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Carmen Gebhard, Application pattern I: The Security Community Approach in:

Carmen Gebhard

Unravelling the Baltic Sea Conundrum, page 193 - 200

Regionalism and European Integration Revisited

1. Edition 2008, ISBN print: 978-3-8329-4084-3, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-1239-5 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845212395

Series: Nomos Universitätsschriften - Politik, vol. 164

Bibliographic information
193 also feel themselves merely focussing on the interaction of states through diplomacy or violence within an overall context of structural anarchy.684 However, EIT could equally be blamed for trying to develop a “general theory of regional integration from very particular European experiences.”685 Hurrel probably has a point claiming that some political or social phenomena might appear to be politically complex but theoretically, turn out to be “rather easily explicable” by applying a “traditional toolkit.”686 He also goes on with a rather provocative but probably useful recommendation. Rather than try and understand other regions through the distorting mirror of Europe, it is better to think in general theoretical terms and in ways that draw both on traditional International Relations and on other areas of social thought. Hence we should consider foundational sets of ideas before they have become encrusted by their application to a particular region or case.687 While in this context, Hurrell is referring to the applicability of EIT to other regions, meaning regions outside Europe, these considerations appear to be also highly relevant for the theoretical complex addressed in this study. These considerations build the point of departure for the following trial application of IRT to the Baltic Sea case. They have also led to the consideration of yet another theoretical camp in political science for the purpose of this study. By way of concluding this theoretical section, an “outsider” approach taken from the field of traditional comparative analysis, the system theoretical model developed by Talcott Parsons will be dealt with, intending to point out the added value alternative theoretical choices can bring when trying to analyse an issue as complex as the “Baltic Sea Conundrum.” D. Inputs from International Relations Theory Most approaches in IRT developed before or during the Cold War have mainly focussed on large-scale and global developments and processes. Only after the superpower overlay had been lifted, also IRT slowly started to open itself towards political phenomena at a “lower” level of action. However, since state-centric perspectives still dominate scholarship in this field, a theoretical IR model explicitly treating the subject of meso-regional cooperation or regionalism is difficult to come by. However, selected traditional IR approaches do address the aspect of cooperation occurring within a certain geopolitical unit, and therefore, appear to be arguably applicable for the purposes of this study. The arrangement of this chapter takes over the structure suggested for the discussion of various different approaches in EIT.688 The aforementioned “application pattern I” refers to the BSR in terms of a macro-cosmic entity, treating it as a phenomenon of its own with less attention to the ways it relates to the ‘outside world’, mainly meaning the broader context of European integration. The 684 See ROSAMOND Ben: Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke 2000, p. 164. 685 See ibd., p. 159. 686 HURRELL Andrew: The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory. In: FARRELL Mary/HETTNE Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 2005, pp. 38-53, here p. 39. 687 Ibd., here p. 39. 688 See also table 19 presented in chapter “Applying Integration Theory to the Baltic Sea Case: Application Patterns”, p. 162-. 194 “application pattern II” then turns again to the issue of macro-meso relationships, of the virtual linkages between the BSR as a European region and the EU context as a broader context framing action in the BSR and transregional interaction across its outside borders. application pattern I Baltic Sea Regionalism is addressed as a self-standing phenomenon, – trying to identify the inherent dynamics that led to the establishment of the BSR as a common notion in regional/international discourse, – addressing the question about the quality of Baltic Sea Regionness in comparison to other more established geopolitical notions current in the Northern European context (e.g. the “Nordic system”). application pattern II The BSR is distinctly treated as a European region that holds a close albeit not exclusive connection to the EU. The analysis focuses on the theoretical incorporation of the macro-meso connections, trying to develop different models to depict the relationship between the BSR and its supranational counterpart, the EU institutional and political complex. Table 23: Application Patterns for the Critical Discussion of IRT in the BSR Case I. Application pattern I: The Security Community Approach Throughout the past decades, the Nordic North has established itself as a non-war community. Despite occasional frictions, the Nordic five have largely abstained from employing physical or material force as a means to solve or settle political differences. The Nordics have on numerous occasions found their way out of situations that would have typically led to war [or would normally have] a strong tendency to cause military action.689 This specific Nordic phenomenon has inspired a number of political scientists just as much as IR theorists, who tried to develop various different models of explanation. The Security Community Approach (SCA) as developed by Karl Deutsch and some of his fellows in the late 1950s has certainly been among the most prominent abstract models applied to the Nordic case. Deutsch extensively dealt with the specific Nordic circumstances and claimed to offer a theoretical explanation to grasp the phenomenon of lasting and sustainable Nordic peace. The broad reception and success of his approach turned the Nordic case into a “standard example for an uncontested security community” that developed “features of a dogma”.690 The following sub-chapters give an overview of the theoretical model introduced by Deutsch in the framework of his logic of transactionalism in order to prepare for the critical discussion recently brought up by theorists like Adler and Barnett. 689 JOENNIEMI Pertti: Norden Beyond Security Community. In: ARCHER Clive/JOENNIEMI Pertti (eds): The Nordic Peace. Aldershot 2003, pp. 198-212, here p. 198. 690 See ibd., here p. 199. 195 1. Deutschian Transactionalism The concept of security communities originally dates from Richard Van Wagenen.691 However, it was only in the surroundings of Karl Deutsch that the approach eventually got international attention. Deutsch was what most in academia would perceive as the founding father of the SCA.692 Karl Deutsch pioneered transaction flow analysis as a distinct form of regional integration theory. The transactionalist perspective focuses on the magnitude and symmetry in the flows of social and economic transactions as well as of social communications. These flows are also perceived as the major indicators for the waxing and waning of regional security communities.693 Intensified transactions between national communities are thought to foster a sense of trust at the supranational level and hence, to produce a feeling of security. Deutsch defined the idea of a “security community” as a group of people/actors that becomes integrated to a degree and extent that the members of this community abstain from physical conflict and find other ways to settle their disputes. Deutsch differentiates between two different types of security communities:694 – “amalgamated” or “unified” communities” (showcase: USA); – “pluralistic” communities, where members retain their legal independence and sovereignty. Today’s EU could be classified as this sort of a pluralistic security community, since it consists of a group of virtually integrated states, dominated by stability and a permanent absence of any risk of physical war between its members. Despite these formal differences, security communities are defined by a common element, which is the “dependable expectation of peaceful change.”695 2. Security Community Building in Northern Europe The traditional formation of Nordic Cooperation has often been referred to as the ideal example of a Deutschian security community since it meets all preconditions for a peaceful resolution of controversies. The outstanding quality of Nordic Cooperation is said to be lying in its traditional cultural and ideological focus. Intra-Nordic discourse during the Cold War has been very much about identity building, togetherness and “we”-feeling while state-centric behaviour was close to inexistent. The Deutschian SCA has been among the most contested approaches in IRT during the Cold War era. By placing Norden within the domestic field of the states involved Deutsch declined to adhere to the general rule in traditional IRT that there is an important qualitative difference between the inside and the outside of state action. According to his explanation, the Nordic model succeeded in transcending the logic of international anarchy by developing a high degree of cooperative cohesiveness from 691 VAN WAGENEN Richard: Research in the International Organization Field. Princeton 1952. 692 Adler and Barnett give a good overview of the respective scholar debate. See ADLER Emanuel/BARNETT Michael (eds): Security Communities. Cambridge 1998. 693 See DEUTSCH Karl W.: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton 1957, p. 16. 694 See DEUTSCH Karl/BURRELL Sidney A./KANN Robert A./LEE Maurice Jr./LICHTERMAN Martin/LINDGREN Raymond E./LOEWENHEIM Francis L. VAN WAGENEN Richard: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton 1957, pp. 3-6. 695 See KATZENSTEIN Peter J.: Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. ARENA Working Papers, No. 1/1996. Oslo 1996, p. 8. 196 within.696 This approach allows for the avoidance of various different dilemmas common in IRT. Security is not perceived to be solely determined by the international system; single actors can join in a community of security and peace in order to reduce the likelihood of tension between a certain number of selected partners. Using a constructivist approach with behaviouralist methodological connotations, Deutsch made a clear choice in arguing that the Nordic region had become a pluralist security community, a community not in terms of common security with some specific, sovereigntybased, statist and centralising arrangements to provide for it, but something unstructured, societal and an island of peace amidst a broader setting based on the presence of the danger of war. The recipe for doing away with the danger of war, in his view, consisted of farreaching consultation, communication and co-operation. By their affinity and the establishing of a useful co-operative relationship, the Nordic countries had overcome the usual hardships of relations between states and eliminated the expectations of war in their interrelations.697 During the Cold War, the security community concept was strongly opposed by the then dominating realist paradigm in IR analysis. Mostly the Deutschian security community application to the North Atlantic area was seen as highly hypothetical and “not in tune with the overall situation of power politics and spheres of influence during the Cold War.”698 Only after the dissolution of the bipolar world order, the concept became fashionable again. The social factors of a peaceful political order (identity, a common cultural understanding and shared values) which used to build an important element in Deutsch’s theoretical construct seemed to re-enter the academic debate and were taken up again as a starting point for further theorising. 3. Adler and Barnett – Transactionalism Reconstructed It was Emanuel Adler together with Michael Barnett, who tried to produce a refined version of the traditional Deutschian security community concept. In their early papers, Adler and Barnett replaced Deutsch’s behavioural approach to regional integration with a constructivist stance, by embedding the basic model into what could be called the mainstream assumptions of Social Constructivism, i.e. that security communities are discursively constructed entities established between states that agree on the “unbearable destructiveness of modern war”, and thus, choose to strengthen their system of collective security. While Adler and Barnett are conventional in their view of the relation between theory and evidence, they resist the economist’s tendency of sidestepping the effect of actor identities on actor interests and strategies. Hence, their research agenda links up with perspectives stressing social psychological factors and social roles in international relations.699 696 See JOENNIEMI Pertti: Norden as a Post-Nationalist Construction. In: Id. (ed.): Neo-Nationalism or Regionality: The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim. Stockholm 1997, pp. 181- 234, here p. 193. 697 Ibd., here p. 194. 698 STADSHOLT André: Security Communities and Communities of Security. Security Community Building in a Neo-Grotian Perspective. Flemingsberg 2001, p. 3. Online publication www2.huberlin.de/BaltSeaNet/forum/beitraege/ast.pdf [23 January 2007]. 699 KATZENSTEIN Peter J.: Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. ARENA Working Papers, No. 1/1996. Oslo 1996, p. 8. 197 According to Adler’s interpretation, it is collective identity that lays the ground for a security community. Shared self-definitions lead to an internalisation of norms and values. Social learning creates stability and peace, above all if it is combined with general processes of functional integration.700 Security communities are socially constructed because shared meanings, constituted by interaction, engender collective identities. They are dependent on communication, discourse, and interpretation, as well as on material environments.701 Adler’s and Barnett’s main criticism of the Deutschian transactionalist SCA was its alleged inattentiveness to the “complex and causal ways in which the state power and practices, international organisations, transactions, and social learning processes can generate new forms of mutual identification and security relations.”702 Another weakness in the conventional SCA identified by the two critics is the indistinct relationship between the various analytical factors: transaction, identity, security and we-ness. In fact, Deutsch does not clearly indicate how security and identity actually relate to each other in terms of a cause-effect chain. He does not specify whether it is identity and mutual responsiveness that allows for the settlement of peace and security, which again, creates the ideal circumstances for further integration; or whether security is achieved through integration that increases the we-feeling and furthers the establishment of a common identity. Adler and Barnett sought to introduce a more linear sequence to the model, establishing that states are, in the first place, determined by external factors that make them aspire to joint solutions. They are then thought to move on with a process of social learning that is accompanied by the establishment of common institutions. This institutionalisation and formal settlement is thought to build the basis for trust and mutual responsiveness.703 According to this flow of transactions, the alleged “we-feeling” is rather part of the integration outcomes than part of the origins that build the foundation of a security community. 4. Regional Security Complex Theory: Reactions from Copenhagen The application of a linear sequence of transactions to the Nordic case as suggested by Adler and Barnett has been strongly opposed by some analysts, most importantly those stemming from the core of the so-called Copenhagen School. Ole Wæver argued that the circumstances determining the Nordic case would largely not comply with the linear assumptions of the newly interpreted SCA by Adler and Barnett. 700 See ibd., here p. 259. 701 ADLER Emanuel: Imagined (Security) Communities. Cognitive Regions in International Relations. Millennium: Journal of International Relations, No. 2/1997, pp. 249-278, here p. 258. 702 ADLER Emanuel/BARNETT Michael: Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective. In: Idd (eds).: Security Communities. Cambridge 1998, pp. 3-28, here p. 9. 703 See ADLER Emanuel/BARNETT Michael: A Framework for the Study of Security Communities. In: Idd. (eds): Security Communities. Cambridge 1998, pp. 29-68, here p. 38. 198 The Nordic non-war community emerged in contrast to the expectations of most contemporary theorists of security communities, in having not been achieved by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily by processes of ‘desecuritisation’, that is progressive marginalisation of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues.704 Building on a more radical constructivist stance, the critical Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) established by Buzan and Wæver claims for a more differentiated explanation of about how security or “non-war communities” come into being and what foundations they are built upon. A security complex is defined as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.705 Buzan et al. acknowledge the centrality of state actors on the international scene, but at the same time, seek to move their analysis beyond the state level. They turn their attention also to non-official collective and individual actors, focussing in particular on the “speech acts”, meaning discursive interactions that contribute to “writing or speaking a region into existence”.706 Another aspect about the RSCT that appears to be highly relevant in the context of this study is the amity/enmity pattern introduced by the classical RSCT in the early 1990s and taken up by the critical version some years later. The amity/enmity pattern results from the idea that security communities or more generally, security complexes may assume various different forms and that the normative or material foundations they are built upon might change over time. The amity/enmity pattern is intended to conceptualise this potential diversity of security complex phenomena, assuming that interdependence within a non-war community can range on a spectrum between amity and enmity: – amity involves positive interactions between the various actors within the security complex, this leads to the establishment of strong cooperative structures: – enmity: the interactions within a security complex are thought to be dominated by confrontation and conflict, or at least, by suspicion and fear.707 Buzan also sought to consider the factor of gradual change, distinguishing between – changes that rise from within a security community (‘internal transformations’), and – changes that are effected by exogenous factors (‘external modification’).708 He also found a category that he would label the ‘overlay’ option, implying that the security interdependence holding together a non-war community is considerably impacted by specific upcoming circumstances at the meta-level. The power emanating 704 WÆVER Ole: Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non-war community. In: ADLER Emanuel/BARNETT Michael (eds): Security Communities. Cambridge 1998, pp. 69-118, here p. 204. 705 BUZAN Barry/WÆVER Ole/DE WILDE Jaap: Security. A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder 1998, p. 201. 706 See ibd., p. 9. 707 See BUZAN Barry: People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. New York 1991, p. 189. 708 BUZAN Barry/WÆVER Ole/DE WILDE Jaap: Security. A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder 1998, p. 13. 199 from this meta-source of power is seen to be modifying the nature of internal interdependence, either in a way that the external threat tightens the security links within the community, or in a way that growing suspicion within the community hampers the quality of mutual support.709 5. Inclusive Balticness: Extending the Nordic Non-War Community? These reflections about a differentiated and dynamic development of non-war communities build a good starting point for the discussion about whether the traditional Nordic peace system has been successfully extended to the wider Baltic Sea area, or firstly, whether this was intended to happen at all and from whose point of view. The underlying question whether the Nordic system as a mental construct happened to be substantially (and ultimately) challenged by the rise of “New Regionalism” and whether the Baltic States, while striving for (Northern) Europeanness, managed to open up the compact normative system of old Norden has been discussed at another point of this study.710 The conceptual considerations offered by Buzan et al. in the framework of the traditional and critical RSCT may help to grasp the conclusions drawn in that context on a more abstract level. When trying to recall the criteria that generally account for the emergence and persistence of a non-war community one could list the following: two or more states are thought to be – willing to cooperate; – constituting a geographically coherent grouping; – facing security problems that cannot be resolved apart from one another; – having a relationship marked by security interdependence, – either on the basis of amity or on the basis of enmity – to the extent that the ties among them are stronger than between them (or one of them) and an ‘outside’ actor or systemic reference. The notion of inclusive Balticness, of a BSR in which both the ‘Old North’ and the new ‘Baltic Northerners’ merge in the framework of a compact regional entity, is verified in most of these aspects – at least at first sight.711 Factors like the “willingness to cooperate” and the question of “having a relationship marked by security interdependence” may well be perceived as given in the wider Baltic Sea area. But does that prove that the Nordic non-war community has indeed been successfully expanded to the Baltic States, Poland or even parts of Russia? A distinct “BUT” needs to be added when it comes to the substance of these qualities. Both characteristics are shared among the group of BSR states. All of them are – (most likely) willing to cooperate............................BUT not exclusively among them – (presumably) interdependent regarding security.... .BUT not exclusively. This problem is grasped by criterion (6) that asks for exclusive interdependence within the group. This conceptual condition is strongly challenged by the security implications of the general European (and Northern Atlantic) integration process that involves both the classical Nordic and the newly independent Baltic sphere. 709 See ibd., p. 14. 710 See chapter “The ‘Nordic Bloc’ – Driving Core for Baltic Sea Regionalism?”, p. 73-, and chapter “Old North vs. New Regionalism. Visions Competing for the Same Space?”, p. 76-. 711 See figure 5 “Mental subspaces in the European North”. 200 An alleged Baltic Sea non-war community would lack an important feature, which is, moral insularity building on mutual “expectations for peaceful change.”712 The EU accession of the Baltic States institutionally marked the fact that a Nordic non-war community was merely perceived as an option or tool to prepare full integration in the wider European (and Northern Atlantic) community. Never explicitly rejecting this option, on the long run, they strived for “more central” channels to secure their interests and progressively enhance their geopolitical position. Looking back, there has never been a Baltic liability to prefer going for a Northern European alternative and to join the club of reluctant, eurosceptical and exceptionalist member states as just where Sweden could be counted in. Equally, the Nordic system never really opened itself for this kind of extension. The Nordic States, and most of all Sweden and Finland, tried to take over a guiding role in the process of Baltic post-Soviet reorientation. However, these efforts were not aiming at a broader reorientation of Nordicness towards a more comprehensive concept of “Northern Europe”. Nordicness has remained exclusive, a fact that could not least be told from the rhetoric style employed in the inner-Nordic debate about the Baltic inclusion.713 II. Application Pattern II: Sketching a Model of Explanation Application pattern II addresses the question of how the meso-level (i.e. the BSR) relates to its macro-level framework, the wider complex of European integration or more specifically, the European Union. The main point of reference here is the consideration presented at the beginning of this section that both Baltic Sea Regionalism (a meso-phenomenon) and the European project (a macro-phenomenon) can be seen as instances of “regional integration” or “regionalism”.714 There are many ways of how the two levels can be related to each other.715 The following figure tries to outline the spectrum of possibilities in this respect. 712 See KATZENSTEIN Peter J.: Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. ARENA Working Papers, No. 1/1996. Oslo 1996, p. 8. 713 For a detailed discussion, see chapter “Old North vs. New Regionalism. Visions Competing for the Same Space?”, p. 76-. 714 See ROSAMOND Ben: Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke 2000, pp. 14-15. And chapter “Introductory Remarks on Regionalism and Integration”, p. 152-. 715 For a discussion of system levels and considerations about the micro-meso-macro distinction of regionalism, see chapter “Levels of Regionalism: Macro-, Meso- and Micro-Regionalism”, p. 37-.

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Zusammenfassung

Seit 1989 ist es im Ostseeraum zu einer explosionsartigen Entstehung einer Vielzahl von regionalen Initiativen und Zusammenschlüssen gekommen. Der Ostseeraum weist bis heute eine europaweit einzigartig hohe Konzentration an kooperativen regionalen Strukturen auf. Diese bilden gemeinsam ein enges Netzwerk von Vereinigungen, die unter dem Überbegriff der "Ostseezusammenarbeit’ interagieren.

Diese Studie analysiert die Hintergründe dieses regionalen Phänomens oder so genannten „Ostsee-Rätsels“ auf Basis eines Vergleichs zwischen den Regionalpolitiken zweier staatlicher Schlüsselakteure, Schweden und Finnland, wobei der europäische Integrationsprozess als übergeordneter Bezugsrahmen für die Untersuchung dient.