Content

Andrzej Makowski, How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed in:

Sebastian Bruns, Sarandis Papadopoulos (Ed.)

Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy, page 113 - 128

Festschrift for Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (ret.)

1. Edition 2020, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-5753-4, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-9915-0, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299150-113

Series: ISPK Seapower Series, vol. 3

Bibliographic information
How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed Andrzej Makowski Introduction On 10 February 2017 a document entitled The Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security (PSCMS)1was presented at the Polish Naval Academy in Gdynia. The strategic concept was the cumulative work of two years for the team tasked with producing the document. The main objective behind the efforts of the team was to overcome the intellectual impasse concerned with working out systemic solutions for state actions in the area of maritime security. In particular, the missions and employment of the Polish naval force needed work, and planning for their development. The problem seemed important as in 1999 Poland became a member of NATO, which meant it had joined the “club” of maritime states and indeed a maritime alliance. How to use this opportunity in the political, diplomatic, military, economic or cultural aspect was an open question, with the continued national land-centered approach to these issues. Another important issue was the geopolitical changes that took place in the Baltic region after 1991 and Poland’s accession to the European Union (2004). In the subsequent National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, a document developed between 1990 and 20142, maritime issues were not raised or were merely discussed peripherally. Another issue to be addressed was the real contribution of the country to the diplomatic and law enforcement actions carried out by NATO naval forces, as hitherto, with a few exceptions, the Polish Navy was prepared only to conduct war operations. Its participation in additional naval NATO and EU projects had an exceptional and episodic character. 1 Full text: en.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/SKBMRPENG.pdf. 2 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2014) and White Book of the National Security of the Republic of Poland (2013), http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/bez pieczenstwo-narodowe/akty-prawne-i-dokumenty-1/5973,Akty-prawne-i-dokument y-strategiczne.html. 113 The title of the document also needs brief explanation. Why the strategic concept, and not simply the maritime security strategy? The sarcastic claim is that Poles are grandmasters in creating new concepts. Instead, due to formal and legal reasons, the name of the document could not be a strategy. Strictly defined, strategies are within the domain of the work by the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of National Defense. Therefore creating successive, lower-level entities was not possible. Thus, there arose a compromise in the form of strategic concept as a general framework for implementation of planning and development activities and future use of the naval force. Challenges in the area of maritime security and maritime strategy perceived in Poland The Baltic Sea, Poland’s home waters, is particular body of water. Located on the sidelines of world maritime transport routes, having a narrow and shallow natural connection to the Atlantic Ocean through the Danish Straits3, it has long been the area of lively multilateral trade and political relations between coastal states. Over the centuries, it was an area of peaceful trade, but very often also a theatre of fierce, long-lasting wars for hegemony, in which the extra-Baltic powers were also actively involved.4 It should also be stated that in its modern history Poland represented a decidedly terrestrial and continental approach to the issues of security and strategy, while the interest of the state elite in maritime affairs can be described as episodic and rather marginal. Maritime affairs began to break into the public consciousness only after 1918, with the regaining of independence and the establishment of the Polish Navy and shipping, fishing, and shipbuilding companies. 3 The area of the Baltic Sea with the Danish Straits is 415,000 km2, the average depth is 52 m (maximum 459 m), the meridional extent is 1300 km, and the latitudinal 1100 km, see Joanna Maj-Szatkowska, Oceany, morza. Leksykon [Oceans, Seas, Glossary] (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 2004), 41-42. 4 See Edmund Kosiarz, Bitwy na Bałtyku [Battles on the Baltic] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1978), 62-75. Michel Mollat de Jourdin, Europa i morze (Europe and Sea) ), trans. by M. Buczkowska, (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 1995), 56-58 and 146-156; Wolfgang Froese, Historia państw i narodów Morza Bałtyckiego [History of States and Nations of the Baltic Sea], trans. by M. Dorna, E. Słomińska-Krawiec and K. Śliwińska (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2007), 40-206. Andrzej Makowski 114 It should be emphasized that the shipping routes of the Baltic Sea are of primary importance in terms of navigation and economics mainly for the Baltic States.5 For some of them, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, it is the only sea route connecting them with the world’s ocean. The relatively small size of the Baltic Sea and the resulting geographical proximity of its states mean that the sense of community of interests and mutual benefits is now playing an increasingly important role in this region. Not without significance are also the political, economic and military changes that have taken place among countries around this basin after 1991. Currently, all Baltic countries, except Russia and neutral Sweden and Finland, are members of NATO. Besides Russia, all are members of the European Union (EU), which makes the Baltic Sea to some degree EU’s Mare Nostrum, with all the economic and legal consequences this entails. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (1991), Poland’s admission to NA- TO (1999) and accession to the EU (2004), triggered profound geopolitical, economic and military changes in the Baltic region, and also posed intellectual and organizational challenges to the “philosophy” of perceiving issues from the perspective of maritime security and maritime strategy. Another challenge was brought by the year 2014 in the form of annexation of Crimea, armed (separatist) operations in the eastern part of Ukraine, as well as rapid increase in military potential in the Kaliningrad region to build an effective A2/AD structure by the Russian Federation. The labelling of the United States of America and NATO as “threats” in the Russian War Doctrine of 2014 and the Maritime Doctrine of 2015 were significant. It was therefore necessary to acknowledge that the period of dividends of peace and detente in our part of Europe, begun in the 1990s, had ended. In parallel, an area of security destabilization appeared on the eastern border of the country. One of the key challenges during the work on PSCMS was the introduction of the term “maritime security” to the maritime theory and practice in Poland. The difficulty was that both maritime security and maritime safety translated into Polish the same way. Moreover, while issues in the scope of maritime safety are well known and explained, maritime security was seen only as protection of human activities at sea. Using the written achieve- 5 Over the course of the day, between 2000 and 2500 vessels equipped with AIS are recorded in the Baltic Sea area. The Baltic Sea is also the 3rd ferry market in the world in terms of transport’s frequency. How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed 115 ments of Professors Geoffrey Till6 and Natalie Klein,7 the above concept was introduced into the Polish “scientific and practical” circulation, separating them between “hard” and “soft” security, which allowed their implementation in PSCMS. Another difficult challenge was to convince political decision makers, parliamentarians, and military that the navy is not only for warfare (military operations), but has three essential functions: military, diplomatic and constabulary.8 Indeed, the three are inseparable, and their validity depends on specific plans and operational situation. It seems that despite the two years which have passed since the publication of the PSCMS, the above truth is barely making its way through to the decision makers. It should also be noted that after the events in Ukraine in 2014, a more visible slant was seen in the military capabilities of the Baltic fleets with regard to their plans for modernization. Among the key challenges to Poland’s maritime security are:9 • An active and permanent cooperation in upholding the legal order according to the Law of Sea; • The rebuilding of the potential of the Polish Maritime Forces, which would ensure an acceptable level of maritime security through an increased involvement in NATO and EU activities that protect the interests of the member states in connection to access to global marine areas, key region stability, and border protection; • Logistics infrastructure development, which would enhance our Host Nation Support capabilities and forward military NATO presence in the Baltic Sea region, as well as the developing cooperation between NATO and EU; 6 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, first edition (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), 310-311. 7 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (New York: Oxford, 2011), 4-11. 8 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge 1979), 16-21; Eric Grove, The Future of Seapower (London: Routledge 1990), 234; Christian Le Mière, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century. Drivers and Challenges (London and New York: Routledge 2014), 20-28. 9 Jarosław Brysiewicz, Dariusz Gwizdała, Andrzej Makowski, Szymon Hatłas, Agnieszka Adamusińska, Cezary Cierzan, Maciej Janiak, Sławomir Kamiński, Jarosław Kraszewski and Tomasz Szubrycht, Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security, ed. by M. Biernat, J. Kwaśniewska-Wróbel, M. Skowron (Warszawa-Gdynia: National Security Bureau and the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, 2017), https://en.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/SKBMRPENG.pdf, 11. Andrzej Makowski 116 • A role in rebuilding NATO naval capabilities (NATO Maritime Force Posture), including their integration with land and air components, inclusion of this matter in long-term Alliance policy and active participation and development of the Maritime Situational Awareness/Maritime Domain Awareness MSA/MDA systems; • Acquisition and maintenance of local (littoral) sea control, including the development of allied and national capabilities for overcoming anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities of potential adversaries, which aim to hinder allied forces from providing reinforcements in the region of the Baltic Sea; • Creating conditions for diversification of energy supply sources to be delivered by sea; • Neutralization of uncontrolled forced mass migration and human trafficking through maritime regions; • Stopping sea environment degradation, with many of the changes to the natural environment in the Baltic region stemming from climate change; • Maintaining Baltic Sea security and focusing on the management of sea traffic, sea and ecological rescue as a result of an increasing traffic on Baltic Sea routes and their key importance to raw material inflow to Poland. Taking into account the geographical conditions of the Baltic Sea and the different combat potentials of individual fleets on this sea, on the one hand small and medium-sized states, on the other, nuclear powers, Poland can face the challenges of the maritime strategy with regard to: • Deterrence and maintenance of peace, based on the cooperation of NA- TO and EU soldiers by building credibility and readiness during joint exercises, naval peace operations, participation in permanent NATO standing naval groups, and close cooperation of navies in Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Poland in the Baltic region ; • Preparation of the Polish Navy for participation in joint operations in the national and allied dimension, as well as activities within the framework of hybrid warfare and critical infrastructure protection, devices, and installations at sea and in coastal regions in the Baltic Sea; • Acceleration of the implementation of the naval technical modernization plan (the average age of Polish warships is 32 years), while the current condition should be treated as a threat, not just a challenge. In addition, modernization should take into account the various dimensions of contemporary activities in confined and shallow waters: maritime, How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed 117 air, land, cosmic space and cyberspace, as well as the interoperability within NATO. Why the PSCMS was developed The need to develop a document having the character of a strategic concept was signaled by experts associated with the Naval Academy, Shipbuilding Council, and the Institute of General Jozef Haller (a security think tank). The diagnosis by the National Security Bureau confirmed that such a need existed, because Poland had not optimally used its potential as a coastal location in the conditions of a dynamically changing security environment. Moreover, the potential it possessed was not adequate to the mission set and the water regions in which they were to be carried out. Moreover, some parts of the documents published in the previous years (“The Concept for Navy Development by 2030” and the “Operational Program- countering threats at sea 2013 to 2022/2030”) raised doubts as to the relevance of the main directions chosen for modernization of the Polish Armed Forces. Considering many years of defense neglect, especially regarding the Polish Navy, which consequently might limit the implementation of tasks assigned, it was considered appropriate by the three groups to redefine and redirect modernization priorities for the Polish Armed Forces and other components of the naval force. This definition was in particular needed to present the concept of implementable strategic tasks for the naval force and its consequent preparation and use to ensure national security and economic and social development of the state. The document also took into account the fact that the evolutionary departure from the dominance of military issues (that is, land forces) in the content of strategic planning, and the shift towards questions of integrated national security, including sea regions, is becoming more and more visible beyond Poland. The growing importance of non-military threats and challenges also results in the need to involve broader entities to achieve security policy objectives, which is another significant change in the perception of the security of the state as a whole. Given the foregoing, it was justifiable to make use of experience of other maritime states and of some international security organizations possessing maritime security strategy documents In particular, the European Union Maritime Strategy (EUMSS) of 2014 and NATO’s Allied Maritime Strategy (AMS) as of 2011, provided the umbrella for a shortened process of developing Poland’s own solutions. Andrzej Makowski 118 In the light of the above, a conclusion was made that the National Security Bureau (NSB), in cooperation with the Naval Academy (NA), Naval Shipbuilding Council and other entities was the right place, under the present legal system in Poland, to initiate a public debate focused on this important but hitherto unappreciated area of national security. The Place of PSCMS in the Strategic Planning System of National Security To determine the place of the PSCMS in the strategic planning system in national security in Poland is a difficult task for a few basic reasons. The first of these is the strategic planning system in the field of economic development is subject to national law on principles for pursuing development policy (2006), whereas the strategic planning system in the field of security is subject to the law on obligations relating to common defense of the Republic of Poland (1967). This is the reason why in Poland there are two de facto strategic planning systems: in the field of integrated development implemented under the government program as related to the cohesion of policy and in the narrower field of national security Second, the Polish national security strategy is assumed to be complex and interdisciplinary. It embraces various fields and areas of security, including development policy issues, whereas the sector strategies (of development) embrace only the smaller segments assigned to them. Thus, it stems from this definition that the sector approaches are not of a complex character and their integrative character is determined through their uniform, equal embedding in the strategic planning system. This means that the relations between security strategies and development strategies are still not determined in a formal manner, and planning in both of the fields is subject to different laws10. With the above-mentioned conditions, the authors of the Concept recognized that it was justified to place it in the system of Polish strategy documents, so as not to violate applicable laws, or disturb relations with the documents already in effect, or the existing elements of strategic culture. To do so, the management of the NSB and members of the team of au- 10 See Slawomir Kamiński, “Rozwiązania organizacyjno – metodologiczne, miejsce, funkcje i charakter Strategicznej Koncepcji Bezpieczeństwa Morskiego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Organizational and Metodological Solutions, Place, Functions and Character of Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security),” in Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego [International Security Annual] vol. 11, no. 1 (2017), 22-24. How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed 119 thors adopted the “soft” formula of the Concept, as a grassroots initiative of the presidential center, aimed at presenting the desired vision of the development of the Polish Navy and other components of the naval forces. The significance of the document was additionally strengthened by the fact that the foreword to the Concept was authored by the President of the Republic of Poland and the Head of the Armed Forces. As individuals such as Peter Swartz have pointed out, successful strategy efforts must have toplevel cover and shepherding.11 The authors of PSCMS have made every effort to ensure that the content and form of this document are of a comprehensive, integrated and complementary nature, in relation to the National Security Strategy of 2014, the Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland until 2022,12 and other governmental documents. The changes proposed by the author team are therefore adaptive and transformative in relation to existing solutions and plans of action. Such flexibility offers policy-makers more leg room to utilize a conceptual document such as this. It was also assumed that the Concept would serve as an inspiration and basis for future governmental work in the field of developing the state-wide, whole-of-government maritime strategy. Organization of the team’s work, applied research methods, and tools In February 2016, pursuant to the order of the NSB Head, a nine-member task force for the development of SCMS RP was appointed. The team was headed by deputy head of the NSB Jaroslaw Brysiewicz, who was replaced on November 1, 2016 by Dariusz Gwizdala. The deputy head of the team during the entire period of his work was held by Prof. Andrzej Makowski, retired Navy Captain from the Naval Academy in Gdynia (and author of this chapter). The inauguration of the team’s work took place on February 25, 2016 at the commemorative conference at the Belvedere Palace (the official residence and workplace of president before WWII)13. The team was dissolved after the publication of the Concept (its “launching”), which for- 11 Swartz, Peter, U.S. Navy Capstone, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to Consider Before You Write One” (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, March 2009), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/D0020071.A1.pdf. 12 Full text: http://en.mon.gov.pl/documents/. 13 Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security, authors team: J. Brysiewicz, D. Gwizdała, A. Makowski, S. Hatłas, A. Adamusińska, C. Cierzan, M. Janiak, S. Kamiński, J. Kraszewski, T. Szubrycht; ed. by M. Biernat, J. Kwaśniewska-Wróbel, Andrzej Makowski 120 mally took place on February 10, 2017 at the conference summarizing its work, which was held at the Naval Academy in Gdynia. The team of authors met at sessions that were held every few weeks at the NSB headquarters in Warsaw or at the Academy in Gdynia. In total (from 9 October 2015 to 10 February 2017), 17 sessions and one teleconference took place. Depending on the current needs, the chairman of the team invited representatives of selected ministries to some of the sessions. The team members also participated in additional undertakings, conferences, and seminars focused on maritime security, organized by other bodies, during which they promoted and disseminated the idea of developing the Concept. Pursuant to the order of the NSB Head, the members of the team were not entitled to any remuneration for participation in the team’s work. The Concept document is composed of four chapters corresponding to the four main problem areas–the Marine Environment; Polish Naval Force; Directions of Development of the Capabilities of the Polish Naval Force; Recommendations for the Development of the Naval Force of the Republic of Poland. These align with the four phases of the classic strategic cycle (defining interests of a given organization and strategic goals assigned to them, assessing security conditions, the concept of achieving strategic objectives under specific security conditions and resources, forces and capabilities assigned by the organization to implement this concept). Hence, the subject-matter scope of the work embraced • the characteristics of the marine environment, including the space of human activity at sea; • threats, risks, challenges and opportunities in the area of maritime security; • description of the areas of operations of the Polish naval force; • definition of the naval force of the Republic of Poland as a whole and its individual elements; • directions of development of the Polish naval force capabilities to secure the maritime interests of the state and achieve its strategic goals in the field of maritime security, • and recommendations for development of the naval force. The chapters of the Concept are supplemented with two annexes containing a description of the legal order on the seas and oceans, and the charac- M. Skowron, National Security Bureau, Warszawa-Gdynia [3 officers, 3 academics, 4 think tank members] 2017. How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed 121 teristics and international legal status of and geopolitical situation in the Baltic Sea, a dictionary of concepts, and a list of abbreviations and acronyms. During the work, both theoretical and empirical research methods were applied, and used at all stages of document creation: diagnostics, prognostics, and recommendations. During the diagnostic and prognostic work, the method of risk assessment (Common Analysis and Risk Assessment and Management Methodology) was applied with two parameters: the severity of the consequences (outcomes) of the hazards and the probability with which they may occur. The analysis of the security environment was carried out using the PESTEM method (segmentation of the environment into subsets of factors: political, economic, social, technological, ecological and military) supplementing it with a legal (regulatory) factor, due to its special importance for the maritime environment. At all stages of the document’s development, the work done by team of authors was objectified, corrected, and supplemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, the Ministry of Maritime Economy and Inland Navigation, as well as the General Command of the Armed Forces, including the Navy Inspectorate and Special Operations Inspectorate, General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Operational Command of the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard branch of the Border Guard, Maritime Search and Rescue Service and Crisis Management Center of the Pomeranian Voivodship (the Polish coastal administrative region). The draft document also went through the external review procedure, and was presented twice to the members of the parliamentary National Defense Committee. Functions of PSCMS The overall objective of the Concept development was supplemented with a utilitarian goal, which was to develop substantive foundations enabling the state institutions and authorities to take actions in the area of maritime security. Achieving such a goal required the implementation of three basic functions of the strategic concept: diagnostic, prognostic, and recommendations, the latter being the most important one. This was due to the fact that the recommendation function is the result of analyses which were carried out during the diagnostic and prognostic work. In addition, it expresses itself in proposing reforms and changes necessary for implementation, important for realizing the interests of the state in the area of maritime safety and achieving strategic goals in three interpenetrating and interde- Andrzej Makowski 122 pendent spaces of human activity at sea: the political-military, economic, and socio-cultural. In addition, the Concept should perform the following functions: informational, educational, popularizing, ordering (as a tool in politics and strategic planning), as well as for control, constituting, and integrating (building tandem capabilities: security and development). In uniquely Polish conditions, the informational-educational and popularizing functions seemed the most important. The majority of Polish society and its elites represent land-oriented viewpoints regarding state security issues, and they do not notice the close relationship between the presence of NATO’s multinational standing maritime groups with regional and even global security. Therefore, the informational and educational function of the Concept involves both ordering and presenting the knowledge and information in the field of maritime security, both to the state authority bodies and general public. The objective adopted by the authors was to develop a document which would contribute to building and shaping the maritime-oriented identity of citizens. That means understanding and identifying with maritime elements of social reality, in psychological, sociological and cultural terms, resulting from the coastal location of the country. The informational and educational function of the Concept could not be properly implemented without fulfilling the popularizing function. This goal involves a precise definition of the quality and scope of the transfer of information on the maritime security of the state to the public and the most important bodies of the state administration. In connection with this end, the management of the National Security Bureau, as well as designated members of the team of authors, took some steps to promulgate the main content of the Concept, and especially its recommendations through cooperation with mass media, public speeches, participation in conferences, and other meetings dedicated to the state maritime security issues. The ordering function of the Concept involves presenting this document as a strategic policy and planning tool that can have an effect on setting priorities and increasing the effectiveness, and harmonizing its processes in the area of state maritime security. The applicable dimension of this function also manifests itself in gathering, ordering and hierarchizing information in this field. The development of the dictionary of terms, as well as the cross-sectoral, cross-industry, integrated approach to the maritime security issues and to their role and importance in the state security system should be regarded as particularly important. The control function of the Concept is defined by the fact that the various participants of the national security system (various groups whose interest are related to the sea and use of the coastal location of our coun- How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed 123 try) may build the hierarchy of their interests and strategic goals differently, and thus, have varying expectations about the system. Therefore, it was important to accurately define the problems of fundamental, national importance for the maritime security of the state, considered in the context of emerging megatrends in global civilization development. The constituting function of the Concept involves a proposal to make the recommendations specified in the document legally binding in order to give them a lasting and obligatory character. Because PSCMS does not have the legal validity of an Act of Law, the recommendations contained in this document could only be regarded as proposals, or an inspiration for other state bodies to take actions. In the opinion of the authors these would be beneficial for the national security system or for shaping the security environment in a direction desirable to pursuing national interests and achieving strategic goals, both in the fields of national security and economic development. The integration function of the Concept draws from the fact that this document covers various areas of security as well as economic development issues. Due to the relationships and interdependencies between development and security, it was advisable to link both strategic planning systems at the state level to ensure parallel work focused on building tandem capabilities for security and development. This last goal was aimed at identifying needs concerning desirable formal and legal changes necessary for better integration of the security and development policies of Poland.14 Weaknesses of PSCMS The development of the Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was an innovative project that has no counterpart in the entire history of the country. No precedent existed. It was also a difficult process, characterized by a high degree of complexity, implemented with little experience and few models or methods that could be referred to, due to the specificity 14 The competitive nature of strategic documents in the field of national security and development in Poland results not only from the provisions included in them, but also from the fact that work on development strategies are carried out in governmental centers (ministries), and work on the National Security Strategy is carried out with initiatives and according to the presidential administration regulations. Such a solution does not contribute to the ordering of the strategic planning system in Poland and does not result in its separation from the current political debates. Andrzej Makowski 124 of the topic. Despite the high value of the results obtained, the study was not free from both organizational and methodological shortcomings. Firstly, it is impossible in the present formal legal conditions to precisely place this document in the strategic planning system (the document is of expert nature). Secondly, its creation is an ad hoc process, which lacks institutionalization. The work on the Concept was the result of a conviction shared by a determined group of people that such efforts would contribute to improving the functioning of the national security system (maritime security had not been part of strategic thinking at the national level). Thirdly, it is necessary to ensure transparent and depoliticized document development process, something that is challenging in the national security realm. In future work on the Polish Maritime Strategy, not only public administration bodies should be involved, but also representatives of expert and academic circles as well as representatives of the political opposition should join. This approach should be applied to work out a concept of use and development of the Polish Armed Forces. At present a comprehensive, overarching Concept 2.0 does not exist. There appear to be two conflicting visions. The first, the Polish Armed Forces should perform exclusively military functions (execute missions mainly to deter and deny access), which the second would extend its missions to the promotion and protection of Poland’s interests both in the Baltic Sea and outside its area.15 In addition, the current document does not sufficiently refer to the interaction and relations occurring between the various components of the naval force, nor does it define the interdependencies between the Polish Armed Forces and other branches of the armed forces to the full extent. These critical remarks are important, but they do not negate other substantive values of the Concept and the fact that its content, form, and scope have already contributed to launching a public discussion on maritime security in general and on directions for modernization of the naval force in particular. 15 The team of authors presents in the Concept a series of arguments for the necessity of applying the second approach, because Poland’s maritime interests are located worldwide, not only in the Baltic. How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed 125 Conclusions The inevitable element of subjectivity in assessing state security readiness, is a specific feature of national security, especially in a parliamentary republic. It stems from the scope of contemporary globalization processes. Hence, the conviction among the team developing the Concept of the need to develop a supra-ministerial mechanism which would show long-term directions in security policy at the state level, including in the field of maritime security. Owing to the comprehensiveness of this document, its integrated character and multifunctionality the PSCMS contributes to obligating state bodies to deal with problems of national security on continuous, not only ad hoc basis. Also noteworthy are the annexes, which form an integral part of the project. They, in succession, synthetically present the applicable legal order of the seas and oceans, introduced by the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (Poland ratified the Convention in 1998), the international legal status of and geopolitical situation in the Baltic Sea, and a dictionary of terms. It follows from the analysis of the current capabilities of the Polish naval force, in particular the capabilities of the Polish Navy that its forces are not adequate to the missions and large maritime regions in which they are to be executed. Undertaking remedial actions in this area with the utmost employment of the existing national potential is not only urgent, but it is an indispensable condition for responsible and secure functioning in an unstable international environment. As outlined here, Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security does not exhaust the presented subject. The main goal of its authors was to initiate a broader public debate on Poland’s maritime security and to inspire state-level bodies having competence in the field of national security, to undertake joint systemic work to ensure Poland’s maritime security, and the conditions for its successful development. The decisive factor in the final assessment of the Concept will be whether it will achieve its objectives. Will it remain the “driving force” of public discussion in Poland on maritime security issues and the effective use of the coastal location of our country for economic development? Will it be used by state institutions and authorities to take action in the area of maritime security? Will it launch the process of developing the Polish Maritime Strategy? Will it contribute to the development of maritime-centered identification of the Polish society? Andrzej Makowski 126 These are still unanswered questions. It should be noted, however, that the main motive for the development of PSCMS was the conviction of the team of authors that in the near future the answers would be affirmative. Works Cited Booth, Ken, Navies and Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 1979). Brysiewicz, Jarosław, Dariusz Gwizdała, Andrzej Makowski, Szymon Hatłas, Agnieszka Adamusińska, Cezary Cierzan, Maciej Janiak, Sławomir Kamiński, Jarosław Kraszewski and Tomasz Szubrycht, Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security, ed. by M. Biernat, J. Kwaśniewska-Wróbel and M. Skowron (Warszawa-Gdynia: National Security Bureau and the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, 2017), https://en.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/SKBMRPE NG.pdf. Froese, Wolfgang, Historia państw i narodów Morza Bałtyckiego [History of States and Nations of the Baltic Sea], trans. by M. Dorna, E. Słomińska-Krawiec, K. Śliwińska (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2007). Grove, Eric, The Future of Seapower (London: Routledge, 1990). Kamiński, Slawomir, “Rozwiązania organizacyjno – metodologiczne, miejsce, funkcje i charakter Strategicznej Koncepcji Bezpieczeństwa Morskiego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Organizational and Methodological Solutions, Place, Functions and Character of Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security],” in Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego [International Security Annual] vol. 11, no. 1 (2017), 22-24. Klein, Natalie, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (New York: Oxford, 2011). Kosiarz, Edmund, Bitwy na Bałtyku [Battles on the Baltic] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1978). Le Mière, Christian, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century. Drivers and Challenges (London and New York: Routledge 2014). Maj-Szatkowska, Joanna, Oceany, morza. Leksykon [Oceans, Seas, Glossary] (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 2004). Mollat de Jourdin, Michel, Europa i morze [Europe and Sea] (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 1995), trans. by M. Buczkowska. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2014) and White Book of the National Security of the Republic of Poland (2013), http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/b ezpieczenstwo-narodowe/akty-prawne-i-dokumenty-1/5973,Akty-prawne-i-doku menty-strategiczne.html. Swartz, Peter, U.S. Navy Capstone, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to Consider Before You Write One” (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, March 2009), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/D0020071.A1.pdf. Till, Geoffrey, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, first edition (London: Routledge, 2004). How Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security was Developed 127

Chapter Preview

References

Abstract

The 21st century is witnessing renewed tension as conflicts between major powers, serious concerns about future security alliances and global, even generational, security policy challenges arise. In the light of this, naval forces and maritime security, and understanding their underlying strategic rationale, are gaining momentum and importance. What are the roles and missions of naval forces, and how have states and the institutions themselves sought to frame their goals and methods? This book brings together experts from the United States, Europe, and Asia to reflect on how maritime and naval strategy is conceptualised and how it has been used. It celebrates the life and work of Peter M. Swartz, Captain (US Navy) ret., who since contributing to ‘The Maritime Strategy’ of the 1980s as a young Pentagon officer, has been a mentor, friend, intellectual beacon and the foremost purveyor of maritime expertise to the global naval community. With contributions by James Bergeron, Sebastian Bruns, Seth Cropsey, Larissa Forster, Michael Haas, John Hattendorf, Peter Haynes, Andrzej Makowski, Amund Lundesgaard, Narushige Michishita, Martin Murphy, Sarandis Papadopoulos, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Jeremy Stöhs, Eric Thompson, Geoffrey Till, Sarah Vogler, Steve Wills.

Zusammenfassung

Großmachtkonflikte, die Zukunft von sicherheitspolitischen Institutionen sowie transnationalen Generationenherausforderungen bergen eine neue globale Unsicherheit. Vor diesem Hintergrund bekommen maritime Sicherheit und Seestreitkräfte sowie deren Einordnung im außenpolitischen Werkzeugkasten eine zunehmende Bedeutung. Was sind die Rollen und Einsatzaufgaben von Seemacht, und wie haben Staaten und ihre Institutionen maritime Ziele, Mittel und Wege konzeptualisiert? Dieser Sammelband bringt ausgewiesene Experten aus den USA, Europa und Asien zusammen, die ihre Perspektive auf maritime Strategie teilen. Das Buch dient gleichzeitig die Festschrift für Peter M. Swartz, Kapitän zur See a.D. der US-Marine, der seit seiner Arbeit als einer der Autoren der „Maritime Strategy“ (1980er) als Mentor, Freund, intellektueller Leuchtturm und vor allen Dingen als Spiritus Rektor wesentlich zur Schärfung des Verständnisses von Seestrategie in den globalen Beziehungen beigetragen hat. Mit Beiträgen von James Bergeron, Sebastian Bruns, Seth Cropsey, Larissa Forster, Michael Haas, John Hattendorf, Peter Haynes, Andrzej Makowski, Amund Lundesgaard, Narushige Michishita, Martin Murphy, Sarandis Papadopoulos, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Jeremy Stöhs, Eric Thompson, Geoffrey Till, Sarah Vogler, Steve Wills.