempus programs, liberalisation on some sectors like especially agriculture, agreement on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade and launching dialogue on migration, mobility and security.119 Before the meeting Ms Ashton said “The Task Force has three key objectives: to listen to the needs of the Tunisian people; to improve the coordination of European and international support to deliver faster and more effective assistance; to provide a catalyst for concrete results."120 She added that European Commission doubled its financial assistance due to Tunisia’s economic challenges.121 Within the framework of these meetings the EU also confirmed that it would provide a €100 million grant in support of a €1 billion multi-donor support programme, as well as a €57 million EU grant to reform the water sector.122The important goal of this meeting was for economic reasons covering the recovery of frozen assets, foreign direct investment, market access, job creation, building a knowledge society as well as supporting for civil society.In addition to EU’s support of 100 million $ and 57 mil- 119 EC. (27 September 2011) First meeting of EU/Tunisia Task Force to support transition to democracy and economic recovery. (Press Release). IP/11/1087 http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1087_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015). 120 Ibid. First meeting of EU/Tunisia Task Force…. 121 Ibid. First meeting of EU/Tunisia Task Force…. 122 EEAS. (29 September 2011). 'A privileged partnership' – the EU and Tunisia. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2011/290911a_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015). 4.4 Value Projection 101 lion $ for water sector EU’s the third agreement was for the rehabilitation of the poor neighborhoods worth 20ml. Frozen assets’ recovery and their turning back to Tunisians was also important for the Task Force. The EU announced that it would set up an asset recovery team to facilitate the process. But before that Tunisia needed emergent financial support. For this reason EU’s 100 ml funding was strengthened by World Bank’s 500 million $, the African Development Bank’s 500 million $ and the French Development Agency’s 185 million $.123 The EU reiterated its commitment to create a new vision for the Southern Neighborhood continued with launching a partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Commission. This partnership was for promoting political and democratic reform in the Southern Neighbourhood countries to be initially rolled out in Tunisia and Morocco. Catherine Ashton, on this program, said that building democracy was more than holding one election and this program was part of the new approach to the EU’s neighborhood. Füle also added in complementarity that they were helping for a strengthening human rights, good governance and judiciary system. The legal decisions under the Ben Ali regime were found to be biased and unfair by Freedom House analysis as the system was carried out by the executive branch.124 This program exactly because of the major deficits in judiciary targeted governmental bodies, civil society and youth representatives and covered activities including expert recommendations, legal opinions, policy advices, conferences, round tables, peer-reviews and training young political leaders.125 As to realize a deeper relationship and to clarify a new Action Plan the EU-Tunisia Association Council met in Brussels on 19th November 2012 for realizing the status of Privileged Partnership as it has been discussed in the Task Force Meeting. Tunisia was supposed to be involved in some 123 EEAS. (28-29 September 2011). Meeting of the Tunisia – European Union Task Force 28-29 September 2011, Tunis. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/tunisia/docs/ 20110929_taskforce_en.pdf, (accessed 7 November 2015). 124 Tunisia 2012. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/ 2012/tunisia-0 (accessed 13 June 2 . 125 EC. (22 December 2011). New EU programme to support political and democratic reform in Southern Mediterranean. IP/11/1597 (Press Release). http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1597_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 102 community meetings and discussions with the Action Plan.126 Tunisia was represented by the Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Rafik Abdessalem and the EC was represented by Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy. They sealed a political agreement on the Privileged Partnership. The joint document was a guidance for implementing reforms and bilateral cooperation.127 The EU aimed to support Tunisia in its ongoing democratic transition with an intention to finance institutional twinning programs with the administrations of the member states and to strengthen the capacity of administrations, public institutions and civil society. This was a part of the Association Agreement, the Transition Process (P3AT) and the Neighborhood Action Plan.128 Commissioner Stefan Füle made his third visit to Tunisia since the revolution on 9 July 2012. He emphasized the principle of more for more by saying “Success of the transition is however in your own hands and will require continuing the political and economic reforms.” He talked about EU’s concrete assistance which he also discussed with the Tunisian Prime Minister. The two results derived from this meeting were to provide funding for the transformation process. Of the two financing programs the first one worth 20 million euros was designed to be spent for developing the services sector and the second one worth 7 million euros was for boosting the role of civil society in Tunisia. The rest of the funding would be spent for poor regions including access to health care and renovation works. As part of the regional development and reducing inequalities between the regions EU project purchased equipment for patient services and medical transport vehicles to be available in the disadvantaged regions. Another objective was to provide technical facilities for laboratories, imaging and 126 European External Action Service (EEAS). 2013. EU–Tunisia Action Plan. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/tunisia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, (accessed 7 November 2015). 127 EU and Tunisia seal Privileged Partnership. 21 November 2012. Infrastructure North Africa. http://www.infrastructurenorthafrica.com/news/eu-and-tunisia-sealprivileged-partnership, (accessed 7 November 2015). 128 European Commission. (10 December 2012). Tunisia: European Union adopts a new program of support for democratic transition process. (Press Release). http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1347_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015). 4.4 Value Projection 103 dental services. Civil society and regional and local associations are also involved in this project.129 Mr Füle explained that “Privileged Partnership” and a new Action Program were also on EU’s agenda. Negotiations to Tunisia’s access to EU market and EU investments in Tunisia in return were also on the list. Another issue on EU’s focus was rearranging the aviation area to boost tourism and business, intensifying people to people dialogue, mobility partnerships and privileged partnership130 An important part of EU’s humanitarian aid was sent for Libyan refugees in Tunisia. IOM data shows that 345,238 migrants reached Tunisian borders, among whom 136,749 were Tunisian nationals.131 These people were escaping from the war in Libya. EU in this case committed considerable humanitarian aid amounting to €150 million to Tunisia to help Tunisians in coping with the influx of refugees fleeing the war in Libya.132 The EU supported access to healthcare for four million people in Tunisia. As part of EU investment for Tunisia’s poor regions the European Commission adopted a project worth 12 million for poor Tunisians, which accounted for 40% of Tunisian population, to have better access to healthcare. Tunisian population is aging fast and this poses demographic and epidemiological challenges. Actions of this project, from which 4 million people would benefit, covered buying equipment for patient services and building capacity for the Health Ministry. To improve the quality of healthcare specialized services such as early screening for chronic diseases, in basic and intermediate health centres would be launched. Anoth- 129 European Commission (6 August 2012). The European Union supports access to healthcare for four million people in Tunisia. (Press Release). IP/12/886 http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-886_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015). 130 European Commission. (9 July 2012). Further concrete support for transformation in Tunisia, (Press Release), Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-540_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015). 131 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Migration Policy Centre (MPC) Migration Profile-Tunisia. (June, 2013) retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Tunisia.pdf (accessed 9 June 2015). 132 EC.(27 September 2011) First meeting of EU/Tunisia Task Force to support transition to democracy and economic recovery. Press Release http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-11-1087_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 7 November 2015). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 104 er priority of this project was to provide laboratories, imaging and dental services and adequate training for medical staff in remote regions.133 The Council took a step on 26 November 2012 to return the frozen funds of Tunisia in collaboration with member states with the authorizing new legislative framework. On 31 January 2011 misappropriated funds were frozen and the funds and economic sources of Mr. Ben Ali, on the ground that he was subject to judicial investigation, were frozen until 31 January 2012. His annulments were also dismissed by the General Court. However upon the investigation that was made the General Court annulled the extension of Mr Mehdi Ben Ali’s inclusion on the list of persons whose funds are to be frozen in view of the situation in Tunisia.134 The EU would return the misappropriated funds of the previous Tunisian regime with the amended legislation. Ms Ashton regarding this issue said that the return of funds misappropriated by the previous regimes in Tunisia and Egypt was a priority for them. The new legislative framework authorized EU member states to release frozen assets on the basis of judicial decisions recognized in EU member states. Once the necessary judicial steps were taken, this would enable the release and return to the Egyptian and Tunisian authorities of funds frozen under EU sanctions against the former Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes. In addition, the amended legislation would facilitate the exchange of information between EU member states and the relevant authorities in Tunisia and Egypt so as to assist in the recovery of misappropriated funds. Since January 2011, the funds and assets of 48 persons responsible for the misappropriation of Tunisian state funds, including former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, have been frozen in the EU.135 The EU had a cooperation program with the Tunisian officials to improve the knowledge of where the assets were staying. There were a lot of investigations to be carried out like contacting the parents and family of the Ben Ali to see what sort of responsibility they had in the 133 EC. The European Union supports access to healthcare for four million people in Tunisia. (6 August 2012). Press Release. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-886_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015). 134 General Court of the EU. (2 April 2014). The General Court annuls the extension of Mr Mehdi Ben Ali’s inclusion on the list of persons whose funds are to be frozen in view of the situation in Tunisia. (Press Release). CJE/14/47 http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_CJE-14-47_en.htm, (accessed 9 June 2015). 135 Council of the EU. (26 November 2012). Egypt and Tunisia: Council facilitates asset recovery. PRES/12/469 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-12-469_en.htm, (accessed 9 June 2015). 4.4 Value Projection 105 assets before these assets could be unfrozen. According to the interviewed officials the EU was not only trying to locate the assets but also helping the Tunisian legal system to come closer with the European one.136 Many of the Arab States are still disappointed how slowly the European countries have moved.137 Political and Social Turmoil in Tunisia While these positive steps were planned on the EU side political and social turmoil did not stop in Tunisia almost a year after the revolution. On January 5, a 48-year-old man set himself on fire in Gafsa similar to what Bouazizi has done. At least three more self-immolations occurred immediately after this.138 As already explained in the above chapters economic situation was not getting any better and this caused great anger among public. Tunisians’ standards of basic infrastructure, living, services dropped significantly under the last year of Zine El Abidine Ali’s rule in addition to prevailing youth unemployment and discouraging entrepreneurship. Government corruption fostering discontent with the Ben Ali regime should also be noted.139The government asked for time to bring about the economic changes though. Corrupt economic situation could not be fixed overnight. The government spokesperson said that there were serious strikes and several companies have closed as a result of the strikes. National statistics revealed that exports rose by 6.7 per cent compared with 2010, although phosphate exports, hit by strikes, plunged by 39.7 per cent. Tourism sector saw 31 per cent decline in 2011 dramatically.140 4.4.3 136 Int. No:1. 137 Int. No:23. 138 Ryan, J.Tunisians hungry for a break with the past (16 January 2012) Al Jazeera http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/201211513559482819.html, (accessed 9 June 2015). 139 Tunisia: Analyzing the Dawn of the Arab Spring Gallup retrieved from http:// www.gallup.com/poll/157049/tunisia-analyzing-dawn-arab-spring.aspx, (accessed 2 September 2014). 140 Tunisians Hungry for a Break with the Past (16 January 2012) Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/201211513559482819.html, (accessed 4 January 2014). 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 106 In addition to the economic decline the two political assassinations deepened the crisis in Tunisia. Tunisia was shocked that the two politicians were killed with the same gun. Shukru Belaid, a lawyer and the opposition leader of the left-secular Democratic Patriots’ Movement, was shot outside his house on 6 February 2013. The assassination caused the biggest political crisis in Tunisia. People stood up against the government. Questions on security were raised. The Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali resigned on 20 February 2013. He said: “Today there is a great disappointment among the people and we must regain their trust and this resignation is a first step."141 Ennahda reshuffled the government and appointed a new interior minister. Muhammed Brahmi, the leader of the opposition Popular Movement Party was gunned down outside his home as his family watched on July 25, 2013. This act incited nation-wide outrage and deepened political divide. Police used the tear gas to scatter the crowd of protests in central Tunisia and the provinces. Ennahda expressed that it was a "cowardly" act "targeting the revolution and national unity, and obstructing the democratic transition process."142 On the other hand hundreds of protesters blamed the ruling Islamist Party and wanted the government to leave the office. Leftists accused Ennahda of being inefficient in the face of political turmoil. Mr. Ghannouchi called the assassination an attack on Tunisia. “This is a crime against the democratic transition,” he said. Ennahda called on all parties to show “responsibility and restraint at this sensitive time.”143 Serious allegations rose up from different parts of society following the assassination of Mr Belayid. The leader of Islah Cephesi Partisi Muhammed Hoca alleged that the old regime’s people together with the leftist circles planned the assassination of Shukru Belaid on purpose to destroy the government. The old regime supporters especially provoked Nahda’s supporters. He gave the example that their serious protests in 141 Tunisian prime minister resigns Al Jazeera. (20 February 2013) Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/201321918739992693.html, (accessed 15 January 2014). 142 Protests after Tunisia politician shot dead. (26 July 2013) Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/07/201372512523404400.html, (accessed 15 January 2014). 143 Gall, C. (25 July 2013). Second Opposition Leader Assassinated in Tunisia, NY Times http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/world/middleeast/second-oppositionleader-killed-in-tunisia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, (accessed 7 November 2015). 4.4 Value Projection 107 front of the American Embassy were jeopardized by a group of old regime supporters, whose identities had explicitly been determined later. He said that provocateurs reflected the Nahda movement to public as being “an extremist and violent movement” in the eye of the public.144 On the other hand there was the fact that Ennahda members were inexperienced in running a country. It was especially difficult to handle the leftover problems of the Jasmine Revolution.145 Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali stepped down after his proposal of replacing the country’s politicians with non-partisan technocrats on February 19, 2013. Ali Larayedh was charged with forming a new government by President Moncef Marzuki. After two weeks of negotiation with the opposition Nahda resolved political crisis. Political alliance was confirmed and Tunisia’s new political coalition was unveiled as Larayedh handed in the list of the new parliamentary to the President on March 9, 2013.146 Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Füle visited Tunisia on March 15, 2013 after the establishment of the new government. The two contracts he signed were about preventing gender violence, which costed €550.000 and improving the performance of the justice sector which costed €1.8 million. The first project aimed to train specialized staff for providing legal, psychological and socio-medical support to the victims. This program was carried out by a Spanish NGO called Fundación CIDEAL de Cooperación Investigación and lasted for three years in the governorates of El-Kef, Jendouba and Béja. It would show its multiplication effect in the following years as well. The second one was carried out with UNICEF within the framework of EU-Tunisia cooperation program of support to the justice sector in the area of juvenile justice. It was about protecting young delinquents and their integration in- 144 Özer, M. (18 March 2013) Islah Partisi: "Halkımızın Seçtiği Meclisi Koruduk" Haksöz Haber http://www.haksozhaber.net/islah-partisi-halkimizin-sectigimeclisi-koruduk-36285h.htm, (accessed 15 January 2014). 145 Second Opposition Leader Assassinated in Tunisia. (25 July 2013) http:// www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/world/middleeast/second-opposition-leaderkilled-in-tunisia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, NY Times (accessed 16 January 2014). 146 News articles on Libyan revolution are gathered from Timeturk. http://www.timeturk.com/tr/kategori/dunya/libya.. 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 108 to the society. Füle said that the EU was delivering its promises to Tunisia as a committed partner.147 Table 13: Main Features: Value Projection Main Features: Value Projection Time Frame: HR/VP Ashton’s Speech at the EP on Tunisian Transition (2 Feb. 2011)- EC President Füle’s Visit to Tunisia upon the Establishment of the New Government (15 March 2013) Discourses: Highly symbolic importance of democratically elected government Repetition of the importance of values like consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights Fight against deception and corruption and investigation of violent actions Supporting civil society, human rights defenders, women representatives and students Priority of returning assets EU as a strong partner of future Tunisia Actions: 2013 SPRING Program/Support for Good governance, Economic growth and Social Development (20 ml for 2011, 80ml for 2012, 55ml) Immediate support for the preparation of elections and direct support to civil society after the revolution Coordination and encouragement of international funding 2011 Humanitarian Support for Libyan refugees worth 80.5 ml from Commission and 72ml from EU member states 21 Sept. 2011 Election Observation Mission Sent 28 Sept. 2011 Increasing the Performance of Justice Sector worth 20ml 29 Sept. 2011 Rehab. Of Poor Regions worth 20 ml 29 Sept. 2011 Reform water sector worth 57 ml 26 Jan 2011 Assets freeze of 48 people 2 Feb. 2011 Funding for cooperation with civil society worth 1.2ml 2 Feb 2011 Legal advice to transition authorities 1.2 ml 9 July 2012 Funding for developing services sector worth 20ml 9 July 2012 Funding for boosting the role of civil society worth 7ml 6 Aug 2012 Funding for better access to healthcare worth 12ml 26 Nov. 2012 Authorizing new leg. framework to return frozen assets 147 EC. (15 March 2013) Tunisia: New EU aid to support democratic transition. (Press Release). IP/13/232 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-232_en.htm, (accessed 19 September 2013). 4.4 Value Projection 109 15 March 2013 Funding for preventing gender violence worth 550.000 15 March 2013 Funding for improving the performance of the justice sector worth 1.8ml Additional funding for Tunisia’s economic recovery and for creating employment in the most impoverished parts Interviews: Values and interests almost consistent in Tunisia Border security, control of migration and stability prioritized over democracy and human rights despite robust conversation on human rights Modest amount of funding for Tunisia Slowness to return assets Member state interests trumping EU neighborhood policy Values forgotten in the last three decades EU’s incompetency in promoting human rights Shifted rhetoric from transition and reform to security and stability No uniform EU policy (shared values etc..) No clear agenda for future Content Analysis: Rule of Law: An independent judiciary and consolidation of the rule of law is mentioned 7 times Legitimacy of Tunisian revolution is mentioned 6 times Respect for Human Rights: Out of the 24 mentions on respect for human rights half is dedicated to EU support for the objective of maintaining respect for human rights. It has been declared 6 times that EU works closely with Tunisian authorities to respond to peoples demands and hopes for full respect for rule of law. Respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights in relation with the need to release bloggers, journalists and lawyers immediately from detention is mentioned twice. 4. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Tunisia 110 Social Solidarity Necessity of reconciliation is mentioned 15 times Unity is mentioned 4 times Solidarity is mentioned 7 times reminding the point that they can draw on from European history for building reconciliation. Anti-discrimination Anti-discrimination in relation with assisting not only Tunisian authorities but also helping and empowering civil society is mentioned 11 times. Sustainable Development Transition, a sub code of sustainable development, is mentioned 22 times in relation with deep and stable democracy. It is mentioned 8 times that sustainable development can only be maintained when democracy and economy are tackled in an integrated manner. Codes of democracy, democratic and democratization are mentioned 165 times as sub codes of good governance. Out of these 165 citations democratic transition in connection with Tunisia’s engagement in a free electoral process and setting up a Constituent Assembly in a spirit of openness and dialogue is mentioned 25 times. Accountability is mentioned 7 times as another sub code of good governance. Mutual accountability as cited by EU top officials means that Tunisia needs to make enhanced commitments in all areas if Tunisia wants an enhanced status. Mode of Behavior: Strongly normative 4.4 Value Projection 111 Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia Political Decision Making Process and A Quick Look on the West’s Position on Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution EU delegation, which was like the embassy of the EU in Tunisia, met regularly with the heads of ambassadors of member states to establish cooperation. Germany, Italy and France already had a cooperation agency in Tunisia. The expectation was exchange of ideas and to help decision making process work.148 The UK sorted out its policies with top priority in three areas as indicated in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Libya149: Supporting British nationals in Tunisia, supporting Tunisia’s democratization process and increasing business with Tunisia. UK Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt summarized their response to the Arab Spring as seeking for both their national interest and also being sensitive to each country’s experiences.150 This declaration and the defined policy areas covered both norms (democracy promotion) and interests (business opportunities). The UK Prime Minister David Cameron explained his ideas on the Arab Spring with a superior look at the G8 Summit as he said: “…the most powerful nations on Earth have come together and are saying to all those in the Middle East and North Africa who want greater democracy, greater freedom and greater civil rights – we are on your side." He made promises of help in all areas just to avoid `poisonous extremism`.151 5. 5.1 148 Int. No:6. 149 World Location: Tunisia and Libya. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/world/tunisia, (accessed 12 Sept. 2014). 150 The UK’s Response to the Arab Spring. (31 Oct. 2012) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-uks-response-tothe-arab-spring, (accessed 12 September 2013). 151 Wintour, P. (26 May 2011) G8 summit: UK offers Egypt and Tunisia £110m to boost democracy. The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2011/may/26/g8-summit-egypt-tunisia-democracy, (accessed 17 December 2014) G8 summit: UK offers Egypt and Tunisia £110m to boost democracy. The 112 France had strong ties with Tunisia as its former colony. France is a strong economic partner of Tunisia and hosts a huge Tunisian population. Despite these seemingly good relations French civil society and French press has been critical of the French government for not condemning President Ben Ali’s government for human rights abuses and for not giving political and press freedom. (Wood 2002) France was also hesitant to support thousands protesting the regime in Tunisia. According to Münkler’s article, which appeared in Spiegel Magazine, “The Limits of Morality: Sometimes It's Right to Cooperate with Dictators” the inactivity of the West is linked to the fact that the situation in the Middle East and North Africa is unambiguous at the moment.152 Some other authors like Asselborn expressed that “Europeans constantly work with states that don't necessarily reflect European values.”153 Paris was no exception to this real-politik approach. Paris has for too long supported the ousted regime. Even French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been chosen as an honorary citizen in 2008 by the Ben Ali government. (Piser, 2013) The Jasmine Revolution, however, was something unexpected for France after years of extensive social, economic and political relations. French leaders behaved not decisively but cautiously as Ben Ali was preparing to flee. Only after the ex-president had fled to Saudi Arabia French government statements referred to democracy and transition to democracy.154 During the mass demonstrations in Tunisia in December 2010 France was on Ben Ali’s side. France didn’t show solidarity with the Tunisians who wanted the removal of Ben Ali. The French government’s Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/26/g8-summit-egypttunisia-democracy, (accessed 22 June 2013). 152 Münkler, H. (10 February 2011) The Limits of Morality: Sometimes It's Right to Cooperate with Dictators. Der Spiegel.http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/the-limits-of-morality-sometimes-it-s-right-to-cooperate-with-dictatorsa-744597.html, (accessed 22 June 2013). 153 Asselborn, J. (9 February 2011).The EU and the Arab World: 'We Focused Too Much on the Rulers'. Der Spiegel. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ the-eu-and-the-arab-world-we-focused-too-much-on-the-rulers-a-744408.html, (accessed 24 July 2013). 154 Traynor, I. and Willsher K. (17 January 2011) Tunisian protests have caught Nicolas Sarkozy off guard, say opposition. The Guardian http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/tunisian-protests-sarkozy-off-guard, (accessed 20 July 2013). 5.1 Political Decision Making Process 113 position towards the Tunisian protests led even to the resignation of then Foreign Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie. (Mikail 2011, p.5) Only after it was clear that the Tunisians got the revolutionary ball running Alain Juppe, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, defined the Arab Spring region as “mare nostrum-our sea” where they had a “special” responsibility. With this motivation he saw the Arab Spring as “auspicious” which meant that France had both moral duty and interest. Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations he admitted that for far too long they have considered the authoritarian regimes as barricades against extremism and stability was more important than anything just like what the Western traditional thinking said.155 German Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle visited Tunisia every year after the revolution. Only this clue showed how much weight Germany gave to the new Tunisia and how enthusiastic Germany was in setting up good and close relations with the country. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, found it necessary to adopt to this new period in history and watch for Germany’s interests. Her approach to the spurring events was that it was like overthrowing dictators in Eastern Europe. She said that it was irresistible to stop people demanding their rights and Europe in these cases had the responsibility to work more closely with the transitioning countries for peace and security.156German Foreign Ministry Spokesman Andreas Peschke wrote to Deutsche Welle "The government has always made it clear that human rights must be respected, even in times of great social upheaval and new governments must offer perspectives to all social and religious groups and protect their fundamental rights”.157 Germany had obviously other policy concerns to take care of during the Arab Spring process together with the EU. These were, as Christian Democrat Ruprecht Polenz, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag put it, security, economic cooperation, migration, security of Israel, modernization, democratization, the rule of law, 155 The Arab Spring: A Conversation with Alain Juppe. (19 September 2011) Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/ arab-spring-conversation-alain-juppe/p25931, (accessed 18 July 2013). 156 Germany commends Arab revolutions, pledges aid to promote democracy. (12 February 2011) DW. http://www.dw.de/germany-commends-arab-revolutionspledges-aid-to-promote-democracy/a-14839246, (accessed 22 July 2013). 157 Germany considers a shift in Middle East policy. (24 December 2012). DW. http://www.dw.de/germany-considers-a-shift-in-middle-east-policy/a-16467435, (accessed 22 July 2013). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 114 and human rights. He added however that the last one 4 of these objectives fell aside.158 When we take the economic cooperation out from the list of priorities mentioned above we see that Germany has taken many initiatives in this field. Germany saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity for North-South cooperation.159 Germany wanted to support democracy in Tunisia with a development partnership and Westerwelle had campaigned especially for a stronger role for the German economy in the region. Democratic success was dependent on economic success in Tunisia. Although, as often discussed, Arab revolutions were not predicted by the West Germany claimed to follow a foreign policy course defending the revolutions. The spurring changes in the Arab world and a new phase of reconstruction process would meet Germany’s interests and values alike. 5.2 Physical Security The Protection of UK Nationals and the Very First UK-Tunisia Cooperation in Security First and foremost, in order to prevent any harm, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in cooperation with the British Embassy in Tunisia released publications on how British people could stay safe and on travel advices. Accordingly Foreign Secretary Mr Hague reminded assistance of British embassy and warned his people to listen to the local security authorities. He also called to the authorities for returning to the law and organizing free and fair elections as well as expansion of political freedoms.160 Hague told that he had spoken to the Tunisia’s Foreign Minister, Kemal Morjane, on the issue of fundamental political changes that a large population has for long awaited. He also expressed the UK’s support to hold free and fair elections.161 5.2.1 158 Ibid., Germany considers a shift in Middle East Policy. 159 Deutscher Bundestag Stenografischer Bericht 95. Sitzung, Berlin (16 March 2011) http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/17/17095.pdf, (accessed 12 June 2013). 160 Foreign Secretary William Hague calls for restraint from all sides and an orderly move towards free and fair elections.(14 January 2011)Foreign and Commonwealth Office(FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretaryurges-rapid-reurn-to-law-and-order-in-tunisia, (accessed 8 August 2015). 161 Foreign Secretary William Hague encouraged Tunisian Foreign Minister to meet the aspirations of the Tunisian people.(26 January 2011) Foreign and Common- 5.1 Political Decision Making Process 115 While Hague was doing his part by protecting his own nationals he also viewed the insecurity in Tunisia as a risk for uncontrolled migration, destabilization, disruption to energy exports and extremism which in the end would affect Europe. For this reason Tunisia’s success towards democracy would be also Europe’s success. This success would be acquired with the practical support of other international actors.162 In accordance with UK’s National Security Strategy, the UK protects its interests overseas. Conflict prevention is a key element of also UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) which was published in 2011. This strategy mainly aims to anticipate and prevent any possible crisis, react to early warning signs of instability, build legitimate institutions to be able to manage crisis and to set up programs for preventing violence against women and girls. UK increased the budget of Arab Partnership Initiative up to 110 million in 2011-2015 with these aims in the MENA region.163 The UK cooperated with Tunisia in the area of security drawing on British experience. Foreign Office Minister Tobias Ellwood, speaking at the UK-Tunisia Bilateral Forum in November 2014, made UK’s commitment to provide counter-terrorist equipment and training.164 Deputy Minister, Ridha Sfar announced that a new central Strategic Planning Unit within the Ministry of Interior was established as an ambitious step towards security reform. The UK and Tunisia for a long time have been on this project. Sfar said that this center would work for managing risks, confronting security threats in a preemptive manner, tackling border security and terrorism and setting up accountable institutions for these aims. British Ambassador to Tunisia, Hamish Cowell, on the other hand, emphasized that this was the first time Tunisia and the UK cooperated in the security sector. He said “The challenge facing Tunisia is also a wealth Office(FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretarycalls-tunisian-foreign-minister, (accessed 8 August 2015). 162 Helping the Arab Spring succeed is Britain's cause too. (8 August 2011). Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/helpingthe-arab-spring-succeed-is-britains-cause-too, (accessed 5 August 2015). 163 Preventing conflict in fragile states. (12 Dec. 2012). Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/preventing-conflict-infragile-states--2, (accessed 15 December 2014). 164 FCO Minister announces plans for further cooperation with Tunisia. (3 November 2014). Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/fco-minister-announces-plans-for-further-cooperation-withtunisia, (accessed 15 December 2014). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 116 historic opportunity to prove that democracy is achievable; Tunisia has the United Kingdom’s unwavering support for that. As other countries come out of conflict and look for paths to stability, I have no doubt they will look to [Tunisia] for [its] hard-won lessons. I look forward to Tunisia’s future and to our continued cooperation”165 Anti-Immigrant Speeches and Policies of France and Germany The most important topic regarding physical security is immigration. French authorities’ declarations pointed to the fact that the immigration policy was obviously affected by French public opinion which was not in favor of immigration and also the fear of extremism. President Sarkozy said that Tunisian opposition leaders were allowed to live in France but Paris refused to give residency for Islamists.166 If Tunisian migrants coming from Italy couldn’t prove financial resources enough they would be sent back across the border according to what the French interior minister said.167 Sarkozy’s former chief of staff, Claude Guéant also expressed the intention to reduce the number of immigrants on French soil. He told Europe 1: “It’s easier for immigrants to integrate if there are less of them.”168 France’s sharpest precaution was to temporarily shut its border to the trains carrying Tunisian migrants from Italy on January, 23. France chose to protect its territory while Italy delivered some 22,000 temporary residence to Tunisian migrants. (Mikail, 2011) Despite the accusations coming from Italy European Commission decided that France has acted within 5.2.2 165 UK supports Tunisia's security reform efforts. (25 November 2014). Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/world-locationnews/uk-supports-tunisias-security-reform-efforts, (accessed 15 December 2015). 166 Chirisafis, A. (24 January 2011) Sarkozy admits France made mistakes over Tunisia. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/24/nicolassarkozy-tunisia-protests, (accessed 21 June 2013). 167 France threatens to return Tunisian migrants. (18 April 2011) Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/04/2011418142417356815.html, (accessed 30 June 2013). 168 Allemandou, S. (30 November 2011) France hardens immigration stance as elections loom. France 24. http://www.france24.com/en/20111130-french-government-immigration-elections-sarkozy-paris-visa-assylum-le-pen-gueant, (accessed 30 June 2013). 5.1 Political Decision Making Process 117 its rights when they stopped the trains for “public order”.169 Another event showing France’s anti-immigrant policy happened when France detained 60 migrants mainly from Tunisia in and around Paris for breaking residency laws. France police was under fire in the eye of human rights organizations in France. Alexandre Leclève, a spokesperson for La Cimade, a French NGO, advocated the rights of these illegally detained migrants. For him, these migrants should be held outside the standard procedure since they had Italian documents granting them residency rights in France.170 Irregular immigration as the result of the political and economic crisis in the Arab Spring countries especially in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria became almost unmanageable for the EU and member states. In Germany like in Italy, Spain and the UK migrant stocks increased in 2011. Just after the revolution Tunisia and Libya became the departure points for migrants and refugees to Italy, particularly to the largest island of Italy, Lampedusa, which is only 70 miles away from Tunisia.171 In March 2011, the Italian Interior Minister, Roberto Maroni, said that “flows of migrants from Libya would bring Italy to its knees”172 to picture how desperate the situation was. Faced with the flow of Tunisian migrants Italy offered to provide refugees with temporary travel visas so that they could also enter other European countries. In April 2011 German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich however responded to Italy’s offer and said that Italy should solve its problems and provide order in the country but not force other countries to accept migrants. He added that they should be sent back to their countries.173 Chancellor Merkel took even a tougher position on the security of borders and illegal migration. Merkel put forward the criteria that the mi- 169 France threatens to return Tunisian migrants.(18 April 2014) Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/04/2011418142417356815.html, (accessed 2 October 2015). 170 France 'illegally' detains uprising migrants. (28 April 2011) Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/04/2011428191651858227.html, (accessed 27 September 2014). 171 Fargues, P. and Fandrich, C. (Sept. 2012). MPC – Migration Policy Centre http:// www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2009.pdf, (accessed 2 December 2015). 172 Ibid., p.6. 173 Mara, D. (April 10, 2011). Germany tells Italy to 'solve its own problems' in Tunisian refugee row.DW http://www.dw.de/germany-tells-italy-to-solve-its-ownproblems-in-tunisian-refugee-row/a-14980272, (accessed 2 December 2015). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 118 grants who were exposed to political persecution only in their home countries could be accepted as asylum migrants. As opposed to the countries like Syria, Lebanon and Yemen Germany had no responsibility for those arriving from Tunisia.174 She also said "not everyone who does not want to be in Tunisia can come to Europe. Rather, we need to talk to each other how we can strengthen the rule of law in Tunisia again and whether Europe can be of help.”175 Facts on the ground revealed that the tragic journey of refugees trying to arrive European shores was a shame for the host and receiver countries. After the meeting where EU member countries gathered to discuss EU refugee policy in Milan in July 20114 Thomas de Maiziere, Interior Minister of Germany, pointed at this tragedy in an interview with Deutsche Welle and talked about the necessity of finding an orderly path to Europe and fighting back against smuggling. He demanded a coordinated European effort to avoid scandals. People were jumping into a journey at the expense of their lives. He also added that Frontex was the organization to response to the demands of Italia, which receives influx of migrants every day, is only 120 km away from Tunisia. He mainly discussed that the EU should focus its efforts on refugees' countries of origin, as well as transit countries.176 Italy blamed fellow member states for abandoning Italy alone with mainly Tunisian migrants. Italy’s last attempt to issue around 20,000 migrants with temporary permits to travel to other countries didn’t work also. This move was criticized by France and Germany. Early in April however, France and Germany agreed to set up joint patrols off the Tunisian coast.177 174 Merkel defends policy to deport North African economic migrants. (5 June 2011). DW http://www.dw.de/merkel-defends-policy-to-deport-north-african-economic-migrants/a-15132075, (accessed 2 December 2015). 175 Italy struggles with Tunisia influx. (14 February 2011). Al Jazeera. http:// www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2011/02/2011214133653175984.html, (accessed 9 August 2013). 176 Riegert, Bernd Maiziere: EU must help refugees at the source. (11 July 2014). DW. http://www.dw.de/maiziere-eu-must-help-refugees-at-the-source/ a-17773504, (accessed 11 September 2015). 177 France threatens to return Tunisian migrants. (18 April 2011) Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/04/2011418142417356815.html, (accessed 11 August 2013). 5.1 Political Decision Making Process 119 Economic Prosperity Member States’ Quest for Retaining Lucrative Economic Ties with Tunisia Oil, gas and renewable en5ergy business play a major part in North Africa. UK Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt also emphasized this point while speaking to the World Affairs Council of Houston a year after the revolution. He reminded of the global trends in secure and stable energy consumption. Renewable energy exploitation still has a subsidiary role though. The proportion of wind and solar energy only amounts to four percent in the whole energy production. Tunisia had a plan to increase this share of renewable energy up to a 30 per cent share by 2030.178 Mr Burt told that this region’s role on meeting the global energy demand was not going to change and Western countries were keeping an eye on how their relationship should be in the area of energy while political reforms were sweeping the region.179 Business relationships between the Western companies and Tunisia relied on mutual gains as Tunisia also needed foreign investors to enliven its economy and the West needed to sell its technology and expertise. Mr Burt also pointed at this type of relationship when he said “Renewable technologies are changing the global energy mix and their links with the regional countries should be more on mutual economic benefit than being on the one way supply of oil.”180 From this perspective UK’s economy policy towards Tunisia ostensibly was to watch for business interests while British leaders were making commitments to help Tunisia handle economic challenges. It was equally important to ensure stability and reduce poverty through economic development. Minister of State for International Development, Alan Duncan, expressed his view of these momentous changes in the region that The 5.3 5.3.1 178 Tunisia – a New Partner Country for the Manager Training Program. Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy http://managerprogramm.de/en/tunisiaa-new-partner-country-for-the-manager-training-programme/ (accessed 1 September 2015). 179 The Arab Spring and Challenges for 2012. (2 February 2012). Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-arabspring-and-challenges-for-2012--4, (accessed 1 September 2015). 180 ibid., The Arab Spring.. (accessed 1 September 2015) https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/the-arab-spring-and-challenges-for-2012--4, (accessed 1 September 2015). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 120 Arab Partnership Fund was exactly the cure for poverty-reducing economic growth, supporting job creation, skills for employment, integrated trade, and effective, accountable institutions.181 On March 12, 2012 Minister for the Middle East and North Africa Alistair Burt met the Tunisian Foreign Minister and Speaker of the Parliament with the aim to engage with British investments in Tunisia and to increase the level of trade. He said that “Our economic ties are strong. British companies are already big investors in Tunisia and we hope to be able to increase the level of trade still further.”182 On his third visit to Tunisia Burt told that UK would be Tunisia’s long term economic partner and investor with major companies like British Gas. The main strategic investment was BG’s gas processing site near the city of Sfax. Before his departure he reiterated that Tunisia had strong potential in tourism and business and that the UK wanted to be a close business partner. The UK was already a strong investor in energy and tourism sector. They would also work to create opportunities in renewable energy and finance183 Tourism, trade and financial services from other areas where British companies would be active besides energy.184 The UK expected to increase trade and investment in Tunisia where more than 80 companies left the country after the revolution and foreign direct investment fell by 20%.185 A memorandum of understanding was planning to be signed between the British Venture Capital Association and the Tunisian League for Investment to give the partnership an official status.186 181 The UK's response to the Arab Spring. (31 October 2012). Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-uks-response-tothe-arab-spring, (accessed 1 September 2015). 182 Foreign Office Minister Visits Tunisia (13 March 2012) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-visits-tunisia, (accessed 1 September 2015). 183 In his third visit to Tunisia since the revolution, Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt underlined the UK’s support for Tunisia’s transition process.(15 March 2012) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-visitedtunisia, (accessed 1 September 2015). 184 British foreign policy and the "Arab Spring" - Foreign Affairs Committee. (19 July 2012) UK Parliament. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ cmselect/cmfaff/80/8009.htm, (accessed 22 August 2015). 185 Ibid. British foreign policy.. 186 UK wishes to expand partnership with Tunisia. (16 January 2011). Al Monitor http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/pt/contents/articles/politics/2014/06/tunisia-ukambassador-strengthen-ties.html, (accessed 20 August 2015). 5.3 Economic Prosperity 121 The UK had a strong tourist presence in Tunisia. Although the number of tourists dropped after the revolution British people started to visit Tunisia in 2012 following a strong marketing campaign in Britain by the Tunisian tourist office.187 Actually the number of British visitors to Tunisia has reached the number of more than 400,000 visitors.188 The British Ambassador to Tunisia Hamish Cowell also explained that UK’s intention was to be Tunisia’s main partner in the field of energy by encouraging more investment in this area. Furthermore UK would work to develop partnerships in other areas of financial and commercial sectors as well. “With the progress of the transition phase, Tunisia has real potential to establish itself as a hub for neighboring countries and the region as a whole. And I would like to see British companies play a role in that” Cowell said. 189 Tunisia has the real potential to establish itself as a hub for neighboring countries and the region as a whole. Current political changes in North Africa offered business opportunities also for Germany. The region boasted unstable political conditions. On the other side, there are quite appealing business opportunities. Among the North African countries Tunisia has been its most important economic partner for years. As the German government saw its interest in stability and economic cooperation would lead to stability they gave their support to Tunisia wholeheartedly by financing more than 100 development projects with around 50 million euros in Tunisia as part of its Transformation Partnership.190 After France and Italy, Germany is the third most important trade partner of Tunisia. According to German-Tunisian Chamber of Industry and Trade, there are almost 250 German companies in Tunisia with approx. 50.000 employees. The German-Tunisian trading volume reached 2.84 billion euros in 2013. German exports accounted for approximately 1.4 billion euros of this figure. Exports primarily include fabrics, electronics, machines, cars, chemical products and foodstuffs. German imports from 187 British foreign policy and the "Arab Spring" - Foreign Affairs Committee. (19 July 2012) UK Parliament. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ cmselect/cmfaff/80/8009.htm, (accessed 21 August 2015). 188 Ibid. UK wishes to expand…. 189 Ibid. UK wishes to expand…. 190 Westerwelle promotes democracy in Tunisia. (16 August 2013). DW http:// www.dw.de/westerwelle-promotes-democracy-in-tunisia/a-17024109, (accessed 21 August 2015). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 122 Tunisia increased by 3.8 per cent and totaled 1.49 billion euros in 2013; these included textiles, electro-technical components, car accessories (including cables), leather goods, crude oil, foodstuffs, fuels, lubricating oils and carpets.191 Tunisia continues to develop its economic ties with Germany since 2011 when the Ennahda Party won most seats after elections for the Constituent Assembly. Germany saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity for North-South cooperation. Germany offered a North-South Pact which would allow for more trade and would allow to open European markets. There were more than 270 companies currently investing in Tunisia.192 Germany was also preparing to make an investment promotion agreement and protection treaty with Tunisia. “The political stability is not secured in Tunisia but economic relations with Germany will” according to Mohammed Halaiqah, head of the Jordanian parliament's International Affairs Committee. Germany with its technology and quality would be very active in the region.193 Infrastructure has been destroyed during the events and this meant German as well as other European companies have work to do. Renewable energy is another field where Germany has expertise. Another expert who can evaluate the future of German business in Tunisia is Thomas Bach, head of the Ghorfa Arab-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He says that Germany had expertise in building up a free-enterprise system and social market economy which are needed by the region. He has been campaigning for the German private sector to accompany the change in Arab countries.194 The Arab world is a growing market not only for Germany but also for other European countries. The mostly shared idea is that the region with its newly born middle class through trade and investment and exchange of 191 Tunisia – a New Partner Country for the Manager Training Program Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. http://managerprogramm.de/en/ tunisia-a-new-partner-country-for-the-manager-training-programme/, (accessed 1 September 2015). 192 Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 95. Sitzung (16 March 2011) Berlin http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/17/17095.pdf, (accessed 21 November 2015). 193 Kinkartz , Sabine. Arab political upheaval opens prospects for western business partners. (17 May 2011). DW. http://www.dw.de/arab-political-upheaval-opensprospects-for-western-business-partners/a-15083401, (accessed 21 November 2015). 194 Ibid. Kinkartz . 5.3 Economic Prosperity 123 economic opportunities can be an excellent candidate for being a business partner.195 France’s Ambivalent Response to Changing Tunisia due to High Economic Interests France is Tunisia’s leading trading partner as the biggest supplier (with a market share of 18.9%) and as the biggest customer (28.7% of Tunisian exports). France is Tunisia’s top investor accounting for 25% of 2010 investment in the Maghreb. The value of French exports to Tunisia rose from €3.4 billion higher margin, from €4 billion in 2010 to €4.5 million in 2011.196 France, with the aim of integrating Tunisia in the European market, proposed to open negotiations for DCFTAs with Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt as part of the trade pillar of the Deauville Partnership to integrate them in the European market.197 Almost 3000 French companies form the basis of foreign investment in Tunisia and also thousands of French citizens live in Tunisia. The value of French loans and grants between 2006 and 2010 is 950 million Euros. (Jebel, 2014)For the sake of French citizens, companies and economic interests in Tunisia there was no much criticism for the regime in opposition to the Tunisians who were exhausted from the deep economic crisis. It was substantially because of years of strong business links that France’s diplomatic response was ambivalent. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire, for example, said Mr. Ben Ali had been judged unfairly and had done many good things for Tunisia. During the month of demonstrations that led to Mr. Ben Ali’s fall on Friday, France only called for “calm” and 5.3.2 195 Ibid. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 95. Sitzung (16 March 2011) Berlin http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/17/17095.pdf, (accessed 21 November 2015). 196 Economic Relations (18 December 2012) France Diplomatie http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/tunisia-286/france-and-tunisia/economic-relations-5170/article/economic-relations-8105, (accessed 21 November 2015). 197 Free Trade Agreements: Potential levers for growth and job. (24 May 2013). France Diplomatie. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy-1/ economic-diplomacy-foreign-trade/a-european-and-international/making-international-regulations/article/free-trade-agreements-potential, (accessed 21 November 2015). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 124 an end to violence.198 In terms of actions, as soon as the G-8 meeting in Deauville ended, AFD signed two loans for €200 million to support Tunisia’s recovery and economic stimulus plan. AFD’s 2013 reports also shows that France delivered grants and loans worth 6 ml to Tunisia to be used for supporting to set up a microfinance institution and support for young entrepreneurs. 199 Although French media and human rights circles criticized Ben Ali for his weak human rights records, free press and free elections French diplomacy remained quiet.(Wood, 2002) France was accused of turning a blind eye to the dictatorship as an alternative to hostile regimes and as a protector of beneficial business relations. Philippe Moreau-Defarges, co-director of the French Institute of International Relations, for instance said: "The government of Ben Ali did bring a form of stability to Tunisia. What did you expect the French government to do? They didn't want to throw oil on the fire.”200 Jacques Lanxade, a former ambassador to Tunis in the late 1990s, also explained France’s slowness in responding to the protests from an economic perspective: “Since 2000, people saw the Tunisian regime closing itself into a semi dictatorship, but we did not react. We continued public support of this regime because of economic interests, because we thought Ben Ali had a role in fighting Islamists.”201 Value Projection UK Condemning Violence in Tunisia Zine al-Abidine left the country upon people’s spontaneous uprising. He escaped to Saudi Arabia after 23 years of authoritarian rule leaving a chaotic country behind. Following M. Bouazizi’s self-immolation in front of a local municipal office Houcine Falhi, a 22 year old protestor commit- 5.4 5.4.1 198 Erlanger, ibid. 199 Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) Report2011 and 2013. 200 Traynor, I. and Willsher, K. (17 January 2011) Tunisian protests have caught Nicolas Sarkozy off guard, say opposition. The Guardian http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/tunisian-protests-sarkozy-off-guard, (accessed 6 August 2015). 201 Erlanger, Steven. (16 January 2011). France Seen Wary of Interfering in Tunisia Crisis. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/world/africa/ 17france.html?_r=0, (accessed 6 August 2015). 5.4 Value Projection 125 ted suicide by electrocuting himself in the midst of another demonstration over unemployment in Sidi Bouzid after shouting "No to misery, no to unemployment!”. M. Ammari, an 18-year-old protester, was shot and killed by police during violent demonstrations in the central town of Menzel Bouzaiene. Chawki Belhousinne, a 44-year-old man, was among those shot by police at the same protest.202 In the following month, in January, military forces attempted to restore order. Nine protesters were reportedly killed and several people were wounded in clashes with police. More than two hundred people lost their lives during the civil uprisings. Upon these tragic events Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt said that the UK regretted the loss of lives during the protests in Tunisia on January 10, 2011. He added that “they hoped all sides of the conflict would work to avoid further violence”. 203 Following this announcement Hague also condemned the violence in Tunisia and the deaths of protestors and the closure of schools. He called on to the authorities to resolve the problems in peace. He also asked for implementing a transparent process for detained people.204 UK’s vision in the Arab Spring process was that legitimacy derived from people deliver peace and security while legitimacy based on fear and violence deliver nothing but conflict and insecurity. Therefore Foreign Secretary Hague saw the Arab Spring as “a huge opportunity” to build security and prosperity in the region. At a parliamentary speech on `UK’s response to the Arab Spring` he explained: “We support democracy, human rights and economic freedom worldwide because they are universal. But 202 Timeline: Tunisia's uprising. (23 January 2011). Al Jazeera, http:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/ 2011/01/201114142223827361.html, (accessed 13 June 2013). 203 Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt speaks about demonstrations in Tunisia over the weekend which resulted in the loss of at least 14 lives (10 January 2011). https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-expresses-regretat-loss-of-life-and-urges-restraint, (accessed 10 June 2013). 204 Foreign Secretary William Hague called on the Tunisian authorities to take steps to resolve the situation peacefully. FCO (11 January 2011). https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/foreign-secretary-condemns-violence-in-tunisia, (accessed 10 June 2013). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 126 we also know that they are the best recipe for the stability and prosperity the world needs.”205 UK’s Arab Partnership Fund as the Main Protection against Instability UK’s reflection of European values in the MENA region was accomplished through setting up the Arab Partnership Fund. It was at the same time UK’s main protection against instability on Europe’s doorstep. British officials alleged to advocate political change with peace. It was announced by the Foreign Secretary in February with a budget of €110 million. Mr Hague believed that supporting the Arab people in their fight for political and economic reforms- political participation, rule of law, corruption, public voice, youth employability, and private sector developmentwas at the heart of UK’s national interest.206 The UK funding included £40m from FCO over four years to bolster political reform and a further £70m from the Department for International Development (DFID) between 2011 and 2014.207 The money would be used to build political participation, support human rights groups and challenge corruption.208 Arab Partnership was a policy response not only to Tunisia but also to the historic events of the Arab Spring in general. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for International Development explained that they see this in the interests of the UK.209 The UK offered several projects via Arab Partnership Fund for supporting Tunisia’s reforms. One of these projects was International Conference 5.4.2 205 Foreign Secretary updates Parliament on Middle East and North Africa (26 April 2011) FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-updates-parliament-on-middle-east-and-north-africa, (accessed 10 June 2013). 206 Foreign Secretary: "This is a crucial moment for the people of the Middle East and North Africa and the UK will rise to the challenge of meeting our responsibility to support them." (26 May 2011) FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/ news/uk-pledges-support-for-political-and-economic-reform-in-the-middle-east, (accessed 16 December 2014). 207 Working for peace and long-term stability in the Middle East and North Africa. (12 December 2012) FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/working-forpeace-and-long-term-stability-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/supportingpages/the-arab-partnership, (accessed 16 December 2014). 208 Ibid., Wintour, P. (26 May 2011). 209 Ibid., Working for peace. 5.4 Value Projection 127 on Islam and Democracy that took place in Tunis, 29 – 30 March. The event was organized by the Centre of Islam and Democracy (CSID) as part of the Arab Partnership initiative led by the UK to support political change and economic growth in Tunisia and the MENA region. This conference carried an important mission as to bring two political enemies Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi and Nida Tounes’ Secretary General Tayeb Baccouche together on the same platform.210 Another project of this kind in support of Tunisia’s democratic transition was creating `I Watch´ handbook. In support of Tunisia’s democratic transition the International Foundation for Electoral Systems supported the development of `I Watch` Handbook on Monitoring Campaign Finance. The handbook laid out principles of professionalism, impartiality, non-partisanship and non-interference in the electoral process that guided the work of I Watch which is an NGO to fight corruption and to observe elections.211 The Arab Partnership program had already approved 48 projects in 9 countries worth £6.5m. In a statement to the Parliament on April 26, Hague made his approach towards Tunisia within the frame of the revolutions that the UK would stand for “reform not repression and the universality of human rights and freedom as a policy in accordance with their beliefs and national interest as well as in pursuit of the peace and prosperity of the wider world”.212 He also underlined the fact at a special session on the Middle East at the Security Council that the UK needed support from international financial institutions, the G8 and regional organizations and of course the EU within this international community to be able to offer more projects and convey meaningful assistance to open up prosperous and stable societies and political and economic freedom.213 210 Sharing Tunisia’s achievements and challenges through its democratic transition. (18 April 2012) FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/ tunisia-as-a-model-in-democratic-transition, (accessed 19 December 2014). 211 Arab Partnership supported project on supporting democratic transition (11 April 2013) FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/monitoring-political-finance-project-in-tunisia, (accessed 17 December 2014). 212 Foreign Secretary updates Parliament on Middle East and North Africa. (26 April 2011) FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-updates-parliament-on-middle-east-and-north-africa, (accessed 17 December 2014). 213 The situation in the Middle East: challenges and opportunities (12 March 2012). FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-situation-in-the-middle-east-challenges-and-opportunities, (accessed 23 August 2013). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 128 UK’s Projects on Institution and Capacity Building Job creation was one of the main demands of the Tunisian revolution. Unemployment and unequal development between regions were also the two challenges that need to be addressed. These were the problems that led the UK along with France to develop ‘Tounes tekhdem’ (Tunisia is working) project with an agreement between Mercy Corps Tunisia and the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment in the southern governorates of Gafsa, Kasserine, Medenine, and Tataouine. This project targeted 3500 young people enrolled in Vocational Training Centres, unemployed university and vocational training graduates and young entrepreneurs, all living in less advantaged areas in Tunisia through training materials for financial education, entrepreneurship and life skills. This project better equipped young Tunisians from less advantaged areas to create their own companies and their own employment. That, in turn, was expected to lead to the wider development of their regions and more job opportunities for others. Additionally, in parallel with the biggest problems of Tunisia as being corruption and false spending strategies, UK Ambassador to Tunisia Chris O’Connor launched a project in partnership with the Tunisian Association of Public Auditors. This project was for maximizing value for money and auditing public expenditure. The Ambassador highlighted the importance of proper financial control, transparency and accountability in his opening speech. The audience had the opportunity to hear the experiences of UK National Audit Office.214 The UK also supported reforms in Tunisia’s public governance. In this respect the British Embassy held a conference on promoting transparency of public financial management, and government’s integrity and citizen participation in public policy decisions in Tunisia. After the presentations of the experiences from different countries Louise Burrett from the Embassy said that anti-corruption and transparency were the global priorities 5.4.3 214 UK with Tunisian Association of Public Auditors launched a Performance Auditing project (14 March 2012) FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/uk-launched-a-project-with-the-tunisian-association-of-public-auditors-to-maximising-value-for-money-in-public-expenditure, (accessed 23 August 2013). 5.4 Value Projection 129 for the UK under its G8 Presidency.215 Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), one of the UK’s leading democracy-building organization, offered a project to adopt better relations between the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and eventually to make the NCA more effective and accountable. This project covered two training workshops in November 2013 and January 2014 following an initial assessment carried out during 2013.216 These projects came into life partially at the meeting of the Finance Ministers and international financial institutions of the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition in Washington on April 19, 2013. The UK, like the EU and other member states, put great emphasis on supporting Tunisia’s electoral process, political parties, media and civil society for a more democratic Tunisia via bilateral and multilateral projects. He informed that the UK provided voter education for women and young people and the development of free press.217 The election campaign for a constituent assembly started on October 1. The historic riots, which started on May 10, lied in the background of these elections with the preexisting doubts on the governments’ path to democracy. Eventually 11 thousand candidates entered the competition for 217 seats. This election had a special place in the Arab Spring process for being an example to other dictatorships. Furthermore this constituent assembly had a serious task of forming a new constitution since 1959. The result was announced after counting began on 25 October 2011 and Ennahda won a plurality in the election. The preparations for this momentous change in the Tunisian history attracted high level visits from the EU side. On March 15, 2012 Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt made his third visit to Tunisia since the revolution. He met Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Rafik Abdessalem and Secretary of State for Europe Mr Touhami Abdouli and highlighted UK’s support for Tunisia’s democratic transition and their strong bilateral relation- 215 The UK is supporting reform in Tunisia’s public governance (12 July 2013) https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/promoting-public-governances-transparency-and-integrity-in-tunisia, (accessed 24 August 2013). 216 Building capacity of Tunisian CSOs in the policy making process. (24 May 2014). FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/building-capacity-of-tunisian-csos-in-the-policy-making-process, (accessed 24 August 2013). 217 The UK’s Response to the Arab Spring. (31 October 2012) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-uks-response-to-the-arab-spring, (accessed 24 August 2013). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 130 ship. Mr Burt welcomed Tunisia’s efforts to bring Maghreb countries together, help Libyan refugees and to host the first Friends of Syria meeting.218 Two weeks later Foreign Secretary William Hague met Tunisian Foreign Minister Rafik Abdesselam in London. Mr Hague was pleased to see successful elections and a work in progress constitution based on democratic values and human rights. He told that the UK’s BBC was supporting reforms of the state media and that UK would support civil society organizations.219 BBC Media Action, for example, organized a 3-day study tour to Edinburgh and London for Tunisian National TV (Watania) news managers. The visitors had the chance to see the BBC experience live as well as they got some different insights on covering elections and political news.220 France’s Inconsistent Declarations Replaced with Full Support for Democracy and Freedom France has also been in a close historical and cultural relationship with Tunisia as its former colony. France has been the top country of residence for Tunisians. As Tunisia is a special country for France everything France says and does becomes important. Some anti-revolutionary expressions of the French media and the politicians caused tense relations though. For example, President Sarkozy’s reaction to the criticized Ben Ali rule was “To say that Tunisia is a one-man dictatorship seems to me quite exaggerated."221 As human rights groups were condemning the crimes of Tunisian police the French foreign minister, on the other hand, said that France 5.4.4 218 Foreign Office Minister visited Tunisia.(15 March 2012) FCO https:// www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-visited-tunisia, (accessed 10 June 2013). 219 Foreign Secretary meets Tunisian Foreign Minister.(March 29, 2012) FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-meets-tunisian-foreignminister, (accessed 10 June 2013). 220 UK supports Tunisia's national public service broadcasting. (16 April 2014).FCO https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/watania-news-departmentuk-study-tour, (accessed 20 November 2015). 221 Tunisian protests have caught Nicolas Sarkozy off guard, say opposition. (17 January 2011). The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/ tunisian-protests-sarkozy-off-guard, (accessed 16 June 2013). 5.4 Value Projection 131 would lend its own police "knowhow" to help Ben Ali's forces maintain order.222 Mr Sarkozy, however, later admitted that they had made mistakes. French support for the Ben Ali regime caused outrage in Tunisia and in the human rights defenders’ circles and Sarkozy admitted that they had underestimated this anger. He said “Behind the emancipation of women, the drive for education and training, the economic dynamism, the emergence of a middle class, there was a despair, a suffering, a sense of suffocation. We have to recognize that we underestimated it”.223 He then gave its full support to Tunisia within the principles of non- interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and support for democracy and freedom in the wake of the revolution.224 That the dictatorships are “tolerable for they are providers of stability and bulwarks against radicalism” is an often cited argument in the realpolitic thinking.225 Although France initially acted reluctantly after Ben Ali has gone France is now expected to revise its entire North African Policy. As Christian Bouquet, a professor of geopolitics at the University of Bordeaux who specializes in African issues expresses Paris has shifted into `reverse gear`. "There was without question a brutal realization of the fact that France's initial position was going to hit a wall," he told the news agency The Reuters.226 France’s Three Priorities and Development Projects Tunisia-France relations turned back to normal only after the visits of Tunisian Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali and Tunisian President Moncef 5.4.5 222 Chirisafis, A. (24 January 2011) Sarkozy admits France made mistakes over Tunisia. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/24/nicolassarkozy-tunisia-protests, (accessed 10 October 2013). 223 Ibid. Chirisafis, A. 224 Tunisia : statement from the President of the French Republic (15 January 2011) France Diplomatie http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/tunisia-286/ article/tunisia-statement-from-the, (accessed 16 June 2013). 225 Simons, S. (20 January 2011) Dumping Old Friends: France Makes Awkward U- Turn on Tunisia Policy. Der Spiegel http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ dumping-old-friends-france-makes-awkward-u-turn-on-tunisia-policya-740551.html, (accessed 11 October 2013). 226 Simons, S., Ibid. 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 132 Marzouki. As a symbol of trust Tunisian Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali paid an official visit to France in June 2012. The next month Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki met President Hollande and Prime Minister Ayrault to discuss their deeper relations as France was a “natural” gateway to Europe.227 President Al-Marzouki and Mr Hollande talked about France's support for the political experience in Tunisia from building constitutional institutions to promoting Tunisian tourism and the possibility of transferring part of Tunisia's national debt to France in investment projects.228 French official rhetoric also confirmed that France’s goal in this process was to foster democracy and the rule of law, hope for peace and stability, hope for a better future via the Deauville Partnership initiated by the G-8 heads of states and government in Deauville in France. It was also important for France to enable the EU to be involved in this task.229 The Prime Minister presented a proposed action plan for Tunisia on February 16, 2011. The three priorities of this action plan were: 1) supporting the establishment of democracy and the rule of law; 2) contributing to the modernization of the economy and the development of employment; 3) maximizing contacts between the two civil societies. The French Development Agency (AFD) played a central role in Franco-Tunisian cooperation. Under the terms of the Deauville Partnership, the AFD provided €425 million in funding in 2011-2012 to support Tunisia’s transition to democracy. 185ml of this has been delivered. The Institut Français also in Tunisia worked to promote French language.230 France also declared at the G8 Summit to support Tunisia’s democratic transition at the G8 Summit only after two months EC announced to make 258 mil- 227 Political Relations. (18 December 2012). France Diplomatie. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/tunisia-286/france-and-tunisia/political-relations-5169/article/political-relations-8102, (accessed 14 November 2013). 228 Tunisia's relations with France are "back to normal" (24 July 2012). Middle East Monitor. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/europe/4034-tunisias-relations-with-france-are-qback-to-normalq, (accessed 14 November 2013). 229 The Arab Spring: A Conversation with Alain Juppe. (19 September 2011) Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/ arab-spring-conversation-alain-juppe/p25931, (accessed 15 November 2013). 230 Presentation. (18 December 2012). France Diplomatie http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/tunisia-286/france-and-tunisia/cultural-scientificand-technical-5171/article/presentation-8106, (accessed 14 November 2013). 5.4 Value Projection 133 lion euros available in financial support to Tunisia.231 This shows that France has its respect for EU initiatives but at the same time advances national interests. (Mikail, 2011) Women rights were seen as a priority in external relations and for this aim France additionally developed A “Gender and social cohesion” cooperation program, on employment for youth and young women in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, in partnership with the International Labour Office (€500,000, 2012-2013), in the process of validation.232 Hollande’s Visits to Tunisia in Times of Critical Political Milestones French leaders were present in Tunisia in almost every important step towards democracy. President Hollande went to Tunisia while they were working to form a new government to put an end to the ongoing political crisis. Ex Interior Minister of Tunisia, Ali Laarayedh, formed a new cabinet after a long negotiation process and handed his proposal to President Moncef Marzouki on 9 March 2013. This was seen as a solution to the political crisis which had risen after the assassination of the opposition leader Shukru Belaid. Upon the horrific killing of opposition leader Mohamed Brahmi, elected to the National Constituent Assembly in 2011, and founder and former secretary general of the People’s Party President six years later Hollande called for “the spirit of responsibility needed to preserve national unity and ensure the success of the democratic transition, which involves the adoption of a constitution and the holding of elections by the end of the year.”233 Mr Brahmi was killed in his car in front of his 5.4.6 231 The EU and Tunisia (March 2011) http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/interview/ Tunisia%20press%20pack%20March%202011_ENG.pdf, (accessed 10 November 2013). 232 France’s Actions Promoting Women’s Rights and Equality. France Diplomatie http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy-1/development-assistance/france-s-actions-promoting-women-s/article/france-s-actions-promotingwomen-s, (accessed 1 December 2015). 233 Tunisia – Assassination of Mohamed Brahmi (25 July 2013) France Diplomatie. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/tunisia-286/france-and-tunisia/ political-relations-5169/article/tunisia-assassination-of-mohamed, (accessed 12 July 2014). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 134 wife and daughter on 25 July 2013.234 It has been alleged by Dr. Muhammad Hoca, leader of Recovery Front, that the political assassinations are some planned actions by the advocates of old regime and the leftist circles to overthrow the government. These circles are provoking Nahda supporters on purpose.235 President Francois Hollande was again in Tunisia in July 2013 for a two-day visit. He promised to turn some of Tunisian debt (1 billion euros) into development projects. A close look at the debt agreements revealed however that certain relevant terms and conditions provide for mandatory purchase of French products.236 He also promised to prompt fellow member states and the EU to help Tunisia’s economy rise up. On the second day of his visit he also announced 500 million euros for investment and aid in Tunisia for the period between 2013 and 2014. In 2011, however same type of promises (some 40 billion in aid and investment) has been made. France in two year materialized little of the money to the Arab Spring countries including Tunisia.237 His visit was criticized by the many democracy and human rights defenders as he never mentioned the violations of freedoms and large number of political detainees being held. The purpose of the visit was evaluated as to sign a number of economic, industrial and commercial contracts. Many well-known organizations including Reporters without Borders, Human Rights Watch, International Federation for Human Rights and Euro- Mediterranean Human Rights Network made a call to Hollande to pressure Tunisia to protect freedom of expression. Economic relations and trade agreements seemed to outweigh other considerations relating to human rights.238 234 Tunisian politician Mohamed Brahmi assassinated. (25 July 2013). BBC News http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23452979, (accessed 12 July 2014). 235 Tunuslu Islah Partisi Liderleriyle Gorustuk. (18 March 2013). Imkander. http:// www.imkander.org.tr/?aType=haber&ArticleID=378, (accessed 12 July 2014). 236 Hlaoui, N. (8 July 2013) Hollande's Tunisia Visit Upsets Some Civil Society Advocates. Al Monitor http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/07/frenchpresident-hollande-visit-tunisia-ennahda.html, (accessed 10 July 2014). 237 France to turn Tunisia debt into development. (5 July 2013) The Big Story. http:// bigstory.ap.org/article/france-turn-tunisia-debt-development, (accessed 16 July 2014). 238 Hlaoui, N. (8 July 2013) Hollande's Tunisia Visit Upsets Some Civil Society Advocates. Al Monitor http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/07/frenchpresident-hollande-visit-tunisia-ennahda.html, (accessed 10 July 2014). 5.4 Value Projection 135 The anti-government protests again led to the collapse of the Hammadi Cibali government. It was expected from the newly formed government to run until the end of the year.239 France congratulated the prime minister and the ministers on their appointment. France highlighted its support for the future’s new constitution and elections within the frame of democratic and peaceful process.240 After all these governmental crisis and protests parliamentary elections were held in Tunisia on 26 October 2014 following the adoption of the new constitution in January 2014. The Nida Tunis Party (Tunis Calls Party) won 85 of the 217 seats in parliament. They also won the right to name a prime minister and lead a coalition government. The moderate Islamist Ennahda Party, which had dominated the parliament before won 60 seats. Nida Tunis is led by Beji Caid Essebsi, an 87year-old veteran politician who previously served as foreign minister in the 1980s and parliament speaker in the early 1990s under later deposed President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.241 Francois Hollande, the president of France since 2012, underlined the fact that France was supporting Tunisian elections in the name of the exercise of democracy. 242Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development, and his German counterpart, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, conducted a visit to Tunisia following the elections in April. They welcomed the holding of elections and also the adoption of the constitution. Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki and the head of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly, Mustafa Bin Jaafar, signed the new constitution of the country on January 27. Mazourki told reporters at the signing ceremony that the document signified a victory over dictator- 239 Tunus’ta Hükümet Kuruldu. (9 March 2013). Timeturk. http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2013/03/09/tunus-ta-hukumet-kuruldu.html, (accessed 4 September 2014). 240 Tunisia – Inauguration of the government (14 March 2013) France Diplomatie. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/tunisia-286/france-and-tunisia/ political-relations-5169/article/tunisia-inauguration-of-the, (accessed 10 July 2014). 241 Tunisia election results: Nida Tunis wins most seats, sidelining Islamists. (30 October 2014) The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/ tunisia-election-results-nida-tunis-wins-most-seats-sidelining-islamists, (accessed 12 July 2014). 242 21st Ambassadors’Conference-Speech by Francois Hollande, President of the Republic (27 August 2013). France Diplomatie http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/ the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-158/events-5815/article/21st-ambassadors-conference-speech, (accessed 15 July 2014). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 136 ship, but there was still a long way to go to enroot democracy in the country.243 This was a constitution guarantying the freedom of faith and conscience. They also visited the construction site of the rapid rail network for greater Tunis; 60% of the funding for this project was being provided by a group of European donors, primarily the French Development Agency and its German equivalent, the KfW.244 Germany’s Investment in Good Governance Education and Capacity Building From the beginning of the Tunisian revolution German leaders have been supportive of establishing democracy in Tunisia with numerous projects on the ground. Berlin provided aid for political and economic change in the first place. Germany was side by side with Tunisia during and after its political crisis and supported its democratic struggle with all the governmental changes and elections. Germany not only rhetorically advocated a democratic political system but also invested in governance, education, civil society and media with more than 100 projects with over 50 million euro between 2012 and 2014. These projects covered advisory support for NGOs and for the constituent assembly by Max Planck Institute, cooperation with lawyers and probation officers for strengthening the rule of law by the Hans Seidl Foundaiton and media training for journalists, political parties and civil society representatives by Media in Cooperation and Transition and the DW Akademie. (Youngs 2014, p.73) After one year of the revolution German Foreign Minister arrived in Tunisia to meet Muhammed Ghannouchi in February 2011. His approach to Tunisia was that the country was going to be a role model and an example for the region and the transition was irreversible. Berlin promised to source Tunisian democratic promotion with 3 million euros and student exchange scholarships with 500.000 euros. As a sign of friendship and the 5.4.7 243 Tunisian president, parliament speaker sign new constitution. (27 January 2014) TUSS Russian News Agency http://itar-tass.com/en/world/716469, (accessed 10 July 2014). 244 Joint Visit by Laurent Fabius and his German counterpart to Moldova, Georgia and Tunisia (April 23 to 25, 2014) France Diplomatie http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/georgia/visits-4601/article/joint-visit-by-laurentfabius-and, (accessed 8 July 2014). 5.4 Value Projection 137 belief in Tunisia’s success Germany has accepted to divert a part of Tunisian debt into development projects. At the time of political crisis when people were refusing to accept a technocratic government before going to elections and the government was refusing to resign Westerwelle said that Germany wanted to support the democratization process, but without taking sides. Germany’s interest was in stability. Therefore Germany wanted to support the security realm in Tunisia. He talked with members of the Tunisian government, opposition politicians and the trade unions. Germany traditionally has supported economic and political stability as its most important trading partner for years. Almost one year after former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali went to exile German foreign minister visited Tunisia again. This time he was accompanied by a delegation of German business leaders. He praised Tunisia’s urge to be an open and democratic society and being a model for North Africa. These were the motivations behind Germany for signing a partnership agreement. Abdessalem and Westerwelle signed a memorandum of understanding on transformation partnership, under which Tunisia in the next two years is to receive 32 million euros for projects in the fields of education and training. In addition, the federal government wanted to Tunisia agree on a debt swap totaling 60 million euros. The funds would be used to support reforms in the Maghreb country.245The Western rhetoric always supported the democratization processes in the region. On the other hand West is also not ready to face the results of a democratizing Arab population. Westerwelle however put this phenomenon in a different way and acknowledged the success of Islamist-democratic parties. According to him Europe must get used to it that Islam is going to be a strong reference for these countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. He said “there are Islamic-democratic parties, as there are Christian democratic parties in Europe," Westerwelle said during a visit to Tunis. He added that Germany would have working relationship with the democratic political forces in Tunisia.246 Since April 2012, there has been a more intensive cooperation in the security field. The Federal Ministry of the Interior provided development assistance in areas such as maritime security, airport security, capacity-build- 245 Westerwelle sagt Tunesien Millionenhilfen zu. (9 January 2012).N24 http:// www.n24.de/n24/Nachrichten/Politik/d/1438426/westerwelle-sagt-tunesien-millionenhilfen-zu.html, (accessed 21 June 2014). 246 ibid. N24. 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 138 ing in the police sector and civil protection. There were two pilot projects designed to strengthen the Tunisian civil protection in the long term through better training and equipment. One of these projects was "Protection and saving lives - strengthening the Tunisian firefighters" under the leadership of the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK). A total of 11 fire-fighting and ambulance vehicles were delivered. The BBK owned Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ) also trained multipliers in crisis management. The THW built the project of "Introduction of voluntary work" at three locations for voluntary groups. These 42 decommissioned THW vehicles have been delivered to Tunisia. A total of 6 courses took place and 6 helpers were trained in accordance with `train the trainer` program. The projects ran until the end of 2013 and kept everyone in the light of the current state of flux with new challenges. In the context of the conversation with Secretary of State Fritsche, the Tunisian Interior Minister also gave a food donation to the BMI. Two tons of dates were made to the THW-helpers in the flood area available.247The next year in 2013 Germany announced a budget of 151,5 million euros for supporting environment and resource protection, sustainable economic development and renewable energy, etc. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), KfW Bank and the Deutsche Welle Akademie were in Tunisia with over 150 employees to manage the development projects/ process.248 In accordance with the significance Germany gave to Tunisia Westerwelle became the first Western official to meet with Tunisia’s new Prime Minister Ali Larayedh who had been appointed for office following Hamadi Jebali’s resignation. This visit was for supportive purposes like solidarity and friendship that he pledged German economic support for Tunisian democracy. In March 2013 he said "Violence, extremists and fanatics must not form the image of Tunisia but rather respect, democracy, 247 Deutschland unterstützt Tunesien auf seinem Weg in die demokratische Gesellschaft. (7 June 2013) Bundesministerium des Innern http://www.bmi.bund.de/Sha redDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/2013/06/stf_tun_innenminister.html, (accessed 1 September 2015). 248 Tunesien: Wirtschaft. (September 2015) Auswertiges Amt http://www.auswaertig es-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Tunesien/Wirtschaft_node.ht ml (accessed 1 September 2015). 5.4 Value Projection 139 the rule of law and tolerance and we want to help”.249 Westerwelle visited Tunisia again in August 2013 and met Tunisia's President Moncef Marzouki when the country was just in the middle of political crisis following the assassination of the two opposition leaders. Westerwelle called on Tunisia’s government and the opposition to end the stalemate and called also for dialogue between the political parties.250 Berlin had also made proposals for the reform political institutions, the reconstruction of the administration, anchoring and strengthening of freedom of expression, press and religion and the expansion of education as short term assistance.251 249 Germany pledges further investment aid for Tunisia. (19 March 2013). DW. http://www.dw.de/germany-pledges-further-investment-aid-for-tunisia/ a-16684289, (accessed 1 September 2015). 250 Tunisia parties called to dialogue during Westerwelle visit. (14 August 2013) DW. http://www.dw.de/tunisia-parties-called-to-dialogue-during-westerwelle-visit/a-17021971, (accessed 1 September 2015). 251 Deutschland unterstützt Tunesien auf seinem Weg in die demokratische Gesellschaft(7 June 2013) Bundesministerium des Innern http://www.bmi.bund.de/Shar edDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/2013/06/stf_tun_innenminister.html, (accessed 1 Se ptember 2015). 5. Assessment of Interest and Actions of Member States in Tunisia 140 Critical Discourse Analysis of the Articulation of the Political Identities of Member States and Tunisia The Construction of the Self (Europe) It was often highlighted in official speeches that France, Germany and the UK were supporting Tunisia to foster democracy, rule of law, peace, stability and a better future. The member states’ construction of normative identity was built through the articulation of the West as `representative and guarantor of EU values’. In opposition to normative identity colonial identity is also constructed in the discourses of the Western leaders. One exemplar rhetoric to this colonial identity was found in Cameron’s call to the people of the MENA region. He said “….the most powerful nations on Earth have come together and are saying to all those in the Middle East and north Africa who want greater democracy and greater freedom and greater civil rights – we are on your side”252 The Western states were illustrated as the most powerful nations while the Arab Spring countries were the ones who were in need of help to build the basic requirements of states which were democracy, economy and trade. This construction of `colonial power` identity was more obvious when Alain Juppe, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, defined the Arab Spring region located in the southern Mediterranean as “mare nostrum-our sea”.253 Since these two identities of normative power and colonial power are the two opposite concepts the Western leaders’ discourses are found to be amalgamated. This means that their discourses are weak in consistency. When leaders illustrated the Western identity as `representative´, `guarantor´ or ´carrier of EU values´ it was no surprise that `responsibility´ rhetoric came right after. This meant that member states were superior and they had the `responsibility` to assist in political, social and economic development. The spread of democratic development would only be possible 6. 6.1 252 Ibid., Wintour, P. (26 May 2011). 253 Transcript of The Arab Springs. (19 September 2011) Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/arab-spring-conversationalain-juppe/p25931, (accessed 23 June 2013). 141 if the West fulfilled its responsibility to bring Tunisia closer to Western standards. With this rhetoric being said Western leaders also mentioned the concept of non-interference. If the UK, France and Germany captured Tunisian state as being incapable of transition without their help then their articulation of `non-interference´ also caused their speeches to take the risk of being instable. Another point that undermined their normative identity was their robust conversations on `national interest´. They many times expressed that supporting Tunisians in their transition and their fight for EU values was in their ´national interest´ and they often did this without mentioning the role of the EU in this transitioning mission. Member states legitimized their foreign policy both for their pursuit for national interest and for human rights. This in the end presented a combined construction of normative and non-normative identity. The Construction of the Other (Tunisia) Tunisia’s identity was constructed as `underdeveloped´ and ´in need of help for transformation´ against the Western identity of `example of developmental power´. (See Figure 4) There were shifts not only in the construction of the Self but also in the construction of the identity of Tunisia specifically in the example of France. France illustrated Tunisia as extremist and instable without Ben Ali. Then Sarkozy changed his rhetoric and described Tunisian society as `desperate´, ‘suffering´ and ‘suffocated´ under the regime of Ben Ali. This changing discourse caused the discussion of `reverse gear`. Tunisia, constantly, was characterized as being in need of the Western world’s help to get out of its `backward´, ´underdeveloped´ and `destabilized` situation. As Ben Ali went to exile and Tunisian authorities set their way to parliamentary elections Tunisian identity was constructed as a `representative of the West´, an `admired country´ and as a `role model´ of political, economic and social development and as `an example of transition´. The new and transitioning Tunisia’s image as being part of the normative Self (the West) was stressed through the picturing of Tunisia to be an open and democratic country where there was the hope that respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and tolerance prevailed in opposition to the old Tunisia where there was `violence´, ´extremists’ and ´fanatics’. 6.2 6. Critical Discourse Analysis of the Articulation of the Political Identities 142 Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya EU Strategy in Libya As explained in the previous chapters EU Strategy is composed of physical security, economic prosperity and value projection. (Smith, 2011). Physical security in the neighborhood for the EU means securing borders and keeping distance from the troubles of problematic neighbors. This was exactly what the EU was trying to do in Libya. The EU, however, didn’t have an association agreement with Libya. Therefore the EU hasn’t agreed on the priorities of EU-Libya cooperation. There was indeed a negotiation on an association agreement before the revolution. This process started with the Gaddafi regime but then negotiations were suspended with the instability of the post-revolution period. Therefore, as EU officials explained, activities or initiatives with Libya were kind of not unilateral but basically the EU decided what to do.254 In the area of securing borders several attempts to avoid migration flows and to protect migrants were being implemented under the Thematic Program for Migration and Asylum, Frontex Hermes 2011 and Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security partnerships with non-EU countries including Libya. In order to protect physical security in the case of Libya the EU supported the humanitarian aspect of the intervention while France and the UK led the military aspect of the intervention. EU’s economic prosperity referred to pursue long term interests in Libya as having a share in the oil market and having a say in Libya’s reconstruction process as well as establishing deep economic integration. Although EU support for military intervention in Libya relied on Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle different rationales of member states were also at stake. As for its economic prosperity the EU supported this intervention in Libya with the leadership of its member states, the UK and France and also took place in Libya Contact Group meetings where mainly the recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC), unfreezing of the Libyan assets, economic interests of member states were discussed. 7. 7.1 254 Int. No:2. 143 Lastly the EU aimed to reflect its values of human rights, the rule of law and democracy in Libya’s post-revolutionary period as part of its strategy. The EU started this process by putting some restrictive measures on the Gaddafi regime and family to condemn violation of human rights. Then special measures for Libya were adopted in 2011 and 2012 with special a focus on public administration, capacity building, better quality education and increased inclusiveness for all children, support to the emergence and development of civil society and local governance, support to the health sector, technical and vocational education and training and reinforcing the rule of law. Libya Contact Group Meetings constituted one of the initiatives of the EU to discuss these points. All in all the EU, under the theme of value projection of its strategy, put some restrictive measures on the Gaddafi regime, organized Libya Contact Group Meetings and supported Libya in the post-revolutionary period with humanitarian support. Physical Security Libyan Military Intervention: Events Leading to UNSCR 1973 Resolution What made military intervention in Libya necessary was basically the brutality of the Gaddafi forces against civilians involved in a series of protests against the regime. The West just couldn’t isolate itself from this type of violent treatment against democratic uprisings. On the other hand there was an ongoing international fight on Libya and this couldn´t be explained only by normative concerns. European interests in the country covered a wide range of areas including energy supply, export markets for European goods, avoiding migration and, in relation to illegal migration, avoiding terrorism. Events that led to passing the UNSCR resolutions dated back to the media and human rights activists’ condemnation of the violent attacks against rebels. Protests were organized against the conflict that endangered civilian populations’ lives in Libya. On February 25, 2011 the Human Rights Council held an extraordinary meeting and issued a resolution that called the Libyan government to release all detained persons, stop attacks against civilians and ensure the safety of all civilians including citizens of third countries. This call also reminded Libya of its obligations to guarantee the access of human rights and humanitarian organizations to the country re- 7.2 7.2.1 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 144 calling the R2P Principle. The next day, on February 26, 2011 the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution in response to the violence that Libyan government launched against its population. Hence the UN- SCR 1970, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN “demands an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population”255 But the Libyan government didn’t respond positively to this call which imposed travel bans, assets freezes on Gaddafi and members of his close entourage. So another resolution was adopted on 17 March 2011 called UNSCR Resolution 1973 (2011). This decision prepared the legal ground for military intervention in Libya and authorized the use of force against Libyan forces loyal to Colonel Gaddafi in order to protect Libyan civil population again calling Responsibility to protect principle. The 15-member Security Council voted 10-0 in favor, with five abstentions, which are Brazil, Germany, India, China and Russia, of a nofly zone over Libya and “all necessary measures” — code for military action — to protect civilians against Gaddafi’s army in New York. UNSCR 1973 was taken in reaction to the violence launched against Libyan population and it was proposed by the UK, France and Lebanon with US support. As explained above UNSCR 1973, starting with the UN’s expression of “the responsibility to protect civilians” and acting under Chapter VII, set forth a number of measures. These were protection of civilians, establishment of a no-fly zone, enforcement of the arms embargo, ban on Libyan flights, assets freeze and travel restrictions for certain individuals.256 EU’s motivation, on the other hand, in supporting the intervention in Libya, was generally humanitarian at the stage when Gaddafi threatened the rebels. There was genuine concern that there would be huge amount of loss of life. The situation on the ground went so far that the humanitarian aspect to the mission couldn’t just be isolated without thinking of the change of the regime. 257 255 In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters (26 February 2011) UN http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm, (accessed 17 December 2015). 256 UN security council resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya. The Guardian http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/17/un-security-council-resolution, (accessed 21 April 2013). 257 Int. No:23. 7.2 Physical Security 145 The Union’s 27 heads of state and government met on 11 March at the Extraordinary Summit to discuss the Libyan crisis. President Rompuy explained that this kind of extraordinary meetings in order to respond to an international crisis was very rare in the EU. It had only happened in the cases of the war in Georgia in August 2008, the Iraq War and the 9/11 attacks for the last three times. In this Extraordinary Council Meeting, where a declaration for the Gaddafi’s relinquishment of power was adopted, he called on to the international community to act together. He also welcomed the interim transitional Council in Benghazi. A second issue he focused was the humanitarian crisis getting worse in Libya at the press conference he made just after the Extraordinary European Council Meeting. He said: “Almost a quarter of a million people have already left the country out of fear. Safety of the people must be ensured by all necessary means.” In order to give protect civilians he talked about three conditions that urgently must be considered: a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region.”258 EU’s role during the post-conflict phase was mainly humanitarian trying to keep the doors open for mediation. The EU moved quickly to offer after many aid programs on the ground. This was the EU’s contribution separate from the UK and France. The EU also tried to keep different member states together because they obviously got different views on the intervention. The EU played a big role in security sector reform (border security) which obviously hasn’t been successful after Gaddafi.259 It was also confirmed in this extraordinary summit meeting that Colonel Gaddafi had to depart from power immediately and the population’s safety must be ensured but the Franco-British proposal for a military intervention was taken with cautiousness. Member states were to examine all options and decide if there was a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region to engage in a situation to protect the civilians.260 It was true that the EU was supporting the intervention because the expecta- 258 Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy at the press conference following the extraordinary European Council on EU Southern Neighborhood and Libya by Herman Van Rompuy. (11 March 2011). http://www.voltairenet.org/article168883.html, (accessed 22 April 2013). 259 Int. No:14. 260 European Council. (20 April 2011). Extraordinary European Council, EUCO 7/1/11 REV 1 , http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/en/ec/119780.pdf, (accessed 22 April 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 146 tion was to protect civilians and to stop human rights abuses. There was the Gaddafi regime threatening people in Benghazi and the international community intervened to stop that. The reality on the ground was out of control.261 EU’s Humanitarian Assistance in support of the UNSCR 1973 Resolution In the following four days after the Extraordinary European Council Meeting many explanations came from the EU’s leading figures. Upon these developments Council of the EU expressed its satisfaction after the adoption of UNSCR 1973 and stressed its willingness to contribute to its implementation in coordination with other international stakeholders like the Arab League. The EU would, in the light of the UN Resolution, support humanitarian assistance and civil protection operations.262 The common idea was that the EU had no military role in Libya. According to Mr. Pierini the EU limited its intervention to only taking care of refugees in the south of Tunisia and in the West of Egypt. There was a diplomatic role with HR Ashton’s presence in all the conferences about Libya but in the case of the Libyan revolution a diplomatic role didn’t mean much as long as there was no interlocutor in Libya. So it was in the hands of the UN to reconcile the people and the EU of course strongly supported this process.263 In their joint statement on the UN Security Council Resolution on Libya Mr Rompuy and Ms Ashton welcomed UNSCR 1973 believing that it was the legal basis for protecting civilians. They explained that their biggest concern was protection of the population and the cooperation of the other international partners to protect the civilian population on 17 March 2011, in Brussels. The next day on 18 March Ms Ashton also announced that the legal basis for responding to the unfolding events in Libya had been fulfilled with the UNSCR 1973. She was pleased about the explicit mention of sanctions against the Libyan oil assets. In her follow- 7.2.2 261 Int. No:2. 262 Council of the EU. (21 March 2011). Conclusions on Libya, 30706, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting. (Press Release), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/120065.pdf, (accessed 21 April 2013). 263 Int. NO:18. 7.2 Physical Security 147 ing speeches she would stress how necessary for the EU to work in concert with other international actors like the African Union, the Arab League and the UN. The EU and the member states didn’t hesitate to take quick steps towards a regime change in Libya. On March 19, 2011, the Libyan Summit was set with the hostage of Sarkozy. The meeting ended with a declaration stressing that the violence of the Libyan regime on its own people was intolerable and they were determined to give full effect to the implementation of UNSCR 1973. Western leaders agreed on urgent action on Gaddafi forces which broke ceasefire. President Sarkozy said "We are determined to continue with NATO strikes for as long as Mr Gaddafi and his supporters represent a threat to Libya.” He also said that his country’s air force was “ready to attack Gaddafi's tanks and planes to defend the people of Benghazi”. In support to this Prime Minister David Cameron said “the NATO operation in Libya would continue as long as there is need to protect civilian life`. On the same day a coalition of states led by France and the US launched air strikes against the Libyan territory in order to destroy Libya’s military capabilities. President Rompuy said that the three conditions that were mentioned at the European Extraordinary Council meeting have been met. Gaddafi regime was a threat to civilians in Libya and it had lost its legitimacy. His main point was to take action to implement the Resolution of the UN Security Council. The US code name in the military operation in Libya to enforce UNSCR 1973 was Operation Odyssey Dawn. The UK’s code name for the military operation was Operation Ellamy and France’s code was Opération Harmattan. The initial operation established a no-fly zone to prevent air strikes on Anti-Gaddafi forces. The complete military command of the operation was passed to NATO. The activities of the coalition were carried out under the name: Operation Unified Protector. On April 1, the Council of the EU decided to support humanitarian assistance operations in Libya. The EU, if requested by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), would conduct military operation and support humanitarian agencies and the safe movement and evacuation of displaced people.264 At the Foreign Affairs Council of April 12, 2011 Ms Ashton also gave an important massage about the mili- 264 Libya: EU Council decides on EU military operation to support humanitarian assistance operations. (1 April 2011) European Union Delegation to the UN http:// www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10887_en.htm, accessed 21 April 2013. 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 148 tary position the EU has taken. She said that it was for the UN to decide whether the EU would engage with its military assets or not. Along with this statement she reminded the UN that they should take this decision considering the humanitarian aspects of operations as if she was willing to engage in a military operation in the name of the EU.265 During the conflict itself the EU didn’t intervene directly though. The EU rather provided civilian support. It was the UK and France going for an intervention and they asked NATO for help for commander control, facilitation, ammunition and so forth. According to the experts on Libya the EU at some point discussed to establish humanitarian corridors but it never materialized because the events were quick on the ground. The EU had a sanctions regime against Gaddafi but the EU didn’t intervene actively but intervened through diplomatic means, sanctions and through providing humanitarian supplies. The conflict took five or six months. EU’s role really started after the fight against Gaddafi ended. Therefore there was no involvement at all in military terms.266 Ms Ashton also confirmed this by saying “If in this first phase of our foreign policy we cannot be present militarily we have to exercise a humanitarian profile, defend our values and use persuasion and cohesion - and we are doing it.”267 Several days later on March 31, 2011 NATO took overall command of the intervention in Libya to protect civilians and civilian populated areas. From then on the NATO Alliance launched, predominantly air strikes, attacks on Gaddafi forces for seven months. After weeks of street fighting between the NTC loyalists and supporters of Colonel Qaddafi the university, conference center, hospital and main police station have been captured and Qaddafi’s hometown Sirte fell.268 On October 20, 2011 Gaddafi was lynched in a brutal way and coalition countries kept silent against this 265 EU. (12 April 2011). Remarks by the High Representative Catherine Ashton upon arrival at the Foreign Affairs Council. (Press Release),http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121505.pdf, (accessed 27 March 2013). 266 Int. No:12. 267 EP. Libya: Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Albertini: "Protect the human rights of the civilian population" (21 March 2011), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IMPRESS+20110321S- TO15968+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN, (accessed 16 October 2013). 268 The significance of the fall of Sirte. (20 October 2011). Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/20111020111342211367.html, (accessed 16 June 2013). 7.2 Physical Security 149 unacceptable way of killing. One week after his death NATO explained that the operation in Libya was over. The EU only intervened with the EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) mission but it is a very small mission in comparison with the size of Libya and in comparison with the challenges that it has to face. The level of EU intervention in Libya is very low in comparison with the challenges.269 Ms Ashton marked the fall of Sirte as the end of the Gaddafi era on October 20, 2011 after ten month of violence in Libya. She stressed the norms of democracy and full respect for human rights. She also reminded the EU presence in Tripoli and Benghazi and the European humanitarian assistance and confirmed that the EU is a strong future partner of Libya.270 Mr Barroso and Mr Rompuy reaffirmed their support in Libya’s democratic transition and economic reconstruction. They called to Gaddafi to step down and expressed that the New Libya supported by EU member states and NATO would bring an end to the Gaddafi regime.271 Accordingly, on August 22, 2011, Ms Ashton announced the last moments of the Gaddafi regime and she saluted the new era of Libya. In this new era she underlined once more the points of protection of civilians, respecting international human rights and humanitarian law, maintaining peace and stability throughout the country. She affirmed the EU as a strong partner of the Libyan people in their quest for a prosperous, stable and democratic state.272 At a time when the National Transitional Council was trying hard to move forward in its attempt to control the whole Tripoli, the EU was providing support to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Libya. They primarily provided aid medical supplies and fuel which were necessary for Tripoli. Other than this one important issue Ms Ashton, in her remarks on Libya, raised was security. She stressed the need for 269 Int. No:16. 270 EEAS. (20 October 2011). Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the fall of Sirte and reports of the death of Colonel Gaddafi, (Press Release).http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/press_corner/all_news/news/ 2011/20111024_1_en.htm, , (accessed 1 June 2013). 271 EC. (22 August 2011). Joint statement by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy on Libya, MEMO/11/563, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-563_en.htm, (accessed 1 June 2013). 272 EU. (22 August 2011). Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on developments in Libya. A 323/11 (Press Release). http://ec.europa.eu/danmark/ documents/alle_emner/eksterne/ashton_libya.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 150 putting weapons and guns under control and securing the borders. She gave information on the internal support mechanism in the EU as she talked about being in contact with the foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany to flourish democracy and economy in Libya.273 The Question of Responsibility to Protect? The UN firstly established R2P in 2005 to refer to the cases when a sovereign state fails to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. It has been debated if the situation in Libya fell into one of these categories. For Doyle “a legitimate and lawful outcome to the operation is far from assured.” He goes on to inquire the legality of UN decision by looking at Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to intervene in domestic matters of a state and “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and act to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” He adds that Libya’s internal conflict even if it covers the killing of civilians do not count as threats to international peace but count as threat to peace.274 Responsibility to protect is a universal obligation in cases of humanitarian crisis but the assumption that UNSCR 1973 relies on R2P is falsified by Vilmer. He thinks that the resolution `reiterated the internal responsibility “of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population”, but nowhere did it speak of an external responsibility of the international community to intervene`.275 The legitimacy of the Libyan military intervention has also been discussed. The intervention poses three ethical problems which are `no sufficient cause for regime change`, ‘selectivity issue` and the likely `longterm consequences of humanitarian intervention`. Military attack is only 7.2.3 273 EU. (23 August 2011). Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Libya, A 326/11 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/ docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124428.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013). 274 Doyle, M. W. (20 March 2011). The Folly of Protection is Intervention Against Qaddafi’s Regime Legal and Legitimate?, Foreign Affairs Magazine http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67666/michael-w-doyle/the-folly-of-protection? page=show, (accessed 2 June 2013). 275 Baptiste, J. (23 July 2012). `Libya to Syria: R2P and the ‘Double Standards’ Issue`, Fair Observer, http://www.fairobserver.com/article/Libya-to-Syria-R2P- Double-Standards-Issue, (accessed 10 Aug. 2013). 7.2 Physical Security 151 permissible in the most extreme cases which raise a “shocking effect” on moral conscious of mankind as this was the case in the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995. The issue of selectivity, as one of the ethical drawbacks, has also appeared as hot disputes on media. Libya was not the first and only country being exposed to human rights violations. The international community abstained from intervening Bahrain, Yemen and Syria in particular. Syrian War, starting on March 15, 2011, caused the death of thousands and millions were displaced. As Pattison puts it “the failure to act militarily in response to these crises demonstrates the inconsistent moral standards of the coalition and the dominance of self-interest in its decisions about where to intervene” (Pattison, 2011, p. 276) Cameron’s comment on Libyan intervention points to this selectivity issue when he said “If we had not acted, we would have been spending recent months not talking about the progress of our action in Libya but wringing our hands over the slaughter in Benghazi, as we did after Bosnia”.276 On the other hand authors like Vilmer suggests that Libyan intervention had unique reasons that Syria do not have. In Libya the regional escalation was weak but in Syria there was the risk of regional `conflagration`. Also Libyan regular army was weak when compared to Syria’s strong army donated with Russian weaponry.277 Even if Libyan intervention meets these tests, Pettison believes that “the situation in Libya did not seem to be serious enough to provide just cause for regime change—or, more precisely, forcible regime change by an external party in support of a rebel movement.” (Pettison, 2011, p.2) He argues that “although the Qaddafi regime is brutal and oppressive, forcible regime change can all too often do more harm than good” (Pettison, 2011, p. 2-3) There are ethical pitfalls to be discussed when studying military intervention in Libya besides the discussion of legal pitfalls. The extent to which military interventions have actually produced the objectives for which they were launched is also questionable. In case of Libya, NATO shouldered the task of protecting Libyan civilians but there have been reports challenging the legality of NATO operation. NATO forces have been accused of killing civilians they claimed to have come to protect. The news was challenging as to the justification of fighting Gaddafi for killing 276 UK diplomats re-establish 'full presence' in Libya. (5 September 2011). BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14795710, (accessed 10 Aug. 2013). 277 Baptiste, Ibid. 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 152 civilians. Despite A. F. Rasmussen’s, the General Secretary of NATO, declaration that says “We have carried out this operation very carefully, without confirmed civilian casualties” an investigation made by the New York Times tells that “credible accounts of dozens of civilians killed by NATO in many distinct attacks. The victims, including at least 29 women or children, often had been asleep in homes when the ordnance hit.” The result of this multi-national military intervention caused horrible results with the estimates of deaths varying from 2,000 to 30,000 and at least 50,000 wounded278. Until 23rd of October, when rebellions had a victory and the National Transitional Council had the control of Libya, NATO air strikes caused deaths of civilians. This was partly because military centers were placed in civilian areas where the risk of killing innocent people is so high.279 There are also reports from the international human rights organizations revealing civilian casualties of the NATO strikes.280 What’s Next after the R2P Mission? The EU had a delegation in Tripoli working in a very difficult environment and doing its best along with the EUBAM mission. It was a small mission though in comparison with the challenges it had to face.281 Before 2014 what the EU was doing was mainly capacity building and institution/ state building to have a more transparent and democratic state. After Gaddafi lots of cooperation programs to support civil society were launched. EU mission in Libya created civil centers at Tripoli, Benghazi, Sabha, Misrata where the civil society could meet and get organized.282EU’s modest initiatives to make some positive changes in the 7.2.4 278 Ciftci, A. et. Al. (6 December 2011). `The EU Humanitarian Aid Policies in the Context of the Libyan Crisis`. http://classes.maxwell.syr.edu/PSC783/2011_Fall/ WP3EU.pdf, (accessed 15 Aug. 2013). 279 `Leading article: Targeted assassinations are a strategic mistake´(2 May 2011). The Independent http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/leading-articletargeted-assassinations-are-a-strategic-mistake-2277721.html, (accessed 20 Oct. 2013). 280 See Amnesty International’s Report ` Libya: The Forgotten Victims of Nato Strikes` from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE19/003/2012, (accessed 25 August 2013). 281 Int. No:16. 282 Int. No:2. 7.2 Physical Security 153 country’s fate didn’t accomplish much. Just two years after the revolution instable and insecure picture of Libya proved that the long term consequence of military intervention caused `more harm than good`. The country was basically split in two. The news agencies revealed that kidnappings, armed robberies and gun violence were increasing on the streets. Government officials were being assassinated with guns and bombs. All in all the shaky security situation was threating stability of the whole North African region.283 There was no success measured in reaching an agreement on transitional road map to have a new parliament. Libya was left after the revolution simply with a mix of remnants of the state, remnants of the army plus multiple brigades. This mix of tribal issues and brigades resulted in the fragmentation of the state with the power in Tabrook, counterpower in Tripoli and ISIS in the middle. 284Only the Tabrook government got the UN recognition consisting of several Gaddafi state officials, secularist and the remaining of part of the military. 285Even four years after the launching of air strikes by NATO members there was still lack of any state institutions, a divided society with armed groups, militias and rivalries led a weak army. There were more than 3,000 casualties of civil war and numerous human rights violations.286 The EU basically concentrated on supporting the UN process. Amidst the conflict in Libya its role was mainly humanitarian with development aid and the EU had a mediation role trying to keep member states with different views together. EU played a big role in security sector reform (reforming border security) but obviously that hasn’t been successful.287 Since the fall of Gaddafi every stage of development in a way got worse and worse. Security situation, particularly, got worse and many people left the country. The militias became much more powerful than what they 283 Sullivan, K. (6 Sept. 2013) Two years after Libya’s revolution, government struggles to control hundreds of armed militias. The Washington Post https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/two-years-after-libyas-revolutiongovernment-struggles-to-control-hundreds-of-armed-militias/ 2013/09/06/6f32c4c0-13ae-11e3-880b-7503237cc69d_story.html, (accessed 21 Oct. 2015). 284 Int. No:18. 285 Lucas, S. ( 21 April 2015) Libya Analysis: 4 Years After the Revolution, A Country in Chaos, EA World View http://eaworldview.com/2015/04/libya-analysis-4-years-after-the-revolution-a-country-in-chaos/ (access 21 Oct. 2015). 286 Lucas, ibid. 287 Int. No:14. 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 154 have been during the fight against Gaddafi. So the scope for international partners to really intervene not in the military conflict but rather to help constructive development was reduced.288 Reforming EU Migration Policy: Security vs Human Rights The events that broke out in 2011 posed an insecure environment for individuals affected by the Libyan Crisis and one result of these events for the EU was the reorganization of the EU’s migration policies. Through the thematic programs for migration and asylum the EU aimed to prevent and manage irregular migration and strengthen border management in Libya. Frontex Hermes 2011 Operation was held responsible for monitoring the effects of migration resulting from the Southern Mediterranean uprisings. Member States were expected to provide human and technical resources for this operation. They would also cooperate with the regional countries to improve the management of borders and would help migrants in turning back to their countries of origin. The European Commission would also use instruments like mobility partnerships and youth exchanges to fight against human trafficking and irregular immigration. Another instrument was called the SEAHORSE program that started in September 2013 to deal with irregular migration and illicit trafficking of Libya as well as Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. Additionally, within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), EUBAM in June 2013 aimed to train border and customs officials and naval cost guards and to develop a broader strategy for border management.289It motivated Libya towards cooperation as `European strategic interest lies in the migration phenomenon´. (Seeberg 2014, p.4) Before the extraordinary meeting of the European Council the first attempts to give a more comprehensive response to the migration issue was found in the Joint Communication of the Commission and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton named `A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean` on March 8, 2011. EU’s predominant approach was `more for more`. This meant that the EU 7.3 288 Int. No: 12. 289 EC. (9 October 2013). EU action in the fields of migration and asylum. MEMO/ 13/862, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-862_en.htm, (accessed 5 June 2013). 7.3 Reforming EU Migration Policy: Security vs Human Rights 155 would offer mobility and would fund countries which have made better progress in the areas of democracy and human rights. The EU and the Southern Meditherranean countries would facilitate people to people contacts and the longer term goal was mentioned as visa liberalization for partner countries.290This declaration actually showed EU’s long term interest in the Southern Mediterranean. It stressed the need for democratic transformation, institution building and economic growth. Within this framework the European External Action Service (EAAS) developed projects for security sector reforms, demobilization, reintegration and disarmament.291 Furthermore the European Council gave the responsibility to seek solutions to the migration problem to DG Home Affairs. This responsibility would be carried out by establishing “Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security”. In this respect The Justice and Home Affairs Ministers met on 11-12 April and concluded that: “The Dialogue should in first instance focus on the identification and promotion of measures which can contribute in a concrete and effective way to the prevention of illegal migration, to the effective management and control of their external borders, to the facilitation of the return and readmission of irregular migrants, and to the development of protection in the region for those in need, including through regional protection programs. Subsequently, this dialogue could explore the possibilities for facilitating people-to-people contacts using instruments such as mobility partnerships.”292 This conclusion was criticized for prioritizing migration management and border control instead of a dynamic mobility policy which intended to support democratization in North Africa. (Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog and Joanna Parkin, p.9, 2012) News articles also pointed to EU’s 290 Partnership for democracy and prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. (8 March 2011). Europa Summaries of EU Legislation. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_partner_countries/rx0024_en.htm, (accessed 5 June 2013). 291 EC. (14 July 2011). Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle following his meeting with Dr Mahmoud Jibril, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Libyan Transitional National Council, MEMO/11/509, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-509_en.htm, (accessed 7 June 2013). 292 European Council. (11 April 2011). 3081st Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs Luxembourg, PRES/11/93 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-11-93_en.htm, (accessed 5 June 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 156 impotent migration responses to the demands of the huge surge of migrants.293 Additionally Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council and European Commission organized a conference on May 12, 2011.The Member States were expected to discuss their commitments on the relocation of persons who were beneficiaries of international protection present in Malta and on the resettlement of stranded refugees in North Africa. As for the results of the Ministerial Pledging Conference on May 12, 300 people were expected to be relocated and 700 refugees stranded in North Africa are to be resettled.294 In view of the current developments in the Mediterranean the initiatives would cover `effective and credible controls at the EU external border`, `an effective and responsible approach to tackling irregular immigration`, `promoting mobility in a secure environment`, `deepened relations with third countries in the framework of the Global Approach to Migration` and `development of common rules on legal migration`.295 Furthering these attempts to reorganize migration policy `Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean` was finally adopted by the Commission on May 24, 2011. The Commission especially stressed ‘significant movement of people` as a result of the uprisings in the Middle East. The EU also offered short, medium and long term measures. The Commission warned that many more were expected to flee in the future. Therefore it was found to be necessary to take further longer term actions in addition to immediate short term measures. These short term measures were being implemented by Justice and Home Affairs Council. In January 2013, the Council declared to support Libya in developing capacity and strategy for border management. This would be achieved through advice and training. Additionally this support would cover man- 293 Traynor I., Kirchgaessner, S. and Kingsley, P. (20 April 2015) `EU Holds Migrant Boat Crisis Talks as More Deaths Reported` The Guardian http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/eu-ministers-meet-migrant-crisis-talksmediterranean-death-toll-rises, (accessed 28 July 2015). 294 EC. (11 May 2011). Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council and Commission Pledging Conference on Relocation and Resettlement, MEMO/11/285, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-285_en.htm, (accessed 5 June 2013). 295 Ibid. EC. (11 May 2011). Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council and Commission Pledging Conference on Relocation and Resettlement. 7.3 Reforming EU Migration Policy: Security vs Human Rights 157 agement of migration flows, human rights and law reform. Ashton told that this kind of integrated border management was necessary for the whole region. It was however very difficult to work with the Libyans as long as they don’t have practically working institutions.296 As for the longer term goals the Commission’s aim was sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development. For securing migration and mobility channels the Commission foresaw helping job seekers as the only solution. This protected the interests of both sides: job seeking individuals and the EU member states. Considering EU’s old population and labor shortages immigrants would make a great contribution to economy. Keeping this in mind, mobility partnerships based on country by country approach, would be beneficial for both sides. They would also promote mutual understanding by establishing people to people contacts.297 This approach was also be confirmed with the adoption of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). Repatriation of EU Nationals Before the Libya Contact Group Meetings took place in Doha, Rome, Abu Dhabi and Istanbul the EU in the Extraordinary Council Meeting of March 11 called to the Arab League and the African Union to hold a summit rapidly to discuss an orderly transition to democracy in Libya where Qaddafi regime had lost its legitimacy for long. The EU published the declaration of this meeting where the Libyan problem was discussed on April 20. Once again the Council emphasized that they were together with the Libyans in their fight for democracy and freedom and they condemned systemic violations of human rights. One major issue discussed in this declaration was migration. The EU was worried about the massive migration movements escaping from Libya. The EU’s priority was to safely evacuate the EU citizens and other nationals in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Organization for Migration, 7.3.1 296 Int. No: 12. 297 EC. (24 May 2011). A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean countries, COM(2011) 292 final , http:// ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/pdf/ 1_en_act_part1_v 12_en.pdf, (accessed 7 June 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 158 the International Committee of the Red Cross / International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and non-governmental organizations.298 In line with this concern following the Extraordinary Meeting of European Council on the Southern Mediterranean explained that they were finalizing the repatriation of EU nationals with the coordination of the Commission’s civil protection mechanism and FRONTEX was developing a contingency plan to handle a possible large influx of migrants.299 The EU rushed to provide immediate relief to the refugees fleeing Libya. During Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva’s visit to Tunisia and Libya border she announced that the European Commission boosted its aid for the humanitarian needs of refugees and for those who were stuck within the conflict in Libya from 10 million Euros to 30 million in less than a week adding that "The unleashing of violence in Libya has triggered a major humanitarian crisis at Europe’s doorstep. Europe’s values and interests command us to act decisively and this is what we are doing.”300 Bilateral Agreements and Resettlement of Refugees The EU didn’t have a problem of irregular migration from Tunisia unlike the situation in Libya. There was a very well established pattern of migration and family regrouping with France, Italy, Belgium and to some extent with Germany.301 The rapid increase in the number of people drowned in leaky boats was because of the conflict in Libya, Syria and Iraq. The deterioration of the situation in Libya caused many migrants try to reach Europe, especially to Italy, through risky routes. As analysts, who also have worked on the ground, confirm there was essentially a collusion between 7.3.2 298 European Council. (11 March 2011), European Council Declaration. EUCO 7/1/11 REV 1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/en/ec/119780.pdf, (accessed 5 June 2013). 299 Statement by President Barroso following the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on the Southern Mediterranean, Speech 11/168, (11 March 2011), file:///C:/Users/sekiz/Downloads/SPEECH-11-168_EN.pdf, (accessed 31 October 2015). 300 EC. (3 March 2011). EU ups its response to Libya’s humanitarian crisis as Commission and Hungarian presidency visit Tunisia-Libya border, IP/11/254 http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-254_en.htm, (accessed 5 June 2013). 301 Int No: 18. 7.3 Reforming EU Migration Policy: Security vs Human Rights 159 human trafficking networks and the regime in Libya. Libya had a special police for borders and these people were simply taking money from traffickers who led migrant groups. There was a kind of ‘stop and go´ operation. The situation didn’t get any better since there was no state but there are criminal networks existing in Libya. These criminal networks had an easy time as long as there were desperate people, either for economic or political reasons, willing to spend several thousand euros on transit.302 Smugglers in Libya and Egypt were using the roads to take profit out of it. It was a big problem to be tackled at the roots.303 It should also be mentioned that as long as the EU didn’t offer adequate mobility options smugglers would continue to make benefit out of their existing `business` models. Increasing migratory demands pushed the European Commission to make a call to its members so as to set up mutually beneficial partnerships (Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security) with non-EU countries. In this respect the EU made bilateral agreements for handling the problem of refugee flows as the regimes fell in the North African countries. EU launched these dialogues with Tunisia, Morocco and is expected to launch this type of dialogue with Egypt, Jordan and Libya. (Carrera, den Hertog & Parkin, 2012) These partnerships would be unique to each country and funding would depend on the progress the target country makes in migration, readmission, mobility and security. GAMM approach however, was criticized for `lack of transparency`, `internal fragmentation` and `predominance of home affairs and security actors`. (Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin, p.1, 2012) The National Transition Council of Libya made this type of agreement with Italy. They signed Memorandum of Understanding on 17 June 2011 to fight against illegal immigration and to cooperate for the return of irregular migrants. According to this agreement Italy and Libya would exchange information on illegal immigrants to promote the management of migration. As Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin inform over 13,000 migrants returned between January 2011 and July 2011. The problem was that it was not clear whether these returns took full account of the risks of returning individuals to post-revolutionary and post-conflict zones. Their compliance with international law and the principle of non-refoulement 302 Int. No: 18. 303 Int. No:1. 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 160 was highly in question. (Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin, 2012, p.6) Bilateral agreements between Italy and North African countries are criticized for putting domestic concerns and interests over international human rights. Not only with Libya but also with the other North African countries Italy made bilateral agreements privileging border security and domestic interests over human rights. (Paoletti, 2012) Looking at the general picture the EU provided upon the refugee movements, mostly by boat, and the displacement of different nationalities in the Southern Mediterranean Paoletti thinks that “prioritized security issues is linked to the need of politicians to appease populist demands and quench deepening anti-migrant sentiments” . (Paoletti, 2012) Criticism from International Human Rights Organizations In 2011, around 2000 migrants died on their way to Europe. Pedersen underlines this fact saying that “European states would rather abandon boat migrants to their deaths, than opening asylum cases for them” despite the Commission’s promise for ensuring the migrants’ fundamental rights.304 As it is shown on Chart 4 not only European countries but also neighboring countries faced an influx of refugees fleeing Libya. With the fall of the Libyan regime the number of returnees (economic migrants) from Libya crossed 209,030, with 95,760 in Niger, 82,433 in Chad, 11,230 in Mali and 780 in Mauritania.305 Heaviest migration flows occurred in Libya with 1 million (700 foreigners) individuals leaving Libya. (Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin 2012, p.3). There were five types of migrants in the case of Libya: evacuating migrant workers, Libyan nationals moving into Egypt and Tunisia, ‘boat people’ arriving in the EU, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and asylum-seekers and refugees.306 7.3.3 304 Pedersen, M., L. (10 August 2012). ‘state of the European migration policy`. Beyond Brussels. http://beyondbrussels.com/2012/08/the-state-of-the-european-migration-policy/, (accessed 10 June 2013). 305 UN Security Council. (18 January 2012). Report of the assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya %20S%202012%2042.pdf, (accessed 7 June 2013). 306 Koser, K., (Nov. 2011), Responding to Migration from Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Libya, Chatham House http:// 7.3 Reforming EU Migration Policy: Security vs Human Rights 161 Migrants Fleeing Libya rights.305 As it is shown on Chart 4 not only European countries but also neighboring countries faced an influx of refugees fleeing Libya. With the fall of the Libyan regime the number of returnees (economic migrants) from Libya crossed 209,030, with 95,760 in Niger, 82,433 in Chad, 11,230 in Mali and 780 in Mauritania.306 Heaviest migration flows occurred in Libya with 1 million (700 foreigners) individuals leaving Libya. (Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin 2012, p.3). There were five types of migrants in the case of Libya: evacuating migrant workers, Libyan nationals moving into Egypt and Tunisia, ‘boat people’ arriving in the EU, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and asylum-seekers and refugees.307 Chart 4: Migrants Fleeing Libya Unlike the West Sahel countries Europe didn’t receive a major influx of migrants. By contrast, the number of individuals that fled the upheavals in North Africa by crossing the Mediterranean to Europe was relatively minor. The EU, primarily Italy and Malta, saw a rising inflow of migrants during the first half of 2011, but overall figures were a fraction of the population displacement witnessed in the Southern Mediterranean. Between 1 January and 31 July 2011, Italy received approximately 48,000 irregular migrants as part of the 2011 influx from North Africa of whom 24,769 originated from Tunisia and 23,267 arrived from Libya. (Carrera et al., 2012) Despite the fact that migrants arriving in Europe were not big in number when compared 305Pedersen, M., L. (10 August 2012). `State of the European migration policy`. Beyond Brussels. http://beyondbrussels.com/2012/08/the-state-of-the-european-migration-policy/, (accessed 10 June 2013) 306 UN Security Council. (18 January 2012). Report of the assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%202012%2042.pdf, (accessed 7 June 2013) 307Koser, K., (Nov. 2011), Responding to Migration from Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Libya, Chatham House http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/1111bp_koser.pdf, (accessed 7 June 2013) Niger 80,329 Egypt 226,200 Tunisia 304,127 Malta 1,533 Italy 25,935 Other African 67,952 Migrants fleeing Libya in Spring and Summer 2011 by country of arrival Niger Egypt Tunisia Malta Italy Other African Unlike the West Sahel countries Europe didn’t receive a major influx of migrants. By contrast, the number of individuals that fled the upheavals in North Africa by crossing the Mediterranean to Europe was relatively minor. The EU, prima ily Italy and Malta, s w a rising inflow of migrants during the first half of 2011, but overall figures were a fraction of the population displacement witnessed in the Southern Mediterranean. Between 1 January and 31 July 2011, Italy received approximately 48,000 irregular migrants as part of the 2011 influx from North Africa of whom 24,769 originat d from Tunisia and 23,267 arrived from Libya. (Carrera et al., 2012) Despite the fact that migrants arriving in Europe were not big in numb r when compared to otal scale of migrati from Libya Koser says that “International media and political attentio on the migration utcomes of the Arab Spring to date has mainly focused on the relatively small number of migrants who have arrived in Europe”.307 (Koser, 2011, p.5) There were explicit humanitarian doubts on EU migration policy. A report released by International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) named `Libya: The Hounding of Migrants Must Stop` says: “It is very worrying rt : www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/1111bp_koser.pdf, (accessed 7 June 2013). 307 Koser, Ibid, p.5. 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 162 that, although the European political establishment is well aware of the situation of insecurity faced by migrants and asylum seekers in Libya and the serious violations of their human rights, the objective of controlling migration continues to outweigh all other considerations”.308 Amnesty International also strongly criticized EU governments in its article `Europe, now it is your turn to act` for offering resettlement to only 700 refugees out of 5000 who are stuck in conflict. Consequently, Commissioner Malmström conceded that Europe had “failed” refugees fleeing the crisis in the Southern Mediterranean in 2011.309 She also spoke before the European Commission's special pledging conference on Malta's intra- EU resettlement pilot project. She made a call to the member states to implement `concrete action` for the necessary solidarity with the island. However she also added that “the Commission cannot impose obligatory solidarity as member states are sovereign in taking such decisions.”310 The EU paid a lot of lip service to human rights and justice but didn’t accomplish much. There was a robust conversation on human rights but Europe always referred to security and economic imperatives over the human rights imperatives. This played itself out in the Arab Spring that the EU didn’t promote human rights as robustly as it could.311 308 `Libya: The hounding of migrants must stop`. (29 November 2012). FIDH: World Wide Human Rights Movement. http://www.fidh.org/Libya-The-houndingof-migrants-12255, (accessed 7 June 2013). 309 Malmström, C. `Refugees: How Europe Failed`. (19 January 2012). The Times of Malta in Carrera et al, p.8. 310 `Commission Acknowledges Malta's Particular Migration Challenges (4 May 2011). Times of Malta. http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110504/ local/brussels-announces-pledging-conference-to-malta-s-pilot-project.363601, (accessed 7 June 2013). 311 Int. No: 13. 7.3 Reforming EU Migration Policy: Security vs Human Rights 163 Table 14: Main Features: Physical Security Physical Security 3 March 2011 EC Decision on Aid for Refugees – September 2013 Establishment of SEAHORSE Program Actions: Evacuation of EU citizens and other nationals Providing humanitarian assistance and supporting civil protection operations in the military intervention 3 March 2011 Increased aid for refugees worth 30 ml 8 March 2011 Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity launched 5 May 2011 Call for the establishment of a temporary financial mechanism to support opposition groups 11 March 2011 Extraordinary Council Meeting on massive migration movements 11 March 2011 Call to member states to support FRONTEX 1 April 2011 Launching EUFOR Libya 12 May 2011 Ministerial Pledging Conference 24 May 2011 Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security 17 June 2011 Memorandum of Understanding btw Italy and Libya 6 March 2013 EU Instrument for Stability and INTERPOL launching a project to improve Libyan border security worth 2.2ml January 2013 Support for developing capacity and strategy for border management June 2013 Integration of EUBAM Libya September 2013 Establishment of SEAHORSE program worth 4.5ml Resettlement of 700 refugees out of 5000 Donation for security sector and migration in add. to other areas of education and civil society worth 68ml for 2012-2013 Discourses: Acting in cooperation with international community to establish UNSC Res. 1970 and 1973 Acting in accordance with member state proposals Ending the Gaddafi regime Putting weapons under control and securing borders Necessity of national reconciliation Maintaining peace and stability Safe evacuation of EU citizens and other nationals EU support for security sector reforms Concerns on massive migration movements Content Analysis: Security sector reform (14) Security in relation with freedom and job opportunities (4) Security in relation with management of migration (4) Military operation (4) 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 164 Interviews: EU migration policies suboptimal and driven by security concerns Libya open for migratory pressures No statehood in Libya EU had a humanitarian role in Libyan intervention Humanitarian corridors never led to anything concrete EU better in post-conflict scenario Projects in security and border assistance suspended Security sector reforms unsuccessful EU more present in Libya after the war than before the war Bilateral relationships of member states are more important than EU relationship with Libya Mode of Policy Behavior on Libyan intervention: Normative Mode of Policy Behavior on Migration: Strongly Rational Economic Prosperity Libya Contact Group Meetings Leaders of more than 35 countries, NATO and the UN gathered in London and decided to establish Libya Contact Group for helping Libya shape its future and further increase international pressure on Gaddafi on March 29, 2011. Ms Ashton also announced the establishment of this international contact group to help the Libyans’ democratic transition process. She added that the EU had engaged constantly to make sure key international partners act in concert, particularly the United Nations, the Arab League and the African Union to work for a solution to the crisis.”312 This was the first strong diplomatic response of the international community to the Libyan conflict. The first four meetings were respectively held in Paris, London, Doha, and Istanbul. It was also a platform where EU’s long term economic interests were discussed. The EU again showed its support for Libya Contact Group in the Council of the EU meeting on April 12, 2011. It was a cooperative effort established to support the Libyan National Transitional Council and to overthrow the regime by 7.4 7.4.1 312 EU. (29 March 2011). Statement by the High Representative following the London Conference on Libya. A 129/11 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/ 2009_2014/documents/dmag/dv/dmag20110413_03_/dmag20110413_03_en.pdf, (accessed 10 June 2013). 7.4 Economic Prosperity 165 western nations, the EU and also the Arab league. Council of the EU concluded with a call for an immediate ceasefire and a call on Gaddafi to relinquish power. The Council also stressed its determination to deprive the regime of all oil and gas funding.313 The first meeting of the Contact Group on Libya was held in Doha and was led by the State of Qatar and the UK. 21 other countries and representatives of the UN, the Arab League, NATO, the EU and Organization of Islamic Conference and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States also attended this meeting. A number of important decisions were taken in Doha. Participants laid out additional restrictive measures to cut off the Libyan regime’s funds. They supported the implementation of UN- SCRs 1970 and 1973 (2011) and welcomed NATO’s command and control of military operations. The international community repeated its call to Gaddafi to pull back forces from the occupied cities. They recognized the National Council as the legitimate representative of Libyans. They also thought about setting up funding mechanisms for rebels. The message they delivered to the world was that “Gaddafi’s continued presence would threaten any resolution of the crisis.”314 The second Contact Group Meeting on Libya was held on May 5, 2011. 22 countries and six international organizations – EU, UN, NATO, the Arab League, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council- attended to this meeting. The participants expressed that Gaddafi regime would not go unpunished. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court would submit an arrest warrant in the coming weeks for the regime’s violent attacks to the UN Security Council. Contact group participants expressed their views to intensify efforts to defend civilians. One way to do this would be to put political, economic and military pressure on the regime. Militarily they would strengthen strikes targeting military objectives. For this purpose they recognized NATO-led “Operation Unified Protector”. They welcomed several countries’ decisions to participate in the mission. They made it clear that NATO actions would be fully consistent with UNSCRs Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Oth- 313 Council of the EU. (12 April 2011). Council conclusions on Libya 3082nd FOR- EIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cmsUpload/121499.pdf, (accessed 21 April 2013). 314 `Libya Contact Group: Chair’s Statement`. (13 April 2011) Foreign and Commonwealth Office(FCO) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/libya-contactgroup-chairs-statement, (accessed 22 April 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 166 er types of punishments were that some satellite operators would stop broadcasting of official media used by Qaddafi’s regime to call to violence. In addition to military pressure political solutions were also discussed in the meeting. In this line the Transitional National Council, as the legitimate interlocutor, would be strengthened. In terms of humanitarian aid the international community had already made significant contributions totaling 245 million dollars to address the humanitarian need triggered by the Libyan crisis.315Observing that there were still threats to the civilians the EU would support the continuation of the operation of UN- SCR 1973 and UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL). After the meeting of the Contact Group on Libya, Ms Ashton on May 5, 2011 stated the importance of the international community including the UN, the Arab League, the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Gulf Cooperation Council and said that they would work together for a ceasefire and Libya’s national reconciliation. She also announced the establishment of the Temporary Financial Mechanism for supporting the opposition groups in Libya. As part of the Responsibility to protect the international community and the EU would support the continuation of UNSCR 1970 and 1973, UN Support Mission to Libya (UN- SMIL) and increase the pressure on the Gaddafi regime. The UN Special Envoy for Libya would work in cooperation with the EU and this cooperation would lead to a ceasefire and finally to political transition.316 Istanbul Meeting: Discussion of Libya’s Future Economy The Libya Contact Group’s fourth meeting was held in Istanbul on July 15, 2011 under the co-chairmanship of Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Representatives from 32 countries and 7 international organizations, including the United Nations, European Union, NATO, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, the Gulf Coop- 7.4.2 315 Second Meeting of the Contact Group on Libya, Rome (5 May 2011) http:// www.esteri.it/mae/doc/20110505_MeetingConclusions.pdf, (accessed 22 April 2013). 316 EU. (5 May 2011). Statement by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, after the meeting of the Contact Group on Libya. A 174/11 (Press Release).http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/ 121876.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013). 7.4 Economic Prosperity 167 eration Council and, as an invitee, the African Union decided to take further steps for a free Libya. The Group decided that NATO operation under the name of `Operation Unified Protector` should be extended for another 3 months and the contribution of the UK and France to the operation was increased. The participants expressed their strong demand for a genuine ceasefire and relinquishment of Gaddafi from power and the immediate withdrawal of the forces of the regime in Tripoli to bases, the release of detained people and the opening of all borders. In accordance with the road map of the NTC the group supported the formation of an interim government and territorial formation of a national congress, and a supreme executive council. Participants acknowledged the need for resources to finance the works of the NTC. They talked about exporting hydrocarbons, unfreezing the Libyan assets and using the unfrozen assets. They also reminded the importance of international support and exportation of crude oil. The Contact group also welcomed the funding worth 200 million USD from Turkey, 100 million USD from Qatar, five million USD from Bahrain and Italy’s contribution of 250 million Euros in cash and 100 million Euros in refined oil products, and the remaining pledges would be paid by France and Kuwait. The group also stressed the need of opening up Libya to foreign investment.317 On the discursive level, on July 15, 2011 Ms Ashton reaffirmed that the international community would work in cooperation to implement UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and also for stabilization, political transition and the revival of economy 318 as EU’s long term economic interests have also been discussed in these meetings. EU’s economic interest in Libya comes from some agreements on oil and gas production as well as trade negotiations that have to be redesigned and the maintenance and repair of fossil-fuel production facilities. (Seeberg 2014, p.3) 317 Libya Temas Grubu Dördüncü Toplantısı. İstanbul (15 Temmuz 2011) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) http://www.mfa.gov.tr/libya-temas-grubu-4_-toplantisi-fotograf-albumu_-15-temmuz-2011_-istanbul.tr.mfa, (accessed 23 April 2013). 318 EU. (15 July 2011). Statement by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, following the meeting of the Contact Group on Libya Istanbul, A 281/11, (Press Release), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/ foraff/123891.pdf, (accessed June 1, 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 168 Table 15: Main Features: Economic Prosperity Economic Prosperity Time Period: 1 April 2011 Humanitarian Ass. Operation in Libya- November 2013 ENPI Program for Economic Integration Actions: Recognition of NATO operation Attendance in Libya Contact Group meetings where long term economic interests discussed 2012-2013 Donation for economic development, security, technical and vocational education and training, migration and support for civil society worth 68ml November 2013 ENPI program for economic integration, diversification and sustainable employment worth 10ml Discourses: EU support for economic development Revival of economy Reassuring investments, oil and gas production Free trade zone Strategic importance of the Arab Spring Being a strong future economic partner of Libya Advocating long term interests in deeper economic integration Content Analysis: Economic Development (15) EU Support for economic development (7) Restarting economy, investments and oil and gas production (2) Establishing a full free trade zone (4) Economic growth in relation with democracy (2) Interviews: EU and member states can´t have an agreement in the economic field Member states pursue more of their interests as a trade partner or technology exporter Member states defense their economic agenda Bilateral interests entrap European interests Mode of Foreign Policy: Rational 7.4 Economic Prosperity 169 Value Projection EU’s Restrictive Measures against the Gaddafi Regime Libyan Civil War began in February 2011 and ended in October 2011. This was a war between the Gaddafi forces and the Gaddafi loyalists and those seeking to overthrow him. It was February 15, 2011 when peaceful protests were met with military reactions. The events spread with the arrest of the human rights activist Fethi Tarbel. Security forces opened fire against protesters who were demanding freedom of the arrested human rights activist. Demonstrations grew stronger and Gaddafi forces launched air strikes against rebels. Almost ten days later, on February 24, anti-government militias took control of central coastal city of Misrata after removing Qaddafi forces. Two days later the regime forces opened fire against rebels and 24 of them have been killed. On the same day the UN Security Council voted unanimously imposing sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and referred to the crackdown on rebels to the International Criminal Court (ICC).319 In support of the UN decision the EU adopted a declaration on February 28, imposing arms embargo, a travel ban and freezing the financial assets of Libyan Government members.320 In the following days serious human rights violations occurred in Libya. Upon this depressing situation the UN General Assembly made an announcement on March 1, 2011 that upon the deep concern about Gaddafi’s violent treatment of anti-regime protestors they had suspended Libya’s membership in the Human Rights Council.321 Ban Ki-Moon said “the Arab Awakening also produced an awakening at the Human Rights Council.”322This decision on behalf of the Libyan people came after 7.5 7.5.1 319 Lynch, C. (26 February 2011) U.N. votes to impose sanction on Gaddafi. Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/ AR2011022603386.html, (accessed 1 June 2013). 320 Council of the EU. (28 February 2011) Libya: EU imposes arms embargo and targeted sanctions, (Press Release). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119524.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013). 321 General Assembly Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council (1 March 2011).UN Department of Public Information, http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2011/ga11050.doc.htm, accessed (21 April 2013). 322 Ambassador Donahoe: U.S. Working With Partners to Make the Human Rights Council as Effective as It Can Be. (24 January 2013). Human Rights.Gov, http:// www.humanrights.gov/2013/01/24/ambassador-donahoe-u-s-working-with-part- 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 170 Gaddafi’s famous speech threatening his rebels with death and calling them “rats”.323 Additionally at that time the US Ambassador to the UN made a declaration that Gaddafi had lost his legitimacy in governing his country and that Gaddafi had to go.324 Ms Ashton was quick to react to this unified international response in a speech she made at the European Parliament just a week later telling that she was pleased to see that the international community sent “a strong and unified political signal concerning the human rights violations in Libya” but she also addressed that she was eager to see these signals turn into action. She addressed universal human rights such as free speech, freedom of assembly, justice and equality325 Also the Council of the EU adopted a number of restrictive measures towards people close to the Gaddafi regime and the regime’s financial resources on March 10, 2011. The measures published in the Official Journal of the European Union show that funds and economic sources of 26 individuals who are held responsible for the violent crackdown on civilians have been frozen.326 EU’s strategic response, however, to the Arab Spring countries in general came with the joint communication of Ms Ashton and the Commission proposing "A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean".327 It was based on the idea that both support and restrictive sanctions depend on the reforms countries make. “More for ners-to-make-the-human-rights-council-as-effective-as-it-can-be/, accessed (10 May 2013). 323 Quinn, B. and Haynes, J. (22 Feb. 2011) Gaddafi speech and Libya unrest – as it happened. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/feb/22/ libya-gaddafi-speech-reaction-live-updates, (accessed 10 May 2013). 324 Libya´nin BM Insan Haklari Konseyi´ne Üyeliginin Askiya Alinmasi, (1 March 2011). Timetürk http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2011/03/01/libya-nin-bm-insan-haklari-konseyi-ne-uyeliginin-askiya-alinmasi-bm-genel-sekr.html, (accessed 10 May 2013). 325 EC. (3 Sept. 2011). Remarks on UN Human Rights Council. (Press Release). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-161_en.htm, (accessed 20 March 2013). 326 Libya: EU extends restrictive measures to key financial entities. (10 March 2011). European Union at United Nations, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/ articles/en/article_10783_en.htm, (accessed 10 Jun 2013). 327 EC. (8 March 2011). Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean, COM(2011) 200 final, http:// eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf, (accessed 20 April 2013). 7.5 Value Projection 171 more” principle works for financial assistance, mobility and access to the EU Single Market. The first concrete decisions of “more for more” principle and of course on the Arab revolutions were taken at the Extraordinary Meeting of the European Council. These decisions were summarized by HR/VP Catherine Ashton after her arrival to the emergency EU Summit as three Ms:328 – Money - resources that can go into the region to help support the transition to democracy, the support for civil society and of course the economic needs of countries. For example the loss of tourism in Egypt and Tunisia – Secondly market access - the importance of making sure that we give advantages in trade and the people can take advantage of that by being able to export and import properly. – And thirdly mobility - the ability of people to move around, for business people to be able to conduct business more effectively. President Rompuy spoke firstly on the Extraordinary European Council telling that the attendants, as the members of the EU, should take some concrete and urgent decisions to set the direction of EU response. He stressed how important it was for Europe strategically that the Arab Spring, which is similar to the events of Central and Eastern Asia, offered a new phase in the MENA region. He confirmed the EU support towards democratic transformation and economic reforms adding that they would implement positive conditionality in their support. In his following remarks he emphasized the concept of `ownership` that the outcome was in the hands of people in the concerned countries and the explained that transition to democracy was a slow process. President Rompuy, explained after the Council meeting that the problem’s name was Gaddafi and he had to go. The three pillars they were supporting were democratic transformation and institution building, engagement with civil society and sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development.329 328 EU. (11 March 2011). Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on arrival to the Extraordinary European Council. (Press Release). A 102/11, http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/ 119777.pdf, , (accessed 27 March 2013). 329 EC. (11 March 2011). Statement by President Barroso following the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on the Southern Mediterranean. (Press Release) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-168_de.htm?locale=en, (accessed 27 March 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 172 On 23th of March the EU within the scope of the deprivation of oil resources froze the assets of national oil company and its five subsidiaries.330 The EU also froze the assets of Libyan Investment Authority, which has almost a 70 billion dollar budget, Central Bank and some state funded companies to cut Qaddafi off from his financial resources 331 This Council decision also strengthened the enforcement of the arms embargo, bans Libyan aircraft from EU Member States' airspace, the visa ban and the assets freeze were extended to include additional people. This decision of the EU was based on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) which broadened the scope of the restrictive measures against Libya. Furthering its restrictive measures on June 7, 2011 EU extended the assets freeze to six Libyan port authorities. This meant that the European ships were not allowed to do business using these ports, Tripoli, Zuara, Zawiyah, Al-Khoms, Ras Lanuf and Brega, in Libya. Gaddafi needed resources derived from fuel importation for his military but, with this initiative in charge, sanctions on oil and oil products had been increased.332 The EU additionally increased the number of target institutions in the scope of restrictive measures to 49. In addition to that 39 people including the Gaddafi family members were banned from entering the EU. Since the beginning of the Arab Revolutions EU has adopted sanctions to increasing number of countries. For this reason the EU has been criticized for turning into a “sanctions machine”. 333 For some authors, as a strong international actor, the EU was expected to use sanctions in an effective way and combine this tool with other tools.334 However the EU 330 AB, Libya'ya yaptırımları ulusal petrol şirketi kapsayacak şekilde genişletti. (23 March 2011). Zaman http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_ab-libyaya-yaptirimlariulusal-petrol-sirketi-kapsayacak-sekilde-genisletti_1111740.html, (accessed 21 April 2013). 331 AB Libya'ya yaptırımların kapsamını genişletti.(10 March 2011). Milliyet http:// dunya.milliyet.com.tr/ab-libya-ya-yaptirimlarin-kapsamini-genisletti/dunya/ dunyadetay/10.03.2011/1362537/default.htm (accessed 21 April 2013). 332 Council Decision 2011/332/CFSP of 7 June 2011 amending Decision 2011/137/ CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya. (8 June 2011). OJ L 58. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=OJ:L:2011:149:0010:0011:EN:PDF, (accessed 21 April 2013). 333 Lehne, S. (14 Dec. 2012). The Role of Sanctions in EU Foreign Policy, Carnegie Endowment http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/14/role-of-sanctions-in-euforeign-policy/etnv, (accessed 10 May 2013). 334 Lehne, Ibid. 7.5 Value Projection 173 preferred to leave the decisions on military and crisis managements issues to the UN and NATO. Ashton made it clear when she said that they were waiting for UN decisions turn into “solid action”. 335 Still EU’s decision of assets freeze and other restrictive measures can be considered as a moral condemnation of violence against civilians in Libya. It is equally important to release frozen assets for reconstruction programs in the post-conflict area of Libya. Using Libyans` resources for Libyans again should be the future plan despite the fact that Libya is an oil-rich country. As a first step to normalization the process of freezing funds and delisting entities of gas and oil has quickly improved based on the UNSCR decisions. EU’s Immediate Humanitarian Assistance after the Military Intervention The EU announced its position on the side of the reforms and long term developments in the areas of justice, security sector reform, public financial management, media, public sector capacity building, education, health, and civil society in ´European Neighborhood Policy´ launched on May 25, 2011. EU’s philosophy offered positive conditionality based on ‘more funds for more reform’ approach.336 Before working towards these goals the EU would provide short term immediate assistance for the most urgent needs in the public services, particularly medical supplies, water and fuel.337 Just before European Neighborhood Policy was announced Ms Ashton opened a new EU office in Benghazi for the coordination of EU assistance. On the 22th of May Ms Ashton made a visit to Benghazi and met the Chairman of the National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil. 7.5.2 335 EC. (9 March 2011). Catherine Ashton EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Remarks on UN Human Rights Council, (Press Release). http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-11-161_en.htm, (accessed 20 March 2013). 336 EC. (25 May 2011). A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood A review of European Neighbourhood Policy, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/ com_11_303_en.pdf, (accessed 26 July 2015). 337 Libya: Statement by EU HR Ashton following the Cairo Group conference call. (26 August 2011). Europe at United Nations http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/ articles/fr/article_11315_fr.htm, (accessed 1 June 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 174 This was a meeting to show European support for border management and security, economy, health, education and civil society.338 The experts of this office were in close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, International Medical Corps and UNICEF to provide medicines, food and drinking water was delivered quickly. In Ms Ashton’s words opening the EU office in Benghazi was a sign of “putting words into action”.339 EUFOR Libya, which was launched on April 1, 2011, was the instrument to support humanitarian assistance in Libya. This service would be activated only with the request of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Among the plans were clearing, repairing and running an airport or a port, ensuring bulk fuel distribution and evacuation and delivery of food and water. OCHA didn’t make a request though.340 On May 23, 2011 the EU boosted its humanitarian aid from 50 million to 70 million. This extra funding would be used for Libyans affected by the fighting, third country nationals and Libyan refugees. Kristalina Georgieva, Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, announced this decision: "Europe's solidarity has been in action since the outset of turmoil in Libya. EU will continue relentlessly to relieve the plight of the affected men, women and children."341 The total aid of EU in Libya covering humanitarian response and civil protection was 154,501,252 € as of November 2011. However this aid was divided between the sums contributed by the member states themselves (73,926,412 €) and the amount donated by European Commission 338 EU. (22 May 2011).Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton after the meeting with the Chairman of the transitional National Council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, in Benghazi, A 197/11, (Press Release), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122141.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013). 339 EC. (24 May 2011), Catherine Ashton opens European Union office in Benghazi, COM(2011) 292 final, (Press Release), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-625_en.htm, (accessed 1 June 2013). 340 Libya: EU Council decides on EU military operation to support humanitarian assistance operations. (1 April 2011). Europe at United Nations. http://www.euun.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10887_en.htm, (accessed 21 April 2013). 341 Europe boosts its humanitarian aid in the Libyan crisis. (23 May 2011). European Union at United Nations http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11070_en.htm, (accessed 7 June 2013). 7.5 Value Projection 175 Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) (80,574,084 €). The first amount was a voluntary contribution from every member state and the deployment of humanitarian aid was done quickly. ECHO’s main concerns were to protect the Libyan population from the effect of the armed conflict as well as to protect and assist vulnerable groups such as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), third Country Nationals (TCN) and Libyan refugees in neighboring countries.342 The EU supported the TNC’s mission `Road to Democratic Libya` but was also aware of the financial needs of the TNC. The EU expressed its satisfaction that France and Italy contributed to the Temporary Financial Mechanism (TFM), which was made operational at the Abu Dhabi meeting. Apart from this €80.5 million committed for humanitarian relief ECHO donated €10 million for helping the war wounded, displaced people and the refugees, providing assistance in the health sector and humanitarian mining operations.343 As the world’s largest aid donor the EU distributed funding in a short time. The main concerns for the EU in delivering aid were the coordination of relief, helping NGOs to dispense their resources in an efficient way, protecting civilians and enabling refugees to turn to their countries of origin. This aid was also highlighted at the meeting of Mr Füle and Dr Mahmoud Jibril. Füle expressed his thankfulness for the EU’s humanitarian support worth 138 million till July.344 After six months of conflict in Libya the EU had totally spent over €136 million in humanitarian assistance to the Libyan crisis. In any case the issue of aid was not relevant for Libya because Libya was a very welfare country per capita, which was far above EU. The issue was more about good governance especially in the security sector. After the fall of the regime, supporting the transition of authorities in reforming the security sector, obviously without any success, very quickly had been identified as a priority.345 342 EC. Helping worldwide: EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection in 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/2012/Helping_worldwide.pdf, (accessed 7 June 2013). 343 ECHO. (27 Nov. 2013) Libya: ECHO’s Assistance, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/ news/2011/20110823_02_en.htm, (accessed 15 March 2013). 344 EC. (14 July 2011). Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle following his meeting with Dr Mahmoud Jibril, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Libyan Transitional National Council, MEMO/11/509, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-509_en.htm, (accessed 7 June 2013). 345 Int. No: 14. 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 176 EU’s Wish for a Democratic and Stable Libya as the Next Phase and EU’s `Responsibility to Assist` As the NTC took power after the civil war which overthrew the regime of Gaddafi Libya entered into a new phase where Libya was expected to follow a democratic path. The NTC was the de facto and legitimate governing authority of Libya in the year 2011 after the civil war until its dissolution in August 2012.346 This government formally occupied a seat at the UN with the name “Libya”.347 The NTC held elections to a General National Congress and handed power to the newly elected assembly on 8 August. The ceremony marked the first peaceful power transfer in Libya's modern history.348The EU welcomed recent developments in Libya and reaffirmed its commitment to support the emergence of a new, stable, prosperous, sovereign and democratic Libya.349 In this new phase EU would apply “responsibility to assist” as well as “responsibility to protect”350. In a speech she made after the Cairo Group Meeting Ms Ashton said "Libya is now embarking on an historic transition process that should be based upon the respect for democratic values and human rights. Colonel Gaddafi must avoid further bloodshed by relinquishing power and calling on those forces that continue to fight to lay down their arms and protect civilians.” Acknowledging the UN leadership she called on all parties involved in the Libyan revolution to respect international humanitarian and international human rights obligations. One of the things she underlined 7.5.3 346 National Transitional Council Libya http://ntclibya.org/, (accessed 27 July 2015). 347 National Transitional Council. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Transitional_Council, (accessed 27 July 2015). 348 Muhammed, E., (8 Aug. 2012) Libya’s Transitional Rulers Hand Over Power. USA Today http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-08-08/Libyapower-transfer/56889806/1, (accessed 20 March 2013). 349 Council of the EU.( 10 October 2011). Council conclusions on Libya 3117th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Luxembourg, (Press Release), http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/ 125012.pdf, (accessed 24 April 2013). 350 Address by EU Council President Van Rompuy at the UN High-Level Meeting on Libya. (20 Sept. 2011). Europe at United Nations, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11395_en.htm, (accessed 27 March 2013). 7.5 Value Projection 177 was promoting reconciliation in a way to reach out all parties in Libya. EU’s long term support would be building a secure and free Libya.351 At the Paris Conference on Libya Mr Rompuy also talked about the next phase which was democratic transition. Libya was expected to go through reconciliation, political transition, and reconstruction. He asked Libyans to respect the rule of law and human rights in the transition process.352 In accordance with the needs assessment of Libya conducted at the Paris Conference the EU was also ready to work in the key fields of border management, civil society and women's rights, communications and media with the overall coordination of the UN and the World Bank. Other areas the EU wanted to help Libyans are democratization, rule of law, institution-building, security sector reform, police training and the relaunching of the economy. To accomplish these tasks the EU has two offices in Tripoli and Benghazi. President Rompuy also talked about a future road map for the Libyans at the High Level Meeting of UN on Libya. The three points he made can be summarized as follows: Firstly the state and democracy needed to be established. Then he touched upon normative values that it was time for justice, rule of law and human rights and reconciliation. Finally he said that military operations should exist as long as it was necessary and economy should be nurtured with reassuring investors. He reminded EU’s coordination with the TNC by deploying teams on the ground and reopening EU Embassy. He also added that the connection between the European and Libyan market would contribute positively to Libya’s transition.353The EU also promised to lift restrictions on Libyan frozen assets to help Libyans re-activate their economy.354 351 Libya: Statement by EU HR Ashton following the Cairo Group conference call. (26 August 2011). Europe at United Nations http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/ articles/fr/article_11315_fr.htm, (accessed 1 June 2013). 352 European Council. (1 September 2011). `We were, we are and we will be on your side in facing these tremendous challenges`message by President Herman Van Rompuy to the Paris Conference on Libya, EUCO 63/11, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/124490.pdf, (accessed 27 March 2013). 353 Ibid., Address by EU Council President Van Rompuy at the UN High-Level Meeting on Libya. 354 Council of the EU. (14 November 2011). Council conclusions on Libya 3124th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting, (Press Release), http://www.consili- 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 178 Libya’s coming closer to the normalization process started with the speech of Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the Leader of the Transitional government, on September 13, 2011. He called for `unity and moderation`. 355Then the NTC announced on 23rd of October that Libya was totally liberated and that Gaddafi rule had ended. 356 This announcement came at a controversial time three days after Gaddafi was killed. The NTC vice chairman Abdel Hafiz Ghoga told to a crowded gathering of ten thousands in Benghazi that they were free Libyans. President Mahmud Cibril told that the first elections should be made in 8 months. In between these two developments Council of the EU published its conclusions on Libya on October 10, 2011. The EU welcomed recent developments in Libya and reaffirmed its commitment to support the emergence of a new, stable, prosperous, sovereign and democratic Libya.357 Unfreezing Libyan assets The EU firstly released held funds of 28 Libyan entities on the 15th of September starting with assets freeze on Afriqiyah Airways. Council of the EU allowed the assets of the Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan Foreign Bank and Libya Africa Investment Portfolio and two oil companies to be released for their usage in humanitarian needs on 22th of September. Then the EU also lifted banning of the Libyan aircraft to use European airports and airspace. These decisions 7.5.4 um.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126042.pdf, (accessed 27 April 2013). 355 Smith, D., Traynor I. (13 Sep. 2011). `Interim Libyan leader pleads for unity as tensions rise between factions’. The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 2011/sep/13/interim-libyan-leader-calls-unity, (accessed 24 April 2013). 356 Black, I. ´Benghazi's moment of joy as Libya's tyranny ends.` (23 October 2011). The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/23/benghazi-joy-endlibya-tyranny, (accessed 24 April 2013). 357 Council of the EU.(10 October 2011), Council conclusions on Libya 3117th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Luxembourg, (Press Release),http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/ 125012.pdf, (accessed 24 April 2013). 7.5 Value Projection 179 were taken as the results of the UN Security Council resolution 2009 (2011).358 In December 2011 Council of the EU unfroze all funds and assets of the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank worth 97 billion to support the Libyan economy and Libyan authorities and partially unfroze funds of the Libyan Investment Authority and Libya Africa Investment Portfolio. Ms Ashton said that this move of the EU would help the Libyan interim government to create a functioning economy again.359 The EU at the beginning of November 2011 also gave the hints of lifting restrictions on economic entities. By this time of the year already 28 entities were de-listed actually. The EU also foresaw a framework agreement with Libya for political, economic and socio-cultural dialogue. 360 EU’s Long Term Goals in Libya: Security Sector Reform, Training Civil Society and Institution/State Building The three issues that the EU put high on the agenda of Libya were security sector reforms, support for the civil society and institution/state building. These were the most important subjects of the meetings of high level visits conducted between the EU and Libya. After the Gaddafi regime fell the EU got very quickly involved. The EU was one of the first ones to be present firstly in Benghazi later in Tripoli. The EU started development assistance and tried to intervene in variety of sectors. The EU set up seven or eight different projects but Libya went into a different direction. Since the fall of Gaddafi every stage of development got worse and worse. Deteriorating security situation caused many people to leave the country. The militias got much more powerful than what they were during the fight against Gaddafi. So the scope for international partners to really intervene 7.5.5 358 Council of the EU. (22 Sept. 2011). EU implements latest UN decisions in support of Libya, 14461/11 PRESSE 317 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124700.pdf, (accessed 10 March 2013). 359 EU.(1 Sept. 2011). Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the lifting of the EU's asset freeze on several Libyan entities, (Press Release). http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/ 124486.pdf, (accessed 10 June 2011). 360 European Council. Responding to the Challenge of Stabilization in Post-conflict Libya http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ 124491.pdf, (accessed 24 April 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 180 not in the military conflict but rather to help constructive development was reduced. Under these conditions the EU basically concentrated on supporting the UN process.361 Due to this shaky security situation %30 of projects were suspended. (See Table 16) Within this line when President Barosso met with Dr Mahmoud Jibril, Chairman of the Executive Board of the NTC, on July 13, 2011 he promised EU support in the areas of free and fair elections, development of an effective administration, civil society as well as security sector reform and sound economic policies. Mr Füle and Dr Mahmud Jibril also met on 14 July 2011 for an assessment of the current situation in Libya. Mr Füle also made an emphasis on European support for Libyan civil society including human rights defenders, youth, women, local authorities and media at this meeting. He expressed EU’s readiness also to contribute to Libya’s long term plans.362 The EU had lots of cooperation programs in Libya. (See Table 16) 80% of EU activities and initiatives basically were to support the civil society, support the institutions, which are important in bringing the transition process forward, like the parliament, the electoral commission and the constitutional drafting assembly. Everything basically had to be done from scratch because unlike Tunisia there were no state institutions in Libya.363 The EU had been successful in supporting civil society and achieved tangible things on the ground. The EU created many centers at Tripoli, Benghazi, Sabha, Misrata where the civil society could meet and get organized.364 One of the many documents which stated that civil society in Libya would be supported was European Commission’s press release dated August 24, 2011. The EU addressed many areas where the EU had expertise along with the issue of civil society. The EU would give training and technical assistance to personnel in civil society organizations and local authorities provide urgent needs like blood safety in the areas of civil society and health. 361 Int. No:12. 362 EC. (14 July 2011). Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle following his meeting with Dr Mahmoud Jibril, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Libyan Transitional National Council, MEMO/11/509 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-509_en.htm, (accessed 7 June 2013). 363 Int No:2. 364 Int No:2. 7.5 Value Projection 181 The EU also addressed issues relating to migrants and would re-activate projects like Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration for Stranded Migrants. This helped evacuating people from Tripoli and in reintegrating migrants to their countries of origin. It was announced that ECHO would concentrate on healthcare after the dramatic clashes in Libya. This included the donation of war surgery and assistance to hospitals and determining ways for return of civilians. European Commission also provided €10 million for delivery of relief like medical supplies all vulnerable people in a cooperative framework with the International Committee of the Red Cross, UN agencies and NGOs to increase the effectiveness of aid delivery.365 In a memo released by the European Commission on October 20, 2011 it was declared that the EU made €25 million available for especially reactivating suspended programs on migration and security along with building up state institutions, strengthening civil society and providing health support. The civil society program offered the establishment of civil society resource centers, capacity building for civil society organizations (for example, through training in advocacy and fundraising), and support to local authorities and civil society on joint local development plans and the establishment of exchanges between Libyan and European/regional civil society organizations.366 It was foreseen that the EU had left a budget of €60 million for capacity building, social and economic development. 367 In the transition period of Libya the EU helped to build up their institutions to have a more transparent more democratic state.368Generally speaking what the EU was doing was mainly state/institution building after Gaddafi. 365 EC.(24 August 2011) Libya: EU geared up for the humanitarian challenge, (Press Release) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-983_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 27 July 2015). 366 EC. (15 December 2011). EU helps to further stabilize Libya through support for education, administration and civil society, IP/11/1555, http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-11-1555_en.htm, (accessed 15 March 2013). 367 EC. (20 October 2011). EU support to Libya, MEMO/11/722 http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-722_en.htm, (accessed 24 April 2013). 368 Int. No: 5. 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 182 Ta bl e 16 : E U ’s Jo in t P ro je ct s i n Li by a Se ct or Im pl em en tin g Pa rt ne r Pr oj ec t T itl e A m ou nt St at us C iv il So ci et y W W F En ab lin g Li by an N G O s t o sh ap e th e fu tu re o f t he n ew Li by an D em oc ra cy € 34 3. 44 2 Su sp en de d C iv il So ci et y A C TE D Su pp or t t o th e em er ge nc e an d de ve lo pm en t o f c iv il so ci et y an d lo ca l g ov er na nc e in L ib ya - PH A SE II € 2. 24 0. 00 0 O ng oi ng C iv il So ci et y /W om en G C I D as to or (C on st itu tio n) € 39 9. 98 6 O ng oi ng € 2. 98 3. 42 8 El ec tio ns U N D P Eu ro pe an U ni on S up po rt to th e Li by a El ec to ra l A ss is ta nc e Pr oj ec t ( LE A P) € 2. 00 0. 00 0 O ng oi ng C ul tu re 1 LI B YA C in em a - L M A € 25 0. 00 0 Su sp en de d Ec on om ic g ro w th A D ET EF Su pp or t t o lib ya fo r E co no m ic In te gr at io n, D iv er si fic atio n an d Su st ai na bl e Em pl oy m en t € 7. 60 0. 00 0 Su sp en de d Ed uc at io n B rit is h C ou nc il Te ch ni ca l a nd V oc at io na l E du ca tio n an d Tr ai ni ng (T V ET ) D el iv er y an d D ev el op m en t € 6. 50 0. 00 0 Su sp en de d H ea lth EU N ID A /G IZ Li by a H ea lth S ys te m s S tre ng th en in g (L H SS ) P ro gr am m e € 8. 49 9. 90 0 O ng oi ng Pr ot ec tio n IC R C Pr ot ec tio n of P eo pl e de pr iv ed o f f re ed om in L ib ya € 2. 00 0. 00 0 O ng oi ng Pr ot ec tio n IF R C M en ta l h ea lth , p sy ch os oc ia l r eh ab ili ta tio n an d so ci oec ono m ic in te gr at io n fo r v ul ne ra bl e an d at -r is k gr ou ps in Li by a € 2. 90 0. 00 0 O ng oi ng H um an R ig ht s TB D Pr ot ec tio n an d su pp or t o f H um an R ig ht D ef en de rs a nd vi ct im s o f H R v io la tio ns € 1. 00 0. 00 0 U nd er p re pa ra tio n 7.5 Value Projection 183 Se ct or Im pl em en tin g Pa rt ne r Pr oj ec t T itl e A m ou nt St at us € 5. 90 0. 00 0 In si tu tio na l g ov er na nc e C ro w n A ge nt s Su pp or t t o th e de m oc ra tic tr an si tio n at n at io na l a nd lo ca l le ve l - P A F Fa ci lit y Li by a ph as e II € 3. 00 0. 00 0 U nd er p re pa ra tio n In si tu tio na l g ov er na nc e W or ld B an k Su pp or t t o Pu bl ic F in an ce M an ag em en t ( PF M ) € 2. 00 0. 00 0 U nd er p re pa ra tio n € 5. 00 0. 00 0 Lo ca l g ov er na nc e A C TE D Lo ca l p ar tn er sh ip s a nd in te rn at io na l c oo pe ra tio n fo r i m pr ov ed lo ca l g ov er na nc e an d so ci al d ia lo gu e in B en gh az i M un ic ip al ity € 39 6. 00 0 In p ro ce ss o f r eac tiv at io n/ re vi si on Lo ca l g ov er na nc e V N G Su pp or t t o th e de m oc ra tic tr an si tio n at n at io na l a nd lo ca l le ve l - Li by a lo ca l G ov er na nc e an d A cc ou nt ab ili ty pr oj ec t € 3. 00 0. 00 0 U nd er p re pa ra tio n € 3. 39 6. 00 0 M ed ia D W M ed ia in L ib ya - St ab ili ty th ro ug h St ru ct ur e € 2. 77 4. 37 3 O ng oi ng M ig ra tio n (D EV C O ) M oI It al y Sa ha ra -M ED - Pr ev en tio n an d M an ag em en t o f I rr eg ul ar M ig ra tio n Fl ow s € 10 .0 00 .0 00 In p ro ce ss o f r eac tiv . / re vi si on M ig ra tio n IO M St ab ili si ng a t R is k C om m un iti es a nd E nh an ci ng M ig ra tio n M an ag em en t i n Eg yp t, Tu ni si a an d Li by a € 9. 90 0. 00 0 O ng oi ng M ig ra tio n (D EV C O ) M oI S pa in (G ua rd ia C iv il) Se aH or se p ro gr am m e: M ed ite rr an ea n N et w or k € 4. 50 0. 00 0 O ng oi ng M ig ra tio n IC M PD Su pp or t t o rig ht -b as ed m ig ra tio n m an ag em en t i n Li by a (C om po ne nt 1 ) € 3. 00 4. 46 3 Su sp en de d M ig ra tio n IF R C Su pp or t t o rig ht -b as ed m ig ra tio n m an ag em en t i n Li by a (C om po ne nt s 2 a nd 3 ) € 6. 25 1. 21 8 O ng oi ng 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 184 Se ct or Im pl em en tin g Pa rt ne r Pr oj ec t T itl e A m ou nt St at us € 33 .6 55 .6 81 R ec on ci lia tio n (F PI ) H D C Su pp or t t o C on fli ct M ed ia tio n in L ib ya € 1. 69 9. 79 3 O ng oi ng SS R -J us tic e IM G St re ng th en in g D em oc ra cy , G oo d G ov er na nc e an d C iv ilia n C ul tu re in th e Se cu rit y an d Ju st ic e Se ct or s € 10 .0 00 .0 00 Su sp en de d Se cu rit y (F PI ) SA S B ui ld in g C ap ac iti es fo r S ec ur ity G ov er na nc e an d C om m un ity S af et y in L ib ya € 2. 39 1. 20 3 Su sp en de d Se cu rit yde m in in g (F PI ) D R C C om m un ity S af et y an d H um an ita ria n M in e A ct io n in Li by a € 2. 08 8. 61 1 O ng oi ng Se cu rit yde m in in g (F PI ) D C A Se cu rit y, S ta bi liz at io n an d D ev el op m en t p ro gr am m e, Li by a € 2. 17 6. 53 9 O ng oi ng € 6. 65 6. 35 3 G ra nd T ot al € 96 .9 15 .5 28 To ta l S us pe nd ed € 30 .0 89 .1 08 To ta l O ng oi ng /U nd er re ac tiv at io n € 57 .8 26 .4 20 To ta l u nd er p re pa ra tio n € 9. 00 0. 00 0 G ra nd to ta l € 96 .9 15 .5 28 So ur ce : D at a re ce iv ed fr om th e O ffi ce o f D ire ct or at e G en er al e N ei gh bo rh oo d an d En la rg em en t N eg ot ia tio ns N EA R .B .1 G eo gr ap hi ca l C oor di na tio n N ei gh bo ur ho od S ou th 7.5 Value Projection 185 The EU also helped authorities organize elections in Libya by sending an Election Assessment Team. The EU Election Assessment Team (EAT) was responsible for covering parliamentary elections which have been conducted successfully.369 Regarding security sector reforms EU Instrument for Stability in cooperation with INTERPOL launched a €2.2 million project to improve Libyan border security. In this context a real-time passport control capacity at Tripoli International Airport would be established. This tangible step towards helping in Libya’s security sector reform had three components which were reinforcement of the Libyan INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) and its network, reinforcement of the criminal analysis capacity of the Criminal Investigation Department within the Ministry of the Interior and a strategic study of the transnational organized crime and terrorist threats in Libya. This project received full support from the Libyan government and was planned to be launched by June 2013.370 President Barosso following his meeting with PM Zeidan said that the EU has been supporting the Libyan people in their transition to democracy over the last two years. They would continue to assist Libya in consolidating the rule of law, judicial system and stability as they see Libya as an important partner in the neighborhood.371 Mr Rompuy after his meeting with Prime Minister Ali Zeidan emphasized the implementation of a constitutional calendar to promote the rule of law and human rights as well as strengthening the government and the Parliament. He also stressed the necessity of secure borders to establish stability and peace. In addition to the donations of 2011 explained above the EU would provide at least an additional €68 million over 2012-2013 for additional sectors like security, technical and vocational education and training, economic development, migration and further support to civil society. Regarding security, which again dominated the 2013 agenda, the EU prepared to deploy a civilian CSDP border management mission to Libya. The EU was 369 EC. (8 Feb. 2013). EU's response to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years. MEMO/13/81, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm, (accessed 8 October 2013). 370 EC. (6 March 2013). EU-Interpol Projekt zur Unterstützung der Grenzsicherheit in Libyen. IP/13/205, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-205_de.htm, (accessed 8 October 2013). 371 EC. (27 May 2013). Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Mr Ali Zeidan, Prime Minister of Libya. SPEECH/13/463, http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-13-463_en.htm, (accessed 8 October 2013). 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 186 seeking to conclude a long term agreement with the new Libyan authorities in order to provide a framework for developing dialogue and cooperation. In January 2013, Libya, in return, announced its intention to join the Union for the Mediterranean as an observer. Mr Füle explained on December 20, 2012 that the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) approved three programs worth 25 million euros in technical and vocational education and training, which would focus on unemployed young people and would contribute to the integration of ex-fighters while fostering economic recovery, strengthening Libya health system, strengthening democracy, good governance and civilian culture in the security and justice sectors. He added that the stabilization of Libya was a key to allow democratic transition to take place according to the expectations of the Libyan people.372As of November 2013, the EU announced another package worth €15 million financed from the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for “Support to Libya for Economic Integration, Diversification and Sustainable Employment” (€10 million) and “Protection of vulnerable people in Libya” (€5 million). The country’s business world, which is mainly filled with oil sector, is expected to be diversified. Eventually Libya’s integration with regional trade networks and deeper trade ties with the EU would contribute to social and economic development. 372 EC. (20 Dec. 2012). `EU-Libya: supporting transition and reforms in key sectors` IP/12/1431 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1431_en.htm, (accessed 7 June 2013). 7.5 Value Projection 187 Table 17: Main Features: Value Projection Value Projection: 22 May 2011 Opening of EU’s Benghazi Office-November 2013 ENPI Program for Protection of Vulnerable People Discourses: EU support for emergence of a new, stable, prosperous, sovereign and democratic state EU support in the areas of health, education, civil society and institution building Improving justice, the rule of law, human rights Technical assistance to personnel in civil society and local authorities Condemning human rights violations UNSCR 1973 legal basis for protecting civilians Working in cooperation with other international partners Secure borders to establish stability and peace Actions: 28 February 2011 Restrictive measures adopted (arms embargo, travel ban, frozen financial assets) 23 March 2011 Further restrictive measures based on UNSCR 1973 29 March 2011 Announcement to establish an international contact group to democratic transition Participation in Libya Contact Group Meetings 1 April 2011 Humanitarian assistance and civil protection operations in Libya 12 April 2011 Call to an immediate ceasefire and overthrowing the regime May 2011 EU Office opened in Benghazi and Tripoli for coordination of assistance 7 June 2011 Extension of assets freeze to six Libyan port authorities June-Nov. 2011 Unfreezing assets and delisting entities 20 October 2011 Re-activating suspended programs on capacity building, civil society, health, migration and security November 2011 Humanitarian Aid worth 154 ml 15 December 2011 Funding for public administration capacity building, an education program and a civil society program worth 10 ml 20 December 2012 ENPI program for strengthening health system and democracy, good governance and civilian culture in security and justice sectors 8 February 2013 Sending Election Assessment Team (EAT) to Libya November 2013 ENPI program for protection of vulnerable people worth 5ml Donation for education and civil society (in addition to economic development, security and migration) worth 68ml for 2012-2013 7. Assessment of Interests and Actions of the EU in Libya 188 Content Analysis: Democracy (66) Human rights (54) Anti-discrimination (39) Liberty (35) Rule of law (36) Free elections (3) Free Media (1) Interviews: EU’s role based on institution building and support for civil society until 2014 EU’s transfer of not only money but also values Variety of projects in health and education suspended in the post war period No association agreement with Libya and not much cooperation with Libya No clear agenda on Libya Member states going through a process of increasing disengagement in Libya `The jury is out´ in Libya Mode of Policy Behavior: Strongly Normative 7.5 Value Projection 189 Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya Decision Making Processes Leading to the Military Intervention in Libya The aim of this part is to analyze the decision making processes of member states and the motivations behind the decisions on the Libyan crisis and particularly military intervention. How leaders have assessed their interests and what kind of policies they have implemented are seeked through official declarations on government websites and their statements on press releases. Eventual goal is to see if member state policies match EU policies on Libya and to see whether they enable or constrain EU policies. France gave the strongest support for military intervention in Libya among the member states. France launched the first air strikes on Libya along with the UK and US. The National Transitional Council, representing the Libyan opposition, was firstly recognized by France. Paris was also an initiator of Libya Contact Group. There wasn’t a common position of the EU towards Libya at the time when French President Sarkozy was determined to intervene in Libya. Even the French foreign minister Juppe told Le Monde: “The CFSP of Europe? It is dead.”373On the eve of the emergency summit of European leaders UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Sarkozy wrote a letter to the European Council President Herman van Rumpoy and to the other 25 EU leaders in an attempt to convince them for a possible no fly zone in Libya. The letter also condemned the Libyan authorities’ attacks on civilians.374 But the next day on March 11, 2011 Sarkozy and Cameron failed to convince the European Council to endorse a no fly zone at the emergen- 8. 8.1 373 Ash, T. G. (24 March 2011). France plays hawk, Germany demurs. Libya has exposed Europe's fault lines., The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/24/france-hawk-germany-demurs-libya-europe, (accessed 3 September 2014). 374 Bloxham, A. (11 March 2011). Cameron and Sarkozy urge EU allies to be ready for 'all contingencies'). Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 190 cy summit on Libya in Brussels. The Council was divided and the two leaders failed to win explicit support to enforce a no-fly zone and launch a CSDP mission.375Despite this failure, on March 15, France, Lebanon and the Arab League circulated a draft resolution for a no-fly zone.376 The next thing Sarkozy did was to host the Paris Summit to discuss the Libyan crisis. There he announced the military intervention against Gaddafi forces with other partners. He explained that they were intervening under a mandate of the UNSCR with particularly Arab partners. To enforce the UN Resolution on Libya the UK and France provided jets to deploy air-strikes on Gaddafi's ground forces and secure the no-fly zone in Libyan skies. He underlined the need for protecting civilians and that the Gaddafi regime had lost legitimacy.377 On March 23, 2011, France, UK and the US agreed that NATO would take over the military command of all military operations. Sarkozy and Cameron, who were instrumental in passing the UN resolution that allowed NATO intervention, jointly held Paris Conference on September 1 to discuss the actions of the Libyans themselves. They both emphasized the necessity of NATO to protect the civilians. "We are determined to continue with NATO strikes for as long as Mr Gaddafi and his supporters represent a threat to Libya," said Mr Sarkozy. He also stressed the need for “reconciliation and tolerance”. He announced that $15bn of Libyan assets were unfrozen. The NTC, as the new face of Libya, together with the international community was about to move from chaos to reconstruction of Libya.378 africaandindianocean/libya/8375044/Cameron-and-Sarkozy-urge-EU-allies-tobe-ready-for-all-contingencies.html, (accessed 10 September 2014). 375 Traynor, I and Watt, N. (11 March 2011). Libya no-fly zone plan rejected by EU leaders. The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/libya-nofly-zone-plan-rejected, (accessed 10 September 2014). 376 Libya and Middle East unrest - (March 16, 2011). The Guardian http:// www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/mar/16/arab-and-middle-east-protestslibya, (accessed 7 September 2014). 377 Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People – Statement by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic. (22 March 2011).Embassy of France in Washington DC. http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article2241, (accessed 7 November 2014). 378 Paris conference urges Libya reconciliation. (1 September 2011). BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14744073, (accessed 3 November 2014). 8.1 Decision Making Processes Leading to the Military Intervention in Libya 191 When we look at the political decision making process of the UK we see that Cameron was acting with more caution than Sarkozy. Cameron initially was only condemning the Gaddafi actions against his own people. He said that Gaddafi’s violence to stay in power was "utterly unacceptable".379 He then applied more concrete and multilateral measures on Libya. It is possible that his talk with President Obama which was reported on February 25, 2011 had an impact on this change.380 In line with this perspective UK foreign secretary told that the UK was absolutely in line with the US over Libya for a possible no-fly zone.381 Cameron also said "We have got NATO. We've got the UN. We've got the Arab League. We have right on our side.”382 It was also clear that Cameron joined Sarkozy in establishing an alliance against Gaddafi when they sent a letter to the EU Council planning a no-fly zone. But HR/VP Ashton was cautious on this and warned that it would be `highly risky` and `could end up killing large numbers of civilians`.383 One factor behind Cameron’s independent policy from the EU was that Cameron, following the US policy on Libya and joining the NATO alliance over Libya wanted to keep UK’s special relationship with the US. As Wallace explains “The UK always wanted to have a special place within NATO with the positioning of British ships and troops and with its cooperation on nuclear and intelligence issues.” (Wallace 2007, p.57 in Loon 2012) Even the UK thought of itself as a `bridge between the EU and the US`. (Wallace & Phillips 2009, p. 278 in Loon 2012). 379 Libya: David Cameron and Barack Obama discuss how to depose Gaddafi. (25 February 2011). The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ africaandindianocean/libya/8346822/Libya-David-Cameron-and-Barack-Obamadiscuss-how-to-depose-Gaddafi.html, (accessed 3 November 2014). 380 Libya: David Cameron and Barack Obama discuss how to depose Gaddafi. (25 February 2011) The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ africaandindianocean/libya/8346822/Libya-David-Cameron-and-Barack-Obamadiscuss-how-to-depose-Gaddafi.html, (accessed 3 November 2014). 381 UK in line with US over Libya, says William Hague. (3 March 2011). BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12638015, (accessed 4 November 2014). 382 NATO Strike Hits near Gaddafi’s Compound. (16 June 2011) CBS News http:// www.cbsnews.com/news/nato-strike-hits-near-qaddafis-compound/, (accessed 5 November 2014). 383 Watt, Nicholas and Traynor, Ian. (March 11, 2011). Libya no-fly zone setback for David Cameron. The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/ libya-no-fly-zone-david-cameron, (accessed 3 November 2014). 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 192 According to the declaration of Downing Street the UK and France decided to increase pressure on the Gaddafi regime `militarily, politically and economically`. It was important for them that Gaddafi left the office in order for Libya to be peaceful and stable.384 The Libyan ambassador to the UK was expelled on May 1, 2011 after the British embassy in Tripoli was set on fire. It has been four months since Libyan rebels have been fighting against Gaddafi when David Cameron met Mustafa Abdul Jalil, chairman of the Interim National Transitional Council, in Downing Street. Cameron identified the National Transitional Council as "Britain's primary partner" in Libya. Mr Jalil in return thanked the British government for their `moral stand`.385 As opposed to Germany Libyan intervention found support among the public and this increased Cameron’s popularity for the next elections in 2015. (Lindström and Zetterlund, p.38) There was an apparent cooperation between France and Libya. This cooperation relied on a legal document: Defense Cooperation Treaty of 2010. With the purpose of backing up NATO and European Defense operations, this treaty foresaw that the UK and France, who hold the biggest defense budget in Europe, were supposed to keep solidarity on nuclear power elements, cooperate militarily and intervene in international crises on the basis of strategic partnership. These two countries acted together in the operation in Libya on behalf of this treaty. According to Mercan this treaty ensuring the necessary legal background explains why the UK and France jump forward in every military occasion in Europe. (Mercan, 2013) Germany conversely sharply opposed to the Libyan campaign in opposition to the US, the UK and France and took its position next to the the "Brics" – Brazil, Russia, India and China. Germany’s foreign minister Westerwelle said “We don't want to get involved in a civil war in North Africa”.386 384 Cameron and Sarkozy restate Libya 'determination'. (7 May 2011) BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13319473, (accessed 7 November 2014). 385 Cameron invites Libya rebels to open office in UK. (12 May 2011). BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-politics-13371152, (accessed 8 November 2014). 386 (30 March 2011) Libya conflict: reactions around the world. The Guardian retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/30/libya-conflict-reactions-world, access (15 September 2015). 8.1 Decision Making Processes Leading to the Military Intervention in Libya 193 Physical Security The UK and France participated very strongly in the military intervention and some other member states gave other assets like maritime support, humanitarian aid and diplomatic aid to the NTC. There was strong consensus in the principle of supporting the UN Security Council. Each member state participated in the global effort to protect the Libyan citizens against the threats from the regime according to their capacities and willingness to be less or more active.387 The French government armed rebels in June so that oil and gas pipelines would be safe. (Youngs 2014, p.177)One big reason why the UK and France both intervened strongly was because they had the biggest military capacity to intervene. There was no other country that had the same capacity as the UK and France in terms of force projection. Germany also had a big army but it didn’t project it outside and it didn’t have a tradition of foreign intervention. Others like Italy, Spain and Netherland had small armies. They could contribute with one ship or ten ships but it was basically the UK and France that could make a proper military contribution.388 French public also gave widespread support to the intervention in Libya. The last poll which was carried two days ago showed that 66% of those asked supported the military intervention. Political parties also agreed on the operation except the Parti Communiste.389 France also saw Libyan intervention as an opportunity to prove its importance as an international player in the EU as well as in NATO. Intervention in Libyan crisis, both in military and humanitarian terms, was a matter of prestige for France’s national and international status. (Jude, 2012) For some authors Libyan intervention was an opportunity for the UK to strengthen its relations with France and to counterbalance Germany in political, economic and military terms. (Jude 2012) Cameron justified his part in the intervention in Libyan crisis and in the brutal removal of Gaddafi by stressing the necessity of protecting Libyan civilian people under serious danger. He always said that “it was intolera- 8.2 387 Int. No:14. 388 Int. No:18. 389 Libya conflict: reactions around the world. (30 March 2011) The Guardian , http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/30/libya-conflict-reactions-world, access (15 September 2015). 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 194 ble to do nothing in the face of the threat of massacres in Libya”.390 UK’s motives behind increasing military commitments were more about moral values. Cameron approved the employment of the UK apache helicopters in Libya after BBC had revealed this news at the G8 Summit. A day later he repeated that the use of theUK Apache attack helicopters were another way of increasing the pressure. He said: "The most important thing is to send the same message down the pipe, as it were, every time one of these offers appears - which is... Gaddafi has to go.”391 All sorts of decisions regarding politics and economy would be taken after he has gone. It was the security issue that rose high on top of the British agenda though. Cameron told BBC Radio 4's "Today" program: "Gaddafi was a monster. He was responsible for appalling crimes, including crimes in this country, and I think the world will be much better off without him.”392 Accordingly when Gaddafi was killed he said “Prime Minister Jibril has confirmed that Colonel Gaddafi is dead. I think today is a day to remember all of Colonel Gaddafi's victims, from those who died in connection with the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, to Yvonne Fletcher in a London street, and obviously all the victims of IRA terrorism who died through their use of Libyan Semtex.”393 From a historical point of view Britain, remembering the Lockerbie attack,394 was seeing Gaddafi as a threat. As British politician Ken Clarke has also said Gaddafi was posing a risk and Britain had a real interest in intervening in Libya and deposing Gaddafi.395 UK’s military spending costed more than expected and this was criticized in the UK at a time 390 Robinson, N. (20 October 2011). The end of Cameron's first war? BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15390888, (accessed 20 August 2015). 391 Libya: Cameron supports increased pressure on Gaddafi. (27 May 2011) BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13576322, (accessed 19 August 2013). 392 PM: World better without Gaddafi. (2 September 2011). http://www.oxfordmail.co.uk/news/national/news/9229697.PM__World_better_without_Gaddafi/, (accessed 20 August 2013). 393 Colonel Gaddafi Dead: David Cameron Says He Is 'Proud Of UK's Role In Libya' (20 October 2011). Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ 2011/10/20/david-cameron-on-the-deat_n_1021851.html, (accessed 20 July 2013). 394 To read more on Lockerbie Bombing Greenspan, J. (Dec. 20, 2013) `Remembering the 1988 Lockerbie Bombing´ History http://www.history.com/news/remembering-the-1988-lockerbie-bombing, (accessed 28 December 2015). 395 Collins, Lucy.'Bombing Libya could provoke Lockerbie-style revenge attack on Britain', claims Ken Clarke. (26 March 2011). http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 8.2 Physical Security 195 when public expenditure faced harsh measures. At a press conference at the end of the G8 summit in France David Cameron responded to these criticisms pointing at security challenges. He said that he was proud for aid spending since this was necessary for blocking `terrorism, immigration and instability` coming from Europe’s southern border. He warned that failing to help Libya could cause `poisonous extremism` and `a wave of immigration`.396 The Prime Minister emphasized that failing to support countries at the forefront of the Arab Spring would give oxygen to extremists.397 As the UK was taking security threats coming from an instable Libya seriously a group of experts to further British interest in Libya was formed. There were experts ready to be deployed in Libya as soon as the fighting stops. For example the Stabilization Unit398 was directed with the mission to further British interest in post-conflict zones. British interests mean to ensure that Libya never becomes a threat to the UK security. The Foreign Office, Department for International Development (DfID) and the Ministry of Defense all contributed to this unit. A rapid response team determined three priority areas- food, water and electricity-in the first weeks of military action back in March. The five longer term priorities were an inclusive political settlement, basic service provision, infrastructure, ensuring security and the rule of law, restarting the economy though.399 As Robinson the political editor of BBC acknowledged Cameron always emphasized Britain's national interest in the removal of Gaddafi. These interests were more about security reminding people the role of Gaddafi in article-1370132/Bombing-Libya-provoke-Lockerbie-style-revenge-attack- Britain-claims-Ken-Clarke.html, (accessed 20 July 2013). 396 David Cameron dismisses aid criticism.(27 May 2011) The Independent http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/david-cameron-dismisses-aid-criticism-2289947.html, (accessed 18 July 2013). 397 PM dismisses foreign aid criticism. (27 May 2011). http://www.express.co.uk/ news/uk/249131/PM-dismisses-foreign-aid-criticism, (accessed 10 August 2015). 398 See this webpage for more information on Stabilization Unit. Stabilitation Unit, Libya http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/top-10-reads/geographic/libya, (accessed 20 August 2015). 399 Brant, R. (25 August 2011). Who are the UK civilians in Libya? BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-1466480, ( accessed 2 June 2013). 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 196 Lockerbie bombing, murder of PC Yvonne Fletcher400 and the supply of semtex explosives to the IRA.401 Germany’s Position on Military Intervention in Libya When the UNSCR voted to establish a "no-fly zone" over Libya on 17 March 2011 Germany didn’t support this measure and declined to be with its traditional allies of France and UK. Instead Germany sided with China and Russia by abstaining to vote for military intervention. There are many reasons for why Germany refrained from military action. The UK and France had in mind that they were colonial powers. So they had a different approach than Germany. German foreign policy didn’t foresee a military approach but more a political and economic approach on foreign affairs.402Edmund Ratka, an expert on Germany's foreign policy in the southern Mediterranean believes that "Germans don't know themselves what they want. We are in favor of Europe, but we don't want to pay for it. We are in favor of saving Benghazi, but we do not want to participate. And the current leadership of Germany is hesitant, and looks closely at public opinion. I cannot remember a German government that cared so much about public opinion." He adds: "We are a trading nation. We want to make and sell cars. That's all. We don't want to put our flag somewhere." 403Another reason for this decision was German public’s opposition to military involvement due to the country’s long lasting involvement in Afghanistan. The Afghan experience, which was considered by the German public opinion as `costly and questionable` explained Germany’s unwillingness to intervene in Libya. Surveys made among public to measure people’s opinion about using military means as a foreign policy instrument both in Afghanistan and Libya also proved weariness on this issue. West- 8.2.1 400 See this for more on the Murder of WPC Yvonne Fletcher http://news.bbc.co.uk/ onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/17/newsid_2488000/2488369.stm, (accessed 20 August 2015). 401 See this for Libya’s link to IRA Libya's 30-year link to the IRA. (7 September 2009) BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/8241393.stm, BBC News (accessed 20 August 2015). 402 Int. No: 10. 403 Germany's Libya policy reveals a nation in transition. (20 September 2011) DW http://www.dw.de/germanys-libya-policy-reveals-a-nation-in-transition/ a-15367751, (accessed 15 August 2015). 8.2 Physical Security 197 erwelle’s little foreign policy experience was shown as another factor in Germany’s loneliness among its traditional allies. (Lindström and Zetterlund, Oct. 2012, p.28) Germany also had doubts about the feasibility of military mission. (Lindström, p.29) For Ischinger, Germany could take part in the international peacekeeping missions while staying “status quo-orientated, conservative power, uncomfortable with its growing influence and military responsibilities – and the enhanced expectations of allies” but would avoid being part of shooting wars in the future.404 Besides public opinion Westerwelle’s clarification on the country’s strong opposition to air strikes or any military intervention was because of the unpredictable results both for the western nations and the freedom movements in the Arab world. The country could find itself in a long lasting civil war.405 He also explained that declining to vote for a no fly zone doesn’t mean inaction. Germany would continue to work in the EU and UN with political, economic, financial and humanitarian assistance. His talk in the German Bundestag on developments in Libya proved that their decision on military non-intervention was partly for not risking the lives of their soldiers considering also the experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan.406 Horrible Results of the War NATO intervention was justified on the basis that Gaddafi forces were about to commit a massacre in Behghazi. Moving from this claim David 8.2.2 404 See Wolfgang Ischinger, “Germany after Libya: Still a responsible power?” p.59. in Tomas Valasek (ed.), “All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO”, Centre for European Reform, (1 March 2012). http:// www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/ rp_089_km-6278.pdf, (accessed 12 August 2013). 405 Harding, L. (March 17, 2011). Germany won't send forces to Libya, foreign minister declares. The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/ germany-rules-out-libya-military, (accessed 10 August 2013). 406 Policy statement by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle in the German Bundestag on current developments in Libya (UN Resolution). (18 March 2011) http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/ 2011/110318_BM_Regierungserkl%C3%A4rung_Libyen.html, (accessed 10 August 2013). 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 198 Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy were authorized to use the necessary means to prevent this crime happening. On the other side the NTC put losses at 30,000 and wounded at 50,000 as a result of this intervention.407 Besides this horrible result the cities were ruined during the civil war. British forces were authorized to conduct aerial and naval missions in Libya in March to protect civilians from attack. Although the Prime Minister said that it was `necessary, legal and right`408 the horrible results of the war said the opposite. Colonel Burkhard of France also declined to comment on the strategic implications of the assistance, saying that “France was simply protecting civilians from harm, as mandated by the United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the intervention”.409 As Libya’s liberation and freedom from Gaddafi became more obvious one could see the horrible results of this war looking at the bigger picture. Human Rights Watch reported that there were 53 bodies executed with their hands tied in Sirte, the last stronghold of Gaddafi. Officials also reported that there was evidence of 500 people killed in the last days of NATO bombings. According to the Guardian’s news article “these massacre sites are only the latest of many such discoveries. Amnesty International has now produced compendious evidence of mass abduction and detention, beating and routine torture, killings and atrocities by the rebel militias Britain, France and the US have backed for the last eight months – supposedly to stop exactly those kinds of crimes being committed by the Gaddafi regime.”410 The UN Security Council resolutions never aimed to destroy the regime. From this perspective British and French moves to employ air strikes and sometimes to kill civilians were illegal and were considered as exceeding the directive. Russian foreign minister said “The UN Security Council never aimed to topple the Libyan regime” and “All those who are currently using the UN resolution for that aim are violating the UN mandate”. In support to this the Libyan opposition leader Mustafa Abdul-Jalil 407 Ibid. 408 David Cameron says Libyan regime is 'falling apart'. (22 August 2011).BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14610508, (accessed 14 June 2013). 409 Jolly D. and Fahim K. (29 June 2011) France Says It Gave Arms to the Rebels in Libya. NY Times http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/world/europe/ 30france.html?_r=1&, (accessed 14 June 2013). 410 If the Libyan war was about saving lives, it was a catastrophic failure. (26 October 2011) The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 2011/oct/26/libya-war-saving-lives-catastrophic-failure, (accessed 14 June 2013). 8.2 Physical Security 199 said “The Libyan opposition is not looking to other nations to remove Gaddafi. We are not looking or inviting anybody to kill him, and we don't have such a possibility, but we hope he and his regime can leave Libya as soon as possible.”411 Europe in the Face of Migratory Demands European governments were divided over their responses to the migratory demand from North Africa. Some prioritized security and defense aspects and some favored cooperation based approach for migration for working with North African and Middle Eastern countries. The UK, France and Germany were more on the side of not relaxing immigration policies because of economic crisis, fear of terrorism and anti-immigrant parties. Libya was an open state for all kinds of migratory pressures as it had no functioning statehood.412 Most of the power in migration issues was with member states. This was also apparent in the debates on the distribution of refugees. Normally any member state that has signed the Geneva Convention has to grant asylum to the asylum seeker or the refugee after his dossier is screened by the High Commission for Refugees for eligibility.413 Data, however, showed that member states were accepting very little percentage of the whole number of asylum requests. Germany received 187 asylum applications in 2011 and only one of them was granted the status of asylum. Again in 2012 Germany received 152 requests and 358 in 2013.Six of these 152 people were admitted as refugees and none was accepted in 2013.(See Table 18) The UK’s position on migration was that the UK decided resettlement schemes at the national level and didn’t sign up to a compulsory EU quota. They believed that they could make the greatest contribution by focusing their assistance on the most vulnerable people rather than subscribing to a quota scheme. They viewed that relocation of refugees within the EU was wrong. Instead the UK set its priority as to provide humanitarian aid to those most in need while they were in their country. They provided support to those countries facing particular 8.2.3 411 `Libya warns against UK military advisers` (20 April 2011).Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/04/20114204314499732.html, (accessed 15 June 2013). 412 Int. No: 12. 413 Int. no:2. 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 200 pressures and their focus would remain on helping the most vulnerable who remained in the region.414 Table 18: Decisions on Asylum Requests Decision on Asylum Requests Years Total Asyl. Appl. Asylum status (Art 16a and family asylum) Refugee protection (acc. § 60 I A.gesetz) Readmission (acc. § 60 II, III, V, VII Aufent.gesetz ) Total number of protection Rejection Other Total 2011 187 1 2 - 3 4 43 50 2012 152 6 1 3 10 - 40 50 2013 358 - 2 14 16 68 50 134 Source: Internal Document from Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge Table 19: EU Cooperation with Libya Programme Implementing agency Amount (mill. €) Duration (months) Start Date Support to Libyan Government Public Administration Capacity Building Facility Libya The International Management Group - IMG 4,5 24 January 2012 Better Quality Education and increased inclusiveness for all children. UNICEF 2,4 24 May 2012 Revitalisation, Regeneration and Strengthening of Rehabilitation Services for People with Disabilities in Libya International Medical Corps UK (IMC) 2 30 March/April 2012 Libyan-EU Partnership for Infectious Disease Control Belgian Red Cross 3,9 42 23/10/2009 Support to Civil Society in Libya (institutional side) The European Network of Implementing Development Agencies (EUNIDA)/ Crown Agents 3 24 22/12/2011 414 Official explanation from Direct Communications Unit, Home Office, UK. 8.2 Physical Security 201 Programme Implementing agency Amount (mill. €) Duration (months) Start Date Libya Health Systems Strengthening (LHSS) Programme The European Network of Implementing Development Agencies (EUNIDA)/ Crown Agents / GIZ 8.5 48 January 2013 Technical and vocational education and training (TVET) delivery and development British Council 6.5 36 January 2013 Strengthening Democracy, good Governance and civilian culture in the security and justice sectors The International Management Group - IMG 10 48 January 2013 Enhancing Local Risk Detection and Crime Investigation Capability INTERPOL 2.2 18 September 2012 Support to Libyan Civil Society Initial Capacity Building programme for emerging institutions and civil society in Libya Common Purpose Charitable Trust 2 20 24/06/2011 Civil Initiatives Libya Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development - ACTED 3,1 24 January 2012 All inclusive Libyan Dialogue in the future The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 1,7 15 January 2012 Stabilizing at-risk communities and enhancing migration management to enable smooth transitions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya International Organization for Migration (IOM) 9,9 36 January 2012 Support to torture victims and victims of enforced disappearance in post-Gaddafi Libya and advocate for an effective protection from torture International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT) and World Organisation against torture (OMCT) 1,499 24 February 2012 Protection and promotion of the freedom of information in Libya Reporters without borders 0.47 18 April 2012 Won for Libya Women Organizations’network towards building a new Libya and European Centre 0,356 10 March 2012 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 202 Programme Implementing agency Amount (mill. €) Duration (months) Start Date for Electoral Support (ECES) Supporting Democracy in Libya European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) (in consortium with IDEA, Club of Madrid,European Partnership for Democracy - EPD, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy - NIMD) 1.6 12 May 2012 Libyablog Radio France international 0.34 18 June 2012 Enhancing human rights based reforms in Libyan detention system Intercultural Institute of Timisoara 0.235 12 July 2012 Libya meets Europe Italian Cultural Institute 0.17335 12 January 2013 Libyan Street Theatre Workshops British Council 0.15 12 January 2013 Asylum and Migration in Libya Danish Refugees Council 1.44 18 Nov 2012 Security, Protection and Stabilization Program in Libya” (Protection and Demining Activities) Folkekirkens Nodhjaelp Fond 5 18 September 2012 Libyan Protection Governance Initiative (LPGI) Mercy Corps 2.231917 18 July 2012 Source: EUROPEAID Libya Economic Prosperity: Previous Economic Relations under Gaddafi vs the Current Business Deals Libya is the holder of Africa’s largest proven oil reserves and European energy companies would want to make use of this rich resource of oil 8.3 8.3 Economic Prosperity 203 since 85% of Libyan oil is exported to European countries.415 Solely Italy relies on the country for 10% of its natural gas and 12% of its oil requirements.416 Close strategic relationship between the UK and France had certain pragmatic bases also in the area of economics. They had privileges in Libya that the oil companies of Shell, BP, Eni and Total would go on with their existing contracts. (Mercan, 2013) In case of a war with Libya these countries would be largely affected. In opposition to the UK France had much smaller interest in Libya but perhaps France was hoping for more.417 The UK also held Libya’s frozen money worth 20 billion pounds418 following NATO operations. Obviously the UK would also have a big share in the oil and arms market and accordingly they had negotiation and enforcement power over the newly emerging Libya419. Bilateral investment between the two countries reached an important level. (Youngs 2014, p.194) British Prime Minister was one of the leading figures in advocating a strong response to the conflict in Libya and the UN resolutions. He defended the NATO -led operation and leading role of the UK in it. He also said that Libyan intervention was in the country’s “national interest”.420 The UK and Libya had beneficial economic relations before the revolution as well. It was the year 2003 when Muammar Gaddafi agreed to end the weapons of mass destruction and European energy firms moved quickly to invest in energy sector in Libya in addition to the lucrative deals in the arms and construction deals.421 British PM of that time, Tony Blair had undertaken the mediation role between English and American petroleum 415 World Leaders Seek to Coordinate Libya Crisis Response. (25 February 2011). Retrieved from http://www.ihs.com/products/global-insight/industry-economicreport.aspx?id=1065929081.. 416 Ibid. World Leaders Seek to Coordinate Libya Crisis Response, (accessed 8 November 2014). 417 Int. No:18. 418 Gaddafi assets, worth 20 million pounds, frozen in UK. (28 February 2011). http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/gaddafi-assets-worth-20-million-poundsfrozen-in-uk-88342, (accessed 3 November 2014). 419 Kankaları Kaddafi'nin ölümünü selamlıyor!, 21 October 2011) Demokrat Haber http://www.demokrathaber.net/dunya/kankalari-kaddafinin-olumunu-selamliyorh4468.html, (accessed 2 June 2013). 420 Brenton, H. (18 March 2011)Cameron: Libyan action in 'national interest', http:// www.politics.co.uk/news/2011/3/18/cameron-libyan-action-in-national-interest, (accessed 2 June 2013). 421 Europe's interests in Libya (21 February 2011) 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 204 companies between 2004 and 2006.422 Blair arrived in Libya and welcomed the improved relations as oil companies from both countries signed a major deal. In 2009 British Petroleum (BP) made a 900 million dollar exploration deal with Libya. This was the most comprehensive petroleum seeking agreement in BP history.423 France also had pragmatic and controversial ties to Libya. After Gaddafi’s visit in December 2007 considerable economic relations with Paris were strengthened. A bedouin-style tent in central Paris became the symbol of this visit and by the time Gaddafi returned home numerous contracts, most notably the endorsement of a contract worth € 10 billion were announced by Sarkozy including an atomic energy plant for Libya, a desalination plant, and 21 Airbus planes.424 Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam claimed that Gaddafi had even sponsored Sarkozy’s Presidential Elections in 2007.425 In a reaction to the current events of 2011, France was the first country to recognize the NTC and the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé told RTL radio that “it would be fair and logical if the NTC preferably turns to those who helped the reconstruction of Libya.”426 This was the signal of the desire of France to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with Libya. France also shared profitable economic ties with Libya just like the UK did. France’s TOTAL has a major share in the Libyan oil market although it falls behind the shares of UK and Italy. France’s 10% of domestic oil production comes from Libya. Abdeljalil Mayouf, the NTC’s oil industry spokesperson, told the Reuters News Agency: ‘We don’t have a problem Al Jazeera http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/ 2011/02/2011221163030575441.html, (accessed 20 April 2013). 422 Ibid. Kankaları Kaddafi'nin ölümünü selamlıyor! 423 Ibid. Kankaları Kaddafi'nin ölümünü selamlıyor! 424 Wöss, C. and Stahl, D. (February 22, 2011). `France and Italy share strong ties with Libya's Gadhafi`. DW. http://www.dw.de/france-and-italy-share-strong-tieswith-libyas-gadhafi/a-14859155, (accessed 2 June 2013). 425 Samuel H. (12 March 2012) Nicolas Sarkozy 'received £42 million from Muammar Gaddafi for 2007 election' The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/nicolas-sarkozy/9139310/Nicolas-Sarkozy-received-42-million-from- Muammar-Gaddafi-for-2007-election.html, (accessed 19 August 2015). 426 Borger, J and Macalistar T. (September 2011) The race is on for Libya's oil, with Britain and France both staking a claim. The Guardian http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/01/libya-oil, (accessed 2 June 2013). 8.3 Economic Prosperity 205 with Western countries like Italians, French and UK companies`427. This meant that the NTC would continue with the further beneficial oil contracts of the countries who had given previous political support and France was one of those countries with Sarkozy’s open and persistent support. European oil companies’ shares increased suddenly early in September 2011 after Mayouf’s declaration though.428 France was the strongest advocator of NATO operation. This rebellion was a kind of opportunity for France since a friendly regime in Libya would boost French access to energy resources and guarantee energy cooperation policy. Libya is also very close to other oil resources in addition to its own oil resources. Libya has borders with several countries which are within France’s sphere of influence, including Algeria, Tunisia, Niger and Chad. Southern Chad is an entrance into the Darfur region of Sudan, which is also strategic for its wealth of oil.429 Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed extensions for a pair of exploration and production sharing agreements (EPSAs) with Spain's Repsol, France's Total, Austria's OMV and Norway's Saga Petroleum. This was counted as the continuation of old contracts under the new EPSA IV framework. These agreements were expected to increase Libya’s oil production and these deals would be mutually beneficial.430 Intervening in Libya with humanitarian causes would serve the interests of oil companies. Chossudovsky’s prediction is that the eventual goal in Libya was the transfer of the control and ownership of Libya’s oil wealth.431 One of the interested parts was Britain and for Najimdeen “military intervention on premise of humanitarianism is justified.”(Najimdeen, 2012, p.542) British Petroleum was already operating prior to the rebellion in Libya as well as France’s Total. Najimdeen gives the example of the relationship between multinational oil companies and the third world in explaining 427 Anderson, David. (September 15, 2011). `The Fight for Libya’s Oil` Retrieved from http://politicsinspires.org/the-fight-for-libyas-oil/, (accessed 2 June 2013). 428 Ibid. 429 Chossudovsky, C. (9 March 2011) `Operation Libya and the Battle for Oil: Redrawing the Map of Africa`, http://www.globalresearch.ca/operation-libya-andthe-battle-for-oil-redrawing-the-map-of-africa/23605, (accessed 2 June 2013). 430 European Oil Companies Extend Contracts in Libya(31 January 2011) Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/8294850/european-oil-companies-extend-contracts-in-libya-1.SBU.html, (accessed 2 June 2013). 431 Ibid, Operation in Libya.. 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 206 Libyan situation vis a vis Britain. Libya has large reserves of crude oil lacking the necessary technology and know-how to benefit this oil. With these deficiencies Libya starts with minus one in the face of multinational companies like BP which has uncontestable leverage in the energy sector. (Najimdeen, 2012) Looking from this perspective it is quite natural that Tony Blair, Britain's former prime minister, signed a so-called "Deal in the Desert" in March 2004,432 which paved the way for oil contracts worth billions, leading to a close relationship that has come under increasing criticism. A second matter of concern in the Western states’ relations with Libya is arms trade. The leading countries defending Libyan intervention are at the same time the leading countries in arms exportation. (See Table 20) Arms sales, between 2006 and 2010, have increased by 25% compared to previous four years. ¾ of these sales have been performed by USA, Russia, Germany, France and England.433 One estimate puts the value of French arms export licenses granted to Libya at 210 million euros in 2005-2009.434Next move of arms companies is expected to take part in the modernization of Libyan armed forces. France is the second biggest arms exporter to Libya with a total amount of 210.15m euros. France is followed by the UK with a total amount of exportation worth 119.35m as of 2009.435 European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) has set up its office in Tripoli and has sold civilian aircraft to Libya. The UK, additionally, licensed ammunition worth $6m to the country.436 432 Waterfield, B. (14 April 2011) Libya: Tony Blair defends 'deal in the desert' with Colonel Gaddafi. Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ africaandindianocean/libya/8449111/Libya-Tony-Blair-defends-deal-in-thedesert-with-Colonel-Gaddafi.html, (accessed 19 August 2015). 433 Karaismailoğlu, E. Ortadogu´da Yeni Bir Denklem mi?, http:// www.academia.edu/1281328/Orta_Doguda_Yeni_Bir_Denklem_Mi, (accessed 2 June 2013). 434 Rogers, S. `EU arms exports to Libya: who armed Gaddafi?` (1 March 2011). The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/eu-armsexports-libya, (accessed 7 June 2013). 435 Ibid., Rogers, S.. 436 Europe's interests in Libya (21 Feb. 2011).Al Jazeera http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/europe/2011/02/2011221163030575441.html, (accessed 20 November 2015). 8.3 Economic Prosperity 207 Table 20: EU arms exports to Libya (in million) Country Total 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total 72.19 59.03 108.8 250.78 343.73 834.54 Italy 14.97 56.72 93.22 111.8 276.7 France 12,88 36.75 17.66 112.32 30.54 210.15 UK 58.86 3,11 4,63 27,20 25.55 119.35 Germany 0.31 2,00 23.84 4,18 53.15 83.48 Malta 0.01 79.69 79.7 Source: The Guardian on http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/euarms-exports-libya, (accessed 1 December 2015) Table 21: Trade Volume between Libya and the Member States between 2010 and 2013 Country/ Year (Import) 2010 2011 2012 2013 Germany 3.103.022.000 € 1.988.403.000€ (-35.92%) 5.479.822.000€ (+175.59%) 4.654.713.000 € (-15.06%) France 64.073.096.000€ England 42.278.120.000€ Country/ Year (Export) 2010 2011 2012 2013 Germany 996.450.000€ 324.276.000€ (-67.46%) 694.404.000€ (+114.14%) 978.331.000€ (+40.89%) France 100.320.480.000 € England 75.641.744.000€ Source: http://ec.europa.eu/index_de.htm Value Projection Addressing the Humanitarian Needs and Rebuilding Libya The two popular leaders of Europe, Cameron and Sarkozy, arrived in Libya on September 15, 2011 and they were met with slogans: `Merci Sarkozy!` and `Thank you Britain!` They were the first leaders to visit 8.4 8.4.1 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 208 Libya since anti-Gaddafi forces took control of the capitol Tripoli and Gaddafi was overthrown. Speaking at the Liberty Square in Benghazi, Mr Cameron’s message was to find Gaddafi and bring him to justice and to stay in Libya until all civilians were protected. Mr Sarkozy on the other hand focused on “pursuing the last remnants of the Gaddafi regime, rather than focusing on economic deals or reconstruction contracts”.437 He underlined the values that Libyans needed by urging them not to "vengeance and retaliation" but to preserve “unity” and “seek reconciliation”.438Libyan public opinion on the other hand pointed to something different: Al Jazeera spoke to the Libyans on the street about the British and French leaders’ visit. They, in general, told that the UK and France have had interest in establishing good ties with Libya for Libyan oil and gas contracts as well as other economic gains.439 In his first speech at the UN General Assembly David Cameron stressed the necessity of seeing the Arab Spring as an `opportunity` to spread peace, prosperity, democracy and security although he said that his talk would be received as `business as usual` by the Western nations. He urged the UN to take action instead of condemnation.440 To see this intervention as a `business` meant that it was an opportunity for the Western world to advance their interests in North Africa. Ten days before this speech Cameron had said “If we had not acted, we would have been spending recent months not talking about the progress of our action in Libya but wringing our hands over the slaughter in Benghazi, as we did after Bosnia,”441 while speaking at the House of Commons. Normative intentions of the West are doubtful when one thinks of why the West has not intervened in the Bosnia Srebrenica genocide in 1992, as Mr Cameron himself explained. 437 Libya conflict: Cameron and Sarkozy visit Tripoli. (15 September 2011). BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-africa-14926308, (accessed 12 June 2013). 438 Ibid. Libya conflict. 439 ´Views from Tripoli on French and UK visit´(15 September 2011) Al Jazzeera http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/09/201191512581789990.html, (accessed 16 June 2015). 440 Seize opportunity of Arab Spring, Cameron urges UN. (22 September 2011) BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15025599, (accessed 16 June 2015). 441 UK diplomats re-establish 'full presence' in Libya. (5 September 2011). BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14795710, (accessed 10 August 2013). 8.4 Value Projection 209 It was inevitable that the humanitarian aid delivered by the West would stay in the shadow of the endless discussion of business interests vs normative values in the eye of the locals. Amid this discussion the UK and France delivered considerable humanitarian aid to ameliorate the situation in Libya. This kind of help was also necessary for them to project their repeated values of social solidarity, reconciliation and cooperation. In June France announced that they were ready to deliver 290 ml to the NTC particularly by unfreezing some assets held by French banks. The UK gave 16 ml to meet immediate humanitarian needs, providing funding for medical and food supplies, emergency shelter and assistance for evacuating poor and vulnerable migrants. Germany made available nearly 10 ml in humanitarian aid. (Youngs, 2014, p.166) ECHO published a fact sheet as of January 2012 reflecting the humanitarian aid conveyed by EU member states. (See Table 20) UK made the biggest donation worth 13,651euros after Sweden442. The Prime Minister invited the rebellious group to set up a formal office in the UK. He also said that he would support them by sending a special representative to Libya for helping the TNC improve the broadcasting capacity and also the UK presence in the country. He admired their braveness and struggle for freedom. 442 Sedghi, Ami and Sarah Marsh. Humanitarian aid in Libya: how much has each country donated?. (22 August 2011).The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/ news/datablog/2011/aug/22/libya-humanitarian-aid-by-country#data, (accessed 15 June 2015). 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 210 Table 22: Donations of Member States during the Libyan Crisis Donor Commitments Total (cash and in-kind) € In-kind Assistance (MIC/CECIS) Main items Austria 1.150.000 Health kits, kitchen sets Belgium 1.000.000 Plane for repatriation Bulgaria 139.650 Plane for repatriation Czech Republic 100.000 Denmark 4.844.690 Experts ECHO 70.000.000 Estonia 100.000 Finland 2.850.000 Blankets, tents, medical team France 2.942.584 Planes, vessels, medicines Germany 9.913.861 Planes, vessels, sanitation Greece 1.660.752 Hungary 51.200 Plane, experts Ireland 1.000.000 Blankets, tents Italy 4.001.971 Planes, tents Lithuania 14.481 Luxembourg 1.077.700 Expert Malta 430.949 Planes for repatriation Netherlands 2.500.000 Poland 277.032 Slovenia 50.000 Spain 6.606.794 Planes, medical post Sweden 15.861.391 Planes, tents, sanitation United Kingdom 13.651.934 Planes, vessels Total (before co-financing) 140.224.988 Co-financing requested by 8 participating states* 10.574.084 Transport co-financing requests European Union Total 150.799.072 Source: ECHO Libyan Crisis Factsheet The UK had already sent 1,000 sets of body armour, satellite telephones and humanitarian aid, including the funding the evacuation of 4,000 people from Misrata and providing 30 metric tonnes of medical and emergen- 8.4 Value Projection 211 cy food supplies to the town. Communications equipment, bullet-proof vests and uniforms have also been provided to the civilian police authorities. International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell also announced new UK support for the clearance of mines in Misrata, Benghazi and other affected areas to help ensure the safety of 200,000 people. France also contributed to the humanitarian efforts in Libya with 2,942.443 They gave mainly tents, planes and sanitation equipment. In September 2011 the British government sent a team to strengthen diplomatic ties with the new regime in Libya, support the NTC authorities to rebuild Libya and to communicate with international organizations to address humanitarian needs. Mr Cameron underlined the concept of ownership at the House of Commons "Of course there is a role for foreign advice, help and support. But we don't want to see an army of foreign consultants driving around in 4x4s giving the impression this is something done to the Libyans, rather than done by them."444 He also announced to deploy a UK military team to advise the NTC on security, return Libyan assets worth £600m to the interim authorities as soon as possible, make 50 places available in the UK specialist hospitals for critically ill Libyans and provide £600,000 for de-mining efforts and £60,000 to pay for a police communications system.445 In May 2012 the UK signed cooperation programs on civil society, open government, health and education and police and prisons reform. (Youngs 2014, p. 181) William Hague, the foreign secretary of the UK, and International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell also made a trip to Benghazi and held talks with the TNC's head Mustafa Abdul Jalil. Although the state owned Jana News Agency called the visit as `an interference with the internal affairs of a sovereign state` the visit was significant for it focused on Gaddafi’s leaving power and helping Libyans with humanitarian aid donations. The UK office in Benghazi was the second largest office in North Africa. Upon the discussion of the UK visit to Benghazi Mr Hague said “part of a co-ordinated and strategic approach to Libya - ensuring that our military, diplomatic and development actions are aligned”.446 A similar re- 443 Ibid., Sedghi. 444 UK diplomats re-establish 'full presence' in Libya. (5 September 2011). BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14795710, (accessed 10 August 2013). 445 Ibid.UK Diplomats.. 446 Libya: William Hague and rebels talk political roadmap. (4 June 2011). BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13655288, (accessed 1 July 2013). 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 212 action to British efforts came from Khaled Kaim, the Libyan deputy foreign minister, when William Hague announced that British military advisors were to join a group of British diplomats to contact and help the Libyan opposition. He said via the Associated Press News Agency on 20 April 2011 “This is not in the interest of the UK. This is an impossible mission. To organize who? They [the rebels] are different groups. There is no leader. They are not well-organized, and I am sure it will be a failure.”447The multi-national military intervention to Libya led rebellions to a victory on October 23, 2011. The National Transitional Council assumed the interim control of Libya. What It Means to Help Libya When we talk about value projection it is not only norms embedded in EU law and policies but values that are important domestically for member states also come into the circle of attention. It was a matter of prestige, a remembrance of historical memory, an opportunity to prove leadership both in the region and in the EU and NATO especially for France. France engagement in North Africa as a national foreign policy goal was at the same time a proof of strength from the perspective of domestic sovereignty. Sarkozy saw the crisis in the Arab world as a chance to gain voters. Sarkozy wanted to secure his position in the eyes of the 2012 voters by taking a highly risky but moral risk. (Lindström, 2012, p.21) He also addressed his North African migrant population by undertaking a mission like protecting Libyans from their dictator. This would be a source of pride for France. Sarkozy also sought to make France a leader in the region. For France, foreign policy of EU was primarily shaped by member states. Within these member states France had the leading role. Lehne thinks “EU’s foreign policy as a force multiplier of the French approach is an instrument to ensure a strong and visible leadership role in Europe.”448 Sarkozy’s personal- 8.4.2 447 `Libya warns against UK military advisers` (April 20, 2011). Al Jazeera http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/04/20114204314499732.html, (accessed June 2, 2013). 448 Lehne, S.( July 2012) The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy, Carnegie Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/eu_big_three1.pdf, p. 13, (accessed 2 June 2013). 8.4 Value Projection 213 ity and `being a man of action` should also be considered in France’s actions. (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012, p.22) As Hewitt, Europe editor of BBC, also says “President Sarkozy acted as a powerful head of a nation state, free to act in what he saw as his country's interest and that of the international community.”449 There was more at stake about French domestic politics. According to Stratfor’s Report Libyan intervention was an opportunity for France to demonstrate his military power. France in this way showed how he led Europe on foreign and military issues and how Europe needed French military power. Also France in alliance with Britain considered counterbalancing Germany’s economic and military power.450 In an attempt to help Libya in its transition phase France was the initiator of Libya Contact Group, which aimed to help Libya in its democratic transition. Alain Juppe, Foreign Minister of France, proposed a steering committee to unite foreign ministers of countries involved in Libya as well as the Arab League.451 It is fair to say French support for democratic transition in Libya is linked with France’s historical memory. For Najimdeen “the memory of the past is psychologically un-detachable, as the shadow of man cannot be avoided.” The point is that the French can´t forget their history with the North African colonies and Sarkozy wants to establish a new type of relationship like `partnership between equal nations.` (Najimdeen 2012, p. 542) With As part of ` Francofrique' policy Paris doesn’t hesitate to intervene in their domestic policies as in the cases of military actions in Ivory Coast in 2011 and Chad in 2008. (Bucher et. Al, 2013) Unlike Germany French intervention under NATO was well received by French public opinion. That the consensus and foreign policy ideals of France, as Helen Drake argues, “still enjoy rhetorical support from across the political spectrum in France, and are as uncontroversial as they are ambiguous and ambitious”. (Drake, 2011, 199) French presidents have a special place in the eyes of public as they are elected by the people of France. 449 Hewitt, G. (August 25, 2011). Will Sarkozy get a statue in Libya? BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14668335, (accessed 10 August 2013). 450 France, U.K. Have Differing Motives For Intervening In Libya. (29 March 2011) Forbes Magazine http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2011/03/29/franceu-k-have-differing-motives-for-intervening-in-libya/, (accessed 9 August 2013). 451 Viscusi, G. (22 March 2011). France’s Juppe Proposes Political Committee for Libya Mission. Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-22/frances-juppe-proposes-political-committee-for-libya-mission.html, (accessed 10 June 2013). 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 214 Similar motives are valid for the UK as well. The UK was less aggressive than France but the UK still was at the forefront of the coalition of intervention and humanitarian and civil aid donation. Calls for Supporting Libya at the G8 Summit David Cameron used the G8 Summit in France on May 26, 2011 as an opportunity to make a call to the G8 countries to donate for Libya in order to secure values of democracy and freedom. He asked them for financial contributions to help Libyans build their economies, trade and democracy and this would be something good for the West back at home. The UK would provide £40m to improve political participation, the rule of law and freedom of the press and a further £70m for economic reform, youth employment, anti-corruption measures and private sector investment. He was also expecting to push back the pressures of immigration with these measures.452 He stressed that there would be no compromise but the only option for Gaddafi was to give up power.453 This G8 meeting, hosted by France, also witnessed the threats of Sarkozy towards Gaddafi. “We are not saying that Gaddafi needs to be exiled. He must leave power and the quicker he does it, the greater his choice,” Mr Sarkozy told journalists. He added that if Gaddafi stepped down quickly there would be more `options` for him. Otherwise` the list of his possible destinations would be short. `454The final declaration of this summit pointed out that "Gaddafi and the Libyan government failed to fulfill their responsibility to protect the Libyan population and lost all legitimacy. He has no future in a free, democratic Libya. He must go."455 8.4.3 452 UK calls for G8 financial aid for 'Arab Spring'. (26 May 2011) BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13565532, (accessed 12 June 2013). 453 Wintour, P. and Willsher, K. (27 May 2011). G8 summit: Gaddafi isolated as Russia joins demand for Libyan leader to go. The Guardian http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/27/g8-gaddafi-libya-russia, (accessed 12 June 2013). 454 France’s Sarkozy offers Libya’s Gaddafi `Options`. (26 May 2011). http:// www.talkafrique.com/issues/frenchs-sarkozy-offers-libyas-gaddafi-options, (accessed 16 June 2013). 455 G8: Libya's Gaddafi 'should go', say world leaders. (27 May 2011). BBC http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13572830, (accessed 13 June 2013). 8.4 Value Projection 215 Germany’s Assistance in Libya’s Reconstruction Germany also worked on Libya to help the new authority build a new structure based on values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Chancellor Merkel said that Libya’s frozen one million euros out of seven billion should be used to rebuild the country and to contribute to humanitarian and civilian assistance. Merkel also offered Libya’s new National Transitional Council assistance for building police structures and for drawing up a new constitution speaking at the Paris meeting.456 Germany recognized Libyan rebels as the legitimate representatives of the Libyan people. Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said that Germany wanted a free, peaceful and democratic Libya. He added that they were not neutral when staying out of NATO-led operation but they were one of the first governments to say that Gaddafi must go. Germany was coming to reconciliation with his allies with this declaration.457 Westerwelle gave priority to the elements of the UNSCR 1973 tightening sanctions against the Gaddafi regime but not to the ones about military intervention. He spoke on behalf of the EU values that Germany was standing on the side of democratic principles and freedom and that they stood against dictators. He saw stepping up the pressure on the regime as an alternative to military action. Just like Westerwelle Merkel also made calls to the Gaddafi government to stop violence. Otherwise Germany would exert pressure on the regime via sanctions.458 He, at the Afrikaverein Dinner, explained that Federal Foreign Office had established a working group on medical assistance to Libya to promote better living conditions, stability and democracy. His wish, for their mutual interest, was to prevent fundamentalism spread with the cooperation of politics and business and German know-how. He declared Germany as the new partner of Libya. In this respect the Afrikaverein took 40 German businessmen to Libya and 8.4.4 456 International assistance for Libya. (2 Sept. 2011). http:// www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/EN/Archiv 17/Reiseberichte/frparis-2011-08-29.html;jsessionid=798B888C3A0923B0F88D502150508C3D.s2t1?nn=393830, (accessed 13 June 2013). 457 Germany recognizes Libya rebels as sole government. (13 June 2011). BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13753422, (accessed 13 June 2013). 458 Gaddafi speech very frightening, says Merkel. (22 February 2011). Reuters http:// www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/22/us-libya-germany-merkel-idUS- TRE71L6CV20110222, (accessed 13 June 2013). 8. Assessment of Interests and Actions of Member States in Libya 216 Minister of Economics, Dr Phillip Rösler, prepared a plan including the acceleration of the lifting of sanctions, humanitarian assistance worth 15 million euro, credit for the NTC worth 100 million euro for humanitarian and civil needs, reopening of German Embassy in Tripoli and taking care of Libyan students in Germany. Germany also took part in the Deauville Partnership. The Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition was launched by the G-8 countries in 2011 to support the countries in their transition in stabilization, job creation, participation/governance, and integration. Germany would support the NTC’s democratic vision.459 459 Statement by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle on the occasion of the Afrikaverein Libya Dinner (29 Sept. 2011). Federal Foreign Office http:// www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2011/110929- BM_Afrikaverein_Libya_Dinner.html, (16 June 2013). 8.4 Value Projection 217 Critical Discourse Analysis of the Articulation of the Political Identities of Member States and Libya The Construction of the Self `Europe` As elucidated above the UK and France were the two member states advocating and supporting military intervention in Libya. Although they didn’t get the support they expected from the EU they still gave the impression that they were not alone in this war. They built a leading and powerful role model in Europe and so proved their ability to influence events in Libya by saying “We have got NATO. We've got the UN. We've got the Arab League. We have right on our side”. They constructed their identity as being `multilateral actors` and `models of power`. But before this their first and foremost identity was being ´protector of civilians`. They reiterated that there was great `necessity of protecting civilians’, and ´they would stay in Libya until all civilians are protected`. Within their construction of the Self not only construction of the `normative identity´ but also a `rational identity` which pointed to the ‘strategic calculations of national interest´ was also included. Intervening under UNSCR Resolution to secure `democracy` and `freedom` was in the national interest of member states in opposition to `poisonous extremism`, `instability´ and a wave of immigration` at their doorstep. Member states of the UK and France also acted as the representatives of being a `norm-setter´ and `a supreme wisdom´. This was revealed through the speeches of leaders when they underlined the values of `unity`, `reconciliation´ and `tolerance` which they thought the Libyans needed. This `leadership role` of UK and France as representatives of EU values was articulated not only in the EU but also at wider international platforms like G8. In this respect they made a call to G8 countries to donate for Libya to secure values of `democracy` and ´freedom´. Their construction of the identity of the ‘self´ included `holder of absolute legitimacy´. For this reason they introduced conducting aerial and naval missions in Libya as `necessary, legal and right´. Keeping away from the war in Libya would be equal to watching the ‘slaughter´ and this would be ´intolerable´. 9. 9.1 218 Germany differed from the UK and France in its opposition to military intervention. Germany advocated stepping up pressure on the Gaddafi regime via sanctions as an alternative. Germany’s concern started more in the post-conflict scenario as Westerwelle often talked about providing better life conditions in Libya along with EU and UN. Germany like France and the UK still constructed a normative identity as it called Gaddafi as `a dictator against EU values’ but Germany also acted as a `representative of soft power´. The identity of the National Transitional Council, on the other hand, as the temporary representative of the post-Gaddafi Libya was constructed as part of the European Self and an `equal partner´ of Europe. Libyans seeking for EU values were close to the European normative identity and their governing authority the NTC was articulated as primary partners of member states. The Construction of the Other `Libya` As mentioned earlier the identity of the Libyan people and the NTC was part of the European Self whereas the identity of the ´Other´ belonged to the regime of Gaddafi and his advocators. This non-normative identity was constructed through the discourse of ´threat to Libya´, ´illegitimate´, ´violent´, ‘slaughterer`, and ´monster´. These adjectives constituted the articulation of an `irrational identity` as well. He was the main reason for dictatorship, violence, instability and stagnation. All the talk about spread of peace, prosperity, democracy and security could begin only after he went. Therefore all Western leaders strongly said: `Gaddafi must go!` 9.2 9.2 The Construction of the Other `Libya` 219 Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Tunisia: Discourses Matching Actions? EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security The EU faced migratory flows from North Africa with the outbreak of the protests, conflicts and revolutions of the Arab Spring. Although many young Tunisians wanted to leave the country after Ben Ali’s departure Tunisia is less a country of origin of migration than being a transit country of migration.460 Non-Tunisians, especially sub-Saharan Africans and Libyans exposed to the Libyan civil war are the two sources of migrants who used Tunisian shores as departure points. The EU remained impotent in the face of migratory flows and again the EU focused more on securing borders than protecting refugee rights. The EU also decreased the budget of Frontex in 2011 when the revolutions broke out and when migration level reached its peak point. At the time of Tunisian obligation to host Libyans in Shousha refugee camp because of the war in Libya the EU resettled only 700 refugees from Tunisian refugee camp despite the calls from Commissioner Malmström to support Tunisia EC’s regional protection program in North Africa. European countries also do not yet have offices in North Africa to offer asylum applications. This causes people to take very risky routes on leaky boats. Although mobility options are more important than migration in EU’s partnership with Tunisia interviewed analysts think that it was not so generous for Tunisians461 considering that it puts emphasis on border control (Collett, 2007) rather than offering much space for visa access. This is also linked with domestic concerns of member states such as the restrictive approaches of nationalistic parties and public and fear of terrorism. We see especially on the issue of migration, which is the EU’s biggest challenge in the Arab Spring, national interests trumping EU policies. EU’s concrete response to the demands for mobility was realized via only Erasmus Mundus Program which allowed students to access to the EU to 10. 10.1 460 Int. No:12. 461 Int. No: 13 and 23. 220 attend university exchange programs and get some scholarships for masters and doctoral programs and which was launched both in 2011 and 2013. EU leaders’ speeches on the other hand are identical with their actions. Their common expressions gathered around the ideas of sending illegal migrants back with no reservations despite the fact that human treatment of people sent back are in question, seeing emigration not as a solution to unemployment etc and increasing people to people contacts. Content analysis indicate that out of the three mentions of the word `migration` is linked with security twice and it is used to mean avoiding migration once. The word security has been mentioned for ten times and half of these is linked with economy meaning that security can only be maintained with offering job opportunities. Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security Tunisia received the biggest number of migrants escaping the Libyan War in 2011 in addition to its own people escaping the unrest and poor socioeconomic situation in the country. These circumstances and Tunisia’s closeness to Europe made it a main departure point for immigrants. Member states, in these conditions, prioritized protecting their borders and avoiding unwanted migration. This was apparent both in their speeches and actions. Member states pursued hard line anti-immigrant policy. They didn’t push the limits for accepting migrants, evaluating properly the requests of asylum seekers and resettling refugees. Their policy was more about avoiding migration, closing borders, sending migrants back and ignoring human rights by closing eyes to risky routes of escaping people. They didn’t act with humanitarian concerns and so diverged from EU norms. The assessment of Western leaders’ security interests was based on the idea that providing security and controlling migration in Tunisia also meant security and stability in Europe. Member state leaders’ speeches explain their anti-immigrant positioning due to a number of internal rational calculations consisting public opinion sentiments of conservative parties, fear of extremism and economic crisis. The effect of uncontrolled migration in Europe would be extremism. They highlighted their demands for a more coordinated European effort and they asked the EU to work more in 10.2 10.2 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security 221 countries of origin and transit countries to avoid migratory flows. Whereas the EU was asking for member states’ voluntary support, a long term migration policy strategy and for more cooperation with North African states. Conclusion EU strategy in the area of migration as part of its physical security is in conformity with member state strategies. There is an overlap between rhetoric and suboptimal migration policies that both are constructed to seek European security and to avoid migration rather than to prioritize and to promote human rights. Member state leaders delivered anti-immigrant speeches and demanded a coordinated European effort but they also put most of the burden on Italy. They evaluated this issue of migration through the lens of security rather than protection of human rights and they did not offer a coordinated response. The hypothesis that the likelihood of EU’s value promotion decreases when member states pursue interest-based policies has been verified in case of migration. EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity On the issue of economic support the EU doubled the amount for Tunisia’s economic recovery in 2011. Again in 2012 the EU continued with this approach and increased its financial assistance from 240 to 445 ml. In order to improve private investment Economic Advisory Council was set up for the purpose of bringing investors into contact with Tunisian authorities. The EU also had a big role in encouraging the EIB and EBRD to bring investment and to finance the country particularly to fund SMEs. EIB became the first financial institution to support Tunisia’s democratic transition. The three points EU top officials highlighted in their speeches were Tunisia’s economic integration with the EU, improving conditions for private investment and supporting economic reforms. The first step of Tunisia’s integration into EU single market was establishing DCFTA which did not come out as being successful. Tunisia had a weak economy 10.3 10.4 10. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Tunisia: Discourses Matching Actions? 222 and the EU is accused for not offering practical and concrete measures462 which Tunisia very much needed in 2011 Content analysis also shows that EU leaders mention the word economy 49 times and out of these 49 words 14 is dedicated to full support for sustainable and economic development. Open market economy is mentioned four times and facilitating private investment is also mentioned four times. The word trade has been used 13 times and six of these are about free trade agreements. It was declared for six times that security and stability could only be maintained when democracy and economy are tackled in an integrated manner. In a similar manner deep democracy is mentioned eight times in relation with economic prosperity. Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity The UK, under the terms of the Arab Partnership Fund, offered projects for economic growth, job creation and integrated trade. In accordance with the action plan for Tunisia France’s AFD loaned Tunisia 200ml to set up two parts of its national stimulus plan, one for employment and the other for the financial services sector. Germany was financing more than 100 development projects as part of its Transformation Partnership. Western companies have a strong presence in Tunisia in tourism, financial and commercial sectors and also they are the leading trade partners of Tunisia. Member states assess the concepts of democracy and economy as quite dependent on each other. France, Germany and the UK basically had two aims in supporting transition to democracy and helping Tunisia handle its economic problems. The first goal was to provide stability in the absence of which Europe, as often mentioned in leaders’ evaluations would face high pressure of migratory demands and extremist terrorist movements. Their second aim was to carry their past beneficial and trade relations to the future as France is Tunisia’s biggest supplier and also customer, as British companies are the major investors in Tunisia and likewise as Germany is the most important trade partner after France and Italy. 10.5 462 Int. No:23. 10.5 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity 223 Conclusion The EU, as an immediate respond to Tunisia’s transition, focused more on the elections and constitutional process than economic development. Analyzed discourses verify that EU leaders followed a neutral path by referring to both normative elements of intensified assistance to reinforce economic reforms, which would tie up to fundamental values and democratic stability and of establishing consistency between values and interests, and to rational elements of facilitating private investment, setting a DCFTA agreement and Europe’s better access to Tunisian market. In terms of policy implementation the EU acted positively by offering programs on reducing social inequality, job creation and improving business climate. The mode of EU policy is found to be normative in the area of economic prosperity. Western companies see Tunisia as a growing market where they can sell their technology and know-how and where they can build a system of free enterprise and market economy. Both sides are in need of each other since the involvement of foreign investors to create jobs and finally to stabilize the economy is also good for Tunisia. Consequently the West sees Tunisia as a strong and close business partner with this purpose of promoting ´national business interests’ especially in the fields of energy and tourism. Germany, particularly, was willing to finance numerous development projects. Member state leaders’ speeches indicate that they assess Tunisia as a long term economic partner and that they want to expand their business relations in different areas. They have a strong interest based agenda for the future economic relations. The first hypothesis that normative/ value-based assessment of interests of the EU is used for maximization of interests rather than promotion of values has been falsified in case of economic prosperity. The hypothesis that increases in rational/interest-based policies at the member state level is associated with decreases in normative/value-based policies at the community level has also been falsified in economic prosperity. EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection The EU played its diplomatic role by being present in the Tunisian revolution from day one to give its explicit support for reforms and to encourage dialogue with the authorities.EU bilateral assistance under the ENPI fund- 10.6 10.7 10. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Tunisia: Discourses Matching Actions? 224 ing focused particularly on helping Tunisians organize free and fair elections, improving the performance of justice sector, rehabilitation and investment for poor regions, boosting the role of civil society and sending humanitarian aid for Libyan refugees. These actions respectively correspond with promoting EU values of good governance, rule of law, sustainable development, anti-discrimination and respect for human rights respectively. The EU also had a big role in coordinating European and international financial support. EU top officials’ rhetoric mainly focused on the consolidation of democracy, importance of free and fair elections and respect for human rights and the rule of law. Content analysis of EU documents and press releases shows that an independent judiciary and consolidation of the rule of law is a very important pre-condition, which is repeated seven times, in order to advance partnership between Tunisia and the EU. Accordingly EU officials mention six times that Tunisians revolution is based on justice and Tunisians aspirations are legitimate. In continuation with this assessment it has been declared six times that the EU works closely with Tunisian authorities to respond to peoples` demands and hopes for social justice and democracy with full respect for rule of law. Out of 24 mentions on respect for human rights half is dedicated to EU support for the objective of maintaining respect for human rights along with democracy and rule of law. The EU twice referred to respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights in relation with the need to release bloggers, journalists and lawyers immediately from detention. They also repeated five times that they want to work with Tunisian authorities to respond to Tunisian peoples’ demands for fundamental rights and dignity. EU’s bilateral assistance after 2011 focused on good governance. Codes of democracy, democratic and democratization are mentioned 99 times as sub codes of good governance. 25 of these mentions is dedicated to free electoral process and setting up a Constituent Assembly. As a second sub code of good governance mutual accountability is cited seven times. Transition, which is considered as a sub code of sustainable development, is also cited in relation with deep and stable democracy 22 times. Assistance to the electoral process as the first step towards this type of transition is also often mentioned in speeches and policy documents. Council of the EU made it clear that more for more approach towards Tunisia was “new and ambitious” as Tunisia passed through a transition process which very much corresponds with the EU values. Since 2011 Tunisia had an elected president and a new government based on a broad 10.7 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection 225 spectrum of political parties and a new constitution which advocates freedom and human rights as a result of the negotiations between different segments of Tunisian society. Considering this ambitious neighborhood policy of the EU in response to the `model` Tunisia and its progress in democratic transition EU support for 2011-2013 remains modest. EU focused on the necessity of reconciliation twice and unity once and solidarity five times reminding the point that they can draw on from European history for building reconciliation but Tunisia couldn’t create a peace atmosphere and reconciliation between Al-Nahda Party and the secular opposition. Tunisia needed much more capacity building activities especially throughout most of 2013 when there was political crisis in society following the assassinations and when the government was reshuffled several times in the face of continuing protests. EU could also be more active in coordinating the judicial process of returning the unfrozen assets as the fragile Tunisian economy needed this money. Supporting civil society became a main area of cooperation after the revolution. The value of anti-discrimination in relation with assisting not only Tunisian authorities but also helping and empowering civil society is mentioned 11 times. The EU makes it explicit that even if the government is undemocratic the EU still increases bilateral cooperation budget to support civil society to build a system of civil rights and democratic values without any discrimination. Numeric Layout of Interests vs Values in Official Statements of EU Top Officials on Tunisia the EU values. Since 2011 Tunisia had an electe president and a new government ba ed on a broad spectrum of political parties and a new constitution which advocates freedom and human rights as a result of the negotiations between different segments of Tunisian society. Considering this ambitious neighborhood policy of the EU in response to the `model` Tunisia and its progress in democratic transition EU support for 2011-2013 remains modest. EU focused on the necessity of reconciliation twice and unity once and solidarity five times reminding the point that they can draw on from European history for building reconciliation but Tunisia couldn’t create a peace atmosphere and reconciliation between Al-Nahda Party and the secular opposition. Tunisia needed much more capacity building activities especially throughout most of 2013 when there was political crisis in society following the assassinations and when the government was reshuffled several times in the face of continuing protests. EU could also be more active in coordinating the judicial process of returning the unfrozen assets as the fragile Tunisian economy n eded this money. Supporting civil society became a main area of cooperation after the revolution. The value of anti-discrimination in relation with assisting not only Tunisian authorities but also helping and empowering civil society is mentioned 11 times. EU makes it explicit that even if the government is undemocratic EU still increases bilateral cooperation budget to support civil society to build a system of civil rights and democratic values without any discrimination. Chart 5: Numeric Layout of Interests vs Values in Official Statements of EU Top Officials on Tunisia 107 88 73 35 24 24 22 13 10 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 All EU Leaders Codes good gov interests sust. dev. liberty r. for HR rule of law anti dis. social sol. peace Re pe tit io n of Co de s Chart 5: 10. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Tunisia: Discourses Matching Actions? 226 Results of Content Analysis: Usage of Codes in the Case of Tunisia – Anti-discrimination (22) – Anti-discrimination in relation with empowering civil society (11) – Good Governance (107) – Democracy (99) – Democracy in connection with free elections (25) – Accountability (7) – Recognition of Tunisians’ democratic aspirations (8) – Interests (88) – Economy (49) – Economy in relation with politics and successful elections (6) – Migration in relation with security (3) – Migration in relation with economy(5) – Open market economy (4) – Facilitating private investment (4) – Trade (13) – Free Trade Agreements (6) – Security (10) – Security in relation with Economy (5) – Liberty (35) – Liberty in relation with free elections and enhanced commitments for respect for freedom – Peace (10) – Rule of Law (24) – Independent judiciary and consolidation of the rule of law (7) – Tun. Rev. based on justice (6) – Responding to demands of people for respect for the rule of law (6) – Respect for Human Rights (24) – Maintaining Respect for Human Rights (12) – Responding to demands for respect for human rights (5) – Releasing journalists and lawyers from detention(2) – Social Solidarity (13) – Necessity of reconciliation (2) – Solidarity (5) – Cooperation (6) – Sustainable Development (73) 10.7 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection 227 – Economic prosperity in relation with deep democracy (8) – Transition in relation with deep democracy (22) – Transition in relation with freedom of association and civil society (2) Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection As for the member states the UK emphasized support for democracy, human rights and viewed the uprisings as a huge opportunity to maintain security and prosperity. In UK leaders’ words promoting EU values would first and foremost be in UK’s national interest. Towards these aims the UK set up Arab Partnership Fund worth 110 ml to be spent for political participation for supporting human rights and for challenging corruption. Tunisia is a special case for France as a former colony. Tunisia has the closest economic, social and historical ties with France among the other Arab Spring countries. France was slow to accept, synthesize and develop an orderly response to Tunisia’s uprising. Faced with the harsh criticisms of the circle of human rights defenders and media France eventually grasped the severity of the end of the Ben Ali regime. France changed its initial rhetoric of support for Ben Ali and afterwards French leaders stated that they would give full support for democratic freedom. France’s diplomatic presence was felt via Hollande’s visits to Tunisia at crucial times like when there was a political crisis, a government collapse or parliamentary elections. These trips hold huge symbolic significance but his promises of investment for economy and financial aid were not fulfilled within the next few years. Tunisia blamed France for providing little support for their delicate democratic transition process.463 Hollande was also criticized for not mentioning human rights violations during these visits. Tunisia, as a strategic partner and a potential hub for the region, was expecting more from France in this special time of history. France, eventually, didn’t use a consistent rhetoric of reflecting EU values and French funding for democratic transition process is insufficient. 10.8 463 Talili, W. (8 April 2015) “Tunisia asks France, 'why the coldness?'” Al-Araby http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/4/8/tunisia-asks-france-whythe-coldness, (accessed 5 October 2015). 10. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Tunisia: Discourses Matching Actions? 228 Finally Germany has been supportive of establishing democracy with more than 100 projects worth over 50 ml between 2012 and 2014 in the areas of governance, education, security and environment. On the discursive level German Foreign Minister Westerwelle assesses Tunisia as an open and democratic model for North Africa. German leaders highlighted particularly economic and political stability as Tunisia used to be a very important trade partner for years. It was important for Germany to help Tunisia sustain a secure and stable economic and political environment in order to go on with the existing beneficial trade relations and to do business in a secure country. This was apparent both in discourses and actions. Conclusion In value projection, as the last part of EU’s strategy, EU leaders’ value based discourses match their value based actions. There was immediate consensus on Tunisia’s quick and peaceful transition. Cooperation with Tunisia is crafted on a strongly value based framework. The transition process that Tunisia went through make it easier for the EU to have a crystal clear discourse and consequent action. There is a lot of consistency between what is said and what is done. As illustrated in the Figure 4 member states constructed a unique identity which borrowed elements from both rational and normative identities. They pictured themselves as representor and guarantor of EU values while at the same time they voiced their position as the most powerful and superior. The Tunisian Other, at the same time, was depicted as desperate, underdeveloped and in need of help for any change. They also added to this neutral identity by legitimizing their foreign policy both by pursuing national interests and human rights at the same time. In short high officials from member states focused on political stability and prosperity which would eventually protect their national interests in the areas of security and business. Their projects proved to reflect the values of good governance, education and support for civil society but Tunisia, as a candidate for being a role model among the Arab Spring countries, deserved more support. They pursued normative policy as their discourses are neutral and their actions are normative. The hypothesis that normative assessment of interests is positively related with normative policies has been verified in value projection both at the community and member state level. 10.9 10.9 Conclusion 229 The Articulation of the Political Identities of `the European Self` and `the Tunisian Other` by Member State Leaders Figure 4: The Articulation of the Political Identities of `the European Self` and `the Tunisian Other` by Member State Leaders Tunisia in need for help (for transition) desperate suffering suffocated Backward underdeveloped destabilized most powerful superior power colonial power Europe representor and guarantor of EU values Figure 4: 10. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Tunisia: Discourses Matching Actions? 230 Table 23: Mode of Foreign Policy Behavior of EU in Tunisia Actions (EU Strategy) Discourses (Assessment of Interests) Normative (Value-Based) Rational (Interest-Based) Normative (Value-Based) Strongly Value- Based Policies Value Projection Weak Interest-Based Rational (Interest-Based) Weak Value-Based Policies Strong Interest-Based Policies Physical Security (Migration) Neutral Normative Economic Prosperity Rational Table 24: Mode of Foreign Policy Behavior of Member States in Tunisia Actions (EU Strategy) Discourses (Assessment of Interests) Normative (Value-Based) Rational (Interest-Based) Normative (Valuebased) Strongly Value- Based Policies Value Projection Weak Interest-Based Rational (Interest-Based) Weak Value-Based Policies Strong Interest-Based Policies Physical Security (Migration) Economic Prosperity Neutral Normative Value Projection Rational 10.9 Conclusion 231 Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Libya: EU Strategy between Norms and Interests EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security Despite the criticisms that the EU remained inactive in the face of the revolutions, this is not the case for Libya. NATO’s new strategic concept464 proposes that NATO promises to work in close cooperation with the EU and the UN in case of political and security issues beyond borders. In line with NATO’s new strategic concept the EU provided major support for UN decisions. EU leaders always declared the motivation to protect civilians and referred to the legal basis that the UN has provided for achieving this. The EU would also be a strong partner of future’s Libya after setting national reconciliation and maintaining peace and stability. Another important concern of Ms Ashton and Mr Rompuy was putting armed forces under control, securing the borders and also acting in accordance with the member state proposals. All in all the Arab Spring as a whole was ‘strategically` important. The EU declared explicit support for UN resolutions but it was the UK and France leading the coalition of military intervention in Europe as members of NATO. It should also be considered that it was not an option for the EU to operate the Libyan crisis under the CSDP because of the fact that the EU is only capable of conducting small scale actions. This also hints to the fact that the EU is much better in the post conflict scenario in terms of institution building, providing basic services and state building.465The EU had no military role in Libya. The EU at some point also discussed whether they should establish humanitarian corridors but this never materialized because the events quick on the ground were too quick. The EU limited its intervention to only taking care of refugees in the south of Tunisia and in the West of Egypt.466 11. 11.1 464 Active Engagement, Modern Defense (19 November 2010). NATO, http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm, (accessed 30.08.2015). 465 Interview No:12. 466 Interview No: 18 and 23. 232 EU leaders’ assessment of Libyan intervention, on the other hand, focused on these points: bringing an end to the Gaddafi regime, respecting international human rights, protecting civilians, maintaining peace and stability, securing borders, integrating Libya firstly as a strategic future political partner and see Libya grow into a country where justice, rule of law, human rights and reconciliation dominate. Although the EU didn’t take independent decisions on important phases of the civil war EU leaders played a role in calling the international community to act together against the humanitarian crisis and especially to protect civilians. The EU set up seven or eight different projects with a variety of partners but many of these projects are on put on hold because of the shaky security in the country.467 Official data from DG Near Department shows that 60% of projects are under reactivation, 30% of projects are suspended and 10% of them are under preparation.468 Content analysis shows that military operation was mentioned four times in key policy documents and press releases and the outstanding purpose of these mentions was to tell that operation was shared by member states, UN and NATO but not by the EU. However it was up to the UN to decide on EU’s involvement with its military assets. Other mostly vocalized points are putting weapons under control, acting in accordance with member state proposals with different rationales (being in contact with the foreign ministers of UK, France and Germany) and securing the borders. Security sector reform is mentioned 14 times. Four out of 14 are dedicated to the idea that there is no real freedom without security and no real security without economy that provides job opportunities. Interviewees argue that security sector reforms were not successful.469They were completely uncoordinated not allowing any type of common approach and this leads to the conclusion that Europe has the responsibility in the collapse of Libya.470 When we look more into the content analysis we see that maintaining peace was referred once in relation with securing borders. Leaders also referred to reconciliation 13 times as a sub code of the value of social soli- 467 Interview No: 11. 468 Internal Document from the Office of Directorate General Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations NEAR.B.1 Geographical Coordination Neighborhood South, available upon request. 469 Int. No: 9 and 14. 470 Int. No: 9. 11.1 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security 233 darity. Six out of these 13 mentions are dedicated to the example of Europe that Europe was built on reconciliation and reconciliation, as the most difficult virtue, was viewed as a solution to the chronic problem of sectarian divisions in Libya. The second issue to be discussed in terms of physical security is migration. EU actors expressed their concerns on massive migration movements. They declared that it was in the EU’s `interest` to provide immediate relief to refugees. Although they referred to the fundamental rights of migrants, serious human rights violations occurred. Comissioner Malmström also acknowledged that EU policy towards migration became a `failure`. Scholars and human rights reports on migration movements from Libya agree on the idea that EU policies were predominated by domestic interests and security rather than international human rights obligations and a responsible approach to tackle irregular migration and border management. Content analysis shows that management of borders as a precondition of providing security was mentioned four times out of 14 mentions of the word security. Both content analysis of coded data and discourse analysis of texts indicate that EU leaders mostly vocalized security of borders, taking a strategic position next to the UN as Libya’s future partner and the concept of R2P despite its highly debated legal and ethical pitfalls, acting in accordance with the internal support mechanism in the EU (member state positions), bringing an end to the Gaddafi regime. The efforts in the area of migration are not enough. It is more about lack of focus and lack of coordination than being lack of money. Asylum seekers need more attention and a more coordinated policy response from the EU. EU policies, however, are predominated by domestic interests, border management and security rather than international human rights obligations and a responsible approach to cooperate with the North African countries to tackle irregular migration. Correspondingly leaders speaking on behalf of the EU expressed their worries about the massive migration movements and accordingly their decision to act in accordance with both values and interests. Their priorities were prevention of illegal migration, controlling their borders, facilitating readmission of illegal migrants and looking for possibilities of people to people contacts. 11. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Libya 234 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security Apart from EU’s official position there are member state approaches to be considered. France and the UK took the leading position in advocating military intervention as they have the biggest two military capacities in Europe and some other member states gave other assets like maritime support, humanitarian and diplomatic aid to the NTC.471 Both had some interests in actively supporting and adopting UNSCR resolution, launching a no-fly zone and conducting the military intervention as the next step. Among these interests their priority was to secure borders from terrorism and to avoid immigration. Gaddafi was seen as a security threat and if the regime was not removed Libya would be a source of instability. Domestic factors also came into play. It was important for both the UK and France to gain domestic credibility, strengthen their identity in their transatlantic relations and counterbalance Germany. (Jude 2012, Wallace 2007, p.57 in Loon 2012) Germany, on the other hand, abstained voting for a no-fly zone and air strikes because they didn’t see military intervention in their interest as opposed to France and the UK. Germany had different types of security concerns like facing up to unpredictable results and losing its credibility in the eyes of the public by risking German soldiers’ lives. On the discursive level Mr Cameron told that military action was necessary for blocking instability, terrorism and immigration. France senior officials used the rhetoric of civilian protection. Member states did not push their limits to open more space for refugees. This however didn’t change the situation that thousands of people were taking risky routes in leaky boats to get to European shores from Libya. In Libya essentially there was a collusion between these human trafficking networks and regime. There was ‘stop and go` operation. They had special police for borders and they simply took money from traffickers who led migrants group. And as long as there were desperate people for either economic or political reasons willing to spend several thousand euros on transit these criminal networks would have an easy time.472To avoid this type of risky routes to get to Europe the argument was that there should be a possibility for asylum seekers to request asylum while they 11.2 471 Interview No: 18. 472 Int. No:18. 11.2 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Physical Security 235 were still in Africa. According to Director Neighborhood South-DG Near there could be such possibilities available in a couple years. Conclusion On the issue of military intervention EU’s mode of foreign policy is normative as discourses are covering both values and interests and actions are composed of a reflection of humanitarian assistance. (See Table 25) In case of migration however the mode of EU foreign policy is strongly rational as both discourses and actions are interest based. When we look at the member states their policy falls into the category of strongly rational both on the issues of `military intervention´ and ´migration`.(See Table 26) The hypothesis that the likelihood of EU’s normative policies decreases when member states pursue rational policies has been verified in case of migration. Most of the power on migratory demands is with the member states and the EU, in parallel with member state decisions, follows an antiimmigrant policy. This hypothesis however has been falsified in case of Libyan military intervention. In opposition to the UK and France the EU pursued normative policy by taking part only in humanitarian assistance part of the operation in Libya. EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity The EU actively participated in the common platform of international community called Libya Contact Group Meetings to advocate its long term interests in deeper economic and political integration with Libya as well as to recognize NATO operation, to finance the NTC and eventually to open up Libya to foreign investment. Libya is a country with no debts and %95 of its wealth comes from oil reserves which they can still use. Libya, therefore, doesn’t need money from outside. What Libya needs is to stimulate diversified market-based economy and transform the management of oil revenues. In terms of the redesigning of economy EU’s aim was to bring the regulatory lines of the southern Mediterranean states and the EU’s single market closer for the reason that energy cooperation was already prepared in the region. (Youngs 2014, p.193) Youngs, however, explains that European policies and international companies were found to 11.3 11.4 11. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Libya 236 be too rushing to sign commercial contracts and oil deals. (Youngs 2014, p.181) What the EU did in this country with security problems in terms of economic development was to offer €10 million package financed from the ENPI to support Libya’s economic integration, diversification and sustainable development as of November 2013. Internal armed conflict in Libya blocked all the efforts for the adoption of economic governance though. On the discursive level EU actors underlined the need for implementing UNSCR resolutions, helping Libya in its democratic transition and the revival of economy. Indicators derived from coded data show that the EU referred to economic development and economic reforms 15 times with a focus on EU’s full support for adopting instruments to promote economic development (seven times), on the necessity of restarting economy, reassuring investments, resuming oil and gas production (two times), on establishing a full free trade zone in the long term (four times) and on establishing a link between increased trade, foreign investment, economic growth and transition to democracy (two times). Leaders’ speeches show that a link between security and an economy with job opportunities has been established four times. Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity Libya, as the fourth largest oil producing country in Africa, has definitely an important place in energy interests of the UK and France. Despite being an oil exporting country Libya lacks necessary technology. At this point European companies’ know-how steps in and they convey their expertise to the Libyan oil producers. This is how mutually beneficial business relations have continued between Libya and the West. The Paris Conference was the particular platform where economic interests of France and the UK were discussed. Since these two countries were the main driving forces for the Western intervention in Libya they would also be the main receivers of oil production according to the new Libyan government’s reasoning. Accordingly the NTC declared this intention to continue with the further beneficial oil contracts with the countries which provided previous political and military support.14% of the oil and gas market in Libya is controlled by France. French companies like Total would continue to be present in Libya in return for its support for the rebels and for the opera- 11.5 11.5 Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Economic Prosperity 237 tion which was later passed on to NATO. The UK also had interests in oil and gas extraction. UK’s British Petroleum (BP) is considered as the best company for Libya’s hydrocarbon processing industry.473 Interviewed analysts think that each country’s national interest usually trumps improvements that have been made in the neighborhood policy. For example; Germany has an interest in selling German technology, France has an interest in its geopolitical position in the ex-colonies in Libya.474 Within this framework member states policies are less pretentious in terms of norms whereas there is explicit reference to values in the treaties in the European context. They promote their national champions as trading partners and export of technology etc.475 EU Diplomat Mr. Pierini likewise links the robust involvement of the UK and France in military intervention to the fact that the UK had big oil and gas interest in and France had much smaller interest in Libya but perhaps France was hoping for more.476 This pragmatic basis of mutually beneficial relations can also be found in discourses of Sarkozy and Blair that military intervention is in their countries’ national interest. They perceive military intervention necessary for establishing a long lasting strategic partnership, deeper economic integration with Libya’s new regime and particularly make favorable oil deals. Conclusion In the area of economic prosperity analyzed texts show that EU leaders chose a neutral way of assessing interests as they made emphasis for both economic development and reforms in order to help Libya grow into a democratic country and for reassuring private investment, oil and gas production for the benefit of the Western companies and Libya. They pursued a rational strategy in their actions as they attended Libya Contact Group Meetings and supported NATO operation for long term economic interests 11.6 473 Rousseau, R. (19 November 2011) Libya: A Very Long War over Competing Energy Interests. Foreign Policy Journal http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/ 2011/11/19/libya-a-very-long-war-over-competing-energy-interests/, (accessed 29 December 2016). 474 Int. No: 13. 475 Int. No: 14. 476 Int. No: 18. 11. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Libya 238 in addition to other primary concerns of democratic transition and development. EU’s rational economic policy can obviously be explained the impact of member states in pursuit of their national interests. After the announcement of Gaddafi that they had eliminated all programs on weapons of mass destruction in 2003 especially France and the UK made lucrative business deals with this oil and gas producing country. Their trade volumes likewise have increased every year since 2011. Within this frame the EU is also in pursuit of advocating their long term economic interests both in the recognition of UNSCR resolutions, NATO operation and in Friends of Libya meetings. Consequently EU’s mode of behavior in case of economic prosperity is rational. Member states on the other hand both in discourses and actions made explicit reference to their national interests in advocating Libya’s economic development and followed strongly rational policy. Member state diplomacy includes the defense of their economic agenda and there is a good match between EU’s economic interests and member states’ interests. The second hypothesis that the likelihood of EU’s value promotion decreases when member states pursue interestbased policies has been verified in case of economic prosperity. EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection The EU was committed to deepening its relations with the Libyan people via humanitarian and civil support both before and after the war. In the short term the EU provided immediate assistance, through its two offices in Benghazi and Tripoli, for the most urgent needs of public services, medical supplies, water and fuel. The EU set goals to support Libya in the long term in the areas of institution/state building, capacity building in a variety of fields, security sector reform, civil society, education and media. These types of assistance were realized through ECHO and also individual member state donations which totally reached 154, 501 as of Nov. 2011. The EU also provided at least an additional €68 million over 2012-2013 for long term projects. The final goal is to see Libya turn into a country where EU norms prevail. As part of its strategy of value projection the EU also actively participated in all the Libya Contact group meetings. EU’s presence in these meetings is in an important indicator of its value projection. Lastly the EU followed UN decisions in enabling sanctions and restrictive measures towards the Gaddafi regime. The principle of `more for 11.7 11.7 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection 239 more` required the EU to quickly unfreeze Libyan assets in order to help the Libyan interim government. This is a clear sign of EU’s intention to protest the old regime. This is also one of the three Ms (Money) explained in the Emergency Summit on Libya. On the discursive level, EU leaders, at every possible meeting with the governing officials of Libya between 2011 and 2013, stated that they wanted to see Libya as a democratic and stable country in the future and as a strong partner of EU. Good governance, sustainable development and respect for human rights are the mostly stated top three EU values. What they have in common is that all of these values have somehow been articulated in connection with democracy. One of the main indicators of good governance is democratization. Codes of democratization, democracy and democratic are mentioned 66 times in the assessments of senior officials. The EU, via these repetition of words, makes its intention to commit full support to the country’s efforts to be a democratic state. Out of these 66 references to democracy, democratic transition is mentioned 10 times and democratic elections are mentioned four times. EU leaders stated their objective to be a key partner for the organization and monitoring of elections. Anti-discrimination was mentioned 39 times and 30 out of 39 mentions EU leaders meant to support civilian population and a civil society of human rights defenders and free media in an impartial way. The analysis of speeches also show that leaders mentioned liberty 35 times together with the sub codes of liberate, free and freedom. The most repeated idea was EU’s full support for the people of Libya in their aspiration for freedom. They also referred to free and fair elections three times, free media once and also they viewed freedom as opposite to clash of civilizations once. Both Ashton and Rompuy condemned the human rights violations in Libya and addressed universal rights to take place in Libya such as justice and equality. Rule of law, legality and justice are mentioned 36 times. Via these mentions the EU mainly tells that it is essential to consolidate the rule of law for long term stability and the EU is ready to help a transition that respects the rule of law. Additionally EU leaders emphasized that all combatants should be treated in accordance with international law and human rights and those responsible for abuses towards detainees should be brought to justice when they made a reference to justice. When EU leaders made a reference to human rights for 54 times they pointed to full support to democratic transition and a new constitution which respected human rights. Peace was stated nine times in EU documents with a focus on in- 11. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Libya 240 stalling the government, organizing national elections, struggling for basic rights, the NTC’s work and eventually on political transition. Numeric Layout of Interests vs Values in Official Statements of EU Top Officials on Libya free and fair elections three times, free media once and also they viewed freedom as opposite to clash of civilizations once. Both Ashton and Rompuy condemned the human rights violations in Libya and addressed universal rights to take place in Libya such as justice and equality. Rule of law, legality and justice are mentioned 36 times. Via these mentions EU mainly tells that it is essential to consolidate the rule of law for long term stability and EU is ready to help a transition that respects the rule of law. Additionally EU leaders emphasized that all combatants should be treated in accordance with international law and human rights and those responsible for abuses towards detainees should be brought to justice when they made a reference to justice. Whenever EU leaders made a reference to human rights 54 times they pointed to full support to democratic transition and a new constitution which respected human rights. Peace was stated nine times in EU documents with a focus on installing the government, organizing national elections, struggling for basic rights, the NTC´s work and eventually on political transition. Chart 6: Numeric Layout of Interests vs Values in Official Statements of EU Top Officials on Libya Results of Content Analysis: Usage of Codes in the Case of Libya - Anti-discrimination (39) o Support for civilian population to maintain anti-discrimination (30) - Good Governance (71) o Democracy, democratization, democratic (66) 73 72 71 53 39 36 35 28 9 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 All EU Leaders sust. dev. good gov. interests r. for HR rule of law anti dis. social sol. liberty peace Re pe tit io n of Co de s Results of Content Analysis: Usage of Codes in the Case of Libya – Anti-discrimi ation (39) – Support for civilian population to maintain anti-discrimination (30) – Good Governance (71) – Democracy, democratization, democratic (66) – Democratic transition (10) – Democratic elections (4) – Peace (9) – Peace linked with national elections (7) – Peace linked in relation with secure borders (1) – Liberty (35) – Free and fair elections (3) – Free media (1) – Freedom in opposition to clash of civilizations (1) – Respect for Human Rights (54) – Rule of law (36) – Social Solidarity (28) Chart 6: 11.7 EU Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection 241 – Reconciliation (13) – Unity (3) – Sustainable Development (72) – Transition (52) – Transition linked with democracy (23) – Transition linked with reconciliation (4) – Stability (13) – Prosperity (8) – Interests (73) – Economic Development (15) – EU Support for economic development (7) – Restarting economy, investments and oil and gas production (2) – Establishing a full free trade zone (4) – Economic growth in relation with democracy (2) – Security sector reform (14) – Security in relation with freedom and job opportunities (4) – Security in relation with management of migration (4) – Military operation (4) Member State Policies and Assessment of Interests in Value Projection When we look at member state policies in terms of value projection we see that they provided planes, vessels and sanitation in addition to their teams and offices located in Libya to give training and advice on security and medical issues. They not only themselves made donations but also called to the G8 countries to support Libya to secure values of democracy and freedom. Among the motivations behind the humanitarian and diplomatic actions of the UK and France were to gain domestic credibility and international prestige and to push back migration pressures in addition to diffusion of humanitarian values. When we look at the explanations behind humanitarian and civil aid of top we find repeated emphasis of values of peace, prosperity, democracy, freedom and protecting civilians from harm more than their emphasis on maintaining security and pushing back the pressures of migration. They also highlighted the necessity of reconciliation, unity and social solidarity instead of economic deals and reconstruction contracts. Critical discourse analysis of the speeches of member state leaders show 11.8 11. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Libya 242 that they constructed a normative identity by presenting themselves as `protector of civilians`, norm-setters and norm-givers`, and `representatives of EU values` in contrast to the non-normative construction of Gaddafi and his advocators through the articulations of `illegitimate´, `violent´, `dictator` and `a threat to Libya´. The identity of the Libyan people seeking for EU values and the TNC, as the temporary representative of the post-Gaddafi Libya, were constructed as part of `the European Self` and as `an equal partner of Europe`. (See Figure 5) Conclusion The last part of EU’s strategy is value projection. The mode of foreign policy of the EU and member states on value projection is strongly normative considering both declarations on the Libyan humanitarian situation and the measures and tools implemented. Nevertheless Libya is a specific case and there is not much cooperation for security reasons and lack of authority. Libya is a country in a civil war. In addition to the war of 2011 different armed groups of revolutionary brigades and brigades who have broken away from national army (Seeberg, 2014) have caused even more instability in Libya. It was this instable and insecure atmosphere that didn ´t allow any type of cooperation on reforms on economic or political governance between the EU and Libya. Despite the administrative weakness of the Libyan state Europe could have achieved more on the way to constructing a stable state only if they had spent more resources and energy. The promotion of values is more at the center of EU action in Tunisia than in Libya but still EU leaders have proved great consistency in what is said and what is done in promotion of EU values. Eventually the EU has constructed a normative identity through discourses. Furthermore there is not even one area where their discourses are based on values but their actions are based on interests. Thus the hypothesis that the normative/value-based assessment of interests of the EU is used for the maximization of interests rather than promotion of values has been falsified in both cases of Tunisia and Libya. 11.9 11.9 Conclusion 243 The Articulation of Political Identities of `the European Self´ and ´the Libyan Other´Figure 5: The Articulation of Political Identities of `the European Self´ and ´the Libyan Other´ Europe Controlled RationalDeveloped Civilized Libya Violent IrrationalUnderdeveloped Barbarian Figure 5: 11. Synthesis of Findings in the Case of Libya 244 Table 25: Mode of Foreign Policy Behavior of the EU in Libya Actions (EU Strategy) Discourses (Assessment of Interests) Normative (Value-Based) Rational (Interest-Based) Normative (Value-based) Strongly Value- Based Policies Value Projection Weak Interest- Based Rational (Interest-Based) Weak Value-Based Policies Strong Interest- Based Policies Physical Security (Migration) Neutral Normative Physical Security (Libyan Intervention) Rational Economic Prospertiy Table 26: Mode of Foreign Policy Behavior of Member States in Libya Actions (EU Strategy) Discourses (Assessment of Interests) Normative (Value-Based) Rational (Interest-Based) Normative (Value-based) Strongly Value- Based Policies Value Projection Weak Interest- Based Rational (Interest-Based) Weak Value-Based Policies Strong Interest- Based Policies Physical Security Economic Prosperity Neutral Normative Rational 11.9 Conclusion 245 Concluding Remarks: Analysis of EU Policies, Lessons, Advices and Future Research The Gap between Rhetoric and Policies in Democratic Transition The Maastricht Treaty calls for the promotion of values, on which the EU is founded, especially democracy, human rights, freedom and the rule of law. Whether the EU needs a normative definition or not is another discussion but the EU defines itself with these norms and principles. As the Arab Spring youth went to streets to protest long lived dictatorships and as the states in the MENA region collapsed the EU initiated ENP to renew its approach towards the region in 2011 with the emphasis to support deep democracy on the basis of conditionality. Political conditionality requires more for more principle and three Ms (money, market and mobility) to respond to the demands of the Southern neighbourhood. The outcomes of the ENP `Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity` and `A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood` also acknowledge the necessity to offer more benefits and greater resources for political reforms in the neighbourhood.Political conditionality however came as an unsuccessful attempt for a number of reasons. According to the basic methods of policy analysis the first reason is that policies are not well defined, the second reason is incomplete knowledge of the state in question, (Patton, Sawicki and Clark, 2012) and the third one is lack of local ownership.477 As Tocci also indicates the ENP doesn’t offer a clear direction as to explain the principles of conditionality. The EU promises to provide money in return for political reforms, market opportunities for integration with the Single Market and mobility to increase the movement of people but there should be more indicators provided to make these principles functional.478 12. 12.1 477 Kausch, K. and Youngs, R. (eds.) (2012) Europe in the Reshaped Middle East FRIDE ISBN: 978-84-615-9959-2 (Online), retrieved from http://fride.org/download/Europe_in_the_reshaped_Middle_East.pdf, (accessed 28 December 2016). 478 Tocci, N. (April 2012) MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 1 State and (un)Sustainability in the Southern Mediterranean and Scenarios to 2030: The EU’s Response, re- 246 Despite the strong rhetoric of democratic transition this rhetoric doesn’t find enough reciprocity at policy level. Tunisia, in particular, has been the test case for the EU to prove itself as a normative polity as indicated in Maastricht Treaty and as to apply positive conditionality. The EU, however, should be pressing more for democratic reforms in Tunisia the system of which has the potential to correspond with EU values. They mainly had free elections observed by an EU mission and they prepared a constitution the principles of which are also recognized by the EU. Although Tunisia’s transition steps have to face prevailing political, economic and social challenges Tunisia more than any other country in the region carries the hope of a democratic future. The second factor for the gap between rhetoric and policies is lack of knowledge of the geographical, social and political context of the cases of this study. For example Ms Ashton just after Ben Ali has been prisoned for 35 years announced that a democratic and prosperous Tunisia was emerging and negotiations on Mobility Partnership and DCFTA were starting. These words however sound quite shallow at a time when the dangerous power struggle between revolutionary dynamics were at their peak point.479 Schumacher calls it as `informational norm diffusion` turning into `informational confusion´480 in the EU’s case and harms the credibility of the EU as a crisis manager and a democracy promoter. Additionally one of the important areas where the EU intensified its efforts in the post-revolutionary process was state building. Both in Tunisia and Libya the process of building a state is not an easy task. According to the functionalist approach that Echagüe suggests creating a state from scratch especially in Libya is more than a technical exercise.481 It involves serious political conflicts born out of the different armed and un-armed holders of trieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/58348/1/MEDPRO_PP1_NT_updated.pdf, accessed December 28, 2016. 479 EC. (29 Sept. 2011) Comments by the HR/VP Catherine Ashton following the EU/Tunisia Task Force. MEMO/11/650 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-650_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 5 April 2013). 480 Schumacher, T. (January 2015) The European Union and Democracy Promotion: Readjusting to the Arab Spring in Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring. Rethinking Democracy, Routledge, pp. 559-573. 481 Echagüe, A. (April 2012) The role of external actors in the Arab transitions FRIDE Policy Brief , No:122 ISSN: 1989-2667, retrieved from http://fride.org/ download/PB_122_Role_external_actors_arab_transitions.pdf, (accessed 28 December 2016). 12.1 The Gap between Rhetoric and Policies in Democratic Transition 247 power. It is a difficult task to have the tribal and ethnic identities meet at the minimum standards of mainstream democracy. A sudden shift from Gaddafi’s stateless society to institutions including a parliament and a government has certain pitfalls. In the case of Tunisia the evolving nature of political Islam and its regaining of power should be considered in democratic calculations. Sharing other experiences of transition from the countries in proximate geography would also be helpful. Any lack of attention of the social and political context leads to failure of transition. Another important factor of a successful transition and democracy promotion is local ownership which requires the necessity of choosing whom to listen to and with whom to cooperate with such as lobbyists, constituents or policy advisers. While involvement in domestic matters in order to assist refoms like setting up free elections, a parliament and a constitution is necessary it is also important to listen to domestic actors and to credit their legitimacy. Transition is not a matter of making deals between the elites. The EU also needs to take advice from diplomats covering the Middle East and shouldn´t side-line the responsible people in the External Action Service besides local actors. To be able to make effective changes in the MENA region the EU needs to derive a set of lessons from these people with a renewed understanding beyond lending money for democracy. History has taught that if a traditional identity and structure of a country is not incorporated into mainstream democratic and human rights standards they form the potential of re-emerging as reform spoilers. By saying so Youngs suggests that the direct export of the EU acquis would not necessarily help democratization and institution building.482 Adversely there is an urgent need to strengthen dialogue with civil society and government representatives in Tunisia and Libya to make the principle of conditionality workable. For countries like Tunisia and Libya that have for long been governed by an authoritarian regimes this process needs to be handled with great care and patience. This was also recognized by Mr. Füle as he said: “The EU has often focused too much on stability at the expense of other objectives and more problematically at the expense of our values. The time to bring our interests in line with our values has come”.483 482 Kausch, K. and Youngs, R. (eds.) (2012) Europe in the Reshaped Middle East FRIDE ISBN: 978-84-615-9959-2 (Online), retrieved from http://fride.org/download/Europe_in_the_reshaped_Middle_East.pdf, (accessed 28 December 2016). 483 Füle, S., (14 June 2011) Revolutionizing the European Neighborhood Policy in Response to Tougher Mediterranean Revolutions, Round table discussion orga- 12. Concluding Remarks: Analysis of EU Policies, Lessons, Advices and Future Research 248 Libya: A Test Case for EU’s Global Actorness Libya has been even a harder test case for the EU for Libya has a more conflict ridden nature than Tunisia. The EU was divided within itself on military and humanitarian actions in Libya too. The EU launched EUFOR Libya but humanitarian corridors were not operational. EU foreign policy was simply shadowed by the leadership of the UK and France in military sphere. If the EU wants to prove itself as a global actor the EU firstly needs to work more on speaking with one voice and secondly the EU needs to put into action what has been voiced in order to fulfill its geopolitical responsibilities. Behind the scene plays capability and expectation gap (Hill, 1993) and lack of coordination and cooperation (Patton, Sawicki and Clark, 2012) on the EU-Libya case. These principles of policy analysis correspond with `EU’s lack of military capabilities` and `EU’s inefficient political decision making process` which caused its indecisiveness on Libya.484 The lack of coordination between the Commission, the Parliament and unilaterally acting member states, who have a strong place in NATO and who furthermore have the power of pursuing an independent foreign policy, ended up EU’s failure in Libya as a crisis manager on humanitarian stage and as a military power. It was the UK and France that dominated the military and diplomatic mission in Libyan Civil War. If the EU has the assertion of acquiring its own foreign policy as a global actor, in the light of Hill’s explanation of the gap between expectations and capabilities, the EU needs to show the power of having a leading role in the war and peace issues of Libya and to be able to raise armed forces and project military power beyond its borders. (Hill, 1993) However the extent of demands both during and after the conflict in Libya seemed unmanageable proving the expectations and capability gap to be correct. 12.2 nized by Members of the European Parliament, SPEECH/11/436, Brussels in Vanda Amaro Dias, A Critical Analysis of the EU’s Response to the Arab Spring and its Implications for EU Security. 484 Bendiek, A. and and Markus Kaim (June 2015) New European Security Strategy – The Transatlantic Factor, SWP Comments 34, retrieved from https://www.swpberlin.org/.../2015C34_bdk_kim.pdf, (accessed 29 December 2016). 12.2 Libya: A Test Case for EU’s Global Actorness 249 EU Conditionality in Mobility and Economic Integration Positive conditionality requires the EU to have a clear long term agenda in the economic integration of Tunisia. The more Tunisia gets integrated into the European market the better. Tunisia is a gateway to Europe for a lot of other countries. DCFTAs aim to bring trade and market regulations of a country closer to that of the EU. The neglected point however is that these standards for Tunisia, with no chance of membership, are too high. Tunisia’s state dominated economy is weak. There is high unemployment, corruption and injustice of income. What Tunisia needs is more investment, more development projects to reduce inequality, more practical solutions for market access and liberalization rather than long term regulatory process of the single market. An additional point to be seriously considered is that the EU officials need to evaluate the opinions of civil society actors in all types of negotiations on the economic sphere. It was those young members of civil society organizations who have sparkled the revolutions and who have been in strong affinity with social media. Migration is the second major issue that has been explained as part of security sphere in this study. What the EU misses in the successful management of migration is twofold. One is the idea that policy implementation requires perfect coordination and cooperation and it necessitates to speak with one voice and the second one is that you have to have a grasp knowledge of the geographical and political context and understanding of the state in question as mentioned in the above discussions. The EU needs a revision of mobility partnerships in order to move away from too much security orientation requiring readmission and to offer more benefits to the sides. If the ENP and its revision, Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, recognizes the need to offer more conditionality and more benefits to the neighbors accepting asylum requests without discrimination should be among these benefits. The EU does not have the chance to ease the huge immigration crisis born out of the chaotic and insecure post/revolutionary atmosphere by limiting the options of mobility to a small area which is granting scholarship for high education in Europe. These scholarship programs don´t solve anything in the face of everyday tragedies of migrants sunk in the Mediterranean Sea. There should be the possibility to request asylum while people are in North Africa. It was also a mistake to cut the budget of Frontex in 2011 when the Libyan War broke out. Tunisia and Libya shouldn’t be left alone with migratory pressures. 12.3 12. Concluding Remarks: Analysis of EU Policies, Lessons, Advices and Future Research 250 The EU doesn’t have a long term migration policy though. Differing rationales of member states however make coordination of a long term strategy impossible. Member states’ main concern is to invest in border security to avoid migration. France and Italy, for example, temporarily lifted Schengen Visa and closed their borders to prevent migration and accordingly instability on the Mediterranean Shore. Self-interested migration policies of member states diminish EU’s mobility options. Hence this inconsistency and interplay between member states cause the EU to lose the chance to respond normatively to the changing conditions at its Southern borders. Refugee problem poses the necessity of protection of human rights and holds the risk of the spread of terrorism. It not only causes people to live in poor conditions in insecure and chaotic places but it also means the spread of radical elements and extremist ideas. The EU needs to go down to the root causes of migration. This can be done by understanding economic and political conditions in Tunisia and Libya. The fall of Gaddafi didn’t stop people trying to reach Europe as a safe place. The urgent task of the EU as well as the international community in Libya should be to assist economic governance to smooth down the fight over holding power between multiple armed brigades and militias and to develop a democratic securitization. If international partners of Libya can help migrants to have a secure, dignified and prosperous life and improve better control of the borders in cooperation and consultation with the Libyan authorities Libya can have a brighter future. Libya doesn’t need the money from outside. Libya already has sufficient resources for building a more secure and democratic future. Gaddafi regime mainly relied on oil but the oil sector is not labor intensive and it is not well integrated to a broader market.485What Libya needs is a guidance for economic reform. Serious consideration should be given to supporting the diversity of economy and creating jobs to calm down the tension between a complex network of tribes and ethnicities. European Commission’s assistance package for economic development, security and education worth 68ml and another assistance worth 10ml through ENPI are not enough in the face of these economic challenges this country has. Much more needs to be done to create an efficient economy and employment and to generate revenue. 485 Mikail, B. (January 2012) The multiple challenges of Libya's reconstruction, FRIDE Policy Brief No:114, ISSN: 1989-2667,retrieved from http://fride.org/ download/PB_114_Libya_reconstruction.pdf, (accessed 29 December 2016). 12.3 EU Conditionality in Mobility and Economic Integration 251 Political solutions need to be revised in addition to funding and assistance programs with a humanitarian focus and in addition to providing economic governance. The EU should search for the political implications of displacements and migration. From this perspective conflict resolution responses are necessary for Libya likewise Syria.486 Lastly this basic rule of policy implementation should also be addressed that execution of a policy requires perfect coordination and cooperation between multiple actors. If the EU wants Libya to be a reliable partner in the region the EU also has to work closely with other international partners in order to realize necessary economic and political strategies such as anti-terrorism, anti-migration, integration of trade, industrialization of country, reform of the public sector, modern infrastructure etc.. This international partnership can be established with Washington, Russia and with regional players of Turkey, Gulf States and the Arab League. Libyan public opinion also shows that Libyans need training on technological expertise, training and funding for political parties as well as civil society. Future Research The political situation on the ground changes too quickly so it is hard to catch up with the newest developments. The outcomes and successes of the uprisings are still largely unknown and unique for each country but there are three additional points to be considered for future research on the EU-Arab Spring literature. Firstly it would be useful to make a continuum of this project to see how the course and content of European influence took shape in the re-emerging societies and political systems of the MENA region. It would be fair to see the revolutions not as a moment but to see them as a dynamic process which has a say in the future of the Middle Easterners. Likewise it is the topic of another research to see how the Arab Spring countries react to European policies. Lastly there are obviously more member states to be included in this study. These are particularly Southern European countries of Italy, Spain and Greece. They are highly relevant as they are mostly exposed to migratory demands due to their ge- 12.4 486 Mikail, B. (July 2013) Refugees in the MENA region: what geopolitical consequences?,FRIDE Policy Brief, ISSN: 1989-2667No: 162, retrieved from http:// fride.org/download/PB_162_Refugees_in_the_MENA_region.pdf, (accessed 29 December 2016). 12. Concluding Remarks: Analysis of EU Policies, Lessons, Advices and Future Research 252 ographical closeness and Italy and Spain especially depend on Libya for their oil consumption. The relations between these mentioned member states and the North African countries might be covered in another study. 12.4 Future Research 253 Bibliography Articles and Reports Africa-EU Partnership Mediterranean Solar Plan links North Africa to Europe. The Africa EU Partnership. http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/success-stories/ mediterranean-solar-plan-links-north-africa-europe, (accessed 5 October 2015) European Resettlement Network. Regional Protection Programs. 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Tunisialive, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/11/30/eu-promotestunisia-as-destination-for-european-enterprises/, (accessed 5 July 2013) Bibliography 287 Appendix I: Interviewee List – Interview No 1*: EU Official, 23 April 2015, EC, Brussels – Interview No 2*: EU Official, 10 February 2015, EEAS, Brussels – Interview No 3*: EU Official, 10 February 2015 EEAS Brussels – Interview No 4*: EU Diplomat, 18 February 2015, Phone Interview – Interview No 5*: EU Official, 23 April 2015, EC Brussels – Interview No 6*: EU Official, 23 April 2015, EC Brussels – Interview No 7*: EU Diplomat, 18 February 2015, Brussels – Interview No 8*: EU Diplomat, 18 February 2015, Brussels – Interview No 9*: EU Official from a Political Group, 20 April 2015, EP Brussels – Interview No 10: Eduardo Ferrara, Political Advisor at ALDE Group, 21 April 2015, EP, Brussels – Interview No 11: Maria Augustina Flores, 20 April 2015, ECHO Brussels – Interview No 12: Michael Köhler, European Commission, DG Near´s Director for the Southern Neighborhood, 20 April 2015, EC, Brussels – Interview No 13: Dr. William Lawrence, Lecturer at George Washington University, Elliot School of International Relations, Senior Advisor at the US State Department, 6 April 2015, Phone Interview – Interview No 14: Officials from the European Parliament Administration, 18 February 2015, EP Brussels – Interview No 15: Dr. Irene Fernandez Molina, Research Fellow, College of Europa/Natolin Campus, European Neighborhood Policy Chair, 21 January 2015, Phone Interview – Interview No 16: Isabella Montoya, Principal Administrator-European Parliament North Africa at Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), 5 February 2014, Phone Interview – Interview No 17: Joachim Paul, Administrator at Tunisia Office of Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 6 April 2015, Phone Interview – Interview No 18: Marc Pierini, EU Diplomat, Visiting Scholar at Carnegie Europe, 24 April 2015, Carnegie Europe, Brussels – Interview No 19: Official from Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 16 February 2015, Phone Interview 289 – Interview No 20: Michael Reinprecht, Former Head of Euro-Med and Middle East Unit, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, EP, 11 February 2015, Phone Interview – Interview No 21: Jordi Sebastia, MEP, 4 December 2014, The Greens/ European Free Alliance, European Parliament – Interview No 22: Prof. Richard G. Whitman, Head of School of Politics and IR, Kent University, 28 January 2015, Phone Interview – Interview No 23: Richard Youngs, Senior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Program at Carnegie Europa, 24 April 2015, Brussels * Those who wanted to stay anonymous are cited either as EU Official or as EU Diplomat. Appendix I: Interviewee List 290 Appendix II: Coding Scheme* Appendix II: Coding Scheme* *Not all the sub codes used in the analysis are included. For example; democracy represents all of the similar words like democratize, democratization, democratic etc.. Category 1: Values Peace Peace Liberty Free, Liberate, Liberty Rule of Law Legitimate, legitimacy, legal, law, judiciary, judicial, justice Respect for HR Tolerance, dignify, dignity, humanitarian, human rights Social Sol. unity, cooperation, cooperate, reconciliation, reconcile, solidarity Anti-discrim. non-discrimination, equitable, plural, civil, anti-disc. Sustainable Dev. growth, prosperity, stability, reconstruction, transition, prosperity, capacity building Good Gov. transparency, accountability, democracy, participatory, open Category 2: Interests oil, gas,economy, military, migration trade,market, energy, security, investment * Not all the sub codes used in the analysis are included. For example; democracy represents all of the similar words like democratize, democratization, democratic etc. 291

Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to explain if the way the EU assesses its interests (both norma-tive and rational) and foreign policy goals corresponds to its actions in North Africa during the Arab Spring process. It seeks to understand whether the EU's conduct in the areas of security, economic prosperity and value projection in Tunisia and Libya was based more on material interests or on values by also taking member state involvement into consideration. This study adopts an original approach, using insights from neoclassical realism. The research findings it presents are based on the author's extensive analysis of EU documents, expert interviews, primary sources and secondary literature. The author moved to Ankara after the completion of her doctoral studies in Cologne. Her research interests are EU foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy and foreign policy analysis.

Zusammenfassung

Das Ziel der Autorin ist es darzulegen, ob die Interessen (sowohl normative als auch rationale) und Ziele der europäischen Außenpolitik mit den Aktionen/Handlungen der Union in Nordafrika während des Arabischen Frühlings übereinstimmen. Ist das außenpolitische Verhalten der EU in den Bereichen Sicherheit, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Wertesicherheit in Tunesien und Libyen mehr materiellen Interessen geschuldet oder ist es normativer Natur? Durch Einbeziehung von Erkenntnissen des neoklassischen Realismus verwendet die Autorin hierbei eine neue Methode. Die Studie beinhaltet eine weitreichende Analyse von EU Dokumenten, Experten Interviews und Primär- und Sekundärquellen.

Die Autorin ist nach Abschluss der Doktorarbeit in Köln nach Ankara umgezogen. Ihre Forschungsinteressen liegen in der Europäischen und Türkischen Außenpolitik und der Außenpolitikanalyse.

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EU Documents
European Council
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European Council. (27 February 2011) Statement by Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on the resignation of the Tunisian Prime Minister A 077/11 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119512.pdf, (accessed 7 October 2015)
European Council. (28 February 2011) Libya: EU imposes arms embargo and targeted sanctions, (Press Release). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119524.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013)
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European Council. (20 April 2011). Extraordinary European Council, EUCO 7/1/11 REV 1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119780.pdf, (accessed 22 April 2013)
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European Council. (22 May 2011).Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton after the meeting with the Chairman of the transitional National Council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, in Benghazi, A 197/11, (Press Release), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122141.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013)
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European Council. (23 August 2011). Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Libya, A 326/11 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124428.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013)
European Council. (1 September 2011). Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the lifting of the EU's asset freeze on several Libyan entities, (Press Release). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124486.pdf, (accessed 10 June, 2011)
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European Council. (10 October 2011) 3117th Council meeting Foreign Affairs Luxembourg, PRES/11/357 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-11-357_en.htm, (accessed 10 March 2013)
European Council. (14 November 2011). Council conclusions on Libya 3124th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting, (Press Release), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126042.pdf, (accessed 27 April 2013)
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European Commission
European Commission. Countries and Regions: Tunisia. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/, (accessed 4 October 2015)
European Commission. Europaid. Action Fiche for a Special Measure for Tunisia in 2013, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-financing-education-tunisia-af-20130507_en.pdf, (accessed 7 June 2015)
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European Commission. (14 February 2011). High Representative Ashton visits Tunisia and wider Middle East. IP/11/151 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-151_en.htm, (accessed 7 November 2015)
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European Commission. (9 March 2011). Catherine Ashton EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Remarks on UN Human Rights Council, (Press Release). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-161_en.htm, (accessed 20 March 2013)
European Commission. (11 March 2011). Statement by President Barroso following the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on the Southern Mediterranean. (Press Release) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-168_de.htm?locale=en, (accessed 27 March 2013)
European Commission (30 March 2011). Joint statement by Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy and Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, on their trip to Tunisia. MEMO/11/204 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-204_de.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015)
European Commission. (11 May 2011). Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council and Commission Pledging Conference on Relocation and Resettlement, MEMO/11/285, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-285_en.htm, (accessed 5 June 2013)
European Commission. (22 May 2011). Remarks by Catherine Ashton at the opening of the EU Office in Benghazi, SPEECH/11/364 (Press Release). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-364_en.htm, (accessed 1 June 2013)
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European Commission. (14 July 2011). Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle following his meeting with Dr Mahmoud Jibril, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Libyan Transitional National Council, MEMO/11/509, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-509_en.htm, (accessed 7 June 2013)
European Commission. (22 August 2011). Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on developments in Libya. A 323/11 (Press Release). http://ec.europa.eu/danmark/documents/alle_emner/eksterne/ashton_libya.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2013)
European Commission. (22 August 2011). Joint statement by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy on Libya, MEMO/11/563, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-563_en.htm, (accessed 1 June 2013)
European Commission. (23 August 2011). European support of €110 million for economic recovery. (Press Release), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-974_en.htm, (accessed 5 April 2015)
European Commission. (24 August 2011) Libya: EU geared up for the humanitarian challenge, (Press Release) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-983_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 27 July 2015)
European Commission. (3 September 2011). Remarks on UN Human Rights Council. (Press Release). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-161_en.htm, (accessed 20 March 2013)
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European Commission. (27 September 2011) First meeting of EU/Tunisia Task Force to support transition to democracy and economic recovery. (Press Release). IP/11/1087 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1087_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015)
European Commission. (29 September 2011) Comments by the HR/VP Catherine Ashton following the EU/Tunisia Task Force. MEMO/11/650 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-650_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 5 April 2013)
European Commission. (10 October 2011) 3117th Council meeting Foreign Affairs Luxembourg, PRES/11/357 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-11-357_en.htm, (accessed 10 March 2013)
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European Commission. (14 December 2011). EU agrees to start trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. (Press Release). IP/11/1545 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1545_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 4 October 2015)
European Commission. (15 December 2011). EU helps to further stabilize Libya through support for education, administration and civil society, IP/11/1555, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1555_en.htm, (accessed 15 March 2013)
European Commission. (22 December 2011). New EU program to support political and democratic reform in Southern Mediterranean. IP/11/1597 (Press Release). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1597_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015)
European Commission. (27 December 2011) Statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Fuele. MEMO/11/947 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-947_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 7 November 2015)
European Commission. (2012) Helping worldwide: EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection in 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/2012/Helping_worldwide.pdf, (accessed 7 June 2013) https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34569
European Commission. (3 February 2012). Arab Spring Press Release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-66_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 9 June 2015)
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European Commission. (15 May 2012). EU bolsters its support to reformers in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods, (Press Release) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-474_en.htm, (accessed 5 March 2013)
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EAAS
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Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to explain if the way the EU assesses its interests (both norma-tive and rational) and foreign policy goals corresponds to its actions in North Africa during the Arab Spring process. It seeks to understand whether the EU's conduct in the areas of security, economic prosperity and value projection in Tunisia and Libya was based more on material interests or on values by also taking member state involvement into consideration. This study adopts an original approach, using insights from neoclassical realism. The research findings it presents are based on the author's extensive analysis of EU documents, expert interviews, primary sources and secondary literature. The author moved to Ankara after the completion of her doctoral studies in Cologne. Her research interests are EU foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy and foreign policy analysis.

Zusammenfassung

Das Ziel der Autorin ist es darzulegen, ob die Interessen (sowohl normative als auch rationale) und Ziele der europäischen Außenpolitik mit den Aktionen/Handlungen der Union in Nordafrika während des Arabischen Frühlings übereinstimmen. Ist das außenpolitische Verhalten der EU in den Bereichen Sicherheit, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Wertesicherheit in Tunesien und Libyen mehr materiellen Interessen geschuldet oder ist es normativer Natur? Durch Einbeziehung von Erkenntnissen des neoklassischen Realismus verwendet die Autorin hierbei eine neue Methode. Die Studie beinhaltet eine weitreichende Analyse von EU Dokumenten, Experten Interviews und Primär- und Sekundärquellen.

Die Autorin ist nach Abschluss der Doktorarbeit in Köln nach Ankara umgezogen. Ihre Forschungsinteressen liegen in der Europäischen und Türkischen Außenpolitik und der Außenpolitikanalyse.