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Soft Law and its Importance in Ensuring Member States' Compliance with Union Law / Table of Cases
Soft Law and its Importance in Ensuring Member States' Compliance with Union Law / Table of Cases
Contents
Chapter
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1–20
Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
1–20
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21–26
Abbreviations
21–26
Details
27–54
Table of Cases
27–54
Details
Court of Justice
Court of Justice: Opinions of the Advocates General
Court of First Instance / General Court
Permanent Court of International Justice / International Court of Justice
Other judicial bodies
55–66
Table of Acts (Selection)
55–66
Details
Council, European Parliament or European Parliament and Council (together)
Commission
Other actors
67–74
I. INTRODUCTION
67–74
Details
1. Ambition and structure
2. Methodology and embedding in legal scholarship
3. Some technicalities
75–148
II. SOFT LAW: TERMINOLOGY AND LOCALISATION
75–148
Details
1. Origins and concepts: a theoretical account of ‘soft law’
1.1. Origins, ideas and challenges: a tour d’horizon
1.1.1. Terminology, recognition and occurrence in practice: an approximation
1.1.2. The challenges of using public international law as a starting point
1.2. Different concepts of soft law
1.3. Discussion and conclusions
1.3.1. Different schools of thought
1.3.2. On legal (non-)bindingness as distinctive feature
1.3.3. The creators of soft law
1.3.3.1. On the difference between public and private legal action
1.3.3.2. Non-binding norms: public and private creators
1.3.4. A concept of ‘soft law’
2. Delimitation of soft law
2.1. From law
2.1.1. Delimitation with a view to enforceability and effectiveness
2.1.1.1. On the issue of enforceability
2.1.1.2. On the issue of effectiveness
2.1.2. The recognition of law, soft law and other output of public authority: relevant indicators
2.1.3. Exemplifying the proximity between law and soft law
2.1.3.1. General examples
2.1.3.2. Special effects of public international law in EU law – the Kadi saga and the case of WTO law
2.1.3.2.1. Introduction
2.1.3.2.2. The effect of UN law in the EU legal order, exemplified in the Kadi cases
2.1.3.2.3. The effect of WTO law in the EU legal order
2.1.3.2.4. Discussion
2.2. From other sets of norms
2.2.1. Custom and customary law
2.2.2. Morals
2.2.3. Regulation by private actors: the example of standards
2.3. From other output of public bodies
149–396
III. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF EU SOFT LAW
149–396
Details
1. Introduction and overview
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Overview of the historical and current use of EU soft law
2. Different forms of EU soft law: originators and addressees
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Originators
2.2.1. On the question of assignment
2.2.2. The EU’s institutions
2.2.3. The EU’s bodies, offices and agencies
2.2.4. MS and non-EU bodies
2.2.4.1. Acts relating to different legal orders
2.2.4.2. Incursus: The Memoranda of Understanding concluded under the so-called umbrellas (rescue measures to protect the Eurozone)
2.2.4.2.1. Contextualisation in between EU law and public international law
2.2.4.2.2. On the question of legal bindingness
2.3. Addressees
2.4. Legally non-binding acts other than soft law
3. The legal bases of soft law
3.1. Preliminary remarks: the meaning of Article 288 TFEU for EU soft law
3.1.1. The difference between recommendations and opinions
3.1.2. Is there a numerus clausus of EU soft law acts?
3.2. The applicability of the principle of conferred powers
3.2.1. Introduction
3.2.2. The principle of conferral – an interpretation of the relevant terms
3.2.3. The case law of the CJEU
3.2.4. Résumé
3.3. Special features of the EU’s competence regime
3.3.1. The implied powers doctrine and powers implied in competence clauses
3.3.2. Argumentum a maiore ad minus
3.3.2.1. The argumentum a maiore ad minus in EU law
3.3.2.2. The (lack of an) argumentum a maiore (law) ad minus (soft law) in selected Treaty provisions
3.3.3. Internal soft law
3.3.3.1. The phenomenon of internal soft law
3.3.3.2. The competence to adopt internal soft law
3.4. General competence clauses in the Treaties
3.4.1. Introduction
3.4.2. Article 288 TFEU – a general competence clause?
3.4.3. Article 292 TFEU
3.4.3.1. The power to adopt recommendations of the Council and of the Council and the EP, respectively
3.4.3.2. The power to adopt recommendations of the Commission and of the ECB, respectively
3.4.4. Article 127 para 4 and Article 132 para 1 (3rd indent) TFEU
3.4.5. Opinions of committees
3.4.6. Limits to a ‘general’ competence to adopt soft law
3.5. Special competence clauses in the Treaties
3.5.1. Introduction
3.5.2. Institutions
3.5.2.1. Commission
3.5.2.1.1. Support of decision-making/rule-making
3.5.2.1.2. Initiation of (soft) decision-making/rule-making
3.5.2.1.3. Soft decision-making/rule-making
3.5.2.2. Council
3.5.2.2.1. Support of decision-making
3.5.2.2.2. Initiation of decision-making
3.5.2.2.3. Soft decision-making/rule-making
3.5.2.3. European Council – soft rule-making
3.5.2.4. European Parliament – support of decision-making/rule-making
3.5.2.5. Court of Justice of the European Union (and its components) – support and initiation of and actual (soft) decision-making/rule-making?
3.5.2.6. European Central Bank
3.5.2.6.1. Support and initiation of rule-making
3.5.2.6.2. Soft decision-making
3.5.3. Other actors
3.5.3.1. EU-internal actors
3.5.3.2. EU-external actors
3.6. Competences to adopt EU soft law other than recommendations and opinions
3.7. Special competence clauses in EU secondary law and in public international law
3.7.1. Introduction
3.7.2. Special competence clauses in EU secondary law
3.7.2.1. Regulation 182/2011
3.7.2.2. Council Regulation 168/2007
3.7.3. Special competence clauses in public international law
3.8. The effects of a lack of a legal basis
3.9. The revisitation of the above approaches on the difference between recommendations and opinions, on whether there is a numerus clausus of EU soft law acts, and on the principle of conferral
3.10. Résumé and transition
4. Legal, factual and mixed effects of soft law
4.1. Introduction
4.2. Legal effects
4.2.1. Introduction
4.2.2. Member States
4.2.2.1. The effects of soft law according to the Court’s case law
4.2.2.1.1. Introduction
4.2.2.1.2. The effects on the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary of the MS
4.2.2.1.3. Prima facie soft law which turns out to be legally binding
4.2.2.2. The actual or potential legal reasons for these effects
4.2.2.2.1. Administrative cooperation according to Article 197 TFEU
4.2.2.2.2. Sincere cooperation (‘loyalty’) according to Article 4 para 3 TEU
4.2.2.2.2.1. Overview
4.2.2.2.2.2. The consequences for soft law
4.2.2.2.3. The principle of interpretation of national law in line with Union law
4.2.2.2.4. Legal certainty, legitimate expectations, equality and effectiveness
4.2.3. Institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU
4.2.3.1. The effects of soft law according to the Court’s case law
4.2.3.2. The actual or potential legal reasons for these effects
4.2.3.2.1. Sincere cooperation (‘loyalty’) according to Article 13 para 2 TEU
4.2.3.2.2. Article 296 para 2 TFEU
4.2.3.2.3. Legal certainty, legitimate expectations, equality and effectiveness
4.3. Factual effects
4.3.1. Introduction
4.3.2. Human nature
4.3.2.1. The steering effects of ‘nudging’
4.3.2.2. EU soft law created by MS officials
4.4. Mixed effects
5. The purposes of soft law
5.1. On the categorisation of soft law in general
5.2. On the case of EU soft law in particular
5.2.1. Accepted purposes of EU soft law
5.2.2. Avoiding law as a purpose of EU soft law
6. Judicial review of soft law
6.1. Introduction
6.2. The annulment procedure
6.3. The preliminary reference procedure
6.4. Other procedures
397–486
IV. MECHANISMS IN EU LAW TO ENSURE LEGAL COMPLIANCE OF MEMBER STATES
397–486
Details
1. Introduction
2. The mechanisms in detail
2.1. The general compliance mechanism: the Treaty infringement procedure
2.1.1. Introduction
2.1.2. The procedure in short
2.1.3. Soft and hard elements of the procedure
2.2. Special compliance mechanisms
2.2.1. Hard compliance mechanisms
2.2.1.1. In primary law
2.2.1.1.1. Article 106 para 3 TFEU
2.2.1.1.2. Article 108 TFEU
2.2.1.1.3. Article 114 TFEU
2.2.1.1.4. Article 348 TFEU
2.2.1.1.5. Article 144 TFEU
2.2.1.2. In secondary law
2.2.1.2.1. Article 13 para 1 of Directive 2001/95/EC
2.2.1.2.2. Articles 70 f of Regulation 2018/1139
2.2.1.2.3. Article 29 para 2 of Regulation 806/2014
2.2.1.2.4. Article 63 of Regulation 2019/943
2.2.1.2.5. Articles 18 and 19 of Regulation 1093/2010
2.2.1.2.6. Safeguard clauses
2.2.1.3. Summary and résumé
2.2.2. Mixed compliance mechanisms
2.2.2.1. In primary law
2.2.2.1.1. Articles 116 and 117 TFEU
2.2.2.1.2. Article 126 TFEU
2.2.2.1.3. Article 271 lit a and d TFEU
2.2.2.2. In secondary law
2.2.2.2.1. Article 63 of Directive 2019/944
2.2.2.2.2. Articles 22 f and 28 of Council Regulation 2015/1589
2.2.2.2.3. Article 17 of Regulation 1093/2010
2.2.2.2.4. The excessive imbalance procedure laid down in Regulations 1176/2011 and 1174/2011
2.2.2.2.5. Article 7 para 4 of Regulation 806/2014
2.2.2.2.6. Article 25 of Regulation 2016/796
2.2.2.3. Summary and résumé
2.2.3. Soft compliance mechanisms
2.2.3.1. In primary law
2.2.3.1.1. Article 121 TFEU
2.2.3.1.2. Article 148 para 4 TFEU
2.2.3.2. In secondary law
2.2.3.2.1. Article 6 paras 5–7 of Regulation 2019/942
2.2.3.2.2. Article 53 of Directive 2019/944
2.2.3.2.3. Article 33 of Directive 2018/1972
2.2.3.2.4. Article 3 para 7 of Regulation 472/2013
2.2.3.2.5. Articles 16 and 17 of Regulation 1092/2010
2.2.3.2.6. Article 6 of Regulation 2019/452
2.2.3.3. Summary and résumé
487–636
V. CLASSIFICATION AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS
487–636
Details
1. Introduction
2. Classification
2.1. The EU actors involved in compliance mechanisms
2.2. The policy fields and the primary legal bases concerned
2.3. The sequence and addressees of acts in compliance mechanisms
2.4. The purposes of soft law acts in compliance mechanisms
2.4.1. The question of command
2.4.2. The Treaty infringement procedure
2.4.3. The purpose of preparation – not always a matter of course
2.4.4. The purpose of company (‘accompagnement’) and the right to be heard
2.4.5. Substitution or permanent alternative – two purposes which often overlap
2.4.6. Institutional transformation as a purpose of soft law?
2.5. The deviation from the Treaty infringement procedure
2.5.1. The ubiquity of the Treaty infringement procedure
2.5.2. Time of intervention, discretion, and confidentiality
2.5.3. Efficiency concerns and EU Pilot
2.5.4. The MS’ right to be heard
2.6. Why the compliance mechanisms ‘look the way they look’
3. Legal assessment
3.1. Compliance mechanisms: implementation or enforcement?
3.1.1. The characteristics of implementation and enforcement
3.1.1.1. Introduction
3.1.1.2. Implementation and enforcement under the Treaties
3.1.1.2.1. Main characteristics
3.1.1.2.1.1. Primary aim, time of intervention, and the discretion granted under Article 291 TFEU
3.1.1.2.1.2. Different approaches towards ensuring compliance: concretisation and determination
3.1.1.2.1.3. The indicative value of the material scope of and institutional questions relating to compliance mechanisms
3.1.1.2.2. The preliminary reference procedure, the procedure pursuant to Article 218 para 11 TFEU, and the excessive deficit procedure – special cases
3.1.1.2.3. Two further aspects: soft law and sanctions
3.1.1.2.4. Conclusion
3.1.2. The categorisation of the compliance mechanisms
3.1.2.1. Introduction
3.1.2.2. Hard mechanisms
3.1.2.3. Mixed mechanisms
3.1.2.4. Soft mechanisms
3.2. The primary legal bases of compliance mechanisms established through secondary law
3.2.1. Introduction
3.2.2. A frequently used legal basis: Article 114 TFEU
3.2.2.1. Overview
3.2.2.2. An appropriate legal basis for compliance mechanisms?
3.2.3. The compliance mechanisms based on Article 114 TFEU
3.2.3.1. Introduction
3.2.3.2. Hard and mixed mechanisms
3.2.3.3. Soft mechanisms
3.2.4. Other primary legal bases
3.2.4.1. Hard mechanisms
3.2.4.2. Mixed mechanisms
3.2.4.3. Soft mechanisms
3.3. The institutional balance of the EU
3.3.1. Introduction
3.3.2. The Treaty infringement procedure
3.3.3. Judicial review
3.3.4. The neglection of Article 291 para 2 TFEU and the empowerment of European agencies
3.3.4.1. Introduction
3.3.4.2. European agencies and Article 291 para 2 TFEU
3.4. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
3.4.1. Introduction
3.4.2. The principle of subsidiarity
3.4.2.1. Compliance mechanisms in general
3.4.2.2. Implementing and enforcement mechanisms in particular
3.4.2.3. On the issue of soft law
3.4.3. The principle of proportionality
3.4.3.1. The Treaty infringement procedure as the elephant in the room
3.4.3.2. The specific compliance mechanisms
3.4.2.3. Inter-institutional proportionality considerations in the legislative process and the final decision-making power of the Court
3.5. The effects of soft law in compliance mechanisms: varying degrees of authority?
3.5.1. Introduction
3.5.2. Degrees of authority or mere legislative wordiness?
3.5.3. Considerations in the legislative process and conclusions
3.6. Legal protection for the Member States
3.6.1. Introduction
3.6.2. The action for annulment and the action for failure to act
3.6.3. The MS’ motivation to seek judicial protection
637–650
VI. CONCLUSION
637–650
Details
1. Summary
2. Closing remarks and outlook
2.1. Soft law
2.2. Compliance mechanisms
651–708
Bibliography
651–708
Details
709–714
709–714
Details
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Soft Law and its Importance in Ensuring Member States' Compliance with Union Law , page 27 - 54
Table of Cases
Autoren
Paul Weismann
DOI
doi.org/10.5771/9783748935865-27
ISBN print: 978-3-7560-0008-1
ISBN online: 978-3-7489-3586-5
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