The Why, When, How, What, and In How Far of European Employment Policy Co-ordination
195
(cf. Jacobsson/Schmid 2003:130), provides for a Community tool to finance pilot
projects. Yet, activities under the ESF remain largely unlinked to those under the
EES as “neither the Employment Title nor the provisions governing cohesion policy
include any explicit reference to the other” (Hartwig 2002:112; cf. Jacobsson/
Schmid 2003:131). Additionally, the asynchronous policy cycles of the ESF and the
EES suppress explicit coherence between the two, while in parallel, the former,
nevertheless, supported the four pillar approach of the latter (cf. Hartwig 2002:113).
However, secondary legislation is more precise in this context, offering a direct link
between the two (cf. ibid.:112). Therefore, in order to increase effectiveness of the
ESF and the EES, the overall “task is to streamline Community initiatives, pilot
projects and ESF interventions …[as to] date they are far too much two different
worlds …[with] different policy cycles … handled with by different administrations
at both European and (sub-) national level” (Smismans 2004:21; cf. Best/Bossaert
2002:12; Jacobsson/Schmid 2003:130). This request was reinforced by both the
2003 and the 2004 Kok Report and reformed with the 2007 financial perspective (cf.
chapter 3.2.3.3).
3.2.2 The Underlying ‘Policy ID’: Spotlight at the Initial What of the EES
The EES presents “an integrated approach bringing education and vocational training policies, social security systems, labour-market policies, competition and tax
policies closer together” (Jacobsson/Schmid 2003:111). The overall “philosophy
underpinning the EES is that while flexibility is needed, it should be predicated upon
upgrading or renewal of skills, facilitation of mobility and, generally, investment in
human capital” (Begg 2004:4), initiating “a paradigmatic shift towards ‘activation’
and ‘responsibilisation’” (de la Porte/Pochet 2003:22). So, an activation approach
and the focus on active labour market policies are at the heart of the EES’s underlying ‘policy ID’ (cf. Jacobsson/Schmid 2003:111; Jenson/Pochet 2002:4; Serrano
Pascual 2003:141; Tucker 2004:14).
As a method, goal, project, ethic, and ideology (cf. Serrano Pascual 2003:143),
this activation approach targets at job creation, “ways of encouraging people to work
… [,] increasing the activity rate …[,] adaptation of national systems to the challenges linked to the emergence of a new production model …[,] fight against dependence … [and] revision of the representation of the social question” (ibid.). It
most strongly emphasises training and lifelong learning as a basis for the future
development of a skilled labour force and highly adaptable labour markets (cf. de la
Porte/Pochet 2003:24; Heidemann 2003:170; Steinle 2001:152) and replaces “the
old formula of ‘protection against risk’ … by a new idea of ‘ability to adapt to
change’” (Heidemann 2003:174). Moreover, the EES “allows social goals to gain
political purchase on economic policy making” (Laffan/Shaw 2005:10). This specific combination owes much to “the importation of a basic principle of Third Wayism, and the creation of the notion of ‘employability’ as a new term in Eurospeak”
(Jenson/Pochet 2002:7; cf. Tucker 2004:13). At the same time, it represents a
The Why, When, How, What, and In How Far of European Employment Policy Co-ordination
196
supply-side focus “fully compatible with the EMU requirements and the internal
market, as well as the dominant economic approach” (de la Porte/Pochet 2003:42;
cf. chapter 3.3) of the EU, “complement[ing] .. an economic model which continues
to constitute the hard core of European integration” (Pochet 2002:42). Yet, by taking
into account anti-discrimination and equal opportunities, the EES also presents “an
alternative to both neo-liberal preferences and the post-1945 employment patterns”
(Jenson/Pochet 2002:20). It “enables a response to be given to both liberal arguments (reduction of public expenditure, strengthening the free play of the market)
and social-democratic arguments (condition of institutionalisation of solidarity)”
(Serrano Pascual 2003:150; chapter 2.2.2 and 3.1.2). So, “[e]mbedded in [the EES
and] the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 lay divergent assumptions about social market
protection and free market flexibility, between welfare capitalism and ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ capitalism” (Wallace, W. 2005:486; cf. Serrano Pascual 2003:148). These
elements mirror the two approaches dominant at the time of the inception of the EES
(cf. chapter 3.1.2).
Instead of concentrating on a decline in unemployment levels, the aim of the EES
is to raise the level of employment by domestic adaptation to its particular ‘policy
ID’. “Behind this lay concerns about the financial viability of Europe’s social model,
especially in terms of pensions, and the need for a secure revenue base. It followed
that the goal of increasing labour force participation became central, and attention
focussed primarily on increasing and improving labour supply” (Foden/Magnusson
2003:6).
Within the EES’s ‘first-phase’ (1997-2002), its ‘policy ID’ was based on four
strategic pillars: employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability, and equal opportunities (European Council 1997:point 22; European Council 2000a:point 29; cf. graph
8), with the employability pillar becoming the most prominent and significant
trademark of the EES (cf. Foden/Magnusson 2003:6). These “four pillars, which
were agreed upon in a top-down manner, … impl[ied] for some countries important
structural reforms … not necessarily in tune with their dominant national policy
objectives or traditions” (Smismans 2004:15). In such cases, domestic misfit instigated policy adaptation aiming at ?-convergence (similarity towards a common
model) through down-loading of the EES approach.
Especially the employability pillar reflected “the belief that there is significant labour-market mismatching … [that] become[s] more acute through … the process of
technological development and the ageing of the workforce” (Foden/Magnusson
2003:7). It focused on “improving access of the unemployed … to the labour market, both through preventive action, in particular by providing training, and through
‘activation policies’ by reviewing tax and benefit systems” (Smismans 2004:11)
rather than on financing wage replacement costs (cf. Best/Bossaert 2002:3). Main
target groups under this pillar were long-term unemployed and youth.
The entrepreneurship pillar was foreseen to enhance business dynamics as well
as job creation (cf. Foden/Magnusson 2003:7). It assembled measures to support
business start-ups by reducing administrative burdens, simplifying taxation as well
as the overall business environment especially for self-employment and SME. It
The Why, When, How, What, and In How Far of European Employment Policy Co-ordination
197
included the reduction of supplementary wage costs, the support for secondary capital markets and tax system reforms (cf. Best/Bossaert 2002:3).
“Allied to the notion of dynamism, and in some sense rebalancing it, came the
emphasis on negotiating change and the search for ‘flexi-security’”
(Foden/Magnusson 2003:7). Thus, the adaptability pillar referred to overall labour
market reforms by measures aiming at “the modernisation of work organisation in
order to reconcile more flexibility with security and high occupational status”
(Smismans 2004:11; cf. Best/Bossaert 2002:3), establishing the famous, albeit hazy
‘flexicurity paradigm’74 of the EES. Its policy targets were related to enhancing the
flexibility of working hours, labour organisation, and employment contracts or to tax
advantages for in-house training. In this context, the ‘policy ID’ of the EES set new
accents and opened up a path towards a re-interpretation of the policy field’s terminology. This approach followed the insight that, while “promoting flexibility on the
labour market, it is also important to foster new forms of security. Security in today’s labour markets is not a matter of preserving a job for life. In a more dynamic
perspective, security is about building and preserving people’s ability to remain and
progress in the labour market” (Employment Taskforce 2003:28).
The equal opportunities pillar strongly targeted at female participation within the
labour market and promoted measures to reconcile work and family life. It embraced
“gender mainstreaming, tackling gender gaps in unemployment rates, [and] encouraging gender pay equality” (Smismans 2004:11). It, moreover, focused on activities
to improve part-time work conditions and child-care facilities (cf. Best/Bossaert
2002:3; Mósesdóttir 2003:183) as well as measures related to the integration of
persons at a disadvantage into the labour market. With this focus, the equal opportunities pillar that was especially promoted by the Scandinavian countries (cf. Steinle
2001:160) offered instruments “to push the member states towards policy convergence around the dual-breadwinner model” (Mósesdóttir 2003:184), a concept rather
distant from German labour market traditions (cf. chapter 2.2.2.2).
Until the 2003 revision of the EES (cf. chapter 3.2.3.2), the EGs were grouped
under these four pillars.75 The first 19 EGs for 1998 were adopted by the Council in
December 1997 based on the decision of the 1997 extraordinary European Council
on employment (cf. Council of the EU 1997b). The “Commission had proposed
rather more detailed guidelines, accompanied by quantitative benchmarks, than most
member states were willing to accept” (de la Porte/Pochet 2003:22) and, thus, its
proposals were downgraded by the Council. They, yet, provided for two benchmarks
for the “significant increase in the employment rate in Europe on a lasting basis”
(Council of the EU 1997b) and for the decline of the overall unemployment rate (cf.
de la Porte/Pochet 2003:22).
In the course of its lifetime, the EES and its underlying ‘policy ID’ especially
caused by its “intensification in quantitative terms, .. has become more complex, and
many would argue that it has also become increasingly autonomous, becoming a
74 Initially labelled ‚flexi-security’.
75 For a full overview on the EGs 1998 to 2005 cf. table 51.
The Why, When, How, What, and In How Far of European Employment Policy Co-ordination
198
policy process in its own right” (ibid.:25). Accompanying these developments, criticism has been raised “that there is too much red tape, too many goals, and too much
focus on the process itself instead of its results” (cf. Best/Bossaert 2002:9; Langejan
2002b:52). Particularly since the decisions of the Lisbon and Stockholm European
Councils, the four pillars were amended by the concentration of the EGs on the six
key horizontal objectives to
(1) generally raise employment;
(2) provide for a better quality of employment;
(3) strategically promote lifelong learning;
(4) strengthen the involvement of social partners;
(5) establish equilibrium between the strategy’s four building-blocks; and
(6) search for suitable indicators
to measure the success of the EES (cf. Jenson/Pochet 2002:8; Langejan 2002b:49),
that is, ?-convergence (similarity towards a common model).
With the annual recommendations to member states issued since 1999/2000–
assessed to be “the climax of the EES’s practical institutionalisation” (de la
Porte/Pochet 2003:27)–the supranational level additionally disposes over an instrument capable of putting “more pressure on the member states to meet the objectives
set out in the guidelines” (ibid.) and, thus, of fostering the development towards ?convergence, “while ensuring a sort of constitutionalisation of fundamental (social)
rights” (Pochet 2002:32).
Graph 8: The ‘Policy ID’ of the ‘Stand-Alone’ EES (1997-2002)
Indicators
Pillar Equilibrium
Social partnership
Lifelong learning
Employment quality
Employment increase
Entrepreneurship
Measures to
? increase
entrepreneurship
by facilitating to
start-up and run
business,
? simplify
business
environment
? reduce ancillary
wage costs,
? support efficient
secondary market
for capital,
? promote risk
capital and
reforms of tax
systems (reduction
of taxes on labour
force).
Employability
Measures to
? promote
employability by
enhancing the
attributes of
workers,
? promote the
move to active
employment
policy,
? foster the
modernisation of
training systems /
vocational training
of unemployed
persons,
? minimise youth
unemployment by
facilitating the
move from school
to work.
Adaptability
Measures to
? reinforce the
modernisation of
labour
environments,
? increase
flexibility of
working hours,
labour
organisation and
contracts of
employment as
well as tax
advantages for inhouse training.
Equal
opportunities
Measures to
? assure equal
opportunities,
? improve gender
specific problems
through the
integration of parttime work,
? improve childcare opportunities
and equal
employment rates
for men and
women,
? support
employment of
women,
? facilitate reintegration of
women into the
labour market.
EES
Source: Own design based on Council of the EU 1997b:Annex and European Council 1997.
The Why, When, How, What, and In How Far of European Employment Policy Co-ordination
199
3.2.3 Adaptation to the ‘Practice’: The Official Interim Assessment and the Streamlining of the EES – A Re-Interpretation of the ‘Legal Constitution’
As in the case of most treaty-based provision, also the content of the ‘legal constitution’ of the EES witnessed re-interpretation and adaptation to its actual practice.
Based on the first official interim assessment in 2002 and a series of subsequent
evaluation reports, the adaptation of the EES paid tribute to diagnosed shortcomings
and to the actual development of the political practice ever since its inception.
3.2.3.1 The First Five Years: Positive Interim Assessment, Rocketing Complexity –
The EES Achieving Better Practice by Exchange of Best Practice?
The 2002 JER underlined the coherence and clarity of the NAPs and their response
to the horizontal objectives of the EES to have improved over the first five years of
the strategy (cf. Council/European Commission 2003:5). The NAPs were assessed to
present a better policy mix than in previous years, laying more emphasis on equal
opportunities and entrepreneurship. At the same time, “[h]owever, the use of national targets, reporting on the impact of measures on the labour market budgetary
information, evidence of use of structural funds to support the EES and the involvement of key stakeholders all appear largely insufficient” (ibid.). Given that the 2001
situation raised substantial concern, efforts to reach the 50 pp employment target for
older workers by 2010 were assessed to need reinforcement. Furthermore, the
Commission bemoaned quality of work aspects not to be confronted sufficiently by
the member states (cf. Council/European Commission 2003:5; European Commission 2005c:3). This development indicated at thin rather than at thick learning in this
area (cf. chapter 2.1.2.3). On the other hand, initiatives regarding lifelong learning
were assessed to be progressing across Europe, even if the further development of
more inclusive and comprehensive approaches was necessary (cf. Lund 2002:19).
Especially the “widening gap in the take-up of education and training opportunities
between those with low and high skills and between older and younger age groups
..[gave] cause for serious concern” (Council/European Commission 2003:6).
The 2002 annual assessment provided for the scenery, in which the official five
year interim evaluation of the EES took place. As decided by the 2000 Nice Summit,
the EES–after its first five years of lifetime–was subject to an official functional and
political interim evaluation, that “initially [was] a quasi-clandestine evaluation
which, under pressure of its discourse on openness, eventually became public” (de la
Porte/Pochet 2003:41; cf. European Commission 2002d:2; European Council
2000c:ANNEX Ia; Pochet 2002:31). It was taking place in a “three-stage evaluation
process” (Jenson/Pochet 2002:8), focusing on the strategy’s efficiency rather than on
its structural-procedural aspects (cf. de la Porte/Pochet 2003:39). First, a technical
assessment (involving experts, academics, and public administrations) was undertaken to answer a supranational questionnaire. Second, a political evaluation
Chapter Preview
References
Zusammenfassung
Mit ihren spezifischen Merkmalen als neues Politikinstrument – wie etwa ihrem rechtlich nicht bindenden Charakter, dem Ziel des gegenseitigen Politiklernens durch Austausch bester Praktiken oder gemeinsamen Evaluierungsprozessen – stellt die Europäische Beschäftigungsstrategie (EBS) und die mit ihr Anwendung findende Offene Methode der Koordinierung (OMK) beschäftigungspolitische Akteure in der EU vor die neuen Herausforderungen von Politik-Koordinierung, die die Politikgestaltung im europäischen Mehrebenensystem neu prägen.
Das vorliegende Buch beschäftigt sich intensiv mit diesen unterschiedlichen Facetten der EBS und ihrer Wirkung. Es geht dabei über bisherige Einzelstudien zur EBS hinaus und befasst sich nicht nur mit deren Entstehung, Entwicklung und Merkmalen. Es kontrastiert vielmehr den eigenen Anspruch der EBS mit ihrer politischen Realität und untersucht theoretisch hoch reflektiert deren Einfluss auf Politik-Koordinierungsstrukturen, Beschäftigungspolitiken und zugrunde liegenden Ideen sowie deren Zusammenspiel mit anderen wirtschaftspolitischen Bereichen. Neben der EU-Ebene dienen Großbritannien und Deutschland als Fallbeispiele für mitgliedstaatliche Anpassungsprozesse. Das Buch verankert seine Wirkungsanalyse sehr fundiert in der wissenschaftstheoretischen Debatte um Europäisierung und Politikkonvergenz, um deren Anwendbarkeit im Falle der EBS kritisch zu analysieren. Es komplettiert damit Europäisierungsstudien zu regulativer Politik durch die Analyse des Einflusses weicher Politik-Koordinierung im europäischen Mehrebenensystem.