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Epilogue
Anything more to say about the theoretical incorporation of Baltic Sea Regionalism?
This study has led the reader through an extensive process of theoretical abstraction and
consideration, crossing various fields in political theory and trying to consider a wide
array of different approaches and theoretical traditions. At this point, I am not planning
to return to the single arguments in detail. Even less so, would it be appropriate (or
viable indeed) to give a specific comment and outlook for each of the numerous models
and approaches discussed earlier herein. However, there still seems to be room for a few
critical comments, which might stimulate further discussion and research interest in
these respects.
By way of conclusion, I would like to turn once again to one of the most frequent
theoretical models employed in the wider field of Baltic Sea Regionalism, which is,
Social Constructivism. In the years following the end of the Cold War, hence the years,
in which the phenomenon of “New Regionalism” emerged in Northern Europe, Social
Constructivist contributions, literally flooded the field. As a result, arguing on
Constructivist grounds has long since become a question of bon ton in Baltic Sea
Regionalism studies. The defensive tone of early Constructivist contributions has even
created the impression that only a Contructivist could be a ‘good’ Baltic Sea analyst.
The region and its distinct structural development has indeed offered a veritable
laboratory for theoretical excursions of any kind, and given the value-laden character of
much political discourse in the BSR, it might well have been a veritable repository for
Constructivist experiments. The Constructivist claim that everything in politics and
society is (discursively) constructed, and thus also many elements within the complex of
Baltic Sea Regionalism (most significantly, the region itself) has been proliferated in
many different contexts of the Baltic Sea debate, but with consistent sophisticated
eloquence and bold creativity. In fact, Constructivists have been among the most
productive region ‘constructors,’ in the sense that they contributed abundantly to the
process of ‘talking the region into existence.’ Constructivists were often inclined to
infer a major constructive process or discursive region-building element where there
was nothing more than an accidental misstatement, or simply, a bad uninspired speech.
The polemic assertion that Constructivist scholars themselves have been more
‘constructive’ and virtually activist than any other allegedly eager ‘region-builder’ on
the political scene would certainly be countered by some, pointing at the existing
Constructivist claim that indeed, scholars, analysts and policy consultants are wellknown and established elements in the purported process of region-building. While for
some individuals in the Constructivist camp that really have these informal affiliations
with regional actors or activists this might certainly apply, the large amount of
‘outsiders’ in this regard must not be neglected. Many analysts that have published
abundantly on the Baltic Sea actually operate from remote places, and just as myself,
have no influence on or whatsoever role in the ‘real’ political process of regionbuilding. This large group of fervent ‘Constructivist outsiders’ (in terms of both their
physical position and functional role in the process) have, turned the region into some
sort of playground for reflectivist experiments and the literal ‘construction’ of elements
of regionness that in essence, find little to null empirical evidence. The numerous
problems about this sort of self-reproducing (allegedly empirical) research have been
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extensively discussed in the introductory part of this study and have then been taken up
again in the respective theoretical chapters. However, in short, the criticism is about
declared constructivist studies that often end up in a maelstrom of self-affirmative
theoretical constructs that have little empirical relevance or even legitimacy. Social
Constructivists often just add alleged ‘empirical’ elements to their highly hypothetical
monologues apparently expecting to create the impression of serious empiricist
involvement that could help them to foil the permanent denunciations by realist and
rationalist colleagues.
I will not miss the chance of giving a concrete example. Constructivists have recurrently
claimed that a main constitutive factor in the process of establishing the Baltic Sea area
as a ‘region’ has been the tactical employment of argumentative strategies such as, most
prominently, the so-called history tool. In line with this argumentation, alleged region
builders (individuals or collective actors, officials or non-officials that are thought to be
keen to establish or ‘construct’ a region) intentionally “write or speak the region into
existence” by discursively availing themselves of so-called ‘raw material’ (i.e. any kind
of argumentative substance that qualifies for the discursive construction of a region). A
very common aspect that has been repeatedly ‘identified’ by many Constructivist
analysts is, for example, the ‘Hanseatic’ argument. Region builders are said to employ
this historical reference in a way that it serves them to ‘sell’ their regionalist ambitions
under very different circumstances, and hence, under ‘false’ pretences. What sounds
quite legitimate at first, does, in many cases, lack sufficient empirical evidence that
would allow the analyst to actually infer a broader mechanism or phenomenon. While
this has been done repeatedly and with few indications of honest self-criticism, hardly
any exponent of the approach has ever set out to verify this claim in reference to a more
comprehensive set of empirical data. Constructivists have produced very bold claims
about the ‘social origins’ of Baltic Sea Regionalism. However, there have so far been no
major attempts to produce quantifiable material to test these assertions on a larger scale.
This study in turn has sought to compensate this lack of systematically gathered
material. I would like to be brief on the respective outcomes. A comprehensive
assessment of several regional organisations in the BSR and of their respective
argumentative foundations has shown that about 28 out of 30 examples have never in
the course of their existence, seen the employment of any sort of ‘constructed’ or
‘constructive’ element in political or social discourse. Most associations and initiatives
founded their regionalist activities directly on nothing but ‘raw material’, conceivable
challenges, apparent threats and environmental concerns. Very few of them rely on the
‘history argument’ or other argumentative tools that would stimulate the proliferation of
certain spatial imaginations. What can be added to this evidence is that in essence,
regions should not be thought to be (exclusively) ‘spoken into existence.’ If the pregiven physical and normative foundations do not allow for a comprehensive regionness,
discourse cannot ‘construct’ any material entity whatsoever. Regional entities merge on
the basis of certain pre-given empirical conditions. Discourse may be supportive of such
activities or intents but it cannot assume any major (or even decisive) constructive
function. The criticism about the production of analytical claims without sufficient
empirical evidence could in some variation certainly be extended to many other
theoretical approaches. Whether drawing upon a distant sociological approach can put
things right, might be arguable. Parsons’ model certainly lacks empirical measurability
no less than Social Constructivism does. However, I leave the latter standing here alone
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since its numerous exponents operating in the field of Baltic Sea Studies have been so
particularly keen to expose themselves in a way that has no parallel in terms of selfconfidence, which in essence, is not yet a flaw, and very often, arrogance, which is a
flaw in any case.
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References
Zusammenfassung
Seit 1989 ist es im Ostseeraum zu einer explosionsartigen Entstehung einer Vielzahl von regionalen Initiativen und Zusammenschlüssen gekommen. Der Ostseeraum weist bis heute eine europaweit einzigartig hohe Konzentration an kooperativen regionalen Strukturen auf. Diese bilden gemeinsam ein enges Netzwerk von Vereinigungen, die unter dem Überbegriff der "Ostseezusammenarbeit’ interagieren.
Diese Studie analysiert die Hintergründe dieses regionalen Phänomens oder so genannten „Ostsee-Rätsels“ auf Basis eines Vergleichs zwischen den Regionalpolitiken zweier staatlicher Schlüsselakteure, Schweden und Finnland, wobei der europäische Integrationsprozess als übergeordneter Bezugsrahmen für die Untersuchung dient.