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of its hard-working people, a picture that is remarkably close to the image produced by
the UBC.164
J?ul in Estonia, Joulu in Finland, Jul in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Yule on the British
Isles. [...] Today, these peoples share a common mentality expressed in rationality,
stubbornness and diligence. They rank the highest in the world in Internet connections and
in mobile phone penetration, lowest in the world in corruption.165
Visionary statements of this type recurrently suggest the idea of the Baltic Sea area and
certain parts of it respectively to be united in some sort of innate or even genetically
inbred moral exclusiveness, if not supremacy. A less popular connotation in this regard
is offered by modern history: precedent ideas about the existence of a morally and
ethnically superior breed of man inhabiting the area were produced in the context of
Scientific Racism under the German Nazi Regime. The proto Nazi race theorist Hans F.
K. Günther identified the Aryan race to be constituted by two major ethnical strands: the
Nordic and the Eastern Baltic one. The Nordic-Baltic race was perceived as the natural
leader and the essentially Moral Man.166
Even though this comparison might appear overdrawn if referred to in this context it
nevertheless helps to characterise the argumentative strategies politicians and other
region-building actors have tried to apply in this regard. The idea of moral supremacy
albeit on very different grounds has also a strong tradition in the Nordic context.167
Even though these visions were sometimes carried too far and became
“counterproductive to efficient practical co-operation” they nevertheless helped to
create a feeling of common identity around the Baltic Sea.168
V. The Argument of Challenges – United in Diversity
Another argumentative tool that was implemented in the Baltic Sea region-building
discourse was the accentuation of challenges. While many associations and initiatives in
the early post Cold War wave of regionalism availed themselves of the abovementioned history tool, others strictly abstained from the attempt to link present
ambitions to any sort of alleged historical predecessor, or to avail themselves of
identity-related arguments. These region-building projects rather appealed to the “other
side of the coin”, the differences, challenges and problems that the region was and is
facing in present days, and promoted Baltic Sea Regionalism as a useful forum to
overcome obviously existing differences as well as to find constructive solutions for
common problems such as the lack of infrastructure, illegal migration, drugs- and arms
trafficking, environmental degradation etc.. Instead of reviving historical concepts, they
chose to emphasise the fact that the BSR has never been a homogenous entity and that,
164 See ILVES Toomas Hendrik: “Estonia as a Nordic country”, speech given at the Swedish Institute of
Foreign Affairs, 14 December 1999. Official Website of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
www.vm.ee [25 November 2007].
165 Ibd.
166 See also FISCHER Eugen/GÜNTHER Hans F.K.: Deutsche Köpfe nordischer Rasse. Munich 1927.
167 For more details, see ØSTERGÅRD Uffe: The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity from Composite States
to Nation-States. Copenhagen 1997.
168 See DELLENBRANT Jan Åke: The Baltic Sea Co-operation. Visions and Realities. In:
BALDERSHEIM Harald/STÅHLBERG Krister (eds): Nordic Region-Building in a European
Perspective. Aldershot 1999, pp. 83-97, here p. 86.
59
throughout history, the Baltic Sea States have mostly regarded themselves as parts of
other regional constructs such as the Nordic sphere or Continental Europe. A gaze back
into history shows that indeed the powers surrounding the Baltic Sea have “more often
been brought together in conflict than in cooperation.”169
The CBSS is one of the outstanding examples in this regard. In contrast to all the
enthusiastic visions promoted by other regional associations and initiatives, this
organisation rather committed itself to the functional challenges that emerged after the
political changes of 1989/1990.
The recent dramatic changes in Europe herald a new era of European relations where the
confrontation and division of the past is replaced by partnership and cooperation. An
enhanced and strengthened Baltic cooperation is a natural and logical consequence of these
events.170
The CBSS never tried to build on a value-laden rhetoric but rather aimed at pointing out
the differences to emphasise the respective need for cooperation. In one of her public
statements, Gabriele Kötschau, then CBSS Secretariat Director, took up the issue of
Baltic togetherness and the challenge and problem of “branding the region”.
Why should we ‘brand’ this region that has much in common, but has even more
differences? What is the Baltic Sea Region known for? [...] What do we have in common?
One has to talk of something intangible, the ‘Baltic brand’ as a combination of attributes,
something that is both tangible – by geography and intangible – through memory and
emotional attachment to an ideal of the Baltic Sea. [...] We as nations are so different – so
how to convince us to act as one region with one brand identity? Exactly for this reason! We
are rich on diversity and it is exactly for this reason that we must come together. Why
should we look homogenous? We are not! The link between perception and reality – that is
the art of selling, even if the Baltic Sea Region has a lot to sell, the buyers must believe in it
– and we ourselves, convinced of our region, should be encouraged to do so.171
VASAB 2010 (Visions and Strategies about the Baltic 2010) provides yet another albeit
less clear-cut case in point. In most of its recent declarations and action plans the
organisation is not reluctant to talk openly about the problems that the region is facing
because of its political, cultural and structural disparity.
The BSR is maybe the least homogenous region in Europe. This creates a demand for
internal cohesion and is a source of particular market potentials. [...] The BSR spans arctic
to temperate climate zones. Its 103 million inhabitants live in 11 different countries or parts
thereof, in which as many major languages are spoken.172
However, in its founding declarations, VASAB 2010 was less outspoken. It also
appealed to the history tool by clearly emphasizing the historical background of its
strategic ambitions and defined the re-integration of the region as its “top objective”.
169 KNUDSEN Olav F. (ed.): Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. London 1999, p. ix.
170 CBSS Copenhagen Declaration, agreed on at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Baltic Sea
States, Copenhagen 5-6 March 1992. Official CBSS website www.cbss.st [23 December 2007].
171 KÖTSCHAU Gabriele: Branding the Region. What, by the way, is “Uusimaa”? Strömsborg Direct.
In: Baltinfo. CBSS Newsletter, November-December 2006, p. 12.
172 See VASAB 2010 Plus Spatial Development Action Programme 2001. Available on the official
VASAB website www.vasab.org.pl [30 November 2007].
60
The BSR, in the millennium until the early 20th century, developed a rich network in many
areas of society. Trade was widespread; the Baltic Sea provided an important link in the
transport system. The Viking Age, the Hanseatic Epoch and other transnational networks
succeeded one another. The spread of Christianity, during the 10th century, played an
important role in cultural co-operation. Regional development occurred along the shores of
the Baltic Sea (with corresponding urban networks), expanding from there to the hinterland.
After World War II, Europe was split into two parts. Most contacts across this curtain were
cut off. Since the recent end of this period of separation re-integration is a top issue.173
Yet another example in the above-mentioned context is the Northern Dimension
Initiative (NDI), launched by Finland in 1997. The Finnish initiators completely
refrained from any sort of ideology-related rhetoric and simply counted on the argument
of European responsibility. Paavo Lipponen, then Finnish Prime Minister and founding
father of the NDI, put it as follows:
With the accession of Finland and Sweden, the European Union now extends from the
Mediterranean to just a few kilometres from the Barents Sea. The Union has thus acquired a
natural ‘northern dimension.’ We need a policy for this dimension too.174
The fact that Finland aimed at bringing some of its foremost geopolitical interests onto
the EU working agenda was probably the basic reasoning behind this strategic choice.
The initiators did not employ any region-based argumentation; they rather chose to
point at the problems and challenges this region was facing, underlining the inherent
responsibility of the EU not to close the eyes in front of its mission. Joenniemi and
Lehti actually identified this aspect as part of the reason why the EU ND never gained
much public support r even cognition in the region.
No narrative has been coined in the context of the NDI that would aim at reconfiguring the
past and linking into earlier historical experiences. There is nothing like the Hanse of the
Baltic Sea related discourse or the elevation of the Pomor period when imagining a Baltic
Region. Since there is no obviously identity-related rhetoric present in the discourse on the
NDI, people do not feel that the matter is one of considerable urgency and relevance in
relation to who ‘we’ are in the post Cold War period.175
The utilitarian and functional approach applied in the EU ND context did obviously
refrain from joining the regional discourse about inclusive Baltic togetherness. In recent
years, the question whether this actually favoured the effectiveness of the policy or not
was part of a wider academic debate about the overall success or failure of the policy.176
173 VASAB 2010. Towards a Framework for Spatial Development in the BSR. Third Conference of
Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning and Development. December 1992. Official VASAB
website www.vasab.org.pl [30 November 2007].
174 LIPPONEN Paavo: The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern Dimension. Speech
delivered at the conference “Barents region today” in Rovaniemi/Finland, 15 September 1997.
Official website of the Finnish Government www.vn.fi/vn/english/speech/970915e.html [26
December 2007].
175 See JOENNIEMI Pertti/LEHTI Marko: On the encounter between the Nordic and the northern. Torn
Apart but Meeting Again? Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI): Working Paper, 11/2001,
pp. 32-33.
176 For more details, see chapter “Evaluation: The EU ND Reconsidered”, p.148-.
61
F. Mental Geography – The Constitution of the BSR as a Spatial Concept
The notion of a region generally implies the existence of a spatial unit, which is at least
to some extent self-contained and thereby evidently recognisable and delimitable as an
entity. In fact, after the end of the Cold War, part of the European North has developed
into some sort of regional unit: the BSR. Numerous regional initiatives, associations and
networks carrying the Baltic label give us a ‘proof’ that in fact, there must be some sort
of regional entity in Northern Europe that is gathering around the Baltic Sea. Still,
ascribing a cohesive image to an area as ample and diverse as the BSR seems to be a
bold venture. Jasper von Altenbockum chose a quite provocative way to put it:
There is nothing, which doesn’t exist at [sic!] the Baltic. A politician would however
struggle if asked: is there a Baltic? Because he would have to say: Oh yes, there are Baltic
programs, Baltic concepts, Baltic sub-regions, Baltic councils and Baltic conferences. [As]
said: there is nothing, which doesn’t exist at the Baltic Sea. Something for everyone and
nothing for all.177
In fact, is there any supportive evidence for ‘Baltic togetherness’ besides the mere
existence of ‘Baltic’ associations? The BSR is a uniquely diverse geographical area, on
the political as well as on the economic, cultural and ideological level. What actually
accounts for comprehensive Balticness besides the plain fact of physical vicinity? These
are questions raised in the context of “mental geography”.178 In contrast to physical
geography, mental geography is widely determined by normative factors, such as
identity, values and cultural connotations.
Identity markers always involve a choice (what we wish to belong to?), because the social
world is defined not just by physical constraints but also in spiritual and normative
categories.179
After the end of the Cold War, the spatial framework in Northern Europe has
considerably altered and diversified, a development that Jukarainen labelled the “growth
of spatial complexity”.180 Today, the region features a variety of virtually constructed
sub-spaces, such as the ‘Nordic’ or the ‘Baltic sphere’. The following chapters deal with
the consistencies of the ‘Baltic Sea Region’ as a spatial concept, questioning and
analysing the various sub-spaces that have emerged in the course of the recent
international developments.
I. Is ‘Nordic’ Plus ‘Baltic’ Equal to Inclusive ‘Balticness’?
The demise of the unnatural Cold War division and the national independence of the
three Baltic States paved the way for different forms of regional cohesion in the BSR,
and thus, for the development of an inclusive ‘Balticness’. Formerly isolated sub-spaces
177 VON ALTENBOCKUM Jasper, cited by Tassinari. See TASSINARI Fabrizio: Mare Europaeum.
Baltic Sea Region Security and Cooperation from Post-Wall to post-Enlargement Europe.
Copenhagen 2004, pp.157-158.
178 See chapter “The Discursive Construction of Regions”, p. 170-.
179 MAKARYCHEV Andrey S.: Where the North Meets the East. Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and
Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’. In: Cooperation and Conflict No. 3/2004, pp. 299-315, here p. 301.
180 See JUKARAINEN Pirjo: Norden is Dead. Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North. Geopolitical
Re-making of Norden in a Nordic Journal. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 12/1999, pp. 355-382,
here p. 364.
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References
Zusammenfassung
Seit 1989 ist es im Ostseeraum zu einer explosionsartigen Entstehung einer Vielzahl von regionalen Initiativen und Zusammenschlüssen gekommen. Der Ostseeraum weist bis heute eine europaweit einzigartig hohe Konzentration an kooperativen regionalen Strukturen auf. Diese bilden gemeinsam ein enges Netzwerk von Vereinigungen, die unter dem Überbegriff der "Ostseezusammenarbeit’ interagieren.
Diese Studie analysiert die Hintergründe dieses regionalen Phänomens oder so genannten „Ostsee-Rätsels“ auf Basis eines Vergleichs zwischen den Regionalpolitiken zweier staatlicher Schlüsselakteure, Schweden und Finnland, wobei der europäische Integrationsprozess als übergeordneter Bezugsrahmen für die Untersuchung dient.