Content

Amund Lundesgaard, The Difficult Art of Achieving Military Change: The U.S. Navy after the Cold War in:

Sebastian Bruns, Sarandis Papadopoulos (Ed.)

Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy, page 267 - 280

Festschrift for Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (ret.)

1. Edition 2020, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-5753-4, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-9915-0, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299150-267

Series: ISPK Seapower Series, vol. 3

Bibliographic information
The Difficult Art of Achieving Military Change: The U.S. Navy after the Cold War Amund Lundesgaard As the Cold War ended, the U.S. Navy faced an uncertain future. The U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy of the 1980s was moot as its enemy of over 40 years rapidly became irrelevant. Furthermore, the Navy’s forces consisted of platforms that were state of the art, but tailored to fight the Soviet Navy rather than handling the regional conflicts, rogue nations, civil wars, and terrorists that were emerging as the primary challenges of the new era. In other words, neither strategy nor force structure fit the strategic circumstances. This development is strikingly similar to the situation facing the Navy in 1945. As Admiral Stansfield Turner put it, “[w]hen the [Second World] War ended […] there was no potential challenger to U.S. sea control. In essence, the U.S. Navy had too much of a monopoly to justify a continuing Sea Control mission. It was a Navy in quest of new missions.”1 Even though it can be a contentious and drawn out process, adaptation of stated strategy is relatively simple. Compared to other aspects of military change, the process of writing a strategy is inexpensive and requires few substantial changes to the organisation. The proof of the strategy pudding is in converting a novel strategy into actual organisational change. That includes change in institutional culture; force structure and acquisition; as well as shifts in the attitudes and cultures of stakeholders outside of the organisation. This chapter describes, analyses, and explains the difficulties in changing the U.S. Navy after the Cold War through changes in strategy documents, force structure and culture. It concludes that significant military change depends on a sound strategic and operational rationale, political support and support within the service’s officer corps, and circumstances that are not fleeting in nature. 1 Admiral Turner defined four missions for the Navy, sea control, power projection, strategic deterrence and naval presence. Stansfield Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy, ” in Naval War College Review vol. 27, no. 2 (March-April 1974), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss2/2, 4. 267 Projecting Power With the demise of the Soviet Union, there was no challenge to U.S. sea control, which allowed the Navy to shift its emphasis away from this aspect of naval warfare and concentrate on what it considered its most decisive contribution to U.S. foreign policy: power projection. The shift of emphasis in the Navy’s strategic documents was rapid and significant indeed, as the demise of the Soviet Union spurred the Navy to produce a flurry of publications. The most well-known and influential of these was . . . From the Sea, published in 1992.2 The Navy designed . . . From the Sea to bring the service into the post-Cold War era and keep it relevant in the eyes of its political masters and the public, as well as providing the Navy with a cohesive strategic approach that gave it a unifying goal. Much like the Cold War Maritime Strategy, the major selling point in . . . From the Sea was the ability to project power.3 In the former, the objectives were the flanks of the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the Soviet homeland itself, while . . . From the Sea was much less specific in terms of who the potential enemy was, but none the less made clear that it was power projection that was the Navy’s primary contribution. Although sea control was much more central to the Maritime Strategy, its value as a prerequisite was no less appreciated in . . . From the Sea. With the Soviet fleet in mind, the U.S. Navy had to attain sea control before it could project any power onto the land. To the U.S. Navy both before and after the fall of the wall, sea control is the backbone that facilitates everything else. However, with no challenger on the high seas, the Navy started assuming to have sea control, barely mentioning it at all or only in passing. As stated in . . . From the Sea: “[w]ith the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of the world claim preeminent control of the seas and ensure 2 Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1991-2000): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2012), 53-55. 3 For more on the US Navy’s Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, see Sebastian Bruns, US Naval Strategy and National Security: The Evolution of American Maritime Power (London, New York: Routledge, 2018), 65-111; John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (eds.), “U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents,” Naval War College Newport Papers 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008); Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, US Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, December 2011). Amund Lundesgaard 268 freedom of commercial maritime passage.”4 The Base Force, which was a strategic and force structure review of the US military as a whole, did not address sea control on the open ocean at all, and the 1991 Gulf War indeed illustrated the absence of any serious challenger to control of the sea – while showing great success for strike warfare and conventional operations. The operations in the Balkans provided similar lessons, as NATO and the U.S. successfully used strike warfare to end hostilities in Bosnia and Kosovo.5 Even though the Navy acknowledged the challenges of operating in the littorals referring to issues such as mines, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles‒threats that had been a significant part of countering the bastion defences of the Soviet Union‒these concerns were not acute.6 Nevertheless, the Navy understood the necessity of having sea control, it just did not need to emphasise it. Thus, . . . From the Sea differed quite significantly from its Cold War predecessor, with a different set of priorities. However, the changes were far from revolutionary, as they represented a significant shift in priorities between the Navy’s traditional core missions, rather than an introduction of new ones. Indeed, officers central in developing . . . From the Sea were expecting that, in the relative near future (15-20 years), another great power would attempt to fill the void that the demise of the Soviet Union had left.7 With such expectations, there were few incentives to radically change the Navy’s strategic thinking. Thus, both Navy and Department of Defense documents, as well as the Navy’s operational experience in the early 1990s, reinforced the trend towards emphasising power projection over sea control. The Gulf War, the operations in the Balkans and those in Somalia were indeed indicative of 4 “… From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century,” in “U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents,” Naval War College Newport Papers 27, ed. by John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006), 89. 5 To the US, the primary factor limiting operational efficiency in the Kosovo operation was thought to be NATO and the “war by committee” that NATO operations entailed. Ellen Hallams, The United States and NATO since 9/11 : the transatlantic alliance renewed (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 44-45. 6 “… From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century,” 93. 7 Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annapolis, MD: The Naval Institute Press, 2015), 68-72; Sebastian Bruns, “U.S. Navy Strategy & American Sea Power from ‘The Maritime Strategy’ (1982-1986) to ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ (2007): Politics, Capstone Documents, and Major Naval Operations 1981-2011,” doctoral dissertation (Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, 2014), 203. The Difficult Art of Achieving Military Change 269 the operating environment that the U.S. Navy engaged in over the course of the 1990s. None of these campaigns confronted the U.S. or its allies and coalition partners with significant challenges to sea control, so all consisted of a primary role of strike warfare, complemented by sanctions control and constabulary missions. To the Navy, the above missions confirmed the validity of the post-Cold War shift of emphasis away from the combination of aggressive sea control and power projection from the 1980s, and onto a singular emphasis on power projection. As the Navy’s strategic thinking changed to keep up with the times, it started adapting its force structure. However, these adaptations were of a much shallower nature than the changes in strategy. The Base Force mandated a 25 per cent cut in US force levels, and for the Navy, that meant a reduction from 530 to 450 ships within 1995.8 The majority of these cuts affected the Knox-class frigates, a predominantly anti-submarine platform. All Knox-class vessels, 46 in total, were taken out of service, and the Navy had no plans to build a new class of frigates. Furthermore, the Navy started adapting its existing force structure to emphasise power projection over sea control. For example, the Navy cancelled the Seawolf-class of attack submarines, which was very expensive and had very limited capacity for missiles. Instead, it started developing what eventually became the Virginiaclass, which has vertical launch system (VLS) tubes for cruise missiles. On the topic of cruise missiles, the Navy was introducing the Tomahawk at the time, and generally increasing the proportion of its ships with VLS capabilities. The Navy also shifted its inventory of carrier-based aircraft, planning to replace all air superiority F-14s, and its longer-ranged A-7s, with the multi-role F/A-18. With the exception of the Virginia-class submarines, the Navy developed all of the above programmes during the Cold War, so their existence was not due to a sudden shift in strategy. The fact that the Navy continued these programmes while the Seawolf programme was cancelled is testament to the importance of power projection. But most importantly, it makes it clear that the direction the Navy took after the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely a continuation of the Cold War force in a reduced format and somewhat emphasising power projection over sea control. 8 Joint Chiefs of Staff (eds.), “National Military Strategy of the United States” (Washington D.C., 1992), 19, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms 1992.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-123420-723. Amund Lundesgaard 270 Challenges in the Littorals The next shift in the U.S. Navy’s strategic statements occurred in 1997, the year after the Taiwan Strait Crisis. The tensions of 1995-96 were a watershed moment, both for China and for the United States. The virtual impunity of the U.S. Navy’s ships sent to the Taiwan Strait during that crisis sent alarm bells ringing in China, and the nation consequently set out on a path that led to heavy investments in what we know today as Anti-Access/ Area Denial (A2/AD) defences.9 The crisis prompted the U.S. Navy to increase its emphasis on A2/AD challenges in Anytime, Anywhere.10 The source of this concern was the proliferation of advanced weapons and information technologies among potential U.S. enemies, and the perceived severity of this challenge was considerable. As the authors stated, “This is more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem; it is an area-denial threat whose defeat or negation will become the single most crucial element in projecting and sustaining U.S. military power where it is needed.”11 The Soviet Union presented a very similar challenge during the Cold War, so it represented a sudden reintroduction of these concerns. In addition to A2/AD concerns, the U.S. Navy also reintroduced sea control in Anytime, Anywhere, stating that Mahan was right: navies are about more than just fighting other navies; they are powerful instruments of national policy whose special strength stems from their ability to command the seas. In fact, at the core of U.S. security requirements lies one prerequisite— sea control.12 The reference to Alfred Thayer Mahan and reintroduction of sea control was a clear recognition that the pre-eminence on the high seas that the U.S. Navy had enjoyed since 1991 would not be a permanent state. However, any burgeoning attention to sea control met its end in the “Global War on Terrorism” after 9/11. The associated conflicts occupied the attention of not only the Navy, but the entire U.S. military for many years. Although sea control was the prerequisite for conducting these wars, it was not contested in any serious way, which did not provide an incentive for the Navy to emphasise it. Subsequent documents–primarily the Sea 9 Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use of Force,” International Security vol. 25, no. 2 (2000), 111. 10 Swartz with Duggan (2012) 128. 11 Jay Johnson, “Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century,” in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings vol. 123/11/1,137 (November 1997), 174. 12 Ibid. The Difficult Art of Achieving Military Change 271 Power 21 series published in late 2002 and early 2003–reflect this, as they did not address open ocean sea control in any comprehensive way. The authors assumed sea control, in much the same way as it had been for the entire post-Cold War era. The zig-zagging regarding sea control shows how easily the Navy changed central aspects of its strategic statements. As the strategic statements further emphasised power projection, the force structure changed as well. However, the changes in force structure did not follow the shifts in the strategic documents. The force structure largely remained a smaller version of its Cold War incarnation, although with an emphasis on power projection. Projects that really pushed the boundaries faltered at some point, and the prime example of this is the Arsenal Ship. Designed to be a large, relatively simple platform, the Arsenal Ship was equipped with 512 VLS cells for firing Tomahawk cruise missiles and other land-attack weapons and was thus “unique and defied normal ship classification.”13 In essence, it would be a large “missile barge”14 designed “to provide U.S. regional military commanders with substantial additional in-theater or early-arriving firepower for use in the early phases of regional crises and conflicts.”15 There were two other programmes that successfully challenged the orthodoxy, however: the Zumwalt-class destroyer and the Littoral Combat ship (LCS). As the LCS’s name suggests, the Navy wanted a ship designed for the contested operating environment of the littorals. However, in the Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 2003-2007, the Office of the Secretary of Defence instructed the Navy to develop a ship implicitly designed for contested environments in the context of terrorism, and failed and rogue states.16 Consequently, the Navy did not design the LCS type of warship to operate in conventional naval battles. The Navy had designed all other major combat vessels with a peer competitor in mind, and the LCS plans thus ran counter to the Navy’s culture. Consequently, the ship is perhaps the most controversial in the service’s recent history. The LCS class was initially planned to consist of 52 ships, however, the Navy currently wishes to 13 Ronald O'Rourke, “Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress (28 October 2004), 9. 14 Robert O. Work, conversation with Amund Lundesgaard, 19 September 2013. 15 O'Rourke (2004), 9. 16 Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 2003-2007 is quoted in Robert O. Work, The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 4. Amund Lundesgaard 272 shift procurement to a more traditional frigate after the 34th LCS, slowly replacing the LCS over time.17 Together with LCS, the Zumwalt-class of destroyers made up the Navy’s future littoral surface combatants. It was to replace the void left by the retirement of the battleships in the early 1990s, providing Marines much needed fire support.18 Although not as controversial as the LCS, the Zumwalt still was contentious. Among other things, it lacked capabilities for ballistic missile and air defence, as well as significant anti-submarine capabilities, all of which are traditionally vital on multi-mission US Navy destroyers. At 14,000 tons, it was also large and costly. Thus, citing these issues in a congressional hearing in 2008, the Navy truncated the Zumwalt at three ships and restarted its Arleigh Burke destroyer programme instead. Although the Navy was not referring to near-peer competitors explicitly, the implications of those priorities clearly allude to its facing such challenges. The cases of the Arsenal Ship, the LCS, and the Zumwalt-classes demonstrate the orthodoxy of the Navy, and the difficulty of introducing ships that run counter to its culture. Adapting the “conventional” force structure by emphasising aircraft and weapons that addressed the new situation after the Cold War was relatively uncontroversial. However, altering the basic capabilities of new generations of major surface combatants proved a bridge too far, and so the Navy merely made adaptations to their legacy platforms. Thus, the changes in the Navy force structure were quite modest, as the changes primarily affected weapons and aircraft, and not the ship mix. However, there were quite significant changes in strategy and culture coming soon. As Robert C. Rubel, who was the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College in 2010, stated: “In the two decades since [the Cold War], the U.S. Navy has enjoyed total command of the sea, so much so that it has stopped talking about sea control, even to the extent of forgetting how to.”19 Therefore, the greatest attempt at organisational change had yet to come. 17 Ronald O'Rourke, “Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service R44972, 10 October 2019, 1. 18 The Navy also planned a new cruiser, which it cancelled in 2011. 19 Robert C. Rubel, “Talking About Sea Control,” Naval War College Review vol. 63, no. 4 (2010), 38, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=nwc-review. The Difficult Art of Achieving Military Change 273 Back to the Future? The 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21) was the first bona fide strategy document since the Maritime Strategy from the 1980s,20 and the document arguably broke entirely new intellectual and strategic ground within the Navy.21 The major shift was the transition to a systemic approach to naval and maritime affairs, as the Navy for the first time saw its role in light of protecting the liberal international system rather than in relation to a specific threat. In other words, CS 21 took a more holistic view of the strategic challenges facing the Navy. Grounded in this holistic view, the authors emphasised the prevention of conflict rather than just responding to them, as well as the joining of the world’s maritime forces in a Global Maritime Partnership, whose purpose was to defend the established maritime system. As it was stated, “[n]o one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain.”22 This cooperation had to become a permanent feature of the Navy’s approach to maritime security issues in general, as the authors stated that “[a]lthough our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged."23 Even though the ideas in CS 21 were novel in terms of stated strategy, they were not new in terms of US Navy operations. HA/DR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) and commerce protection operations had been part of the Navy’s repertoire for a long time on an ad hoc basis; they had just not been seen as a significant part of a coherent strategy.24 A set of special circumstances brought the holistic approach out of the strategic woodwork and into the limelight. Firstly, the War on Terror and associated conflicts and operations had highlighted the need for cooperation with 20 Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, US Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2011), 145. 21 Although the US Navy had engaged with the cooperative aspects of the CS 21 in its 1000 Ship Navy concept starting from 2005, the comprehensiveness and novelty of CS 21 clearly sets it apart from both strategic predecessors and successors alike. James T. Conway, Gary Roughead and Thad W. Allen, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington: Department of Defense, 2007), https:// web.archive.org/web/20090227115427/http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf 22 Conway, Roughead and Allen (2007), Challenges of a New Era. 23 Italics in original. Ibid., Maritime Strategic Concept. 24 Haynes (2015), 237. Amund Lundesgaard 274 other navies.25 Furthermore, the 2004 tsunami in South-East Asia had a strong impact on the Navy’s priorities, as the goodwill effects of Operation Unified Assistance were very noticeable in the afflicted areas. This prompted the Navy to increase its attention to, and adopt a more proactive attitude towards, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.26 Furthermore, the economic consequences of U.S. Gulf coast Hurricane Katrina in 2005 ”highlighted the need to protect the world’s seventeen megaport complexes from terrorist attacks, an inference that further strengthened the conceptual tie between the Navy and the international economy.”27 Thus, CS 21 was in many ways ground-breaking, as it addressed topics that had long been a part of the Navy’s repertoire, but ignored as components of a wider strategy and thus previously relegated to a secondary status. The path from idea to strategy was not easy, however, as the proponents and critics of the approach waged an intellectual battle. Very simplified, the critics saw it as a dangerous diversion from the core task of the Navy: fighting and winning wars. All other missions were secondary in nature and should not guide strategic thinking or programmatic priorities.28 The pushback against the concepts of the strategy was fierce indeed, and the substance of the opposition’s arguments suggests that the strategy was challenging the boundaries of the Navy’s culture. Previous shifts had not pushed the service’s limits by introducing new concepts, but rather shifted the emphasis within the traditional sea control-power projection dichotomy. Regardless of how innovative CS 21 was, the particular circumstances that facilitated its development did not last for very long. Thus, plans to develop a new strategy emerged quite soon. Several factors contributed to the strategy’s demise, and in particular, the lack of support from Congress was decisive.29 Furthermore, as the disagreements between proponents and critics of the CS 21 during its development showed, the strategy was highly controversial within the Navy, as it was counter to central tenets of the ser- 25 Ibid., 194-195, 210-212. 26 Gary Roughead, J. Stephen Morrison, Thomas Cullison and Seth Gannon, U.S. Navy Humanitarian Assistance in an Era of Austerity (Washington D.C.: CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), 1, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaw s.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130226_Roughead_NavyHumanit arianAssist_Web.pdf. 27 Haynes (2015), 191. 28 For a deep dive into this battle, see ibid., 172-238. 29 Geoffrey Till, “The new U.S. Maritime Strategy: another view from outside,” in Naval War College Review vol. 68, no. 4 (2015), Article 5, https://digital-commons. usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1265&context=nwc-review, 3. The Difficult Art of Achieving Military Change 275 vice culture. Furthermore, China had been on the rise for quite a few years, and with the War on Terror and associated political priorities winding down, great power rivalry in Asia was starting to command significant political attention. The confluence of these developments provided the Navy with an opportunity to revert to the Cold War orthodoxy. The result was the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower R (R for refresh or revision), which arguably laid the most innovative aspects of its predecessor to rest, and instead reverted to an approach strikingly similar to the Navy’s Cold War thinking. Granted, the authors do address undergoverned areas in the Middle East and Africa, which according to them are creating “conditions for regional instability ranging from piracy and illicit waterborne trafficking to support for terrorist activity.”30 These references nevertheless come across as formalities, as the main challenges clearly are China, and to a lesser degree, Russia. There are five traits that stand out in CS21R, and four of these set it apart from its 2007 predecessor. Firstly, the concerns about sea control were significantly more emphasised in 2015, taking a much more central place in the Navy’s strategic document than it had since the Cold War. Indeed, this ties in with the threat to access to the littorals, which was also elevated when compared to previous documents, and the 2015 threat was not just limited to the littorals, but to whole maritime regions. Secondly, there was a revamped focus on conventional operations. The reemphasis on conventional operations tied in with the Navy’s attitude to other operations, which is the third trait. Although it had not been discarded, HA/DR no longer was a central part of the Navy’s justification, as it had been demoted to a function of power projection, and furthermore, the Navy clearly preferred the Coast Guard to take the lead on maritime security issues. And the attitude toward maritime security was evident in the fact that the authors had removed the systemic justification, where the Navy’s rationale was in large part based on being the protector of the international system. Lastly, the major continuity from previous post-Cold War publications was the status of power projection. The emergence of potential challengers to sea control did not distract the Navy from its emphasis on the former, as the utility of sea control was still to facilitate the projection of power. 30 Dunford, Jr., Joseph F., Greenert, Jonathan W., and Zukunft, Paul F., A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015), 4, http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS 21R-Final.pdf. Amund Lundesgaard 276 Navy force structure, shipbuilding plans and weapons acquisition have also changed direction. The most obvious case in point is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). As was mentioned above, the Navy truncated the LCS at 34 ships and the service is now looking for a heavier frigate design to replace the remaining 18 LCS. The reason for shifting the production to frigates was that the corvette-like warship was developed for a more benign operating environment than the one it would face in the contested environments where China is the potential adversary.31 The new frigate will be more heavily armed and have increased survivability compared to the LCS. Additionally, the Navy is currently acquiring new ship-borne anti-ship missiles to replace its aging Harpoon missile, which is outdated and outranged by those of potential adversaries.32 Alongside the efforts that the service is putting into directed energy, railguns and gun-launched guided projectiles, it is clear the Navy is gearing up for a conventional fight very similar to the one it planned during the Cold War. Combined with the return to Cold War style strategic thinking, the Navy has in many ways gone full circle. The US Navy after the Cold War: Lessons for Military Change Despite what are arguably revolutionary changes in the security situation after the Cold War, the Navy did not change significantly. The one major effort, in the form of Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower from 2007, petered out without having much of an impact on the Navy. The U.S. Navy’s experience with change after the Cold War teaches some lessons regarding the requirements for significant, successful and lasting change. Rather obviously, it is not enough that the security environment changes. The strategic and operational consequences of the changes in the security environment must be perceived as significant enough to make the organisation receptive to such changes, and not just relatively modest adaptations of the current organisation. The Navy shifted its strategic emphasis towards power projection and de-emphasised sea control in a rela- 31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Remarks by Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey on the fiscal year 2015 budget preview in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” 2014, https://www .jcs.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/571946/remarks-by-sec-hagel-and-gen-dempsey-on -the-fiscal-year-2015-budget-preview/. 32 Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace, “US Navy selects Naval Strike Missile,” 4 June 2018, https://www.kongsberg.com/kda/news-and-media/news-archive/2018/us-nav y-selects-naval-strike-missile/. The Difficult Art of Achieving Military Change 277 tively significant manner in reaction to the revolutionary changes in the security environment in the first 15 years after the end of the Cold War. However, it did not change its strategic thinking or culture in a radical way. In terms of force structure, the service adapted a scaled-down version of its Cold War forces, with some relatively minor adaptations. The Navy thus perceived the end of the Cold War as having relatively limited impact on its core missions. Indeed, the expectation that a great power eventually would rise to challenge the U.S. seems to have permeated the Navy through most of the post-Cold War era, providing few incentives to change the Navy in any radical way. When attempting to change a military organisation significantly, it is not enough to just write and publish a strategy. The Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower from 2007 is a case in point. Firstly, the strategy lacked political support, as Congress was deeply critical to the new approach to seapower. Since Congress funds the Navy, its support is essential. Furthermore, the internal opposition to the strategy as the Navy was developing it suggests that many top officers, who are essential in ensuring that a new strategy is implemented throughout the service, were as sceptical as Congress. Lastly, the very special circumstances that led to CS 21, a confluence of the military operations associated with the War on Terror, humanitarian missions and Navy leaders that wanted to change the service’s strategic approach, led to a very weak base for such a radical change. Consequently, when circumstances changed somewhat, the strategy became a liability and the Navy reverted to orthodoxy. Therefore, based on the U.S. Navy’s experiences after the Cold War, changing a military organisation on a deeper and more fundamental level depends on a sound strategic and operational rationale, political support and support within the service’s officer corps, and circumstances that are not fleeting in nature. 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Abstract

The 21st century is witnessing renewed tension as conflicts between major powers, serious concerns about future security alliances and global, even generational, security policy challenges arise. In the light of this, naval forces and maritime security, and understanding their underlying strategic rationale, are gaining momentum and importance. What are the roles and missions of naval forces, and how have states and the institutions themselves sought to frame their goals and methods? This book brings together experts from the United States, Europe, and Asia to reflect on how maritime and naval strategy is conceptualised and how it has been used. It celebrates the life and work of Peter M. Swartz, Captain (US Navy) ret., who since contributing to ‘The Maritime Strategy’ of the 1980s as a young Pentagon officer, has been a mentor, friend, intellectual beacon and the foremost purveyor of maritime expertise to the global naval community. With contributions by James Bergeron, Sebastian Bruns, Seth Cropsey, Larissa Forster, Michael Haas, John Hattendorf, Peter Haynes, Andrzej Makowski, Amund Lundesgaard, Narushige Michishita, Martin Murphy, Sarandis Papadopoulos, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Jeremy Stöhs, Eric Thompson, Geoffrey Till, Sarah Vogler, Steve Wills.

Zusammenfassung

Großmachtkonflikte, die Zukunft von sicherheitspolitischen Institutionen sowie transnationalen Generationenherausforderungen bergen eine neue globale Unsicherheit. Vor diesem Hintergrund bekommen maritime Sicherheit und Seestreitkräfte sowie deren Einordnung im außenpolitischen Werkzeugkasten eine zunehmende Bedeutung. Was sind die Rollen und Einsatzaufgaben von Seemacht, und wie haben Staaten und ihre Institutionen maritime Ziele, Mittel und Wege konzeptualisiert? Dieser Sammelband bringt ausgewiesene Experten aus den USA, Europa und Asien zusammen, die ihre Perspektive auf maritime Strategie teilen. Das Buch dient gleichzeitig die Festschrift für Peter M. Swartz, Kapitän zur See a.D. der US-Marine, der seit seiner Arbeit als einer der Autoren der „Maritime Strategy“ (1980er) als Mentor, Freund, intellektueller Leuchtturm und vor allen Dingen als Spiritus Rektor wesentlich zur Schärfung des Verständnisses von Seestrategie in den globalen Beziehungen beigetragen hat. Mit Beiträgen von James Bergeron, Sebastian Bruns, Seth Cropsey, Larissa Forster, Michael Haas, John Hattendorf, Peter Haynes, Andrzej Makowski, Amund Lundesgaard, Narushige Michishita, Martin Murphy, Sarandis Papadopoulos, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Jeremy Stöhs, Eric Thompson, Geoffrey Till, Sarah Vogler, Steve Wills.