The U.S. Maritime Strategy in the Pacific during the Cold War

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In the renewed Cold War confrontation in the 1980s, the United States adopted an offensive Maritime Strategy in the Pacific, pressured the Soviet Union through active peacetime operations, and courted Japan to play a critical role in the execution of the strategy. The proactive US Maritime Strategy in the Pacific, combined with the Japanese contribution, enhanced deterrence and served Western interests in the Cold War military confrontation. This article identifies rationales for and major components of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific, and discusses potential wartime outcomes of the strategy by examining the results of some important war games played by the US government during the Cold War.

The Maritime Strategy’s Rationale and Major Operational Components

The US Maritime Strategy had one overarching strategic rationale with three major operational components in the Pacific. Strategically, the United States attempted to develop the capability to open a second front in the Pacific theater, in what was referred to as “horizontal escalation,” readiness to fight effectively there in the event of global war with the Soviet Union. Broader capability beyond Europe and Southwest Asia was expected to strengthen deterrence against the Soviet Union, and if deterrence failed, to pin down and attrite Soviet forces in the Far East.¹

In order to make that strategy credible, the United States developed the operational capability to (a) strike important targets in the Soviet Far East, including destroying the Soviet Pacific Fleet; (b) undertake amphibious landing operations in the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin and, possibly, the Kamchatka Peninsula; and (c) threaten and destroy Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

Another important ingredient of the Maritime Strategy was better utilization of US allies and friends. In the Pacific, Japan played a significant role since its geostrategic position enabled it to control chokepoint straits and its military was capable of meaningful contributions to the execution of US Maritime Strategy.

**Forward Defense and “Horizontal Escalation”**

By 1983, a US strategic option of threatening the Soviet Far East with war had been formalized. National Security Decision Directive No. 75, issued that year, stated, “In the Far East we [the United States] must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a secure flank in a global war.”2 In the background of that political development, the classified first formal publication of the Maritime Strategy (of which then-Commander Peter M. Swartz was a leading author) stated:

Making the strategic difference by altering the geographical breadth of the conflict means that—with maritime superiority—we can deny the Soviets any advantage through expansion, and permits us, if we choose, to take the conflict to an area or areas where they do not want to fight. The Maritime Strategy is a mobile, forward, flanking strategy of options. While the battle is joined in Central Europe, the Maritime Strategy enables the Western alliance to secure the sea lines of communications, [to] defeat attacks on the European flanks and in the Far East, and to carry the fight to the enemy there.3

The Maritime Strategy, revised in 1985, argued that Pacific operations would play a critical role in keeping Japan in the war, in defending Korea, and in encouraging China to at least maintain an “aggressively neutral posture.” Here again the intention was to tie down considerable Soviet forces which could otherwise be redeployed to the Central Front in Europe.4

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In terms of defense planning, during the 1980s horizontal escalation gained larger support while the swing strategy applied in the 1970s lost traction. Moreover, in the same period the intrinsic value of defending US allies and friends in Asia increased due to the growth of the military and the economic potential of countries such as China and Japan.

In that sense, the fiscal year (FY) 1982 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which went into effect for planning and operations in October 1981, was a turning point. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan—which provided guidance to combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the accomplishment of tasks and missions based on current military capabilities—required for the first time the European and Atlantic Commands to prepare operation plans (OPLANs) to accomplish their tasks both “with and without PACOM [Pacific Command] augmentation.”5 In other words, now PACOM forces might not be swung to the European theater in the event of war with the Soviet Union.

In 1984, the FY 1986-90 Defense Guidance—guidance on strategy and programs, outlining the broad national security objectives and regulating the Defense Department, the Services, and unified and specified commanders on roles, missions, and capabilities6—updated regional priorities and placed defense of US allies and sea lines of communication in the Pacific on an equal footing with access to oil in Southwest Asia.7 As a result, the top defense priority of the Department of Defense was now North America, including the Caribbean Basin, with the other regional priorities being, in descending order: NATO and its lines of communications; the coequal priorities of access to oil in Southwest Asia, security of US allies in the Pacific, and the security of Pacific and Indian Ocean lines of communications; and the security of US friends in South America and Africa.8

Assessment

How successful was the horizontal escalation strategy, or for that matter, the Maritime Strategy as a whole? It was fortunate that the United States

6 Ibid., 111.
and the Soviet Union did not go to war with each other, but that made it difficult to objectively assess the effectiveness of the Maritime Strategy. In this article, I will use the results of some important war games conducted under realistic assumptions by the US government to arrive at a partial answer to the above question. War games are by no means perfect predictors of complex reality, but they do at least indicate opportunities and challenges that the United States would have faced in the execution of its Maritime Strategy.  

In war games, horizontal escalation produced mixed results. The results of the Global War Games conducted at the US Naval War College between 1979 and 1988 suggested that the Pacific front was the most promising scenario for success of the horizontal escalation strategy. However, it was not easy for US forces to reach Soviet targets when considerable strength was already devoted to the Central Front. Strike operations sufficient in scale to cause major concern for the Soviets or to divert Moscow’s focus from Western Europe would have required far larger US forces than those present in the Pacific.

In the 1983 Global War Game, the US forces operated aggressively in the Pacific, seriously damaging Soviet Naval Aviation and Air Force, and took several of the Kuril Islands. Although the United States could not mount major offensives against Soviet territory due to distance and the presence of large Soviet forces, American actions successfully induced the Soviets to keep their forces in the theater. However, the United States failed to force the Soviets to shift their focus away from Germany, which was the original goal of the game. Moreover, as part of their response to the aggressive US approach, the Soviets succeeded in encouraging North Korea to invade South Korea. In response, the United States had to divert its forces away from the Kuril Islands to South Korea.

In the 1983 Proud Prophet war game, with Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger participating, horizontal escalation and counterattacks on the Soviet Far East were tested, but the results were disappointing: the So-

9 The Maritime Strategy was also demonstrated and tested at sea, in exercises. See John F. Lehman, Jr., Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2018).

10 Description of the issues related to the horizontal escalation in the Global War Game in the first five years is based on the following material unless otherwise indicated. Bud Hay and Bob Gile, Global War Game: The First Five Years, Naval War College Newport Papers 4 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), 54-57.
viet leaders seemed unresponsive. In the 1985-1987 Global War Games, a simulation of a protracted conventional war, when the Soviet Union began to send its army divisions from the Far East to Europe, the US government ordered Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) to transfer F-16s and F-15s from Japan and Korea, and various aircraft from Alaska, to the European theater. Although the US operations in the Far East had been succeeding, CINCPAC was forced to send his forces to Europe. Finally, in the 1988 Global War Game, focused on war termination, while CINCPAC pursued amphibious landings in North Korea and strike operations against Vladivostok, the US president, focused on the Central Front, regarded battles in non-European theaters as “meaningless.”

**Strike Operations**

Reflecting the forward defense strategy embodied in the Maritime Strategy, by the end of the 1980s the United States had established readiness to undertake strike operations against targets in the Soviet Far East with multiple carrier battle forces. The plan was to deploy aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG) to striking positions in the Northern and Western Pacific in the early stages of war, and undertake offensive operations against Soviet targets including the Soviet Pacific Fleet, air and ground forces in the Kuril Islands, the air force base in Alekseyevka, and naval bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. To conduct those operations successfully, US CVBGs needed to be capable of transiting safely to the striking positions and undertaking aerial strikes while fending off Soviet bombers and submarines seeking to sink these high-value assets.

In 1981, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward established the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the US Naval War College and created the Strategic Studies Group (SSG), a small group of best and brightest US naval officers. In 1982—1983, the SSG conducted a study of naval campaigns in

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13 Ibid., 89.
14 Peter M. Swartz, interview by author, Arlington, Virginia, 19 February 2016; and Henry H. Mauz, Jr., E-mail interview by author, received 13 October 2018.
the Pacific theater, and spelled out how naval forces ought to maneuver in the Pacific. First, American forces would simultaneously move west along the Aleutians and north from the Philippines in order to drive Soviet forces away from the Chinese border and/or to establish US air superiority over the battle area. They would then move to seize the Kuril Islands and conduct offensive operations against Soviet naval, ground, and air forces in the Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin Island, and the Soviet Far East.\textsuperscript{16}

Successful execution of such operations, the SSG argued, would depend heavily on Japan’s participation. First, land-based air forces would be used to establish air control over the northern Sea of Japan and the Kuril Islands. Then, the United States would use US Marine Corps A-6 attack aircraft\textsuperscript{17} deployed in Japan to destroy opponent air assets including Tu-22M bombers in the Soviet Far East. Carrier air power would later join those US forces. The US Marine forces would attempt to seize the Kuril Islands if the opportunity arose.\textsuperscript{18}

US aircraft carriers would conduct strike operations against Petropavlovsk from locations in the Aleutian Island chain, and against the Soviet Far East including Vladivostok from locations near Hokkaido. The US Navy developed a plan to use as defensive cover land features called “havens” or “near-land operating areas” (NLOAs). The aircraft carriers engaged in strike operations from Haven Charlie and Hook of Hokkaido, NLOAs in the Aleutians and the Northwest Pacific, respectively.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite these developments, strike plans remained largely underdeveloped until 1988. When Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr. became commander of the US Seventh Fleet that year, he learned that there was no ef-

\textsuperscript{16} Hattendorf (2004), 60.
\textsuperscript{17} A-6 had an unrefueled combat range of 878 nautical miles, or 1,626 km with maximum payload. “Grumman A-6 Intruder,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grumman_A-6_Intruder.
\textsuperscript{18} Michael McDevitt, interview by author, Arlington, Virginia, 13 May 2016; and John T. Hanley, Jr., E-mail interview by author, received 6 June 2019.
fective plan for attacking the Soviet Union. His staff did not know which targets to attack, nor did they know how to attack them, and in what order. The Seventh Fleet and the Fifth Air Force had two separate, uncoordinated attack plans.\textsuperscript{20} Mauz obtained detailed targeting information from the US national intelligence commands, and developed a plan to use cruise missiles, decoys, jamming and other means to keep the Soviet air defenses busy.\textsuperscript{21} He eventually devised a new plan: to destroy Soviet air defenses in the first week or two of engagement, and then attack vital air bases and naval facilities.\textsuperscript{22}

Improvements in equipment strengthened the plan. Deployment of long-range Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs) and vertical launch systems on surface vessels and attack submarines greatly increased the range, lethality and number of US Navy strike warfare assets. The cruise missiles could eliminate Soviet command posts and radar installations prior to an attack by carrier-based strike aircraft. Harpoon anti-ship missiles enhanced the surface fleet’s ability to sink enemy surface vessels. The EA-6B electronic countermeasures planes could jam enemy communications and destroy enemy radar installations and missile batteries with high-speed anti-radiation missiles.\textsuperscript{23} F/A-18 fighters replaced A-4 and A-7 light attack aircraft, and increased the number of Navy strike aircraft.\textsuperscript{24}

Assessment

In war games, conventional strike operations produced mixed results in terms of pinning down Soviet forces in the Far East, but proved reasonably successful in achieving military objectives in the theater. At the 1982 and 1983 Global War Games it became clear that simply launching air and missile strikes against Vladivostok, the Belkin Coast, Sakhalin, and Petropavlovsk were not certain to prevent the Soviets from transferring their forces to Europe. It was observed in later games, however, that such a result could be achieved in a protracted war by strikes on some targets:

\textsuperscript{21} Henry H. Mauz, Jr., E-mail interview by author, received 13 October 2018.
\textsuperscript{22} Pokrant (2005), 90.
\textsuperscript{24} Peter M. Swartz, “Characterizing the Navy of the 1980s,” working paper, 22 June 2017, 3.
manufacturing facilities at Komsomolsk-on-Amur, which produced Akula-class submarines and airframes for fourth generation fighters; and metal fabricating facilities at Khabarovsk.\textsuperscript{25}

In the 1983 Global War Game, US CVBGs attacked Soviet forces and installations, and severely damaged the Soviet Naval Aviation and Air Force.\textsuperscript{26} In the 1985-1987 Global War Games, CINCPAC organized CVBGs and battleship battle groups (BBBG). The Soviets fired an average of 84 missiles per US aircraft carrier, but only one carrier sustained damage. At one point in the game, it was estimated that 50 percent of the air defense in Vladivostok and sortie generation capacity had been eliminated. The United States had deployed three CVBGs near the Aleutians and two more to the southeast of Japan, and CINCPAC was poised to take the offensive against the Soviet Union. By D+50, the United States had degraded Soviet air defenses in the Kamchatka Peninsula by 50 percent, and the kill ratio had increased to four-to-one in favor of the United States, given that half of the Soviet fourth generation aircraft had been sent to Europe.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Amphibious Landing Operations}

The Maritime Strategy called for active use of amphibious landing operations in order to take critical land areas when opportunities arose. Moreover, availability of amphibious landing forces was expected to pin down Soviet forces which could otherwise be redeployed to other theaters of operations.\textsuperscript{28} In 1985, “Amphibious Warfare Strategy,” issued jointly by Commandant of the Marine Corps General P. X. Kelley and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins, defined the role of amphibious forces in the Maritime Strategy, calling for the use of amphibious forces for power projection along the Soviet flanks.\textsuperscript{29}

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy spelled out ways in which US Marine Corps (USMC) could be employed in the Pacific in a three-phase construction. In Phase I, operations for deterrence and preparation for general war

\textsuperscript{25} Gile (2004), 62.
\textsuperscript{26} Hay and Gile (1993), 42.
\textsuperscript{27} Gile (2004), 64-66.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 124.
would be conducted simultaneously. In that phase, two Marine Amphibious Brigades (MAB; some 13,600 personnel each) associated with the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons could be airlifted to a number of forward locations including Japan to prepare for subsequent operations. US Pacific Fleet amphibious ships would embark Marines from I Marine Amphibious Force, stationed in California, and from III Marine Amphibious Force, stationed in Okinawa.30

In Phase II, US amphibious forces would heighten the level of uncertainty for the Soviets and start complicating their strategic calculations. At that point, the USMC could launch limited amphibious raids (committing a Marine Amphibious Brigade) or more robust amphibious assaults to secure territory adequate for the introduction of follow-on forces or reinforcements. In the Pacific, amphibious operations against the southern Kuril Islands would become an option, depending on US force disposition.31

Execution of significant amphibious operations would become a realistic option in Phase III, if Soviet forces had been sufficiently attrited. The objectives of the operations would be to regain lost territory, to keep critical sea lines of communication open, and to occupy Soviet territories (which could be used to enhance US position in the process of forcing the Soviets to terminate the war on terms favorable to the United States).

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy contended that while such forces were likely insufficient to decisively affect the outcome of a European war, they could shift the strategic center of gravity against an exhausted Soviet force. In the later stages of Phase III, amphibious assaults by forces the size of the Marine Amphibious Force would become realistic. In the Pacific, amphibious operations against Sakhalin Island would become possible and, if Sakhalin Island were successfully taken, would contribute to warfighting objectives in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.32

Throughout the 1980s the US Navy possessed 60 to 65 vessels – about 11-12 percent of its total battle force – for amphibious operations. The target amphibious force level under the 1980s 600-ship Navy plan was sufficient for deployment of assault echelons consisting of one Marine Amphibious Force and one Marine Amphibious Brigade.33 To facilitate amphibious operations, the US Navy recommissioned four Iowa-class battle-

30 Ibid., 127-128.
31 Ibid., 131-132.
32 Ibid., 131-134.
33 Swartz (2017), 4.
ships, each equipped with nine 16-inch guns and twelve 5-inch guns, which could provide massive fire support for landing forces. The 1980s also saw the beginning of construction of Wasp-class amphibious assault ships, each of which could support almost the full strength of one Marine Expeditionary Unit with some 2,200 troops, transporting them with landing craft or helicopters, and providing air support with AV-8B Harrier II attack aircraft. The addition of those new capabilities buttressed the amphibious strategy laid out in the Maritime Strategy.

Assessment

Before the completion of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy in 1985, the US Navy and the USMC had examined possible roles of amphibious forces in the Global War Game in 1984. In that game, the southern Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island attracted attention, based on the assumption that in a global war with the Soviet Union, Japan would be interested in recovering the Kurils, which the Soviets occupied at the end of World War II. Specialists tested the idea of the United States and Japan working together to preempt a Soviet attack on Hokkaido, and to take and hold Sakhalin Island and the southern Kurils. The results of the gaming suggested that decisive amphibious operations could facilitate US naval operations in the Soviet submarine bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare

Potentially the most important concept, but also the most controversial, was strategic anti-submarine warfare (ASW) against Soviet SSBNs. In the Pacific, threatening and possibly attacking Soviet SSBNs sortieing out of Petropavlovsk and operating in the Sea of Okhotsk bastion was an option envisioned in the Maritime Strategy.

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36 Marolda (2012), 92-93.
The early forward strategic ASW operations had at least two advantages. First, defeating Soviet SSBNs before they could sortie into the Sea of Okhotsk bastion would be easier than after. Those operations also made sense in terms of the geography of the Western Pacific: Soviet submarines would have to sortie out of the port of Petropavlovsk into the Sea of Okhotsk in the face of US nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) on patrol beyond the port. In the event of war, US Air Force B-52 bombers would lay mines near Petropavlovsk in an attempt to blockade it.\(^{39}\)

Second, it was believed that placing high-value SSBNs at risk would force Soviet general-purpose forces to remain on the defensive, deployed close to the Soviet homeland, which would reduce the burden of defending high-value American assets such as aircraft carriers.\(^{40}\) Moreover, by destroying Soviet SSBNs, the United States could significantly alter the wartime strategic military balance between the two superpowers.\(^{41}\)

The forward ASW doctrine was supported by US operational and technological advantages over the Soviet Union. For example, since Soviet submarines were noisy and US submarines were quiet, the United States had an edge in detection and tracking them.\(^{42}\) Furthermore, the United States had a reasonably accurate picture of where the Soviet SSBNs operated in the Sea of Okhotsk.\(^{43}\)

New intelligence assessments of Soviet strategy made a crucial contribution to the development of anti-SSBN strategy. By the early 1980s, the US intelligence community had become convinced that the Soviets had adopted what was dubbed the “bastion” strategy, i.e. the Soviets had decided to maintain their SSBN forces in well-protected bastions such as the one in the Sea of Okhotsk, and to use them as a strategic reserve for the purpose of influencing peace negotiations and achieving political goals.\(^{44}\) Moreover, in 1984, the United States gained an understanding of the details of crisis-time operation of the SSBNs by analyzing information acquired through a tapping device attached to the Soviet Navy communication ca-
ble in the Barents Sea. During the highly assertive Able Archer exercise conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Western Europe in 1983, the Soviets prioritized the protection of SSBNs and quickly moved some of them into bastions.45

Assessment

The anti-SSBN operations produced mixed results in war games. In the 1979-1983 Global War Games, the United States conducted anti-SSBN operations in the Atlantic and the Pacific. On the positive side, for example, the United States successfully destroyed nearly half of strategic missile submarines in the 1983 Global War Game, and the Soviet Union failed to counter the US anti-SSBN campaign effectively.46 The United States also prompted the Soviet Union to use its SSNs to protect its SSBNs instead of undertaking offensive operations against the Western sea lines of communication.47 In the 1984 Global War Game, the Soviet SSBNs took heavy losses in the initial phase, although losses ceased after the SSBNs were placed in well-protected shallow water bastions in the northern Sea of Okhotsk.48 In the 1985-87 Global War Games, the United States destroyed about half of the Soviet SSBNs by D+64.49

On the negative side, in the 1979 game, US anti-SSBN operations led the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons against American CVBGs in the Atlantic and the Pacific, sinking two carriers.50 In the 1982 game, the United States actively conducted anti-SSBN operations. However, the results did not affect the calculations of the US National Command Authority or the Soviet Supreme High Command with regard to possible nuclear use, since neither side knew how the strategic nuclear balance had been altered.51

47 Hay and Gile (1993), 40.
49 Ibid., 117.
50 Hay and Gile (1993), 40.
51 Gile (2004), xxvi. Tracking submarine losses was difficult. John T. Hanley, Jr., E-mail interview by author, received 8 August 2019.
Japan’s Role

Japan played a significant role in assisting the United States to execute its Maritime Strategy in the Pacific. Positioned in the center of the Pacific theater of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, Japan undertook two important missions: blockading key chokepoint straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) and defending the sea lines of communication.

Those blockade operations made it difficult for Soviet naval forces to transit between Vladivostok and the Western Pacific. The Maritime Self-Defense Force strengthened ASW capabilities; the Air Self-Defense Force acquired C-130 transport aircraft as a mine-laying platform; and the Ground Self-Defense Force introduced surface-to-ship missiles to attack Soviet surface vessels.

Defense of the sea lines of communication was intended to help US CVBGs transit the Western Pacific safely to striking positions including Hook of Hokkaido. The Maritime Self-Defense Force was tasked with hunting down Soviet submarines and providing safe passage for US CVBGs. The Self-Defense Forces took up those new missions while continuing to provide protection for US bases in Japan, including Misawa, Yokota and Kadena air force bases, Yokosuka, Atsugi and Sasebo navy bases, and Iwakuni and Futenma marine air stations.

According to retired US Navy officer and Japan specialist James E. Auer, no US Navy operator would doubt the importance of US-Japan cooperation for the execution of the Maritime Strategy. It was “unbelievable,” he said, “We tracked every [Soviet] submarine [by the end of the Cold War].” 52 Former Soviet Navy leaders agreed. One retired Soviet admiral admitted after the end of the Cold War that the Soviets took the presence of allied navies such as the Japanese in US exercises seriously, going so far as to express his respect for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. 53

However, there were questions regarding Japan's role in the Maritime Strategy. The US planners were rightly concerned that Japan might decide to remain neutral in the event of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 1984 Maritime Strategy discussed that US allies’ decision to stay out would weaken capabilities to implement the strategy, and

52 James E. Auer, interview by author, Tokyo, 19 September 2012.
that the stance assumed by Japan would be “pivotal.”\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Soviet Military Power}, published by the US Department of Defense in 1989, states that Soviet military objectives in the Pacific included “neutralizing Japan and South Korea by military or political means to prevent them from supporting the United States.”\textsuperscript{55}

\section*{Assessment}

Several related scenarios were examined in the Global War Games in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1979 game, the Soviet Union offered France, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, and Algeria incentives to remain neutral. In the 1980 game, the Soviet Union detonated three nuclear weapons east of Japan to intimidate the Japanese government into neutrality.\textsuperscript{56} In the 1984 game, the Soviet Union perceived that it would be impossible to keep Japan neutral through diplomatic pressure and military threat alone, and launched a large-scale air attack on Japan.

The scenario in the three-year serial games conducted between 1985 and 1987 was more complicated and sophisticated. In those games, Japan vacillated between support for the United States and broad neutrality. During the first week of hostilities, the United States conducted air operations against the Soviet Union with the involvement of units based in Japan. When the Soviet Union protested that this was not in keeping with Japan’s professed neutrality, the Japanese government condemned US actions and banned the future use of Japanese soil as a base for US attacks on Soviet forces. Then Japan decided to receive two damaged US aircraft carriers in Yokosuka and Osaka ports. Moscow regarded this as a serious violation of Japanese neutrality and attacked Japan. The Japanese government finally made a decision to fully assume its alliance obligations and pledged to use its Self-Defense Forces to protect US forces in Japan.\textsuperscript{57} Certainly those were hypothetical scenarios used in war games, but the repeated appearance of that theme clearly indicates that US planners took the issue seriously and examined how best to prevent Japan from being neutralized—and, if it were neutralized, how to fight a global war without Japan’s support.

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\textsuperscript{54} “The Maritime Strategy, 1984,” 100. \\
\textsuperscript{56} Hay and Gile (1993), 4 and 7. \\
\textsuperscript{57} Gile (2004), 28 and 63-67.
\end{flushright}
Nobody knows what Japan would have done in a real war. It might have stayed out in fear of Soviet retaliation; it might have assisted the United States believing that its superpower ally would eventually prevail and that not assisting the United States could produce dire postwar consequences. In any case, the beauty of deterrence is that as long as there was a possibility of Japan entering the war on the side of the United States, the Soviet leaders could not but take that into account.

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