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Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine / Contributing Authors
Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine / Contributing Authors
Contents
Chapter
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1–16
Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
1–16
Details
19–154
I. Background and Causes
19–154
19–30
Chapter 1: The Ukraine War as a Result of Geopolitical Rivalry?
Joris Van Bladel
Joris Van Bladel
19–30
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 The Grinding Power of Geopolitics
3 NATO Enlargement: A Complicated and Controversial Process
4 Ukraine as an Integral Part of Europe’s Security Landscape
5 Conclusion
31–46
Chapter 2: The Ukraine War as a Regional Confrontation
Jakob Wöllenstein
Jakob Wöllenstein
31–46
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 Continuities
3 Russia’s Path to Ideology-Driven Authoritarianism
4 Lessons for the West
5 Conclusion
47–70
Chapter 3: Russia’s Narratives and Disinformation in the War on Ukraine
Susanne Spahn
Susanne Spahn
47–70
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 Russia’s State Media Circumvent EU Sanctions
3 Narrative 1: The Fight against Fascists
4 Narrative 2: Ukraine is Not a Separate Nation with Its Own History
5 Narrative 3: Ukrainians Must Be Liberated from Nazis
6 Narrative 4: The West Wages War against Russia
7 Narrative 5: The West is Decadent and Weak
8 Narrative 6: Russia Is an Empire in Eurasia
9 Narrative 7: Supporting Ukraine Leads the West to Its Downfall
10 Conclusion
71–94
Chapter 4: Russia’s Foreign Policy Determinants: Expansionist Policy and “Imperialism” since 1991
Olha Husieva
Olha Husieva
71–94
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 The Old “New” Russia: The Ideological Implications of Modern Russian Imperialism
2.1 “Velikaya Derzhava”: Great(er) Russia
2.2 “Pravoslavie”: Russian Orthodoxy
2.3 “Us” versus “the West”
2.4 Post-Soviet Nostalgia
3 Russian Appeals to Historical Hegemony: Transnistria and Chechnya
4 A Decade of Certainty: Putin’s Ambition to Transform Russia into a Superpower
5 Conclusion
95–118
Chapter 5: Russia’s Dictated Non-Peace in the Donbas 2014–2022: Why the Minsk Agreements Were Doomed to Fail
Hugo von Essen, Andreas Umland
Hugo von Essen, Andreas Umland
95–118
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 The History of the Minsk Agreements
2.1 Legitimation of International Legal Nihilism
2.2 Ignoring Basic Democratic Principles
2.3 Letting the Aggressor Reap the Fruits of the Aggression
3 Conclusions and Recommendations for Action
119–154
Chapter 6: Germany’s “Ostpolitik” until Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Joachim Krause
Joachim Krause
119–154
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 The Years of the Kohl Government (1990–1998)
3 The Phase of the Red-Green Coalition (1998–2005)
4 The First Merkel Coalition (2005–2009)
5 The Years of the Christian-Liberal Coalition (2009–2013)
6 The Years of the Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD (2013–2021)
7 How Much Did Germany Harm Ukraine?
157–276
II. War Events and Developments
157–276
157–178
Chapter 7: Russia’s Strategy in the Ukraine War: Restoring Russian Greatness by Any Means
Johanna Möhring
Johanna Möhring
157–178
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
1.1 Russia's Neo-Imperial Consolidation of Power and Systemic Competition
1.2 Ukraine as the Key to Russian Great Power Politics
2 Strategic Implementation of Russian Objectives
2.1 Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Dual Strategy
2.2 Permanent Confrontation by Indirect Means
2.3 The Strategic Role of the Russian Military
3 Russia’s Indirect and Direct Strategy to End Ukrainian Statehood
3.1 Preventing Western Integration through the Annexation of Crimea and War in Eastern Ukraine
3.2 Genesis of a “Regime Change by Military Means”
4 The Russian “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine
4.1 The Failure of Russian Warfare
4.2 The Russian War against Ukraine in the Shadow of Atomic Weapons
5 Outlook
179–196
Chapter 8: Operational-Tactical Approach of the Russian Army in the 2022 Ukraine War
Markus Reisner
Markus Reisner
179–196
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 The Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG)
3 Phase 1: The Russian Attack on February 24, 2022
3.1 Deployment of Combined Armies
3.2 The Defensive Success of Ukraine
4 Phase 2: The Formation of a New Russian Heavyweight
4.1 The “Russian Steamroller”
5 Phase 3: The Ukrainian Counterattack
5.1 The Offensive in the Kherson to Lyman Area
Factor Terrain
Factor Force
Time Factor
Factor Information
5.2 Offensive in Kharkiv
Factor Terrain
Factor Force
Time Factor
Factor Information
6 Historical Comparisons
7 Summary and Outlook
197–222
Chapter 9: Ukraine’s Defense against Russia’s War of Aggression in 2022
Oleksiy Melnyk, Olha Husieva
Oleksiy Melnyk, Olha Husieva
197–222
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 The Ukrainian Defense Army until 2022: Experience is Gained
2 Reaction to the Russian Invasion in 2022
3 The Military Support from the West
4 National Weapons Development and Production in Ukraine
5 The Non-Material Component of Ukrainian Defense: A Factor of Morale
6 Ukraine’s Security Cooperation with the West: From Formal Contacts to Existential Partnership
7 Complicated but Vital Relations between Ukraine and Germany in 2022
8 Conclusion
223–238
Chapter 10: The Russian War of Aggression against Ukraine: A Classification under International and Human Rights Law
Christina Binder
Christina Binder
223–238
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 General International Law: ius ad bellum
3 International Humanitarian Law (IHL): ius in bello
4 International Human Rights
5 International Criminal Law
6 International Court of Justice (ICJ)
7 Conclusion
239–250
Chapter 11: The Cyber Dimension in Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine
Arthur de Liedekerke, Kira Frankenthal
Arthur de Liedekerke, Kira Frankenthal
239–250
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 The Role of Cyber-Based Operations in Russia’s War against Ukraine in 2022
3 The Cyber Resistance of Ukraine
4 The Impact of Russian Cyberattacks on Europe and Germany
5 First Lessons
6 Conclusion
251–276
Chapter 12: The Ukraine War as an Exogenous Shock for the Image of Russia and Alliance Solidarity in the German Population
Timo Graf
Timo Graf
251–276
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 On the Importance of Public Opinion for Alliance Defense
3 On the Importance of Threat Perceptions
4 Russia as a Threat from the Perspective of the German Population
5 Between Principle and Practice: The Alliance Solidarity of the Germans
6 The Influence of Threat Perceptions on Alliance Solidarity
7 Low Level of Knowledge about NATO Missions Remains a Problem
8 Conclusion
279–354
III. Zeitenwende for Germany’s Security Policy
279–354
279–286
Chapter 13: Implications of the Russian War of Aggression against Ukraine for German Foreign and Security Policy
Tobias Lindner
Tobias Lindner
279–286
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 What Does Zeitenwende Mean in Terms of Security Policy?
2 What Does Zeitenwende Mean for Our Russia Policy?
3 What Does Zeitenwende Mean for Our Ukraine Policy?
4 Conclusion
287–298
Chapter 14: Europe’s Response to the Russian War of Aggression in Ukraine and Germany’s Place in the European Security Architecture
Angela Mehrer, Jana Puglierin
Angela Mehrer, Jana Puglierin
287–298
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 European Reactions to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
2 EU Sanctions against Russia: Unity in Diversity in the Face of New Power Dynamics
2.1 A “Visa Ban” for Russian Citizens
2.2 A (Partial) Oil and Gas Embargo
3 The Future of Europe: A New Orientation of the European Security Order
4 Conclusion
299–310
Chapter 15: The Security Autonomy of Europe and the Hegemonic Shadow of NATO
Markus Kaim, Ronja Kempin
Markus Kaim, Ronja Kempin
299–310
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 The USA as a “European Power”
2 A Snapshot
3 American Ambivalence
4 New Dynamics
4.1 Strategic Compass
4.2 European Peace Facility
4.3 EUMAM Ukraine
5 Ambivalence of the EU Member States
6 Conclusion: What Next?
311–324
Chapter 16: China’s Role and Strategic Choice in the Ukraine War
Sarah Kirchberger
Sarah Kirchberger
311–324
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 Before the Invasion: Ignored U.S. Warnings and a Sino-Russian Declaration of “Limitless” Friendship
3 After the Beginning of the Invasion: Only Covert Chinese Support for Russia, but Why?
4 The War Becomes a Problem: Shielding from the Consequences of Putin’s Strategic Miscalculation
5 Effects of the Ukraine War on the Relations Between China and Russia
6 What Tactical Lessons Could China Learn from the War in Ukraine?
7 Conclusions
325–348
Chapter 17: Zeitenwende Without Strength? Strategic Mirror Axes of Vital German Security Interests: Eastern Flank and East Asia
Maximilian Terhalle
Maximilian Terhalle
325–348
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 Timeless Strategic Insights
2.1 Wars Cannot Be Banned, Only Defined Away
2.2 Strategists Do Not See “Policy Areas”, Only Instruments of State Power
2.3 Not International Law, Only Power-Political Will Preserves Internationally Its Own Concept of Order
2.4 Strategists Do Not Disregard the “Big Picture” that the Military Superpowers Draw of an Era
3 Strategy, the Time Factor and Strategy Planning
4 Zeitenwende Must Be Strategically Thought of Globally, not in Terms of Central Europe
5 No Zeitenwende Without Strategic Mindset: Three Flaws
349–354
Chapter 18: Realignment of the German Security Architecture after 2022
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
349–354
Details
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
2 Challenges of German Security Policy
3 Conclusion
355–359
List of Editors and Contributors
355–359
355–355
The Editors
355–355
Details
356–359
Contributing Authors
356–359
Details
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Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine , page 356 - 359
Contributing Authors
Autoren
Stefan Hansen (Ed.)
Olha Husieva (Ed.)
Kira Frankenthal (Ed.)
DOI
doi.org/10.5771/9783748917205-356
ISBN print: 978-3-7560-1159-9
ISBN online: 978-3-7489-1720-5
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