RECENT WORK ON PLATO’S
AND ARISTOTLE’S PSYCHOLOGY

The strategy of this chapter is to offer an overview of Plato’s and Aristotle’s psychology as I have come to see it and alongside comment on recent work on relevant topics. This procedure has the unavoidable consequence that I sometimes have to return to certain hotly debated areas already dealt with in earlier chapters.

Plato

Compared to the industry of papers and books on Aristotle, the output on Plato is relatively limited. Especially on his general view of soul and soul and body.¹

Sabina Lovibond (1991) comments concisely that ‘Plato invented the idea of ‘mind’ with which modern European languages op-


Specific topics discussed are:


erated’ and ‘is responsible [ ] for the entrenched tendency to posit ‘mind’ (or in certain contexts, ‘soul’) as a substantial component of our nature.’ It is important to keep in mind all the time that we are talking here about the broad concept of psyche (ψυχή), basically a life principle. For Plato this soul is not only what animates and moves the body, but also what does the thinking. Hence the soul is characterized and differentiated from the body by its cognitive and kinetic capabilities: it must be abstract to some extent in order to contemplate abstract ideas, and it must have a dynamic-telic nature in order to account for motion and action.

The Socratic soul

It is reasonable and practical to regard the Corpus as being divided into three traditional parts: early, middle and late dialogues. The early so-called Socratic dialogues are marked by an intellectualism, the view that everybody seeks the good and that knowledge is sufficient for the attainment of the good. Failure is due to ignorance, not to weak will or being mastered by passions. The picture of soul as mind is dominant. Socrates is skeptical about its survival (Ap. 40b-41c, 29a), although one should care for wisdom


It is also worth mentioning International Plato Studies (the Proceedings of the International Plato Society on several dialogues). Here one can also find valuable studies on Platonic psychology. The extensive bibliography of Plato and the Divided Self, eds. R. Barney, Tad Brennan and C. Brittain, Cambridge 2012, also contains a variety of studies relevant to Platonic psychology.

2 Heda Segvic (2000) gives a useful analysis of the concept of intellectualism as traditionally used (the non-rational is not given its due because of an overly rational mindset), and offers her own interpretation (the non-rational is an integral part of the knowledge in which Socrates locates virtue, and every act actually involves an act of reason).

3 Lorenz (2008) points out that the relevant sense of ἀκρασία is action against actual knowledge of the best course, not being mastered by passion.
and truth (29e) and be as good and wise as possible (36c). As he is obsessed with not wronging anybody and thereby himself (37ab, cf. 29b), he obviously regards morality to be one part of his self. A good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death (41cd, cf. 30cd). The other part is the love of and search for wisdom (philosophy).

The separable simple substance soul and the embodied tripartite soul

In the middle dialogues, for instance the Phaedo, the picture is different. We have two parts: soul and body (79b). Death means the separation of soul and body (64c), and the soul caring for knowledge should strive for separation from the disturbances of the body. The soul is clearly still conceived of as mind. Immortality is ‘proved’ in four much-debated arguments: In the first, cyclical argument, the soul is seen as a bearer of life and death and thus as a substance, a life-principle. In the second, from recollection, the soul is shown to have existed before incarnation as a contemplator of Forms, a cognitive principle. The third argument, from affinity to the Forms, argues that Forms are constant, simple and invisible, and that the soul to some extent shares not only invisibility with the Forms but also constancy, incompositeness and hence indestructibility. Kinship with Forms is also revealed when the soul engages in contemplation (abstract thought) and turns away from sense-perception (79de). And its kinship with the divine is seen in that it naturally rules while the body is ruled (80a). We conclude that the Form-like and divine soul is here viewed as a substance. In an interlude, the harmony theory of soul is disproved by a series of reductios: 1) a harmony cannot direct or move its components as we have just seen the soul does, 2) a harmony can (but the soul cannot) have degrees, 3) goodness being a harmony cannot be accommodated within another harmony. Hence if a soul-harmony cannot have degrees (as the soul cannot), then such a soul cannot share in wickedness (disharmony) and all souls would be equally good. This implies that the soul is not a property (harmony), but a substance capable of causal efficacy exerted on the body. A psychological conflict is therefore entertained as possible, here between
the soul and the ensouled body (Odysseus controlling his anger). The final proof operates with a soul substance that is essentially alive and therefore, controversially, cannot die. The soul is not a Form (that would not require a proof of immortality). But because of its special relation to Forms, it is either a special particular essentially alive or alternatively a Form-copy. Even if they are accepted, these arguments deal only with an impersonal soul: there is not much individuality about a pure intellect and a life-principle. Moreover, the arguments are best viewed as dialectical exercises. The weaknesses of these arguments have naturally occupied scholars, but our interest here is the presuppositions and implications for the view of soul. It can be concluded that the soul is both a cognitive and a life-soul. This has been seen as a problem. How could a life-soul be combined with a reasoning power? Plato would probably see thinking as a privileged life. Similarly, the constant soul of the affinity argument has been seen as problematic in connection with a life-soul. In fact, the constant soul is perfectly compatible with the life-soul of both the cyclical and the final argument, and of course with the contemplative power.

It may be said that the Symposium provides the ingredients of an answer in dealing with the development of Eros, the great Daemon, the drive of love that may be transformed from bodily attraction to increasingly abstract objects ending in contemplation.

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4 In a thoughtful article, D. Sedley (2009) defends this as the best argument for immortality in Plato (152). Strato’s objection (Damscius, in Phd. I 442) that there is no such thing as a dead soul does not show that a soul always exists, is faced with the laws of logic: the soul is essentially alive (151).
6 Plato himself advocates further examination of the premises (107b). But Socrates invests hope in traditional wisdom (63c, e).
8 It may of course be said that contemplation is a different life, difficult to combine with a practical life (cf. Aristotle’s problem). The soul is pure intellect by nature, but happens to be embodied with the demands it meets there. Conversely, there is no implication that all life must be intellectual.
10 The former is a permanent substance in the cycles, and the latter is a form-like substance.
of beauty itself. It is significant that Eros is a philosopher (Sym. 203d7). This suggests that we have here the mind (intellect) of the Phaedo in new clothes. One may view mind as an intermediate being (a daemon), a source of goal-directed energy (life) that may be directed from concrete and personal concerns to abstract and impersonal targets. Eros, as a daemon, is neither immortal nor mortal (Sym. 203d8 f.), but stands for a longing for the good forever, i.e. immortality (ibid. 205e-207a). This longing is implemented in procreation in the beautiful (206e5). While mortals seek immortality in the only way possible, by leaving behind something new replacing the old (207d, 208b2-4), procreation (γέννησις) is something immortal in the mortal being (206c, cf. e f.). It is commonplace to regret the omission of immortality in this dialogue, but there may be more than a hint that there is more to the mortal soul and body, namely the procreative drive, which may end in the vision of Beauty itself.11 This would bring the Symposium into line. But it is also controversial.12

The tripartite soul is the new great theme of the Republic, and again in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus. This has been claimed to be ‘Plato’s central contribution to psychology.’13 It is certainly and primarily a central theme in Plato’s view of the soul. There is a growing realization on his part of the importance of the non-rational. Starting out with the ‘Socratic intellectualism,’ where the soul is reason (mind), he moves on to the Phaedo, where ‘bodily’ non-rational desires and emotions are controlled by the mind. Finally, in the Republic the non-rational is incorporated in the soul as parts of the soul. There is the well-known fact of mental con-

11 D. Sedley (2009) partly follows this line of thought, which he calls ‘earned immortality’ (156ff). But it cannot be denied that there is a tension between the neither immortal nor mortal daemon and the immortal element. Cf. the following note.

12 It is perhaps relevant to note that the immortal (divine) part of the soul in the Timaeus (90a, c) is a daemon. The reservation (‘achieve immortality as fully as is permitted to human nature’ (90c2-3) concerns ‘human nature’, not the divine part. This fits in with the picture of human souls in the Phaedrus (248a-d) striving to follow the gods to gain a vision of the Forms.

13 Lorenz (2008) 243. Originally, Grube, in his fine book (1935) 133, stressed that the concept of στάσις is ‘one of the most startlingly modern things in Platonic philosophy.’
CHAPTER VII

Conflict, which is now analyzed by means of the ‘principle of opposites’: ‘one and the same thing cannot act or be affected in opposite ways at the same time in the same part of it and in relation to the same object’ (R. 436b). This ‘hypothesis’ leads to analyzing the soul in three parts: reason, spirit (thumos) and appetite. Are they faculties or capacities? Is reason just a Humean capacity to figure out the means of desire, without its own goal? Appetite is seen here as blind good-independent thirst (439a, d). Are there not three drives or motives involved, each with its own goal? We are told that the elements and traits of the state must exist in the individual too: φιλομαθές, θυμοειδές, φιλοχρήματος (435e f). These are all drives (cf. ὁρμήσωμεν 436b2, cf. 604b). The validity of the argument has been questioned: can a person have both a pro-attitude and a con-attitude to the same thing? There has also been a debate among scholars about the nature of appetite. To what extent is it ‘rational’? Can it form its own goals, or is it even capable of means-end reasoning? The answer to the latter is probably ‘no’. Understanding the nature of reason has also been controversial: It is true that reason (the understanding element) is explicitly described as almost solely bent on knowing the truth (581b). The reasonable man can go to sleep with a reason that can freely reach out to-

14 When repeated at 436e9-437a2, it is added that opposite predicates are also excluded: one and the same thing cannot ‘be’ characterized in opposite ways.

15 Burnyeat (2006). Miller (1995), Stalley (1975) and Lorenz (2008) 257 interpret in directional terms and defend Plato. Moreover, as a matter of fact you cannot as a whole move forward and backwards toward the same object. But Plato may envisage more than empirical necessity, cf. previous note. Plato may thus be thinking of the kind of opposite that Aristotle called ἐνάντια (Cat.11b38). They cannot both be true, but may both be false, e.g., white and black.

16 Lorenz (2008) 260-263 argues for the first alternative. Annas (1981) 129 f. and Bobonich (2002) 244 take the second alternative. However, when the elements of the soul turn up again in book ix (580d-581b), it is with a view to evaluating the lives of men dominated by different motives or drives. So calling appetite ‘profit seeking’ must be understood in context and cannot be taken to indicate the cognitive resources of that element per se. Rep. 439a on desire for just drink and Timaeus 77b5-6 on the irrationality of appetite seem to decide the case.

17 Ferrari (2007) 191 ff.,
ward awareness of what it does not know (572a). But reason also has to rule the other two parts of the soul (R. 439-441). However, this does not imply that reason has two inherent desires, to rule and to understand.\textsuperscript{18} Reason has one interest (like the guardians), namely spending its time searching for truth. Ruling is (as for the guardians) a necessity, a consequence of incarnation. It is not that reason just suppresses (606a, c) the other elements to avoid their interference. It needs their assistance in its bodily situation and therefore regulates and trains (604d) them in the best way, being able to reflect about good and evil (R. 441b, e, cf. 606d).\textsuperscript{19}

The innovation of the Republic in psychology thus acknowledges human motives other than pursuance of the good. Honor, pleasure and the avoidance of their opposites must be reckoned with as well. This implies that desire and action may aim at goals which are acknowledged to be bad.\textsuperscript{20}

In the Republic it is the embodied soul that is tripartite. It is certainly the tripartition of this soul that is analyzed. It is unclear whether the disembodied, immortal soul of bk. X is tripartite: ‘it is not easy for something composite of many parts and not beautifully composed to be immortal’ (611b5-7). However, its love of wisdom (philosophia) points to kinship with the divine. Extrapolating from this, one may get an idea of ‘its true nature, whether composite or uniform and how’ (612a3-5). The hint that it may be ‘beautifully composed’ is perhaps confirmed in the Phaedrus, where we again find some hesitancy to state the truth about the disembodied soul, which is only likened to a charioteer with a pair of horses. The gods, too, have composite but more harmonious souls with two good horses (reason) – in contrast to humans, who have to cope with a good and a bad horse. The implication seems to be that before the ‘fall’ of the ‘human’ soul it was divine (reason) too and beautifully composed. If this is correct, it conforms to the view of the Timaeus, where only divine reason, a god-given dai-

\textsuperscript{19} The good/bad in the long run, that is.
\textsuperscript{20} Lorenz (2008) 264. This break with earlier (Socratic) psychology has been contested by Ferrari (1990), Carone (2001) and Weiss (2006).
mon, is immortal, the other parts being accretions consequent on incarnation as in Rep. x.

The embodied tripartite soul has been an inspiration for Freud’s tripartite soul and modern psychology, not least because of its definition of mental health as psychic harmony. In bk. x the restraint of reason is associated with internalized social restraint (e.g. 604ab, 606bc), and we are reminded that reason, too, needs training (606a, cf. 441e f.). For Freud a part of the Id develops into the Ego, which later forms the Superego. Plato too, in a way, implies a genetic account in so far as children are full of spirit and only later (if ever) become reasonable (441ab). Reason may then hopefully be trained to observe social norms (604d, 606b). The basis for this seems to be fear and shame (606bc). These feelings are not irrational, but have cognitive content. Blind desire, on the other hand, is shameless (571cd, 572b, cf. Phdr. 250e). It is grounded in biology and therefore developmentally basic, like the Id. Spirit has some sense of shame, in that it is not roused when a man feels he is wrong (440c). The Ego has some similarity to Platonic reason, but the latter seems less impotent and shares some traits of the Superego. So there is no 1-1 correspondence. Moreover, the whole project of dividing the soul is in general a matter of debate, and Plato’s division in particular has been problematized.

There is an argument for the immortality of the soul in R. x, 608c-611a: (1) things have a natural good and evil, (2) they can only be destroyed by that evil (the good and neutral are not destructive), (3) the natural evil of the body is disease, and it destroys it eventually. (4) However, the natural evil of the soul, injustice and vice, cannot destroy it and sever it from the body. (5) It is impossible that something can be destroyed by the evil of something else, unless that evil produces natural evil (e.g. if the body contracts a disease owing to bad food). (6) Similarly, the soul

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22 Contra Ferrari (2007) 177. However, this is empirical psychology, nothing to do with the metaphysical soul.

23 R. 439d.
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cannot be destroyed by a diseased body, unless that evil produces injustice and vice. (7) Hence, not being destroyed by either its own evil or that of something else, the soul is immortal.

This proof has been regarded as below Plato’s standard. However, the first two premises are part of Plato’s metaphysics of functions and optimal or bad states (R. 352d-354a), and must be judged in that context. Premise (4) seems weak and questionable, even on Plato’s own terms (Crit. 47d). Having pointed out the difference between body and soul and mentioned that the destruction of the soul means severance from the body (with implied dualism), Plato turns to a long defense of (2). The obvious objection that what eventually kills the soul is a bodily evil is met by the claim that it has to be done via the evil of the soul. This is supported by the general theory of destruction, which again is part of a metaphysics of functions. Everything has a function. The body and its parts and the soul have a function. The specific assumption here is that the soul is essentially a moral principle (substance) which is unaffected by whatever happens to the body. They are totally different substances. This is in line with Ap. 41cd, cf. 30cd (a good man cannot be harmed), but not with Crit. 47d (that part of us is

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24 Brown (1997) has offered a defense against, e.g., Annas 1981.
25 Brown notes this.
26 Cf. Rep. 353d: the soul’s function is to care, govern, deliberate and indeed live.
27 Annas is particularly critical of this argument, which is ‘question-begging’ (1981, 345 f.). But this is a straw man. Plato is not assuming without arguing that the soul is a different kind of thing from the body. This is argued in, e.g., the Phaedo, the Crito and the Republic generally. And the fact that it is unaffected by the body is part of his general theory of functions argued elsewhere. Hence it cannot be claimed that it is assumed at the outset that the soul is indestructible. Annas also wonders why a consequence of the proof is a ‘plurality of immortal souls’. But what Plato is telling us is that the number of souls is constant (611a): obviously no decrease and also no increase, if at the expense of mortality (assuming a finite world). But again, one should not read a Platonic text in isolation. The background here (for what it is worth) is the cyclical argument of the Phaedo.
28 Care of the soul is also important, as wealth does not make the soul excellent, but excellence makes wealth and everything good for men (Ap. 30b). Cf. Charmides for the holistic thought that the soul is the source of bodily health and disease (156b-157a). Just as eyes are part of the head, and the head
improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions.

Two consequences are then drawn from the immortality of the soul: (1) the number of souls is constant (implied in the cyclical argument at Phd. 72b-d), and (2) the soul in its true nature must have some kind of unity. The empirical composite soul with conflicting parts cannot ‘easily’ be immortal (611b). If we extrapolate from the soul’s love of wisdom and its associating with the Forms, we may gather (by reason) its ‘true nature, composite or single or whatever’ (612a). Plato is trading on his proof from affinity in the Phaedo here (78b-80b, esp. 79de).

The self-mover soul

The self-moving soul is encountered in the Phaedrus, the Timaeus (37b5, 36e3-4, 89a1-3) and the Laws (893c-896c). There are implications of it in the Sophist (248a ff.) and the Politicus (269c-270a). This is a permanent shift in focus, if not a fundamental change in the doctrine of soul. The Phaedrus introduces the new view of the soul as a self-mover, both in an argument for immortality (245c-246a) and in the memorable metaphor of a charioteer with a good and bad horse (246ab, 246b-248e). It may be said that the conception of soul as an animating principle in the Phaedo in some sense anticipated what has now developed into something which is both more concrete and more general: a principle of motion, and in Timaeus and Laws a world-soul.

The proof goes like this in the main: the ever-moving is immortal, the self-moving is ever-moving, hence the self-moving is immortal. But the soul is self-moving, hence the soul is immortal.

A closer look shows the details and sub-arguments:

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29 Contra the Republic proof, where injustice does not kill.

30 I follow Brandwood’s chronology (1990 and 1992), which groups Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus and Laws together as the last group, after a group of four: Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus. See also Young (1994) for an overview. Hence, the Phaedrus belongs to another, earlier group than the six late dialogues.
(A) The ever-moving is immortal.
Only the self-moving can be ever-moving, and as a first principle it moves all other things.

(B) A first principle cannot come into being (if it did, it would not be a first principle).
It must also be imperishable (if not, nothing could come to be, and nothing can bring it back as that would require a first principle).

(C) But the self-mover is a first principle of motion (which can neither be destroyed nor come into being. Otherwise the universe would end in immobility and not be brought back).
So the self-moving is immortal.
But the soul’s essence is self-motion, for bodies with an external source of motion are soulless, whereas those with internal sources of motion are besouled (animate).
Therefore: all soul is immortal (unborn and does not die).\(^{31}\)

The strategy is to identify the ever-moving with the self-mover, which is then interpreted as a principle (arche) with the special status of being ungenerated and imperishable. Finally, the self-mover is identified with the soul. One might feel that part (B) about the principle is unnecessary: once the ever-moving had been identified with the self-mover, Plato could move straight on to its identification with the soul. However, arguing via the principle enables him to strengthen the argument with two reductio ad absurdum arguments against generation and annihilation respectively.

The next question is: What ontological status does this self-moving principle have? The identification with the soul is based on the observation that ensouled bodies are self-moving. This is a non sequitur. It is unclear whether it is the organism or a ‘part’ of it that is the self-mover. However, the first alternative is excluded as the

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\(^{31}\) It is not stated explicitly (but perhaps implicitly) that the reference is to a world-soul (one meaning of \( \psiυχη \) πᾶσα, ‘all soul’ 245c5). It should in fairness be noted that πᾶν [ ] σώμα near the end of the argument is used distributively. Similarly, at 246b6-7 \( \psiυχη \) πᾶσα is used distributively, and T.M. Robinson (1995) 115 may be right that it should be translated ‘soul in all its forms.’
organism is obviously not immortal. So we are left with a ‘part’ of the organism. Are we then back with a dualism of substances again? An answer may be gleaned from the myth of the charioteer and the winged horses (σύμφυτος δύναμις). This is the tripartite soul under new guise. It has generally been assumed that now the *disembodied* soul is tripartite, even the gods are tripartite. However, I have argued elsewhere that self-motion involves tripartition, which in turn involves *embodiment*. The driving force of physical motion is desire, but desire must be regulated in order to continue (forever). Hence embodiment is essential. What is embodied is this composite *power* that is the soul. This is neither a Cartesian substance soul nor the immortal soul of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. It looks rather like a very special aspect of the body. It should be noted that the myth adds a personal trait to the self-mover soul: ‘all soul’ *cares* about the non-psychic (246c). This adds a teleological aspect to the cosmological soul. The question of immortality arises: in the *Phaedo* and probably also the *Republic*, it is only the intellect that is immortal. Is the whole tripartite soul now immortal? The short answer is ‘yes’. The gods, too, are tripartite and obviously immortal. However, they are rational and, in the words of *Rep.* x, 611b5-6, ‘most beautifully composed’, while man is immortal to the extent he is rational. So strictly speaking and after all, only reason is immortal.

The *Timaeus* has another ‘likely story’ about the nature of soul. The world-soul is *created* by a Demiurge, which is surprising in view of the fact that the self-mover soul of the *Phaedrus* is *un/generated*. But this is one reason *not* to take the creation story literally. Anyway, it is claimed that the soul is constructed out

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32 Unless of course the reference could be to the world-body (as in the *Timaeus*, e.g., 37b5).
36 The *Laws* (896a6, 899c7), also in a non-mythological context, takes the soul to be *generated* prior to body. T.M. Robinson (1995) XVI, XXX and 68-
of an intermediate kind of Being, Sameness and Difference, each intermediate between an indivisible and a divisible version (35a). This stuff is then formed into two circles, the Same and the Different, with a harmonic structure. This is to account for astronomical ‘facts’ (ensouled stars), but also to provide for the cognitive powers of the soul so that true λόγος ‘moved in the self-moved’ can calculate identity and difference between both Forms and particulars.  

The intermediate ontological status also appears at the individual level, where reason is now a daemon (90a-c). This reminds one of the Symposium’s Eros, the Daemon, and is a marked difference from the Phaedo, where the soul is in the category of the invisible (intelligible), where Forms belong (Phd. 80b). The soul is still invisible in the Timaeus (36e6, 46d6), but is now dependent on divine reason. The world-body is fashioned within the world-soul, center to center, with the soul ‘woven’ right through from the center to the outermost heaven, enveloping it from the outside. Revolving around itself, it provides a divine source of unending and rational life for all time (36d8-37a2). Hence, it is clear that the Timaeus, too, has a self-mover soul (cf. also 37bc). As to status, this soul is not a mysterious soul substance, a non-phenomenal motion. Rather the parallel geometric/harmonic structure points to an identification of soul with the body-structure.  

69 follows Hackforth (1959) and Vlastos (1964) in taking creation literally (key evidence: the world has come to be, γέγονεν 28b6-7). However, if there are reasons for taking that non-literally, there may be a possibility for a non-temporal reading of the Laws too. One ought to note here that in Philebus the world is referred to as γεγενημένην οὐσίαν (27b8-9) and γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν (26d8). The first reference in particular does not invite an interpretation in terms of literal creation. One problem, too often unnoticed, is that if generated, the soul would be corporeal, tangible and visible! (cf. Tim. 31b4-6, and n. 46 below).

37 Zeyl (xli n. 77) sees this as a rudimentary theory of predication superseded by the (later) Sophist.

38 The world in the Politicus 269e only has a limited uniform, invariable motion in one place.

39 This has been denied by, e.g., T.M. Robinson (1995) 154, 161 and Owen (1953) 338, with reference to the absence of self-motion in plants! This seems to ignore that what is denied plants is obviously locomotion.

40 I have argued this more fully in Ostenfeld (1982) 247-250. It seems to me significant that Aristotle claims that the Timaeus treats the soul as a magnitude and its motion as circular motion (DA 406b25-407b26). To Cherniss (1944),
In the *Sophist* in the Battle of Gods and Giants (245e-249d), the idealists are forced to admit the reality of intelligence, life, soul, change and, by implication, what is changed, i.e. matter (248e ff.). This is done by a series of implications: reason and life reside necessarily in the soul, and as ensouled reality changes, so change and what is changed, matter, are real. Hence, reason must be in a soul and the soul must be in a body. And *vice versa*, physical objects as we know them must involve the soul and intelligence. Motion is due to the soul, and orderly motion (‘natural laws’) requires reason. The result is that the soul and reason are co-implicated with the body.

In the *Politics* Myth (269c-270b), the world is an organism formed by God. It has one rotation due to God imparting life and immortality, and another opposing rotation due to σωματειδές (273b), εἰμαρμένη and σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία (272e). The challenge is to identify the two opposing forces at play here. God is probably best seen as an *intelligent soul*, being everlasting self-rotation. If we venture to demythologize this, the opposing revolutions may be seen as simultaneous: for the world needs the constant presence of God, who must therefore be in the world. The mythological transcendent intelligent God (self-rotation forever) *must be in* a soul.41 In the myth, God is the world-soul in abstracto, but demythologized he is the world-soul in concreto and is embodied and faces bodily desires etc.42

The *Laws* (896a-b2) continues the *Phaedrus*: Soul is by definition the motion that moves itself. Therefore, it is a principle of

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Aristotle’s account of *Timaeus* has ‘no validity’! The soul is neither an idea nor a particular, and so it is not an extended magnitude (411). The premises are correct, but the conclusion does not follow. The soul belongs now to another category. It is an *intermediate entity* (the structure of the world-body), responsible for life and organization. It is itself an *invisible* rational cause that operates on irrational causes with casual and random effects (*Tim*. 46de). If it is objected that the structure that is soul must be visible, then it should be recalled that it is structure in the sense of organization, rather like Aristotelian forms.

41 ‘The only existing thing capable of intelligence we must call soul’ (*Tim*. 46d5-6, cf. *Soph*. 248e7-249b7 and *Phil*. 30c9-10).

42 The universe is bodily and therefore it cannot entirely avoid change; but *as far as possible* its movement is uniform, invariable and in one place (269e). That the world-soul can have less elevated desires (σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία...
motion; and therefore, it is prior to material things. And as in the *Timaus*, the soul is *generated* (896a6 899c7, cf. 967d6-7) and prior to the body (896c1-2, cf. *Tim.* 34c4-5). The ‘proof’ runs like this:

(1) When an object moves itself it is alive (895c7-10).
(2) When an object has a soul it is alive (895c11-13).
(3) Hence (?), the soul is by definition motion that moves itself (895e10-896a2).
(4) Hence, the soul is the cause of all change and motion (896b1).
(5) Therefore, the soul is the first γένεσις and motion of all at all times (896a6-8, cf. 899c7, 967d6-7).43

This has traditionally been taken to mean that the soul is generated, and that it contradicts the *Phaedrus*, where the self-mover is not and cannot be generated.44 However, what is said here is that the soul is the first γένεσις and motion, not that it is itself literally generated.45 It is the cause of all other γένεσις, but that is another matter.

272e6) seems in line with *Laws* X (896e8-897b4), but on the face of it fits in badly with the intelligent world-soul of the *Timaeus* (36e). And indeed with the self-mover of the *Phaedrus*. This alone would be a reason to place the *Timaeus* chronologically just after the *Phaedrus* and before the *Politics*. It should be noted that even the intelligent world-soul of *Timaeus* has (true and sure) beliefs about the sensible, communicated by the Circle of the Different (37b, but see Aristotle *DA* 407a3-6). Bodily εἰμαρμένη linked with desire (272e6) has been compared or identified with ἀνάγκη in *Timaeus* (e.g., Vlastos (1939) 395). Ἀνάγκη is not explicitly mental, but the Demiurge must use ‘persuasion’ to produce cooperation. Similarly, εἰμαρμένη in *Politics* is non-mental bodily motion facing God, who as a soul must *feel* the dragging (σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία) but makes it comply and produces few bad effects, and this may continue for a while after he has left (273c). So perhaps the *Timaeus* is not entirely incompatible with the *Politics* and the *Laws*.

43 What are we then to do with the unruly, primitive motions of εἰμαρμένη and ἀνάγκη? They seem and have generally seemed independent of the self-mover soul. However, they depend on the inequality of ‘corpuscles’ in chaos which tend to their like. This process would end in universal death, if the constraining circle of intelligent soul did not step in (cf. Ostenfeld 1968). So even so-called precosmic motions are mind-dependent after all. Cf. Aristotle for a similar thought (*DA* 416a6-9).

44 Vlastos (1964) 414, Zeyl xxiv.

45 ‘*Genesis* and motion’ is a hendiaclys: *genesis* is motion. Ψυχὴν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος (896c1-2) might be a final hurdle for our interpretation. But
The world-soul of the Laws seems to embrace every conceivable mental content: intellectual and emotional. It can be reasonable or unreasonable. If it is the former (as it appears to be now), it leads and cares for the world; if it is the latter, the world will suffer (L. 896e-897c). What are we to think of this entirely profane world-soul? On the surface, it is totally different from the principle of motion in the Phaedrus and the intelligent world-soul of the Timaeus 36e. But it is now realized that soul as the cause of everything is the cause of both good and evil (896d). This implies that in theory there is more than one world-soul: a rational soul and an irrational soul. Judging from the cosmos, it is the former that is in control. Hence, the notion that the soul cares about the soulless is repeated (897c7-9). But has the world-soul then all the feelings and desires etc. of the human soul? Yes, this is what we learn from the Politicus Myth, with its scenarios of a world with and without God.47

Rather than taking this as a revolution in the concept of world-soul, we should take it as a consequence of different scope: in the Phaedrus the purpose was to introduce a principle of motion, in the Timaeus we are presented with a physical view of the world, and finally in the Laws the world-soul serves as an ethical worldview, including people with their mental equipment.

The gods care (900c-907b). We do not find the demiurge again in the Laws, but we do find some figures like him: the divine Chess Player (903d6), the wise and caring God, better than mortal demiurges (902e), Supervisor of the universe (903b), and Our King (904a). These intelligent and good figures must be mythical representations of the intelligent world-soul: only the soul can be

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46 It is forbidden to claim that two deities turn the world opposing each other (Pol. 270a).

47 The issue is the mental origin of evil. It is possible (as Skemp does (1987) 146 n.1) to refer it to individual souls (cf. L. 906a).
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intelligent (Tim. 46d5-6, 30b3, Soph. 249a6-7), and Occam’s razor forbids another soul above the world-soul.\(^48\)

On the question of the ontological status of the (rational) soul, Plato offers a likeness. Reason cannot be seen (897d8-e1). Circle motion is most akin to and like the cyclical motion of reason (898a). They have a number of characteristics in common (898a8-b3). Again, the traditional view of this has been that the motion of reason is spiritual or immaterial.\(^49\) The alternative made probable by comparison with other late dialogues (and the Phaedrus), and by Aristotle’s comments (cf. n. 40 above), is that the rotation of reason is not exactly reducible to physical rotation, but is ‘manifest in’ or ‘shows in’ physical rotation.\(^50\)

There are also some suggestions about the way the soul of the sun moves the body: either being in the body as in our own case, or


\(^49\) Cherniss (1944) 404 f. In (1957) 352 he thinks the Sophist argument against the ‘Friends of Ideas’ proves the existence of non-phenomenal [=spiritual] motion, different from γένεσις. I think this is misguided and contradicts our analysis of the Timaeus and the explicit words of the Laws. Other advocates of immaterialism are Skemp (1967) 21, 86, (1987) 105 and T. M. Robinson (1995) 151, who refers to Soph. 249a where, according to him, the motions of soul are ‘clearly not spatial, but totally spiritual’.

\(^50\) Carone (2005) has ventured the extreme view that the soul is a material entity (249, 266). She claims to have disproved both substance and attribute dualism on the ground that they ‘allow that mind and body may be what they are independently of each other’ (266). Her thesis is that mind and body can be seen as necessitating one another (259). Fair enough, I agree, and it should appear from my (1968) that I do. Thus, while organized body (B1) obviously implies mind (M), it is also the case that continued erratic motion involves (M). And vice versa: (M) is obviously involved in physical rotation and motion generally (B1), and even in erratic motion (B). Hence, the attribute dualism I advocate does not imply that soul is what it is independently of the body. What it does imply is that there is to the body (and the physical world) a special dynamic-telic aspect (M) that differs from erratic motion (B). Only soul can have reason. This is the meaning of the soul being ‘prior’ to the body.

It is important that the soul is invisible (Tim. 36e6, 46d6) in contrast to the elements, for instance (‘what comes to be must be corporeal, visible and tangible that is’, and nothing can be visible apart from fire, tangible apart from solidity or solid without earth (ibid. 31b4-6, 28b7-c2). So Plato is explicit that the soul is not fire and earth! Holding that the soul is a material entity,
via another external body, or it is ψιλή (‘immaterial’) and guides the body with ‘wonderful’ powers (898e-899a). Plato favors the first model (896d10 ff.). This may count against ‘spiritual motions’.

Summing up

For Socrates the soul is the mind (intellectualism). Survival is uncertain, but care for the soul is important: be as wise and good as possible. This means that the self is a cognitive and moral self.

The soul of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* is an immaterial substance (mind) independent of the body. It is simple and therefore immortal. Its nature is love of wisdom (*philosophia*). When it is embodied it acquires other interests and becomes tripartite. Ontologically, in so far as it is capable of existing on its own apart from the body, it must be a *substance*. Thus, we have a dualism of substances. However, the self-mover soul of the later dialogues (*Phaedrus, Timaeus, Statesman, Philebus* and the *Laws*) is more like an attribute of the body: it is a dynamic-telic entity, a *unique attribute* of the living body, as an agent, a self-mover and organizer of its body. The world-soul of the *Timaeus* is identical with the structure of the world-body, and is therefore extended but immaterial (cf. n. 50). It is a unique attribute which is ontologically prior to the body. The latter owes its existence to the soul. But as

G. Carone (2005) focuses on invisibility, which according to her need not imply incorporeality (235-241). She rejects the proposal of Sedley (1997) 329 f. that the incorporeal (reference to *Tim*. 36a6 should be 36e6) may be invisible and intangible (*Tim*. 28b and 31b) and yet not necessarily non-spatial. Sedley may well be right that these texts leave room for spatiality. But one cannot on this basis assume that invisibility allows for corporeality (Carone (2005) 236). This is surely prevented by *Tim*. 31b4-5. The scope of invisibility and incorporeality is a matter of interesting debate and obviously relevant to the interpretation of Plato. However, for him invisibility means intelligibility (νοητόν): we can see the body, we cannot see the soul, we must think it (*Laws* 898d9-e3, cf. *Phd*. 80b). Hence the question then becomes: does the intelligible exclude the spatial? Or the corporeal (σῶμα)? The answer to the latter seems clear. The answer to the former is less clear. A remark about space in the *Tim*. 52a8-b2 is suggestive: ‘apprehended without the senses in a sort of spurious reasoning.’ So spatiality in a way belongs to the intelligible, and the soul can be invisible and intelligible and also spatial. In support of this point, perhaps it could be added here that Aristotle’s forms and especially the form-soul is intelligible, but in extended matter.
an attribute it cannot exist apart from a body. Hence it must be reincarnated to survive. But it seems still to have the status of a substance. Hence a sort of dualism is preserved, but a dualism of mental and corporeal attributes, of teleology and mechanism.\footnote{FMM 252 and pp. 78-83 above. Plato and Aristotle share the (to us) hybrid concept of a substantival attribute. The corporeal attributes are here less (or not) substantival.}

Similar to the Aristotelian dualism. To some extent, the picture which was drawn in the first edition (1987) of this volume has been confirmed by subsequent scholarship.\footnote{I am thinking of, e.g., H. Granger (1996) chs. 6-7 and C. Shields (2009).}

\textit{Aristotle}

Aristotle was the first to devote a special work, the small treatise \textit{De Anima}, to the subject of the soul (\(ψυχή\) as the source of life, an explanation of what characterizes living beings). Part of his philosophy of soul is also a much-debated discussion of intellect (\(νοῦς\)). Aristotle’s philosophy of soul and mind has enjoyed much more attention recently than Plato’s thoughts on soul, simply because it looks much more relevant to the modern debate. More precisely, his \textit{hylomorphism} has appeared as an alternative to Cartesian dualism on the one hand, and to materialism on the other. This alternative has often been interpreted as attributivism: the soul is an attribute of the body. Much work has then gone into understanding the status of this attribute.\footnote{See the following selection (cf. also Caston (2006) 318) exhibiting a variety of general treatments of the soul-body relation:
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ma I. Here we are told what the soul is not. The soul has typically and historically been characterized by the production of movement and cognition. Interestingly, the focus is on the *Timaeus*, both in I 2 (on the earlier opinions), where the issue is cognition: the soul is composed of the elements, and in I 3 (critical evaluation of the earlier views), where the self-mover soul is refuted in great detail. The main objection to the *Timaeus* soul is that it is extended (μέγεθος), and that its motion is local, rotation in the case of reason. In other words, and paradoxically, Plato is too materialistic for Aristotle’s taste. An important criticism of Plato here is that the relationship with the body is claimed to be contingent, like the Pythagorean transmigration story (407b12-26). Aristotle must be thinking of the individual soul here, as Plato did believe in trans-

Conception of Soul’ (1992).


There are of course also specific studies on aspects of Aristotle’s psychology (with apologies for not labelling the views as intended by the authors):


M. Nussbaum & A. Rorty (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima* (1992) is a rich source of explorations of both specific topics and general analysis of the soul.
migration. Among other things, Plato is faulted because he overlooks the uniqueness of each soul and body and their unique and necessary partnership (κοινωνία). It is notable, however, that there are hints that even for Aristotle νοῦς may be an imperishable and divine substance (408b18-29, cf. 413a6-7). In general, for Aristotle the soul cannot be in motion, and hence it cannot be self-motion (I 4, 408b30-1), nor is it composed of elements (I 5). Plato is wrong on both counts, according to Aristotle. But it should not be overlooked that Aristotle surveyed the earlier opinions with the intention of adopting the sensible ones and warning against the others (403b20-24). So we should not be surprised that many Platonic ideas turn up in Aristotle’s own exposition, not least in psychology.

The soul as form

Aristotle’s own view of cognition (perception and thinking) is dealt with in Book II 5-12, and Book III 1-5. The issue of motion (motivation) is handled in III 9-11. However, the general view of soul as such is set out in Book II 1-4. In the important first chapter we are told that the category of substance includes matter (in itself not a particular -’a this’), form (giving a thing particularity, according to which ‘a this’ is said), and the compound, and that matter is potentiality and form actuality. Natural bodies are most clearly substances, and some have life, so a natural living body is a substance and a substance qua composite (412a16). Now the soul is not substance as a composite living body (which is rather like subject and matter), but substance as ‘the form of a natural body which potentially has life’; and as this substance is actuality, the soul is the actuality, or strictly the first actuality54, of such a body (412a11-22). And as such bodies include bodies with organs, the final definition of soul is ‘the first actuality of a natural body with organs’ (412b5-6). Hence, the soul and the body are one, just as imprint and wax are (412b6-8). Being form, the soul is also the definition (λόγος) or the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of such a body. An axe and an eye are adduced as illustrations: ‘what it is to be an axe’ is the essence of an axe, and capacity for sight is the essence of an eye. This choice of

54 It is an actuality of σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἕχοντος (412a20-21), meaning that it is an acquired state (ἕξις), cf. 412b25-26.
an artifact and an organ reveals that the focus is on form as function. This reflects Aristotle's teleological outlook, and is similar to Plato's ἔργον philosophy in the Republic I 352d-354a. However, there is a difference: Plato is concerned with the function of soul, whereas Aristotle explores the function of man. This is exactly the difference between a mind-body substantialist dualism and Aristotle's hylomorphic view, which looks monistic (soul and body are one), but whose interpretation is hotly debated. A solution must be found in an understanding of the central metaphysical concepts of substance, form/matter and actuality/potentiality. Substance is briefly introduced (412a6-9, cf. 402a23-25). It may be either matter, form or composite. It appears that it is substance in the sense of composite (τὸ δὲ τί) that is the focus.

Hylomorphism

In other words, Aristotle’s great idea is to view the soul/body relation in terms of his form/matter relation. This is what has come to be called the hylomorphic view. Hence much work has gone into understanding the nature of Aristotelian hylomorphism (HM). So two questions ought to be posed in this order: What is the status of form in HM? How does the application of HM to the mind-body relation fare? The latter has received much attention since J. Ackrill (1972/3) questioned the logic of the form-matter analogy. The relation between soul and body is necessary, whereas the form and its matter are, it is assumed, only contingently connected.55 So based on this theory the human body ought to be contingently enformed, but it is also necessarily enformed, because Aristotle holds that when unensouled at death, it is no longer a body.56 However, the contradiction is, it may be argued, not in HM itself,

55 It is not always observed that this is not generally true (cf. Met. Z 10-11). More on this below.

56 Ackrill (1972/3) changed the study of Aristotle’s psychology with an article complaining that Aristotle applied his form-matter to the soul-body distinction inconsistently. He assumes that generally the matter of an object must be contingently informed by its form: ‘The contrast of form and matter in a composite makes ready sense only where the matter can be picked out in such a way that it could be conceived as existing without that form’ (126). So the form-matter contrast, as Ackrill sees it, does not fit the soul-body relation.
but points rather to limits of an analogy with artifacts such as bronze spheres or statues. HM is developed to account for change in general. It works well for a lump of bronze made into a statue of Sophocles which loses that shape when it is reshaped. In the case of man (a living natural body), the body is already formed and so is not neutral matter like a lump of metal. Hence, this has been seen as a problem with the analogy which scholars have sought to remedy. But perhaps it is better to realize that we have to follow Aristotle in accepting the limits of the analogy with the creation of artifacts, which is of course suggestive as far as it goes. We are, at any rate, invited to think of the soul as ‘substance as a form’ (412a19-21), and the unity of soul and body answers some questions about the soul-body relation, such as what is the bearer of mental predicates (DA 403a, 408b). However, the real issue is the status of form in HM.

Soul as cause

The classic text on causes (Phys. II 3, 194b24-33) mentions matter, form, efficient cause and end, and we are told (Phys. II 7, 198a24) that the last three may come to the same thing (cf. APo II 11). In DA II 4 the soul is said to be the cause and principle of the living body, and just as these [cause and principle] vary, so the soul is the cause of the body in three ways: (1) it is the cause of change (local change, but also qualitative change in sensation and quantitative change in growth and decay), (2) it is the end (the body and its parts are ‘for the sake of’ the soul), and (3) it is the substance (formal cause) of ensouled bodies (substance is the cause of being, i.e. life) (415b8-28, cf. Met. Θ 4, 1044a32-b3).

As a cause of change, the soul also holds the body together (411b6-9), an idea derived from Plato. In the specific case of metabolism and growth, fire is a concurrent cause (as the materialists hold), but complex natural wholes like men (for instance) have a limit (πέρας) or ratio (λόγος) which determines their size and increase; and limit and ratio are marks of soul, not fire, and belong to formulable essence (λόγος) rather than matter (416a9-18). Aristotle seems here on to talk biologically of our DNA, the genetic code, the vector of genetic information. This is not to explained in simple materialist terms.
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The soul is also the formal cause: substance as form or in accordance with the account of the body, which is ‘what it was to be’ for a natural body of the right kind, having itself the principle of movement and rest (412b10-17, cf. Phys. 193b3-6). The definition of soul then contains reference to the body, and it is through its partnership (κοινωνία) with the body in a certain state (407b16) that the two interact.

Substance as form is what gives particularity to what it is the substance of (412a8-9). If this substance is separated from a human being, he is no longer a human being. Just as with an axe: if you take away its being an axe (its function, cutting power), it ceases to be a true axe. The same applies in the case of an eye. Hence, the definition of function refers necessarily to the matter. Fulfilment refers necessarily to what it is the fulfilment of. The soul, being an end (τέλος), is the actuality, i.e. the fulfilment or realization of the body, and the body and its organs serve the soul. Hence, both as cause of change, as substance as form and as actuality of the body are the soul and the body necessarily connected.

The soul as form, again

The close relation between form and matter does not hold in the case of a bronze sphere or statue or a wax imprint. Here the form does not imply the bronze, metal or wax. But an axe, an eye and the ensouled body are different. These three items have a func-

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57 It may be suggested that the form of an axe (and a house) is less closely tied to its matter than is the form of an eye. The question is raised in Met. Z 10, 1034b20-28: must the definition of a whole contain a definition of the parts? ‘The formula of the circle does not include that of the segments, but that of the syllable does include that of the letters.’ Further, ‘the bronze is a part of the concrete statue, but not of the statue when this is spoken of in the sense of the form’ (1035a6-7). In Z 11 we learn that of things found in different materials, as a circle may exist in bronze or stone or wood, the essence does not refer to the materials, as it is found apart from them.’ The form of man, by contrast, is always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind. Still, it is questionable whether they are parts of the formula, but it is obviously impossible to form an abstraction (1036a31-b7). However, eliminating matter is useless, for ‘some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter or particular things in a particular state’. For instance, ‘Socrates’ means ‘this particular soul and this particular body.’ While the circle can exist without the bronze, man cannot exist without his parts. An animal is something perceptible and cannot be de-
tion, and their matter is ‘for the sake of’ the form, and the form is the fulfilment of the individual thing. This means that the connection between form and matter is necessary (perhaps in various degrees). The soul-form contains a reference to the body and its organs, and the organs cannot be understood without reference to the soul. By contrast, the bronze sphere, statue, and wax imprint are only contingently connected with their matter, which may be different. They are not natural bodies with a function or artefacts imitating such bodies. The form-matter scheme is introduced in Physics I 7 and II 1 and the biological works in connection with an analysis of change, and it also pops up in Metaphysics Z 3 and 7-11 in connection with the substance philosophy (‘substance is the indwelling form’ 1037a29). Here Aristotle acknowledges that the application of form to animals (and men), a case of a particular form in a particular matter, has the consequence that the form and its definition must refer to motion (and hence to matter), the reason being that animals are perceptible (1036b22-30). So when we are given a definition of the soul as ‘substance as the form of a natural body which potentially has life’ (in DA II 1), we realize that Aristotle could argue that this is a special case of hylomorphism. Even so, Ackrill (1973) claimed that Aristotle cannot consistently use hylomorphism in this way; and Barnes (1995a) protests that it is ‘so broad a use of ‘form’ and ‘matter’ that their analytical powers are entirely lost’ (98). It seems, however, that the almost universal opinion that Aristotle is wrong here or needs help unfortunately overlooks the fact that Aristotle is perfectly aware that he is putting his schema to a new use in connection with living nature. He is not especially trying to explain substantial change (the creation of artefacts such a bronze spheres, houses, etc.) but to analyze an-

fined ‘without reference to movement nor without reference to the parts being in a certain state’ (1036b22-30). The understanding of this aporetic chapter is helped to some extent by Hamlyn (1985), who has a useful observation on the strict material implications of form in contrast to essence, e.g., snub versus curvature. Jiyuan Yu (1997) has produced an interesting article in which he claims that there are two conceptions of hylomorphism in Met. ZHΘ: ‘isolated hylomorphism’, where matter does not enter the definition of form (e.g. Z 7-8), and ‘conjoined hylomorphism’, where it does (e.g. HΘ, esp. H 6). Z 10-11 contains both in a confusing way.

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CHAPTER VII

imals and man and their development (via the δύναμις/ἐντελέχεια contrast). Interpreters have focused on the body and come up even with a BODY underlying the body,\(^{58}\) or with two kinds of matter in an animal (the organic body and the elements constituting it).\(^{59}\) It seems more profitable to concentrate on the form, particularly the soul-form.

The status of the soul must then be understood from within the framework of the general form-matter contrast. And within the general substance philosophy. So while the body is ‘rather’ substance as subject (ὑποκείμενον) and matter (ὕλη), the soul is ‘substance as the form (εἴδος) of a natural body which potentially has life’ (412a17-19). This means that the body is potentiality and the soul actuality. In consequence, soul and body are one, like the oneness of an imprint in wax, and in general like the oneness of form/actuality and matter/potentiality (DA 412b6-9).

Nevertheless, soul and body are both substances. Now substance is thought to be ‘a this’ (τόδε τι) and separable (χωριστόν), and so form and the compound would seem more of a substance than matter (Met. 1029a27-30). Similarly, form is a more plausible candidate for being nature than matter because the potential flesh and bone has not yet gained its own nature, and we refer to a thing as what it actually is at the time, rather than what it then is potentially (Phys. II 1, 193a26-b8). The form then is prior to the matter and more real (1029a6, cf. PA 640b28-9). Hence, we would expect that the soul as form-substance is ‘a this’ (τόδε τι) and separable. But it is not separable,\(^{60}\) and it is rather what makes individual substances ‘a this’ (τόδε τι) and separable. It is what makes us call something ‘a this’ (DA 412a8-9, cf. Met. Z 17, Phys. 191a13-4). The ‘indwelling form from which and the matter the so-called concrete substance is derived’ (Met. 1037a28-9). So, paradoxically in view of the focus in the Metaphysics on the form as substance, form does not strictly live up to the two above-mentioned (common sense)

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58 B. Williams (1986).
60 413a3-5, cf. Phys. 193b4-5 ‘except in definition’, conceptually. The body as matter is not ‘a this’ (DA 412a7-8), nor is it separable (412b25-26).
criteria of substance. This is not to say that it is not substance in a more technical sense.

Sense-perception

One might say that the soul is moved by the objects of perception, if it is moved (406b10-11). However, this is no ordinary motion or change. This leads on to the other area of debate: perception. There is a whole industry of scholarly work on what is to be made of (for instance) Aristotle’s idea that perception is the reception of form without matter (424a17-19, 425b23-24). Sense-perception occupies a large part of DA II 5-III 2, II 5 and III 2 in particular. Aristotle follows Presocratic tradition in holding that perception and thinking are a kind of affection (410a25-26) and are very close to each other. The focus must therefore be to identify where he departs from tradition. For Aristotle, sense-perception involves being moved (κινεῖσθαι) and affection (πάσχειν), and seems to be a sort of alteration (ἀλλοίωσίς τις) (416b33-35). More specifically, it is an assimilation of the organ, which is potentially such as the sense-object is actually (417a17-20, 424a1-2). This is part of Aristotle’s general idea of change.

Now, there are in fact three stages: two kinds of potentiality and, partly overlapping, two kinds of actuality. This is then illustrated by knowing: man is by nature capable of knowing, but when he has learnt something, he actually knows it but is only potentially contemplating. When he then actually exercises this knowledge, he has left potentiality entirely behind (417a21-417b2). Correspondingly, there are two kinds of affection or alteration: ‘destruction by the opposite’ or ‘change to privative dispositions’ on the one hand, and on the other hand ‘preservation of what is in potentiality by what is in actuality, and of what is like what acts on it in the way that a potentiality is like its actuality’ (417b2-16). Now, the second transition to full actuality is ‘a progression toward the thing itself’ and is therefore either not an alteration or another kind of alteration (417b6-7).

Applying this distinction to sense-perception, at birth the sense-organ has a form: sense-capacity. This may then be activated, just as knowledge. In the absence of any better term, this
transition is called ‘affection’ or ‘alteration’ (418a1-6). In fact, it is, as appears from III 2, ‘actualization’ (ἐνέργεια) of the sense in Aristotle’s understanding. The eye has in a sense become coloured. For each sense-organ can receive the sense-object without matter (425b22-24). The actualization of the colour of the sense-object together with the actualization of the faculty of seeing (425b26-27) or activated sound and activated hearing (426a3-4) occur in the organ. The result of this is that (for instance) the eye becomes coloured ‘in a sense’, since it is colour without matter. The sense is affected by the sense-objects, not ‘as they each are said to be, but as of a kind (τοιονδί) and after their ratio’ (424a22-24). I take it that what is produced in the sense-organ is a sense-quality. Aristotle takes sound as his example: voice is a kind of concord which is a ratio (λόγος), and voice and hearing are in a sense one, therefore hearing too is a sort of ratio. Sensation in general is a ratio (426b7), destroyed by excess. This ratio is, one must assume, a form of the sense-organ, to be understood as a mean (μεσότης τις 424a4-5) of opposites in the sense-objects, e.g., white and black. It is both potentially, neither in actuality. The eye does not literally go coloured, say white, but just as we feel and judge the temperature (hot or cold), so we judge the colour (between white and black). The mean then involves a capacity of discrimination which is ‘certainly not [ ] extended but a sort of ratio and capacity of the organ’ (424a26-8).

61 T. Johansen (1997) has some useful remarks on how to reconcile the ideas that the sense-object is in actuality what the sense-organ is potential-ly, and that both are actualized in the sense-organ. Thus he conceives of the sense-object as ‘an active potentiality’ (263).

62 In a lengthy article, V. Caston (2005) gives an informative overview of the battle of Literalism and Spiritualism, Sorabji versus Burnyeat, on the involvement and character of corporeal change in perception. He himself thinks he occupies a middle position and that ordinary material changes are required but that strict replicas [of forms] are not needed (the signet is not received in the wax as gold or bronze) (303). However, could Aristotle’s point not rather be that the wax does not receive the signet (just as the mind does not receive the stone)?

63 T. Slakey (1961) is followed by R. Sorabji (1974) and (1992) in claiming that the eye-jelly goes red.
In Sens. 436b7-8 ‘sensation is produced with the soul (τῇ ψυχῇ) through the body’. This is a formulation like DA 408b15 in a passage on affections common to soul and body (408b1-18). Some confirmation of this may be obtained from Physics VII 2-3. ‘In a way the sense-organs too are altered. For actual sensation (αἰσθησις ἡ κατ’ ἑνέργειαν) is a bodily change (κίνησις) which affects the sense somehow’ (244b10-12). Further, ‘it is necessary that they [mental states like virtues] are generated when the organ of perception (τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους) is altered’, ethical virtue being about bodily pleasure and pain (247a6-8). The conclusion is that alteration is found in perceptible objects and the part of the soul capable of perception (248a6-9). The difference between the soulless and the ensouled is that the latter ‘are aware of being affected’ (οὐ λανθάνει πάσχον) (244b15 f.). Cf. ‘what is smelling apart from (παρά) being affected somehow? Or is it that smelling is also perceiving/being aware (αἰσθάνεται)?’ (DA 424b16-17). There is a related problem of perceiving that we perceive (DA III 2, 425b12-25). So perception and sensation are partly non-physical (non-extended) and are not only affection but also action in judging and discrimination.

Imagination

With the topic of imagination (DA III 3), we get closer to thinking which occupies a special status in Aristotelian psychology. Imagination (φαντασία) is that according to which an appearance (φάντασμα τι) occurs to us (428a1-2). The positive account of imagination is that it seems to be a movement (κίνησις τις) not without sense-perception, for perceivers and about sense-objects. The movement results from actualized sense-perception and is similar

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64 The dative is probably instrumental-comitative (H. Smyth, Greek Grammar 1920, para. 1521): the soul takes part in the process. Cf. DA 408b15. Shields (2009) 287 seems unnecessarily worried about this instrumental dative, which he thinks clashes with the priority of the soul.

65 M. Burnyeat (1992) goes to the other extreme from Sorabji when arguing that the reception of form without matter is just awareness of colours, sounds, etc., no physiological change is needed (21-22).

66 A sensible middle position is taken by S. Everson (1997), who argues that perception must be ‘paradigmatically a case of [ ] a common affection’ (231), referring to Sens. 436b1-4. He holds that the material alterations determine the perceptual changes (230).
to that (428b11-14, cf. 429a1-2), but without matter (432a9-10). Thinking (and understanding) is different from sense-perception (427b6-14), and imagination is different from both sense-perception and thought (supposition), but it is dependent on sense-perception, and supposition (ὑπόληψις) is dependent on it (427b14-16). Having established that thinking and sense-perception are different, Aristotle claims that imagination and supposition are parts of thinking (427b27-28). It is certainly seen as a kind of thinking (433a9-10) in the case of locomotion and action. Most of the argument here turns on the fact that imagination is mostly false. It is not assertion and negation, for it is the combination of thoughts (νοήματα) that is true or false. Primary (single) thoughts are not images either, but they and other thoughts are not without images (432a8-14). This has led to a discussion about the nature of imagination: does it consist in or involve mental images? It has been argued that imagination (φαντασία) is more ‘appearing’ than images, used to explain imagination, dreaming, delusion and motivation.67 However, although imagination may be wide in scope, images are involved. Non-human animals have perceptive imagination, but humans have deliberative imagination involving choice, i.e. the power to produce a single thing from many images (φαντάσματα 434a9-10).

Intellect

Thinking seems to be an exclusive property of the soul (403a8), perhaps the only one. Being unmixed with the body and hence without organ it must be incorporeal.

As the part of the soul that has cognition and understands (429a10-11) or thinks and supposes (429a23), the intellect (νοῦς) raises several questions: is it separate (χωριστός), and if so, how? Spatially or conceptually? If it is like perception, is it affected by its object or not? It must be unaffected (ἀπαθής) but capable of receiving the form and is potentially such as the ‘such’ (essence) of its object, not the object itself. In a manner similar to perception. However, the unaffectedness of intellect is different from that of sense-perception in that it is not affected by excessively thinkable

objects. The reason is that it is separate (χωριστός), in a spatial sense apparently. Because it must also be unmixed (ἀμιγής), as it thinks all things. Any ‘foreign’ intrusion (e.g., from the body via an organ 429a24-27) would hinder thought, so that its nature must be a potentiality for all things. Thus, it is ‘the place of forms’ but only potentially. The intellect becomes each thing as an actual knower. This is still a potential state, but then the intellect can think actively by itself.

However, assuming the intellect is simple, unaffected with nothing in common with anything, how does it think, if thinking is being affected somehow (which involves something common between cause and effect)? And is it itself thinkable? Either other things will have intellect if it is not in virtue of something else that it is thought and the object of thought is one in form, or it will have something mixed with it making it a thought-object as others. Hence, it seems that the intellect can neither think nor be thought.

Now, affection via something common should here be understood as the actualization of a potentiality, which is no ordinary affection.68 But, it may asked, the potentiality of νοῦς? If not of an organ of, e.g., sense-perception, it is utterly mysterious how one is to conceive of this immaterial potentiality. Moreover, it is itself thinkable, because in contemplation it is the same as its thought-objects, which are without matter (430a3-4).

But how is the universal ‘produced’ and how is it actualized?69 What is the role of the active intellect in this? Thought

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68 Barnes (1979) 38 n.10 is sure that the ἀλλοίωσις of sensation in Phys. 244b7-15 is non-physical. If this is correct, it could be assumed a fortiori, if necessary, that the ἀλλοίωσις of intellect must be non-physical. Cf. also (ibid.) 38.

69 Caston (2006) 335 referring to 429a13-18 contends that ‘the simple causal model’ underlies both sensation and understanding. However, this goes only as far as receiving universals (δεκτικών | | τοῦ εἴδους 429a15), and even this is hardly satisfactory as an explanation of the picking out the universal from the more concrete sense-impressions or images. APo II 19 describes in more detail the stage before the universal is recognized: from repeated memories of the same object one gets ἐμπειρία, ‘embodying (in the words of Ross 1965 [1949] 677) the data of unconsciously selected awarenesses’ and being ‘not aware of the universal’. The step further toward the universal is said to require ἐπαγωγή by νοῦς (APo II 19, 100b3-17). We are here beyond the ‘simple causal model’.
and sense-perception are different\textsuperscript{70} but are also compared with regard to their non-affection relation to their objects (429a13-15, 431a4-8), and in that thought is the ‘form of forms’, whereas sense-perception is the ‘form of sense-objects’ (432a2-3). This means that thought is the form of the forms of sense-objects. Otherwise expressed, thought-objects (universals 417b23) are ‘in the sensible forms’ (432a5) (i.e. particulars 417b22, 27-28), stored in memory and imagination. One may say that thought-objects are abstracted twice or in some cases thrice from sense-objects. The thought-objects are in the perceived forms, and while percepts are themselves \textit{without matter}, images seem \textit{more abstract}. For simple thoughts are not without \textit{images} (432a8-14, cf. 431a16-17)

\textsuperscript{70} Perception is had by all animals and is always true, thought is had by few and may be false (\textit{DA} III 3, 427b6-14), though simple thoughts of essences are veridical (430a26-27, b27-28). Perception is of external particulars, whereas knowledge is of universals which are ‘in a way’ in the soul itself (417b16-28).
and such images (φαντάσματα) are like percepts (ἀισθήματα) but without matter. Thus, while percepts and images are particular (the ratio: this white), thought-objects are general (universals or essences like ‘white’ or ‘man’). When there is no actual perception thinking needs imagination. The faculty of thinking then thinks forms in images (431b2), and rational imagination allows one to think abstractly and in isolation. But it may be argued that the dependence of intellect on imagination which in turn is dependent on sense-perception reveals that the intellect is dependent on the body (cf. 403a8-10, 408b8-9). The handling of this topic obviously reveals the aporetic character of the whole subject of psychology.\footnote{71}

Assuming the principle of correspondence between perceiver/knower and object (429b10-22, 431b24-28), and the fact that the intellect, when actualized, is identical with its objects, it becomes a question (for Aristotle) whether it is possible to think what is separate without being oneself spatially separate (429b21-22, 431b17-19). He suggests that we discern flesh and the being of flesh either by something else or by something in a different state. But it is with sense-perception that we discern the sensible properties of flesh, and the being of flesh with something else. And this may be either something separate or the same in a different state. Generally, the intellect deals with objects to the extent that they are separate. In other words, it may simply be by the same means in a different state that we ‘judge’ the flesh and the essence of flesh. This would imply that thought is just sense-perception in another state, and no separateness would be relevant. But it may also be that a separate means is required. This question is not answered in ch. III 4.

An answer seems given in DA III 5. In nature there is matter and a creative cause, just like a skill and its subject matter.\footnote{72} Similarly, in the soul there is an intellect that is capable of becoming everything, and another intellect capable of making everything, just as a state (ἕξις), and as light (φῶς). And this intellect is separ-
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rate, unaffected, unmixed\textsuperscript{73} and essentially actualized. It always thinks. When separated it alone is what it is, and it alone is immortal and eternal. It gives us no memories as it is unaffected. On the other hand, the intellect that is subject to affection (παθητικός νοῦς) is perishable and needs the creative intellect for thinking.

Here we find the very same attributes of the intellect of ch. 4 attached to the active intellect of ch. 5. This makes it unlikely that ch. 4 deals only with the passive intellect. Ch. 4 is about intellect in general. It is only with ch. 5 that Aristotle seems to settle for an answer to the cognitive problem of abstract thought. But the chapter nevertheless looks like a (late) insertion, because he still seems uncertain about the need for a separate intellect at the end of ch. 7 (431b17-19).

One is reminded here of earlier suggestions\textsuperscript{74} that some parts might be separable from the body if not the actualization of any body, and that the soul could be like a sailor of a boat (413a6-9).\textsuperscript{75} The soul is a user of the body (407b25-26, 415b18-20). It is an efficient cause (415b8-28), and, as it is generally thought, holds the body together, though it is unclear what the intellect holds together (411b). The intellect has a special status because old age affects the organs and the body but not the soul and the mind. The capacities for sight and thinking are intact, although we obviously lose memory and love and even thinking,\textsuperscript{76} which are attributes of man. Hence, the intellect ‘comes to be in’ man and is not destroyed, and is probably more divine and unaffected (408b18-29), and is essentially actuality (430a18), immortal and eternal (430a23). The intellect alone enters from outside, it alone is divine because phys-

\textsuperscript{73} Cf. \textit{Met.} 1073a3-11. Anaxagoras (405a16-17, 405b19-21).

\textsuperscript{74} 403a10-11, 408b18-29, 413a6-7.

\textsuperscript{75} H.J. Easterling (1966) has argued convincingly in a short note that the sailor is not an alternative to the \textit{ἐντελέχεια} doctrine. He refers correctly to the function of soul as efficient cause (415b8-28) and as \textit{ἐντελέχεια} (b15). Local motion is due to the soul but it does not itself move (411a25-30).

\textsuperscript{76} ‘When some other internal part decays’ (408b25). This does not accord well with the assertion that the intellect has no organ (429a26-27). But Aristotle sometimes suggests that it may have an organ (408b7-11) and the passive intellect may, as we have seen, be just an aspect of sense-perception (429b20-22). Alternatively, it may simply be that the active intellect is dependent on the body for its exercise (see p. 144 below).
ical activity has nothing to do with its activity' (GA 736b27-29). The body of semen has in it the soul-principle, part of which is inseparable and, part of which is separable from the body in the case of those for whom something divine is included, i.e. so-called intellect (GA 737a9-11).

It is commonplace to object to this notion of the active intellect as being inconsistent with the entelechist theory of soul. And it does look like Aristotle eventually lapsed into Cartesian dualism. However, the Aristotelian model of the psyche requires not only a passive intellect but also an intellect that is like a skill working on some stuff, which produces everything like a ‘state’ (ἐξίς) as light does. It makes potential colours actual (430a10-17). While the other capacities need external stimuli if they are to be activated, thought is special in that it is capable of being in activity through itself (DA 429b5-9, 417b23-24, 427b18). When

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77 Bostock (1994) 141-145 argues that De Anima is inconsistent on the soul. By contrast M. Wedin (1986) argues for a non-transcendentalistic analysis and fits the active intellect into the general naturalistic ‘finitistic account of mind.’ Similarly D. Modrak (1991) has offered a reconciliation or unification of the philosophy of νοῦς with the general entelechist philosophy. The fact that such an attempt can be undertaken is arguably made possible by Aristotle’s own aporetic attitude.

78 It seems obvious that Aristotle is thinking of his own doctrine of light as a medium here (II 7, esp. 419a9-11). But it seems likely (as Ross (1924) I, CXVLI and Kosman (1992) 349-350 have noted too) that he also has in mind also the Sun of Plato’s Republic 507c-509b, where light enables the eyes to see and makes the colours visible, i.e. seen (507d11-508a2). Correspondingly, the form (or ‘state’ 509a5) of the good produces insight and truth. Common to the two philosophers is that they realize that an external ‘link’ between intellect and its objects is required. The passive intellect thinks nothing apart from the active intellect (430a25). (F.D. Miller (2012) n. 50 lists the various possible interpretations of 430a25). There may also be a metaphysical connotation of God as the ultimate cause of cognition (cf. Plato’s Sun). Apart of course from other differences, the active intellect is internalized but still immortal, divine and separable from the body. It may be argued that, if thought requires the active intellect, and if other mental processes such as sense-perception and desire and locomotion require thought in so far as judging (κρίνειν) is involved, then the active intellect is fundamental for the human soul. For instance, seeing sense-qualities as what they are and belonging to objects or persons, and acting on desire in an identified situation (practical syllogism) require thought and active intellect. If this is anything near the truth, the active intellect is, Aristotle says, ‘necessary’ to his doctrine of soul (430a13-14), and not at all inconsistent with it.
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we are not perceiving sense-objects they are in imagination. Or memory. Ready to be actualized by the active intellect together with the passive νοῦς which is in a way potentially the universals (429b30-31). The active intellect works like light, illuminating both the thought-objects in imagination and the passive intellect. This is the case even for a knowledgeable person (429b5-9). He can then think ‘through himself’ (429b9, 417b22-24). For this ‘second actuality’ (417a21-b16) (a criterion of being human) the active intellect is needed. Admittedly, the intellect needs imagination, which is in turn dependent on sensation, but is ‘without matter’ (432a8-10, cf. 431a16-17). So we have an active intellect that seems to combine inconsistent qualities, being immaterial and immortal (Godlike cf. Met. 1072b18-1073a12) and also dependent on a perishable body. A possible solution could be that mind as such is not dependent on a body and is an impersonal full-fledged substance (no memories 430a23-24), but human thinking obviously requires its presence in a body, and then it becomes an Aristotelian ‘substance as form’ of the passive intellect. However, this is speculation due to the scarcity of evidence.

Locomotion and desire

DA III 9-10 deal with motivation and desire: the object of desire produces movement by being thought or imagined while not itself in motion (433b11-12). Thus, movement is started by the object of desire, and practical thinking produces movement on this basis (433a18-20). Hence locomotion is produced by intellect and desire, or just the capacity of desire (433a21), as intellect does not move by itself (a22-23). There are three things involved: (1) what produces movement ((a) the unmoved object and (b) what moves and is moved (i.e. the desiring capacity is moved, and actualized desire is a kind of motion), (2) the instrument and the (3) the animal which is moved (433b13-18). Is actualized desire non-physical? The description of movement being in terms of push and pull requiring ‘a still point’ as a point of departure for the movement (433b21-27) is entirely mechanical (cf. Phys. 253a15-18, 259b7-20). On the other hand, imagination seems to introduce an element of awareness. Remaining in the soul after sense-experience, imagination is the basis of locomotion of both animals and humans (cf. DA III 9-11,
Motion is expressly denied the soul in *DA I* 3, 406a2. However, hesitant exception is taken to the motion caused by the objects of perception (406b10-11). The cause of this motion is itself unmoved, unusual in a physical context (cf. *Phys. VIII* 5, 256b23-4), and the perceptual motion caused is only a kind of motion which has a physiological and a psychological side to it.

The fuller explanation of animal motion (in *MA IX*-X) describes the cause of motion as *desire* which moves by being itself moved. In addition, in ensouled bodies there is a body (σῶμα) of such character: *innate spirit* (πνεῦμα σύμφυτον) (*MA* 703a4-11). However, we also learn that the *soul* is the mover, being *other than* the described magnitude (μέγεθος) but situated in it (*MA* 703a2-4). This may mean that the *soul is non-physical*, and that desire with the innate spirit is a psycho-physical moved mover and an agent. Desire (like other emotions) is ‘not without’, i.e., is ‘with’ the body (*DA I* 1, 403a). It might be suspected that the soul is moved in emotions and other mental states. But if sense-perception, thinking and emotions are *movements* of some kind caused by the soul, it is strictly not the soul but man that is moved with the soul. This does not mean that the soul is in motion, but sense-perception, for instance, is from movements in the sense-organs to the

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79 Cf. Nussbaum’s discussion in (1978) Essay III. In *De Anima* the question is whether the producer of motion is separate, either spatially or conceptually (432a18-20).

80 Anger and fear being heart movement, and thinking a movement of either this or some other part, and such movements being local or somehow qualitative (*DA 408b*7-11). ‘Thinking’ (διανοεῖσθαι) is here ‘common’ to soul and body. And the ‘passive intellect’ may be just an aspect of the perceptive capacity (429b10-22), perhaps with the heart as its organ (cf. 408b8-9). However, 429a24-27 is emphatic that it is unmixed with the body and without an organ. Aristotle seems uncertain about it.

81 This passage has been dubbed the ‘Rylean passage’ because of its seeming reduction of the mental to predicates of the body. However, the Rylean materialism is not so obvious once the context is observed: the mental events and processes are with or by the soul, and to and from the soul. Moreover, at *Sens. 436a*8-11 it is claimed that sensation, memory, passion, desire and appetite generally, as well as pleasure and pain, are *common to soul and body*. Cf. *DA 403a* 3-27.
soul, while recollection is from the soul to movements in the sense-organs (408a34-b18).

In DA III 7 we learn that ‘to experience pleasure and pain is to be active with the perceptive mean’ in relation to good or bad as such’ (431a10-11). Pursuit and avoidance are analogous to assertion and denial. In general, the soul is said to move by choice (προαιρέσις) and thought (νόησις) (406b24-25), which is another way of saying that locomotion is caused by desire and intellect. It must be assumed that this implies a non-physical element in human action. And this is consonant with what we have seen above (p. 131) that the soul is also an efficient cause working on (limiting) concurrent material causes. But it does not itself move, except accidentally, by being moved by the body it moves. The lesson is that the form-soul belongs to a category that does not move.

Summing up

Granted that the soul-body relation has to be seen within Aristotle’s metaphysical framework of hylomorphism, some scholars take the mental attribute to be identical with bodily predicates (strong physicalism), while others see it as entirely non-physical, and others again (the majority) identify it with something else (weak physicalism, functionalism, nonreductive materialism, supervenience, emergence, immaterial epigenesis, various sui generis theories).

Often the relation is elucidated via an analysis of perception. Thus we find interpreters that take perception to be an entirely physical event or process in the sense-organs. Others view it as entirely non-physical. A third position is that perception is both material and mental, giving us a weak physicalism or kind of psychophysical parallelism, etc. Similar interpretations are given of desire.

It is out of the question, having reviewed the evidence above, that Aristotle argued for a reductive materialism. For instance, he is critical of Empedocles. ‘There will be no advantage in the elements being in the soul’ (410a7). He blames Plato for making the soul extended in the Timaeus (407a2-3), and he is quite explicit that the soul is not a body (414a19-22).82 The soul is not a body,

because the body does not belong to what is predicated but is rather subject and matter (412a17-19). This could be taken to imply that the soul could be said to be predicated of the body. This and the very idea of soul as form have likely contributed to the opinion that the Aristotelian soul is an attribute of the body. However, this is misleading as it stands. It is neither an attribute in the Aristotelian sense of pathos nor in a current modern sense. The project of De Anima is to determine the category to which the soul belongs, for instance whether it is a particular and substance, or a quantity or quality, etc. (402a). A brief answer is that it is the actuality of some body which means that it is neither without body nor a kind of body, but it belongs to a body and is present in a body of the appropriate kind (414a18-22). An actuality (ἐντελέχεια) comes naturally to be in what is potentially it and in its own matter. Hence the soul is the actuality of what has potentiality to be such (ibid. 25-28). The fuller answer given (II 1) is that it is substance as form or substantial form (412a19-20), a substance that lends particularity to the body it informs. It is ‘a this in this’. Which is inconsistent with a prevalent interpretation of Aristotle as a functionalist. This form is also ‘substance in accordance with the account (λόγος), i.e. the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of a body with organs (412b10-11). This does not mean that it is just an attribute of the body. Rather it is a cause and principle of the living body (415b8-10, 402a6-7) in three ways: as motive and final cause, and as substance as form. It is a final cause in that the body is for its sake. It is also a motive cause, but only indirectly in that it is the

immaterial.

83 I find myself in full agreement with Shields (2009) on this point.

84 Cf. Met. Δ 8, 1017b14-16 lists the soul as substance in that it is the ‘cause of being’ for living beings and ll. 23-26 sums up the two main senses of substance: the ultimate substratum (the individual) and the form, which is ‘a this’ (τόδε τι) and separable (χωριστόν). The latter presumably in thought only (cf. DA 413a4).

85 The soul is a substance, a particular form of a living body which is unique for Socrates and for Coriscus etc. Met. 1037a8-9. But Met. 1034a6-7 claims they are different by virtue of their matter. Cf. D. Bostock (1994) 144.

86 Substance is the cause of being, and being for the living is life. And the soul is the cause of this.

87 This may be connected with the view that the body is a potentiality
essence of a body that has a principle of motion in itself (412b15-17, cf. Met. 1015a13-19). In this way it is the cause both of locomotion and of nourishment and growth by setting limits for the material causes (‘holding the body together’) (416a17-18). Hence, even though the soul as form of the body initially may look like simply an aspect of the body, it is apparent on a closer look that this is impossible. Even though the soul is not without the body, belongs to the body and is present in it, the soul cannot be interpreted as an attribute of the body, neither in Aristotelian terms nor in modern terms. With the possible exception of intuitive thought, the properties of soul are shared with the body (403a3-18). This means that they have a mental and a physical component. The mental component could plausibly be the mean (μεσότης), which is active in both sense-perception and in desire. It would go against Aristotle’s analysis and also be misguided to interpret such phenomena as attributes of the body. They are common to soul and body. Hence it becomes irrelevant to ask: are mental events causally relevant? Is seeing and acting just a series of bodily events sufficient for seeing and acting?

So, is the soul another thing (substance) alongside the body (substantial dualism)? It is ‘a this’, but it would also require spatially separate existence (Met. 1029a27-28). This is not possible (413a4). Except of course for the active intellect. But even the status of the passive intellect is somewhat unclear. It has no organ (429a26-27), or has it (429b20-22, cf.408b25)? It is separable (429b5), but probably only conceptually (cf. Met. 1042a28-29). It is at least unclear, as Aristotle flirts with the idea that it is just an-

and the soul an actuality, and that it is the actuality of a natural organic body.

88 Shields (2016) 206 seems to miss this when complaining that Aristotle offers little argument for the soul’s motive causality. Causing change by setting limits is likely taken from Plato’s idea of the world-soul maintaining motion by constricting matter in the world-body. D. Bostock (1994) 142 takes ‘the principle of motion and rest’ (412b17) to be the soul, apparently not noticing ‘in itself’ that refers to the body. The body has its own activity in the form of elemental motion, which is ‘somehow an ancillary cause’ (416a13-15). The fact that the soul also causes change by thought and choice (desire) ought to be understood in these terms, if I am right.

89 ‘Thisness (τὸ τόδε) belongs only to substances’ (Met. 1030a5-6) ought to be understood in these terms, if I am right.

90 Separable in the sense of ‘independent’ (ἀντὸ καθ’ ἀντό) (Met. 1037a22).
other use of the perceptive faculty (429b10-22). So, it seems dubious, to say the least, that the soul (apart from the active intellect) is a substance in the full sense (Met. 1042a30-31). Hence it cannot either be a non-physical substance (so-called Platonic dualism). I conclude that the Aristotelian soul is a very special unique attribute: a substantival attribute.

**General Conclusion**

I have also suggested elsewhere that Aristotle’s position has some likeness to the later Platonism of, e.g., the *Timaeus* (!), of all dialogues. He spends much time (in *DA* 404b16-21 and 406b26-407b26), as is his wont, misrepresenting and misunderstanding his master. Plato’s view of the soul in the later dialogues may be called ‘an attribute theory’, provided it is kept in mind that it is a very special attribute of the body in that it makes its own body. It is a *dynamic-telic structure* of that body. The reason it is not a substance (in the sense of being capable of existing on its own) is that it must be in a body. So, we have here a soul that is a cross between a substance and an attribute, and the suggestion is that Aristotle inherits this ontological hybrid. ‘Hybrid’ to us, that is. The two philosophers carved reality otherwise than we do. They gave structure and form a high priority. It is prior to matter and more real (Met. 1029a5-7). But of course, Aristotle gave his version, and one that is much more detailed and empirically secured. Still, to Aristotle the status of form is ‘most perplexing’ (Met. 1029a33). He is here, as elsewhere, aporetic and dialectical.

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94 I have now noticed that H. Granger (1996) ch. 7: ‘The Nature of Soul: The Property-Thing’ reaches a similar conclusion. He also usefully outlines the provenance of the idea from the Presocratics (suggested by Solmsen 1960). However, it should be noted that the later Plato and Aristotle refined the property-thing into something abstract, i.e. a formal and structural ‘thing’.
95 The brief translations are either from H. Lawson-Tancred, *Aristotle De Anima*, or my own.