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Carmen Gebhard, Typologies in:

Carmen Gebhard

Unravelling the Baltic Sea Conundrum, page 41 - 48

Regionalism and European Integration Revisited

1. Edition 2008, ISBN print: 978-3-8329-4084-3, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-1239-5 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845212395

Series: Nomos Universitätsschriften - Politik, vol. 164

Bibliographic information
41 In this second sense, the notion of ‘sub-regional’ and ‘sub-regionalism’ refers to the subordinate (and most often sub-state) actors existing and operating at subordinate levels. Confusingly, Baltic Sea Regionalism is sometimes also referred to as ‘Micro- Regionalism’ based on the notion of a much broader European macro-scale process. The conventional form of macro-regionalism is purely sub-national and usually takes place within the parameters of a nation-state. This sort of regionalism on the ‘micro’ or local level is often related to political/administrative planning, democratic or economic/distributional motives; in most cases it is also shaped by the relationship between central government and micro-regional political or administrative forces. Hence, it reflects a model of vertical and state-oriented organisation. Meso-Regionalism has a distinct cross-border focus, i.e. it stretches out beyond both the state level and the state territory. Hence, Meso-Regionalism as it occurs in the case of the BSR could also be labelled as “cross-border regionalism” or “transnational regionalism”.98 This type of regionalism is mostly based on a horizontal model of interaction and involves a wide range of different public and private actors that find themselves grouped together by way of networks or other cooperative formations.99 The territorial extent of regionalism, i.e. whether the respective catchment area is large or small, often informs about the level of action and the type of actors involved. In fact, it can be said that macro-regionalism mainly occurs at the inter-state or intergovernmental level, primarily involving state actors. Meso-Regionalism, on the other hand, may involve both state and non-state actors and includes intergovernmental interaction as well as non-governmental networking. Micro-Regionalism is naturally dominated by non-state actors and mainly occurs at a local level of action. However, needless to say, this pattern is not universally applicable. IV. Typologies Approaches that suggest certain typologies of regionalism that go beyond these simple distinctions considerably help to reduce the empirical complexity of various regionalist manifestations in international politics. They do serve as a tool for characterising the structure of different regionalist models, and for tracing certain regionalist developments over time. However, typologies remain practical tools with limited applicability and validity. 98 The notion of “trans-nationality” needs to be clearly distinguished from the term and concept of “inter-nationality”. Whereas internationality includes intergovernmental dealings, i.e. between the government of one nation-state with the government of another nation-state, or of several nationstates, transnationality covers activity which transcends national boundaries and in which nationstate governments do not play the most important or even a significant role. 99 See JÖNSSON, Christer/TÄGIL Sven/TÖRNQVIST Gunnar: Organizing European Space. Lund/London 2000, p. 149. According to this definition, one can identify a respectable number of Meso-Regions in Europe, such as the North Atlantic Basin, the Northern Atlantic Region, the Metropolises of Northwestern Europe, the Alpine Region, the Carpathian Region, the Danube Basin, the Southern Atlantic, the Latin Region, the Adriatic Basin, the Balkan Region, the Western Mediterranean Basin, and the Central Mediterranean Basin. See KIVIKARI Urpo: The Legacy of the Hansa. The Baltic Economic Region. Helsinki 1996. 42 1. Old vs. New Regionalism and the New Regionalism Approach One of the most common typological distinctions of regionalism is the one differentiating between ‘Old’ and ‘New Regionalism’. In the early 1990s, scholars began to use the phrase of ‘New Regionalism’ in many different contexts. It was mainly meant to stress the difference between current regionalist phenomena and ‘Old Regionalism’, meaning the respective body of theory and practice developed from the 1880s up until the late 1980s. Most studies on the characteristics of the ‘New regionalist paradigm’ have been conducted in the field of Economics and Economic Geography, focussing mainly on the link between trade-related processes and corresponding structures of governance. New insights into the development of the space economy over the last two decades have meant that the scope and nature of economic geography have changed dramatically. [...] The field of New Regionalism is characterised, in particular, by an interest in the role of innovation and economic success (‘competitiveness’) at the level of particular international regions.100 The recent regionalist developments in East Asia and Latin America have been among the most popular examples used for empirical illustration in this context.101 Most studies on the rise of ‘New Regionalism’ focussed on the international scale, i.e. on macroregionalist manifestations such as ASEAN or Mercosur.102 Hettne, one of the founding fathers of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), introduced a more comprehensive model defining‘New Regionalism’ as a multidimensional process of regional integration that includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects, and thus, goes far beyond the mere context of free trade and liberalisation.103 The following table brings together various findings of different exponents of this specific approach, and thus, reflects some sort of typological and terminological commonsense of the NRA.104 100 LAGENDIJK Arnoud: Will New Regionalism survive? Tracing dominant concepts in economic geography. CURDS (Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies) Discussion Paper, No. 10. Newcastle 1998, p. 3. 101 See e.g. BULMER-THOMAS Victor (ed.): Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribean. The Political Economy of Open Regionalism. London 2001. And STORPER Michael: The Resurgence of regional economies, ten years later. The region as a nexus of untraded interdependencies. In: European Urban and Regional Studies 2/2005, pp. 191-221. And LAGENDIJK Arnoud: Will New Regionalism survive? Tracing dominant concepts in economic geography. CURDS (Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies) Discussion Paper, No. 10. Newcastle 1998. 102 See SCHMITTER Philippe C./MALAMUD Andrés: Theorizing Regional Integration and Inter- Regional Relations. Workshop Proposal. Florence/Lisbon 2006, p. 1. Website of the European University Institute, Florence www.iue.it [22 November 2007]. 103 Hettne also focussed more on the subject of city-regions and other locality-based ‘bottom-up’ region building processes. See HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, p. 3. 104 See ibd. and VÄYRYNEN Raimo: Regionalism. Old and New. In: International Studies Review, Issue 1/2003, pp. 25-52. And FABBRI Claudia M.: The Constructivist Promise and Regional Integration. An Answer to ‘old’ and ‘new’ puzzles. CSGR (Centre for the Study of Globalisation) Working Paper, Nr. 182/05. Warwick 2005. And HERRSCHEL Tassilo/GORE Benjamin: Creating the Multi-Purpose and Multi-Scalar ‘Virtual Region’. New Regionalisation in the Baltic Sea Area. Paper presented at the 6th EURS Conference, Roskilde 21-23 September 2006. 43 OLD REGIONALISM NEW REGIONALISM top-down bottom-up launched from above, on the basis of formal state-level initiatives emerging from within the region, less formal and more spontaneous structure process main focus on structural planning formal proceduralism main focus on strategic planning deregulated progression government governance state-oriented restriction to public sector open to all types of actors non-public actors involved exclusiveness openness introverted and particularistic exclusive and (partly) protectionist formal importance of membership criteria extroverted and multitlateral inclusive flexible membership objective-centered comprehensive e.g. security or economy-oriented variety of fields, including ‘low policy’ concentration of power decentralisation vertical state-type hierarchy horizontal/decentralised diffusion of power responsibility trust no one-sided accumulation of power clear separation of labour confidence-building activities creation of visions and common identity coordination cooperation distribution of resources voluntary pooling continuity change constant development/stability rapid changes/volatile conditions Table 5: Old and New Regionalism in Comparison Hettne claims that new regionalism has to be seen in connection with globalisation and the resulting demise of the Westphalian state model, which is a process that has not only qualified the very notion of national sovereignty but has also blurred the lines between national, regional and global contexts. Recent regionalist activity is thought to represent a defence or reaction to globalisation, and an attempt by governments to claw back collectively some autonomy over decision-making and to manage both the positive and negative aspects of international independence (reactive/defensive’ regionalism). Globalism implies the growth of a world market, increasingly penetrating and dominating the ‘national’ economies [...]. From this, there may emerge a political will to halt or to reverse the process of globalization, in order to safeguard some degree of territorial control and cultural diversity.105 105 HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, pp.1-2. 44 In Economics and Urban Studies on regionalism, this alleged correlation between globalisation and progressive regional and local mobilisation has also been termed the “Glocalisation-Thesis” [sic!], which claims that globalisation is directly linked to an increase in the significance of the regional and the local, of regions and cities.106 While these again economy-based reflections might play a certain role in the case of Baltic Sea Regionalism, the line of argument shows that also the more comprehensive interpretation of ‘New Regionalism’ is not neatly applicable to the BSR. Hettne’s NRA has been subject to harsh criticism, mainly as being too vague and arbitrary for the explanation of regionalist dynamics. Lovering is one of the most vibrant critics: It is a set of claims thrown together with inadequate attention to either factual evidence or theoretical coherence, which both misrepresent the real experiences of regions and illegitimately debates over strategy. As a rather vague framework within which to speculate on some possible relationships between hypothetical actors at a vaguely specified level of abstraction it has some limited utility.107 However, most of the features that the NRA suggested for the ‘New’ type of regionalism have been used repeatedly in the scholar debate about Baltic Sea Regionalism. This is particularly true for Hettne’s assumption that the ‘bottom-up’ character of New Regionalism is conditionally related to the progressive deconstruction of the modern or Westphalian state concept. In fact, analysts have outdone themselves trying to typify and characterise the phenomenon of Baltic Sea Regionalism, establishing ‘post-sovereignty’, ‘post-modernism’, ‘post-Westphalianism’, ‘postsecurity political’ or ‘neo-medieval’ as the most common labels attributed to the BSR in this context. These attributions may briefly be summarized as follows: – post-sovereign: The inherent structural approach to regional cohesion that the BSR setting implies transcends the idea of national and territorial sovereignty: it propagates complexity and the establishment of a network character that blurs vertical hierarchies and allows trans-boundary economic flows, transnational exchange and the establishment of border-breaking cultural identities.108 – post-modern/Westphalian: These attributions are very closely related to the idea of post-sovereignty as the structural orientation of modern states, or rather the ‘Westphalian state’, is strongly linked to sovereignty and state independence. “The wide array of projects of regional cooperation that have developed in Northern Europe since the end of the Cold War have fundamentally re-conceptualised the nature of borders in the region (including EU borders), and as such significantly problematise any Westphalian aspirations that may exist at the EU centre.”109 106 The “Glocalisation” neologism originally stems from Japanese business practices in the 1980s, which Robertson later develeoped in theory. See ROBERTSON Roland: Globalisation or Glocalisation? In: Journal of International Communication, Issue 1:1994, pp. 33-52. 107 LOVERING John: Theory led by Policy? The Inadequacies of the “New Regionalism” in economic geography illustrated from the Case of Wales. Paper presented at the Economic Geography Research Group Seminar ‘Institutions and Governance’. London July 1998, p. 21. 108 MAKARYCHEV Andrey S.: Where the North Meets the East. Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3/2004, pp. 299-315, here p. 301. 109 BROWNING Christopher S.: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005, pp. 1-10, here p. 6. 45 – post-security political: since the policy solutions developed in the context of Baltic Sea Regionalism mainly address issues of soft security, this type of regionalism is perceived to pursue an alternative or new concept of security and threat perception. – neo-medieval: argument based on the multitude of overlapping spaces of authority and transnational identities that regionalism shares with the Middle Ages.110 Hettne perceived the end of the Cold War as the central and decisive historical marker for the transition from the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ regionalist paradigm of the 1990s. Whereas the old regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new is taking shape in a multi-polar world order. The new regionalism and multipolarity are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. The decline of US hegemony and the breakdown of the Communist subsystem created a room-for-manoeuvre, in which the new regionalism could develop. It would never have been compatible with the Cold War system, since the ‘quasi-regions’ of that system tended to reproduce bipolarity within themselves.111 According to the primary logic of this argument, the post Cold War setting should have had similar consequences for the BSR. In fact, the political changes of 1989/90 paved the way for regionalist activities across old dividing lines, and for the first time, opened the scene for new kinds of ‘bottom-up’ regionalism. However, Williams exemplified a new way of applying the old-new dichotomy laid down in the NRA, essentially breaking with this argumentation. In my study, ‘New Regionalism’ is understood not as a theory for explaining [emphasis added] the genesis of regions but as a tool for describing certain structural constituencies of regional settings. This allows a precise differentiation between types of regional development, where ‘New Regionalism’ is primarily being seen as a ‘bottom-up’ development that questions hierarchies and supports multilateralism. ‘Old Regionalism’ stands for classical intergovernmental relations where states and sovereignty play a crucial role.112 Instead of ascribing the “New regionalist paradigm” to all forms of post Cold War regionalism in the BSR she used the typology of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ in order to characterise and compare various coexisting regionalist formations. Williams’ reading of the NRA shows that the end of the Cold War did indeed open new opportunities for regional cooperation and thus, allowed the emergence of what is commonly defined as ‘open’ or ‘New Regionalism’. However, it also shows that nevertheless, not all cooperative formations that surfaced in that period fit into this new conceptual paradigm. In the public perception, e.g. the CBSS was seen as one of the most prominent examples for the so called ‘new’ regionalist activism that popped up in the BSR after 1989, even though structurally, it adhered more to the ‘old style’ regionalism.113 110 See ibd., here p. 3. 111 HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan. 112 WILLIAMS Leena-Kaarina: Post-modern and intergovernmental paradigms of Baltic Sea cooperation between 1988 and 1992. In: NORDEUROPA Forum 1/2005, pp. 3-20, here p. 7. 113 For a detailed discussion, see chapter “The Irony of Competition I”, p. 47-. 46 Herrschel and Gore developed yet another alternative or comprehensive interpretation for the NRA and its underlying concepts and terminology, building on the general assumption that ‘Old’ and ‘New’ regionalist manifestations should not be seen as two separate concepts but rather as “two sides of the same coin.”114 Generally referred to as ‘old’ and ‘new’ respectively, different features are associated with the two categories, depending on the respective condition at the beginning of the presumed changes. But [...] rather than following a simple sequential shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’, whereby the latter, as repeatedly suggested, replaces the former, there seems to be need for concurrency of the two. They are two sides of the same coin. This means that whatever features of ‘old’ Regionalism there are first, they will be complemented by the relevant ‘new’ features of the respective new form of the region.115 According to Herrschel and Gore, this specific combination of old and new qualities forms the basis for an “integrated” or “comprehensive regionalism.” That is to say that in practice, ‘New Regionalism’ should not be perceived to have replaced the “old pattern” but rather to have added to the existing regionalist fashion. Evidence ‘on the ground’ suggests less of a shift than a need for complementarity between ‘old’ and ‘new’ practices. In this, existing ways of ‘doing regions’ are expanded, rather than replaced by new ways. How this is done reflects local conditions, including the personalities of the main decision makers.116 Applied to the BSR this means that it is only the diversity of approaches materialised after the end of the Cold War that made it a model case for the ‘full set’ of regionalisms. Drawing on a broad range of regional scales and thus their associated interests and understandings of regional cohesion, it offers a particularly diverse example of the multi-faceted nature of regionalism in its full and “integrated extent” by bringing together the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ logic of regionalism.117 2. Hard vs. Soft Regionalism The dichotomy of ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ in the context of regional development originally stems from the field of Urban Geography and is thus far less common in Political Science.118 Makarychev tried to apply this terminology to the conceptual background of regionalisation in Northeastern Europe and produced a typology of regionalism that is much akin to the old-new paradigm presented earlier in the chapter. 114 See HERRSCHEL Tassilo/GORE Benjamin: Creating the Multi-Purpose and Multi-Scalar ‘Virtual Region’. New Regionalisation in the Baltic Sea Area. Paper presented at the 6th EURS Conference, Roskilde 21-23 September 2006, p. 2. 115 See ibd., pp. 1-2. 116 See, ibd., pp. 4. 117 See ibd., p. 17. 118 See e.g. MATTHIESEN Ulf/BÜRKNER Hans-Joachim: Grenzmilieus im potentiellen Verflechtungsraum von Polen mit Deutschland. Erkner 2002. 47 HARD REGIONALISM SOFT REGIONALISM actorness – scale of interaction state-to-state diversified flow of activities/distribution of power and responsibility vertical horizontal focus control influence promoting hierarchy and standardisation autonomy and variety structural logic administrative and/or diplomatic integrated network concept main organizing principle sovereignty and security de-regulated regionality relations formal and framework-oriented flexible and network-oriented vision of regionality sovereign (modern) post-sovereign (post-modern) Table 6: Hard and Soft Regionalism in Comparison Just as the old-new dichotomy introduced by Hettne, these two opponent concepts of regionalism suggest a formalistic and state-centered structure on the one side, and a more flexible and informal design on the other. According to Makarychev’s typology, ‘Soft Regionalism’ is based on a decentralized network-centric logic of organisation. Its accent on networked Regionalism [...] leaves ample space for grass-roots initiatives beyond the ‘administrative market’. Creativity, inspiration and imagination become guiding principles of ‘soft’ Regionalism. It draws on a set of shared meanings giving rise to a sense of belonging. [...] ‘Hard Regionalism’ refers to top-down, state-centric, hard securityoriented cooperation. It is centralised and elicits a hierarchical pattern of regional dynamics focused on control over sovereignty, territory and borders.119 Even though the ‘hard’-’soft’ dichotomy has never been linked to a sequencing logic, still it presents ‘Soft Regionalism’ as the more progressive or advanced version of the two. Drawing on the argument suggested by Herrschel and Gore in the context of the ‘old’-’new’ dichotomy, it should be emphasised that these typologies cannot be perceived as exclusive categories but rather as concurrent concepts.120 119 MAKARYCHEV Andrey S.: Where the North Meets the East. Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3/2004, p 301. 120 See HERRSCHEL Tassilo/GORE Benjamin: Creating the Multi-Purpose and Multi-Scalar ‘Virtual Region’. New Regionalisation in the Baltic Sea Area. Paper presented at the 6th EURS Conference, Roskilde 21-23 September 2006, p. 2. 48 E. Regionalism in Northern Europe After 1989 The political changes of 1989/90 opened a “historical window of opportunity” for the establishment of cooperative cross-border networks in Northern Europe.121 The newly gained independence of the three Baltic States made it possible for regional and subregional actors to try to bridge the gaps and dividing lines caused by the static bipolar structure of the Cold War. For the BSR the collapse of the Iron Curtain stood for the fall of – what Sander called – a ‘Baltic Wall.’122 The specific circumstances that followed the end of the Cold War in the BSR paved the way for regional cooperation across the Baltic Sea Rim – a phenomenon that has put forth a large number of associations, projects and initiatives operating at different levels of action and covering a large range of policy fields. Promoted by the decentralisation of the international system and the removal of the superpower overlay, both the number of regional organisations and interest in what was called the ‘New Regionalism’ grew exponentially.123 I. The Early Phase of Construction Today’s BSR is said to be the most networked, and therefore, among the most complex regions in Europe. Given the huge variety of cooperative structures and initiatives at hand, it would go beyond the scope of this study to explain the history of establishment in detail, or to mention every single initiative in a specific content-related context. At this point, it seems more practicable and helpful to offer a structured overview on the bulk of cooperative formations and to outline the fundamental events in the early phase of Baltic Sea Regionalism, focussing in particular on the major discursive trends at the first stage of region-building and construction.124 Most of the cooperative structures in the BSR were founded (or, as in the case of HELCOM, structurally reconceptualized) in the wake of the 1989/90 events. Stålvant called this early phase of pro-active cohesiveness the ‘construction period’ (Germ. Grundlegungsperiode) of Baltic Sea Regionalism, in which the first generation of regionalist structures emerged. It was the phase of seminars and of debates about ideas and visions. The variety of Baltic Sea identities was made aware, and new organising principles for cross-border action and cooperation were formulated. The first regionalist actors entered the scene: networks and action groups (such as Coalition Green Baltic) as well as official interregional initiatives were launched at the national, regional and local level.125 121 See WILLIAMS Leena-Kaarina: Post-modern and intergovernmental paradigms of Baltic Sea cooperation between 1988 and 1992. The Genesis of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as a historical case study. In: NORDEUROPA Forum 1/2005, pp. 3-20, here p. 5. 122 See SANDER Gordon: Off Centre. Baltic hands link across a troubled sea. In: Financial Times, 8 April 2000. 123 See FAWCETT Louise: Regionalism from a Historical Perspective. In: FARRELL Mary/HETTNE Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 2005, pp. 21-37, here pp. 29-30. 124 For a detailed description of the major associations and initiatives, see the annex of this study. 125 STÅLVANT Carl-Einar: Zehn Jahre Ostseekooperation. Was wurde erreicht – was bleibt zu tun? In: Schleswig-Holsteinisches Institut für Friedenswissenschaften (ed.): SCHIFF Texte, No. 61. Kiel 2000, p. 12.

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Zusammenfassung

Seit 1989 ist es im Ostseeraum zu einer explosionsartigen Entstehung einer Vielzahl von regionalen Initiativen und Zusammenschlüssen gekommen. Der Ostseeraum weist bis heute eine europaweit einzigartig hohe Konzentration an kooperativen regionalen Strukturen auf. Diese bilden gemeinsam ein enges Netzwerk von Vereinigungen, die unter dem Überbegriff der "Ostseezusammenarbeit’ interagieren.

Diese Studie analysiert die Hintergründe dieses regionalen Phänomens oder so genannten „Ostsee-Rätsels“ auf Basis eines Vergleichs zwischen den Regionalpolitiken zweier staatlicher Schlüsselakteure, Schweden und Finnland, wobei der europäische Integrationsprozess als übergeordneter Bezugsrahmen für die Untersuchung dient.