Wait, see and hope: Explaining crisis management in the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism

István Benczes

doi:10.5771/1610-7780-2017-4-606

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- I–II Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis I–II
- 603–605 Nachruf auf Joachim Jens Hesse, 20.11.1942 – 17.02.2018 603–605
- 606–689 Abhandlungen / Analyses 606–689
  - 606–626 Wait, see and hope: Explaining crisis management in the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism István Benczes István Benczes 606–626
  - 627–656 Wähler und Parteien bei der Bundestagswahl 2017: Eine Analyse des Entscheidungsverhaltens auf Basis von Paneldaten der German Longitudinal Election Study Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck 627–656
  - 657–670 Deutschland, quo vadis? Neue Regierung, alte Herausforderungen Lewe Bahnsen, Gerrit Manthei, Bernd Raffelhüschen Lewe Bahnsen, Gerrit Manthei, Bernd Raffelhüschen 657–670
  - 671–689 Die Zukunft der europäischen Grundfreiheiten: Plädoyer für eine Erweiterung der EU-Reformdebatte Martin Höpner Martin Höpner 671–689
- 690–707 Forschungsberichte / Reports 690–707
  - „The Britain I knew is ceasing to exist“. Die konstitutionelle Sprengkraft von Devolution und EU-Austritt im Vereinigten Königreich Stefan Schieren Stefan Schieren
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ZSE Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften | Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy , page 606 - 626

Wait, see and hope: Explaining crisis management in the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism

Autoren

István Benczes

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/1610-7780-2017-4-606
- ISSN: 1610-7780
- ISSN online: 1610-7780
Abstract

Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), a state-centric, rationalist-institutionalist paradigm based upon strict microfoundational assumptions, has often been re- ferred to as the baseline theory amongst European integration theories, due to its theoretical soundness, analytical rigour and empirical power1. It is rather surprising that in spite of its presumable relevance in providing a sound inter- pretation of crisis management, LI has not yet been too active in explaining the post-crisis events of the EU - the only exception being Schimmelfennig2. In this paper, Schimmelfennig argued that the situation where every party wanted to preserve the single currency by also trying to minimize the costs of crisis man- agement could be best depicted by the so-called “chicken game”, a model where the winner takes it all. This paper wants to demonstrate that the “chicken game” might not be an appropriate choice for understanding the actions (and inaction) of member states in the post-crisis situation. It is argued instead that national governments have been engaged more rather in a game of “war-of-attrition”
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