Das Management der dritten Großen Koalition in Deutschland 2013 bis 2015: unangefochtene Dominanz der drei Parteivorsitzenden

Patrick Horst

doi:10.5771/0340-1758-2015-4-852

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- I–IV Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis I–IV
- 673–674 EDITORIAL 673–674
- 675–829 DOKUMENTATION UND ANALYSEN 675–829
  - 675–691 Wissenschaftliche Wahlprognosen – Alternative oder Ergänzung zu Umfragen? Arndt Leininger Arndt Leininger 675–691
  - 692–707 Zur Wahrnehmung und Glaubwürdigkeit von Umfragen aus Sicht der Bürger: Ein Test zweier notwendiger Bedingungen für Umfrageeffekte Thorsten Faas Thorsten Faas 692–707
  - 708–729 Wahlumfragen und der Willensbildungsprozess der Wähler im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl 2013 Hanna Hoffmann Hanna Hoffmann 708–729
  - 730–745 Alles eine Frage der Umfragen? Ursachen von Koalitionserwartungen im Bundestagswahlkampf 2013 Thomas Zerback, Carsten Reinemann Thomas Zerback, Carsten Reinemann 730–745
  - 746–759 Haben die Demoskopen die FDP aus dem Bundestag vertrieben? Ergebnisse einer experimentellen Studie Thorsten Faas, Sascha Huber Thorsten Faas, Sascha Huber 746–759
  - 760–777 Staatliche Regulierung und die Freiheit der Umfrageforschung weltweit Thomas, Petersen Thomas, Petersen 760–777
  - 778–794 Auf dem Wege zur europäischen Gewaltenverschränkung: der Deutsche Bundestag während der Eurozonenkrise Timm Beichelt Timm Beichelt 778–794
  - 795–809 Institutionelle Regeln oder politische Kultur? Faktoren der parlamentarischen Mitgliederfluktuation in der Schweiz Antoinette Feh Widmer, Adrian Vatter Antoinette Feh Widmer, Adrian Vatter 795–809
  - 810–819 Zum Rederecht von Liedermachern – Durfte Wolf Biermann im Deutschen Bundestag reden, obwohl er singen sollte? Christoph Smets Christoph Smets 810–819
  - 820–829 Die zeitliche Begrenzung des Untersuchungsausschusses Björn-Christian Kleih und, Christine Rex Björn-Christian Kleih und, Christine Rex 820–829
- 830–886 AUFSÄTZE 830–886
  - 830–851 Halbzeit: Die Entwicklung des Parteiensystems nach der Bundestagswahl 2013 Oskar Niedermayer Oskar Niedermayer 830–851
  - 852–873 Das Management der dritten Großen Koalition in Deutschland 2013 bis 2015: unangefochtene Dominanz der drei Parteivorsitzenden Patrick Horst Patrick Horst 852–873
  - 874–886 Anmerkungen zur Koalitionsdemokratie und ein Plädoyer für die Beendigung des Lagerdenkens Ingo von Münch Ingo von Münch 874–886
- 887–906 REZENSIONEN 887–906
- 907–916 MITTEILUNG 907–916
  - 907–910 Populismus in Europa – Konsequenzen für Parteien und Parlamente. Eine Veranstaltung der DVParl am 29. Juni 2015 in Berlin Philipp Kahlert Philipp Kahlert 907–910
  - 911–916 ABSTRACTS . 911–916
Durchsuchen Sie das Werk
Geben Sie ein Keyword in die Suchleiste ein
No access

ZParl Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen , page 852 - 873

Das Management der dritten Großen Koalition in Deutschland 2013 bis 2015: unangefochtene Dominanz der drei Parteivorsitzenden

Autoren

Patrick Horst

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0340-1758-2015-4-852
- ISSN: 0340-1758
- ISSN online: 0340-1758
Zusammenfassung

In fundamental aspects the management of the third Grand Coalition does not differ from the conflict handling in other coalitions. The importance of coalition agreements as an instrument of conflict reduction has grown, although it tends to decrease over time. Coalition bargaining follows the same pattern as ever but it takes longer. In 2013, it took almost three months due to the fact that the Social Democrats made use of an intraparty membership vote on the coalition treaty for the first time in history. The third Grand Coalition respected basic cooperative norms of coalition management as well. Specific characteristics in the management of grand coalitions result from the fact that the two main competitors of the party system work together. This leads to a heightened conflict intensity, which demands special efforts of explaining the day-to-day decision-making. In the practice of the third Grand Coalition this has lead to a centralization of the decision-making processes. Whereas the coalition committee is of subordinate significance as an instrument of conflict resolution, the coalition summits of the three party chairs are dominating the internal decision- making processes. Finally, grand coalitions work with the precognition that they will last only until the end of the election period. [ZParl, vol. 46 (2015), no. 4, pp. 852 – 873]

Abstract

In fundamental aspects the management of the third Grand Coalition does not differ from the conflict handling in other coalitions. The importance of coalition agreements as an instrument of conflict reduction has grown, although it tends to decrease over time. Coalition bargaining follows the same pattern as ever but it takes longer. In 2013, it took almost three months due to the fact that the Social Democrats made use of an intraparty membership vote on the coalition treaty for the first time in history. The third Grand Coalition respected basic cooperative norms of coalition management as well. Specific characteristics in the management of grand coalitions result from the fact that the two main competitors of the party system work together. This leads to a heightened conflict intensity, which demands special efforts of explaining the day-to-day decision-making. In the practice of the third Grand Coalition this has lead to a centralization of the decision-making processes. Whereas the coalition committee is of subordinate significance as an instrument of conflict resolution, the coalition summits of the three party chairs are dominating the internal decision- making processes. Finally, grand coalitions work with the precognition that they will last only until the end of the election period. [ZParl, vol. 46 (2015), no. 4, pp. 852 – 873]
Share