200
An alleged Baltic Sea non-war community would lack an important feature, which is,
moral insularity building on mutual “expectations for peaceful change.”712 The EU
accession of the Baltic States institutionally marked the fact that a Nordic non-war
community was merely perceived as an option or tool to prepare full integration in the
wider European (and Northern Atlantic) community. Never explicitly rejecting this
option, on the long run, they strived for “more central” channels to secure their interests
and progressively enhance their geopolitical position. Looking back, there has never
been a Baltic liability to prefer going for a Northern European alternative and to join the
club of reluctant, eurosceptical and exceptionalist member states as just where Sweden
could be counted in. Equally, the Nordic system never really opened itself for this kind
of extension. The Nordic States, and most of all Sweden and Finland, tried to take over
a guiding role in the process of Baltic post-Soviet reorientation. However, these efforts
were not aiming at a broader reorientation of Nordicness towards a more comprehensive
concept of “Northern Europe”. Nordicness has remained exclusive, a fact that could not
least be told from the rhetoric style employed in the inner-Nordic debate about the
Baltic inclusion.713
II. Application Pattern II: Sketching a Model of Explanation
Application pattern II addresses the question of how the meso-level (i.e. the BSR)
relates to its macro-level framework, the wider complex of European integration or
more specifically, the European Union. The main point of reference here is the
consideration presented at the beginning of this section that both Baltic Sea Regionalism
(a meso-phenomenon) and the European project (a macro-phenomenon) can be seen as
instances of “regional integration” or “regionalism”.714 There are many ways of how the
two levels can be related to each other.715
The following figure tries to outline the spectrum of possibilities in this respect.
712 See KATZENSTEIN Peter J.: Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. ARENA Working Papers,
No. 1/1996. Oslo 1996, p. 8.
713 For a detailed discussion, see chapter “Old North vs. New Regionalism. Visions Competing for the
Same Space?”, p. 76-.
714 See ROSAMOND Ben: Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke 2000, pp. 14-15. And chapter
“Introductory Remarks on Regionalism and Integration”, p. 152-.
715 For a discussion of system levels and considerations about the micro-meso-macro distinction of
regionalism, see chapter “Levels of Regionalism: Macro-, Meso- and Micro-Regionalism”, p. 37-.
201
As shown in the figure, macro-regionalism could, for example, be perceived to be
building on regionalist formations at lower levels. From another point of view, it could
be seen to provide the framework or means that enable (sub)regional activity. The
various possibilities listed above show clearly that most relationships are based on a
two-way dynamic. Equally, the different variations are not all mutually exclusive but
partly interlocking or conditioning each other. Given the variety of possible relations,
this list remains exemplary and non-exhaustive. Application pattern II could be
addressed by making use of a traditional tool current in the field of IR. Many IR studies
approach research questions from a systemic perspective, asking questions like: how is
phenomenon X embedded in the wider system of global politics? How does it relate to
the ‘outside world’? To what extent is a regional entity subject to systemic impacts and
of what sort and intensity are these impacts? How does the regional entity persist
despite broad systemic impacts and with what instruments and action strategies does it
seek to encounter what infiltrates from ‘outside’? While searching for an answer to this
sort of questions, IR studies very often avail themselves of abstract models that help to
visualize how a bilateral relationship is e.g. marked by superiority and dependence, or to
demonstrate how an alleged centre relates to its periphery.
Hence, what could be derived from the scheme above are various different models of
meso-macro inter-relation or inter-action, where single elements from the list together
form a distinct type of relationship pattern. Picking out for example the idea of the
macro-level entity (in this case, the EU) providing the (necessary) framework for
regionalist activities at the meso-level (Baltic Sea Regionalism), the following elements
could be combined to build a coherent and comprehensive model of explanation:
– the macro-level provides the necessary normative (or other) framework for the
emergence or functioning of regionalist action at the (sub)regional level;
– the macro-level enables Meso-Regionalism by offering appropriate systemic
conditions;
– the meso-level is dependent on the framing quality of the macro-level;
Figure 8: Interaction and Influence Flows Between Meso- and Macro-Level
meso
macro
requires
builds on
provides framework
continues in
enables
concurs
depends on
is detached from
enhances/fuels
anticipates
operationalise
delegates
competes with
undermines
202
– the meso-level forms part of the macro-level by operationalising integration as
delegated ‘from above’ downwards to the sub-regional and sub-sub-regional/local
level.
Following this procedure, different distinct models can be developed that help to
approach the macro-meso issue on the basis of a systemic perspective. When adding a
time factor, the different models can also be thought of as scenarios, as development
patterns whose underlying cause-effect logic also informs about future structural or
functional inclinations and ultimately, the finality of the complex and interlocking
integration processes that compete against each other across levels, concur or happen
independently from each other. The models presented hereinafter are seen to typify the
most current (and obvious) relationship patterns, treating the BSR as
– a European region or a subset of the wider European integration framework;
– a peripheral region positioned at the margins of the EU system of gravity, (a model
that could be seen as a variation of a);
– an auto-dynamic entity that emancipates from the EU framework and incorporates a
more comprehensive Europeanness with border-transcending elements.
The explanatory power of these models is limited to the extent that they offer little
proficiency for the identification of cause and effect chains or the exact ascertainment of
independent variables underlying a relationship as complex as the one between the BSR
and the EU. However, this working tool helps to structure a multidimensional research
problem by offering a practicable way of depicting relationships between any sort of
delimitable entities that emerge, operate and develop in the intricate system of IR.
1. The BSR as a Subset
According to this model, the BSR is perceived a sub-region of the EU and could –
drawing on the terminology of set theory (Mengenlehre) – be termed a “subset” that is
largely framed and dominated by its “superset”, the EU polity including all its
normative implications. The impact of the macro-level is perceived to dominate any
regionalist action occurring at a lower level. The BSR is subordinate to the wider EU
framework to the extent that both its emergence and future development is dependent on
the course of the general integration process. Accordingly, regionalist action within the
subset cannot be seen as detached from the broader frame of European integration.
"region" is the subset of "EU"
"EU" is the superset of "region"
Figure 9: Model of Explanation I: Subset vs. Superset
203
A model that builds on similar considerations is the one assuming a Europe of
“Concentric Circles”. It has originally entered the scholar debate in the context of
general European integration and the question of a prospective “variable geometry” for
the European project. The circles were then perceived to depict subgroups of member
states, which have achieved or strive for different levels of integration, with the
candidate countries and prospective members building some sort of ‘adjacent circle’
around the Union. A similar notion is the one of selected or ‘functional circles’ (e.g. the
currency, security and defence circle) with the EU building the unifying space or centre.
Applied to the context of meso-regional formations relating to a macro-level context,
the EU would be interpreted as the centre and reference point for its ‘adjacent’ circles,
the meso-regions on the European continent. As the ‘centre’ of this constellation, the
EU would be seen to function as a regulatory power relating to its ‘outer elements’ by
way of standardised and/or multilateral patterns of interaction. Applying a similar
interpretation to the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Michael Emerson
suggested calling it the “Cobweb Model”. This constellation could also be illustrated as
a “Hub-and-Spoke-Model”.716
These two models depict two different ways of how the macro-centre (i.e. the EU) can
relate to certain regional entities or how the macro and the meso-level interact with each
other. While the Cobweb Model allows both for multilateral and bilateral relations and
action flows, the Hub-and-Spoke-Model clearly emphasises the bilateral element. This
bilaterality can also be interpreted in terms of a differentiated approach, which involves
716 See EMERSON Michael: European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy or Placebo? In: Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS). Working Document, No. 215/November 2004. Brussels 2004, pp.
8-9.
Figure 10: The Concentric Circles Model
Figure 11: The Cobweb and the Hub-and-Spoke Model
204
that the macro-core develops a specific framework for each regional entity (e.g.
different nation states based in a region, or different meso-regions in Europe), seeking
to take into account the individual specificities of each bilateral link ‘outwards’.
2. The BSR in a Cobweb Variation: Peripheral and Marginal?
The first model of concentric circles could be developed further by stressing certain
aspects about the alleged meso-macro relationship. Assuming that the core function of
the Union is very distinct and strongly pronounced so that the BSR is put into a slanting
position, one could develop the following cobweb-variation.
According to this model, the BSR is seen as a peripheral region situated at the very
margins of the EU centre of gravity. The model is extended to the aspect of (physical)
peripherality, which is thought to assume a certain air of political marginality. This
model is close to the concept of “subsidiary systems” in that the EU itself including its
closest neighbours is defined as a “regional system” consisting of a set of
geographically proximate states with a certain perceived interdependence or interconnectedness on the political, economic and/or security level. The EU polity builds the
core of this system that is surrounded by a number of “subsidiary systems encompassing
the relations of a part of the regional area.”
These ‘subsidiary systems’ consist of a group of states “alienated from the core in some
degree by social, political, economic and/or organizational factors but which
nevertheless play a role in the politics of the [regional] system.” The peripheral subsystems are thought to be both dependent on and conditioned by the core of the regional
system.717 As for the BSR example, this dependency would e.g. be consisting of the
EU’s political impact (regulative/‘disciplinary’) and financial assistance (distributive
relation). Many studies about the BSR follow this pattern of interpretation, mostly in the
context of a general criticism of the centrality thesis that assigns everything that is
perceived ‘far off’ from the centre to the political margins of the integration project.
Browning underlined the importance of challenging this dominant tendency of
underestimating the role of (perceived) ‘marginal’ regions in respect to the wider
European integration process.
717 See CANTORI Louis J./SPIEGEL Steven L.: The International Politics of Regions. A Comparative
Approach. London 1979, p. 151.
BSR
Figure 12: Model of Explanation II: the BSR as a Peripheral Region
205
Post-modern developments in Northern Europe have challenged the very figure and
subjectivity of the EU and Russia [...]. For example, there has been much discussion in
Europe of whether the EU is moving in an increasingly statist direction, or if it is instead
developing more along the lines of multilevel networks and interlocking dimensions. Whilst
the modernist statist discourse has strengthened in recent years, elements of dimensionalism
also remain significant. Importantly, Northern Europe has not just been a recipient of these
different debates, but has also arguably played a notable role regarding just how Europe
(and Russia) unfolds. This is to say that the wide array of projects of regional cooperation
that have developed in Northern Europe since the end of the Cold War have fundamentally
re-conceptualised the nature of borders in the region (including EU borders), and as such
significantly problematise any Westphalian aspirations that may exist at the EU centre.718
The core message of this abstract offers the basis for yet another variation of the
scheme. It seeks to grasp the issue of what repercussions the awareness about this
pattern of perception (the ‘thinking the North marginal’) could have on the conduct of
(sub)regional stakeholders towards the alleged centre and in view of the (sub)regional
strategies they seek to pursue. If there are permanent signals of marginalisation coming
from the centre, this practice is likely to influence the way region-based actors perceive
their influence potential. This again can be expected to determine the strategic choices
they take in order to maximise this influence towards the centre, or rather, compensate
the marginality they are being assigned from outside, or in fact, from the centre.
3. The BSR as an Auto-Dynamic Unit Within the Wider Unit Europe
Building on the foregoing model of explanation, the BSR could also be seen as an autodynamic (albeit not autonomous) unit that does correlate with the wider framework
‘Europe’ to some extent but does not operate out of a consciously subordinate position
or under the exclusive auspices of the EU framework. Part of the action and interaction
directed to actors beyond the inner circle of European integration may be ascribed to the
stakeholders’ awareness about their perceived marginality. Their awareness about their
own reduced influence potential is expected to impact on their behaviour in a way that it
makes them more reactive and susceptible to defensive or proactive strategies.
Signals of marginalisation coming from the centre are perceived as a challenge to the
regional stand-alone quality that fuels the efforts regional stakeholders make in order to
substantiate the convergence of their (sub)regional surrounding and thus, to build up a
compact and solid counterpart to the alleged centre.
718 BROWNING Christopher S.: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern
Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005, pp. 1-10, here p. 6.
Figure 13: Model of Explanation III: the BSR as an Auto-Dynamic Unit
206
The major motivational background of these efforts could be termed a “positive selfawareness” of the region’s own marginality. This awareness is not only thought to
provoke defensive reaction, it also inspires the regional stakeholders to develop
strategies of compensation that help to impair the systemic centrality of the alleged core.
One important strategy in this context has been mentioned at another point of this
study.719 This strategy is particularly common among the Nordic countries, but most
present in the Swedish conduct on the European scene. Sweden has systematically tried
(and still does) to profit politically from its own perceived marginality, trying to
maintain its reputation as the “boring backwater of Europe” and thus, to gain important
leeway and legitimation for its exceptionalist stance in many questions about a further
deepening of European integration.720 This study confirms Browning’s postulation
that a position in the margins often entails particular resources for action that enable the
margins to play a significant role in shaping the nature of the whole. [...] Developments in
Northern Europe may not just impact on the policies of the European centres, but to some
extent also impact on the very nature and subjectivity of those centres, which in turn
impacts on the nature of the broader European constellation.721
The mere fact of a region being situated in a geographically peripheral position does not
automatically imply that it is also politically marginal. However, in essence, I would not
ascribe this alleged effect coming from the Northern periphery to what Browning calls
the “formative power of the margins.” Besides the fact that the choice of words itself
appears somewhat esoteric, it also neglects the role of state action and interests, and
most importantly, of the regional orientation of single states. States often seek to
instrumentalise the action arena offered in the regional context in order to reflect their
foreign political orientation at a lower scale. In a second instant, this may also be
expected to determine their political conduct on the European scene, hence as formal
members of the macro-level project.
The examples of Sweden and Finland have shown that states are likely to develop very
different strategies in this context. While Finland since the end of the Cold War has
always sought to “europeanise” its national interests and objectives, Sweden retained
most of its suspicion towards supranational integration and comprehensive
Europeanisation.
719 See chapter “Remotenesss and Marginality – the Periphery’s Romantic Temptation”, p. 28-.
720 CAVE Andrew: Finding a Role in an Enlarged EU. In: Central Europe Review, Nr. 20. 22 May
2000. Online publication www.ce-review.org [26 November 2007.
721 BROWNING Christopher S.: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern
Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005, pp. 1-10, here p. 1.
Figure 14: The Auto-Dynamic Unit as an Arena for State Action (e.g. Sweden)
207
Generally, it appears to be easy and therefore particularly attractive for peripheral states
to try to establish themselves in the best possible way at the regional level before they
try to counter other more influential powers that are situated closer to the core. The
regional self-containedness resulting from this sort of strategic considerations may, in
the long run, promote the establishment of a rival sub-system that easily removes itself
from the zone of visibility, and thus, gains considerable latitude to pursue objectives
independent from or even running contrary to what is suggested by the core. The hub
between the meso and the macro level in this model is built by nation states. In respect
to the concrete case of Baltic Sea Regionalism, they also build the natural link between
the EU framework and the phenomenon of sub-regional cooperation on the basis of
initiatives coming from within, or rather from below in terms of a systemic hierarchy.
Even grass-root action is potentially linked to the state level, since most sub-regional
cooperations can only operate when given support from the national level. For example,
cross-border co-operation for regional development normally requires an improvement
of transport infrastructure, of communication systems, of border control procedures,
education systems etc. Such improvement measures need efforts and decisions to be
taken at the national level.
Coming back to the model, this means that states based in a certain region are thought to
be striving to transcend borders to the outside world (e.g. towards Russia) without
employing the channels that emerge from their formal affiliation with the core. Such a
tendency could potentially lead to the emergence of a region state, which is, as specified
earlier in another context, a region that has reached a level of interdependence and
integration that enables it to operate as a single actor.722 However, looking at the
concrete circumstances in the Baltic Sea case, there are no clear indicators for an
emerging region state in this very sense. What could instead be told from the regional
strategies of single states, and here I am again alluding to the prominent Swedish
example, is that they seek to build up their own image of the region. This implies that
the region or regionness is not a ‘fact’ in terms of a political consensus between a set of
involved actors. The single state is thought to construct its own version of the region,
which serves as an arena for foreign political action without having to comply with
broader supranational instructions. This convenient construct builds the basis for
regional action up to the level of distinct proactiveness and regional activism.723
The future development and deepening of the EU is not least a question of unity among
the member states, unity about the question of finality of the European project (what
Europe of the regions?). One of the imaginable scenarios could be that regionalist
tendencies backfire and lead to disintegrative developments that are different from mere
intergovernmentalisation (pillarisation) of integration. The question is whether the
dynamic of asymmetric efforts, the “regionalist alternative”, could even reinforce the
existing divisions within the EU-25. Holger Moroff underlined the danger that the EU
ND could, for example, further a falsely perceived regionalism within the EU und lead
to the intergovernmentalisation of the European project.724
722 See HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the
Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, pp. 3-4. See also chapter
“What Makes a Region a ‘Region’?“, p. 32-.
723 On “regionalist activism”, see chapter “Baltic Sea Region: What Sort of Regionalism’?”, p. 35-.
724 See MOROFF Holger: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): European Soft Security Policies. The Northern
Dimension. Kauhava 2002, pp. 12-36, here p. 17.
208
In the EU official context, regionalist interactions are mostly viewed as a positive and
desirable phenomenon that helps to strengthen transnational ties and thus, enhances
deepening of the overall integration process. This study claims that transnational
regionalism can also assume a counterproductive and disintegrative quality that furthers
diversification and, in the context of peripheral regions, stimulates single state
tendencies of isolationism and disengagement from membership responsibilities. The
factor of regionalist self-sufficiency seems particularly significant in the case of the
Nordic members, since their populations are among the most euro-sceptical in the EU-
27. In this sense, the reading of ‘regionalism’ is fairly critical and polemic. It implies
that proactive regionalism in terms of regional assertiveness can lead to region-oriented
self-centeredness and self-marginalisation on the European scene. Thus, at a certain
scale, regionalism can gain a highly disintegrative effect on a member state’s European
policies because it potentially affects the membership conduct of the respective country.
4. What Kind of ‘Europe of the Regions’?
The notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ (EoR) has originally entered usage in the
context of the regional federalist movement of the 60ies and 70ies. The phrase then used
to have positive if not enthusiastic implications for the future of the European project.
The EoR conceptualization seemed to serve as a handy tool for both the ‘governmentalists’
and the ‘region enthusiasts’ in describing the spatial future of the EU: the EoR was seen as
much a construction of neo-nationalistic region states as one of flexible and overlapping
(trans)border regions. [...] Writers recognized that questions over the nature and structure of
‘real regions’ in a regionalized Europe would remain unsolved, as the ‘region’ concept
would always be interpreted in multiple ways. [...] However, it was precisely the
tremendous vagueness of the region concept, and the conceptualization of the EoR for that
matter – that made it so popular.725
Despite this pluralism of interpretations, in its narrow sense the notion can be said to
spell the promise of a Europe in which the nation state is no longer the primary unit of
action and governance. This idea is very closely connected to the vision of a federal
state of Europe since the “Euro” regions are thought to constitute the principal level
between the nation state and the supranational level.726 In this ‘strong’ sense, the vision
of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ entails the idea of emerging “region-states”; a concept that
was also reflected in the aforementioned scale of regionness developed by Hettne.727
Hettne suggests the highest level of “regionness” to become materialised at what he
calls “an acting subject”. This state-like regionness involves that the respective region
features a distinct identity, legitimacy and certain structures that allow formal joint
decision-making.728 The resulting actor capability of various different regions in Europe
725 JUKARAINEN Pirjo: Norden is Dead. Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North. Geopolitical Remaking of Norden. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 12/1999, pp. 355-382, here p. 369.
726 This sort of regionalism may occur within or across state territory or borders, involving pragmatic
cooperation between regional and local authorities in areas of joint interest. For more details, see for
example WEBER Karl: Der Föderalismus. In: EMMERICH Tálos/FALKNER Gerda (eds): EU-
Mitglied Österreich, Gegenwart und Perspektiven. Eine Zwischenbilanz. Vienna 1996, pp. 50-66.
727 See OHMAE Kenichi: The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies. New York
1995, p. 80. See chapter “What Makes a Region a ‘Region’?“, p. 32-.
728 See HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the
Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, pp. 3-4.
209
would complete the picture of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ to replace the present ‘Europe
of the Nation States’. The finality of this vision would be the establishment of a
European federation that functions independently from the regulatory and distributive
function performed by states. This concept is close to the idea of a ‘Europe of Olympic
Rings’, which could be described as “a conception of Europe and the EU in which there
is not one but several centres, power is dispersed throughout interlocking and
overlapping regionalist formations with rather fluid external borders.”729 The model
suggests a polycentric structure that builds on horizontal interaction. Regional entities
are perceived to co-exist and form a European (or global) patchwork net of regions.
Europe of ‘Concentric Circles’ Europe of ‘Olympic Rings’
regions subordinate to Brussels co-existing regional spaces
(‘neo-medievalisation’ of Europe)
vertical integration horizontal interaction
distinctive centre-periphery divide neither a clear centre nor a clear periphery730
sovereignty-based concept of space
post-sovereignty concept
Figure 15: Europe of Concentric Circles vs. Europe of Olympic Rings
The more complex the EU is becoming intrinsically, the more space will be needed for
regional groupings inside it, with each increasingly likely to seek more autonomy in making
contact with non-EU members. This potentially emerging structure of European political
space can be metaphorically depicted as promoting an ‘Olympic rings’ vision of Europe.731
The joint effect of the two major parallel developments ‘beyond the nation state’,
Europeanisation and regionalism, has been said to relativise the importance of nation
states in European, and more generally, in international politics. According to this view,
the state-centric distribution of the European territory does no longer seem to be the
single “best”. National state borders are perceived “artificial” while ethnic or open
spatial entities are seen as more natural or “really belonging together”732, or, as Wiberg
and Wæver put it, they are given as a “pre-political datum”, and thus are to be perceived
729 See JOENNIEMI Pertti: Can Europe Be Told From The North? Tapping into the EU’s Northern
Dimension. In: MÖLLER Frank/PEHKONEN Samu (eds): Encountering the North. Cultural
Geography, International Relations, Northern Landscapes. Aldershot 2003, pp. 221-260, here p. 259.
730 The model does not fully comply with the original Olympic symbol, since no ring or unit intersects
with all adjacent counterparts.
731 MAKARYCHEV Andrey S.: Where the North Meets the East. Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and
Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3/2004, pp. 299-315, here pp.
301-302.
732 See KEATING Michael: The European Union and the regions. Oxford 1995, p. 10.
210
as far more legitimate than any other structural imposition.733 The self-evidence of
nationality, sovereign statehood, and national written histories are said to be fading.734
In brief, the now-familiar suggestion is that nation-states will fade away in favour of regions
and super-regions that can survive and thrive within the EU and the global economy. This
vision is reinforced by the increasing tendency of both the EU and the regions to try to bypass the central state, often in the name of subsidiarity. Still, [...] there is as yet little
evidence that central governments will fade away any time soon. Indeed, it may be the case
that the popularised and overly simplistic Europe of the Regions scenario actually diverts
attention away from the actual, more nuanced realities of Regionalism.735
In fact, the overall developments in European politics have made clear that there is no
immediate prospect of a materialising ‘Europe of the Regions’ in the narrow sense of
the concept, not least because of the widely differing strengths of regional feeling and
identity among the citizens of the European Union.736
A more general and decent interpretation of the phrase ‘Europe of the Regions’ appeals
to the argument that “regions matter”; this reading acknowledges the fact of regional
allegiance as well as the value, in both economic and socio-political terms, of an
intermediate level or interface between the local and the national or supra-national. In
this sense, one might come to the conclusion that, in recent years, we have witnessed the
establishment of a ‘Europe of the Regions’.
One of the most striking and important expressions of this new salience of regions in
Europe has been the creation of the Committee of the Regions by the Treaty of Maastricht
in 1992 and its coming into existence in 1994.737
The notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ underlying the creation of the EU CoR is built
on the vision of a Europe in which regions and regional representations of various kinds
have found a new self consciousness and new roles in politics and policy-making at the
European level and beyond, which had hitherto been denied to them.738 Another
interpretation could be based on a different understanding of what regionness is about.
A viable model would be, for instance, the vision of a Europe of functional regions,
where common interests in certain policy fields build the basis for cooperation. This sort
of integration by functional terms is then thought to occur at different scales and most
importantly, without being bound by geographical adjacency. Physical closeness is still
not ruled out as a factor since it could be thought to favour the build-up of ‘nodal
points’ or ‘condensations of dominance’. Clusters of interest are perceived to result in a
concentration along (a) certain policy fields, and (b) in regional clusters.
733 WIBERG Håkan/WÆVER Ole: Norden in the Cold War Reality. In: Nordic Security in the 1990s.
Options in the Changing Europe. London 1992, pp. 13-34, here p. 28.
734 JOENNIEMI Pertti/WÆVER Ole (eds): Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region. Washington 1993, p.
44.
735 DOWNS William M.: Regionalism in the European Union. Key Concepts and Project Overview. In:
Journal of European Integration, No. 3/2002, pp. 171-177, here p. 172.
736 See WAGSTAFF Peter: The Committee of the Regions of the European Union. In: Id. (ed.):
Regionalism in the European Union. Wiltshire 1999, pp. 188-193, here p. 188.
737 LOUGHLIN John: Representing Regions in Europe. The Committee of the Regions. In: JEFFERY
Charlie (ed.): The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Third Level in Europe.
London/Portland 1997, pp. 147-165, here 147.
738 For more details on the CoR, see chapter “The EU Committee of the Regions”, p. 92-.
211
The finality of this ‘functional regionalisation’ process would be a “networked Europe”.
One of the related scenarios or variations could be a functional flexibilisation with
regional clusters building on and allowing for open intersections (offene Schnittmengen). It may be assumed that functional considerations on either side produce
certain agglomeration forces that encourage geo-political clustering of political and
socio-economic activities. This clustering may result in the build-up of “functional
regions”, i.e. groupings of actors on either state or sub-state level according to their
positive interdependence. These agglomeration forces thus lead to sectoral clustering:
one policy sector leads to clusters in a certain position, another sector in another a.s.o.
The geo-political distribution of political activities is thus very concentrated in each
sector but dispersed at the level of all sectors together.739
E. A Short Ride into the Field of Comparative Theory
After consulting the bulk of EIT and taking a short excursion into the field of traditional
IRT, this study will eventually turn to the “third” camp, the set of comparative models
and system theory. There are various different practical considerations to support the
methodical choice of calling on Comparative Theory (CT) while analysing an instance
of (sub)regional integration. In fact, theorists like Ernst Haas have produced significant
contributions in the field of European studies, obviously viewing the analysis of the
European case as a distinctly comparative-historical enterprise. In his early contributions, Haas composed systematic comparisons between various forms of regional
integration that were emerging in the immediate post-war setting (including the Nordic
Council, the Council of Europe, NATO, and, as yet another instance, the European
Communities).740 From a methodological perspective, this short ‘ride’ into the field of
CT is intended to function as a showcase as for how alternative (and for some, probably
also absurd) theoretical choices can offer an added value when it comes to the analysis
of an empirical phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as the “Baltic Sea
739 For a detailed discussion of regional clustering in BSR trade affairs, see WIDGRÉN Mika: Trade
potential, intra-industry trade and factor content of revealed comparative advantage in the Baltic Sea
region. In: Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos (ETLA): Discussion papers, No. 1034. Helsinki 2006.
740 HAAS Ernst B.: International Integration: The European and the Universal Process. In: International
Organization, No 4/1961, pp. 366-392. And HAAS Ernst B.: The Study of Regional Integration.
Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing. In: LINDBERG Leon N./SCHEINGOLD
Stuart A. (eds): Regional Integration. Theory and Research. Cambridge 1971, pp. 3-43. This very
different methodological approach strongly inspired the formation of the neo-functionalist approach,
which ironically, became an integral part of the bulk of self-restricted and euro-centric EIT.
Figure 16: Networked Europe – Functional Regionalisation
functional
region/
sectoral
cluster
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References
Zusammenfassung
Seit 1989 ist es im Ostseeraum zu einer explosionsartigen Entstehung einer Vielzahl von regionalen Initiativen und Zusammenschlüssen gekommen. Der Ostseeraum weist bis heute eine europaweit einzigartig hohe Konzentration an kooperativen regionalen Strukturen auf. Diese bilden gemeinsam ein enges Netzwerk von Vereinigungen, die unter dem Überbegriff der "Ostseezusammenarbeit’ interagieren.
Diese Studie analysiert die Hintergründe dieses regionalen Phänomens oder so genannten „Ostsee-Rätsels“ auf Basis eines Vergleichs zwischen den Regionalpolitiken zweier staatlicher Schlüsselakteure, Schweden und Finnland, wobei der europäische Integrationsprozess als übergeordneter Bezugsrahmen für die Untersuchung dient.