The Substance of Contractual Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century: The South African Experience

Deeksha Bhana

doi:10.5771/0506-7286-2015-4-491

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- 1–442 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 1–442
- 443–515 Abhandlungen / Articles 443–515
  - 443–468 Die Änderung des Gesetzgebungsgesetzes der VRCh und die „neue Normalität“ der Gesetzgebung in China Xiaodan Zhang Xiaodan Zhang 443–468
  - 469–490 Land Grabbing in Cambodia as a Crime Against Humanity – Approaches in International Criminal Law Franziska Maria Oehm Franziska Maria Oehm 469–490
  - 491–515 The Substance of Contractual Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century: The South African Experience Deeksha Bhana Deeksha Bhana 491–515
- 516–532 Berichte / Reports 516–532
  - 516–521 Conference Report: 40th Annual Meeting of the Arbeitskreis für Überseeische Verfassungsvergleichung Konrad Vossen, Tanja Herklotz Konrad Vossen, Tanja Herklotz 516–521
  - 522–532 Conference Report: International Law & Economic Development in Africa Romy Klimke Romy Klimke 522–532
- 533–548 Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 533–548
- 548–562 Bibliographie / Bibliography 548–562
  - 548–551 RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG ALLGEMEIN / LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL 548–551
  - 551–554 ASIEN / ASIA 551–554
  - 554–555 LATEINAMERIKA / LATIN AMERICA 554–555
  - 556–562 NAHER UND MITTLERER OSTEN / NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 556–562
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VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee , page 491 - 515

The Substance of Contractual Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century: The South African Experience

Autoren

Deeksha Bhana

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-2015-4-491
- ISSN: 0506-7286
- ISSN online: 2941-9603
Abstract

In this article, I look at the values of freedom, dignity and equality, as they are founded in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and consider how they ought to constitutionalise the legal concept of contractual autonomy. I argue that the conception of contractual autonomy in the post-apartheid era has to be a shifting one that at once needs to be sensitive to the factual context, any applicable fundamental human rights (as entrenched in the Bill of Rights, Chapter Two of the Constitution), as well as the broader constitutional vision of a substantively progressive and transformative South Africa. To this end, I develop what I call the ‘foundational constitutional triad’ and use it as the framework for my ensuing analysis of the founding values. My analysis of the values then, reveals a distinct leaning toward a more full-bodied, substantive conception of legal autonomy. Indeed, this stands to reason given that the constitutional self is grounded essentially in the broader transformative project of South African society. In the end therefore, I maintain that if such an understanding of autonomy is carried forward into the South African law of contract, it would be able effectively to address the constitutional deficiencies of the extant conception of contractual autonomy.
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