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Iztok Prezelj, Daniel Harangozo

Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Europe at a Crossroads

1. Edition 2018, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-4670-5, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-8897-0, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845288970

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Iztok Prezelj | Daniel Harangozo Confidence and Security- Building Measures in Europe at a Crossroads Nomos BUT_Prezelj_4670-5.indd 2 15.10.18 10:00 Confidence and Security- Building Measures in Europe at a Crossroads Nomos Iztok Prezelj | Daniel Harangozo BUT_Prezelj_4670-5.indd 3 15.10.18 10:00 The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de ISBN 978-3-8487-4670-5 (Print) 978-3-8452-8897-0 (ePDF) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-3-8487-4670-5 (Print) 978-3-8452-8897-0 (ePDF) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Prezelj, Iztok / Harangozo, Daniel Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Europe at a Crossroads Iztok Prezelj / Daniel Harangozo 280 p. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 978-3-8487-4670-5 (Print) 978-3-8452-8897-0 (ePDF) 1st Edition 2018 © Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2018. Printed and bound in Germany. This work is subject to copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to “Verwertungs gesellschaft Wort”, Munich. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Nomos or the authors. Book Reviewers: Wolfgang Zellner and Hans-Joachim Schmidt BUT_Prezelj_4670-5.indd 4 15.10.18 10:00 5 Table of contents Abbreviations 11 1. Introduction 13 2. The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 22 Presentation of the Currently Valid Vienna Document 22 Improving the Effectiveness of CSBMs over Time 29 3. Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to Confidence- and Security- Building Measures in Europe 39 Introduction 39 Indicators of Contextual Distrust 41 The Present Crisis as a Logical Consequence of Our Past Choices (History Strikes Back) 41 Divergent Perceptions and Mutually Contradictory Narratives 44 Conflicting Strategies and Related Interests 51 The Example of War in Ukraine and the Related Sanctions 56 The Example of the Zapad 2017 Military Exercise 61 An Emerging Security Dilemma in Europe – A Spiral of Escalation 65 The Hope, Will and Motive for Peace are Still Present 71 Hope in the OSCE and the CSBMs 75 4. A General Concept of the Effectiveness of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 79 5. Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness with Military and Defence Experts from Participating States 86 Effectiveness Based on the Extent of Achieving the Basic Objectives 86 Table of contents 6 Effectiveness Based on the Extent of Complying with Norms and Rules in the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 91 Are Participating States Concerned about Their Reputation Related to the Level of Their Noncompliance? 101 Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime during Military Crises and Periods of Conflicts («Foul-Weather Situations») 103 Effectiveness in Internal Armed Conflicts 108 What to do about Non-compliance in the Vienna Document CSBM Regime? 110 Distribution of the Benefits of Cooperation/Participation in the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 115 Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Power 118 Cost-Effectiveness of Implementing the Vienna Document CSBMs 122 6. A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 126 Strengths of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 126 Weaknesses of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 130 Opportunities to Improve the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 134 Threats to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime and its Effectiveness 147 7. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document Confidence- and Security- Building Measures during the Ukrainian Crisis 151 The Vienna Document CSBMs’ Positive Implementation Record 152 Lessons from 2014 Based on Debates in the Forum for Security Cooperation 156 Lessons from Debates in the Forum for Security Cooperation during 2016 and 2017 161 Conflicting Interpretations of the Issue of Crimea and the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine 164 Failure to Reissue the Vienna Document in 2016 168 Ideas about Modernising and Amending the Vienna Document 170 Structured Dialogue and Breakout Workshops 177 The Mapping Exercise 181 The Automatisation of Reporting and Geographical Fact Representation 183 Some Assessments of the Structured Dialogue 184 Uncertainties and Denials Concerning Unusual Military Activities (Risk-Reduction Mechanism in Chapter III) 186 Table of contents 7 Uncertainties about Inspections and Evaluations under Chapter IX 189 Military Exercises and Related Interpretations (Chapter V) 191 Concluding Remarks 193 8. The Future of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe 195 Scenarios about European Security and the Vienna Document CSBMs 195 Widening to Include Non-military Confidence-Building Measures 199 Widening to Include Cyber Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe 204 Cyber Threats 205 Military Cyber Capabilities 210 Russia 214 China 217 The USA 220 NATO’s Cyber Policy 223 Existing Cyber Confidence-Building Measures in the OSCE 224 How to Move Forward to Including Cyber Confidenceand Security-Building Measures 227 9. Conclusions 235 Acknowledgements 255 About the Authors 257 Sources 259 Index 277 9 List of figures and tables Figure 1: Pillars of the Vienna Document CSBMs 23 Figure 2: Multidimensional Approach to Assessing the Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 82 Figure 3: Ranking of the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s strengths 128 Figure 4: Ranking of the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s weaknesses 131 Figure 5: Ranking of opportunities to improve the Vienna Document CSBM regime 145 Figure 6: Ranking of the threats to the Vienna Document CSBM regime 149 Figure 7: The spectrum of military and non-military confidence-building measures 202 Table 1: Possible objectives and outcomes in a simplified security dilemma 66 11 Abbreviations ABM Anti-Ballistic Missiles ACV Armoured Combat Vehicle AEMI Annual Exchange of Military Information AIAM Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting APT Advanced Persistent Threat AWACS Airborne Early Warning And Control System BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance CBM Confidence-Building Measures CENTCOM Central Command (United States) CERT Computer Emergency Response Team CFE Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty on) CIO Chairperson-in-Office (OSCE) CPC Conflict Prevention Centre (OSCE) CSBM Confidence- and Security-Building Measures CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe DoD Department of Defense (USA) DoS Denial of Service (cyber attack) DISA Defence Information Systems Agency EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FSB Federal Security Service (Russian Federation) FSC Forum for Security Cooperation (OSCE) FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GEMI Global Exchange of Military Information GIS Geographic Information Systems HEAT High-Explosive Anti-Tank (warhead) HUMINT Human Intelligence ICT Information and Communication Technologies INEW Integrated Network Electronic Warfare INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty on) ISIS/ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and Syria / Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant IWG SD Informal Working Group on the Structured Dialogue (OSCE) Abbreviations 12 JCCC Joint Centre for Coordination and Control (OSCE) MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence Systems MC Ministerial Council (OSCE) MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket Systems MoD Ministry of Defence NAC North Atlantic Council (NATO) NAPCI Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative NSA National Security Agency NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe PC Permanent Council (OSCE) PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) RACVIAC Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre RRF Rapid Reaction Forces SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition SMM Special Monitoring Mission (OSCE) SSF Strategic Support Forces (China) VD Vienna Document WEU Western European Union WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UN United Nations USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 13 1. Introduction Providing security through cooperation or cooperative security has been a general trend in Europe since the Cold War came to an end. This period has been seen optimistically by the general public while European leaders have expressed unprecedented historical expectations of a profound change and a new era of democracy, peace and unity.1 The unprecedented reduction of armed forces and new approaches to security and cooperation were also reflected in the progress of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and conventional armed forces in Europe. Since then, a cooperative security system has been created in the entire Euro-Atlantic region based on various international regimes and international organisations. CSBMs have become a key international regime for enforcing the concept of cooperative security in practice and several Vienna Documents have been adopted to improve and maintain transparency and trust among the participating states. Cooperation between various participating states was sometimes so prosperous and deep that some observers even questioned the utility of any CSBMs in the future Europe. However, the remaining and recently erupted external and internal conflicts in wider Europe and on its borders increasingly show they could trigger another major violent armed conflict with all the uncertainties and consequences for stability and security in the region. Considering the military crisis in Ukraine, the security situation in Syria, military incidents in European airspace, military exercises that have raised concerns, the introduction of conscript armies in some states, rising defence budgets, antagonistic rhetoric between Russia and the West, cyber attacks with related accusations between states etc., it seems we might be skating on thin ice with regard to a more serious armed conflict between the West and Russia. This emerging situation was well described by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Hamburg in 1 A vision of how to build a structure of cooperative security was introduced by Canadian Secretary of State Joe Clark in his speech at the UN General Assembly in 1990. He proposed eight conditions for a cooperative security system, such as: 1) cooperative security is multidimensional; 2) cooperative security accepts that links exist among threats; 3) cooperative security is functional; 4) cooperative security requires dialogue and compromise; 5) cooperative security builds on the link between stability and change; 6) cooperative security rejects blocs; 7) cooperative security rejects stale rhetoric and sterile ideology; 8) cooperative security recognises that true security is impossible without justice (see Ueta, 1994: 64). Introduction 14 2016, where he said «a quarter of century after the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves at something like a crossroads. We are faced with the fundamental question: do we want to continue pursuing this vision of co-operative and comprehensive security or not?» (Ministerial Council Hamburg 2016, 2016: 4). Meeting participants also believed the very foundations of the international and European security order are endangered from the inside by past violations of international principles and political commitments. Despite the general security cooperation trend since the end of the Cold War, it seems that today cooperation and conflict go hand in hand in interstate relations. Such more or less regulated «competitive cooperation» can be observed in many areas of Euro-Atlantic relations, including in international regimes and related confidence and security-building measures. This means that, despite many believing otherwise, confidence and security are actually not granted in Europe. We need to fight to ensure the agreed measures are implemented and to modernise them in order to retain a reasonable level of effectiveness. Cooperative security in Europe is embodied in the UN and OSCE general security frameworks. The UN Charter determines the basic principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes among countries and the OSCE plays the role of a regional security arrangement for maintaining international peace and security in Europe. The OSCE is in fact the largest regional security organisation in the world and the most appropriate venue for building and rebuilding trust and confidence among states in Europe. It is the venue for dialogue and cooperation. Cooperative security in Europe in the area of arms control and related confidence and security is materialised in three main agreements (two legally, one politically binding): the CFE Treaty (creating a new Europe-wide regime of transparent national and regional ceilings for arms and manpower), the Open Skies Treaty (establishing a system for unarmed aerial surveillance flights to monitor the territory and related armed forces and activities of participating states) and the Vienna Document (regulating CSBMs). The last one places limits on military activities in Europe, such as exercises, and establishes a system for reporting on defence policy, planning, military forces and equipment coupled with a relatively well-developed verification apparatus. In the past, it was simply impossible to establish a single and comprehensive legally binding or legally non-binding regime. Instead, Europe had the mentioned three mutually reinforcing and interlocking arrangements or regimes (see Kelleher, 1994: 305; Evans, 1993: 51; Nolan, 1994: 7, 12; Spector and Dean, 1994: 137). This may be seen as a normal situation from the conceptual Introduction 15 perspective because international arrangements or regimes are only partial orders as they pertain to specific issue-areas rather than the totality of the political relationships of their members (regulated by the UN and OSCE, as described above). These issues are also inseparably connected, they can even interfere with each other, and the boundaries among them are determined by the perception of participating actors (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 59-61) that belong to related epistemic communities or transnational issue networks (Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 311). In dense policy spaces, issues are interdependent and need to be dealt with in a coordinated way to avoid negative impacts of certain policies on other policies (Wallander & Keohane, 1999: 32). As will be shown in this book, international regimes can influence each other either positively or negatively. These, initially ground-breaking regimes have been challenged by the changing international security environment in the past 10 years. The CFE2 and Open Skies are now blocked and the Vienna Document seems to be the only working regime (with a few challenges as well, such as a period of deadlock in 2012, its relative ineffectiveness in promoting confidence in some crisis areas etc.). It has become clear that the Vienna Document needs to be modernised to better reflect the reality and related changes on the ground. Today, it is not completely clear how effective the Vienna Document and related CSBMs are, and several quite different scenarios for their further development have been considered. Many people have criticised the Vienna Document and existing CSBM measures for not preventing the spread of violence and related military activities, and also for the decrease in trust. But the key to this lies not so much in the mechanisms for building trust and security as in the political will of the participating states (the users of the mechanisms). In any case, the Vienna Document has been a key pillar of European stability, security and transparency, and the most important OSCE CSBM tool in the politico-military dimension. In fact, the Vienna Document CSBM is the largest and most developed CSBM instrument and regime in the world. The Vienna Document has been updated, modernised and revitalised four times since its inception in 1990. Each version is named after the year of adoption: Vienna Document 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011, respectively. The first two amendments in 1992 and 1994 introduced significant changes to the document’s core provisions (prior notification and observation of 2 The CFE introduced legally binding ceilings for heavy weapons in Europe and a comprehensive verification regime. It was adopted by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in the CSCE framework in 1990. An adapted CFE Treaty was agreed in Istanbul in 1999, but Russia first suspended implementation of the original treaty in 2007, and then 24 other countries declared a related cessation of obligations towards Russia. Introduction 16 military activities), while in 1999 and particularly the 2011 revisions were more limited to the technical parts without any major conceptual changes. The main novelty in 1999 was a new chapter that envisaged complementing OSCE-wide CSBMs with voluntary (political) and legally binding measures tailored to regional needs (see Lachowski 2004: 16.). The Vienna Document 2011 (which incorporated the FSC technical decisions adopted since 1999) may be considered more of a starting point for future negotiations on the substantial modernisation of Vienna Document CSBMs. It is also important to stress the mechanism for amending the document was also agreed (the so-called VD-Plus procedure agreed by the FSC Decision on Establishing a Procedure for Incorporating Relevant FSC Decisions into the Vienna Document, 2010). Challenges of the present time, the growing insecurity and instability in Europe parallel to the growing conflict between Russia and the West necessitate greater attention to the effectiveness of CSBMs. This is also the outcome of deep technological changes and the transformation of military doctrines and structures in Europe and beyond. For example, cyber warfare and the related cyber capacities of modern armed forces require the Vienna Document to be modernised in this direction, less it become ineffective and even irrelevant in the future. Improving the Vienna Document would definitely help strengthen security and stability in the OSCE area. The aim of this book is to assess the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs. This will entail our assessment of the current security environment and related problems, existing debates in the OSCE and especially its Forum for Security Cooperation, debates within the Structured Dialogue, and also a consideration of the perceptions of Vienna-based military and defence experts acquired in a series of interviews. The book also provides a quantitative SWOT assessment of the Vienna Document. The existing set of CSBM mechanisms was assessed in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, opportunities for future improvement, and potential internal and external threats to the process, its existence and effectiveness. Ultimately, we explore the need for and potential to modernise these measures in the direction of cyber CSBMs. In this book, we argue that while the Vienna Document has been surprisingly effective in the past, today it suffers serious problems and possesses great opportunities for future improvement. The current situation resembles a glass that is either half-full or half-empty. It depends on the perspective and interest of the beholder. The «half-full» part refers to the positive achievements in history and the present time, while the «half-empty» part refers to the ineffectiveness and missed opportunities to implement and Introduction 17 modernise it. We should also stress here that the Vienna Document has not been and can never be completely effective. Complete effectiveness would instantly reduce the need for its existence. Complete trust and harmony among countries has also never really existed in Europe, except in visions of what the future might look like.3 On the other hand, in a largely cooperative framework, there have also been elements of competition. This is why many people have criticised the Vienna Document CSBMs’ effectiveness, some even arguing they are wholly ineffective. In our view, such an extreme interpretation is also not valid. Vienna Document CSBMs are a partly effective set of mechanisms and our task in this volume is to improve understanding of their effectiveness, main strengths and challenges. We consider CSBM mechanisms in the Vienna Document as a soft security regime because the document introduces norms and rules about the behaviour of the participating states. This means a certain level of compliance with norms and rules is therefore essential for one to assess this regime as effective. In order to clarify how effective the Vienna Document-based CSBMs are, we pose several research questions: 1. How do contextual factors from the existing security environment affect the Vienna Document CSBMs’ effectiveness? There are several negative factors and dilemmas that hinder the effectiveness and prevent the proper implementation and modernisation of this regime. These might be divergent threat and risk perceptions, mutually contradicting narratives, conflicting and mutually exclusionary strategies, competition for power and security etc. On the other hand, several positive factors also probably exist and instil hope and optimism in this trust- and security-building process. 2. To what extent are the main objectives of this regime being achieved? One should expect some level of effectiveness, but never full effectiveness and in the case of zero effectiveness the regime would probably cease to exist even before such an assessment was made. 3. To what degree are the norms and rules complied with? As in all regimes, some examples of non-compliance surely exist. 3 One of the proofs that shakes the notion of complete trust among partner countries comes from the intelligence world. Friendly countries with many cooperative processes and projects have used intelligence services also to spying on each other. This was clearly demonstrated by the case of the USA spying on German Chancelor Angela Merkel. This was done despite the assumption that NATO countries do not spy on each other. It is known in the intelligence world that trust is good, but control is better. It seems that this principle is not only applied in internal, but also in external policy. The second proof comes from the use of economic and business intelligence methods against a country’s own trade partners and political allies. Introduction 18 These examples might be more or less serious. The vital sub-question here is: how do participating states perceive these cases and how does this affect the reputation of the non-compliant states? 4. How effective are the Vienna Document CSBMs in military crises and conflicts? Such situations are the ultimate test for such regimes: military crises and conflicts only exist if there is no trust and confidence. 5. How effective are the Vienna Document CSBMs in internal armed conflicts? Most modern armed conflicts are internal in character and the Vienna Document is an international agreement. Is there a role for the Vienna Document in such situations and how does this affect the regime’s effectiveness generally? 6. What to do about non-compliance? In all regimes, what to do with the non-compliant states it is a vital issue. If nothing is done, the regime will sooner or later face the threat of dis-integration. The same can happen if «too much» is done (namely, too much in the perception of certain participating states). 7. How are the benefits of cooperation distributed in the regime? The benefits should be distributed as equally as possible. There should be no net winners or losers in the CSBM regime. Another question arises here: is the equal distribution of benefits possible at all in practice? 8. How are CSBMs perceived from the power perspective of the participating actors? In a simultaneously cooperative and competitive security environment, the question of power is particularly relevant. CSBMs can affect power relationships and be used and, theoretically, also mis-used to change the distribution of power among the participating states. 9. How cost-effective is implementing the rules in the CSBM regime? It can be costly to implement rules in a sensitive and partially cooperative and partially competitive environment. The ultimate price to pay may be dissolution of the regime which, again, is probably not the purpose of the regime or those managing it. In such a situation, the international CSBM regime could be a victim of its own success. 10. What are the core strengths and weaknesses of the CSBM process, opportunities for future improvement, and potential threats to the process? The Vienna Document CSBM regime surely has some strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Nobody has applied a SWOT analysis to this regime until now, yet the lessons from doing this could be very valuable. Introduction 19 11. What can we learn about the regime’s effectiveness during the current military crisis in Ukraine? We expect to find many indicators of ineffectiveness that should be a cause of great concern for the future of European stability and security. But, on the other hand, we also know there is a positive implementation record which is unprecedented in other world regions. 12. To what degree do the effectiveness and modernisation of the Vienna Document CSBM regime depend on the scenarios for European security in the future? Modernisation of the Vienna Document is possible in certain conditions. There is probably no other conceptual way to increase trust and security among states. Does this mean that all scenarios end up with some kind of CSBMs that would pave the future of Europe? 13. Is «cyberisation» of the Vienna Document CSBMs required in the current security environment in order to ensure the regime remains effective? If so, what would the proposal for cyber CSBMs look like? Another related question is what would happen with European security if no cyber CSBM measures were to be put in place. In its goals, research questions and structure, this book fills a gap in the existing academic literature. Most research and analytical focus has gone to arms control regimes, related deadlocks and some general questions pertaining to European security and CSBMs. The theme of this book is crucial to Europe as we know it. The book provides a holistic and unique approach to Vienna Document-based confidence and trust in Europe. A large part of this volume builds on extensive interviews with Vienna-based military and defence experts from a considerable number of participating states (35 experts from 29 participating states). Many answers to the above questions are based on analysis of their perceptions and related similarities and differences. Most of the experts participated in the interviews on the condition of anonymity. Their names and states are thus not disclosed in a way whereby their statements could be attributed to them. Some preliminary results of interviews (on research questions 2-9) were presented to the OSCE at a session of the FSC in 2014 and were very positively received by the participating states, including Russia and the USA. Some consequent debates in the OSCE forums mentioned this study in terms of positive contribution. Accordingly, one OSCE expert commented that this study has helped independently uncover and thoroughly describe the «big elephant» sitting in the rooms of OSCE during all meetings. On this basis, it was decided to continue work on the theme and start preparing a book. Major conclusions Introduction 20 drawn from the book were presented at the FSC in April 2018. Another aspect concerning this book’s relevance comes from the innovative quantitative SWOT assessment of the key strengths and weaknesses of the existing CSBM process, opportunities to improve it in the future, and potential internal and external threats to the process. We are otherwise unaware of anyone else having performed a SWOT assessment of the CSBM process with formal defence and military representatives of OSCE participating states. The book thereby contributes in an innovative way to existing studies of European security, the OSCE, the Vienna Document and the CSBMs. The original trigger to start working on this theme with the OSCE came with a call by former OSCE Secretary General H.E. Mr. Lamberto Zannier in July 2011 to increase cooperation with academic institutions to stimulate debates on Eurasian security. In this respect, the Defence Research Centre from the University of Ljubljana, where both the author and co-author were then working, commenced engagement on this theme. Finally, we note this book is a politically independent work, with our aim being to contribute impartially to better understanding of both the current challenges and the prospects for future improvement of the Vienna Document and related CSBMs. The book has the following structure. First, we present the currently valid Vienna Document 2011 and its contents. We then address the context of CSBMs by identifying and describing several indicators of contextual distrust (the present crisis in Russia-West relations, divergent perceptions, mutually contradicting narratives, conflicting national strategies, war in Ukraine and the pertaining sanctions etc.), leading to a genuine security dilemma in Europe where states have started competing instead of cooperating for security. Then we define the conceptual approach we take to study the effectiveness of CSBMs and present the results of extensive interviews with defence and military experts from many participating states. In the sixth chapter, we identify the key strengths and weaknesses of the existing CSBMs, opportunities to improve them and threats to their effectiveness. In the next chapter, we concentrate on observing the level of effectiveness during the Ukrainian crisis. This part was largely done by following debates in the Forum for Security Cooperation and performing some additional interviews. In the last chapter, different scenarios for European security and related scenarios for the Vienna Document CSBMs are considered while we also examine the existing concept of non-military CBMs and, finally, explore the cyber dimension of future CSBMs. This part identifies typical cyber threats, existing cyber military policies and the capabilities of many relevant states along with past work of the OSCE in the direction of cyber Introduction 21 CBMs. Perhaps a key contribution made by this book lies in our brainstorming on how the future cyber CSBMs might appear, which elements and themes should be covered, and how. The conclusions presented in this book contain extensive answers to the above research questions. 22 2. The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History Presentation of the Currently Valid Vienna Document The confidence- and security-building measures applied today in Europe are defined in the Vienna Document 2011 (2011). As of April 2018, 57 countries had signed it and are officially considered participating states of this agreement.4 It should be stressed that the zone of the CSBMs’ application does not cover entire geographical area of the participating states. This is a result of negotiations among countries in the past. The document defines the zone of CSBMs’ application as «the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space». The criterion for sea and air space activities is that they affect security in Europe. Special commitments by several post-Soviet states undertaken in letters to the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE extended the application zone to the territories of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (ibid., page 49). This means that all CSBM mechanisms defined in the Vienna Document can be applied only in or related to the specified zone of application (with the exception of the exchange of information on defence planning which, by definition, has a broader zone of application – valid for the entire territory of all participating states). The Vienna Document CSBMs are managed by the OSCE, especially within its politico-military dimension. The OSCE is a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter that concentrates on the peaceful settlement of disputes, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Several sets or pillars of mutually 4 The following participating States of OSCE have adopted the Vienna Document 2011: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Uzbekistan. On 21 November 2012, Mongolia became a member state of the OSCE and a Participating State of the Vienna Document, but the zone of application of the latter does not include Mongolian territory (see FSC Decision No. 1/13 Vienna Document Plus on changes in the context of the accession of Mongolia to the OSCE). The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 23 complementary CSBM measures are defined in this document (see Figure 1). We describe them below. Figure 1: Pillars of the Vienna Document CSBMs European Security Regional Vienna Document Confidence and Security-Building Measures 1. A nn ua l E xc ha ng e of M il it ar y an d D ef en ce I nf or m at io n w ith a R el at ed C on tr ol a nd V er if ic at io n M ec ha ni sm ( E va lu at io n) 2. P ri or N ot if ic at io n of C er ta in B ig ge r M il it ar y A ct iv it ie s w it h a R el at ed C on tr ol a nd V er if ic at io n M ec ha ni sm ( In sp ec ti on ) 3. R is k- R ed uc ti on M ea su re s 4. M il it ar y C on ta ct s 5. O bs er va ti on o f C er ta in M il it ar y A ct iv it ie s 6. E xc ha ng e of A nn ua l C al en da rs 7. R eg io na l C om pl em en ta ry C SB M M ea su re s 8. A ss es sm en t o f Im pl em en ta ti on o f C S B M s 9. O SC E C om m un ic at io ns N et w or k Cooperative Security (concept and values) International Law and UN Charter 1. Annual Exchange of Military and Defence Information with Related Control and Verification Mechanism (Evaluation). The Vienna Document provides that participating states will annually report and exchange information on their military forces (AEMI) and defence planning. Information on military forces is to be provided in the agreed format before 15 December each year and includes the following (see pp. 3-6): The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 24 ˗ Information on military organisation or command structure, specifying the designation and subordination of all formations (armies, corps and divisions and their equivalents) and units (brigades, regiments and equivalents). For each formation and unit, the following information is to be provided: information on active or non-active status, normal peacetime location of its headquarters, peacetime authorised personnel strength, major organic weapon and equipment systems, specifying their numbers (battle tanks, helicopters, armoured combat vehicles (armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles), armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes, anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally mounted on armoured vehicles, selfpropelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above) and armoured vehicle launched bridges). All planned increases in personnel strength above determined thresholds also need to be reported. ˗ Information relating to major weapon and equipment systems as defined above, including data on the new types or versions of these systems before or during their deployment for the first time. ˗ Information on plans to deploy major weapon and equipment systems (their number, type, units and formations supplied with these systems etc.). ˗ Information exchange on defence planning shall occur no later than three months after adoption of the military budget.5 This type of exchange includes (see pp. 7-9): ˗ information on defence policy and doctrine, including military strategies and doctrines, national procedures for defence planning, current personnel policy and substantial changes; ˗ information on force planning, including on the size, structure, personnel, major weapon and equipment systems, deployment of armed forces, reorganisation of defence structures, training programmes, procurement of major weapons systems etc. ˗ information on previous defence expenditures from preceding fiscal years according to the UN Instrument for standardised international reporting on military expenditures (adopted 12 December 1980); and ˗ information on budget estimates for the forthcoming fiscal years. 5 Dates of adoption of military budgets can vary significantly among states. This can cause problems in terms of expectations of transparency in crises and related trust. The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 25 The Vienna Document included a special clarification mechanism about the information provided on defence planning. Any participating state may ask another state for clarification of the information supplied (including where it deviates from previously reported data) and the requested state must «make every effort to answer such questions fully and promptly» (page 10). The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (described below) is available for a discussion on this matter. Special study visits can be also organised to meet with officials involved in defence planning. With regard to the above-mentioned data that are exchanged, the Vienna Document provides a mechanism for compliance and verification called Evaluation. Participating states have the right to evaluate the information supplied and a duty to provide an opportunity to other states to visit active formations and units at their normal peacetime locations. The Vienna Document also defines special quotas for the number of such visits in a certain time. Due to the sensitivity of this, we quote more extensively here: «Each participating state will be obliged to accept a quota of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every sixty units, or portion thereof, reported under paragraph (10). However, no participating state will be obliged to accept more than fifteen visits per calendar year, and the number of visits per calendar month may not exceed two visits. No participating state will be obliged to accept more than one fifth of its quota of visits from the same participating state; a participating state with a quota of less than five visits will not be obliged to accept more than one visit from the same participating state during a calendar year. No formation or unit may be visited more than twice during a calendar year and more than once by the same participating state during a calendar year« (p. 38). Each state must inform others when its quota is filled. No state is obliged to host more than one visit at any given time. Where units are stationed in the territory of other participating states in the zone of application, the allowed maximum number of visits should be proportional to the number of units in the host state. The Vienna Document specifies how a request for such visits is made and how countries must reply. We should underline that the reason «force majeure» may be given when refusing an evaluation visit. The reasons need to be explained in detail and the duration of such conditions must also be estimated (pp. 39-40). All requests and replies need to be communicated to all participating states. The Vienna Document also specifies the size and composition of evaluation teams, namely three members, unless otherwise agreed, and for nationals from up to three participating states. Members of the team are granted privileges and immunities according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (p. 41). The Vienna Document allows receiving states to deny teams’ access to sensitive points, facilities and equipment. The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 26 The teams are accompanied by representatives of the receiving state and the team’s safety concerns need to be taken into consideration. The visitors must be given briefings by commanders and can have access to personnel and weapons from the evaluated units, yet their visit should not interfere with these units’ activities (p. 42). All communications regarding compliance and verification are preferably) transmitted through the OSCE communication network. 2. Prior Notification of Certain Bigger Military Activities (exercises, concentration and transfer of forces) with a Related Control and Verification Mechanism (Inspection). Chapter 5 of the Vienna Document requires participating states to give prior notice (42 days or more) to other states about exercises, the concentration or transfer of forces into the zone of application if the following thresholds are exceeded at any time during the activity: «at least 9,000 troops, including support troops, or at least 250 battle tanks, or at least 500 ACVs…, or at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above)» (pp. 20-21). Notification shall also be given in the case of more than 200 sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters. Notification needs to be provided by the participating state in whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place. Such notification should include the purpose of the military activity, the names of the participating states, the total number of participating troops, the number and type of the formations and units, the number of major weapon systems, air force and naval participation, the envisaged geographical area of activity, the start and end dates of military activities etc. (pp. 21-23). Concerning this, the Vienna Document provides Inspection as a mechanism for compliance and verification. Inspection focuses on observation of the specified zone of military activities (labelled «specified areas») where notifiable military activities are conducted or where the participating state believes such activity is taking place. Each participating state has the right to conduct inspections; no participating state is obliged to accept more than three inspections per calendar year, and no more than one inspection from the same participating state (quotas). Inspection will not be counted if it cannot be carried out due to «force majeure». The reasons for this are to be explained in detail. In the specified area, the inspection team is accompanied by representatives of the receiving state, the team should have permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted. Inspections are permitted on the ground, from the air, or both. Any request for inspection as well as reply thereto is to be communicated to all participating states. One The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 27 should stress that inspectors are guaranteed safety by the receiving state, they are entitled to receive briefings from commanders on military activities and their timeframe etc. The inspection team uses its own maps, photo and video cameras, night-vision devices, binoculars and dictation devices. Eventually, the team prepares a report which is then communicated to all participating states. 3. Risk-reduction Measures: Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation in the Case of Unusual Military Activities (Chapter III). Participating states may have security concerns about unusual military activities in other participating states. A request for explanation can be sent to such states that then need to reply within 48 hours. The requesting state can further request a meeting with the responding state to discuss the matter. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office or his representative shall prepare a report on this meeting. A meeting of all participating states can also be requested. The OSCE Permanent Council or Forum for Security Cooperation can be used as a venue for such a joint assessment of the situation and recommendations to the states involved. Participating states, in which there may be cause for such worries, can voluntarily host visits by concerned states to dispel concerns about military activities in the zone of application (pp. 12-13). 4. Military Contacts. Chapter IV provides many options for fostering military cooperation as a tool for improving confidence. Participating states are obliged to organise visits for representatives of other states to their air bases (at least one visit every 5 years). The programme of military contacts includes exchanges between members of armed forces, especially junior officers and commanders, contacts among military units, visits of naval vessels and air force units, reservation of places in military academies and schools for representatives from other participating states, use of language schools for training representatives of other militaries, exchanges between military academies, issuing joint academic publications etc. Military cooperation includes joint military exercises, visits to air bases to observe activities below the threshold, the provision of experts, seminars on cooperation etc. The demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems can be organised before or at least one year after their deployment (pp. 15-19). 5. Observation of Certain Military Activities. Chapter VI of the Vienna Document states that participating states shall invite observers to the following notifiable activities: exercises under a single operational command, any engagement in amphibious and heliborne landing or parachute assault, or transfer of land forces from outside the zone of application to arrival points within the zone. These activities are subject to notification if the The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 28 following thresholds are reached or exceeded: 13,000 troops, 300 battle tanks, 500 armoured combat vehicles or 250 self-propelled or towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 calibre and above) (p. 24). A special observation programme is prepared for the observers who are given briefings on the purpose, the basic situation and phases of the activity, they receive a military map of the situation and appropriate observation equipment. The purpose of their visit is to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening in character (p. 25). 6. Exchange of Annual Calendars. Participating states shall communicate to all other participating states a written annual calendar of their military activities (in the zone of application for CSBM), subject to prior notification. If no such activities are planned, this should be also communicated to other states. States are to report the following items: number of notifiable military activities, type of activities, their purpose, the states involved, planned duration, total number of troops and number of troops by state, types of armed forces involved etc. (see Chapter VII, p. 28). Military activities subject to prior notification have some additional numerical constraints listed in Chapter VIII, such as the limit (threshold) of no more than one military activity within three calendar years entailing more than 40,000 troops (etc. for other types of weapons), no more than six activities in one year where each involves more than 13,000 troops (etc.), no more than three activities in one year exceeding more than 25,000 troops (etc.) and no more than three simultaneous military activities where each involves 13,000 troops (etc.) (p. 30). 7. Regional Complementary CSBM Measures. Chapter X provides that participating states can adopt complementary (to OSCE CSBMs) separate bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements to increase transparency and confidence. These additional measures can be legally or politically binding. In any case, they must fulfil narrower regional needs within the OSCE and cannot replace existing Vienna Document-based CSBMs. The intention is to create an «OSCE-wide web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing agreements» (p. 44). The Vienna Document mentions several possibilities such as the exchange of military information in a more regional context, further development of risk-reduction provisions, enhancement of the existing mechanism for consultation, establishment of a cross-border communications network, reduction of thresholds for military activities, increase The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 29 in the size of evaluation teams, creation of bilateral or multilateral verification agencies for the coordination of verification activities6 etc. (p. 45). 8. Assessment of the Implementation of CSBMs. Every year, the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) is held for a focused and structured dialogue on the present and future implementation of the agreed CSBMs, including the clarification of questions, operation of agreed measures etc. Subsequent suggestions for improving the implementation are then discussed by the Forum for Security and Cooperation. The CPC circulates a survey for suggestions to improve implementation of the CSBMs each year (p. 46). 9. OSCE Communications Network. This network enables the transmission of all messages related to the measures agreed in the Vienna Document. Participating states are encouraged to provide the CPC with a copy of all CSBM notifications and information exchanged (p. 47). This network is a secure and reliable infrastructure, complementing traditional diplomatic channels (Connecting the Participating States, 2017). In sum, the Vienna Document CSBMs depend on the duties and rights agreed among the participating states, the communication framework and the practical implementation. Such Vienna-based security dialogue enables the states to interact, clarify issues and pursue their own interests. Improving the Effectiveness of CSBMs over Time The purpose of this book is not to present and discuss the history of creating CSBMs in Europe. However, a brief overview of the development of these measures is useful to facilitate understanding of the potential for and dynamics of further modernisation of the Vienna Document in the future. At the peak of the Cold War, both sides increasingly realised there would be no complete victory for one side in any scenario. The threat of Mutually Assured Destruction became ever clear. In this context, NATO adopted a policy of détente together with the offer for security cooperation, while the Soviet Union proposed peaceful coexistence between different political and ideological systems. On this basis, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was convened in Helsinki in 1973. The conference 6 RACVIAC, or the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (or presently the Centre for Security Cooperation), is one of the oldest of such institutions. It was founded in 2000 to provide arms control training, promote confidenceand security-building measures and broaden cooperation in South Eastern Europe. RACVIAC is presently a regionally-owned international organisation comprised of ten member states. The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 30 ended in 1975 with adoption of the first generation of European CSBMs by 35 states as part of the Helsinki Final Act. The Act defined areas for cooperation in three baskets (I. Security in Europe; II. Economics, science, technology and environment; and III. Humanitarian, cultural, educational etc. cooperation). The first basket contained 10 very important principles of security relations among participating states such as respect for mutual sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the principle of cooperation among states as equals; and the fulfilment of obligations under international law. In addition, the basket contained a Document on CSBMs, including: Readiness («will notify») for prior notification of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with air or naval components, 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre. Readiness («may notify») for prior notification of other smaller military manoeuvres in the border areas with other participating states. Voluntary exchange of observers to attend military manoeuvres: participating states will invite other participating states to send observers on manoeuvres, where their number, procedures etc. is determined by the inviting state. Prior notification of major military movements: participating states «may» notify their major military movements etc. (see Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – Final Act, 1975: 4-12). It is also important that the zone of application for notifiable manoeuvres was defined as Europe and in the adjoining sea area and air space. The first-generation CSBMs were arose from the mutual fear of potentially dangerous military manoeuvres and military movements. Border areas were also indirectly recognised as very relevant for CSBMs. But, following the adoption of these CSBMs, the political and security situation deteriorated in Europe and their implementation was limited and selective. According to Richter (2016), sharp differences in interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, deepened the mutual distrust. In the field of CSBMs, implementation was only limited. Richter provides the following statistics: of 72 notified The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 31 large-scale manoeuvres, 47 were observed in the period from 1975 to 1986, and of 53 smaller notified exercises only 19 were observed. All agreed measures reflected mutual security perceptions among all states. It is to be noted that these cooperative agreements were adopted at the same time as preparations to wage war against each other. This paradox was reduced once the Cold War ended but returned in full force during the war in Ukraine. No tangible progress on CSBMs was possible during the follow-up conferences in Belgrade and Madrid in the 1980s. The insufficient level of implementation reflected the lack of confidence among the participating states. Spies (2005: 66) stressed that only Western countries made use of the voluntary invitation of observers to large-scale military activities. A breakthrough finally came at the Stockholm conference from 1984 to 1986 when Soviet President Gorbatchev initiated reforms within the Soviet Union. The document of the Stockholm Conference on CSBM and Disarmament in Europe (1986) specified many existing CSBMs and introduced some additional ones. These measures still represent the core of today’s CSBMs. They were labelled the second-generation CSBMs. The document’s language when it comes to states’ obligations is stricter (states «will»), but the participating states also made it clear at the end of the document that all of the adopted measures are politically binding. The zone of application (Europe and the adjoining sea area and air space) was specified in terms of the obligation to notify activities whenever they affect security in Europe and constituted part of their notifiable activities within the whole of Europe. Participating states re-confirmed the validity of the Helsinki principles on their mutual relations and expressed the need that they be implemented in full. They specifically stressed that non-compliance with the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law. A provision on the significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for international peace, justice and security was again included. In terms of CSBMs, the following relevant specifications and additions were adopted: Prior notification of certain military activities: the time for notifying other participating states was extended from 21 to 42 days, the 25,000-troop threshold for such activities was reduced to 13,000 troops and a further threshold of 300 battle tanks was added. In the case of the participation of air forces, the notification threshold was put at 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, amphibious landings’ and parachute drop notification thresholds were set at 3,000 troops, thresholds for notifiable activities for the transfer of forces from outside the zone of application to The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 32 concentration points in the zone was placed at 13,000 troops or at least 300 battle tanks. The information to be included in notifications was further specified in terms of the purposes, dates, participating states, numbers of participating troops, units, weapon and equipment systems. One should note that the participating states needed to notify large military activities in their territories also if their own military participation was below these thresholds (e.g. in the case of large military exercises). Observation of military activities: the Helsinki Final Act provisions were strengthened and further specified in terms of the threshold of 7,000 troops for all observable activities, with the exception of 5,000 troops in case of amphibious landing or parachute assault training. Each participating state was allowed to send a maximum of two military or civilian observers, a general observation programme and procedures were further specified etc. A requirement to exchange the annual calendar listing notifiable military activities by 15 November each year was included in the Stockholm document as a new CSBM measure. States needed to provide chronological information on notifiable events according to the following model: type of military activities, their purpose, involved states, planned duration, planned total number of troops, types of involved armed forces, envisaged level of command, number and type of divisions etc. Additional constraining provisions for bigger military activities were also included: states needed to notify other participating states about all events with more than 40,000 troops in the second subsequent calendar year and states will not carry out any unnotified military activities involving more than 75,000 troops. Compliance and verification: states were given a new right to conduct inspections in the territory of any other participating states within the zone of application. The document specified the maximum number of inspections in one state (3), that no participating state is obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating state, a provision on force majeure was included, the specified area for inspections and the way to request inspection and reply to this request (see Document of the Stockholm Conference on CSBM and Disarmament in Europe, 1986). The security situation, especially relations between the Soviet Union and the USA, dramatically improved after the Stockholm document was adopted. Arms control negotiations had also progressed towards the conclusion of the CFE treaty. CSCE countries decided to continue with a follow-up conference and negotiations in Vienna on strengthening the Stockholm CSBMs. The aim was to identify and adopt a new set of CSBMs designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. The position The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 33 of Eastern states in these negotiations, according to Spies (2005: 70), was to include naval and air forces, extend the zone of application to the territory of the USA and Canada and the creation of zones of confidence to limit forces stationed in Europe. Yet Western states rejected the inclusion of naval and air forces as not being in line with the mandate, and also rejected the extension of the zone of application as not consistent with the principle of equal security. The conference resulted in the first Vienna Document 1990, regarded as the third-generation CSBMs. This document brought additional CSBMs, such as: a wider scope of military information being exchanged (plans on deployment of major weapon and equipment systems, on military budgets); an expanded verification regime by including evaluation visits to active formations; a mechanism for consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities and cooperation related to hazardous incidents of a military nature; a chapter on military contacts and visits to air bases as a concession towards the Eastern demands to include air forces; and a network of direct communications for the transmission of messages on CSBMs (Spies, 2005: 71). The Paris Summit meeting of the CSCE held in November 1990 also led to a decision to establish the Conflict Prevention Centre as a focal point for implementation of the agreed measures. The Vienna document has been updated, modernised and revitalised four times since its inception in 1990. Each version is named after the year of adoption: the Vienna Document 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011, respectively. The Vienna Document 1992 was adopted in the spirit of implementation of the Charter of Paris and offered the following new set of CSBMs: improved exchange of information (technical data on major weapon systems and demonstration of new types); notification of the activation of non-active forces; further constraining provisions for military activities (states will not carry out more than six military activities with more than 13,000 troops in one calendar year); The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 34 lower thresholds for the notification and observation of military activities (troop thresholds were cut in this document to 9,000 and 13,000 and down to 13,000 from 17,000 in the 1990 Vienna Document); an improved verification regime with the possibility to create multinational inspection teams by inviting representatives of other participating states to join; and the zone of application was extended to all new former Yugoslav and non-Russian former Soviet states, while the Russian Federation continued to apply the CSBMs only in its European parts. Along with strengthening the role of the Conflict Prevention Centre, the 1992 Helsinki CSCE Summit Meeting established the Forum for Security Cooperation. The Forum became the key CSCE body for negotiating, implementing and developing CSBMs in Europe, including arms control and other military cooperative issues. Some documents adopted by the FSC during 1993-1994 later became incorporated in subsequent revisions of the Vienna Document, such as the Vienna Document 1994 (see Vetschera 2000: 715). The Vienna Document 1994 included the following new CSBMs: a threshold on Armoured Combat Vehicles (at least 500) and artillery pieces (at least 250) for the military activities subject to notification and observation; strengthening the verification regime by removing the need for explanation or doubts about compliance with agreed commitments when requesting an inspection; exchange of information on defence policies and doctrines, force planning and previous expenditures, along with the right to request clarification; voluntary hosting of observation visits, visits to military facilities, provision of experts and seminars on cooperation in the military field; and provisions on the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) were expanded and the role of the Conflict Prevention Centre was strengthened in implementing the agreed CSBMs (Vetschera 2000: 715-716; Spies, 2005: 72). The negotiations about a new revision of the document, which commenced in 1998, did not lead to any major overhaul. Agreed changes were more incremental in character. As Vetschera (2000: 717) noted, if the new document had contained far-reaching, fundamental changes it would even have been called «Vienna Document 2000» to indicate its future-oriented The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 35 character. In the process of assessing past CSBMs and negotiations about improvements, it became clear that both the process and the document were imperfect. In the Vienna Document 1999, the naval component was missing, the so-called transparency gap existed: the thresholds were becoming large on one hand, and small-scale exercises did not have any real military significance on the other (see Ueta, 1994: 70). Negotiations did not lead to lower thresholds for military activities and the inclusion of para-military forces (despite the dramatic experiences with Kosovo). No agreement could be reached on the validity of the document in crises either (Spies, 2005: 72). The 1999 Document did include, however, all amendments to the Vienna Document 1994 adopted by the Forum for Security Cooperation in the period 1995-1999, such as the introduction of armoured vehicles as a parameter for the constraining provisions. One big change concerned a new Chapter II about Defence Planning that included the provisions hitherto contained in Chapter I on the Exchange of Military Information. The document brought a new Chapter X on regional CSBMs as well: participating states were encouraged to enhance transparency via additional measures at a smaller sub-regional level in response to more specific individual bilateral or multilateral security challenges. These measures were supposed to complement the Vienna Document. At the time, there were already more than 20 such agreements in the zone of application. Lachowski (2004: 16) commented that the main novelty in 1999 was the adoption of a new chapter which envisaged complementing the OSCE-wide CSBMs with voluntary (political) and legally binding measures tailored to regional needs. Spies (2005: 73- 79) clearly assessed the Vienna Document 1999 as effective. He praised the level of information exchanged annually (95% of all required information was exchanged), reflecting a high standard of openness, predictability and transparency. The risk-reduction mechanism in the case of unusual military activities consisted of a series of conflict prevention and crisis management tools capable of resolving emerging tensions among participating states at an early stage. But it turned out that the mechanism had not been activated at the time he was writing. It seemed that the exchange of annual calendars on military activities was also losing relevance due to the lower importance of large-scale military activities. But the war in Chechnya and Kosovo showed a grey area with no readiness to assure the transparency of military operations in an ongoing operation or to accept observation of the concentration of forces. On compliance and verification, Spies (2005: 77) mentioned the quota race in case of inspections which had changed in nature during the time of the disappearance of large-scale military activities. He mentioned the misuse of inspections for the purposes of The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 36 evaluation (due to the limited and early-used evaluation quotas). His analysis of the document shows that some potential military threat elements were not addressed, like some qualitative and doctrinal aspects of the armed forces related to modernisation, the use of armed forces and changed forms of their activities. In addition, the document did not cover the causes of conflicts within states, threats by non-state actors and threats originating outside the OSCE region and concerning the OSCE participating states. He and other experts called for an improvement in the effectiveness and modernisation of the Vienna Document in the future and the creation of fourthgeneration CSBMs in Europe. Spies (2005: 93) concluded that the list of already agreed CSBMs was impressive, their implementation had become almost a routine for states, which was also impressive, and that the most important thing is their implementation. Early in this century, national governments and international organisations clearly recognised a broad spectrum of security threats. For example, the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century (2003) pointed to new challenges in the security environment, such as terrorism, organised crime, discrimination and intolerance, migrations and several economic and environmental challenges. The document also stressed the relevance of threats of a politico-military nature, especially intra-state conflicts, and proposed an OSCE multidimensional formula for dealing with them: building confidence among people within states and strengthening cooperation between states. The OSCE’s contribution to reducing the threat through the concentration of significant military forces and military capabilities in Europe was recognised, as was the need to improve the effectiveness of CSBMs and arms control agreements via «full implementation», «timely adaptation» and «further development». Spies (2005: 94) commented on these ambitions in a sobering way. He warned that a qualitative adaptation or even development of the Vienna Document, such as lowering the thresholds or widening the scope of information, will remain only a vison so long as some countries strongly object to the document being opened. He also argued that mere fine tuning of the document will not be able to truly meet the new threats and challenges. The first two amendments in 1992 and 1994 introduced significant changes in the document’s core provisions (prior notification and observation of military activities), while the 1999 and particularly the 2011 revisions were more limited to the technical parts without bringing major conceptual changes. The Decision of the 2009 Athens Ministerial Council as well as the Declaration of the Astana Summit of 2010 called for the revitalisation and updating of the Vienna Document due to the changed security The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 37 landscape (see Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community, 2010). The Forum for Security Cooperation agreed in 2010 on the document’s periodic reissuance every 5 years, starting no later than 2011 (see FSC Decision No. 1/10 on Establishing a procedure for incorporating relevant FSC decisions into the Vienna Document). However, no consensus has been achievable on any substantial modernisation of the Vienna Document 1999 and 2011 since then. Changes to the Vienna Document 2011 have been more technical in nature and not really substantial. The amendments adopted by the Forum for Security Cooperation in the period 2000-2011 were included in the document, but there were greater ambitions and needs. The last Vienna Document may therefore be considered more the result of a compromise in the OSCE and a «starting point» for future negotiations on substantial modernisation of the Vienna Document CSBMs. The document now includes the so-called Vienna Document Plus procedure, originally adopted by the FSC in 2010. These provisions call for the document to be periodically reissued every 5 years (see Vienna Document 2011, Articles (151) and (152)). The adopted CSBM documents have become the most sophisticated and comprehensive politically binding documents on CSBMs in Europe and the world. Another CSBM document does exist, but its ambition is more global. The Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) was adopted in 1994 at the 91st Plenary Meeting of the Special Committee of the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in Budapest. Under this politically binding arrangement, OSCE participating states are committed to annually exchanging information on major weapon and equipment systems and personnel in their conventional armed forces, in their territory as well as worldwide. Even though the weapons and armament categories covered in GEMI are broader than those included in the Vienna Document, including naval forces, the general provisions of GEMI exclude any verification (GEMI Document, 1994, Articles 1 and 3). The document only provides for the instrument of «clarification» which any participating state may ask from any other participating state concerning application of the measure (see Article 7). A CSBM mechanism with a global scope and no verification procedures is hardly able to be effective. In sum, we can see that CSBMs and their effectiveness have improved remarkably over time. This improvement has come in steps and generations of CSBMs. The improvements were mainly based on widening or specifying the information-exchange rules, introducing new thresholds or lowering the existing thresholds, extending the zone of application, inclusion of additional OSCE decision-making or support bodies, agreeing on periodic The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History 38 reissuance of the entire document and adopting the measured Vienna Document Plus procedure. Moreover, it became ever clearer that the Vienna Document is imperfect and that it needs to be improved in the future if efficient CSBMs are desired in Europe. 39 3. Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe Introduction It is evident that the existing CSBMs in Europe depend strongly on the wider political and security context. The CSBM mechanisms described above are undoubtedly a historical milestone for Europe and even for the world. But a series of related problems and dilemmas hinders their effectiveness. Some problems relate to the context of the European security situation and associated international relations, the rise of distrust in Europe and escalation of the biggest security crisis since the Cold War ended. Existing general trust or distrust among the states in Eurasia is a key variable impacting the effectiveness of the existing CSBMs. Some level of initial trust is a necessary base for CSBMs to work at all. Additional trust is then a result of the existing and working CSBMs. The problem is that Europe has encountered simultaneous cooperative and conflicting trends since the end of the Cold War. One can identify trust in some areas of international relations and distrust in other areas. At the same time, states have shared some similar goals and interests for a peaceful and secure future on one hand, and different visions on the power-related ways of achieving these goals on the other one. It also seems that the power of actors, especially Russia and the USA, remains one of the crucial variables in European security (because they have chosen to seek power in their national strategies). This also means that not much has in fact been learned since the Cold War. The present situation also shows there was never complete trust between the USA and Russia since the Cold War concluded. Yet, by the same token, one should not believe there is a complete absence of trust between these two actors. Europe currently lies somewhere between trust and complete distrust. The glass is either half-full or half-empty. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyse simultaneous indicators of distrust and trust in Europe as a key contextual base for the existing Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. But before identifying these indicators, we need to establish what kind of trust we are talking about. Trust research shows that trust is a behavioural multidimensional category that can be assessed in many different ways. It is a psychological relation between a trustor and a trustee and their mutual perceptions. The most Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 40 cited definition of trust in organisational research states that «trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviours of another» (Rousseau, Burt, Sitkin and Camerer in McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011: 24). This definition has two relevant perceptional elements: the willingness to be vulnerable and the expectation of favourable treatment by another party. Key variables in trust measurements have emerged to be trustworthiness beliefs, trusting intentions and trusting behaviours. Trustworthiness beliefs relate to expectations about the extent to which the counterpart expresses care and concern for the welfare of the trustor (affect-based trust) or to beliefs about whether the trustee makes good-faith efforts, is honest and refrains from opportunism. Trusting behaviour’s best proximal antecedent is the trustor’s intention to trust. Here, trust is understood as the trustor’s willingness to engage in trusting behaviour or, in other words, his willingness to be vulnerable and expose himself to the risk of potentially being harmed by the trustee (McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011). Key trustworthiness variables are ability, integrity and benevolence (Chen, Saparito, and Belkin, 2011: 87). Our analysis below shows that some relevant states do not show a willingness to be vulnerable anymore (reflected in an increase in their military budgets, deployment of forces, military exercises etc.). Yet, parallel to this, these states also have expectations of a peaceful and secure Europe in the future. We can also extract a useful understanding of the dynamics of trust from the trust literature. Trust grows, maintains or declines depending on the extent to which the trustee lives up to the trustor’s positive expectations. Trustworthy actors are trusted, untrustworthy actors not so. If initial trust is reciprocated by the trusted party, mutual trust or a higher level of trust can develop. The outcomes of such a relationship are constantly re-evaluated and cognitive decisions to trust more or less are constantly made. Trust breaches and violations are actions by the trustee that represent a failure to fulfil positive expectations of the trustor. Responses to breaches of trust can be very emotional. The breaking of trust can (through more or less affective reactions) lead to the erosion of trust over time. The depth of such erosion reflects the degree to which trust has dropped as a result of the breach, while the breadth of the erosion of trust refers to the spread of consequences of the lost trust across different facets of the relationship (Chen, Saparito and Belkin, 2011: 95). Our assessment of the current level of trust in Europe must thus consider a range of contextual factors about trustworthiness beliefs, trusting Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 41 intentions and behaviours. Let us try to assess distrust and trust from several perspectives (multidimensional assessment). Indicators of Contextual Distrust Europe today is faced with the worst security crisis since the end of the Cold War. The annexation of Crimea, the war in Ukraine, rising number of increasingly war-focused and even offensive military manoeuvres/military exercises, temporary concentration of forces, increased use of spy aircraft, secret military operations, airspace incidents, naval movements for deterrent and warning purposes, «forward deployments», reassurance measures on collective defence in the event of an armed attack etc. The whole of Europe has become trapped in the old US-Russian (Soviet) rivalry. Europe once again finds itself in the security dilemma. These hostile measures stem from some broader context that is itself built on the legacy of past choices, divergent perceptions, mutually contradictory narratives, conflicting national interests and related strategic documents. The Present Crisis as a Logical Consequence of Our Past Choices (History Strikes Back) We argue in this section that the current problems with trust are an inevitable outcome of the process of restructuring the European security architecture since both the Second World War and the Cold War. Europe faces «new» and surprisingly «surprising» security problems and countries are attempting to resolve them unsuccessfully. The international relations literature may hold clues as to why are we encountering this boomerang of problems from the past. Aybet (1997: xi) observed long ago that the post-Cold War European security architecture and regime was in fact formed on the basis of Western European interests and a transatlantic component. Following the end of the Cold War, Eastern Europe has gradually been incorporated into Western Europe, with the security architecture for Europe being restructured from the existing fora of cooperation (NATO, WEU, EU, CSCE), namely, all relics of the Cold War. From the perspective of dominant Western values, it was inconceivable to operate this structure effectively without the transatlantic component. Recently, the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions published a study on the historical origins of the present «web of mutually Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 42 contradictory narratives and interpretations». The study also examined newly unclassified documents and reveals an opportunity that was missed to overcoming the East-West divide and establishing a true European security architecture. The study argues the biggest mistakes already came in 1989 and 1990. It builds on a base of narratives as intentional tools to further states’ goals in international relations and also internally to address domestic goals. Diametrically opposed narratives of the European security order’s evolution prevent any consensus on the causes of the present problems, such as the crisis in Ukraine. The study calls for debate on these narratives to improve our understanding of the current situation (see Nünlist, Aunesluoma and Zogg, 2017). It was Gorbatchev who introduced the idea of a «Common European Home» as a vision for a future pan-European security architecture. This idea visioned a continent without borders within which people and ideas could move freely. The vision stemmed from the Russian aspiration to be part of Europe. German Foreign Minister Hans- Dietrich Genscher shared this vision at the time. He wished to establish a new security order in Europe, modelled after the CSCE. He was also ready to dissolve both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. French President Mitterrand pushed for an order that would include the Soviet Union and exclude the USA. Vaclav Havel, the President of Czechoslovakia, favoured replacing NATO and the Warsaw Pact with a pan-European organisation along the CSCE lines etc. However, Russia was already disengaged from the future European security order in 1990. The US government and particularly President Bush, reacted to these ideas with great scepticism. For them, US leadership and the «NATO first» policy was still key (in other words: continued US military presence in Europe and NATO remained a crucial anchor for the USA). NATO was prioritised over the CSCE. The American discussions expressed ideas such as «CSCE cannot replace NATO as the core of the West’s deterrence strategy in Europe», «strengthening the CSCE at the expense of NATO was out of the question», «the real risk to NATO is CSCE» etc. US President Bush even stated «To hell with that. We prevailed, and they didn’t. We cannot let the Soviet snatch victory from the jaws of defeat». James Baker, the then US Secretary of State, said that while it was nice to talk about pan-European security structures and the role of the CSCE, it was just a dream. This means the Paris Charter was perhaps the clearest articulation of the common vision of the European future. But it was soon overtaken by a parallel vision without Russia that located NATO and the EU and their enlargements (and not the CSCE) at the centre of European security architecture. Russia was no longer considered an equal partner and left on the periphery of Europe, the CSCE was too weak and had Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 43 not been unable to prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts in Europe (ibid., pp. 18-22). The study also argues that a sustainable and stable European security order should be built on shared values and objectives – together with Russia and not against Russia (ibid., p. 10). The problem of historical choices is even deeper since it dates back to the end of the Second World War. Aybet (1997: 49) in his study of the planning for the post-war European integration found that the Teheran conference in 1943 and the Yalta conference in 1945 showed that the «US and USSR agreed not to let Europe have an independent role in the future peace organisation». He stressed that at the end of the war the USA was interested in establishing a global system of free trade according to its own liberal principles, while the USSR was interested in creating spheres of influence around its borders to safeguard it against any future attacks on its territories. A United Europe would hence represent a guarantee for the Soviet Union against any future aggression. His conclusion then was that Europe was also later hindered in its attempts to develop a separate foreign and security policy due to its dependence on the USA and its unique position between the superpowers. According to Aybet (1997: 2-3), European security cooperation during the Cold War was actually shaped by certain external forces: the superpower squeeze and the Soviet/Russian threat. This means European security cooperation during the Cold War in fact developed in response to the Soviet threat (the raison d’être for Western European security cooperation) or to demonstrate the Western resolve to stand up to this threat, and to provide Western Europe with an independent voice between the superpowers. These reactive measures to develop Western European security cooperation were led by the USA. This is how Europe was squeezed by the two superpowers and encountered the so-called abandonment-entrapment dilemma. This dilemma was reflected in the concerns of Western European states of being either abandoned by the USA vis-à-vis the Soviet threat or becoming entrapped by the American policies that did not always align with European interests. This dilemma was provisionally then resolved by creating De Gaulle’s third force and later the WEU (without the membership of the USA and the USSR/Russia). The hope for independent European security was subsequently transferred to the EU (by transferring the Petersberg tasks and other goals from the WEU). An attempt was thereby made to minimise the superpower squeeze via the federalist plans to create a third force between the two superpowers. The questions were: which country would lead this third force (France?) and how friendly will the relations be among the supporting countries? It is evident that many problems with the WEU’s identity Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 44 and its operational capabilities and the very unclear or limited defence guarantees actually pushed pure European security integration closer to the transatlantic side, i.e. NATO and the USA. NATO, with its transatlantic link, became Europe’s main defence forum. Consequently, the theme of the relations among NATO, the EU, the WEU and the OSCE was more frequently debated. These debates and relations determined the major path of the development of European security architecture. Some countries supported the European security vision around NATO (e.g. the United Kingdom), some supported the vision and primacy of the EU (e.g. France) while others supported the idea of a pan-European structure centred round the CSCE/OSCE (e.g. Germany at some points in time). All of these international organisations evolved and adapted. NATO’s evolution from a predominantly defensive towards a security organisation was a good way of adaptation but, without Russia, it cannot claim to have a pan-European character and makes a limited contribution to European security in a broad perspective. This chapter shows the present crisis has important points of departure in our history. The crisis seems to be an inevitable outcome of our earlier choices in Europe. Perhaps, it was only a matter of time before it erupted. If we desire to solve this crisis, we need to understand its contextual basis. All subsequent choices in this area that are made without considering the wider context will hit a wall. The problem is that this hitting of the wall appears to be too soft for a number of actors in international relations to perceive it. Divergent Perceptions and Mutually Contradictory Narratives A joint and cooperative future requires more or less common perceptions and trust. It is difficult for trust to exist in the presence of mutually exclusive and even hostile perceptions. Many sources offer useful material for identifying two mutually contradictory perceptions and narratives and one group of in-between perceptions. Andrei Zagorski believes the sides have no common baseline of facts in the discussion, their narratives are growing further apart, and their security concerns and threat perceptions are diametrically opposed (Wolff, Remler et al., 2017: 9). The Western perception is based on condemning the Russian activities that culminated in the annexation of Crimea and support for rebels in eastern Ukraine. For the West, these actions pose a threat to peace and security. Russia also brutally violates the sovereignty of its neighbouring Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 45 states in its quest for them to assume their rightful place in world affairs. On the other hand, Russia perceives Western activities as a threat, especially those activities that led to the «coup d’état» in Kyiv. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov even stated that this action had been the work of «Nazis». Russian officials believe they are facing a conspiracy involving Western powers since the end of Cold War that seeks to keep Russia from assuming its rightful place in world affairs. In the eyes of Russians, these activities justify the reactions Russia takes. Both sides perceive relations cannot be normalised unless one side reverses its actions: in Russia’s eyes the West should rescind its sanctions while the West contends the Russians should withdrew from Crimea (Wolff, Remler et al., 2017: 4-11). West–Russian political and security cleavages started to move into the spotlight already during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. NATO’s intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was seen by Russia as an aggressive act without due regard to Russia or the UN Charter and that the OSCE had proved to be useless. In fact, some Russian observers (e.g. V.V. Voblenko) concluded the OSCE had actually facilitated NATO’s «aggression» and was biased in its approach to assessing the separatists and the response of the Yugoslav authorities (see Lynch, 2003). In an excellent study on European security through Russian eyes by the Institute of Security Studies of the EU, Lynch (2005: 10-18) highlighted the following divergences and misperceptions: ˗ the role of US foreign military bases in the former Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (particularly the change from the temporary to the more long-term presence of troops); ˗ contest over elections in order to ensure friendly (pro-Russian or pro- Western) leaders were in power (e.g. the competition between Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yuschenko in Ukraine); ˗ different views on post-conflict settlement in the former Soviet Union (especially the divergent relations with separatist entities in Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia); and ˗ the values gap concerning respect for human rights connected with Russian domestic affairs. Ever since the 1990s, Russia has been seeking an equal voice on major security developments in Europe and beyond. Deepening ties with NATO has brought benefits, but not an equal voice in European security (Lynch, 2005: 9). Theoretically speaking, an equal voice can only be achieved: Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 46 a) by including Russia in a reformed NATO; or b) in a completely renewed security architecture whereby NATO would somehow cease to exist and/or some new joint international organisation would be created or c) the OSCE would acquire new responsibilities following deep reform. However, in reality the West (particularly the USA as the victor of the Cold War) was never really keen on doing something like this. Russia therefore started seeking to boost its international weight and position in international relations. The positive climate for cooperation after 9-11 and the successful cooperation regarding the war in Afghanistan likely prevented the escalation of crisis when the USA withdrew from the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty, made plans for National Missile Defence etc. On the other hand, the Kremlin reserved its right to withdraw from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and declared plans to modernise its nuclear potential (Karaganov, 2005: 31: Lynch, 2003). The Interim Report and the Final Report of the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons also represents a very useful source for explaining the differences in perceptions.7 According to these, the idea of the indivisibility of security has been undermined by the contradictory perceptions of events among the OSCE participating states (related to Ukraine and generally) (Lessons Learned for the OSCE from Its Engagement in Ukraine, 2015: 5). The Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project stated that European security is in crisis, that today’s situation is the most dangerous it has been for several decades, and Europe is far from the co-operative order imagined in the early 1990s. The report stressed we are facing dangerous and threatening behaviour, disinformation, the threat and use of force, all establishing a poisonous atmosphere. The vision of confidence-building measures has been challenged by close encounters between naval vessels and military aircraft, military exercises designed to intimidate, the forward deployment of troops and equipment etc. (Back to Diplomacy, 2015: 11). The panel identified and 7 The Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project was launched by the OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel in December 2014. Its task was to prepare the basic analytical grounds for inclusive and constructive security dialogue across the Euro- Atlantic and Eurasian regions, and to reflect on how to re-build trust to enhance peace and security in the OSCE area on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Fifteen eminent personalities with long-standing practical expertise in European security in all its dimensions from all OSCE regions worked on this panel (see Back to Diplomacy, 2015: 38). Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 47 described three simultaneously existing different and diametrically opposed narratives on how the current crisis has developed. 1. View of the West. This view contends the end of the Cold War brought the liberation of Central and Eastern European countries from Soviet domination. The newly liberated countries started joining Western institutions and transforming their economic and political systems. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the conflicts that emerged challenged the process of creating Europe whole, free and at peace. The Balkan crisis, especially the conflict over Kosovo, brought the West into conflict with Russia. It is contended the present crisis is because Russia decided to stop cooperating and integrating into the West. It decided to start using force in parts of the Ukraine and Crimea. The authoritarian rule in Russia has also strengthened, fears of the spread of coloured democratic revolutions to Russia have emerged, the values of the Charter of Paris have been forgotten and disagreements over Georgia in 2008 and over Ukraine in 2014 were tackled by the use of force (p. 7). Here we can add also the perception of Alexander Vershbow, the NATO Deputy Secretary General, that conflicting visions are present. He stated that NATO and most across Europe believe in the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and respect the sovereignty of any single state, while Russia wants to return to a kind of Yalta 2 based on spheres of influence. He also assessed that military and non-military incidents reflect a deliberate choice by Russia to ratchet up tension, send intimidating messages and stake out spheres of influence. In his view, there will be a suspension of practical cooperation in the NATO–Russia framework as long as Russia is not prepared to back away from its aggression against Ukraine. Implementation of the Minsk agreement could be the first step away from the current situation, but this would not solve the problem of the illegal annexation of Crimea (Revitalizing Arms Control, 2016: 7). In addition, then US President Obama included Russian aggression in Europe among the three biggest threats to humankind (alongside Ebola and ISIL) (see Kramžar, 2014). 2. View of Moscow. This view is based on several perceptions that stand in full contrast to those described above. The panel report identified the following views: ˗ Instead of creating a common European security system, a Western takeover occurred. Russia was given the Versailles treatment and has responded accordingly. ˗ The main problem after the end of the Cold War has been the expansion of Western institutions at the Russia’s expense. The West has never Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 48 seriously and honestly tried to address security with Russia; simply, without it, or against it. This is why NATO’s expansion has been perceived as a growing threat to Russia and its national security. Promises of NATO membership at various summits were not made following consultation with Russia. ˗ The EU has expanded and increased its economic space at the sake of Russia and taken over Russia’s markets, Russian citizens have not been included in the free movement of citizens in Europe (it is not in Schengen and there is no visa-free travel for Russians). ˗ Russia has been left out of enlargement processes. The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council as a partnership tool does not compensate for genuine inclusion in the enlargement process. ˗ NATO’s attack on Serbia, a traditional partner of Russia, destroyed the perception that NATO is a benign and defensive alliance. The case of Kosovo constituted a breach of both international law and the Helsinki principles. The West acted unilaterally. The US-led invasion of Iraq was also contrary to international law. The West further pursued regime change and created turmoil in the Middle East and Libya, while also giving «active support» to the colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space. ˗ Russia made its views known at the right time, but no one listened, with propaganda campaigns being launched against Russia in 2013 and the Sochi Olympic Games being boycotted by Western leaders. The panel report also reflects the view that Russia responded in the only language that captures Western attention. 3. View of the «In-Between States». The Panel report also identified states that do not fully share the above narratives. These are states in transition with more or less democratic elections, such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, states which struggle for integration into Western institutions and see Russia as a threat, or states that have accepted Russia’s security dominance and not to neither align with the West nor Russia (ibid., p. 9). Other reports identified Kazakhstan, Moldova, Armenia, Belarus and Uzbekistan as states-in-between. These states are actually caught between two abovementioned camps. They see the possibility of NATO enlargement on one hand and Russian international associations on the other. Some are trying to strengthen their links with both sides (Wolff, Remler et al., 2017: 4-14) as their way of surviving on the geostrategic chessboard. In our assessment, the situation is much more complex and the categorisation presented above in fact has some cracks and exceptions. These states’ Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 49 narratives have been fluid in time, like their policies. These three groups of countries with accompanying narratives are not completely coherent. For example, traditionally neutral states do belong to the Western part of the narrative described above, but with some strong reservations. Then Germany is sometimes closer to this third group of mainly neutral states due to its central geographic position in Europe. The former German foreign minister stated in December 2017 that long-term security and stability in Europe is only possible with Russia and not against Russia. He stated that the USA under Donald Trump had stopped being a reliable promotor of the Western multilateral approach and sees its partners as competitors, even opponents. The minister perceived the US economic sanctions against Russia as harmful to «our» own economic interests and called for a new strategic foreign policy with changed relations with the USA (Prevlada ZDA postaja zgodovina, 2017). The new German foreign minister stated that while Russia remains a difficult partner, it is also needed for solving big international conflicts (Demokratični prostor v svetu se spet oži, 2018). Internal voices can also be heard against the official narrative in some countries. For example, US voices were heard to say that the US president (then Obama) and NATO were making Europe less secure and that NATO and the US-Russian border confrontation is unnecessarily leading towards possible nuclear war (see US-NATO Border Confrontation with Russia Risks Nuclear War and Loss of European Partners, 2016). Dobbs (2018) provides an interesting and useful reflection on the perceptional differences in his study on the risk of stereotypes in Russia–West relations. He found that both sides are prone to use a wide range of stereotypes or oversimplifications, fixed views and even clichés in their mutual relations. He chiefly talked about stereotypes of other but indicated that both sides also hold stereotypes about the self (with similar dire consequences for mutual relations). Stereotypes of the other and the self then interact and trigger certain outcomes. He warned of the consequences of these stereotypes for policy and politics on both sides. The more stereotypes policymakers use, the more likely their response will be biased and miscalculated (e.g. demonisation of the enemy and miscalculation of the threat). He mentioned stereotypes about Iran and its nuclear policy, and North Korea. We can add a false Western stereotype about Iraq and its threat to international security that led through interest-based securitisation and even demonisation in the media to an international military intervention against a dictator with «Weapons of Mass Destruction». These weapons were never found, and many people lost their lives. Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 50 Dobbs (2018: 7-14) noted several false assumptions about Russia since the end of the Cold War, such as: ˗ The end of the Cold War is the end of history in the sense that the West has won, and Russia will integrate into its international order, but eventually Moscow took a different path. ˗ An oversimplified understanding of Russian President Putin as the sole dominant actor in formulating Russian foreign policy, as a master tactician and terrible strategist or a judo fighter and not a chess player. However, the case of Ukraine shows Putin is definitely a good strategist. Similarly oversimplified is the idea of Putin as a tsar, a dictator or being «in another world» (detached from reality) and in complete control of Russian decision-making at the general level. ˗ The previous oversimplification created the perception that relations with Russia actually cannot improve with such a Russian president. This stereotype leads to the danger that all Russian attempts to improve relations will go ignored or dismissed by the West as part of Putin’s master plan. ˗ A false idea that Russia is only reacting and bluffing. This has produced a misunderstanding of Russia’s ultimate goals and actual strategies in Europe. ˗ The perception that the Kremlin is following an expansionist policy and that nothing but full subjugation of the former Soviet Union will satisfy the leaders in Moscow. This view encourages a more forceful response from the West. ˗ The perception that the Russian economy is weak and corrupt, overreliant on hydrocarbons, completely dependent on Western investments and that it will soon collapse. But this economy showed around 2% growth in 2017. ˗ Linked to the last stereotype is the perception that the best way to influence Russia is via economic pressure. This perception has made several Western leaders less inclined to apply diplomatic means. On the other hand, Russians also employ stereotypes and oversimplifications, like the perception that the EU will soon collapse. This has discouraged Moscow from seeking better relations with the EU. Dobbs proposed that both sides need to recognise these stereotypes first (like in medicine, the first step to recovery is to recognise you have a problem). Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 51 All these inconsistencies in the classification of narratives and existence of stereotyping on both sides reflect the complex political and security situation in Europe, and the fact that information warfare so as to win hearts and minds has started. Contradictory perceptions such as these do not foster trust among countries. It is no wonder that journalists have begun asking about the possibility of the outbreak of the Third World War. Conflicting Strategies and Related Interests Based on these mutually exclusive perceptions, relevant actors have been adopting their strategic policy directions and guidelines against each other. US and Russian national security strategies simply reflect the increasing level of distrust and directly or indirectly aim at each other. NATO’s documents also show this. In this chapter, we will highlight certain documents and policies that clearly reveal conflicting logics and interests. The US National Security Strategy of 2015 (2015) explicitly mentioned the threat of Russian aggression. The USA perceived «Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity» and «its belligerent stance toward other neighbouring countries» as a threat to European security and international norms that have largely been taken for granted since the end of the Cold War. The strategy defined the US response in the form of it leading an international effort to support the people of Ukraine to build their democracy and economy, reassuring allies by backing US security commitments and increasing responsiveness through training and exercises, including a dynamic presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression, along with sanctions on Russia to impose costs and deter and counter future aggression. The USA also committed itself to counter «Moscow’s deceptive propaganda with the unvarnished truth». But the very same strategy asserts the USA will keep the door open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of common interest, a path of peaceful cooperation that respects the sovereignty and democratic development of the neighbouring states (US National Security Strategy, 2015: 25). The newest US National Security Strategy (2017) adds Trump’s trademark to the American perception of Russia and its role in the security environment. This is the most competitive US national security strategy since the Cold War and likely does not show a promising future for a comprehensive CSBMs in Europe. In its foreword, Trump asserts the American people elected him to make America great again and accordingly he will put the safety, interests and well-being of that nation’s citizens first. This includes Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 52 revitalising the American economy, rebuilding the military, defending the borders, protecting sovereignty, advancing US values, promoting a balance of power that favours the United States, its allies and its partners. In this strategy of principled realism (guided by outcomes and not ideology), the USA projects an image of a competitive world with rival and revisionist powers, such as Russia and China, actively working against the United States and its allies and partners, challenging America’s influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity, using propaganda to discredit democracy, advance anti-Western views, spread false information, and shifting regional balances of power in their favour. In the USA’s view, Russia is seeking to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders, weaken American influence in the world, divide the USA from its allies, perceives NATO and EU as threats, invests in its military capabilities with some of them (nuclear systems and destabilising cyber capabilities) constituting the biggest existential threat to the USA. In Europe, Russia violates the sovereignty of states, continues to intimidate its neighbours with threatening behaviour, such as nuclear posturing and the forward deployment of offensive capabilities etc. In response, the USA proclaims the «great power competition» is alive and expresses the need to compete on an ongoing basis with its rivals in all world regions. The US view continues by asserting that the outcome of this competition will influence America’s political, economic and military strength and those of its allies and partners in the future. The USA will follow its national security interests: protecting the American people and the American way of life, promoting American prosperity, preserving peace through strength (by rebuilding its military capabilities to deter enemies and fight and defeat them), and advancing American influence in all world regions. The USA will work to prevent an unfavourable shift in Europe and other regions, strengthen deterrence by maintaining a forward military presence (capable of deterring and defeating any adversary), cooperate with Europe to counter any Russian subversion and aggression and demand its European allies to lift defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP by 2024, with 20 per cent devoted to increasing military capabilities. However, we should stress the strategy also expresses the USA’s readiness to cooperate with Russia and China in areas of mutual interest (see p. 25). In our assessment, the US National Security Strategy is a very (or overly) competitive strategy in particular and sensitive times that hold uncertain consequences for Europe. It also seems the strategy resembles a business strategy of a company struggling to increase its market share. We also cannot avoid the feeling the Trump influence on East–West Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 53 security relations has somewhat blurred the lines between politics, security, the economy etc. Trump has brought a very new and quite unexpected approach to US foreign and security policy. Yet it is also likely the Trump syndrome reflects some parts of our reality that most people have not wanted to see since the Cold War. Let us look at one EU observer’s critical commentary here. Accordingly, Trump is a billionaire populist who tweets fake news and insults, defends white supremacists, initially praised Vladimir Putin, threatened NATO and its partners it would tear up the treaty if EU nations do not spend more money, pulled out from the Paris Accord (making the USA the only nation out of 193 UN members to not support it), insulted the North Korean leader by calling him «short and fat» and thereby escalating the risk of nuclear confrontation, supported BREXIT and thereby exacerbated the threat to the EU itself, supported harsher sanctions against Russia etc. (Rettman, 2017). These positions and actions actually started to disintegrate the unity also in the Western bloc, NATO and the EU. The same source further reports the perception of an anonymous senior EU diplomat. He thinks that the EU is today in «a paralysis with regard to question of Russia and the US is emerging as the weakest point of the Western alliance». He added that Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Rome and Madrid are unwilling to cooperate with Washington on several crucial international issues like NATO spending, Iran, Syria, climate change, energy security etc. Finally, he said the EU needs to be patient and to show that trust levels remain was intact and that the harm can be repaired (ibid: 5). Not surprisingly, the Russian Federation's National Security Strategy (2015) outlines a completely different threat perception. Accordingly, militarisation and arms-race processes in regions adjacent to Russia and the related role of force in international relations have become ever more of a problem. From the perspective of global security and the system of treaties and agreements in the arms control sphere, the strategy identifies the threatening aspiration of some states to build up and modernise offensive weaponry and develop and deploy new types of it. Russia feels that the principles of equal and indivisible security are not being observed in the Euro- Atlantic, Eurasian and Asia-Pacific regions. NATO is seen as a threat to Russian national security for several reasons: the build-up of its military potential, creation of its global functions «pursued in violation of the norms of international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries' military activity, the further expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders». The US missile defence system also significantly reduces opportunities to maintain global and regional Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 54 stability (ibid: 4). The document highlights the following long-term national strategic interests: consolidating Russia’s status as a leading world power, whose actions aim to ensure strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a polycentric world. The strategy asserts that Russia finally has demonstrated its ability to safeguard sovereignty, independence and state and territorial integrity and to protect the rights of its compatriots abroad. The Russian view was extensively explained by President Putin in an interview for Germany’s Bild in 2016. He stated that NATO is an aggressive military alliance, the Western sanctions are a theatre of absurdity and that Russian Crimea is as just as fair as the right of Kosovo to self-determination. He stressed that after the fall of the Berlin Wall the borders have just moved towards the East and all recent problems and crises stem from this. He was also self-critical, saying Russia was too late in more clearly expressing its interests from the outset. He believes that, if that had occurred, the world would retain that balance even today (Vse smo naredili narobe, 2016). NATO has labelled many of Russia’s actions hostile and a threat, adopted many actions in response and called for the peaceful settlement of problems. In 2014, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) declared the March referendum in Crimea illegal and illegitimate because it violated the Ukrainian constitution and international law. Its results were also not recognised by its allies since it was carried out in an environment of military intervention, where there was media manipulation and no possibility of a truly free debate (Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the So-Called Referendum in Crimea, 2014). The NAC also condemned the Russian Parliament’s authorisation of the use of armed forces on the territory of Ukraine and the Russian Federation’s escalation in Crimea. This military action was declared a breach of international law by the Russian Federation, its obligations under the United Nations Charter and the spirit and principles of the OSCE. The NAC called on Russia to deescalate tensions (North Atlantic Council Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, 2014). A NATO-Ukraine Commission jointly condemned Russia’s continued destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, including the supply of weapons to separatists, such as tanks, advanced air defence systems etc. NATO did not recognise Russia’s recognition of the elections held by separatists in 2014 and condemned the military build-up in Crimea. On the other hand, NATO welcomed free and fair extraordinary parliamentary elections in Ukraine in the midst of challenging circumstances (Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, 2014). In 2017, the NATO-Ukraine Commission called on Russia to use its influence over the militants to turn them away from aggressive actions, respect Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 55 the Minsk Agreements and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, and reverse its «illegal and illegitimate annexation of the Crimean Peninsula» (Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, 2017). Ukraine has been a special partner of NATO. It is a founding member of the PfP. This is why NATO has continuously reaffirmed its support for Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of the Ukrainian people to determine their own future, without outside interference (see North Atlantic Council Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, 2014). Consequently, NATO adopted a package of responsive measures at its meeting held in Wales in 2014. These measures mainly targeted Russia and its «illegal self-declared annexation of Crimea and Russia’s continued aggressive acts in other parts of Ukraine». First, a Readiness Action Plan was adopted as a comprehensive package to enhance preparedness and responsiveness to the new security challenges linked to Russia and risks emanating from the southern neighbourhood. The first pillar of this plan comprehends assurance measures, such as: enhanced air, land and maritime presence of NATO forces in the territory of the Eastern allies on a rotational basis, an increase in air policing, AWACS surveillance, more NATO exercises on crisis management and national defence etc. The second pillar of the plan contains adaptation measures like enhancing the NATO Response Force and, within this, establishment of a new Spearhead Force (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) with a multinational brigade (some 5,000 troops) deployable within two to three days, the creation of a NATO command and control presence in the territories of the Eastern allies, the preparation of national infrastructure such as ports and airfields etc. (NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, 2015). Second, the allies decided to stop cutting defence budgets and to lift them up to 2% within a decade. Third, the decision to keep the door to membership open was taken again. The alliance reiterated it does not pose a threat to any country (Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond, 2014). One year later, the open-door policy was reaffirmed on the basis of positive experiences from past rounds of enlargement and their contribution to security. NATO’s door remains open to all European democracies that share the alliance’s values, and in particular to Montenegro (the last new NATO member), FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia. All partners were further encouraged to continue the necessary reforms to prepare for membership (Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers on Open Door Policy, 2015). The commitment to an open-door policy has been reaffirmed several times since then (e.g. see The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security, 2016). Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 56 The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security (2016) focuses on security challenges posed by Russia’s actions that undermine rules-based order in Europe. Here NATO decided to improve its collective defence, deterrence based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, resilience against cyber attacks and hybrid threats. The declaration stresses that all these measures are defensive, proportional, transparent and that NATO poses no threat to any country. It also stresses that NATO will always be ready for dialogue with Russia and clear communication and reciprocal transparent measures in order to minimise the risk of military incidents. The Example of War in Ukraine and the Related Sanctions The distrust between Russia and the West is probably best reflected in the political and military conflict in Ukraine. Political protests in Ukraine (the so-called Maidan movement) first erupted in the winter of 2013 when, under pressure from Moscow, Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich backed down from signing an EU association agreement. Although the pro-European Maidan protesters enjoyed the support of some Western governments, they were also supported and financed by Ukrainian oligarchs who had fallen out of favour during Yanukovich’s rule (Talas, 2014: 1). After escalating violence that left scores dead, on 21 February 2014 Yanukovich and the main leaders of the opposition reached an agreement that was mediated by Russia, France, Germany and Poland. The agreement stipulated early presidential elections in 2014, a national unity government in the meantime, restoration of the 2004 constitution of Ukraine, as well as an amnesty for all protest movement participants. However, more radical and nationalist sections of the protest movements refused to acknowledge the agreement and threatened further violence if Yanukovich did not immediately resign (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018). In these circumstances, Yanukovich fled the capital for eastern Ukraine, then to Russia, while the Ukrainian parliament impeached him. Russia interpreted this sequence of events as a «coup’d état» by «radical nationalist elements» (see, for example, Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/820, 2016). After the regime change in Kiev, unidentified armed men (later confirmed to be members of the Russian armed forces) started to take control of the Crimean Peninsula, an autonomous region of Ukraine populated by a Russian majority that had been ceded to Ukraine only in 1954, during the Soviet era. On 6 March, the regional Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 57 parliament of Crimea initiated a process to secede from Ukraine, declaring its independence on 11 March and, on 16 March, voting in a referendum to decide by a large majority to join with Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry cited the case of Kosovo in 2008 as a precedent for the legitimacy of the declaration of Crimean independence (see Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018). After late March 2014, an armed conflict also broke out in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk provinces) between the military and law enforcement of Ukraine and pro-Russian irregular forces. The rebels in eastern Ukraine are given military support (personnel, weapons, know-how, intelligence), logistic support, financial support and humanitarian support by Russia, which also has many refugees from Ukraine. The breakaway territories also proclaimed their secession from Ukraine, forming the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR). According to Anton Bebler (2017: 411-425), Ukraine is the hub of four mutually interlinked conflicts. The first is the internal political conflict in Ukraine between pro-Russian and pro-Western forces, the second between pro-Russian eastern Ukraine and Crimea and pro-Western parts of the country, the third conflict is between Ukraine and Russia with Crimea in the centre, while the fourth conflict is the global conflict between the USA, the EU and Russia taking place in Ukraine. Likewise, Peter Talas (2014: 3) distinguishes between internal or domestic, regional and geopolitical levels of the Ukraine crisis. In a way, Ukraine is simply like a chessboard for the big powers. Even though the 2014 crisis erupted due to a dispute over whether to sign an EU association agreement, the prospect of NATO membership of Ukraine, first considered in 2008, was a breaking point in the relations between Russia and the West. It is true the Russian authorities have frequently warned against and opposed NATO enlargement to perceived Russian historical territories and due to national security.8 It is also true, as argued by Bebler (2017: 417, 421), that Western politicians have not seriously listened to these statements and warnings, even publicly proclaimed countermeasures against Russia. They have also not succeeded in persuading the Russian leadership and public that such enlargement is not aimed against 8 For example, the public relations representative of Russian President Putin stated that NATO is approaching Russian borders as an «aggressive bloc» (see Novi ruski raketni sistemi v okolici Kaliningrada, 2016), Sergei Karaganov (2016), adviser to Putin, stated that Russia perceives NATO’s enlargement as a provocation. In addition, NATO is declared a threat to Russian national security in the latest Russian national security strategy (also see Zelena luč za uporabo vojaške sile, 2016) and experts warned that NATO’s activities constitute a threat to the national security of Russia (see Kulesa, 2016). Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 58 Russia. The promise to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO that was made in Bucharest in 2008 has affected Russia’s approach strongly. It seems that Russia then took the decision to more actively resist this enlargement. In 2008, after a «bold experiment» by Georgian President Saakashvili to forcibly recapture the secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had failed due to the Russian military’s intervention, Moscow moved to recognise the two breakaway statelets as independent states. Russia also took advantage of the Maidan protests, political crisis and removal of President Yanukovych from power and initiated its occupation of Crimea, organised the referendum on secession in March 2014 and the annexation of Crimea to Russia. On the other hand, EU and American support for pro-Western politicians in Ukraine (seen as anti-Russian in Moscow) contributed to a worsening of relations between Russia and the West, leading to the biggest crisis in the relations between these two powers since the end of the Cold War. The case of secession and annexation of Crimea has been discussed and compared with what happened in Kosovo. Some observers find similarities while others stress important differences that render the two cases incomparable. In our view, both cases are connected because one of the actors in the geostrategic game claims so and is acting in line with these perceptions. Russian President Putin more or less directly compared and linked Russia’s move in Crimea with the Western and NATO move with Kosovo. A very informative and lucid comparison between the Kosovo and Crimea secession cases is offered by Bebler (2017: 419). He identifies some striking similarities such as: the absence of any UN Security Council authorisations for either operation, violation of the UN Charter in both cases, the two occupied areas were both violently separated from territories of UN member states (Serbia and Ukraine), secession and independence in both cases were linked to the right of nations to self-determination, and approximately similar popular support for independence among the majority population. Bebler concludes that application of the same standards means the two military interventions (Russia’s in Crimea and NATO’s with Kosovo) should be labelled the same. However, in practice, NATO described its own activities as «air strikes» and the activities of the Russians «aggressive action». On the other hand, one of the key differences between the two cases is the mass casualties in Kosovo, which did not occur with the Russian operation in Crimea. Bebler identifies certain double standards of some EU and NATO politicians concerning the «Russian aggression». Another example of the spiralling exchange of conflicting views is the discussion between the Foreign Ministers of UK and Russia in December 2017. In response to Boris Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 59 Johnson’s statement that the case of Crimea is the first case of the violation of state sovereignty since 1945, Sergei Lavrov stated this is untrue and simply propaganda of the Ukrainian government and its sponsors. In his view, the first breach of sovereignty was in former Yugoslavia when Kosovo was given independence without any referendum, while there was a referendum in Crimea (see Rusofil «Baris» pri svojem prijatelju Sergeju, 2017). It is important to point out however, that the referendum organized in the Crimean Peninsula was not recognised as neither legitimate, nor free and fair by the United States and the European Union. On March 27, 2014, 100 member states of the UN General Assembly endorsed a resolution reaffirming the territorial integrity of Ukraine and underscoring the invalidity of the Crimea referendum. The issue of Crimea has not changed since then and the conflict between the secessionist Eastern parts of Ukraine and the central government remains unsettled. The Minsk agreements were signed, and we have seen a great number of breaches of it in the form of continued fighting, failure to remove heavy weapons etc. This situation in Ukraine spreads fear and distrust to the neighbouring countries, such as Poland and the Baltic states. As a reaction and an expression of its security guarantees, NATO has deployed 4 battalions or approximately 4,000 soldiers in the Baltic countries and Poland. NATO informed Russia of this deployment and Russia on the other hand informed NATO about its three new divisions in its Western geographic areas. Russia has also deployed anti-ship naval rocket systems in the area around Kaliningrad in response to NATO’s strengthened naval protection for its Baltic member states. The USA introduced sanctions against Russia in response to the latter’s actions in Ukraine and in relation to Crimea, and managed to persuade the EU to do the same in 2014. These later sanctions have been extended and prolonged based on the state of implementation of the Minsk agreements. They aim at the financial, energy and defence sectors and the dual-use goods area. They contain targeted individual restrictive measures, such as a visa ban and asset freeze for 150 individuals and 38 entities related to the annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Donbas, limiting access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for 5 major Russian state-owned financial institutions, an export and import ban on trade in arms, an export ban on dual-use goods for military use or military end-users in Russia, curtailing Russian access to certain sensitive technologies and services that may be used for oil production and exploration etc. (see Russia: EU Prolongs Economic Sanctions by Six Months, 2017). Russia responded to the sanctions with President Putin’s stating they have not been effective as Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 60 Russia has not changed its policy. Putin also explained that the Ukrainian crisis was just an excuse of the West. If there was no Ukraine, another reason to impose sanctions on Russia would be found, he believes. The main reason for these sanctions is to limit Russia’s growing power on the international scene and globally, something Western countries do not like, he added. The Russian Foreign Ministry also commented that the EU gave in to the US pressure and introduced harmful sanctions against Russia. The ministry stressed that in the «global sanctions war» against Moscow the USA has actually been gaining and increasing its trade with Russia, while EU members have lowered their trade (see Konec ruske mantre o neškodljivosti, 2016; Gorjača novih sankcij proti Moskvi je še pospravljena, 2016). Yet Bebler (2017: 424-425) warns that the contextual interests and goals of the EU and US sanctions are somewhat different. The US sanctions namely reflect its global strategy in which Russia plays the role of an adversary if not an enemy (together with North Korea and Iran). On the other hand, the EU does not treat Russia in this way and creating economic damage with its sanctions is not really in its interest. Bebler concludes that the EU finds itself caught in a trap. Last but not least, these sanctions have become counter-productive and made any political solution of the Ukrainian crisis even more difficult. In the meantime, the Ukrainian state started losing credibility even in the eyes of its Western supporters. Ever more evidence is emerging on the corrupt nature of the current government in Ukraine. Even the US Secretary of State commented that «it serves no purpose for Ukraine to fight for its body in Donbas if it loses its soul to corruption» (Committing to the Fight Against Corruption in Ukraine, 2017). A prime example of corruption likely reflects a state-capture situation when the state which was supposed to prosecute high-profile corrupt actors turned against its own Anti-Corruption Commission. Ukrainian authorities arrested a member of this commission (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, NABU) when it uncovered a corrupt network inside the Ukrainian Immigration Service requiring a USD 30,000 bribe for a necessary permit for a foreigner (see Napačni ljudje na napačnih mestih, 2017). Another scandal, although not related to Ukraine but clearly showing the spirit of relations between Russia and the West, happened early in 2018. Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were attacked in Salisbury, UK, by being poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok (a chemical weapon originally produced by the Soviet Union). Skripal was a British double agent working in Russia and caught by the Russian authorities. He lived in the Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 61 UK after he had been swapped in a spy exchange programme. British political authorities immediately accused Russia of the attack and Russia denied it. Russia required proof and an apology for the accusation. Britain decided to expel several Russian diplomats from the country (some of whom were suspected of espionage) and several EU states joined this measure. This led to the most drastic expulsion of Russian diplomats following the Cold War. In total, 24 states decided on the expulsion of more than 100 Russian diplomats. Yet some EU states did not take such measures, such as Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. Austria positioned itself as a bridge between the East and West and decided to keep all channels with Russia open. The main problem for these states was the attribution of this attack to Russia without any clear and unambiguous proof. The situation reminded some observers of the case of Iraq and the related intervention. Former German EU Commissioner Günter Verheugen commented on this by saying that such strong sanctions against Russia should not be based on an assumption but on facts. In his view, the argumentation was reminiscent of a verdict based on the possibility of attribution and not on the facts. He warned against the risks of a policy which blames the Russians for every case where some doubt exists (see Evropski glasovi proti izgonu, 2018). In this chapter, we have seen that the war in Ukraine and associated sanctions are a clear consequence of broader misunderstandings between Russia and the West. That is why some small local examples of success cannot actually change the broader conflict. We also see that Crimea may be interpreted as some form of revenge or that at least the Western move with Kosovo and its independence has been used an excuse by Russia. The logic behind the sanctions against Russia also seems more complex than one might expect. Finally, the sanctions have not altered the key parameters of Russian security policy. The Example of the Zapad 2017 Military Exercise The Russian and Belarus military exercise Zapad 2017 added to the crisis in East–West relations. This was a joint strategic military exercise by the two countries that lasted from 14 September to 20 September 2017. As the name suggests, the exercise took place in the Western border areas of Russia, in Belarus, the Baltic Sea and the exclave of Kaliningrad. We observed the complete mistrust of Western officials and the media in the information Russia provided about the number of troops participating in Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 62 this exercise. Were the number of participating troops to exceed 13,000, Russia and Belarus would have to invite observers through the OSCE. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, and other diplomatic sources expressed serious doubts that the figure was truly below 13,000 based on the deliberate Russian practice of reporting too low numbers and rapidly organising exercises to minimise their transparency (see Na vzhodu skoraj nič novega, 2017). Many other Western sources were openly wary of these numbers and even talked of 100,000 participating troops, which if true would have been the largest Russian military exercise since the Cold War (see the report by Reuters in Emmott & Sytas 2017; Putinove priprave na jesenske manevre «Zahod», 2017). Calls were made to give notice of this exercise in line with the Vienna Document 2011 and NATO officials stated they would be monitoring it closely. Western sources also expressed concerns about the scenario for this exercise (operations against threats from the West) and the presence of tactical nuclear weapons. The scenario referred to a conflict between the imaginary states of Lubenia, Vesbaria and Veshnoriya. It started with border incursions from Veshnoriya, related massive air raids and the identification of an illegal armed formation in the region of the Union State (Russia and Belarus). Eventually, the Russian and Belorussian forces destroyed the enemy behind the initial threat. The last days of the exercise were about counterattack. Polish sources were concerned about the officially unannounced role of nuclear weapons in this scenario. Western public officials and other sources talked about preparations for an offensive war of European proportions. One security official from a European state thought Zapad represents «a complex, multi-dimensional aggressive, anti-NATO exercise» (Emmott & Sytas 2017). Polish and US sources also expressed concerns about Russia potentially using the exercise to increase its military presence in Belarus. There were fears Russian forces would never leave Belarus (see Putinove priprave na jesenske manevre «Zahod», 2017). Sources also feared the exercise would be used as a Trojan horse to attack Poland and the Baltic countries. Lithuanian Defence Minister, Raimundas Karoblis, feared the exercise might trigger an accidental conflict, while also claiming he cannot be calm if a large foreign army has gathered in the neighbourhood (see Emmott & Sytas 2017). This statement highlights the lack of military contacts and mutual trust between the two sides. NATO officials stated that experts would be sent on «visitor days» during the exercise, but this was not considered a substitute for meeting Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 63 internationally-agreed norms like meeting soldiers and receiving briefings under the Vienna Document. Interestingly, the concept of the Zapad 2017 exercise was not dramatically new. In fact, it followed the pattern of other Zapad exercises. For example, Zapad 1981 was the biggest exercise ever held by the Soviet Union with some 100,000 to 150,000 Soviet and other Warsaw Pact member state troops. The scenario for that also predicted an invasion of the Warsaw Pact area by NATO which was discovered in an early phase and then successfully countered by Moscow. The exercise included «a counterattack into Germany and pre-emptive use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Western forces» (Mizokami, 2017). Zapad 2013 used a scenario in which «Baltic terrorists» had attacked Belarus with helicopters, aircraft and amphibious craft and then forced the defenders to engage in urban warfare. It is to be noted that elements practised in this exercise were later used by Russia in Crimea and Syria (ibid.). Russian and Belarus official sources, in contrast, claimed that up to 12,700 troops were to participate (7,200 from Belarus and 5,500 from Russia). This was below the mentioned threshold. They also stated that NATO is actually increasing risks by strengthening its presence on the border with Russia. NATO responded by stating this is incorrect and the number of NATO troops near Russia is much lower that the number of Russian troops etc. US Vice-President Mike Pence was sent on a European tour approximately one month before the Zapad 2017 exercise. He reiterated the promise to all three Baltic countries that under President Trump the USA would assure all necessary support and protection, including NATO Article 5 protection. Further, he labelled Russia the ultimate threat to peace and security in Europe and the greatest threat to the Baltic countries. He stated that Russia is trying to create new borders and undermine the democratic regimes of sovereign states as well as the unity of European states. He expressed his wish to improve relations with Russia, but not at the expense of US and allied security (Pomirjanje zaveznikov kot izhod v sili, 2017). As mentioned, the USA had stationed one of its armoured brigades on European soil in response to Russia’s actions in Crimea, thereby confirming its defence and security guarantees in Europe, and for the purpose of «deterring aggression of our enemies» (statement by a high Polish military official in Poljska gravitacija za ameriške zavezniške vojaške sile v Evropi, 2017). The USA rotated its forces just before and during the Zapad 2017 exercise. Sources stress these forces are not stationed there permanently but are being rotated by the USA. This is relevant because the permanent Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 64 stationing of forces would represent a breach of the NATO-Russia Charter of 1997 (see Odvračanje Putina sredi poljskih ravnic, 2017). The second Armoured Brigade Combat Team from the first Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas, replaced the third Armoured Brigade Combat Team that had been in Europe for nine months. The delivery included 87 M1 Abrams tanks, 103 Bradley fighting vehicles, 18 Paladin self-propelled howitzers etc. (see Roberts, 2017). The Commanding General of US Army Europe, Ben Hodges, declared Poland a gravitational centre of the US armed forces in Europe. American soldiers were warmly welcomed in Poland at all societal levels, locals have been enthusiastic,9 security perceptions have improved, but the Polish local, state and military policy has ignored the fact that all of these defensive activities have been perceived by Russia as threatening (Poljska gravitacija za ameriške zavezniške vojaške sile v Evropi, 2017; Rusi nas opazujejo, mi tudi njih, 2017). Russian President Putin commented on this, labelling the deployment of US forces in Europe a provocation. The seriousness of how this exercise has been interpreted is shown in the case of the largest Swedish exercise (Aurora) since the Cold War that occurred at the same time as Zapad. Aurora relied on a scenario of an attack on Sweden, with altogether around 19,000 troops participating (Swedish, USA and six other NATO members). Sweden regards Russia as a threat. Some say that Zapad 2017 was meant to be a reminder to the Baltic countries and Scandinavia that Russia considers them as its backyard. Eventually, it turned out the actual number of Russian and Belarussian troops participating in Zapad 2017 was much lower than feared. Even some Western sources reported numbers below the threshold (around 13,000 troops). But doubt remains. One thing is clear, the public debate concerning this exercise was part of the information strategies and information warfare engaged in by the USA, NATO and Russia. Even Chatham House assessed that Western commentators had become obsessed with Zapad 2017 and the related numerical figures. Eventually Russia had proved them wrong by keeping the exercise small and contained, using this to boost its political strategy that adds to Russia’s sense of superiority. In the end, the Kremlin stated the West had overreacted and fallen victim to scaremongering and rumours (Boulegue, 2017). However, it must also be noted that over some days this «defensive tactical anti-terrorist exercise» turned into fighting an equally conventional and advanced enemy 9 Media reported extensively on the enthusiasm of the Polish people about the arrival of US forces. US soldiers brought gifts for children, visited schools, participated in local manifestations etc. Their presence also affected local business in a positive way (see Odvračanje Putina sredi poljskih ravnic, 2017). Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 65 that had the appearance of NATO forces. This actually reflects the true Russian message to the West that it is able to react to the perceived threat of incursions and that its reaction will be very costly for the attacker and any conventional forces behind these incursions. It also shows the Russian capacity to quickly shift from deterrence to actual conventional warfare (ibid.). The exercise was ultimately about a show of conventional force based on the use of artillery, modern tanks and mobile mechanised units. The interpretations and misinterpretations it raised were completely consistent with the broader atmosphere of distrust across Europe. An Emerging Security Dilemma in Europe – A Spiral of Escalation The conflicts, hostile perceptions, mutually exclusive narratives, political statements, strategies and declarations, force deployments and exercises analysed above reflect a spiralling deterioration of relations between Russia and the West. Based on this, we argue that Europe is caught in a crisis typically called the «security dilemma». It seems that countries have increased their competitive activities in order to provide for their security at the expense of other countries. The quest for security has once again become a zero-sum competitive race. Each side has a defensive and responsive narrative and engages in defensive actions then unfortunately interpreted as a threat by the other side. On top of that, Kulesa (2016: 16) notes that each side’s activities continue to reflect worst-case-scenario assumptions about the other side’s motives. Accordingly, let us take a post-Cold War look at how does the theory accounts for this situation (namely, the theory that emerged from our experience with the Cold War). Buzan (1991: 295-325) talks about the power-security dilemma (a slightly better term for labelling security competition). This dilemma reflects competition for power and security among states at each other’s expense (a zero-sum game where X can only become stronger only by making Y weaker). Such a quest for power and security by some states can easily threaten the power and security aspirations of other states. This struggle is in fact a struggle between revisionist and status quo powers, where the latter benefit from and support the existing pattern of international relations while the former feel alienated from it. In the present situation, it is easy to see the USA (and, conditionally speaking, also the remainder of the West) as a status quo power trying to protect its gains from the Cold War victory or even increase them, while Russia under Putin may be seen as a revisionist power Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 66 trying to improve its position in international relations as well as its power following dissolution of the Soviet Union. Buzan (1991: 303) continues that «security» is a «watchword» of the status quo powers, usually expressed in terms of preserving stability. On the other hand, revisionist states see security in terms of changing the system and improving their position within it. In their view, stability is the essence of the problem. The security dilemma or competition for security can be more or less intense and has several dimensions like the narrative dimension, arms race, defence budgets, exercises, demonstration of power, sponsoring particular political candidates, supporting states etc. Viewed cynically, the paradox of such competition is that perhaps neither side wants to threaten the other, but its defensive actions are still directly or indirectly perceived as threatening. There is also the problem that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive intentions of the other side. The following simplified matrix shows possible interactions between the goals of the status quo power and revisionist powers. Table 1: Possible objectives and outcomes in a simplified security dilemma (Buzan, 1991: 316) Revisionist state (Challenger) Status-quo state (Responder) Partial catch-up Parity Superiority Increase lead Unresolvable objectives Unresolvable objectives Unresolvable objectives Maintain existing lead Unresolvable objectives Unresolvable objectives Unresolvable objectives Allow gain short of parity Resolvable objectives Unresolvable objectives Unresolvable objectives Allow gain of parity Unlikely situation Resolvable objectives Unresolvable objectives Accept inferiority Unlikely situation Unlikely situation Unlikely situation If the USA under President Trump wants to increase its lead (as expressed by the US National Security Strategy, 2017), and Russia under President Putin wants to achieve parity, then these objectives are unresolvable. This is a very unfortunate situation for Europe - unless the game changes. We thus need to change this game away from competitive to being more cooperative. We are aware the security dilemma has always existed in international relations and will continue to in the future (it is likely impossible to get rid of it). But it can be minimised down to healthy interstate competition Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 67 in the context of peaceful co-habitation and intensive cooperation within the European security architectural framework. CSBMs are typical tools for reducing the security dilemma by increasing transparency with regard to military strategies, intentions, locations etc. and simultaneously reducing the mutual fear. CSBMs as we know them at this point in time in Europe can only work when supported by the political will of all sides. The contextual indicators of distrust described above clearly do and will continue to prevent the efficiency of the existing CSBMs. If one side fails to respect its CSBM obligations, the other side might perceive this as confirmation of its deep and hidden mistrust. In this case, these measures are useless when it comes to improving confidence and trust. Frequently, some sides represent their position in the power-security game as being neutral and simply reactive to threats. To explain this, we can use the argument of Carr who stressed that the status-quo position is also not neutral. In his view, this position also represents a set of interests that seek to maintain an advantageous position in the system. An even more interesting note is that «the English-speaking peoples are past masters in the art of concealing their selfish national interests in the guise of the general good». Carr also added that this kind of hypocrisy is a special characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon mind (see Buzan, 1991: 300). As identified above, the mutually exclusive perception of NATO’s efforts to enlarge is one of the key indicators of the distrust in Europe. Another explanation can be given to better understand the Russian revisionism in our security dilemma scheme. Russian opposition to NATO’s enlargement is partly also based on the following perception of deception by the West. Russian President Putin has several times mentioned that the West promised not to expand NATO towards the East if the Soviet Union allowed the unification of East and West Germany. Archive researchers at George Washington University recently discovered and published 30 documents relevant to this topic. It turns out that these promises were in fact given to Soviet leaders in the 1990s by at least 10 prominent Western leaders: James Baker (US State Secretary), George Bush senior (US President), Hans-Dietrich Genscher (German Foreign Minister), Helmut Kohl (German Prime Minister), Robert Gates (CIA Director), Francois Mitterrand (French President), Margaret Thatcher (British Prime Minister), Douglas Hurd (British Foreign Minister), John Major (British Prime Minister) and Manfred Wörner (NATO Secretary General). The recently published documents show that Russia’s claims are not a «myth» spread by Russia (as claimed by much of the Western media) (see Zahod v 90- letih naplahtal Ruse, da ne bo širil Nata, 2017). Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 68 Some additional and very specific examples of the existing security dilemma can be identified in practice. For example, in December 2017 the White House announced that the US government had authorised the sale of its modern anti-tank man-portable missile system, the FGM-148 Javelin, to Ukraine. Its HEAT warhead is very effective against modern tanks, attacking them from above. The missile uses automatic infrared guidance, allowing the shooter to seek cover immediately after launching (fire-and-forget). The purpose of this procurement was presented as defensive in the USA, namely, to help the Ukrainian military fight the Russian tanks being used by the rebels in the east of the country. Moscow instantly responded to this news by saying the USA is pushing the Ukrainian authorities deeper towards new bloodshed (see Izstrelki v pravem in navideznem svetu, 2017). However, subsequent Russian reactions were more mixed: military sources sought to downplay the significance of the shipments, while government representatives apart from condemning them, did not specify any particular countermeasure. According to Hungarian defence analyst Andras Racz, due to their cost and limited supply the missiles are unlikely to alter the status quo in eastern Ukraine, with the deal (also including Barrett M107A1 sniper rifles) being more of political than military significance (Racz 2018: 1, 5- 7). It is worth reminding that for the security dilemma to be present it is actually not important which side is right and what the truth is. What is important is that defensive reaction leads to another defensive reaction, with both perceived as a threat by the other side. The security dilemma has also entered the nuclear dimension. UN secretary General, Antonio Guterres, declared a «red alarm» in 2018 for our planet based on the new nuclear threats, the spread of nationalisms and hatred of foreigners, and climate change. We can see the start of a new nuclear arms race based on the action-reaction model (Kot da ne bi bil svet že dovolj oborožen, 2018). US President Trump declared the strong modernisation of American nuclear weapons in February 2018. Russian President Putin almost instantly responded in his pre-election speech with a video presentation of Russia’s latest strategic weapons, said to be unstoppable by any state. The Balkans provides more examples of the re-emerging soft power struggle and battle for influence between Russia and the West. The British public broadcaster the BBC recently reopened its Belgrade media office: although the BBC representative stated the re-opening is about achieving «accurate and balanced reporting», some commentators saw this move as a reaction to the perceived dominance of pro-Russian media in Serbia and an element of the Western fight-back against Russia in the battle for influence Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 69 in the Balkans. The West is increasingly worried that Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States have increased their influence to the level that requires a refocusing on the Balkans. Commentators have also said the BBC will be going up against Serbian national media that do not report critically on Serbian President Vučić. The latter commented that BBC is not impartial media, and, in his view, BBC reporting will not be objective reporting and only «information in the interest of one kingdom» will be supplied (see Hopkins, 2018). Other international news outlets have already established their Balkan services: Al-Jazeera Balkans, the affiliate of the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera network, started operating in 2011, while Russia’s state-run Russia Today network opened an office in Belgrade in late 2014, and started a thrice-daily radio news broadcast in Serbian in January 2015 (Al Jazeera Balkans Goes on Air, 2011, «Russia Today» News Service Opens in Serbia, 2014, Russia Today Starts Broadcasts from Serbia, 2015). There are many consequences of the ongoing competition for security in Europe for European security of today and tomorrow. Some existing treaties are threatened by partial or full non-compliance, all excused by various mutual accusations. The CFE is one such agreement. Russia left the agreement and its adaptation remains wishful thinking in the present circumstances. The Open Skies Treaty has problems with implementation and compliance. Parallel to the examples of the security dilemma related to conventional weapons, very specific non-conventional examples have also emerged. The INF or Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces agreement also suffers from mutual accusations of violations. This treaty was signed in 1987 by the USA and the Soviet Union to eliminate their nuclear and ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 km. These systems were eliminated in the past under special verification procedures. The Special Verification Commission still holds more or less regular meetings (last session in December 2017). Yet Russia has raised the possibility of withdrawing from the treaty due to the fact its neighbour, China, possesses such weapons and due to the threat from the USA and other Western countries of deploying strategic anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe. Allegedly, these systems can be used to fire cruise missiles with similar characteristics to the INF-prohibited intermediate-range missiles. The USA alleges that Russia was in breach in 2014 by producing and testing launchers for such missiles. In addition, in 2017 the New York Times reported and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that Russia had deployed an operational unit of treaty-non-compliant cruise missiles (SSC-8). Russia denied all of this and accused the USA of violating the treaty. US sources namely reported that the USA had approved funds for developing a ground- Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 70 launched cruise missile system that, if tested, would violate the INF treaty (The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at a Glance, 2017). It is difficult to verify the deployment of such weapons and it seems the two sides have already deployed these weapons in Europe (see Se jedrske rakete znova vračajo v Evropo?, 2017). The security dilemma also has some other consequences. Russia started allying itself with China and some mutual military exercises with a related display of force have been seen (e.g. naval exercises in the Mediterranean and in the Baltic Sea). Both powers wish to reduce America’s military dominance of the world. In fact, we can say that both China and Russia are seeking to fill the gap left by the USA in terms of military power and dominance. In addition, President Trump has also opened up the economic front with America’s European allies. US trade tariffs and related accusations of Europeans of discrimination against US companies will likely lead to an EU response. In this way, the Western alliance will become even weaker. The transatlantic link is the key component of both the Western alliance and NATO; weakening this link is counterproductive for the USA since it means a weakening of NATO. This conflicting situation in Europe also holds several consequences for the OSCE and the existing Vienna Document-based confidence and security-building measures. Austrian Foreign Affairs Minister Sebastian Kurz felt during the OSCE presidency of his state that the OSCE is being paralysed by a crisis of trust and distrust (Konec brezglave varnosti in sodelovanja, 2017). In 2014, Swiss Chairperson-in-Office Didier Burkhalter said that the system of conventional arms control is in crisis and this has led to an erosion of trust and confidence in the military sphere across the OSCE. Adam Kobieracki, former Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, stated there is much less trust in the OSCE among the participating states than used to be. For him, some statements and accusations are unbelievable compared to 2011 (Interview with Adam Kobieracki, 2015: 25). The OSCE Security Days introductory conceptual paper from 2016 mentioned that the OSCE has been struggling with paralysis at the political level (due to the growing East–West divide, divergent security perceptions and priorities, and falling trust and confidence), hindering consensus-based cooperation in various areas for several years. The crisis in and around Ukraine has only exacerbated the existing divisions and marked a clear retreat from aspirations for a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. The concept also stressed that this mistrust has reached a critical level and governments are mainly focused on short-term gains as opposed to discussing how to overcome the current stalemate (From Confrontation to Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 71 Cooperation: Restoring Cooperative Security in Europe, 2016). Participants at the Conventional Arms Control Fit for the 21st Century conference declared there is a real danger that European Conventional Arms Control and the CSBMs will collapse. All efforts to modernise the Vienna Document and agree on additional CSBMs are also being blocked (Kulesa, 2017: 1). The Special Representative of the German Federal Government for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2016 stated the present situation with CSBMs gives only little space for enthusiasm. He perceived a discrepancy between the spirit in which these regimes were concluded and the manner in which they were being applied (Erler, 2015: 13-16). The decrease of trust also affects the field level of providing confidence and security. Frozen conflicts (e.g. the Transdniestrian conflict) are situations where a larger military action is regarded as more or less unlikely, but it is also unlikely that countries will engage in the serious and deeper exchange of information: military data exchanges or inspections are seen as too sensitive to engage in. The conflict in Ukraine showed that, despite the establishment of the JCCC (Joint Centre for Coordination and Control), any information on the location and the number and types of heavy weapons is regarded by both sides solely as intelligence the other side can use for a military attack. Therefore, neither side is prepared to authorise a mechanism intended to increase transparency regarding sensitive information (Neukirch, 2015: 51-53). Frozen or protracted conflicts have killed off several OSCE efforts, including an ambitious modernisation of the Vienna Document. In addition, legally binding arms control is practically ruled out for some time to come (Dunay, 2015: 24, 18-25). The Hope, Will and Motive for Peace are Still Present The security situation in Europe described above is however only the empty part of the glass. We already saw above that even mutually exclusive perceptions and narratives sometimes leave some room for cooperation and even an improvement in relations. In other words, the idea of a peaceful and cooperative Europe has not died yet. In this chapter, we will try to explore some positive processes, ideas and initiatives related to the future of European security. One of the most telling and mutually satisfying indicators of good security relations between Russia and the West is found in the cooperation against international terrorism. Al-Qaeda represented a global terrorist network that managed to carry out some terrorist attacks with global Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 72 consequences. Afghanistan harboured its leadership and global counter-terrorism operations required the cooperation of Russia and the USA. It is very important (also from the perspective of European security) that the threat of Islamic terrorism was perceived as a common enemy or as joint threat, leading to different kinds of security cooperation at different levels. Most terrorist groups on the US and Russian lists of terrorist actors are radical Islamic groups. The outcome of this intense counter-terrorism cooperation between Russia and the West has actually been very logical as the ultimate aim of Islamic terrorists was and is to create a political system very different from the European one, which is based on the Greek, Roman and Christian backgrounds. Their aim of the Islamic caliphate completely denies these backgrounds.10 Consequently, many examples of successful cooperation can be found. Russia helped NATO and the USA with transport over its territory for the purposes of counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Counterterrorism played an important role within the NATO-Russia Council. Both partners cooperated intensively as equal partners in joint exercises, projects, exchanges of information through several platforms, several Russian ships have been deployed to support NATO’s maritime operation against terrorism in the Mediterranean (Active Endeavour) etc. (see NATO- Russia Council – Practical Cooperation Fact Sheet, 2013). The G-8 Counter-terrorism Action Group, two Working Groups of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (one led by diplomats and one led by intelligence officers) were established and also cooperated fruitfully. After the Ukrainian crisis erupted, most of these successful mechanisms were suspended or blocked. The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing already showed somewhat mixed results, reflecting the current level of trust. While Russian intelligence services had alerted the FBI in 2011 that the alleged mastermind Tamerlan Tsarnaev was a potential threat, they did not respond to several requests for additional information. Some experts think this situation shows the «new Cold War» atmosphere has affected counter-terrorism cooperation, while others think we have been facing sporadic episodes of intense counter-terrorism cooperation that fade away after some time. There are also experts who believe that the situation in Ukraine has not influenced intelligence cooperation. Accordingly, both sides will cooperate if their 10 Islamic terrorists actually misuse Islamic religious principles and dogma for the purposes of their political goals. The terrorist use of religion is largely based on a selective and narrow interpretation of Islamic religious principles and verses. The misuse of the context and the religious texts is based on the creation of an interpretation that Muslim society has been attacked by non-believers, leading to the need for Jihad (also narrowly understood as only the fight against external evil). What follows is the creation of a simplified understanding of non-believers as complete enemies of Allah that deserve only death (for empirical evidence, see Kocjancic and Prezelj, 2015). Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 73 compartments in services find a mutual interest (Kinstler, 2014). Some experts have also warned that such counter-terrorism cooperation would be risky for the USA because Russian counter-terrorism has been much more brutal and indiscriminately violent than that of the USA. Some say that the USA «practices counter-terrorism with a scalpel, while Russia uses a chain saw» (Benjamin, 2017). In any case, a common enemy will always force the two sides to think in a more cooperative direction. There is hence hope for future cooperation, but unfortunately this hope comes from a bad direction. There is something good in something bad for both sides. The election of US President Donald Trump also created an initial sense of optimism regarding mutual relations (together with simultaneous fears for the future of this relationship) in the eyes of some observers, most notably in Russia. Quite a clear indication came in his pre-election speeches showing admiration for Vladimir Putin and readiness to have peaceful relations. Trump also expressed a readiness to press the reset button. After the first Putin–Trump telephone conversation, Moscow reported the two leaders would strive for «constructive partnership» and that part of this may include the joint fight against international terrorism and extremism. Commentators also talked about a more pragmatic partnership (Z novim partnerstvom nad terorizem, 2016: 6). President Trump even argued that counter-terrorism cooperation might be used as a leverage for improving relations with Russia and even lifting the sanctions against Russia for the suspected interference in the US presidential elections (Benjamin, 2017). The potential to reset the USA–Russia relations was also discussed by four US global intelligence specialists (former intelligence officials) (How Will the World Change After the Election?, 2016). They stressed that Putin wanted to get Washington to the negotiating table and talk about bigger strategic issues, and that he wanted more respect. The presidential campaign showed that Hilary Clinton was not moving in the direction of resetting the relations, but this was something Trump talked about. The experts stated that a reset of relations is doable by accepting the Crimea, accepting the status-quo events in Ukraine and affording Russia respect. The reset can also be achieved by boosting confidence-building measures, especially in a very technical field, because Russians tend to like working on these issues. In 2018, it turned out that Trump had not improved relations with Russia in the first year of his mandate. In fact, the relations had even deteriorated. According to Russian commentators in Kommersant, Trump and US policy were the biggest disappointment of the past year. Many people in Moscow had expected some improvements in relations by «our man» in the White House, but it emerged that President Trump did not show enough will to Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 74 «change anything». Commentators also concluded that President Trump had actually retained many policy elements advocated by previous US President Obama (Hillary Clinton v ovčji preobleki, 2018). Upon the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, many calls and ideas were expressed by a wide range of actors on how to leave behind the negative spiralling relations between Russia and the West. For example: The priority of diplomacy. Russia stressed its priority is still diplomacy as the main tool for conflict management (Zelena luč za uporabo vojaške sile, 2016: 6). A Russian analyst suggested that none of the parties (neither the USA nor Russia) is able to win the war in Syria and will therefore have to sit down at the negotiation table and make a compromise on the matter (Čakajoč na novega poglavarja Bele hiše, 2016: 6). The same seems to also apply to the Ukraine. Adam Kobieracki, former Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre , reminds us that «der Weg is das Ziel» – the journey is the goal. With the political process it is not so much about the outcome, but the fact that people sit down and talk, try to explain things to each other (Accept Reality and Work with It, 2015: 25). Open high-level communication channels. NATO froze the meetings of the NATO-Russia council after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, communication channels at the highest political levels remained open. Several meetings at these high levels also took place (Na vzhodu skoraj nič novega, 2017; Več konstruktivnosti, a brez odjuge, 2017). A reflection on the dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council renewed in April 2016 shows that NATO and Russia do indeed have some deep and permanent problems, but that greater military transparency also remains in their common interest (Med Natom in Rusijo še vedno brez mostu, 2016: 1). This is affirmed by the German foreign minister who said NATO-Russia relations require a renewal of military contacts and exchange of information on foreseen manoeuvres, overflights of military aircraft etc. He observed that the level of contacts had dropped below that during the Cold War (Natov rdeči telefon, 2014). Recognition of the relevance of the other side and readiness to cooperate. Brent Hartley (US Ambassador to Slovenia) stated that while the USA disagrees with Russia on Ukraine and is worried about its aggressive behaviour in parts of Europe, it recognises that Russia is an important player in Europe and the world, it wants to cooperate with Russia and thinks both states have more interests in common than not (Brent Hartley: Ob prihodu si nisem predstavljal, da bo šlo prek Slovenije kmalu pol milijona ljudi, 2016, interview in Sobotna priloga: p. 7). Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 75 Strategic compatibility of the two sides in the fight against terrorism. In September 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated the strategic compatibility with Russia in the fight against terrorism and the fight against ISIS, and potential cooperation in post-conflict peacebuilding in Syria. To prevent Europe becoming trapped between two actors. Various actors have warned about the danger of Europe again becoming a potential sacrificial lamb due to its intermediate position between Russia and the USA. According to German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Europe would have to prevent this situation and should take the initiative within the OSCE to improve the situation as well as disarmament (Neodgovorno bi bilo ne poskusiti, Delo, 2016: 7). Moreover, Hans-Joachim Giessmann, Director of the Berlin Conflict Research Centre, recommends that Europe exits this spirale and rethinks its security architecture (which in any case has to include Russia) (Mir v Evropi prvič po hladni vojni resno ogrožen, 2016). Hope in the OSCE and the CSBMs The role of the OSCE and the CSBMs is mentioned in several visions in support of a cooperative approach that will prevail over any short-sighted confrontation in Europe. For example, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in 2016) called for a restoration of dialogue in the OSCE. He argued that the «OSCE can provide us with essential instruments for de-escalation in times of crisis» (Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE in 2016, 2015: 15). In 2015, the OSCE Ministerial Council in Belgrade (2015: 19) reflected the message that everybody realises the importance of the OSCE in restarting the dialogue. Consequently, OSCE participating states engaged in dialogue on how to overcome the political paralysis and different threat perceptions. A Panel of Eminent Persons was appointed to advise on how to re-consolidate European security as a common project and rebuild mutual trust and confidence. The OSCE Security Days conference was used to generate ideas and recommendations for rebuilding trust and confidence among the OSCE participating states. In particular, the panel tried to reflect on how Europe could reconsolidate its security as a common project and examine ways to re-launch the idea of cooperative security. In its report, the panel called on the rebuilding of confidence and trust chiefly via diplomatic means and not militarily, for a return to European security as a common project, and called on the OSCE to launch a diplomatic process to rebuild Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 76 the foundations of European security (Back to Diplomacy, 2015: 3-14). The panel found that the OSCE had performed remarkably since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, that a neglected international organisation had become a key negotiating forum and was asked to fulfil numerous unprecedented tasks (like mobilisation of a mission containing up to 500 monitors at short notice in a hostile environment). The Ukrainian crisis brought the OSCE back into focus, demonstrating its added value but also exposing its limits (Lessons Learned for the OSCE from Its Engagement in Ukraine, 2015: 2, 6). The panel called for the reinforcement of several agreements as follows: ˗ by updating the Vienna Document 2011 by adjusting the thresholds for notification and inspection of military exercises, raising the quotas for inspections, reviewing categories for information exchange and revising the definition of unusual military activities; ˗ by updating the Open Skies Treaty; ˗ by including snap exercises and exercises close to borders in CSBMs; ˗ by increasing military-to-military contacts (on cyber security, new technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles and automated weapons systems, terrorism and organised crime); ˗ by reinforcing the NATO-Russia Council; and ˗ by creating a new and comprehensive conventional arms-control regime based on the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) etc. (Back to Diplomacy, 2015: 15). Military transparency and confidence remained a priority in the security policy of several states. It is to be noted that especially the Central European states have had this focus in their security policies. For example, a Special Representative of the German Federal Government for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2016 stressed it was high time to reverse the cycle of violence and distrust, restore trust and transparency and that CSBMs would remain priorities of German foreign and security policy. He also called for a fresh look at the basic instruments that had served so well in the past and welcomed independent, out-of-the-box thinking (Erler, Keynote speech, 2015: 13-16). Another priority of the Austrian chairmanship in 2017 was to reestablish trust and confidence. The chairmanship launched various initiatives to facilitate confidence-building (see Priorities of the Austrian Chairmanship, 2017). For example, debates on the need to modernise the Vienna Documents were organised. At one debate in 2017, the OSCE Secretary General pointed to the need to find common ground and genuine commitment to make real progress on modernising the Vienna Document, i.e. to Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 77 progress on the many proposals on the table. He called for the Vienna Document to be adapted to the requirements of our time and make it more effective and use the momentum of our shared security concerns (Progress on Modernizing the Vienna Document Vital to Making the Agreement Effective in Current Challenging Security Environment, 2017). Other proposals included establishing a new set of confidence-building mechanisms in order to create a new politico-military equilibrium between NATO and Russia. For example, Kulesa (2016: 3) proposed measures to boost the predictability of military exercises, dialogue on military doctrines, restraints in forward conventional military deployments of NATO and Russian forces, refraining from introducing nuclear weapons as more central tools for confrontation, an explicit or tacit agreement on a sequence of steps leading to establishing new rules of the game in NATO-Russia relations etc. Proposals on what to do were also discussed at a major European conference in Berlin on arms control and CSBMs in 2017 organised by Germany. Participants proposed the following potential solutions, among others: ˗ Back to diplomacy. Engagement with Russia would increase the likelihood of returning to compliance and agreeing on new arms-control measures. This view includes that compliance by Russia is a precondition for any substantive discussions. ˗ Arms-control negotiations in circumstances of no trust. Some argue that arms-control negotiations should be pursued especially because there is an absence of trust. Some others believe this is pointless in a situation without trust between the West and Russia. ˗ Small steps or grand architectural designs. Initiating ambitious architectural designs, such as the Helsinki 2.0 process or a legally binding arms-control agreement akin to the CFE treaty is likely not to meet with success, but a small-steps approach in this direction was preferred by most participants (see Kulesa, 2017: 2). At the end of this section, we should stress that the OSCE remains the most developed regional security system and the Vienna Document CSBMs remain the most developed CSBM regime in the world. The achievements of both have been amazing and transferring them to other neighbouring regions is still a dream of many. Shin Dong-ik, Deputy Minister for Multilateral and Global Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, stressed that Korea intends to duplicate in Northeast Asia what the OSCE has achieved in Europe. Due to the trust deficit in that region, South Korea is developing the NAPCI (Northeast Asia Peace and Key Contextual Dilemmas Related to CSBMs in Europe 78 Cooperation Initiative). This trust-building initiative is supported by the USA, China and Japan, but North Korea argues the initiative is politically motivated and designed to destabilise North Korean regime. North Korea is very reluctant to participate in the NAPCI process because its main concern is the regime's stability (The OSCE: An Inspiration for Asia, 2015: 22-25). Interestingly and logically, the last big sporting event – the Winter Olympic games in South Korea – were used to improve confidence between North Korea and other countries in the region. This proves that sports events can still play the role of a very specific confidence-building measure. This also means that Pierre de Coubertin’s ideas of the modern Olympics as tools for promoting peace, understanding across cultures and reducing the danger of war are still relevant in the concept of any CSBM. 79 4. A General Concept of the Effectiveness of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures In this chapter, we define what is meant by the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs and explain why it is relevant. We start by defining the effectiveness of international regimes, their robustness and life cycle. The Vienna Document CSBM is a specific international regime that requires a particular effectiveness assessment, although some of the main assessment variables used for all other international regimes should be employed. We also describe our multidimensional constructivist approach to the effectiveness assessment used in Chapters 5 and 6. In the modern complex security environment, it has become essential and inevitable for the existing security regimes and related effectiveness to be assessed on an ongoing basis if we wish to retain their relevance and improve them. A general concern with all cooperative security arrangements finds its roots in scepticism about the achievability of their goals. Several authors stress that security based on cooperation and the prevention of conflict is and probably will remain an aspiration only incompletely fulfilled (Nolan, 1994: 9; Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 66). It is therefore necessary to recognise their constraints and limits as well as their promises (Nolan, 1994: 8). The approach taken in this book was built with this recommendation in mind. The second reason for assessing the effectiveness derives from the notion of regime life cycle. International regimes change continuously over time and some regimes decline or go out of existence even as others are coming on stream (see Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 318). A critical realist perspective claims that cooperation in international institutions (in the broadest sense) is contingent, unstable and the by-product of dangers posed by imbalances or serious threat. Such cooperation is therefore temporary and will disappear soon after the disappearance of the special conditions that created it. Authors who generally address the continuity and change of security institutions claim that institutions need to adapt if they are to survive. The death rate among international organisations is quite high. Adaptation thus requires organisations to be sensitive to general changes in their environment and to the interests and foreign-policy preferences of their key members (Wallander, Haftendorn & Keohane, 1999: 5, 12). If a cooperative security regime is to serve its intended purpose over time, it must be adaptable to inevitable changes in technology, substantive problems and A General Concept of the Effectiveness of CSBMs 80 economic, social and political developments. The usual way of adaptation entails a formal amendment or adoption of a protocol (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 99). This all means that the regime robustness (resilience, persistence or «staying power» of international institutions in the face of exogenous challenges) changes over time. The theory of regime persistence argues that regimes are created against a backdrop of a particular constellation of interests and power, which they reflect in the content of their principles, norms and rules. Those initial conditions in which a regime is formed and which are reflected in its structure typically change over time, often making the regime increasingly less attractive to some or even all of its members. Regimes arguably persist despite the shrinking satisfaction of their members since creating a regime in the first place is so difficult (Keohane, 1984, in Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 38). The ability or failure to solve problems determines the regime’s persistence (see Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 289). Krasner categorised two kinds of regime change: a change of the regime takes place only if principles or norms (rules) are altered; all other changes in regime content are changes within a regime (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 13). The attractiveness and utility of the CSBM regime for the participating states is thus a fundamental research and analytical topic to be pursued in this book. The Vienna Document CSBM regime needs to be useful to the participating states and hence flexible and adaptable enough to survive in time. Regime assessment has been methodologically demanding and less straightforward than usually assumed due to the imprecision of the concept of international regime (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 8). Such vagueness arises because definitions of the concept cover a mixed bag of subjects with different meanings (Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 270), leading to a broad array of research questions that require different research strategies/approaches. Levy, Young and Zurn (1995: 269, 291, 292) found that that regime effectiveness is also an elusive concept that is construed quite differently by analysts. Each meaning requires analysts to differently combine difficult normative judgments and employ various research strategies. They stressed that in this case it is essential to explicitly state the definition being used so that differences in analytical and empirical findings can be discussed meaningfully. The Vienna Document CSBMs are a set of measures with the character of a politically binding international regime because they contain agreed «implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area» Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 81 (Krasner cited in Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 9). International regimes, such as the Vienna Document CSBMs, enable states to achieve their own goals through cooperation. They are designed to lower physical threat from other nations, reduce threat perceptions that drive states to acquire destabilising arsenals and ensure that organised aggression cannot start or be prosecuted on any large scale (Nolan, 1994: 5-15). Their main purpose is to reduce uncertainty (or lack of information) about their partners in a changeable security environment by providing credible information about their capacities and intentions (interests) (Wallander, Haftendorn & Keohane, 1999: 4; Keohane, Haftendorn and Wallander, 1999: 330; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 36; Kolodziej, 2005: 125). Uncertainty is reduced by increasing levels of transparency, predictability and assurance concerning the benign intentions of other states and adherence to the agreement. Another vital part of this process is monitoring or verification with potential sanctioning mechanisms in place for those who violate the agreed norms and rules.11 Regimes can be more or less effective for achieving the above stated goals. The debate on how to achieve organisational effectiveness while implementing international regulatory regimes is not new. Perhaps a fundamental measure of the Vienna Document CSBMs’ effectiveness can be derived from a «comparison with what would have happened if the regime had never existed» (see Wettestadt and Andresen in Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 293). We can see that the Vienna Document CSBMs reflected the end of the Cold War and significantly improved transparency and certainty among the participating states in the period after that «war». But this regime did not completely solve the international security dilemma given that some states still compete for security and power. Yet, without this regime, much greater uncertainty about other countries’ intentions, more politico-military conflicts, increased threats, more misperceptions and misinterpretations of threats, capacities and intentions would exist in the Euro-Atlantic and Euro- Asian areas. In this book, we employ Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger’s (1997: 2) definition of regime effectiveness. According to them, a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules, and to the extent it achieves certain objectives or fulfils certain purposes. This attribute is sometimes referred to as «regime strength». This means effectiveness is a 11 Thus, regimes (1) stabilise mutual expectations regarding future behaviour, (2) reduce transaction costs, (3) produce information otherwise not available or available only at a high cost, and (4) provide a frame of reference that ensures that the interaction repeats itself frequently enough to generate a long «shadow of the future» (Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 288). A General Concept of the Effectiveness of CSBMs 82 matter of the degree to which a regime ameliorates the problem that prompted its creation and the degree to which members respect its norms and rules. This directs analytical attention to the «observable behaviour of members» (see Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 291-292). Abiding by norms and achieving objectives are, however, only the fundamental dimensions of the effectiveness assessment used in this book. We include also other dimensions and develop a multidimensional approach to the CSBM effectiveness assessment (see Figure 2). Apart from the extent of achieving basic objectives and complying with norms and rules, these other dimensions are: concerns for the reputational effects of non-compliance, effectiveness during military crises and conflicts («foul-weather situations»), effectiveness related to internal armed conflicts, willingness to address cases of non-compliance, distribution of the benefits of cooperation and participation in the regime, the role of power in CSBMs and the cost-effectiveness of implementation. Figure 2: Multidimensional Approach to Assessing the Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime EFFECTIVENESS of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime Extent of Complying with Norms and Rules Extent of Achieving the Basic Objectives The Role of Power in CSBMs Effectiveness during Military Crises and Conflict Situations Willingness to Address Cases of Non-compliance Distribution of the Benefits of Cooperation and Participation Effectiveness Related to Internal Armed Conflicts Concerns with Reputational Effects of Non-compliance Cost-Effectiveness of Implementation Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 83 The Vienna Document, namely the most original and successful normative OSCE document in the politico-military dimension, will be assessed according to the said dimensions. We will employ a specific assessment approach that takes account of the «observable behaviour of members». In Chapter 5 (and for the SWOT assessment in Chapter 6), we shall use a broad spectrum of expert perceptions of the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs and comparatively analyse them at a macro level to find important similarities and differences in perception (shared and non-shared interpretations). This approach is based on the cognitive theory of international regimes that underlines the role of actors’ perceptions and beliefs that determine the actual regime formation and performance (see Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 194). Shared meanings and perceptions are important for the way the Vienna Document CSBM regime has evolved. The constructivist regime theory12 calls for regime learning by the related epistemic community by adopting new rules or simply the progressive adaptation of the existing rules that prevent the regime’s decline and increase its effectiveness and robustness (Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 278; 318). The effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs is assessed in Chapters 5 and 6 according to the following methodological steps: ˗ a study of the security regime theory to detect the biggest issues concerning the effectiveness of past security regimes; ˗ a study of the available OSCE documents related to the Vienna Document CSBM process (e.g. FSC reports, AIAM reports, national statements etc.); ˗ forming an empirical questionnaire for the experts based on the theory and after examining the existing documents; ˗ sampling and inviting the experts through their national missions to the OSCE in Vienna; ˗ conducting interviews with the experts in Vienna (mostly in Hofburg); ˗ clarifying some answers with individual experts and receiving their additional answers or explanations; ˗ analysis of the results and production of a report; and ˗ having the first draft reports reviewed by selected experts from academia (2), national missions to the OSCE (2) and the Secretariat of the 12 Regime theory offers an assesment framework for all situations where inter-state relations are regulated by some principles (beliefs of fact and causation), norms (standards of behaviour), rules (prescriptions for action), and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge on a given area of international relations (see Krasner in Aybet, 1997: 28). All of these variables can be usefully analysed from a perceptional or constructivist perspective. A General Concept of the Effectiveness of CSBMs 84 OSCE (1). Their comments were taken into consideration when producing the final version of Chapters 5 and 6. We created a questionnaire for assessing the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs consistent with the above described dimensions of regime effectiveness. The questionnaire was distributed to all OSCE participating states with the help of the Slovenian Mission to the OSCE and the OSCE Secretariat. Eventually, 35 experts from 29 participating states participated in the interviews. The study aimed to obtain similar views and assessments from those participating together with their unique perceptions. Similarities reflect the prevalent joint perception of the effectiveness, while differences point to unique divergences. In particular, these unique views were very useful in helping to understand the effectiveness of the CSBM regime. The sampling procedure requires some further explanation. Initially (in March 2013), general information about the project was sent to all the national missions in the OSCE and then we sent the invitation to participate in an interview to all missions with defence or military representatives (experts) in Vienna. Initially, we encountered a relatively low response rate from the states and their experts.13 This improved later and we ultimately managed to organise seven rounds (clusters) of interviews in Vienna. The sample used in this book includes 35 military and defence experts from the 29 OSCE participating states (out of 57 participating states). The sample of participating experts’ countries comprises the following countries, in alphabetical order: Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the USA. This means the study is based on the participation of experts from big countries (e.g. the USA, Russia, Germany, France, the UK), neutral countries (such as Austria, Switzerland and Sweden) and smaller countries from Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, including the Western Balkans. The Conflict Prevention Centre from the OSCE participated in this phase of the research process by providing general information about the Vienna Document CSBM process and the location for the interviews in Hofburg. 13 The initial idea of a statistical survey based on a sample of experts from Vienna and the national capitals (at least three per participating state) was dropped due to the low response rate from the countries. Instead, a more realistic sampling (one person per country involved in a predominantly qualitative interview) was used for the purpose of this research. Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 85 It is necessary to stress that the results of this research do not attribute any of the opinions and answers to any of the participating experts or related countries. The so-called non-attribution approach is used throughout this book. This compromise was necessary to obtain a positive response from the majority of experts. Without this compromise, the response rate would have been too low to allow the successful conclusion of the research. The typical reasons for the invited experts not to participate in our study were: ˗ the concern our interviews would be like an examination of their knowledge of the substance of the Vienna Document; ˗ the impression our questions were too detailed (while many participating experts thought just the contrary – that our questions were only general); ˗ the uncertainty of some experts in Vienna as to whether they could participate in this study because several of them were not used to acting as independent experts; ˗ the concern their names or the names of their countries would appear in the reports and potentially expose them in a sensitive policy process in Vienna or elsewhere; ˗ the capitals did not allow their experts to participate, but the experts themselves were willing to participate (even though the invitation made it clear we were looking for the personal views of the experts and not any official views); ˗ the feeling the results would be used or even misused for political purposes; ˗ the lack of experience and culture of participating in independent research projects: especially post-Soviet countries seem unused to and perhaps even suspicious of participating in interviews conducted by a non-governmental organisation. We state this based on the fact that hardly any invitations or reminders were responded to by them. Such low participation was perceived by the external observers as not unusual for these states; ˗ the regular change of staff in diplomatic missions to the OSCE prevented some interviews from taking place (their replacements were hesitant to participate due to some of the above reasons); and ˗ some smaller states simply do not have a military or defence expert for the Vienna Document and CSBM located in Vienna, but only in their capital. This also prevented us from conducting an interview with them. 86 5. Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness with Military and Defence Experts from Participating States In this chapter, we synthetically and comparatively present the main results of interviews with the military and defence experts on the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs. The experts were asked for their personal opinions and perceptions. The overview of similarities and differences in their perceptions uses anonymised citations without attributing their statements to their names and countries (a code number is used instead of the name of the expert). The chapter focuses on the following dimensions of the Vienna Document CSBMs’ effectiveness: the extent of achieving the basic objectives, the extent of complying with norms and rules, concerns with the reputational effects of non-compliance, effectiveness during military crises and conflicts («foul-weather situations»), effectiveness related to internal armed conflicts, willingness to address cases of non-compliance, distribution of the benefits of cooperation and participation in the regime, the role of power in CSBMs, and the cost-effectiveness of implementation. Regarding each dimension, a conceptual or practical introduction is first given, a summary of similarities of perceptions/opinions and identification of relevant perceptional differences or unique views are then provided, and a short conclusion that reflects on the results is presented. Effectiveness Based on the Extent of Achieving the Basic Objectives The Vienna Document CSBM regime is effective to the extent that it achieves its objectives. The objectives of the Vienna Documents have been to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in bringing about disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of the participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations generally (Vienna Document 2011 on CSBM, 2011: 1; Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on CSBM, 1999: 1; Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on CSBM, 1994: 1; Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on CSBM, 1992: 1; Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on CSBM, 1990). The interviewees were asked to assess the extent to which the Vienna Document CSBMs achieve their main objectives, such as strengthening confidence, transparency, predictability, stability, security and refraining from the threat Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 87 or use of force in interstate relations. They were asked to place their answer within the following three options: fully achieves the objectives, partly achieves the objectives, or does not achieve the objectives. Most interviewees (24) believe the Vienna Document CSBMs partly achieve the stated objectives when assessed as a group (all objectives together). Only a minority (4) think that the Vienna Document CSBMs fully (or almost fully) achieve them and not one stated that all of the objectives (together) have been missed. Most of those who think the CSBMs partly achieve their stated objectives distinguished the level of achievement relative to particular objectives: they mainly believe that confidence and transparency have been almost fully achieved, while refraining from the threat or use of force in interstate relations was clearly seen as the least achieved goal.14 Frequently, the latter goal was perceived as completely unachieved and unachievable by the interviewees (interviewee nos. 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 22, 23), affecting the achievement of other goals. In the perception of many, this goal is not part of the Vienna Document. The low level of effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs for this element was explained by noting this objective is part of the Code of Conduct and a result of the fact that Chapter III does not prevent states from the threat or use of force (interviewee no. 3) or that the Vienna Document was not designed to prevent the threat or use of force in interstate relations (interviewee no. 6). Instances of ineffectiveness in the Georgian conflict (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh) were offered as examples of ineffectiveness as well (interviewee nos. 11 and 22). However, two interviewees (nos. 20 and 25) pointed out that the Vienna Document CSBMs can indirectly contribute to the avoidance of the threat or use of force in interstate relations. Accordingly, the purpose of the Vienna Document CSBMs is not to solve conflicts, although it can help to prevent conflicts or them escalating. Partial achievement of the stated objectives and related partial effectiveness has several dimensions that need to be looked at from several perspectives. The first aspect of ineffectiveness concerning the achievement of some goals can be found in the interconnectedness of the stated objectives. In the case of the Vienna Document CSBMs, perceived low or absence of effectiveness in refraining from the threat or use of force in interstate relations obviously affects the (perception of) effectiveness in the achieving of other objectives, such as confidence, transparency, predictability, stability and security. It also seems that the interviewees (defence and military 14 The example of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 also confirms this finding. The Vienna Document has also been partly effective in this case (see Chapter 7). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 88 experts from OSCE participating countries) understand very differently what refraining from the threat or use of force means (direct and active refraining of some actors or a more subtle and indirect effect on actors that contextually refrains them from using threats or force). Second, the partial effectiveness has a strong geographic dimension. It was made clear by certain interviewees that some Central Asian countries do not participate in the exchange of information (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and often Tajikistan). Several interviewees (nos. 5, 9, 10, 11, 15, 27) pointed out the «grey zones« such as Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, and North Cyprus (and in the past Chechnya in Russia) where the Vienna Document has not been (or been less) applied, information not exchanged, transparency and predictability not achieved. These are actually the territories that would most need CSBMs. The exchange of information in these cases is frequently seen through the logic that giving information on one’s own military postures to one’s adversaries would give them an advantage. It also seems that interviewees from countries involved in these conflicts perceive the entire effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs chiefly through the lens of how it impacts their national interests and chances of success. Third, interest-based perceptional differences and related different levels of commitment affect the effectiveness of achieving the stated goals. A lack of clarity and different opinions on some objectives are evident. Sometimes there is ambiguous wording even on technical issues, e.g. what is included in the concept of «main weapon system» or «auxiliary personnel». Translation issues also sometimes emerge and create misunderstandings as the OSCE has six official languages (interviewee nos. 18, 19). Fourth, a view was expressed that the Vienna Document CSBMs only partially achieve their objectives because the formal basis of the document is only political and not legal in nature (interviewee no. 4). Fifth, the fact that some chapters of the Vienna Document (risk reduction) lay dormant has decreased its effectiveness in recent times. This chapter has only rarely been activated. It turned out that the Vienna Document is good as a forum for dialogue, and totally useless as a tool for conflict resolution (interviewee no. 29). Last but not least, the time dimension and related changes in the security environment constitute an additional dimension that reduces the effectiveness of achieving the stated objectives. Several interviewees (nos. 7, 16, 23, 25, 30) pointed out that, historically speaking, the Vienna Document was effective because it efficiently achieved the objectives for which it was created in the 1990s, but many provisions are today obsolete since they do not take account of the changes made in technology, doctrines and force structures. In the period 1986–1994, the ground-breaking CSBMs Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 89 absolutely achieved their stated objectives. During the verification and evaluation visits one could gather valuable information otherwise only obtainable by HUMINT means (human intelligence). In the period from 1994 to 1999, problems started to appear, diminishing the extent to which the VD achieves its objectives (e.g. NATO’s eastward expansion in 1999, «consolidation» in Russia in the late 1990s and hardening of Russian positions in some security-related matters, a decrease in defence budgets, downsizing of military forces etc.). It can also be said that the success of CSBMs paradoxically contributed to their later loss of relevance. After 1999, the dysfunction of the Vienna Document CSBM regime started to gain momentum. The Istanbul Summit was the first sign that something had gone seriously wrong, the CFE and the Vienna Document were occasionally controversially connected, a Russian analytical report from 2009 claimed that most of the Vienna Document is not working, and part of it is «dormant», that the Vienna Document 2011 did not bring any substantive modernisation and the debate on its modernisation is continuing without success (interviewee no. 8). Today, for example, the information exchanged is outdated as it corresponds only to the 1990s. It is not intrusive. The intrusive information forms part of the CFE, which is «dead», said the source. This means the Vienna Document today has questionable usefulness: militarily, it is not significant, it is only significant politically because this is currently the only working document available (interviewee no. 30). The next example of the outdated provisions in the Vienna Document is the problem of excessively high thresholds for military exercises. What seemed a normal threshold 15 to 20 years ago is considered by some as too high today. Due to the changing military context (reduced armed forces, exercises on a smaller scale etc.), the possibility to conduct inspections of notified military exercises is significantly reduced (thresholds are too high – fewer inspections – less trust and transparency). One can clearly observe this trend in statistics provided by the CPC. This leads to reduced transparency while adding to the possibility of growing mistrust (interviewee no. 9). The majority of the participating states supported the French proposal to cut the threshold for notifications of military activities from 9,000 to 5,000, thereby making the Brigade the new unit of reference in military exercises. However, this proposal has met with opposition, arguing it will affect some states more than others or create a geographical misbalance (e.g. mostly Russia, but also some other states) (interviewee no. 29).15 This case shows the biggest challenge facing 15 France is the co-sponsor of the 45-nation proposal to lower the thresholds. Among the remaining nations, it seems that only Russia has a fundamental issue with this proposal. Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 90 the Vienna Document is to modernise and adapt to the current realities. The problem is that countries pushing for some kind of modernisation oppose other kinds of modernisation proposed by other countries. Some respondents state that the main problem hindering modernisation is that states in the OSCE region encounter very different challenges. That is why it makes sense to implement the Vienna Document regionally (differently in different regions) (interviewee no. 23). The positive regional experience of the Western Balkans was mentioned here. The subregional arms control agreement («Dayton 4») among Croatia, Serbia, BIH and Montenegro was established in 1996 (after negotiations since 1995) on the exchange of information on combat aircraft, tanks, artillery, number of soldiers etc. With such a «mini CFE», the military surprise has become impossible. The idea is that this subregional regime would become part of the future CFE (interviewee no. 12). This variety of interpretations makes the effectiveness of achieving the Vienna Document CSBM goals quite an unsettled issue for the future. The problem is that the perspective on what the Vienna Document should achieve itself changes over time. In the view of one interviewee (no. 13), some people expect the Vienna Document to today do something other than it was designed for. The effectiveness of achieving the Vienna CSBMs’ objectives should also be seen in the context of the other two related documents (CFE and Open Skies) and the relationship between them. In this constellation, the Vienna Document represents the broadest document, the CFE is purposefully designed to be narrow and intrusive, while Open Skies fills the gap between them. Accordingly, these instruments can only be effective when they work in harmony – they have a multiplying effect (interviewee no. 1). An attempt made in the 1990s to harmonise the Vienna Document and the CFE (creation of a single regime, but not exactly the same document) failed due to a lack of consensus (interviewee no. 30). The problems with functioning of the CFE contributed to the add to the Vienna Document’s importance (interviewee nos. 10, 27). Those interviewees who perceive the Vienna Document CSBMs have fully or almost fully achieve the stated objectives still believe there is room for improvement (interviewee no. 28), that the exchange of information is so efficient that «countries can do better than Jane’s Defence Weekly» (interviewee no. 14), and that it is very difficult to prove the opposite, namely Russia argues it is going to create a geographical disbalance because its armed forces are the biggest in the area of application. Other states, however, are in a de facto ‘abstain’ mode, some of them informally support the proposal but are waiting for a signal from Russia to support it openly (interviewee no. 29). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 91 what would have happened without the Vienna Document CSBMs. For example, the conflict in Georgia in 2008 took place due to the inefficiency of the Vienna Document, and it is unclear what would have happened if there were no Vienna Document CSBMs (interviewee no. 24). Interestingly, the UK accumulated its military force during the Olympic Games, voluntarily shared information on this, and then asked other participating states not to demand an inspection (interviewee no. 1). It seems that such sports events where most participating states send their own athletes represent a special case in the CSBM framework. Effectiveness Based on the Extent of Complying with Norms and Rules in the Vienna Document CSBM Regime16 The question of compliance is vital for any security regime (see Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 277), including CSBMs. Keohane, Haftendorn and Wallander (1999: 325) stressed that all international security institutions are imperfect unions, i.e. they do not always elicit perfect compliance from selfinterested states. Sometimes states ignore the norms and procedures embodied in these institutions, occasionally states’ interests diverge too much to permit agreement on how these institutions might be used to cope with security problems, and other times institutional forms themselves hinder effective cooperation. Without doubt, power and selfish national interests remain important in security relations (Keohane, Haftendorn and Wallander, 1999): 325). There is also no need to require that all behaviour conforms to the prescriptions and proscriptions of the regime at all times. But occurrences of major or long-term noncompliance, particularly involving the participation of or support of major actors in the system, bring the efficacy of the regime injunctions into question (Zacher in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 2). On the other hand, the behavioural interpretation of international regimes claims that more significant than the fact of a rule having been violated is how such an incident is interpreted by other members of the community of states, and the communicative action (excuses, justifications…). In this case, the effectiveness of the regime depends on the intersubjective convergent expectations and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour (Kratochwill and Ruggie in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 16). 16 It should be considered in this chapter that some states do not have armed forces and send NIL reports or even do not send them. This is not serious non-compliance, but simply the result of the presence of a structurally very unique state participating in the CSBM process. Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 92 Before we address the results concerning the perception of compliance with the Vienna Document CSBM norms, it is important to summarise the conceptual aspects of compliance and non-compliance in security regimes and related CSBMs. According to Chayes and Chayes (1994: 66-70), a cooperative security regime should be based on a strong normative base that implies general acceptance of and compliance with (binding) commitments limiting military capabilities and actions. The key to compliance with such a system of norms is that it is seen as legitimate. Legitimacy, in turn, requires that the norms are promulgated by fair and accepted procedures, applied equally and without invidious discrimination, and reflect minimum substantive standards of fairness and equity. The success of a cooperative security regime will depend centrally on the strength of the structure of norms the regime establishes. Norms include a broad class of generalised prescriptive statements – rules, standards, principles, and so forth – both procedural and substantive. All of these statements are prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed. Not all norms carry a legal obligation (like in the case of the Vienna Document). Only treaties embody rules that are legally binding on the states which ratify them. Another key element in compliance is transparency: the availability and accessibility of information about the regime and the performance of parties under it.17 Transparency induces compliance in a variety of ways. The main source of information will necessarily be self-reporting of the parties, subject to evaluation, checking, and independent verification, using all the techniques in the arms-control inventory as well as new types of measures that become available as a result of technological or political developments (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 66). The regime management or administration of a complex enterprise of international cooperation requires significant institutional capability. The collection, evaluation, verification and analysis of information themselves constitute a huge organisational task. The regime must be able to deal successfully with instances of inadvertent or deliberate departures from treaty norms (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 66-89).18 The production and review of 17 Transparency is much talked about, but not often defined. Chayes and Chayes (1994: 81) understand it as the availability and accessability of knowledge and information, generated through the processes of the regime about (1) the policies and activities of parties to the treaty and of the central organisations established by it as to matters relevant to treaty compliance and regime effectiveness, and (2) the operation of norms, rules and procedures established by the treaty. So defined, transparency is a matter of degree. There is no ideal level of transparency applicable to all treaties. 18 Self-reported baseline data have been the starting point for the verification system in all contemporary arms control treaties. Independent data collection by a central organisation Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 93 information about performance is a standard management tool in private and public bureaucracies, as well as in international organisations. One of the crucial functions of transparency is to generate information that helps assess the performance of a party and overall effectiveness of the treaty. The objective is to discover how individual and system performance might be improved (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 90). An international security regime is effective insomuch as its members abide by its norms and rules and related interpretation of compliance or noncompliance.19 Norms and rules are also key for the Vienna Document even though it is a politically binding regime. The OSCE officially monitors compliance and non-compliance, writes reports on it and discusses the situation at various forums (AIAM meeting, Annual discussion of Code of Conduct, Annual Security Review Conference etc.). In this study, we asked the participating experts to: (1) assess the level of compliance of participating states with the Vienna Document and related norms and rules; and (2) explain their perception of past cases of non-compliance. They were also requested to pack their answers into the following options: strong, moderate or weak compliance. No respondent opted for weak compliance. The majority of interviewees perceive compliance generally somewhere between moderate and strong (moderate – 16 interviewees, strong or strong to moderate – 11 interviewees). However, their arguments about effectiveness are not so different. They are all aware of the difficulties with compliance, but some labelled this as strong (or strong to moderate) compliance with some reservations (limitations), while others labelled this moderate compliance. For some experts, moderate means that compliance is at a high level for the majority of states. They referred to statistics on around 75% or 95% or 48–53 (out of 57 states) of strong compliance, but they also named the participating states known for noncompliance (interviewee nos. 1, 2, 5, 12, 14). On the other hand, those perceiving the level of compliance with norms and rules as strong simultaneously stress this does not mean full (100%) compliance for all participating states (interviewee nos. 6, 11, 21, 23, 29). is costly, intrusive and by no means error-free. Two principal issues arise in a system that relies on self-reporting: (1) inaccuracy of the reporting, and (2) failure to report at all – non-reporting. The principal problem seems not to be deliberate flouting of the reporting requirements but limitations of capacity and the constraints and priorities of the bureaucratic setting in which the reports are generated. Self-reporting is only the beginning, not the end of the data-gathering process. External checks and balances are needed (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 86). 19 Some reasons for non-compliance are simply a result of human errors. The CPC’s task is to find such cases and kindly remind participating states, through the Chairman of the FSC or similarly, to comply with the document. Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 94 One respondent stressed the importance of the time dimension when assessing the level of effectiveness: the level of compliance has varied in time (e.g. weak in the first half of 2012 when Russia did not comply) (interviewee no. 28). One respondent also stressed that to date there has been no wide-ranging and systematic non-compliance, but still the compliance is strong only if we see the «big picture» (interviewee no. 8). The respondents identified several cases of noncompliance they consider problematic and stated several general reasons for not complying with the norms and rules in the Vienna Document CSBMs: ˗ the problem of different interpretations of the norms and rules; ˗ the problem of the quality versus quantity of the information reported/exchanged; ˗ the problem of limited national capabilities; ˗ the problem of reporting defence expenditure; ˗ the problem with interagency cooperation; and ˗ the problem of the asymmetric geographic distribution of noncompliance. The problem of varying interpretations of the norms and rules in the Vienna Document CSBMs. Several respondents mentioned that the general wording, ambiguous or unspecific wording of the Vienna Document in combination with their different national political interests and agendas sometimes logically (even normally) lead to wide and different interpretations of the rules and sometimes even accusations among the participating states that affect the level of compliance (interviewee nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 16). National political interests lead states to know in advance with which measure they will comply and how much they want to take out from this regime (interviewee nos. 16, 27). The perception from a smaller state that bigger states take more manoeuvring space and freedom in interpretation should be noted (interviewee no 16). This also all leads to greater confusion because the participating states have varying perceptions of compliance and non-compliance based on their different traditions and mentalities (what it takes to comply, to what extent, how etc.). Disagreements over whether something is in compliance or not are not unusual. The contextual problem for this stems from the fact that there is no single OSCE body for authoritatively interpreting the Vienna Document (like the legal service in the UN). Accordingly, the non-compliance issue makes its way onto the table when somebody needs political points (interviewee nos. 12, 21) and participating Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 95 states are actually allowed to interpret provisions differently (interviewee no. 1). It should also be stressed that the Vienna Document was designed for negotiations in: (a) Vienna; and (b) on the ground (inspection teams with the host country). The main non-compliance is seen in a field where the instrument of negotiations is not used: a state can give a non-negotiable position (interviewee no. 1), like a position on the size of a sensitive area or the declaration of force majeure. When during the Caucasus 2012 exercise Russia declared an area sensitive, thereby preventing a US inspection team from entering, the USA said this was non-compliance and a clear violation of the Vienna Document. In contrast, the Russian representatives said they have a right to declare a sensitive area. This case suggests that interpretations on the size of the area for inspections can be interpreted narrowly or more broadly. The most frequently mentioned other example of disagreement has been the definition and application of force majeure . It should be clear what that means when people see it (natural disasters, war etc.), yet it has sometimes been applied arbitrarily for administrative reasons (interviewee nos. 1, 10, 19, 24, 25, 28). Other practical misunderstandings and disagreements are mentioned, like the question of whether the interpreter is a member of the team or not (interviewee no. 19), whether GPS equipment can be used or not (interviewee no. 5). The last problem relates to the fact that the provisions of the Vienna Document are limited with regard to modern verification possibilities (interviewee no. 15). Finally, a paradoxical aspect of non-compliance with the rules and norms should also be mentioned. One interviewee (no. 3) suggested the general wording creates not only interpretational problems, but also simultaneously a higher level of implementation. If the language had been more specific, there would be greater non-compliance. In this perspective, it is the political bounding that leads to a higher rate of compliance. The problem of quality versus quantity of the information reported/exchanged. Several respondents identified the problem of the low quality of the information exchanged, i.e. a lack of specificity and excessive formalism in reporting the required information to the OSCE information system. It turns out that some exchanged information has been barely usable and that reports are sent primarily to meet the deadline without much attention to the quality of the information included. Such qualitative non-compliance also includes a problem of not submitting sufficiently comprehensive information. The quality of the information exchanged actually determines the usefulness of the whole mechanism (interviewee nos. 2, 12, 20, 24, 25). This explains why the CPC official compliance assessment is sometimes Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 96 not the most accurate «mirror» on compliance (as it includes predominantly quantitative aspects and not so much qualitative aspects) (interviewee no. 20). This problem is clearly seen in the case of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan where due to strong mutual threat perceptions generally unusable information about armed forces has been exchanged. But there is very little the Vienna Document can do in this case. It is a politically binding document and simply an element of a bigger package (CFE, Open Skies etc.) (interviewee no. 24). The problem of limited national capabilities to respect norms and rules. Some respondents pointed to the problem of national capabilities that prevent compliance with norms and rules. In this respect, a shortage of (experienced) personnel (interviewee nos. 20, 14, 4, 17), technical capabilities (mostly in Central Asia) (interviewee no. 3) and financial problems (interviewee no. 14) were mentioned. This lack of capabilities is more obvious in poor and smaller countries but also present in more developed countries as an effect of the financial crisis (interviewee nos. 6, 17). For example, it is expensive to fly a helicopter in any country. It is known that the Tajik delegation asked for financial assistance in the FSC after an incident with the German delegation (interviewee no. 19). It was also made clear that such a lack of objective capacity reflects the broader lack of political commitment or simply the absence of interest (interviewee nos. 3, 7). Problems with reporting defence expenditure. Several respondents noted the cross-national structural problem of reporting the defence budget that stands apart from the issue of political will. Different start and end dates of the fiscal year in different participating states (and related obligations to report on changes three months after they were made) create confusion and non-compliance. The problem is even larger because the structure of the defence budget varies across countries (whether pensions are included or not etc.). We also encounter Armenia and Azerbaijan that have not reported their defence budgets for several years, with each accusing the other about this (interview nos. 2, 9, 29). Problems with interagency cooperation. This problem concerns the question of national capabilities. It seems that some states have a horizontal problem of interagency effectiveness in respecting the norms and rules of the Vienna Document. Representatives of smaller and bigger EU countries have found that many information reports need to be exchanged per year due to the extensive international cooperation and that it has become very demanding to provide accurate information on time for each and every exchange in question. The capacity to coordinate in the capital not only reflects the existing resources mentioned above, but also whether the Vienna Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 97 Document is even a priority at all in the capitals (interviewee nos. 2, 20, 24). There is also a perception that occasionally some countries simply «forget» about reporting (interviewee no. 7) despite the fact that the CPC notifies them two months in advance of the deadline. Problem of the asymmetric geographic distribution of noncompliance. The interviews again reflect a clear geographic pattern of non-compliance with norms and rules. Some people generally feel that political commitments are treated less seriously in the East than in the West. The East supposedly only treats legally binding regimes seriously, while the West wishes to also comply with political commitments (interviewee no. 22). Grey zones and specific Central Asian countries were frequently identified as problems in the area of complying with norms and rules (interviewee nos. 7, 8, 11, 12, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29) because they do not attend meetings, exchange information or accept inspections or evaluations. Further, Russia’s specific abstinence, suspension or noncompliance for six months during 2012 was mentioned by respondents (interviewee nos. 7, 20, 25, 27) along with the case of when the US delegation was not let into a specified area (interviewee no. 7). In terms of names, Uzbekistan has not exchanged information since 2005, Tajikistan almost never sends any information, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia were also often mentioned as problems. Albania was also mentioned because its computer station had problems with electricity (interviewee no. 12), but some observers do not consider this to be non-compliance (interviewee no. 31). Some respondents interpret the attitude of Central Asian countries to the Vienna Document as disinterested and lukewarm. This regime seems to bring no benefit to these countries; they may think it does not reflect their security needs or they have more confidence in other security regimes. A very telling example is one of the Security Dialogue conferences organised by the OSCE on the security challenges facing Central Asia, where only one country representative out of five countries was present (Tajikistan) (interviewee nos. 23, 25). One explanation for this attitude might arise from the way these countries became members of the CSCE. They joined the Vienna Document automatically after the Soviet Union dissolved. That is why compliant participating states apply a different approach to these countries to bilaterally explain what they need to do (interviewee nos. 14, 22). In addition, the national interests of states in conflict are definitely stronger than the Vienna Document CSBM norms and rules as they override these norms and rules (interviewee no. 8). Moreover, it sometimes turns out that for a number of participating states the concept of indivisible security is just an empty slogan. Countries in which the frozen conflicts are taking place certainly feel that Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 98 security is not indivisible for them. They believe they are faced with a more urgent security deficit which outweighs any Vienna Document compliance concerns. Revealing military information to one’s opponent is not an option due to security considerations (interviewee nos. 8, 10). Focusing on technical elements of the Vienna Document CSBMs might in fact be unable to solve the situation in such cases, only resolving the underlying conflict can lead to better compliance with the norms and rules, as happened in the Western Balkans where subregional CSBMs were jointly defined after the political settlement of the conflict (interviewee no. 25). Such cases of noncompliance, according to one concerned respondent, destabilise the balance achieved on the subregional level of the CSBM regime and thus leads to an unnecessary rise in the defence budget by countries neighbouring the area of potential crisis (interviewee no. 15).20 Among all cases of noncompliance, the most frequently mentioned was the unsuccessful inspection led by Germany (with Spain included) to Tajikistan. The delegation was refused a visa on its arrival at Dushanbe airport in 2013. The Tajik government officially maintained it was an unfortunate technical error due to a computer malfunction. It has apologised to Germany for the mistake/misunderstanding, but never disclosed any further details regarding the cause of the incident (interviewee no. 19). Another respondent stipulates that the visa denial was probably not the fault of the high official at the airport, but more an outcome of the Tajik misunderstanding of its obligations under the Vienna Document. The Tajik explanation supposedly also included the claim that it is a poor country which cannot be pressured so much (interviewee no. 22). The explanation given by the Tajik ambassador in the OSCE on this issue makes it clear that for some participants this country is not familiar enough with the norms and rules (interviewee no. 23). Another interpretation is that the true reason was that the congress of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), a major opposition party, was taking place during the planned visit and the issuing of visas at Dushanbe airport 20 An example of the Moldovan perception of obvious non-compliance is considered to be the presence of 13 BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers belonging to the Russian Federation, which were stationed at the peacekeeping checkpoints in the Eastern part of the Republic of Moldova and were not reflected in the VD11 Annual Exchange of Military Information. The mentioned equipment was supposedly observed by many of the VD inspections coming into Moldova, but it is never declared in the briefings offered to the VD inspectors by the Russian Federation’s military representatives. Moldova perceives this lack of transparency as being connected with the unwillingness of the Russian side to cooperate with the international community on implementation of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, which stipulated the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova, as well as the removal of the Russian military equipment and ammunition stockpiled in the Transnistrian region. Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 99 had been suspended for this period. This would mean the German-led delegation was «collateral damage» of the measure (interviewee no. 7). The respondents tried to distinguish different types of noncompliance. Frequently mentioned was the differentiation between smaller or minor cases and big or the worst cases of noncompliance. The first group encompasses the majority of cases in practice, mostly delays in reporting due to a lack of staff or resources (because eventually states do submit their reports), cases due to confusion or misunderstanding (e.g. because the inspected unit no longer exists and this had not been reported), while the second group contains a much smaller number of cases like the denial of an inspection, such as by Tajikistan in 2013, or continued disregard of the VD regime by Uzbekistan (interviewee nos. 3, 5, 13, 14, 22, 28, 30, 31). Another classification includes unintentional noncompliance (generally due to technical problems or internal political or institutional reasons) and intentional noncompliance (such as avoiding the exchange of information, disagreements over the information provided etc.) (interviewee nos. 4, 27). The last classification mentioned was serial, repeated, long-term non-compliance by some states, ad hoc non-compliance (like that by Russia during the first half of 2012, probably due to a mix of legal difficulties when the Duma did not adopt the necessary legislation on time and external political considerations related to the mutual relationship between the Vienna Document and CFE) and qualitative non-compliance in cases where supplied information of small value or without explanatory power was shared simply to comply to the letter with the VD provisions (interviewee no. 6).21 A few additional interesting views should be noted at the end of this section: When talking about noncompliance, the respondents chiefly talked about the noncompliance of others, not their own. It seems that some aspects or types of noncompliance have become part of the OSCE culture since some respondents think the OSCE has become used to cases of Vienna Document CSBM noncompliance, that the noncompliance is not a terrible problem and 21 The assumption that every case of departure from treaty norms reflects a deliberate decision to violate is not borne out by experience. Apparent departures may derive from factual misunderstandings or differing interpretations of treaty provisions. Lack of internal capacity to enforce the international rules, bureaucratic failure, or other relatively innocuous causes may also account for seemingly noncomplying behaviour. Moreover, deviations from treaty requirements range from trivial technicalities to those that threaten the viability of the regime (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 90). International treaties are able to accommodate a significant amount of non-compliance as long as the basic objectives are not threatened. In security regimes, the problem of the obdurate violator is of particular concern. What is needed, it is said, is a «treaty with teeth» (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 100). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 100 that the OSCE has bigger problems to deal with, such as the absence of an arms control regime (interviewee nos. 27, 30). Reactions to cases of noncompliance depend on the political interest of participating states and the state where the noncompliance allegedly occurred. If an important country does not comply, the reaction will be more intense (interviewee no. 9). Non-compliance is criticised if it is in the interest of the big powers, while «small states are all the time quiet because they are also having some problems with compliance» (interviewee no. 12). A pattern of including non-compliance in mutual allegations emerged: the USA or the EU via a joint position call on Russia to comply and Russia (and Belarus) calls on the aforementioned states to comply (those EU states that joined in the previous call). One respondent perceives that Russia once or twice a year calls upon the non-compliant countries to comply, but in a way that attempts to respond to the pressures being applied to modernise the Vienna Document. In 2012 and 2013, the Russians stated they cannot afford to modernise the Vienna Document because the country is undergoing a modernisation of its armed forces (interviewee no. 30). An interesting account of the inspections was shared with the researchers. One respondent claimed that in inspections the Russians show everything, but say nothing, while the Americans show everything and answer everything, but their answers are not the right ones (interviewee no. 4). When dealing with noncompliance, it is very important which kind of political leverage can be applied to noncompliant states. In the 1990s, NATO and EU members could pressure the candidate countries, while today this can only be done in the Western Balkans (interviewee no. 30). Consequently, a general perception held by the respondents is that nothing will happen to noncompliant countries because there is no legal authority and no sanctions in the Vienna Document CSBM regime (interviewee no. 25). Another specific perception concerning transparency and intrusiveness was given by one respondent. He perceives the reporting requirements of the AEMI as not very intrusive, detailed or demanding. The Scandinavian countries actually publish more information on their armed forces in the open domain (like the MoD website etc.) than is required to submit to the AEMI. This is very different from the CIS countries (interviewee no. x – source number not disclosed due to the possibility of linking the content with the country). One respondent perceives that the compliance of the OSCE host country (Austria) is very important. Its noncompliance would become an issue (interviewee no. x - source number not disclosed due to the possibility of linking the content with the country). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 101 Are Participating States Concerned about Their Reputation Related to the Level of Their Noncompliance? International security regimes shape the reputation of their members. Rational actors are concerned about their reputation. Actors with a reputation for trustworthiness are more easily accepted as partners in cooperative ventures for mutual benefit (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 35). The concern held by participating states about their reputation plays a role in their compliance and noncompliance and affects the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs. The respondents were therefore asked if they think noncompliance with the CSBM regime affects the reputation of the participating states and if the participating states are concerned with their reputation related to the level of their noncompliance. The results show that noncompliance does affect the reputation of the participating countries, but in quite a complex way. There are two aspects to this question: actual reputational effects and perceived reputational effects. Moreover, these effects are changing through time (one country can be concerned differently about its compliance at different points in time; for example, interviewee no. 22 mentioned Russia’s ignorance of reputational effects during its abstinence from the VD CSBM regime in 2012) and geographic space (again it seems that Western and Central Europe are more concerned about reputation than the East, interview nos. 3, 24). Moreover, the specific situation of the Western Balkan states was mentioned as they are strongly concerned about their reputation due to their interest in entering the EU and NATO, although this is not the case in Central Asia where countries simply want to win in the conflicts (interviewee no. 23). If a country is not concerned with its reputation at some point in time in the CSBM process, this does not mean there are no reputational effects in the eyes of other participating states. For example, there is no doubt that the reputation of the Central Asian countries has been affected, despite the fact these states are concerned about the non-compliance of some other states. Many indicators showing the opposite were suggested by many respondents throughout our research. Some respondents think the size of a country does not affect its compliance or noncompliance (interviewee no. 5, 11), yet more of them stress that size does matter: smaller countries care more about non-compliance than big, economically wealthy and politically strong countries (including nuclear powers and NATO members) (interviewee nos. 3, 4, 14). The responses given by almost all the participating experts simultaneously confirm the existing concern for reputation by the participating states Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 102 and the existing disregard of their reputation. An example confirming that countries care for their reputation can be found in informing other countries when a country is not ready for inspections and evaluations. Some countries have asked other participating states to refrain from verification or evaluation visits during certain periods, e.g. the UK during the 2012 Olympics (including Open Skies), Azerbaijan during the Eurovision song contest in this country and Bosnia and Herzegovina during a major EU meeting there (only for Open Skies). In some of these cases, the participating state in question claimed there were no resources available to provide escorts for the verifiers during these events (interviewee no. 7). On the other hand, many examples of disregarding the effects on reputation related to noncompliance were also mentioned: States know that reputation is affected if a case of noncompliance emerges at the political/diplomatic level in Vienna, but this is not the level of a country's global reputation (the reputation of a country as a whole is not actually affected) (interviewee nos. 2, 15, 20, 30). States are not concerned with reputation because the Vienna Document contains no accountability mechanisms and sanctions (interviewee nos. 1, 24, 25, 29). Cases of noncompliance (like the rejection of an inspection by Tajikistan in 2013) might be debated in the FSC, but there are no other tools available to exert compliance (interviewee no. 16). There is an awareness that «punishment» can come from other mechanisms and not the Vienna Document CSBMs (interviewee no. 1). Non-compliance with the Vienna Document is not a media issue like human rights. Cases of noncompliance are mostly not published. There is no interest in publishing such material (interviewee nos. 3, 27). There is no serious «naming, blaming and shaming» mechanism in the OSCE to force countries to worry more about their reputation. Despite the official reminding mechanism (which is also inefficient if a country does not react), Russia occasionally does blaming and shaming by publicly stating the names of these countries. But the usual response from the blamed and shamed countries is often the same – naming, blaming and shaming in return (interviewee nos. 2, 22, 24). Countries involved in military conflict or related to grey zones care less for their reputation because their immediate political and national security interests overrule any concerns for their reputation for complying with the norms and rules of the Vienna Document CSBMs (interviewee nos. 7, 8, 18, 19, 20). Accordingly, reputation costs are not as important as their position costs (interviewee no. 9). This is how withholding military budget information for national security reasons and the related political gains Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 103 arising from non-compliance outweigh the reputational concerns (interviewee nos. 17, 20). An expert from a country with not such a good reputation for compliance stressed that states are most concerned about counterbalancing and that all states have some instances of non-compliance (interviewee no. 10). This seems like an explanation/excuse for that country’s own non-compliance, although it is true that states fully committed to the norms and rules of the Vienna Document sometimes also submit reports late. Another respondent stressed that in the case of Azerbaijan there is clear dissatisfaction with the status quo in the Karabakh issue, and this is reflected in its attitude to the Vienna Document. But the problem is that the Vienna Document CSBMs cannot play a role in resolving these conflicts (interviewee no. 20). The low position of the OSCE and the Vienna Document in the hierarchy of international organisations has created a situation in which UN, EU and NATO issues hold priority over the OSCE issue and the associated reputational effects of non-compliance (interviewee no. 9). Even though some neutral countries (like Switzerland) or Germany (for historical reasons) put great emphasis on the OSCE, the Vienna Document is actually not high on the priority list of the participating countries. Only a small number of people in ministries deal with it and thus reputational effects are not as important as might have been otherwise (interviewee no 14). The possibility and fear of the transfer of a reputational issue to other areas in which the country's reputation matters was also detected. A bad reputation in arms control and CSBM commitments can or may spill over to other areas in which that country’s reputation is important (diplomatic relations in general, trade etc.) (interviewee no. 18). This fear is, according to one respondent, substantiated by the actions of a country like Russia which in 2012 used its non-compliance as a bargaining chip in other negotiations (interviewee no. 20) and also vetoed the draft decision on SALW issues since it mentioned a substantial modernisation of the Vienna Document (interviewee no. 8). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime during Military Crises and Periods of Conflicts («Foul-Weather Situations») We already noted the Vienna Document aims to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and achieving disarmament so as to give effect and expression to the duty of the participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations and in their international Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 104 relations generally. The respondents were asked (see the previous sections) to assess the extent to which the Vienna Document CSBMs achieve their basic general objectives, like strengthening confidence, transparency, predictability, stability, security and refraining from the threat or use of force in interstate relations. The results presented in the earlier sections reflect the asymmetric level of achieving these objectives. Military crisis or conflict is the Achilles heel of any confidence- and security-building measures as it reflects their partial or complete ineffectiveness. In reality, conflicts do happen and the respondents were therefore also specifically asked to estimate the extent of compliance with the Vienna Document CSBM regime during periods of crisis and conflict (foul-weather situations). This question is important because Chapter III of the Vienna Document 2011 on risk reduction provides a mechanism for consultation and cooperation in the event of unusual military activities (i.e. activities that mostly lead to the eruption of military crisis or conflict are already an expression of an existing conflict). This mechanism stipulates that participating states will consult and cooperate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled activities of their military forces outside their normal peacetime locations within the zone of application for CSBMs and about which a participating state expresses a security concern. The participating state with such concerns may submit a request for an explanation to another state. The request for explanation needs to be replied to within 48 hours and then there is a possibility of a bilateral meeting. Both parties can request a joint meeting of the Permanent Council and of the Forum for Security Co-operation be held, which can lead to recommendations on appropriate measures to stabilise the situation (Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence Building and Security Building Measures, 2011: 12-13). It should also be noted that during crises in the Vienna Document application zone the CSBM mechanism should be operational at least in the rest of the application zone where information should be exchanged, inspections and evaluations carried out etc. The majority of respondents (18 of them) believe the Vienna Document plays no effective role in times of crisis and the remaining experts responding to this question think it only plays a small, weak or limited role during crises. This corresponds to the general feeling among the respondents that the Vienna Document is actually a «good-weather document», not a «badweather document». This means it works only in periods where there is no crisis or conflict, and that it is able to strengthen peace when there already is peace. Specifically, several actors stressed that the Vienna Document CSBMs can be efficient before a conflict or crisis and right after one (interviewee nos. 5, 16, 24, 25) because it was not conceived and designed to Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 105 prevent the threat or use of force in interstate relations (interviewee nos. 6, 21, 28, 29). The main goal and task of the CSBMs is to avoid such military conflicts and crises and, should they break out, it is the failure of the CSBM and its role has finished for the period of conflict or at least as long as there is no ceasefire. The situation needs to be stabilised and then the actors can start establishing confidence and try to build security through confidence (interviewee no. 8). One respondent stated the CSBMs are always the first casualty of conflicts, and it requires considerable political will to apply them again (like in the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008) (interviewee no. 20). The example of successful sub-regional CSBMs in the Western Balkans clearly shows their adoption was possible only after a conflict situation (interviewee no. 26). In a crisis where there is no confidence, the effectiveness of the CSBMs is surely affected (interviewee no. 29). During the interviews with the experts, the perception of Chapter III on risk reduction was largely one of frustration. The respondents were aware of its limitations and applicability in practice, but some indicated it has to be improved (upgraded). The general perception is that the risk-reduction clauses are not fully applied in practice and that this part of the Vienna Document is actually dormant (not often applied in crises) (interviewee nos. 3, 8, 27, 29, 30) or even a «dead letter» (interviewee no. 9). The rare past applications of Chapter III (e.g. in the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008) were not perceived as effective for conflict resolution: the Vienna Document created a forum for discussion, but it was useless in terms of resolving the conflict (interviewee nos. 29, 3). Yet one respondent stressed the Vienna Document has been very successful in terms of early warning (interviewee no. 14). The primary reasons perceived for ineffectiveness during military crises was again the prevalent focus of countries on their own national interests and advantages, affecting their political will to comply with the Vienna Document (interviewee nos. 6, 12, 15, 22, 29). These states have a chance to claim force majeure, an inability to guarantee the safety of the inspectors/verifiers, declare a conflict zone a sensitive military security area (interviewee nos. 1, 7, 20) or declare interference in internal affairs (interviewee no. 27). It was, however, stressed that the Vienna Document’s provisions can be applied in areas in the vicinity of or around a crisis area or frozen conflict (grey area) (interviewee nos. 7, 27). Some respondents also stressed that during a crisis/conflict the risk-reduction mechanism can and has led to information being exchanged via diplomatic channels (interviewee no. 8) and a slowdown in the crisis (interviewee no. 23). It was pointed out that the Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 106 OSCE has other mechanisms available for conflict/crisis management (interviewee nos. 6, 25) and that the Vienna Document CSBMs can support these mechanisms (interviewee no. 16). The respondents mentioned the opportunity to improve the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during military crises and conflicts. Proposals made by several states are on the table. The Dutch proposal foresees an automatic mechanism that would give the Secretary General, on the request of the participating states, the initiative for execution while reporting to the Permanent Council. The Russian proposal foresees a mechanism where the taking of each step needs a PC decision (thus introducing a right to veto) (interviewee nos. 9, 17, 30). On the other hand, warning voices were raised not to expect the Vienna Document to be a tool for crisis management (interviewee no. 11), that any kind of improvement to Chapter III cannot substitute for the lack of political will in crises (interviewee no. 17) and that military crises and conflicts should be solved at the political level and not through arms control and CSBM methods (interviewee no. 21). This means that military and non-military CSBMs need to be integrated into a broader package, which includes a political fix to the conflict itself. A very good example is the Balkans where the CSBMs were integrated into a broader peace settlement, the Dayton framework (interviewee no. 29). Early on in the crisis in Ukraine, Chapter III of the Vienna Document was used by Ukraine, the USA, Estonia, Canada and the Russian Federation. Three joint FSC-PC meetings were held to discuss the situation (although the Russian Federation did not attend). In addition, voluntary visits to dispel concerns were arranged by Ukraine (56 military observers and civilian personnel). The observers attempted to enter Crimea in four attempts in vain (even firing warning shots). Consequently, the group was not able to dispel the military concerns in Crimea. These facts confirm the above observation that the Vienna Document CSBMs can only play a limited role during a crisis. We should stress at this point that the OSCE/CSCE actually adopted a special CSBM document for crises in 1993 entitled: Stabilising Measures for Localised Crisis Situations (1993). This document offered a catalogue of specific military significant stabilising measures for local crisis situations. The application of these measures is not automatic and only possible based on the prior consent and active support of the parties involved in the crisis. The catalogue includes the following measures: ˗ Measures of transparency: extraordinary information exchange in addition to the Vienna Document information exchange (on numbers of Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 107 formations and units, their locations, detailed command structure, consideration of irregular forces), notification of certain military activities in the crisis area, and notification of plans for the acquisition and deployment of major weapon and equipment systems in crises. ˗ Measures of constraint (with an appropriate consideration of the relationship with legitimate needs to protect state borders): introduction and support of a cease-fire with the disengagement of forces, establishment of demilitarised zones (and related withdrawal of forces, prohibition on their presence and deployment, withdrawal of weapons to an agreed distance from the zone etc.), cessation of military flights (with the exception of safe passage for peacekeeping, humanitarian or other similar flights), deactivation of certain weapon systems, subordination of irregular forces operating in the crisis area. ˗ Measures to reinforce confidence: public statements to avoid further escalation of the conflict, invitation to observers of certain military activities, creation of liaison teams with direct communication capabilities between local operational headquarters, establishment of direct communication lines between respective capitals and their operational headquarters (hotlines), creation of joint expert teams etc. ˗ Monitoring of compliance and evaluation of agreed stabilising measures to clarify ambiguous situations, build confidence and avoid misperceptions: evaluation of data provided under extraordinary information exchange, inspections, observation of compliance within demilitarised zones, verification of heavy weapons, challenge inspections and an aerial observation regime (Stabilising Measures for Localised Crisis Situations, 1993). The document also allows for the participation of third parties (states, OSCE or non-state parties). The inclusion of the latter is conceptually very important. They can be identified and can participate in crisis prevention, management and/or settlement, and this activity would not affect their status, according to the document. Kapanadze, Richter and Zellner (2016) discussed the possibility of the above described status-neutral arms control approach in crises. They stressed that the success of the Helsinki process in the 1970s was linked to the willingness of states to accept the territorial status quo. That is why modern territorial disputes in Eastern Europe have poisoned relations among states and hampered the implementation of CSBMs and arms-control agreements. Such a status-neutral approach cannot be achieved without the political will of the states involved, it can only be enforced if all sides Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 108 agree. In practice, this was not achieved in all crises where the central governments do not control de facto regimes in some territorial areas. Four examples prove this: ˗ the case of Nagorno Karabakh reflects the absence of relations between the state of Azerbaijan and the de facto regime, ˗ the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia reveal only limited relations, ˗ the case of Eastern Ukraine shows that the de facto authorities of Donetsk and Luhansk are not part of the official mediation format of the Trilateral Contact Group, but they frequently negotiate and have signed the two Minsk agreements (in September 2014 and February 2015), ˗ yet the case of Transnistria reflects official recognition of the de facto regime as a negotiation partner by the concerned state in the formal 5+2 negotiation scheme (Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, EU and USA), but with unsuccessful implementation of the agreed arms-control and CSBM measures. Effectiveness in Internal Armed Conflicts By being embedded in the OSCE architecture, the Vienna Document and CSBMs suffer from certain weaknesses and challenges due to the nature of the OSCE. According to Zellner (2005: 32-34), one such problem is the contradiction between the OSCE’s comprehensive and all-encompassing framework for general cooperation among states and the fact that most challenges and conflicts are in fact of a domestic or intra-state nature. Indeed, statistically speaking, most armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been internal in character between the official government and smaller ethnic groups. It is also true that many of these internal conflicts were politically or even militarily penetrated by external actors. The respondents were therefore asked about their perception of the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs in past internal armed conflicts and the extent to which they think these CSBMs could be useful for preventing future internal armed conflicts (crises). The large majority of respondents believe the Vienna Document CSBMs were not effective in past internal conflicts. Only a minority think its effectiveness has been very limited. The examples of (internal) grey zones and previous armed conflicts (Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, North Cyprus, Chechnya, Kosovo and South Ossetia/Abkhazia) point to the ineffectiveness of the Vienna Document (interviewee nos. 1, 7, 9, 10, 15, 19, 29). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 109 It is impossible to conduct inspection or verification visits in these areas and there is limited or no exchange of information. This is logical in the perception of several respondents because the Vienna Document is a tool for regulating interstate military relations, creating confidence among participating states and not for regulating political issues and internal conflicts (interviewee nos. 11, 21, 3). The main problem here is that sovereign nations are involved in both starting and resolving such conflicts. These nations manage the Vienna Document CSBM regime, and there is no supranational body, like the UN Security Council, to «rule» or «pass judgment» on these internal conflicts (interviewee no. 25). Other respondents also pointed to the problem of not capturing the paramilitary and interior forces (interviewee nos. 1, 7, 24) frequently used in internal armed conflicts. For example, some participating states have put their Main Battle Tanks under the ministries of interior (Georgia, Turkey), which makes the AEMI mechanism ineffective (interviewee no. 14). This kind of «blindness» of the Vienna Document CSBM regime is somewhat compensated by the participating states through their intelligence services that may intensively gather data in such cases (interviewee no. 2). A key problem related to effectiveness with internal armed conflicts has an interpretational nature. Some respondents pointed out it is sometimes difficult to figure out if some conflict is more intrastate or interstate (interviewee no. 12) and that the dividing line cannot be drawn in practice (interviewee no. 30). It is sometimes very difficult to determine «who is the aggressor» and this is why the distinction between internal and external conflict is artificial. In diplomacy, actors almost have an obligation to think about internal and external (interstate and intrastate) conflict as two completely distinct issues, while the advantage of the academic approach adopted in this book is to observe the reality in more complex terms (interviewee no. 29). In response to the question on to what extent the Vienna Document CSBMs could be useful for preventing future internal armed conflicts (crises), the respondents largely answered in the negative (it cannot be useful), but simultaneously many also expressed their ideas and views on how to improve their performance. The majority believe it would be politically difficult (due to problems with political consensus) to change the Vienna Document to make it more effective and useful for preventing internal conflicts. Such provisions would be completely unacceptable for a number of participating states (interviewee nos. 9, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24). Other reasons supporting these perceptions include: Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 110 ˗ even if an internal-conflict provision were to be added to the Vienna Document, it would still be a politically binding regime (interviewee no. 3); ˗ adding internal conflict provisions to the Vienna Document as an intrastate agreement does not make sense because internal conflicts include rebels (not parties to the agreement) (interviewee no. 4); ˗ adding internal-conflict provisions would infringe the sovereignty of countries and represent interference in internal affairs (interviewee nos. 5, 8, 15, 24, 27); ˗ other OSCE mechanisms should be put more into action in the case of internal armed conflicts (Code of Conduct, human rights instruments etc.) (interviewee nos. 20, 25, 27) and one should be careful not to create parallel structures in the area of arms control and CSBMs (interviewee no. 18). On the other hand, there is something the Vienna Document CSBM regime can do in the case of internal conflicts. The risk-reduction measures under Chapter III and inspections could be utilised more in times of internal conflict (interviewee nos. 18, 30). They enable the participating states concerned to ascertain if a threat or intrastate difficulty exists (interviewee nos. 7, 14, 22) and ensure the conflict will not spill over (interviewee no. 13). The point is that this chapter does not differentiate between internal and external military activity, it just refers to unusual military activity (interviewee no. 5) and points to any troop concentration when fighting (interviewee no. 3). Other ideas on how to improve the effectiveness of the Vienna Document in internal armed conflicts referred to reducing the thresholds for military activities (interviewee no. 2) and including paramilitary and internal forces in the Vienna Document (interviewee no. 1). What to do about Non-compliance in the Vienna Document CSBM Regime? The dilemma about what to do with serious cases of non-compliance with the Vienna Document has entered many past debates. The arguments in those debates mainly pointed out the need to stimulate voluntary compliance, but also some voices arguing for sanctions have appeared from time to time. The Vienna Document CSBM regime belongs to «international institutions for assurance» which, by the use of mechanisms for transparency, show that the institution’s members do not have exploitative intentions but Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 111 seek instead to maintain cooperative relations. The task of such institutions is not to enforce rules or sanction members, but to make it easier for them to reveal their benign intentions (Wallander, Haftendorn & Keohane, 1999: 8).22 Cooperative security arrangements are established by consent rather than imposed by threat of force, so they must be based on premises that can be widely accepted as politically legitimate. This means that they seek to accomplish their purposes through institutionalised consent and positive incentives to induce compliance rather than via threats of material or physical coercion. It presupposes fundamentally compatible security objectives and seeks to establish collaborative rather than confrontational relationships among national military establishments (Nolan, 1994: 5-12). It should be clear that the countries not participating in the arrangement will not gain any benefits (Nolan, 1994: 15) and that the most obvious cost of violation is the loss of the anticipated benefits of the agreement itself (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 83). On the other hand, the debate highlights the fact that cooperative security in Europe will evolve towards a tighter institutional framework and the assignment of responsibilities and penalties will become somewhat of a more automatic process (Kelleher, 1994: 325). This means such arrangements and regimes must be at least implicitly based on the prospect of enforceable sanctions for non-compliance and to deter and if necessary redress egregious and obdurate violations (see Nolan, 1994: 12; Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 68). There are three preconditions for the successful operation of the strategy of reciprocity (embodied by the sanctions in our case) in international relations: (1) defections and defectors must be identified; (2) retaliation (if necessary) must punish that defector and only the defector; and (3) someone must be prepared to bear the costs of sanctioning (Keohane in Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 35). The divergent debate on how to achieve compliance in cooperative security arrangements and regimes led us to ask the respondents about their perceptions concerning this matter. The first question was whether it was considered at any point that non-compliant countries would be excluded from receiving the benefits of the Vienna Document security regime. A large majority of respondents stated this was not debated in the past and would not be possible in the future, while a minority knows this was actually discussed. Exclusion from receiving the regime’s benefits would not be possible because the Vienna Document does not foresee sanctions (interviewee no. 9) or exclusion (interviewee no. 29) and there would be no consensus 22 The central problem for a cooperative security regime is not deterrence but reassurance. The actors must have confidence that the other participants are abiding by the applicable restrictions on force structures and capabilities (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 65). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 112 on this in any case (interviewee nos. 10, 12). Such a measure would also damage the consensus nature of the Vienna Document (interviewee no. 11) and go against the document’s political bindingness of the (interviewee no. 8).23 The Vienna Document contains no principle of reciprocity. The aim of this document and related CSBMs (and the main benefit) is to create confidence among the participating states. Those that comply obtain more confidence and those that do not comply acquire less confidence (benefit) (interviewee nos. 3, 1). Exclusion of a non-complying country from receiving the benefits would also not make sense in a cooperative security regime because the OSCE would lose the last tool for leverage and it is better to have such countries included in the regime or club so as to control them (interviewee nos. 25, 22). In this respect, some respondents perceived such a measure as counterproductive, questioned its usefulness (interviewee nos. 6, 19, 20, 23, 25) and concluded it might lead to the disintegration of the Vienna Document or perhaps even the OSCE as a whole (interviewee no. 24). Yet the respondents remember that former Yugoslavia was suspended from CSCE/OSCE membership in the 1990s and that Belarus’ exclusion was discussed due to its human rights record (interviewee nos. 7, 8, 11, 16, 20). A minority of respondents, however, also remember that potential exclusion from receiving the benefits of the Vienna Document security regime has only been discussed informally (never formally) among OSCE circles (interviewee nos. 1, 5, 13). The second question posed to the respondents concerned the appropriate reaction to serious non-compliance in the form of sanctioning or exerting political pressure. Some academics argued that the incentives for compliance must be built in the regime (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 112). The respondents were reminded that the Vienna Document is a political convention which is not legally binding among the participating states. They were asked to comment on the following statement: «Can we say that the point of the VD CSBM regime is not to sanction non-compliant countries, but more to exert political pressure to comply?». Almost all respondents agree the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s purpose is to apply political pressure on non-complying states and not to sanction them. Some stressed the Vienna Document is a mechanism for trust. If unusual military activities take place, then it is already too late for this document. An obligatory Vienna Document would create counter-effects because it would be based on dis- 23 According to one respondent, the main benefit of participating in the Vienna Document CSBM process is to have opportunity for dialogue and discussion and a place to meet (interviewee no. 27). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 113 trust, not on trust (interviewee no. 23). The Vienna Document is a consensus-based forum for dialogue based on free will (voluntarism) with the aim to build and increase confidence (interviewee nos. 2, 5, 7, 14), which is inconsistent with the idea of sanctions (interviewee no. 29). There is no sanction tool in the Vienna Document, introducing one would be inconceivable (interviewee nos. 6, 17, 31) as that would increase internal conflicts about interpretations and lead to the end of the regime. It would also be counterproductive since sanctions might not only motivate countries to comply but discourage them or malevolent countries preparing for conflict might ask for an exclusion (interviewee nos. 11, 22) and this would open Pandora’s box (interviewee no. 14). Such sanctions would not help and would impede adaptation of the Vienna Document as all participating states are in some kind of non-compliance (interviewee no. 10). The solution thus lies in the soft political pressure to comply (interviewee no. 2). 24 This is not an intense level of political pressure because after the appeal the countries almost always only discuss the problem (interviewee no. 3). For most of the time, the fact that states can be named and shamed in front of others and put in the spotlight is already an important argument to comply (interviewee nos. 9, 13, 25). In most cases such political pressure therefore works. It does not work solely in exceptional cases (interviewee no. 18). Some respondents also noted that, with some states, political pressure works while with others it does not. It is sometimes known to all participants that the causes of non-compliance are more deep-seated and will not be resolved simply through political pressure (interviewee nos. 24, 29). A further limit of political pressure was mentioned: political pressure occurs within the OSCE building and remains there; it is not even reported to the media (interviewee no. 13). Publicity of non-compliance could improve this mechanism (interviewee no. 8). The common denominator of this group of respondents’ perceptions is their belief the VD CSBM regime should remain sanction-free. A sobering view on the whole CSBM process stressed that political pressure does exist, but from the participating states, not from the regime. «The regime is just a collection of norms without countries» (interviewee no. 31). In addition, the procedural logic was stressed by one respondent: the purpose of the Vienna Document CSBMs is to persuade states to comply first, if this does not work, then to exert political pressure to comply, and then the sanctions can be debated, but this is already beyond the Vienna Document (interviewee no. 16), in the hands of the UN Security Council and 24 The incentives for compliance must be built in such a regime (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 112). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 114 Chapter VII of the UN Charter (interviewee nos. 12, 29). A view that rejects any kind of pressure was also expressed: it is not the purpose of the Vienna Document to exert political pressure because pressure on one state does not reflect trust. Given that the Vienna Document CSBMs are a matter of will, such pressure would destroy the spirit of the VD (interviewee no. 23). Notwithstanding this, a minority thinks that the Vienna Document does not contain a mechanism to compel and sanction state not in compliance and that it should be upgraded to become a legally binding regime in order to improve its effectiveness, if sufficient consensus can be established for that (interviewee nos. 5, 15, 26). Several respondents compared the Vienna Document CSBM regime with other arms-control regimes, such as CFE and Open Skies. They are aware there is a greater emphasis on sanctions in legally binding treaties, but even there they are not used that much because it is actually difficult to apply and enforce them. The case of Russia was often mentioned as it stopped applying CFE in 2007 (it stopped exchanging information) and then other countries stopped sending information to Russia in 2012. But the question is how to enforce any sanctions on a powerful actor in a legally binding regime: should states go to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (interviewee nos. 3, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 20)? The dilemma described in the previous paragraph led us to ask whether the political binding nature of the Vienna Document and related CSBMs is more a strength (or comparative advantage) or a weakness of the regime. The majority of respondents perceive the regime’s political binding nature as a strength, with only a minority seeing it more as a weakness, or both (6 respondents). The former group of respondents perceives the political bindingness of the Vienna Document as a strength because of its specific role among the mutually complementary arms-control documents. Legal bindingness is a characteristic of other documents (interviewee nos. 2, 6). It was stressed in this respect that many proposals to amend the Vienna Document have been motivated by the blockade of the CFE. If the CFE were alive the opposite might be the case (interviewee no. 12). This group of respondents thinks a politically binding document is easier to adopt in the first place and more flexible and adaptable to new circumstances as no ratification is needed. It is also easier to modernise and it is more inclusive (interviewee nos. 7, 9, 13, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 31). Yet a minority of respondents claimed the Vienna Document’s political nature is more a weakness in comparison with the potential legal nature (interviewee nos. 17, 19) and argued for an «upgrade from a political to a legal document» (interviewee nos. 10, 22). This division of opinions made some respondents undecided as to Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 115 whether the political binding nature is more a strength or a weakness (interviewee nos. 5, 24). In addition, arguments against the overly optimistic and unrealistic view of a legally binding instead of a politically binding document were expressed. Practice shows that a legally binding document can also be blocked (interviewee no. 11) and that commitments have to be complied with regardless of the legal or political nature of the document (interviewee no. 21). For one respondent, the creation of a legally binding regime would be pointless given that most countries do not represent a security threat to his country. A legally binding document would also require a more extensive apparatus, more complicated verification, an arbitration and dispute-settlement mechanism, a sort of «mini UN» (interviewee no. 29). Distribution of the Benefits of Cooperation/Participation in the Vienna Document CSBM Regime It is vital for the CSBM regime that the partners perceive the mechanism as fair to all participants. We therefore asked respondents if the benefits of cooperating within the Vienna Document CSBM regime are equally distributed among the participating states or whether some states profit more than others (are there any winners or losers in this process). The respondents were clearly divided on this question. The same respondents frequently expressed the view that there is an equal distribution of benefits in general and unequal distribution in practice. The respondents argued that «generally», «normatively speaking», «globally speaking», «in principle», «on paper» or «in Vienna» the benefits of cooperation are equally distributed among the participating states (interviewee nos. 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 18, 19, 21, 24). The reasons stated for this include the equality of all participating states (interviewee nos. 11, 18), the win-win principle applied in the document (there are no winners or losers) (interviewee nos. 2, 3, 20, 26, 28, 29), the equal access to information for all participating states (interviewee nos. 1, 10), equal evaluation and inspection quotas (interviewee no. 8), equal opportunities or rights to use the mechanisms («equal benefit opportunities») (interviewee nos. 9, 12, 15, 21, 27), and the consensual nature of the decision-making process («if you feel that you stand to lose, you just don’t adopt the decision») (interviewee no. 17). The authors of this book were also told it is not politically correct to use the words «winners and losers» in relation to benefits and that only transparency can be a winner or a loser (interviewee nos. 3, 25). Yet the fact is we are employing and testing a theoretical concept here and not conducting a Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 116 political project that aims to influence the future decisions of states. This proved to be correct because, on the other hand, several respondents stressed the benefits are actually not equally distributed among the participating states or that some states profit more than others (they are the winners in the process). Several reasons were given for this: The states which comply more and carry out more activities benefit more (also profit and win more) than noncompliant and non-active countries. This means those that are more committed extract more from the Vienna Document CSBM regime (interviewee nos. 3, 6, 7, 22, 23). It also means the opportunities for all states are in principle equally distributed, but differences among states’ endeavours result in an uneven distribution of outcomes (benefits). For example, if state A could inspect state B but does not use this opportunity, whereas state C does, we could say state C has a greater benefit (information, knowledge etc.) from the regime than state A (interviewee nos. 18, 21). Central Asian states were mentioned here as countries benefiting less than other countries (interviewee no. 22). Countries not using fully the quotas for inspections and evaluations benefit less than other countries (interviewee no. 12). For some respondents, the reasons for not using all the quotas are financial (lack of money) and a related lack of political will. This is mostly the case with small and poor countries. In addition, the opportunity to use additional regional CSBMs was mentioned as a reason for not using all the quotas (interviewee nos. 7, 8, 11, 12, 27). It should be stressed that one respondent disagreed with the claim that more developed countries benefit more from the CSBM regime (interviewee no. 17). States with a more stable security environment obtain more benefits than states involved in a protracted/frozen conflict (grey zone) or in the vicinity of that conflict. The latter states benefit less because the Vienna Document is not implemented there (interviewee nos. 5, 8, 10, 12, 20). The states on the borderline of the area of the Cold War could benefit more than, for example, Atlantic countries. Some of the latter countries feel security fatigue after a long time of peace and then the question is asked about why one should invest in the Vienna Document CSBM activities (interviewee no. 20). The misbalance in the information being exchanged makes some noncompliant states benefit more than compliant states. If a country does not provide information, it can still obtain it from others (for example, two countries have not provided information for years) (interviewee nos. 31, 14). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 117 In the opinion of one respondent, states without armed forces benefit more than other states because they can participate in inspections but do not need to accept them (interviewee no. 31). The limited area of application of the Vienna Document CSBMs is also considered a reason for the unequal distribution of benefits. Some respondents are not satisfied with the fact the territories of continental USA, Canada and Mongolia are not covered by the Vienna Document so they cannot receive a verification or inspection visit on their national territory and do not have to send information, yet they can send verification or inspection teams and read information sent by others (interviewee nos. 7, 9, 16, 27, 30). Russia has stated on different occasions that it finds the situation with Canada unfair (sometimes even Canadians believe the same) (interviewee no. 9). The fact that NATO states do not inspect themselves is interpreted by these states in the OSCE community as an expression of trust among the NATO member states (they exchange similar information by different means), but some other states understand this as the unbalanced and incorrect application of the Vienna Document. This practice harms the Vienna Document in the perspective of the OSCE (interviewee no. 14) and leads to an unequal distribution of the benefits (interviewee no. 30). This fact (not inspecting themselves) has also inevitably led NATO states to focus in their verification and inspection activities on the area of the former Soviet Union (the area with countries at risk and the area of strategic interest in terms of stability). Consequently, Russia and some other Eastern countries feel the Vienna Document is a mechanism that runs against them (interviewee nos. 2, 14). From their perspective, the lack of trust is concentrated in one place and so NATO benefits more. On the other hand, the benefits are equal from the NATO perspective (interviewee no. 13). One respondent thinks that the focus on the area of the former Soviet Union is also a result of the fact that Russia sometimes attempts to act like a superpower, attracting the attention of military verifications and inspectors (interviewee no. 31). Interestingly, we also detected the existence of «bloc» thinking in relation to quotas. For example, one respondent contended the number of quotas is more or less balanced by the main blocs: NATO vs. Russia and allies (interviewee no. 7), while another respondent thought the quotas are not equally distributed or are asymmetrically distributed between NATO and Russia because the former has much more quotas. On these grounds, a proposal was made to equalise the quotas for NATO and Russia because that would only be fair (interviewee no. 16). As always in the OSCE community, there are also respondents who do not perceive the NATO problem of Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 118 mutual non-inspection as a problem or as a reflection of the unequal distribution of the benefits (interviewee nos. 12, 1). At the end of this section, it should be stressed that several respondents perceive the unequal distribution of benefits among the participating states not as being due to the Vienna Document CSBM regime itself, but more to the differences among the participating states (interviewee nos. 6, 8, 18, 20, 21). Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Power International regimes are connected to power and the way it is distributed among states, even if that may not seem like this at first sight. Changes in power and how it is distributed might lead to a change in the regime. In the transition from a competitive model to cooperative security model, it is very important how the impacts on power are perceived. The realist power-based theory of regimes has stressed that the distribution of power (together with the distribution of the benefits of cooperation, as discussed before) affects the prospects of effective regimes emerging and persisting (see Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997: 3). In our study, we asked the respondents about their perceptions because perceptions of power and changes to it also play a significant role in practice. We first enquired whether they think the Vienna Document CSBMs have altered the distribution of power among the participating states. The lion’s share of the respondents (23 of them) believe the Vienna Document has not altered the distribution of power. Following the end of Cold the War, the power distribution has changed for reasons other than the Vienna Document (interviewee nos. 1, 3, 27, 29) and the Vienna Document has merely accompanied those changes. Some respondents stressed the CFE treaty has had a greater impact on the distribution of power (interviewee nos. 9, 20, 25), while the Vienna Document is more a mechanism for balancing power (interviewee no. 2) and increasing trust (interviewee no. 9) or reducing threat perceptions (interviewee no. 7). However, some claimed the OSCE has not overcome the division between East and West, albeit the geography has changed slightly (from the Soviet Union in opposition to NATO through to Russia, Belarus and some other countries in opposition to NATO today) (interviewee no. 12). Another opinion put forward was that states that are inspected more often than others project the view that they are victims of the Vienna Document CSBM process. They then blame NATO member states for not inspecting each other (interviewee no. 13). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 119 Our second question concerned views held about the attitude of the great powers to the Vienna Document CSBMs. We were particularly interested in perception how much the great powers truly support the Vienna Document CSBM regime. It is realistic to say that the more supportive the great powers, the more effective the Vienna Document regime. Regime theory also suggests the great powers can be involved in a so-called collaboration game (see Keohane, Haftendorn and Wallander, 1999: 330). The general perception held by the respondents was that the great powers (the USA and Russia) hold positive attitudes to the Vienna Document CSBMs, albeit with serious caveats. It was made clear that the USA and Russia have been the key stakeholders of the Vienna Document (interviewee nos. 5, 6, 9) and that the process does not make much sense without them (interviewee no. 22). However, many of the respondents stressed America and Russia’s generally positive attitude has been strongly influenced by their national interests, the broader context of arms control, and the relations between them. These explanations have been driven by the feeling that this is on one hand normal and, on the other, by frustration that they both use this mechanism mainly to suit their own ends. One respondent argued the states are all equal in the Vienna Document but, in reality, some are more equal than others: if Russia and the USA do not comply, then this is different to the non-compliance of a smaller state (interviewee no. 13). One group of respondents contends the great powers do not let the Vienna Document guide them, instead being led solely by their national interests (interviewee no. 31). If something runs contrary to their national interest, they simply block suggestions or proposals that may go in that direction (interviewee no. 19). With sensitive issues in terms of impacts on their national interests, mutual mistrust has been obvious (interviewee no. 3). For example, the USA does not support extending today’s military capabilities addressed in the Vienna Document to include other military services, such as the navy, because it wishes to preserve its freedom of movement in the Mediterranean Sea. In contrast, Russia has not been supportive due to its priority of reorganising its armed forces (it has not wished to be hampered by the Vienna Document in its military restructuring efforts) (interviewee nos. 27, 25)), uncertainty about the future of the CFE treaty, the deployment of a NATO missile defence system and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia opposes any substantive modernisation of the Vienna Document and prefers small technical adaptations in order to improve its effectiveness and efficiency, because it «wanted to balance the tactical area if the strategic level is not balanced for them» (interviewee no. 9). Some respondents even perceive Russia’s behaviour as having a «pick and choose» character when Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 120 it comes to compliance (interviewee no. 11). Both great powers’ compliance in the context of their national interests was also described in the following way: «when I need, I respect, when I do not have a need, I do not respect» (interviewee no. 12). A somewhat cynical yet still informative view was expressed by another one respondent to highlight how useful the un-usefulness of the Vienna Document can be. Interviewee no. 17 namely contends that because the Vienna Document’s provisions and obligations are so weak, it is unlikely that any great power would leave the regime or stop implementing it. Accordingly, the great powers generally support the Vienna Document CSBMs because this also allows an opportunity to blame the other for non-compliance. For example, in 2012 the USA was blaming Russia for non-compliance and in response Russia drew up a long list of acts of non-compliance by EU and NATO members. While this practice has been used by other participating states, Russia and the USA are the biggest exponents of it. The great powers’ strong expression of their national interests also has effects for other states. According to some respondents, the great powers sometimes still use the Cold War rhetoric and approach, while other smaller states align their own positions according to the bloc they are a member of (NATO, countries aspiring for NATO membership, like many Western Balkan countries, and Russia together with allies like Belarus and also Armenia). Smaller countries express their position, but this is in reality the position held by one of the great powers. In mutual accusations regarding compliance, each side believes it is sufficiently transparent. The problem here is that the Vienna Document requires consensus and that will be always blocked if there are blocs among the participating states (a pro-NATO and a pro-Russian bloc) (interviewee nos. 2, 16, 23). Moreover, the Vienna Document is only part of the broader political and security relations among states, especially the great powers. The Vienna Document CSBMs actually mirror the general security relationship between the great powers (interviewee nos. 8, 29). Some respondents observed how the great powers have used the Vienna Document to exert political pressure in other political areas in which they also play a role. For one respondent, the Vienna Document is for the great powers a political arena for playing games and trying to outsmart each other (interviewee no. 4). The immediate broader context for the Vienna Document CSBMs is arms control and the related interlocking agreements – CFE and Open Skies – as many respondents noted (interviewee nos. 6, 8, 19, 29). Yet this context, in perception of some respondents, spells a problem for the Vienna Document CSBMs. The CFE deadlock has led the great powers to create a deadlock concerning the Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 121 Vienna Document. In fact, the great powers have started to see everything related to the Vienna Document in the CFE context. Political games played in one regime also seek to advance a certain interest or make a point in another. The Vienna Document has also been used as a bargaining chip in other negotiations (interviewee nos. 7, 18, 20, 23, 28). As a result, it is clear to all that states will have to take one step forward and finally find a better solution for the future of arms control in Europe but agreeing on the right path currently seems unclear given the differing views. The Vienna Document could well be improved if the deadlock over the CFE is solved, but this also raises the idea of solving all arms-control issues in one package (perhaps a new document). If the problem with CFE is not resolved, the Vienna Document might (as the only partially functional document) become more of a central piece in the European arms-control framework (interviewee nos. 24, 25, 27, 29). The support of the great powers also seems to vary over time. Some American presidents were more supportive of arms control, as reflected in the number of the US proposals to modernise the Vienna Document. Russia has put forward many ideas for improvement in the past, but since the second half of 2011 it has been less supportive (interviewee nos. 1, 5, 15, 27). Interestingly, one respondent asserted that the great powers once produced the main ideas on how to improve the Vienna Document, but today smaller states are producing more ideas (interviewee no. 23). As a counterbalance to the above perceptions, it should be stressed that the great powers are objectively limited by the consensus rule and the amount of support required from each participating state. Other states can, technically speaking, also block moving forward (interviewee nos. 21, 28). It was also stressed that bigger states (such as Germany and France) together with the great powers (the USA and Russia) have an agenda-setting or trend-setting influence (interviewee no. 8). The different interests held by both great powers concerning the Vienna Document were also seen as quite a normal consequence of the fact the USA only has a small number of troops in Europe and Russia has the majority of forces in Europe (interviewee no. 22). An additional factor connected to power was disclosed by the current coordinator of the Vienna Document: the fear of losing control. This factor provides important motivation for many participating states to participate in the process (interview with Lüber, 2018). Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 122 Cost-Effectiveness of Implementing the Vienna Document CSBMs The Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999: 2) declared that the implementation of all of the OSCE commitments in good faith is essential for relations between states and between governments and their peoples. When talking about putting it into practice, we should have in mind that Vienna Document can be implemented to the letter of its articles and also to the spirit of the document. The former refers to a broader view transcending the articles, words and letters in the document, which is equally important for building trust among the participating states. The cost-effectiveness of implementing the Vienna Document has different aspects. The broadest context is the potentially highly efficient Vienna Document CSBMs that reduce threat perceptions and in turn lead to lower military spending. In this way, the nations’ existing resources could be spent in other areas (interviewee no. 7). The cost-effectiveness that is discussed in this chapter, however, relates more to implementation of the Vienna Document in light of the growing financial constraints caused by the world economic crisis and the eurozone crisis (namely, this question was posed to the respondents). Our question was answered by 27 respondents. One respondent simply stated that cost-effectiveness is a «major problem» for the Vienna Document regime, without elaborating (interviewee no. 10). Two different types of perceptions can be identified regarding the question of the cost-effectiveness of implementation: One group of respondents did not consider cost-effectiveness as an issue at all for the Vienna Document CSBM regime. The main arguments in support of this opinion were the small-scale funds involved and the much higher costs associated with the lack of confidence and transparency, e.g. a defensive military build-up (interviewee nos. 14, 16, 24). The second group expressed «qualified approval» of at least some proposals aimed at improving cost-effectiveness, but at the same time stressed that cost-effectiveness could and should not be achieved at the expense of transparency. In other words, «confidence and transparency come at a price» (interviewees nos. 3, 25, 27, 28, 29). One respondent asserted it would be best to adopt a «business case» approach to assess which of the cost-savings proposals would make verification actually cheaper when taking all factors into account (interviewee no. 6). On the issue of quantity versus quality, several respondents observed that quality rather than quantity should be the aim of the Vienna Document’s compliance and verification activities. (interviewee nos. 1, 2). One respondent said an increase in the size of teams should only be considered if that Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 123 measure does not impair the quality of the information obtained (interviewee no. 6). Other respondents noted that compliance and verification activities should be aimed at «observing something significant» (interviewee no. 29) or that the biggest misuse of financial resources occurs when an inspection is cancelled due to abuse of force majeure or the unwillingness of the host nation to proceed with the planned inspection (interviewee no. 25). Several respondents expressed support for creating a regional verification centre as a possible solution to cost-related concerns (interviewee nos. 6, 19, 23). One respondent called attention to existing best practices in the field of pooling and sharing neighbouring participating states’ verification assets (interviewee no. 9). Another respondent raised the idea of an OSCEwide verification centre operated by the CPC, which may reduce the concerns of some neutral participating states as well (interviewee no. 17). However, this concept was opposed by another respondent (interviewee no. 20). There are somewhat different views on whether increasing the size and multi-nationality of teams can produce cost savings. While several respondents supported either or both of these ideas (interviewee nos. 9, 17, 18, 19, 25), others thought that increasing the size or multi-nationality of teams would actually increase costs (interviewee nos. 7, 11). One respondent remarked that in the case of evaluation visits the bottleneck arises not in the number of inspectors but in the eventual limited access to helicopters. Moreover, the same respondent thought making teams more multi-national might be against the interests of neutral or non-aligned participating states (interviewee no. 7). Another respondent referred to the practice of mixednation flights under the Open Skies Treaty and suggested that it be used for Vienna Document-verification-related activities. Such aerial verification might lead to significant cost reductions (interviewee no 29). A different approach came from a respondent who suggested introducing bigger and more multi-national teams but fewer inspections, coupled with an overhaul of the information-exchange provisions (interviewee no. 26). One respondent favoured a reduction of team sizes (interviewee no. 15). We encountered strongly different views on the use of accommodation during compliance and verification events and the potential for savings to be made. Several respondents supported the idea of using military facilities for lodging (interviewee nos. 8, 9, 15), but most interviewees were opposed to this. The main arguments offered against were the lack of space at military premises (interviewee nos. 6, 19) and the lack of infrastructure needed for verification (interviewee 5, 18, 19). However, several respondents Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 124 acknowledged that the current accommodation standards could be lowered to achieve savings (interviewee nos. 7, 18, 23). Views were somewhat more convergent on the issue of side-events or socalled military tourism. Most respondents agreed that the abuse of compliance and verification events for military tourism should be terminated or avoided as much as possible (interviewee nos. 1, 7, 8, 11, 17). Yet, a few respondents argued that military tourism is not necessarily all bad. One respondent, for example, stated that the biggest source of hostility at the psychological level is the de-humanisation of one’s adversaries: getting to know the culture of other countries and peoples can contribute to increased confidence, also in the military-political field (interviewee no. 8). Similarly, when drawing on his own country’s experiences, another respondent pointed out that if people do get to know each other this may increase trust and confidence (interviewee no. 16). One of our interviewees recommended scrapping the Chapter IV (military contacts) visits altogether, arguing that they have lost their usefulness by now (interviewee no. 17), while another mentioned that the gift exchange that used to accompany visits has recently «gone too far» and the practice should be reconsidered (interviewee no. 18). Particular organisational measures holding cost savings potential were mentioned: the comprehensive event approach, namely, the combination of different types of events at the same time (interviewee nos. 1, 8), an increase in the 5-year period on airbase visits (interviewee no. 19) or the abolition of airbase visits altogether (interviewee no. 11). Two respondents highlighted the role of the team leader in using time and resources efficiently during an inspection or verification visit (interviewee nos. 7, 8). Some support was expressed for the verifier-pays concept, as a way of reducing the host country’s costs (interviewee nos. 5, 13, 20, 28). Yet very different perceptions were encountered about the potential effectiveness of introducing such a concept. One respondent thought that would favour the richer participating states (interviewee no. 20) while another respondent expressed concern that some proposals (the verifier-pays concept among them) might divide the participating states into two: states that can afford to conduct inspections and states that cannot (interviewee no. 22). Several respondents also linked the cost-effectiveness issue to potential amendments to the Vienna Document provisions. Two interviewees expressed their support for a reduction of inspection and evaluation visit quotas (interviewee nos. 1, 15), while in the opinion of another the solution might be «to replace some existing commitments with new ones which are more effective and efficient» (interviewee no. 9). Another respondent thinks Results of the Empirical Study on the CSBMs’ Effectiveness 125 that substantial cost savings could be achieved by replacing the existing conventional arms-control regimes (CFE, Vienna Document, Open Skies) with a single new arrangement, and by implementing a new single annual information exchange for that arrangement (interviewee no. 15). At the conclusion of this section, we may say the majority of our respondents held the view that cost issues are relevant to the Vienna Document regime but advocated a balanced approach to ensure that cost-effectiveness is not improved at the expense of transparency. Almost a unanimous view exists among our respondents that transparency comes at a price, a price worth paying only after the cost of the alternatives (e.g. a defensive military buildup) have been considered. On the other hand, the interviewees had very different views on how to bring about the greater cost-effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs. 126 6. A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime The above text reflects different aspects of the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM regime. Another kind of assessment was performed in this chapter by analysing the experts’ perceptions of the current strengths and weaknesses of the Vienna Document CSBM regime, the potential opportunities to improve its effectiveness in the future, and threats to the regime and its effectiveness (the SWOT approach). We believe such an approach is needed to fill the gap in the literature and help improve the present understanding of different aspects of the effectiveness of today’s CSBMs in Europe. The traditional SWOT approach entails identifying the internal strengths and weaknesses, and external opportunities and threats relative to the performance of a single organisation or activity. It has become a valuable tool for assessing favourable and unfavourable factors in the internal and external environment and for improving strategic planning by leading to a strategy of maximising the strengths, minimising the weaknesses, exploiting opportunities, and countering threats (Saaty 1987; Ghazinoory, Esmail Zadeh and Memariani, 2007, 99; Shinno et al., 2006, 258). One of the main drawbacks of this approach has been its qualitative nature, that is, its inability to rank the importance of the individual SWOT indicators (Arslan and Turan, 2009, 132; Lee, Huang and Teng, 2009). The modified SWOT approach employed in this chapter is based on a quantitative assessment of the SWOT variables that reflects their importance in the interviewed experts’ perceptions. The SWOT variables were ranked based on their average value on a scale from 0 to 2, where 0 means not a relevant, 1 a partially relevant and 2 a very relevant strength/weakness/opportunity/threat. The variables were identified based on the existing literature and, in the case of opportunities, also on the overview of the past official national proposals on how to improve the Vienna Document. Strengths of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime The respondents were asked to assess the relevance of the following potential strengths of the Vienna Document CSBMs regime (on a scale from 0 to 2, where 0 means not a relevant strength, 1 a partially relevant strength and 2 a very relevant strength): A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 127 1. VD CSBMs are an important source of information for all participating states; 2. VD CSBMs strengthen confidence, transparency, predictability, stability, security and dissuade states from the threat or use of force in interstate relations; 3. VD CSBMs are a useful political tool for conflict prevention, risk reduction and early warning; 4. the VD is a facilitator of military contacts and cooperation; 5. the VD is a living document with the potential for continuous adaptation; and 6. the VD is a politically binding document negotiated among all OSCE participating states. The respondents prioritised the most important strengths and distinguished them from the less relevant ones. Figure 3 shows the respondents regard the most important strength of the Vienna Document CSBM regime as facilitating military contacts and cooperation (average relevance 1.87), while the least important strength is its political usefulness for conflict prevention, risk reduction and early warning (score 0.91). The latter is consistent with the above results where some respondents had serious doubts in the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM regime for conflicts and crises. The Vienna Document CSBM regime significantly facilitates military contacts and cooperation, while it also represents an important source of information for all participating states (score 1.71).25 It also turned out that the regime’s flexibility is perceived as a very important strength. The politically binding nature of the document (score 1.75) and the fact the Vienna Document is a living document with the potential for continuous adaptation (score 1.69) are seen as particular strengths of the regime. 25 One respondent made a useful comment on the information exchange within the regime. Accordingly, the whole Vienna Document has been transformed in time. When this system was conceived, the information exchange was considered strictly confidential, and was an objective of intelligence during the Cold War. Today, so much information is openly available about the armed forces in the OSCE area that the main use of information exchange is not for intelligence. It is more about learning about how other armed forces work. The information gained through Vienna Document information exchanges helps improve the inter-operability between Western/NATO and Russian armed forces (interviewee no. 29). A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 128 Figure 3: Ranking of the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s strengths (based on average respondent answer, where 0 means not a relevant strength, 1 a partially relevant strength and 2 a very relevant strength) We note that some respondents suggested some additional examples of strengths (not covered by our SWOT) that would in their opinion rank high. These are «the ability to confirm and verify the exchanged information» (interviewee nos. 1, 9, 24) and «the inclusive non-bloc-to-bloc (non-confrontational) approach in the regime» (interviewee nos. 9, 21). In light of the above discussions on the political versus legal nature of the Vienna Document and the somewhat divided opinions on this, we asked the respondents whether the political binding nature of the Vienna Document and related CSBMs is more a strength (or comparative advantage) or a weakness (in comparison with its potential legal nature). The majority of respondents think that the politically binding nature of the Vienna Document is more a strength (interviewee nos. 4, 14, 15, 16, 18, 22, 26 etc.) and only a minority believe it is actually a weakness compared to its potential legal nature (interviewee nos. 10, 17, 19). The respondents identified the following reasons concerning why the politically binding nature is more of a strength: 1,87 1,75 1,71 1,69 1,42 0,91 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00 V D i s a f a ci li ta to r o f m il it a ry c o n ta ct s a n d c o o p e ra ti o n V D i s a p o li ti ca ll y b in d in g d o cu m e n t n e g o ti a te d a m o n g a ll t h e O S C E p a rt ic ip a ti n g S ta te s V D C S B M s a re a n i m p o rt a n t so u rc e o f in fo rm a ti o n f o r a ll p a rt ic ip a ti n g S ta te s V D i s a l iv in g d o cu m e n t w it h t h e p o te n ti a l fo r co n ti n u o u s a d a p ta ti o n V D C S B M s st re n g th e n c o n fi d e n ce , tr a n sp a re n cy , p re d ic ta b il it y , st a b il it y , se cu ri ty , a n d d is su a d e s ta te s fr o m t h e th re a t o r u se o f fo rc e i n i n te rs ta te re la ti o n s V D C S B M s a re a u se fu l p o li ti ca l to o l fo r co n fl ic t p re v e n ti o n , ri sk r e d u ct io n a n d e a rl y w a rn in g A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 129 ˗ because «legal» means sanctions and «politically binding» means the opposite (interviewee no. 2); ˗ due to the role the Vienna Document plays in the system of mutually complementary regimes (legal bindingness is a task of other regimes and documents) (interviewee nos. 1, 6); ˗ the provisions of a legally binding regime would be too strong (interviewee no. 3); ˗ because «politically binding nature» means greater flexibility for adaptation (changes in the regime and modernisation can occur quickly without ratification) (interviewee nos. 7, 9, 13, 20, 21, 27, 28) and higher commitment or compliance from the states (interviewee nos. 9, 31); ˗ since a legally binding document would require a more extensive apparatus, a more complicated verification and arbitration and dispute-settlement mechanism (a sort of mini UN) (interviewee no. 29); ˗ because its politically binding nature is a natural consequence of the realistic possibilities available to adopt these principles in the past (interviewee nos. 23, 25, 31); and ˗ its politically binding nature allows more states to be involved (greater inclusiveness) (interviewee nos. 11, 25). At this point, we might usefully add Zellner’s (2005: 32-34) thoughts and concerns about the OSCE being a vital forum for political dialogue. He argued that only larger and richer states can make full use of the organisational potential, unlike smaller states (which chiefly benefit from the political voice given by the consensus rule in the security dialogue). This would mean in our context that only larger states (or perhaps an association of many states) can exert all the elements of political dialogue, pressure etc. within the OSCE and beyond. This caveat should not be overlooked. A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 130 Weaknesses of the Vienna Document CSBM Regime The respondents were asked to assess the relevance of several potential weaknesses of the Vienna Document CSBMs regime (on a scale from 0 to 2, where 0 means not a relevant weakness, 1 a partially relevant weakness and 2 a very relevant weakness): 1. the «fair-weather character» of the VD CSBMs: they have neither prevented nor limited any serious conflicts and some states have often dropped them precisely during conflict and pre-conflict conditions; 2. the VD cannot substitute for the lack of political will shown in past crises; 3. the significant cross-national divergences over the vision for the role of the VD CSBMs; 4. the lack of implementation or obstacles to the implementation of the VD commitments; 5. the current thresholds to report military-significant activities no longer correspond to the new conditions – they are too high; 6. differing threat perceptions among the states and the related mistrust; 7. the inability to avoid artificial links with other political divergences among the participating states (e.g. links between protracted conflicts, CFE and implementation/modernisation of the VD); and 8. the absence of an agreed understanding of the meaning of force majeure. The respondents ranked the most important weaknesses, distinguishing them from less relevant ones. Figure 4 shows two groups of weaknesses. The respondents regarded the set of relevant weaknesses of the Vienna Document CSBM regime as consisting of: ˗ crisis-related weaknesses, such as the fair-weather character of the Vienna Document (ineffectiveness in preventing conflict and during conflicts, average value 1.44) and the related lack of political will during crises (score 1.41); ˗ threshold-related weakness in terms of the excessive and obsolete threshold levels that do not correspond to reality (score 1.56); and ˗ contextual weakness in terms of the inability to avoid the artificial links with other political divergences among the participating states (e.g. links with protracted conflicts, CFE and the implementation/modernisation issue; score 1.41). A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 131 The second group consists of partially relevant subjective weaknesses, such as the differing threat perceptions among the states and the related mistrust (score 1.14), significant cross-national divergences over the vision for the role of the VD CSBMs (score 1.09), absence of an agreed understanding of the meaning of force majeure (1.06) and the lack of implementation or obstacles to the implementation of the Vienna Document commitments (score 0.97). Figure 4: Ranking of the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s weaknesses (based on average respondent answer, where 0 means not a relevant weakness, 1 a partially relevant weakness and 2 a very relevant weakness) We asked the respondents to add any weaknesses they might see as relevant. The list of additional relevant weaknesses includes: ˗ a focus only on classic military potential and the exclusion of all other forces (Marines, Navy, special forces, the cyber component, headquarters, training and logistical units…) and contemporary weapon systems (especially precision weapons, anti-missile defence component) (interviewee nos. 2, 17, 20, 24, 27, 30); 1,56 1,44 1,41 1,41 1,14 1,09 1,06 0,97 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 C u rr e n t th re sh o ld s to r e p o rt m il it a ry si g n if ic a n t a ct iv it ie s n o l o n g e r co rr e sp o n d t o n e w c o n d it io n s; t h e y a re t o o h ig h “F a ir -w e a th e r ch a ra ct e r” o f th e V D C S B M s V D c a n n o t su b st it u te f o r th e l a ck o f p o li ti ca l w il l w h ic h w a s sh o w n d u ri n g p a st c ri se s In a b il it y t o a v o id t h e a rt if ic ia l li n k a g e s w it h t h e o th e r p o li ti ca l d iv e rg e n ce s a m o n g t h e p a rt ic ip a ti n g S ta te s D if fe ri n g t h re a t p e rc e p ti o n s a m o n g th e s ta te s a n d r e la te d m is tr u st S ig n if ic a n t cr o ss -n a ti o n a l d iv e rg e n ce s o v e r th e v is io n f o r th e r o le o f th e V D C S B M s N o c o m m o n u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e m e a n in g o f th e n o ti o n o f fo rc e m a je u re La ck o f im p le m e n ta ti o n o r o b st a cl e s to i m p le m e n ta ti o n o f V D co m m it m e n ts A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 132 ˗ there is no institutionalised discussion on noncompliance: most cases are not even dealt with – they are never addressed (interviewee no. 31); ˗ the relatively expensive and rigidly formatted inspection and evaluation regime (interviewee no. 9); ˗ the inability to impose arms-control measures over non-state actors in conflict zones (interview no. 15); ˗ the number of inspections and evaluations (quota) is too low for the Vienna Document and too high for CFE (interviewee no. 17); and ˗ the imprecise regulation of the equipment to be used during verification and inspection (interviewee no. 25). The above discussions on the inter-relationship between the CFE and the Vienna Document CSBMs and the somewhat divided opinions also led us to ask the respondents if a close relationship between both regimes is more a strength or a weakness for the Vienna Document CSBMs (from the Vienna Document’s perspective). The answers show a typical half-emptyglass situation where some respondents think the relation or linkage between CFE and the Vienna Document CSBMs is a weakness for the latter, while others perceive this linkage as a strength and a third set of respondents is unsure whether this is a strength or weakness and whether an actual link between both regimes exists. The first group of respondents believes this link is a weakness from the perspective of the Vienna Document because the blockade in CFE and the related uncertainty cause problems for the Vienna Document, especially for its modernisation (interviewee nos. 5, 7, 9). Some even think the Vienna Document is threatened in this way by the CFE (interviewee no. 14) and one respondent contends the link is a weakness, even without the deadlock on the CFE (interviewee no. 17). This way of thinking was clearly explained by one respondent: «we have a problem because of the CFE in the Vienna Document process, we have unresolved conflicts because of the CFE, we have returned to the bloc politics and rhetoric of impatience/intolerance. VD is a casualty or collateral damage of other processes in the region. All states are in principle for its modernisation, but nothing is eventually done within the VD. The main problem for the development of the VD is the deadlock in CFE. The big powers perceive everything related to the VD in the CFE context (how will this affect the CFE or the whole political-military dimension in the OSCE). Even technical proposals to modernise the VD are perceived through the CFE» (interviewee no. 23). Respondents from this group however feel that the negative link between the two is changeable over time because they remember that, prior to the deadlock, this link was a strength. They predicted a positive impact on the A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 133 Vienna Document when the CFE issue is settled (interviewee nos. 6, 7, 9, 18). Their prediction about the future of this link is twofold (apart from the option of solving the CFE deadlock): ˗ the integration of parts of the CFE into the Vienna Document (the methodology used in the two regimes is the same: an exchange of information and verification, battalion level approach can be used) (interviewee nos. 16, 19); or ˗ the creation of an umbrella treaty or regime to integrate both the CFE and the VD into the new European Security Architecture, as indicated by Medvedev’s plan on the European Security Treaty (a single package deal) (interviewee nos. 17, 29). Most European countries want to deal separately with each regime, but this does not mean the mentioned proposition is currently without any individual expert sympathy/support. The second group of respondents perceives the CFE-VD linkage as a strength (from the perspective of the Vienna Document) because due to logical connections the Vienna Document took on some of the responsibility and became more useful and central (interviewee nos. 20, 22, 24, 15, 26, 1). A respondent added that there is an unofficial consensus in the OSCE community that the CFE is more important than the Vienna Document. The problem in his view is that the CFE «is dead» (read «not functional») and that the Americans and Russians will probably be unable to get the new CFE approved by their parliaments. The Vienna Document therefore has an opportunity to become a future reassurance document for Europe (interviewee no. 14). However, a second thought was also expressed, namely that the success of the Vienna Document could actually represent a problem or a threat from the perspective of European arms control or the CFE (interviewee nos. 1, 3).26 The third group of respondents is unsure whether this link constitutes a strength or weakness of the Vienna Document and whether any link between the two regimes actually exists at all. These respondents stress that: 26 One of the respondents, however, downplayed the importance of the CFE deadlock by stressing that this deadlock is limited only to Russia-related issues, while outside of Russia this regime actually works (interviewee no. 25). Another respondent also stressed that the most serious problem would emerge only if all three regimes in Europe (CFE, Vienna Document and Open Skies) were blocked. Now, with the blockade of the CFE the Vienna Document represents a key tool for information exchange. This is also not such a problem because the same teams are doing inspections under all three treaties (interviewee no. 13). A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 134 ˗ no such link exists (interviewee nos. 4, 21) or should exist (interviewee no. 10); ˗ such a link could be both a strength and a weakness (interviewee nos. 11, 12, 13, 3); and ˗ the link is in fact artificial – artificially constructed by some states for political reasons (interviewee nos. 3, 31). Opportunities to Improve the Vienna Document CSBM Regime The constantly changing security environment requires ongoing changes to security institutions and regimes. The cooperative security system in Europe has constantly evolved since the end of the Cold War. However, real institutional innovations can only take place occasionally (Keohane, Haftendorn and Wallander, 1999: 332) and the system’s evolution and progress are not necessarily linear. Kelleher (1994; 296: 325) discussed different scenarios for the evolution of Europe’s cooperative security regime and predicted the institutional framework will eventually become tighter and the assignment of responsibilities and penalties will become somewhat more automatic. Accordingly, success will be measured by future agreements and cooperative actions on the regulation and reduction of offensive forces, the restructuring of national forces and facilities to ensure their increasingly defensive character, the assurance of ever greater mutual transparency and communication and further multilateral control of surprise-attack capabilities. In this chapter, we will consider some of the current and past debate on modernisation of the Vienna Document and then present the results of our interviews with military and defence experts. Former Yugoslavia was one of the main promoters of the Helsinki process and underlying philosophy. However, it turned out that none of the agreed CSBMs played any significant role in wars in the former country. The problem was that the initial CSBMs were constructed to stave off potential military conflict between states and/or blocs and not among actors within states (see Ritfeld, 2008: 5). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, some major actors (e.g. self-declared new states, paramilitary groups of volunteers etc.) were not states parties to the Vienna Document. Then, if not before, it became clear there were many opportunities to improve the Vienna Document and that states would sooner or later have to improve it. The Vienna Document has been updated, modernised and revitalised. Since its inception in 1990, the Document has been amended four times, A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 135 with each version being named after the year of adoption: the Vienna Document 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011, respectively. According to the Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999: 7), OSCE participating states committed themselves to further develop CSBM and arms-control agreements as a key contribution to political and military stability. They also stressed that timely adaptation of all OSCE instruments in the politico-military dimension is needed in order to provide an adequate response to security needs in the OSCE area. Many observers also think that, even though the Vienna Document on CSBM is one of the most original and successful normative OSCE documents in the politico-military dimension, a new generation and philosophy of CSBM are still required to address the latest security challenges. New tools are needed to cope with intra-state problems, involve non-state actors and cross-dimensional security challenges27 (Spies, 2005). Debates on modernising the Vienna Document have included many ideas and proposals on how to do achieve that. Below, we give some examples of ideas and proposals. Some have been in existence for around 10 years, but remain relevant for understanding the dynamics of the Vienna Document’s modernisation: Reports from debates organised during the Austrian Chairmanship in 2017 show that the need to modernise the Vienna Document stems from the existence of new military capabilities, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, the necessity to lower the thresholds for the notification of military activities to reflect activities conducted by smaller forces, and the need to introduce a new risk-reduction mechanism to investigate the facts following a military incident of a hazardous nature (Progress on Modernizing the Vienna Document Vital to Making the Agreement Effective in Current Challenging Security Environment, 2017). Spies (2005: 97) considered several ideas for modernising the Vienna Document during the time of his writing (he was thinking about the Vienna Document 1999, although his thoughts are still valid today). He proposed 27 A cross-dimensional security challenge is a security challenge that exists in at least two supposedly separate dimensions (e.g. military dimension and terrorist dimension, or military dimension and criminal dimension, or military dimension and health dimension etc.) and shows more or less strong cross-dimensional connections (e.g. escalation of armed conflicts leads to escalation of terrorism, organised crime, health problems etc.). On the response side, there is no single state or international actor that can solve such a crossdimensional problem (for more on this and a complete elaboration of the concept of complex crisis, see Prezelj, 2005). Similarly, while talking exclusively about the OSCE, Zellner (2005: 45) warned that thinking in terms of OSCE dimensions or baskets was outdated and even counterproductive. He observed this based on the example of comprehensive security sector reforms, where security, rule of law and human rights issues are inseparably linked. He proposed the integration of different fields of competence into a more comprehensive service. A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 136 an improvement of CSBMs in crises by inserting provisions about non-military forces, police, security services, intelligence agencies, further developing the crisis mechanism, enhancing civil-military contacts and cooperation in emergencies, incorporating information in counter-terrorism activities, border security, widening the scope of information such as the inclusion of new weapon systems, potentially changing the zone of application etc. Kulesa (2017: 1-3) reported several opportunities for improvement made at one of the main conferences in Europe on arms control and CSBM. The debate was on several dangers that could be addressed through arms control and CSBMs, such as the increased activity of military forces in close vicinity of each other, the higher likelihood of military incidents, the development and deployment of new weapons systems in Europe, potentially destabilising changes in military doctrines and postures, and technological developments that enable, for example, large-scale precision strikes and the quicker movement and concentration of troops. While conventional arms control cannot resolve conflicts, it can prevent the emergence of new tensions and assist in stabilising the situation, including in protracted conflict areas. But this conference also showed that debates on including new military doctrinal and technological changes can produce very complex dilemmas. It is unclear how to include the following weapons categories (beside battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters): stealth aircraft, air and missile defence systems, certain categories of UAVs, electronic warfare assets, major multi-purpose naval platforms etc. It is also unclear what to do about the increased range and lethality of MLRS, or how to address the jointness or multinationalism of force structures. Theoretically, it should be possible to develop a CSBM mechanism for each of these categories in terms of the exchange of information and verification, but the latter should address qualitative and quantitative aspects. Verifying cyberspace and outer-space capabilities would require additional specialised knowledge. Which conclusions then can be made about our sample of respondents? According to one respondent, what was considered unbelievable in the 1990s is today insufficient, and thus the document must be modernised (interviewee no. 23). The latest version of the Vienna Document from 2011 (incorporating the FSC decisions since 1999) may be considered more of a starting point for future negotiations on the substantial modernisation of Vienna Document CSBMs. Especially important has been the adoption of the VD PLUS procedure that allows the document to be amended without having to update the entire document. The OSCE community has several times A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 137 discussed how to improve the efficiency of implementing the Vienna Document and how to improve the document itself. The CPC each year circulates a survey seeking suggestions on how to improve the implementation, also being discussed at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM). In addition, the Heads of Verification Centres meet once a year to discuss technical aspects of implementing the Vienna Document. Several proposals and food-for-thought papers about supplementing the Vienna Document 2011 have come from many participating states (sponsor states in this case). Many of these proposals to improve the Vienna Document are disputed by other states, but this might not be the case in the future due to constantly changing security environment. The different opinions on how to improve the Vienna Document CSBMs stem from all of the perceptional and interest differences discussed above. One respondent also warned that many proposals to upgrade the Vienna Document are motivated by the blockade of the CFE (interviewee no. 12). There are two main scenarios regarding opportunities to improve the intersecting regimes established by the CFE, Vienna Document and Open Skies agreements. The fundamental provisions of the Vienna Document and other related regimes can be broadened and/or deepened. The tendency of any bureaucracy is to await the perfection of the existing regime in all its technical details before embarking on new initiatives (Kelleher, 1994: 326). We therefore asked a more general question on the opportunities to improve the Vienna Document CSBM regime before embarking on the SWOT questions. The respondents were namely asked what they generally regarded as more important: a) improving the current implementation modalities and specifying the existing provisions of the Vienna Document (deepening); b) adding new areas to the Vienna Document (widening); or c) both (deepening and widening)? No respondent believed that only adding new areas to the Vienna Document is more important than improving the existing provisions. Several respondents thought improving the current implementation and specifying the Vienna Document’s existing provisions is the most important in order to retain its relevance (interviewee nos. 9, 10, 17, 19, 31), while a large majority thought that both are important (interviewee nos. 4, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25). Many adhering to this group add that while both improvements are important, it is more realistic to improve the implementation (vertical modernisation or deepening) first or in the short term and only then A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 138 add new areas to the regime in the long term (horizontal modernisation – widening) (interviewee nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29). The greater realism with the vertical modernisation was explained in the way that a country with an advantage in one field would not allow the inclusion of restrictions on this (interviewee no. 2). Some respondents talked about a situation in which a state that wishes to modernise the regime is at the same time against all modernisation proposals made by other rival states. One respondent warned that adding new things prior to improving the existing mechanism would actually damage the mechanism (interviewee no. 1). It was also said that any modernisation of the regime must consider the outcomes of the CFE negotiations (interviewee no. 18), but if the CFE is to be truly declared «dead» then a great opportunity would emerge to add new areas to the Vienna Document (interviewee no. 7). One respondent clearly described the decision-making situation in relation to taking the opportunity to improve the Vienna Document. In his view, both trends and directions (vertical modernisation or deepening, such as the French proposal to cut thresholds for notification from 9,000 to 5,000, and horizontal modernisation or widening, such as the Russian proposals on RRF, force transit and naval CSBMs) are important, but vertical modernisation has more realistic prospects in the short term. One of the key issues of vertical modernisation concerns the thresholds. The Vienna Document is based on brigade- and regiment-level forces, but the armies of many EU member states do not even have regiments and brigades. More and more forces are based on battalions and non-permanent (combined) battle groups. Horizontal modernisation is also needed to deal with the substantive technological development seen in today’s militaries. Here, even more political will be needed to reach consensus (interviewee no. 8). Participating states’ official proposals to improve the Vienna Document CSBM regime refer to several parts of the document. For example, at the end of 2013, the following proposals related only to AEMI were on the table: ˗ to exchange additional information on the command organisation of military forces, specifying the designation and subordination at each level of command down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level (proposal by Germany, the USA, Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania and Sweden, FSC.DEL/58/11/Rev.2/Corr.1 dated 18 July 2011); ˗ to also exchange information on military training establishments and military repair or maintenance facilities with organic major weapon and A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 139 equipment systems (proposal by Germany and Cyprus, FSC.DEL/63/12/ Corr. 1 dated 18 October 2012); ˗ to exchange information on each military transport aviation unit or military transport aircraft down to and including wing/air regiment or equivalent level (in the framework of the exchange of information on air forces) (proposal by Germany and Cyprus FSC.DEL/63/12/Corr.1 dated 18 October 2012 and proposal by Germany and Cyprus FSC.DEL/63/12/Corr.1 dated 18 October 2012); ˗ to exchange information on land and air forces (battalion and higher levels) separately deployed outside the national territory of the state where the headquarters of the formation and/or unit is located. This will apply if subordinate elements are separately deployed in the zone of application for CSBM for six months or longer. Subordinate elements separately deployed under UN resolutions or OSCE decisions will not be subject to information exchange (Ukraine, FSC.DEL/196/09/Rev.3 dated 9 November 2010); and ˗ to report any permanent changes in the command organisation of states’ military forces relating to formations and units covered by the information exchange (proposal by Belarus, FSC.DEL/34/12 dated 29 March 2012). In that part of the Vienna Document on the exchange of data pertinent to major weapons systems (also part of AEMI), Russia proposed that participating states annually exchange information on their naval forces (organisation and manpower). This proposal specifically refers to naval forces not assigned to European naval bases if they are expected to stay in the adjoining sea area for more than two months in the following calendar year (Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on the exchange of information on naval forces, Russian Federation, 2011). In that part on the exchange of information in the field of defence planning, a proposal was put forward to exchange information on plans for or ongoing procurement of major equipment and major military construction programmes on the basis of the categories set out in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures (2012). Another proposal was to exchange information on previous expenditures based on the categories of the standardised reporting format given in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 2 December 2011. This proposal also includes providing specific information and the appropriate clarification of discrepancies between expenditures and previously reported budgets, and information on the relationship A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 140 of the military budget to the gross national product (GNP) as a percentage (ibid.). In the risk-reduction part of the Vienna Document (on the mechanism for consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military activities), two proposals were made on the establishment of a special OSCE inspection in the event a participating state’s security concern has not been dispelled (the first from July 2011 was Russian and there was another in September 2011 from the following states: the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Latvia, Albania, Luxemburg, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Romania, Slovakia, Moldova and Italy). Both proposals shared the idea to organise a special OSCE inspection team and send it to investigate the situation in the areas causing concern. The participating states must notify each other in the case of certain military activities the exceed the predefined levels in Chapter V of the Vienna Document. The notification threshold for exercise activities of land forces is (at any time of the exercise or activity): at least 9,000 troops, including support troops, or at least 250 battle tanks, or at least 500 ACVs, or at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket-launchers (100 mm calibre and above). Several states28 proposed a reduction of these thresholds down to at least 5,000 troops, including support troops, or at least 100 battle tanks, or at least 200 ACVs, or at least 80 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocketlaunchers (100 mm calibre and above). In this respect, the FSC decided that in the absence of any notifiable military exercise or military activity in a calendar year (when all such activities are below the threshold), the participating states will provide notification of one major military exercise or military activity held on their national territory in the zone of application for CSBMs (Vienna Document Plus Decision no. 9/12 on Prior Notification of Major Military Activities, 2012). In addition, a proposal for the exchange of information by participating states hosting the multinational Rapid Reaction Forces was submitted by Russia. The notification thresholds for such activities would be at least 900 troops, or at least 41 combat tanks, or at least 70 ACVs, or at least 18 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars 28 Albania, Germany, the USA, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, the UK, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Turkey and Ukraine (Proposal for a draft FSC Vienna Document Plus decision on lowering thresholds for prior notification of certain military activities, FSC.DEL/107/10/Rev.5/Corr. 2 dated 16 November 2012, Corr. 4 dated 8 March 2013). A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 141 and multiple rocket-launchers (75 mm calibre and above) etc. (Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on notification of the deployment multinational rapid reaction forces, Russian Federation, 2010). It was also proposed to notify large-scale military transits (transborder redeployment of a formation/unit) at least three days prior to its start if they involve: at least 3000 troops, or at least 50 combat tanks, or at least 120 armoured combat vehicles, or at least 30 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket-launchers (100 mm calibre and above) (Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on prior large-scale military transits, Russian Federation, FSC.DEL/133/10/Corr.1 dated 16 November 2010). Official recommendations for improving the compliance and verification part of the Vienna Document include a proposal by the USA to increase the maximum number of accepted inspections per year from 3 to 5 (Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on inspection quotas, USA, 2010) and one by Belarus to include a formal definition of force majeure. Accordingly, an inspection will not be counted if, due to force majeure , it cannot be carried out. The following should be regarded as falling within such circumstances: ˗ the impossibility of accessing the specified area due to poor weather conditions or natural disasters; ˗ the existence of a complex epidemiological situation in the specified area threatening the health of the inspectors and auxiliary personnel; and ˗ the inability of the receiving state to ensure the safety of the inspectors and auxiliary personnel as a result of armed conflict, the threat of terrorism or other unpredictable risks and threats in the specified area (Proposals by the Republic of Belarus on the update of Chapter IX of the Vienna Document 1999, Compliance and Verification, 2010). It was also proposed that a specified area not exceeding 25,000 km2 be defined for each inspection related to notifiable military activity (Proposals by the Republic of Belarus on the update of Chapter IX of the Vienna Document 1999, Compliance and Verification, 2010). A similar proposal adds that no straight line between any two points in that area shall exceed 250 kilometres (Poland, FSC.DEL/109/10 dated 6 October 2010). In addition, several proposals have been put forward on the financial responsibility to pay for inspections and on how many members from how many states are to be included in the inspections (proposals by the UK, Cyprus and Italy from 2011, Belarus from 2010, Poland from 2010 and the USA from 2010). A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 142 Another proposal was made for each inspection team to use its own maps and charts, photo and video cameras (including digital ones), personal computers, binoculars, hand-held passive night-vision devices, and dictaphones (including digital ones) (Proposals by the Republic of Belarus on the update of Chapter IX of the Vienna Document 1999, Compliance and Verification, 2010). In the area of evaluations, a proposal was made to increase the quota to accept the evaluation visits of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every 60 units, to two evaluation visits per calendar year for the first 15 units (Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on evaluation visit quotas, USA, 2010). Similarly to the proposal in the previous paragraph, it was proposed to specifically define force majeure (Proposals by the Republic of Belarus on the update of Chapter IX of the Vienna Document 1999, 2010) and the equipment of the evaluation teams (ibid.). In addition, proposals were made regarding the number of team members and the number of participating countries in the team (Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on team size for inspections and evaluation visits, USA, 2010; Proposal by the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Italy, FSC.DEL/57/11/Corr.1 dated 11 November 2011) and about the financial responsibility to cover the costs of evaluation visits (ibid.). Last but not least, a proposal was made to specify the adjoining sea area to the east by the meridian 60 degrees east longitude, to the north by the parallel 80 degrees north latitude, to the west by the meridian 40 degrees west longitude, and to the south by the parallel 20 degrees north latitude, including the waters of the Mediterranean, Black and Caspian Seas (Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on the exchange of information on naval forces, Russian Federation, 2011). As part of our SWOT assessment, we asked the respondents to assess the relevance/importance of the following opportunities to improve the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s effectiveness on a scale from 0 to 2 (where 0 is not a relevant opportunity, 1 means a partially relevant opportunity, and 2 refers to a very relevant opportunity). The respondents considered the following potential opportunities that were derived from the literature and from the list of existing proposals and food-for-thought papers for supplementing the Vienna Document 2011: Q1. inclusion of information on command organisations and combat units and related changes, Q2. inclusion of information on military training establishments and military repair or maintenance facilities, A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 143 Q3. inclusion of information on military deployments (land and air force) outside national territory, Q4. inclusion of information on non-combat units (for example, military transport aviation units/aircraft), Q5. inclusion of data on military expenditures of the preceding fiscal year and appropriate clarifications of possible discrepancies, Q6. inclusion of information on naval forces (organisation, manpower etc.), Q7. improving the application of the VD in crisis situations, e.g. proposals to establish special OSCE international inspections to clarify military activities that raise concern, Q8. further reduction/lowering of thresholds for the prior notification of certain military activities, including exercises…… (due to the reduction of armed forces), Q9. inclusion of information on (multinational) rapid-reaction forces (RRF) or even on battle groups and related military activities or deployments, Q10. inclusion of information on large-scale military transits, Q11. inclusion of a definition of force majeure and synchronisation of the understanding of its meaning, Q12. specifying the scale of the area for inspections, Q13. increasing the inspection and evaluation visit quotas (compliance and verification), Q14. increasing the size of inspection teams and evaluation teams, Q15. specifying the adjoining sea area where the measures are applicable, Q16. inclusion of information on paramilitary forces which are equivalent to conventional military forces with respect to their equipment, Q17. inclusion of information on the sale and transfer of arms, Q18. inclusion of information on internal security forces, Q19. inclusion of new categories of weapons systems: - Q19a. tactical drones, - Q19b. SALW, - Q19c. MANPADS, - Q19d. landmines, Q20. inclusion of information on counter-terrorism forces, Q21. inclusion of information on the proliferation of WMD, Q22. inclusion of information on armed actions by non-state actors, Q23. creation of a legally binding VD CSBM regime, Q24. enlargement of the territorial scope of the application of the VD, A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 144 Q25. inclusion of rewards for compliant states, Q26. increased transparency by creating wider public access to exchanged data, Q27. extension of the observation practice to command post or staff exercises that use computer simulations, Q28. turning the current externally-focused VD CSBMs into a useful tool for preventing new internal armed conflicts (crises), and Q29. contribution to further development of the global exchange of military data (global CSBMs). Figure 5 shows how respondents ranked the potential opportunities to improve the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM regime. A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 145 Figure 5: Ranking of opportunities to improve the Vienna Document CSBM regime (based on average respondent answer, where 0 means not a relevant opportunity, 1 a partially relevant opportunity and 2 a very relevant opportunity) The respondents ranked the most important opportunities in order of priority for improving the efficiency of the Vienna Document CSBMs and distinguished them from less relevant ones. No opportunity was uniformly regarded as very relevant, yet a group of four with the highest assessments should be mentioned. The most relevant opportunity in the view of respondents is a further lowering of the thresholds for the prior notification of certain military activities, including exercises (due to the reduction of armed forces) (Q8, score 1.80). Some respondents stressed that lowering the 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00 Q 8 Q 1 Q 7 Q 1 0 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 6 Q 2 Q 5 Q 1 8 Q 1 9 a Q 6 Q 9 Q 1 4 Q 1 1 Q 1 2 Q 1 3 Q 2 9 Q 2 4 Q 2 7 Q 1 9 c Q 1 9 b Q 1 9 d Q 2 0 Q 2 8 Q 2 2 Q 1 5 Q 2 6 Q 2 3 Q 1 7 Q 2 1 Q 2 5 A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 146 thresholds for the exercises observed through the Cold-War lens may negatively affect/disadvantage Russia as it would have to report much more exercises than NATO (interviewee nos. 14, 24). Another relevant opportunity is the inclusion of information on command organisations and combat units and related changes (Q1, score 1.62), improving the application of the Vienna Document in crises: e.g. proposals to establish special OSCE international inspections for the clarification of military activities which raise concern (Q7, score 1.55) and the inclusion of information on largescale military transits (Q10, score 1.44). On the other hand, the least relevant opportunities to improve the Vienna Document according to the respondents were the following proposals: specification of the adjoining sea area where the measures are applicable (Q15, score 0.52), to increase transparency by creating wider public access to exchanged data (Q26, score 0.52), the creation of a legally binding VD CSBM regime (Q23, score 0.41), the inclusion of information on the sale and transfer of arms (Q17, score 0.38), the inclusion of information on the proliferation of WMD (Q21, score 0.24) and the inclusion of rewards for compliant states (Q25, score 0.24). Interesting comments were made about the opportunity to increase transparency by creating broader public access to exchanged data. Respondents think there is almost no public interest in the Vienna Document (interviewee no. 11) and that this would lead to decreased government-to-government transparency (interviewee nos. 1, 7, 12, 13, 14, 25). Among the options for including the new categories of weapons systems, the opportunity to include tactical drones seems the most relevant (score 1.23) compared with including SALW, MANPADS and landmines (which are already addressed by some other documents). We also asked the respondents to add any other ideas for opportunities to improve the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s effectiveness in the future. The following interesting proposals were given: ˗ international organisations should be included in the Vienna Document (interviewee no. 4); ˗ to achieve and retain continuous support for the Vienna Document CSBM regime from all participating states (interviewee no. 15); ˗ to incorporate more dynamic elements in the Vienna Document (for example, the obligation to report on the EU Rapid Reaction Forces which only have some parts active) (interviewee no. 14); ˗ to incorporate nuclear tactical potential due to its relevance for European security (interviewee no. 30); A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 147 ˗ further regionalisation of the Vienna Document: we need different parts of the Vienna Document for different regions (Western Balkans, Central Europe, Caucasus), while some elements/parameters would stay the same for all regions. In this way, the Vienna Document would address regional problems more efficiently (interviewee no. 30); and ˗ to start negotiations on a new security architecture in the next 5–7 years. With such architecture, the Vienna Document CSBMs may gain a more central role (interviewee no. 24). In this context, it was also proposed to start new negotiations on a future CFE agreement (interviewee no. 9). One respondent provided a very interesting contextual framework for thinking about any new opportunities to improve the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s effectiveness. He believes that within the current framework (regulating state-to-state relations in the military domain) the opportunities are limited. It seems logical to broaden the scope of the regime by adding the naval dimension (within the military domain) or adding paramilitary organisations (beyond the military domain). However, the question here is whether we truly want this. And, if so, is the Vienna Document the appropriate instrument? He contends that within the present framework the Vienna Document is partially effective because the OSCE is an organisation of nations that are not complete friends. Complete friends are NATO because it is there where the countries completely open themselves. The question is whether the Vienna Document can be brought as far as NATO. In his view, this is not likely (interviewee no. 11). Threats to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime and its Effectiveness Regime robustness or resilience (or even persistence) refers to the «staying power» of international institutions in the face of exogenous and endogenous challenges. Institutions that change with every shift of power among their members or whenever the most powerful participants find that their interests are no longer optimally served by the current regime lack resilience (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 2). The main question in the robustness or persistence analysis of international regimes is whether the regimes persist when the circumstances in which they came into existence change. Another question is if regimes are robust enough to survive the deterioration of relations among the participants and whether they are flexible enough to adapt to changes (Levy, Young and Zurn, 1995: 268). A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 148 All of these aspects affect the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s effectiveness. We accordingly asked the respondents about their perception of the most important threats to the Vienna Document CSBMs and its effectiveness. The following threats were offered in the questionnaire: 1. potential to misuse the regime by some states against other states; 2. creation of a legally binding VD CSBM regime; 3. decrease of defence budgets; 4. close relationship between the VD and CFE (and related deadlock); and 5. withdrawal of big states from the regime. Figure 6 shows the biggest threat to the Vienna Document CSBM regime is that of big states withdrawing from the regime (score 1.39). Most respondents perceived the Russian policy on the Vienna Document in 2012 as a partial withdrawal. Some respondents drew attention to the case of Canada where after an assessment of its membership in international organisations some people proposed to leave the OSCE. It was recognised later that, aside from the potential of starting a domino effect (other countries leaving the regime as well), it would have caused a big funding gap in the OSCE budget (the potential loss of 80 jobs in the Secretariat). This proposal did not make it past the discussion stage in Canadian policy-making (interviewee nos. 24, 27). On the other hand, a respondent warned against the possibility of smaller nations halting implementation of the Vienna Document and the associated domino effects (interviewee no. 25). In our SWOT analysis, the partially relevant threats (perceived by the respondents) were the CFE deadlock and its effects on the Vienna Document CSBM (score 1.16) and a decrease in the defence budget (score 0.88). The potential of some states misusing the regime against others was perceived as the least relevant threat (score 0.56). The respondents do not see many chances of the regime being misused. A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 149 Figure 6: Ranking of the threats to the Vienna Document CSBM regime (based on the average respondent answer, where 0 means not a relevant threat, 1 a partially relevant threat and 2 a very relevant threat) We further asked the respondents to identify other threats to the Vienna Document CSBM regime and its effectiveness. The following additional threats were perceived: ˗ lack of political will to implement, modernise and adapt the Vienna Document, leading to a failure to change in a changing environment. One should bear in mind the WEU example of how a security organisation may become irrelevant and may disappear (interviewee nos. 1, 17, 24); ˗ the disappearance of political interest in the Vienna Document by the major powers and a lot of countries (interviewee nos. 17, 19). One or a couple of the «great powers» leaving the VD community would create a situation similar to the CFE Treaty (interviewee no. 15); 1,39 1,16 0,88 0,72 0,56 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 Withdrawal of big states from the regime Close relationship between the VD and CFE (and related deadlock) Decrease of defence budgets Creation of a legally binding VD CSBM regime Potential to misuse the regime by some states against other states A SWOT Approach to the Vienna Document CSBM Regime 150 ˗ inability of smaller countries to accomplish the requirements due to their budgetary restraints (interviewee no 15). The withdrawal of smaller states can also cause domino effects (interviewee no. 25); ˗ the Vienna Document could fall hostage to arms-control matters (e.g. non-strategic nukes, missile defence) (interviewee no. 9) and other political conflicts and controversies (not just the CFE conflict) (interviewee no. 27); ˗ different threat and security perceptions (Europeans vs. Central Asian countries); ˗ the existence of a spoiler in a consensus-based regime where a veto is always available (Azerbaijan would be the biggest spoiler) (interviewee no. 9); ˗ frozen conflicts (a true burden on the organisation); ˗ growing mistrust, especially towards Russia on one hand and by Russia on the other. Russia perceives CSBMs as an intrusion by Western states into internal matters and as part of a bigger game (interviewee no. 9); and ˗ the bloc-to-bloc thinking that has been persistent for 20 years following the end of the Cold War. The Vienna Document is increasingly being run according to an «old script» and there is thus much less chance of obtaining good results (or substantial modernisation) (interviewee no. 19). One respondent optimistically sees there is no real threat to the existence or operation of the Vienna Document (he assessed all the potential threats offered in the questionnaire with 0). He does not believe the goodwill of the participating states will disappear and thinks that probably the Vienna Document is the last arms-control document the member states would abandon (interviewee no. 21). Another participant also does not see any real threat of the major players abandoning the Vienna Document. He contends that an existential threat to the Vienna Document CSBMs would arise in the event of a dramatic improvement in the overall security situation in the OSCE area. In the highly unlikely case of Russia joining NATO, for example, the Vienna Document CSBMs would become entirely superfluous (interviewee no. 20). 151 7. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document Confidence- and Security-Building Measures during the Ukrainian Crisis The effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian crisis29 deserves a special chapter in this book. The chapter aims to look at the Vienna Document CSBMs’ effectiveness not only in relation to the Ukrainian conflict but also more broadly at the time or during this conflict. This allowed us to obtain a broader and more positive picture than simply by looking at the crisis itself. We should first stress that the OSCE’s role in the Ukrainian conflict transcends the Vienna Document and related CSBMs. The OSCE has adopted many measures and represents a discussion forum for all involved and interested states. For example, OSCE Chairpersons and the Secretary General have frequently urged all sides to fulfil the commitments under the Minsk agreements and to end the fighting. In addition, a Trilateral Contact Group was established with Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE Chairperson-in- Office’s Special Representative as members, and with several related subgroups. These actively worked on the disengagement of forces and hardware, local elections, releasing prisoners, repair of critical infrastructure, providing for the continuation of pension payments etc. The OSCE also established a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine to monitor the security situation and engage with the population to reduce the tensions. The problem facing this mission has been the movement of monitors in insecure areas and the lack of security guarantees from both sides. The OSCE also established an Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk to monitor cross-border transit. The problem is that the security situation has not improved despite the many measures of the OSCE and other international organisations. The death toll has been high, with people being threatened every day. At the end of 2016, on average there were over 1,000 explosions per day, with a peak of over 3,000 explosions a day in November. The Minsk agreements have been constantly violated along the contact line and ideas for how to solve this conflict have frequently been disregarded by both sides. The crisis in Ukraine has completely challenged the CSBM mechanisms in the OSCE. The Vienna Document has been tested every day in the field 29 By the term "Ukrainian crisis", we refer to political and security crisis, including the violent conflict in the Eastern Ukraine, as well as the annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 152 and in the OSCE headquarters in Vienna. One can say the Vienna Document was often used during the crisis in Ukraine, but one can also doubt its effectiveness. Our observation is that the Vienna Document CSBMs have been neither completely effective nor completely ineffective during this crisis. While it is true the Ukrainian crisis blocked CSBM implementation in several ways, it is also true that these problems remain geographically limited. CSBMs have been much more effective in areas around some problematic grey zones. Not being completely effective and discussing the problems is, speaking from the broader historical perspective of European cooperative security and from the perspective of the OSCE, still a positive scenario in contrast to the disastrous alternatives whereby nobody is talking to nobody. It is very important that Russia played a very constructive role during its Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Cooperation in 2017. No CSBMrelated processes were disrupted during this time (i.e. CSBM processes that might have been disrupted had Russia not been chairing the FSC). On the contrary, Russia regarded this chairmanship as one of its main priorities and acted in the direction of seeking consensus, finding agreement on the basis of mutual benefit, while also enabling open and constructive dialogue on a wide range of themes. It also tried to maintain a neutral, balanced and diverse agenda chaired by an impartial and honest broker (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/865, 2017). This means that Russia is not withdrawing from the CSBM regime, which is a good thing for European security. In this chapter, we will try to present the positive record of the Vienna Document CSBMs in past years on one hand and several challenges that have emerged during the crisis in or around Ukraine on the other hand. The chapter is based on our study of documents from the Forum for Security Cooperation, reports and presentations from workshops within the Structured Dialogue, and several interviews with competent experts from practice. The Vienna Document CSBMs’ Positive Implementation Record Trends in the use of the Vienna Document in past years reveal strong evidence of its effectiveness. Our comparison of the OSCE annual trend reports from 2018, 2013 and 2010 (see Summary Report on Recent Trends in Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 153 the Implementation of the Vienna Document and Other Measures, 2018; 2013; 201030) shows the following: A large majority of participating states (more than 50) has exchanged information on their military forces (AEMI) every year. For example, 53 states exchanged such information in 2017, 53 (in 2016), 52 (in 2015), 53 (in 2014), 54 (in 2013), 54 (in 2012), 53 (in 2011), 55 (in 2010), 55 (in 2009), 55 (in 2008), 54 (in 2007), 51 (in 2006) and 53 (in 2005). The number of states exchanging AEMI remains high and has not changed much since the start of the Ukrainian crisis. A large majority of states (40 in 2012 and 39 in 2017) has also exchanged information on their air formations, air combat units, air defence aviation and naval aviation. The numbers of reporting states before and after the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis remain almost unchanged. A large majority of participating states has exchanged information through the OSCE automated data exchange system (in electronic format). The number varies between 44 to 46 in the period from 2008 and 2017. This means the Ukrainian crisis has not affected the way of submitting data. It is important is that the majority of participating states are already connected to the OSCE Communications Network, which provides reliable and secure communications among the capitals and the majority of its servers have a high level of availability. Participating states have been notifying plans every year about the new types of weapons or equipment that are about to enter into service. The Ukrainian crisis has, however, affected the numbers of states that provided this information. From 2006 to 2011, 16 to 21 states exchanged this information every year, while the figure started dropping to 14 in 2012, 12 in 2013 and 11 in 2014 (start of the Ukrainian crisis). Since then, this number has varied between 11 and 14 (14 in 2015, 11 in 2016, 13 in 2017 and 12 in 2018). Chapter II on the exchange of information on defence planning and defence budgets: the majority of participating states has been submitting the required information (numbers vary from 42 to 50 states between 2013 and 2017). These figures have not been changed significantly by the Ukrainian crisis. In fact, the lowest number of states providing such information was in 2006 (40) and 2008 (41). However, there is a worrying trend of an increasing number of states not exchanging any of the required information since this crisis started (5 in 2014, 4 in 2015, 6 in 2016 and 8 in 2017). 30 Each report wrote about the situation in the preceeding year. The use of these documents has been approved through the participating state in the OSCE. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 154 Chapter III on risk reduction: after a peak in requests for consultation and cooperation related to unusual military activities in 2014 (17 such requests), we observed a decline to 5 in 2015 and 0 requests in 2016 and 2017, respectively. We believe this might reflect the ineffectiveness of past requests in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. There were also no cases of the voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities in the past few years. Yet we should stress that almost no activity was detected under this chapter prior to the Ukrainian crisis (for example, there was only one voluntary hosting of a visit to dispel concerns in 2011). Chapter IV on visits to air bases and military facilities: a smaller number of countries conducts such visits every year. Interestingly, the number of such visits has increased since the start of the Ukrainian crisis with a peak in 2016, and a slow decline thereafter. These numbers seem to vary every couple of years, from low numbers of visits (e.g. 2 per year per category, as in 2012, 2013 and in 2007 and 2008) to higher numbers (e.g. 16 per category). Chapter V on prior notification and observation of certain military activities: around 30 states have sent prior notification of slightly less or slightly more than 30 military activities since 2015. Most of them were below the thresholds contained in the Vienna Document and only a few were above those thresholds. There is still a group of relatively many countries that do not report such activities (even if below the threshold). A comparison of numbers with the situation before the Ukrainian crisis shows that approximately half as many states were sending information on half as many military activities in that time (e.g. only 8 participating states about 13 military activities in 2012; 15 states about 13 activities in 2009). In the entire assessment period, most of these notified cases were below the threshold (even though the VD plus decision on this was adopted in 2012). This all means that the exchange of information and transparency in this chapter has increased since the eruption of the Ukrainian crisis. Chapter VII on annual calendars: the majority of countries (between 52 to 54) have submitted information on their annual calendars since 2008. The Ukrainian crisis seems not to have affected this trend. Chapter IX on compliance and verification – inspections: since 2014, around 100 inspections were requested every year and most of them were conducted (e.g. 100 requested in 2017 and 92 actually conducted). This means the Ukrainian crisis has contributed to an increase in the number of inspections. Another peak of this number came in 2008 with 109 requested and 109 carried out inspections. Before that and after that (up until the Ukrainian crisis), these numbers were around 90. More than half of the Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 155 participating states conduct inspections every year and also more than half the states host inspections every year. Most of the equipment required by the inspecting states (e.g. mobile phones, GPS, digital cameras, video cameras, portable computers etc.) has been accepted and only rarely refused. Most inspection reports have reported full compliance with the Vienna Document’s provisions. A small number of reports stated some irregularities about the process, such as inability to observe specified areas or no option to fly over certain areas, restriction on photographing in particular areas, refusal to use equipment , differences between the observed number of equipment and the numbers submitted in the AEMI etc. Chapter IX on compliance and verification – Evaluations: some 40 evaluations have been conducted and requested every year since 2005 with peaks coming in 2008 (57 requested and 55 conducted) and in 2014 (with 52 requested and 49 conducted). It seems the Ukrainian crisis has not significantly affected the number of evaluations. In 2017, there were 41 requests and 39 completed evaluations. Most evaluations led to positive reports. Also here, the use of certain equipment is sometimes rejected by the host states. Sometimes, differences between the observed personnel and equipment and submitted numbers have been observed. These differences largely emerge from daily situations such as holidays, sick leave, training, business trips etc. Trends also show that most participating states also exchange information via the GEMI (Global Exchange of Military Information) (between 52 to 54 states in the period from 2011 and 2017). The Ukrainian crisis once again seems not to have affected this trend. These assessments were also reflected by others. For example, Ostrauskaite and Kobieracki (2015: 32-34) showed in 2015 that the consultation mechanism under Chapter III had been invoked 18 times in the years before their writing, resulting in three joint meetings of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation and the OSCE Permanent Council. Further, 26 countries have decided to send military inspectors and observers to Ukraine in line with Chapters IX and X, resulting in 19 verification activities by the time they were writing. In addition, 13 countries have conducted verification activities in the Russian Federation. They concluded that the Vienna Document’s application has enabled a timely and continuous international presence on the ground from the early days of the crisis in Ukraine. The participating states have also managed to adopt four amendments to the Vienna Document’s chapters and articles (the so-called Vienna Document Plus decisions) since 2011, but all of them were confirmed before the Ukrainian crisis started in November 2013. It is also necessary to note that Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 156 most, if not all, were very technical in nature. The Vienna Document Plus Decision no. 9/12 (2012) amended Chapter V on the prior notification of certain military activities. In the case of the absence of any notifiable military exercises or military activities in a calendar year, states shall provide notification of one major military activity or exercise that falls below the thresholds. This decision has been very important by also opening space for reporting smaller exercises that might be perceived as a potential threat or somehow represent a concern. The Vienna Document Plus Decision no. 1/13 (2013) updated the Vienna Document by adding Mongolia as a participating state (but without extending the zone of application of the Vienna Document to the territory of Mongolia) after it joined the OSCE. The Vienna Document Plus Decision no. 2/13 (2013) changed the reference in Chapter II of the Vienna Document from the UN «Instrument for Standardised International Reporting of Military Expenditures» to the «UN Report on Military Expenditures endorsed by the General Assembly». Pursuant to the Vienna Document Plus Decision no. 4/13 (2013), the Forum for Security Cooperation also changed Chapter IV on visits to air bases by limiting the length of such visits to up to 24 hours (instead of a minimum of 24 hours) and by specifying that the visitors can have the opportunity to view routine, working-day activities. Lessons from 2014 Based on Debates in the Forum for Security Cooperation Between 21 February and 1 August 2014, five joint meetings of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and the Permanent Council (PC) were held aside from the regular sessions of the FSC. These meetings were dedicated (at least in part) to discussing the crisis in Ukraine. Three of them concerned activation of Chapter III (paragraph 16.3 on the risk-reduction mechanism) by some participating states. At the first of these joint sessions (an Extraordinary Joint FSC-PC meeting held on 4 March 2014, pursuant to paragraph 18 of Chapter III of the Vienna Document), Ukraine invited a multinational military verification mission to dispel concerns about unusual military activities in the territory of Ukraine, particularly in the Crimean Peninsula. This was the first time this mechanism (voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities) has been activated. The first visit of the multinational team involving 18 participating states took place between 5 and 10 March 2014 in the eastern part of the country. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 157 The group attempted to enter Crimea four times but was unable to move beyond the checkpoints established at the administrative border of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The group was thus unable to dispel the military concerns in Crimea. On the request of Ukraine, the duration of the visit was twice extended. From 10 to 20 March 2014, monitoring activities were carried out in the south-eastern part of the country (Donetsk and Kherson oblasts) (Ukraine requests continuation of visit by unarmed personnel, 2014). In total, 56 inspectors from 30 participating states were involved in the mission (Different forms of OSCE engagement with Ukraine, 2014). In March 2014, the mechanism for consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military activities (paragraph 16, Chapter III of the Vienna Document 2011) was also activated. The cause of this activation were the troop movements and exercises of Russia’s armed forces close to the national border of Ukraine with Russia. The Ukrainian side was concerned by these troop movements. The Russian delegation at the OSCE pointed out that the airborne troop exercises carried out on 13 March and between 11 and 14 March were on a scale that is not subject to prior notification under the Vienna Document 2011 and denied that large-scale troop concentrations were taking place along Russia's eastern border (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/755 Annex 1, 2014a). However, both Ukraine (EU Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, FSC.DEL/54/14, 2014) and the USA (Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America, FSC.JOUR/757 Annex 3, 2014a) found the Russian replies given in response to requests submitted pursuant to paragraph 16.2, Chapter III of the Vienna Document (request for explanation) to be unconvincing. Since the US delegation has concluded that the Russian response «did not answer the questions that the United States asked about the purpose, duration, composition and character of the deployed forces», it asked the Chairman-in- Office to convene a meeting pursuant to paragraph 16.2, Chapter III between the USA and the Russian Federation «in order to further discuss these concerns» (ibid.). As the envisaged meeting did not take place due to the absence of Russia, the third stage of the paragraph 16, Chapter III, riskreduction mechanism was activated at a meeting of all participating states. After the joint FSC-Permanent Council session on 7 April, two more of such meetings were held in April 2014 (17 and 30 April) on the request of Canada, Estonia, the USA and Ukraine. The Russian delegation was completely absent from the first and third, and partly absent from the second meeting (Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America, PC. FSC-PC.JOUR/41 Annex, 2014b; US Statement On Russian Military Activities Near Ukraine’s Border, 2014). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 158 Regarding the first joint FSC-PC session, Russia explained its refusal with the «groundlessness of the convening of such a session and, respectively, the application of provisions of Chapter III of the Vienna Document». Moscow pointed out that it was not carrying out any unusual or unscheduled activities that would be significant in a military way, in its territory in the region of the border with Ukraine and that this was convincingly confirmed by the results of international inspections under the Vienna Document and observation flights within the framework of the Open Skies Treaty carried out in the Russian Federation in March of that year (Comment by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the non-participation of Russia in the joint session of the OSCE Permanent Council and Forum for Security Co-operation, 2014). In a statement dated 28 April 2014, Russia reiterated its willingness to discuss the crisis in Ukraine in both the Forum for Security Co-operation and at bilateral meetings but «not in connection with the mechanism of Chapter III of the VD 2011». Russia also maintained that it saw no reasons to host a visit in accordance with paragraph 18 of the VD 2011 (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control, 2014). Two more cases can be mentioned of when the risk-reduction mechanism foreseen in Chapter III of the Vienna Document was activated by a participating state. First, in May 2014, Ukraine requested information from the Russian Federation on the air force exercise Aviadarts-2014 on one hand (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine, FSC.DEL/96/14, 2014b) and in July 2014 Russia requested an explanation from Ukraine on unusual military activities pursuant to paragraph 16.1 of the Vienna Document on the other (EU Statement on Russian Unusual Military Activities and the Situation in Ukraine, FSC.DEL/138/14/Rev.1, 2014b). In addition to the Chapter III-related activities discussed above, military verification activities were also undertaken pursuant to Chapter IX and X of the Vienna Document in both Russia and Ukraine. From March to September 2014, 17 participating states took part in 11 activities on the territory of Ukraine and 11 participating states in five activities on the territory of Russia (Different forms of OSCE engagement with Ukraine, 2014). In this context, it is important to mention the detention of a German-led Vienna Document inspection team and its Ukrainian escorts on 25 April in Slavyansk, Eastern Ukraine, by irregular forces loyal to the «people's mayor of Slavyansk». Members of the team, comprised of German, Danish, Polish and Czech nationals, were released on 3 May after concerted efforts by the Ukrainian authorities, the OSCE, and the Russian mediator Vladimir Lukin Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 159 (one Swedish national was released earlier on medical grounds) (Swiss OSCE Chair calls for release of abducted military inspectors, 2014). In the summer of 2014, informal discussions were going on within the OSCE on the potential continuation of the OSCE’s military presence in Ukraine within the framework of the Vienna Document inspections. The «above quota» idea found some support among certain participating states, but more states had reservations about this due to security concerns and because they did not see the usefulness of the Vienna Document in this military crisis. For these states, it was clear that military inspections would be unable to verify unusual activities in the troubled areas controlled by pro- Russian groups. Besides this, the security of the inspection teams could not be guaranteed. Some representatives expressed their view that the Vienna Document as an early-warning tool cannot be used at this point in a conflict, it can be used only when a peace plan is to be agreed. This means that if the cease fire agreed in the Minsk Agreement of 5 September 2014 were to hold, the Vienna Document might become more relevant, particularly if compliance and verification activities can be carried out on those territories of Ukraine over which the government in Kiev currently has no effective control. Regarding the zone of application of the Vienna Document CSBMs, the Russian statement made at the FSC plenary meeting held on 9 April 2014 should be mentioned. In that statement, the Russian delegation declared that, in connection with the admission of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to the Russian Federation, Russia had started to consider its Vienna Document commitments also being extended to the territory of Crimea (see Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/758 Annex 1, 2014b). A statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also declared that Russia is open to receiving international inspectors on the territory of the peninsula, but «respective requests should be sent to Moscow rather than Kiev» (Comment by official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Alexander Lukashevich, regarding the «concerns’ of the Ukrainian authorities about Russia’s military activities «on the territory of Ukraine», 2014). However, the participating states have been hesitant to make such a request as that would mean implicit recognition of Russian sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula. Several participating states, as well as the European Union, explicitly rejected the Russian position on extending the zone of application of Russia’s Vienna Document commitments to the territory of Crimea (See EU Statement on Russian Unusual Military Activities and the Situation in Ukraine, 2014; Statement by the Delegation of the Netherlands, FSC.JOUR/767 Annex 1, 2014). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 160 Regarding implementation of the Vienna Document, two broad groups of issues have given rise to controversy between Ukraine, the USA, and EU/NATO member states on one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other. The first question is whether a particular military exercise is subject to prior notification pursuant to paragraph 40 of the Vienna Document. Examples include, but are not limited to: Russian airborne troop exercises involving the 98th Parachute Division in March 2014 (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/755 Annex 1, 2014a), Russian air force exercises Aviadarts-2014 in May 2014 (EU Statement on Russian Unusual Military Activities and the Situation in Ukraine, 2014a) and Ukrainian Air Force training activities in May 2014 (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine, FSC.DEL/100/14, 2014d). Second, the exact circumstances that justify triggering of the risk-reduction mechanism foreseen in Chapter III of the Vienna Document have also become an issue. Ukraine’s position is that each participating state has the right to assess from its own perspective what constitutes militarily significant activity and seek clarifications, notwithstanding the existing notification thresholds in the Vienna Document (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine, FSC-PC.DEL/15/14, 2014a). Moreover, a US statement pointed out that «the unusual military activity provision of the Vienna Document is not restricted to raising concerns about specific types of military activities or the number of troops involved in such activities. Clarification of the purpose and duration of this unusual military activity is important to reassure OSCE partners, especially when the activity occurs so close to the border of another participating State» (Remarks on Military Activities of the Russian Federation on the Border with Ukraine, FSC-PC.DEL/9/14, 2014). In contrast, Russia maintained that the military activities in question could not be deemed «significant» as they were below the thresholds for notification stated in the Vienna Document (see, for example, Comment by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the non-participation of Russia in the joint session of the OSCE Permanent Council and Forum for Security Co-operation, 2014). Three points can be made by way of a conclusion to this chapter. First, the fact that Vienna Document inspections were carried out in Ukraine also during the crisis and that implementation of the Vienna Document commitments was not completely suspended by any participating state affected by the situation shows there was no complete breakdown in trust among the parties concerned. On the surface, at least some trust in the existing CSBM mechanism remained. Second, Chapter III of the Vienna Document and the aim to reduce risk proved largely ineffective partly due to the differing perceptions of the nature of the conflict held by the countries concerned. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 161 Third, as happened in earlier crises and conflicts in the OSCE area, the existence of a grey zone in Ukraine and the related conflict does not allow for implementation of the Vienna Document (particularly inspection and evaluation visits and likely also AEMI). Lessons from Debates in the Forum for Security Cooperation during 2016 and 2017 The complicated security situation of 2014 continued until 2018 when this book was being prepared. In this period, several similar and additional issues emerged that reflect the simultaneous cooperation and competition among certain participating states. This section aims to show some key difficulties with CSBMs in the past 2 years and highlights key related lessons. But, before doing that, we should point out that all the debates occurring in the framework of the Annual Security Review Conferences and other related OSCE forums show a need for trust and confidence between participating states still exists, which is difficult to bring about in a very complex, unpredictable and unstable security environment (see Chairperson’s Perception in 2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017). OSCE participating states took various opportunities in 2016 and 2017 to discuss their mutual views. For example, when marking the 20th anniversary of the Framework for Arms Control, CSBM and related problems were also discussed. Russia clearly explained its perception of the West and its policies. It pointed to the NATO policy and the lack of its reform as a cause of problems in adapting arms control and CSBM agreements to the new conditions. Russia stressed its hopes of building the European security architecture based on the OSCE were cynically ignored by the West in practice. This was evidently linked with the euphoria over the final victory in the Cold War, leading Western countries to think they can administer justice and punishment on behalf of other countries. This perception led NATO countries to drop bombs on former Yugoslavia, violating the principles of the inviolability of borders, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity etc. Russia’s concerns were thereby ignored, and NATO effectively expanded its sphere of influence by force. By moving eastwards, the dividing lines were not blurred, but deepened: in fact, a new Iron Curtain has emerged in Europe through the NATO policy of coercively containing Russia. A new NATO-centric European security architecture is being built according to the «not with, but against Russia» principle. This has also produced a fundamental conflict between NATO policy and the purpose of the Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 162 Framework for Arms Control: indivisibility of security for all OSCE participating states. Russia also explained that the CFE, as one of the pillars of arms control, was not adapted because NATO states preferred to use the agreement as a bargaining chip for solving some local conflicts and forcing their own terms and conditions in these cases. Similarly, the window of opportunity to modernise the Vienna Document has now closed and it is difficult to predict when it will again open (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC-PC.JOUR/50, 2016). On the other hand, the USA shared its perception of Russia as a country that sees instability as a useful long-term tool, while other countries pursue sustainable and comprehensive security. The US representative also rejected a call by some participating states to «acknowledge new security realities» in Europe. He pointed out a false premise underlying many of such calls, namely that the core principles which make up the foundations of the international system are somewhat outdated or simply not up to the task of strengthening cooperation and increasing transparency and predictability. The USA expressed criticism of Russia for suspending application of the CFE treaty and its «refusal to engage in the modernization of the Vienna Document», while modernisation of the Vienna Document could lead to greater military transparency. «Lowering notification and observation thresholds as well as increasing available inspection opportunities would benefit all OSCE participating States, including Russia, which has said it has questions about NATO military activities», the US representative added (Revisiting the 1996 OSCE Framework for Arms Control, 2016). As a result, the CFE Treaty is today a frozen document. Consequently, states are arming themselves in the present time and CFE is on a side track. CFE is also outdated as military doctrines have changed considerably since the Treaty was signed. Today we face cyber attacks, fake news and disinformation through multiple channels, ever more military exercises, hybrid forms of warfare featuring the strong participation of para-military forces etc. We have also been witness to the first attack using a chemical weapon on European soil since the end of World War II (the attack against Skripal and his daughter regarding which the UK and several other states have accused Russia). This situation has been frustrating for many. Accordingly, debates during the Annual Security Review Conference in 2017 showed that several participating states want the CFE regime to be updated in order to improve our security (2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017: 28). This also explains why German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier proposed in 2016 a new initiative for arms control in Europe. The German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published his initiative to Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 163 negotiate a new multilateral treaty on conventional arms control with defined regional ceilings, minimum distances, transparency measures, including new weapons systems, new military capabilities, strategies etc. Fifteen European countries joined this initiative (some NATO members, some neutrals, and all of them OSCE participating states31), supporting the renewal of dialogue on arms control (see Germany, 15 Other Countries Press for Arms Control Deal with Russia, 2016; The German Initiative for Arms Control: Time for Dialogue with Russia, 2016). Russia stopped implementing the CFE Treaty in 2007 and the West made any further modernisation of CFE and ratification of any adapted CFE treaty conditional on the requirement that Russia withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova (to fulfil the commitments made in Istanbul). Germany therefore wanted to break this limbo during its presidency of the OSCE in 2016. It is noted that Steinmeier’s initiative was maintained through several informal meetings of ministers of foreign affairs. This initiative was an informal side-track to the OSCE processes and did not take place in the OSCE. Another important fact emerges when talking about a strategic approach to security and trust-building in Europe. NATO opened an office in Vienna and the NATO participating states frequently attend coordination meetings on OSCE military issues. This means that all proposals involving Russia are debated at the NATO coordination meetings in Vienna. However, this coordination is somewhat different from the long-existing EU coordination. Based on EU coordination meetings, the EU states speak with one voice in the OSCE, which is not the case for the NATO states. NATO’s general position on the security situation in Europe has also been made quite clear. NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General stated that the security system has been challenged by a lack of respect for the rules-based international order and by violations of the fundamental values and principles by one participating state. She stressed that NATO will continue to support a settlement of the crisis in and around Ukraine while supporting the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017: 5). With the deterioration of the security situation in and around Ukraine, it also turned out that it was a good decision to keep coordination of the Vienna Document process in the hands of neutral Switzerland and its diplomatic representatives (previous coordinator Pierre Von Arx and present coordinator Hans Lüber). Switzerland has acted as a coordinator of the CSBM process at the OSCE for all sides, which has proven to be a good solution 31 France, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Portugal. The total number has risen to 22 in the present time. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 164 in the current unpredictable and confrontational situation. The Vienna Document CSBM process should be led and maintained in a very objective and neutral way. The Chairperson of the Forum for Security Cooperation gave this advice to the participating states: «obey the procedure but be creative and adaptive! Resist all temptations, except to work in the interest of all!» (Statement by the Chairperson, FSC.JOUR/856, 2017). Conflicting Interpretations of the Issue of Crimea and the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine The situation in Ukraine and associated reactions and debates show this conflict is inseparable from the broader European security situation. Debates also show that all states perceive the Ukrainian crisis (the crisis in and around Ukraine) as posing a serious challenge to European security, while there is obvious disagreement on the nature of the crisis. Several states see the crisis as an outcome of international armed aggression, while one country thinks it was caused by an internal crisis. The Forum for Security Cooperation could have not avoided the conflicting interactions about Crimea between Russia and its opponents. Since the start of the crisis, these actors have more or less reiterated their positions and interpretations of the legitimacy and legality of what happened in the past. For example, Ukraine has stressed that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea remains an integral part of Ukraine, that it was illegally occupied by military force and annexed by the Russian Federation in violation of the OSCE’s principles and the commitments and norms of international law. Russia’s actions are considered illegitimate and Russia has been called upon to reverse its illegal occupation (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine, FSC.JOUR/820, 2016; FSC.JOUR/847, FSC.DEL/201/17, 2017). Ukraine has also stated frequently the conflict will not be resolved until Russian forces leave Ukrainian territory. Ukraine also declared that Russia's attempted annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol pose a serious threat to European and global security. Russia's selective approach to arms control and CSBM has undermined trust and confidence within the OSCE (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 63rd Joint session of FSC and PC, FSC-PC.DEL/17/16, 2016). Yet Russia has claimed that the situation is fully compliant with international law and that the Republic of Crimea’s status as constituent entity of the Russian Federation in not open to reconsideration or discussion. Its delegation stated «the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Crimea and its Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 165 incorporation into the Russian Federation was a legal expression of the right of the people of Crimea to self-determination at a time when Ukraine, with outside support, was in the throes of a coup d’état, with radical nationalist elements exerting a forceful influence on the decisions adopted in the country, which in turn resulted in the interests of the Ukrainian regions and Russian-speaking population being ignored». Russia also stressed that decisions by the multi-ethnic population of Crimea were expressed in a free and fair way (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/820, 2016; FSC.JOUR/846, FSC.JOUR/847; FSC.JOUR/854, 2017). On the other hand, the USA thinks that Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine represent the gravest challenge to the European security architecture since the Cold War ended. The so-called new security realities are a consequence of Russia's ongoing violations of the core principles of international law (Revisiting the 1996 OSCE Framework for Arms Control, 2016). The USA perceives that Russia (or «at least one country») sees instability as a useful long-term tool, while the vast majority of the other states pursue sustainable and comprehensive security, seeing it as a win-win for the citizens of all participating states. The USA disagreed with the notion of new security realities in Europe or the interpretation that the core principles of the international system are somewhat outdated and not up to the task of strengthening cooperation and increasing transparency. Russia’s unilateral suspension of the CFE Treaty, its refusal to modernise the Vienna Document, ongoing violation of the core principles of international law etc. are causes of these new security realities in American eyes (Revisiting the 1996 OSCE Framework for Arms Control, 2016). The EU has also continuously expressed its deep concerns about the security situation in Eastern Ukraine and the related ceasefire violations and armed incidents. It has reiterated its unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and called upon Russia to do likewise. The EU has strongly condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, stressing that it will not recognise it (EU Statement on Security Situation in and Around Ukraine, FSC.DEL/257/17/Rev.1 2017). To meet the Minsk commitments in full, the EU has also called on Russia to use its considerable influence over the separatists (in any case backed by Russia) (EU Statement on Security Situation in and Around Ukraine, FSC.DEL/252/17 2017). The EU has also rejected Russia’s interpretation of the crisis in Ukraine being a civil war and that Russia’s role has only been to facilitate dialogue. Member states of the EU have also obtained information about the presence of members of the Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 166 Russian armed forces in Ukraine as fighters in separatist areas, about the many Russian convoys that cross the border uninspected etc. (EU Statement on Security Situation in and Around Ukraine, FSC.DEL/51/17/Rev.1, 2017). In various statements, Ukraine has continuously pointed to Russian or rebel violations of international norms and principles in Ukraine and other associated actions, such as: ˗ numerous armed provocations and violations of ceasefires and the Minsk agreements along the whole line of contact. Ukraine has recorded such violations every day and constantly reported them to the OSCE. The number of these violations, for example, varied from 16 to 48 a day during the summer of 2017 (FSC.DEL/201/17). ˗ Numerous cases of the illegal use of UAV for air reconnaissance, mainly in the Luhansk sector (see FSC.DEL/192/17). ˗ Russia’s denial of its military involvement in Donbas. Ukraine contrasted this denial with its own evidence showing the direct presence of Russian troops. Accordingly, Russian hybrid forces consisted of up to 36,261 troops on top of 4,200 servicemen from Russia (see FSC.DEL/115/17). Ukraine also reported on Russian inspectors visiting the troops in Ukraine, demanding they leave behind their Russian personal documents at unit headquarters to prevent having their identity linked to Russian citizenship (FSC.DEL/201/17). Ukraine accused Russia of legalising the illicit practice of sending Russian military mercenaries to Ukraine by officially terminating their military contracts in Russia etc. Ukraine informed the OSCE community in March 2017 about a Russian sniper who had been killed during combat in the industrial zone of Avdiivka. The sniper was obviously carrying documents of a citizen of Russia. Video presentation of this case was presented to delegations at the OSCE (see FSC.DEL/58/17). ˗ Russian supply shipments to the rebels. Ukraine provided evidence of Russia’s direct support for the Russian hybrid forces in terms of supplies of weapons, ammunition and fuel transported illegally via uncontrolled segments of the Ukraine-Russia border (see FSC.DEL/192/17). For example, information on a train echelon on 2 February 2017 was provided. The train transported 40 pieces of heavy weapons, 2,700 tonnes of fuel and lubricants and around 300 tonnes of ammunition (see FSC.DEL/24/17). In addition, information was given that, during January 2017, the following equipment made its way illegally to Donbas: 21 trucks with military equipment , 23 gasoline tankers, 88 railway tank Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 167 cars with fuel and 26 rail carriages with ammunition. Ukraine also stated that Russian humanitarian convoys have been misused to transport items of military significance (see FSC.DEL/134/17). ˗ Attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure by the Russian hybrid forces. Ukraine reported that the Donetsk water filtration plant and Avdiivka coke plant were left without electricity at the end of January 2017. The temperature was minus 18 Celsius and over 16,000 people (including children) ended up without water, electricity and heating. Ukraine stressed that such attacks are creating a humanitarian disaster and are examples of terrorist tactics (see FSC.DEL/24/17). Due to further interruptions to its electric power, Avdiivka was connected to a new power line running from the west of Ukraine. Finally, Ukraine has also stated that Moscow continues to make political declarations about a peaceful resolution to provide a diplomatic cover for the ongoing aggression against Ukraine (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine, FSC.DEL/168/17 2017). At the Annual Security Review Conference in 2017, it was made clear that Russia had triggered some measures concerning the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics that were not in line with either the letter or spirit of the Minsk agreements. Namely, Russia recognised the travel documents of these two republics, recognised their adoption of the rouble as the currency, assumed control over Ukrainian companies in these areas and declared the line of contact as the state border (see Statements of Thomas Mayr-Harting at the 2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017: 11). In response to the threat perceptions of some NATO member states, NATO deployed 4 battalions or approximately 4,000 soldiers in the Baltic countries and Poland. It is noted these forces were not reported via the Vienna Document for several reasons, causing great concern for Russia on the other hand. Yet NATO had informed Russia about this deployment using channels outside the Vienna Document, while Russia on the other hand had informed NATO about its three new divisions in its western Russia (mainly near the eastern border of Ukraine). In addition, while the Vienna Document requires the reporting of units to the brigade level, international organisations are not required to report, and multinational units are also not mentioned by the Vienna Document. The question also arises of how temporary or permanent these units are. Soldiers and some equipment is on rotation, yet some is also staying in place. For Ukraine, the whole problem with its situation and the CSBMs is simply a reflection of the very low efficiency of the Vienna Document. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 168 Ukraine has thus expressed strong support for discussions aiming to upgrade the document (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine, FSC.DEL/17/17 2017). Based on the above statements, we can say that eastern Ukraine has started to play a similar role as other grey zones in the CSBM regime. Ukraine simultaneously shows the Vienna Document CSBMs were not designed to solve conflicts but, according to Marcel Peško, also that CSBMs can play a role in containing the conflict. This means that certain parts of CSBMs also apply to such situations (interview with Peško, 2018). Yet the difference is that Ukrainian conflict is the latest of all ongoing conflicts, it is still hot and not yet frozen compared to many others. People are still dying there in big numbers (interview with Strazisar, 2018). Failure to Reissue the Vienna Document in 2016 The Vienna Document 2011 (paragraph 152, Chapter XII) states that the Document must be reissued every 5 years, incorporating the VD plus decisions emerging in the meantime. The point of this paragraph is to make the Vienna Document a «living document», one that officially changes according to changes in the security environment. In this way, it was believed the CSBM regime would become more robust and adaptive in the future. Since 2011, the FSC has only adopted a few Vienna Document Plus decisions (most of them of a very technical nature) and reissuing the document would mean adopting the document with the additions included. According to the established timetable, this had to happen in late 2016. However, this did not occur due to Russia’s objections. Reissuing the Vienna Document was one of the key tasks of the Forum for Security Cooperation in 2016. The Portuguese Chairmanship made every effort to create favourable conditions for a constructive discussion about the document and its adoption, but eventually no consensus could be achieved on this (see Statement of the Chairperson, FSC/JOUR/840, 2016). Many states commented that this was regrettable and disappointing (e.g. Portugal, the USA, also EU member states with a single voice etc.). These countries were also a little surprised because reissuing the Vienna Document only meant including the all already adopted VD plus decisions from 2012 and 2013 in the existing Vienna Document from 2011 and reconfirming it as a new package. They had expected the process to be fairly simple and more of a very technical matter. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 169 For the USA, this inability was a stark indication of the lack of a wide commitment to advance what should be shared or the lack of the OSCE community’s effort to rebuild military transparency. The USA saw Russia’s objection as an intentional move to politicise the very process it had actually supported in 2010 and called on Russia to adhere to all its existing OSCE commitments (Reissuing the Vienna Document 2011, FSC/DEL/208/16, 2016). The Russian delegation clearly explained why Russia did not support reissuing the Vienna Document. Accordingly, this was no disaster given that the existing Vienna Document 2011 and all subsequently adopted VD plus decisions remain equally in force, even without reissuing the document. Russia reminded the other states that they had not supported the Russian proposals to modernise the Vienna Document several years earlier. If they were truly interested in a new version of this document, they would have supported Russia’s efforts in the past. Second, Russia wanted to show the West that it was no longer «business as usual» with Russia. Russia no longer needs an arrangement in which more and more is demanded from it. Russia also thought that adopting a new version of the Vienna Document would send a false signal that everything is rosy in the CSBM area. In its statement, Russia stressed the possibility of supporting the question of reissuing the document would not be ruled out in the future if the necessary conditions emerge. For Russia, what was most disturbing is NATO’s policy of the military containment of Russia. It was made clear that Russia can envisage the modernisation of the Vienna Document if NATO abandons its policy of containment of Russia, recognises and respects Russia’s interests and restores normal relations with Russia in both military and non-military spheres. Until then, the focus should only be on implementing the existing Vienna Document and the new VD plus decisions (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/840, 2016). Despite this antagonism, we should stress that many actors were optimistic when stating that efforts aimed at updating and modernising the Vienna Document must be continued in order to adapt it to the changing security environment. For example, the EU representative said work on strengthening the Vienna Document must continue and that all efforts and proposals to modernise and update the document are welcome. But it was also stressed that progress can only be achieved in genuine dialogue where all partners display the necessary political will (EU Statement on Reissuing the Vienna Document 2011, FSC/DEL/208/16, 2016). In the words of one state representative, we must not deny what has already been achieved and should also not relinquish our efforts to further develop the Vienna Document (Statement by the Delegation of Poland, FSC.JOUR/840, 2016). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 170 Ideas about Modernising and Amending the Vienna Document The modernisation of the Vienna Document is key to the survival of the CSBM regime in Europe. The entire debate about modernisation of the Vienna Document is actually a debate on how to improve the future effectiveness of CSBMs. We have already seen that in the period after 2011 and before the start of the Ukrainian crisis, the Forum for Security Cooperation only adopted 4 Vienna Document Plus decisions and most, if not all, were very technical in nature. In other words, no VD plus decisions have been adopted since 2013. Many proposals have been made, but there has been no consensus to adopt them. The brief overview of the proposals below shows us that states have actually been very active during the Ukrainian crisis in thinking about and proposing how to amend the document and use it in the future. Several Chairpersons and the Coordinator of the Vienna Document (Switzerland) have organised several informal meetings on the Vienna Document CSBMs at which they discussed various chapters and their potential amendments. A number of states have distributed food-for-thought papers containing proposals for amendments. If we look at the entire set of proposals on the table of the coordinator of the Vienna Document in early 2018, we can see no proposals about defence planning (Chapter II), annual calendars (Chapter VII) or regional measures (Chapter X). However, there are several very important proposals about other chapters. For example, in Chapter I on the annual exchange of military information, states have proposed the inclusion of the location of the headquarters of attached subunits at the battalion level or equivalents (by Austria, Hungary, Montenegro, Norway), military training establishments and military repair or maintenance facilities with organic major weapons and equipment systems (Germany), air combat units at the wing/air regiment or equivalent level (Germany, USA, Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania and Sweden), military transport aircraft (Germany), all permanent changes in the command organisation of their military forces relating to formations and units (Belarus), and information on naval forces in terms of military organisation and manpower (Russian Federation). Chapter III on risk reduction attracts four important proposals for improving the crisis management potential of the CSBMs and the OSCE. These proposals hold considerable importance for the present and future effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM regime. While these proposals are somewhat similar, they also differ in important details. The German proposal from 2016 aims to establish a permanent Special Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 171 Representative for risk reduction who would mediate in all cases that require risk reduction. He/she would assemble an on-site inspection using experts from a pre-existing roster, carry out the inspection and report to the FSC. The American proposal from 2015 is based on the idea that the CiO organises a fact-finding mission led by the lead nation that would form a team from a group of interested nations. The final report of this mission would be communicated to all participating states. No participating state would be obliged to receive more than three such missions per year (quota). The Russian proposal from 2011 is more reserved and contains several checks for those organising the inspection. The proposal is based on the idea that the CiO can organise a special OSCE inspection in the zone of application. Russia proposed that the leading nation cannot be the requesting state nor a contiguous state, that the group of inspectors is subsequently approved by the FSC, that the group of inspectors needs to reflect a broad geographic representation and, at the end, that the final report can include separate assessments or opinions by individual inspection team members if they differ from the general assessment. In 2011, an OSCE inspection was also proposed by a group of countries led by the Netherlands (also including Poland, Sweden, Latvia, Albania, Luxemburg, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Romania, Slovakia, Moldova and Italy). In this version, the CiO may entrust the inspection to a group of participating states. The lead nation should also not be the requesting or a neighbouring state. Such inspections would also not be subject to any quotas. In Chapter IV on military contacts, we note Russia’s proposal from 2013 concerning the demonstration of new types of major weapons and equipment systems. This proposal is based on the idea that such demonstration be organised at the earliest opportunity, but no later than 5 years after being first deployed. The demonstration could also be merged with other events. In 2016, a group of states led by Albania proposed that such demonstrations may be in conjunction with contact measures organised by other participating states. This would be a more cost-efficient approach. In Chapter V on prior notification of certain military activities, the USA proposed including in these notifications military activities containing forces from other participating states. A group of states led by Albania proposed in 2015 and 2016 that the reporting thresholds be lowered from 9,000 to 5,000 troops, from 250 to 100 battle tanks, from 500 to 200 armoured combat vehicles and from 250 to 80 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket-launchers. A similar reduction of thresholds was proposed for land forces in transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points within the zone, or from inside the Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 172 zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone. The USA additionally proposed that states organising notifiable military exercises should be encouraged to invite military observers to the activity and provide further information about the activity and/or be obliged to accept an additional inspection during that calendar year or within 60 days of notifying the activity (additional inspection). Russia put forward two very important proposals concerning this chapter in 2010. The first is that participating states on whose territory multinational rapid reaction forces (from at least two states) are being deployed (host state) should provide notification of such events. This proposal also states the thresholds, such as at least 900 troops, or 41 combat tanks, or 70 armoured combat vehicles etc. The second Russian proposal refers to notification of any large-scale military transit (transborder redeployment of a formation/unit) along a route at least partly located in the zone of application. Once again, thresholds were proposed. Russia also proposed what exactly should be reported in these cases. In Chapter VI on the observation of certain military activities, in 2015 the USA proposed lowering the thresholds for reporting, e.g. from 13,000 to 9,000 troops etc. Chapter IX on compliance and verification (inspections and evaluations) attracted many proposals for modernisation. The USA proposed in 2015 an increase of the inspection and evaluation quotas: inspection quotas from 2 per calendar year to up to 5 per calendar year, however no more than half the total number of inspections may be performed before 1 July of each year, and from one evaluation visit to two evaluation visits per calendar year for the first 15, 30 or 60 units. In 2010, Belarus gave a useful proposal that specifies force majeure in case of inspections and evaluations (they will not be carried out or finished in the event of force majeure ). This proposal defined force majeure as: ˗ the impossibility to access the specified area due to unfavourable weather conditions or natural disasters; ˗ the existence of a complex epidemiological situation in the specified area that threatens the health of the inspectors and auxiliary personnel; and ˗ the inability of the receiving state to ensure the safety of the inspectors and auxiliary personnel due to armed conflict, the threat of terrorism or other unpredictable risks and threats in the specified area. Belarus and Poland made very similar proposals in 2010 about the specified area for inspections. Both proposed limiting this area to 25,000 km2. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 173 In 2014, Russia proposed prolonging the inspection time from 48 to 72 hours. Germany in a similar proposal added that, if the receiving state does not provide the possibility of aerial inspection, the duration of the inspection will be extended by up to 24 hours. Similarly, the Russian Federation in 2014 and Germany in 2016 proposed extending the duration of evaluation visits. Many proposals have emerged about the number of inspectors or evaluators in the teams and the number of participating states. States proposed adding up to three participants (to the existing four) from other participating states upon the invitation of the host state (Belarus and Poland in 2010), in 2014 Russia proposed that the inspection team consists of no more than six inspectors from no more than five participating states, and Germany gave a proposal in 2016 that was very similar to the Russian proposal. The current evaluation team may have up to four members, and the participating states provided five very similar proposals to increase the number of team members to up to five (the USA in 2015, the FSC coordinator in 2016, Germany in 2016 etc.). Belarus in 2010 and Germany in 2016 proposed that inspection and evaluation teams could use more of their own equipment (satellite-based devices, mobile communication technology such as mobile telephones, smartphones, tablet PCs). Germany’s proposal would allow receiving states to limit the use of this equipment if respective national devices are provided. Several proposals were also made regarding who covers the costs of the increased number of inspection and evaluation visits. This all shows that the FSC’s Working Group A has many proposals on modernisation on the table and under consideration, some being proposed by a single state and others by a group of participating states. Some assessments suggest that since 2011 around 100 proposals to modernise the Vienna Document have emerged from participating states and their delegations. As mentioned, no consensus was achievable to adopt even one of them since 2013. The FSC Chair’s Coordinator for the Vienna Document positively commented on this at the 1st Breakout Workshop on CSBMs in 2017. He stated this should not stop efforts for further refining these proposals and expanding the support for them. The Chairpersons and Coordinator of the Vienna Document (Switzerland) therefore organised several informal meetings on amending the Vienna Document CSBMs, several foodfor-thought papers were distributed in the OSCE information system and presented to all participating states. For example, Germany distributed a food-for-thought paper with proposals for Chapter IV which deals with military contacts. This proposal was co-owned (supported) by another 11 Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 174 participating states. The proposal included improving the coordination of contact measures in the 5-year cycle, combining measures conducted by different states and improving the reporting mechanisms (Statement by the Delegation of Germany, FSC.JOUR/831, 2016). The EU has continuously called for a substantial modernisation and stressed this is an urgent task if we want to increase transparency and predictability, argued for the need to intensify discussions on modernising and updating the Vienna Document and stressed that results can only be achieved if the participating states work together, including Russia, and possess the necessary political will. Interestingly, the EU also stated that informal discussions and all other deliberations to update and modernise the Vienna Document represent a significant confidence-building measure by themselves (see EU Statement in response to H.E. Marek Ziółkowski, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland, 2016; EU Statement on the Security Issues in the Baltic Sea Region, 2016; EU Statement on Conventional Arms Control and Confidence and Security Building Measures, 2016; EU Statement in response to H.E. Dr. Augusto Santos Silva, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, 2016). The Annual Security Review Conference in 2017 also showed there is general agreement that conventional arms control and the CSBMs remain essential pillars of European security and that efforts to reverse their weakening need to be stepped up. Modernisation of the Vienna Document was mentioned as a priority goal by many delegations. On the other hand, it was also ascertained that the current tools for increasing transparency are insufficient and need to be adapted (2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017: 3, 15). The OSCE organised special Breakout workshops within the Structured Dialogue (its concept and structure are to be presented and analysed in the next chapter) where ideas for modernisation were discussed in greater detail. For example, it is worthwhile mentioning the German Verification Centre’s vision of modernisation presented at the first Breakout Workshop on CSBM in 2017. Accordingly, an increase in transparency should lead to «transparent armed forces». This would be based on the disclosure of all relevant information on the armed forces of all participating states and should concentrate on new types of military activity. First, the exchange of military information should be revised to cover the entire armed forces of each participating state. Next, semi-official or private armed forces or security companies should be included. Qualitative capabilities should also become a focus of the Vienna Document. The German proposal foresaw the inclusion of air transport capabilities, logistic capabilities, capabilities for conducting military training activities (e.g. training areas), including Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 175 computer-assisted exercises, command post exercises, multinational exercises and exercises involving personnel from non-OSCE states etc. (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 89-90). Debates at the 1st Breakout Workshop also presented many other proposals on how to modernise the Vienna Document, e.g. reflecting force structures by moving down to the battalion level from the brigade level, including command, control and communication and logistic units, encompassing strategic air mobility, multilateral cooperative activities, combat drones (although the problem of including long-range strategic drones into a regional CSBM framework was also exposed). Certain proposals attracted some support and also some reservations in the debates, such as including naval fire support for land operations (due to the difficulty of defining the adjoining sea areas on the European periphery), the inclusion of naval infantry (it is unclear if these units are already included under amphibious units), the inclusion of Short- Range Ballistic Missile systems (given the question of how feasible this is as only a small number of participating states actually have these systems), and the inclusion of Electronic Warfare capabilities (due to the question of whether states would have the will to include them). Several other proposals were rejected by the workshop participants due to their lack of relevance, technical feasibility or national reservations. These were the inclusion of special operations forces, internal security forces, material depots, cyber operations capabilities, net-centric warfare capabilities etc. (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 116-118, 159). In addition, the 1st Breakout Workshop of the Structured Dialogue revealed a sobering intention to continue working on concrete proposals despite the fact that no decisions are possible. The sobering lesson for the FSC Chair’s coordinator Laggner was that the key to unlocking the deadlock does not lie in Vienna and that the right balance must be struck between desirability and feasibility in modernisation. The Workshop also offered the lesson that CSBMs do not take place in a vacuum away from the broader security situation and that no technical solution alone can overcome the current political rift in the Transatlantic-Eurasian security space (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 107). The second Breakout Workshop led to the idea that the Vienna Document must be modernised more in a qualitative direction. Certain qualitative aspects of armed forces are missed in verification activities and creative thinking needs to be applied to find ways to achieve this. The debates also revealed a general awareness that modernising the Vienna Document is only feasible if there is the political will. The debate was concluded by stating that modernisation concepts need to be prepared in advance by military Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 176 experts so they can be used when the political time is ripe (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 139, 155, 161). It seems there are certain time windows to modernise the Vienna Document. Unfortunately, Russia was ready in the past to modernise it and the West objected, and now (in 2018) it is the West that wants to modernise it while the Russians are objecting. According to Mossinkoff and Podbevsek, every proposal to modernise the Vienna Document coming from the Western side is perceived by Russia as being against it. A typical Russian comment is that the window of opportunity has passed. Russia argues there is a need to discuss implementation before modernisation can be discussed. This seems logical because some possibilities in the Vienna Document have not been used frequently enough (e.g. military contacts), while it is also true that the implementation record shows that modernisation is required (interview with Mossinkoff and Podbevsek, 2018). It might be that this dilemma is the reason for which the implementation of the Vienna Document seems to be declining in certain areas and for underexploiting it in other areas. The debate on modernisation also reveals that states are not listening to each other, they are only listening to themselves. Everything is political and tactical in this process. Russia first wants confidence to be established afresh and then for negotiations on modernisation to follow, while the West first wants modernisation and then confidence will likely be restored automatically (interview with Lüber, 2018). We should add here that Russia also sees some imbalance in the proposals to modernise the Vienna Document because it is mostly one state (namely Russia) that would be affected by greater transparency (see 2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017: 27). Russia has also linked the modernisation debate to other broader issues at the OSCE. Russia believes that common problems can only be solved according to the principles of equal and indivisible security and openness, the rejection of confrontation or the imposition of ideologies in international relations, while conducting a joint, mutually respectful and in-depth analysis of the problems that have arisen (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/857, 2017). On the other hand, there is a view that the West probably wants modernisation now also because the CFE Treaty has been suspended and the Vienna Document is an insufficient tool for obtaining information. Accordingly, this tool must be modernised for more useful information to be gathered (interview with Strazisar, 2018). A note concerning the paradox of partial modernisation should be added at the end of this section. We should understand that any partial changes of the Vienna Document might create the need to change another part of the document. For example, changes in relation to the number of notifiable Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 177 military units would affect many other parts/chapters (e.g. number of quotas for evaluation visits etc.). We should keep in mind these interconnections within the document and the net impact of changing one part on other parts. Several points in this book suggest that modernisation is not merely a question of logic but also of political feasibility. We talk more about this later in the book, but here we simply share a comment by Alexander Vershbow , NATO Deputy Secretary General. He said that many countries’ proposals are on the table (e.g. about reducing the thresholds for exercise notifications and for mandatory inspections) and that at one stage Russia actually supported many of these ideas. But the tragedy is, seen over the duration of his career, that both sides often hold the same position, but not at the same time (see Revitalizing Arms Control, 2016: 7). Structured Dialogue and Breakout Workshops With the Declaration «From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control» in December 2016 at the Hamburg Ministerial Council the participating states underlined the importance of conventional arms control and the CSBMs for advancing comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible security in the OSCE area. They also committed themselves to exploring how negative developments in conventional arms control and CSBMs can be reversed.32 In this respect, the Structured Dialogue on current and future security challenges and risks in the OSCE region was launched in March 2017, with the first meeting of the Informal Working Group (IWG SD) being held in Kahlenberg near Vienna. The Austrian Chairmanship organised an Intersessional Dialogue on military doctrines in May 2017 and three so-called breakout workshops on CSBMs, one in March, the second in June and the third in October 2017. The purpose was to break out from the standard setting in Hofburg. Events were participated not only by the delegates from Vienna, but by experts from the capitals as well. This was the key aspect of these events (to give the experts from the capitals an opportunity to talk). The intention was to provide a platform for informal debate outside the OSCE’s formal 32 The Declaration was addopted with two disclaimers, one by the USA and the other by Russia. The USA stated the declaration does not commit any nation or group of nations to undertake any particular activity. This refers especially to the USA’s «statutory limitations» in its bilateral military-to-military cooperation with the Russian Federation. The Russian disclaimer stressed that the declaration does not apply to implementation of the CFE treaty by Russia (see attachments to the declaration). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 178 structures and to discuss short-, medium- and long-term solutions to the problems. Such genuine dialogue formed part of the Austrian programme across all OSCE dimensions. Austria, in the words of its Chairperson, believed this would lead to the enhancement of the OSCE’s instruments and boost their effectiveness (in case of CSBMs to the full implementation and modernisation of the Vienna Document). This dialogue has proven to be very useful as will be demonstrated in this chapter, but some notable differences in perceptions are visible. Most countries in the OSCE support this dialogue and agree it is the right venue for such debates. Yet some states that think that the bloc-like arrangement of the debate will lead to the failure of this process. Particular states (one from the American continent and three Russian neighbours) believe the programme of this dialogue tends to be overambitious, that it will take much more time than predicted by the Chair and that greater attention should be given over to implementing the already agreed commitments. For example, the USA supports the Structured Dialogue because it may contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of arms control, but its representatives asked whether the time for this is right during Russia’s continuing destabilising activities. The question that has bothered the USA has been if negotiating something new is at all possible with a key player that does not uphold its existing commitments (Revisiting the 1996 OSCE Framework for Arms Control, 2016). On the other hand, the Austrian Chairperson of the 2017 Annual Security Review Conference stressed that several countries regard the erosion of the rule-based security order in Europe as the crucial background to initiating the Structured Dialogue. This dialogue was widely perceived as a process for use in de-escalation and rebuilding trust among the participating states (2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017). In addition, Russia agreed the Structured Dialogue represents an independent measure for strengthening trust and reducing tension (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, FSC.JOUR/865, 2017). Another perceptional problem is that, as has emerged during the process, states hold somewhat different views on the appropriate direction the whole process of the Structured Dialogue should take. Some states see the road leading towards arms control (e.g. Germany), while others want to broaden the themes with terrorism, migrations etc. (interview with Mossinkoff and Podbevsek, 2018). For example, the USA proposed that forward momentum could be achieved by focusing on border security, the nexus of migration, economic dislocation and terrorism (the OSCE has expertise in all of these issues anyway) (US Mission to OSCE on the Assessment of the Structured Dialogue in View of the Ministerial Council, 2017). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 179 Structured dialogue is about identifying similarities and differences regarding many issues. Understanding the concerns of others is the first step towards overcoming the differences. The dialogue should lead to a common basis for strengthening trust, cooperation and security. The ultimate aim has been the substantial modernisation of the Vienna Document. For the current Head of the Conflict Prevention Centre at the OSCE, the Structured Dialogue is a platform for discussion and dialogue about the issues and differences among participating states. This dialogue is a positive trend, but answers have yet to be produced. The answers will become clear in 2018 or so (interview with Peško, 2018). For the EU, this dialogue is part of the work on creating an environment conducive of reinvigorating conventional arms control and CSBMs (EU Statement – Structured Dialogue, 2017). Generally speaking, this dialogue is another way of increasing trust, stability, predictability, transparency etc. In this way, it contributes to the relaunching of CSBM and arms control in Europe. The Informal Working Group ensures a structured approach in debates. The word structured refers to the organisation of the agenda and themes, it is an attempt to force the organisation to talk about the correct root topics and problems, it is a side track of the formal and more political discussions in other OSCE formats (e.g. FSC is formal and Security Dialogue has also become formal), it is a true brainstorming forum for the OSCE (interview with Lüber, 2018).33 A likely solution to the problems described above between the West and Russia is a debate that satisfies both sides: for example, the debate focused on snap exercises for the West and moving NATO forces from the Russian perspective (interview with Lüber, 2018). The question is how to arrive at a common vision of common security in Europe. The path entails looking into the contradictory visions of how European security is to be provided. The current environment resembles a pre-Paris Charter situation when a similar kind of discussions was opened (interview with Peško, 2018). The key focus areas of the discussions in this process were: threat perceptions, military doctrines and trends in force postures, military activities that cause concerns and OSCE tools for early warning. Especially important was that the first Breakout workshop also addressed gaps and loopholes in the Vienna Document regime in several chapters (such as prior notification and observation of certain military activities, compliance and verification, and risk reduction). The Intersessional Dialogue on Military Doctrines 33 The informal surrounding of such brainstorming slightly resembles the Corfu process and even the Panel of Eminent Persons. The lesson of both is that they provided a window of opportunity only for a limited time. This means the influence of the Structured Dialogue will also be limited in time. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 180 (May 2017) concentrated on commonalities and divergencies in threat perceptions, their influence on defence doctrines (link threats-doctrines-defence policies), ways of addressing these threats and other main doctrinal drivers. It was suggested at this event that debates should inquire into the possibility of harmonising global threat perceptions and coordinating respective responses. The debate showed that global threats, such as international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and failing states, hold the potential to improve security cooperation. This dialogue also showed that military doctrines as expressions of military thinking and related principles are reacting to geopolitical, military and technological changes and further affect national force postures, including troop structures, personnel strength, procurement of weapons and equipment, patterns of military training, stationing, infrastructure etc. In other words, doctrines contain strategic threat and risk perceptions and directly translate into military structures and developments (in the words of the Chairmanship’s perception paper). The dialogue also showed that changes in the doctrines of one country may cause a reaction in the doctrines of others (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 55-62, 64). The dialogue also showed that an open and serious debate on security concerns and military doctrines is a confidence-building measure in itself and that there seems to be a common understanding that in an environment where trust is lacking there is an urgent need to engage in meaningful dialogue (despite differences in threat perceptions) (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 56, 63). The debates reveal some important convergences and divergences among the participating states. In terms of threats, countries face broadly similar challenges, although some of them are far beyond the structured dialogue. In terms of reactions, countries acknowledge the need to try to minimise the risks emanating from the current security situation (EU Statement – Structured Dialogue, 2017). In our view, the preliminary conclusions from the Intersessional Dialogue contain an extremely important recognition of the fact that «own military measures – even if subjectively taken with a defensive purpose – can pose a risk to others» (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 56). This situation was attributed to a lack of military-tomilitary contacts. Consequently, proposals for increasing and improving these contacts were made. Special focus will be given to periodic High- Level Military Doctrine Seminars. Switzerland suggested establishing a special Working Group of the FSC as a standing body for a more structured military-to-military contacts and in-depth discussion at the expert level (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 184). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 181 The debates also show an interest in organising more military contact events in Vienna (interview with Mossinkoff and Podbevsek, 2018). Moreover, the debates highlighted the need to improve risk-reduction mechanisms, fact-finding and transparency measures, and communication channels (EU Statement – Structured Dialogue, 2017). The finding from the debate that the OSCE Communications Network is a CSBM in its own right is also interesting (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 222). In the remainder of this chapter, we present two cases: one on the mapping efforts to improve the OSCE’s fact-based analytical potential and the second one on the excellent idea of the automatisation of reporting and geographical fact representation. 1) The Mapping Exercise Debates in the structural dialogue (second Breakout Workshop) showed that mapping force postures (personnel, equipment, capabilities and locations) would be useful for creating a basis for further deliberations on CSBMs (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 155). Support for more systematic analysis or the mapping of military capabilities and exercises was also expressed at the Annual Security Review Conference in 2017. The current mapping exercise in the OSCE military dimension aims to enable a more fact-based analysis or, in words of the current Head of the CPC, we have no common information on armed forces outside the Vienna Document exchanges to help establish a common picture. The FSC is a platform for exchanging views but it does not address the gaps (interview with Peško, 2018). The mapping exercise can be operationalised in several ways and participants are still discussing which methods should be used for mapping. At this point in time, we can already share some of the positive results from the threat perception mapping. The aim of this mapping was to establish similarities and differences in threat perception. In this process, many threats were identified, such as terrorism, migrations, military exercises, NATO enlargement, violation of human rights and international law (in the cases of Donbas and Crimea) etc. The discussions reflected the problems of the different subjective interpretations of these threats and differences in the hierarchy of the threats identified. These threats were grouped in four clusters and future debates should explore them more deeply: Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 182 1. violations of principles, values and rules (international law), where a problem is due to differences in perceptions of common values and principles, and different interpretations of problems (some countries labelled this cluster challenges to a rules-based European security order); 2. transnational threats, such as terrorism, cyber warfare, migrants, refugees etc.; 3. interstate tensions of a politico-military nature with threats of use or actual use of military force, arms race, military capacity build-up at unusual locations, increased number of bigger and unscheduled military exercises, involvement of the nuclear dimension in existing exercises etc.; and 4. other threats or new instruments and trends that increase instability like political rhetoric, propaganda, fake news etc. (interview with Strazisar, 2018; see Braunstein, Director of the Bundeswehr Verification Center in Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 44). While the above classification may look very nice and usable, as always in the OSCE there are different views about it. The EU expressed its interest to mainly focus on cluster 1 and cluster 3 in future debates (see EU Statement – Structured Dialogue, 2017). However, some states stressed that exchanges concerning threat perceptions should also focus on cybersecurity (cyber threats), hybrid threats, existing conflicts, paramilitary forces, terrorism and violent extremism. The Annual Security Review Conference showed there is a discrepancy between those who would want to focus also on these threats and those who stress the need to keep a narrow politicomilitary focus and avoid the duplication of efforts with other formats (2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017: 2, 14). Two interesting notes and perceptions should also be outlined here for readers. For example, the Chairmanship perception paper of the Intersessional dialogue shows that threat and risk perceptions have an obvious geographical component: several of them focus on the Baltic region or other parts of Eastern Europe. Austria also holds an interesting perception: the country feels located in a relatively secure area surrounded by NATO and neutral countries, but it also identified a «ring of fire» around this area that extends from the Baltic countries, Poland, Ukraine and Crimea, Caucasus, Syria and the Middle East, and then from Egypt to Libya and Morocco (see Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 29, 64). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 183 2) The Automatisation of Reporting and Geographical Fact Representation Another good idea for improving common situation awareness based on the existing reported information is the idea of the automatisation of reporting. The Secretariat of the OSCE found that much of the incoming information is not being used. An interesting symbolic comparison with a straw was made: analysis and consequent implementation seems like the OSCE community is looking at the ongoing situation(s) with a straw, that is, with a very narrow view, missing out on a lot of information, leading typically to the application of only a limited amount of measures. In other words, there is the reality, then there is exchanged information about this reality and, eventually, decision-makers brief look at this reality through a straw (interview with Mossinkoff and Podbevsek, 2018). A difference can also be seen in the analytical capacities of the bigger and smaller states of the OSCE. This difference is based on the size of missions to the OSCE and home staff dealing with the military aspects of security. The analytical capacities of some states are simply huge compared to the analytical capacities of some others. The idea is to help participating states see the wider picture, create reports automatically and add visualisation tools. Advanced visualisation techniques could help participating states and the FSC obtain the exchanged data presented in a much more user-friendly manner. These ideas of automatically mapping data and hosting interactive software on the OSCE information systems were also discussed in sessions of the Structured Dialogue. Such tools would represent a move from the existing complex Excel tables to more complex GIS tools featuring the locations of events on geographic maps, locations of units, numbers of soldiers, weapons, areas of exercises etc. In early 2018, this was still in the process of debate and demonstration. The final aim is to create an analytical platform for presenting the existing information in a clearer way. The CPC could manage this tool and make the information more structured and digestible. The key is that the participating states would actually carry out the analysis themselves. Based on electronic submissions, a comprehensive database would be created as a base for the analytical tool (interview with Mossinkoff and Podbevsek, 2018). This goal and endeavour is completely in line with paragraph 157 of the Vienna Document 2011 that requires the CPC to regularly provide to all participating states a factual presentation of all CSBM information exchanged. It is also defined that such factual presentation should Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 184 facilitate the analysis of this information by the participating states and that presentations should not entail any conclusions by the CPC. 3) Some Assessments of the Structured Dialogue Existing reports from the Structured Dialogue stress the openness, respectfulness and sincerity of these debates, despite the differences in opinions. An additional effect of the Structured Dialogue has been putting the CSBM issue back high up the political agenda of the OSCE. Let us consider some perceptions of the ongoing process. Many states commended the dialogue and its usefulness for creating a solid basis to move forward. For example, Spain believes the mapping exercise turned out as a useful tool for transcending the strategic bloc mentality of the Cold War (Statement by the Delegation of Spain, 2017). EU participating states assessed the ongoing dialogue as a meaningful opportunity for a more open and deeper exchange of views. The informal setting of the meetings and participation of the capital representatives and academic input turned out to be very useful from this perspective (EU Statement – Structured Dialogue, 2017). For a former OSCE Secretary General, the Structured Dialogue offered cautious optimism that a renewed dialogue might also lead to the revival of discussions on CSBMs (2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017: 6). But, like always in the OSCE, some contend the participating states have only scratched the surface in these debates and stressed that progress in this dialogue depends on the readiness to dig deeper and review the security challenges more thoroughly than has been done in other fora. Norway also stressed that the Structured Dialogue needs to remain a political process that is owned and driven by the states. It also called for patience and advised against hurrying (Statement by the Delegation of Norway on the Assessment of the Structured Dialogue, 2017). It is clear that, after one year of discussions, the diplomatic talks have been exhausted, and true debate is emerging. In addition, a worrying observation was made that people might be becoming tired of the endless discussions (a kind of institutional fatigue) (interview with Lüber, 2018). The USA wishes to deepen this dialogue in the future and provide opportunities for reinforced sessions among delegations that would allow time for expert discussion to enhance mutual understanding. The USA also found that most of the threat perceptions on the table are not susceptible to any easy resolution. By way of conclusion and a proposal, it was stated it is necessary to do everything to improve our Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 185 ability to understand one another’s language, intentions and concerns about military activities. The USA proposed that forward momentum could be achieved by concentrating on border security, the nexus of migration, economic dislocation and terrorism. In addition, Structured Dialogue should have no preconceived outcomes and no false deadlines. If states want to improve mutual understanding of security threats, the dialogue must be among nations and not think-tanks (US Mission to OSCE on the Assessment of the Structured Dialogue in View of the Ministerial Council, 2017). At this juncture, how Russia perceives the Structured Dialogue is crucial. Russia has linked this dialogue with its broader goals of achieving a pan- European political process, an equal and indivisible security community, and a new model of European security that takes everyone’s interests into account. Accordingly, for Russia, Structured Dialogue is supposed to assist in deescalating the situation and restoring trust by moving towards those goals. Russia was pleased by the Structured Dialogue’s progress achieved by the end of 2017. It noted a positive shift in tone in Western experts’ statements and their gradual departure from a position of accusing Russia towards one of cooperating with Russia. For Russia, we should move from asking «who is to blame» and who violated the rules and when to «what is to be done». Russia also proposed not talking for the sake of talking and seeking transparency for transparency’s sake, but to move to discussing specific steps to reduce tensions. In its view, the dialogue among military experts has been lacking because NATO countries have decided to suspend it and opted to punish Russia. But, in this way, the communication channels were lost. Russia is leaving it up to its partners what to do with Structured Dialogue in the future: if military activities against Russia are stopped, including deployments of forces and infrastructure near Russia’s borders, and if the build up of foreign presence in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe discontinues and if foreign forces return to the lines occupied by NATO in 2014, it would be possible to move on to the next stages of joint work on conventional arms control and CSBMs (Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, 29 November 2017). Finally, it is very important to again stress that some observers labelled Structured Dialogue a confidence- and security-building measure «in and of itself» (Revisiting the 1996 OSCE Framework for Arms Control, 2016), especially in times of a division within the OSCE (Statement by the Delegation of Norway on the Assessment of the Structured Dialogue, 2017). In other words, Structured Dialogue could become a CSBM if it is changed in the near future in line with the above advice (US Mission to OSCE on Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 186 the Assessment of the Structured Dialogue in View of the Ministerial Council, 2017). Uncertainties and Denials Concerning Unusual Military Activities (Risk- Reduction Mechanism in Chapter III) This mechanism was put to use three times during the Yugoslav crisis, twice in the Georgian crisis in 2008 while most requests and concerns were voiced in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. Recent years have seen no use of the mechanism, as revealed in the above trend report. Russia and Ukraine have repeatedly asked each other about their unusual military activities and then denied there were any. Both sides continued to ask these questions under Chapter III, meaning that concerns were not dispelled by either party. For example, Ukraine responded to Russia’s concerns by saying that it had never conducted an unusual military activity against any other state, that it was simply reacting to the attempted annexation of its territory (a threat to territorial integrity) and sovereignty, attempting to restore its constitutional order in the temporarily occupied areas, and conducting an anti-terrorist operation with the involvement of its armed forces. Ukraine did not allow the OSCE participating states’ observers access to the anti-terrorist operation zone because their security could not be guaranteed in line with the Vienna Document. Ukraine also emphasised there was no destabilising accumulation of personnel, weapons and military equipment of its armed forces and noted the substantial accumulation of Russian separatist forces combined with Russian regular forces in the antiterrorist operation zone. Ukraine stated these forces receive supplies from Russian territory and that many fighters also come from Russia. Ukraine assessed the total strength of the separatist armed force as 35,000 troops, 350 tanks, 700 armoured combat vehicles, 700 large-calibre artillery systems, 130 multiple rocket launch systems and 60 air defence systems. Ukraine also assessed that Russia had accumulated almost 50,000 military «groupings»34 near Ukraine’s border. Ukraine also stressed it would continue to implement all provisions of the Vienna Document in good faith and called upon Russia to receive above-quota inspections on its territory (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine, FSC.JOUR/822, 2016). Ukraine has frequently stated that Russia has also refused to provide satisfactory answers to Ukrainian requests for clarification under the risk- 34 It is unclear to the authors of this book and also the reviewers what exactly “grouping” means in this case. We decided to retain it as in the original source. Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 187 reduction provisions. In the eyes of Ukraine, Russia has chosen to avoid transparency, information exchange and verification control, especially relative to the situation in the Southern Military District in Russia. Ukraine also thinks that the CSBM is not valid on the Ukrainian territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 63rd Joint session of FSC and PC, 2016). Chapter III also provides for cooperation in the event of hazardous incidents of a military nature. The mechanism for hazardous incidents was used only once in 1992 and the voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities have also been rare. In addition to provisions on clarifying such hazardous incidents, Poland proposed improvements in terms of clarification and specification of the information exchange. The proposal says that states should provide information on such activities to neighbouring states before such a hazardous event takes place and that the information provided should contain the type, timing, location and duration, the types of deployed military forces as well as the closest proximity to borders (Statement by the Delegation of Poland, FSC.JOUR/839, 2016). Structured Dialogue also reveals some kind of paradox: the risk-reduction mechanism should be increasingly used in times of crisis, but that does not occur in practice. The debate in this process shows that military incidents hold escalatory potential and that a substantial revision of Chapter III is urgently needed. The general perception within the OSCE is, as already stated, that risks will be reduced by increasing military-to-military contacts, where a special role is to be played by the periodic High-Level Military Doctrine Seminars. Several proposals for ways to improve the operation of this mechanism were ventilated during the dialogue. These are: establishing a Special OSCE Representative for Risk Reduction, establishing an informal group of experts (friends of Chapter III) proposed by Greece, a Dutch proposal for an OSCE Inspection and a Russian proposal for a Special OSCE Inspection (but later withdrawn). The First Breakout Workshop showed that there was general support to establish fact-finding missions to clarify military incidents. There was also general support for the idea that the CPC would organise such missions on short notice. There are ideas that the CIO upon request appoints a lead nation, or that a fact-finding mission is launched on the request of at least nine participating states if all other measures have failed (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 46, 217). Participants of Structured Dialogue sessions also debated how Chapter III can be improved in order to avoid incidents escalating in international sea areas adjacent to the European continent. But there is a lack of definitions concerning this (ibid. 61, 123). The debate also reveals a lack of Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 188 definitions of other terms (e.g. unusual military activity35), dilemmas about the kinds of consensus as a rule for decision-making (consensus by all participating states, consensus minus one – the receiving state, authorisation of the OSCE Chair in Office or Secretary General) and the absence of enforcement capabilities (what can be done if one participating state does not play by the book, e.g. does not appear at meetings) (ibid.: 104-105). The current limitations of the current risk-reduction measures have the following characteristics (according to Mossinkoff in Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 216): ˗ they are not rapid enough for a timely response in a crisis situation, ˗ the data obtained are not acceptable to all participating states (or contested by some states), ˗ host-nation consent, which reflects the OSCE’s cooperative security approach, prolongs if not prevents possible verification activities, and ˗ there is no sufficient political will to implement Chapter III. It is very useful that Russia opened up the theme of incidents of a military nature during its Chairmanship of the FSC in 2017. Russia drew to attention that in the past (between 1972 to 2004) several incident-prevention agreements were signed between Russia and other countries, such as the USA, the UK, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Portugal and Turkey. These agreements defined how military commanders should act to avoid incidents in the event of close meetings of ships, aircraft etc. They define communication methods and actions to be avoided (e.g. not to use lasers, not to launch signal rockets or similar pyrotechnical devices in the direction of the other party’s ships or aircraft, not to intentionally interfere with the communication and navigation systems etc.). Many participating states (e.g. Switzerland, Poland etc.) were pleased that these agreements had been brought to the table. 35 For example, the following criteria were proposed to define unusual military activities: unscheduled military activities outside exercise plans, unusual activities outside stated defence planning and scope, location, timing and direction of military operations etc. (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 123). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 189 Uncertainties about Inspections and Evaluations under Chapter IX Chapter IX of the Vienna Document defines how inspections are to be conducted. The example of a partly successful inspection in Russia by Ukraine in 2016 might be useful for reflecting on the trust in or related to the conflict areas. Ukraine carried out an inspection by four officers in a specified area of the Southern Military District in Russia. This inspection area was chosen based on information indicating a significant concentration of Russian armed troops and equipment. The Ukrainian team did not observe any military activities that were subject to prior notification in the inspected part of the specified area. However, Russia did not allow some parts of this area to be inspected by ground and air transport (e.g. areas less than 25 km from the Russian-Ukrainian border, the area near the settlements of Vesyeloe, Kuzminki, Aleksandrovka and Kalmykov, the road and railway from Rostov-on-Don to Taganrog). Ukraine claims that, during the inspection, Russian escorts obstructed the movement of the Ukrainian observers who were then unable to complete their inspection. Inspection of the mentioned areas from the air was prohibited and the aircraft simply changed route out from the inspected area and refused to comply with the Ukrainian demands to return to the specified area (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine, 2016, FSC.JOUR/822, 2016). According to our information, the Russian side argued that the route had to be changed due to bad weather in the planned flight area. This is only one problematic example of where an inspection was conducted, but not as initially desired. The Structured Dialogue could not avoid discussing the role of inspections and related challenges. The debates show that it is still impossible to agree on the general use of digital cameras during inspections and evaluations, which is quite absurd. At the first Breakout workshop, the participants discussed the implications of a low quota for inspections and evaluations. The problem is the so-called quota race at a time of deep reorganisation of the armed forces and a decreasing number of notifiable military activities. It also turned out that inspection’s value as a verification tool is limited. Some participating states have obviously used inspections as an opportunity to visit units deployed in specified areas rather than verify notifiable military activities. This practice does not correspond with the goal of inspections, but still contributes to trust in the zone of application (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 90). Several ideas on how to solve this problem were proposed and the debates pondered on them. The first solution would be a simple increase in quotas. The second option would be to coordinate quotas among all Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 190 participating states, or a new system for calculating the quotas for inspections and evaluations. The quota race is especially observable in relation to Russia. Every year, all of the available quotas were already exhausted in January for Russia. This means that no verification activities could occur later in the year (even though large-scale snap exercises could take place then). The German Verification Centre, for example, proposed the creation of a single OSCE quota by combining the verification and evaluation quotas. In this way, the states would be flexible in deciding for which activity their quotas would be used. The quota race would decelerate as well. In addition, each participating state could have an annual number of credits for different categories of their own military activities. Each activity would then be deducted from this number. Germans are aware these proposals are only implementable as part of a new arms control regime that could be created in the future (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 91-94). Also, unanswered remains the question of the costs if the quotas are to be increased. The problem of the duration of evaluation was also discussed at Structured Dialogue sessions. It has often been impossible to verify all of the submitted exchanged data on military forces in a comprehensive manner due to the large size of some armed forces and the related areas and distances between relevant subunits. The German proposal here is to extend the duration of evaluation visits and give evaluators greater time to observe the exchanged information (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 95). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 191 Military Exercises and Related Interpretations (Chapter V) Under the title Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities, Chapter V of the Vienna Document stipulates that military activity is subject to notification if certain thresholds are exceeded. We have already looked at the problem of exercises that fall below the thresholds (e.g. less than 9,000 troops etc.) and in vicinity of international borders. OSCE participating states have encountered many dilemmas in this respect. Let us consider some recent cases. In February 2016, Latvia was worried about a Russian military exercise in the Pskov region near the Estonian and Latvian borders. Latvia expressed its concerns about the exercise due to its proximity to its borders even though the exercise did not reach the threshold (it involved 2,500 paratroopers and 300 military vehicles, according to the Latvians). The Latvian delegation stated it would be grateful if such exercises with numbers close to the thresholds and conducted in the vicinity of its borders were published with much greater advance notice and with more detailed information. Indeed, Russia announced this exercise one day before it commenced (Statement by the Delegation of Latvia, FSC.JOUR/819, 2016). Latvia says that, although the exercise was below yet still close to the Vienna Document Chapter V notification threshold, Russia should notify the neighbouring countries in similar situations in the future if military exercises are to take place close to their borders. In this spirit, Norway announced its own military exercise Cold Response 16 conducted from 9 February to 11 March 2016. This was the largest military exercise in Norway in 2016 with about 15,000 personnel from 12 nations taking part. The number of participating troops notifiable under Chapter V was 12,910, namely below the threshold for observation. Despite this fact, Norway shared details about it pursuant to the Vienna Document. This was done «voluntarily and in the spirit of promoting transparency and confidence». Norway also invited countries to observe this exercise and, eventually, observers from the following countries participated: Belarus, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK and the USA (Statement by the Delegation of Norway, FSC.JOUR/819, 2016). In contrast, some regular diplomatic exchanges between Armenia and Azerbaijan reveal complaints by one side that the other had not notified its exercises appropriately. For example, two large-scale military exercises in Azerbaijan (June 2016; November 2016) were of deep concern to Armenia. Armenia was concerned about statements by the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan about the numbers of participating troops (25,000 in the first and Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 192 60,000 in the second exercise) and weapon systems (300 tanks in the first and 150 tanks and 50 aircraft and helicopters in the second exercise). Accordingly, these activities should have been notified at least 42 days in advance and Armenia expressed its concerns several times and required clarifications (Statement by the Delegation of Armenia, FSC.JOUR/830, 2016a; FSC.JOUR/842, 2016b). Problematic exercises conducted by both states led them to continue to voice concerns, accuse each other of violating the Vienna Document, and call other participating states to take a clear position on protecting the letter and spirit of the Vienna Document. For example, in September 2017 Armenia raised concerns about a large-scale military exercise in Azerbaijan with up to 15,000 military personnel and more than 150 tanks and armoured vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, new types of electronic warfare assets etc. (according to the Azeri government's website). Armenia required Azerbaijan to notify such activities under Chapter V on the prior notification of certain military activities at least 42 days in advance (Statement by the Delegation of Armenia, 2017). Azerbaijan did something similar in December 2017 when it observed «blatant violations by the Republic of Armenia». Namely, the President of the Republic of Armenia as Commander in Chief was «illegally» present on Azerbaijani territory when he observed the illegal military exercises by the Armenian armed forces in the occupied territories. Azerbaijan was very worried about the scenario of this exercise: a large-scale counter-attack with the participation of several hundred units, several thousand servicemen and new Armenia-made military equipment. Azerbaijan found it unbelievable how such provocative actions in the occupied territories could take place at a time when OSCE participating states were discussing important issues in Vienna (Statement by the Delegation of Azerbaijan, 2017). The Armenian statement in response was that the Azerbaijani delegation presents Armenia’s exercises in a distorted way, selectively combining pieces of information from media and official websites. Armenia stated that Nagorno-Karabakh is not bound by the Vienna Document and the said exercises were well below the thresholds that require prior notification. Armenia advised Azerbaijan to start using direct military-tomilitary contacts to acquire more information about such exercises (Statement Delivered by the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, 2017). Armenia additionally expressed its concerns and required explanations of the joint military exercise conducted by Azerbaijan and Turkey in June 2017 in the vicinity of Armenia’s borders (Statement on the Large-Scale Military Exercises of Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2017). Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 193 We have already considered the problems surrounding the Zapad 2017 exercise in Chapter 3. The Swedish military exercise Aurora 17 was a military response to a perceived threat by Russia. Aurora was held at approximately the same time as Zapad 2017. The scenario was armed conflict in a Swedish neighbourhood and an armed attack on Sweden. Swedish armed forces defended the territory of Sweden in this exercise with help of some partners (participants from the USA, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway). This exercise was a test of Sweden’s reform efforts and a signal to the rest of the world of Sweden’s military capabilities. The exercise also aimed to further build military operational capability, capability to conduct joint operations, increase the ability to receive military support from partners etc. The location for this exercise was South, Central Sweden and the island of Gotland. Sweden stressed at the OSCE that the total number of the Vienna Document related troops in this exercise would not exceed 10,500 at any given time and the exercise would be as transparent as possible by continuously providing information. Accordingly, Sweden invited several states to the «under threshold observation»: Germany, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Poland, and the Russian Federation (see Statement by the Delegation of Sweden, FSC.JOUR/863, 2017). Concluding Remarks The last few years of implementing the Vienna Document show the growing importance of compliance and implementation «in good faith». This means that states can implement the document’s provisions «to the letter» and also «to the spirit». The latter refers to a broader view transcending the words and letters in the document, which is equally important for building trust among the participating states. Compliance with the spirit actually necessitates the change of the letters in the document. Much of the debate on modernisation has been based on this. But the debate has been a hostage of current and past security problems on the ground and the associated strategies and policies. Structured Dialogue sessions have also occasionally shown that the solution for the Vienna Document does not necessarily lie in Vienna. Debates also occasionally revealed that some concerns exceed the authorities and capacities of the OSCE itself. It is therefore not surprising that the participating states did not manage to achieve consensus on a declaration on military stability and security or a commemorative declaration to mark the 25th anniversary of the Forum for Security Cooperation in December 2017. A negative European security Effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs during the Ukrainian Crisis 194 spirit was also present at the Munich security conference in 2018. The conference was conducted in a very pessimistic tone. According to Wolfgang Ischinger, a former German diplomat, deputy foreign minister and present Chairman of the Munich security conference, Europe had not been closer to war for a long time. The conference also reflected views that NATO is not that strong militarily along the border with Russia and the conclusion that it seems that arming nations has become the answer to all security problems. Hence, some observers of this conference pessimistically asked whether this is the end of diplomacy and beginning of open confrontation (see Ko si politiki začno odkrito groziti, 2018; Srhljiv pridih hladne vojne v Evropi, 2018). The whole debate in the Forum for Security Cooperation during the Ukrainian crisis reflects the collision of two narratives: the Western narrative of the breakdown of rule-based order and the Russian idea of an equal and indivisible security community. These concepts underpin most statements made by the key states. The debate also positively shows that, notwithstanding all the interests and problems, many states or related experts seek solutions for European CSBMs and believe Europe has a positive future. They express optimism and wish to modernise the Vienna Document and to continue supporting efforts to strengthen our common security architecture without difficult conditions for other participating actors. For example, the current Head of the CPC asserts that the Vienna Document still acts to prevent a major conflict in Europe. Despite the unpromising trends of strengthening military postures, deterrence, increasing defence budgets and hybrid military activities, the CSBM structure has not been broken or destroyed, participating states are even willing to protect the Vienna Document CSBM architecture (interview with Peško, 2018). Perceptions of inclusivity also vary between both sides. The present ideas of inclusivity also differ from such ideas in the 1980s. What Russia sees as a legitimate right is regarded by several others as a problem for human rights. Comprehensive security is based on shared values that are no longer shared today. We need more inclusive debates, but this is hard to achieve in times of military build up (ibid.). 195 8. The Future of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe We have so far seen a broad spectrum of ideas and modernisation proposals by participating states and military and defence experts. In this final chapter, however, we shall take one step back to look at broader CBMs and wider scenarios for the future and take one step forward towards future cyber confidence- and security-building measures. Scenarios about European Security and the Vienna Document CSBMs European security could go in several directions in the future. We can identify the following distinct and more or less likely scenarios: 1) War between the East (Russia and potential allies) and the West (the USA and allies). For example, the German General Staff was thinking in this direction and produced a series of scenarios for the future of Europe. A classified study labelled Strategic Perspective 2040 was leaked to Spiegel at the end of 2017. The document reflects several worrying and chaotic scenarios for Europe, such as multiple confrontations in the region, leading to dissolution of the international legal order, the Western system of values and the end of globalisation as we know it. One scenario predicts the reemergence of conflict between East and West in which some EU member states or candidates would join the Eastern bloc (in a BREXIT-like process) and adopt the Russian economic and political model (see The Germans are Making Contingency Plans for the Collapse of Europe, 2017; German Army Contemplates EU Fissures in Scenario Study: Spiegel, 2017; Šest Možnih Scenarijev Razpada Unije in Zahoda, 2017). This scenario, which we regard as the most unlikely of all three, could entail conventional, nuclear or both dimensions. Two theoretical end points of this scenario exist: MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction by both sides in a full-scale nuclear confrontation (we do not have to worry about CSBMs anymore) or some kind of Nash equilibrium or balance of power enshrined by a peace treaty or similar. In this case, CSBMs would again become important and we would once again be confronted by the present decision points. 2) Emergence of a new Cold War with several more or less limited armed conflicts between Russia (plus allies) and the West (the USA and allies) and partially effective CSBMs. NATO Allied Command Transformation The Future of CSBMs in Europe 196 explored this direction and created an inspiring set of scenarios for the alliance’s future. After a series of workshops and strategic engagements involving representatives of 45 nations and more than 60 institutions (over 500 military and civilian experts), they created four plausible futures (see Multiple Futures Project: Navigating Towards 2030, 2009): Dark Side of Exclusivity where weak and failed states generate instability in areas of interest, and states of the globalised world are faced with related strategic choices (key drivers of change are integration, climate change, resource allocation and changing state capacity); Deceptive Stability where developed states are preoccupied with societal change and demographic issues rather than geopolitical risk (drivers of change are demographics, resource allocation, friction); Clash of Modernities where advanced, rational and networked societies are facing inherent fragility challenged by external authoritarian regimes (drivers of change are use of technology, demographics, competing ideologies and worldviews); and the Scenario of the New Power Politics where an increasing number of major powers, competition and proliferation undermine the value of international organisations (drivers of change are friction, competing ideologies and worldviews, resource allocation, integration). It emerges that, since 2009, when these scenarios were conceived, Europe has actually been moving in the direction of the fourth scenario with some elements of the other three scenarios. The fourth scenario mentioned processes that we increasingly witness today, such as the creation of a multipolar world, shifting spheres of influence, competition for ideological supremacy, proliferation of various kinds of weapons, inter-state rivalry etc. The NATO report also foresaw the growing threat of hybrid attacks as genuine combinations of traditional warfare with irregular warfare, terrorism and organised crime. The Vienna Document CSBMs will also be needed in this scenario to hold Europe together and stabilise relations with some transparency among the participating states. CSBMs will not be effective in crisis areas but will to some extent be effective in non-crisis areas, which is not irrelevant. Today, we are already experiencing this scenario. 3.) Creation of an entirely new European security system with a renewed and considerably updated Vienna Document. This scenario contains new or significantly reformed international security organisations, and new or reformed arms control and CSBM regimes. Russia will have to be included in this scenario as its constitutive part by definition. This direction is also not new, and many people have discussed it. The idea of establishing an all- European security system was actually adopted by some Soviet and East The Future of CSBMs in Europe 197 European leaders in 1989 and the 1990s. This idea stemmed from an even older idea expressed by Soviet leaders in the 1950s in response to West Germany’s membership in NATO. In debates at the time, it seemed that some countries wanted to transform the CSCE into a collective defence institution and other countries were afraid of this because NATO would then be made irrelevant. Many countries argued the CSCE was too big to provide a security guarantee and tried to retain NATO’s collective defence. The USA argued in this direction, especially because NATO represented a «crucial means for exerting influence over European affairs as the US can never be a member of the European Union». The USA was also always concerned about the rise of Europe’s security and defence identity. Russia, on the other hand, consistently regarded the CSCE/OSCE as the core institution of European security in which it had equal standing to all the other countries (Ueta, 1994: 66). In addition, in this scenario one could also envision the existing security institutions in Europe (NATO, EU) being retained and the simultaneous creation of a completely new European arms control treaty combining the current Vienna Document, CFE and the Open Skies Treaty. It is important for our study that CSBMs also play a relevant role in this scenario but lose that role at its theoretical final point of a truly integrated Europe. In such a case, CSBMs might only be needed between such a peaceful and integrated Europe and other external actors (perhaps those that have already threatened parts of Europe in human history or some entirely different actors). In any case, CSBMs will always be needed in Europe or for Europe. In addition, some more specific scenarios for the Vienna Document were considered in the Structured Dialogue in 2017. Workshop participants identified and discussed the following four scenarios: 1. The scenario of deliberate Cold War-style major offensive operations in Europe involving alliances and nuclear powers was not considered a realistic scenario. In such a case, many of the military activities would exceed the current Vienna Document thresholds. 2. The scenario of interference in the internal affairs of other states by participating states or the support of anti-government activities with hybrid warfare techniques (such as providing military assistance to insurgents) or by threatening military support for a secessionist entity combined with concentrating forces in the vicinity of international borders was considered a realistic scenario, although some participants thought that hybrid activities unrelated to conventional armed forces (propaganda, cyberattacks, arms transfers to non-state actors and covert deployment The Future of CSBMs in Europe 198 of special operation forces or other internal or irregular forces) are less suitable to be dealt with by means of the Vienna Document. 3. The scenario of hazardous incidents and unintended escalation due to changes in military postures and increased activities, including largescale exercises close to international borders, was considered highly relevant. Participants also stressed that reconnaissance can be dangerous brinkmanship with the potential to spin out of control. 4. The scenario of new or extended military capabilities resulting from the use of advanced technology (precise long-range weapons, high mobility and reactivity and in combination with multinational cooperation) was also considered a real but manageable scenario if the Vienna Document is adapted accordingly (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 112-115). We also asked some relevant CSBM process stakeholders about future positive and negative scenarios for the Vienna Document CSBMs. A positive scenario for the Vienna Document clearly requires the Document to be modernised in order to prevent escalation and ensure trust. Peško (Head of CPC OSCE) distinguished two positive scenarios. The optimal but not very likely scenario for the present time is complete modernisation of the regime according to the modernization of our armed forces. This scenario does not seem very realistic because the existing CSBM measures do not produce sufficient trust to move forward. A more realistic scenario is to create an environment conducive to open dialogue, especially on the root causes of the present situation, threat perceptions etc. This is how the Structured Dialogue was created (interview with Peško, 2018). Current weaknesses of the CSBM process based on the Vienna Document arise from the fact that several issues outside the CSBM regime affect the current CSBMs (issues like missile defence, nuclear postures etc.). A negative scenario for the CSBM process based on the Vienna Document is that the current situation leads to high unpredictability that in turn leads to escalation. If the CSBMs become further eroded, the gap in security perceptions would widen and escalation would follow. The question is only how (un)controlled that would be. Further, there are negative scenarios in the field of conventional confrontation, but probably the worst scenario would be the nuclear stage of confrontation (ibid.). Other interviewees also point to other possible negative scenarios. First, it is possible the current implementation level would drop further. There is no modernisation in this scenario. Second, it is possible that participating states would increasingly exploit the loopholes in the Vienna Document to the point it would become unusable: states could implement The Future of CSBMs in Europe 199 the Vienna Document to the letter, but not to the spirit, leaving many exercises below the threshold going unreported etc. States could deliberately «burn» inspection and evaluation quotas so that the other side could not monitor some specific countries (interview with Mossinkoff and Podbevsek, 2018). For example, NATO countries could burn quotas to visit Western countries and Serbia and some other countries could burn quotas to visit Russia. In fact, there seems considerable space for the present situation to deteriorate. Moreover, the beginning of the worst case could be the eventuality that all of the unsettled themes in the FSC and the Structured Dialogue go by without any genuine discussions. Second, the Vienna Document could face a similar scenario as the CFE. Today, the CFE is frozen but nobody has pulled out. If Russia continues to feel pressure, it could apply escalating tactics and say that no one is listening to its arguments and concerns, then freeze implementation on its part (by not accepting inspectors, not providing information, not coming to meetings etc.), but not leave the agreement (interview with Lüber, 2018). It is evident that almost all of the above scenarios will sooner or later bring us to the same decision point that faces us right now: what to do with the Vienna Document and CSBMs in Europe and how to improve their effectiveness? All reasonable and even less reasonable paths and scenarios end up in some kind of CSBMs for Europe. This is actually very good news. It means that the future of CSBMs lies in improving their effectiveness and modernisation, regardless of what is happening. In this book, we also explore the process of widening CSBMs to include non-military measures for increasing confidence and towards non-military and military cyber confidence- and security-building measures. Widening to Include Non-military Confidence-Building Measures The expert public has increasingly seen that traditional CSBMs are insufficient for dealing with modern complex threats and crises. In the present security environment, everything is interconnected, including military and non-military threats. Modern complex crises develop in situations of multiple escalated and interconnected threats (for more, see Prezelj, 2002; 2005). Most of these threats are actually civilian in character and require civilian measures but, due to threat interconnections, military CSBMs need to be synchronised and complement civilian CBMs. All civilian and military measures must in any case be interconnected. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 200 Based on these and other similar perceptions of the complexity of the security environment, the OSCE has conducted many discussions on the potential widening of confidence measures to include other non-military fields. For example, the threat of terrorism was clearly recognised by participating states in the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century (2003: 2), but it emerged in the discussions that it is not so easy to incorporate modern complex and agile threats in the CSBM framework. Spies (2005: 88-90) showed that the debate on the relevance of the Vienna Document 1999 to combating terrorism has always been open and lively, but the debate about this in 2002 led to a common understanding that the Vienna Document was designed for a specific purpose that is not really suitable for fighting terrorism. Amending this document to cover another aim (different from the original) might endanger its effectiveness and usefulness. However, it was also recognised that the Vienna Document indirectly contributes to the fight against terrorism by creating an environment of confidence and security among the participating states. This debate also shows we should be more careful when thinking about what we can do with the Vienna Document so as not to endanger its current effectiveness in a narrower field. Another path of the future development of confidence-building measures in Europe is to increase their scope to non-military areas in different stages of the conflict cycle. This is why the OSCE adopted the OSCE Guide on Non-military Confidence-Building Measures (2012). These CBMs are the result of more comprehensive thinking about trust in Europe and were designed to complement the existing military CSBMs. The OSCE deliberately used the abbreviation CBM instead of CSBM in order to stress its non-military character. The guide states the origins of non-military CBMs can be traced back to the Helsinki Final Act from 1975, but most CBMs were later focused on hard security and inter-state relations. Non-military CBMs are, however, focused on intra-state conflicts/crises and non-governmental actors, such as civil society representatives (which is precisely the deficiency of the existing security CSBMs). The current definition of non-military CBMs talks about «actions or processes undertaken in all phases of the conflict cycle and across the three dimensions of security in political, economic, environmental, social or cultural fields with the aim of increasing transparency and the level of trust and confidence between two or more conflicting parties to prevent inter-State and/or intra-state conflicts from emerging, or (re) escalating and to pave the way for lasting conflict settlement» (ibid., p. 9). The OSCE guide differentiates the following measures from both OSCE non-military baskets: The Future of CSBMs in Europe 201 ˗ political CBMs (building confidence in the political system, democratisation, electoral reform, proportional recruitment and allocation of posts etc.); ˗ economic CBMs (improving cross-border or cross-community trade and thereby removing the barriers of mistrust); ˗ environmental CBMs (e.g. collaborative planning and training in joint response to natural and man-made disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, fires, toxic spills36 etc.); ˗ societal CBMs (e.g. dialogues among educators and journalists, joint textbook projects, academic conferences, joint research projects, exchanges of journalists, academics and other public figures etc.); and ˗ cultural CBMs (refraining from repressive laws on language or religion, avoiding the declaration of a single official language in a multilingual state, respect for cultural leaders and local practices, exercising sensitivity towards removing monuments meaningful to certain ethnic communities etc.) (ibid., pp. 9-10). We could also add the cyber dimension to this classification. Cyber threats have become part of the most pressing threats in the modern security environment, also requiring more attention from the trust and confidence-building perspectives. The relationship between the CBMs and CSBMs is supposed to be mutually reinforcing whereby civilian measures complement the existing military CSBMs. The idea is that success in one CBM area can have a positive effect on another area. Non-military CBMs can also include areas in which the military plays a role (such as disaster relief). CBMs can be unilateral (unilateral measures of goodwill as the first step to encourage the other partner to make the same move37), bilateral and multilateral. They can be developed at the elite level or more at a civil society level. It is also clear that certain CBM mechanisms can be used in CSBMs or vice versa. Non-military CBMs are based on the following principles: reciprocity, incrementality, long-term nature, predictability, transparency, reliability, consistency, communication, verification, local ownership and multi-level nature. 36 Here the idea is to establish cooperation in disaster management area among the otherwise hostile parties. This might be possible because they would have to deal with a joint pressing problem or a joint threat. 37 This was advised by Charles Osgood already in 1966. A superpower should make a unilateral good will gesture and wait for the other superpower to respond. Several such unilateral gestures might be needed to melt distrust and before the other side will respond (OSCE Guide on Non-military Confidence-Building Measures, 2012: 12). The Future of CSBMs in Europe 202 Non-military CBMs can be used as a preparatory measure for military CSBMs in the case of the complete breakdown of trust among actors (ibid.). The following figure depicts a pillar structure of European measures. Figure 7: The spectrum of military and non-military confidence-building measures European Security Regional Military and Non-military Confidence-Building Measures 1. M IL IT A R Y C B M s (C S B M s) 2. P O L IT IC A L C B M s 3. E C O N O M IC C B M s 4. E N V IR O N M E N T A L C B M s 5. S O C IE T A L C B M s 6. C U L T U R A L C B M s 7. C Y B E R C B M s Cooperative Security (concept and values) International Law and UN Charter Non-military CBMs also have similar limitations as military CSBMs. These include ineffectiveness in the event of a lack of political will, a lack of resources and minimum confidence and trust required to initiate the CBM measures. Yet the two measures are both embedded in the European concept of cooperative security as well as in international law and the UN Charter. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 203 We should also be careful how civilian CBMs are introduced in a crisis or post-crisis environment. Lessons from the Western Balkans showed the international community has often made the mistake of insisting for too long on a top-down approach instead of stimulating bottom-up approaches to confidence-building. For example, lessons from the case of Kosovo and the international community’s role revealed that when the international community neglects the local context, instead of developing trust it actually creates more distrust among local actors (see Qehaja and Prezelj, 2017). In this sense, it is very good that the OSCE concept of civilian CBMs recognises that the absence of local ownership can often constitute a main cause of their failure. The concept states that practice has proven that the best CBMs are those initiated or at least inspired from within the host country. This is the way the participating actors will likely see their benefit (OSCE Guide on Non-military Confidence-Building Measures, 2012: 44-45). On this basis, an exploratory study on non-military CBMs was recently written by representatives of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions (see Wolff et al., 2017). Their study proposed that the OSCE increase its capacity for applying confidence-building measures in the economic and environmental dimensions. They argue that improved measures in these two fields will be useful tools to boost trust. The report proposed to restructure the Office of the OSCE Coordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities into a separate institution, give OSCE field operations a specific mandate on CBMs in the economic and environmental dimensions, update the 2003 Maastricht economic and environmental dimension strategy etc. The study identifies several examples of non-military CBMs, like economic rehabilitation programmes (e.g. in Georgia), water projects, journalist networks (e.g. across the Dniester), multilingual education (e.g. in Southern Serbia), or multi-ethnic mediation networks (e.g. Southern Kyrgyzstan). The study also mentions the case of the Inguri dam as a jointly managed facility by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides that provides electricity to them both. The authors argue that in the event of problems with direct CBMs (where both sides take steps regarding the other to make both feel equally more secure) more indirect measures could be established, such as cooperation between the conflicting sides to address a common problem or to assist third parties with problems they cannot resolve by themselves. When comparing the Vienna Document CSBMs and OSCE Guide on non-military CBMs, we should clearly stress that the latter measures are even less binding than the former. In the case of the Vienna Document, we have a whole system of checks, as described in the previous chapters, and The Future of CSBMs in Europe 204 there is nothing similar in the case of non-military CBMs. That is why the OSCE needs to take further steps in this direction by adopting a new document on non-military CBMs with more binding verification measures. Similarly to the Vienna Document, this document would retain its political (i.e. not legally binding) nature. The problem here will be how to organise verification and control over such a broad spectrum of activities engaged in by so many actors (many more actors exist in each participating state than with the military dimension) and who will pay for this. Widening to Include Cyber Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe It does not make much sense to modernise CSBMs without including the cyber security dimension. Warfare of the present and the future is increasingly gaining a cyber character and dimension. Cyber warriors are waging cyber wars and our societies are ever more dependent on the support and services facilitated by information technology. The «cyberisation» of society has been followed by the «cyberisation» of warfare, and this is an unavoidable fact. Threatening military and non-military activities take place in cyberspace. Cyberspace was first mentioned in 1984 in a William Gibson novel entitled Neuromancer (Gibson, 1984). Since then, cyberspace has evolved into a complex form of space comprising many interrelated elements, such as material (computers and links among computers), software and human users. The transfer of information via material components is performed by software support and managed by the human component. In other words, cyberspace consists of three interdependent levels, namely, the human layer, the logical layer (software) and the physical layer (network physical components and infrastructures) (Even and Siman-Tov, 2012: 10). Not only is human dependence on IT increasing, but the numbers of computers and users are also increasing. Such rapid growth of cyberspace brings new risks and threats along with it. This has created a need to widen CSBMs to include cyber military and non-military activities and capabilities. Individual military and non-military cyber practices of states should be limited by some regimes, related rules and codified thresholds etc. In this chapter, we first give an overview of the cyber threats our societies face. We then present the existing military cyber capabilities of selected states with a special focus on Russia, the USA and China. In this part, we also mention NATO’s cyber policy that is growing in importance in Europe. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 205 Then we describe the existing cyber CBMs in the OSCE and, finally, give an idea of how to move forward towards cyber confidence- and securitybuilding measures in the OSCE. Cyber Threats We can observe a broad spectrum of cyber threats used in modern warfare by state and non-state actors. These include cyber propaganda (or disinformation, including «fake news»), cyber disruptions (in the form of attacks on systems, denial of service attacks etc.) and cyber spying for intelligence and other purposes (cyber espionage). We have therefore started to use terms such as cyber war/warfare, cyber weapons, cyber attacks etc. Cyber espionage is very attractive for intelligence services as engaging in this does not pose such high risks as HUMINT operations where individual people can have their lives at risk. The aim of such operations is intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance and not system disruption. Intelligence services generally prefer to control than to destroy an enemy’s IT system. With the hybridisation of threats, we are seeing the greater integration of cyber activities with pure traditional military activities, despite the fact that cyberspace is largely a civilian space (only some infrastructures and networks are purely military owned). Research on critical infrastructure has also shown that the cyber domain is the most cross-sectoral in nature. This means any damage or malfunction in this sector instantly affects several other sectors of society (see Prezelj and Ziberna, 2013; Prezelj et al., 2012). This suggests that cyber threats are potentially more dangerous due to their multiplicative nature than many other conventional threats. In addition, cyber attacks may be used in preparation for a kinetic war or as an accompanying factor in such a war. We can increasingly expect combinations of conventional, unconventional and cyber warfare preparations and activities in a mixed non-military and military cyberspace. It seems that all ambitious states are employing hybrid techniques in their foreign security and military operations. For example, the West has been particularly worried about Russia’s approach to this field. Accordingly, Russia has been using hybrid, ambiguous and non-linear warfare, combining the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological and physical advantages. NATO, and especially some new members, thus perceives the threat of hybrid warfare by Russia as very aggressive and dangerous because it exploits grey areas in The Future of CSBMs in Europe 206 the alliance. Similar allegations about hybrid warfare techniques were made by the Russian side as well. However, some complications emerge when seeking to apply CSBM to the cyber dimension and vice versa. First, one would expect high terminological clarity in the cyber field that could easily be applied to the military field, but this is unfortunately not the case. There is no widely accepted definition of cyber war and traditional definitions of war or warfare are not directly applicable. This means that we may encounter a problem when attempting to widen and deepen CSBMs to the cyber field. Second, some researchers stress that cyber war has never actually happened in the past, that it does not occur in the present and that it is highly unlikely it will disturb our future (see Rid, 2013: xv). An attempted extension of the traditional definition of war from the famous project Correlates of War to the cyber field was also unsuccessful. This definition allows to use the label «war» if there are more than 1,000 casualties. Rid immediately found there is no such thing as a cyber war with more than 1,000 deaths (there are no battle casualties at all at this point in time) (see Valeriano and Maness, 2015: 28-30). Due to these problems, some authors prefer to use the words «cyber conflict» and define it as the use of computational technologies in cyberspace for malevolent and destructive purposes in order to impact, change or modify diplomatic and military interactions between entities (ibid.: 31-32). Some others claim that, for this reason, one should actually use the term «cyber warfare» instead of war because we are actually talking about smaller scale cyber attacks. In this sense, the term «cyber aggression» is also recommended. This term also more clearly conveys the inter-state dimension of the cyber act instead of comparatively minor disruptive acts in cyberspace (Green, 2015). Some authors have also tried to extend Clausewitz’s definition of war to cyber war. For example, Shakarian, P., Shakarian J. and Ruef (2013) defined cyber war as «an extension of policy by actions taken in cyber space by state or nonstate actors that either constitute a serious threat to a nation’s security or are conducted in response to a perceived threat against a nation’s security». Operationally speaking, in the heart of cyber war or cyber conflict or cyber aggression are cyber attacks which are meant to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy computer systems of the target. Another complication arises from the problem of attribution for cyber attacks. It is very difficult to prove with 100% accuracy which (political) actor is behind an attack. In the present security environment, we can already find a growing number of cyber attacks used for geopolitical, security and even purely military purposes. We can already identify a trend of moving from cyber attacks that The Future of CSBMs in Europe 207 only have cyber consequences to cyber attacks that cause physical damage in the real world. In the final scenario, cyber attacks might cause physical consequences perhaps similar to the consequences of conventional warfare attacks. This has led some authors to define cyber attacks only as those cyber operations, whether offensive or defensive, that are expected to cause injury or death to persons or the damage or destruction of objects (see Schmitt, 2013: 106).38 But here we might also have a problem, as suggested by the latest research by Kostyuk and Zhukov (2017). They analysed the use of cyber attacks in warfare in Ukraine and Syria and their findings show little or no impact on real kinetic fighting by cyber attacks. Evidence suggests that cyber attacks have not visibly affected the actions of their targets. In fact, hackers on both sides in both conflicts had difficulty responding to battlefield events and did not really shape them. This means it is clear that cyber activities are accompanying kinetic activities in warfare, but it is not so clear and not much evidence exists concerning how much difference they truly make. In any case, their combination is a definitional part of the socalled hybrid warfare approach. Let us look at some selected examples of cyberattacks from the recent past. This overview will help us contemplate how to create and widen the confidence- and security-building measures in this field. Ukraine and the related CSBMs were discussed at length in earlier chapters of this book. At this point, we should stress that Ukraine has reported massive and even increasing pressure on its cyber space during the crisis facing this country. Accordingly, Ukraine has found that a significant number of cyber attacks originated from Russian territory and that its anti-terrorist operational units were among the main targets. Ukraine has also reported the growing quantity and complexity of these attacks. Accordingly, Ukraine included cyber security capabilities in its defence reform process. Ukraine also adopted a Cyber Security Strategy and established the National Cyber Security Coordination Centre in 2016 (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 64th Joint FSC-PC Meeting, 2017). Some sources talk about several thousand cyber attacks every month in Ukraine. One specific example should be mentioned here. Ukraine attributed an attack on its electrical power grid and control systems (SCADA) in 2015 to a Russian 38 Cyber operations are a broader category than cyber attacks. They mean the employment of cyber capabilities for the purpose of achieving cyber goals, while cyber attacks represent very specific operations. A broader category than cyber operations is information operations. The latter refer to the integrated employment of capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception etc., aiming to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making (see Roscini, 2014: 10-11). The Future of CSBMs in Europe 208 group known as Sandworm (which had already attacked other targets in Ukraine, Poland and also the USA). This is considered to be the first known successful attack on an electrical power grid in another country. The attack caused a large blackout in the capital city and in western parts of the country, it also left more than 200,000 people without electricity. This attack was actually composed of many attacks, extending from denial of service attacks, seizing the SCADA systems, destroying files etc. Russia has been mentioned relatively frequently by the Western press as a culprit for many other cyber attacks. US authorities have accused Russia of cyber meddling in the last US elections. The case was still under investigation in the USA in the first half of 2018. Germany accused Russia for being behind an attack on the computer system of its Bundestag in 2015. Research journalists indicated that Russia was behind the attacks on computer systems of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 2018. Allegedly, a group called Turla, known to work on behalf of Russia, was responsible for this attack. The Russian governmental press representative commented that Russia deplores the fact that all attacks made by hackers around the world are attributed to Russian hackers (see Hekerski napad na nemško zunanje ministrstvo, 2018). The Russian Foreign Minister stated that nobody has shown any proof about Russian activities and that accusations about Russian meddling in the elections in France, Germany and the USA are nonsense. He also noted that, when it was proven that US intelligence services had listened to the mobile phone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, everybody perceived this fact as something normal (Rusofil «Baris» pri svojem prijatelju Sergeju, 2017). North Korea is perceived as one of the most aggressive and dangerous cyber threats in the Western world. This state has largely targeted South Korea in the past but has also acted on a wider scale. It is assumed that North Korea was behind the cyber attack on a South Korean nuclear power plant in 2014. In addition, attacks by WannaCry blocked the use of computer systems of many hospitals, banks and companies all over the world (notably the US National Health System, FedEx and Nissan Motors). Users of «hijacked» computers typically received a demand to pay USD 300 within 72 hours if they wanted to have the contents of their computers restored. Some computers remained blocked even after payment was made. Several responsible authorities attributed this attack to the Lazarus Group, which is supposedly related to North Korea. This group likely also hacked Sony Pictures Entertainment. This attack destroyed many files, leaked corporate communications and created a crisis, leading to the withdrawal of several company executives (see Supersila v kibernetskem prostoru, 2017; The Future of CSBMs in Europe 209 Facebook Action Hints at Western Retaliation over WannaCry Attack, 2017). We should also mention that North Korea has denied making any of these attacks. Media sources suggest that the USA and the UK may be engaged in cyber-offensive operations against North Korea in retaliation for attacks such as WannaCry. While neither government confirms these attacks as well, the Guardian drew such a conclusion after observing moves by Facebook which deleted all accounts related to the Lazarus Group that was blamed by both countries for the WannaCry attacks and also for the attack in 2014 on Sony Pictures Entertainment. The aim was to make it harder to conduct their activities (Facebook Action Hints at Western Retaliation over WannaCry Attack, 2017). The jihadist group Islamic State (IS, ISIS or Daesh) also possesses some cyber capabilities. However, several cyber security researchers claim (see Flashpoint 2016; Poor coding limits IS hackers' cyber-capabilities, says researcher, 2017) that IS-linked cyber actors are relatively unsophisticated, loosely organised and underfunded. This contrasts with the efficiency with which the group carries out online recruitment and propaganda, in particular on social media. Most attacks attributed to these actors target unclassified computer systems, exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available hacking tools. Notable operations by IS-linked hackers include the hijacking of US Central Command (CENTCOM) social media accounts and the publication of personal information on US military personnel (which, however, was not obtained from any classified system) (FlashPoint 2016; Infosec Institute 2016). In addition, Anonymous, a very specific hacktivist group, should be mentioned in this context. Anonymous fights against the secrecy of data and aims to create the Internet as an open medium without censorship. This explains why Anonymous attacked the information systems of several institutions that embody different aspects of power, such as banks, the Church of Scientology, the CIA, the FBI etc. A similar fight against secret data and sources of power based on secret data has been waged by Wikileaks (see, for example, Singer and Friedman, 2014: 51-55, 80-85). We should also mention the technique of infiltrating an adversary’s computer network and engaging in instant or delayed exploitation. A dormant tool can be planted in a network and remain there undetected for some time. A recent movie on Snowden included his statement that one country plants such tools in the computer systems of an enemy’s and even allied states’ critical infrastructure, especially electrical energy infrastructure. Some allied states’ critical infrastructures were supposedly penetrated this way due The Future of CSBMs in Europe 210 to uncertainty about whether they will remain allied in the future (see movie Snowden, 2016). According to Daniel Cohen, a cyber security expert, we needed a long time to understand that not only cyber weapons but also strategic cyber weapons can be found in the hands of states. They were made to provoke conflicts among states and can create damage comparable to a nuclear war. Nuclear power plants or facilities have already been a target (e.g. in South Korea, Germany, the case of Stuxnet in Iran) and are a future target of such strategic cyber weapons. This means that strategic cyber weapons may be compared to nuclear weapons. In Cohen’s words, it should be clear that only a few countries can carry out a cyber-attack with comparable consequences of a nuclear war due to the huge resources needed for such an activity. The existence of strategic cyber weapons automatically means we could encounter a problem that they might end up in the hands of rogue actors. We also see more and less powerful states in cyberspace, and their competition in the form of a very specific cyber Cold War can also be imagined. Previous examples of cyber attacks already show that a kind of game is underway, similar to that during the Cold War: actors attack information systems in correlation with events in the real space and sometimes deliberately show only their destructive potential and some fingerprints. This suggests they wish to show their true potential to cause much greater damage (Cohen in Kibernetska hladna vojna, 2017). Military Cyber Capabilities All responsible states in the OSCE region have been developing their cyber security policies and related cyber capabilities in the civilian field and also in the military field. States are increasingly employing cyber specialists for the military dimension. However, states are not only engaged in defensively protecting their cyber systems and networks, but also in more offensive forms of cyber warfare. Officially, most of them are developing defensive cyber capabilities, but examples from practice (see below) and statements of witnesses and experts suggest that offensive attack capabilities have also been developed and used. The purpose of this chapter is to overview the cyber policies and capabilities of several OSCE participating states. This overview will enable us to extract cyber modus operandi that can be threatening to other states and that needs to be subsequently included in cyber CSBMs. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 211 The overview below will more or less implicitly show that military cyber capabilities are much more developed in bigger states than smaller ones, much less developed in post-Soviet states (except Russia) and that some countries have (or have publicly acknowledged) that they also possess offensive attack cyber capabilities. Let us first consider a simpler sample of states that have already developed cyber warfare capabilities. The main source for this paragraph is Military Balance (2015; 2017). IISS started to follow national cyber capabilities several years ago and includes their short qualitative descriptions in its annual overview of armed forces. The sample reveals the following facts: ˗ Canada adopted a cyber Security Strategy in 2010 and established the Canadian Forces Network Operation Centre as the national «cyber defence unit» that is permanently assigned to support military operations. The Director General Cyber leads all cyber military activities, including the Canadian Forces Cyber Task Force. ˗ Austria has established a Cyber Defence Centre within its Ministry of Defence. Its primary goal is to ensure national defence in cyberspace and secure defence information. The role of the established Military Cyber Emergency Readiness Team is to respond to emergencies and develop capabilities for Computer Network Operations. ˗ Belgium adopted a national Cyber Security Strategy in 2012 and then also a Cyber Security Strategy for Defence in 2014, outlining the following pillars for its cyber security capability: cyber defence, cyber intelligence and cyber counter-offensive. ˗ The Czech Republic also adopted a National Cyber Security Strategy and a Law on Cyber Security. The former provided that the state will increase its active cyber defence and cyber attack countermeasures. The Ministry of Defence has started to develop cyber-defence capabilities. ˗ Denmark established a Centre for Cyber Security within its defence intelligence service in 2012. Since then, it is working on capabilities for defensive and offensive military operations in cyberspace. After creating a proper legal framework, Denmark will develop cyber offensive and exploitation capability. ˗ Finland is in the process of creating a comprehensive cyber defence capability, encompassing cyber attack and cyber defence capabilities. It is also in the process of creating a cyber division, with full operational capability being planned for 2020. ˗ France issued a Defence White Paper in 2008 which emphasised cyber threats. The Defence Ministry also created a Cyber Defence Concept in The Future of CSBMs in Europe 212 2011. The Cyber Defence Cell acts as a French cyber operational command responsible for cyber defence and commanding cyber operations. The Information Command was established in 2016 within the Land Forces Command and an analytical centre for defensive cyber operations was also established within the MOD. The French cyber military model has focused on developing cyber defence capabilities in close liaison with intelligence and defensive and offensive planning in support of military operations. ˗ Germany has also boosted its cyber capabilities by adopting far-reaching reforms. A Directorate General Cyber/IT was created within the Ministry of Defence in 2016, with two divisions: one for cyber/IT governance and the other for IT-Services/Information Security. In addition, a new Cyber and Information Space Command was established with more than 13,000 personnel and two subordinated commands: the Strategic Reconnaissance Command (with a cyber operations centre and other centres, electronic warfare battalions, school etc.) and the Information Technology Command (with seven IT battalions, IT school, various centres etc.). We should also note the statement by the German Chief of the Verification Centre during debates in the OSCE that strengthening the implementation of the OSCE’s cyber CBM is of the utmost importance for Germany’s Cyber Defence Policy. ˗ Latvia adopted a National Cyber Security Strategy and also established a military CERT unit and a Cyber Defence unit within its National Guard. The latter represents a reserve unit with cyber defence capabilities that can be used for military or civilian tasks. ˗ Lithuania also adopted a national cyber security strategy and a law on cyber security. Within its Ministry of Defence, a Cyber Security and Information Technology Department was established and, interestingly, a National Cyber Security Centre with tasks transcending the military and defence fields. It not only monitors military networks, but also those managed by other institutions, performs penetration tests, requires other non-military bodies to improve their controls and response, disconnects infected networks from the Internet without a court order etc. ˗ The Netherlands adopted a Defence Cyber Strategy in 2012 and updated it in 2015. A Defence Cyber Command (in the Dutch Army) and Joint Defence Cyber Command were established, a defence cyber doctrine is being developed etc. According to Dutch authorities, the military can also attack, manipulate and disable digital systems of opponents, such as other states, terrorist groups, hackers etc. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 213 ˗ Poland adopted a Cyber Security Doctrine in 2015 that assessed the national cyber environment, defined national cyber security capabilities and also noted the need to carry out active cyber defence, including offensive actions, and maintain readiness for cyber war. ˗ Spain established a Joint Cyber Command in 2013. Its goals include cyber network defence, cyber network attacks, exploitation etc. ˗ Sweden’s National Defence bill from 2015 defined national cyber defence capabilities as an important part of Swedish defence. Its vital systems need to be protected. This also requires capability to carry out active operations in cyberspace. ˗ The United Kingdom adopted its National Cyber Security Strategy in 2011 and an upgraded strategy very recently. In the defence field, the UK established the Defence Cyber Operations Group in 2011 responsible for the «cyberisation» of operations, training and doctrine. A Joint Forces Cyber Group was then established, being responsible for the operations of two Joint Cyber Units and Joint Cyber Reserve. The UK has also stated it will respond to a cyber attack in the same way as to an equivalent conventional attack. The UK is increasing public funding for cyber defence and improving its cyber activities under or hosted by the GCHQ (establishing the Cyber Security Operations Centre, National Cyber Centre etc.). ˗ Greece established a new Joint Cyber Command within its General Staff in 2014. Cyber capabilities are currently being developed. ˗ Hungary has developed a military cyber defence concept and started to create computer incident and emergency response teams within the MOD. ˗ Irish defence forces have also been developing cyber defence capabilities to protect the country’s own networks and users. ˗ Italy adopted a Joint Integrated Concept on Computer Network Operations (2009) and a Joint Interagency Concept on Cyberwarfare (2014). Its national strategic framework enables the defence ministry to plan and execute computer network operations in the cyber domain with the aim to prevent, localise and defend (actively and in-depth), oppose and neutralise all threats in the cyber domain. ˗ Norway has tasked its armed forces with the cyber defence of the country’s own networks against cyber attacks. The country also adopted the Cyber Security Strategy for Norway in 2012. ˗ Portugal has established a Cyber Defence Centre in its armed forces. ˗ Romania has set up a military CERT responsible for managing cyber security incidents in the field of defence. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 214 ˗ Switzerland adopted the National Cyber Defence Strategy in 2012. Cyber protection is divided among five military and non-military institutions (military commands, military intelligence and non-military bodies) and the Department of Finance which is responsible for implementing the mentioned strategy (see Military Balance, 2015; 2017). For North Korea, it is known that its cyber Unit 180 has around 6,000 hackers, many of whom are actually working abroad while some of them remain in the country. One of this unit’s core tasks is to collect money by various means. Supposedly, it collects more than USD 1 billion per year (by extortion, also by stealing bitcoins etc.). This leads commentators to conclude that North Korea has already become a cyber force (see Supersila v kibernetskem prostoru, 2017). After this general overview, let us examine more closely the attributed attacks and military cyber capabilities of three major cyber powers, China, Russia and the USA. Although not a comprehensive analysis, it will be useful for understanding the threat and capabilities that will need to be considered by future cyber CSBMs. 1) Russia Many past cyber attacks in politically sensitive circumstances have been attributed to Russia and its hacker community. It seems that ongoing conflicts, such as Ukraine, Syria and others, are used by that state and associated actors to test and develop their own cyber tools and forces. By testing, we mean technical testing and also testing which broader consequences can be inflicted, which technical and political reactions will ensue etc. The best known and also probably the most influential attack largely attributed to Russia took place in 2007 in Estonia after relocation of the national monument. The monument was installed by the USSR in 1944 to honour Soviet soldiers who had died in World War II. The ethnic Russian minority was opposed to this act and a post was published on the Internet with instructions for how to participate in a massive DoS attack against Estonian governmental websites. Eventually, thousands of people were obviously involved in this attack (Shakarian et al., 2013: 16) with some sources identifying around 80,000 IP addresses as the source of the attacks. For Estonia, it was clear that at least some of these attacks originated from within the Kremlin, but further investigations failed to confirm this conclusively and Russia denied any involvement (even though some official statements The Future of CSBMs in Europe 215 applauded and encouraged the online hackers) (Green et al., 2015: 17-18; Connell and Vogler, 2017: 15-16). The conflict in Georgia about the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was also exposed to cyber attacks. Russia has been supporting these two breakaway territories in their secessionist endeavours. One day before Russian military operations in 2008, a wide-scale cyber attack was launched against Georgian websites (sites used to communicate with the population, Georgian banks, ministries etc.). The website StopGeorgia.com was used to spread public information on how to target the 36 different servers in Georgia. There was strong circumstantial evidence showing that this was organised by Russia. This attack is considered to be the first known wide-scale case of offensive cyber operations preceding a conventional military operation (see Green et al., 2015: 18.-19; Connell and Vogler, 2017: 18). CyberCaliphate was seemingly associated with ISIS when it hacked the French TV station TV5 Monde in 2015. But it turned out that the group was linked to Russian military hackers, those who had hijacked the Twitter feed of the US Central Command. CyberBerkut has been a Russian state-sponsored front cyber organisation supporting Russia’s military operations and strategic objectives in Ukraine and also against NATO (cases of cyber espionage, attack, such as denial of service attacks etc.). Recently, this group has focused on publishing hacked documents obtained from the Ukrainian government’s hacked computers. Russia also uses its «troll army», namely paid online commentators who manipulate or try to change the narrative in Russia’s favour. «Bots» are further used to automatically push content within the social media environment etc. (Russia Military Power Report, 2017: 37-41). We already saw above that the Ukrainian power grid was attacked in 2015 and the attack was largely attributed to Russia. Technical details of the attack were described above. It seems that Russia’s aim was, according to sources, to create a general air of confusion and uncertainty regarding the Ukrainian government’s ability to secure its information systems and related integrity. It seems that hackers could have caused much greater damage in this attack and that this was more like a warning signal to Ukraine concerning what can be done (Connell and Vogler, 2017: 19- 22). Last but not least, the Russian hacker community has shown an interest in election results. The most scandalous case is the last US presidential elections in 2016. The US Democratic National Committee was hacked during the election period in 2016 by two groups: Fancy Bear or APT 28 and Cosy Bear or APT 29. The purpose of this attack was to monitor communications of the Democratic Party and extract confidential documents from its servers. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 216 Many observers interpreted this as a Russian attack and a plot to meddle in the US presidential elections. Supposedly, Putin ordered an influence campaign to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Hillary Clinton and harm her electoral chances. The case remains under investigation in the USA and Trump’s links with Russia are being examined. Both of the mentioned hacker groups already have a history of attacking Western sites, such as ministries of defence all over Europe, the US White House, the State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff unclassified websites etc. (Connell and Vogler, 2017: 23-24). The investigation shows that both attackers used a very sophisticated approach that was also based on the constant changing of their implants and modification of the methods used, moving to new communication channels in order to stay ahead of security controls (see the Crowdstrike website). Public data and several attributions of cyber attacks show that Russia is well ahead in developing cyber military capabilities than other post-Soviet states. In times of the operations related to Georgia in 2008, broader discussions started about the creation of Russian information troops. Russia adopted Conceptual Views on the role of its armed forces in information space in 2011. This concept talked about cyber forces and was entirely defensive in tone. We should stress that Russia understands cyber warfare as part of its information warfare activities. Russian authorities have thus defined cyber activities as defending the country’s own communications and information systems, disrupting adversaries’ information systems, including by introducing harmful software, and working on domestic and foreign public opinion (using the Internet, media etc.). Russia was considering establishing a cyber security command in 2017 (Military Balance 2017, 2017: 224). In February 2017, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu officially acknowledged that «Russia had formed a new information-warfare branch of the armed forces» (Military Balance 2018, 2018: 206). In 2013, the government announced it would create a cyber unit in the armed forces responsible for offensive and defensive cyber operations. The government also boosted cyber research through its Foundation for Advanced Military Research. For Russia, the information sphere is a key domain of modern military conflict. It has started to draw on psychological warfare tactics and techniques from the Soviet era with the purpose of influencing Western societies. Russia’s prioritisation of the cyber dimension is expressed in the concept of «information confrontation». This is a holistic concept for ensuring information superiority in times of both peace and war. The concept consists of two sets of measures: informational-technical effect (computer network operations, including defence, attack and exploitation) and The Future of CSBMs in Europe 217 informational-psychological effect (that includes attempts to change people’s behaviour or beliefs in favour of Russian governmental objectives). This means that cyber operations form part of attempts to control the information environment (Russia Military Power Report, 2017: 37-41). Sources stress the Russian military was a relative latecomer to the Russian cyber activity spectrum. For a long time, these operations were the exclusive domain of the FSB. We should also be aware that Russians use the term «cyber warfare» only in relation to the threat from the West. For its own purposes, it uses the term «information warfare». Cyber information operations are thereby regarded as a mechanism for enabling the state to dominate the information landscape. They are also appropriate because their covert nature enables Russia to maintain a degree of plausible deniability with regard to its participation in such operations. In the words of Russian General Gerasimov, the lines between the states of war and peace have become blurred, and the experience of recent conflicts (including the colour revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East) show that perfectly thriving states can be rapidly (in a matter of months or even days) transformed by cyber information operations into an arena of fierce armed conflict and become a victim of foreign intervention and sink into a web of chaos (Connell and Vogler, 2017: 3-7). Moreover, Russian authorities have been outsourcing cyber operational activities to proxy non-governmental actors. Cyber hacking groups have become part of Russia’s cyber information operations toolkit. The reason for their inclusion arises from difficulties in attempting to link the government with their activities (or the problem of attribution). These groups operate in a grey zone and provide the government with an extra degree of anonymity and deniability. This enables the Russian government to constantly reject the idea that it sponsors any hacker groups. The second reason for using proxies is their cost effectiveness. Proxies require little technical support and need to be provided with just a target list with attack vectors. They can be mobilised very quickly and also disbanded as soon as they are no longer needed (Connell and Vogler, 2017: 10-12). 2) China Several cyber attacks have also been attributed or largely attributed to China and its hacker community. For example, Operation Titan Rain against the US Government, the Defence Information Systems Agency (DISA), Sandia National Laboratories, the World Bank, Lockheed Martin and NASA was The Future of CSBMs in Europe 218 based on infiltration of their computer systems, cyber reconnaissance and then the exfiltration of large amounts of data. Operation Ghostnet against the Office of the Dali Lama, the Tibetan Government in exile and several pro-Tibetan non-government organisations was also based on infiltration of their computer systems after monitoring them for a long time and modifying data with the intention to disrupt the operations of the targets (Shakarian et al., 2014; 124, 132-133). Operation Aurora against Google, Adobe and Yahoo was carried out in 2009 and 2010 with links to the Chinese military, private security experts and Internet outlaws recruited by the Chinese government (Green et al., 2015: 12). In an operation named CoolSwallow, Chinese hackers also attacked the White House’s information systems in response to the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia in 1999 (Shakarian et al., 2013: 121-124). Chinese armed forces have devoted considerable attention to developing their own cyber-warfare capabilities. The main doctrinal document (entitled Integrated Network Electronic Warfare) guides computer network operations and integrates electronic and non-electronic aspects of information warfare. China for a long time used the following organisational structure: offensive warfare or computer network attacks and Electronic Warfare was organised by the 4th Department, while defensive warfare or computer network defence and intelligence gathering were by the 3rd Department. This department was composed of military and civilian cyber warfare personnel and included the secret Unit 61398. This unit was suspected of extracting huge amounts of data from many companies (Military Balance 2017, 2017: 288). The department is located in Beijing and has been very similar to the American NSA. Some 130,000 people work there. Its key part has been the Beijing North Computer Centre or PLA unit 61539. In addition, at least 12 cyber training facilities operate around the country. It should also be noted that the so-called Blue team unit simulates how the US military and its allies use cyberspace and provide targets for Chinese units for training. PLA also organises training programmes for the wider cyber community, such as the «patriotic hacker program» (Singer and Friedman, 2014: 141-142). In 2015, China reorganised its cyber forces. Accordingly, a Strategic Support Force (SSF) with three branches was established: (1) intelligence and military operations in cyberspace (defensive and offensive); (2) military space operations; and (3) defensive and offensive electronic warfare and intelligence (Military Balance 2017, 2017: 288; also see Shakarian et al., 2013: 121). The SSF’s structure is becoming progressively clearer. It is organised around the concept of an integrated cyber attack, defence and reconnaissance. This basically means that intelligence, offensive and The Future of CSBMs in Europe 219 defensive elements are integrated together to enable full-spectrum war combat. This also means the SSF is organised in units responsible for space, cyber and electronic warfare (Costello, 2016). The Chinese strategic and organisational thinking is still based on the INEW strategy elaborated in 1999 by General Dai Qingmin in his book. That strategy argued for the integration of cyber operations into traditional information warfare and for the simultaneous application of electronic warfare and cyber operations to overwhelm the adversary’s C4ISR (Shakarian et al., 2013: 121). The Chinese doctrine is based on the perception that modern forces, especially the US armed forces, are so highly reliant on information that whoever dominates the cyberwar battle will occupy the new strategic high ground. The idea is also to affect an enemy’s decision-making, slow down their operations and weaken their morale. The side that controls the flow of information can create blind spots that can be exploited, windows of opportunity to attack undetected, or with a reduced risk of counterattack (Singer and Friedman, 2014: 141-142).39 This explains why the Chinese cyber doctrine is very much integrated into its information warfare concept. Military Balance (2017: 288) also reported that Chinese cyber forces consist of three groups: specialised military network warfare forces, PLAauthorised forces and non-governmental forces. Other sources reported that China also established information warfare militia units or some kind of cyber national guard. These units are organised in several Chinese provinces, consist of personnel from the commercial information technology field and academia, and mainly have offensive wartime tasks (Shakarian et al., 2013: 121). We should also note that all major military exercises in China also have a cyber dimension containing defensive and offensive elements. The Chinese hacker community supposedly consists of several thousand hackers. Some of their attacks are regarded as a response to political incidents (e.g. DoS attacks and website defacement). It seems that some attacks are controlled by the Chinese government or military while others are not. The hacker movement can easily become uncontrolled but, on the other hand, the Chinese military has also managed to leverage the pool of talent and employ some hackers or direct them. Shakarian et al. (2013: 121-124) reported that several hackers transitioned from «black hat» (unsupervised, extra governmental or illegal hacking) to «white hat» («ethical» hacking in the form of security consulting or academic activities). The latter means that some members of academia are to some extent included in China’s hacking endeavours. We should also note that PLA cyber programmes seem to be 39 These principles remind us considerably of Sun Tsu's principles of warfare. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 220 collocated with many engineering schools and technology firms. For example, Unit 61539 is collocated with Beijing University and the Central Communist Party School. This resembles the US practice of collocating military cyber facilities with NSA and civilian research programmes (Singer and Friedman, 2014: 141-142). 3) The USA The Stuxnet worm deliberately targeted Iranian industrial control systems in a facility for enriching uranium in Natanz. The worm purposefully accelerated nuclear centrifuges to the point that they destroyed themselves. This cyber attack led to actual physical damage in the nuclear facility of a relatively isolated country. It is widely believed that the USA is behind the attack (see, for example, Valeriano and Maness, 2015: 150-151). Green et al. (2015: 20-22) stressed that this is the first documented example of a statesponsored cyberattack used to achieve geopolitical goals, such as slowing down Iran’s entry to the nuclear club. This is also the first instance of a cyber attack causing direct physical damage. The target was the Iranian uranium refinement facility in Natanz and the operation’s codename was Olympic Games. Because nuclear centrifuges are not connected to the Internet, the attackers infected the system with human help (a contractor or an insider) and a USB drive. After the first computers were infected, the worm spread and located the centrifuges (that is, their computers) and changed their instructions. Centrifuges started to spin at high rates, causing physical damage (including by burnout). Valeriano and Maness (2015: 153-154) argued this attack at best produced only a temporary slowdown in the enrichment rate because the recovery time only lasted a few months. The attack by the Stuxnet was responded to by the Iranians who attacked several US banks and companies and showed they also can perform such attacks. After this exchange of messages, everybody became aware that multiple state actors can carry out dangerous cyber attacks on the global scale. American cyber infrastructure is increasingly attacked, and this is one reason the latest American National Security Strategy (2017: 12, 31) prioritises keeping America safe in the cyber era. It states that the future of the country’s prosperity and security depends on the response to related challenges and that cyberspace allows US opponents to wage campaigns against American political, economic and security interests without ever physically crossing its borders. The strategy identifies malicious state and non-state actors that use cyber attacks for extortion, information warfare, The Future of CSBMs in Europe 221 disinformation etc. Especially worrying is the capacity to harm large numbers of people and institutions with a minimal investment and a troubling degree of deniability. The strategy states that cyber attacks have become a key feature of modern conflict. Some US sources mention the nation’s army in cyberspace aiming to achieve cyberspace goals. Cyber defence is considered vital, but there is also cyber offense. This means that not only cyber defensive operations are discussed, but also cyber offensive operations. Experts talk about cyber officers, cyber operators, cyber warriors who operate in cyber teams etc. It was made known that cyber teams are also plugged into the real environment to undergo realistic training. Consequently, cyberspace has become a domain of operations for the US armed forces. This also includes training, organising and equipping the armed forces. New security concepts have been tested and implemented in this space that are analogous to what the military does in the air, at sea or on the ground. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff divides cyber warfare into cyber attack, cyber defence and cyber-enabling operations. Cyber attack is defined as a hostile act using computer or related networks or systems intended to disrupt or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber systems, assets or functions (see Roscini, 2014: 14-15). Military Balance (2015: 52; 2017: 57) clearly reflects the USA’s cyber organisation. Under the US Strategic Command, there is the US Cyber Command with a subordinated US Army Cyber Command (4 signals commands, 1 information operations command, 1 intelligence and security command, 9 signals brigades, 1 military intelligence brigade, 1 cyber protection brigade, 1 reserve cyber operations group), the US Fleet Cyber Command (2 information operations task forces, 2 network operations and defence task forces, a cryptologic operations task force with 10 task groups, a cyber warfare development task force etc.), the Marine Forces Cyberspace Command (a cyberspace warfare group for defensive and offensive operations in support of the marines and cyber command, 13 cyber mission force teams, 2 combat mission teams etc.), the Air Forces Cyber Command (2 cyberspace wings, a combat communications wing, 4 cyberspace operations groups, an operations centre etc.) and the 960th Cyberspace Operations Group (Air Force reserve command formation with a network warfare squadron, 3 network operations squadrons etc.). US Cyber Command is co-located with the NSA and the NSA Director also heads the Cyber Command (but this could change in the future) (Military Balance, 2015: 52; 2017: 57). This double-hatted position is good from the coordination perspective, but some people have expressed concerns about blurring the lines between a military command and a civilian spy agency. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 222 They are worried about which mentality will prevail: the spy inclination to watch and learn, or the warrior’s inclination to act. Further dilemmas were expressed, such as whether cyberspace dominance can be achieved and if deterrence in cyberspace even works (Singer and Friedman, 2014: 133- 136). The US DoD released a Cyber Strategy in 2015 which named cyber as a primary strategic security threat (even more serious than the threat of terrorism, which happened for the first time since 9-11). Cyber Command is expanding its budget (to USD 505 million in 2017), organising exercises, aiming to create a Cyber Mission Force with 133 teams in 2018, funding research with many non-governmental actors in this field etc. (Military Balance, 2015: 52; 2017: 57). In 2012, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD- 20) (2012) to establish clear standards for how US agencies will confront cyber threats. The document was made public in the Snowden leaks and clearly distinguishes defensive and offensive cyber operations. Accordingly, US cyber operations consist of cyber collection, defensive cyber effects operations and offensive cyber effects operations. The latter were defined as all operations and programmes or activities in or through cyberspace that are intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside US government networks. Cyber effects were further defined as the manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation or destruction of computers, information or communication systems, networks, psychical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems etc. In relation to offensive operations, this directive also enables the US Government to: (1) identify potential targets of national importance where offensive operations can offer a favourable balance of effectiveness and risk as compared with other instruments of national power; (2) maintain offensive cyber effects operative capabilities; and (3) execute these capabilities. Engaging in these operations in practice should be consistent with the US Constitution, international law, including neutrality and sovereignty, and the law of armed conflict, where applicable. At the end of 2017, the US administration signalled that it could revise its strategy in such a way that cyber-attacks could prompt retaliation with a nuclear strike (Facebook Action Hints at Western Retaliation over WannaCry Attack, 2017). In our view, such a move would entail a very risky cross-dimensional securitisation of individual security situations. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 223 4) NATO’s Cyber Policy In addition, as a collective defence and security organisation NATO has adopted a policy on cyber defence and started developing its cyber defence capabilities. Cyber issues and cyber policy have been on its agenda since the Prague summit in 2002. The conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated for NATO that cyber attacks could become an essential component of conventional warfare. At the Warsaw summit held in 2016, NATO recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as in the air, on land and at sea. This recognition was accompanied by the interpretation that NATO’s mission remains defensive. NATO sees cyber attacks as part of the evolving complex security environment where its defences need to be strengthened and made more resilient in order to fulfil the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO is also aware that its defence is as strong as its weakest link. At the Wales summit in 2014, the Allies declared that cyber defence forms part of its core task of collective defence. NATO has established several bodies that take care of cyber defence tasks and decide about them (e.g. the Cyber Defence Committee that is directly subordinate to the NAC) (see Cyber Defence, 2018). NATO also adopted the Cyber defence pledge in 2016 where the following aims were listed: assure capability to defend itself in cyberspace, enhance the defence of national infrastructures and networks, reaffirm the applicability of international law in cyber space, ensure that the alliance is cyber-aware, cyber- trained and cyber-secure, and to continuously adapt NATO’s cyber defence capabilities (Cyber Defence Pledge, 2016). It is also very important that NATO confirmed that international law also applies in cyberspace. NATO conducts regular cyber exercises (such as the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise) and integrates cyber elements into other exercises, such as its major Crisis Management Exercise (CMX exercise). The tenth annual cyber defence exercise was conducted in Estonia in November 2017. Twenty-five states participated in a realistic scenario that included responding to malware, attacks on mobile devices, hybrid threats involving social media etc. Many NATO and partner state representatives participated in this exercise from their home locations (NATO’s Flagship Cyber Exercise Begins in Estonia, 2017). The question is: what does NATO’s declaration that cyber defence is part of its core task of collective defence really mean? Frear (2018) warned that declarations that a cyber attack on an ally is a cause for triggering the The Future of CSBMs in Europe 224 Article 5 collective defence clause seem to have been made without any serious discussion within the alliance about the threshold that would cause such a response. This raises serious questions of modern deterrence about how to manage escalations across domains. Thousands of cyber attacks on cyber infrastructure in various countries occur every day. For Springer (2015), this means that many of the most technologically advanced states are currently willing to tolerate the status quo in terms of creating a major international push to restrict or prohibit such activities. Springer believes that cyber war is currently only one of the means that may be used by one state to attack another, possibly without provoking a greater confrontation in the physical world. For NATO, such high numbers of daily attacks would mean Article 5 would have to be activated several times a day and perhaps a thousand times a year. NATO should therefore probably concentrate only on the big cases, but the question of «what is big enough?» remains unanswered. Some observers may say that this question will actually remain unanswered due to the reasons of deterrence. Existing Cyber Confidence-Building Measures in the OSCE The above presentation of the security situation in cyber space, the existing military cyber capabilities and their offensive tasks makes it clear that more regulation of cyber activities and responses to threats is increasingly needed. We should also know that any future regulation will be vulnerable at its weakest link. Some states are clearly less prepared than others and this might pose a risk for all new regulations in the cyber field. The OSCE has not been idle in changing the security environment and already taken a step into the cyber dimension by adopting voluntary cyber confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from ICT use. These measures aim to improve predictability in cyber space and offer specific tools to avoid misunderstanding. The OSCE followed the UN guidance on enhancing cyber stability among states and used its character of a complementary regional security arrangement (under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) as an ideal platform for building confidence also in this specific field. This fact made the OSCE the first regional security organisation to reach an agreement on cyber CBMs (see Transnational Threat Department – Cyber/ICT Security, 2017). This is actually a niche for the OSCE as these activities are not engaged in by other international organisations (interview with Hiller, 2018). The OSCE established the Transnational The Future of CSBMs in Europe 225 Threat Department and the associated position of cyber security officer that support participating states in meeting the goals concerning the cyber/ICT security dimension. We should stress that the OSCE does not focus on cybercrime and similar frequent and relatively small-scale cyber activities. It instead focuses on big cyber attacks that can influence inter-state relations (interview with Hiller, 2018). It is also concentrating on preventing attacks on or via cyber space from escalating into real kinetic attacks with real and classic military consequences. The OSCE has adopted two key decisions on cyber CBMs, the first in 2013 (in Kyiv) and a supplemented set of CBMs in 2016 (see Decision No. 1106 – Initial Set of OSCE CBMs to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies, 2013; Decision No. 1202 – OSCE CBMs to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies, 2016). Accordingly, OSCE cyber CBMs include: ˗ voluntary provision of national views on various aspects of cyber threats to and in the use of ICTs, also encouraging reporting of vulnerabilities affecting the security of and in the use of ICTs; ˗ voluntary sharing of information on national organisation, strategies, policies and programmes, national terminology, best practices for protection, ICT-enabled infrastructures considered as critical infrastructures etc., including facilitating inter-state exchanges in the form of workshops, seminars and roundtables; ˗ voluntary facilitation of cooperation among the competent national bodies and exchange of security-related information on measures and related readiness to use the OSCE as a platform for dialogue, exchange best practices, awareness-raising, shape modern legislation to facilitate cooperation and information exchange; ˗ nominating a contact point to facilitate permanent communications and dialogue on the security of and in the use of ICTs (contact data of existing official national structures that manage incidents); and ˗ voluntary consultations among participating states in order to reduce the risks of misperception and of the possible emergence of political or military tension or conflict that may stem from ICT use and to protect critical infrastructures. The OSCE’s cyber security officer classified the measures adopted in three categories: sharing information (which tells a lot about the character of the The Future of CSBMs in Europe 226 state), caring for national cyber resilience, and having a communication channel in the event of escalation and a network of national contact points (interview with Hiller, 2018). In a decision from 2016, participating states also decided to support the facilitation of authorised and protected communication channels to prevent and reduce the risks of misperception (see Decision 1202, 2016). With Decision No. 5/17 (2017), the FSC decided that participating states can use the OSCE Communications Network for the purposes of addressing the security of and in the use of ICT (on all ICT-related issues mentioned in the above decisions). The only condition was that the introduction of new system requirements would not hinder the existing services provided to OSCE participating states. This communication system is being operationalised in 2018. Participating states are expected to exchange ICT-related information annually. They meet on this topic three times per year within the framework of the Informal Working Group in order to discuss exchanged information and explore the further development of CBMs. The group meets at the level of experts from the capitals and is chaired by one of the participating states. These measures are currently a civilian part of the politico-military dimension of the OSCE. Participating states are still discussing how to operationalise them. Discussions on the operationalisation of CBMs reflected already known limitations and problems. Hiller stressed that the progress of cooperation in the cyber CBMs field was very fast in the initial stage when cooperation in many fields covered by the OSCE were actually blocked. But then the progress slowed down. For example, a delicate and very political point in an escalating scenario is how to interpret a telephone call seeking clarification of events: is this call already an accusation by another state or not (interview with Hiller, 2018). Another problem is that the civil and technical specific domain has become a domain of military operations in which attacks can be carried out at the «speed of light» and in secrecy. This once again raises the problem of attribution or locating the actual source of the attack. Many attacks are made using proxy/ies not necessarily located in the state from where the order, idea or support for the attack originates. Currently, there are no technical verification means able to reliably (or beyond reasonable doubt) attribute cyber offensive activities to a specific actor. This means there is considerable room for speculation and potential misunderstanding after a cyber attack. This is exactly what we do not want in any CBMs or CSBMs. Finally, the implementation of all of these adopted measures is voluntary. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 227 How to Move Forward to Including Cyber Confidence- and Security- Building Measures In the preceding chapters, we presented the Vienna Document as it is: focused on building confidence and security based on conventional military capabilities and activities. We also presented the emerging dimension of cyberwarfare and the associated existing national capabilities. The hybridisation of warfare clearly connects conventional and cyber warfare to form a single interconnected activity. It is therefore time to integrate the lessons and observations from the existing conventional CSBM regime and cyber CBMs into a proposal for the cyber modernisation of the Vienna Document CSBM regime. This debate on cyber CSBMs should also form part of the wider debate on building international norms and rules of behaviour of states and non-state actors in cyberspace. The OSCE security community has already discussed this integration and come to a modest and more or less diplomatic conclusion. There is no doubt that the Vienna Document must be modernised in the direction of regulating the use of new military capabilities. As argued by Peško, no state is against cyber, the debate on military doctrines shows there are common concerns among the participating states and that they might also hold different views on these issues (interview with Peško, 2018). The Intersessional Dialogue on Military Doctrines (May 2017) opened up debate on whether risks such as cyberattacks and terrorism affect all participating states and constitute an area for a shared approach (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 18). The Annual Security Review Conference showed that some participating states wish to consider cyber threats in the politico-military dimension. The conference also revealed that some countries want to boost transparency in cyberspace and that cyberspace should be organised in a peaceful and transparent manner (2017 Annual Security Review Conference, 2017: 7). The first breakout Workshop of the Structured Dialogue also led to a debate on the potential inclusion of cyber capabilities in the Vienna Document. Yet, workshop participants rejected this proposal due to the multipurpose, dual-use nature of software technologies, the widespread and mainly civilian application nature of these capabilities and problems with attributing these attacks. They believed that such area would not be negotiable and that there will be difficulties with verification. This explains why they agreed these capabilities are not suitable for inclusion in conventional arms control and CSBMs (Promoting Military Stability and Security, 2017: 118). Cyber is, of course, not conventional warfare, but has become and will be increasingly integrated into conventional warfare in the future. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 228 The participating states very consciously decided that cyber confidencebuilding measures are not the business of the FSC. According to the OSCE’s cyber security officer, cyber CBMs are a non-military part of the first dimension (politico-military dimension). States feel that CBMs are complimentary to military CSBMs. He also thinks that states will not be ready for a long time to exchange information on the cyber aspects of military activities. He also stated that, on the other hand, CBMs can already include military, depending on how far participating states will want to take this (interview with Hiller, 2018). There are very different visions regarding what to do with CBMs in the future. The OSCE Secretariat is trying to downplay these differences and trying to improve the communication channels and exchange of information in the meantime (interview with Hiller, 2018). The current predominant view in the OSCE that cyber CBMs should stay out of military CSBMs is based on several other reasons, such as that first the OSCE should take care of the problems in implementing the existing core or classic Vienna Document provisions. The view also argues that cyber CBMs should not be implemented at the expense of the classic CSBMs (interview with Peško, 2018; interview with Mossinkoff and Podbevsek, 2018). Cyber additions have been mentioned in the Structured Dialogue and other similar discussions, yet there are no concrete proposals to amend the Vienna Document with cyber measures on the table. Countries are more thinking how to amend the Vienna Document with naval measures, how to lower thresholds, how to report snap exercises etc. The question is whether the current scepticism also relates to the lack of political will of the participating states, their diplomatic uncertainty or simply to their deficient awareness. If so, time will actually force them to start changing this slow progress in the cyber CSBM direction. Despite the existing equilibrium between state interests, concerns and limitations, in this chapter we propose a very specific modernisation of the Vienna Document CSBM in the cyber direction. It is known that the current Vienna Document does not really reflect the entire spectrum of existing military capabilities and force structures, and that its modernisation needs to embrace all aspects of military capabilities or power, including cyber. CSBMs have to be militarily meaningful and the only way to ensure this is to include the most relevant aspects of all existing military capabilities, including cyber capabilities. Not doing so means we would be neglecting the present and future characteristics of warfare. In such a constellation, the Vienna Document can perhaps become more efficient only in some narrow areas (e.g. snap exercises), which is important, but widening to cyber is also The Future of CSBMs in Europe 229 required to preserve the effectiveness of the CSBMs in Europe. Mere finetuning of the Vienna Document with only conventional capabilities will not really meet the challenges of modern warfare and the related threats. All past decisions to upgrade the Vienna Document CSBMs were adopted to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe, and the inclusion of cyber would do exactly this. Some might consider this proposal somewhat utopian. We know this is not implementable immediately and that we might be a little early, but our proposals can act as a beacon showing what should be done or as light at the end of the modernisation tunnel. In addition, some other proposals emerged in this direction which are considered (including by the authors of this book) as too utopian given the existing international system. For example, Frear (2018) proposed it would be a net gain for Euro- Atlantic security to simply acknowledge the need to limit cyber espionage during periods of potential crisis, such as around large exercises. This would reduce the risk that such an activity would be mistaken for the beginnings of a cyber attack. But this idea does not take the whole purpose of intelligence in crises into account. This proposal appears as if the author is proposing to stop intelligence services doing their job at a time when their input is greatly needed from the national security perspective of their country leaders and from the perspective of inter-state competition. New cyber CSBMs need to focus more on those attack capabilities that can bring serious consequences. In our view, the future cyber CSBMs need to create transparency in military cyber capabilities, cyber doctrines, improve contacts among military staff responsible for cyber warfare, lower risks in the case of escalation, establish inspections and evaluations to monitor cyber capabilities and events etc. We are aware that states are still in the process of building up their military cyber capacities. But time will, with each individual cyber attack, increasingly bring these issues onto the OSCE’s military decisionmaking table. The OSCE will be increasingly unable to continue avoiding this reality. The new cyber CSBMs also need to improve one of the current key problems in cyber warfare: attribution in the case of attacks. To do so, additional technical (cyber) and legal knowledge will have to be integrated into the cyberisation of CSBMs in Europe. In addition, verification of the existing cyber capabilities will require additional specialised cyber knowledge in the ranks of military inspectors and evaluators. Our specific proposal is to look at the existing Vienna Document and extend it in the cyber direction by considering the lessons on cyber warfare and cyber capabilities presented in this chapter. For example, the Vienna Document can be upgraded in the following ways: The Future of CSBMs in Europe 230 1.) Introduce a more structured chapter on the Annual Exchange of Military and Defence Cyber Information with Related Control and Verification Mechanism (Cyber Evaluation). The Vienna document should provide that participating states will annually report and exchange information on military cyber forces (cyber AEMI) and related cyber defence planning. The information should be provided in an agreed format before December 15 of each year, just like the ordinary AEMI. The exchanged information would include the following: ˗ Information on the cyber military organisation and command structure, specifying the designation and subordination of all formations (cyber commands down to larger cyber task units40). States should also report their reserve cyber units and existing cyber operations schools or training centres. Which smallest units are to be reported remains to be clarified in debates. The problem is that in fact very small cyber units in personnel terms can have a strategic impact on other states. This simply means the Vienna Document would have to include much smaller units than the classic AEMI. For each unit, the following information should be provided: information on active or non-active status, normal peacetime location of its headquarters, peacetime authorised personnel strength, and major equipment systems (number and an agreed description). ˗ Information exchange on cyber defence planning should be exchanged no later than three months after adoption of the military budget. This type of exchange should include information on cyber defence policy, cyber security/defence law, general cyber strategy, defence or military cyber strategy, cyber defence concepts, cyber military doctrine, military cyber research, current personnel policy and substantial changes, information on cyber force planning, including on the size, structure, personnel, equipment systems, reorganisation of cyber defence structures, cyber training programmes etc. This reposting should also include information on previous cyber defence expenditures from preceding fiscal years and future plans for the cyber budget. States should agree on what exactly is reported under this item. The existing mechanism for clarifying exchanged information and the need to answer such questions would then also equally apply to the cyber AEMI. 40 For example, information on cyber defence units, cyber defence/security operational centres, cyber cells, divisions, cyber commands, cyber operations groups, military CERT and related joint cyber bodies. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 231 The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting would also be used to discuss cyber matters. Special study visits could also be organised to meet with officials involved in military cyber activities. The exchanged military cyber information would have to be included in evaluations. Participating states would have the right to evaluate the cyber information provided and a duty to give an opportunity to other states to visit active cyber formations and units at their normal peacetime locations. Cyber evaluation quotas should be determined separately from the existing classic quotas or included in them (if the number of existing quotas is increased). Even if new cyber quotas are accepted by the participating states, we should expect a continuation of the quota race and associated problems also in the cyber domain. In addition, a limited force majeure could be applicable in cyber evaluations. The same evaluation rules would apply to the cyber evaluation teams (privileges, diplomatic immunity, possibility to meet cyber soldiers, not interfering with existing work etc.). The question is what kind of cyber access would be given to the cyber evaluators (just a presentation by the host state or more individual exploration of the existing systems). All communications concerning compliance and verification should also be transmitted through the OSCE communication network. 2.) Prior Notification of Certain Bigger Cyber Military Activities (cyber exercises, concentration and transfer of cyber forces) with a Related Control and Verification Mechanism (Cyber Inspection). Participating states should notify other states (42 days or more in advance) about cyber exercises or the concentration or transfer of cyber forces. Thresholds on the number of participating cyber soldiers and the capacity of their equipment should be agreed. Such notifications should include the purpose of the cyber military activity, the names of any other participating states, the total number of participating cyber troops, the number and type of formations and units, a description of the equipment systems etc. Cyber inspections should be established as a verification mechanism. Inspection would focus on the specified zone of military activities in both the physical space and in cyberspace. Cyber inspection quotas would be added to the existing inspection quotas for each state. We should also consider what force majeure in the case of cyber inspections can actually take place. For example, an electrical blackout would to a large extent prevent the execution of a cyber inspection. Requests for cyber inspections would be communicated to the potential host state and also to all other participating states while the report made by cyber inspectors would be also communicated to all participating states. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 232 3.) Cyber Risk-Reduction Measures: A Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation in the Event of Unusual Military Activities in Cyberspace (to be added to Chapter III). Participating states may have security concerns about unusual military cyber activities of other participating states (e.g. a cyber attack on governmental websites or critical infrastructure involving suspicion of another state, unusual connections between kinetic military and cyber activities). A request for explanation could be sent to such states also for such cyber cases and the reply would need to be made within 48 hours. The communication procedure that would follow is the same as the existing one in current the Vienna Document. Participating states which have caused concerns could voluntarily host visits by the concerned states to dispel their concerns about unusual cyber military activities. Cyberspace is a global space with interactions taking place mostly at the speed of light. It is not unusual for a state to organise a cyber attack through servers that are not located in its territory. This fact takes cyber risk-reduction measures from the regional to the global level and significantly complicates the whole riskreduction process. This also calls for a rethinking of the concept of the zone of application of CSBMs: in the case of a globally executed cyber attack, such a limited application zone would be grossly insufficient. 4.) Stimulating Military Cyber Contacts as a tool for improving cyber confidence. Participating states would commit themselves to organising visits for representatives of other states to their cyber facilities and centres. The programme of military contacts would also include the exchange of cyber soldiers, joint military cyber exercises, provision of experts, seminars on cooperation etc. A demonstration of new types of cyber weapons and equipment systems could be organised for interested participating states. 5.) Observation of Certain Military Cyber Activities (to be added to Chapter VI). Participating states could send cyber observers to cyber exercises in other participating states. Specific thresholds would be determined for these exercises. Observers would be given a special observation programme, briefings on the purpose, basic situation and phases of the activity, and some limited access to the computer systems used by the participants. The purpose of their visit would be to confirm that the notified cyber activity is non-threatening in character. 6.) The exchange of Annual Calendars of military activities would be extended to also cover cyber military activities. States would include the number of important cyber military activities, type of cyber activities, their purpose, the states involved, planned duration, total number of cyber troops and number of cyber troops by state, and types of armed forces involved. The Future of CSBMs in Europe 233 7.) Regional Complementary Cyber CSBM Measures (to amend Chapter X). States would be encouraged to also adopt complementary (to OSCE cyber CSBMs) separate bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements to increase cyber transparency and confidence. 8.) Assessment of the Implementation of CSBMs in the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting would also include the cyber dimensions of CSBM implementation. All suggestions for improvement would then be discussed by the Forum for Security and Cooperation. 9.) The OSCE Communications Network would transmit all messages related to the agreed cyber measures contained in a reformed Vienna Document. The cyber security dimension is actually very complex. There are some similarities with traditional kinetic warfare, but also many significant differences and specificities. At the moment, cyber attacks have not been as deadly as kinetic military operations and cannot be detected as easily as such military operations. The problem is that the initial stage of a cyber attack resembles cyber intelligence activities and states are not considering making such activities part of the CSBMs. The questions are whether the infiltration of a computer network already represents an attack, and what level of attack this represents. States mostly consider the cyber dimension as a domain of military operations and typically develop defensive capabilities. However, they also develop offensive capabilities with much greater secrecy than defensive capabilities. Practice shows that in some countries certain military units are involved in completely illegal activities, such as extortion. The legality and legitimacy of the attack operations of cyber units have become similar to intelligence operations: always legal and legitimate from the perspective of the home state and primarily illegal and illegitimate from the perspective of the attacked country (except in the case of self-defence). States tend to integrate their military kinetic and cyber activities into an integrated concept of operations. We can observe in practice an increasing level of attacks against critical infrastructure. Malfunctions of this infrastructure can create serious consequences for larger societies. We have seen revenge attacks for past cyber attacks or in response to particular political events. Another problem is the collocation of military cyber institutions with civilian and even non-governmental cyber institutions. The former sometimes collocate with universities, civilian IT companies or national security services (e.g. intelligence services). The Future of CSBMs in Europe 234 The current technical means do not allow a fast and reliable attribution capability, even for major cyber attacks. This means that such operations have become a convenient tool for states wishing to influence the security situation around the world. The high level of plausible deniability provides sufficient cover for them. States organise cyber capabilities on several levels. The most developed states in this regard have governmental (military) cyber forces, government authorised forces and non-governmental forces (the hacker community). Some states also have reserve cyber forces. This all seems very frustrating from the perspective of the possibilities to create cyber CSBMs in Europe. But the necessity and vulnerability are both so great that there is no other way than to start creating real cyber CSBMs at a politically acceptable tempo. This means slow, but slow is much better than doing nothing. 235 9. Conclusions Security through cooperation or cooperative security has been a general trend in Europe ever since the end of the Cold War. A cooperative security system has in the meantime been created in the entire Euro-Atlantic region based on various international regimes and international organisations. The Vienna Document CSBMs have become one of the key international regimes for implementing the cooperative security concept in practice and several Vienna Documents have been adopted to improve and maintain transparency and trust among the participating states. However, the remaining and recently erupted external and internal conflicts in wider Europe increasingly demonstrate their potential for the re-emergence of a major violent armed conflict with uncertain consequences for the region’s stability and security. The emerging situation was well described by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the OSCE Ministerial Council held in Hamburg in 2016. He said that «a quarter of century after the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves at something like a crossroads. We are faced with the fundamental question: do we want to continue pursuing this vision of co-operative and comprehensive security or not?» (Ministerial Council Hamburg 2016, 2016: 4). This meeting also showed that the very foundations of international and European security order are endangered from the inside by past violations of international principles and political commitments. Despite the general trend of security cooperation following the end of the Cold War, it seems that now cooperation and conflict go hand in hand in relations among countries. Such more or less regulated «competitive cooperation» can be observed in many areas of international relations, including in international regimes and related CSBMs. This means that confidence and security are actually not provided in Europe, even though many might think so. We need to fight for the implementation of the agreed measures and we need to modernise them in order to ensure a decent level of effectiveness. In this situation, it is not completely clear how effective the Vienna Document and related CSBMs really are. The aim of this book was to assess the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs. This entailed our assessment of the current security environment and associated problems, existing debates in the OSCE and especially in its Forum for Security Cooperation, debates within the Structured Dialogue and also by considering the views Conclusions 236 held by Vienna-based military and defence experts as acquired in numerous interviews. The book also offered the results of a quantitative SWOT assessment of the Vienna Document, identifying its key strengths and weaknesses, opportunities to improve it in the future, and potential internal and external threats to the process, its existence and effectiveness. Eventually, we explored the necessity and potential of modernising these measures in the direction of cyber CSBMs. We are able to confirm our argument that, while the Vienna Document has been surprisingly effective in the past, today it suffers from some serious problems and has great opportunities for future improvement. The current situation really resembles a glass that is either half-full or half-empty. It depends on the perspective and interest of who is holding the glass (what they can see and want to see). The «half-full» part refers to the positive achievements in history and at the present time, while the «half-empty» part refers to the ineffectiveness and missed opportunities to implement and modernise the document. We should also stress at this point that the Vienna Document has not been and can never be completely effective. Complete effectiveness would instantly reduce the need for its very existence. Our overview of the history of the Vienna Document showed that improvements in terms of widening or deepening came in steps (or generations) when the political situation was ripe (windows of opportunity). The history of the Vienna Document’s modernisation also shows it never was and never will be a perfect document, and that it must be constantly improved if we want to ensure its effectiveness and related trust and confidence among the participating states. This means the Vienna Document must be improved, despite the worse security situation today. Moreover, history teaches us a methodological lesson that effectiveness is a moving target in the assessment process. The Vienna Document needs to change to reflect the constant changes in the concept and practice of warfare. This means that a Vienna Document without any changes will automatically become less and less effective over time. The effectiveness assessment of any regime has to start from a general understanding of the regime life cycle. Theory suggests that most regimes collapse sooner or later and that cooperation within regimes is temporary and prone to disappear soon after the disappearance of the special conditions that created it. Theory also suggests that regimes may persist despite the declining satisfaction of the members because it was so difficult to create the regime in the first place. International regimes can be either more or less effective in achieving their main goals. The key measure of regime effectiveness might perhaps come from a comparison with what would have Conclusions 237 happened if the regime never existed. In the case of the Vienna Document CSBMs, the answer is clear. Without it, much greater uncertainty about other countries’ intentions, more political-military conflicts, more threats, more misperceptions and misinterpretations of threats, capacities and intentions would exist in the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian areas. We took a multidimensional approach to assessing the CSBMs’ effectiveness, consisting of the extent of achieving their main objectives, the extent of complying with norms and rules, concerns about the reputational effects of non-compliance, effectiveness during military crises and conflicts («foul-weather situations»), effectiveness related to internal armed conflicts, willingness to address cases of non-compliance, the distribution of the benefits of cooperation and participation in the regime, the role of power in CSBMs and the cost-effectiveness of implementation. We formulated and distributed a questionnaire on effectiveness to all participating states, asking them to provide national experts to answer the questions. Eventually, 35 experts from 29 participating states took part in interviews. The study aimed to identify similarities and also differences in their perceptions. We posed several research questions at the start of this book and below we provide some general synthesised conclusions. 1. How do contextual factors from the existing security environment affect the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs? Isn’t everything we see in Europe actually a «back to the future» situation? The effectiveness of CSBMs strongly depends on the wider political and security context. The current crisis in Russia–West relations is actually a logical and inevitable consequence of our historical choices concerning the European security system. This system has not been thoroughly reformed since the end of the Cold War. This means it is still to some extent a result of the socalled superpower squeeze and associated Soviet/Russian threat. It is a result of the European abandonment-entrapment dilemma (the fear of being abandoned by the USA against the threat from Russia and, on the other hand, entrapped by the USA’s policies). Consequently, it was just a matter of time before distrust and competition for power would reappear. Presently, we are lacking trust in all its definitional aspects. The most cited definition of trust in organisational research states that «trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviours of another». This definition has two relevant perceptional elements: the willingness to be vulnerable, and the expectation of favourable treatment by another party. We currently do not see these elements between Russia and the West, we can only see them predominantly among the NATO member states. Conclusions 238 There are several negative contextual factors that hinder the effectiveness and prevent the proper implementation and modernisation of the Vienna Document CSBM regime. All of these are factors external to the Vienna Document mechanisms. This means the key to unlocking the CSBM process (the lock) comes from the national capitals and not from Vienna and Hofburg. These negative contextual factors are: ˗ the divergent threat and risk perceptions (the Western perception of Russia as an aggressive actor, the Russian perception of NATO as a threat, and of being betrayed by the West and its promises not to expand, and an increasingly strong in-between perception); ˗ mutually contradictory narratives with the increasing use of stereotypes on both sides; ˗ conflicting and mutually exclusionary security strategies as a consequence of conflicting perceptions (strategies point to other actors and their activities as key security threats and promise to defend or fight against these threats); and last but not least ˗ the spiralling deterioration of relations and growing competition for power and security. In this respect, we can see the beginning of a real security dilemma where states have started to compete for security at the expense of other states. Europe finds itself once again trapped in this zero-sum competitive behaviour where each side simply wants to defend itself, but all of these defensive actions are perceived as a threat by the other side. Mutual perceptions have also been built based on some worst-case assumptions (which then mostly do not happen in reality). We can also see that competition for winning hearts and minds has started in Europe as well as the related information warfare («fake news» being just one of the new terms in use). We can also observe that this struggle actually occurs between revisionist and status quo powers (one is trying to protect its post-Cold War gains and the other is trying to improve its position in international relations). There are indicators that a security action-reaction spiral has also emerged in the nuclear dimension. If we apply game theory to the current objectives of both («increase its lead» on one side and «achieve parity» on the other), we come to the unfortunate outcome that the objectives are unresolvable if both actors do not make a step back. Moreover, we note the many debates on who violated what go back to the case of Kosovo and who started the conflict first. We should also note here that NATO and EU have become parties in the West-Russia conflict. This automatically created the opportunity for the Conclusions 239 OSCE to become a more central forum for negotiations and discussions. The question is what this means for the future of Europe’s security architecture. Could the OSCE become the central European security organisation where all states could be more or less equally satisfied? On the other hand, the current debates SIMULTANEOUSLY reflect strong hope and optimism for the future trust- and security-building process in Europe. This means that hope has not died, which is good news. This may be confirmed and proven by many statements, including statements by key actors on both sides. History tells us that having a common enemy (such as international terrorism) has been the best stimulus for cooperation. The present positive ideas refer to the priority of diplomacy, the need for mutual respect, military transparency in the interests of both sides, the OSCE as the best venue for dialogue etc. In summary, this part of our conclusion reveals the paradoxical situation where both sides believe they are sufficiently transparent while also accusing each other of not being transparent enough. In addition, they are not trustful, protect themselves by threatening the other, and expect a peaceful and secure future in Europe. This paints a picture of a complex and paradoxical, partly smart and partly naive policy situation. 2. What is the extent of achieving the regime’s main objectives? In the current circumstances, one should expect CSBMs to have some level of effectiveness, but never full effectiveness. In the case of zero effectiveness, the regime would probably cease to exist even before the assessment could take place. We found that the Vienna Document has been partly effective due to the partial achievement of its basic objectives. In fact, it has been very effective in achieving particular objectives (e.g. some aspects of confidence and transparency) and much less effective in achieving the objective of refraining from the threat or use of force in interstate relations. The document would be more effective if properly modernised. Changes in technology, doctrines and force structures need to be taken into account. The current paradox of modernisation is that all states support it in principle, many have certain proposals but simultaneously do not support the proposals made by other countries. The windows of opportunity on both sides do not coincide. Improving this document will only be possible when all sides make concessions. 3. What is the extent of complying with norms and rules? As in all regimes, some examples of non-compliance must exist. These examples can be more serious or less serious. The Vienna Document CSBM regime has been moderately to strongly effective in terms of complying with norms and rules. Compliance or non-compliance is very important for the regime’s Conclusions 240 effectiveness and survival. The regime must be able to deal successfully with instances of departures from norms and rules. In the case of the Vienna Document CSBMs, the following compliance-related problems can be identified: the problem of different interpretations of the norms and rules, the problem of the insufficient quality of the information exchanged, the problem of limited national capabilities, the structural problem of reporting defence expenditure, insufficient interagency cooperation to support the Vienna Document CSBM process and the problem of the asymmetric geographical distribution of noncompliance (problems with specific Central Asian countries and grey zones). The real and pressing sub-question here is: how do the participating states perceive these cases and how does this affect the reputation of the non-compliant states? Some smaller types of non-compliance have become a normal part of the OSCE culture because not many people care about them. This is due to the view that the OSCE has bigger problems than, for example, one country missing a reporting deadline. Many participating states know how to excuse their non-compliance: mostly, it is presented as a misunderstanding or somebody else’s fault. Participating states also show mixed concerns about the reputation of non-compliant actors. On one hand, they are very concerned about this and are trying to eliminate the problem but, on the other hand, they do not care about reputation because noncompliance does not affect their broader (global) reputation, there are no punitive mechanisms, non-compliance is not a media issue (like human rights for instance), there is no serious «naming, blaming and shaming» mechanism in the OSCE, and involvement in conflicts in grey zones clearly makes national interests much stronger than any interest in greater transparency and mutual prosperity. The Vienna Document is also hierarchically positioned lower than UN, EU and NATO processes in the policy hierarchy of several participating states. When combined, these facts have affected the effectiveness of the entire Vienna CSBM process. 4. How effective are the Vienna Document CSBMs in military crises and conflicts? Such situations are the ultimate test for such regimes: military crises and conflicts only exist if there is no trust and confidence. The Vienna Document’s effectiveness during military crisis or conflicts is very limited or non-existent. Military conflict represents the Achilles heel of any CSBM as it reflects its ineffectiveness. CSBMs are the first casualty of a conflict or crisis and it requires a lot of political energy to apply them again. Technically speaking, the Vienna Document CSBMs can only be truly effective before a military conflict and crisis or after it, while its effectiveness during such a situation will be only very limited. Conclusions 241 We should stress here, however, that the Vienna Document’s ineffectiveness during military conflict and crises only applies to particular more or less narrow geographical areas. This corresponds to the general feeling that the Vienna Document is actually a «good-weather document», not a «badweather document» (it only works at times of no crisis and conflict and is able to strengthen peace when there is peace). Experience from the war in Ukraine shows that the Chapter III mechanisms on risk reduction can be activated several times, but with very limited effectiveness. From the perspective of points 2, 3 and 4 above, the Vienna Document looks like Emmentaler cheese with holes: it generally works well, but not in certain geographical areas and with regard to certain practices. Most observers talk about the holes and not about the cheese in-between. Quantitatively speaking, more space in the Emmentaler cheese is occupied by cheese than by holes. Here we return to the idea of the one holding the glass and what they wish to see. 5. How effective are the Vienna Document CSBMs in internal armed conflicts? Most modern armed conflicts are internal in character but the Vienna Document is an international agreement. This is why the Vienna Document has also not been really effective during internal armed conflicts due to problems with the reliability of the exchanged information, the impossibility of conducting inspections and evaluations in troubled areas, expressions of force majeure etc. The Ukrainian crisis confirms all of these findings. However, Chapter III of the Vienna Document does not differentiate between internal and external military activity and most conflicts are mixed anyway (most are intrastate with external involvement). The OSCE in fact adopted a mechanism in 1993 entitled Stabilising Measures for Localised Crisis Situations that could be used to improve trust and security in areas of conflict. 6. What to do about non-compliance? In all regimes, what to do with non-compliant states is vitally important. If nothing is done, the regime will sooner or later face the threat of dis-integration. The same can happen if «too much» is done (too much in the eyes of some participating states). The question of what to do about the non-compliance of participating states is especially relevant if one seeks to improve the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM regime. The prevailing view detected in our study is to stimulate voluntary and positive compliance by different means, including via political pressure. Only a minority thinks that non-complying states should be excluded from receiving the regime’s benefits, but they admit this is impossible if the Vienna Document remains a political (and not a legal) document. The CSBM regime is tailored in such a way that those who Conclusions 242 comply obtain more confidence and those who do not comply obtain less confidence (benefit). Political pressure works in many cases, but there is potential to improve its effectiveness by making non-compliance public (known beyond the narrow OSCE political and military circles). The logic of voluntary compliance and eventual political pressure to comply reduces effectiveness in the short term but increases legitimacy and related effectiveness in the long term. We also know from our SWOT analysis that the political binding nature of the Vienna Document CSBM regime is more a strength than a weakness. A minority of defence and military professionals would nevertheless like the Vienna Document to have more compulsory mechanisms with the power to compel and sanction the non-complying states (a legally binding regime). 7. How are the benefits of cooperation distributed in the regime? The benefits should be distributed as equally as possible. There should be no net winners or losers in the CSBM regime. Another question here is if the equal distribution of benefits is even at all possible in practice. The distribution of the benefits of cooperation and participation in the Vienna Document CSBM regime is on one hand perceived as equal and balanced and, on the other, as unequal or unbalanced. Conceptually (on paper, in principle), the benefits of cooperation and participation in the regime are equally distributed (meaning that no state profits more than others): states have equal access to the information exchanged, equal evaluation and inspection quotas, equal rights and opportunities to use the mechanisms, the consensual nature of decision-making (states have a veto power), etc. On the other hand, there is the perception that some states profit more than others in the regime. These states are supposedly those that comply more with the rules than others, those using quotas fully, those with a more stable security environment, those on the borderline of the Cold War gone past, those providing less information and acquiring all information from other states, those without armed forces, those outside the area of application of the Vienna Document etc. The fact that NATO countries do not inspect themselves is perceived with mixed feelings by some non-NATO states. While this practice is considered as an expression of trust among the member states, some other states understand this as an unbalanced and incorrect application of the Vienna Document. This friendship inevitably leads NATO states to inspect states outside the alliance and makes Russia and some other states feel that the mechanism is turned against them. This practice is obviously very useful and positive for the NATO member states, but unfortunately not so much from the perspective of the effectiveness of the Conclusions 243 entire Vienna Document CSBMs. But it is also logical: if there is trust, then no inspections and evaluations are needed. 8. How are CSBMs perceived from the power perspective of the participating actors? In a simultaneously cooperative and competitive security environment, the question of power is very relevant. CSBMs can affect power relationships and be used to alter the distribution of power among participating states. Some participating states think the Vienna Document CSBMs have been used to affect power relations by certain other participating states. The Vienna document itself and its modifications have not changed the distribution of power in the security environment. It has merely accompanied these changes as a mechanism for balancing power. In principle, all participating states have the same power to move forward or block the Vienna CSBM process. However, great powers have by definition more power to do so than smaller states. Great powers generally support the Vienna Document CSBM process (with variations over time) and hold a positive attitude, but with serious caveats. Their positive attitude has been strongly determined by their national interests, the broader context of arms control, and current mutual relations. Some respondents perceive the occasional existence of a Cold War division between the East and West, except that the geography has changed somewhat (we now have, instead of NATO against the Warsaw Pact, the division between NATO and aspirant countries on one side, and Russia and Belarus on the other). Smaller countries express positions that are more or less aligned with the positions of great powers. Mutual accusations about non-compliance, the competitive-cooperative game frequently engaged in, and the wide variety of views lead us to assume that confidence and security in Europe cannot be taken for granted and that the Vienna Document regime’s effectiveness is a question of permanent balancing among the sources of power. 9. How cost-effective is implementing the rules in the CSBM regime? Implementing the rules in a sensitive and partly cooperative and partly competitive environment can be costly. The ultimate cost might be dissolution of the regime which is, again, probably not the purpose of the regime and its managers. In such a situation, the international CSBM regime could also become a victim of its own success. In any case, the cost-effectiveness of implementing the Vienna Document CSBM norms and rules is an important topic affecting the regime’s effectiveness. We found that the costs of implementing this regime are actually low compared to the much higher costs in the case of a lack of transparency and confidence. The majority of respondents also thought that cost-effective implementation is relevant in light of the economic crisis and that one needs to ensure that cost- Conclusions 244 effectiveness is not strengthened at the expense of transparency. The problem, however, lies in the significantly different views on how to improve the cost-effectiveness of the implementation. 10. What are the core strengths and weaknesses of the CSBM process, opportunities to improve it in the future, and potential threats to the process? The SWOT approach was innovatively applied to the Vienna Document CSBM regime in this book. We identified and described the basic strengths and weaknesses of the past and existing CSBM process, opportunities to improve it in the future, and potential internal and external threats to the process. The perception assessment applied in our study revealed the most relevant strengths of the Vienna Document CSBM regime are: facilitating military contacts and cooperation (average relevance 1.87 on a scale from 0 to 2), exchange of information for all participating states (1.71) and flexibility (expressed by the politically binding nature of the document (1.75) and the fact the Vienna Document is a living document with the potential for continuous adaptation (1.69)). The most pertinent weaknesses of the Vienna Document CSBM regime are: ˗ crisis-related weaknesses, such as the fair-weather character of the Vienna Document (ineffectiveness in conflict prevention and during conflicts, average value 1.44) and the related lack of political will during crises (1.41); ˗ threshold-related weakness in terms of too high and obsolete threshold levels that do not correspond to reality (1.56); and ˗ contextual weakness in terms of the inability to avoid artificial links with other political divergences among the participating states (e.g. a link with protracted conflicts, the CFE and the implementation/modernisation issue, 1.41). In terms of opportunities to improve the Vienna Document, we explored many existing proposals to widen or deepen the CSBM regime. At the general level, the experts we spoke to support both the deepening and widening of the document, but simultaneously stress that the former is currently a more realistic option and should occur before any widening (which is considered more a long-term option). The most relevant opportunities are: further reduction/lowering of the thresholds for prior notification of certain military activities, including exercises (due to the reduction of armed forces) (average value 1.80); inclusion of information on command organisations and combat units and related changes (1.62), improving the Conclusions 245 application of the Vienna Document in crises: e.g. proposals to establish special OSCE international inspections to clarify military activities which raise concern (1.55) and the inclusion of information on large-scale military transits (1.44). The Vienna Document CSBM regime has, like all other international mechanisms, been constantly exposed to unfavourable challenges, including threats. The biggest threat to the regime in the perception of our sample of experts is the threat of big states withdrawing from the regime (average value 1.39). Two partly relevant threats should also be mentioned: the CFE deadlock and its effects on the Vienna Document CSBM (1.16) and the potential lowering of defence budgets (0.88). Other threats to the regime also need to be mentioned, such as the lack of political will to implement and modernise the Vienna Document, the Vienna Document becoming hostage to other deadlocks (e.g. in the CFE and in general mutual relations), different threat perceptions, growing mistrust and bloc mentality etc. 11. What can we learn about this regime’s effectiveness during the Ukrainian crisis? The Vienna Document has been tested every day in the field and at the OSCE’s headquarters in Vienna. One can say the Vienna Document was used frequently during the crisis in Ukraine, but one can also question its effectiveness. The Vienna Document CSBMs have neither been completely effective nor completely ineffective during this crisis. We identified a relevant positive implementation record. For example, states have continued with dialogue despite problems in the field, the large majority of states has continued to exchange military-relevant information, including on their defence plans and budgets, annual calendars, states have continued to inform each other about their new types of weapons and equipment, observations of certain military activities have continued, states have continued to carry out inspections and evaluations in the application zone etc. It is very important that Russia played a very constructive role during its Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Cooperation in 2017. If our information is correct, no CSBM-related processes were disrupted during this time (i.e. CSBM processes that would have not been disrupted had Russia not chaired the FSC). It turned out that it was a good decision to continue to trust neutral Switzerland to manage the Vienna CSBM process in this period. Its neutrality again makes sense. It is also important that states have continued to discuss proposals for modernisation etc. But, in contrast, we can observe many indicators of ineffectiveness that should cause great concern for the future of European stability and security. Perhaps the greatest victim of this war is Chapter III with its risk-reduction mechanism as states have discontinued using it. The reason is its Conclusions 246 ineffectiveness at the start of the crisis. Perhaps the greatest clash between Russia and the West is about Crimea and its integration into Russia. One side claims the annexation of Crimea was illegal and that it represents the gravest challenge to Europe’s security architecture, while the other side claims that the proclamation of independence was an expression of the right to self-determination at a time when Ukraine was facing a coup d’état. This and all other debates in the OSCE, in fact, reflect a clash of two narratives in the OSCE: the Western narrative of a breakdown of the rule-based order and the Russian idea of an equal (fairer) and indivisible European security system or community. The failure to reissue the Vienna Document in 2016 was a reflection of all of these problems, but we believe that far greater damage comes from the fact there is no consensus on modernisation. This failure was more a message from Russia to the West. The Ukrainian crisis reflects our argument on simultaneous cooperation and competition where the CSBM process is part of the game. It is true that the Ukrainian crisis blocked CSBM implementation in several ways, but it is also true that these problems remain geographically limited. CSBMs have been much more effective in areas around some problematic grey zones. Not being completely effective and discussing the problems is, speaking from the broader historical perspective of European cooperative security and from the OSCE’s perspective, still a positive scenario compared to the disastrous alternatives where nobody is talking to anybody. In other words, the Ukrainian crisis did not kill off the CSBM process, states have continued dialogue and cooperation, and continued expressing their need to trust each other (but at a lower level than some 15 years ago). 12. How do the Vienna Document CSBM regime’s effectiveness and modernisation depend on scenarios about European security in the future? Several scenarios for European security have been debated recently within national security agencies, academia, the press etc. Here comes a sobering and valuable lesson from our work: the present situation regarding how to modernise and implement the Vienna Document looks difficult, but for any scenario considered in our book (the eruption of a major war between the West and Russia, the emergence of Cold War 2.0 with several more or less limited smaller armed conflicts between both sides, or the creation of an entirely new European security system), we will eventually (sooner or later) arrive at the very same decision point that we have now: what to do with the Vienna Document and CSBMs in Europe and how to improve their effectiveness. All reasonable and even less reasonable paths and scenarios end up in some kind of CSBMs for Europe. Conclusions 247 There will be peace and there will be actors with interests and some kind of Nash equilibrium will exist among them. This will be the time to modernise the Vienna Document, but the question remains of what will be the price (in other words, who many people will have to die) before we come back to the same table or decision point via a more violent scenario. This means that the window of opportunity to modernise is actually now, not at some later point in time. This should be logical to all readers, except those whose main aim is to increase the power of their states. Most of the current confrontation in Europe is about the power of the actors. What does all this mean for our modernisation debate? First, we need to turn the dialogue of the deaf into a dialogue of understanding and progress. What seems to be unbelievable today shall be possible in the future. The Structured Dialogue’s role has been very important in this regard. It gives an added dimension to the Hofburg debates on current and future CSBMs. There has been some criticism of the dialogue, but we think it has brought very important added value especially due to the increased professional input from the capitals, locations outside of («the politically loaded») Hofburg, the wish to understand the concerns of others, its open-ended nature (no predefined conclusions) and the focus on military doctrines that actually stand behind all new and potentially concerning military capabilities. We can agree with the thesis that the Structured Dialogue represents a unique confidence-building measure in itself. In this context, we propose to open and discuss a new theme within the Structured Dialogue about national interests and the perception of power (own and that of others) in international relations. Mutual understanding will be improved considerably with this theme. We noted that some countries want to discuss terrorism within this dialogue. Our opinion is that terrorism is predominantly a civilian threat and that the civilian part of the OSCE should mainly deal with it. But there is a military prism on counter-terrorism that should be interesting for the Structured Dialogue and the FSC: the role of armed forces in the fight against terrorism. We would also recommend greater transparency of the debates in the Structured Dialogue. The Austrian practice of publishing records and texts from the breakout sessions should be followed as a positive example. In any case, we need to be patient with this process because it is not expected to produce fast «plug-and-play» results. Every drop of progress means progress. We also strongly support the so-called mapping exercise in terms of personnel, equipment, capabilities, locations etc. in order to establish a common picture and establish similarities and differences in threat perceptions. It is actually surprising that this did not happen earlier, e.g. after 9-11. Moreover, we think the idea of the automatisation of Conclusions 248 reporting and geographical fact representation (in GIS) is excellent and should also be fully supported. Connecting the exchanged information in Excel tables with more complex GIS tools and automatised visualisation of locations, units, numbers of exercises, areas of exercises etc. is the future of CSBM. Without it, we will continue to look at the situation through a straw and think that our narrow insights will lead our states to smart decisions. Only a comprehensive overview can ensure comprehensive solutions to complex security problems. A map tells more than a thousand words, according to an old military saying. Modernising the Vienna Document in the OSCE environment is not only a question of logic but also a question of political feasibility. Debates on modernisation can therefore be reflected in the following formula: Modernisation = if political will available; Political will = [0-1] (on an interval from non-existent to fully existent); Political will < 1, but also always > 0 because: participating states did not abandon the process, continue to talk to each other, express a need to modernise and give proposals in this direction, conduct debates on modernisation etc. Interestingly, the political will to modernise has been present on both sides in the past 15 years but has not coincided. When Russia wanted to modernise the Vienna Document, the West was against it, and now it is vice versa. We thus need a push in the opposite direction and to think how to harmonise the timing and political will. Theoretically, we need a common threat or enemy (e.g. terrorism), a shared fear of MAD like in the Cold War, or a negative mutual war experience. Alternatively, we need wisdom that actually does not require all of these negative experiences and can be based only on our memory and also simulations of the undesirable futures stemming from the current situation. There is also a strong caveat to modernisation. Partial modernisation of only one section of the Vienna Document will likely affect also other parts of the document. This means the issue of modernisation will easily become much more complex, requiring a more comprehensive and holistic approach than some might think. We call this phenomenon the paradox of partial modernisation. There is one other thing that requires our attention in the future. The OSCE also developed Non-military CBMs with the OSCE Guide in 2012 (they cover political, economic, environmental, societal and cultural dimensions). We argue here that military CSBMs and non-military CBMs are complementary and require a more integral approach than in the past. CBMs are based on a guide and are not so obligatory (read intrusive) for Conclusions 249 states as the Vienna Document. We propose upgrading non-military CBMs to a higher level from a guide to a contract-based regime with more binding verification measures. Second, non-military CBMs address intrastate conflicts in all their phases (before, during and after) and non-governmental actors, which are problematic areas for the Vienna Document. The integration of military and non-military confidence-building measures marks the end of the evolution of confidence measures in Europe. 13. Is the «cyberisation» of the Vienna Document CSBMs necessary in the present security environment in order to maintain the regime’s effectiveness? If so, what would the proposal for cyber CSBMs look like? A related question here is what would happen to European security if no cyber CSBMs were in place. This is an even more delicate question because currently the OSCE is developing civilian cyber CBMs and the prevailing view is not to develop cyber CSBMs. Let us initially see the facts. First, cyber threats are clear and present. They extend from cyber propaganda (or disinformation, including fake news), cyber disruptions (in the form of attacks on systems, denial of service attacks etc.) and cyber spying for intelligence and other purposes (cyber espionage). In our context, the most problematic are cyber attacks which are meant to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy computer systems of the target. Cyber threats have been integrated into the concept of hybrid warfare that is increasingly used in practice. There is also a trend of moving away from cyber attacks with only cyber consequences to cyber attacks that cause physical damage in the real world. The literature identified many cyber attacks all over the world with governmental and even military forces also directly or indirectly being involved. All of these attacks have been denied by them, but many states do not deny that they possess cyber-attack capabilities. Second, cyber has become one of the domains of military operations and warfare. Concepts of cyber warriors, cyber wars, cyber conflicts or cyber aggression have been increasingly debated in professional circles. Many states have established security and defence cyber strategies, cyber doctrines, cyber capabilities (not only defensive capabilities but also offensive capabilities), military cyber commands, military cyber task forces and military units of different sizes, cyber reserve forces etc. Our overview in the book showed that military cyber capabilities are much more developed in bigger states than smaller ones, much less developed in post-Soviet states (except in Russia) etc. It is also obvious that some states outsource their cyber attack capabilities specifically to gain an opportunity for plausible deniability in the case of allegations by affected actors. Conclusions 250 This led us to conclude that the modernisation of CSBMs without the cyber dimension no longer makes sense. The need to widen and deepen to include the cyber dimension is here and denying it reduces the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBM regime at the present time. The OSCE has not been idle in this changing security environment and already entered the cyber dimension by adopting cyber confidence-building measures in 2013 and 2016 to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICT, established the position of cyber security officer to support participating states achieve goals in the dimension of cyber/ICT security etc. Interestingly, this process belongs to the first dimension of the OSCE (politico-military dimension), but it is claimed to be civilian in character and deliberately not connected with the military CSBMs. It is also not the business of the FSC. Non-military CBMs are currently made for the voluntary sharing of information, caring for national cyber resilience, having a communication channel in case of escalation and a network of national contact points. It is also known that the OSCE focuses in this field only on big cyber attacks that can influence inter-state relations and on preventing attacks on or via cyber space from escalating into real kinetic attacks with actual and classic military consequences. Our proposal to improve the effectiveness of the Vienna Document CSBMs is based on the idea of connecting classic CSBMs with cyber measures for increasing transparency among states. In our view, the future cyber CSBMs need to create transparency in military cyber capabilities, cyber doctrines, improve contacts among military staff responsible for cyber warfare, decrease risks in the case of escalation, establish inspections and evaluations to monitor cyber capabilities and events etc. In this book, we propose the following specific amendments to all chapters of the Vienna Document: 1. Create a chapter on the Annual Exchange of Military and Defence Cyber Information with a Related Control and Verification Mechanism (Cyber Evaluation). 2. Add in obligations for the Prior Notification of Certain Bigger Cyber Military Activities (cyber exercises, concentration and transfer of cyber forces) with a Related Control and Verification Mechanism (Cyber Inspection). 3. Add in Cyber Risk-reduction Measures: Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation in Case of Unusual Military Activities in Cyberspace (to be added to Chapter III). Conclusions 251 4. Add in Stimulating Military Cyber Contacts as a tool for improving cyber confidence. 5. Add in the Observation of Certain Military Cyber Activities (to be added to Chapter VI). 6. Extend the Exchange of Annual Calendars of military activities to also include cyber military activities. 7. Extend Regional CSBM measures with the possibility of Complementary Cyber CSBM Measures (to amend Chapter X). 8. Extend the Assessment of the Implementation of CSBMs in the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) to also include cyber dimensions of CSBM implementation. 9. Enable the OSCE Communications Network to transmit all messages related to agreed cyber CSBMs contained in a reformed Vienna Document. We are aware this proposal is not feasible currently (in 2018), but not doing it reduces the effectiveness of the current CSBMs in Europe, and simply means neglecting some 15-20 percent of modern warfare. On the other hand, introducing the proposal would considerably improve effectiveness. There is no other option in the future. We are aware several problems exist with such cyberisation, perhaps the main one being related to the problem of the attribution of cyber attacks. But the possibility to locate the real attackers will increase over time. Conclusions 252 *** We need to reverse the existing spiral of threats, mistrust and violence. The behaviour of our states in the present security crisis actually reflects our maturity and our real character. If we have learned anything from the Second World War and the Cold War, then we know that we need to find a consensus for modernising the Vienna Document and improve its implementation. If not, then we cannot help ourselves and nobody else will be able to assist. We need to create a reverse domino effect for confidence and trust in Europe. We have to create sufficient political will for trust and the related efficient implementation of the Vienna Document that will further lead to the deepening and also widening of the document. Let us put this figuratively using sailing and windsurfing terms: we need a sufficient «initial wind» (political will) in the sails of CSBMs that will create the initial speed (small gestures to improve mutual trust, successful implementation, especially in the case of some problematic geographical areas), which will create an extra «apparent wind» 41 in the sail and place the whole CSBM regime «planning» in the sea of the security environment. This suggests that, with a little more investment and concessions from both sides in the CSBM process, much more will be gained from the two sides in terms of mutual trust in Europe. In other words, both sides need to step two steps back today and wait for some 2 years to allow us to all be able to move four steps forward. From our history, we can find an example when a similar thing was done with great positive consequences. This happened, for example, in the Cold War when NATO adopted a policy of détente together with the offer for security cooperation and the Soviet Union proposed the peaceful coexistence of different political and ideological systems. This is what paved the way for greater mutual trust. In the present circumstances, unilateral steps by individual states or like-minded groups of states to break the current deadlock could also be usable and helpful. States could, and some of them already did, invite other states to observe military activities more than three times per year, inspect also naval forces in harbours etc. These positive moves could be then met by similar moves from the other side in the future. The above conclusions were presented by the first author of this book to 57 ambassadors or representatives of OSCE participating states in Hofburg, Vienna, on 25 April 2018 at the 881st meeting of the Forum for Security 41 Apparent wind in sailing and windsurfing is the wind on the sail created by the existing speed of the boat/surf. Greater initial speed creates more apparent wind that further increases the speed. Conclusions 253 Cooperation (under Slovenian Chairmanship). The diplomats were pleased with our timely and comprehensive assessment of CSBMs in Europe. The presentation raised several questions and sparked an interesting and unusually long debate. For example, several states’ representatives (Canada, Germany and Switzerland) asked how to take two steps back in the current situation while one state asked why we would need to wait some 2 years for confidence to be restored (Slovenia). We think that we need to compare what we are doing today with our actions around 15 to 20 years ago. Today, we are increasing our budgets and armed forces, creating and nurturing narratives that portray the other side as an enemy never to be trusted, creating policies and strategies that label the other side as a threat and enemy, organise exercises which are perceived as threatening from the other side etc. We can break the security dilemma simply by ceasing to do this. Naturally, we cannot organise a joint military exercise between NATO and Russia right now. This is due to our strategies and policies that describe each other as enemies. However, we can start fixing our narratives and mutual perceptions and then this will lead to a change in our policies, strategies and doctrines. This will unfortunately take more time than we have used to destroy the mutual trust. Nobody will help us if we do not help ourselves in Europe. The definition of trust refers to the intention to accept vulnerability and the expectation that the opponent will not take advantage of our vulnerability. We need a few positive cases where the West would be vulnerable, and Russia would not take advantage of it, and vice versa. After a few examples of this nature, we will start reversing the fall of dominos. The dominos will stop falling towards the theoretical end-point of major war and will instead fall back towards trust, security and prosperity for all in Europe. History teaches us that negotiations about modernisation and modernisation itself are also possible during a time of competitive security cooperation (of course, only to some extent). If we start with fixing the mutual perceptions, the following questions should be answered by the West and by Russia. The question for Russia is: why does the West think that Russia is an aggressive actor? How has Russia contributed to this? And the question for the West is: why does Russia feel threatened by NATO and that it was betrayed by the West with its promises about enlargement? How has the West contributed to this? When we have these answers, we will likely be in a better position to move forward with correcting our mutual perceptions. In addition, we need to see answers to the question of what stakeholders (states) really want and not only declare. This is important because we seem Conclusions 254 to be making moves towards a major war while at the same time everybody wants peace. What then do we (they) really want? Perhaps we can simplify the questions for the participating states here: ˗ Do you want peace in Europe? ˗ Do you want more power for your state? ˗ Do you want peace in Europe and more power for your state? ˗ Do you want less peace in Europe and more power for your state? The responses to these questions will bring us one step forward in understanding what is actually happening and what to do about it. Good luck Europe! 255 Acknowledgements We would like to thank the following institutions and persons for their help: ˗ the Slovenian Mission at the UN, OSCE and other international organisations based in Vienna and the Slovenian MOD and MFA: Ambassador Blanka Jamnišek, Ambassador Andrej Benedejčič, Major General Alojz Šteiner and Robert Stražišar for their advice and support in communicating with the missions of the OSCE participating states and related interviews; ˗ the CPC from the OSCE and its staff for providing general information on the Vienna Document, related processes and facilitating the interviews in Hofburg; ˗ Dr Pierre von Arx and Hans Lüber from the Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE, the UN and the international organisations, and Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati from the ICDT, Hungary, for their advice on how to proceed with the study; ˗ Dr. Wolfgang Zellner from the CORE Centre in Hamburg for his review of the book and all useful comments; and ˗ Dr. Hans-Joachim Schmidt from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt for his review of the book and all useful comments. 257 About the Authors Iztok Prezelj, Ph.D., is an associate professor and vice-dean for scientific research at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. In this capacity, he is the director of the Institute of Social Sciences with 20 research centres (https://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/en/research/institute-ofsocial-science). He was Head of Defence Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences in the period 2015-2017. His teaching and research activities cover national security, threat and risk assessment, comparative defence systems, intelligence studies, crisis management and critical infrastructure. He obtained his doctorate in 2004 at the University of Ljubljana with a dissertation on national crisis management systems. His master’s thesis dealt with the modelling of complex threats in the contemporary security environment. Prezelj has coordinated several influential research projects in the mentioned fields. Currently, he is the coordinator of a research project entitled Radicalization and Comprehensive Countermeasures in Slovenia (2018- 2020) and of a bilateral project with Princeton University entitled Secession Games: Application of Game Theory on Secession Situations in Contemporary States (2018-2019). Iztok Prezelj is presently teaching the following courses at the University of Ljubljana: Comparative Defence Systems, New Terrorism and System Countermeasures, Contemporary Intelligence Systems, and Crisis Management and Contemporary Security. As a guest professor, he taught a National and International Security course at the Staff and Command School of the Slovenian Armed Forces between 2000 and 2010. At the George C. Marshall Centre – European Centre for Security Studies, he was an adjunct professor in the programme on terrorism and counter-terrorism (PTSS) in 2014 for professionals from various services and many countries. He was a guest researcher or lecturer at Princeton University, Leiden University, University of Sarajevo, University of Vienna etc. He is a member of the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (EENeT) and a member of the editorial boards of the following journals: Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy; Journal of Criminal Justice and Security; and the journal Security, Terrorism and Society (Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società). Prezelj has published widely in the mentioned fields (more than 100 articles, including books or edited volumes). His scientific articles can be found in the following foreign journals: Risk Management, Public Management Review, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Journal of About the Authors 258 Radiological Protection, Defence Studies, International Studies, Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Comparative Strategy, Radiation Protection Dosimetry, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Slavic Journal of Military Studies, Romanian Journal of Political Science, Information & Security, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs etc. Readers of this book might be interested in the following articles: Quantitative Monitoring of Military Transformation in the Period 1992–2010: Do the Protagonists of Transformation Really Change More than Other Countries? Defence Studies, 2016, vol. 16, no. 1; Evolutionary Reality of the Revolution in Military Affairs: Results of a Comparative Study, Romanian Journal of Political Science, Win. 2015, vol. 15, no. 2; Resilience in a Complex and Unpredictable World, Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, vol. 25. no. 3, 2017; Issues of Local Ownership in Kosovo’s Security Sector, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2017 etc. Prezelj was a member or advisor of several Slovenian governmental interagency working groups in the past. He is also vice-president of the Euro- Atlantic Council of Slovenia. Contact e-mail: iztok.prezelj@fdv.uni-lj.si Daniel Harangozo is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest. In 2018, he is due to defend his PhD thesis entitled «Soldiers and Politics in Slovenia and Croatia – Civil-Military Relations and the Democratic Control of Armed Forces after Independence». 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February 20. 277 Index AEMI, 11, 23, 100, 109, 138, 139, 153, 155, 161, 230 armed conflict, 13, 57, 105, 141, 172, 193, 217, 222, 235 Arx, Pierre von, 163, 255 Baker, James (U.S. Secretary of State), 42, 67 Balkan(s), 47, 68, 69, 84, 90, 98, 100, 101, 105, 106, 120, 147, 203 benefits, 18, 45, 82, 86, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 237, 241, 242 Breakout Workshop, 173, 174, 175, 177, 179, 181, 187, 189, 227 Bush, George H. W. (U.S. President), 42, 67 capabilities, 20, 36, 44, 52, 56, 92, 94, 96, 107, 111, 119, 134, 135, 136, 163, 174, 181, 188, 193, 198, 204, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 218, 222, 223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 233, 234, 240, 247, 249, 250 CFE, 11, 14, 15, 32, 69, 76, 77, 89, 90, 96, 99, 114, 118, 119, 120, 125, 130, 132, 133, 137, 138, 147, 148, 149, 150, 162, 165, 176, 177, 197, 199, 244, 245 Chairmanship, 71, 76, 135, 152, 168, 177, 180, 182, 188, 245, 253 China, 12, 52, 69, 70, 78, 204, 214, 217, 218, 219 clarification, 25, 29, 34, 37, 139, 146, 160, 186, 187, 192, 226 Clausewitz, Carl von, 206 Cold War, 13, 14, 29, 31, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 72, 74, 81, 108, 116, 120, 127, 134, 150, 161, 165, 184, 195, 197, 210, 235, 237, 238, 242, 243, 246, 248, 252 competition, 17, 45, 52, 65, 66, 69, 161, 196, 210, 229, 237, 238, 246 competitive security, 18, 243, 253 compliance, 17, 25, 26, 34, 35, 69, 77, 82, 86, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 120, 122, 123, 124, 129, 141, 143, 154, 155, 159, 172, 179, 193, 231, 237, 240, 241 Conflict Prevention Centre, 11, 33, 34, 70, 74, 84, 179 cooperation, 13, 14, 18, 20, 27, 29, 33, 34, 36, 41, 43, 46, 47, 51, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 79, 81, 82, 86, 91, 92, 94, 96, 104, 108, 115, 118, 127, 136, 154, 161, 162, 165, 177, 179, 180, 187, 198, 201, 203, 225, 226, 232, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 242, 244, 246, 252, 253 cooperative security, 13, 71, 75, 79, 92, 111, 118, 134, 152, 188, 202, 223, 235, 246 corruption, 60 counter-terrorism, 72, 73, 247, 257 Crimea, 41, 44, 47, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 63, 73, 74, 106, 157, 159, 164, 165, 181, 182, 187, 246 CSCE, 11, 15, 29, 32, 33, 34, 37, 41, 42, 44, 97, 106, 112, 197 cyber confidence-building measures, 224, 228, 250 cyber policy, 204, 223 cyber threats, 20, 182, 204, 205, 208, 211, 222, 225, 227, 249 cyberspace, 136, 204, 205, 206, 210, 211, 213, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 227, 231 deepening, 137, 138, 236, 244, 252 defence planning, 22, 23, 24, 25, 139, 153, 170, 188, 230 democracy, 13, 51, 52 distrust, 20, 30, 39, 41, 51, 56, 59, 65, 67, 70, 76, 201, 203, 237 doctrine, 24, 212, 213, 219, 230 Index 278 enlargement, 48, 55, 57, 67, 143, 181, 253 equipment, 14, 24, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33, 37, 46, 95, 98, 107, 132, 139, 142, 143, 153, 155, 166, 167, 170, 171, 173, 180, 181, 186, 189, 192, 230, 231, 232, 245, 247 escalation, 39, 46, 54, 75, 107, 135, 178, 198, 226, 229, 250 European security, 14, 19, 20, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 51, 67, 69, 71, 72, 75, 122, 133, 135, 146, 152, 161, 164, 165, 174, 179, 182, 185, 193, 195, 196, 235, 237, 239, 246, 249 European security order, 14, 42, 43, 182, 235 evaluation team(s), 25, 29, 142, 143, 173, 231 evaluation(s), 23, 25, 33, 36, 89, 92, 97, 102, 104, 107, 115, 116, 123, 124, 132, 142, 143, 155, 161, 172, 173, 177, 189, 190, 199, 229, 230, 231, 241, 242, 243, 245, 250 force majeure, 25, 26, 32, 95, 105, 123, 130, 131, 141, 142, 143, 172, 231, 241 Forum for Security Cooperation, 11, 16, 20, 27, 34, 35, 37, 152, 155, 156, 161, 164, 168, 170, 193, 194, 235, 245, 253 gap, 19, 35, 45, 70, 90, 126, 148, 198 Gates, Robert, 67 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 42, 67 Guterres, Antonio, 68 Helsinki Final Act, 30, 32, 46, 47, 200 hope, 17, 43, 73, 239 Hurd, Douglas, 67 hybrid, 56, 162, 166, 167, 182, 194, 196, 197, 205, 207, 223, 249 implementation record, 19, 152, 176, 245 incident, 91, 96, 98, 135, 188, 213 indicators, 19, 20, 39, 67, 71, 101, 126, 238, 245 inspection team(s), 26, 27, 34, 95, 117, 140, 142, 143, 158, 159, 171, 173 inspection(s), 26, 32, 34, 35, 71, 76, 89, 91, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 104, 107, 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 123, 124, 132, 133, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 171, 172, 173, 177, 186, 187, 189, 190, 199, 229, 231, 241, 243, 245, 250 intelligence, 17, 57, 71, 72, 73, 89, 109, 127, 136, 205, 208, 211, 212, 214, 218, 221, 229, 233, 249 internal conflict(s), 13, 108, 109, 110, 113, 235 international security, 15, 49, 81, 91, 93, 196 Kohl, Helmut, 67 Kosovo, 35, 45, 47, 48, 54, 57, 58, 61, 88, 108, 203, 238 Kurz, Sebastian, 70 legally binding, 14, 15, 16, 35, 71, 77, 92, 97, 112, 114, 115, 129, 143, 146, 148, 204, 242 lesson, 175, 179, 236, 246 Lüber, Hans, 163, 255 Major, John, 67 military exercise(s), 13, 27, 32, 40, 41, 46, 61, 62, 70, 76, 77, 89, 140, 156, 160, 162, 172, 181, 182, 191, 192, 193, 219, 253 military expenditures, 24, 143 Mitterrand, Francois, 42, 67 modernisation of the Vienna Document, 19, 29, 36, 37, 71, 103, 119, 134, 162, 169, 170, 174, 178, 179, 227, 228, 238 national security, 48, 51, 52, 53, 57, 102, 229, 233, 246 National Security Strategy: Russia, 53; United States, 51, 52, 66, 220 non-compliance, 17, 18, 31, 69, 82, 86, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 110, 111, 112, 113, 119, 120, 132, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243 norms, 17, 51, 53, 63, 80, 81, 83, 86, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 113, 164, 166, 227, 237, 239, 243 North Korea, 49, 60, 78, 208, 214 notification, 15, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 76, 107, 135, 138, 140, 143, Index 279 145, 154, 156, 157, 160, 162, 171, 179, 189, 191, 192, 244 observation, 15, 26, 28, 32, 34, 35, 36, 106, 107, 144, 152, 154, 158, 162, 172, 179, 184, 191, 193, 232 Olympic Games, 48, 91 Olympic Games (U.S. cyber operation), 220 Open Skies, 14, 15, 69, 76, 90, 96, 102, 114, 120, 123, 125, 133, 137, 158, 197 opportunities, 16, 18, 20, 53, 115, 116, 126, 134, 136, 137, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 161, 184, 236, 242, 244 paradox, 31, 66, 176, 187, 239, 248 peace, 13, 14, 31, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52, 63, 78, 104, 106, 116, 159, 195, 216, 217, 241, 247, 254 perceptions, 16, 17, 19, 20, 31, 39, 41, 44, 46, 47, 51, 58, 64, 65, 70, 71, 75, 81, 83, 84, 86, 94, 96, 109, 111, 113, 118, 121, 122, 124, 126, 130, 131, 150, 160, 167, 178, 179, 182, 184, 194, 198, 200, 237, 238, 245, 247, 253 Peško, Marcel, 168, 198, 227 politically binding, 14, 28, 31, 37, 80, 93, 96, 110, 114, 127, 128, 129, 244 Putin, Vladimir, 50, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 73, 216 quota race, 35, 189, 190, 231 quotas, 25, 26, 35, 36, 76, 115, 116, 117, 124, 132, 141, 142, 143, 159, 171, 172, 177, 186, 189, 190, 199, 231, 242 reissuance, 37, 38 risk reduction, 88, 104, 105, 127, 154, 170, 179, 241 sanctions, 20, 45, 49, 51, 53, 54, 59, 60, 61, 73, 100, 102, 110, 111, 113, 114, 129 scenario, 29, 62, 63, 64, 65, 152, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 207, 223, 226, 246 security dilemma, 20, 41, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 81, 238, 253 security environment, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 36, 51, 79, 81, 88, 116, 134, 137, 161, 168, 169, 199, 200, 201, 206, 223, 224, 235, 237, 242, 243, 249, 250, 252 security regime, 17, 79, 83, 91, 92, 97, 99, 101, 111, 112, 134 Shoigu, Sergei, 216 Soviet Union, 29, 31, 32, 42, 43, 45, 50, 60, 63, 66, 67, 69, 97, 117, 118, 252 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 13, 75, 162, 163, 235 Stoltenberg, Jens (NATO Secretary General), 62 strategy, 36, 42, 51, 52, 53, 57, 60, 64, 66, 111, 126, 200, 203, 207, 211, 212, 213, 214, 219, 220, 222, 230 strengths, 16, 17, 18, 20, 126, 127, 128, 236, 244 Structured Dialogue, 11, 16, 152, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190, 193, 197, 198, 227, 228, 235, 247 SWOT, 16, 18, 20, 83, 126, 128, 137, 142, 148, 236, 242, 244 terrorism, 36, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 135, 136, 141, 143, 172, 178, 180, 181, 182, 185, 196, 200, 222, 227, 239, 247, 248, 257, 262 Thatcher, Margaret, 67 threats, 13, 16, 18, 20, 36, 47, 52, 56, 62, 67, 68, 81, 88, 111, 126, 141, 148, 149, 150, 172, 180, 181, 182, 185, 199, 200, 201, 204, 205, 213, 223, 224, 229, 236, 237, 238, 244, 245, 249, 252, 257 threshold(s), 24, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 63, 64, 76, 89, 110, 130, 135, 138, 140, 143, 145, 154, 156, 160, 162, 171, 172, 177, 191, 192, 193, 197, 199, 204, 224, 228, 231, 232, 244 transparency, 13, 15, 24, 28, 35, 62, 67, 71, 74, 76, 81, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 98, 100, 104, 106, 110, 115, 122, 125, 127, 134, 144, 146, 154, 162, 163, 165, 169, 174, 176, 179, 181, 185, 187, 191, 196, 200, 201, 227, 229, 233, 235, 239, 240, 243, 247, 250 Index 280 trend, 13, 14, 89, 121, 152, 153, 154, 155, 179, 186, 206, 235, 249 Trump, Donald J. (U.S. President), 49, 51, 52, 53, 63, 66, 68, 70, 73, 74, 216 trust, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 24, 39, 40, 41, 44, 46, 51, 53, 62, 67, 70, 72, 75, 76, 77, 89, 112, 114, 117, 118, 122, 124, 160, 161, 163, 164, 178, 179, 180, 185, 189, 193, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 245, 246, 252, 253 verification centre, 123, 137, 174, 190, 212 Vershbow, Alexander, 47, 177 weaknesses, 16, 18, 20, 108, 126, 130, 131, 198, 236, 244 weapons, 15, 24, 26, 28, 37, 49, 54, 57, 59, 62, 63, 68, 69, 71, 76, 77, 107, 119, 131, 136, 139, 143, 146, 153, 163, 166, 170, 171, 180, 183, 186, 196, 198, 205, 210, 232, 245 widening, 36, 37, 136, 137, 138, 199, 200, 228, 236, 244, 252 Wörner, Manfred (NATO Secretary General), 67 Zannier, Lamberto, 20 Zapad 2017, 61, 63, 64, 193

Zusammenfassung

Die Studie zeigt, dass das Wiener VSBM-Abkommen in der Vergangenheit überraschend effektiv war und heute zwar vor großen Herausforderungen steht, aber auch die Chance einer künftigen Optimierung besteht. Die Autoren untersuchen 13 Forschungsfragen:

1. Wie wirken sich Kontextfaktoren im bestehenden Sicherheitsumfeld auf die Wirksamkeit der VSBM aus?

2. Inwieweit werden die Hauptziele des Abkommens erreicht?

3. Inwieweit werden die Normen und Regeln eingehalten?

4. Wie wirksam sind die VSBM bei militärischen Krisen und Konflikten?

5. Wie wirksam sind die VSBM in Bezug auf interne bewaffnete Konflikte?

6. Was ist bei Nichteinhaltung zu tun?

7. Wie verteilen sich die Vorteile der Zusammenarbeit auf die beteiligten Staaten?

8. Wie werden VSBM aus der Machtperspektive der einzelnen Teilnehmerstaaten wahrgenommen?

9. Wie kosteneffizient ist die Umsetzung der Regeln des VSBM-Abkommens?

10. Was sind die Stärken und Schwächen des VSBM-Prozesses, die Möglichkeiten, ihn in Zukunft zu verbessern und die potenziellen Gefahren für den Prozess?

11. Was können wir über die Wirksamkeit dieses Abkommens in der gegenwärtigen militärischen Krise in der Ukraine erfahren?

12. Inwieweit hängen Wirksamkeit und Modernisierung des VSBM-Prozesses von den künftigen Szenarien für die europäische Sicherheit ab?

13. Ist die "Cyberisierung" der VSBM im gegenwärtigen Sicherheitsumfeld erforderlich, um die Wirksamkeit des Abkommens zu erhalten?

References

Zusammenfassung

Die Studie zeigt, dass das Wiener VSBM-Abkommen in der Vergangenheit überraschend effektiv war und heute zwar vor großen Herausforderungen steht, aber auch die Chance einer künftigen Optimierung besteht. Die Autoren untersuchen 13 Forschungsfragen:

1. Wie wirken sich Kontextfaktoren im bestehenden Sicherheitsumfeld auf die Wirksamkeit der VSBM aus?

2. Inwieweit werden die Hauptziele des Abkommens erreicht?

3. Inwieweit werden die Normen und Regeln eingehalten?

4. Wie wirksam sind die VSBM bei militärischen Krisen und Konflikten?

5. Wie wirksam sind die VSBM in Bezug auf interne bewaffnete Konflikte?

6. Was ist bei Nichteinhaltung zu tun?

7. Wie verteilen sich die Vorteile der Zusammenarbeit auf die beteiligten Staaten?

8. Wie werden VSBM aus der Machtperspektive der einzelnen Teilnehmerstaaten wahrgenommen?

9. Wie kosteneffizient ist die Umsetzung der Regeln des VSBM-Abkommens?

10. Was sind die Stärken und Schwächen des VSBM-Prozesses, die Möglichkeiten, ihn in Zukunft zu verbessern und die potenziellen Gefahren für den Prozess?

11. Was können wir über die Wirksamkeit dieses Abkommens in der gegenwärtigen militärischen Krise in der Ukraine erfahren?

12. Inwieweit hängen Wirksamkeit und Modernisierung des VSBM-Prozesses von den künftigen Szenarien für die europäische Sicherheit ab?

13. Ist die "Cyberisierung" der VSBM im gegenwärtigen Sicherheitsumfeld erforderlich, um die Wirksamkeit des Abkommens zu erhalten?