The Mediterranean is once again on top of the international community's agenda, returning as the Mare Nostrum of our time with a host of maritime security challenges and various seapower opportunities. This book provides fresh perspectives on the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and its geoeconomics. It discusses the role of regional stakeholders – such as Israel, Egypt, and Iran – and addresses the challenges for the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. The book will be of special relevance to policy-makers, strategists, intelligence professionals, academics, military thinkers, and those individuals with a deeper interest in the Eastern Mediterranean alike.

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Dr. Sebastian Bruns is the Head of the Center for Maritime Strategy & Security (CMSS) at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK).

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Volume 1
Maritime Security in the Eastern Mediterranean

Kiel International Seapower Symposium 2017
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Contributors

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Map of the Mediterranean Region
One need not dive deep into the history books to underscore that the Mediterranean Sea is an arena unlike any other. In fact, an up-to-date map and a collection of recent newspaper clippings (or tweets, if it must) will reveal some of the hottest issues that inform maritime security and security strategy related to this particular body of water. By virtue of the global and transregional interests at stake, this part of the world offers significant challenges for policy planners, strategists, scientists, maritime tradesmen, and military leaders everywhere. The Eastern Mediterranean in particular does not simply concern the citizens of the states in the area. It is all the more surprising that the maritime security and strategic literature thus far in the 21st century has devoted comparatively little attention to the Eastern Med.

The region is characterized by two of the world’s most important maritime choke points. These natural or man-made bottlenecks ferry a significant part of global trade. Shipping there is subject to political influence, military intervention, or simply the higher likelihood of maritime disaster. To the north, the Bosporus connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. Running through the heavily settled city of Istanbul, this chokepoint is important for both commercial and military reasons. Its geography and the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Treaty make its use for strategic purposes extremely challenging. Further to the south, the Suez Canal is one of the world’s most important artificial waterways. Opened in 1869 to link the Mediterranean with the Red Sea (and by extension the Indian Ocean) to avoid the circumnavigation of Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, the canal today sees about 18,000 passages a year. Egypt, which controls the canal and whose economy rests to a significant degree on canal passage reve-

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1 For the purpose of this book, this is loosely defined as the area of the east of (and including) Greece and Northeast Libya to comprise all littoral states as well as countries with demonstrated interests in the region.
nue, has repeatedly witnessed internal turmoil in recent decades. In fact, the Suez Canal was the site of major military confrontation such as the 1956 Suez crisis which pitted Egypt against France, Great Britain, and Israel. Eleven years later, during the Six Day War of 1967, the canal was blocked until 1975. 21st century globalization, which rests on the free passage of goods on container ships, bulkers, and tankers, has dramatically elevated the importance of these choke points.

More recently, Turkey’s increasingly erratic foreign policy under president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called into question the political trajectory of the gatekeeper of the Bosporus, particularly in light of Russia’s maritime expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean and the emerging entente between Ankara and Moscow. Meanwhile, in Egypt, where the Suez Canal has been expanded to allow for north-and-southbound passages, the potential for maritime terrorism remains high. A 2013 video uploaded on YouTube shows two men firing a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at a container vessel transiting the canal. While the damage sustained was minimal, the incident underlined the potential for disruption and increased risk (in turn leading to higher premiums in the already volatile shipping market) through asymmetric attacks on global shipping. Yet, it is quite telling that seaborne terrorist acts are hardly on the top of the list of concerns given the various armed conflicts and the significant amount of organized crime (such as smuggling and human trafficking) that plague much of the region.

For about a decade, political instability, violent uprisings, civil wars, and international military interventions have swept over vast parts of the Eastern Mediterranean. The great majority of these developments have maritime implications and many of them distinct naval elements. The civil war in Libya, for instance, triggered a NATO military intervention with overwhelming coalition naval and air forces. The brutal war of the Bashar

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3 See for example: Brooke Smith-Windsor, “NATO’s Maritime Strategy and the Libya Crisis as Seen from the Sea,” NATO Defence College Research Paper, No. 90 (March 2013). Felix Seidler, Maritime Herausforderungen der NATO: Strate-
Al-Assad regime on its own people in Syria, coupled with the rise of the barbaric Islamic State over large swaths of the Levant and Iraq, prompted limited military interventions by the West and Russia. Moscow used its support of Mr. Assad to expand its naval footprint via Syrian ports—although the naval forces involved are but a shadow of the Soviet Union’s Cold War Escadra—and, to take a page from the naval diplomacy playbook, dispatched state-of-the-art corvettes and its sole operating, but dramatically aging, aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, U.S. and French carrier aircraft sortied from their floating platforms in support of the fractioned Syrian opposition forces. Allied naval forces were in part integrated into the carrier battle groups, whereas other elements—such as German Air Force reconnaissance Tornado aircraft—are land-based in the region to support the West’s joint and combined campaign. In fact, Russian, allied, and even Chinese warships had joined forces in 2013 when an international naval coalition helped escort and ultimately destroy Syrian chemical weapons. The sea as a medium that offers both political solutions and dramatic challenges was more recently highlighted by the flow of migrants and refugees who desperately try to reach the European mainland in rubber dinghies and unseaworthy craft via Northern Africa or across the Aegean Sea. The E.U. and NATO have both set up naval missions to cope with this maritime security challenge.

Looking beyond the region, the increasing tension between the aspiring hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran is another key factor which deeply influences allegiances in the Eastern Med. Their increasing division creates and sustains fault lines along the Levant as both governments wrestle for influence through religious and sectarian groups. From Syria to Lebanon and Egypt, and from Iraq to Bahrain (on the Persian Gulf), and the proxy war in Yemen (on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula), the mount-

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ing competition between Teheran and Riyadh is palpable. Both countries routinely employ their naval forces for political ends as well. Naval diplomacy and logistic support for allies are only two examples recently on display. On the high end of the conflict spectrum, the armed conflict in Yemen with its naval blockade has seen troubling indications of vessel-borne improvised explosive devices and the havoc that can be caused by anti-ship missiles.\textsuperscript{6}

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that many countries in the region have embarked on, and increasingly intensified, ambitious naval modernization programs. These range from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ \textit{Dolphin}-class air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines and German Naval Yards’ corvettes built in Germany for Israel, to submarines of a less advanced type 209-1400 for Egypt also built in Kiel, Germany. Turkey and Greece are operating a similar submarine design, whereas the latter will add Type 214 AIP submarines to its inventory beginning in the early 2020s. Turkey, despite or maybe even because of its recent political turn—which has strained its relations with the European Union and with NATO—has made public plans to procure new frigates and a large dock landing ship, “a game-changer in the Eastern Mediterranean”.\textsuperscript{7} On the southern end of the Mediterranean basin, Egypt is undergoing a more erratic naval modernization, having procured the two formerly Russia-bound, French-built helicopter carriers of the \textit{Mistral}-type and a colorful collection of surface warships. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has ordered 48 small surface patrol vessels for its navy from Lürssen shipyard in Germany.

Far from Germany’s only naval meddling in the region, the country has also been a steadfast supporter of the United Nations’ Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Maritime Task Force set up in 2006 after an armed clash between Israel, Lebanon, and the Islamist political party and militant group Hezbollah. Although Brazil has long-since led the task force and assumed flagship duty, Germany—along with a handful of regional navies—continuously dispatches at least one surface vessel in this first Unit-

\textsuperscript{6} The 2017 incidents which targeted U.S. Navy and Saudi warships (in separate instances, with the latter scoring hits) were among the first such instances since the Israeli corvette \textit{INS Hanit} was hit by a C-802 missile in July 2006 while on patrol enforcing a naval blockade of Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{7} “Turkish Navy modernization and shipbuilding plans through 2030,” \textit{Naval Analyses}, 16 September 2017.
ed Nations’ maritime peacekeeping mission. Here, the strategic forward bases in Cyprus (UNIFIL’s port for replenishment) and NATO-operated Souda Bay on Crete (Greece) are once again proving their worth. The Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy as the principal heirs to these bases are currently revisiting whether a standing naval presence with actual warships in the Eastern Mediterranean should be set up—again. For the U.S. Navy in particular, the appreciation for the Sixth Fleet area of operations in the Mediterranean, which saw sustained naval presence including aircraft carriers during the Cold War, is gradually changing after this critical forward hub was depleted of most of its forward-deployed warships after 1990. In light of the proclaimed goal of a 355-ship navy (as of 21 November 2017, the number of deployable ships stood at 279 according to the official U.S. Navy website), the case needs to be made for the opportunities that come with applied allied seapower in the Mediterranean and a deepened U.S./allied naval involvement. The 1980’s history offers plenty of examples.

It is to be expected that geopolitical rivals will not sit idle. Russia, for example, is likely to deepen its footprint in the Mediterranean through direct and indirect influence given its unfortunate sea-strategic position (a reminder that some things from the Cold War years do indeed persist). Russia, much like the Soviet Union, must strive for choke point control to have access to warm water and the high seas. For China, the Mediterranean is a critical piece of the puzzle in its ambitious “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative that aims to influence and use trade routes, control selected maritime and rail infrastructure, and provide political leverage in the region. It goes without saying that many larger and medium-sized

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powers are increasingly looking beyond the immediate civil wars and armed conflicts and trying to take a longer view, such as regarding the security of the sea lines of communications (as well as undersea cables and pipelines) that traverse the Eastern Med. Undersea resources such as oil and gas are also high on the list of contentious subjects when it comes to the maritime domain.

Some of these issues will be discussed in more depth in this book. The chapters found in this edited volume are products of the Kiel International Seapower Symposium 2017, “Seapower in the Eastern Med”, held in Kiel, Germany on 20 June that year. The editors are grateful for the contributions of these experts which allow an important contribution to the seapower literature on the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, we would like to acknowledge the instrumental support of Mr. Tyler Young, a diligent research intern at the Institute for Security Policy University of Kiel’s Center for Maritime Strategy & Security (CMSS) in October-November 2017, to the completion of this book.

Kiel, December 2017
The Eastern Mediterranean – A Brief Geo-Political Overview

Chris Parry

Geography

The Eastern Mediterranean—or the Levantine Sea—comprises an area of 320,000 square km (120,000 square miles), measuring about 550 km from north to south and 1200 km from the coast of Lebanon to the western end of Crete. No point is more than 300 km from land. Politically, it is bounded by Turkey in the north, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Gaza Strip in the east, Egypt and Libya in the south, and the Aegean Sea in the northwest. It also contains the two major islands of Crete to the west and Cyprus to the east. The greatest depth of 4,384 m (14,383 ft.) is found in the Pliny Trench, about 80 km (50 miles) south of Crete. The area is also framed, and maritime activity shaped, by the existence of choke-points—notably the Suez Canal, the Aegean Sea with the Bosporus at its head and the western boundary, leading to the broader Mediterranean, which runs from Cape Ra's al-Hilal in Libya to the island of Gavdos, south of Crete.1 Two features of the Eastern Mediterranean are noteworthy: no portion of the sea lies outside an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the water column in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea is warmer and more saline than that in the Western Mediterranean.

The area is also highly active seismically, with recent research indicating that in the geologic past large earthquakes occurred in bursts, potentially increasing the future risk for earthquakes and tsunamis in the region. Although the region has experienced only two recorded earthquakes with magnitudes larger than 8.0 in the past 4,000 years (a notably quiet period seismically), research suggests that the major fault lines ruptured on aver-

age every 4,500 years and that another burst might occur in the near future.²

Frontier or Hub?

For most of recorded human history, the Eastern Mediterranean has been the centre of several major civilizations, three major world religions, and a critical node in the global trading system.³ Early modern maps accentuated its position (adjacent to that of Jerusalem and the Holy Land) at the geographical intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Over the course of classical, medieval, and modern history—it has alternated between being an economically and politically integrated region under a dominant power such as the Greeks, the Romans, and the Ottomans; at other times it has

been a frontier region, notably in pre—classical, early classical times, and between Christian and Muslim rulers.

Today, the region combines both frontier and integrated elements, without the presence of an overwhelmingly dominant power. Consequently, it constitutes a ragged border between the modern and postmodern world and a buffer between Islam and the West; yet its predominantly Islamic character has, at its heart, the powerful presence of Israel. It is also politically diverse, containing democracies (Israel), authoritarian regimes (Turkey, Syria and Egypt), the divided island of Cyprus (a member of the European Union) and other power groupings of varying legitimacy and appeal (such as Hezbollah and Hamas).

The region’s position on major trade routes from East to West from Asia and onto Europe and along a north-south axis through the Black Sea—coupled with ease of navigation, numerous port-cities, and favourable weather patterns for most of the year—have ensured that it has been a major hub for commercial enterprise and seaborne exchange since prehistoric times. Today, dense shipping traffic continues to pass through the region to and from the Suez Canal, and significant trade and energy product distribution flows through undersea pipelines or by ship into and out of the Black Sea. Meanwhile, the revival of the traditional trade routes from the East, primarily from China and centred on the Belt and Road initiative and China’s Four Seas Energy program, have enhanced the strategic importance of the region owing to their access points in the Levant and through the Suez Canal⁴. Indeed, Syria’s president, Bashar Al-Assad, boldly stated, as long ago as 2009:

Once the economic space between Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran [becomes] integrated, we would link the Mediterranean, Caspian, Black Sea, and the [Persian] Gulf … We aren’t just important in the Middle East … Once we link these four

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seas, we become the compulsory intersection of the whole world in investment, transport and more.5

Current Trends

The discovery of significant offshore natural gas deposits in Egyptian, Israeli, and Cypriot waters have added further complex geopolitical challenges, with implications for the national control of sea-space. The exploitation of these resources has led not only to regional competition but also to increased interest by outside powers, such as China and Russia. In addition, political considerations complicate choices about how to transport the gas to market. Options include routes via Cyprus to Turkey, south to Egypt, and inland to Israel, as well as floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) facilities and subsea pipelines. Investment relies overwhelmingly on the prospects for geo-political stability, the enforcement of the rule of law, and the resolution of disputes.

Unfortunately, Turkey does not recognize Cyprus EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. It claims that as a de facto divided island, the so called Republic of Cyprus cannot represent the interests of the northern part of Cyprus unless the island is reunited with a single EEZ. Conversely, Cyprus’ declaration of its EEZ and delimitation agreements with neighbouring countries were in accordance with UNCLOS and are recognized by its neighbours and the international community. The recent presence of Turkish warships in Cypriot waters underlines the sensitivities associated with both exploitation and distribution of gas, the difficulty of resolving the sovereignty of the island as well as Turkey’s interests and ambitions within the wider, consciously Ottoman aspects of its foreign policy.6 This increased naval activity also highlights other disputes in the region associated with the precise demarcation of exclusive economic zones and the rights to the exploitation of oil and gas, mineral deposits, and fishing.

Regional disputes are complicated, and stability is affected not only by the overlying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran—between Sunni and Shia communities and between their various proxies—but also by the interests of the major powers. Russia has three main objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean. Firstly, it needs to maintain its ability to influence and intervene in a volatile region whose instabilities have a direct security impact on Russia’s southern provinces and the territories adjacent to them. Secondly, Russian presence in the region allows Russia to influence and balance China’s commercial presence in the region via its Belt and Road initiative. Finally, the exploitation of offshore gas in the Eastern Mediterranean and its distribution threatens to compete with—and displace—Russia’s market share in Europe. As a result, it is likely that the Russian air and maritime presence in Tartus will expand significantly, enabling Russia to threaten and use force in the region in support of its interests, while providing a useful check on NATO and U.S. deployments to the region.

Similarly, China will wish to safeguard its investment in both the Four Seas Project and in the sections of the land and maritime routes of the Belt and Road that converge in the Eastern Mediterranean and the littoral countries of the region. These interests justify the need for increased Chinese maritime presence in the region, initially operating from Djibouti as a forward base, but, in the future, from facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean itself, reinforcing and exploiting the existing Chinese commercial footprint.

Increased Russian and Chinese presence is likely to be accompanied by a decreasing U.S. maritime presence in the region as operations against the Islamic State and the Assad regime in Syria wind down. However, continued Iranian military presence and increased interference in Syria and Lebanon, especially in support of its proxies and Hezbollah, that threatens Israel will mean continued U.S. engagement. Otherwise, future NATO activity in the region is likely to be increasingly taken on by European maritime forces and centred on the use of the British sovereign bases in Cyprus, with forward deployment and presence tailored to forestall or deal with crises that directly threaten European interests; these include threats

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7 The Russian presence is particularly interesting in view of China’s majority ownership and use of the port of Piraeus, with the expectation that it will become the Mediterranean hub and emporium for Chinese goods reaching Europe via both maritime and land arms of the OBOR initiative.
to the freedom of navigation and the Suez Canal along with migratory pressures. In parallel, while maintaining presence and freedom of navigation operations, U.S. maritime forces are only likely to deploy in strength to deal with technological and military threats with which European and regional partners cannot cope and in response to threats to Israel (as mentioned above, primarily, but not exclusively from Iran).

**Maritime Complexity and Oceanic Encroachment**

A notable feature of the geopolitics of the region is its maritime complexity. Critical air and sea routes from oceanic areas pass through coastal regions and important sources of offshore oil, natural gas, and seabed minerals are located in the adjacent waters. The offshore zone is also increasingly used for extensive land reclamation schemes, energy platforms, and offshore construction projects—while the seabed hosts progressively more fishing, resource extraction, and power distribution arrangements, as well as submarine cables. All these activities are likely to require increased coordination, surveillance, and security capacity to prevent interference by terrorists, criminals, and hostile states.

To differing extents, states in the region already seek to impose limitations on traffic in their EEZs for security or environmental or navigational safety reasons. In this region, the potential for terrorist incidents and criminal activity is high; Israel’s security problems are especially acute, but other countries such as Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey maintain close control of their offshore zones—well beyond their territorial seas—with emphasis on combatting the high incidence of trafficking (of people and illicit goods), migration, and illegal fishing. However, there is an intensifying trend whereby states in the region are extending quasi-jurisdictional control over their exclusive economic zones (much as they do in their territorial seas) and are investing in systemic surveillance and interception capabilities. As such, we are likely to see the creeping “territorialisation” of these littoral regions as states seek to extend their control and jurisdictions.
further out to sea, right up to and, in some cases, beyond the limits of their current EEZ limits.

Other pretexts are evident, such as: “green” (environmentally protected) seaways and zones, commercial exclusion zones, or traffic control schemes that can plausibly be justified under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but that, in aggregate, will effectively limit free access to offshore zones and constrain legitimate movement on the high seas. There are precedents elsewhere. Malaysia, for example, has sought to exclude military exercises by foreign powers in its EEZ and to prevent the passage of nuclear-powered ships through international straits that are contained within its archipelagos. China is attempting to exclude the passage of foreign warships within certain distances from its illegal artificial structures in the South and East China Seas. As a result, there is a very real risk that exclusive economic zones will become de facto exclusive zones, and existing international law and conventions will be compromised, especially in relation to the freedom of navigation and innocent passage.

Both littoral control and oceanic encroachment in the Eastern Mediterranean have serious implications for trading patterns and the universal access to the sea currently afforded to the international community. The fundamental issue at stake is whether UNCLOS will remain the basis for the international order at sea or whether the freedom of the seas will be replaced by a patchwork of controlled and exclusive sea-space. Consequently, the near future is likely to witness a series of tests of will and resolve as regional countries on the one hand and the United States and U.S. allies, China, and Russia probe and assess each other’s responses to incidents on the ragged edge between “territorial” claims and the continuation of the freedom of the seas. As long as countries have more to lose than to gain from a breakdown of the international system of law and trade then the current grudging acceptance of the overall status quo seems set to continue; this will be punctuated by a sequence of encounters and disputes in the margins of UNCLOS, which, if not resolved, have the potential for confrontation and conflict.

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This trend towards control is paralleled by acquisition of modern and sophisticated systems by the countries of the region. Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and a reviving Syria are deploying a range of capable sea denial platforms; including extensive surveillance and strike assets that comprise land-based patrol and combat aircraft, well-armed surface combatants, submarines, mines, and long range anti-ship cruise missiles. More importantly, modern land-based systems have the range and discrimination to be able to dominate the offshore zone and international waters throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. The region already contains significant numbers of ballistic missiles, primarily SCUDs, and area denial systems, such as anti-ship cruise missiles. In the future, anti-ship cruise missiles of increasing range and sophistication are likely to be available, such as the Turkish ATMACA which has a 200-kg warhead and flies at subsonic speed out to 200 km, with a guidance suite comprising an INS/GPS system with a terminal-stage active radar-homing (ARH) seeker. In the future, these systems will be linked to imagery and targeting information derived from satellites, unmanned vehicles, and land and air assets equipped with multispectral sensors and fused through networked decision-making tools, linked to powerful processing and Big Data applications. The effect will be to make surface ships more visible and vulnerable in the confines of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In addition, the proliferation of sophisticated land-based anti-air missiles significantly alters the operational geometry by allowing states to deploy substantial deterrence and denial options in relation to air and sea space in large parts of the eastern Mediterranean. Significant in this regard is the S-400 TRIUMF deployed by Russia to Syria and the future purchase of the same system by Turkey. The S-400 has a maximum range of 400 km (248 miles) and the engagement envelope of the Russian system in Latakia dominates the whole of the eastern portion of the Levantine Sea.

12 Kasapoglu, “Naval Balance.”
Its Turkish equivalent will similarly allow interdiction of targets throughout the whole northern sector. A range of other capable anti-air systems is also able to interdict air targets at sea, as was demonstrated by the destruction of a Turkish RF-4E by Syrian forces in 2012.\textsuperscript{13}

These options are not limited to states. The engagement on 14 July 2006 of the Israeli corvette \textit{Hanit} by an Iranian-derived C-802 anti-ship missile fired from land by Hezbollah demonstrated that sub-state groups in the region are able to access sophisticated military capabilities that can influence the offshore and oceanic zones. A succession of similar engagements by Houthi rebels in Yemen against US warships and other vessels with anti-ship missiles have confirmed that this irregular threat persists.\textsuperscript{14}

Conversely, the topography and geographical connectivity of the region also allows sea-based military assets, in conjunction with modern platforms and systems, to conduct surveillance, exert influence, and project military power and force over a wide area—particularly in those areas of strategic interest to the major powers. The Eastern Mediterranean gives access and opportunity to sea-based forces to conduct strike operations against the land (using cruise missiles, amphibious warfare assets, and carrier aircraft) well into adjacent areas and states. This accessibility is keenly felt by Russia and partly shapes its leaders’ responses to NATO deployments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Conversely, and more recently, Russia has used advanced missile technology to engage targets in the Eastern Mediterranean from the Caspian Sea\textsuperscript{15}, and these remote engagements must be considered part of the future warfare landscape in the region.

\textit{Summary}

Overall, it is clear that the critical importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, both to the states of the region and to major powers, looks likely to increase with significant potential for cooperation, competition, and possibly even conflict amid a range of struggles for resources and access, unre-

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} For detailed discussion on recent attacks, see Sebastian Hamann’s article in this publication.
solved claims, and geopolitical rivalry. In particular, the indications are that states in the region will continue to compete for advantages at sea—especially in relation to the exploitation of resources and the proprietorial rights to sea-space. The path to the future is likely to be shaped by whether the region remains characterized by a frontier mentality, is stabilized by a dominant power, or settles down to a rules-based and collaborative system. The future will also be determined by whether outstanding issues are resolved by the littoral countries themselves or by the intervention and continued engagement of the great powers acting in their own interests.
Economic globalization has created a dense network of strategic flows of goods, capital, and information as well as an exchange of people.¹ These flows connect locations of production, transit, and consumption to generate prosperity. Prosperity requires connectivity that depends on transport corridors, infrastructure, and transportation means. Strategic competition in the twenty-first century is all about controlling connectivity and thus shaping the strategic flows that provide prosperity and thereby affect security and stability.

Connectivity control—defined as the freedom of action to use transport corridors, infrastructure, and means of transportation for one’s own purpose, and to deny their use to a competitor, if needed²—is a central theme of geostrategy and geoeconomics. Geostrategy describes how actors project power into zones of strategic interest and analyzes how geography shapes actors’ abilities to do so.³ Geoeconomics is closely related, yet distinct from geostrategy as it describes “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests and to produce beneficial geopolitical outcomes.”⁴

1 For more on this, see: Parag Khanna, Connectography: Mapping the Global Network Revolution (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016).
Against this background, the Eastern Mediterranean (henceforth abbreviated EastMed)\textsuperscript{5} is of fundamental geostrategic and geoeconomic importance as it connects Europe, the Levant, Arab Gulf countries, and Northern Africa. Given its prominent location, it is tempting to assume that different actors project power into the region, but this notion should be cautioned. The region’s cultural background, current political systems, and economic competitiveness are very diverse. There are different loci of economic power that compete with each other, as outlined below. Attempts by regional and extra-regional powers to project economic, political, and military power easily offset each other. But things are starting to change due to the unintended geoeconomic consequences of policy decisions by the European Union (E.U.), the advent of China in the region, and the growing assertiveness of leading Arab Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. In sum, the EastMed is no longer the E.U.’s or NATO’s nor (yet) anybody else’s \textit{mare nostrum}.\textsuperscript{6} Rather it is on the tipping point of becoming the playground for a very complex strategic competition. Given the centrality of this region for sea-borne trade with the Asia-Pacific region, a diminished European role in the EastMed will have serious economic and security implications. This paper outlines some of the challenges by looking at trade, maritime transport, foreign direct investment, defense trade, and energy relations.

\textit{Regional trade}

With about the population size of Brazil and the Gross Domestic Product of Italy,\textsuperscript{7} EastMed nations operate in a very challenging economic envi-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{5} For the purpose of this paper, the EastMed includes Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. The State of Palestine is part of this region as well, but will be excluded for the most part from the analysis as reliable statistical information is hardly available.
  \item \textsuperscript{7} In 2016 Brazil was home to around 210 million people, whereas the population of the nine EastMed nations counted roughly 235 million people. Their aggregate Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounted for around US $1.9bn, which was about the size of Italy’s GDP with US $1.85bn. Population data according to: “2017 World Population by Country,” World Population Review, last updated
\end{itemize}
The Diversity Challenge

According to the 2017 IMF Global Economic Forecast, the regional economic outlook is affected by geopolitical conflicts, lower-than-expected oil prices, and political and social obstacles to reform.\(^8\) The following trade patterns illustrate the region’s challenging situation:\(^9\)

- In 2015, the overall trade volume accounted for roughly $730bn. Countries in the region imported goods worth around $432bn, whereas exports stood at about $298bn. This means the region ran an aggregate trade deficit of approximately $134bn.
- Intra-regional trade among the nine EastMed countries accounted for less than $32bn or 5 percent of total trade. Turkey was at the helm of intra-regional trade with an aggregate volume of close to $16bn followed by Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus.
- Trade with the ten most important extra-regional economic partners, by contrast, reached $325bn. In terms of total trade volume, the United States ($63bn) led this group, followed by Germany ($60bn), and China ($58bn). Other important extra-regional trade partners included Italy, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Spain, Iraq, and South Korea. Of these extra-regional partners, China was the most important source of imports with supplies worth $53bn, followed by Germany ($37bn), and Russia ($20bn). In terms of exports, the United States was the most important destination accounting for deliveries worth almost $37bn. Germany came in second ($22bn), followed by Italy ($16bn), and the U.K. ($15bn).

These figures clearly emphasize the extent to which EastMed trade depends on connectivity with outside partners. This illustrates the economic vulnerabilities that result from connectivity control and supply chain interruptions. In addition, Turkey, which accounts for around 47 percent of the

region’s aggregate trade volume, seems to be tilting away from the E.U. It remains to be seen how further deteriorations in this relationship will affect Ankara’s trade relationships, but it is hard to see that other trade partners like China, Russia, or the United States could compensate for significant losses in trade with Europe.

Maritime Transport

Maritime transport is important for the EastMed region. In Turkey 85 percent of all goods exports and imports go through 71 ports. Israel largely depends on seaborne trade. Greece is among the world’s leading fleet owners, while annual revenues worth $5bn from transports through the Suez Canal are an important source of Egypt’s national income.10

In the recent past, China has been tiptoeing into the region driven by its ambitious multi-decade One Belt, One Road (OROR) plan for pan-regional economic cooperation. Its involvement in Greece began with a 35-year concession to operate parts of the port of Piraeus in 2009. This was followed by a majority stake in the port of Alexandria; a sizable stake in Kumport, which is part of Istanbul’s port cluster; the administration of the Naples port, which oversees NATO’s main military base in the Mediterranean; and a commitment to build a new harbor in Israel’s Ashdod.11

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coastline km in percent of world total, 2016</th>
<th>National flagged fleet DWT in percent of world total, 2016</th>
<th>Fleet ownership DWT in percent of world total, 2016</th>
<th>Container port throughput TEU in percent of world total, 2016</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1.84</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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</tr>
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<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.01</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Maritime Profile of EastMed Nations  
Source: UNCTAD Country Profiles
China seized the opportunity presented by the Greek’s financial and economic difficulties. Between 2010 and 2013, China bought “toxic Greek government bonds” and spent freely as “Greece became increasingly subject to creditor budget restrictions.”\(^{12}\) In parallel, China increased its footprint in the port of Piraeus, where Cosco bought a controlling stake of 67 percent in April 2016. When the terminal was state run, it did not rank among the world’s global top 100 ports. But from 2010 to 2014 its turnover capacity rose by 699 percent to 3.5M TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit), which catapulted the port of Piraeus to rank 39. For 2020, the port of Piraeus eyes further capacity increases to 6.2M TEU. During this period, Cosco invested around €600M to modernize port infrastructure and hired 1,000 new workers. Meanwhile, important companies started relocating distribution activities to Piraeus, primarily driven by cost. Hewlett-Packard relocated a distribution center from Rotterdam to Piraeus, and Huawei and ZTE launched their own distribution centers.\(^{13}\)

Under the OBOR umbrella similar developments have been kicked off elsewhere in the region. DHL Global Forwarding, a leading logistics company, opened the China-Turkey Intermodal Corridor in 2015. Israel aspires to set up an Israel-Gulf Economic Corridor that could link OBOR with Israel, Jordan and Arab Gulf nations in addition to plans for a railway link to connect the Mediterranean and the Red Sea as an alternative to the Suez Canal. In Egypt, China has pledged to invest €40bn in development projects, particularly related to the Suez Canal Economic Zone. This project has also attracted the interest of DP World, UAE’s leading logistics company. In September 2017, DP World and the Suez Canal Authority


agreed to set up a joint venture company to develop the respective economic zone.\textsuperscript{14}

All of this illustrates that established market economies that have left supply chain design to market forces were wrong-footed by ambitious rising powers like China. Today rising powers master the art of connectivity control and shape regional supply chains. If and to what extent China can seize this potential geoeconomic leverage to her own benefit depends on the political response by receiving countries. Here, the growing convergence of interests among state-dominated emerging countries might counterbalance the demand by market economies to level the playing field. In addition, commercial players will do their own calculation to decide if abiding by connectivity control makes sense or if alternative routes need to be opened to increase supply chain resilience.

\textit{Foreign Direct Investment}

Foreign direct investments (FDI) and indigenous local investments provide the basis for trade to flourish. FDI is important as it provides national economies with capital knowledge, stimulates integration of value chain, deepens economic interaction, and promotes the exchange of technologies and know-how. FDI also plays a key role in infrastructure development that is a prerequisite for global connectivity. FDI patterns start to change as more and more non-Western actors enter the scene as foreign investors. This is of particular relevance for the EastMed.

Regional statistics on the total amount of outside investment in a country (FDI inward stock)\textsuperscript{15} are very heterogeneous because there is no one

\begin{flushleft}
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Heiko Borchert

database that covers all nine countries. Thus, this paper bends available data a bit in order to compare 2015 FDI inward stock in Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Turkey with so called new greenfield projects\textsuperscript{16} realized between 2003 to 2015 in the remaining five countries. Available data shows a distinct regional division in terms of the main origin of FDI:

- Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria have attracted a total of $252bn for greenfield projects between 2003 to 2015. Most investments were bound for Egypt ($121bn), followed by Jordan ($43bn) and Libya ($37bn). Interestingly, Arab Gulf investors were the most important source of FDI for these five EastMed countries. The United Arab Emirates pumped $65bn into the five countries, followed by Bahrain ($26bn), Qatar ($15bn) and Kuwait ($14bn). Together, Arab Gulf FDI accounts for almost half of the volume of greenfield projects during this period. Other important investors were Russia ($17bn), the United States ($12bn), and Greece ($11bn).\textsuperscript{17}

- Total FDI inward stock in the remaining four EastMed countries reached $387bn in 2015, with Cyprus being the leader ($173bn) followed by Turkey ($107bn), Israel ($82bn), and Greece ($23bn). Looking at the top ten origins of FDI in these countries shows that the Netherlands are the undisputed FDI leader ($42bn) followed by the United States, Russia, and Germany each holding FDI stocks worth $22-24bn. Each of these investors has a specific focus: the Netherlands and Germany are key for Turkey and Cyprus, Russia’s FDI is mainly concentrated on Cyprus, and U.S. FDI primarily benefits Israel followed by Turkey.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} This paper uses FDI inward stock rather than FDI flows because the former fluctuates less over time.

\textsuperscript{16} Greenfield projects describe completely new investment projects. By aggregating investments for 12 years we get a total volume that is used as a proxy for the inward FDI stock that is not available as statistical data for Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon and Syria.

\textsuperscript{17} All figures are rounded and quoted according to: Dhaman Investment Attractiveness Index 2015 (Kuwait: The Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, 2015).

\textsuperscript{18} Data based on IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) statistics, except for Israel, which is based on OECD statistics for 2013. See also: “Inward Direct Investment Positions,” IMF, accessed 2017, http://data.imf.org/
In reflecting on the geoeconomic importance of these FDI patterns, two aspects are noteworthy. First, Chinese FDI in the region is just about to lift off. As discussed above, China’s OBOR plans serve as a driver to deepen economic ties by way of infrastructure ownership and development. How this will affect regional policies remains to be seen, but China’s recent decision to invite Egypt and Kenya to attend the 9th BRICS summit is a harbinger of things to come.19 Second, the increasing FDI footprint of Arab Gulf nations in the EastMed could further accelerate policy changes. Saudi Arabia and the UAE play key roles in funding Egypt’s government and providing support to Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, and Syria. The fact that Qatar and Turkey have strengthened economic ties further increases regional complexities given the lingering Qatar crisis. Should the current spat continue, Arab Gulf FDI could become a dividing, rather than a uniting element in EastMed economic policy.20

**Defense Trade**

Arms import and export relations between the nine EastMed countries and their key suppliers confirm the patterns discussed above, but behind the scenes substantial changes are taking place. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global arms transfer between 1990-2016 amounted to $676bn. Arms imports by the nine countries in the region accounted for roughly $100bn. This equals the combined arms import volume of India ($56bn) and China ($42bn) during the same period. As figure 1 illustrates, Turkey was the main importer

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20 The increase in FDI and economic aid from Qatar to Egypt under former President Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood), which stood in stark contrast to the immediate halt in economic support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, illustrates this point. For more on this, see also: Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, *War by Other Means* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 71-72.
($30bn) followed by Greece ($22.5bn) and Egypt ($22.2bn). The United States is the preeminent regional arms supplier with exports worth $58bn or around 25 percent of all U.S. weapons supplies between 1990-2016. Germany finished second ($14bn) followed by Russia ($6bn), France ($5bn), the Netherlands ($2.4bn), the United Kingdom ($2bn) and South Korea ($1.4bn).21

However, focusing on defense transfer volumes risks overlooking important developments:

- First, the nature of the weapon system matters. Whereas Israel’s two primary sources for weapon systems are the United States and Germany, other nations depend on many more suppliers. Notwithstanding the proficiency of local armed forces in handling sophisticated weapon systems and developing adequate concepts of operations, this creates challenges for interoperability for the latter. In addition, maintenance and logistics of multi-weapon system portfolios are often more expensive than homogenous portfolios. Turkey’s most recent decision to procure the Russian S-400 air defense system in parallel to developing another air defense system with the French-Italian Eurosam consortium illustrates current ambivalences in defense markets.22 Russia’s S-400 air defense system also exemplifies the fact that regional weapon systems and supplier systems are becoming more and more integrated. In addition to Turkey, Syria has built its air defense network by successfully integrating Russian systems. The same is true for Iranian and Russian air defense, while Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia show interest in purchasing the S-400 system.23 These examples do not yet suggest that Russia is about

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21 All figures rounded and based on the SIPRI arms transfer database as referenced in Figure 1.
23 Toi Staff, “Iran says S-300 air defense system now ‘fully integrated’,” The Times of Israel, 28 August 2017, http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-says-s-300-air-
Figure 1: Defense Imports by Main Suppliers, 1990-2016 (in $bn)

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
to establish an integrated air-defense system spanning from the EastMed to the Arab Gulf. But it becomes obvious that the difficulties the United States faced in establishing a missile defense shield in the Arab Gulf might matter more these days than in the past.

- Second, regional defense markets are challenging. Germany’s monopoly in conventional submarine technology (with buyers including Egypt, Greece, Israel, and Turkey) is an exception. The United States enjoys a similar situation regarding anti-submarine warfare systems, airborne early warning radar, and reconnaissance systems. The same is true for unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) deliveries from China to Jordan, whereas Turkey has developed indigenous UCAV. Many other segments, in particular for land systems, are densely packed with several local and foreign suppliers. Competitive pressure is increasing due to growing ambitions for indigenous defense industries. Here, Israel and Turkey are the regional frontrunners followed by Egypt that has a vast, but so far not very effective defense-industrial complex.

- Third, Arab Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE play an increasingly important defense role in the EastMed. Their influence unfolds along three vectors: Both nations increasingly finance defense procurements by their regional allies such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya; donations of defense systems help advance military capabilities as seen in Libya and Jordan; and there is a growing web of pan-regional defense industrial cooperation.24 On this last aspect, Tur-

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key has opened significant inroads into Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. But it is an open question to what extent Turkey’s support for Qatar during the current crises might affect the readiness of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to rely on collaborative defense projects with Turkish partners in the future.25

Energy Relations

The exploration of significant gas fields off the coast of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel have created international interest in the EastMed’s role as a source of regional self-sufficiency and diversification for Europe. News about important gas reserves have been welcomed because most countries in the region are dependent on importing energy. As EastMed Energy Figure illustrates, gas plays an important role in the region’s primary energy mix and is pivotal for local energy generation. This underlines the key role of gas in local stability as volatile electricity prices are a recipe for local unrest.

As Shaul Chorev’s chapter in this volume illustrates, many options have been developed to use EastMed gas to boost local economies, regional energy cooperation, and energy exports. So far, however, a regional gas market based on a trusted regulatory framework and cross-national energy infrastructure (particularly with links to the north, as the EastMed Energy Figure illustrates) has not materialized.26 In addition, markets have changed since offshore gas exploration began in 2004. Projections for future gas demand in Europe, the region that looks most promising for EastMed gas exports, are highly uncertain. This uncertainty results from the yet unknown effectiveness of E.U. energy policy decisions (e.g. energy efficiency, nuclear phase-out), technology developments, and general market conditions. Therefore, projections for future E.U. gas demand vary greatly. However, the trend line suggests that “gas demand remains low in


25 There are signals that Saudi Arabia could shelf naval projects with Turkish partners. See: “KSA: Arms deals with Turkey put on hold?,” Tactical Report Weekly, 15 September 2017.

26 For more on this, see: Shaul Zemach, Toward an Eastern Mediterranean Integrated Gas Infrastructure (Washington, DC: The German Marshal Fund of the United States, 2016).
the coming decade and hence that the E.U.’s gas import needs hardly grow.’”27

U.S. energy policy adds to the existing complexity. In light of the current standoff with Russia, the U.S. administration is willing to use its energy surplus as a foreign policy instrument, thereby emulating the very Russian policy approach that Washington has criticized for decades. Throughout the first half of 2017, the first deliveries of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) arrived in Poland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. More supplies are likely to follow as U.S. LNG company Cheniere projects around 50 percent of its LNG exports could be shipped to Europe.28 This not only increases the pressure on pipeline gas particularly from Russia, but also suggests that any plan to supply EastMed gas to Europe would need to take U.S. competition into account.

This opens the door for a closer look at Russian and Chinese energy interests in the region:

- Russia’s position is strongest in Turkey, who gets around 60 percent of its gas supplies from Russia.29 The current rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow, that comes in response to worsening E.U.-Turkey relations, is likely to deepen the energy partnership. More recently, Russia’s Rosneft made headlines with a 30 percent stake in Egypt’s Zhor gas field and deals to buy crude oil from Libya and Egypt as well as provide LNG supplies to Egypt.30 However, such news should be taken with a grain of salt since past Russian plans for offshore energy projects in Israel and Syria have not materialized. Russia has also made strides in selling peaceful nuclear energy technology to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey and has plans to work with Syria

27 Iulia Pisca, *Outlook for EU gas demand and import needs to 2025* (Clingendael: CIEP, 2016), 27.
and Saudi Arabia. But all of these projects have yet to produce tangible results.31

- China’s position is different. China National Petroleum Corporation has active production fields in Libya and Syria as well as neighboring Iraq.32 Most interestingly, the China led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is one of several international banks funding the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline that is expected to transport Azeri gas from Georgia to Turkey and Europe. Total project costs amount to $8.6bn with AIIB shouldering $0.6bn.33

Conclusion

As this paper illustrates, the EastMed faces a first-rate diversity challenge. The insignificant volume of intra-regional trade is a source of concern as it suggests continued dependence on foreign actors. Western trade partners are still in the lead, but China is catching up. Rising new powers illustrate how connectivity control works in the maritime transport sector, with the EastMed becoming a springboard for China. On FDI, the region is split between the four OECD countries that mainly attract investments from fellow OECD countries. The remaining five countries, by contrast, have become key investment destinations for ambitious and increasingly

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Figure 1: The EastMed Energy Picture
Source: Author’s chart.
assertive Arab Gulf nations. In the defense domain, Western suppliers still dominate in terms of volume. However, Russia has traditionally played a key role that is being reinvigorated; China is tiptoeing into EastMed defense markets; and Arab Gulf nations are strengthening defense ties with Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Finally, the energy field is highly competitive as every important outside actor is present on the ground. EastMed countries struggle to benefit from the “energy bonanza” because of the lack of necessary regulatory framework and much needed interconnected energy infrastructure to advance regional energy cooperation. As this paper illustrates, the EastMed faces a first-rate diversity challenge. The insignificant volume of intra-regional trade is a source of concern as it suggests continued dependence on foreign actors. Western trade partners are still in the lead, but China is catching up. Rising new powers illustrate how connectivity control works in the maritime transport sector, with the EastMed becoming a springboard for China. On FDI, the region is split between the four OECD countries that mainly attract investments from fellow OECD countries. The remaining five countries, by contrast, have become key investment destinations for ambitious and increasingly assertive Arab Gulf nations. In the defense domain, Western suppliers still dominate in terms of volume. However, Russia has traditionally played a key role that is being reinvigorated; China is tiptoeing into EastMed defense markets; and Arab Gulf nations are strengthening defense ties with Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Finally, the energy field is highly competitive as every important outside actor is present on the ground. EastMed countries struggle to benefit from the “energy bonanza” because of the lack of necessary regulatory framework and much needed interconnected energy infrastructure to advance regional energy cooperation.

Therefore, current trends shaping the region reinforce centrifugal powers. This is a particular challenge for Europe. Europe could play a role in advancing regional cooperation, but her hands are tied. Considering the challenges the European Union is facing, it is unclear to what extent the EastMed—apart from dealing with refugee flows—is a strategic priority to the Union that would garner support for concerted efforts aimed at advancing regional development. In addition, EastMed countries strive to broaden their portfolio of political relations. Whereas Europe is sometimes considered the so-called tough-nanny, other partners come with a no-strings-attached policy that is much appreciated as it provides more leeway and can be sold domestically as bolstering, rather than limiting the powers of local regimes. Finally, it is far from sure that the current U.S.
administration and European allies follow the same line in the region, thus making it very difficult to agree on a potential role for NATO. This is of particular relevance given NATO’s January 2017 announcement to seek closer ties with Arab Gulf countries.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite this bleak outlook, there is a silver lining on the horizon.\textsuperscript{35} From a European perspective, the EastMed should be considered as a “policy lab” where Europe explores new ways of international governance with ambitious local actors and powerful outside challengers. Unlike in the past, European nations will no longer sit in the driver seat, but will need to share the helm. A flexible policy format to bring together the E.U., the United States, Russia, China, Arab Gulf nations and EastMed partners is needed. As connectivity depends on infrastructure, a concerted effort should focus on regional infrastructure development. This effort could step up coordination between the different infrastructure investment funds currently available, or—if nations were to agree—could also see the launch of a multi-stakeholder investment fund. Such a multilateral approach is far from easy. But it is worth considering in order to overcome the region’s inherent preference for zero-sum approaches that are neither sustainable nor useful in the long run.


Security and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Israeli Perspective

Shaul Chorev

Israel’s Maritime Interests

Israel is an economic island with virtually all (approximately 99 percent by volume) of its foreign trade being transported by sea. It is therefore impossible to overstate Israel’s interests in maritime security. As early as 1950, Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, stated that "anyone who understands our geographic reality and its economic and political implications will immediately grasp the value of our sea power for our existence."2

Another important advantage that the maritime domain provides Israel with, considering its small size, is strategic depth. Strategic depth, in military terms, signifies the internal distance within a state from its frontline to its center of gravity or heartland, its core population areas, important cities, or industrial installations. It also refers to the considerations relating to the vulnerability of a country’s center of gravity to the enemy’s forces in case of war.

Israel's coastline is 195 km long and its territorial water comprises 16 percent of its overall territory. Israel's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) covers 22,000 square kilometers—more than its entire size prior to the 1967 Six-Day War. The main threat to Israel’s security today is the increasing accuracy and massive amount of ballistic projectiles and rockets in the

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hands of its enemies and the persistent attempts by its adversaries in the region to develop weapons of mass destruction. These threats are mainly intended to erode Israel's national morale and resilience. The maritime domain gives Israel additional multi-dimensional space from which it can secure, defend, and deter against any of the above-mentioned threats. In a small and increasingly densely populated country, in which 40-50 percent of the population lives along its coastline or in its vicinity, the importance of this domain cannot be overstated.

Since Israel’s rebirth in 1948, it has been dependent on energy imports from other countries, and the state’s policy makers have been concerned about securing energy supplies. This has changed in the last decade since the discovery of large hydrocarbon fuel fields in Israel's EEZ. The two largest Israeli gas fields are ‘Tamar’ (estimated 246–280 billion cubic meters of gas) and ‘Leviathan’, (470–620 billion cubic meters). These newly discovered resources will allow Israel to reduce oil imports and cut its use of coal, thus reducing pollution. Building a domestic energy industry creates jobs and business opportunities for many Israelis. It also has the po-
potential to bolster Israel's finances, secure its energy independence, and even turn it into a potential energy exporter. Further, it can strengthen the country’s diplomatic tools through energy trade; and recapitalize its military. While Israel's conflicts with its neighbors cannot be solved through the export of natural gas, such export could help strengthen existing relationships and possibly forge new ties.

Israel is also highly dependent on the system of underwater communication cables which connects Israel with several European countries. For example, a 2,250 km long fiber-optic cable links Israel with Cyprus, Sicily, and Italy. From these points, the cable is connected to the network of submarine cables around the world. Their durability is exceptional and their bandwidth potential is enormous. Moreover, Israel is connected abroad by three separate undersea cables so that multiple paths are available in the unlikely event of a cable breaking or being compromised.

Finally, the Mediterranean is also a key source of Israel's drinking water. Today desalination provides over 50 percent of the country's total amount of drinking water. By solving its water woes, Israel has created the possibility of transforming the region in ways that were unthinkable just a few years ago. However, reliance on this technology also carries some risks; including the danger of leaving a key element of the country’s infrastructure vulnerable to attack and the fact that the desalination plants require immense energy, consuming roughly 10 percent of Israel’s total electricity production.

Surprisingly, despite the significant importance of the sea for Israel’s security and prosperity, as illustrated above, the maritime domain is almost absent from public discourse in Israel—a nation which lacks maritime culture or history. Properly incorporating maritime considerations into Israel’s national security strategy is therefore a critical task.

Ever since the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, the Eastern Mediterranean has undergone a period of extraordinary flux. The major shifts in regional dynamics produce new risks but also new opportunities.

A key consideration in recent years has been a significant increase in Russian naval activity in the region, ever since its military entered the Syrian arena in 2015. Russian permanent naval assets in the Eastern Mediterranean include between 10 to 15 vessels operating from the Syrian port of Tartus. In January 2017, Russia and Syria signed agreements to extend Russia's control of its facility for 49 years and give it sovereignty over the territory. It allows Russia to dredge, install floating berths, and carry out repair work to expand its capacity to 11 warships, including nuclear-powered ships.6 These ships are organized under the Fifth Eskadra—the same command structure employed by the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean during the Cold War. At times these assets have been reinforced by missile frigates, a nuclear-powered attack cruiser, and even the Russian navy's sole aircraft carrier.7 While the ships' activities are mostly logistical—in transporting troops and supplies—Russia has also used naval assets to fire sea-launched land-attack missiles as part of military intervention in Syria. While Russia seems to be limiting its naval activity to the Syrian coastline (besides long-range cruise missile strikes), some argue that its very presence in the region limits Israel's freedom of action, including against weapon transfers from the Assad regime to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel and Russia currently have a coordination agreement in place to avoid military collisions, primarily within airspace.8

On the other hand, there may also be areas where the interests of Russia and Israel coincide. In recent years, the United States and Russia have cooperated on sanctions against Iran as well as the Syrian chemical weapons deal. Most recently, Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin agreed

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to implement the Syrian cease-fire on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Germany. Both sides have previously conducted backchannel talks with Israel on the issue of creating safe zones in southern Syria to shield Israel from an Iranian-led Shi’a coalition developing on its northern border. At first, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cautiously welcomed the cease-fire agreement, yet later told reporters that Israel is concerned that under these conditions Tehran could possible build a corridor to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded that Russia and the United States would do all they could to address Israeli concerns about the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria.9

Another related area of concern is the formation of a joint Russia-Iran axis in Syria, notwithstanding a history of distrust between these two countries. The coordination between them, which so far seems to have been successful in upholding the Assad regime, presents a threat to the interests of Israel as well as to those of Sunni Arab states and the United States. Part of the concern is that Iran may attempt to use naval bases in Syria and Yemen as a basis to project power into the Mediterranean, as was recently suggested by General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.10 An Iranian naval base in Yemen would make it more difficult to prevent arms-smuggling from Iran to Lebanon and Gaza. A further concern is the potential for Iran or its allies to use anti-access and area denial tactics in the Red Sea (Bab el-Mandeb straits) and Mediterranean.

Naval terrorism represents a growing challenge in the new Middle East. Thus far, terrorist organizations have generally not commanded significant maritime capabilities. However, with the collapse of Libya, Syria, and Yemen, this might change. One of the major criticisms of the nuclear deal with Iran is that lifting economic sanctions will strengthen Iran’s ability to support terrorist groups and other activities that destabilize the Middle East. States in the Eastern Mediterranean face the possibility of attacks against vessels underway or in port and there have already been several

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10 Reuters Staff, "Iran May Seek Naval Bases in Yemen or Syria: Chief of Staff," Reuters, 27 November 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-navy-yemen-syria-idUSKBN13M08M.
occasions where this occurred: the October 2000 bombing of the United States Navy guided-missile destroyer *USS Cole* in Yemen; the July 2006 Hezbollah attack on the Israeli Navy corvette *INS Hanit* using a Chinese C-802 anti-ship missile off the coast of Lebanon; the 2016 missile attack on the United Arab Emirates’ *HSV-2 Swift* near Yemeni shores; and the February 2017 attack on a Saudi frigate by an unmanned boat loaded with explosives, estimated by the US Navy to have been of Iranian origin. Meanwhile, Hamas and Hezbollah are expanding their arsenals to enable them to threaten Israel’s offshore infrastructure. Both Hamas and Hezbollah rocket ranges already cover most of Israel’s territorial waters, but they lack the capability to hit targets with precision. Russia has been delivering advanced supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (Yakhont missiles) to the Syrian arena for over five years. Such missiles could find their way into the hands of Hezbollah and would enable it to target Israeli gas platforms and ships in the Mediterranean.

While the natural gas discoveries provide many opportunities for increased cooperation, they could also serve as a new source for conflict: Israel and Lebanon have competing claims to approximately 850 square kilometers where their claimed EEZs overlap, and the disputed area is potentially rich in hydrocarbon resources. In March 2017, the Lebanese government published a tender for oil and gas exploration in this disputed territory. Meanwhile, the Israeli parliament is discussing a law that will define this area as part of Israel’s EEZ. The Lebanese speaker of parliament told local media that such a decision would be "equal to a declaration of war on Lebanon". The disagreement is further complicated by the fact

that Israel and Lebanon do not have any formal diplomatic relations and that Israel has not ratified UNCLOS. Therefore, there is a concern that the Eastern Mediterranean could now trigger further conflict between Israel and Lebanon—and specifically Hezbollah, which portrays itself as the defender of Lebanese sovereignty.

The vulnerability of the global maritime sector to cyber-attacks is immense and the consequences of such an attack could be devastating. A cyber-attack threatens all participants; from oil and gas companies, mining corporations, and port terminal facilities to every type of shipping firm for every type of cargo or passenger. This risk grows as marine commerce increasingly depends on advanced data equipment, known as Information Communication and Technology (ICT). Within the maritime sector, there is little to no awareness of cyber security needs. The continuing crisis in the shipping industry continues to limit the motivation of shipping companies to invest money to protect their ICT equipment and infrastructure.\footnote{George Livingstone, “International Shipping Crisis – What About the Professional Mariner,” \textit{gCaptain}, 20 May 2016, \url{https://gcaptain.com/international-shipping-crisis-professional-mariner/}} Israel has become a world leader in the technical aspects of cyber defense. Since the ports of Israel and its gas installation and infrastructure are a critical part of national infrastructure, they need to be protected accordingly. The establishment of an adequate defense array with the power to cope with cyber-attacks must be part of an Israeli maritime security strategy.

Last but not least, Israel is faced with the challenge of protecting the marine ecosystem. Management of Israel's marine natural resources has suffered from instability and lack of binding long-term planning; this instability, combined with multiple regulators and interested parties operating in this domain, leads to conditions that are harmful to the ecosystem, governmental and private parties operating in the area, and the public in general. The idea of an Israeli environmental organization (a new and independent authority for managing the maritime domain) is an initiative in the right direction. The proposed authority should regulate the variety of uses for the marine environment and unite the authority currently spread among different agencies, which sometimes have contradictory interests.\footnote{Global Correspondent, "New bill seeks to protect Israel's marine ecology," \textit{Globes Israel Business News}, 29 March 2017, \url{https://www.globes.co.il/en/article-new-bill-seeks-to-protect-israels-marine-ecology-1001183098}.}
Israel has long been a target of terrorist attacks. The extraction of natural gas, with its strategic importance to Israel, represents another potential target for terrorists seeking to damage Israel’s economy and infrastructure. The logistics of offshore exploration and development as well as the relatively limited logistical requirements needed to conduct terrorist attacks add a further layer of difficulty in maintaining security at sea. A stable gas supply network is necessary for an efficient market, a growing economy, and energy security.

Possible attack scenarios include a variety of conventional military threats posed by state-actors as well as non-state terrorist activities in the multi-dimensional domains of the maritime sphere (surface, subsurface, air, and cyber), with a diverse range of weapons such as missiles, rockets, UAVs, explosives, torpedoes, suicide attacks, communications hacking, kidnapping, and hostage-taking. The nature of the infrastructure provides an advantage to offensive actions against (mostly) permanent and fixed maritime facilities.

A state's legal control of its territorial waters as opposed to its exclusive economic zone differs significantly. Territorial waters, in international law, are subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the state, while in the EEZ the state has merely special rights to the exploration and use of marine resources. In the EEZ "the coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention."17 Accordingly, in the early planning phase of the marine infrastructure, it is important, from a security point of view, to locate sensitive infrastructure within Israel's territorial waters wherever possible.

Another important factor for energy security is to create redundancies within sensitive maritime infrastructure. These redundant systems have components that become operational or can be activated in case of damage caused by hostile activities. Such components include additional gas

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transmission pipelines, a secondary production facility, and the construction of a second buoy for receiving LNG (liquid natural gas) vessels.\textsuperscript{18}

Considering the above-mentioned factors, securing energy facilities in the Mediterranean and along the Israeli coast requires the Israeli Navy to stretch its operations and capabilities. The aim should be to develop a multi-layered “system of systems” that will protect the marine gas infrastructure from various threats: one layer of such a system is made up of intelligence gathering and routine defense operation, including aerial defense (anti-aircraft and anti-missile), maritime and ground patrols, identification and visual intelligence, and regulation of civilian activities such as commercial traffic. It should also include cyber-defense and underwater components. A complementing layer should be a dedicated, spatial defense apparatus operated by the Israeli navy, tasked with safeguarding Israeli energy interests in its EEZ. A thorough analysis should be carried out to identify weaknesses in the cyber domain and a plan on how to protect the Israeli commercial fleet, the ports and their infrastructures against cyber-attacks.

As part of the effort to secure Israeli's energy installations, by the end of the decade the Israeli Navy will operate four, relatively large, Sa'ar-6 surface combatants as part of a recent deal between Israel and Germany. These ships will also be used to defend offshore energy assets in Israel's EEZ. However, the Sa'ar-6 arguably will not be able to respond to the full


The demand for the import of LNG started after the shortage of gas in Israel in 2011-2012 following the disruption of gas supplies from Egypt. This demand led the Israel Electric Company (IEC) to initiate a project of constructing an offshore buoy terminal about 6 miles west of Hadera power station and to lease an LNG tanker. In a scenario where no gas is flowing from Tamar, or the grid cannot supply the demand of the domestic market, the LNG tanker should go into operation within a very short time to produce gas and send it ashore. The LNG and its offshore facility therefore serve as the contingency plan for the Israeli market. The fact that only one reservoir, Tamar, currently supplies the Israeli market through only one pipeline, and the delay in the development of Leviathan, only increase the importance of this contingency plan. Accordingly, in March 2016, IEC considered the construction of a second buoy in southern Israel, to allow a second LNG terminal to connect to the grid, though no decision has yet been made on this issue.
range of threats that have been presented—such as divers or attacks that employ merchant vessels. They also have certain vulnerabilities, as the attack on INS Hanit illustrates. With these platforms being large and costly they themselves become the targets of terrorist attacks. These ships can therefore merely be part of a system of systems. The system of systems should include other defense components that can be installed in onshore installations and aerial vehicles. Also, since most of the Israeli Navy's activities can be expected to take place in littoral water, there is a clear need for a fast, agile, mission-focused platform designed for operations in near-shore environments and for defeating asymmetric anti-access threats such as mines, submarines, as well as small and fast surface craft. These are not the characteristic features of the Sa'ar-6.

Another important element in Israel's maritime security is the Dolphin-class submarine fleet, also built in Germany. These modern submarines are equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) which provides increased underwater endurance. The submarines have the capacity to carry surface-to-surface missiles and torpedoes. The missions of the submarines range from carrying out interdiction operations, conducting surveillance and intelligence gathering duties, as well as special operations assignments. Thus, they can function as a credible anti-ship platform, allowing Israel to exercise control over the eastern Mediterranean, secure sea lines of communication, and conduct stealthy reconnaissance along enemy shores. Finally, the use of submarines also compensates for Israel's lack of strategic depth.

Both of these important tools for Israel's maritime domain defense (Sa'ar-6 and submarines) are the result of the German government’s long-term commitment to the security of Israel.

The first meeting between official representatives of Israel and Germany took place merely 15 years after the Holocaust had ended. In their first meeting in early 1960, the respective heads of state, David Ben Gurion and Konrad Adenauer, discussed various topics including the provision of arms to the Israeli Defense Forces, which led to an agreement on financial support for Israel for many years, and ultimately, also to the establishment of diplomatic relations five years later.19

The process of acquiring submarines from the HDW/TNSW shipyards for the Israeli navy began in July 1989 and the first order was placed in January 1990 (this order was cancelled later that year due to Israel’s Ministry of Defense reallocating its budget during the first Gulf War). In winter 1991, then-Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl approved an assistance package including the construction of two Dolphin-class submarines at the German government's expense. The underlying consideration for this deal was a concern by the government of West Germany regarding the participation of German industries in the construction of chemical plants in Iraq and an effort to compensate Israel for war-related damages. The cost of the third was split between Germany and Israel, according to an agreement between Chancellor Kohl and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin.\(^{20}\)

In 2006, Israel signed a contract with ThyssenKrupp to purchase two additional submarines from its HDW subsidiary. The two new boats are a heavier, upgraded version of the older Dolpins, featuring an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. In July 2011, Israel ordered a sixth Dolphin-class submarine, and an agreement was reached under which the German government would subsidize about one third of the cost of the sixth submarine.\(^{21}\)

Germany’s commitment toward Israel's security, including its maritime aspect, has been demonstrated time and again over the last five decades.

**Opportunities for Export of Israeli Natural Gas**

According to geological estimates, the combined reserves of the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields are sufficient to provide natural gas to the local market for the next 30 years, and still allow for significant exports—namely about 40 percent of all natural gas, according to a government decision following the conclusions of the Tzemach Committee.\(^{22}\) An esti-
mate by the Bank of Israel in 2015 forecast that the government's revenues and taxes from gas over this period will amount to 69-100 billion USD.

Besides their obvious economic implications, energy exports also have geostrategic and geopolitical dimension for both the importing as well as the exporting country. The importing country requires stability and reliability of supply to ensure the function of key infrastructure whereas the exporting country requires a steady and long-term market to sell its resources and to potentially gain leverage over the importing country. This leverage, however, can sometimes act as a double-edged sword when the exporting country becomes dependent on a small number of clients who can threaten to cut trade ties in favor of more profitable alternatives. Given the substantial costs of creating the necessary installations and infrastructure to exploit and distribute natural gas, a prudent formulation of export policies is of great importance in determining its geopolitical impacts.

Although the amount of Israeli gas intended for export is relatively small in global terms, an innovative export policy could strengthen countries with shared interests, mitigate conflicts, and, in general, strengthen Israel's position in Europe and even Asia. However, the limited amount of gas and the high cost of infrastructure for export mean that Israel will have to choose and prioritize certain markets over others. Below are several considerations pertaining to possible destinations for export.

**Europe:** Given its geographic proximity, Europe would seem to be the natural export market for Israeli gas. Western Europe is facing a potential gas supply crisis due to growing instability in Algeria and the rest of North Africa. Moreover, proven offshore gas reserves in Israel’s and Cyprus’ EEZs are already sufficient to underpin multiple complementary export projects via pipeline and LNG (carried by tankers) to Eastern and Central Europe. If carried out, such export could help reduce the dependence of several Eastern European countries on Russian gas. The findings of the pre-FEED study (front end engineering design), co-financed by the E.U. Commission, are promising. The project resulted in Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy agreeing on energy cooperation in April 2017 during a ministerial summit in Tel Aviv. To reinforce their cooperation, the parties formed a quadrilateral working group with the aim to monitor and support

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*Executive Summary* (Haifa: Ministry of Infrastructure, Energy, and Water Resources, 2012),
the development of the EastMed Pipeline Project and to identify terms of a necessary intergovernmental agreement to expedite project realization. The pipeline project, while complementing other export options under assessment, represents a strategic priority for exporting part of the current gas reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean region into Europe. The proposed project would be the world’s longest and deepest subsea pipeline. Extending from Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to Greece and Italy, it would run for about 2,200km and reach depths below 3km in certain places. The main stumbling block is the global drop in gas prices, which may make this an unprofitable investment in economic terms. Building a gas pipeline to Greece is deemed highly difficult from an engineering point of view, and the estimated investment of about $6bn.-$7bn. would call for solid government support.

**Jordan:** The easiest, cheapest, and most likely destination for Israel’s natural gas is across the Jordan River to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In economic terms, Jordan is an obvious market for Israeli gas: Pipeline distances are short; potential linkages between the Israeli pipeline network and Jordan’s are measured in mere tens of kilometers. The Israeli government approved the first export deal in 2014, which enables the provision of up to 2.2 bn. cubic meters of gas from Tamar field to the Arab Potash and Jordan bromine companies over 15 years, for use at their respective facilities near the Dead Sea. The gas began flowing in early 2017. Due to political considerations, and wide-spread opposition among the Jordanian public toward a deal with Israel, the second and much larger gas deal from the Leviathan field will be carried out through a third-party marketing company that will be listed outside Israel. The owners of Leviathan—a joint-venture between Noble Energy Inc. and Delek Drilling-LP—signed a contract in September 2016 to supply 45 bn. cubic meters of natural gas to the Jordanian Power Company (NEPCO) for a period of fifteen years, with a total cost of ten billion USD. Jordan is facing increasing energy demand; this has been further heightened by a lack of Egyptian gas, following several instances of sabotage to pipelines through the Sinai Peninsula. Although Jordan currently imports some liquid natural gas

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23 John Reed, “Israel signs pipeline deal in push to export gas to Europe,” *Financial Times*, 3 April 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/78ff60ca-184c-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87.

24 John Daly, “Jordan Scrambling to Replace Lost Egyptian Natural Gas Imports”, *Oil Price*, 27 October 2011,
from Qatar, the pipeline option is preferable to Jordan both in terms of reliability of supply and in terms of price; it is also unclear whether the continued export from Qatar is feasible given the current sanctions being applied on Qatar by Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Israeli exports could assist Jordan's economy and its political stability. The contract requires a pipeline that will run close to the territory of the Palestinian Authority, and it is therefore likely that Israel will supply gas to the West Bank through this pipeline as well. The agreement, expected to enter into force in 2019, has sparked demonstrations as many Jordanians oppose a normalization of relations with Israel. It is also too early to predict how the July 2017 security incident in the Israeli embassy at Amman, which led to a severe diplomatic crisis, will affect the relationship between Israel and Jordan, including the implementation of the gas agreement.

**Egypt:** Egypt currently suffers from a severe shortage of natural gas in its internal market. The large Zohr field, discovered in its economic waters in August 2015, could presumably cover its internal demand for years. However, the development of the field is likely to be a lengthy process, during which Egypt may require Israeli gas. Additionally, Egypt operates two facilities for liquefying natural gas, which are currently under-used, and which Israel could use for export purposes. It is also possible that rather than gas being a source of competition, the synergy between the Leviathan and Zohr fields could make gas liquefaction more economically profitable for both.

In April 2017, a Swiss court ruled that Egypt will be forced to pay 3 bn. USD in compensation to the Israel Electric Company (IEC) and EMG, the company that constructed the Israel-Egypt gas pipeline, for the disruption of the previous gas deal in 2012 following attacks by militants on the pipeline. Recent reports in Egypt have suggested that a new settlement has been reached, by which IEC will forego 500 million USD in compensation...

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in exchange for Egypt agreeing to import natural gas from Israel and delineating its maritime border with Israel.

**Turkey:** The option of a pipeline to Turkey received significant momentum following the reconciliation agreement between the two countries signed in June 2016. There are indications that talks between the two governments are likely to conclude very soon, paving the way for commercial contracts.\(^{27}\) A deal with Israel could help Turkey reduce its dependence on Russian gas, especially in light of the conflicting interests of both countries in the Syrian conflict. The Turkish business sector is interested in energy cooperation with Israel, especially in light of the alternatives; such as imports from Qatar and Iran, which are likely to be more expensive, or from Azerbaijan, which would be insufficient to cover the rising demand of the Turkish energy market. An export agreement could help strengthen the relations between Israel and Turkey and create shared interests in a market with strategic importance. Furthermore, the significant price-tag attached to building an underwater pipeline and the existence of long-term contracts could also increase the cost of conflict for both countries and thereby increase incentives for cooperation. However, Israel will likely be more dependent on Turkey than vice versa, since imports from Israel are likely to amount to only about 10 percent of the entire Turkish demand and can be imported from other states relatively easily. The same is not necessarily true for Israel, which must choose which export market to focus on. A pipeline to Turkey will naturally require the consent of Cyprus, since it will pass through its ‘economic waters’. While some in Israel hope that anchoring Israel’s export system to Turkey and becoming an answer to Turkey’s energy gap will help reverse the strategic foundering of the (lopsided) bilateral relationship, Israel’s experience with Egypt and the Palestinians suggests that such hopes, while well intended, will likely be met with great disappointment.

**Gaza:** A final consideration regarding natural gas concerns the Gaza Marine gas field, near the shores of the Gaza Strip. This field is estimated to contain about 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas and the drilling rights are owned by British Gas (BG). On the one hand, developing this

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field would significantly improve the economic situation in Gaza and provide more regular and reliable electricity. On the other hand, it would arguably also strengthen Hamas vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority and boost its finances. The recent demand by the Palestinian Authority to reduce power supply to Gaza in order to put pressure on Hamas, points to the fact that a move to bolster Gaza’s energy situation would be seen as harming the Palestinian Authority. Israel therefore faces a complex dilemma regarding the Gaza Marine field.

Conclusion

Recent developments have increased the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean for all stakeholders in the region and for Israel specifically. Israel’s key interests in the Eastern Mediterranean are: (1) maintaining open sea lines of communication and identifying vital marine transportation concerns in emergency situations; (2) developing the concept of the Eastern Mediterranean as Israel’s strategic depth; (3) analyzing the strategic implications of Israel’s offshore natural gas; and (4) studying the best practices regarding energy development and use of energy revenues by other democratic countries, including environmental policies to protect and preserve the ecological system.

In order to counter rising threats and to seize new opportunities, Israel needs to pay more attention to and be more active in influencing the maritime domain. This requires, first and foremost, formulating a nation-wide maritime policy and strategy that incorporates security, economic, social, environment and other considerations, as well as developing maritime awareness among Israeli policymakers. The strategy should recognize the existing state of affairs, provide a vision for what the future should look like, and devise a plan of action on how to get from the present to the future.

Regional Stakeholders in the Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt

Sebastian Hamann

Introduction: Strategic Relationship

For the past two years, the waters around the Arabian Peninsula have witnessed military actions which were provoked by an increased struggle for supremacy in the region. Throughout the Middle East, Saudi Arabia (supported by Egypt) and Iran face each other as strategic rivals. Both parties use sea power in order to pursue their strategic objectives. The rivalry between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran predates the revolution of 1979, though it has gained great momentum since then. The recent rise in sectarian conflicts in the region has increased the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran to an unprecedented level. Though most of the conflict between the two sides has taken place in Iraq and Syria (and to a lesser degree in Bahrain and Lebanon) the developments at sea—especially off the Yemeni coast in the Red Sea—are also worth examining. The situation in this area may influence the maritime security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean for at least three reasons: Egypt, which operates the largest fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean,¹ is an ally in the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Huthi insurgency in Yemen. Egypt contributes ships to the embargo operation off the Yemeni coast, thus being part of that struggle. A possible reduction in traffic through the Suez Canal due to a worsening security situation in the Bab el Mandeb is a second cause for concern within the Eastern Mediterranean shipping community² (and not just for Egypt), as such a development would negatively affect the Eastern Mediterranean’s importance as a global water-

way. It would—simply put—become a maritime dead-end street, rather than a busy strategic waterway. A third reason why the recent developments in the waters off of Yemen matter, is the possible effect they might have on how Iran supports Israel’s opponents in Gaza and Lebanon: If there is truth to the claim that Iran and/or Hezbollah have supported the Huthi rebels in Yemen in their recent maritime attacks, then the kind of tactics used in Yemen could potentially be applied in the Eastern Mediterranean as well, should there be another round of confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah (or Hamas for that matter). Therefore, Yemen could be a testing ground for new tactics in maritime Hybrid Warfare and a training field for future operatives in this matter.

Ways to Use Sea Power

For the purpose of this article, sea power shall be defined as the ability to use the sea for military, diplomatic, or maritime-security purposes. One can distinguish a number of activities which can be described as “use of sea power,” but for this article, three specific areas will be examined:

Support to partners/proxies

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have undertaken a number of activities to support partners in the region, whereas Egypt has not been active in this field.

Iran is actively supporting allies in the region by providing both arms and training. In the past twenty years, a number of arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon and to Hamas in Gaza were well documented examples of this Iranian practice. Recently, support to the Huthi-rebels in

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Yemen has reportedly been granted by Iran.\textsuperscript{5} This is similar to the Iranian pattern of support to allies such as Hezbollah. That support—both in arms supply and in training—had a direct effect on the outcome of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{6} Perhaps most evidently, on July 14 2006, Hezbollah was able to fire an anti-ship guided missile against the Israeli corvette \emph{Hanit}. This incident constituted the first use of such a sophisticated weapon by a non-state actor.\textsuperscript{7}

Saudi Arabia has used a kind of “Dollar Diplomacy” (i.e. providing the financial means to support partners and proxies). Egypt is one of the main beneficiaries of such financial assistance, which is used both for military procurement purposes and for civil purposes.\textsuperscript{8} The Government of Lebanon has also received substantial Saudi support. In 2014, the Kingdom cofunded a multi-billion-dollar arms deal with France.\textsuperscript{9}

The absence of Egyptian activities in this area may be caused by a lack of resources, or because Egypt is to a lesser degree in need of underpinning her position in the region.

Maritime Diplomacy

Iran and Egypt are both active in the field of maritime diplomacy. Both try to actively engage with partners in the region. In the case of Iran, the Counter Piracy Squadrons of the regular Iranian Navy are used to demonstrate a regional ambition by sailing to ports reaching from Indonesia to

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{5}This topic is discussed in section 3 of this article.
South Africa. At the same time, Iran has actively engaged with partners in the region and sought access to international forums covering piracy and counter piracy operations. Iran has suffered from pirate activities, with several Iranian seafarers being held as hostages for long durations. At the same time, Iranian oil tankers are constantly in danger of falling prey to pirate attacks due to their low freeboard and slow speed. To this end, there is a great degree of legitimacy to the Iranian counter piracy efforts.

Egypt has actively engaged with partners in the region, and has participated in a number of military exercises in order to strengthen ties with these partners. Egypt has held multilateral exercises with her allies from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and with neighboring countries such as Greece. Egyptian ships and aircraft have conducted live-firing exercises with Greek naval units off Crete. Egypt has recently increased the scope of its exercises with Russian forces and seems to consider Russia as an important strategic partner.

Military Operations

In terms of military operations, the three countries act distinctly different. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have traditionally focused on the protection of key infrastructure (i.e. oil terminals for Saudi Arabia and the Suez Canal for Egypt) and related waterways. Both countries are threatened by terrorism and dependent on maritime infrastructure for their economic well-being.

Fear of an American intervention has triggered Iran to pursue an anti-access/area denial strategy. Swarm attacks by small boats are a key part of

this strategic concept which is supported by the more conventional fleet using sea-mines, submarines, and anti-ship missiles.\textsuperscript{14}

The outbreak of open hostilities in Yemen in Early 2015 has changed the strategic balance in the region. Saudi Arabia for the first time took the lead in a military coalition supporting the internationally recognized Yemeni government. An arms embargo was put in place by the United Nations, and ships from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates patrol the waters off the Yemeni coast in the Red Sea.\textsuperscript{15} This area has since become a focal point of converging interests, where all three countries pursue their respective national aims across the maritime domain.

\textit{Yemen as a Focal Point of Conflicting Maritime Strategies (KSA – IRN)}

In the past months, the waters off Yemen have witnessed a number of incidents in which Huthi-Saleh forces have used various means to attack ships of the Saudi-led international alliance.

There is reason to believe that Huthi (who are mainly a mountain tribe with no experience as seafarers) have received assistance from Iran and/or Hezbollah. Weapons found in Yemen (drones, guidance devices for SA-2 missiles, and anti-tank guided missile systems) of Iranian origin give evidence of such assistance.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, remotely controlled boats armed with explosive devices were found in Yemen. The boats were later used to attack warships off the Yemeni coast and port installations in Southern Saudi Arabia and Yemen.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} Press reports indicate that Houthi-rebels targeted a pier in the Saudi-held Yemeni port of Mukha on July 29, 2017. See: Staff, “Houthis target Yemeni port with booby-trapped boat,” \textit{Alarabiya}, 29 July 2017,
The first attacks on allied ships occurred in October 2016 and were carried out with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The first ship that was hit was the United Arab Emirates´ auxiliary vessel HSV-2. She was hit by an unknown missile on October 1 2016. Nine days later the U.S. warships USS Mason and USS Ponce were attacked by unknown missiles. USS Mason fired her own antiair missiles in response. It is yet unclear what exactly hit HSV-2 and USS Mason. It could have been a weapon from the inventory of the former Yemeni armed forces (i.e. SSN-3 STYX) or a weapon delivered from outside (i.e. C-802). In either case, the use of ASCM is a major escalatory step as these weapons have only rarely been used in the past fifty years.

On January 30, 2017 the Saudi frigate RSN Medina was attacked by a remotely controlled boat armed with an explosive device. The boat used for the attack was of the same kind that had been found in Yemen by coalition forces. Technical details of the boats revealed their likely Iranian origin. On April 25, a remote-controlled boat (likely carrying an improvised explosive device) was stopped by Saudi forces as it sailed toward a Saudi Aramco oil terminal near the Saudi town of Jazan. This attack was another escalatory step: While the first attacks took place between Hudaydah and Mukha, through this attack the Huthi-Saleh area of operation has doubled in size. At the same time, the attack against the Saudi Aramco oil terminal was the first attack against a civil target and it could potentially have caused great damage to the environment.

In March 2017, a number of incidents involving sea mines were reported by forces of the Saudi-led coalition. The mines were probably laid by Huthi forces in order to protect the Huthi-held coasts in Yemen.

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19 LaGrone, “Saudi Frigate.”
Generally speaking, it seems that the Huthi leadership would consider attacks at sea a strategically valuable course of action. Should this be the case, one can expect more attacks of this kind in the future.

**Egypt – Current Operations Versus Ambitious Procurement**

The Egyptian naval forces are currently engaged in three main fields: (1) securing the borders to Libya and Gaza, (2) securing the Suez Canal, and (3) supporting the Saudi led coalition in their maritime interdiction operation off Yemen.

This operation off Yemen underlines the regional ambitions of, and serves as a support to, Saudi Arabia. In the last ten years, Egypt has procured a number of high-value, modern naval assets. While this procurement program looks impressive at first, it remains to be seen if the Egyptian Navy will be able to operate all of the new vessels at their full potential. The Egyptian fleet now consists of ships produced by various different states which may negatively impact logistics, training, and interopera-
bility. In addition to these potential difficulties, the purchase of the two Mistral-class LPD (landing platform dock) in 2015/16 must be considered a very bold step for the Egyptian navy, which had no previous experience with ships of that size and complexity. It is therefore by no means certain that the navy will be able to make full use of the capabilities of these vessels.\footnote{Ben Ho Wan Beng, “Egypt’s Acquisition of the Mistral Amphibious Assault Ship: An Operational Analysis,” 8 October 2015, http://cimsec.org/egypts-acquisition-mistral-amphibious-assault-ship-operational-analysis/19174.} Generally speaking, one can argue that the recent additions to the Egyptian fleet were prestigious symbols rather than necessary additions. In other words, the procurement of numerous ships designed for high-intensity warfare stands in direct conflict to Egypt’s current operational needs. Smaller, simpler, and cheaper units would have arguably been more useful to deal with the maritime security challenges Egypt is faced with in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

**Summary, Outlook, and Strategic Implications**

Of the three actors under discussion, Iran has been most successful in using sea power in pursuit of her strategic aims. She has made good use of her limited resources and has managed to gain the initiative in the struggle with Saudi Arabia off Yemen. However, there is a danger that as this conflict intensifies, Yemen could become a testing ground for new tactics and technologies which may later be used elsewhere—especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. One may even argue that a generation of battle-hardened, maritime hybrid warfare specialists is currently learning their trade in a real-world environment. These men may later use their skills in the Eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere.

Saudi Arabia has hardly been able to use sea power to support its political objectives. She is reacting to Iranian moves and struggles to prevail in the conflict at sea. Her naval ambitions remain limited, and she will likely be unable to directly shape events in the Eastern Mediterranean by effectively deploying naval forces beyond the Arabian Peninsula.

Egypt has made use of her sea power in pursuit of her strategic aims. Her naval procurement is however inconsistent with Egypt’s economic capabilities as well as with her strategic needs. This may become a strate-
gic disadvantage if the ‘big-ship’ fleet becomes a burden rather than an asset.

For the West, there is a growing threat to shipping in the Red Sea and—in the case of future conflict—potentially also in the Mediterranean Sea. In such a situation, it may become hard to distinguish whether an attack was carried out by pirates, by Huthi rebels, or by al-Qaida affiliated terrorists. All three groups may use similar tactics to attack (often similar) targets. In the end, all of these circumstances add to the myriad maritime security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

*The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the German Navy, the German Ministry of Defense, or the German Government.*
The *longue durée*: Mediterranean challenges and solutions for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps

*Sarandis (‘Randy’) Papadopoulos*

The Mediterranean has been a seaway connecting the peoples of three continents for millennia. Today, 20 political jurisdictions divide its shoreline, making its waters a passageway for trade, travel and, most recently, refugees. For the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps this is familiar territory. In fact, they owe their very existence as services to the region: after late-eighteenth century North African rulers tried to tax American ships’ cargoes, as termed at the time ‘pirate’ them, the U.S. government decided to rebuild the sea services it had dismantled after the American Revolution.1 When he coined the term ‘Middle East’, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan centered it on the Arabian Gulf, with the Mediterranean as its gateway, linking Europe (especially Britain) to the world beyond the Suez Canal. Writing over 100 years ago, the American naval theorist saw the Mediterranean as vital to commerce—and for both defensive and offensive warfare.2


Since the end of the War of 1812, the Mediterranean has been a focus of Navy and Marine Corps presence. In peacetime they have offered humanitarian assistance to the region, secured diplomats and trade, deterred Soviet aggression, or reassured North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and Israel of American support. Whether speaking about the nineteenth century, or of the aftermath of two world wars, the ‘Middle Sea’ has been a leading command for both services. Indeed, even during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Sixth Fleet counted the most advanced American assets available, including its largest aircraft carriers and newest nuclear submarines. Since the end of the Cold War, the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf have drawn greater shares of the services’ attention, but the Sixth Fleet has remained on at least a smaller scale. These facts mean that for the foreseeable future, the US Navy and Marine Corps will be in the Mediterranean.

Prior to 1964, the Cold War challenges to the American naval services in the Mediterranean were Soviet land-based aviation and the occasional submarine. After this date, additional surface ships and cruise missiles amplified the high-end potential threat to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Regional players began to broaden the confrontation at that time, with the rise of terrorism and the use of an oil embargo as a political lever by Arab states in the aftermath of the 1973 October War. Collectively, these meant that the Sixth Fleet simultaneously faced a high-end threat at sea, armed with nuclear weapons, as well as a local constellation of groups using unconventional means, such as economic opposition and the first wave of terrorism, to broaden the challenges the United States faced. These turned the region’s players into potential destabilizers of the globe’s economic and political systems.

That past array of threats mirrors today’s challenge to the Marine Corps and Navy, which see shifts in the equilibrium of their Mediterranean commitment, punctuated by the aftermaths of the 9/11 attacks, the Iraq War, a renewed Russian assertiveness, threats in the cyber realm, and the instability caused by the Arab Spring. The U.S. services showed dynamic flexibility by adapting so well to the challenges of a previous generation, winning the Cold War and largely holding 1970s’ terrorism in check. They showed the same responsiveness after the fall of the Soviet Union, mastering the skills needed to contain post-1991 national collapses and enforce trade embargoes. That same breadth of inventiveness, however, will also be needed to address the challenges of today. Given the faded post-Cold War consensus, fragmented challengers, rapid information flows, and the reassertion of great power struggles, the pressure is on to employ American naval power to solve today’s security problems.

There will be a larger U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to confront these issues, but any growth to buttress maritime security in the region will take years. Simply put, the services are straining to meet the needs of combatant commands in East Asia and the Arabian Gulf; reinforcing a third in the Mediterranean would be difficult. The forces in the latter region now include (mid-2017), four Aegis destroyers capable of both ballistic missile defense and long-range strike. U.S. Marines are renewing attention to their decades-old European role, bolstered intermittently by ships transiting the sea, but these forces constitute all which will be available for some time. Indeed, as this piece is written, U.S. political leaders are debating how to achieve the force goal of 355 ships needed to support an enlarged presence in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Building ships takes time.

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Consequently, overall naval force growth during the next half-decade or more will only start to supplement the existing forces between Gibraltar and Suez. The Navy and Marine Corps have planned to grow their overall strength for some time, but getting there will take still longer.8

This presents a problem, as the range of issues confronting today’s Mediterranean are numerous and complex, and demand a resolute maritime re-

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response. The hottest crisis, the multi-sided Syrian civil war, with the Islamic State a key combatant, and Russia backing the lethal Bashar al Assad regime, cries for a robust involvement. But history shows the perils of intervention ashore without local acceptance. A brief 1982 multinational security operation in Beirut became a longer, ill-defined peacekeeping mission with tragic consequences. Amidst the Lebanese civil war, U.S. Marines found themselves under fire, and were targeted most tragically by a truck bomb at the Beirut International Airport on 23 October 1983, killing 241 servicemembers and wounding 70 more.9 French peacekeepers suffered the same fate within minutes. Such risks mean any effort to confront the region’s instability needs to be considered carefully.

Lack of legitimacy has undermined the authoritarian regimes along the Mediterranean, a movement affecting as many people as the fall of the Iron Curtain a generation ago. Rather than fearing the agents of repression, some of the peoples of the North African and Levantine coasts are denying both the local and international order.10 In one country, Tunisia, this has resulted in democratic change, but other nations’ peoples are unwilling to accept any segment of the established state of affairs. In a way, we are seeing predictions of a rise of “globalization and its discontents” come to fruition.11 Even beyond the Eastern Mediterranean, challenges to the accepted order suggest failing popular confidence in institutions (government, economics, religion and culture), akin to the “legitimation crisis” explicated by Jürgen Habermas in his 1973 work of that title.12 Reluctance to intervene from outside the region will be strong. Problems of such scope therefore underscore the need for naval adaptability in the face of resolute challenges. Militarily, today’s threats are deadly and in the open (always for maximum publicity), and they are occurring in locales where many assumptions about the nature of war no longer apply. Cumu-

10 Nathan P. Freier et al, Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone (Carlisle Barracks: Lulu, 2016), 56-63, pdf.
12 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). I am indebted to my colleague James Willson-Quayle for reminding me of this viewpoint.
latively, this array of problems poses challenges for the U.S. sea services and their longstanding allies.13 Addressing cyber-attacks, whether from groups like ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and Levant) or states such as Russia or North Korea, also demands caution, for what we know is often blurred. The 21st century presents indistinct perils freed from geography, which unsettle and complicate usual maritime ways of addressing crises.14 State agents, and criminal or contract hacker partners, have used the Internet to create important challenges to countries in and outside of NATO.15 The attackers’ key advantages are (1) speed, as falsified, stolen, or eradicated information occurs quickly; (2) low cost, making them an accessible offensive tool; (3) deniability, because attribution to a specific perpetrator is difficult; and (4) resilience to deterrence, which diminishes the utility of conventional military or naval preventive measures. Just as with the 1970s’ oil shocks, such blows take place at lower risk to culprits, making them a further challenge which sailors, staffs, and commanders must learn to manage.

With these difficulties in mind, we must look to the opportunities for naval influence, sometime called ‘shaping’, in the Eastern Mediterranean. What follows is a case study of a past attempt to limit a Mediterranean conflict, showing what NATO navies accomplished then, and offering ideas of what can be done in future.

In response to the post-1991 breakdown of Yugoslavia, the United Nations (U.N.) instituted an embargo of weapons and oil supplies, enforced by NATO and Western European Union warships. Operation Sharp Guard worked at sea alongside U.N. ground peacekeepers in the fragmenting re-

14 John Arquilla, “Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2012.  
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public and a parallel Danube River barrier mission.\textsuperscript{16} Three task groups, of roughly a dozen warships backed by maritime patrol aircraft, and with a submarine for operational support, identified and challenged more than 74,000 merchant vessels between 1992 and 1996. Over that period they boarded over 5,950 ships at sea and dispatched 1,480 of these to Italian ports for detailed inspection.\textsuperscript{17} During the mission, U.S. crews boarded numerous suspect merchantmen, while the Navy added its own unique air and subsurface surveillance of the Yugoslav Navy’s warships, processed for the use of allies.\textsuperscript{18} When the international community’s conflict with Serbia turned hot in 1995, those same units also offered local awareness and support for the combat intervention which led to the Dayton Accords.

Within the limits of a maritime operation, it is now clear that Operation Sharp Guard, as the embargo was called, slowed Serbian aggressiveness.\textsuperscript{19} The NATO and Western European Union ships on blockade duty did not stop the civil war, but the embargo they enforced successfully limited its scope and consequences. To explain that point one must go back to the writing of the famous British naval scholar, Julian Corbett: navies “hinder” operations ashore, shaping a result over time and not dictating it. Crucially, the warships of Sharp Guard fulfilled political ends which went well beyond the simplistic statement that militaries “exist to kill people and break things.”\textsuperscript{20} Coming after decades of preparation for a hot war, their success was also a testament to the lengthy interoperability investment NATO navies had made.


\textsuperscript{17} Prince and Brett, “Royal Navy,” 63.

\textsuperscript{18} Papadopoulos, “Sharp Guard,” 90-93.

\textsuperscript{19} Prince and Brett, “Royal Navy,” 74-75.

Operation Sharp Guard was no small achievement, needing constant effort by the ship’s crews and taking place despite evolving political differences within NATO on how to manage the Yugoslav crisis. For example, during 1994 and in response to domestic politics, the U.S. government altered its objectives and consequently naval orders, including rules of engagement. In response to the so-called Nunn-Mitchell Amendment of Congress, U.S. ships stopped boarding blockade runners, but they continued to inform allied ships of potential smugglers’ approach and provided air defense cover.21 That change had no impact on the mission’s ultimate success.

As a rule, alliance operations always demand efforts to establish objectives and renegotiate a mission’s terms and roles. Once begun, however, alliances assume value for political leaders—and this advantage proved true in managing the Yugoslavian crisis.22 Operationally, and despite the navies’ lengthy commitments to the Arabian Gulf and Haiti during the same period of time, political differences never created serious stumbling blocks during Operation Sharp Guard. Instead, the central strengths backing the U.N.-mandated Balkan maritime operation proved to be common doctrine, frequent exercises, compatible information protocols, and above all, the durable professional relationships from decades of service in multinational units. Today, Western navies continue to take these steps seriously, thereby building trust in one another. More than any other group of international units, NATO’s navies have practiced how to operate and fight alongside one another. As of this writing, its two Standing Naval Groups, and parallel mine warfare commands, have worked together for a cumulative total of nearly 140 years.23 The familiarity they have built doing so puts them ahead of armies and air forces, and it offers policymakers a tool for managing the Mediterranean’s recurrent crises.

That last point brings us back to the present. To the author, taking the same approach as used 25 years ago in the Adriatic could today limit in-
stability south of Europe. Geography still plays a role in politics and strategy, meaning most crises will have a naval solution, or at least a contributory maritime role. Conversely, given their Pacific and Indian Ocean commitments, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps cannot play the leading role in the Mediterranean for the near term. Ships and people can only be in a single place at a time.

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Despite declining numbers, many ships in today’s navies are more capable than at the end of the Cold War.

Source: Papadopoulos / ISS Strategic Balance

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Nonetheless, one can foresee American sea services being ordered to join credible NATO missions where the Alliance provides robust naval resources and clear interest-based objectives to justify such a contribution, even for combat. NATO navies can offer real strength for a variety of missions, precisely the ones which the United States can and probably will support.\(^{25}\) Once allies demonstrate they are making vigorous commitments of forces to an achievable mission, akin to an investment, the likelihood of a tangible American involvement will rise.

Going forward, there is also room for innovation to this approach. Shared technical efforts to improve security in the cyber and electromagnetic domain will work to the advantage of Europeans as well as Americans and be noticed and respected by the latter. To build the foundation for trust and cooperation, if allied navies adopted, for example, autonomous unmanned systems for peacetime maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean, useful for tracking refugees in small boats, and assets incidentally valuable for sharing information in case of an open conflict, it would reinforce the chances of American support. Every sailor wants to know the seas into which they are sailing. Just as was the case with Operation Sharp Guard, the bases of naval trust at sea will always be built first and most strongly with combat-capable allies.\(^{26}\)

Behind all these points are some timeless elements: as military professionals, U.S. and NATO naval personnel today enjoy opportunities for collaboration with more services than ever before. They are confident in their skills and count many friends across the globe. These are the best sailors on the planet, who know and respect one another, and the ideal crews to address problems on a globe mostly covered by water. The current crises in the Mediterranean demand solutions which will require a marathon-length effort to resolve, not just a sprint. Such a *longue durée* mission is the type of work capable fleets do best, ensuring maritime secu-

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25 Derived from Vice Admiral Greg Maddison, Canadian Navy: “the Americans do this in a very interesting way. They will not formally ask you for a contribution until they know what the contribution is actually going to be because they do not ever want to be seen to ask a nation for A, B, C, D and E when we can only give B.” Quoted in Eric Lerhe, *At What Cost Sovereignty? Canada-U.S. Military Interoperability in the War on Terror* (Halifax: Dalhousie University – Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2013), 132.

rity through naval means. Finally, so long as the day-to-day work of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps includes regular steps to build trust with allies and coalition partner navies, one can confidently expect them to contribute to a more secure future in the Eastern Mediterranean.

*The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author, and should not be construed as those of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the United States government.*
About the Kiel Sea Power Series

Building on a series of successful maritime security conferences since 2013, the ISPK has decided to establish a designated international forum to discuss maritime security challenges and the roles and missions of naval forces in the 21st century: The Kiel Seapower Series. Formally established in 2017, the series was kicked off by the Kiel International Seapower Symposium 2017—Seapower in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The events of this series are organized and/or co-hosted by the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and its adjunct Center for Maritime Strategy & Security (CMSS).

All events under this series offer a forum where experts can openly discuss pressing maritime security issues and thus raise awareness of the opportunities and challenges of seapower in a comprehensive fashion. Sensing that the maritime domain remains an opaque area for policy-makers, scientists, and naval officers alike, the series aims to foster dialogue among maritime professionals from diverse but strategic backgrounds. Ultimately, the series also seeks to create momentum within the community of interest to reach out to a broader audience and make the case for the importance of seapower and the need for further research and discussion on these matters. To this end, the ISPK will use its existing and tested avenues to spread the word through academic publications and policy briefings as well as the facilitation of a focused interdisciplinary international discourse.

The series’ logo, a trident and a pen, demonstrates our ambitions. Each event marries academic rigor to carefully articulated naval thought anchored in intellectual excellence. It is driven by the conviction that shared knowledge is empowerment.

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