The Transformation of Public Sphere

An Interdisciplinary Debate about the Recent Development of Publicity in Turkey
Politics, Society and Culture in Turkey
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edited by

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The Transformation of Public Sphere

An Interdisciplinary Debate about the Recent Development of Publicity in Turkey
The Transformation of Publicity in Turkey: Introduction

This study aims to bring the publicity forms within the recent history of Turkey into question by taking rather the conjuncture after the year of 1980. As it is known, the concept of publicity points to the social interaction spheres which operate on different levels such as visual and printed press, urban spaces, political parties and social movements. The embodiment of public sphere materializes within the (economical, political, cultural, etc.) interventions of different power forms. "Subjectivity" and "Collectivity" are produced and maintained within the public sphere. In capitalist modern society, the public sphere both diversifies as far as possible and transforms into an intense struggle spaces. As it is known, the publicity has an important weight within the deepening process of the pluralist perspective of the concepts of public sphere and civil society towards politics. Public sphere is both a reference point for criticisms towards liberal-capitalist system and analysis framework for social movements and ideological envisagement and an irreplaceable component in the building process of a more pluralistic social-political instance.

Our articles which bring the publicity into question have concentrated in three aspects. These aforementioned publicity paths which each of them correspond to a subtitle are, respectively, violence and neo-liberalism, ideology and historical transformation, and institutions and daily life. First chapter of the book rather consists of the articles which are devoted to the concept of public sphere and the relationship of the publicity with violence and neo-liberalism. It can be said that there is serious relationship between the existence and the characteristics of public life and the fact of violence. Violence restricts the public life by annihilating the actions of organization and speech. In the countries like Turkey in which the repressive apparatus is strong and in which the state and the violence are in a decisive position within the relationships between the state and the society, the non-dynamic and non-active characteristics of the public life is related to the level of this violence in use. The organization of the state in terms of neoliberal principles within the post-1980 conjuncture reveals the political-economic background of the relation of violence-publicity.

First article of both this chapter and the book is written by Murat Satıcı. This article emphasizes primarily on the meaning of the publicity. Accord-
ing to the writer, discussing the publicity means to discuss the characteristics, principles and the practice of a sphere in which the citizens ensure political participation in modern societies, negotiate their common problems and in which the critical discourses apart from and towards the public which implies the state find an opportunity to get into mediation, in short, to discuss the democracy. The writer argues that the publicity is facing both with the consequences which are created by the acceptance of liberal policies and with serious limitations under the negative influence of the perception towards pluralist democracy.

The second article of the chapter belongs to Esin Hamdi Dinçer. The article named "Lie, Obedience, Violence and Arendt: Political Life in Turkey After 2011" analyzes the recent era political life of Turkey based on the categories and the conceptualizations of Arendt. According to Dinçer, as it is clearly seen in some political actions such as Gezi events, there is a natural connection between the power and the lie. The deterioration of the public sphere also means something of a deterioration of the truth.

The article of Ali Rıza Taşkale which contextualizes neo-liberalism, violence and public sphere together brings the bio-political control processes within the society under the neoliberal conditions into question. The article which maturates with the references to the works of the thinkers such as Simmel, Foucault and Agamben provides clues to its readers about the characteristics of the neoliberal Islam in AKP Turkey.

The last article of the chapter belongs to Ayhan Bilgin. Bilgin who problematizes the relationship between the state, security and the publicity interrogates the dominant point of view which defines the public sphere as the sphere of the state. The article which embraces the relationship between the state and the security with reference to the conceptualization of liberal administration and security of M. Foucault at the first stage focuses on the transformations of approaches the liberal administration towards the security. The article which puts the interaction of the market and the civil society in the center of its analysis within this context, addresses the expansion of the market by redefining of this relationship within the neoliberal period and the repressive-punitive neo-liberal political administration techniques which feature the controlling and the supervision of the civic public sphere. Finally, the article focuses on the relationship between neo-liberal policies and security in Turkey and reveals the formation course of the neo-liberal security state in AKP era.

The second chapter of the book approaches rather the ideological and the historical transformations. Publicities reflect the social-political envis-
agements and the ideals (ideologies) of the groups who have different daily life experiences. These actors create their own publicities in different forms, for instance, by producing ideologies/ideals of "we" and public spaces. Modern society features the publicity projections and practices of various actors with their conflict/rivalry dimension in it. Ideologies reflect the plurality and the conflictual aspects of these relations within the political sphere in their purest form. In this context, the historical transformation of some ideologies in Turkey also characterizes the transformation of publicity. Besides, there are certain parallelisms between the ideological differentiations that determine the public life and the historical evolution of Turkish modernization. A sociological examination on the centralized power and the periphery reveals the details of this aforementioned transformation.

The first article of the second chapter which is about ideology and the modernity is written by Armağan Öztürk. In his article about civic Atatürkism, Öztürk brings two topics into question: The first matter which is expressed by the writer is the sociological, ideological and the historical problems within the criticisms towards Kemalism. The lack of a critical attitude towards Islamism that is similar to one towards Kemalism caused to the extinction of the secular characteristics of the public sphere and the Islamic transformation which is proceeding today by name of New Turkey. The other topic is about the changing characteristics of Atatürkism. Atatürk-based stance is characterizing a socialistic, democratic and civic opposition focal point against the state for a long time.

The article of Yavuz Çobanoğlu is about the envisagement for publicity of Islamism which wins its hegemony struggle with Kemalism. While Islamist social engineering is transforming the public sphere, the establishment of new moral codes and norms constitutes the ideological background of this aforementioned process.

The third article of the chapter is opened up for discussion by Özlem Denli with the title of "Hosting the Nation: Populist Themes in Erdoğan's Muhtar Meetings". The writer aims to analyze populism on the basis of the speeches of Erdoğan with neighborhood representatives. Neighborhood representative meetings have an exclusive position within the power realpolitik of recent era as the embodiment ground of populist themes. This study is followed by two articles which analyze the historical adventure of Turkish world of thought and Turkish modernity within the focus of power elites and space. First of these articles is written by Doğancan Özsel with the title of "Turkish Modernization and the Public Space:
Emergence, Expansion and Recent Demise". The writer argues that Turkish modernity did not cause a lasting transformation in the establishment and maintaining forms of the political power relations by contrast with it is assumed in many studies, thus the thesis which claims that "the guardianship administration of bureaucrats and intellectuals beginning from 19th century up to 20th century" is not true. While Özsel points to the differences between the 19th century publicity and the 20th century publicity concerning proving this claim, he thinks that the public sphere deepened and diversified rapidly during the republican modernization process so as to absorb other publicities. However, this process is interrupted with the right-wing hegemony of Erdoğan. The public sphere is becoming arid and monotype gradually.

The article of Efe Baştürk reviews the issue of modernity through a focus as the building of the publicity in periphery. The discursive building of the periphery is actually a kind of alternative publicity creation. The claim of the writer is in the direction of that the periphery did not obtain its qualification of being political by political discourses. The thing that makes the periphery political is the relations, discourse and the identity structures which take place in a completely a-political plane. The experience ground of traditional role patterns of the social sectors those had not been invited to the sphere of modernity and had been excluded as a means of "recognition" and self-conscious comprehension is always the periphery or peripherialized spaces.

The last chapter of our study is about institutions and the daily life practices. While institutions determine the public life, the daily life corresponds to the factors which reproduce the publicity on the level of actions and discourses. The article of Funda Çoban examines the influence of the shopping malls to the diversification of public life by analyzing the publicity in Anatolian cities through shopping malls. This topic involves remarkable outcomes especially in respect to woman publicity.

Arslan Bayram brings the relation of education-publicity into question and expresses that the access to education which is one of the fundamental human rights is no longer a right because of the applied neo-liberal policies. According to the writer, globalization and neo-liberalism privatized the educational system; this situation decreased the level of publicity. In the article studied on football by Yavuz Yıldırım, an argument similar with the sensibility emphasized in the article of Bayram. The writer eloquently underlines the capacity of football fan groups for taking public roles politically and socially. However, this tribune culture which is available to give
political reactions has been transforming into a less public instance by force of the post-industrial conditions.

The study of Hakan Serhan Sarıkaya which analyzes the relation of art and publicity in Republic Turkey is quite considerable in helping us to comprehend the cultural background behind the public sphere. The writer thinks that the transition from a more statist line in terms of the guidance and financing of art events to another perception in which the private sector and bourgeois class become influential, summarizes the Republic era art history in its most general terms. This transition has negative sides as much as positive sides. Finally, while the article brings the artistic actions in Gezi events into question within the context of their public characteristics, it defines the AKP era art policies as a regression compared to past.

Last two studies of our book are devoted to the articles which analyze the relationship between the administrative and political order and the public sphere. The article of Bağçe-Demir comparatively examines the differences between presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems in terms of political rights, democratic culture and freedoms. When it is considered that a constitutional amendment that provides a transition from parliamentary system to presidential system is approved through a referendum, the analyze framework used in the article of Bağçe-Demir becomes much more informative and meaningful.

Finally, we can mention the article of Kutay Aytuğ titled "Institutional Transformation of Turkey in the Negotiation Process: The Case of Ombudsman". The writer analyzes the formation and establishment process in terms of both European Union-Turkey relations and the democratization process of the country. The article also emphasizes the fact that the aforementioned institution is an opportunity for a democratic constitutional state.

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Publicity is one of the complex conceptions that focused on by Social Sciences. Especially Jürgen Habermas’s analyses of publicity and public sphere have impacted on the considerations of modern liberal and representative democracy and their boundaries. These are also starting points of debates on contemporary social movements and limits of the political institutions. He tried to find resolutions to issues which exist between citizens, citizenship and state, right-freedom and system of law, individual and collective demands, ideologies and present economic-politic-legal structures. According to his definition, “by ‘the public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens” (Habermas, 1974: 49). In short, publicity is a metaphor as above mentioned:

It’s a metaphor for thinking about how individual human beings come together to exchange ideas and information and feelings, about how large-scale communities manage themselves when too many individuals are involved to simply list the issues that affect them all and have each one explain, face to face, their position. It’s a metaphor which keeps us focused on the distinction between individual, personal forms of representation- over which we have a large degree of control- and shared, consensual representation- which are never exactly what we would like to see precisely because they are shared (public). It’s a liberal model which sees the individual human being as having an important input into the formation of general will- as opposed to totalitarian or Marxist models, which see the state as ultimately powerful in deciding what people think. This is the public sphere (McKee, 2005: 204).

Thus we can say that debating on publicity and the public sphere is a debating on democracy in which citizens participate in the deliberation of their common problems. And this sphere is which distinct from a state and a public which represents images of the state.

Nevertheless, with Nancy Frazer’s warning, the publicity can be read as a story of regression of modern democracy and politics. We can see this

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story in the subtitle of Habermas’s *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* which is “An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society”. In this subtitle, the emergence of bourgeois public sphere explains grounds of the liberal public sphere, but according to Habermas, it might be instrumentalized. To him, because of submission to a passive consuming and self-interests, the public is ruled by economic, political powers and their methods. Now to him,

> Beyond influencing consumer decisions this publicity is now also useful for exerting political pressure because it mobilizes a potential of inarticulate readiness to assent that, if need be, can be translated into a plebiscitarily defined acclamation. The new public sphere still remains related to the one rooted in civil society insofar as the latter’s institutional forms of legitimation are still in force. Even staged publicity generates political efficacy only in the measure that it can credibly suggest or even cash in on a capital of potential voting decisions. This “cashing in,” to be sure, is then the task of the parties (Habermas, 1989: 201).

In that way, this regression story of publicity is of vital importance for considering of contemporary politic issues around the World.

The way of debating on publicity and the public sphere in Turkey has linked to the positive and the negative characters of them. Hence it is necessary to trace the effort to democratization which included Turkey’s modernization idea. Especially we need to focus on the last decades that liberal policies dominated Turkey’s political culture after 1980 military coup which destroyed democracy and publicity. The liberal policies in Turkey such as free market, privatization policies, etc. embraced the economic liberalism. But liberal democratic process which are essential elements in the conception of contemporary democracy such as politic participation, the right to demonstration and freedom of thought and speech and non-governmental organizations and their economic or political demands have been ignored and criminalized by governments for decades. In 2000’s, although liberal and Islamic-conservative governments seem to like to consider publicity and the public sphere, they focused on these issues with limited perspective regarding “turban” and the public area which symbolized public institutions. In parallel with that matter, the definition of the modern public sphere has been incarcerated in the discussion of “turban,” and this precluded the debate about how to establish the democratic free public sphere which included intercultural, pluralistic political life. This approach created a conflict of taking part in state institutions and public areas which were bureaucratic agencies such as education, army, parlia-
ment, etc. Thus this kind of definition on the public sphere not only compressed conceptions of the democratization and the democratic public sphere into the small ground but also it raised the propensity to criminalize the criticisms raised against liberal and Islamic-conservative governments which restricted freedom of speech and the right to assembly and demonstration. These showed that the prejudice that the acceptance of liberalism automatically could establish the liberal political principles, rights, and freedom, was a delusion.

Hence we need not forget that story of publicity in Turkey has dual characters which impacted on Turkey’s political culture and history and that democracy has been the center of them. For that reason, while this work looks at the main preferences of publicity and the public sphere, it focuses on the boundedness in theory and practice in Turkey’s political culture. We also consider representative democracy which has been transformed a plebiscitary form of democracy in Turkey. At last, we will look for the possibility of rethinking the concepts of democracy and publicity that are impossible to categorically exists under conditions of “the state of emergency” exceeding a year.

Idea of Publicity and Conflicts of Present Democracy

Publicity, as Habermas described it, is indispensable regarding a critical social theory and democratic policy practices. Habermas imposed the obligation on the publicity is clear from the following quote:

A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body. They then behave neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion— that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions— about matters of general interest. In a large public body, this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it (Habermas, 1964: 49).

The concept of the public sphere, which Habermas emphasized in early modern Europe, is a concept that we cannot discuss politics and democracy today without reference to it. By McCarty definition: “In its clash with the arcane and bureaucratic practices of the absolutist state, the emergent bourgeoisie gradually replaced a public sphere in which the ruler’s power
was merely represented before the people with a sphere in which state authority was publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people” (McCarty, 1989: XI). The emergence of the public sphere rests on the rational and critical debate of the literary communities that publish groups, newspapers, and magazines that come together in cultural settings, in halls and dinner invitations, and in publicly accessible places. But the political public, which can develop outside the state, becomes able to convey the needs and interests of the society to the state by forming public opinion. Thus, the family with special interests and interests is a mediator between the private sector, such as the workplace, and the state power. According to Kellner,

Habermas’s concept of the public sphere thus described a space of institutions and practices between the private interests of everyday life in civil society and the realm of state power. The public sphere thus mediates between the domains of the family and the workplace -- where private interests prevail -- and the state which often exerts arbitrary forms of power and domination (Kellner, 2000: 263-264).

The element that fills the interior of the sphere is the emergence of a structure based on the principle of publicity that activities of the state become open to public access, that is to say, Kant1. This public sphere “later, it meant transmitting the considered “general interest” of “bourgeois society” to the state via forms of legally guaranteed free press, and free assembly, and eventually through the parliamentary institutions of representative government” (Frazer, 1990: 58). So as above mentioned:

The bourgeois public’s critical public debate took place in principle without regard to all preexisting social and political rank and in accord with universal rules (...) At the same time, the results that under these conditions issued from the public process of critical debate lay claim to being in accord with reason; intrinsic to the idea of a public opinion born of the power of the better argument was the claim to that morally pretentious rationality that strove to discover what was at once just and right (Habermas, 1989: 54).

Publicity, in general, is seen as a way for the inequalities to lose their power stemming from their statutes and to form a strong consensus on the common good as a result of the debate that discussions can be regarded each other as equal. The consensus seems to be able to respond to the

question of “modern normative and political legitimacy”. At the same
time, this replay reveals the idea of modern bourgeois publicity. But ac-
cording to Frazer,

According to Habermas, the full utopian potential of the bourgeois conception
of the public sphere was never realized in practice. The claim to open access,
in particular, was not made good. Moreover, the bourgeois conception of the
public sphere was premised on a social order in which the state was sharply
differentiated from the newly privatized market economy; it was this clear
separation of “society” and state that was supposed to underpin a form of
public discussion that excluded “private interests”. But these conditions event-
ually eroded as nonbourgeois strata gained access to the public sphere. Then,
“the social question” came to, therefore; society was polarized by class strug-
gle; and the public fragmented into a mass of competing interest group (Fraz-
er, 1990: 59).

This point will be an opportunity for us to evaluate publicity in Turkey be-
cause publicity has become apparent in all historical variants of parlia-
mentary democracy experienced in for a hundred years to realize the mod-
ernist political utopia for the solution of the problem of political legiti-
macy in Turkey. These modifications make it possible for us to evaluate how
Turkey close to the idea of publicity both regarding the practice of mod-
ernization and regarding the legitimacy and democratization of political
institutions. Turkey’s political history shows that Turkey has experiences
of modern state and parliamentary democracy. But when we look at the
framework of the idea of publicity, especially the 80s and 90s are tough
times for debating on publicity and democracy. It would not be wrong to
say that we have been stuck in the discussion of the viability of publicity
regarding the conceptualization of publicity, even though the multiparty
parliamentary system and representative democracy have been performed
long ago. According to Toker and Tekin, it is a matter that political
thought in modern Turkey was a stranger to what called ‘liberating dimen-
sions of modernity’, because of ignoring links between philosophy, think
over thinking Enlightenment, criticism, jurisprudence and capacity to be-
come citizens (Toker and Tekin, 2007: 84).

As a matter of fact after 1960-72 and lastly 80 military coups, “the 1982
Constitution” stands in front of us as the main problem. The fact that “the
1982 Constitution” that was prepared by a military junta does not include
the first and categorically to democracy, negotiation and public expression
of publicity. In this character, “the 1982 Constitution” which placed in the
security of state against its citizens is incompatible with Habermas’s view
that publicity is a legitimation of state, constitution, and law. Although
“the 1982 Constitution” defined fundamental rights and freedoms and human rights, this does not mean anything other than a ghost in the shell. For as long as there are restrictions on the right to life, the freedom of thought and expression, the free debate, and the right to action-gathering, such constitutional texts are far from being texts which based on liberty and democracy. Moreover, the elections, with the 10% voting threshold and the shadow of political bans, have been articulated in Turkish political culture for many years. While such restrictions injury equal, free and participatory representation, negotiation and publicity, citizenship does not emerge as a liberating category, but as citizenship, a state and a constitution and an authority that restricted in the principle of state’s continuation. This result reveals that the utopia of the modernization of Turkey has not taken place, on the contrary, it shows a liberal dystopia regarding publicity and democracy because of the 1980 coup d’etat and the “1982 Constitution”.

At this point, the problem is a question other than the definition and qualifications of publicity. It is the democratization issue of the public sphere. Along with the 80s in Turkey, the recognition that the liberal economy will bring about political liberalism spontaneously has reduced publicity and the public sphere to mass democracy by adding to the idea of the welfare state. The problem is a tension that exists between the potential for realization of the bourgeois public sphere and the existing normative and political potential. The results of this stress are evident: “Finally, with the emergence of ‘welfare state mass democracy,’ society and the state became mutually intertwined; publicity in the sense of critical scrutiny of the state gave way to public relations, mass-mediated staged displays, and the manufacture and manipulation of public opinion” (Frazer, 1990: 59). By reducing democracy especially to an election activity, politics becomes a populism-centered activity sphere that centers on the efficiency of providing the majority. Particularly in the definition of democracy and election, it is clear that only majority will not be related to publicity. Whereas,

The popularity index is a government’s measure of how much it has the non-public opinion of the population under its control or of how much publicity

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2 Inspired from the movie “Ghost in the Shell” (1995).
that can be translated into popularity its team of leaders must additionally obtain. Popularity is not as such identical with publicity, but it cannot be maintained in the long run without it (Habermas, 1989: 218).

The idea of publicity suggests that the source of the legitimacy of laws or policies is not the sum of the wills which depends on the results of elections but is the sum of the negotiations. But it is clear that Habermas’s idea of publicity cannot be realized in an equally participatory manner, because of its structural problems. In the idea of publicity, it was necessary to bracket the status inequalities to enter into a genuinely common negotiation, but this action has not always succeeded in overcoming these biases. As a result, dominating an integrative statist view in the negotiations doesn’t remove inequality in legislation and politics, and also different and diverse groups in decision-making and practitioners cannot include in the process.

In stratified societies, unequally empowered social groups tend to develop unequally valued cultural styles. The result is the development of powerful informal pressures that marginalize the contributions of members of subordinated groups both in everyday life contexts and in official publics spheres. Moreover, these pressures are amplified, rather than mitigated, by the peculiar political economy of the bourgeois public sphere (Frazer, 1990: 64).

These pressures always carry with the potential to insist on the demand for democracy, centered on diversity and pluralism, as well as a substantial majority. In this perspective, Turkey has gained an experience during “Gezi Movement”. According to Göle

The Occupy Gezi movement has been a staging ground for the creativity of micro-practices, and it embodies the importance of the politics of everyday life. As a public square movement, it opened up a new arena of experience and democratic opportunities growing and resonating from Istanbul, Turkey. (...) The movement represents a new threshold for democracy where old cleavages between authoritarian secularism and Islam are surpassed, and new forms of citizenship are rehearsed (Göle: 2013: 7).

4 “Habermas’s account of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere stresses its claim to be open and accessible to all. Indeed, this idea of open Access is one of the central meanings of the norm of publicity. Of course, we know, both from there visionist history and from Habermas's account, that the bourgeois public’s claim to full accessibility was not in fact realized. Women of all classes and ethnicities were excluded from official political participation precisely on the basis of ascribed gender status, while plebeian men were formally excluded by property qualifications. Moreover, in many cases, women and men of racialized ethnicities of all classes were excluded on racial grounds” (Frazer, 1990: 63).
During June 2013, citizens claimed to free participate in city policies and the decision-making process in spite of growing economic data. After the outrageous intervention of police, protestation expanded all over the country. From that moment it was understood that these protestations were resists against social, sexual, cultural discrimination and exclusion, the conservative intervention of lifestyles and against hindrances before freedom and free participation in politic decision-making.

The secularist “reaction” contained in itself a plurality of reactions from all walks of society, who participated in the protests by raising a plurality of demands. Below is a list of the most visible forms of this discontent, identities and demands, in their relationship to the Gezi protests, including the labor movement; ecological movement; the urban poor youth activism; middle-class youth activism; Alevi identity; soccer fans; women; the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transvestite, transsexual (LGBTT) movement; and the Kurdish movement (Vatikiotis and Yörük, 2016: 4).

As Benhabib said that “Gezi created an urban consciousness that brought environmentalists, feminists, LGBTQ activists, Kurdish groups together in searching for an institutionalized cultural and political voice which is not contained within the existing political structures” (Benhabib, 2013, as cited in Örs, 2014, 497). However, after this experience, the attitude of the political power which criminalized the demands of the democratization and participation in the decision-making process in Gezi Movement, has shown us that the perception of the liberal right view of publicity in Turkey hasn’t changed. At the end of the process, looking at the Constitution referendums and parliamentary elections in Turkey, we can say that political power ignored the democratic publicity which has bonded between publicity and democracy. Elections and Plebiscites are seen as an only way of legitimation of decision making and ruling. In this view, the legitimacy principle is sought in parliamentary elections and referendums which based on the majority of will alone. On the contrary debates and negotiations are of vital importance in emerging the new demands of rights and freedoms which are the reason of the constitutional and political changings. However, in Turkey, especially in the determination and implementation of the content of the constitutional amendments, it is necessary to obtain a sufficient number of majority approval in parliament, otherwise referendum. As seen in 2007-2012 and 2017 the constitutional amendments were prepared and presented by the political parties. It is clear that the participation to the negotiations was insufficient and that the approval is only subject to the majority in the parliament and the referendum is a
clear indication that the publicity is reduced to a plebiscitary process. The process of negotiations carried out both legally and de facto, and there is no established negotiation process on the social, sociological and political equality of the content of the amendments. In the course of a vital constitutional amendment included the system change, the meetings made by political parties are considered legitimate and sufficient regarding the justification, contents, and results of the changes. At the same time, in the case of a referendum held in under conditions of “the state of emergency”, the fact that the equal participation in any democratic negotiations cannot be established in an actual situation in which by the definition of the state of emergency the state can partially or wholly remove the fundamental rights and freedoms. From this perspective, it is clear that the question of the legitimacy of the state and the constitutional system is about public consensus versus majority, publicity versus manipulation, political action versus security practices, and legalism which has monologic character and status quo versus justice. This process of deterioration which was included theoretically and practically by the bourgeois public sphere draws upon the problems on general qualities of the public sphere and realization of it, while at the same time it is a structural transformation that we will take lessons to enable the achievement of the public sphere. As a matter of fact “Habermas wants to make explicit the meaning of these normative ideas and to reflect upon how they contribute to the essential informal core of a democratic society” (Pauline, 2006: 20). For Habermas, the reason of the breaking up of the public sphere is that the non-bourgeois sections gain access to the public sphere and the rise of class struggles.

The structural transformation came about, however, as private organizations began increasingly assume public power on the one hand, while the state penetrated the private realm on the other. State and society, once district, became interlocked. The public sphere was necessarily transformed as the distinction between public and private realms blurred, the equation between the intimate sphere and private life broke down with a polarization of family and economic society, the rational-critical debate gave way to the consumption of culture (Coulhon, 1996: 21).

It is not possible to have a reasoned discussion aimed at reaching a common good among groups that are almost in opposition to each other. Moreover, the press organs, that have played a significant role in the emergence of the public sphere, and that have been obligatory in public debate and the transmission of information are now technologies that manage the social consensus and support the consumption culture.
By means of these transformations, the public sphere has become more an arena for advertising than a setting for rational critical debate. Legislators stage displays for constituents. Special-interest organizations use publicity work to increase the prestige of their own positions, without making the topics to which those positions refer subjects of genuine public debate. The media are used to create occasions for consumers to identify with the public positions or personas of others. All this amounts to the return of a version of representative publicity, to which the public responds by acclamation, or the withholding of acclamation, rather than critical discourse” (Coulhon, 1996: 26 and Katz, 2000).

Those above mentioned mean that a simple reconciliation which obtained through the non-public path takes the place of publicity.

Publicity once meant the exposure of political domination before the public use of reason; publicity now adds up the reactions of an uncommitted friendly disposition. In the measure that public relations shape it, the public sphere of civil society again takes on feudal features. The “suppliers” display a showy pomp before customers ready to follow. Publicity imitates the kind of aura proper to the personal prestige and supernatural authority once bestowed by the kind of publicity involved in representation (Habermas, 1989: 195).

This transformation is also what Habermas called “refeudalization of public sphere”:

One may speak of a refeudalization of the public sphere in yet another, more exact sense. For the kind of integration of mass entertainment with advertising, which in the form of public relations already assumes a “political” character, subjects even the state itself to its code. Because private enterprises evoke in their customers the idea that in their consumption decisions they act in their capacity as citizens, the state has to “address” its citizens like consumers. As a result, public authority too competes for publicity (Habermas, 1989: 195).

Of course, the greatest critical point here is primarily that political parties define their electorates heteronomous and promote a representation that based on ideological engagements and self-interests. Such the conception of representation gives the numerical superiority to sovereign political parties while centralizing the economic welfare, religion and a particular group. But it won’t include various sides and opponents in society. On the other hand, institutions and tools of mass media and social media do not reflect the public itself. On the contrary, we can see that media owners, editors, general publishing directors or columnists manipulated citizens’ political tendencies, self-interests, and ideological belongings. It shows that the press does not represent the public, but rather reflects a simulation of the public as the purpose of establishing an artifactual public representa-
tion instead of the real public. In other words, the relationship between media and society doesn’t differ from that of citizens and political parties. This situation perfectly meets the conception of “refeudalization of publicity” above-mentioned in Turkey. Because in the elections and referendums that have taken place in Turkey over the last few years the issue that emerges through the mass media and the media mentioned above also exposed through questionnaires or public opinion polling companies. We see that many survey companies announced the numerical results in favor of some political lines. In general, research results that several of the companies have guessed are published in the media, although the success rates are low. Despite this failure, these research results are of importance regarding manipulation of a political tendency in elections. However, it is technically impossible for these investigations to reach correctly every social line. So it can not be said that the survey companies that produce small numerical representation rates could show an equal genuine participation. Taking into consideration the relations between the public and the media, a pessimistic public opinion and publicity, this shows up the publicity and public sphere that reversed the bourgeois idea of publicity. “Beyond influencing consumer decisions, this publicity is now also useful for exerting political pressure because it mobilizes a potential of inarticulate readiness to assent that, if need be, can be translated into a plebiscitarily defined acclamation (Habermas, 1989: 201). In this pessimistic view, according to Habermas, there is a surrendering to passive consumption and self-reliance rather than common good and democratic participation of citizens.

“Rescuing the Publicity” and Conclusion: An Attempt to Rethinking the Turkey’s Democracy Notion

Habermas tries to get out of the pessimism of publicity again by returning to his remarkable determination of modernity. Emphasizing the dialectic of publicity Habermas stresses the continuity of the process of structural transformation of publicity, just as his modernity defense that he claimed that modernity is an “unfinished project” (Habermas, 1997).

The outcome of the struggle between a critical publicity and one that is merely staged for manipulative purposes remains open; the ascendancy of publicity regarding the exercise and balance of political power mandated by the social-welfare state over publicity merely staged for the purpose of acclamation
is by no means certain. But unlike the idea of the bourgeois public sphere during the period of its liberal development, it cannot be denounced as an ideology. If anything, it brings the dialectic of that idea, which had been degraded into an ideology, to its conclusion (Habermas, 1989: 235).

Similar to Habermas’s definition of modernity, publicity has turned into a fundamental concept for him to underpin the realization of dialogic and deliberative democracy, even though it has entered the pessimistic paths. The political public is well-suited to become the core concept of a normative democracy theory as a tool for conditions of communication of a civil society that established by citizens that based on negotiation (Habermas, 2007: 43) This definition confronts us as an indispensable legitimacy category of the publicity for a deliberative model of democracy. While defending the idea of deliberative democracy, Habermas inevitably connects the concepts of publicity and public space. Because according to Habermas,

the source of legitimacy is not the pre-determined will of the individuals but rather than formation of this will, the process of deliberating personally. The legal decision does not represent the general will, but it is a result of the deliberation of the public as a whole, and we should assume that legitimate law is not the expression of general will, but a result of extensive discussion (Habermas, 2007: 43).

The public sphere, united with the deliberative and procedural democracy models, has now a different dimension. In Between Facts and Norms Habermas also consider the idea of the public sphere in concerning theory of democracy. Up to now, Habermas has dealt with the public sphere as a communication structure rooted in the lifeworld through the associational network of civil society. In the Structural Transformation of Public Sphere, Habermas presented public sphere as a possibility of rational and dialogical communication and normativity, avoiding the domination. Namely, “the political public sphere also defines as a sounding board for problems that must be processed by the political system because they cannot be solved elsewhere. To this extent, the public sphere is a warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society” (Habermas, 1996: 359). But as in Between Facts and Norms, in addition to the communicative and deliberative dimensions of publicity, it gains another dimension in relation to the theory of democracy within the political system. The new aspect of the publicity is clear:

From the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentialy thematize them, furnish them
with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes. Besides the “signal” function, there must be an effective problematization. The capacity of the public sphere to solve problems on its own is limited. But this capacity must be utilized to oversee the further treatment of problems that take place inside the political system (Habermas, 1996: 359).

In the hands of Habermas, the publicity became a guide to the democratic political thought. Because Habermas now uses the publicity to meet the need for the institutionalization of norms and justice not for the measure of legality of law and fairness. If he did not attach this democratic dimension, he would remain in the modern tradition that investigated for a universal legal and political legitimacy principle in modern natural law doctrines. In particular, this return would imply a return to the principle of “public use of the reason”5 that Kant described as a principle of practical reason. Habermas, however, has dialogically redefined the public in intersubjective point of view. For this reason, Habermas reinterpreted the principle of the rational legitimation in the way of an intersubjective and public version of it. For meeting the dialogic necessity for the validity of social norms tested in the actual discourse, the discourse ethic has gained a qualification that can meet the need for Habermas to realize the institutions that establish a de facto and healthy public sphere in his interpretation of publicity. The norms, however, are valid only because of the discussion in which everyone concerned as participants in the practical discourse so that the theory of law and democracy can be institutionalized in an efficiently functioning public sphere. Thus “the general social conditions which are necessary for effective participation in practical discourse are seen as a matter of justice and rights concerning claims of legitimacy of all individuals” (Baynes, 1992: 7).

As a result, publicity which has been becoming a guide for the thought of a democratic politics by Habermas indeed is not an independent theory of law or politics. He has focused on law, politics, and democracy as important parts of his project. In fact, Habermas has examined that what the

5 “Though Habermas rejects Kantian epistemology and its corollary ahistorical exaltation of philosophy as arbiter and foundation of all science and culture, in his recent work he nonetheless argues that something remains crucial from the Kantian view of modernity. Above all else, this is a notion of “procedural rationality and its ability to give credence to our views in the three areas of objective knowledge, moral-practical insight, and aesthetic judgment.” This procedural rationality is fundamentally a matter of basing judgment on reasons.” (Calhoun, 1996: 2).
nature and function of law, politics, and democracy should be in his project of democratic society, criticizing the places that they occupy in modern societies.

Critiques on that the potentials of the idea of publicity could not be realized and that this idea must be democratized are extremely useful for Turkey. In modern political institutions, principles and political actions that are only interested in the legitimacy of the state and the law publicity can not be visible all dimensions. Especially in Turkey’s multicultural and highly fragmented society, publicity does not interpret inclusionary way. The primary element for the visibility and democratization of publicity is to ensure that claims of different parties, which are essential to publicity, are seen as legitimate and democratic demands, not as threats. This can occur by the medium of recognition of the criticality of publicity.

The democratic public sphere and processes of deliberation and contestation which occur in them are doubly contingent: on the one hand, it is a historically contingent process of development which allows the formation of such a sphere in some policies and not in others; secondly, it is also contingent whether individuals in a polity have the cultural and moral resources to become full participants of a discursive or deliberative public sphere. No matter how counterfactual and contingent these processes may be, without the institutionalization of some form of free public sphere successful democracies are inconceivable. For in a world without metaphysics, identity-formation, constitutional sovereignty, and democratic legitimacy require processes and channels of deliberation, contestation, argument, and subversion which only the interlocking net of many public spheres can allow” (Benhabib, 1994: 23).

Thus the deliberation could overreach the discriminatory (economic, social, cultural and sexual) public definition in every sense of equal participation.

On the other hand, after the July 15 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and “state of emergency” announced afterward, it is impossible to speak of a publicity and public sphere categorically. We have confronted with a political structure which has been turned over security-centered politics by delegated legislations for more than a year. While delegated legislations completely close the questioning and criticism of the legitimacy of the politics, the pressure on society is increasing day by day. In such cases, it is impossible to talk about the critical, deliberative, and democratic features and criticism of publicity. In Turkey’s politics has problematic experiences of publicity and democracy in this process debating democracy is not considered enough to solve the problems. What is urgently needed is to remove
the state of emergency and then immediately rearrange the publicity for going beyond the plebiscitary way of democracy.

Indeed, in the twentieth century, central political discourses which focused on welfare and political participation have left their places to political discourses to political forms of struggles that emphasize environmental, LGBT rights, cultural and ethnic differences and diversity. Along with the new ways of political struggles, it has long been seen that politics is not only possible as being a member of a political party. Now new political actors are not just party members, but women, different ethnic groups, LGBT, environmental groups and social media users. It is the new media that is providing the space for these new political struggles. Of course, for this reason, the democratization of publicity will necessarily involve mass communication, media, social media and new media regarding the dialogic nature of it.

The importance of the public sphere lies in its potential as a mode of societal integration. Public discourse (and what Habermas later and more generally calls communicative action) is a possible mode of coordination of human life, as are state power and market economies. But money and power are nondiscursive modes of coordination, as Habermas’s later theory stresses; they offer no intrinsic openings to the identification of reason and will, and they suffer from tendencies toward domination and reification. State and economy are thus both crucial topics for and rivals of the democratic public sphere (Coulhon, 1996: 6).

The media which provide financial support for the circulation of views in this public domain, are private property and operates for profit. “Consequently, subordinated social groups usually lack equal access to the material. Thus, political economy enforces structurally what culture accomplishes informally” (Frazer, 1990: 64-65).

Indeed, although the power of the media to influence the masses is unquestionable, it is certain that it can be transformed into manipulation and propaganda tools by certain interest groups. The public opinion polling or research activity by the survey companies and media, whether they represent real public and publicity or not must be urgently debated. It is a matter of discussion how the media should be shaped to establish a publicity includes diversity and variety participants. The Internet, social media, video channels, smartphones, new media and a new communication that differs from traditional media has become widespread for so long. Contrary to the modern political subject, the participants of this new media and communication have established the public sphere which includes the
faster and more moving political subjects. As a result, social media and its users have become founding subjects of dialogical deliberation.

It is the question how the media in Turkey and the Turkey’s democracy that established in grounds homogeneous nation state, religion, language, and race can respond to these diverse, multicultural and postmodern rights, freedoms and general policies. Asking this question is the first step for realizing democratic politics that have a dialogically equitable publicity and able to include differences in deliberation.

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Towards the end of her life, Hannah Arendt returned to three subjects present across her life’s works, this time to call attention to unfolding political crises in the United States. These subjects, at the center of her 1972 *Crises of the Republic*, are lies, violence, and civil disobedience. Here, as usual, Arendt called attention to the emancipatory roots of the American Revolution. Yet more importantly, she stressed the fact that, despite such strong foundations, such a democratic system was not free from the risk of totalitarianism. Due to the persistent presence of lies and the absence of acts of civil disobedience, Arendt claimed that all regimes tend towards totalitarianism. Lies, violence, and obedience together distance individuals from critical thought, and lead to a condition of unthinking. Forgotten, in such conditions, is the fact that being a citizen means defending convictions in an organized manner. Citizens thus forget that they are beings with rights, leading to democracy in the absence of citizenship. In such political regimes, where evil has been institutionalized, citizens are defined based on a singular sense of identity, and have no choice but to obey. In short, totalitarianism becomes the only choice.

In this framework, this paper defends the thesis that Arendt’s ideas, which she maintained throughout her life, have not lost their relevance. It claims that the concepts of lies, violence, and obedience, employed by Arendt to analyze American politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, are important for understanding and debating contemporary Turkish politics. The justification for this claim stress the “great” successes obtained by the ruling Justice and Development Party (hereafter AKP) in the 2009 local elections, the 2010 referendum, and the 2011 general elections. The

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practices during and after the Gezi Park events, the governmental reac-
tions shown to movements seeking rights and freedoms on the grounds of
ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and gender, acts in response to claims of gov-
ernmental corruption, or measures taken in response to protests against hy-
droelectric and nuclear plants: all are highlighted as examples of how to-
talitarianism, which Arendt warned could always enter our lives as a nega-
tive possibility, and of how the lies, violence, and desire for obedience that
shape it, are strongly felt in Turkish politics.

Despite all negative developments, the article concludes by underscor-
ing the stress Arendt gave to the importance of the tradition of the emanci-
patory contract. It should not be forgotten that the relatively positive re-
sults produced across the history of US politics by the horizontal contract
that Arendt so often stressed, and with such importance, could serve as a
valuable source for the development in Turkey of an emancipatory repub-
lic. In this sense, the article underscores, through a different approach to
the subject of lies, violence, and civil disobedience, the possibility for the
emergence of emancipatory politics.

The Conditions of the Political

In Arendt’s thought, politics possesses a pluralist character. The free circu-
lation of beliefs, as well as the organization of similar beliefs, are impor-
tant conditions for the possibility of political life. Thanks to relations be-
tween different publics, the construction of the self in relation to the Da-
sein of the other, and indeed politics itself, become possible. For Arendt,
political action is possible with pluralism. All forms of political action that
are not pluralistic, that tend towards singularity, are beyond and/or op-
posed to politics. Politics, which is synonymous with freedom for Arendt,
is never characterized in her thought as something wholly individual, in-
ternal, or personal. Personhood is a result of relationality and association
(Berktay, 2012: 42). In Was ist Politik, Arendt clarifies that politics means
putting forward our differences collectively, and engaging accordingly in
political action. In this light, the political is the organization of people
within the framework of specific collectives, through the preservation of
the unqualified chaos of differences (Arendt, 2010: 9-10).

The principle of the equality of all individuals and groups shapes
Arendt’s understanding of power. Within such a framework, for Arendt the
concepts of power and sovereignty are entirely at odds with one another.
Power emerges in political regimes wherein one can point to the existence of free and autonomous individuals, whereas the exclusion and destruction of this understanding is the basic characteristic of regimes of sovereignty. It cannot be overemphasized that, by pluralist politics, Arendt means an organized plurality. For instance, she highlights that an important source for the disasters of the Jewish experience throughout World War II was the fact that Jewish polities chose not to participate in organized politics (Arendt, 1996: 24).

Still, Arendt does not criticize the fact of organization through the identities that people possess from birth, or through a concept of multiculturalism referring to the coming together of these identities. On the contrary, pluralist organizations give special meaning to the proliferation of the possibilities for organization and the variation of the relations between such possibilities. To be able to discuss and debate the possibility of political action and to make possible the existence of potential differences within an organization are the foundations of pluralist organization. In this context, Arendtian politics diverges from multiculturalism’s lack of reference-or its inability to refer- to relationality. For this reason, in a political system characterized by pluralism, organization relies on the durability of political action and the assurance that the possibilities for political action would not be endangered, regardless of circumstances.

The importance that Arendt gave to political action, relationality, and collectivity meant that she often discussed these concepts and stressed the basic qualities that define plurality and association. According to Arendt, while we come into being within pluralities, it is of crucial importance that we are able to continue the struggle to answer who we are, to realize our identities, and in this context to be able to assure the constancy of political action. This is because, from her perspective, political action loses its distinctive feature if the political agent is not disclosed or laid bare through such action. Discussion and deliberation are thus the principle political acts for such disclosure. Otherwise, in the absence of deliberation, in a condition wherein identity cannot be disclosed, political action, when seen as a means to an end, is hardly different from production; its capacity for spontaneity, for the uniqueness of an event, and for hopeful beginnings vanishes (Arendt, 2003: 334). Consequently, for Arendt the possibility for the representation of differences emerges both from both organizations composed of free and autonomous individuals and from individuals sharing political beliefs or convictions. One without the other is impossible. For Arendt, political action is not a singular, solitary activity. On the con-
trary, political action materializes when it is possible for free and au-
tonomous individuals (individuals capable of grasping the present, the mo-
ment, the now) to come together in search of a common aim. For Arendt,
the foundation of political action lies in the “sovereignty of a body of peo-
ple bound and kept together, not by an identical will which somehow mag-
ically inspires them all, but by an agreed purpose for which alone the
promises are valid and binding” (Arendt, 2003 a: 353).

If this is so, it is possible for us to say, based on her statements stressing
the foundational elements of politics, that Arendt also emphasized the con-
ditions that eliminate the political. Throughout her life Arendt had ana-
alyzed such facts within the historical conditions of European politics, and
towards the end of her life, made use of the same phenomena to show that
US politics was not entirely far from the possibility of totalitarianism. Ac-
cording to Arendt, the political experiences of the US in the late 1960s
and early 1970s had the opportunity to push things in the direction of po-
litical possibility. Three concepts, which constitute the critical foundation
of nearly all of her works, were Arendt’s window onto matters of Ameri-
can democracy. These are lies, obedience, and violence.

**Lies and Politics**

Lies occupy a privileged position in Arendt’s thought for the foundation of
total domination. To Arendt, the gravitational force that mobilizes the
masses and/or the lumpen is totalitarian propaganda, which exists almost
independently from them yet which is a necessary condition for the power
of acceleration and advancement. Accordingly, as soon as totalitarian lead-
ers occupy a position, they modify truth through practical lies, and in this
way terror takes the form of a specific regime of governance (Arendt,
2011: 726-7). It is, for Arendt, lies that deposit a thought or a behavior, as
a phenomenal reality, into the minds of citizens and into mechanisms for
political decision-making. The evil of lies lies in the fact that they leave no
space for belief beyond the ostensible truths they create. This is Arendt’s
first argument regarding the politics of evil that focuses on lies.

In *The Banality of Evil*, Arendt particularly emphasizes the importance
of lies by focusing on linguistic transformations. She describes how, dur-
ing Nazi rule, telling lies was forced into everyday life in a way that af-
fected the masses. For example, she shows how Nazi officers at the time,
in their “objective” demeanor, spoke of “governance” when mentioning
concentration camps, or of “economy” when talking of extermination camps. It is a sign of how deeply lies had infiltrated everyday relations and how deeply they were given importance by the masses that, like all SS officers, when the officer in charge of sending Jews to camps, Adolf Eichmann, was judged, he persisted in using the same language (Arendt, 2009: 78-9). The example of the institutionalization of lies further opens, for Arendt, a window onto far more grave examples. She emphasizes how all problems, at the time, were subject to strict language rules.

All correspondence referring to the matter was, subject to rigid “language rules,” and, except in the reports from the Einsatzgruppen, it is rare to find documents in which such bald words as “extermination,” “liquidation,” or “killing” occur. The prescribed code names for killing were “final solution,” “evacuation” (Aussiedlung), and “special treatment” (Sonderbehandlung); deportation – unless it involved Jews directed to Theresienstadt, the “old people’s ghetto” for privileged Jews, in which case it was called “change of residence” – received the names of “resettlement” (Midlung) and “labor in the East” (Arbeitseinsatz im Osten). (Arendt, 2009: 94).

Arendt emphasizes that the terms in question contain dangers far greater than lies emerging from relationships based on ordinary individual interests, and that, through the vehicle of language, and in terms of people’s relationship with the truth, it eliminates both the possibility for social organization and for people to resist evil. According to Arendt, the language rules in question were quite useful, regardless of their original design, in this act of cooperation and more importantly to assure the continuation of soldiers’ various daily routines and their mental wellbeing. This is due to the fact that the basic effect of the language system became clear not through keeping people in a state of unawareness, but through preventing people from weighing their acts, their murders and lies, in terms of what they previously knew as normal. The combination of his incompetence in ordinary speech acts and his great sensitivity to slogans and clichés make Eichmann an ideal subject of language rules (Arendt, 2009: 94-5)

In this manner, Arendt focuses on the emergence of lies and falsehood on the basis of not the individual, but the social. She notes how the popularization of lies results in the destruction of the relationship between self and other, and how hypocrisy ends up sacrificing both self and other (Arendt, 2013 a: 133). In this framework, the political, which is equivalent to an organized plurality for Arendt, assures the conditions for the erasure of or exit from politics. That lies had, in a mass way, become increasingly a political tool in American democracy at the end of the 1960s made
Arendt more aware of the conditions of American government and its people.

Arendt further contributed with several significant analyses on the means of politics in light of the experiences of the US during the Vietnam War. Confidential documents published in 1971 in the midst of war made clear the extent to which the American public had been misled by false news. Arendt shows, through these revelations, the ways in which lies were openly and actively used in this period in the highest branches of decision making in American politics. According to her, what renders this example anomalous are two distinct contributions developed in this instance in the art of lies and carried out in contemporary politics. The first negative contribution came with the increasing involvement of public relations officials into the field of governance, and the incorporation of advertisement as an important field of governance. This effectively made consumption the creative engine of society, via the subjects of mass consumption in the market economy. In this way people with free will and thought grew to have a minimum relation to concrete realities, and became simply the subjects of consumption. Public relations experts thus made a new discovery: just as the “free will” of the masses could be bought and sold through consumption, so could it be in thought and politics. The second negative contribution, according to Arendt emerged in the political meaning related to the negative consequences of the shift towards the art of lies.

In this way, pedagogues, with their endless capacity to manipulate, present illusions crafted according to the wishes of government as if they were reality. In certain circumstances, this amounts to an attempt, according to the views of pedagogues, to influence the consciences and thoughts of people, if not through terror. Perceptions thus become subjects of the market. Arendt sheds light on how the regime of lies she describes was tried in a mass manner during the Vietnam War in order to convince the masses of the necessity of war. Regarding the participation to the venture of Vietnam War, Arendt happily determines that such efforts to promote the war had limited area of influence and that the system was disappointed in this context. When she looked for the root cause of this failure, she saw the new/young generations of intellectuals and their success in carrying over their prior experiences in universities (Arendt, 2013 b: 11-12).

Arendt argues that the tendency to create the truth and then the use of that truth in the political life in the U.S. in a manner to dismiss other thoughts constitute a second type of lie and they are used especially in the Pentagon Papers. She maintains that this type of lie was used as a psycho-
logically and morally intense method mostly by the high-ranking officials especially in the field of foreign policy. Professionals, who were identified as “problem solvers,” were brought in from universities and think-tanks and assigned to solve the “problems” of foreign policy by using game theory and systems analysis. According to Arendt, the real problem was that only a small fraction of these “professionals” possessed any critical approach. This is the reason why we were never able to acquire the real reasons behind the eruption and prolongation of the Vietnam War (Arendt, 2013 b: 12-3). Such obstruction of factual phenomena to come to light indicates the disappearance of the possibility of the political, which means the relation and interaction of different publics. This pushes politics away from the political. In other words, it forces individuals to experience a kind of life where evil evolves radically into a mode of being and simultaneously one sees human beings as redundant entities.

**Obedience and Politics**

Just as much as “lie,” violence and obedience are two other factors that prevent people from forming an opinion in their daily affairs. Even when people can manage to form their own opinion, such factors aim at suppressing them. Or, they force people to accept the “naturalness” of suppression. When assessing the notion of civil disobedience, Arendt first distinguishes it from the notion of conscience. For Arendt, a moral inclination appears when an action is taken with conscience. This explains the reason why she highlights the importance of organizing and its relationship with “the political.” The moral, on the other hand, is not directly about the political if expressed in relation to the personal. Instead of separating ethics and politics, Arendt maintains that certain subjects that fall under the domain of the ethics such as “organizing/being there together” can be subjects of the political. Therefore, building Dasein is possible by being organized-pluralist. Arendt blames American democracy because it suppresses organized masses and appropriates totalitarian regimes’ leanings. She considers obedience as a childish act preventing from the formation of free and autonomous individuals. Civil disobedience, on the other hand, is highlighted for it makes the existence of mature and autonomous people who can form their own opinions possible.

For Arendt, obedience, which could only be acceptable for a child, is made part of our daily lives as a tool of suppressing political participation.
It should be countered by civil obedience of organized masses which entails the refusal of consent against structures of power. Two elements appear substantial at this point: The first is civil disobedience, which destroys the “truth” and forces “structures of domination” to share their power, also forcing them to recognize the “other.” In this regard, civil disobedience is extremely important because it forces change in static political structures shaped through law. For her, law could legalize certain acts through stabilizing change. However, change itself is always a product of once non-legal actions. Without any doubt, current rights we enjoy such as the right to strike, the right to organize and the right to bargain collectively have been achieved through years of disobedience which were once against the archaic laws of the time (Arendt, 2013 c: 103).

Civil disobedience, different from conscientious objection, has the power to destroy certain “truth” perceptions thanks to its potential to gather people from different backgrounds to form a pressure group, which in turn can cause a change in people’s opinions about public matters.\(^1\) The conception that lies in the heart of this potential is organizing, which can also be thought as common “publicities.” For Arendt, organizing is key for pluralist understanding, therefore masses combine with the interest of forming a consensus always pose a huge threat against the “truth.” Citing Tocqueville, Arendt explains how organizations gathering free and autonomous individuals together destroy the political authority, and form a multiplicity of power structures that evolve into constellation of political organizations:

“As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world,’ or have found some fault they wish to correct, ‘they look out for mutual assistance, and as soon as they have found one another out, they combine. From that moment, they are no longer isolated men but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for an example and whose language is listened to” (Arendt, 2013 c: 116 italics original).

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\(^1\) In her essay titled “Civil Disobedience”, Arendt compares the category of conscientious objection as an individual moral choice to the category of civil disobedience as a public/organizational structure. Using examples ranging from Socrates and Thoreau, she concludes that conscientious objection is apolitical as an individual assertion (Arendt, 2013 c: 87).
Violence and Politics

Arendt draws attention to “lie” as a tool that prevents opinions from being formed. And eliminating the right to civil disobedience reduces the multiplicity of opinions to only one, arguably to the one of the dominant. Finally, violence is a tool that enables the use of total domination in building the regime of factual truth.

As already mentioned, pluralities are the building blocks that constitutes “the political.” Violence or terror, which is an advanced version of violence, are counter to plurality, and they eliminate the political. Hence, for Arendt, if violence is on the rise, then it means a life with people, who are all like one another, is being constituted. This, in turn, opens more space for anti-political. For her “the extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All. And this latter is never possible without instruments.” (Arendt, 2003 b: 55). Arendt carefully draws differences between concepts of power, force, authority, and violence and ranks them based on their relationship to people’s ability to live in harmony. For her, “power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together” (Arendt, 2003 b: 57). What differentiates the man from other animals and turns him into a political creature is its ability to “act together” with his peers.

Therefore, human beings can challenge a system of total domination if they can overcome violence. In “On Revolution,” Arendt argues against orders that force people to obey authority. Such orders, Arendt argues, would require laws that claim a transcendental source of authority, in other words, a source beyond any humanly power (Arendt, 2013 a: 255). This source, Arendt indicates, is violence. If we look at this statement from another angle it argues: the truth or transcendental authority will disappear when people’s consent and agreement comes to fore. In short, as violence, lie, and obedience are pushed out of the processes of political action, politics will attain a freer character. If not, an administration that binds politics to these three phenomena will inevitably drag everything to destruction.

For Arendt, despite its shortcomings but also thanks to its basic political philosophy, the American political system possesses the potential to refute such “factual truth regimes.” In fact, in response to a question whether there is a place without a factual truth regime, Arendt answers USA without hesitation. In response to another question about what makes the American Revolution and its resistance for politics without other so dis-
tinctive, Arendt responds: the uncompromising tenacity of Americans for action and desire to occupy a place in the public sphere. According to Arendt, what the actors of the American Revolution understood from power was exactly the opposite of pre-political natural violence. Power, for them, could come into existence anywhere people congregate and bond with speech, agreement and promises given to one another. Only this kind of power, a form of power that relies on reciprocity and relationality, can be real and legitimate (Arendt, 2013a: 244).

The Anti-Political in Turkey

Arendt’s way of establishing connections between politics and lie, violence, and obedience gives us illuminating tools to open the post-2011 political developments in Turkey to debate. Following the “great” successes of AKP in the 2009 local elections, the 2010 referendum and the 2011 national elections, Turkey has witnessed a sudden transformation of its “stable” political life. After this turning point, we witnessed that AKP introduced majoritarian political practices along with a “conservative culturalist populist” strategy (Taşkin, 2013: 121-25). Büke Koyuncu calls this turn by “elitism in turn,” a strategy which diverted AKP from its prior goal of “deepening democracy” and jeopardized its status in Turkish political life. (Koyuncu, 2014: 20-2,77). Ömer Laçiner contributes to this periodization debate by highlighting the characteristics of this specific turning point in a quite resounding fashion: “Until 2011, until Gezi, there was an AKP which constantly pushed its own propaganda by putting out numbers, diagrams, statistics and pictures that was supposed to convince us for the factuality of growth, attainment of welfare and becoming freer. After 2011, this polished image was replaced by a countering AKP image which faced conspiracies, fought against hidden agendas and even jealousies of its enemies, constantly looked over its shoulder for putsches that could be triggered by anybody and any reason, and sought sanctuary in the ‘support of the nation’” (Laçiner, 2015).

The impossibility of a definite periodization should be acknowledged, however certain statements of AKP leaders pointing out the ways in which the party distanced itself from its earlier goals confirm the importance of 2011 as a turning point. Statements regarding the abandoning of intra-party coalitions with liberals demonstrates that such periodization was in fact appropriated by some high-ranked AKP officials as well (Babuşçu,

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Ayşe Böhürler, a prominent and a senior member of the party administration, maintains that there was a firm shift in senior party members’ views: “First of all, AKP was a party of coalition of right wingers. However, various segments of society such as leftists and liberals supported it, they saw hope. After gaining enormous strength, this coalition no longer needed its constituents. ‘There is no need any more, we are strong anyway’ was the sentiment. That was the point where collapse had begun.” (Böhürler, 2015). As a matter of fact, it is evident that this was a turning point as it was followed by the surfacing of a deep split in Turkish politics.

In this article, I argue that this transformation can be better understood and explained by Arendtian concept and categories of lie, violence and obedience. A retrospective analysis of Turkish politics dating back to 2011 (including the 2015 national elections and 2017 referendum) demonstrates the explanatory power of this conceptual trio, which will be discussed in the remainder of the article.

The Arendtian approach, which takes competing foci of power as the most crucial condition for the path towards pluralism and “good governance,” directs its harshest criticism to monist perspectives characterized by violence. In this framework, in June 2013 we clearly witnessed the slippage of political system towards anti-political along with the tendency towards a one-man rule. The Gezi Resistance, which erupted as a response to the increasingly violent character of the regime after 2011, is an important example that demonstrates government’s move towards anti-political. The fact that a social movement, which could easily be characterized as an act of civil disobedience, was seen and evaluated as a terrorist act to plot a putsch to take the government down highlights the characteristics of this approach. After a two year-long process, defendants, who were mere participants of an act of civil disobedience exercising their democratic rights, were acquitted based on the principle of the “freedom of thought and expression.” However, the fact that they were made part of such a lawsuit shows us how violence, obedience and lie as well as propaganda were used actively indicating the inclinations towards total domination. (Atik ve Kırkeser, 2015). The false accusation of protesters raiding the Bezmi Alem Valide

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2 Aziz Babuşçu was elected full member of the Intra-Party Democracy Board of Arbitrators in May 21, 2017 at the AKP 3rd Extraordinary General Assembly.
Sultan Mosque and drinking beer inside, was refuted relentlessly by the imam of the mosque. Yet it was put in circulation by no one else than the Prime Minister of the time (NTV Haber, 2013). This is another instance of how lie constitutes the anti-political (Hürriyet Haber, 2013). The news about alleged verbal and physical harassment of a woman wearing headscarves with religious sensitivities in one of Istanbul’s most central locations by Kabataş Pier were later proven untrue. However, this false news was circulated among politicians of the time during Gezi Park protests. It is another perfect example illustrating how lie and propaganda are utilized. The reproduction and promotion of political leaders’ lies in various newspapers as well as by columnists is another characteristic of this period. This illustrates the accuracy of labeling certain segments of media, which was supposed to be in the service of the public, as ‘pro-government media.’ It also demonstrates how the relations between media and government became closely intertwined and lie assumed an institutional character.

Arendt’s criticisms of the use media not only as a propaganda tool but also as a marketing tool to disseminate the perception regarding the Vietnam War can also be critically applied to Turkish democracy today. Especially in the immediate aftermath of the referendum of April 16, 2017, the alteration of the law mandating private media channels to have equal air time for diverse political views can be presented as a proof. The violation of equal air time principle by the public broadcasting outlet TRT as well as other private TV channels demonstrates us how media evolved from its original mission of disseminating information to the marketing of ideas. It also shows how it evolved from a pluralist point of view to a monist one (Babacan, 2017); (Birgün Gazetesi, 2017).

One must remember that one of the central claims of Arendt’s work *On Violence* is the thesis that, to the extent that power distances itself from pluralism, the final point at the analytical plane will be the sovereignty of

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3 One of the alleged witnesses of the incident and a columnist Ismet Berkan later retracted his statement and published how he changed his opinion (Berkan, 2015). For the use of lie in Turkish politics, see, (Ganbetti, 2014.).

4 Kabatas Pier incident is a very good example. This incident, which was later proven untrue, was initially discussed by many columnists in a similar manner to politicians who promoted it (Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 2015). Newspapers came out with similar headlines during the Gezi Park Resistance and Soma mining disaster where more than three hundred workers were killed.
violence. For Arendt, what assures that a single person remains sovereign is a condition that rests crucially on the violent disregard of the claims of pluralities, and indeed their destruction. In addition to the fact that what took place during the Gezi uprising was not recognized within the framework of a citizen’s right to civil disobedience, the way in which events forced citizens, in a strong manner, into disobedience, making use of nearly all the means of violence, is one of the more important matters for understanding political transformations since 2011.

According to Arendt, totalitarian regimes renders humans redundant as human beings. “Redundancy” becomes established as one identity perceives itself as the main constituent identity, and simultaneously excludes others by terrorizing them. During periods of imperialist expansion, tools such as lie, violence, terror, and propaganda are utilized to force excluded identities to obey. It would not be too hard to say that current foreign policy approach in Turkey reinforces such tendencies. The practice of exclusion, which is based on identity politics and one special form of identity (Sunni), has been actively advocated after 2011 in Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey’s stance towards the Syrian Civil War, which is triggered by the Arab Spring of 2011, represents this approach. Political leadership in Turkey promoted a divisive Alevite/Sunni policy and pursued expansionary strategies. This revealed the ways in which it wants to establish its domination. Following the war that broke out in Syria, Sunni identity was appropriated as the superior one, and a certain conception of sovereignty was built around this identity along with a system of violence. A case that depicts the internal politics equivalent of the same approach is the case of Ugur Kurt, who was fatally shot while waiting for a funeral at a djemevi. The police officer, who shot Kurt to death, was sentenced to twenty months in prison, which was later monetized. This portrays how violent acts in the name of superior identity are covered. This case as it is showcases how “sub-identity” members are forced to obey while “supra-identity” members and their inclination to violence are legitimized (Güler, 2017).

According to Arendt, politics that arises from the instrumentalization of identities become central to policies that endorse violence, fear and obedience. Under such circumstances, it is clear we are facing a political agenda

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5 These claims can be proven by the support provided to the Syrian opposition in Turkey. For Syria-based identity politics, see, (Dünya Bülteni, 2013); (Belli, 2012).
in which masses move away from critical thinking, and are composed of individuals who are reluctant to fight for their rights and simply remain unorganized. To attain this goal, organized resistance movements with consciousness to act are suppressed with propaganda and fear techniques. Since 2011, many associations, sports clubs, political parties and many other organizations alike are raided for various reasons. By highlighting the rigidity of obedience policies, what is targeted is to remove the possibility for civil disobedience. In this framework, it should be noted that particularly the ratio of organized labor has dropped to dangerous lows.\footnote{The union membership numbers is concerning. There are more than twelve million workers in Turkey, but according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security only twelve percent of that workforce is organized (ÇSGB, 2017).} Already existing and shrunk unionized workforce is intimidated constantly and their will to act is limited. This strips them off from acting politically in organized publicities. Eight calls for strike by unions have been postponed on the basis of “a threat to national security” since 2011, which could be evaluated in this context (Emek Haberleri, 2017). This terminates the possibility of political practice in which citizens can get a chance to debate different publicities and express themselves. Consequently, voting behavior which is a direct result of easily manipulated masses, motivates those with totalitarian inclinations.

The purging of over a thousand academics from their universities, through statutory decrees (KHK in Turkish), for having signed a document, dubbed “We will not be a party to this crime”, prepared by group of academics who chose to pursue politics in a public, organized, and nonviolent manner, should also be analyzed as another important extra political practice in this period (T 24 Haber, 2016). Following the harsh reactions of those in political power, the fact that Sedat Peker’s\footnote{Sedat Peker, who is portrayed as the “mafioso leader ” by the media, attacked 1128 academics who signed the petition said ‘we will not participate in this crime’ with a statement on his own website that said: "We will drain your blood in streams and take a shower in that blood." Peker is prosecuted in relation to this statement, however after two hearings in February 3, 2017 and June 9, 2017, he was released by the court pending a trial (DHA, 2017).} threatening discourse towards academics, which showed violence to be an ordinary act, received no punishment underscores the judicial legitimation of violence and a tendency to install violence at the base of politics (Hürriyet Haber, 2016). Sedat Peker organized, on 1 November 2015, before the general
elections, a meeting in condemnation of terror and called for support for the AK Party in the elections (DHA, 2015).

Consequently, as Fatmagül Berktay emphasized, when the possibilities for real politics erode, organized political lies and a violent tyrannical approach, aided by mass culture, inevitably fill the space otherwise occupied by organized, public politics with a clear stance against negative development, as we see in contemporary societies. Arendt stresses that in conditions when the forms of possibility in question disappear, this spells the destruction of the ideal of citizenship based on direct participation in the furtherance of political association (Berktay, 2010: 46). This warning of Arendt’s, intended for American democracy, is quite to the point when it comes to Turkish politics, in light of many experiences.  

8 Arendt underscores the importance, despite all the negative developments she witnessed, of the American Revolution and its tradition of the possibility of constitutional amendment by different political branches. And at the heart of all her positive references is an understanding that rests on free action with regards to the speech of new entrants to a society, to how they freely constitute and enunciate their beliefs, and to civil disobedience. If Arendt is able to create political possibilities in the contemporary world of political thought through such an understanding—and this even if the concepts of lies, obedience, and political that she warned against have taken root—is it that she is an important political theorist for understanding this contemporary chapter of Turkish politics. In the end, her emphasis on lies, violence, and obedience that, in Arendtian thought, create crises to democratic politics, can be profitably seen as an important opportunity to bring about a more settled tradition of horizontal and emancipatory constitutional politics in Turkey.

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8 For an evaluation of Donald Trump’s election in the United States and his policies based on lie, obedience and violence see, (Zabci, 2017). Zabci identifies these policies as far right populism.


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Under Siege: Neo-Liberalism and the Militarisation of Public Space

Ali Rıza Taşkale*

The Problem

‘Nothing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it’s awful!’ (Estragon in *Waiting for Godot*, 1959: 41)

Georg Simmel, perhaps still the theorist of urban experience, argues in *The Stranger* (1971) that society is not an external object that precedes the constellation of interactions between human beings. Society, according to Simmel, does not exist before ‘sociality’ takes place through it. If relations of sociality are taken away society simply disappears. As such, Simmel sees a generalised conflict in society, a contradiction between ‘life’ and ‘form’, between life as mere value and relatively stable forms that life takes. The formal structure of sociality, Simmel argues, is a continuum between two limits; human life is a permanent struggle between life and form (1971: 375). Premised upon sociality, the whole history of society and culture ‘is the working out of [the] contradiction’ between life and form (ibid. 375). For Simmel, in other words, sociality and togetherness are fundamental ingredients of society and life where the subject’s identity is constituted through conflict and antagonism.

This is most obvious when Simmel develops the concept of the stranger. In contrast to ‘the wanderer’, who, as defined by Simmel, is the one ‘who comes today and goes tomorrow’, the stranger is the one ‘who comes today and stays tomorrow’ (ibid. 185). Simmel’s stranger is thus a significant element of society itself, an element ‘whose membership within the group involves both being outside and confronting it’ (ibid. 185). The stranger comes from a different origin and ‘interacts’ with society; its distant relationship to society ‘indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near’ (ibid. 185). Embodied personal remoteness and spatial nearness at the same time, the

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stranger, therefore, looks like an example of what Simmel calls ‘sociability’. Precisely in this sense, the proportion of remoteness and togetherness is a fundamental experience of society. In line with ancient philosophy, society allows you to experience remoteness and togetherness as the proper bases of the social as well as the political.

This experience of togetherness and nearness is increasingly threatened within the horizon of neoliberalism today as it bypasses society as a space of political encounter and radical conflict. Neoliberalism seeks to expand market-based economic rationalities into all spheres of life (Davies, 2014: 244; see also Brown 2015); it is the current rationality of replacing politics with economics. By seeking to render the political a technical rationality, a calculated and strategic behavior, neoliberalism seeks to suppress not only the ability to debate and critique but also ‘real events’. It produces a vision of society in which conflict and antagonism are replaced with economic evaluation and measurement. Neoliberalism is, in short, hostile to politicisation and radical social change (see Taşkale 2016 a: 2).

Society is a necessary condition where the social and the political are constituted through radical conflict and antagonism. The logic of neoliberalism, on the other hand, tends to create a society without conflict and antagonism, a preemptive logic in which difference cannot ever be transformed into solidarity and ‘unknown unknowns’ cannot turn into radical structural change. Simmel asserts conflict and social change as the bases for sociality. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, is built on the assumption that there will be no radical dissent, critique and fundamental conflict. To put it even more directly: neoliberalism signals a disengaged politics in which any questioning of reality, or radical structural change seems to be ignored.

If we want to witness this logic of depoliticisation, of disengagement in its pure form, we have only to follow the path of the paintings produced by Edward Hopper, one of the best-known American realist painters. Automat (1927), for instance, depicts a well-dressed woman, sitting alone in a restaurant, gazing at her coffee cup. Having removed one glove only, maybe on her way to or from work or has just come in from outside waiting for a friend, the woman seems to have a deep sense of loneliness, abandonment and disengagement, the weight of which cannot be carried by the figure inside the paintings alone. Reminiscent of a disillusioned landscape, the restaurant, too, seems largely empty and unhappy. The big window makes a powerful setting for the painting: just as there is no street lighting, so there is no information at all about the world outside. Inside
however, a bright light shines out, cutting through the darkness of world outside.

![Automat – Edward Hopper (1927)](http://automathopper.blogspot.com.tr/)

Hopper’s paintings portray deadly silence, loneliness and despair of city dwellers. But the fact that Hopper’s paintings depict loneliness (and despair) as a fundamental experience of city life is a bit tricky. The more you look at it, the more its fame seems contrary:

[Hopper] says that looking at the painting gives him a sense of not being alone which is often the opposite of what people say when they see this picture. Many have seen in this disconnected state some conflict or bitter post-coital argument, but he sees it as a painting of two people who
are alone, but comfortable in being alone. There is comfort in knowing that everyone is as alone as you are (Kennedy, 2004).

No doubt Hopper’s was a society that essentially takes into account internal factors. Hopper was a deeply private man lost in the worlds of art and reading (see Slater 2002: 141). It is his profound alienation from contemporary life that led Hopper to return to internal factors and thus makes his art ‘suspicious of modernity itself’ (Levin, 1995: 229). Such signs of suspicion and alienation are in fact very much related to Hopper’s puritan views. Hopper believed that modernity was ‘antithetical’ to him as he ‘disapproved of social and structural change, of overcrowding, of disorder’ (Slater, 2002: 141). For Hopper, in other words, the modern city was a place of violence, disorder and despair, which should be avoided altogether. It was this ‘threatening’ city that made Hopper paint isolated individuals, detached from the city both socially, politically and spatially (Hobbs, 1987; see also Slater, 2002). Thus, what must appear on the outside is what happens inside the character, at the intersection of action and reaction. This complete emptiness, the coincidence of engagement and disengagement, allows you to become yourself by intensifying the viewer’s focus upon the character. ‘Anyone who looks at a Hopper becomes involved’ (Proulx, 2004: 16). But the image that can be seen as one person’s unhappiness can also be seen our inability or disengagement to help. It is as if the scene and the viewpoint are constructed, ‘so that the viewer is transfixed in front of a frozen moment from a narrative which seems to stretch far beyond the picture plane’ (Kennedy, 2004). That is to say, it comes from somewhere else in the shadow, or loneliness does not only emanate from the picture itself but also from the viewer’s reaction:

It is as if the picture’s frame has to be redoubled with another window frame. The frame is always-already redoubled: the frame within ‘reality’ is always linked to another frame enframing ‘reality’ itself. Once introduced, the gap between reality and appearance is thus immediately complicated, reflected-into-itself: once we get a glimpse, through the Frame, of the Other Dimension, reality itself turns into appearance. In other words, things do not simply appear, they appear to appear. (Žižek, 2006: 29)

What Hopper accomplishes here is a disturbing sense of loneliness and dislocation. He depicts a city where people are imprisoned in a suspended architecture, in which sociality is an impossible idea. Indeed, drawn out into an endless waiting, Hopper’s characters are trapped in their shared ignorance, disconnectedness, which carry space as far as the void. In this sense Hopper paints the desert, the desert of the void. The woman in Au-
tomat, for instance, says nothing, she has no dialogue, no touching; she is the monument of defragmentation and disconnectedness in a fragmented and interconnected world. Thus, in Automat reaction and action, politicisation and depoliticisation, the scene and the off-scene, inside and outside tend to disappear in a ‘zone of indistinction’. And perhaps herein the difference between Simmel and Hopper is at its clearest.

Simmel’s social theory is determined by external factors; his subjects are cultivated through the agency of external forms. The poetics and politics underpinning Hopper’s ‘representational’ painting (Slater, 2002) on the other hand, are concerned with internal factors that evoke senses of loneliness, boredom and despair, that is, the alienated material consequences of ‘unwelcomed modernity’. In this way Hopper ‘reveals a poverty of a society’ and shows how ‘the machinery of industrialism is no longer operative, and the illusion of progress as a motivating life force is no longer believable’ (Hobbs, 1987: 18). Simmel’s subjects are metropolitan subjects, lost into the European bourgeois interior and increased financialisation. Hopper’s subjects, in contrast, are everyday suburban Americans frozen in fordist economy and meaninglessness of the everyday. For Simmel, the city is as much about openings as it is about foreclosures. Thus the European city also has a positive effect on human actors as it enables them to undergo permanent changes. For Hopper, by contrast, the American city has a negative impact on the mind or the self, and is placed in cultural opposition to European cities. Hopper painted during the inter-war years of ‘prohibition and depression’ where unemployment, poverty, protests and strikes were part of a normality in American society. He thus witnessed what happened to the American city (New York) ‘when its growth was explosive, when its economy collapsed, when some of its people were left behind and struggled to make sense of the transforming world in which they lived’ (Slater, 2002: 142).

Moreover, Simmel’s social theory is a response to the rapidly changing, early twentieth century European city. It emerges as a response to the rise of the rationalized, scientific worldview and the emergence of the instrumental money economy. Hopper’s ‘representational’ practice, on the other hand, is a response to the rapidly changing, early twentieth American city, focusing on the subtle interaction of human subjects and the environment in which they live. Simmel’s social theory is concerned with money economy, the increasing commodification of life, in which the differences between values tend to disappear. Hopper’s representational practice, however, is interested in urban architecture and cityscapes where solitude,
boredom, and resignation reign. This is because Hopper viewed modernity and rapid urbanisation with suspicion and usually depicted them with ‘trepidation and uneasiness’ (Slater, 2002: 141; see also Levin, 1995). Simmel has a sense of revolutionary optimism, whereas Hopper is conservative in politics that accepts things as it is and thus allows no room for sociality and social structural change.

In short, Simmel views society as the very arena where sociality takes place, where the personal freedom required for bold creation can be found. Because life is the most important value, difference and sociality that take ‘freedom’ as their main point of departure are the heightening of life as ‘mere-life’. Hopper, however, depicts a world of empty time and space in which radical social change is impossible. ‘Time, like space, is...suspended—nothing is approaching the city other than the viewer’ (Slater, 2002: 148). In Simmel’s society the ‘revolutionary’ struggle in the process of ‘mere-life’ is ‘the fundamental motive force of [radical structural] change’ (see Simmel, 1980: 34). In Hopper’s society, by contrast, lonely, unsure and altogether bored people live together without doing anything: they are not capable of acting to free themselves from a life which they don’t want to live. The relation suddenly disappears, without the characters changing, but leaving them in the void. For Simmel, relation is the fundamental ingredient of city life, whereas for Hopper non-relation constitutes the position of the subject. For Simmel, the ruthless struggle is a break with the given, while for Hopper the given reality is the only reality that interiorises and thus pushes struggle to the background. Simmel symbolises action, Hopper reaction. Simmel’s social theory offers spaces for alternative social and political imaginaries, while Hopper’s anti-urbanism does not allow the social imagination to flourish. If Simmel symbolises liberation, Hopper depression. Simmel’s city is capable of conceiving lines of flight, whereas Hopper’s city is characterised by an incapacity to conceive of conflict and struggle. Simmel’s society is full of optimism, liberating rather than depressing, while Hopper’s is pessimistic which should be feared and avoided. If Simmel’s social theory symbolises conflict and radical structural change, Hopper’s representational painting symbolises a disengaged world in which conflict and radical political change are ignored.

In this essay I argue that ours is a society that increasingly resembles Hopper’s paintings, a society that cannot imagine radical political change. Ours is a neoliberal society in which lives are captivated in a disinterested boredom, inhabiting a time all of their own, unrelated and unbothered by
disruptive ‘revolutionary’ events. As such, this society does not give us, ‘all of us, the space and time to become something else, the right and opportunity to experiment, to enable lines of flight, to forge solidarities’ (Amin et al, 2000: 26). Neoliberalism – the institutionalised reaction, the systematic silence – is the clear logic beneath this process.

The ideal of a world without conflict, antagonism and radical political change is the problem of neoliberalism today. Neoliberalism, therefore, is the impossibility of a real change regarding the ‘given’ situations; its main task is to displace dissent, rupture, and resistance against the system. Its logic, of course, is political. It is a determinate formation, a principled reaction with tendencies towards the increasing neoliberalisation and militarisation of society. While neoliberalism sacralises free-market policies, it also mobilises all sorts of military/security complexes, a process in which the state of exception has become the rule (Agamben, 1998; 2005). Indeed, the militarisation belies the seemingly pacific façade of ‘consensual’ neoliberalism; contemporary society now seems to be formed in the image of militarisation. In this sense ‘the military urbanism’ becomes the organising principle of contemporary neoliberal society (Graham, 2010). In a sense, therefore, the exception has become the norm: military urbanism has permeated ‘the sphere of the everyday, the private realm of the house’ (Misselwitz & Weizman, 2003: 272).

The militarisation of society is central to depoliticised, managerial neoliberalism that has characterised the past few years. Especially since 9/11, this process has been accelerated. However, this is not to say that the militarisation of society did commence on September, 12, 2001. Processes of urban militarisation and securitisation are nothing new; they predate ‘the war on terror’. Thus, one could argue that the ‘war on terror has been used as a prism being used to conflate and further legitimize dynamics that already were militarizing urban space’ (Warren, 2002: 614). In effect, there is a particular relationship between the histories of the city and political violence. For instance, war, for Virilio (2002), is at the origins of the foundation of cities. War, according to Virilio, is not only to be understood as ‘warfare’ but as a means for thinking about the way in which society itself is constituted. War, in this sense, is an ‘absolute immanence’ that political sovereign power ‘ceaselessly fails to capture in performing the kinds of biopolitical manoeuvres upon which forms of civil pacificity are built’ (Reid, 2005: 5). As an absolute immanence, ‘pure war’ enables the state to establish homogeneous cities under the auspices of purity and safety. Indeed, methods of discipline and control—coupled with processes
of urban militarisation—served to normalise war and preparations for war as central elements of the material, political-economic and cultural constitution of cities and urban life (see Graham, 2012: 137).

To understand the importance of militarisation and war as the organising principles of society, it might be useful to read Clausewitz from a Foucauldian perspective. Such a Foucauldian perspective suggests that in On War (1993), Clausewitz did not simply define the conjunctive relation of war to society and politics as the art of strategy. He provided a theory of strategy upon which complex power relations operate within contemporary societies (Foucault, 2003; see also Reid, 2003). The primary significance of Clausewitz’s strategic thought, according to Foucault, was its basic principle upon which a new form of political power had emerged, that which Foucault described as ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 2007, 2008; see also Reid, 2003: 2). Clausewitz’s theory is valuable as it outlines the modern role of warfare in what Foucault (1998) called ‘the strategy of power’.

As Foucault provides an analytics of power that permeates the morphological networks of contemporary society, so Clausewitz helps us better understand the networking of ‘the liberal way of war’ (Dillon & Reid 2009). In this sense, militarisation and war take on positive characteristics of neoliberalism that takes on the task of the management of life in the name of the entire population and life.

Today neoliberalism increasingly centres on securitising and militarising the architectures and circulations of the city (Dillon & Reid, 2009; Graham, 2012). The struggle for contemporary society now coincides more and more with the struggle for the liberal way of war, for the ability to provide security is especially useful in maintaining a liberal way of life. However, as Agamben (2001) shows, security consists not in the prevention of crises and catastrophes but rather in their continual production, regulation, and management. Therefore, by making security central to modern governance, there is the danger of producing a situation of clandestine complicity between terrorism and state terrorism, locked in a deathly embrace of mutual incitement. When security becomes the organising principle of politics, and society and law is replaced by the state of exception, a state ‘can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself terroristic’ (Agamben, 2001).

The state of exception is always reactionary. Its declaration is a form of violence. We know very well from Schmitt (1985) that the political involves a permanent struggle between order and ‘chaos’. This is why the state of exception is declared to save the condition of normality (order),
that is to say, to avoid a true exception (Žižek, 2002: 108). What’s more, the state of exception is always counterrevolutionary because its main task is to displace dissent and resistance against the existing order. It holds together as a response to an ‘urgent threat’: how to protect order against the fear of ‘disorder’. In this sense, the state of exception is not any power whatever of neoliberalism but its central aspect. Neoliberalism, in short, has transformed the logic of exception into a form of sociality. The state of exception is no longer a historical anomaly but the normalcy itself.

The Militarisation of Public Space in Turkey

Is not contemporary Turkey under the AKP rule (the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) a good example of how the militarisation of society and the state of exception operate together? Indeed, contemporary Turkey has become a place where public space and the state of exception are central to the government’s power grab. Furthermore, it also shows how intervening and militarising public space plays a key role in government’s vision of ‘neoliberal Islam’ (Atasoy, 2009; Balkan et al. 2015; Coşar and Özdemir, 2012; Tuğal 2016). The end result is a country where violence, religion and surveillance have come to colonise cityscapes and public spaces of everyday life to protect the power of the capitalist class, creating an Islamic bourgeoisie superior to the economically disadvantaged classes and groups (see Öncü, 2014; Taşkale, 2016 b).

The military urbanism is pervasive and global, but its local and regional variants should be examined in detail. Turkey is such an example. Since the military coup in 1980, Turkey has witnessed massive privatisation of land and public spaces. Mainstream parties have seen urban space as a significant means of capital accumulation. Especially after 2002, this process has been accelerated (see Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010). Within the AKP rule, free-market dynamics were extended to the peripheries, accompanied by a massive commodification of urban space. At the heart of the AKP’s policy was the rapid and usually brutal process of the displacement of the urban poor and what David Harvey (2005) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’. This process of accumulation by dispossession, embodied by the neoliberalisation of all public assets that are seen as outside the market (e.g. the university, the healthcare system, and so on) was not complete without the demolition of public spaces and parks, as well as the destruction of nature and heritage. In this new regime, therefore, the productive labour-
power has expanded to cover all spheres of society and life—in short—all aspects of Turkey itself that have become commodified outside of the old-fashioned labour process under Islamic neoliberalism (Karaman, 2013, Tuğal, 2013). As a result, Turkey has become a country where everything can be bought and sold from every angle in the market.

In contemporary Turkey, street life is reduced to consumerism in which nothing really meaningful happens, a country made safe for the Islamic bourgeoisie and their allies. Peaceful protests of any kind are banned, as the state of exception has become the rule. Collective action is restrained and fear becomes an open field for intervention and arbitrary exercises of neoliberal and Islamist power operating on a continuum with militarisation of society. Fear and danger meet the necessities of securitisation and militarisation, whereas civil and political rights are suspended in the name of the market’s future stability. The association between fear and growing state security apparatus—in the interests of the market and the Islamic bourgeoisie—becomes almost automatic. What remains is a fearful subject whose ability to understand and make sense of events is suspended. Consequently, fear becomes a permanent feature, which circulates through the capillaries of everyday life.

In this context, contemporary Turkey is a place where neoliberal Islamism is in symbiosis with the militarisation of society. In other words, the enclosure and the massive privatisation of public spaces goes hand in hand with militarisation to stifle dissent as evidenced in the Gezi revolt in 2013.

Together with the commercialisation and commodification of inner-city gentrification projects (Lowering and Türkmen, 2011), the militarisation of urban space led to the disappearance of public space as we know it. Moreover, fear becomes part of the military Islamic-surveillance complex through which the neoliberal security state sustains and extends its activities. In this sense, the Islamic neoliberalism of Turkey is not about the state leaving the society and economy alone. Instead, state control has become a driving force in reproducing and appropriating public space. Thus the peculiarity of the Turkish case is the current hegemony of ‘political Islam’, which consolidates state power to create a regime characterised by the neoliberalisation and militarisation of public space and nature.
Instead of Conclusion

I’ve started this essay with a comparison between Simmel and Hopper. I’ve argued that Simmel’s social theory opens up the space for agonistic relations and political events, while Hopper’s is a city in which nothing happens, no perspective takes place. For Simmel, therefore, urban space is the very arena where everyday activities coincide with real events, where urban political subjectification takes place. For Hopper, on the other hand, public space no longer exists; it has disappeared. Hopper’s is a city where individuals cease to appear as active agents, devoid political significance or critical practice. In other words, in Hopper’s city there is no room for politicisation and radical social change.

In this sense ours is a society that has become a Hopperland, a society in which urban militarisation and violent economisation appeared to become unquestionable, naturalised backgrounds. We live in a neoliberal society which empties out the authentic cores that constitute politics, namely conflict and antagonism. Neoliberalism is, therefore, the current colonisation of politics by market-based techniques of evaluation and ever-increasing militarisation.

Contemporary Turkey, too, increasingly resembles a Hopperland, a country in which processes of ever-spreading marketisation and militarisation become productive and generative aspects of social life. However, Turkey is also a country where the Gezi revolt took place. The Gezi revolt demonstrated that public spaces are common grounds; they haunt the imaginations of people who can build a consciousness towards urban politicisation and emancipatory transformation. Though Islamic neoliberalism tries to occlude the very possibility of alternate social imaginaries, imagination nevertheless remains a significant element of politics. Imagination precedes neoliberal Islam.

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Neoliberal Security and the Public Sphere

Ayhan Bilgin*

Introduction

Today it is seen that security discourse and practices become a main part of social controlling and surveillance along with the establishment of neoliberal order on national and global levels. As a result of the reproduction and accumulation crises experienced both in the center capitalist states and in periphery countries since the mid 1970s, the dominant economical and political classes have activated a neoliberal globalization process. In this context, the dominant neoliberal policies towards overcoming the crisis have led a process of comprehensive transformation both of the state and the social structure. Here, the main development which is striking and increasingly transpiring and is accelerated during the contradictions created by the neoliberal globalization process and after 9/11 attacks in United States is the transformation of discourse and the practices of the political administration into a neoliberal security state form through the state of emergency and the state of exception practices. Security paradigm that gains a central ground within this process has strengthened the tendency towards restricting the pluralistic-democratic public sphere by trivializing the issues such as liberal constitutional rule of law and fundamental human rights under the name of "national security" and "war on terrorism". In this article, it will be tried to analyze from the perspective of how the relation of neo-liberalism and security is influencing the public life; and it will especially be discussed how the "exceptional administration" forms which emerge as a global tendency are influencing the liberal political democratic principles such as the rule of law, separation of powers and human rights in the light of these evaluations. In this context, the continuity of national security discourses and practices which have been the main code of the political administration in Turkey will be analyzed and the

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place of this continuity within the neoliberal policies which has emerged in post-1980 period will be discussed. Finally, it will be discussed how the neoliberal administration practices which experience its peak point in AKP era are maintaining the given securitist authoritarian state structure and how it has restructured consequently within a neoliberal security state form.

State, Security and the Production of Dominant Publicity

The historical establishment process of modern state can not be thought independently of the violence and consequently the security relations. This observation is firstly the main point which is emphasized by the thinkers who strive to build the state on a solid ground or justify it. This is also the main problematic which is dwelled on insistently by many early liberal thinkers from Hobbes to Locke when they think about the state. According to this view, the state is born from the security need of the society which is in a state of nature in the most general sense. Contrary to it had thought by early liberal thinkers (without ignoring the differences between them), it has emphasized the priority of security rather than the tradition of freedom. The view which prioritizes security is based on the rationality of "reason d'état" which opens space for extralegal exceptional practices versus freedom (Neocleous 2007:134 ff.). While the discourse of and demand for security corresponds to the process of the formation of a legitimated state monopoly on physical violence means at home, it combines two spheres in itself by involving the regulation of the relations with other sovereign countries at abroad. The matter of the priority of security has also problematized from a broader framework. Especially the analyses towards the state of M. Foucault within the context of governmentality focus to how the state apparatus is transformed within the security practices which point to its profound and comprehensive articulation with the social sphere (urban, economic and demographic processes). Because of that the security constitutes the junction of the poly-power and the domination relations which the state establish with the society –because the legitimate operation of social relations depend on this–, it emerges as the fundamen-

1 M. Foucault considers this rationality as one of the first phases of modern state construction, more precisely, the governmentalization of the state. Foucault (2005 a.).
tial principle of the social order. Governing or thinking and intervention practices of the political administration as a power form which shapes the state function as a regulatory power in which the security techniques (apparatus such as statistics, police, army) are in the center by that it begins to gather its objects from the processes immanent to the society which have spatial borders intensively.

In this sense, the state changes and transforms within the mutual interaction of the rationality and the practices of the social administration with the social processes (regulation) rather than being a stable institutional structure. For example, we see this change within the transition from a rationality in which the "reason d'état" is dominant to capitalist liberal administration rationality especially in 18th century. This rationality which functions as an adaptation to the "nature" of the social processes has emerged with the prevalence of market relations to political administration techniques (political economy) as a production sphere of truth (Foucault 2004a, 2004b). State power emerges also as hegemonic apparatus which both individualizes and totalizes with the integration process of the discipline and regulation (security) techniques. According to M. Foucault, the emergence of security dispositifs is connected with the liberal administration form and is one of the main conditions of its operation. "The employment of security mechanisms which have functions such as guaranteeing all kinds of natural phenomenon, economic processes and the processes peculiar to the population becomes the central task of the administration rationality. Finally, freedom is not the expression of individual rights which provide to resist legitimately against the power and the exploitations and the violations of the sovereign but is the essential element of the administration rationality."

We can observe that security is the main paradigm of the liberal administration also in the fact that liberal thinkers conceive security as identical with the concept of freedom (Neocleous 2008, 24 ff.).

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2 This point which is quoted by Thomas Lemke from Foucault brings forward the main problem that is immanent to liberal administration: He is not interested only in liberal administration's exercising or guaranteeing of individual freedoms but also in the matter of the production of the conditions of freedom and thus it brings the matter of administration also of the permanent dangers which can be produced by these freedoms with it.

www.thomaslemkeweb.de/publikationen/Gouvernementalit%E4t%20_Kleiner-Sammelband_.pdf (10.08.2017.).
Foucault attributes the security problem as the main principle of administration also to the employment and the production of individual freedoms which become the main condition for the operation of the power. Security, in this respect, is thought as the main principle of the production of freedom which has to be based on cost calculation and it has to balance or eliminate the conflicts and the contradictions ("dangers") which can be emerged against each other between the individual interests and the collective interests. "The security strategies which have developed against all this difficulties –to preclude the endangering of the interest mechanisms for individuals or the society- are, in a sense, both the dark side and the fundamental condition of liberalism. Freedom and security; the game of freedom and security lies in the heart of the governmental reason which I told its essentials." (Foucault 2015: 56). Administrating the dangers which comes with the freedoms brings the extension of surveillance, sanction and repression procedures in the liberal state with it. Besides, the "dangers" we face in a different level can also cause liberal governmentality crises with intense administration interventions. The emergence of economical interventionism as the main form of this intervention especially for the inter-war period and the post-war period points to the crisis oh the liberal governmentality. Foucault answers the question whether the incidents which emerge as the crisis of capitalism are also the crisis of liberalism or the liberal administration that there is a connection between two objects but the capitalist crises can not explain the crises of the liberal administration directly in political level (Foucault 2015: 59-61). Of course it is possible to say here that the thing that creates this problematic is the comprehensive effects of the capitalist market and the relations of production on social structure and relations in the last analysis; and the administration has changed and transformed with the social and political outcomes of these effects consistently. While the state transforms into an administrative state through freedom/security dispositifs, the sphere of the political struggle also takes the form of a struggle for administration techniques. All in all, Foucault has also pointed to this political dimension: "If the state continues its existence in its own form, it can only maintain its existence through this governmentality which is immanent and also external to it. Because they are these administration tactics which allows identifying what is the responsibility of the state; what is public and what is private; and what is state-related and what is not state-related." (Foucault 2004 a: 164)
The crisis of liberal administration is the crisis of the political sphere; and the crisis of the political sphere is the crisis of the class-social sphere. Another dimension of the "game of freedom/security" with regard to the characteristics of the modern political sphere emerges at the point of controlling and surveillance of this sphere as a result of its expansion by the initiation of democratic organization, participation and representation processes of the public sphere or civil society intensely at this juncture (Neocleous 2000). While the publicity monopoly hold by the state is questioned the conflicting poly-publicities of the social-political forces in modern era, the security mentality and technique expands around the controlling and surveillance of the political-social forces. Dominant liberal administration forms can only be understood on the basis of these social-political forces. Referring to the society (discourses such as "nature", "interest" and "property") by various sovereign fractions of bourgeoisie during struggling for liberal administration in the industrial-capitalist society is related to the strengthening of its power positions in itself. As for dominant liberal administration, to gain validity and its sustainability is possible with the construction and execution of these positions and it has to be reproduced permanently. While bourgeoisie refers to the society and freedoms, it invites the contradictory processes inside to the game. While the civil public sphere as the womb which determines the stability and the crises of the political administration expands, the political forces arising from this political administration compete for the dominant administration form. In this context, even if the emphasis of liberal rationality on legal norms emerges as a political-social relation and a technique of arrangement, rationalization and predictability of processes (restricting the state power), it also guarantees the domination relations which exists within the social sphere and legitimates within the scope of liberal governmentality by covering them. The effort of liberal administration rationality to make the political administration that shapes the state as limited and minimal (legal norms, separation of powers, constitutional fundamental rights discourse) is related with its capacity to produce legitimacy and consent for the domination relations which are dominant on the society, particularly for the property relations of bourgeois class fractions. Fundamental rights (such as the freedom of thought and speech, free press and the freedom of assembly and organization) which ensures the domination of bourgeois class fractions against the feudal-absolutist political groups arises on the
emergent dominant bourgeois publicities and it had given ground to publicity creation events of the social groups under dominance.³

In this context, the security apparatus which undertake the function for producing and securing the political administration rationality and techniques will be restructured towards the controlling and surveillance of this sphere which produces anti-systemic movements and conflicting publicities politically. It is possible to observe this within the transformation begun in late 18th century especially in the context of liberal governmentality. The police which have an regulatory function in almost all areas has defined during the process of liberal state as a limited force which is defined through the rule of law, which acts within legal rules and secures it; and whose focal point is to prevent, to prosecute crime and the internal security, namely, the controlling and surveillance of civil society constituents (especially the poverty and class movements which endanger the private property) those can produce insecurity (Neocleous 2000a: 22 ff.; Neocleous 2000b:10-12). "The condition of security is thus not so much liberty and property, nor the state itself, but the penetration of civil society by the state via a range of police mechanisms. Far from being a spontaneous order of the kind found in liberal mythology, civil society is the security project par excellence. Police is a mechanism for securing civil society; a mechanism, that is for securing class society" (Neocleous 2000b: 11).

The transition of the focal point of the security in context of the police towards the controlling and surveillance of civil public sphere which provides the expression of the domination relations and the organization of collective struggle (counter-publicities) reveals the liberal state's openness to political administration crises which root in the losses of social legitimacy and consent of the liberal state. It is possible to see this fact historically within the conflicting formation process both of working class movement and the publicities and of the practices in which liberal legal norms and fundamental rights are suspended during political administration crises (emergency power). These facts show that the basis is formed by the social power and power relations rather than the norms. While the class disunity of the industrial-capitalist society and the domination and power relations immanent in social processes have been transforming continuing-

³ Here, the publicity is understood in terms of the class-social conditions of collective will formation rather than in a normative level. (Negt/Kluge 1974.).
ly, it functions as a resource for administration crises –this extends from collective level to selfdom techniques- and it brings the strengthening of repressive-authoritarian forms within political administration strategies with it. These forms can arouse within liberal governmentality. Security dispositifs transforms into the basic field of authoritarian controlling and surveillance in this process. The controlling and surveillance of the civil public sphere can extend from military interventions to civic state of emergency practices in different countries. Today, the "continuing state of emergency state" which is started to be discussed with the state of emergency practices those become quite apparent especially after 9/11 attacks and war on terrorism practices appears before us historically as one of the main factors of the liberal administration techniques as Neocleous emphasizes (Neocleous 2006:194 ff.; Agamben 2005). Besides, the policies applied by the liberal state within the context of "reason d'état" or "national security" contain the practices which violates and suspends civic rights and legal norms in itself.4 (Neocleous 2008: 106 ff.) The expansion of the security practices over the controlling and surveillance of civil public sphere can arise from the contradictions and the conflicts produced by the economic sphere and it also can be an outcome of the rising of the demands for democratic political participation of social groups. It is seen that (neo)liberal states strengthen their security apparatus and practices and put repressive-authoritarian practices and laws into practice especially during the periods in which protest movements arise as a political participation form (Hirsch 1980). As a result, security practices escalate the repressive state domination over the civil public sphere and produce a result of the social exclusion and the constriction of the civil public sphere. The repressive-authoritarian forms take the form of "neoliberal security state" by strengthening throughout state security practices especially in the neoliberal era we live in.

4 "Thus emergency powers are in fact more interesting, politically more revealing, and more analytically challenging, when considered in terms of periods of "peace" and the everyday functioning of civil society, for they are then revealed as nothing less than a persistent attempt at imposing order on an oppositional labor movement and obedience on radical political organizations." (Neocleous 2006: 195.).
Neoliberal Security State

The establishment and expansion of the repressive-authoritarian security state can be seen as roughly related with two important transformation processes: First process is related with the contradictions produced by the social structure and relations while neo-liberalism has been restructuring the relationship between the state and the market in accordance with the needs of the market which restricts the economic interventions. These contradictions are seen intensely in the proliferation of social insecurity, unemployment and poverty within labor class ranks in the most general sense (Castel 2011: 77-88; Harvey 2012:164-196). Neoliberal political regulation pursues the way of strengthening the security and violence apparatus throughout these social contradictions. Second important neoliberal process is the further crystallization of the repressive-authoritarian security state through strengthening of state of emergency practices and security, punishment and law apparatus within the context of "national security" and "war on terrorism" which begun especially after 9/11 attacks. These two fundamental processes express the historical continuity of neoliberal security policies and its transformation into repressive-authoritarian political administration forms. In this context, the first fundamental process marks the repressive-authoritarian changes occurred around the contradictions produced by the social movements and capital accumulation dynamics within the institutional structuring of the state happened on national and global levels after 1980.

This process is also accompanied by the controlling and surveillance, more precisely, the securitization of civil public activities and civil public sphere intensely. It is underlying on the background of such a state structuring that the transition from the Fordist-Keynesian administration forms emerged as economic interventionism towards the capital accumulation crises encountered in the inter-war period to neoliberal market-oriented administration forms on global level. More precisely, it is a great transformation process which expresses the remodeling of social and interventionist arrangements towards the crisis of the market and the production

David Harvey defines this process with the concept of neoliberal globalization which he identifies as the transition from Fordist accumulation process to flexible accumulation process (Harvey 2012). Similarly, J. Hirsh also analyzes this process as the construction of global capitalism and the crisis of capitalist accumulation and its arrangement. (Hirsch 1995.).
sphere in favor of the free dynamics of the market as a result of neoliberal policies. (Lea / Hallsworth 2013: 19 ff.; Hirsch 1995, Harvey 2012) It is seen that the policies those support the capital accumulation and thus the expansion of market relations have been strengthening while the social welfare policies those regulate the production and labor relations and the social risks partly in favor of working classes have been weakening and eliminating. In this context, Wacquant who defines neo-liberalism as a supra-national political project that reconstitutes the connections between the market, the state and the citizenship realized initially by supra-national economical and political elites, emphasizes these extensive effects of this project: Economic deregulation or market-centered rearrangement; re-structuring of the welfare state in accordance with supporting and expanding the intensification of the commercialization of the public goods and the arrangements those force the individuals who reduced to consumer subjects to underemployed and flexible labor relations; the punishment apparatus which intensifies towards restricting the disorder produced by the social precarity and inequality which diffuses to social and physical spaces; and individual responsibility and the entrepreneurship culture. (Wacquant 2010: 213-214).

Wacquant who sees the social precarity and class fragmentation produced by the market-centered restructuring is the basis of the punishment apparatus and practices which are expanded and deepened through neoliberal elites and policies emphasizes that the punishment and violence apparatus is the principle organ of the neoliberal state (Neoliberal Leviathan) in dealing with these problems.

"The first is that the penal apparatus is a core organ of the state, expressive of its sovereignty and instrumental in imposing categories, upholding material and symbolic divisions, and molding relations and behaviors through the selective penetration of social and physical space. The police, the courts, and the prison are not mere technical appendages for the enforcement of lawful order (as criminology would have it), but vehicles for the political production of reality and for the oversight of deprived and defamed social categories and their reserved territories." (Wacquant 2010: 211)

In a similar way, Hallsworth and Lea also emphasizes that the neoliberal security state with a predominant repressive characteristics today emerged.

6 Two key articles of these writers will be examined here for that they involve especially the critical security studies to their analyses regardful. (Hallsworth/Lea 2011; Lea/Hallsworth 2013.).
through the areas such as social policy, crime control and national security with reference to an essential difference between Keynesian state and the neoliberal state within the context of the administration of inequalities produced around the "social problem" within the capitalist market. While the new security state is coercive, it is in no way a return to inter-war authoritarian corporatism. It aims not at the incorporation of all social classes into the State through nationalist unity but at the management of social fragmentation and the 'advanced marginality' of a growing global surplus population rendered ‘structurally irrelevant’ to capital accumulation." (Hallsworth/Lea 2011: 142) This security state is continuingly in search of new power and risk management technologies against "external dangers" in the globalized world. The states subject the whole population to an intensified surveillance and controlling on different levels during the "securitization" process through these technologies (Ibid, 142; Lea/Hallsworth 2013). Lea and Hallsworth identifies three main securitization areas which maintain each other interconnected and mutually: "changes in the nature of the welfare state, shifts in criminal law aimed at dealing with new categories of powerful offenders and the blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control” (Hallsworth/Lea 2011: 143) While the social security systems and strong social connections play a central role in the struggle against crime, welfare state citizenship and social integration have begun to dissolve as a result of decelerated economic growth, increased social precarity and the inequalities in the neoliberal era. The trust and solidarity relationship between social classes has entered a physical disintegration process by fragmenting. Working class segments have faced with impoverishment and unemployment problems, the labor market has become flexible and precarious working conditions has become widespread. In accordance with the assessments of Wacquant, Hallsworth and Lea emphasizes that the widely excluded social groups have been con-

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7 “It is important to distinguish the security state from the classic inter-war authoritarian states of Nazism and Fascism. These were essentially nationalist projects, inaugurated by a seizure of power at the political centre, and aimed at the corporatist absorption of civil society into a single party state through police repression, aggressive war and national-racial ideology. The post-war welfare state was a democratic answer to such authoritarianism, encouraging national integration through an archipelago of welfare and disciplinary institutions in an otherwise open society” (Hallsworth und Lea 2011: 142.).
structed as a risk and danger against which it has to be dealt with through a punitive and repressive administration by the neoliberal security state.

"Managing the risks posed by social disintegration entails new forms of state action that are coalescing into the post-welfare hegemonic project: securitization. As this project gains momentum we witness three fundamental transformations in the nature of the State: first, crime control becomes the pre-eminent paradigm for social control; second, social policy and welfare become progressively criminalized; while, third, the functions of the State are increasingly distributed through an assemblage of state and non-state actors." (Hallsworth/Lea 2011: 144)

Secondly, Hallsworth and Lea embrace the securitization strategies as a hegemonic project of the neoliberal state and according to them, the state activated various social areas and behaviors intensely in the name of controlling and preventing of crime by establishing especially the criminal law as a main ground for social policies. While the actions/areas which necessitate to be punished as a general tendency, the imprisonment/detention rates increase rather than the rates of the rehabilitation of criminals. The practices which aim forced integration of expanding unemployed communities and the poor into low-paying and flexible labor regimes especially escalate. Beyond The unemployed, the poor and the precariat, middle-class segments also begin to be a target of securitist and punitive technologies. Public spaces are rearranged by making suitable for commercial activities and consumers through the intensive employment of CCTV and profound surveillance technologies for building secure communities and life spaces and pre-emptive criminalization. As a result of the securitization of public spaces, especially the schools (drug tests, metal detectors, entrance bans, police cooperation) and the urban areas transform into places in which the crime control techniques and surveillance are justified (Hallsworth/Lea 2011, 145-46; Lea/Hallsworth 2013: 25-26; Noll 2004). While the preemptive punishment techniques increase the number of crime and criminal categories by inserting non-state actors to its control network, the flexible expansion of the powers of law enforcement forces endangers individual and civil freedoms and eliminates the divisions be-

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8 Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, and orders or ‘contracts’ relating to Parenting, Acceptable Behaviour, Curfews, Dispersal from designated public spaces, the practices such as School Exclusions and Fixed Penalty Notices are given as examples. Hallsworth/Lea 2011, 146; For the preemptive policing and its consequences, please see Noll 2004:39 ff.
between the public sphere and the private sphere. Especially the restrictive legal measures taken by all European countries within the context of global war on terrorism and the public security after 9/11 terrorist attacks have started to put democratic rights and freedoms aside at a considerable extent.

"As many have observed, the events of 9/11 led states to erode civil liberties and due process for the promise of public security in the face of 'global terrorism'. In recent UK anti-terrorist law, pre-emptive criminalization has emerged in a range of measures including a vast increase in police stop and search dispensing with 'reasonable suspicion', movement and other restrictions imposed on individuals on the basis of suspicion by the Home Secretary and without right of appeal to the courts (Control Orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005), vague criminalization of the 'glorification' of terrorism (Terrorism Act 2006), redefinition of criminal conspiracy in terms of vague notion of 'links' with 'international terrorist groups' (Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) and extension of police pre-trial detention for terrorist suspects." (Hallsworth/Lea 2011, 148-49)

In United States case, the practices suggested within the context of the measures and the laws of the war on terrorism have brought the strengthening of the executive against other powers to pass; have widened the authorities of police and intelligence apparatus; and have provided a wide playground for personal and arbitrary treatments. Anti-terrorism laws such as "Emergency Economic Stabilization Act" (2008) and the "National Defense Authorization" (2012) have firstly widen the definition of terror in terms of participation and have incorporated large sectors of the society into the intelligence network as suspects by expanded, preemptive intelligence and policing activities (Boukalas 2016: 45-46).

The third point associates the emergence of the new security state to fact that the national borders become vague and become transitive also with the globalization. International money, commodity and population mobility and intense migrations which have brought along the globalization have made the countries interrogated their traditional internal and external frontier divisions within their own territories. Within the context of the struggle against global terrorism, especially the criminal law and the law of war have interpenetrated. "State activities legitimized by 'wartime' conditions include massive intrusive surveillance—of everything from financial transactions, interpersonal communications, presence in significant locations, personal identity details. They have created a whole new population of suspect communities—potential enemy aliens" (Hallsworth/Lea 2011:150). The real borders transforms into everywhere
in this manner and it brings the militarization of police with it. Thus, state practices transform large social groups into suspect communities and possible enemies through interventionist surveillance with reference to the existence of war conditions by gathering the internal and external threats in it within the context of war on terrorism.

In conclusion, critical security perspective places the neoliberal security state to the context of the disintegration of the political-social structure and relations produced by the Keynesian welfare state based on economic interventionism by the neo-liberalism which is understood as a global-scale market-centered restructuring (ideology and administration technique).

Neoliberal political policies and technologies construct and securitize the main social problems (such as poverty, unemployment, urban segregation and criminality) created by this disintegration and their consequences as a risk or a danger rather than using rehabilitation and integration mechanisms and try to manage them with repressive-punitive practices. This process has created the repressive-authoritative security state by encircling the social and physical space, the civil public sphere and freedoms on different levels today.

**Neoliberal Security State in Turkey**

The security-centered authoritative political administration forms which were tried to explain above and were produced by neoliberal discourses, policies and technologies are one of the facts that is observed roughly after the year of 1980 on global level – even though they take different forms in different countries. We can say that the matter is to realize global mutually-adopted market-centered accumulation regimes under the domination of advanced capitalist center countries here in question when we think that one of the most important aspects of neoliberal deregulation is to create the conditions for free mobility of capital on global level.

In Turkey, this process has emerged with the beginning of crisis of the Western Bloc and an accumulation regime (import-substitution development – ISD) which is established by the military coup in the year of 1960 and which is integrated to international market under the leadership of that bloc against the Soviet Bloc. In this regime, the state has taken a central role in the formation of an industry-centered national market and a capitalist class by investment and planning. This period also corresponds to the
developmentalist accumulation model based on economical interventions; and a process in which the constitutional institutions those guarantee the political and social rights and army-centered national security institutions have been designating state-society relations as main mechanisms (Keyder 1989:175 ff; Akça 2010:365 ff.). This established structure has faced with administration crises aroused on different levels (economical, political, social and cultural) especially beginning from mid-1970s and it has ended up in the year of 1980 by a military coup. This historical conjuncture corresponds to the emergence of neoliberal regimes on global level.

A state of emergency regime has declared along with the military coup and has remained in force over three years. In this process, the military has restructured the state sphere based on authoritarian neoliberal administration. The new structuring involves the integration to global market and the international area on the one hand and the associating forms of the state with the market and the society on the other. An export-based development or accumulation model has adopted by leaving the ISD model and at the same time, particularly with the withdrawing of the state form the economical area⁹ (such as privatizations, suspending state investments), a supply- or market-oriented neoliberal political economy framework has established. Central executive has strengthened in state structuring; the political and social rights have restricted; and the position of the authoritarian-military institutions such as the army and MGK (National Security Council) has strengthened within the state. It is seen that the military has struggled for smashing the dominant civil society structure and especially the sectors of leftist-socialist and trade-union organizations exist before the coup for realizing and maintaining this structure.

"Under the military regime, more than 650.000 people were detained, police files were opened on about 1.680.000 people; there were 210.000 political trials, in which 7,000 people faced the death penalty; 50 of 517 death penalties were executed; 300 people died in prisons for allegedly unspecified reasons; 171 people died from torture; 1.680.000 people were classified in police files, 388,000 people were deprived of their right to a passport;30,000 people were fired from civil service; 14,000 people lost their citizenship; 39 tons of published material were destroyed; and 23,677 associations were closed down."
(Akça 2014:16)

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⁹ This does not mean that the state does not have any policy which support and prevent certain capitalist groups.
In the context of security production, the coups and the military state of emergency practices (martial rule) bring a determinant factor in Turkish political life, namely the military before us. In Turkey, the fact of gaining a dominant position of the military within the bureaucratic area which has expanded with the beginning of the process of governmentalization of the state especially since the late-Ottoman era has provided it to become an important actor both in intrastate governmentality struggles and in the arrangement of state-society relations. This importance of the military is also related with the international competition intensified during the process of governmental nation-state formation and the state of war which is the primary scene of power struggles. Before broaching this topic, we can say that especially in Early Republic era, the military apparatus has transformed within the context of this administration rationality and has gained a position of the main carrier of this rationality because of that the political elites arising in the military has assumed the political administration in a monopolistic way and has made a secular-developmentalist-reformist rationality dominant over the administration and the bureaucratic area. As soon as the transition to the multi-party system (1946), the political and the civil public sphere has begun to be relatively plural and has transformed into arenas in which different administration rationalities are produced, discussed and defended; and the dominant rationality has become interrogable. When the political administration has become dependent to further consent production, namely when the need for social legitimacy affiliations has increased, the military apparatus which did not need this relation during its socialization in the context of political administration could reconstruct its existence as a bureaucratic force that reproduces the dominant rationality in its body with the "national security" discourse and institutions (MGK) produced by the Cold War conditions.

The military has gained an important position in determination of the dominant rationality to which the government agencies will be subjected and the "reason d'état" after 1960 through the national security apparatus and its decisiveness within these apparatus. The discourse and the institutional practices of national security have started a process which aims to increase the "reason d'état" rationality, namely essentially the existence and the power of the state and in which everything regarding this aim would be included in the area of state intervention within this framework; and the security has become a "security of the society" which prioritizes "the security of the state" increasingly. This situation also expresses an extensive security state, securitization or the militarization process by the Neoliberal Security and the Public Sphere
transformation especially of all economical, cultural and social areas and problems to the main object of the national security policies (Özcan 2010: 329 ff.; Akça 2010; Bilgin 2017:258 ff.; Neocleous 2000: 10).

The relative democratization in post-1960 period has brought the expansion of the security apparatus around the problem of controlling and surveillance of the society through "national security" policies with it. The practices towards controlling civil society actors (control of media activities, organizational and protest movements, labor strikes) have intensified especially through martial rule practices by defining the national security issues as the subjects in which the fundamental rights and freedoms can be restricted constitutionally (Özcan 2010:331; Üskül 1997).

The military and security institutions transform into main apparatus which assume the controlling and surveillance of the civil society in this process. This controlling and surveillance is based on the threat of "communism" which is produced above all as the absolute "other" in capitalist states during Cold War period. However it also brings a quite flexible definition of the security with it. Internal and external threats are combined in the context of national security or struggle against communism. "However because of that the external threats have internal arms and the internal threats are produced with external connections, ultimately, internal and external, native and foreigner, national and international cannot be separated" (Neocleous 2011: 85). As Neocleous emphasizes, the security complex is not only a means of identifying the military threats and struggling with them but also functions for constructing a national identity and thus a political community. While the national security discourse enters to the schools as textbooks for instance, it also assumes fundamental functions in the production of the national identity (Bilgin 2017; Altınay 2004). In the post-1980 neoliberal era, the "national security" policies have pursued by further intensifying; they have identified one again according to the international relations context; and the security mentalities built on global risks and war on terrorism definitions which are quite flexible, uncertain and all-inclusive within the new situation aroused with the end of Cold War. It is seen in every aspect that the security apparatus and arrangements have been focusing to the controlling and surveillance of the civil society. The social problems, contradictions and conflicts which especially aroused with the

10 According to Üskül, 25 years, 9 months and 8 days have lived under martial rule regimes between the years of 1923 and 1987. This fact shows that the martial rule in its own is an ordinary administration technique. (Üskül 1997: 69-76.).
expansion and diffusion of market principles and demands to the society have securitized by creating the background of this intervention and by evaluating as part of the "national security" problem or "terror" (Gambetti 2007: 30).

In neoliberal era, the central role of the military within the new structure is quite significant. The military apparatus has formed a surveillance network both on intrastate bureaucratic agencies, the political administration and the civil public sphere through its existence within MGK and other institutions. In this context, it has maintained to determine the reason d'état based on national security. As Akça emphasizes, a process of transition from the military-centered neoliberal security state to the police/jurisdiction-centered neoliberal security state (from 2002 up to today) has experienced in this period (Akça 2016). Such an assessment does not ignore the increasing importance of "civil" security apparatus in this period. Especially the issue of controlling and surveillance of the civil public sphere has expanded towards police-jurisdiction-intelligence and private security networks increasingly in this process. The main fact is the emergence of a regime in which the determination capacity of the military towards the political sphere within the context of national security and securitization and in which the civil society is controlled by the "civil" security apparatus that subject to the political administration.

Beyond this, the public sphere has started to be invaded in the form of lynch practices by the "civil" forces themselves based upon the violence one more time (Gambetti 2007). During the military-centered period, na-

11 While the martial rule is defined as a military regime especially in the new constitution and we encounter with it as the main extraordinary intervention form of the previous period, it is seen that there is a division for the state of emergency as a civil martial rule form. It is also seen that the control of the expanded civil public and social sphere has been passing on to civil control apparatus (police, intelligence and increasingly the private security) without a need for direct interventions of the military.

12 I understand the securitization as the formation of the action sphere of the political-social actors by discursive and technical strategies by following Neocleous: "as a political technique, securitizing an issue simultaneously homogenizes and mobilizes social and political forces by highlighting an existential threat in the form of an enemy, justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. In the process the disruption of normal liberal politics under the exercise of emergency powers is legitimized." (Neocleous, 2000 b:12) In this context, Neocleous sees the securitization as the strategy of depolitization of social problems. (Ibid, 13.).
tional security apparatus and policies has restructured in line with war on terrorism which has been the main fact of Turkish politics, especially along with the emergence of armed Kurdish movement since mid-1980s. The military apparatus has restructured from inside by adopting "low intensity war" or "irregular warfare" under the conditions of state of emergency in Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country within the context of war on terrorism and the police apparatus has entered in the process of militarization through the expansion of its institutional structure in accordance with controlling the civil public space (Paker 2010: 414 ff.; Berksoy 2007: 45).13

In this process, the military apparatus has expanded its capacity to determine the political area in the context of national security and war on terrorism in 1990s accompanied by economic crises; and it has intervened to the political area through MGK Summit on the date of February 28, 1997 against the rise of Islamic-conservative power elites.

The conflict axes of the political area have shifted to ethnic-cultural dynamics triggered also by the military intervention during this period in which the class divisions and contradictions intensify. Neoliberal policies, especially the financial liberalization intensified in this period has deepened the political representation crises along with the contradictions of the economical-class area. The military apparatus has tried to make the reason d'état rationality14 of which it is the bearer dominant by mobilizing the political and the civil public sphere throughout securitization strategies under these conditions. While Islamic-conservative elites whose class-cultural roots are vivid have been downgraded, the military intervention has continued to deepen the crises of the political sphere in a contrary direction (Öztan/Bezci 2015: 177 ff.; Akça 2014: 23 ff.). As a result, this intervention has brought the formation of various fractions both on the division of the political power relations on level of political elites such as the division of Islamic-conservative elites and in the military offices clique with it.

13 In this context, it can be counted some units such as special operation forces, anti-terror and operation department and psychological operation unit. Berksoy 2007: 56.
14 The thing which draws the legitimate lines of the intended politics is the Post-Kemalist rationality that emerges as Atatürkism. (Cizre 2001; Bilgin 2017.)
AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the Security State

When Islamic-conservative elites (AKP) came to power with 2002 elections after a deep economic crisis could form a wide political-social coalition by activating the neoliberal reform program for overcoming the hegemony crisis. "AKP’s project hat revitalized the neoliberal hegemony by absorbing Islamism into the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-oriented secular neo-liberalism. In doing this, AKP has reinvented populist strategies of Turkey’s center-right and has promoted a restricted political reformism within the limits of its authoritarian populism" (Akça/Balta 2013, 78). While AKP gathers the traditional organic Islamic-conservative voter segments on the one hand, it has succeeded to mobilize large voter masses that experience a political representation crisis by a paternalist-clientalist populist political strategy on the other. At the same time, in this process which expresses the integration of Islamic-conservative elites into the state, AKP has faced with the military bureaucratic elites who were disturbed from Islamist rising primarily and especially in intrastate sphere. While the general staff did not challenge directly to the new party which has a broad-based support at the first stage, it has preferred to use the politicization of anti-government middle-ranked and high-ranked military officers within the military as a control and balance factor. In the first phase, AKP has used the democratization and European Union membership process for weakening the influence of the military and it has adopted various legal reforms within this context. Especially the position of civilians has strengthened by increasing the number of civilian members of MGK. AKP has ended the existence of the military within the Higher Education Council (YÖK) and RTÜK which is a media surveillance council. The conflict ongoing in the context of the integration of Islamic elites to the state has turned the bureaucratic sphere to almost a battlefield. The wars of position within the police and the jurisdiction bureaucracy, particularly within the military have aroused. AKP has tried to perform the control of the bureaucratic sphere wars mostly through supporting Gülenist cadres and it thus has succeeded to weaken the military-centered power bloc. The intensified first phase of this conflict has happened in the presidential election in the year of 2008 and it has resulted with the election of Abdullah Gül as president of the republic. By this achievement, the interventionist officials within the military through Gülenist cadres in the jurisdiction have discharged and it has been provided important position achievement within the military. Consequently, the process of the integration to the state has
finished through the presidential election, controlling HSYK (Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges) with 2010 constitutional amendment and opening civic judicial remedy to the decisions of Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) (Akça 2016; Akça/Balta 2013). While this process has downgraded the military within the bureaucratic area on the one hand, it has strengthened the position of another bureaucratic actor, namely Gülenist cadres.

By this, the neoliberal security state which was determined by the military has replaced by the civil political forces. Neoliberal security regime expresses the process of establishment of an integrated state form over repressive-punitive administration techniques and procedures. While this establishment is related the contradictions and the conflicts created by the neoliberal policies and the distribution of power relations on behalf of the capital on the one hand, it arises from the association of the political administration with the society through an authoritarian majoritarian populist strategy. In Turkey, the neoliberal security can be seen as a result of another administration crisis (maybe we should call it as the crisis of liberal political institutions) formed by adopting the tradition of "reason d'état" by the political administrations and forcing it to the society rather than traditional political representation crises. Thus, the focal point of neoliberal security will turn around the problem of controlling and surveillance of the civil public sphere. The security apparatus restructured in AKP era reveals this point. The repressive-punitive neoliberal security regime has restructured through main conflict axes such as the economical-class division and the dissolution of the social consensus which had established before 2008 and started to be experienced since 2008; intra-bureaucratic area conflicts (especially the conflicts firstly with the military and then, with Gülenist cadres); the social oppositions produced by the repressive-majoritarian populist strategy, for instance, Gezi Movement (2013); Kurdish question which have a military aspect; and the state of emergency regime which was declared after the coup attempt of Gülenist cadres in July 15, 2016 (Kaygusuz 2016: 103; Akça 2014: 38 ff.).

15 The intensity of these conflicts and the incompatibility of the government with the administration rationalities for solving these conflicts point to an administration crisis feature the repressive-punitive techniques. The struggle for the transition to presidency regime should be understood as a response given to this administration crisis.
Especially the legal measures realized in the context of war on terrorism constitute the major component of this structure. In this period, the State Security Courts were replaced by the Special Assize Courts. In parallelism with this process, it is enabled to codify various social groups and practices as threat and enemy resiliently and to give extraordinary authorities to the prosecutor within this context by making amends in Anti-terrorism Law, Law of Criminal Procedure (CMK) and Law of Police Powers (PVSK) and by widening the definition of terrorism. Especially the Internal Security Law passed in the year of 2015 has ensured broad authorities to the police. For instance, the authorities towards taking into custody up to 48 hours, using arms, and searching and wiretapping without judge approval in the name of public order has given to the police. Besides, it has given extraordinary controlling and surveillance authorities to the governorates with this law. A de facto state of emergency has become applicable without declaring a state of emergency. Nevertheless, the intelligence agency has restructured and its authorities of data collection, wiretapping and profiling has widened with MİT Law passed in the year of 2014 (Akça 2016, Gambetti 2007: 23; Berksoy 2017:19 ff.; Kaygusuz 2016: 115). On the one hand, the insecurity discourse along with the security has intensified the securitization practices towards controlling and surveillance of urban public spaces and on the other hand, the expanded private security sector and the police activities towards preventing crime have been creating a security (insecurity) culture by becoming widespread (Paker 2009; Yardımcı 2009 22 ff.). The public spaces have been securitized by new practices realized especially in school spaces, for example, by employing the police as the "secure educational coordination officers"; expansion of camera systems; the aims such as school "environmental security" which targets securing the students from drugs, ideological-organizational propaganda and obscene elements. Finally, many security regimes on different levels have been building and the repressive-punitive controlling and surveillance of the public spheres by the state and increasingly by non-state actors has been deepening. The political and civil public space has been shaping, colonizing through repressive-punitive techniques through the state of emergency practices which were declared after July 15, 2016 and maintained continuously up to today and the extraordinary political

administration practices have been normalizing. Insecurity has been becoming the resource of the capital accumulation and the control rather than questioning the neoliberal order and policies which produce insecurity.

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Ayhan Bilgin
Civic Ataturkism in the Dissolving Process of Post-Kemalism

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In this article, we will bring up primarily the main arguments used in criticisms against Kemalism and the Post-Kemalism paradigm built upon these aforementioned arguments for discussion. As it is known, Post-Kemalism is the name of the main meta-narrative adopted by a predominant part of the intelligentsia of Turkey until recent times. The theses in which it is argued that the Republic regime imposed Westernization upon the society through radical reforms and in return, the society resisted against this repressive and prohibitive mentality constitutes the basis of Post-Kemalism (İnsel, 2014 a: 21-5). It can be asserted that this mentality was used by Islamism in the struggle for hegemony between Kemalism and Islamism and that everyone who made a contribution to Post-Kemalism during the collapse of Kemalism by disgracing process has a collective responsibility.

Another issue to be emphasized is the transformation of Ataturkism. The articulation between public opposition and Ataturkist political line in contemporary Turkish politics in which Post-Kemalism lost its validity. In this context, it can be spoken of a Civic Ataturkism. Civic Ataturkism is a political manner of discourse which challenges Islamist restoration, has a predominant side of spontaneity, and reestablishes the public space. Civic Ataturkist oppositional language is influencing not only the public space but also the private sphere and Ataturk has been idealizing through numerous commodities and images.

Criticism Towards Kemalism: Theses and Discussions

The criticism towards Kemalism gains its concrete content in a series of arguments. The first and also probably the most popular of aforementioned criticisms emerge strongly within the discussion developed towards the political order of Kemalist national state. The nationalist character of

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the state serves to exclusionist identity politics and state violence through its characteristics which constrains the democratic sphere. Kemalist state politics corresponds to a governing strategy that performs oppression and assimilates in the name of national sovereignty (Bora, 2005: 74-7; Öztürk, 2011-2: 191-2). While Kemalist regime which legitimates itself on the basis of Turkish nationalism consecrates the state as the unique political subject, it objectifies the society and the individual in relation to the state. In this order, national security takes precedence over the Civic politics and the political sphere becomes contingent upon a reelpolitik in which the force almost completely becomes the determinant. The relationship between the real guardians of national sovereignty and the representatives of the people is designed as a relationship based on hierarchy within the statist logic. The discursive and actional practices of Kemalist regime is motivated by the elitist language which grants further privilege to certain groups and cliques within the participation to politics. It can conveniently be said in this context that Kemalist republicanism is in fact the administration of bureaucracy in the name of the nation.¹ The main characteristic of this regime is preatorianism. The military determines the borders of the political system by using force or making a threat for using force. The unique mandatory status of Atatürk as the head teacher and the founder leader makes the republic close to a monarchy. The situation of the subjects of this ideology in relation to the democratization process of the country resembles the situation of the elites who persist with the monarchist republic and try to conserve their privileges (Hale, 1996: 255; Altan, 1992: 35; Laçiner, 1997: 19-24; Kıvanç, 1997: 40; Aktaş, 1998: 75-6; Cangızbay, 2008-9: 146; Mahçupyan, 2008-9: Öztürk, 2011-2: 193; Öztürk, 2015: 19).

The problem with Kemalist mentality does not arise only from the reducer understanding towards politics within the elitist interpretation of the national sovereignty. Another aspect just as striking as this issue is laicism. The view of Kemalists to religion is instrumental. Turkish laicism both inflicts a blow to the public Islam and uses it. General opinion is towards that Kemalist laicism exceedingly recognizes the state within the religiosity sphere. This situation both had turned secularization into a part of social engineering process by putting an end to its condition of being an

¹ Bureaucracy is not a class in everywhere but in Turkey, it had behaved as a class for a long time because of the structure came from Ottoman Empire and the weakness of the bourgeoisie. For an interpretation, See Keyder (2011: 125-126).
output of modernization and had caused a development of a Islamic reaction from the periphery towards the center against aforementioned engineering (Mardin, 1992c: 164-5; Narlı, 1994: 24, 29; Göle, 1997: 48; Amin, 2006: 133; İnsel, 2014a: 42).

The critical literature that fictionalizes Kemalist republic as an imperfect democracy specifies that this structure enforces an authoritarian and organic way of politics which necessarily creates internal enemies. Maybe for this reason, the ideological coordinate to which Kemalism is closest is conservatism. (Bora, 1998: 24-7; İnsel, 1998: 36-7; Öztürk, 2011-2: 193). As for transcending Kemalist nation-state which obliges the political sphere to conservatism, it is relied upon an articulation strategy to supranational bodies such as European Union and to identity movements. Global capitalism may have certain destructive outcomes. However, the way to struggle with the global structure is not taking the nation-state as it comes. The side which weakens the nation-state of globalization can mean the widening of freedom spheres for citizens. Moreover, EU is providing a perspective which encourages regional autonomies to its member countries. Aforementioned mentality can be used in solving sphacelated identity problems such as the Kurdish question (Gülap, 2004: 15-8; İnsel, 2006: 46-7; Öztürk, 2011-2: 195).

Another important topic of the criticism towards Kemalist nation-state is the identity politics. As much as identity politics is the reelpolitik response of the suggestions done for overcoming human rights problems created by Kemalist regime, it also corresponds to a new political paradigm for a democratic alternative for Kemalist regime. The weak point of the existing regime is seen as human rights. The main legitimacy criterion in global world is human rights. There is a significant contradiction between this ascribed situation and the dominant ideological code in Turkey. The state instrumentalizes human rights even in the moments in which it takes a step for advancing fundamental rights and freedoms (Sançar, 2003: 124-6). The destruction caused by this aforementioned instrumentalist approach shows itself definitively especially within the discussions about Kurdish question. Kurdish question is one of the principal blind spots of Kemalist regime. The solution of this question depends on positive and meaningful steps that will be taken in the topic of human rights (Öztürk, 2011-2: 196-7). Kurdish identity movement is thought as valuable not only with regard to its human rights mediation but also from the point of that it creates a counter-weight against Turkish nationalism. When the Kurdish identity gains further rights for representation in the
public, it will also democratize the country and weaken Turkish nationalism (Yeğen, 2004b: 31-5). The main problem in this manner of analysis with respect to the criticisms towards Kemalism and the discussions on Turkish political life is that the connection between Kurdish identity movement and Kurdish nationalism is overlooked. Those who criticize Turkish nationalism had used a discourse which affirms, even though indirectly, the Kurdish nationality (Öztürk, 2011-2: 197-8). The aforementioned discourse is one of the principal components of anti-Kemalism paradigm. The large part of intellectual circles in Turkey had been opting for their attitudes in relation to Kemalism and Kurdish movement within the frame of this discourse interrelated until recent times.

A considerable part of the criticisms towards Kemalism provides a predominantly academic political-sociological analyze framework to their readers. The paradigm which lost its persuasiveness in Post-Kemalism era consists of the expansion of these aforementioned theses. In this context, we can mention the center-periphery reading. Şerif Mardin and his followers who reinterpret the studies of Shils for the political life of Turkey had made a contribution to the popularization of the center-periphery perspective. Shils-Mardin ideational line which remarks the antinomy between the center and the periphery of the society draws some conclusions from this ascribed antinomy for social relations and the political situation. The leaning of the center to get the periphery under control, the mobilization of the periphery towards the center, and the power struggle between the center and the periphery are just a couple of evaluations which can be made on the basis of the center-periphery perspective (Ahıska, 2006: 16-18; Çinar, 2006: 154-5; Öztürk, 2015: 12).

It was also possible to render the evaluations which point to the differences between the West and Turkish modernization meaningful within the scope of the center-periphery perspective. In this context, the center-periphery perspective had become a meta-narrative which interprets Turkish modernization. For instance, Turkish modernization was revealing itself within a historicity which results in with the reforms imposed from outside rather than following a course depends heavily on a class direction. Besides, Westernization had a logic which reproduces the political alienation between the state and the society and features the modern against the traditional almost in any circumstances. In this order, a native-foreigner dialectic had been formed within the society through the Westernization dynamics (Ahıska, 2006: 15; Öztürk, 2015: 13).
The critical discourse built upon the center-periphery perspective was accusing Kemalism of breaking the connections between the past and the present. Kemalist mentality which sees the laicistic life style as the only legitimate code of behavior was imposing this life style to the citizens within a social engineering logic. The state which assigned the task of transforming the society to the elite thus has turned the relationship between itself and the society into a relation of hierarchy (Gellner, 1981: 68; İnşel, 2014b: 110-2; Keyman, 2000: 124-6; Öztürk, 2015: 13-4). Large sectors of the society who were uncomfortable with this modus operandi of Kemalist modernization –Islamists, conservatives, liberals, and socialists- see a content which affirms the social opposition within the center-periphery reading. The aforementioned sense-making style led a general acceptance towards especially that the right-wing political parties which have massive support are democratizing the political system. The political activism of many political parties from Democrat Party to Justice and Development Party (AKP) was seen in such a line. According to the voiced general opinion, Kemalist state which had alienated to its people and Republican People's Party (CHP) as the party of this state were representing the laicistic republican elites. The reaction of Anatolian people against the dictatorship of the minority was in the direction of voting for right-wing mass parties. Right-wing political parties from Democrat Party to AKP tried to widen the sphere of democratic and pluralistic politics against the laicistic oligarchy (İnşel, 1998: 38; Laçiner, 2004: 3; Öztürk, 2011-2: 198-200). However, the fact that the replacement between the center and the periphery is not enough for the democratization of the political order of the country had been manifested clearly within the context both of the right-wing political parties history of Turkey in the long term and of AKP reelpolitik in the short term. As the right-wing politics becomes dominant, Turkey hadn't been democratized but the bureaucratic top-down modernization had been replaced by a populist bottom-up modernization (Açıkel, 2006: 59-60). It can be said that the aforementioned replacement did not remove the authoritativeness but created a mass mobilization on behalf of today's more populist structure instead of the bureaucratic modernization.

Meanwhile, the center-periphery perspective had been creating the ground not only of the criticism towards Kemalist but also of the total rejection of the enlightened-modernist paradigm. There was a serious relationality between religious resurrection and the postmodern current and between Kemalism criticism of the Left and the Islamic-conservative view. Maybe for this reason, it can be point out the existence or a natural
division of labor between center-periphery perspective and the postmodern paradigms (Açıkel, 2006: 34-6; Mert, 1994: 89, 95).

The usage of the center-periphery narrative predominantly in the readings of Turkey politics partly explains the selective criticism problem towards Kemalism and the paradigmatic turning point experienced in Post-Kemalist era. As the center-periphery perspective fall into a decline, the criticism towards Kemalism had ceased to be convincing. When the problems created by this paradigm are embraced in a detailed level, we face with such a panorama: First of all, even if there is a center in social and cultural relations and this center plays a crucial role in the context of political integration, the reality of that the aforementioned center has a pluralistic content should be underlined insistently. The images of a center and a periphery which are homogenous in themselves do not comply with the political sociological reality. Moreover, the center-periphery theory has lost its power and capacity to explain Turkey for a long time. The relationship between the center and the periphery has ceased to be an antagonistic relationship. The center is no stranger to the periphery at all. The periphery also does not result in such a wild, authentic or innocent instance (Yeğen, 2004 a: 19-20). Besides, the center-peripheral discussion has a tendency towards encoding the modernization experience as an exceptional incident vis-à-vis Western and Islamic worlds. The atypicality emphasis in Turkish modernization dooms both Kemalists and conservatives to an introverted point of view. For example, the prejudice of "We are like ourselves" has been keeping alive strongly both in these sections. Moreover, the center-peripheral mentality fixes the political imagination of conservative sectors in a schizophrenic level specific to the cruel-oppressed duality. When the aforementioned fixedness combines with the easy-way-out approach for explaining everything through the center-periphery perspective, an inertia mood which makes understanding the political-sociological situation difficult will rise to prominence. Meantime, it can be asserted that there is a serious tension between the methodological assumptions of the center-periphery perspective and the postmodern world realities independently of the problematical usage of that perspective in Turkey. In the postmodern era, the cultural content of the center has changed and the sociological sensitivities and the ideological positions located in the periphery have reached a reputable position vis-à-vis the center. It can be conveniently be said in this context that liberal, conservative, multicultural, pro-globalization and postmodern values and tendencies have become more
popular than modern, republican, rational and laicistic values for a long while (Açıkel, 2011: 182-4, 188; Bingöl ve Çolak, 2010: 94-5).

Such an intermediate evaluation can be made at this point: Center-periphery perspective corresponds to a reading towards a culture-based and conflict-centered power. Within this sense-making style, a one-dimensional view and a mechanical and dualist methodology come into prominence. However, when the complexity level of the organization style of the society is considered, it is required an alternative reading which allows an analysis of more than One problem dimensions and which is also more sensitive to the historical interaction between components (Reyhan, 2000: 286-7; Açıkel, 2006: 33-4, 49).

Post-Kemalism Conditions: Collapse of a Paradigm

The criticism towards Kemalism which we outlined its main theses have turned into a Post-Kemalism narrative over time. Post-Kemalist paradigm which sees the reforms of early republic as Jacobin, elitist and pro-tutelage was criticizing the recent history of Turkey in the name of being freed from the military tutelage. This paradigm which is contributed by liberal, conservative, leftist, Islamist, and Kurdish intellectuals has become the power itself in academy by being no longer an academic opposition discourse during the period after 2002. Needless to say, this situation should not be regarded as surprising. Academic paradigms are never only academic paradigms. They arise almost always within the backup of major social-political issues (Aytürk, 2015: 35-9).

Rapid conversion of AKP government to authoritativeness during the period after 2010 led the disintegration of the broad anti-Kemalist alliance. Today, we are facing with a situation in which Post-Kemalism loses its intellectual credibility and the perspective that attributes all problems to Kemalism becomes ridiculous. When the reasons of the aforementioned result are examined in detail, we are facing with such a panorama: First of all, there were serious methodological and ideological problems within the establishment form of Post-Kemalist paradigm. For example, Post-Kemalists have never problematized the condition that created Kemalism (Aytürk, 2015: 41-2). The statist way of politics left from the Empire and the anti-pluralist and anti-individualist position of Sunni Islam were making the creation of a democratic culture difficult. The authoritarianism during single-party years was arising from the practical necessities of econo-
mic development, rapid modernization and new regime building problems rather than an essential requirement of the ideology. Besides, authoritativeness was cyclical and quite circumstantial. Single-party years enabled the political institutionalism that would make the operation of multi-party life possible and facilitated the modernization later on (Bağçe, 2004: 208-9). This perspective which is advocated in the works of Ergun Özbudun, Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel and partly affirms Kemalist modernization by examining it with reference to its historical limitations within the context of modernization theories could never be popular.

A more popular mentality which is the source of Post-Kemalism paradigm and makes Kemalism look like an original sin despised the achievements left from the reforms and the revolutions of Kemalist politics. This perspective was regarding Kemalism as a kind of orientalism. Modernization of Republic was positivist, solidarist and elitist. Moreover, Kemalist structure has also been criticizing through authoritativeness, patrimonialism, corporatism, and paternalism. Neglecting the civil society has restrained the institutionalization of democracy and the modernization has been left superficial and deficient (Mardin, 1992 a: 70; Mardin, 1992 b: 82; Bağçe, 2004: 210-3; İnsel, 2014 a: 32, 39, 42).²

Despite all deficiencies within the way of operation of the modernization, it would be unfair to pin the crime entirely on Kemalism. Post-Kemalism which sees the origin of all problems as the developments between the years of 1908 and 1945 has transformed into a chronological prejudgment. Post-Kemalism which embodies its claims in an exaggerated criticism towards Kemalism is producing information only confirms itself and justifies non-Kemalist tutelage forms within the context of the other periods of the history of Turkey (Aytürk, 2015: 38-44).

It is certain that recent political developments have played a predominant role within the process of the collapse of this paradigm. Post-Kemalism has supported identity politics against the republican politics and state order. The primary political purpose of this line is moving Kurds and religious people to the center and building a more democratic and more pluralistic Turkey with reference to the aforementioned political sociological transformation. However, it is obvious that this projection is failed with regards to Muslim mass and AKP (Aytürk, 2015: 44-5). A similar failure

² For a detailed documentation of the main arguments used in the structural criticism towards Kemalism, See Öztürk (2007: 3-22); Öztürk (2015: 12-7).
is at stake within the context of Kurdish politics. Kurdish political move-
ment which can not keep its distance from PKK violence and thus holds
the statist-nationalist reflexes continually on the alert is functioning as a
political actor who restricts the democratization of the republican public
sphere.

It can be said that the collapse within Post-Kemalism is bringing a se-
ries of social, political and cultural outcomes with it. Post-Kemalism
which sees the greatest obstacle stands in the way of a liberal democracy
which adopts the rule of law on the basis of human rights and the plurality
principle as Kemalist ideology was also a narrative of the II. Republican-
ism. II. Republican anti-Kemalist political imagination had broken down
in the face of the authoritarian outcomes of the passive revolution created
by AKP. Liberal-left, liberal-conservative, Islamist and Kurdist readings of
Kemalism which make a contribution to the establishment of this point of
view had also lost their reputation. Members of II. Republican Post-Ke-
malist paradigm who think that both laicism and plurality and republic and
democracy can not exist each other must criticize themselves for the anti-
Kemalist position they advocated in an academic manner by supporting it
politically. Another requirement in parallel with this necessity is to start a
restoration of honor process for Kemalism.

It should be said something also for the liberal-leftist sectors in relation
to the analysis of this new situation. Because the greatest contribution to
the construction of II. Republicanism and Post-Kemalism had been made
by these sectors. The fact of those liberal and liberal-leftist sectors who
holds the academic and intellectual hegemony criticized nationalism much
more than Islamism on behalf of establishing an anti-Kemalist platform
has led a systematic connivance towards Islamist authoritativeness which
corresponds to the historical and ideational background of the party-state
of AKP.

Liberal hegemony which pays no attention to embrace the structural
connection between democracy and the laicism is one of the pillars of sup-
port of the process in which democracy has become fragile by the political
Islam. Liberals of Turkey who helps Islamist to resolve Kemalism by not
criticizing the Islamist-conservative worldview are the organic intellectu-
als of the conservative reelpolitik with regard to their historical positions
(Öztürk, 2014).

We can say that the view towards marginalizing Kemalism popularized
its own antithesis, namely a Civic Atatürkist stance. Özyürek's leading
work titled *Nostalgia of Modernity* which analyzes the new fact with its
sociological and anthropological aspects even if it is written under the influence of Post-Kemalist paradigm had brought a series of arguments concerning the examination of the issue into question. According to the writer, an attention with an intense nostalgic side had come into prominence towards Atatürk in 1990s. There is the fact of the rising visibility of Islamists in public sphere within the origin of the aforementioned attention. The republican ideology of Mustafa Kemal had transferred to the public space in parallel with the institutionalization of religion and laicistic citizens had reproduced the state ideology through symbols and actions. What had happened in this context means the reconstruction of the public sphere as much as the transfer of the symbolic sphere of the state to the private sphere. The writer thinks that there is a political strategy towards forcing opposition into silence behind Atatürk nostalgia (Özyürek, 2011: 7-9, 29-30, 133, 168, 218). The basic dynamic motivating the nostalgic restoration of Kemalism is privatization and commodification. Past is incorporated into consumption by transforming into a commodity. One of the actors of this process is the memories and testimonies of the older generation who had witnessed to the golden age of the Republic. Kemalist biographies idealize the single-party years in which the people were working for public interest by putting individual interests aside. According to the point of view of this generation, the multi-party years are the history of alienation from Atatürk revolutions and of degeneracy. Another popular culture material accompanying this component is the numerous commodities designed with Atatürk images. The pictures, cups, key holders etc. with Atatürk images both normalizes Atatürk within the market processes as a commodity and reconstructs him within a Western bourgeois image (Özyürek, 2011: 17-8, 48-53, 71, 81-2, 127-9). Finally, we can mention the issue of civic organization. Events and facts such as the intensive attention of the people towards 75th year celebrations of the Republic; that the operation of the celebrations ceased to be official; that it is preferred concerts instead of official stadium demonstrations during this process; and that 10 Year March becomes public as a popular music recital are some indicators of a Civic Atatürkist stance with an overriding participation and spontaneity (Özyürek, 2011: 137, 184).

Özyürek degrades Civic Atatürkism to an attitude which is developed by the social sectors that have lost their class positions and ideological domination during the struggle against Islamism. However, the situation can make meaningful within a quite more complicated content. Because
Civic Atatürkism has become an opposition paradigm due to the systematic othering campaign towards Kemalist sectors.

Kemalist mass is the Other of New Turkey. The people who respect Atatürk, hang flags in their homes on national days, visit Atatürk's mausoleum (Anıtkabir) or sing 10th Year March / İzmir March are deprived of public resources and are treated like second-class citizens. Civic Atatürkist mass who are excluded, alienated and mistreated because of adopting secular life style are creating identicalness between Atatürk image and their lives. Atatürk who has recalled to public life by the civil society has become a general justifier for mistreated masses. As the sphere of democratic politics shrinks, a fidelity to Mustafa Kemal has become the only way to be an opponent. This process can also be read as the ideological struggle of secular nationalism against Islamism. Besides, it has been experiencing a political subjectivation process through Mustafa Kemal. A great deal of people has been produced a political discourse which has a corresponding in the public sphere through Civic Atatürkism (Aktoprak, 2017: 46-51; Öztürk, 2013; Öztürk, 2016).

Another factor in the discussion of Post-Kemalism and Civic Atatürkism is the systematic criticism against CHP. The alienation of laicistic republican mass influences also the main opposition party which defends the interests of this mass. The intellectual sector who made a contribution to the construction of Post-Kemalism had criticized CHP much more than AKP for a long time. This crooked political perception in which the opposition is criticized much more than the party in power had presented republicanism as an anti-democratic ideological form and thus had weakened its position within the democratic politics (Öztürk, 2013).

Within the context of Islamism-Kemalism dichotomy, it can lastly be reminded about Kurdish politics. Many intellectuals had softened their categorical and harsh anti-Kemalist attitude in parallel with the invalidation of Post-Kemalist logic. The obstacle before democracy is no more seen as Kemalist elites (Aktoprak, 2017: 51). Despite this new point of view, the image of democratic Kemalism has some structural limits. The most massive opposition movement which can be survived against the dominant position of Capitalistic-Sunni ideology is Civic Atatürkism. However, Civic Atatürkist stance is not only against Islamism and AKP but also against Kurdish movement equally. Being both against Islamism and Kurdish movement has been continuing the realpolitik on behalf of AKP and has been limiting the influence area of Civic Atatürkism against Islamic-conservative hegemony (Öztürk, 2016).
Conclusion

The most important historical bloc within the construction process of New Turkey is Post-Kemalist alliance. The main theses which are used in criticism towards Kemalism of this alliance which also holds the cultural and academic power for quite a while were problematical seriously as it is discussed in detail during this article. Post-Kemalists generally have used a language which locks on ethnic and cultural rights that were dissent against the nation state. It was insistently advocated that Islamism is not dangerous as Kemalism and the level of capitalism and modernity in the country would stop the Islamist reactionism. Moreover, they created a political climate in which criticism Atatürk is counted as the condition for democracy (Şahin, 2008: 59, 81-2, 146, 151-3, 179). The transformation of a considerable part of Kemalist mass in 1990s, for instance, the strengthening of chauvinism which demands autarchy in the name of nationalism made things quite easy for anti-Kemalist sectors. The connection with human rights and liberal democracy was weakened thoroughly among Atatürkists. The mental fatigue created by opposing both to the globalization and to AKP at the same time has forced this mass to a mental inaction which suggest the same arguments all the time and blames everyone who do not think like them as traitors (Şahin, 2008: 60, 139-140, 143).

The ideological map of Turkey and the government-opposition relations has rearranged with the Islamization imposed by AKP to the society. As the party in power becomes permanent in politics, it became intolerant towards criticisms. The obstacles before single party-single leader were eliminated and a serious number of people were alienated through a kind of protest populism. The Great Turkey or New Turkey narrative of AKP has excluded an important part of human capital of the country (Ulagay, 2012: 15, 19-22, 27, 35, 65; Vardar, 2010: 168-9). AKP used democracy and liberalism to consolidate its power and as it gains strength, it has restricted democracy on behalf of a majoritarian point of view. Contemporary Turkey is a less pluralist and less laicistic country when compared to the past. The ties with capitalism were certainly preserved but the modernity weakened (Kaya, 2014: 218-236). In such a conjuncture, Post-Kemalist dissolved by becoming functionless.

Islamic and conservative traditions which are the main components of Post-Kemalism became integrated to the Islamic social engineering of AKP. In liberal, liberal-leftist and socialist sectors, there is a strong feeling
of ideological defeat. However, a comprehensive self-criticism process has not begun yet. The slowly but decidedly elimination of the achievements of the Republic has considerably shrunk the living sphere of these sectors. Thos who made a contribution to the liquidation of Atatürkist modernization by making criticism only towards Kemalism for a quite long time have to face with that because of that it is not displayed sensitivity to the issue of laicism, Turkey lowered to a level of an ordinary Middle East country. The pluralistic structure of Civic Atatürkism is the only alternative remaining in the hands of secular sectors against Islamic uniformization.

References


Transformation of the Public Sphere in Turkey and Islamism: An Introduction to the Hegemony, Power, Morality and Legitimacy Struggles

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Discussions revolving around the concept of public sphere in Turkey today are the result of an ancient contestation. At the center of this arduous contestation lie modern expectations and traditional concerns regarding the organization of public sphere. Modern expectations are rather inspired by Western lifestyles, freedom and right to organize whereas traditional concerns seek to piece their reference together from the Islamic thought and its ethics. Since public sphere in the simplest sense of the term involves a common ground as well as the public spaces of this common ground where people get together in order to interact with each other, where they communicate face to face together, it has always been a domain of tour de force of such competing expectations. What’s more, some developments in the modern sense such as cooperation, reconciliation, feeling content with living together and being subject to an agglomerative social ethics have been expected to emerge as a result of sharing the public sphere since the establishment of Republic in Turkey (1923) yet they have somehow failed to penetrate the society. The fact that deep-seated traditional values and Islamic structures had been well-organized has constantly hindered these modern developments, particularly in the country. Public sphere has thus become a multilayered, complex ground where values and norms clashed without bearing any responsibility whatsoever and they often severely diverged. Therefore, the public sphere in Turkey has ceased to be a ground of cooperation where people are organized around similar problems, expectations and norms, hence ceased to be a space where the society’s demands are attempted to be resolved. On the contrary, it has transformed into a space of disintegration and struggle which is organized by contemporary politics, where harsh conflicts take place with the aim of seizing it and a space which produce social problems.

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In fact, it can easily be observed that the disintegration and the problems in question have increased in recent years due to Islamist political practices. Since the target of the social change which has been going on since the Justice and Development Party (referred to as JDP hereafter) came to power as the single party under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is basically a regime shift, its whole was directed at the public sphere. It is due to this attention that we need to make sense of this ideological attitude which primarily aims to change the public sphere in accordance with Islamic values and criteria. After all, “Religion is an ideological expression of the contradictions in human relationships and therefore the criticism of religion unmasks the problems at the root of social relations” (Turner, 1998: 179). Due to these reasons, the aim and the object of curiosity of this article will be to focus on the Islamist policies and the interest that Islamist groups have in the public sphere in Turkey; to understand how and in what ways this interest transformed the public sphere; to evaluate this transformation and surely, to analyze how the Islamist ideology envisages and dominates the public sphere.

Theoretical Introduction: Brief Considerations on Public and Private Sphere

Every article not only pursues certain objects of curiosity but also involves certain claims. In order to be able to discuss these claims with more depth, it seems necessary to come up with a comparative theoretical framework to start with. First of all, it is well known that the history of the separation of public and private sphere dates back to Ancient Greece. Private sphere was thus historically positioned vis-à-vis public sphere and the two spheres have been considered theoretically related yet separate ever since. The basis of this distinction has to do with the internal structure of Greek city states because “In the Greek city state, [the distinction of public and private sphere] corresponded to the distinction of the space of Polis which the free citizens used collectively (koine) and the space that belonged to individuals (oikos) whereas public and private had a particularly relational nature in the Greek city state” (Sarıbay & Öğün, 1998: 43). Therefore, public which meant belonging to the state and society represented freedom, liberty and stability in contrast to private which meant belonging to the family and the individual. “The realm of the polis, on the contrary, was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship between these two
spheres, it was a matter of course that the mastering of the necessities of life in the household was the condition for freedom of the polis” (Arendt, 1998: 30-31). However, since the household in question had been considered “a total whole” for centuries, differences in this “whole” had neither attracted attention nor been found important. On the other hand, in time, the distinction between public and private has undergone a number of changes in terms of both the meaning it corresponded and the discourses produced with reference to it. What’s more, “the distinction of public-private gradually brought up the distinction between a society of citizens based on public interest (in other words common interest) and a bourgeois society that looks after its own private interests. Eventually, public sphere has started to be understood as the public issues of individual persons and a common ground for discussion” (Sarıbay & Öğün, 1998: 43-44). Whereas in the modern period, the distinction between public and private sphere would start being considered with reference to lifestyles. In this way, there has started an era in which public life was considered differently than private life and the latter gradually gained importance in parallel with individuality that was on the rise albeit slowly. The shifting production system along with individuality that was becoming conspicuously widespread, gradually crystallized the distinction between public and private.

After all “in the industrial society that flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it’s not that only economic production activities were detached from the family. Also, traditional functions of the family were moved out of the family” (Çaha, 1998: 75). Consequently, private sphere which was both at the core of relations of production and gained importance with reference to family and individual in the feudal era, started to lose this importance with the beginning of the modern period. Developments such as production shifting from family to capitalist market economy that was remarkably expanded by technical means, concentration of capital in certain hands due to the increase in commercial affairs, diversification of division of labor and consequently, labor becoming a commodity that could be bought and sold in the market directed the attention to the public sphere and transformed this sphere at a pace that is unprecedented in history. Moreover, cultural and political transformations were bound to follow the economic transformation as feudal relationships dissolved and feudal monarchs lost their power one by one. This is because social life which constituted the space of public sphere was changing radically and in an irreversible manner. Richard Sennett explains this change with reference to three factors: “They were, first, a double relationship which indus-
trial capitalism in the 19th century came to have with public life in the
great city; second, a reformulation of secularism beginning in the 19th
century which affected how people interpret the strange and the unknown;
third, a strength which became a weakness, built into the structure of pub-
lic life itself in the ancien régime” (Sennett, 1992: 19). As the concept of
race proceeded towards the core of politics at around the same time, all
these developments ushered in the emergence of nation-states and social
sciences could not be expected to be indifferent to all these changes taking
place in the social life.

As a result of these developments, not only the scope but also the limits
of the concepts produced in the process which has started with arguments
carried out within social sciences up until today, have become equally de-
battable. Nevertheless, one work among them was going to shoulder al-
most all the effort. Political developments that Jürgen Habermas tried to
point out as “the informatic aspect of public life” (Habermas, 1997: 74-91)
in his eye-opening work The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere1 made very valuable contributions to similar debates. Habermas
addressed concepts such as pluralism, democracy, communication, state,
feminism, sovereignty, hegemony, liberalism, authoritarianism that are
frequently discussed in the modern period and he attempted to make sense
of them by associating them with public sphere. Therefore, the discussions
went on to take place in a much wider range thanks to his great contribu-
tion. At this critical point, Habermas stated that public sphere belonged to
bourgeoisie and it was shaped by liberal thinkers along with this bourgeois
class and he emphasized that it was necessary in terms of public commu-
nication that citizens express themselves, come face to face with each oth-
er, discuss and reconcile even though the last one is not obligatory, without
being subject to any kind of discrimination (Habermas, 1997: 78-80).
Therefore, face-to-face interaction was the essential condition of forming
a social bond.

However, more importantly, Habermas had predicted that the phe-
nomenon of commercialization in the advanced phases of capitalism
would block communication channels and this would cause citizens’ opin-
ions freely expressed in the public sphere to fall victim to the manipulation
of the media monopoly (Çobanoğlu, 2012: 235). Today, the public

1 Habermas, Jürgen: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt
am Main, 1962.
sphere in modern industrial societies has already been transformed into a structure exercised and constituted through democracy, newspapers and means of broadcasting, a structure now open to people to whom it was not open previously, in a much more complex way. It is no longer a structure exercised and constituted through state (Mardin, 1994: 144-147). Yet it should not go unnoticed that this transformation increased the complexity and personal obstacles for the ordinary people in the structure as well as reduced the will to participate in the public sphere and change it. Moreover, communication changing from a face-to-face relationship into a mediated relationship via technical possibilities revolutionized the quality of common living spaces. Emergence of radio, TV, Internet and social media opportunities respectively increased technological dependence on the one hand and on the other, started to popularize an essentially “control oriented” neoliberal discourse which interestingly claimed that the realm of freedom was actually “houses”. Therefore the content of public and private sphere swapped after many centuries following Ancient Greece. Thanks to social media opportunities in particular, the space of rights, organizing, negotiation, liberty and freedoms shifted to private sphere as the space of compulsory obligations that need to be endured became the public sphere.

Since this semantic shift started to signify the continuation of supervision over the society and actively supervising the public sphere, “this will to keep the society under control by supervising the public sphere would result in the military (and the state) paying attention to civil society issues more than they previously did” (Özdalga, 2006: 235-236). Political powers that extended their controls over the society via technological opportunities also remarkably increased their ideological manipulation skills primarily thanks to these channels. Moreover, they even acquired the ability to weaken the civil society that stands against the state as the balancing element of the society, in some cases. Today, for instance, it has become really challenging to distinguish between “true” and “fake” in the public sphere bombarded by the mass media. We have witnessed cameras turning into weapons and social media into lynching areas in countless cases. Consequently, as public sphere got subjugated to not only power or politics but also technology, masses constrained in private spaces led by the promise of freedom have become more impressionable, controllable and supervisable. These developments which extremely undermined democracy also presented opportunities for fascistic trends that could be willing to establish authority in all fields of life whether public or private. Additional
factors like urban spaces being organized according to new lifestyles (all requirements including work areas, to be located in the same building complex etc.), emergence of technological means that subject people to houses (being able to carry out all sorts of jobs and transactions online, without going to work etc.) and changing consumption habits and acts (placing orders online rather than going to market one block away etc.) it gets easier for us to understand the direction of change in the relationships between public and private spheres.

Public Sphere in the Islamist Imagination: A Field of Conquest and Domination

On the other hand, it is acknowledged that the Islamist thought in Turkey embarked in constructing a counter-hegemonic discourse, particularly when it’s public sphere in question, as religionization rose in the 1980’s. However, the “unique moment” when the Islamic thought in Turkey started to rise is exactly 12 September 1980, the day the military coup took place. In the following years, it would be revealed that the 1980 Coup was actually planned by the partnership of the dominant capital, the political power that safeguarded its rights and bureaucracy with the intent of averting the social consciousness and socialist organization on the rise, decreasing the cost of labor and depriving the workers of their social rights. Therefore it is no longer a secret that the Islamist groups who had had limited mass power in the society, who had lacked access to and been deprived of mass media opportunities, had had a very low level of representation in state bureaucracy until then were now deliberately placed in positions left vacant by a dislocated society and by disaggregated social organizations. Islamist structures that organized in worker slums slowly started to get popularized in terms of human potential. So “political Islam became unrivalled in big urban slums and the political Islamist The Welfare Party gained its first victory in the 1994 elections. This process turned the aforementioned segment into a social class” (Balaban, 2014: 98). The partnership of capital, political power and bureaucracy feared socialism and their fear led them to think that this “threat” could only be overcome by religionization. Turkey has been confronting the consequences of that decision ever since. The most recent example to this is the cadres of Gülen Community who consolidated their power by infiltrating channels such as politics, state bureaucracy, education and mass media especially after 1980
and attempted a military coup on 15 July 2016, relying on the strength they gathered from the above mentioned channels.

However, in hindsight, we witness that another notable development had taken place around the same time. The putschist generals of the 1980’s who had the power in their hands, put Islamic thought as a handy means of manufacturing consent up against socialist awakening. Thus, religious education practices (schools that give religious education, Quran courses, dormitories etc.) started to be brought even to the smallest villages of the country. Subjective, personal and informal criteria such as being “a believer” have been set in the recruitment and assignment of civil servants. Yet interestingly enough, the same state policy prohibited female students from entering universities wearing headscarf, “in the name of secularism”. Yet this very ban increased the legitimacy of Islamist discourses regarding public sphere, in a very short period of time. Islamist groups made a good use of the headscarf ban in their own favor. These reactions that were sloganized as “the headscarf persecution” then started to target a “regime of persecution” (as Islamists put it), noting that the main problem was not only headscarf but Kemalist policies. As a result, headscarf almost “became a symbol of showing loyalty to something other than nation state” (Haliloğlu, 2014: 129). Islamism, with the help of this victimization, started to be politically popularized, impose its own moral norms and turn into an increasingly distinct attitude in public relationships. So, when we talk about norms, we may need to recall the responsibilities right after that. And “typically, when moral responsibility is imputed, so are other forms, and when moral responsibility is reduced, it is because some of these other forms are felt to be absent” (Goffman, 2010: 99).

Similarly, moral norms turning into moral responsibilities helped Islamic values to get slowly popularized in the public sphere. Additionally, it can be suggested that a drastic pursuit of purity/integrity started in all types of relationships, particularly in personal relationships in the public sphere and this pursuit too led people towards the same Islamic values. In fact, starting from 1980’s, political powers sometimes loosened the headscarf ban, sometimes reinforced it and sometimes lifted it for short periods. Thus the headscarf and the underlying ideological Islamist thought centered on the political realm. Islamism in Turkey, just like all throughout the world, raised strongly on victimizing itself and on the fact that the promises of the modern thought were not fulfilled. During a period when culture and faith started to rise, Islamism secured its public legitimacy before the masses by claims such as anti-Westernism, primacy of religion.
and traditional values and that Islam should be the sole ground of morality. Fuelled by the energy accumulated from the Islamist-secular antagonism in Turkey, both the political realm and the public sphere were once again dichotimized but this time even more severely.

Without a doubt, the Islamist imagination regarding the public sphere had also been built upon similar binary oppositions and tensions. The Islamist imagination has always sought opportunities in the public sphere, namely tensions such as oppositions like secular versus Muslim, elitist versus folk, Westernist versus traditionalist, believer versus non-believer, pro-hijab versus anti-hijab, halal versus haram, mumin versus kaffir to use in its own favor. Therefore, in public relationships, the method of forcing to make a choice between two options (like the frequently encountered question “are you an atheist?”) is a means of oppression widely employed by the Islamist discourse. So these discriminatory attitudes inherent to Islamism’s understanding of the public sphere acknowledge from the outset the existence of totally different, irreconcilable, opposite and constantly competing thoughts. The reason behind this is that the Islamist imagination seeks to ideally reveal where everyone stands: who is one of “us” (Muslim/friend/good) and who is one of “them” (kaffir/enemy/evil). After all, Islamism is an ideology that largely draw on such public tensions. Moreover, the faith of Islam which this ideology uses as a reference, have some mental codes in itself that tend to homogenize, to eliminate differences, that are holistic and that believe in the “absolute supremacy of the majority” as well as its absolute legitimacy.

These mental codes are based on the claim that nation “consists of Muslims” alone, hence it excludes different religions and sects as well as non-believers from the category of nation. Since being excluded from the category of nation would legitimize social pressures, this exclusionism has a practical significance in terms of Islamist policies. Because the same attitude is also open to opportunities of ignoring the demands of rights of these “otherized” groups in the public sphere, of despising and underestimating their demands. The fact that “how many are you?”, “who are you?”, “you will conform to the will of the majority” etc. are popular phrases used by the Islamist discourse is no coincidence in this respect. This is why the Islamist imagination and its ideology insist on emphasizing that a world where “everyone is Muslim” or “everyone is culturally similar to each other” would be a better place. Therefore religion ceases to be something between God and the individual as is claimed but becomes the sole organizer of the world, starting from the society one lives in. The
same religious ideology which is willing to serve this sublime purpose, attempts to establish its public legitimacy by promising to bring peace, trust, order, quiet, justice etc. to society. After all, the divinity that is the reference of these promises suggests administrators to obey, whereas saves the addressees from giving much thought to these promises. So it can be stated that the public sphere which Hannah Arendt refers to as “the realm of visibility and togetherness, of collective speech and action” (Arendt, 2003: 95-96) is transformed into a space of ideological persuasion, oppression and violence by Islamism in order to establish its own hegemony and to eliminate rival thoughts (as far as it can succeed). Since “[v]iolence can occur in private and in public” (Benhabib, 1992: 93), it is the precious weapon of anti-democratic forces.

What’s more, language and discourse lie at the very core of these efforts of the Islamist ideology to establish hegemony in the public sphere. Since hegemony essentially consists of language and discourses that fixate meaning in the public sphere, it is also very convenient for the domination proposes of the Islamist ideology. Crux of the language and discourse used here is again the faith and the culture of Islam. So much so that, Islam as a path of faith to establish domination in the public sphere would mean the defeat of modernizationist Kemalist thought that attempted to free people of their religious commitments in the very same realm. Therefore, religious discourses entering into circulation via all communication channels made it easier to persuade people on the one hand and extended the limits of public legitimacy on the other. Nevertheless, these extended limits failed to create the homogenous mass which the Islamists long for. Although Islamism dominates the field in Turkey, it has not yet achieved to conquer it. Perhaps it can be suggested that it has achieved to establish its hegemony in a different and limited manner today but it shouldn’t be forgotten that every hegemony contains its alternative within itself. Habermas warns us about this in particular. A public community cannot be self-enclosed in principle. No matter how exclusionist in the beginning, a public community cannot bar its door. After a certain point, everyone needs to be necessarily able to participate in discussions. A public community being institutionalized by a fixed group of speakers would mean, in terms of

the mass of people it contains, that it slowly ceases to be those people or
namely a public community (Habermas, 1997: 104-109).

On the other hand, not only dominating that realm but also making reli-
gion dominate life underlie the interest that Islamism takes in public life.
Therefore Islam pays all its attention to dominating social life. Within the
framework of this aim, it demands that first individuals and then public is
constructed. It is thought that the construction of individuals would not
mean anything if the two were not built together. What’s more,

“Muslims need the public sphere in order for Islam to be ‘completely’ in
force, so Islam should dominate the public sphere. For instance veiling, law-
legislation, convocation, worshipping, sharing, social-cultural activities or life
in short lacks Islam, lacks religion when public sphere is not dominated [by
religion], so a religion without religion emerges. Therefore an unjust environ-
ment emerges, after all keeping religion away from public sphere does not on-
ly harm people but also harms animals and plants. Because the nonbeliever
who come to power ruins the crop and the breed. Those who wish to keep re-
ligion away from public sphere are thieves, corrupts, traitors, sinful crooks.
So they will be able to conduct every sort of fraud easily and without account-
ning for. When Islam is in the public sphere, would it allow this to happen? Of
course not. This means that the reason why Islam, religion is wished to be
kept away from public sphere is the reluctance to be under religious control.
Who doesn’t want to be under the control of religion? The flesh/desire,
taghuts and the devil. Not letting religion in public sphere –perish the
thought- means “not letting Allah in the public sphere”. Although nobody’s
strong enough to do that, by sunnah, people are harmed a lot by this”
(Görmüş, 2017).

As is seen, Islam’s expectations regarding public sphere are based on
problematizing the Western lifestyle as much as possible and subjecting
this sphere to religious control. However, while doing this, “moving some
values that belong to private sphere into public sphere” (respect for reli-
gion and tradition, primacy of religious lifestyle etc.) and them being dis-
cussed in this sphere, come into question (Suman, 2000: 76). So that
which is religious will be visible more than ever before at the very center
of life and it will gain the capacity to extend its impact area. This develop-
ment makes the everyday language that belongs to private sphere and the
language of politics converge on the one hand and enables public’s
thoughts and opinions to be established in the core of politics on the other
hand. As a matter of fact, this implies the conquest of political realm by

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language and discourse and in the hindsight, what Turkey has been going through since the mid 1990’s does correspond to this narrative.

Eventually, the abovementioned religionization process that began in the 1980’s gained momentum in the following decades and thus came the 2000’s. And as a result of this momentum, the public sphere was to be seized with reference to Islamic ethics and values popularized through language and discourse. This takeover correspondingly converting into votes in the ballot box was inevitable. Yet already, “Islam in this capacity, as a resource for official legitimation, drawn upon by conservative and radical governments for different ends, drawing different conclusions according to need, has always constituted an important part of the political field” (Zubaida, 1995: 154). Thus, after almost a century, Islamism in Turkey came to power again. Right after coming to power, it embarked on creating its own capital namely its own rich people whom it assumed would sustain the system, by receiving the support of the political power. This process would enable it to establish its hegemonic bloc against its rivals, in the public sphere. However it is also well known that this hegemonic bloc stands on an utterly fragile balance. Today, it may seem like “writing a new constitution” is the only problem to be overcome in order to change the regime in Turkey but the existence of a pro-modernization mass namely 50% of the population willing to prevent the acquisition of the public sphere by the Islamist imagination stands there as a legitimacy barrier against those changes. In the meantime, JDP has already become a one-party state. The parliament, security forces, bureaucracy, legislation, regulations, jurisdiction, economic life etc. are all under the thumb of Islamist policies but a large pro-Westernization and pro-modernization segment within the middle classes in particular embody a strong capacity to break this Islamist hegemony. So it should be considered possible that conflicts to take place between these two rival understandings in order “to dominate”, in the long-term and in every field, will be even more severe than before.

Following these explanations, it can be suggested that the appearances of Islamist thought in the public sphere in Turkey have gained even more importance. So far, a theoretical framework has been attempted to be presented but what has been said should be supported by some concrete examples. The attitude in some of the vital practices of Islam in the face of the modern world and understanding the results of that attitude would enrich this study. Therefore it should be acknowledged that today’s Islamism
with its language, discourse and symbolic presentations in the public sphere constitutes a rich potential for analysis.

Public Faces of Islamism: Prohibitions, Restrictions and the Will to Cultural Hegemony

Before we start to examine the public faces of Islamism in Turkey, we should first address the concept of ethics that is assumed likely to establish public legitimacy in this realm. As is known, citizens in the public sphere both have certain value judgments and ethical norms and they are obliged to abide by those norms. Public spaces as places where citizens hang around and chat according to unwritten rules and shared norms are also “fields of communication, where there are discrepancies or reconciliements concerning ethics; where ethical rules, acts, norms and values are mostly shaped by unconscious processes or maybe where they are imposed as obligations. Moreover, it can be stated that the present conceptual structure, accumulation or mental pattern is changed, transformed, manipulated/attempted to be manipulated by different and technological communication channels to become a matter of debate in different ways again” (Çobanoğlu, 2012: 235-236). What attracts our attention here is the existence of an Islamic discourse which considers “ethical problems” of individuals as the cause of present issues in the public sphere. The remedy that Islamism offers is “embracing national and moral values even better”, practicing Islam more intensively, internalizing the real Islam and teaching (especially children and youth) Islam more intensively. Therefore Islamism considers it “a right” to intervene public sphere with the intent of solving this “problem” which it identifies in individuals. This paves the way for the demands of Islamist movements to organize this sphere limitless and arbitrarily, according to Islam and its ethics.

On the other hand, the concept of ethics is of central importance for both Islamic texts and the tradition of Islamism. Islam defines itself with reference to “the good morals” or “good character”. Since Muslims represent Islam all throughout their lives, this is as important as doing one’s duty to God as a servant. It is frequently repeated that the purpose of Islam is to promulgate good morals through a hadith of the Prophet that says “I have been sent to perfect good character” (Çubukçu, no date: 27). Islamism, using this command and similar ones as a guide, considers that domination of the public sphere can be achieved by carrying out a reli-
gion-centered moral change in the human potential in that sphere. If this can be achieved, Islam would become the single criterion in controlling the norms and values in the public sphere and also, Western values’ infiltration to this sphere could be prevented. Because according to today’s Islamism, its biggest rival in the public sphere is Western values. Since what Islamism understands from Western values is Christianity, freedom of youth and women, dressing up, degeneration, secularism, alcohol, gambling, prostitution etc. it is believed that, in terms of culture, it is necessary to put Islamic ethics against these. This is why a considerable portion of Islamic language and discourses is based on denigrating, insulting, despising and strongly deprecating the Western culture and its values. The main goal is to help individuals “contaminated” by Western values to return to their essence hence cure them and put some faith in them.

Proceeding in the light of this remark, it can be suggested that there are two topics with which Islamism in Turkey concerns itself the most in the public sphere: Women’s rights and alcohol use. So much so that, despite the visibility of these two phenomena in the public sphere, all sorts of prohibitions and restrictions are attempted to be introduced through political power. After all, these prohibitions and restrictions are inspired by the faith of Islam. According to the classical Islamic perspective, a woman is “the symbol of seductiveness and subvertiveness” (Sabbah, 1992: 48-64) and is not obliged to work outside home. Her primary duty is confined to childcare and housework. God has even told women to abide in their houses. That’s why her real area of responsibility is her home and “what is essential for a woman is that she be the mother and the mistress of her home, not that to take social responsibilities.”5 It can be argued that in Turkey, a large number of men including ordinary men as well as politicians, university professors as well as bureaucrats and a considerable portion of women believe in this Islamic decree and strive to practise it, though there may be flexibilities in some cases. So the primary source of legitimation of the prohibitive policies imposed on women and alcohol use is Islam whereas the second one is the existence of this consenting mass.

Correspondingly, for instance, education system was seriously changed in 2016 despite all the objections of NGO’s and the 8 year compulsory education was replaced with a system of 4+4+4 years. This change has not

4 “And abide in your houses and do not display yourselves as [was] the display of the former times of ignorance.” (Quran, Al-Ahzab/Surah/33) https://quran.com/33.
5 https://www.islam-tr.net/konu/kadinin-asil-sorumluluk-alani-evidir.26034/.
only hindered the education life of girls but also paved the way for even-
more paedophiliac marriages. Additionally, over 300 women are murdered 
in Turkey each year\textsuperscript{6} and their murderers usually get “time off for good behavior”\textsuperscript{7} so their sentence is reduced by one third. Although this is pri-
marily a cultural and then a legal problem, it is observed that the current 
JDP government spends all its energy to “prevent divorces”. However 
women are usually murdered because they “want to divorce” or “file for 
divorce”. Fundamentally, these efforts are based on the alleged holiness of 
marriage in the presence of God and aim to prevent “threats that celibacy 
would create” (Sabbah, 1992: 71-77). Nevertheless, it is the women who 
pay the price when this impunity is combined with the hatred towards 
women’s freedom as a Western value and women’s personal choices. For 
instance, in the recent years, women have started to be harassed frequently 
on the grounds of their clothing in public life. Many women are increas-
ingly subjected to violence of strongly religious men who declare to have 
been aroused by women “wearing shorts” or “wearing a dress that is 
thought revealing”\textsuperscript{8} whereas the rape cases exhibit a proportionate in-
crease. Considering that the real number of cases is way higher than it is 
reported to judicial authorities and reflected in the media, the social as-
pects of the problem become even more serious. In addition to these, the 
political power aims to abolish the visibility of women’s labor force in the 
public sphere and keep women inside the house, so it pays women salary 
and insurance for them to take care of the elderly, patients, grandchildren 
or the handicapped at home. JDP even introduced a law last year that gave 
civil servants the option of “flexible working”\textsuperscript{9} which meant that women 
could work half a day, get paid “half pay” and in return, spend rest of the 
day with their children at home. Although this change may seem like a 
“positive” development for women at first sight, considering the reference 
points of the political power, it can be argued that it is an implementation

\textsuperscript{6} http://kadincinayetleri.org/.
\textsuperscript{7} Time off for good behavior: Sentence reduction given to a prisoner by a judge, 
based on the good behavior that the prisoner displays while imprisoned and in the 
court (also called good conduct time or good time credit).
\textsuperscript{8} http://www.diken.com.tr/pendikte-sort-giyen-kadina-saldiran-adam-giyim-tarzi-
tahrik-etti/.
\textsuperscript{9} http://www.gazetevatan.com/anne-olan-memurlar-yarim-gun-calisacak--1028868-
ekonomi/.

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aimed at excluding women from the public sphere hence making them invisible as much as possible.

Besides, it is a well-known fact that the same Islamist policies are particularly interested in the matter of alcohol use in the public sphere. Actually, at least two thirds of the sales prices of alcoholic beverages are collected as tax in Turkey today. Sales of alcoholic beverages between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. have been prohibited at all points of sale since 2014 and fines are quite high. Private entities with liqueur license in predominantly conservative cities in particular are forced to move outside the city center, to places assigned for them, due to a “red line practice”. Alcohol use has already been prohibited in recreational facilities of athletic clubs and universities on the grounds of “protecting youth from getting into bad habits”. So much so that, the top person of the political power had once said that these implementations meant “carrying out the religious orders” and suggested that if one had to consume alcohol then s/he “should get it and drink it at home.” So it is no surprise that governorships have recently started to introduce bans on alcohol consumption within provincial borders, based on arbitrary decisions they took on their own. Alcohol consumption has been prohibited in public areas (called “open areas”) in Antalya, one of the most important tourist destinations in Turkey. When we look at the list of areas where “the prohibition of alcoholic beverages is implemented” in the statement of Antalya Directorate of Security, we conclude that the only places left to consume alcohol are houses as private areas. Observations regarding the matter can be multiplied but the priority here is not the fact that alcohol use is considered *haram* according to Islam.

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14 In order to see various interventions of the political power in the past ten years, to public rights and freedoms, you may check out the link below: http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/182375-erdogan-in-ve-akp-nin-14-yillik-yasam-tarzina-mudahaleleri.
15 *Haram*: Something prohibited because it is against the rules of Islam. What is wrong, prohibited in terms of religion to eat, drink, do, say etc.
ful/dirty/sick” habit whereas alcohol consumers are considered “antisocial” people. The advantage of this ethical judgment is that the legitimacy of oppressive and restrictive methods used on the grounds of “fight against alcohol” is guaranteed in the eye of society. Hence the way is paved for ordinary people who assume the political power on their side, to intervene with people consuming alcohol in the public sphere. Therefore, such practices aim to get the society to consent to and support the prohibitions and restrictions imposed on alcohol use in the public sphere. Consequently, people increasingly avoid consuming alcohol in public areas today. It can even be said that this act is soon likely to become a norm/rule by itself, without needing a law/punishment.

On the other hand, public sphere is also a realm where there is a pitched battle for cultural hegemony. However it must be known that being in power in the political sense and being in power in the public sphere are two different things. Because cultural hegemony can stay put only as long as it can gain the consent of large social segments outside the dominant cultural class and only as long as these social segments reproduce this hegemony. This is why being in power in the cultural realm is considered a form of hegemony. The primary ideological apparatus that ensures the reproduction of cultural hegemony is education whereas it is followed by intellectual, artistic and popular production. As is known, education signifies indoctrination for cultural hegemony as well as a means of producing consent where hierarchical relations are legitimized. Whereas intellectual, artistic and popular productions are under the control of the cultural hegemony, it has a monopoly on them. Because literary works, cinema, TV, theater, music, painting, sculpture or in other words all branches of art and the people who produce them and the means of communication that convey them to masses all function to encourage people. Social behavior patterns, promised statuses and roles shown by these channels make it easier for large segments to accept the present situation. This acceptance helps the cultural hegemony to fend off the dissidents’ attempts to challenge it.

JDP government has taken over the bureaucracy after 2002 and rapidly transformed into a single-party state. Thus Islamism first came to power and then established its own political and economic hegemony but it is seen that it has not yet achieved to come to power in the social and cultural realm. So much so that this nuisance which has been discussed among the Islamist circles for some time now, was recently expressed as a self-
criticism by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the president of the republic. So we may look for the problem in this self-criticism, in the answer to the question “How come a structure who’s been strongly in power alone for the past 15 years still fails to establish its own cultural hegemony?”

Yet we often witness that Islamists usually answer this by saying educational and moral policies with “local and national” content are not adequately cared about. So, can a “local and national” education ensure to establish cultural hegemony? Answer to this question lies in the intellectual activities within the content of the concept of cultural hegemony. Indeed, it is observed that Islamists fail to deliver any significant artistic product in any area of intellectual activity eventhough they receive all sorts of state support in Turkey. After all culture is a matter of reproduction. It is a struggle to make better what one’s predecessors produced. It is fears, imagination, dreams and fantasies coming to life in human creativity without limits. Thus it needs accumulation of knowledge, quality, labor, devotion, critical reasoning and free thought. Freedom of scientific and analytical thought is necessary for all these needs and it also supports them. As a result, social segments that embody these qualities establish their cultural hegemony whereas systems of thought that try to suppress these qualities in every field of life let alone embody these qualities fail to dominate this realm.

Primary goal of the Islamist thought, not only in Turkey but in the whole world, is to convey God’s commandments to people, to be a mumin worthy of God and to use science to prove God’s existence. Therefore human thought and imagination to exceed this predetermined framework is not considered acceptable. Today’s Islamism addresses all human thought and actions except faith and religious matters within the scope of prohibitions. So the reason, creativity and imagination of a person freed from her/his social bonds that reproduce the cultural hegemony can only be the topic of general prohibitions. For instance, according to the Islamist thought, art cannot go against the values of society. Therefore Islamist art is fundamentally based on aggrandizing and respecting the values of soci-

ety, being at peace with them and limitlessly praising the past. However this understanding is based on repeating what already exists rather than “reproducing” it. That’s why an approach of this sort fails to even come close to establishing cultural hegemony in the public sphere. A concrete example of how far the Islamism in Turkey is from understanding this fact has been in the news during the writing process of this article. The new curriculum was criticized for involving “to teach the idea of jihad” to children and an MP of the party in power, JDP answered these criticisms by saying: “There is no use of teaching math to a child who doesn’t know about jihad”\(^{19}\).\(^{20}\) This is a very clear expression of what an Islamist considers his/her priority. As is seen, Islamists have not yet figured out how to establish a relationship with science. Therefore they believe in the indisputable supremacy of religious concepts.

On the other hand, Tanıl Bora suggests that the real problem is the creation of a new victimization rather than achieving cultural hegemony: “Cultural hegemony functions as a concept that points to the supremacy of the ‘opponent’, predicated on the opportunities provided to them by power and which are still assumed to be held, rather than problematizing a deficiency, inadequacy or lack of zeal (there are those who do problematize them). A kind of victimization discourse hiding behind the excuse of unfair competition…” (Bora, 2017). These lines would sound all too familiar for those who know how Islamism in Turkey rose by referring to “victimizations”. Ability to be the all-time “victim” despite being in power alone and strong is the main motivation of the Islamist thought and the driving force that enables the mobility of the masses. However, this motivation is not enough to establish cultural hegemony because cultural hegemony is always necessarily in need of a group of intellectuals. Islamism had formerly seized political power through elections owing to the fact that it embodied a strong intellectual human potential and this segment was successful in conveying then-current cases of the “aggrieved” to large masses. Whereas today, all of those people who constituted that intellectual potential hold official positions in bureaucracy. They have either lost their independence by taking on the task of praising government policies on media outlets or they seek to win tenders and tenures from the state. Şerif Mardin addresses this situation of Islamist intellectuals as “their skills of function-

\(^{19}\) Jihad: Warmade in the name of religion, in Islam.

ing within the field of the state” (Mardin, 2011: 199). So, one can hardly claim that this segment whose intellectuals have turned into civil servants can really compete with a cultural class with Western values who dominates the cultural realm in Turkey. Moreover “It is hard to say that the Erdoğan-centered JDP constitutes a favorable environment for creative thought and taking initiatives within the party organization, due to its corporate-like hierarchy and discipline that turn all its party members including its MP’s into mere personnel” (Çınar, 2014: 89). Considered in this respect, one can suggest that the problem of a structure knit together with a chain of obedience where obedience is favored, cannot simply be “achieving cultural hegemony”.

Public Manifestations of Islamism: Construction of an Alternative Language Through Symbols

This section will pursue some of the symbolic traces of Islamism in the public sphere. These traces are also symbolic signs (photos, writings, pictures, objects, political discourses, myths etc.) of the Islamist thought conveying its own semantic world to the public sphere. After all, symbols with their increasing importance are clusters loaded with collective meaning. Today, any meaning whether political or ordinary is expressed by using symbols or images. And in such an environment, symbols are both functional and mobilizing because they are loaded with meaning rather than just being physical appearances. Symbols have come to explain a lot of things through their semantic content without even needing words or additional explanations most of the time. What’s more, according to Cohen, “symbols, by nature, signify contrast and distinction” (Cohen, 1999: 131). Therefore they can determine the main points of distinction within the “insiders” themselves as well as those within the relationships with the “outsiders”. To understand or even simply to grasp the symbols of a community is hence to reach the meanings conveyed by those symbols (Castoriadis, 1997: 244).

Accordingly, Islamism needs to make its own symbols visible in the society of spectacle21 we live in. Because “[t]he symbols of community are mental constructs” (Cohen, 1999: 17) and these mentally constructed sym-

bols ensure commitment to the community which one belongs whereas this symbolism with “[t]he very versatility of symbolic form and its capacity to obscure indigenous realities from those on ‘the other side’ of the boundary protects those realities from subversion by change and intrusion” (Cohen, 1999: 103). The symbolism that is sanctified here gives a sense of belonging and this creates a sense of identity (Cohen, 1999: 57). Once the community is established, “consensual symbols” are redecorated with values and they become the border of the community, thus a symbolic world for the people is created (Cohen, 1999: 69). Therefore symbol and its semantic world may correspond to an identity (Islamist, Muslim, mumin etc.) and they also have the potential to construct, reproduce or motivate that identity. One may observe that, today, Islamist segments try to keep this motivation alive through a language and symbolism that they predicate on the “Islam is actually the religion of love” discourse. Due to the very same reason, even the concept of “public dialogue” (Benhabib, 1992: 95-104) produced by the liberal model of public sphere is quite popular among Islamist circles.

But the real struggle here is the struggle to dominate the language and discourse present in the public sphere. Islamic symbols act as the conveyors of religious language and discourses in the public sphere. The fundamental goal of this conveyance is to be able to infiltrate public relationships. The more religiosity is added into everyday conversations and social relationships of the individuals, the better their mental and semantic worlds and worlds of discourse can be dominated. Therefore intensive usage of Islamic symbols and indicators in every field of public life is about the capacity to transform the linguistic instruments that organize individuals’ perception, comprehension and actions. After all, “Islamic ideas and identities are kept in the public’s mind and in popular culture” (Zubaida, 1994: 237). Furthermore, since language and discourse are constructed in a large symbolism, the real aim will naturally be able to make that symbolism more visible. It is obvious that the frequently used Islamist symbolism would increase the dynamism in the public sphere. Thus language which is the conveyor of meaning (and ideology) in symbols also becomes a means to establish social bonds, particularly between people who share the same faith, with reference to language. Accordingly interaction, assimilation or shifts in the public sphere are closely related with this political bond. On the one hand, a political (and perhaps emotional) bond is attempted to be established with individuals through language and meaning and on the other, it is attempted to establish a mental commonality where
similar meanings/reactions are to be given in similar situations through symbols. Because symbols that are framed by language and discourses are the collective designs of community life. “There are, then, standard displays that the individual offers to those in the gathering at large who care to look. The equipment employed is the whole body” (Goffman, 2010: 136-137). Such displays point to a person’s effort to be socially accepted as well as the efforts to assemble the society under a political language and symbols. After all, potential integrations and solidarities to be realized here would also signify the domination of public sphere.

To start with the first photo22 in the appendix, this one is a clear example of how an Islamic language positions itself in the public sphere. The message here is that salat which is thought to relieve the soul would solve psychological problems and that if everyone gave alms23 (zakāt), the sociological problems in the society would be eliminated too. First of all, it claims that performing salat and giving alms, two of the five pillars of Islam24 could save individuals from social and psychological problems. Secondly, it puts two Islamic concepts up against two scientific disciplines to give the message that we don’t need the latter if “the requirements of the religion are fulfilled”. In fact, this banner also explains why critical reason and analytical thought increasingly lose ground in Turkey. Because religious thought and its elements caused all the values associated with scientific thought in the society to be rapidly pushed into the background, particularly in the past thirty years. People in Turkey had always had a problematical relationship with scientific thought but now, not even a responsibility of the sort seems to have remained in general. Consequently, metaphysics announced victory. Many concepts like salat and alms having become frequently visible via language, discourse and symbols paved the way for the meaning in the public sphere to be filled with Islamic values. Today, adding a traditional and religious concept before any object or service makes it more easily sellable. Moreover, all the mass media in the

22 The visual materials analyzed here are compiled from social media. It is cross-checked and confirmed through a number of channels that the materials are not montaged or interfered with. The visual materials are given in the appendix of the article in consideration of the limitations of the book page.

23 Alms: In Islam, distributing one fortieth of one’s possessions and money to the poor every year. Giving alms is also one of the five pillars of Islam.

24 The others are Islamic testimony of faith (shahada), fasting (sawm) and going on a pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj).
country are full of programs that announce reading which Quran verses and hadiths are good for treating diseases, from which bad situations they save people. Therefore it is no surprise that people firstly and most easily resort to religious methods. And when these methods do not work, the ancient yet popular excuse that “one does not believe in or pray to God enough” comes into play and saves the situation.

At this stage, the following three photos should be examined together. The photo number two is from the cover of a book which the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the state institution responsible of religious affairs in Turkey) has published in order to teach children how to perform salat. One of children’s favorite fictional characters, Spider-Man is depicted as performing salat. The book cover is designed in such a way that it looks like a comic book telling the adventures of Spider-Man rather than a religious book. Obviously, the aim of depicting a comic book superhero loved by children while “performing salat” is both to attract more attention to this worship and to teach about this worship better. However, considering the fact that Islamism cares about traditional values and regards such fictional superheroes as “degeneration”, this book points to the failure of Islamism to produce a local hero. It is Spider-Man teaching kids how to perform salat within the scope of religious education in the public sphere and this is a great tragedy for the Islamism in Turkey. Although the visual material number three has a similar goal, the third and fourth items point to a reality that distinguish them from number two. Because these posters are posted on corridor walls of different schools by teachers. In other words, these posters are put up at schools giving public education where there are families and their children of various religions and sects. Especially the assertive language used in the fourth poster saying “every child is born Muslim” is important in the sense of showing the kind of commonality a potential Islamic hegemony will coerce people into. All the Islamist organizations in the world come to a deadlock at the point of this coercion and “the idea that Islam covers all realms, organizes every field of life from politics to social activities” can only multiply the cracks on the wall of reality (Haenni, 2014: 29). In this respect, this statement that claims “every child is born Muslim” and then gets drifted towards different sects, faiths or faithlessness due to factors like family, environment, media also seems to take upon itself to “correct” them and “lead them into the right path”. This thought that turns an ordinary Muslim into a riot police at once is an example of why coexistence has become so difficult.
When we take a look at the fifth photo, we learn that “adultery causes poverty.” According to this premise, poverty will directly vanish if adultery is not committed. This claim which denies all economic theories, interestingly links the cause of a social and economic problem like poverty to “forbidden” sexual intercourses of people. In short, people struggle with the trouble of poverty due to a situation forbidden by Islam because God willed so. Another similarly common idea is that adultery is also the main reason behind the earthquakes happening in Turkey. In a nutshell, God punishes us with poverty and earthquakes because some people “commit adultery”. The Islamist language here chalks the reason of all negative situations up to people “moving away from religion” and also tries to be the “single criterion” of evaluations in the public sphere in the face of potential scientific explanations. Of course, ripping apart all economic theories is of no importance. After all, the promised reward (heaven) can destroy any form of reality.

When we look at the sixth poster, we meet another face of Islamism. When the last 30 years of the Islamic capital is taken into consideration, it can easily be observed that the Islamic segment in Turkey has also found a place for itself in the rapidly changing consumption patterns. Muslims do not see any harm in participating in the consumption society as far as their purchasing power allows. As can be seen in the poster, fashion shows and even weddings are held in luxury hotels because at any rate, Islamist symbolism needs to “be/look modern”. There are headscarves sold for 10 TL as well as for 2.000 TL and both have the same function. But in today’s Turkey “Muslim women’s chastity can express itself not under any veil but under the most European, luxury and latest fashion fabric” (Haenni, 2014: 19). So the wealth earned no longer functions to exalt poverty but wealth. But here we need to identify the semantic shift in moral attitudes in the name of adaptation to economic demands. Following the increase in the Islamic capital, these segments have started to produce discourses that supported capitalism/globalization. On the condition that capitalism is passed through a sift of Islamic ethics, these discourses which relied on the eager acceptance of all its elements also easily saved the wealthy Muslims (and especially the politicians among them) from Islamic responsibilities. Thus wealth-induced hierarchy in public relationships ceased to be a

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25 Adultery: A married man or woman being voluntarily engaged in a sexual relationship with some one other than the spouse. It is strictly forbidden and severely punished in Islam.
considerable problem for today’s Muslims. After all, the God had not created us equal. Moreover, that ancient belief that “God tests people with wealth” has reentered the circulation on the lips of those “being tested with poverty”. Heaven is a sad word for the Muslims today. Because compared to the promises of the world of consumption, the idea of heaven looks weak albeit never altogether gone.

Representations of many similar Islamic symbols in the public sphere can be further exemplified. Yet all of these examples would help us reach the conclusion that the Islamic language, discourse and symbols aim to create an alternative public meaning with their circulation in the public sphere. Transformation of the public sphere on behalf of Islamism is possible in case this is achieved. But the important question here is whether domination of the public sphere necessarily ensures legitimacy. Because the legitimacy issue falls within the a field of discussion even above that of public sphere. How come a power that has the capacity to transform the public based on different interests and rivalries may have a legitimacy problem? Now, we can pursue this.

**Conclusion: Islamism in the Midst of a Deep Legitimacy Problem**

Legitimacy in the most general sense means legal compliance or legality. This definition corresponds to the legal meaning of legitimacy. Plus, the meaning “gained acceptance in the public conscience” is inherent to the definition. But, since even the legitimacy of the laws themselves has become questionable, the concept of legitimacy has not remained exempt from these debates. “*When we look at the legitimacy of the legal order, it has another formal property that is particularly important: The positive character of the provided law. How is the legitimacy of rules that can be changed by the political law maker, be grounded?*” (Habermas, 1999: 63). This question includes in the same debate how and through what ways legitimacy is accepted or approved by the public. Whereas today, the legitimacy of any legal hegemonic power or even that of a party who’s come to power with the votes of majority can be equally problematical. The ground rule here is an act or thought being approved by other authorities as well. However, if the acts and thoughts of hegemonic powers are approved by their own actors and if they consider themselves the top authority in that matter and do not need any other approval, there is a great legitimacy problem there. It cannot be claimed that a structure which can de-
cide its legitimacy itself alone is predicated on an ethical and normative rationale. Speaking in Weberian terms, this situation is neither legal nor rational. Plus, legitimacy is a position hard to regain once it is lost.

Yet this attitude of “not needing approval” has by now become typical of Islamism in Turkey and it pulls itself into a deep legitimacy problem which its supporters fail to realize. It cannot even be suggested that the Islamist thought in Turkey with its conveyors/actors (political power, religious groups, religious people etc.) recognize the existence of such a legitimacy problem in itself. Because this mentality in question claims to get the legitimacy of its acts and policies from first the God and then from its own mass. The source of a legitimacy assumed to be provided by God is Quran and hadiths\textsuperscript{26} whereas the source of a legitimacy assumed to be provided by masses is the elections. After all, “according to a Muslim, the source of legitimacy is unequivocally the commandments of Allah”.\textsuperscript{27} The other reference of legitimacy is the ballot box in all Muslim-majority countries. Thus, getting a high percentage of the votes from constituents is considered the same as “acceptance” in the public conscience. According to the Islamists, racist, discriminatory, oppressive, authoritarian and similar acts are all considered “normal” policies in order to establish domination in the public sphere. For instance, according to an opinion which has become popular by now, eating or drinking anything in the public sphere while Muslims are fasting in the month of Ramadan is regarded as “profanity”. In this month when many restaurants and businesses are closed, the mass who considers itself “majority” expects unconditional respect from the mass who is claimed to be “minority” and the former is totally oblivious to the fact that democracy works vice versa. However in the modern world “[i]t is only there if there is plurality of political forces substituting for each other in power –as the attempt to hegemonize the very principle of ‘order’ and ‘organization’- that democracy is possible” (Laclau, 1994: 5). Today, the political power with its power in media, its ideological and individual pressures as well as the Islamism in pursuit of establishing a transformation and hegemony in the public sphere do not seem to care that legitimacy cannot be established through oppression and violence. Therefore, it should be known that Islamism doesn’t need another authority to question its legitimacy for its public practices. This obser-

\textsuperscript{26} Hadith: Sayings and practices of Muhammad the Prophet.
\textsuperscript{27} \url{http://www.iktibasdergisi.com/siyasal-mesruyet/}.
vation alone is enough to point to the problematical relationship of Islam with democracy and civil society. An Islamist thought which displays utterly intolerant attitudes towards the diversity and pluralism of the public sphere as well as to rights and freedoms would take into consideration neither the problems caused by a public life dominated by religious rules alone nor the way these problems would damage the sense of ethics and justice. However, consent to be gained by spreading fear and intimidating people would only increase social problems.

This religious publicness designed and called “New Turkey” may seem to have succeeded in terms of the extent to which it has changed the dynamics of everyday life but it looks as though it has already historically flopped in terms of law, politics and of course humanity. Moreover, since every power has within itself an equally strong poison, it is not possible for the Islamist thought to realize this atrocity from within its current euphoria of victory. It has gained the consent of half of the society and now keeping them bound and holding them responsible while otherizing and associating the other half with crime (All the dissidents in Turkey are regarded as terrorists, atheists and traitors by the political power). How much longer can this attitude be explained by “It’s God’s will” or “Religion commands so”? It seems like the Islamists will always look for illegitimacy in the allegedly rival thoughts and acts until it gains a victory in its battle with Western values and norms with which it conflicts in shaping the public sphere. Whereas following a potential victory, the definition of legitimate acts will change again and all of these things will be attempted to be legitimized again with reference to “public conscience”. Yet there is neither an intellectual nor a mass effort to prevent this envisagement from turning into a dystopia. Someone has to tell the Islamists already that they can come to power by the sword but cannot stay there by the same means.

As a matter of fact, we can explain the future of Islamism by a reference to the famous metaphor in Franz Kafka’s immortal work of art, The Metamorphosis. One morning, Gregor Samsa wakes up and finds himself transformed into an “insect”. However, his real concern is not having turned into an “insect” but having lost his legitimacy. At the end of the day, some things may seem legitimate to people (like “becoming an insect”) but reputation and legitimacy constitute the subject matter of universal definitions and recognitions that transcend those things. They are necessary, vital and significant...
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Visual Materials

No: 1 (*A society which performs salat does not need to think over psychology a society which gives alms does not need to think over sociology.*)

No: 2 (*I am learning salat.*)

No: 3 (*Why does Super-Man wear a cape?)
No: 4 (*All babies are born as Muslims.)

No: 5 (*Adultery causes poverty.)
No: 6 (*Conservatives' fashion week, Istanbul)
Hosting the Nation: Populist Themes in Erdoğan’s Muhtar Meetings

Özlem Denli*

The subject of this essay is populist themes in President Erdoğan’s speeches addressing the headmen of villages and neighborhoods (muhtars) in periodical meetings held since 29.1.2015. In 2014, Erdoğan became the first popularly elected president in Turkish political history. Shortly after the election, he started to host the muhtars in the Presidential Palace. The, still ongoing, meetings are broadcasted live in major TV channels and have since become a privileged means of popular address for the President.

I will examine Erdoğan's speeches with a view to trace populist elements in his political discourse. Populisms has become a central concept employed in the media and in academia alike. Politicians, political movements and elections across the globe are discussed as instances of a "populist upsurge". "The specter of populism" seems to be haunting political analysis, even though the definition and analytic value of the concept is highly contested (Marlière, 2013). In this essay, I do not attempt to give a precise definition or canvass 'many and contradictory shapes' of populism

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1 The muhtars are elected officials voted in for a period of five years. In the cities, they carry out tasks such as keeping population records, registering addresses, and providing or certifying documentation. Muhtars in the villages have additional responsibilities including acting on behalf of the village in matters of budgeting and raising money, announcing state legislation and decrees to the people, reporting crime to security forces (Kavuk, 2004: 188-189).
2 On 10 August 2014, in the first popular election of the Turkish President in the history of the Republic, Prime Minister and Justice and Development Party (AKP) candidate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected in the first round with 51.79 percent of the vote. The other candidates, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the joint candidate of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), garnered 38.44 percent while Selahattin Demirtaş, candidate for the Peoples' Democracy Party of Peoples (HDP), secured 9.78 percent.
as doctrine, movement or as a singular political discourse (Woods, 2014).³ Instead, I focus on select themes broadly associated with the populist phenomenon, and analyze the form and content they have in the particular historical setting of contemporary Turkey.⁴ I concentrate on two themes in particular. First, an antagonistic positioning of 'us' versus 'them', according to which the outsider and the banished embodies the will of the people vis-à-vis the establishment. Second, willingness to breach existing legal norms and procedures in the name of general will.

I investigate President Erdoğan's addresses in the muhtar meetings from their start in January 2015 until the attempted coup in July 2016. A state of emergency was declared in the aftermath of the failed coup, and the country has been under an exceptional regime ever since.⁵ Singular characteristics of this period demands a different theoretical treatment, therefore, are not covered in this essay.

A Brief Description of the Muhtar Meetings

The first of the periodical muhtar meetings were held on 29.1.2015.⁶ The meetings were projected to take place weekly, but there were times when the intervals were longer. The muhtars are hosted in the Presidential Palace, and they subsequently join the President at a luncheon.

The addresses follow a basic blueprint. Erdoğan starts his speech by expressing his pleasure to host the muhtars, and greets them saying, "Welcome to the Presidential Complex, the House of the Nation".⁷ He states that there are approximately fifty thousand muhtars in Turkey today; eigh-

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³ Arguably, the evasiveness of the concept is also due to the fact that the term has been used to describe political movements, parties, ideologies, and leaders across geographical, historical, and ideological contexts (Woods, 2014).
⁴ See (Dinçşahin, 2012), for an analysis of the discourse of the JDP leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan between 2007 and 2010.
⁵ On 21.7.2016, the Cabinet declared a three-month state of emergency, emergency allows the president and cabinet to bypass parliament when drafting new laws and to restrict or suspend rights and freedoms (www.bbc.com, 2016). The state of emergency was since extended three times; the last one on 18.4. 2017.
⁶ The last meeting prior to the coup attempt was held on 29.09.2016, and the latest one, so far, was on 22.8.2017.
⁷ The term "Presidential Complex" was first used at the second meeting held on 17.2.2015.
teen thousand of them serve in villages and another thirty-two thousand in
neighborhoods. He expresses the wish to continue hosting the muhtars at
every chance he gets, reads out the number and provinces of the muhtars
in attendance, and announces that the Minister of Internal Affairs will be
present during the meeting.

This general introduction is followed by the major points of the address.
The meetings are broadcasted live on major TV channels and given exten-
sive coverage in mass media.

*The President and His "Nation"

From the onset, the AKP has presented itself as the representative of
change, and hailed a new era in Turkish political history. Erdoğan and oth-
er leading figures of the AKP have promoted the party as the voice of the
outsider and the representative of popular discontent with established loci
of power. An ongoing sense of victimization is a central theme of this
claim. On various occasions prior to muhtar meetings Erdoğan had pre-
sented the AKP as the voice of the underdog in an essentially non-inclu-
sive political system, and as part of a political movement persecuted by
the Kemalist status quo (Aytaç and Öniş, 2017). In addressing the audi-
ences at the muhtar meetings, Erdoğan gives this depiction a distinctive
personal twist by anchoring the argument in his past and experience as a
political figure.

“First, I would like to draw your attention to a point. The notion of being a
muhtar has an exceptional meaning for my political struggle. When I was the
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor, I was prosecuted for a poem I re-
cited in Siirt. I was sentenced to 10 months on September, 23 1998. The next
day of my conviction, many of the newspapers, particularly the bestselling
one, reported the news under the headline 'He cannot even be a muhtar any
longer'. Personally I and our nation have always remembered this headline of

I rendered the concept *millet* as nation throughout the essay. Yet, there is a signifi-
cant terminological nuance summarized by Cihan Tuğal, *"In early Islamic usage,
millet... a Kur’anic term, designated Muslim and non-Muslim religious groups... As
there was nothing in local language to refer to ‘the nation’, nationalists appropriated
the term milli in the nineteenth century and started to use it as an equivalent of the
term national" (Tuğal, 2009: 5).
1998. Actually, they did not only affront me with that headline. They also af-
fronted all our muhtar brothers in Turkey” (TCCB, 2015).

Varieties of this statement is reiterated by Erdoğan in most every one of his address, often right after greeting the audience. The plea implicit in the account seems to function on more than one level. Firstly, Erdoğan appeals to the emotions of the audience as a person subjected to persecution and victimization, and as an outsider despite the fact that he occupies the office of presidency. Secondly, he evokes equivalence with his audience in being offended by the expression “even muhtar”. In this way, he positions as a point of identification with the muhtars as underdogs in an “elite-dominated” political regime.

Erdoğan, proceeds to offer explanations as to the mechanisms of vic-
timization at work in his case. The central pillar of his line of argument is the political opposition between the elected, who derive their authority from the people, and the bureaucratic elite, whose claim to power rests elsewhere.

“For those who are against the choices of the nation, there is no difference be-
tween the muhtars and the President, no difference whether you are elected by twenty-one votes or by twenty million votes” (Muhtar Meeting, 24.2.2015).

Placing twenty-one votes on the same plane with twenty million votes is a direct reference to the muhtars, for in some villages twenty-one votes may just be what is needed. On this narrative, what unites the President and the muhtars is the fact that they are both elected by direct vote, and represent the nation in a direct fashion. For him, contempt transpiring in the newspaper headline articulates the elite’s lack of respect for the ballot box.

There are two discursive operations at work here. First, the muhtars are not simply elected officials but also representatives of the state as part of the as part of the administrative hierarchy (Kavruk, 2004: 192). Erdoğan glosses over this fact by a one-sided depiction. Second, he asserts equivalence between the two offices which are far apart in terms of the rank and the authority wielded by their respective holders. The highly subjective note of the speeches summons the muhtars to identify with Erdoğan, not only politically but also on a personal and emotional level. The narrative seeks to unite Erdoğan’s and the muhtars’ individual stories, and suggests

8 Elise Massicard, argues that geographical, social, and relational proximity of the muhtars with the population makes it relevant to consider them as "institutionalized intermediaries" (Massicard, 2015).
that condescension and exclusion, targets an identifiable community. In this manner, Erdoğan construes an ‘in-group’ or ‘us’ as opposed to ‘them’, and posits a political frontier between those who represent the will of the nation and the elite whose mentality and actions are antithetical to this very notion.

The distinction between the elected versus the bureaucratic elite is neither a novel idea in Turkish politics not it is limited to Erdoğan's discourse. In fact, the idea reached a virtually hegemonic status, especially during the earlier years of the AKP rule. The Islamists, the liberals and a major strain of the liberal left carried the idea to the forefront as the discursive counterpart of their struggle to overcome what they term as the legacy of military interventions and ‘bureaucratic tutelage’ (Denli, 2015: 63-64, 198). Erdoğan rebuffs 'bureaucratic tutelage' by relying on the notion of “serving the nation”. (Muhtar Meeting, 19.10.2015). He claims the virtues of “modesty” and “humility” in the name of the political tradition he belongs to, and declares his lifelong pursuit as being " on the side of the people” (Muhtar Meeting, 19.10.2015). Serving the goals of economic development and democratization are the two reoccurring themes revolved by Erdoğan in order to substantiate this claim.

Erdoğan defines economic development on the basis of an abstract notion of prosperity, measured in the quantitative terms of large-scale construction projects undertaken under the AKP rule. He provides detailed figures on dams, residential units, schools, roads, hospitals, power plants, highways, airports etc. built in this period, by putting particular emphasis on a number of high-profile projects:

“This is what we do now. We will continue to do that. There were two bridges over the Bosphorus. The decks of the third one are being installed now and some people are disturbed by this. There is no need to be disturbed. We built Marmaray, the projects of which had been initiated by our ancestors. We completed the project now we say it is not enough, we should build another one. I laid the ground of the second project during my Premiership. They are now approaching the European side below the sea level. I hope we will open the Eurasia Tunnel next year to vehicle traffic. Marmaray is a railroad project the Eurasia Tunnel will be a two-story tunnel, through which automobiles will pass. This shows that if you believe and persevere, you can do anything. If you achieve these projects, then you can be a great state Otherwise, you will remain as a small state” (TCCB, 2015).

In his analysis of urban development, Michael Keating points at the impact of large-scale and high-profile projects for providing symbolic evi-
dence of success and renaissance (Keating, 1991: 159). This point is explicitly made by Erdoğan, who portrays these undertakings as signs of economic prosperity as well as icons of national pride and grandeur (Muhtar Meeting, 29.1.2015).

As argued by (D. Özsel et al., 2013: 559-60), Successive AKP governments lead by Erdoğan have remained loyal to neoliberal principles in areas such as privatizing of public enterprises, issuing pro-employer legislation, and following the economic program set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The AKP followed a path characterized by a unique combination of neo-liberal economic policies with Islamic cultural conservatism (Yıldırım 2009). Erdoğan's repository of populist themes has little to do with the grievances of the poor and the dispossessed. As I will discuss below, he evokes the feelings of marginalization and exclusion, only to translate them into cultural terms. Anti-status-quo elements in his discourse are not economic, but institutional and cultural.

The second and more prominent topic canvassed with uttermost urgency is the political aspect of "serving the people". Erdoğan augments and accentuates previously made points regarding the opposition between "those derive authority from the ballot box" and the bureaucratic establishment. He adds the majors and the prime minister to the chain of identification uniting the President and the muhtars. Besides being elected offices, both positions happen to have direct personal relevance for Erdoğan, for he served as both major and prime minister prior to his presidency.

Erdoğan’s major breakthrough in politics came when he was elected Mayor of Metropolitan İstanbul in local elections held on 27 March 1984, in which capacity he served until being sentenced to prison for reading a poem. With this call back to the earlier narrative, Erdoğan presents himself as a politician with roots in “local government.” (Muhtar Meeting, 24.2.2015) and establishes another path of rapport with the muhtars. He mentions his route to becoming prime minister as yet another instance of ‘unjust persecution’ by the power elite. In the general election in 2002, Erdoğan rallied in capacity of the AKP’s Chairman but could not run for par-

9 The official biography of President Erdoğan reads, "In the local elections held on March 27, 1994, Mr. Erdoğan was elected Mayor of Metropolitan İstanbul. On December 12, 1997, while addressing the public in Siirt, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan read a poem from a book, which was recommended by the National Education Ministry and published by a state agency, and after that, he was sentenced to imprisonment for reading that poem. Thus, his term as mayor was ended." (www.tccb.gov.tr).
liamant himself, and was not able to hold the office of prime Minister until March 2003. Erdoğan describes the cases as an affront against democracy, and invites the muhtars to rallying in its defense (Muhtar Meeting, 29.1.2015). Underlining that the muhtars are voted in by the people is, thus, critical for the antagonism he posits between "the elected" and "the bureaucratic establishment. "

“The muhtars are not appointed civil servants. They are authorized by the will of the nation; and the elected are above the appointed” (Muhtar Meeting, 26.8.2015).

“The muhtars are the elected; that, you shall respect” (Muhtar Meeting, 17.2.2015).

What characterizes Erdoğan’s overall discourse is the use of personal experience as the primary means of political exposition. His examples serve to evoke sympathy of an in-group audience, and depicts "us" as a community with higher status in reality, but disparaged in actuality. Nonetheless, Erdoğan also enunciates "the will of the nation as the insurmountable power" that enabled him to break the hold of the establishment (Muhtar Meeting, 17.2.2015). The personal success story is, thus, inscribed in a wider narrative of democratization through multiple confrontations with the status quo, or between 'us' and 'them'.

The Elite versus the Nation: Representing the Cultural Essence

The political frontier Erdoğan construes between “us” and “them” is at the same time a cultural frontline. He compounds the political antagonism between the elite and the nation with a posited a dissonance of beliefs, values, and ways of life. The role of cultural themes in populist discourse is a topic dealt with in the existing literature. In Erdoğan’s case, cultural themes are gleaned by intimating arguments widespread in the Islamist movement.

10 "Mr. Erdoğan, who was not a candidate for MP during the elections on November 3, 2002 due to the court’s decision against him at the time, joined the deputy renewal election held on March 9, 2003 in Siirt when the legal obstacle was lifted after the necessary legal regulations had been made. Taking 85 % of the votes cast in that election, he became a deputy from Siirt for the 22nd term. Taking over the Prime Minister’s office on March 15, 2003 (www.tccb.gov.tr).
The process of modernization in the Ottoman-Turkish setting started in the 19th century, and entailed a complex relationship with "Western" culture and institutions. Ever since, contestations on Turkey's political scene has been interwoven with controversies on collective identity and authenticity. From the onset, traditionalists and Islamists aimed to limit the effects of transformation to the technical realm, and rejected the values and practices of the modernizing elite as "alien" to primordial cultural identity (Berkes, 1998; Göle, 1996). Şakir Dinçşahin contends that Western orientated intellectuals "culturally alienated from their society known to this day in the discourse of conservative politicians as "monşer" (i.e. mon cher)” (Dinçşahin, 2012: 25). In Turkey today, the proverbial alienated intellectual is epitomized in the figure of the diplomat. On the 23rd muhtar meeting, Erdoğan draws out this theme in the following words:

"You know, I criticized a diplomat for posing cheek-to-cheek with a journalist who stood trial on charges of espionage. Upon my criticism, a humor magazine published on its cover a caricature showing me cheek to cheek with a muhtar of ours. By doing so, it supposedly tried to mock that ‘We pose with consuls but you can only pose with muhtars.’ That is exactly what I mean. My place is on the side of the people. My place is on the side of muhtars, who are the elected representatives of the people. How about you? Whose side are you on? You are on the side of those diplomats. You may continue your march with them. We know their mindset well. This mindset calls itself modern, progressive, enlightened, leftist and democratic. But in reality, they are against the public and nation” (TCCB, 2016).

The antagonism posited by this argument circles back to the running themes of cultural condescension and political exclusion, and courses along the lines of authenticity versus alienation, humility versus condescension, and democracy versus domination. Erdoğan discredits the "elite" as “alienated from their country,” (Muhtar Meeting, 20.01.2016) and accuses them for “arrogating themselves to ruling the country in spite of the belief, culture and demands of the nation” (Muhtar Meeting, 24.2.2015).

In the muhtar meeting held in October 2015, Erdoğan chastises academics, another epitome of proverbial "alienated intellectual," as follows:

“Are not they the ones that attack the nation, insult the nation, and call them ‘numbskull’ because the nation does not think and act the way they want. Calling the nation stupid, hollering ‘man scratching his belly’; are not they the ones? Their path can never, not ever intersect with democracy” (Muhtar Meeting, 26.10.2015).

The nation, in this fashion, is constructed as a substantial reality on both cultural and normative terms. Erdoğan pledges adherence to the values...
held by the common people in the person of the muhtars, and testifies to the quintessential unity of the leader and the people; as much cultural as political.

**Vox Populi or the Muhtars as Proxy for the Nation**

Single-issue forms of political action materializing in referenda or plebiscites are favored tools of populist leaders and parties. Erdoğan's rhetoric presents a clear case of endorsing these mechanisms as superior forms of popular representation. During the period discussed in this essay, Erdoğan strived for *de facto* empowerment of the presidency, and towards constitutional change towards a president system. This context added urgency to promoting the primacy of direct elections, referenda, and plebiscites over and above representation via parliament.

“... This process led to the major transformation we see today: election of the president directly by the people. Do you know what the same circles started to say? They started saying again 'No, not the nation but the parliament should elect the President.' What is the parliament? They represent the nation. So, who are the people? Who are the nation? The original who is represented. What relevance can the representative have in the presence of the original?” (Muhtar Meeting, 12.8.2015).

These words bring in a significant variation into the broader logic of the opposition posited between the elected and the non-elected. The statement gains unique connotations when read together with the following one.

“I wish it were possible to come together and talk face to face with all of the 79-million population. However, you are the representatives of the people so meeting with and talking to you means meeting with and talking to all of the 79-million population” (TCCB, 2016).

Erdoğan regards the muhtars on a superior footing compared to the members of the parliament, and adorns their standing as representation proper: They are positioned in unique equivalence with the popularly elected president as the true personification of the nation. The muhtars, in this fashion, are conformed into the mystical body of the nation as its genuine proxy.
As discussed above, Erdoğan marks being the first president elected by popular vote as a turning in Turkish political history. Early on in his campaign, he announced his intention to be an active or ‘hands on’ president; not a symbolic head of the state or a passive notary to the decisions made by the parliament (www.hurriyetdailynews.com, 2014). Erdoğan and other spokesmen of the AKP also pronounced that if they obtain the necessary constitutional amendment majority in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, they will change the system of government into a semi-presidential or presidential one (Özbudun, 2014). Some interpreted this assertion as the resolve to use constitutionally proclaimed presidential powers to the maximum. Erdoğan’s speeches and actions following his victory, however, indicate a different state of affairs, and illustrate the extent of his ambitions.

On 14.8.2015, Erdoğan gave a speech in the province of Rize, asking that the constitution be updated to recognize his de facto deployment of enhanced powers:

“There is a president with de facto power in the country, not a symbolic one. The president should conduct his duties for the nation directly, but within his authority. Whether one accepts it or not, Turkey’s administrative system has changed. Now, what should be done is to update this de facto situation in the legal framework of the constitution” (www.hurriyetdailynews.com, 2015).

“To update this de facto situation in the legal framework of the constitution” is arguably the key phrase assigning meaning and significance to the rest of the statement. Erdoğan seems to be positing a dissonance between the constitutional framework and actually existing balance of forces, and deeming the former no longer relevant. He dates the said rift to the constitutional amendments and the referendum providing for the election of president by popular vote and his subsequent election in 2014 (Muhtar Meeting, 19.08.2015). It is important to note that the referendum on enhanced presidential powers was not held until 16.4.2017. During the period in-between, Erdoğan served as the popularly elected president within

11 The constitutional reform package contained 18 amendments, which among others, proposed changes to the parliamentary system, the abolishment of the office of the prime minister and the transfer of some of the parliament’s key oversight functions to an executive presidency, an increase in the number of seats in parliament to 600 and the empowerment of the president to appoint some highlevel positions in the judiciary (OSCE, 2017: 4).
a parliamentary setting, where the existing legal norms stipulated political neutrality of the President as the ‘head of the state’.

At the time the muhtar meetings started (January 2015), Turkey was only months away from the general elections of June 2015. Leaders of opposition parties and voices in the media frequently criticized Erdoğan for campaigning for the AKP, and using government resources to promote a partisan cause. The statement made at the ninth muhtar meeting can be read as a reply to these critics.

“Lately, they have been obsessing over my saying that Turkey changed its system of government. As you know... in our country today, the President is elected by the people. This change was first implemented on 10.8.2014. What we have here is fundamental change initiated by the decision of the Parliament and the will of the nation; not by coup d'état. This is what I stated. Isn't this the first time that Turkey gives itself a new form of government by means of the Parliament and the will of the nation? Yes, it does. Constitutional literature is clear. Everybody knows for sure. This is a system change. Look now; I am talking about the Constitution” (Muhtar Meeting, 19.8.2015).

The statement gives a particular interpretation of the constitution, which was widely contested at the time. By actively basing his actions on this reading, Erdoğan is asserting actual monopoly on the right to interpret constitutional provisions, and assuming the mandate to rise above them. To be more precise, the President seems to be endorsing de jure contravention of the de facto legal order in the name of a future ordering.

Willingness to breach established institutions and procedures is commonly accepted as an element of populism. Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty can serve as another reference for understanding this state of affairs. Schmitt postulates that the sovereign authority occupies a boundary position with regard to law; for he is not only bound to the normally valid legal order but also transcends it (Schmitt: 2010). Schmitt’s conception provides for political initiative by the leader as expression of the people’s constituent power or "the people’s right to give itself a constitution" (Bourke and Skinner, 2016: 340-342). Sovereign decision, as a matter of fact, forces a rift into the existing normative order in the name of a ordering still to come.

Erdoğan justifies his stance by reasserting the special status of directly elected presidency, and seeks justificatory grounds in the following argument:

12 On 7.4.2016. An early general election was held in the same year, on 1.11.2015.
“As you know, I made a promise when I ran for presidency. I said: ‘We shall not be neutral.’ And I continued: ‘We shall always be on the side of our nation’... Our mandate is not given by this or that backseat driver, but directly by our nation. Therefore, we are obligation is to our nation alone” (Muhtar Meeting, 12.8.2015).

On the reasoning given above, the de facto situation created by Erdoğan was already approved by the nation long before relevant constitutional package was submitted to a vote.

Conclusion

Erdoğan occupies a seemingly dissonant, and not at all unique, position as a leader who stands in-between the institutions and the people, and who utilizes populist elements for political purposes. During its term successive in government, the AKP consolidated its place in the branches of the state, and reconfigured the structure and authority of key institutions. Despite the fact, Erdoğan, as the leader of the AKP and as the President, stays course on a discourse of victimization and a politics of majoritarian action. He evokes the status of a political and cultural outsider, braving the bureaucratic establishment in the name of the banished, and, as the dispositions as the embodiment of popular will by virtue of fathoming its true essence. This claim is decisive for the de facto overruling of existing norms and procedures. Being in unmediated contact with the people functions as both the prerequisite and the validation of Erdoğan’s stance, as it is solemnized in the muhtar meetings.

Bibliography

Hosting the Nation: Populist Themes in Erdoğan’s Muhtar Meetings


Turkish Modernization and the Public Space: Its Emergence, Expansion and Recent Demise

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There are three distinct but closely interrelated dimensions within which the modernization process of Turkey can be tracked. First, the establishment of Western institutional models in legal, administrative and military organizations of the state. This institutional dimension includes reforms such as the foundation of a parliament, compilation of the principles and decrees of traditional Islamic law into codices, and transformation of traditional vizierates operating as secretarial offices into ministerial bureaucracies. Second, is the discursive dimension which concerns the appropriation of modern concepts, discourses and narrative styles. There are numerous important changes that have occurred in this discursive dimension throughout Turkey’s process of modernization in the last two centuries, such as the accession of the fundamental notions of Western legal reasoning (legal personality, court of appeal, etc.), popularization of nature as the aim of artistic gaze and perspective as a technique in visual arts, and the introduction of numerous concepts and ideas of modern political thought such as citizenship, public, nation, fatherland, social contract, and even the idea of the political. The third dimension of Turkish modernization is the political aspect. It involves the ways of forming, retaining and dismantling the relations of power to be more participatory and egalitarian, the extension of opportunities for all people to actively participate in political processes, and the emergence of the political as a social praxis.

While institutional and discursive changes throughout Turkish modernization are well known and documented, the changes in the political dimension are more controversial. Modernization certainly made its mark on the ways of amassing and distributing political power, such as the introduction of modern discipline and biopolitical techniques in the newly established public schools of the late nineteenth century, or use of elections

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as the correct way of creating legitimate legislative bodies (see Alkan, 2011: 388-389). Still, many scholars tend to disregard these changes for being superficial and insignificant and argue that not much had changed in essence within this political dimension, and that the same power bloc established around the central state apparatus has continued to dominate its subjects. This interpretation mostly depends upon a (mis)reading of the influential Turkish sociologist Şerif Mardin’s (1973) dichotomic analysis of Turkish modernization. The main thesis of this analysis is the existence of an authentic dynamic between center and periphery that has been dominating Turkish politics for centuries. While the distinction between center and periphery is by no means peculiar to Turkish society, and there have always been ‘peripheral’ power blocs against the power of the modern state, such as feudal aristocracy, free cities and, later, the proletariat, the political systems of Western European countries always found certain intermediary institutions to pull these peripheral blocs into the center and stabilize the system through their integration. According to the claims of Mardin, however, this has never happened in the case of Turkish history. The integrative aspect of this relation has never really materialized, neither in Ottoman past nor for the most part of the history of the Turkish republic. The relation between the center power bloc – being mainly the civil and military bureaucrats of the central state and, for the last two centuries, the intellectuals and bourgeoisie who identify themselves with the central state and its ideology – and the periphery – being religious communities, the class of local notables and dynasties, nomadic tribes and other groups which established an alternative power bloc – has always been defined in terms of a struggle and a zero-sum game in which the center consistently had the upper hand and, at least since the beginning of the nineteenth century, gradually dominated the periphery. Reformist bureaucrats and intellectuals of the time were seeing themselves as the teachers of the subject, and were attributing a role of tutelage to themselves. This attitude, although partly influenced by the “enlightened despots” of the time, such as Joseph II of Austria Hungary and Great Friedrich of Prussia, is also argued to be a reinterpretation of the traditional political doctrine in which the ruler is expected to become the benevolent overseer and guardian of their subjects for the good of the latter and for the higher good of preserving the divine law of justice (Oktay, 2017: 44). Mardinian approach to Turkish modernization thus implies a fundamental continuity in the political dimension of the modernization process. While the reforms may have introduced substantial changes in the institutional and discursive dimensions,
the fundamental positioning of the center as primary collector and distributor of political power against and over the periphery, and peripheral actors’ latent strategies of resistance to this dominance, is thought to remain unchanged. The conflict between these two is offered as the key to understanding Turkish political history. Yılmaz Yıldırım, one of the many contemporary scholars who are influenced by Mardin, claims this distinction between the center and the periphery to be “the most important social disjunction that preserved its existence throughout the centuries long process of modernization until recently” (Yıldırım, 2017: 122).

This perspective demonizes the reformist elites and regards the political dimension of modernization as mostly an illusion. Those who are not familiar with Turkish politics might find a discussion on this point quite trivial. Yet, while establishing an authoritarian regime, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his supporters have been frequently referring to this perspective and arguing the conflict between the periphery and the center as the overarching theme of Turkish politics. One of the pillars of Erdoğan’s conservative-populist discourse is that since the beginning of the modernization process in the nineteenth century, the ordinary people of Turkey – by that term he means mostly, if not exclusively, the Sunni-Muslim majority – have been expelled from political decision making processes, their demands have categorically been dismissed and the boundaries of their private sphere have been constantly violated in order to give a shape to their daily lives. It was argued that they were repressed by an homogeneous power bloc with its own intellectuals, artists, columnists and bureaucrats who, as this discourse goes, are alienated to the so-called authentic culture of the country. Particularly, in public speeches in election campaigns, Erdoğan referred to this power bloc in a despising way numerous times. In criticizing his political opponents for being part of this cast and having an elitist culture, he derided them as “mon chers”, the term that later became a coin-word among his supporters (Radikal Gazetesi, 06.07.2014). In other times, his supporters denounced these people for things such as following the Western example and wearing shoes at home (Takvim Gazetesi, 17.07.2014). By railing against these caricaturized elites of the center, Erdoğan is praised as the leader who represents the voice of the ordinary people and who, finally, put an end to their centuries long dominance over the periphery.

I would like to scrutinize this populist discourse by reassessing the relation between the reformist cadres of Turkey, their modernizationist agenda in the last two centuries and the ordinary people. To do this, I will focus
on the changes in the political dimension throughout this timespan and use the concept of “public sphere” as an operational tool to clarify the changes in the conditions of forming, maintaining and dismantling the relations of power. My main argument is that throughout the Turkish modernization process, the public sphere, understood as an egalitarian discursive space of social, political and legal relations, has been expanded and deepened.\(^1\) Appreciating this expansion is key to understanding the changes in the political dimension of Turkish modernization, and to fairly evaluating the role of the reformists in the political history of Turkey. It will allow us to criticize one of the discursive pillars of the right-wing populism of Erdoğan and to put the arising authoritarianism in Turkey into context as well.

From Institutional and Discursive Modernization to the Political Modernization

Institutional modernization in Turkey had begun in the late 1700s and gained pace after the Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu (Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber) in 1839.\(^2\) With the hope of consolidating the power of the central government, reformist bureaucrats and sultans of the nineteenth century were mostly focusing on restructuring the military and central administration. They were observing the state apparatuses in Europe, introducing modern administrative institutions and trying to imitate their operational styles. In 1831, the first fully Turkish official gazette, Takvim-i Vekai (Calendar of Facts) began to inform the subjects of the empire on the will and opinion of the state on a regular basis. With the Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber in 1839 and the Imperial Edict in 1856, Sultan Abdülmecid I acknowledged fundamental rights of his subjects and legal equality among them (Seyitdanlıoğlu, 2012: 377). He self-imposed certain limitations to his political power and granted certain legal guarantees to the reformist

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1 I should note that as I am focusing on the expansion of the public sphere for its role in the political dimension of Turkish modernization, the paper does not aim to cover all different public spheres that emerged in the Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century and developed in different ways in parallel to each other. Instead, I am only interested in the public sphere that emerged with efforts of Ottoman bureaucrats and reformist intellectuals in the capital and continued to play an intermediary role in between the political and civil societies of modern Turkey.

2 The history of these in the eighteenth early modernizationist attempts can be followed in Berkes (2014: 91-147).
bureaucrats as well. After this, institutional modernization began to gain momentum. First elective local councils in modern history of Turkey, *Muhassilik Meclisleri*, were gathered in 1840 and traditional secretaries began to transform into ministerial bureaus that functioned as rationalized and standardized apparatuses of the state. These reforms paved the path to the first nation-wide election to form the parliament in 1876 and the ratification of the first constitution of the country.

Early Turkish reformists of the nineteenth century were a number of influential high ranking bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte, who embraced Western liberal ideas. For instance, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the most influential of the reformist bureaucrats and the mastermind of the Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber, declared in the edict that states can strengthen themselves only by preserving the life and property of individuals (Kaplan, 2012: 468). For a modern audience, there is nothing striking in this argument. Nonetheless, it was a definite break from the traditional political culture which would never relate the needs and desires of individuals directly with those of the state, simply because state and individuals were not regarded as equals (Oktay, 2017: 44-46). Likewise, in one of his writings, another reformist, Sadık Rifat Paşa, argued for the necessity of the state to serve its people, not because it is an obligation of divine law but because it is a natural requirement for states to be able to maintain themselves (Mardin, 2012: 159). The thinking of these high ranking bureaucrats had been clearly influenced by the liberal political culture of nineteenth century Britain. However, these ideas had little significance for the common people and had little impact outside the Sublime Port. For the ordinary subjects of the Empire, and especially for the Muslim majority, these institutional reforms were seen as alien ways of the Europeans that would be detrimental to themselves.

These institutions had evolved in the fundamentally different political culture of modernity. It was this inclusiveness that recognized the people as the origin of political power and was seeking, in principle, their active or tacit consent. While the Ottoman state was still investigating its subjects for participating in the so-called state talk (Kırlı, 2009: 7-9), this was a culture that recognized the legitimacy, and even desirability, of political contemplation and deliberation by citizens. Only by using the vocabulary and discourse of this political culture could the aspirations of Turkish re-

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3 For a detailed study of these local councils see Efe (2002).
formists be truly comprehended and justified. Without this popularisation of modern political culture, institutional reforms could not have been understood and appreciated by the masses. Turkish bureaucrats and intellectuals quickly realized the significance of this, and the language via which these modern institutions came into being. The concepts, discourses and emphases of this language, as well as its hiatuses, should be translated and this language should be popularized.

Young Ottomans, a loosely connected group of intellectuals, authors and journalists who were critical of these bureaucracy-led institutional modernization attempts for ignoring the intellectual basis of the institutional novelties, and for failing to popularize these reforms, made their contribution by beginning to translate and popularize this new language of the modern political culture through their newspapers (Ulken, 2017: 34-36). These newspapers played an important role in Turkish modernization that resembles their role in the history of the emergence of a public sphere and political society in Western Europe (Paquot, 2012: 61). In the 1860 s, they were the primary means for Young Ottomans to voice their opinions and to create a public which embraced their ideals. In their newspaper articles and other literary pieces, Young Ottoman intellectuals translated the main concepts of modern political thinking and popularized this vocabulary by interpreting Turkish politics through these. Concepts such as public (amme), public opinion (amme efkarı), nation (millet), freedom (hurriyet) and constitution (kanun-i esasi), in their modern meanings, were popularized in the Turkish political debates in 1860 s all thanks to the efforts of these Young Ottoman intellectuals.

Arguably, the most important concept translated by them was that of the public. There were, of course, similar terms that had been in use for centuries. For instance, cumhur, which literally means ‘the people’ and is still in use in modern Turkish. Historian, Cemal Kafadar, notes that Ottoman bureaucrats were already using the term in previous centuries, and sometimes even in a political context, such as describing certain parliamentary regimes by writing that in those political systems, cumhur elect their own representatives (Özdemir and Sağsöz, 2017). However, in such previous examples the term simply meant the totality of subjects who live under a common rule. But, then again, when using the term amme as the translation of the concept of public, Namik Kemal and other Young Ottomans meant a group of people who interact with each other, directly or indirectly, within a transparent and level discursive space, and who share common identity, interest and future. This aspect of public was presented in their
writings as an active political subject which has an opinion of its own, and as the final point of reference for political legitimacy (Ülken, 2014: 129). In this new political vocabulary, what previously had been the realm and property of the sultan was reimagined as a collective formation of the public, and relabelled as vatan (literally, fatherland). The efforts of Young Ottomans helped popularize this new political vocabulary and language, and it began to spread gradually among the Muslim population throughout the empire. Modernization thus led to dramatic changes in the discursive dimension, and institutional reforms could be comprehended in a completely new context.

All these changes in institutional and discursive dimensions began to alter the dynamics of political power as well. The public became the true source of political legitimacy towards the end of the nineteenth century. Public opinion became a fundamental point of reference for ambitious politicians, and something to strictly control for the authoritarian sultan Abdulhamit II. A play written by Namık Kemal, *Vatan yahut Silistre* (Fatherland; or, Silistria), and the events following its performance, clearly demonstrates this new role of the public. In the play, Kemal depicts the heroic acts and self-sacrifices of an Ottoman soldier whose main motivation is neither his religion nor his willingness to serve the sultan, but his patriotism and love for his country. This four act play has numerous nationalistic harangues and after the first performance in the Gedikpaşa Theatre in 1873, the audience rushed to the streets for patriotic demonstrations. Authorities became so concerned with this public upheaval that Namık Kemal was sent into exile and the play and the newspapers that covered news about the play banned (Sina, 2002: 349). They were afraid of the emergence of an autonomous public which could have its own political claims. To counter this potential, within a few decades, they developed their own strategies to control the public and shape public opinion. For instance, towards the end of the century public schools were founded in urban areas and numerous ceremonies were introduced for students in order to mass produce consent. Also, Abdulhamit II transformed his weekly *Selamlık* (Salute) processions into carefully designed public demonstrations (Alkan, 2011: 387-389). These control measures were also the first indicators of the emergence of a public sphere that would change the political landscape of the country throughout the next century.

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4 For premodern conceptions of political geography and politics, see. Kafadar (2017).
Emerging as a result of institutional and discursive reforms initiated by the central bureaucrats and intellectuals, this public sphere was an intermediary space between political and civil society. Yet, still, it was not equally compelling for the different ethnicities and cultural communities of the empire. During the nineteenth century, there were numerous discursive spaces and alternative public spheres throughout. These were the bedrock of modern nationalism and were, for many, more attractive than this Istanbul-based public space.

Against all these local discursive spaces, this official public sphere might be expected to be more extensive and encompassing. In reality though, the literature and other sources that led to the emergence of the public sphere and the idea of publicity was out of reach for most of the population living in the Ottoman Empire. Many of these people were illiterate or, at least, unable to read Turkish, and acquiring these publications would still have required serious effort for those who could read. Public schools would not even be founded in rural parts of the country until the republican era and therefore, most of the population was neither active nor passive participant in the public debates.

Moreover, even if the publications and debates could have reached the common people, these people would not necessarily have unconditionally embraced this public sphere and become members of ‘the public’. The public of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire were emerging as a result of institutional and discursive reforms that were modelling European societies. It was a project, a cooperative creation, that was to be defined and molded by the bureaucrats and intellectuals. In defining the public of the Empire, non-Muslim and non-Turkish subjects were given, at best, a secondary place. On paper, all subjects had a place in it but, particularly in times of social and political crises, it repeatedly became clear that the public of the empire had been imagined by the Ottoman reformists as primarily an Islamic sphere and, preferably, a Turkish one (Timur, 2010: 220-222; Üstel, 2011: 166-167). Others could have a place in this public sphere and make their contributions to the formation of it, but their position was never truly seen as equal to their Muslim fellows.

When compared to Habermas’ (1991) narrative on the bourgeoisie public sphere that he argues to have existed in Europe in the eighteenth centu-
ry, the Ottoman public sphere appears only a façade. While Habermas’ model also has an exclusionary nature towards the subaltern, the Ottoman public sphere was blatantly discriminatory. This newly emerging public sphere was also devoid of individuals. Self-reflexive individuals, willing to express themselves, share their opinions, engage in deliberations with fellow individuals and shape the future of their society were a rare breed in nineteenth century Ottoman society. Hasan Bülent Kahraman, in his book which depicts the development of the culture of bourgeois individuality through the transformation of literary and art styles, indicates that even as late as the 1850s prose was virtually non-existent as a literary style and that Ottoman visual artists’ first experimentation on the use of perspective happened even later – and mostly by mimicking Western orientalist painters- (Kahraman, 2013: 76-77; 96-107).

Other than these limitations of the Ottoman public sphere, bureaucrats of the Sublime Port and the Ottoman intellectuals also developed new discursive techniques that would appeal to the masses and secure a privileged place for themselves. They did this by reproducing the traditional distinction between the people of politics (the devletli), who are entitled to rule, and the commoners (the reaya), who are destined to be ruled (Kaynar, 2017 c: 1098). At first sight, modern political culture seemed to be detrimental to the autocratic and elitist traditional political culture. Regardless, modern vocabulary also brought in new discursive opportunities to secure a privileged place for political elites through populist political tutelage. Patriotic and enlightened elites could now be argued to be a necessity in guiding the nation through the perils of the modern world, and in educating the masses. These elites could claim to know the true interests of the public and, thus, act as if the mouthpiece of the people. They were arguing for the amassing of power in order to save the fatherland in the name of the people to which they claimed to serve. Such arguments were extensively used by the reformist bureaucrats and intellectuals for decades throughout the Turkish modernization and the public sphere was consequently limited even further (see Heper and Berkman, 2009: 68-73).

Limitations of the public sphere have been exposed time and again during Turkish modernization through recurring elitist and authoritarian atti-

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5 Habermas’ own conception has already been criticized for being highly idealistic, such that no real experience of bourgeois publicity can be true to the model. Habermasian public sphere’s restrictive nature had been pointed out by numerous works and led to the suggestion of alternative concepts such as the counter-public sphere.
tudes, exclusionary practices, continuous attempts to repress any separatist movements which refuse this common public sphere, and to subject the political deliberations to the raison d’être. Grasping this limitedness of the public is vital to understanding the last two centuries of Turkish political history. It is probably due to this, in studies of Turkish political history, limits of the earlier public sphere has attracted much more attention than the gradual expansion and deepening of this sphere in the twentieth century. Due to these evident public limitations, some scholars are convinced they have had direct impact on the lack of any substantial change in the political dimension throughout Turkish modernization.6

This shallowness of the public sphere in the late Ottoman society cannot be fully explained with its synthetic development – as opposed to its organic development in European societies – and with the pragmatic intentions of the bureaucrats who are argued for public influence as part of a project to recover the state. That is because the limitations of the public sphere mostly originate from the internal constraints and contradictions of the idea. As a communal and egalitarian discursive space, public sphere has always been a Janus-faced notion which implies both divergence and convergence simultaneously. Paguot writes that coffeehouses in early modern societies were “the meeting place for the followers of a certain passion.” Therefore, he adds, these initial exemplars of the public space were a place of “both integration and exclusion” (Paquot, 2012: 60-61). Like the example of coffeehouses in early modernity, modern public

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6 In one extreme example of this perspective, Hanioğlu (1986: 69-70) claims the modernization in the nineteenth century to be entirely non-political. It is true that primary motivation of the Ottoman modernization was to consolidate state power. Reformist bureaucrats were imitating administrative and discursive forms of the European states only to achieve this aim and were not truly expecting, desiring or planning for a substantial change in the political landscape. Neither the Young Ottomans who introduced the concepts of public and public opinion to the Ottoman political thinking, nor the cadres of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) or modernist elites of the young republic could be seen as democrats in the contemporary sense of the term. Still, alongside institutional and discursive transformations, with redefinition of the so-called subjects of the sultan as citizens with certain rights and liberties, an inevitable transformation in the political dimension has also occurred, albeit unintentionally. And more often than not, one of the primary agents of this transformation was the non-democratic elites. While pressing for modernization, they were articulating themselves with the modern political vocabulary and justifying their position not with reference to the divine will or traditions but to the common interest.
spaces can both be a space of mutual conduct and self-expression, or a melting pot of individuals into the totality of the political community. As an intermediary between the civil and political societies, public sphere can be a location for the formation of a democratic will through egalitarian discussions, a symbolic space for the dominant power to show itself off and gather legitimacy, or the area “[of] conflict that conveys social relations of dominance and power” (Floris, 2012: 67). The idea of public sphere is contradictory because of this potential use of it as a scene for the legitimacy of the Leviathan and its implication of the possibility of a homogenizing consensus on the common good. This inner contradiction is the source of dynamism of the public sphere, and leads to the emergence of multiple (counter-) public spheres. Furthermore, if deepening of the public sphere is understood as; (1) the change in the ways of establishing, maintaining and ceasing of relations of power towards more publicized, transparent and egalitarian ways, and (2) the expansion of opportunities of political participation for all individuals and thus the political to be a social praxis, then, this deepening is only realized through the dynamism that is created by the paradoxical nature of the public sphere and the resulting conflicts to move beyond its initial limitations.

Etienne Tassin, in his article that compares the concepts of common and public spheres, depicts an idealistic conception of the public sphere. According to him, the space is public only when it is no more common and not presenting itself in a tendency to proximal community. Public space should not be thought of as the taming of what is separated by distance, but as something that unfolds in this distance between individuals and holds them in an exteriority to each other, and to the whole (Tassin, 2012: 81-82). The public sphere as a homogenizing space of commonalities can only be transformed towards such an ideal publicity that relates individuals through their exteriority, by using the opportunities of divergence, mutual deliberation and self-expression in order to overcome the inner limitations of existing public spaces. This ideal public space, in other words, can be realized dialectically, only within the limited public spaces and through the emergence of alternative publicities and public space imaginings as a response to these limitations. And, Turkish political history in the twentieth century is the history of the contradictions and struggles caused by the limits of the official public sphere that, in turn, lead to the expansion and deepening of this public sphere.
It is hard to attribute a single motif to a whole century when thinking on the social and political history of a country. That is more so if that country has undergone substantial reforms in that century and experienced four successful coup-d’états, as well as fundamental demographic changes. In that case, such an attempt is deemed to remain unsatisfactory and might raise more questions than it answers. Despite all these deficiencies in the attempt, when the social and political history of twentieth century Turkey is evaluated under the theme of the transformation of public space, it is hard not to notice the difference between the beginning and end of the century in terms of publicity. This should have indicated a prevalent tendency towards the expansion of the public sphere during the century, but, this first impression is quite surprising when compared to the dominant discourse in contemporary Turkey on the country’s political history. That is because significant events of the twentieth century, frequently referred to when narrating and periodizing the history of the country, are mostly those moments of military intervention upon the political system that restrain the development of democratic institutions and the expansion of the public sphere.⁷ In these moments, repeated military interventions and bureaucratic initiatives aimed to discipline the public sphere and prevent the political to be shaped by civil society. If Turkey’s twentieth century is analyzed through these moments, it could be mistaken for a century of shrinkage of the public sphere. However, the point we should pay attention to is not that there have been plenty of these interventions but that, from the Raid on the Sublime Port to the post-modern coup of 28 February, these interventions had to be repeated time and again. Furthermore, while the

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⁷ First of these moments is the beginning of the Second Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire in 4 July 1908. After that comes the first military coup of the century, the so-called Raid on the Sublime Porte in January 23 January 1913 and the foundation of the republic in 29 October 1923. In the history of the republic, key-stone events generally began with the enactment of the Law for the Provision of Peace (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) in 4 March 1925 that is the beginning of the one-party rule in Turkey, and after this comes either the foundation of the Democratic Party in 7 January 1946 or the election day of 14 May 1950 in which Democratic Party won with a clear margin and ended the rule of the Republican People’s Party. After this date, the list of events is quite standard: The coup in 27 May 1960, military memorandum in 12 March 1970, another coup in 12 September 1980, and lastly, the so-called post-modern coup that began in 28 February 1997.
initial interventions of the century, such as the Raid or the enactment of the Law for the Provision of Peace were intended to take control of the state apparatus for longer periods, subsequent ones were much more reluctant to do it. For instance, the military were content with a short transition period in 1960, and refrained to take the control directly in 1970 and 1997. Plus, in 1980, despite their gross intentions to reshape society and the public sphere, they did not attempt to form a junta government to serve for years but founded a political party of their own and joined the elections after the coup in order to be able to rule for an extended period (Kaynar, 2017b: 35). Both the need to repeat these interventions throughout the century and this change in their style suggests that these interventions never achieved their goals. Thus, narrating the history of Turkish politics in the previous century by giving a disproportional emphasis on these interventions is not appropriate. In understanding Turkey’s twentieth century, the development that is repeatedly targeted by these reactions is more important than the reactions themselves. This development is the expansion and deepening of the public sphere throughout the twentieth century and the ceasing of politics to be the privilege of a small group of elites, and turning it into a truly public practice. It is the dominant trend for the most part of the history of republic and it should have been the focus in understanding the previous century of Turkey.

This trend showed its initial signs in 1908, when the despotic rule of Abdulhamit II was abolished and constitutional monarchy was re-established. When the constitution that had been put on hold by Abdulhamit since 1878 was put into effect by the Young Ottoman revolutionaries, in a very short period of time, the public sphere began to expand at a previously unforeseen scale. Numerous new magazines and newspapers began to be published and widely distributed among the empire. Many new associations and trade unions were established and social movements, such as the women or labor movements, were able to express themselves much more comfortably without the fear of legal prosecution. Many authors note that 1908 is the first time a true experience of public life became possible in Turkey – at least for those who would become the demographic core of the Turkish Republic.\(^8\) This quite short period was followed by the authoritarian rule of the Committee of Union and Progress which began in 1913, and then, the single-party rule from 1925 to 1946. But, during these three

\(^8\) A panorama of this experience is provided in Kutlu (2008).
decades, Turkish modernization had not suffered any interruption. On the contrary, in order to establish a capitalist society and a central state compatible with it, in these three decades, the historical bloc composed of reformist bureaucrats, intellectuals and the developing bourgeoisie had increased the momentum of institutional and discursive modernization even further, abolished the centuries long monarchy and founded the new republic in 1923 with the famous motto of the first article of its constitution which declared the nation to be the “unconditional and unrestricted” sovereign.

Nevertheless, while continuing institutional and discursive reforms, this historical bloc of modernist elites utilized the discursive opportunities of the modern political culture to revive the traditional distinction between the rulers and the ruled, under the disguise of enlightened despotism. In this sense, the public sphere of the early republic was quite different from that of 1908. In the early republic, it was not the space of expression of diversity and difference, but the place to experience a homogeneous sociality by leaving all local and personal particularities behind (see Çaha, 2006). Political power of the early republican leaders was not truly arising from this space, but it was a scene for them to demonstrate that power and to gather legitimacy from it. The gaze of the state apparatus was always focused on this sphere and the aim was to structure and shape it carefully.\footnote{For an analysis of media cencorship in Turkey in the early republican era, see Yılmaz (2007).}

In this respect, the public sphere of the early republic was an official sphere and an obviously limited one, more inclined toward convergence and unification. On the other hand, institutional and discursive reforms of the modernist elites were causing a paradox: despite its decisive limits, in that public sphere people were being interpellated as individuals, and were hailed as equal members of an unconditional and unrestricted nation. It was, thus, a space of transformation of the subjects of the old empire into citizens and hence becoming the sole legitimate foundation of the political power of the republic. In this space, the republic was effectively trying to educate new generations of society in a way to realize the Kantian ideal of the enlightened individual; famously defined in a poem of Tevfik Fikret, the Humanist figure of the late Ottoman era, as being “free in mind, free in consciousness, free in knowledge” (Kahraman 2008: 75). However, the moment when this enlightened individual emerged, everything was done
to repress and delimit the individual and to preserve the system of political tutelage. Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2008: 75) calls this the “modernity paradox” that was hampering Turkish modernization in the early republican years.

The public sphere promoted by the early republic was therefore uniformative, paradoxical and shallower than the short lived experience of 1908. Although, also in that early republican period, the scope of this sphere expanded greatly. Under the single-party rule of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), the new republic not only opened public schools in all distant towns of the country but also founded indoctrinating organizations of People’s Houses (Halkevleri) and the Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) to educate the whole population and to create individuals that would conform to the new model of publicity (Demirtaş, 2008). The experiencing of the public sphere, which was available only in the larger urban centers in 1908, spread to smaller cities and towns in these initial decades of the republic and the new regime thus tried to widen the social base from which it was gathering discursive legitimacy.

It would be a mistake to think that citizens of different social classes and ethnic groups were passive buyers in the face of this uniformative public sphere. The limits of the homogenizing public sphere of the republic was being challenged internally by the very same individuals it forged, and externally by the alternative and counter public spheres and public groups of different ethnic, religious and economic groups which were resisting this official project. Its borders were thus violated from both inside and outside, and the public sphere thus deepened through these violations and resulting struggles. In the first decade of the republic, these alternative spheres made their presence felt in the support enjoyed by the Şeyh Said Rebellion, in 1925, and the governing historical bloc responded to this with the enactment of the Law for the Provision of Peace that became the beginning of a two decade long single-party rule.10 From that point on, an official public space that neither tolerated the presence of alternative public spaces, nor allowed any differences to be expressed within itself, began to cover the whole visible social space. By making indirect elections for the parliament and banning all opposition parties, reformist elites were effectively preventing the modernization process of the created official pub-

10 Definitive study on the establishment of single-party rule in Turkey is Tuncay (2015).
lic space to be the subject of public debates and deliberations. Therefore, they were diminishing the idea of publicity to the ideal of uniting in the homogenizing common ground of the public. On the other hand, in line with the paradox of modernity, this publicity was the space in which Tevfik Fikret’s ideal of free individuality and the discourse of modernity was being conveyed to the society with the new institutional possibilities of the regime. People were being told that they had become citizens who held their future in their own hands and were encouraged to vote at the elections. In 1930, the events that followed the foundation of the Liberal Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) showed that, despite all the structural limitations of the official public sphere, a genuine sense and desire of publicity was indeed developing among the population. The Liberal Republican Party was established under the supervision of the reformist elites to be an official opposition party, but it enjoyed unprecedented support from the masses and, during party gatherings, large crowds began to clash with the police. In party demonstrations, people were showing their determination to be actual political subjects. Moreover, an example of the greatest support to the new opposition party was given in Izmir, a province that was liberated from Greek occupation just eight years previously, and by the same modernists led by Mustafa Kemal. Discursive dimension of the modernization, ongoing since the time of the Young Ottomans, obviously had an impact on the people and there were now a significant part of the population which would refuse any form of tutelage, even if demanded by a national hero like Mustafa Kemal. Reformists responded to this unexpected popularity of the opposition movement by banning the Liberal Republican Party just three months after its foundation (Koçak, 2014).

The opposition that refused to fit in the narrow limits of the official public sphere came to the fore again in the electoral victory of the Democratic Party (DP), in 1950, against the RPP. By the 1940s, the historical bloc of the reformists had already begun to dismantle and in the general elections of 1950, a broad coalition of peasants, landowners, bourgeoisie and intellectuals stood behind the DP. Thus came the end of the long rule of the modernizing elites who had founded the republic. From this point on, public sphere in Turkey continued to deepen and, despite certain moments of intervention by the bureaucratic elites, it began to transform into a space of difference, divergence and political subjectivity. While the coup in 1960 caused a short break, the 1960s witnessed an explosion in public life along with accelerated urbanization and industrialization, the rise of labor movements and plenty of production in literature and the arts (Kay-
This explosion in the 1960s was so definitive that the next three decades would witness the realization and development of the themes that were already created in the public life of this decade. During this process, numerous different groups such as the feminists, Kurdish nationalists, labor movements, Islamic sects and university students all participated to the public sphere at different times and in varying degrees, with their own particular narratives and differences. All these groups put pressure on the limits of the public sphere and disputed the ways of establishment and disintegration of the relations of power by using the facilities and opportunities of discursive and institutional modernization. The homogeneous and uniformative public sphere of the early republic thus transformed towards the model of ideal publicity, defined by Tassin above. Reactions against this transformation were always short lived and, even after successful coups, civic governments were always re-established quickly. When such reactions dictated limiting legal structures (such as the constitution enacted in 1980), these boundaries were stretched and abolished in the following years.\footnote{Oppression on the left, labor and Kurdish movements after the coup in 1980 can be noted as the most important and long term limitation on the public sphere after the abolishment of the single-party rule. But by the end of the 1990s, even these oppressions had been loosening.}

What is striking is that the public space that the modernizing elites had been constantly trying to limit and discipline throughout the century had expanded by means of the political vocabulary they put in place and by the opportunities of the public space they created. For instance, in the general election of 1950 in which DP won a historic victory against the rule of the RPP, the DP used an iconic election poster. This poster displayed a raised hand marking a stop sign, with the caption on it: “Enough! It is the Nation’s Turn to Speak!” It became very successful and contributed to their victory. But, this slogan owed its influence, at least partly, to the discursive modernization that brought the term ‘public opinion’ into the Turkish political vocabulary and to the fact that the RPP continued this discursive modernization and argued for the nation to be the base of its power. Until the 1950s, the RRP, through its indoctrination efforts, had convinced not only their ferocious supporters but most of the population all over the country that they were -and should be- the sovereign of the country. The problem was the RPP was also refusing to give up its own dominance. Democratic discourse of the opposition, which is elegantly embodied in
that election poster of 1950, offered a resolution to this contradictory position of the RPP. Nonetheless, this discourse of the DP can only be comprehended via the modern political culture and the new political dynamics that were shaped and imposed by the reformist elites. A number of scholars therefore note a continuity between the RPP and the DP such that, while taking power from the RPP, the DP actually preserved the ideology of its rival (see Koçak, 2012).

The influence of the rhetoric of the DP is an indication that institutional and discursive changes that took place during the modernization process have also led to significant changes in the political dimension and created a new topography for establishing, maintaining and dismantling power relations. One sign of the success of the reformists to create a new political topography is that even after the oppressive single party rule of the reformists had ended, any notable Royalist faction to re-establish monarchy never appeared in Turkey. In just twenty three years following the abolition of centuries long monarchy, reformists had succeeded in convincing the population that there should be no sovereign but that of the people themselves. From then on, the recognition of the public as the only and most natural resort to provide political legitimacy became widespread and public sphere had thus begun to transform from the space where political power had exhibited and legitimized itself to a unique field where politics is founded. As labor unions, university students and different ethnic and cultural groups raised their voices, the idea of modern agency and active subjectivity became the paradigm of this new era in the second half of the century. There has surely been temporary backslashes in Turkish political history but even the most serious attempts to transform the political topography, the coup of 1980 and the constitution imposed afterwards, could only stop the expansion and the deepening of the public sphere briefly. Kaynar notes that military coups in Turkey had changed considerably during the twentieth century and, in latter interventions, military elites began to seek a formal legal grounding for their actions (Kaynar, 2017b: 35).

This shows that these elites, who were one of the main parts of the power

12 Vahdat (2015: 84) writes that “formation of the modern subject is not a straight, linear, fast, and single-stage type of process. Rather the opposite is true. The subject that is taking shape in these parts of the world is partial, indirect, and contradictory whose formation would perhaps take place in different phases.” This warning about the development of the concept of modern subject in Iran is also true for Turkey.
bloc which imposed the modernization project from top to bottom, were now unable to ignore public pressure entirely and reposition themselves and adapt their actions in accordance to the changing political landscape.

It is therefore safe to argue that, while not coming close to the ideal public space defined by Tassin, during the twentieth century the public sphere, aided in its emergence by the Ottoman reformists, was truly expanded and deepened. This development was realized as a consequence of the dynamic emanating from the dialectic of the idea of public sphere and thanks to the struggle of different social, economic and cultural groups against the limits of this sphere. These groups transformed the ways to establish political power relations also.

Turkey’s modernization process, then, has not been limited to institutional and discursive dimensions. Once reformist bureaucrats and intellectuals, the so-called center of Turkish politics, had transformed the country institutionally and introduced modern political vocabulary, this necessarily caused a change in the political dimension. The social distinction between the rulers and the ruled that was prescribed by the Ottoman traditional political culture was abolished in time, and the patrimonial state structure was transformed. Reading the political history of Turkey in the twentieth century as composed of the authoritarian endeavors of a small group of elite of the political center in order to impose several reforms upon the people who are systematically excluded to the periphery, and the uprising of the masses against these endeavors, is misleading. It downplays the significance of the changes in the political dimension, offers a totally unfavorable evaluation of the modernization process that had been pressed for a long time in an authoritarian style by the modernizationists and ignores the role of this process in the emergence of a vivid public sphere in Turkey. It also reduces numerous political entities, each with their own agendas, under the two big umbrella terms, the center and the periphery, and by thinking of Turkish politics as a conflict between the people and the reformist bureaucrats, it regards the state as a subject in itself. However, the state is more an object than being the subject of political struggle. Also, political struggle occurs among ethnic, cultural and class based entities. It took place, in the case of Turkey, in an increasingly widening and deepening public sphere. Turkey’s two centuries long history of modernization is, along with other elements, also the history of this public space.
An increasingly popular historiography in Turkey now reads the twentieth century political history from a viewpoint of the struggle between "the authoritarian and modernizationist central elites" and the "traditional people who resisted to their enforcements". As the exact opposite of the nationalist and authoritarian official-historiography, created after the 1980 coup d'état, that overemphasized the role of the military bureaucratic elites in the modernization process, this new historiography emerged in the 1990s and was popularized in the first decade of the twenty-first century as a counter-official narrative. While modernization was being praised excessively in the disgraced historiography, in this alternative it is thought to be a systematic alienation process and no significant change was argued to have occurred in the political dimension. According to this, throughout the twentieth century, bureaucratic elites who owed their political powers to their privileged positions and their privileged positions to their political powers had continued to be the main actors of the country's politics, from the beginning of the century to the end. In this narrative, political space is evaluated not through the ways of establishing and dismantling relations of power or through strategies to seize the surplus value, but in a purely culturalist sense, through the values and culture that the people in power represent. From this perspective, there are only two types of governments in essence. One, are the governments which are established by the representatives of the so-called authentic culture of the people, who are thought to be a largely homogeneous single mass. The other, are the governments which represent anything but this authentic culture. The first type is natural while the second one can only be imposed by force or through misleading propaganda. In this culturalist framework, while bureaucratic elites who abolished the monarchy and founded the republic with authoritarian measures can be criticized for their despotism, Abdulhamit II, who suspended the constitution for thirty years and established a similar authoritarian rule can be praised for supposedly representing the organic culture of the ‘people’ (Czajka and Wastnidge, 2015).

This new culturalist historiography reads the Turkish political history as the conflict between the center and the periphery, which are thought to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive social categories. It thus totally ignores...
the political and thinks of politics as an activity of decision making and administration in order to distribute power and resources effectively among the society. Therefore, it feels no sympathy towards the ideal of publicity, nor has it a concern for the deepening of the public sphere. The expansion and deepening of the public sphere in Turkey throughout the previous century, and this trend’s relation to the modernization process, has no particular value from this viewpoint. Socialization of politics can only happen through its popularization, and what is required and sufficient for that is politicians who represent the authentic culture and popular values of the population.

While Turkey is increasingly leaning towards an authoritarian right-wing populism in the first quarter of the twenty first century, it is hardly surprising that this historiography has gained some popularity. Erdoğan’s right-wing populism justifies itself through exactly this claim of representing the authentic culture. As a political rhetoric, populism is to assert the presence of an ongoing struggle between the ‘real’ people and a small group of elites who stole power from their hands (see Mudde, 2016). Populist leaders claim themselves to be the representatives of the people who are the true owners of the country that have long been repressed, ignored and put into silence in this struggle. Since they are the only true representatives of the people, when they win power, these populist leaders can in turn repress opposition movements -of course in the name of the people-with authoritarian methods. Erdoğan is a staunch follower of this well-known populist rhetoric strategy to gain and preserve political power, and the mentioned counter-official historiography is one of the pillars of his populist rhetoric (Dinçşahin, 2012: 640). As the argument goes, it is no one but he who destroyed the political domination of the bureaucratic elites that had been ongoing for two centuries, since the beginning the Turkish modernization. It is he who gives the power to where it belongs, to the people, and uses that same power in the name of the people, as their legitimate representative. As a populist figure, he claims to be the only leader who represents the authentic values that are presumed to exist. With this populist narrative, he is praised as the leader who ended the centuries long rule of the elite and created the true democracy of the people. After Erdogan's party decided to celebrate July 15th as a ‘Democracy Day’ every year to condemn the failed coup attempt that took place on the same date,

14 On these two faces of politics, see Rancière (1992: 58-59).
2016, in the first of these ‘Democracy Day’ celebrations this year, all the big squares of the cities in the country were furnished with his photographs. This is one of the many indicators indication on the established populist relation between Erdogan's personality and democracy.

In this populist democracy, there is no place for publicity. A discursive space in which individuals would come together and debate on their common concerns is not a necessity in this understanding of democracy but a hindrance for the realization of the true will of the people, and thus, should be intimidated against. This right-wing populism, therefore, not only ignores the expansion and deepening of the public sphere throughout the previous century, it also aims to limit and destroy this public space through institutional regulations. Increased censorship against the press, imprisonment of journalists, raised obstacles against freedom of expression, massive purge in universities and public offices and the enactment of emergency decrees after the declaration of a state of emergency following the failed coup attempt on July 15 are all examples of such regulations (see Öktem, 2016).

What is important here is that, with such institutional regulations, Erdoğan’s right-wing populist rule does not aim to re-establish the traditional distinction between the rulers and the rules, nor does it try to degrade the public sphere into that shallow space in which the Leviathan state demonstrates itself and with which it transforms the public. More radically, the populist discourse that accompanies these institutional steps imagines the whole country as a single household, or oikos, and without publicity in any form. Paterfamilias of this household is, of course, Erdoğan. It is telling that Turkish word “reis” (literally, leader or chief) which Erdoğan’s supporters use to address him, also means paterfamilias (hane reisi) when used as an adjective to the Turkish word for household (hane). People living in this imagined household are not given a deliberative space in which they can gather and reflect on their collective life. In the last decade, central squares in both Istanbul and Ankara have been physically restricted and reduced (in size). They are now constantly kept under police control against any possible protests and the legal boundaries for those who want to demonstrate were tightened (see Toprak, 2017). All these physical and legal measures intend to prevent the development of such an area. Unlike the in public sphere, there is no anonymity in the household. It is the place of intimacy where the relations are personal. Therefore, in this imagined household of the right-wing populist discourse of Erdoğan, the people are subject to him directly. They live under the absolute authority of paterfa-
milias and should best fulfil the roles that the president has given them. It is no coincidence that in his speeches, Erdoğan frequently uses expressions such as “my minister”, “my police” or “my mayor” and personalizes his relation to other civil servants and talks of the public bodies as if they were his private property. Furthermore, this paterfamilias does not address his people collectively in a common space. He prefers to personally call them out in their private spaces as his authority is a domestic one. He, therefore, can criticize people for their style of dress, lecture them on the number of children they should have, or scold them for their smoking habit without any concern of violating their private spheres.

In his book Politics, Aristotle defines the political as a special kind of relation between equal citizens that arises out of the human faculty of speech. In this right-wing populist discourse, one encounters pre-political relations between unequal subjects, such as the relation between father and children, instead of the political ones. Hence, this populist perspective is fundamentally hostile towards the political, and the public space as the site of politics. Dacheux notes that, unlike democracies, totalitarian regimes do not have a public sphere that harbors contrary arguments and ideas as an intermediary space between the state and civil society (Dacheux, 2012: 14). In light of this, current populist attack on the public sphere in Turkey is alarming.

Under the influence of a historiography that categorically disapproves of the modernization process of Turkey and highlights only its authoritarian measures, the public sphere that had expanded and deepened throughout the twentieth century in Turkey is now shrinking and disappearing at an unprecedented extent, even when considering those times of the harshest coup-d’états. Under the rule of Erdoğan, the history of the public sphere in twenty-first century Turkey has been that of decline from the direct attack of right-wing populism.

15 For instance, see. Hurriyeteddailynews, 09.06.2013.
16 During the debates to amend the constitution and change the parliamentary system of Turkey into a presidential system, which was a personal wish of Erdoğan, presidential system was praised by Erdoğan’s supporters as a system that does not lead to any coalition governments and resulting political instability. These critical remarks on political coalitions and the desire for one-party governments were seen by some authors as indicators of an anti-political mindset in Erdoğan and his followers. See Öztürk (2016).
In Defense of the Political

Tassin (2012: 81) reminds that, for Aristotle, colony is the extension of the household (oikos), and imperialist colonization is a generalized oikonomia that imagines the whole world as a single oikos. Colonialism, therefore, relies upon a domestic and non-political form of relation. In this sense, Erdoğan’s imagination of the whole country as a single household leads to the reduction of the political praxis into a generalized oikonomia and is a policy of imperialist colonization of the Turkish society. Just like the colonialists who regard themselves as benevolent supervisors, and think of their relation with the colonized people not as a political relation betweenequals but as the relation between a teacher and student, Erdoğan’s right-wing populism aims to establish a pre-political relation with the people. The mission of Erdoğan’s movement is to instruct the people on their capabilities, to remind them of their lost traditions and historical pride and, eventually, to lead them towards a national palingenesis. And, this ideal of palingenesis is one of the core themes of fascism (Griffin, 1991: 37).

All that said, the people who are being deprived of political subjectivity and who are effectively being colonized will probably have a reaction against this populist style of politics. The idea of modern subjectivity and agency has spread gradually in Turkey since the nineteenth century and, against the attempt to destroy publicity altogether, individuals might be expected to develop and extend their own alternative and counter publicities and to organize different social resistance strategies in these alternative publicities. It is in order to prevent the establishment of such alternative publicities that right-wing populism keeps the city squares under constant police surveillance, closes the non-governmental organizations that it considers harmful, applies a ban on televisions when necessary, prevents television appearances of people who are critical of the government and censors the internet strictly. However, all these obstacles can only delay the inevitable. No matter how extensive the ideological and oppressive apparatuses of the government are, as seen in the Gezi Park Protests, it is not really possible to reverse the process of political and discursive modernization permanently and to suppress the political completely, nor to extinguish all the possibilities of publicity. Neither the existence of the public

In his speeches, Erdoğan frequently claims that Turkish society is in process of a rebirth. For instance, see. Milliyet, 20.12.2014.
sphere, nor the concept of political, can be fully explained causally with reference to the institutional structures. In essence, they are humane concepts that depend upon the non-natural principle of isonomia (Tassin, 2012: 80-81). Hence, whatever the structural conditions are, the political is always defensible. This is especially so for the people of Turkey, who have a two-centuries long history of the development of publicity behind them.

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The term “public sphere” is used to describe a potentiality of a society in order to comprehend and transform the politics itself. Habermas once used this term for understanding an imagination of a society based on “communicative reason”. The communicative reason means that members of the society come across by linguistic forms of the social; and, by communicative action, they are able to establish a new form of communicating including the will to transform their world (Habermas, 1984: 23-46). By referring to this argument, Habermas tries to organize a paradigm of a social which is established by communicative reason referring the normative lines of society. For Habermas, the public sphere is a space in which linguistic forms pre-determined are used to create a new design of the social world (Habermas, 1977: chapter 3). That’s why this term refers a “secular” understanding of a political action which aims to establish the social by grounding creative action of any member belonging the society.

The terms “communicative reason” and “public sphere” both mean creative force of society and a perception that the normative codes of social could be changed as well. Therefore, these terms include a very political implication that any request about social (apolitical facts) could become the problematization of politics. Shortly, the public sphere is a kind of junction point in which apolitical facts of the social and politics including normative codes are linked together. As a result of that, society occurred with public spheres could determine the lines and ingredients of the politics by grounding communicative action and reasoning. For Habermas, the democracy could gain its’ core meaning only if it were processed by communicative action. Because democracy is not only a system in which political power are determined by election, but it is rather an individual capacity showing both freedom to act and liberty to have any idea. That’s why democracy is rather a liberium arbitrium which means that individuals

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have rights not only to elect but also to determine the normative codes or ingredients of political (Habermas, 1996: 129).

The general aim of this article is to discuss the contra-publicity in conservative-nationalist ideology in Turkey. The reason why this article uses the term “contra-publicity” is to understand how conservative-nationalist ideology recognizes the politics as a transcendental (non-secular) concept. By recognizing the politics as transcendental, conservative-nationalism aims to close politics to any secular action or reason whose willing is to determine the normative codes of the politics by democratic deliberation or individual capacity. For conservative-nationalism, the politics should be protected in its’ transcendental context in order to represent itself as an epic image of society which cannot be determined at present. Therefore, conservative-nationalism tries to create a historical background in which society had been very close to an impeccable moment. This impeccability refers the context and task of the politics which is handled as a way to recall that impeccable moment to the present.

The problem of publicity in conservative-nationalist ideology shows itself in the understanding of the context and potentialities of the politics. For conservative-nationalism, the politics should be the transcendental tool by which the cultural and historical identity of the social can be protected and can be maintained as well. This means that the politics is not processed to determine the normative codes of the social by reasoning; rather, it’s both the provision and limit of reasoning. While the terms public sphere and communicative action used in Habermas’ thought refers a potentiality for individuals to make themselves the main subjects of the politics here and now, conservative-nationalism handles the publicity as a representative of the historical image of the social. That’s why the publicity in conservative-nationalism is mostly thought as heterotopic spaces, rather creative action, in which both time and reason are externalized in order to recall the impeccable moment by demonstrating ‘appropriate’ behavioral codes without any reasoning or deliberating. This is the crucial point to understand how conservative-nationalism ascribes a meaning to politics by defining it as an epic context that politics cannot be redefined or re-organized by secular reasoning or action.
Public Sphere as a Modern-Secular Instruction of Politics

Let’s begin with a brief argument on the thesis of the public sphere which is the presumably secular context of the politics. The term public sphere should be understood as an effort to design or comprehend the political atmosphere according to publicity. The publicity means a process in which public opinion can be created within the social (Habermas, 1977: 198). According to Habermas, public opinion is the basic principle of the publicity because citizens can reach to the discussions only by areas in which public opinion can be organized. The publicity, which means the openness of the politics to individuals’ concerns, can only be created by organizing public opinion. Habermas aims to describe the term public opinion by defining a process in which individuals can participate to organize themselves for the political problems in the country (Habermas, 1991: 89-102).

It should be noted that this argument signs the public opinion as a performative context which can be performed by individuals, but it does not reflect their abstract rights. In other words, Habermas tries to point out that the creation of public opinion is a problem of acting politically, but not of having rights.

Habermas’ theory should be handled as a secular-active model of the politics which ensure individuals can participate within political problems. More importantly, individuals can also ascribe themselves as political actors by participating to the public opinion because the principle of the publicity means that political process should be open for discussions and requests to be assigned as well. That’s why Habermas discusses this problem as a context of communicative reason because communication gains a political meaning in this process. By communicative reason, individuals can recognize themselves as authorities on issues of politics and they also ascribe the politics as responsible against them for the principle of the publicity. That’s why Habermas calls the principle of the publicity with communicative action because communicative action ensures individuals both to demonstrate the executions of governments and to organize a path of public opinion in which these executions can be problematized. It is also the reason why Habermas’ theory should be handled as a model of democratic reason because the connection of communicative reason and the publicity provides individuals for organizing a public demonstration which demands re-determining the creation of the normative codes of the politics. For Frazer, Habermas’s theory offers us a strong possibility that...
we can imagine both the scope and deepness of the democracy (Frazer, 1991: 58).

According to this theory, democracy can be both deepened and enlarged by referring to the principle of publicity because publicity ensures individuals to envisage the meaning of the politics. In my opinion, it’s the core point of secularism in this case because the possibility of envisaging the context of politics means that the normative codes of the politics can be organized by *concrete reason and action* of individuals by the means functioned in designing the public opinion. The very secular context of public opinion can be seen in the process of legitimating the normative ingredients of the politics. As Habermas remarks, the very function and importance of communicative reason are that while individuals communicate with pre-determined codes of linguistic order, they are also able to investigate the possibilities and limits. It’s the causality principle which determines the ‘nature of the action’ (Habermas, 1984: 96). For Habermas, as we can see, the action is not only a problem of movement within the determined scope of normative politics, but it’s a problem of pursuing possibilities to re-determine the context of meanings. That’s why this article intends to argue this conception with the fact of secularism because secularism means a possibility to establish the normative principle according to the present. It’s the core issue of the action theorized by Habermas, because the action could gain its essence meaning only if the *action* would be able to have an authority or opportunity to re-determine the normative itself.

This brings us another problem which is one of the prominent issues of politics. As Angles authentically points out, democracy is a kind of struggle by which people have to overcome the obstacles (Angles, 2000: 49). What Angles tries to tell is a democracy is not an individual fact, rather it is a collective becoming to question the normative and, also, to demonstrate itself as an authority to demand to be re-established if necessary. So, democracy is always a problem or possibility of becoming a ‘constituent power”. As for Castoriadis, constituent power means a *will* which is asserted by people who represent themselves as the authority of collective unity (Castoriadis, 1992: 274).

A constituent power is the essence part of the democratic politics which is also the possibility of creating the public opinion ensuring citizens to become the subject of the politics. For Kalyvas, the principle of constituent power is the basic legitimacy point of any political unity (2000: 633). According to this principle, *ruling power* (State or institutions) is de-
termined by the constituent power which is processed by the communica-
tive reason of the people. So, it clearly means that the mechanisms and in-
stitutions associated with the ruling power are a secondary part of the
*Power*; in other words, state, which is the main institutive ruling power, is
the representative part of the social will organized by communicative ac-
tion. That’s why the deliberative context of democracy strongly mentions
that ruling power should be the *secondary*, in other words, it should not be
placed in a transcendental point in which communicative action cannot
have any possibility to re-define and re-determine the normative context
of the politics. That’s why Habermas is of the opinion that the principle of
the public opinion should have an enlarged context in which democracy
can be deepened and authorized in non-political areas (for example, social
and cultural concepts). According to Habermas, the idea of the democracy
should be understood as a legitimate authority which re-define the context
of the normative ingredients of the politics (Habermas, 1995; Habermas,
1996).

In that point, Habermas’ theory offers us a new perception of democra-
cy, importantly he opens a new path of understanding the publicity prin-
ciple which is actually the essence point of the politics unlike it has been
excluded from the political communication so far. As we have seen,
Habermas uses the criteria of publicity in order to highlight the importance
of an imminent creative potentiality of people who could become con-
stituent subjects of political power through becoming the participants of
communicative action. Herein it should be seen that Habermas’s theory on
public sphere provides us to think the normative ingredients of the politics
should be established in apolitical areas such as cultural and social rela-
tionships. The theory of public sphere and the communicative reason,
therefore, presents an idea that both democracy and constitutive action
should and can be produced in apolitical life zones. So, we can assume
that the theory of public sphere including the principle of publicity neces-
sitates that both the possibility of public sphere and principle of publicity
should focus on apolitical zones of the life and problematize them in the
communicative reason.
Conservative-Nationalism as the Rejection of the Idea of the Communicative Reason

Conservative-nationalism, which is the most known mainstream ideological form in Turkish political thought, is used for describing an eclectic ideological form rather produced in a cultural-political context. Unlike other ideological forms, the political perception of the conservative-nationalism is not limited to the politics. In other words, conservative-nationalism focuses on protecting the essence cultural dynamics of the nation including both historical-cultural contexts of the nation and the State in which national will is represented. So, the task ascribed to the politics is becoming inclusionary to be responsible for correlating cultural essence with the political system.

The ideological background of conservative-nationalism consists with solipsist ideas comprehending culture as unique and handling politics in a conservative way. Unlike pure conservative or nationalist ideology as far as is known, conservative-nationalism does not focus only on political issues. In other words, the problematization of conservative-nationalism is rather to unify cultural dynamics with politics. For example, in the conception of conservative-nationalism, the term State is not handled as an external context from the collective unity of the society. Unlike the mainstream theories on ideologies, conservative-nationalism does not handle politics as a specific order to be identified or problematized. Rather, conservative-nationalism tends to handle the politics within the social-cultural dynamics of the society (Öğün, 2004: 539). These concepts are so crucial for understanding how conservative-nationalism refuses the idea of publicity or communicative-constitutive politic action because of its tendency on politics joint into the cultural dynamics.

Intellectual Roots of the Conservative-Nationalism

According to Bora, Turkish conservatism should be understood as a state of mind (2017: 341) for both society and humanity in present. The sovereign drive of this ideological form is that the pessimism about the world, or its present condition. Conservatism tends to comprehend the world in a psychology that feels the most significant and important things no longer exist. This pessimism causes to evaluate the current mechanisms as useless because of they belong to present. On the contrary, for conser-
vatism it’s the only thing that should be followed is the history which is now missing. Therefore, we should note that the pessimism in conservatism closes itself to the politics because of its modern representation, but, on the other hand, it also re-defines politics in order to recall the history which is now missing. So, in conservatism, politics has dual characteristics: firstly, it’s a kind of strangeness that must be avoided; however, secondly, politics is understood as the only way to revive the historical-cultural dynamics of a nation to re-gain an identity to itself.

This paradox causes conservatism to be ‘modern’ in such a specific way. Ziya Nur Aksun, who is one of the most famous conservative thinkers in Turkey, once defined conservatism as a ‘restoration ideology’ (Bora, 2017: 341). It obviously means that although conservatism does rejects the politics in a modern way, yet it functions politics for disciplining modernity with the historical-cultural normative codes. This exemplifies Laroui’s argument which handles conservatism as an ‘authentic recall’ of the past to define identity in an Eastern part of the world (1993: 114). For Laroui, eastern conservatism differentiates from classical conservatism because this kind of conservatism tries to re-establish the meaning of the politics. That’s why the eastern style of conservatism in Turkey could be connected to nationalism or Islamism because conservatism claimed that politics should be owned by historical-cultural context which signifies the essence of the society.

This emphasis is represented clearly in almost every literature of conservative ideology in Turkish political thought. It’s also the base in which the idea of restoration and functionalism are connected. Functionalism is used in two ways: firstly, it is understood like it’s using in modern European thinking. But, secondly, functionalism means that the both tangible and intangible parts of the social must be related themselves. In other words, unlike the modern understanding of functionalism used in European thought, Turkish conservatism tends to define functionalism as a force which can correlate authenticity and exist for reviving the essence being of the nation. It’s, of course, the main objection claimed to the Jacoben Republicanism (Kemalism) whose aim was to define the nation in a modern way or to create the idea of the nation by alienating it from the traditional identity. So, the idea of functionalism functions in recalling and reviving tradition to present days in order to restore [modern] present according to the principle of tradition.

Turkish conservatism resembles classical conservatism in European thought because it is strongly against to the Jacoben policies tending to es-
establish the idea of the nation. According to conservatives, the idea of the nation cannot be established just because of the “naturally of the nation” (Topçu, 1969: 53-7). In other words, for conservatism, the idea of the nation having a spontaneous existence should be understood as a natural thing that cannot be re-established. For the most known Turkish conservatives, such as Yahya Kemal, Sami Banarlı or Fahri Fındıkoğlu were of the opinion that there is a “national essence” and its task is to identify and define the national soul and character which cannot be imagined by reason (Bora and Erdoğan, 2004: 636). As we can understand, the reason here refers to the modern reasoning which tends to establish the social according to the principles of modern mind. Aforenamed conservative thinkers insistently claimed that the unimaginative notion of the “national essence” is the main principle of the national existence. According to them, it’s the only way to separate Turkishness from European culture and to preserve the traditional core against Otherness.

The idea of “national essence” is mostly described in an epic depiction in which conservative thought refers an existence that people to be the ‘natives’ of the cultural society. This epic characteristic is clearly told by Çiğdem. According to him, the fact of ‘being native’ in conservative thought means a reflex demonstrated for claiming the authenticity of the national culture. So, according to Çiğdem, the notion of ‘being native’ should be understood as an attitude moved in certain times and conditions (2001: 65-6). This certainty is best seen at where the traditional perception of the idea of the nation perceives itself as it’s in danger. That’s why, as we will see in below, conservatism commonly combines with the nationalism because of their reactionary characteristic which moves conditional.

The epic characteristic of conservatism means the re-invention of the nation in the present. It should be mentioned that conservative re-invention of the nation differs with Islamic thought based on a thought of ‘golden age’. Conservatism does not tend to bring the society to the missing past, rather its purpose is to compound the past and the present. Dellaloğlu discovers a Benjaminian context in conservative thought: according to him, conservative thinkers do not tend to be conformist by taking refuge in a tradition which is now missing (Dellaloğlu, 2012: 1-3). Truly the Turkish conservative thought tries to find spaces in which the tradition and the present can be related to the sovereign principle of the culture. As it’ll be discussed in below, conservative thought aims to find its political potential which could be claimed against modernity. As we can find in Tanpınar’s thoughts, conservative thought tries to reject the idea that society should
be divided into two parts: one side is modern, progressive and reformist; on the other hand, the other one is reactionary, anti-modern and conservative (2000: 23-46). However, Tanpinar rejects this idea by arguing that this division occurs due to a thought which the authentic ‘owner’ of the nation otherize himself in his genuine lands (1963:14).

Interestingly, once, the notion of ‘exile in own lands’ was the popular discourse in conservative thought and it was perhaps the only possibility for conservatism to become political more than its current potential. This notion caused conservatism to denominate itself as ‘victim’ in social-political life for a long time. This is the crucial tool by which conservatism could establish itself in a discursive way including a bound among tradition and itself. It should be noted that this notion causes conservative reflex to be a systematic political thought figured by discursive construction including almost any context of the politics. For example, as we can observe from aforementioned statements, conservatism usually tends to recall the traditional concepts belonging the culture. However, it’s rather a contingent choice, because it’s hardly certain whether which concepts of the tradition to be recalled. In other words, both epic and discursive characteristics of the conservatism show the similar context that the political ingredient of conservative discourse is more often than not an ‘empty signifier’. So, the aim of the conservative political discourse is to select which context to be useful for positioning against modernity. For that reason, the conservative thought discovered Islamic discourse and its potential in order to create a conservative identity. Especially, some conservative intellectuals in Istanbul tried to establish a normative principle of nationalism including Islamic discourse (Kara, 1987). Mustafa Şekip Tunç, who was one of the most famous conservative thinkers, referred to a Bergsonian term of ‘instinct’ in order to describe the importance of the effect of the ‘spirit’ over the power of [modern] reason (Tunç, 1986). The reason why Tunç referred this term was because he had just discovered a suitable blank to be filled. According to Tunç, the term ‘spirit’ signified the historical subconscious of the nation which manages the drives, wills or desires. The reason, according to him, was inefficient to construe the life with morality. On the contrary, morality is the key factor to keep together the people as social subjects.

Here, actually, we can see one of the general principles of conservatism, because its tendency is to handle the ‘social’ as a secondary thing, or the transcendental morality is the primary context over the social for the conservative thought. Rıza Tevfik, for example, claimed that any progressive
thought should be balanced with ‘social equation’ (Bölükbaşı, 2015). The social equation means a Bergsonian term of ‘circular time’ in which any variation is grabbed by the principle of stability. Conservative thinkers handled this Bergsonian principle by arguing that there is a transcendental context in history which cannot be left behind by any progressive thought or movement. Their critics on modernity based on a paradigm that any progressive thought cannot be the supreme-normative because of that there is a historical-transcendental context closed to any interference claiming a ‘transformation’. It can be realized that conservatism has taken the politics out of the context where modern demands can be expressed, instead, it has imagined the politics in a directly irreconcilable transcendence. This is the epic notion of conservatism in which the politics is totally an object of authenticity that is transcendental to whole time and space.

**Introversive Authenticity as the Epic Construction of Politics**

It should be said that the belief that a transcendental context exists manages the conservative mind about perception or function of politics. This is the ideological root of a paradigm which the potentiality to determine the scope of politics is deprived. In the perception of conservatism, modernity is seen as a decentralization in which both the cultural and historical types of self-entity becomes indistinct. That’s why conservatism is against to a modernist idea which tries to spread the culture of experimentation to the whole society. Because, for conservatism, society should not be thought as a laboratory in which the social institutions, relations, and structures can be tested and claimed to be changed. As for me, the epic way of conservative politics should be understood as a ‘preventive ideology’ which aims to close the society to be experimented by progressive purposes.

Turkish modernism, which is also politically named as Kemalism, tried to transform the basic dynamics of the nation in order to settle the revolutions. Conservativism showed a reflex by rejecting the idea of transformation of politics whose aim was to alienate the State from the nation. The term authenticity rooted in that historical moment (Bora, 2004: 449), because the aim of authenticity was thought for discovering new paths to regain the politics itself. That’s why the ideological-discursive apparatus of the conservatism has always been the ‘introversion’. Introversive reflexes of conservatism is a calling an idea of producing ‘isolated spaces’ instead of modern spheres in which people may diverge from tradition. Therefore,
conservatism has tried to be out of the [modern] politics which may create alienation; but, on the other hand, it feels that it has to merge with the politics which provides a suitable zone to establish a discourse for reviving the authenticity.

The basic paradox on the meaning and the function of the politics continued in the conservative thought. Yet, conservatism tried to pass over this paradox by creating new zones in which it could modulate the nationalism to conservative thought. The reason why conservatism needed to associate with nationalism was because of nationalism offered suitable tools to make conservatism as a modern ideology. In other words, nationalism was the key factor which could modulate conservatism from cultural to political (Bora, 2012: 71). Without refusing modernity itself, conservatism attempted to conceive the normative politics in a ‘conservative modernization’. Nationalist ideology helped conservatism to become modernist because the nationalist perception of politics tended to handle the politics as a struggle between nations. As for these ideological formations, modernism just meant an economical progress by which the nation could defend its unity and to be independent without any domination of the other nations. Interestingly, there has always been a Kemalist resonance in conservative-nationalist ideology. As Köker clearly interrelates, both Kemalist and conservative-nationalism tended to ascribe a transcendental mean to the politics reflecting the unity of the nation (1996: 159). The most important in politics is to maintain the national authenticity and national unity. For Nazım İrem, conservative restoration ideology should take the example of the Kemalism which aimed to establish the society in order to preserve the authentic identity (1997: 76-84).

The relationship or connection perhaps, between conservatism and nationalism can be better seen in the sense that they ascribe a mean to the State. In the late of Ottoman Empire, the general aim of the nationalist ideology was to ‘rescue the State’ (Taşkin, 2004: 188). However, this was not only a technological problem which could be passed over by modernization. It was also a problem of the ambiguity of the national identity or the character in order to form a discourse which would determine the aim and scope of the politics. The necessity of linking culture and politics caused to a connection between conservatism and nationalism. As Çiğdem argued, the seeking of establishing the national identity has always been linked to the problem of rescuing the State in Turkish conservative-nationalism (Çiğdem, 1992: 8-9). Therefore, the primary subliminal code managing the reflex of nationalism was the ‘concern for existence’. Rescuing
the state, preserving the national unity and identity and purifying the political sphere from ‘internal hostiles’ were linked together and these integrated codes established the perception of the ideal State. According to this integrated thought, the politics should be ‘purified’ from any claim which is especially based on foreign discourses. That’s why both nationalism and conservatism have conceived some claims, whose aim was kind of democratizing the state, as ‘insidious plans’ made by enemies. This conspiracy view caused to handle the politics in the discourse of ‘war’. This kind of discursive resonance causes to ignore the importance of the politics whose will is to focus on determining normative principles in order to keep society together by communicative reason.

The epic reflex in conservatism can be discovered in this resonance, because ignoring the politics, which refers a process created by deliberative context, causes to handle the politics as an externality being close to any deliberation (Argın, 2004: 466-7). It is perhaps because of Turkish nationalist thought did not see any difference between establishing-the-State and establishing-the-Nation (Mardin, 1996: 446). The direct bound between State and Nation was the ideological root of epic authenticity which embraces the whole elements within a transcendental discourse. Unlike the European nationalism, Turkish nationalism did not also divide the ethnocentric nationalism and legal-political nationalism (Öğün, 1998: 24-6). So, the constitutional system, the legislative system, and the cultural system were linked together under a transcendental discourse about the State. Term State does not refer a secondary context which comes after the constituent power; rather, it signs a kind of epic ontology existing in cultural subconscious. This cultural subconscious functions on questioning any claim or any fact whether its tendency is dangerous or not. This skepticism has to be considered as a necessary reflex of nationalism which is in a paradoxical situation by positioning between the will to be modern and instinct of preserving the native essentialism. However, nationalism could be able to cope with this paradox by creating a discourse of ‘ethnocentric nationalism’ whose aim was to synthesize the essential context of the nation with modernization in order to both preserve and soup up the cultural-national unity (Engin, 1938: 9-11). The reason why Engin described the Turkish nation as a primary member of the world of civilizations was because of the will to comprehend the national self as a solid existence which needed nothing to preserve its existence. This ethnocentric thought caused to be given preference to the ‘concern of existence’ over any fact.
including demands wishing to question the normative codes of the politics.

In the roots of Turkish nationalism, an introversive positioning shall be seen. The more important thing is to preserve essentialism which has properly been protected against West and its modern culture. According to Koçak, the introversive positioning in nationalism is constructed with the discursive notion implying that national culture is totally ‘self-sufficient’ (Koçak, 1997: 101). The notion of self-sufficiency means both cultural and political closure which any demand is count as redundant. This reflects the de-politized function of the politics because self-sufficiency of the national culture signifies an epic experience of life in which both time and change are ceased. This notion can also be seen in the discourse of ‘citizenship’ in Turkish nationalism. While the term citizenship is understood as the person who is eligible for liberties and rights, Turkish nationalism handles the notion of the citizenship as the reflector of ‘patriotism’. For example, in Kaplan’s writings, the term citizenship was discussed with the notion of ‘militarism’ to be served to preserve the national essence of national identity (Kaplan, 1992: 471). The connection of militarism and citizenship shows that nationalist ideology does not tend to appropriate any individual rights or liberties before political system; rather this ideology tends to relate the political with the individual psychology which can easily ignore the notion of ‘abstract rights of individuality’. The nationalism has always handled politics in a ‘native’ way which is totally differed with the Western concept of the politics. The notion and discourse of ‘native’ in nationalist politics are the possibility of the connection by which nationalism and conservatism come together. This notion indicates the closure of politics on its own path in which any abstract or normative principle shall be ignored. That’s why cultural dynamics reflecting ‘national identity’ becomes political more than it has been before.

The Impossibility of Overlapping

As aforementioned above statements, we may argue that the conservative-nationalism is an ideology which tries to unify native elements of the society with the politics in order to preserve its essentialism against abstract demands to be claimed according to the principle of abstract individualism. It may be the main signifier why there could no overlapping consensus between conservative-nationalism and the theory of ‘public sphere’.
Because, the theory of public sphere, as we discussed it at the beginning of the paper, based on an idea that abstract individual rights must be the basis of the normative principles of the political system. In other words, the theory of public sphere is a belief of that idea of abstract rights has to be established over the current dynamics of the politics. The possibility of establishing the normative codes of a political system must base on communicative reason by which individuals can have an opportunity to actualize their capacities and to demonstrate that they could be the responsible subject of the political system as well.

The response of conservative-nationalism against this idea is framed by a pre-acceptance which handles this kind of normative principles as ‘foreign’ for the culture itself. The main belief of the conservative-nationalism is that both the State and the politics should be named as ‘the carrier’ of history and culture in themselves. This belief was mostly defended in a functionalist theory which did not distinguish the politics and the people (populi, the cultural-political self of the nation). Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, who was one of the most famous functionalist theorists, argued that ‘there is nothing but the nation’ (Bozkurt, 1967: 173). This argument should not be criticized as it is only a reflection of functionalism. Rather, this argument is so important because of that both the term of ‘politics’ and ‘people’ are handled as epic and abstract concepts. As a result of the abstraction, these terms were started to be believed that they could no longer be claimed to actualize any demand of change.

Bozkurt’s idea is important because it also reflects the main reflex of Kemalism which is the primary political-normative in Turkish political life. It can be said that because of Kemalism is the foundation principle of the politics, it takes a position which signals the possibilities of establishing a hegemonic discourse in politics. However, we should not forget that the legacy which Kemalism takes from its ideological ancestors is the ideological acceptance of the necessity of ‘sublimating’ the essence of the nation in the name of ‘nativism’ (Argın, 2004: 473). So, we should not forget that the main idea of Turkish political ideology had been developed by the ancestors of Kemalism, nationalism, and conservatism. However, it can be argued that only conservative-nationalist ideology could close to that idea implying the necessity of connecting the State and people in order to preserve and enforce the nativism in politics. That’s why it may be said that conservative-nationalism, which reflects the main idea of Turkish political ideology, tends to de-politicize the creative-communicative action of people. As for me, this ideological form aims to denominate the politics
in a transcendental discourse reflecting an epic experience of life integrated with the connection of the politics and cultural. It should be imagined as a social-political arrangement in which the communicative action is destabilized.

**Conclusion**

As aforementioned above the statements, the main purpose of this article is to discuss the conservative-nationalist theory which causes the thought of communicative action, which is the basis point of the ‘public sphere’, should not easily be imagined. As for the general opinion of this study, the basis of this fact depends on an idea that because of the meaning of politics is totally handled under an epic context which does not allow any interference to demand creating the normative principles of politics. The theorists of conservative-nationalism have focused on enlarging the discourse of ‘nativism’ in social-political context. Nativism is a term by which we can understand that there is no division between State and people. Through nativist discourse, conservative-nationalism spreads its essentialist approaches throughout the cultural, social and political spheres by relating them to an inclusive context. This ideological approach causes the handling politics as a passive concept in the society.

The main reason of handling politics in a passive approach is to try to keep the society in its native concept. Because being politics or politicizing the sociality means that the current order could be claimed to be changed. The main reflex of conservative-nationalism appears in this context to demonstrate the importance of reviving the native and national character against the claims which handle politics as a tool of dividing culture and the political dynamics. For example, nationalism evaluates the conception of citizenship with the inclusive discourse of the State and conservatism denominates the human being as the carrier and barrier of the culture. It can be seen that both nationalism and conservatism do not handle politics by which people can activate and actualize their capacities to determine the normative principles. Rather, for these ideological forms, there should be a remarkable distance between politics and people. Because the position of politics is considered in a transcendental discourse in order to make citizens become a-political. A-politicization of the politics signifies an epic experiment of life rather than a ‘public sphere’ which claims to re-determine the normative principles.
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Structural Transformation of Anatolian Publicity after the Rise of Shopping Malls in the Provincial Cities

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In relation to the common trends within the world global system, Turkey has undergone a radical transformation economically, socially and politically through neoliberal strategies since the 1980s. In this framework, the economic model of import substitution for industrialization followed between 1960-1980 was replaced by the economic model based on privatization, foreign investments and consuming and thus, governance, priority to liberalized civic society and shrinkage in the public institutions became the new political mottos. The cultural and societal outputs of this politico-economic structural shift were the increase of the urban population, the restructuring of the urban architecture and thus the gradual shortening of the social distance between the big cities and the provincial towns. Thereupon, the way of life in metropolitan cities has increasingly diffused to the provincial zones. Now, it is possible to observe how neoliberal transformation has caused similar effects in public and cultural life both in big and small cities in terms of consuming and consumer society. According to Bora (2005: 44-46) the new economic shift’s results with its complex variations (cultural, architectural, and political) can be summarized as "provincialization of the center and the centrification of the province."1 Indeed, it is possible to observe how the mutual relations between the province and the center cause hybrid situations which wait to be investigated. In this framework, the aim of the article at hand is to contribute to

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1 More clearly, the expression belonging to Bora refers to the idea that the metropolitan cities with their peripheral subdivisions have started to resemble to the provincial “cities” while the provincial life in those “cities” imitate the way of life in the metropolitan areas. Here, the “centrification” means how the provinces increasingly look like the big cities in Turkey.
that field by focusing on "the provinces" of Turkey. Following this aim, the article evaluates the structural transformation of publicity in the small cities of Turkey in the context of increasing shopping malls which are depicted as cathedrals (Corrigan, 1997; Ritzer, 2010) or palaces (Featherstone, 2005) of consumer society.

At that point, it is also important to emphasize some issues that arise in the course of the study because they also draw the limit of it. The first is about the conceptual deepness of the term, "province." Because, even if the word, "province" seems to catch its object at first glance, a deeper reflexion implies that the expression "constructs" its object (Birkan, 2005: 304-305). The second issue, however, arises from the quasi-dichotomy between center and province which is not free from the conceptual problematic. Moreover, the dichotomy has deep roots in the Westernization process in Turkey. The last issue -the technical one- is the lack of sociological or political studies on provincial life. In a comparison, it can be said that the more developed Turkish literary about the province, the less the scope of scientific study. On the other hand, the scarce studies generally focus on the urban planning strategies based on the modernization and Westernization projects in the Atatürk and İnönü era. Interestingly, these studies give the impression that they have been conducted for rationalization or critique of the state ideology rather than investigating the transformation of the small towns. While reading, the reader faces a subjectless –without women, old or young people or whoever- provincial life which basically gets the attention of the researcher for the sake of "understanding the center." Furthermore it seems this symptom has become more evident after the neoliberal shift in the Turkish economy. Thus the provincial life's aspects are evaluated in terms of management, marketing, and city planning in different articles. Relatedly, most of the studies assessing the shopping

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malls touch the economic side of the malls, consumer perceptions, and city-planning targets (İçal and Ağaoğlu, 2016: 6). As a result, studies stressing on the politic-sociologic dimension of the issue are rare. Yet, most of those politic-sociologic inquiries "struggle with" the idea of consumerism in the provinces without investigating the concrete and objective conditions within an "imagined provincial" conceptualization. This bunch of studies prefers to follow the common critical perspective on consumer society in Western literature with ignoring the details hidden behind the different cultural contexts.

Moving with these limitations, the article consists of three sections. The first part looks through the concept of "province" in Turkish context in consideration and thus, draws a general picture of the provincial publicity in the 1990s. The second part focuses on the development of mall sector and its provincial segment in Turkey. The last part, however, discusses the public effects of the development of mall sector in provincial "cities" by interpreting the results of different and separate field researches conducted in Turkish small cities. In this context, the article uses some field surveys and personal observations in different provincial areas as well as a literature survey.

### Small Cities in the Axe of Provincialism and Narratives of Province in Turkish Context

According to Oxford English Dictionary, province means “a principal administrative division of a country or empire" and "the whole of a country outside the capital, especially when regarded as lacking in sophistication or culture." Similarly, Turkish Lingual Institution refers to the province as "all of the places outside the capital city or most important cities, outside." In this framework, both languages consider province as being "out of London" or "Ankara," namely out of the capital city, at the first glance. However, this administrative definition is restrictive rather than inclusive because in the Turkish context, the word "province" refers to the places outside of Istanbul, not the places "outside" Ankara. Thus, even Ankara with its approximately five million population and metropolitan features stands

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as province according to Istanbul-centered mental-spatial consideration. From a similar vein, Yozgat which is a small Anatolian city is provincial in addition to the cities which are really close to İstanbul, such as Edirne or Tekirdağ in the West of Turkey (Laçiner, 2005: 16). In this sense, İstanbul is regarded as the "authentic center" in contrast to the administrative center, Ankara. The fact that "national TV Channels" give priority to the news from İstanbul –traffic, weather, accidents-, that the popular shows and TV series are also produced in İstanbul indicates this perspective. Hence, a province in Turkish context matches a symbolic factuality which points out the places outside Istanbul.5

Contradictorily, it is also true some big cities such as Ankara and İzmir aren't considered as province whereas Istanbul's semiotic and symbolic centrality is given. The main reason why these big cities aren't put on the list of provincial places is that they have a rich urban content with their populations, transportation networks, cultural facilities (pubs, cafes, opera and ballet houses) and their cosmopolitan roots. In this case, the dichotomy between province and center is replaced by the dichotomy between metropolitan city and small city.

On the other hand, there is also a technical classification which vertically cuts aforementioned everyday life cognitions of the term. According to it, the current urban–rural definition in Turkey is based on the population size and the administrative units (Öğdül, 2010: 1524). Subsequently, "the Village Act enacted in 1924 defines the settlements as urban and rural settlements with a population of less than 2000 are villages, those between 2000 and 20,000 are small towns and those with a population over 20,000 are cities" (Öğdül, 2010: 1524). However, transitional districts (% 38.02) and dominantly urban districts (% 17.14) can also be identified according to a series of indicators under the headings of agricultural production, non-agricultural production, employment, demography, education, the flows of money, goods, and people (Öğdül, 2010: 1528).

At that point, it seems all these classifications are made from the eye of a center –no matter from which sight it looks at its subject. So, a province is understood as the place of "not to have the things that center has" or as the area of deprivation. Within the deprivation, the life in the province is

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5 This competition between administrative center Ankara and commercial-cultural center Istanbul can be interpreted in terms of ideological rivalry between Republican Turkey and Ottoman Empire.
thought in terms of a routine everyday life, viscous time, uniformity and conservatism. This discourse dominantly occurs in Turkish literature (Türkeş, 2005), and clearly appears in the clichés which Birkan (2005: 300-303) subtly depicts:

"Incoherent and crowded houses, poky streets, the children who surround a car plunging the neighborhood and jamming, the head-scarfed women who are always alert for gossiping, semi-museum guest rooms which are closed to the household, barely used liqueur glasses, heavy china cabinets with various doilies, encyclopedias within the china cabinets, toughie men playing Rummikub in male dominated coffeehouses, apprentices dreaming to become a footballer, foremen whose biggest dreams are to have their own shops just because they are already married and have children, sluggish and mangy mastiffs, minger cats; the teachers, soldiers, doctors and administrative officers who think they don't deserve to be in that 'damned place' and their wives; spinsters…"  

What is constructed within various clichés, however, is a uniform provincial life. So far, the distant perception of center about the province usually builds these sorts of stereotypes. In a sense, this corresponds to the provinciality in the center's imagination (Ahıska, 2006: 16). However, as pointed out by the different views on the definition above, there is no uniform provinciality, neither conceptually nor concretely. It is more proper to talk about the "provincialities" instead of “provinciality.” For instance, Uşak's –a small city in the west of Turkey- provinciality must be different from Ardahan's –another small city in the northeast of Turkey-. Moreover, those clichés aforementioned can equally be observed in the "provinces of the center," namely in the suburbs (Argın, 2005: 288-289). So, it is more proper to emphasize "provincial life" is not a frozen entity. In other words, provinciality is a historical moment transforming, changing and flowing. In this sense, the bridge between the term, namely the small city referring to an urban size and the term, provinciality referring to a non-urbanized mentality should be thought in terms of historical processes which find their counterparts within the economic and political transitions.

Regarding this Turkish historical background, it should firstly be emphasized that a political-ideological project with the aims of Westernization and modernization has intensely been followed till the 1960s. Following these aims, the ax of Ottoman publicities embedded in the triangle

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6 The original text is longer and more detailed. Here it is only summarized.
consisting of square-mosque-bazaar was reinterpreted and thus, some governmental buildings -such as buildings of municipality, governorship or sub-governorship- symbolizing the existence of Ankara government in those "distant" places were integrated into the traditional structure. Hence, each small city was designed like a small Ankara. Subsequently, many of those reshaped provincial publicities were connected to Ankara along with the railway stations which in turn caused an alternative main (shopping) street called "Station Street" to emerge. In this framework, the structuring along with “Station Street” became the symbol of a complete modernization project with its governmental buildings and the public spaces including parks, gardens and, cultural houses (Halkevi) (Birol, 2004: 5; Sönmez, 2007: 153). Although Station Streets have been surrounded by apartments and beton blocs after the 1960 s, they kept their prior role as a public space for a long time.

On the other hand, it is misleading to think of all modern publicities intermingled with the traditional ones have been adopted entirely by the provincial people. In the provinces, the asymmetric matrix of conservative life, patriarchal codes and income inequalities revealed hybrid forms. As the deeper dimensions of traditional publicity, Qur’an courses (for kids as summer schools), bazaars (for housewives), the coffee shops (for young men), thresholds for gossiping (for women), open-air weddings in the neighborhood intersected the modern socialization practices in the public parks, parties and culture houses. In this sense, “province, the motherland of conservatism” (Bora, 2005: 52) has broken its shell partly. As a result, the modern and traditional publicities created hybrid forms excluding their “rival” while including it. This scene currently has become more evident in the Islamic fashion magazines and conservative five-star hotels (Demirezen, 2016: 556), in a nutshell, Turkish consumers with their conservative religious/cultural backgrounds have been well-integrated into consuming society flows (Başfirinci, 2011: 127).

With all these ambiguous dimensions, the third extension of the historical transformation of provincial publicity has corresponded with the neoliberal era. However, the neoliberal shift from the import substitution industrialization model to the open-economy has given its clear outputs in provinces only after the 2000 s. During the process, an emerging capitalist bloc called “Anatolian tigers” has risen and, in parallel, the small cities has started to resemble the centers with their autobahns, bridges, urban furniture, provincial universities, cafés and cultural events. Thus, provincial areas have had a new face which abolishes but also reproduces the du-
ality between the center and province. In this sense, the meaning of provinciality as a mental code (in a sense not to adopt the modern behavioral and mental codes) remains while its content becomes ambiguous because the small cities have crystallized with their consumer dimension. Through this process, a sort of consumer who is both eastern and western; both collectivist and individualist, namely, a type who desires to keep his/her traditional values while becoming unique emerged (Kabadayı and Paksoy, 2016: 457). Obviously, the increase in the numbers of shopping malls has had a huge effect to complete this picture. Because the cathedrals of neoliberal consumer societies change the flow of everyday life, consequently public spaces' meaning and content when they transform the consuming habits. In this context, it is necessary to analyze how the sector has extended from center to the provinces before evaluating the concrete variations of the change.

A Long and Thin Way from Bazaar to Shopping Mall

For understanding how retailing in Turkey became dominantly mall and market oriented, it is necessary to review the historical background of the sector at some points. In this sense, it is important to emphasize the place of the Ottoman bazaar, bedesten and arasta.

During the Ottoman period, the bazaars located in the city centers and the bedestens situated around the bazaars have taken the prime place in the development of the city. As a result of growing on the horizontal axis of the bazaars, the side streets have formed other commercial, public and cultural areas where artisans work. Potters, blacksmiths, junk shops, thread choosers, saddler, coppersmiths, and tinsmiths have been active in the side streets and the bazaars (Üstün and Tutar, 2008: 270). On the other hand, as an organic part of the main bazaar, bedesten has been seen as a place where imported goods, clothing, valuable goods, gold, silver, and jewelry have been kept safe and sold (Ceylan, 2011: 14). With their space diffused

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7 Because of the transformation process that started with neoliberalisation, the feeling of deprivation of the provinces declined. But the capacity and competence of the emerging urban facilities (in comparison with the center) reproduced this image of deprivation. For example, students studying at provincial universities admire the great universities in metropolitan cities with enviously.

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in the city center, the bazaars were visited by the people of the city or the people traveling from distant places, as they were also the transit to the residential areas (Uysal, 2016: 43; see also Üstün and Tutal, 2008).

Subsequently, the first mall-like structure added to the traditional structures of the Ottoman style in the sector was the Bon Marche type supermarkets opened in Pera in the 19th century. Nevertheless, this type of retailing was only unique to Istanbul. So, in the first years of the Republic, the traditional bazaar concept was commonly preserved beside neighborhood grocery stores. In this sense, the contemporary retailing in Turkey has just only started between 1954 and 1957 (Gavcar and Didin, 2007: 26). Migros entered Turkey in the 1950s as the result of the retail trade regimes in the developed countries and the development process. In the 1970s, a number of small discount malls were established by municipalities in order to regulate the market (Arklan, 2012: 86). Until the 1980s, some procedural work on the sector has been made, but no significant progress became evident.

The introduction of shopping malls to the market, however, was in the 1990s. The Galleria mall, which was opened with the partnership of the state investment in 1998, was the first one inspired by the Galleria in Houston. After that, Nova Baran (1990), Atrium (1992), Capitol (1993), Carrefour (1993) in Istanbul and, Atakule (1988) and Karum (1993) in Ankara started to service (Arklan, 2012: 87). From the beginning of the 2000s, the shopping mall sector in Turkey, so to say, exploded. The increase of the malls in a chronological order proves this trend: in 1995, there were 12 malls while the number increased to 264 in 2011. In 2014, there were 345 malls in different cities of Turkey. According to another research (Köksal and Aydın, 2015:231) there were 106 malls in 2005 while the number increased to 263 in 2010, to 279 in 2011 and to 299 in 2013. It was predicted that the number of the shopping centers would rise from 369 to 414 at the end of 2016, to 443 in 2017 and to 448 in 2018. At present, only 16 of the 81 cities of Turkey don't have shopping malls. Most of the 65 provinces have more than one shopping mall (about 80%) except the individual hypermarkets. 5 cities among 16 cities will have a mall in the near future according to the investment plans. Although 56% of the leasable shopping mall areas in Turkey are in three big cities (Istanbul is at the first place with its 116 malls), it is expected that future investments will concentrate in the provinces due to the sectorial transformations and relative saturation in the big cities. The figures verify the tendency: Looking at the number of shopping centers in the last five years, the

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number of shopping centers opened in Istanbul is 28 while the number of shopping centers opened in Anatolia is 77. According to a survey analyzing the range of 285 operating shopping malls 31 malls are located in the Mediterranean Region, 46 malls are in the Aegean Region, 123 malls are in the Marmara Region, 17 malls are in the Black Sea Region, 46 malls are in the Central Anatolia Region, 6 malls in the Eastern Anatolia Region and 14 malls are in the South East Anatolia Region (Aydoğan and Bakır, 2016: 312). To the survey results and the standards of the International Center of Shopping Centers (ICSC), 43.6% of the shopping centers operating in Turkey are “small,” 27.4% are “medium,” 22.1% are “large” and 4.6% are “very big” (Aydoğan and Bakır, 2016: 321).

Given the internal divisions of the shopping malls examined, there are also figures that can be used to assess consumption habits and the way of the usage of the shopping centers as public spaces. In this context, there are 233 children's playgrounds, 180 cinemas, 88 bowling areas, 31 ice skating fields and 21 theaters in total of those 285 malls (Aydoğan and Bakır, 2016:322). In the same study the other units owned by the shopping malls were also documented. Based on this data (Aydoğan and Bakır, 2016: 322) the most common units in shopping malls operating in Turkey are "cash dispenser" (91.6%), "disabled unit” (89.1%), “baby care room” (%72,6), "consultation point" (70,9%), "taxi stand" (67,7%) and "tailor" (67%). On the other hand, the sector has continued to grow since 2014. So, it can also be assumed that the sector has not undergone a transformation that would lead to a dramatic difference in the tendencies of these figures. However, Hulusi Belgu, Head of Shopping Centers and Investors Association, has declared that neighborhood shopping malls will increase instead of giant shopping malls in Turkey. According to him, by 2016, 24 cities in Turkey need more than 20,000 m² of shopping mall area while 16 cities and 40,000 m² of shopping mall area are needed. The latest report, published by EVA Real Estate Appraisal and Academy in Turkey, titled AVM Potential Analysis 2016-2018, also confirms these trends. As a matter of fact, the shopping center sector, which was 20.6 billion TL in 2009,
reached to 105.9 billion TL in 2016 and reached to 119 billion TL in 2017. In the report, it is also stated that the capacity will reach to 132 billion TL in 2018.

Grounding on these figures, it is possible to infer the sector will keep growing but mostly towards the provinces and the local neighborhoods. It is a dominant view that investment plans for giant shopping malls are coming to an end.

On the other hand, all these historical and current trends in the shopping mall sector obviously and directly concern the structural transformation of the provincial public space, which is the main theme of the study. As emphasized in many studies, shopping malls are transform the shopping habits, preferences and the sense of amusement as well as the city life in the places they are in. In this context, the following chapter focuses on the analysis of the provincial aspect of the issue.

Transformation of the Publicities in the Provinces within the Context of Shopping Malls

Shopping has been the name of negotiation, mutual interaction, not only the consumption but also the publicity of the marketplace from ancient Greece to today's consumer society. The distance from the agora to the marketplaces of medieval cities is not a roundabout. In this sense, it is also possible to follow similar historical lines in the direction of East, namely Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the socio-political aspect of shopping has been reflected in bazaars, bedestens, and arastas in Ottoman shopping culture. In parallel, the traditional Turkish shopping culture with its public extensions has been defined in terms of bargaining, chatting and getting news in the city. On the other hand, it can also be claimed the shopping mall sector's emergence has influenced this culture and therefore the usage patterns of the city in various ways. However, it is beneficial to keep a moderate distance with normative publicity approach (Habermas, 2010; Arendt, 2008; Sennett, 2013)10 and its similar variations which attribute great importance to the shopping malls in the transformation of publicity

10 Here, it is important to regard four basic critiques directed to normative approach: (i) that the normative vision of public space often contains a historical bias which idealizes past publics; (ii) that analysis regarding the governance of contemporary public space often over-emphasize the role of coercion at the expense of recogniz-
as much as to criticize the consumption habits emerged by the shopping malls in the provinces.

At that point, it is necessary to point out that the fast growth of mall sector in the provinces has a great role in the process, "centrification of the province" because, a mall is a kind of simulative place (Baudrillard, 2004) rather than being a space for meeting, bargaining, negotiation although they have been designed for replacing the city center with its furniture, streets, shopping areas and cultural facilities in the beginning (Gruen and Smith, 1960: 140). In this sense, the shopping centers with their sale oriented strategies are the places that give the impression that the customer chooses what to buy. However, the floor plans in the malls direct the customer according to a fixed way. The sounds, rhythm of the music, smells and visual effects are pre-designed interiorly. The fact that the malls have no window causes the customer to lose the sense of time. Moreover, the sold item is not only a commodity but a lifestyle. The malls' interior designs have semiotic and symbolic dimensions. They address to the consuming of the identities, spaces, signs, symbols, and images (Aytaç, 2007: 222). In this context, a shopping mall is a place that is a repetitive, an empty and an abstract space (Birol, 2005: 423, 426). In other words, every shopping mall looks like each other with its content. As a result, the location in which the customer is doesn't matter. So, the person focuses on the commodities, not to the people around. Additionally, there is not much possibility to bargain or chat in a store inside the mall. Among the managers and the workers, there are also no solidarity and intimate relations which are the main features of the traditional guild system (Öndoğan, 2016:13). Consequently, the malls are meta-funfairs in opposed to the funfairs which are depicted in terms of joy, surprise, locality and eccentric features (Baudrillard, 2004: 21).

These universal features of shopping malls repeat exactly in the case of Turkey. For instance, it does not make much difference whether the mall is in Istanbul or in Kayseri for the consumer. It can, therefore, be argued that the consumption habits of the people in the provinces increasingly become similar to the consumption habits of the people in the center. Although the brands sometimes differ, -there are more local and small-range brands in
the provincial malls instead of the global brands such as Gucci, Chanel, Prada, Burberry etc.- the pattern of consumption-oriented shopping, the tastes and the preferences are similar to those in the central malls. Provincial people spend time in the mall “streets”, dine in the eating floor “hang out” in the cafés, the shopping streets, cinemas, bowling saloons, children's playgrounds inside the mall. Provincial young people also prefer branded products that symbolize expensiveness and wealth as a demonstration of aggressive consumption (Mammadova, 2015: 69) as their counterparts do in the big cities. Thus, consumption as a whole is transformed into entertainment which is engaged to “the unending and reproduced desires” (Baudrillard, 2004: 89-95; Üstün and Tutal, 2008: 261). Moving from these cases, it is fair to infer that the distance between the center and the province has been reduced and the deprivation of the province has transformed into similarity. Thus, it can be confirmed there is a transition from the idea, “the province as an object of subjugation” to the idea “the province losing its province” (Kavuş, 2013: 309).

The evident transition has negative effects on the traditional public spaces and the structures of the provinces. Because the number of customers visiting the bazaars decrease, the number of customers coming to the bazaar for chatting and spending time as it used to be, diminishes. The culture of guild grounded on the fiduciary relationships between the customers and the sellers consisting of the values such as caring, favor, respect, custody, and trust are in erosion (Öndoğan, 2016: 15) so, it can be inferred the new consuming ethic weakens the cultures. Investigating the effects of the Margi shopping center in Edirne in the context of the Ali-paşa Bazaar, Uysal (2016: 58) points out that the urban life fades, the daily life becomes more point-oriented, and the bonds established with the city by the citizens get weaker. The complex and variable nature of the urban space and the complex relationships that leave a space for special and different experiences disappear (Uysal, 2016: 58). Üstün and Tutal (2008: 279), who has carried out a similar study in the case of Eskişehir, also reach a similar result, claiming that the trend of the replacement of the open-air traditional bazaar system by the covered shopping malls causes negative effects on the public sphere. When evaluated from the point of view of the city planning and urban memory, it also seems shopping malls to become a dominant element by giving their own name to the region, as it is in the case of Bursa, and to give their identity to the neighborhood by suppressing the features of urban structure in the environment (Tümer Yıldız and Polat, 2011: 18-19). Moreover, as the public spaces within the
city are privatized, these customized areas are transformed into shopping malls (Yavuzçehre and Çezik, 2015: 33). Thus, the memory of the city takes a major blow. In total, all these tendencies cause provincial public spaces to lose their old vivid scene.

However, these findings show only one side of the picture. Because it is also a fact that the provincial people welcome the new shopping malls despite their “negative effects.” As Erkip (2003: 1090-1093) has pointed out, Turkish people’s adaptation of the malls was quite easy. Yet, most of the Turkish literature about the field ignores and insistently not tries to understand why ordinary people in the provinces “desire” the malls, while the current literature focuses on the consuming society with a sort of abstract and almost condemning style around the leading Western thinkers.\footnote{It seems Baudrillard’s pessimistic view has spread over Turkish academics. Following the related literature, it is easy to get the impression that Turkish people are thoroughly haunted by the commodities, without any exit.}

On the other hand, as many field research show (Yüksel and Aydın 2015: 238; Akat, Taşkın and Özdemir, 2006: 20; Ceylan, 2011: 91; Kabadayı and Paksoy, 2016: 464) especially young and middle-aged people go to the malls at least one time in a week and stay there 1-3 hours. The days when the visits are intense are the same as they are in the big cities, namely weekends (Ceylan, 2011: 94). Besides, the provinces which don't have malls elaborate on the cities having a mall while the ones having one mall elaborate on the cities having more than one. For instance, according to a field research applied to the region of the lakes in Turkey, people of Burdur, deprived of a mall go to Isparta while people of Isparta go to Antalya which has more than one mall (Yüksel and Aydın, 2015: 241-243) Similarly, the consumers of Aksaray go to Nevşehir or Kayseri which have bigger malls. At that point, it can even be claimed there is "shopping mall tourism" in the provincial areas.

From this perspective, it is necessary to question why people in the small cities show so much favor with shopping centers. It is possible to derive the necessary empirical data from the mall-focused consumption surveys conducted in the various provinces of Turkey. In this context, the field surveys conducted in various small and medium sized cities like Niğde, Muğla, Karabük and Tekirdağ show that the product diversity, reaching different products in one space, price-quality rates, promotions, credit card usage facilities, protection from the weather and the “chaos” of the city, safe and sterile environment, gentility of the employees, hygiene,
closeness to the city center, cleanness and tidiness, safety, qualified products, accessibility, peace, convenience for children and amusement are some of the main reasons why people prefer the malls (Polat and Kültür, 2007:110; Okumuş and Bulduk, 2003:81; Gavcar and Didin, 2007: 28; Çakmak, 2012: 209-210). In parallel with those researches, Kabadayı ve Paksoy (2016: 471) classify these motivations as follows: experiential, goal-oriented, socializing, time-saving and deal-seeking. On the other hand, it is a very important point Köksal's and Aydın's research (2015: 241-243) finds out another reason to go to the malls is not to “have a better place to go in the city.” A similar finding is also evident in another research conducted in Denizli. According to it, %47.7 of the interviewees says they don't have a nice place to spend time (Şahin and Çiçek, 2015: 213).

In the light of these empirical findings, it can be concluded that the provincial people choose the malls rationally. In other words, the approach emphasizing the simulative side of the mall and thus, implying the customers are the victims of "false consciousness" is misleading even it is not totally wrong. Given the findings of the surveys, it is clear people aren't enchanted by the colors, smells, shiny panoramas of the malls. Additionally, Altınışık and Mert (2001) reach the conclusion the customers aren't imposed to shop by the firms. There are people going to a mall just for the basic needs in addition to those who “use” the mall for price-quality comparisons. There are also the ones visiting the mall for its cinema saloon and theater facilities. In this sense, as it has been shown in many researches regarding the everyday life practices (see Goffman, 2009; De Certau, 2005; Fiske, 1999), people are not only the puppets of the conditions to which they are imposed by the production relations and the socio-political processes. The people compare, prefer and change the options. In this sense, neither publicity is a zero-sum game (Tyndall, 2010: 137) nor is the provincial counterparts of the mall users exceptional.

In this context, we should be more cautious to proclaim the “death of public spaces” (Birol, 2011; Yavuzçehre and Çezik, 2015) in the provinces within the framework of the simulative character of the malls. Indeed, as already mentioned, for the provincial people, the shopping mall is a non-classical public space open to encountering with the others in the sense that mall is actually the “best place to go”. In comparison with mall environment, the classic triangle consisting of square, bazaar, mosque and plus government buildings contains bureaucratic, gender and age-related hierarchies intensely. In this context, it is a fact provincial square and bazaars
are male dominant public spaces. Again, the traditional hierarchical superiority of older men on young men is embodied in the fact that young people do not mostly hang out in the provincial square. Additionally, many provincial cities do not even have a proper city park. The existing children's parks are drowned in exhaust fumes.

Because of these “deprivations,” going to a mall represents socialization for the provincial people. Proving this fact, parents with their kids go to the malls, especially at weekends. They eat, walk around and join the activities. In this sense, the visits to the malls in the provincial areas have different social dimensions in comparison with the ones in the big cities. As a matter fact, the families in the big cities have the chance to choose a mall among the many. So, they "try" and float among multiple options. Therefore, the likelihood of meeting the same family is low (see also Sönmez, 2007) in the central malls. On contrary, the possibility to see the same people in a provincial mall is much more probable because there are not many mall alternatives. Thus, the unexpected meeting -even within a mall- suddenly constructs local ties, namely the face to face relations.

On the other hand, it is possible to see similar socialization trends in the individual use of the publicities in shopping malls. From this point of view, describing the post-modern Flanauré or Flanouse, who is wandering in the shopping mall, is much more than a matter of description. There may be similarities between wandering aimlessly in a bazaar – in the brackets of Benjamin's authentic Flanéur (Benjamin, 1995) – and wandering around in a shopping mall. In this context, the seats placed on the terraces and the shopping mall floors give the possibility to gaze at the flow of the people within the mall while this behavior represents a variation of the “modern urban type” within the crowd. No doubt people, who sit or wander or chat, experience a kind of publicity. Moreover, since the distribution of classical provincial public places is separated according to the gender codes (small parks for women, coffee shops for men), the provincial malls' atmosphere can be more open/comfortable (Sönmez, 2007) for different genders. In that direction, Erkip claims there is the indication that "feminization of the flanañeur " in the Turkish malls (Erkip, 2005: 839). That is, women especially prefer the malls.

From this perspective, the third and another important aspect of the inquiry to determine why the provincial people choose shopping malls is related to the issue of women's publicity. In the province, women's publicity is embedded in patriarchal relations. In this context, going to the bazaar is a very important socialization event for women. As Çur (2005: 126-128)
has stated, the woman who runs to the bazaar (usually with other women) applies constant strategies to extend the time spent outside. However, this shopping activity, which means to get away from the house, is also under the control of masculine eyes (Çur, 2005: 128). Because the bazaar is full of acquaintances; it is necessary to behave “appropriately” in the street, conceal the body and, of course, return home before it gets dark. Since, in the evening, the most popular area of women’s publicity, bazaar becomes once again the main artery of male publicity. On the other hand, shopping malls are among the limited number of social spaces in which women can freely participate in public life and interactions (Erkip, 2003: 1090). Comparatively, the provincial malls are also the places in which the patriarchal codes are felt less. No doubt the masculine eyes are still in operation because the mall is small. Yet, it can be argued that the acquaintance is a less-noticeable domination mechanism within the shopping center due to its objective, abstract, non-personalized and consumption-oriented atmosphere. On the other hand, the closing-time of the most shopping malls in the province at least 22.00 and, this timing allows women to stay outside of the home after it gets dark. Thus, people gradually get used to women to be outside at nights. For example, Aksaray’s small malls located almost in the city center increase the visibility of the women on the street to the extent that it also revives the main streets which are full of cafes. However, it should not be overemphasized the effect of shopping mall to solve the issue of patriarchy. As a matter of fact, as the research results conducted with the Akdeniz University (women) students in Antalya (Kükrer, 2011: 84) confirm that women view shopping mall as a socializing tool and a kind of adventure, that they feel freer when shopping. Nevertheless they like shopping more for their families. Additionally, they tell they feel uncomfortable when the male employee gives the service and they express their desire to be closer to their homes when they shop. Also, another research in Afyon finds out that women prefer to buy the commodities which they produce (such as food or sewing material) in the past (Özdemir and Yaman, 2007: 84). In this context, it seems the gender norms are reproduced in the shopping center environment.

Ultimately, the analytical questioning if the increase in the number of provincial malls causes the publicity to fade or not can be maintained through provincial Ramadan events (compare Schmidt, 2012). As a matter of fact, special events are organized in the malls for Ramadan in many provincial “cities” such as Yozgat, Denizli, Ordu, Afyon, Mardin, Maras, Niğde, Tekirdağ, Edirne like it is done in big cities. During these events,
the folkloric elements in traditional Anatolian culture such as Hacivat-Karagöz, mystic music (tasavvuf), the Ottoman band (mehteran), fasıl, illusion, Pişkar-Kavuklu and semazen are on the “stage.” Participation and interest to them are also high. At that point, it is necessary to ask if these events organized in the malls cause the Ramadan events organized in the city squares to lose their importance. The answer can be traced in the “other” Ramadan entertainments organized by the local municipalities. While these entertainments are arranged as public service, it is aimed that the citizens will benefit from the iftar tent and other facilities freely. In this context, it seems they differ from paid consumption in shopping center atmosphere. However, it should be noted that the person participating in a recreation in the shopping mall does not also have to pay any fee to watch the event. Besides, if the fact that the citizens show a great deal of interest in the activities of both types of venues is considered, it can be assumed the activity inside the shopping mall does not become the alternative to the activities in the square. Rather, the situation implies the existence of competing publicities. On the other hand, in the light of secular festivals such as Valentine day or New Year’s Eve, it seems the malls contribute to the secular life of the province even if the special day events are consumption-focused. Because the provincial municipalities don’t organize special events for those secular festivities or they rarely do it. So, it is fair to conclude there are intermingled and complex publicities in the provinces which synthesize the modern and the traditional (Arklan, 2012: 87). As a matter of fact, in a field survey conducted with Konya bedesten shopkeepers, it is shown the bedesten shopkeeper in Konya has the idea that the bedesten will spatially and commercially continue to keep its existence and importance by adapting itself to the new conditions although the malls change the style of consumption habits (Öndoğan, 2016: 12).

When all these claims are considered altogether, it can be determined that publicity in the provinces is in transformation. However, this transformation doesn’t have to be considered in terms of negative assumptions. Regarding the traditional and nationalist reflexes that the provinces have, it seems the shopping centers realize the social dimension of modernization despite the neoliberal motives and codes of consumption culture. In this sense, while the lifestyle and consumption habits created by malls cause the provinces to resemble the center, they also produce alternative publicities by redefining the social hierarchies existing in the traditional publicities of the province. So the process is double sided. Yet, the reason for the complexity of the process doesn’t derive from the supposed duality
between the center and the province. It is rather more about the supposed private-public duality, which undoubtedly deserves to be the subject of another work.

**Conclusion**

The shopping mall sector in Turkey has shown great deal of growth both geographically and monetarily since the beginning of the 1990s. In this process, the social reflections of consumption culture that is considered in the context of shopping malls has been seen in the social structure in Turkey as a whole. However, the different variants of the currents reflections of consumer society are often discussed in the relevant literature by focusing on the metropolitan cities. In other words, the number of the research “looking at the provincial Turkey” is low. However, Turkey's medium and small-scale cities keep up with the neoliberal global trends within the urbanization process of Turkey. One of the most important indicators of the transition is that the traditional life codes change in parallel with the increase of shopping malls in provincial cities.

From this perspective, it seems that the stereotyped provincial life, which is constantly referred in terms of “deprivation, modesty, boredom, sameness”, experiences “global economic effects” as a oscillation between tradition and postmodern. In other words, the life in province includes different layers which can be followed in the intermingled forms of tradition and postmodern. At that point, the provincial shopping mall gives abundant material to observe the hybrid forms of provincial life and its publicities. From this perspective, it is useful to consider the process with its different extensions that refer to the approach of the normative public sphere on one hand, and the more practical understanding of publicity on the other.

When the first approach is focused, it is possible to say the provincial shopping malls produce some social patterns and norms resembling those in the metropolitan cities. As a consequence, this tendency gradually abolishes the traditional open-air public experiences such as “bargaining, going out for the bazaar, and meeting up in the streets.”

On the other hand, the course isn't one sided. Despite their negative effects on the traditional publicities, it seems the provincial malls create a kind of atmosphere which competes with the normative publicities. Since the provincial malls have some potentials to crystallize the age and gender
hierarchies within the traditional publicities. Although a mall is a privatized place it also questions the distinction between private and public space when it becomes an alternative to the classic publicity consisting of square, bazaar, mosque and park beside the governmental buildings. The fact that the provincial people express they prefer malls because there is no “any other nice place to go” indicate the traditional public spaces don't function as in the way they are idealized while proving the people in the provinces search for a vivid public life. So, the provincial mall publicity is not an alternative to the classic publicity. On contrary, it has close ties with. Thus, it transforms, redefines and even contributes to the traditional public spaces.

Finally, it is possible to claim the malls reproduce the idea of province whereas they assimilate the province to the center. Since every effort of the province to reduce its own distance with the center throws it to the periphery again (Argın, 2005). On shopping malls, the positive thoughts of Burdur people who don't have a mall in their city in opposed to Antalya's people's negative thoughts about their huge shopping centers (Köksal and Aydın, 2015) sums this antagonism properly.

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Analyses of Right to Education, Privatization of Education and State’s Education Expanditure in Turkey within the Concept of Globalization

Arslan Bayram*

Education is one of the fundamental human rights. It is the State’s responsibility to provide citizens with education and preserve their right to education. A democratic State is expected to offer quality, free and equal education to all citizens regardless of race, language, religion, gender, and economic and social status. However, together with the neoliberal transformation in the world and in Turkey, the right to education, which should be provided in a quality, free and equal manner, has begun to disappear. Like many areas of the social life, the globalization process impacts the educational system as well. The impact of globalization’s neoliberal economic dimension on the educational system becomes evident with the alignment of educational system with codes of free market and thus restructuring and managing educational institutions as commercial businesses (Yıldız, 2008).

The Right to Education

The concept of the right to education requires determination of limits of education solely based on what we want to know and how much we want to know and education must be thought, regulated and given regardless of economic determinations. Although the right to education is a right that attributes good deeds to the State, it is a concept that must be respected by the State and also involves dimensions with negative deeds. The freedom to learn, the freedom to teach, the freedom to present both institutionally, in other words, the freedom to open an educational institution and equality

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of opportunity in education are considered within scope of the right to education (Ünal, 2005).

Today, instead of “the concept of compulsory education”, human rights documents involve concepts such as “the right to education” or “the basic right to education”, which consider education not as an incumbency, but as a basic human right. This means “compulsory education”, which is identified with an oppressive State, has replaced with “right to education”, which aligns with a contemporary democratic State. The most common concept when exercising this right is the concept of "equality". Equality of opportunity in education is a common discourse referring to the idea that everyone should enjoy educational opportunities equally. The concept of equality reflects a value judgment; it is far from just a simple mathematical equation. The concept of equality mentioned in laws, on the other hand, has solely a legal meaning. It seems impossible to suggest that everyone exercises their right to education and benefits from educational opportunities “equally”. From another perspective, providing equal educational opportunities to everyone does not necessarily mean providing adequate “right to education” to everyone. Differences in people's abilities, needs, health status, and life conditions may require providing them with different educational opportunities. For this reason, it would be more appropriate to adopt the concepts of “right to education” and “educational opportunity” rather than the concept of “educational equality” to provide education as a whole. When we adopt this approach, we can create opportunities to realize the principle of “to each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs”.

Education is a fundamental human right that is an important prerequisite to equally include individuals in the society and realize their potential and guaranteed by international conventions and Turkey’s internal legislation. In a social order and educational system which aims to realize the principle of the right to education, it is of great importance to eliminate discriminations based on class, gender, race, ethnic origin, language, religion, political opinion, sexual orientation, geographic region, age, etc. (Gök, 2012).

While investments made by the State in education appear to be a service provision or supporting a service, investments made by the individual or his/her family are manifested as benefiting from this service.

With the twentieth century, education, which is considered as a fundamental human right and guaranteed by international treaties, has gained a collective characteristic. Thus, the general school practice, which has
tended to spread along with the Industrial Revolution, has become one of the fundamental tasks of the State as a field of public service. As a necessity of the social state approach, the general school practice aims to provide education as a public service in an equal manner and has been regarded as a tool to eliminate inequalities between social classes. However, in addition to view that education will fulfill this function by allowing for social mobility, there are also those that suggest that it will enhance existing inequalities between social classes. Possible results of dominant powers’ assumption of education and school have been discussed in detail especially by the critical education community (Ural, 2014).

What share of public resources created with taxes from citizens is spent on education is related to economic policies applied. In mainstream economic policies, it is stated that resources are scarce and requirements are endless and public resources are allocated for different areas, interests and other expenditures. Thus, a lower level of budget is allocated for basic requirements such as education and health on the grounds of "scarce resources". The main purpose of this practice is to ensure the society shares the cost of services that the whole society benefits.

The right to education, mentioned as a universal right in conventions, faces a great threat today. The leading threat is that the idea of social state that regards free public education for all as a right is being considered unacceptable at this globalization phase of capitalism. In other words, the right to education is left to brutal competitive conditions of the market and its universality is being damaged. This is nothing but a new form assumed by a comprehensive ideology with historical roots. This ideology is neoliberalism. The program envisioned in the field of education especially for developing countries involves privatization, deregulation, so-called localization practices, which is the program of neoliberalism. In this regard, it is necessary to mention neo-liberalism briefly (Eğitimsen, 2006).

Privatization of education in Turkey began with the decision of 24 January 1980. Stand-by agreements entered with IMF, World Bank’s structural adjustment loans, programs and projects, OECD’s regulatory reports, EU’s accession partnership document and progress reports are some of the tools of privatization of education.

The liberalization policies in education have gained currency all over the world since the 1980s with structural adjustment programs implemented under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank. From the beginning of the 1980s, first of all “reforms” aimed at redefining the purpose and content of education in accordance with demands of the market, sec-
ondly reforms aimed at the funding of education and training and thirdly reforms aimed at regulating education’s role in social mobility and egalitarian political function have been added to the agenda. These have been implemented as a package in the form of structural adjustment programs (Carnoy, 1995; as cited in Sayylan, 2010).

Privatization of education involves less intervention and control on education by the State. It requires the private sector to get involved in the field of education more. This change in roles brought about by privatization reduce the responsibilities of the State and leads to a more active local administration and private sector in decision-making related to management, curriculum and financing (Kishan, 2008: 114).

As in many countries, public education is no longer a fundamental human right, but a commodity that can be bought and sold. Education has been reshaped in line with interests of the global capital and restructured in accordance with neoliberal policies and interests of international actors such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

Privatization of education in Turkey began with the decision of 24 January 1980. Stand-by agreements entered with IMF, World Bank’s structural adjustment loans, programs and projects, OECD’s regulatory reports, EU’s accession partnership document and progress reports are some of the tools of privatization of education.

Policies aimed at marketing/commercializing education has gained currency all over the world since the 1980s with “structural adjustment programs” and “restructuring programs” implemented under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank and most “reforms” are still carried out under the name of “modernization”. Neoliberal structuring of the educational system in Turkey has its roots in structural adjustment and stabilization programs implemented after 24 January 1980 (Aksoy, 2011).

The concept of privatization of education has brought about commercialization of education. Hirtt (2007) notes that Molnar divides commercialization within the context of privatization of education into three categories. The first category involves selling goods and services to schools. The second category involves selling goods and services within schools. Here, providers of goods and services enter into schools and interact with consumers (students) directly. The third and the last category is selling schools. The privatization is completed with this last step and the educational institution becomes a business. Actually, a market forms on its own...
to meet the needs of schools such as tables, desks, heating, etc. (Yirci and Kocabaş, 2013).

Privatization of education involves less intervention and control on education by the State. It requires the private sector to get involved in the field of education more. This change in roles brought about by privatization reduce the responsibilities of the State and leads to a more active local administration and private sector in decision-making related to management, curriculum and financing (Kishan, 2008: 114).

Education is no longer a right due to neoliberal educational policies, but a commodity that can be bought and sold. Both the breakdown in income distribution and decrease in public expenditure due to these policies cause damage to the right to education. This turns education into a privilege that can only be enjoyed by those who have abundant financial resources. In addition, these privileges in education leads to a regeneration of existing inequalities in the society.

Education is one of the fundamental human rights and a public service. Perception of education as a right and exercise of this right give the State certain responsibilities. A democratic State is expected to fulfill this responsibility without discrimination based on race, language, religion, gender, and economic and social status. When the State fails to fulfill this responsibility, those without adequate resources may struggle or fail to exercise their right to education. In such cases, existing inequalities in the society will possibly be enhanced. Funding of education by the public and presenting education to the society in an equal manner is possible via public resources (Şahin, 2007).

Education has gone through a radical transformation all over the world and its public aspect is under the threat of being eliminated with privatization. The privatization of education in Turkey is being completed with the 4+4+4 system and the excuse of closing study center.

Education is an overall structure facilitating both the individual and occupational development of the person, and the social, economic and cultural development of the society. With this respect, it is an activity guaranteed by international covenants as a basic right. Individual development benefits not only the individual herself but the society in general. It is for this reason that education is provided as a public service. International documents declare that education – primary education, to the least – be provided for every citizen by the state. In recent years we observe that the idea of basic education as public service is steadily abandoned and education is commercialized. Relevant neoliberal policies also seem to have
generated a measure of popular consent. Apple (2007) maintains that gradual depreciation of public ownership and service caused the widespread identification of public services as inferior and private services as superior. Another method of persuasion has been rejecting the idea of education as public good and insisting that it is a private good that has to be paid for; thus legitimizing the takeover of public education by commercialization and market mediation.

The purpose of this study is to address education with its freedom and human right aspects and also how educational services, previously provided by the State as a public service in Turkey, are being privatized by the administrative authority, the actual responsible of the provision of this service, within the context of globalization. To this end, we tried to find answers for what sort of course investments in education took since 24 January 1980, how the number of private schools and the number of students attending private schools changes and how education became a commodity rather than a right.

This study is a descriptive/historical analysis model since it aims to describe an existing phenomenon by using written documents and statistics in order to analyze the elimination of the right to education, the privatization of education and State’s education expenditure in Turkey within the context of globalization.

Descriptive/historical models are used to investigate events occurred in the past or historical phenomena or examine an issue in terms of its relationship with the past. Historical research is the process of finding the truth, in other words, an examination of the past with a critical eye, analyzing and interpreting to produce information (Mayring, 2000: 143-148).

The purpose of the qualitative research is to take a holistic and in-depth look at the research object and to examine it in its complexity and to understand it in its context. Qualitative research is sensitive to context and process, experience and local phenomenon. Quantitative research, on the other hand, conceptualizes the reality in terms of variables and the relationships between variables (Punch, 2014: 183-228). The qualitative research method, used in order to better reveal the social reality and gaining popularity in recent years, has been utilized in this study as well.

The study utilizes the document analysis method. Document analysis helps select and understand the research question and put the research in historical perspective (Kaushik, 2005). Document analysis involves the analysis of the target phenomenon and written material containing information about the phenomenon. Document analysis is an inevitable data
collection tool for almost every research (Madge, 1965: 75). The utilization of documents is as important as their availability. Document analysis is known to be a method used by historians, anthropologists and linguists. However, document analysis has been used by sociologists, education scientists and psychologists as well and has led them to important results. Although document analysis was widely used in social sciences between 1930-1950, this research method remained behind the scenes in social sciences between 1960-1970 (Forster, 1994). It can be suggested that the dominance of positivism in study fields of social sciences was one of the most important reasons behind this situation (Şimşek, Yıldırım, 2009).

The data used in the study were obtained from primary (original) data resources. In this kind of data, there is no intermediary between the resource and the researcher. The primary data used in this study were obtained from various public institutions (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Education, State Planning Organization, Turkish Statistical Institute) and statistics and documents received from these institutions (journals and accounting logs of Ministry of Finance and Budget and Financial Control Directorate-General, statistical books of Ministry of National Education, yearbooks of Turkish Statistical Institute, government programs, constitution, development plans, laws and regulations).

Before starting the study, it was determined what documents would be necessary and how these documents could be reached. The authenticity of these documents was checked by the researcher according to criteria such as the data in the document, whether it covered the related period, whether it was a primary document, whether it was an exact copy of the original and where it was printed. The researcher contacted with authorities and received the originals of some documents and copies of some documents. These documents were classified in accordance with the purpose of the study and appropriate charts were made.

In this study we attempted to analyze the right to education, privatization of education and State’s education expenditure in Turkey within the concept of globalization.
Findings and Comments

Chart-1: The number of private schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Year</th>
<th>Primary Education &amp; Junior High School</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
<th>Vocational and Technical High School</th>
<th>Total School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/2003</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/2004</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/2005</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/2009</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2010</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/2013</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>2.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/2014</td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>1007</td>
<td>3.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/2015</td>
<td>1205</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>3919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/2016</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>2504</td>
<td>5867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/2017</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>1414</td>
<td>2208</td>
<td>5264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNE Statistics

Chart 1 shows that there is an increase in the number of private elementary schools, high schools and vocational high schools. The number of private elementary schools in 1999, which was 683, showed a rapid increase within fifteen years (divided into two as primary and secondary schools in 2012) and reached to 2043. The number of private high schools was 441 in 1999 and reached to 2208 in 2017. The Chart shows a very large increase for vocational high schools in particular. The number of private vocational high schools was 22 in 1999 and reached to 368 in 2017. The dis-
crete education model, one of the most important foundation stones of efforts toward privatization of education, was introduced in 2012 with the Act No. 6287 (the Act of 4+4+4) and conservatism, which is indispensable for neoliberal policies, was placed into the educational system and all school types were turned into schools giving religious education. With this Act, a two-fold increase was observed in the number of private schools. Of course, we can suggest that this number will increase even more when the Act that closes private teaching institutions enters into force. The total number of private schools was 1,146 in 1999, whereas it reached to 5264 in 2017. While the number of private schools was 1,816 in 2011, it reached to 2,929 in 2012 with the introduction of the Act that bans study centers and reached to 3,476 in the 2013-2014 academic year, which demonstrates how rapidly the education changed in Turkey.

**Chart-2: The number of students attending private schools.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Year</th>
<th>Primary Education &amp; Junior High School Students</th>
<th>Secondary Education Students</th>
<th>Vocational and Technical High School Students</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>174,773</td>
<td>55,330</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>232,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>185,864</td>
<td>55,881</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>243,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>171,454</td>
<td>73,189</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>245,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/2003</td>
<td>156,007</td>
<td>51,930</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>208,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/2004</td>
<td>160,888</td>
<td>69,299</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>231,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/2005</td>
<td>171,915</td>
<td>70,163</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>243,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>189,090</td>
<td>75,693</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>265,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td>213,071</td>
<td>85,547</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>299,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>226,187</td>
<td>92,827</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>320,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/2009</td>
<td>239,988</td>
<td>110,896</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>352,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2010</td>
<td>251,967</td>
<td>116,619</td>
<td>1,603</td>
<td>370,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>267,294</td>
<td>128,446</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>397,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>286,972</td>
<td>133,816</td>
<td>4,348</td>
<td>425,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/2014</td>
<td>184,325</td>
<td>182,019</td>
<td>142,510</td>
<td>563,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/2015</td>
<td>203,272</td>
<td>208,424</td>
<td>164,281</td>
<td>651,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/2016</td>
<td>232,039</td>
<td>278,089</td>
<td>373,394</td>
<td>982,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/2017</td>
<td>213,183</td>
<td>287,928</td>
<td>389,243</td>
<td>1,001,552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNE Statistics
**Chart-3: The Ratio of Ministry of National Education Investment Budget to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Consolidated Budget between 1999-2017 (2012 = 100)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product (TRY) 2012=100</th>
<th>Consolidated Budget (TRY) 2012=100</th>
<th>Investment Budget of Ministry of National Education (TL) 2012=100</th>
<th>Of the Investment Budget of Ministry of National Education Of the Investment Budget of Ministry of National Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>712,839,846.724</td>
<td>263,971,249.535</td>
<td>3,344,661,369</td>
<td>0,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>746,340,007.510</td>
<td>296,730,469.190</td>
<td>2,693,141,553</td>
<td>0,36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>677,737,428.077</td>
<td>314,616,225.334</td>
<td>2,157,513,069</td>
<td>0,32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>729,281,208.675</td>
<td>316,809,248.126</td>
<td>2,272,024,376</td>
<td>0,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>761,536,116.791</td>
<td>311,451,048.205</td>
<td>2,279,886,361</td>
<td>0,30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>817,007,215.887</td>
<td>297,719,841.128</td>
<td>1,791,173,529</td>
<td>0,22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>874,122,487.723</td>
<td>290,772,181,043</td>
<td>2,047,852,149</td>
<td>0,23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gross Domestic Product** |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centralized Management Budget</th>
<th>Investment Budget of Ministry of National Education</th>
<th>Of the Investment Budget of Ministry of National Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>959,411,010.137</td>
<td>1,793,912,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,291,220,327.573</td>
<td>1,529,594,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,306,249,973.951</td>
<td>1,602,193,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,293,079,528.360</td>
<td>2,102,277,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,364,922,650.048</td>
<td>1,926,902,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,385,642,300.899</td>
<td>2,080,638,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,426,001,000.000</td>
<td>2,599,999,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,565,180,961.710</td>
<td>3,955,000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,719,000,000.000</td>
<td>5,192,300.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,945,000,000.000</td>
<td>5,494,000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,207,000,000.000</td>
<td>6,284,628.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** *Budget Revenue and Expense Realizations (1924-1995), Budget and Financial Control Directorate-General, Number: 1995/5 Ankara.*


Chart 2 shows that the number of students attending private elementary schools was 174,773 and reached 501.111 in 2017, whereas the number of students attending private high schools was 55,330 and reached to 389.243 in 2017. The number of students attending private vocational high schools was 2,125 and reached to 111.198. The total number of students was 232,228 in 1999 and reached to 1.001.552 in 2017. One year before the introduction of the 4+4+4 compulsory education act, the total number of students attending private schools was 425,136 and after the act entered into force, this number increased to 563,007. The Act No. 6287 (4+4+4) can be suggested to be the final blow of the privatization.

The ratio of Ministry of National Education investment budget to Gross Domestic Product and consolidated budget may be considered as one of the indicators of the level of spendings on education. For this reason, Chart 3 shows the change in Ministry of National Education investment budget over the target period. Accordingly, Ministry of National Education investment budget was TL 3,344,661,369 in 1999 with fixed prices of 2012, decreased systematically between 2000-2009 and increased by a small amount in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The share of Ministry of National Education investment budget in the Consolidated Budget was 1.27% in 1999 and decreased to 0.91% in 2000. The share was 0.70% in 2005 and decreased to 0.48% in 2007 and reached to 0.74% in 2012. The minimum share of education investments was 0.12% (2007, 2008) in the 1999-2012 periods and its maximum share was 0.47% (1999). It is observed that the maximum rate of 0.47% in 1999 gradually decreased and dropped to 0.18% in 2012.

It is also observed that the share of education investments in Gross Domestic Product and consolidated budget was the lowest in the history of the Republic beginning from 1999. It seems that the State has been intent on leaving education to companies and private schools after the introduction of neoliberal policies with the decision on 24 January 1980 (Bayram, 2014).

Schooling Rate by Gender

It can be said that women are disadvantaged in Turkish educational system in terms of schooling rate. It can be seen in Chart 4 that women have difficulties especially in transition to secondary education.
Chart-4: Schooling rate by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
<th></th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
<th></th>
<th>Vocational and Technical Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>95.97</td>
<td>96.99</td>
<td>96.49</td>
<td>34.45</td>
<td>32.62</td>
<td>33.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>97.84</td>
<td>98.47</td>
<td>98.17</td>
<td>36.41</td>
<td>34.92</td>
<td>35.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>98.22</td>
<td>98.59</td>
<td>98.41</td>
<td>36.63</td>
<td>34.66</td>
<td>35.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>98.56</td>
<td>98.77</td>
<td>98.67</td>
<td>36.54</td>
<td>33.80</td>
<td>35.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>99.22</td>
<td>99.39</td>
<td>99.31</td>
<td>38.78</td>
<td>34.66</td>
<td>36.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>97.12</td>
<td>97.06</td>
<td>97.10</td>
<td>37.47</td>
<td>33.34</td>
<td>35.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNE Statistics

Chart 4 shows that although there seems to be an increase in female students’ transition to secondary education, there is a decrease especially in the 2014-2015 academic year. It can be suggested that open education high schools lead to this situation. Although 12 years of education is mandatory in Turkey, there are difficulties in transition to secondary education. The chart shows that female students’ are deprived of their right to education.

Chart-5: Number of classrooms by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary School</th>
<th>Secondary School</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>17 952</td>
<td>314 950</td>
<td>8.271</td>
<td>102.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>18 460</td>
<td>321 193</td>
<td>9 404</td>
<td>108.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>19 450</td>
<td>325 260</td>
<td>10 119</td>
<td>111 795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>12 655</td>
<td>222 265</td>
<td>9 893</td>
<td>114 691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>15 626</td>
<td>227 679</td>
<td>10 405</td>
<td>118 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>17 823</td>
<td>219 937</td>
<td>10 342</td>
<td>125 841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>23 019</td>
<td>223 071</td>
<td>17 317</td>
<td>147 626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>21 929</td>
<td>225 186</td>
<td>16 967</td>
<td>158 792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNE Statistics

Chart 5 shows the increase in the number of classrooms by years. While there is not a significant increase in the number of classrooms in public elementary schools, it is seen that the number of classrooms in private
schools considerably increased especially after 2012. The statistical data also shows that the number of classrooms in private high schools considerably increased beginning from 2012, when the privatization of education gained pace.

**Chart-6: The number of teachers by year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private State</td>
<td>Private State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>27 631</td>
<td>458 046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>29 424</td>
<td>473 904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>31 691</td>
<td>484 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>20 546</td>
<td>261 497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>21 273</td>
<td>267 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>22 194</td>
<td>273 058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>25 908</td>
<td>277 053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>23 473</td>
<td>275 047</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNE Statistics

Chart 6 shows the increase in the number of teachers by years. Despite of the increase in the number of teachers in public schools beginning from 2012, it can be said that private schools employ more teachers, which shows that more teachers are employed in private schools compared to public schools.

**Discussion**

From the 1920s to the present day, the primary purpose of the Turkish education system has been to raise citizens who have absolute loyalty to the government and the leaders, who are considered to reflect the highest properties of the nation, by imposing nationalist values.

The ideology of national education consists of three pillars: nationalism, religion and utilitarian rationality. Religion is an element that enhances and completes nationalism. National and religious values have been considered together and described as the essence or the spirit of edu-
cation. Modernism, developmentalism, technology, information and religious values are seen as mere tools.

In line with the new rightist discourse, the national developmentalist planning approach was attacked directly in Turkey in the 1980’s. However, in reality, the content and the form of the plan were redefined and the dominance of the public sector was replaced with a mentality valuing private sector incentives, tax exemptions and credit facilities. Policies in development plans differ in terms of their view on the human type to be raised at different levels of education, citizens’ benefiting from educational opportunities, the structure and organization of education, educational programs, properties of different educational structures, raising teachers, effective use of resources allocated for education, access to higher education, provision of educational services by the government, authorization of local organizations and increase in the share of the private sector in education. Development plans show how policies on the same issue changed over time (Karakütük, 2013). Looking at this picture, it can be said that what happened in the process of neoliberal globalization is a planned “deplanning”. The priority of this deplanning has been to take social services funded with public resources such as education and health and leave them to market’s volatility.

It seems that public education investments decreased with the introduction of neoliberal economy and education policies and the number of public-aided private schools increased. Privatization efforts have gained pace especially with the decision of 24 January 1980. Education and health have lost their public property in Turkey with economy and education policies determined by international organizations and it was ignored that education is a basic human right. The practice of providing only those with sufficient financial resources with quality education has started. The trend of change in education cannot be addressed without considering the transformation process that takes place worldwide. We must mention that these trends observed simultaneously throughout the world result from dynamics specific to capitalism, therefore it is a structural process. International organizations have played the most significant role in the change in educational investments caused by education policies implemented in Turkey after 1980. We can suggest that the reason behind the decline in educational investments is intentional policies which aim to privatize and commercialize education.

Education is no longer a right due to neoliberal educational policies, but a commodity that can be bought and sold. Both problems in income distri-
bution and the decrease in public expenditure due to these policies jeopardize the right to education. This turns education into a privilege that can only be enjoyed by those who have abundant financial resources. In addition, these privileges in education lead to a regeneration of existing inequalities in the society. Education is the most basic right that allows all people to improve themselves and does not discriminate between people. Therefore, providing everyone with the opportunity to benefit from the right to quality public education is only possible with the public service mentality. The public property of education must be brought to the forefront once again and quality education must be provided in all levels.

MNE’s 2015 budget is an indication that privatization and commercialization have gained pace. According to MNE’s Budgetary Draft, there are a total of 5,932 private schools, 3,347 study centres, 1,883 special education and rehabilitation centres, 853 private study and training centres, 2,713 private miscellaneous courses, 13 private in-service training centres, 3,438 private motor vehicle drivers’ course and 4,592 private dormitories and a total of 207,202 students staying in these dormitories. In the 2013-2014 academic year, there were 2,226 pre-school institutions with 86,639 students and 7,541 teachers; 1,071 primary schools with 184,325 students and 21,273 teachers; 972 secondary schools with 182,019 students and 21,459 teachers and 1,433 high schools with 196,663 students and 29,040 teachers. In other words, a total of 650,000 students attended about 6,000 private educational institutions this year and more than 79,000 teachers were employed (Durmuş, 2014).

From the past to the present, education has been an ideological device. It has been organized to meet the needs of the system with all its aspects and regenerate the system. It is possible to see this with clarity in the capitalist system. The existing educational system, which is based on pragmatism and positivism, has been shaped in a way that it will help capitalism survive. The capitalist system is based on exploitation of labour, especially women’s labour. Thus, although it has certain original aspects, the existing educational system contains sexist and exploitative elements to meet periodic needs. The education system, which was based on the Western modernism and the denial of the heritage of the Ottoman Empire to meet the needs of a nationalist government ideology in the early years of the Republic, is shaped in accordance with the needs of today’s government. Keeping women under control in every aspect; physically, intellectually and spiritually, is an indispensable way of keeping the society under control. Male-dominated capitalism is conscious of this fact and limits wom-
en’s access to education to a certain level. Although it seems as if a lot of effort has been made, the difficulties experienced by female students in accessing education as a result of this control mechanism is evident. Similarly, sexist patterns in education are a product of this approach (Eğitimsen, 2006).

One of the fundamental goals of the transition to discrete education is to keep girls on a minimum educational level, because it is inevitable that girls will be taken away from the school during the transition between phases. In parallel to this, what the removal of the ban on underage marriage and the introduction of the open high school system aim in the medium term is that girls get married and have children at an early age. Turkey takes China as a model and aims to create a cheap labour market with high population.

A sufficient share must be allocated to education in parallel with the increase in the number of students and teachers. The constitutional provision of “free” education in public schools and the necessity of making all levels of education public must be met.

Neoliberal ideology emphasizes the high share of budget allocated for education on one hand and tries to decrease the burden of education on public resources on the other. The goal of these policies is to have “philanthropists” make investments in education while damaging the quality of public schools to canalize more students from public schools to private schools. “Implicit privatization” in Turkey takes place by consciously decreasing the quality of education in public schools and promoting private schools on one hand, increasing people’s share in funding of education rather than spending public resources for education investments on the other. As seen in this study, a high budget for education does not necessarily mean a high level of investment in education. It is necessary to reduce the number of students per classroom by constructing new school buildings so that the quality of education will increase.

Neoliberal education policies implemented in Turkey after 1980 have lead to privatization of education and a decrease in investments in public schools. Encouraging philanthropists to make investments instead of investing in education using public resources is against the “social government under the rule of law” principle and provisions of the Constitution. Inequality of opportunity and the commercialization process of education have gained pace as a result of such practices. The government must protect the right to education and the principle of free education and produce necessary social policies which will allow everyone to enjoy an education
of equal quality. Education as a public service must be prevented from being a “commodity” for which users must pay a price to enjoy. Education is accepted as a universal human right all over the world. The most important factor behind this fact is that education allows for improvements in all aspects of an individual’s personality and is a process directly related to self-improvement and self-liberalization. It is mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that all individuals have the right to education regardless of gender, race, ethnicity or nationality. The fact that education is a fundamental human right requires a public responsibility, in other words, the government must provide education to all without discrimination. All sorts and levels of education must be provided for all regardless of their class, race, gender, language, religion, political view, nationality or ethnicity.

The decrease in the general budget and MNE budget share allocated for investments in education shows that citizens assume more responsibility in spendings on education. The distribution of educational spendings by funding sources shows that parents pay more and more for their children’s education each year and their educational spendings increase consistently. MNE must stop implementing policies that regards schools as businesses and parents and students as customers, because implementation of these policies and concepts of quality, profit, competition and customer will turn education into a commodity rather than a public service. The budget share allocated for education must be increased and resources must be used effectively and distributed fairly. In order to mention a contemporary education of sufficient quality, it must include everyone, be given for a sufficient time, accessible, organized as a public service, free and have a contemporary, scientific and secular content. Education must be provided by the government in all levels of the educational system and everyone must be given the opportunity to exercise their right to education.

The trend of change in education cannot be addressed without considering the transformation process that takes place worldwide. We must mention that these trends observed simultaneously throughout the world result from dynamics specific to capitalism, therefore it is a structural process. International organizations have played the most significant role in the change in educational investments caused by education policies implemented in Turkey after 1980. We can suggest that the reason behind the decline in educational investments is intentional policies which aim to privatize and commercialize education. The share of education budget allocated to investments has decreased constantly. The most concrete step that
should be taken to solve problems in education is increasing public investments in education.

Education is no longer a right due to neoliberal educational policies, but a commodity that can be bought and sold. Both problems in income distribution and the decrease in public expenditure due to these policies jeopardize the right to education. This turns education into a privilege that can only be enjoyed by those who have abundant financial resources. In addition, these privileges in education lead to a regeneration of existing inequalities in the society. Education is the most basic right that allows all people to improve themselves and does not discriminate between people. Therefore, providing everyone with the opportunity to benefit from the right to quality public education is only possible with the public service mentality. However, the Basic Law of Public Administration Draft notes that public services are not given to citizens by the government, but citizens take public services from the government. Thus, in a way, citizens’ right to education is now destroyed by the government of the 21st century. Education is now being transformed into a commodity which can be bought by those with sufficient financial resources. The public property of education must be brought to the forefront once again and quality education must be provided in all levels.

In order to reach the goals of education, deal with the increasing number of students, make up for shortcomings related to the number of classrooms, increase the quality of education, eliminate infrastructural and equipment-related shortcomings, it is necessary to create classrooms consisting of 24 students at most and recruit more teachers. The ratio of the MNE budget to national income must be increased at least two-fold as a first step towards solution.

Religion must be removed from both education and politics. The use of sacred dogmas of religion as destructive elements against those who refuse to serve with loyalty must be prevented. The secular education approach, which is human-centric and an important part of public education, advocates that all humans are equal, open to learning and improvement and must be respected. Secularism is to base the management of the government, education, rules of law and social life as a whole on reason and science, rather than religion. Based on this fact, the educational system must be democratic, secular and scientific.
References


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http://erg.sabanciuniv.edu.tr.
Public space is closely related with urban space. Urban space as spatial encounters of differences and similarities reflect the public thought and also reshape it through daily-life., the interaction between the people symbolize with the places where they come together. The place and space have not same meanings and especially in political content (Dikeç, 2005), thus the stadiums as supporters’ convention area transform social place to the political spaces. They create new spatial areas to express the thoughts in a social atmosphere and these places feature public thought, in other words the sharings, the challenges and also the conflicts here expose what the public discuss. In this context focusing on sport communities and as a public place to the stadiums are an important part of public society discussions and they have crucial roles to understand the general framework of a society. Because these places give clues about what society discuss in daily-life and how the macro politics have impact on the micro-level.

The main aim of this study to understand the role of Turkish football-supporters in civic society and to analyze the some activities of their communities and organizations, especially their protests or supports to social and political developments on the stadiums where thy come together. It will be argued that the stadiums are political spaces and reflects some public thoughts but in Turkish politics and democracy these places are the under the control of economic and political rulers. Although there is a changing tendency and expanding of political discussion in the stadiums the route of the democracy in national level can be seen in the sport areas. In changing historical perspective the sport places and communities symbolize different kind of voices of the public. This effort gives a capture of public society in Turkey. In order to this aim, first of all the space and its social role will be analyzed in general framework and then in specific historical periods, indeed after 1980, it will be analyzed how Turkish people
have been reacted in these spaces during sport or football event. In this way the transformation of Turkish public society will be monitored via the stadiums and football-fans. Because of their symbolic importance on the reflection of public thought, the study will give some cases on political displaying in the sports events and the stadiums and then make a discussion on the role of playfield as an urban space whether it support to make politics in a new or established way.

**Sport, Football and Public**

The football reflects the common of the society and the research on football community makes an explanation of the whole. Sport and the places have connection on the different issues like identity, geography and sociology, political economy communication and so on. In other words, it is multi-dimensional topic which can be conceptualized with different perspectives. Football is especially popular because of its public character. This game is a place of contradictions, the construction of identity and under the effect of the market relations because of its massive qualification (Brown, 1998). Especially with the impact of postmodernity discussion in social sciences, with the raising importance of the cultural studies and subcultures, football and its culture catch the scientific attention increasingly since the late 1990s. Redhead (1997; 2015), for instance makes the connection of aspects of this topic via thinkers like Virilio or Baudrillard. The most important aspect of this popularizing literature for this study is the relation of space and sport. As Bale (2003:2) points out that “space and place are central to both geography and sport. They both focus on the way people move and interact in geographic space. Sport is world of territoriality and hierarchies and it is a spatial science”. According to him, sport is becoming more artificial, less like play more like display and geography of sport, its locations and landscapes, reflects these developments. Places not only influence sporting outcomes but also provides a social anchor which clubs can relate (Bale, 2003: 4). Furthermore, Frank and Steets (2010: 1) argues also the stadiums as a social space connected to specific social norms and practices, where not only characteristics of national and local cultures but also global economic developments. They utilize the theory of civilization of Elias and questions the popularity of football in modern society. According to Elias the rules of sport and football are carried over as unwritten rules to the public and highly civilized ordered dis-
order and relaxing tension of football match leads to a collective catharsis among the public. In order to this experience space are needed that enable a large crowd of people to follow (Frank and Steets, 2010: 3). Following Lefebvre’s “space is a social product” thesis, space can be understood as a built, symbolic and social order which is a product of human action, so the built and the social can be seen as constituting each other (Frank and Steets, 2010: 6).

In this context the sports, and specific to football stadiums, become a micro-level reflection of social theory because of their content of human action. Socially whatever is on the street take place also in the stadiums (Yıldırım, 2013). To understand the relation there help to grasp the continuum of society of a long-term. Focusing on these bodies indicate how political, politics and policy shape in society. These three different aspects which is related with each other but have not same meanings express a process of transforming of social cleavages, grievances, demands from top to down. Political process turn these aspects to the institutional bodies called politics and then policies are the implementation of consensus and shared principles. Football communities are the small places of political discussion to reach a consensus. It is a controversial space that different individuals interact each other and some kind of hierarchies predict them to reach a result. These hierarchies diverse from a club president to city mayor or from a community leader to prime minister. The relationship between them effects each other in the stadiums, city and society. While the state policies regulate and control this area with special codes and rules, the supporters as voters demand something from the power elites with their massive power. In other words, to suggest that soccer is politicized implies that certain actors -fan groups, for example- use their powers, such as economic power and collective action power, to affect change, be it at the club level or all the way to the transnational level (Yıldırım, 2017: 3). Elias and Dunning (1986) also follows the civilizing process during the sport culture and they argued that the stadium can be seen as a refuge of social rules of community formation, gender construction and identification that would be unacceptable at almost any other place outside the stadium. Bale (2000: 91) argues that a community of fans is a social network of interacting individuals and this interaction goes beyond a city or a defined territory. Football possesses its own community of followers but the sport also imposes itself on broader communities.

“It is almost impossible to deal with club-community relations without focusing on the changing geographical and social role of the football stadium. The

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stadium has always exemplified a facility that generates both positive and negative effects. These impacts on both the broader urban community and the local community situated around stadiums” (Bale, 2000: 92).

The positive effects can be seen as hearing of popular voice from the bottom which is basically the roots of democratic society but on the other hand the negative effect is the raising contradictions and hesitation on these places. As Yıldırım (2017: 1) stated that soccer stadiums are home to political protest, disillusionment, dissatisfaction and riots and violence, incited by deep-rooted religious, ethnic or class cleavages. For this study, these contradictions can be followed between Turkey and Europe or inside of the country between Istanbul and rest or between eastern and western regions. Social cleavages emerges in sports games, especially in football stadiums in different aspects. Because “the world of football generates a wealth of material for the fan (sub)culture with a repertoire of sings, banners and marches glorifying the team/self and degrading the other/enemy/opponent for materializing nationalism at popular level” (Bora and Senyuva, 2011: 35-36). Especially the media galvanize these notions to make bigger effect.

It is easy to say that the sport games turn to a war against West in Turkish media coverage. Sport places explicitly changes into political battle spaces to make stronger the unity consciousness. “Sports provide a public space to the media to create discourses on an imagined national belonging and more importantly, the limits of this belonging” (Kösebalaban, 2004: 49). As the Turkish case suggests, Kösebalan goes on, it is important highlighting boundaries with others. Stadiums and football communities make boundaries that political debate become visible. As it will be mentioned again in below, stadiums turns a collective mobilization especially 1990s to protect national emotions. The games against European teams allow for revenge against the Europeans who exclude Turkey culturally, economically, politically in traditional public opinion (Bora and Senyuva, 2011: 38). With the increasing effect of fandom organisations as NGOs this situation transformed an institutional attitude rather than a short-term fashion or a spontaneous event. To control the football community means the same meaning to control the public thought in Turkish cases.

Actually, football supporters and their communities as non-institutional organizations have not been key roles in the political and public discourse until late 1990s in Turkey. The biggest exception of this situation was the nationalist discourse and actions. Especially the anger against PKK terror-
ism explicitly had protested in the stadiums on that period, and then to sign national anthem have become a rule before the games. During the NGOs raising and giving a special attention to extension of private media institutions, football community followed this path. They established some NGOs and organizations to legalize and represent their fans. This term was relatively liberal period of Turkey after September 12 coup d’etat suppression and in the beginning of 2000 s football-supporters build more organized bodies. Their organizations have a strict relationship with the board of the clubs, thus it can be said that it was a corporatist way of politics to take or keep some interest of the leaders of these communities. But then the more leftist or radical football-supporters used this way to raise more oppositional look and stadiums turned more colorful and multi-voices areas against the ruling elites and especially to some specific the political agendas. Some big issues in the international relations reflected to the songs and protests in the stadiums so this huge crowds represent a kind of public thought in these cases. But the leaders and the governors always would like to control the (dangerous) crowds and masses, thus the football-supporters could not extend their own spaces easily. But there are some exceptional or unusual reflections oppositional thoughts in the latest events.

In this context counter-public thought or subculture in the stadiums in Turkey could not become a big effect to carry on oppositional public thought, but much more the nationalist emotions. Especially after the renewal of the stadium in the process of renewal of the city architecture on 2010 s the small fan groups of football-supporters’ organisations’ lost their relatively role in the stadiums. This was a kind of gentrification of the stadiums to rearrange the people in order to engagement the neoliberal trend of the markets. But still some exceptional cases occur in the football community of Turkey to express themselves free from the mainstream way. As they will be mentioned below again, they participate some political meetings with the banner of their football organisations such as May Day (May 1st) or national holidays, especially visiting Anitkabir to respect M. Kemal Ataturk. Currently the singing Kemalist anthems express a kind of opposition expression in the stadiums during constitutional referendum propagandas in 2017. In these cases, they define their identity not being a political party voter but rather to be fans of a football club which assume to symbolize the public thought.

Today, football-supporters and their organisations are even a small part to control Turkish public society, they are getting important to represent
some thoughts especially in the social media, without engaging any political party. While the nationalist way is still the biggest tendency of the stadiums, some oppositional regards appear in these places. In the parallel of searching for the new democratic institutions and oppositions political level, the stadiums and sport communities indicate this demand. The role of the stadiums as the space of collecting people reflects the transformation of public space and discussions. Even if the official politics seek to control the masses in the process of urban renewal, the sport areas and the places where people come together have still keep political notions to express the problems and raise the voices against the rulers.

1990s: Europe Europe, Hear Our Voice!: Nationalist Reflections

Indeed “since the foundation of Republic in Turkey, international matches and games have fed the national pride” (Bora and Senyuva, 2011: 36). But post-1990s have a special role in this emotional situation. It has also a rational character because nationalism was a kind of official ideology and only way to do politics in that period. On the one hand the struggle with PKK terrorism and on the other the special focus on 75th anniversary of the foundation of Republic have been ruled the public discourse during those days. Thus the second part of 1990s the nationalism and unity concepts are very popular in the stadiums. On that period popularising of 10th Year Anthem was the typical symbol of these emotions. It was a pride anthem of newly founded Republic to motive the people for the future. “This popular chant revealed two important and seemingly contradictive desires of Turkish football fans. On one hand it represented the revenge sentiments against Europe while on the other hand it connoted the will be accepted to be a part of Europe. (…) In other word the resentment and anger against the European hand in hand with awe and respect.” (Bora and Senyuva, 2011: 39). For Turkey, to be stucked in the West and the East can be seen in the sport event. This was important for international reputation of the country. But it was not for integration goal, rather, “us and them” separation have been crystalized in this field. “Going beyond Edirne” (Kozanoglu, 1999) was important because of the reaching the enemy to beat. But also ultimate goal is to reach there and to be part the Western civilization, at least economic level. Thus to be successful in the sport area is a way to be there and struggle with them. In the second part of 1990s the basketball teams like Efes Pilsen and Tofaş have become more
successful in their international competitions. But their lack of fans have caused to limited influence on civil society. The football protected its power against its international failure.

Out of the anger to the outside, the political attitude was in very low level. In general depoliticization was typical notion of that era in the country and the stadiums have followed this path. “The origins of political quietism in stadiums lie in the extensive patronage network that envelopes the game in the country. A multi-layered de-politicization process hangs over Turkish soccer, nested within a web of clientelistic relations that stretches from the state to the clubs and fan groups” (Yildirim, 2017). Towards to late-1990 s and 2000 s the success in football matches have raised the public and economic attention to this issue. While football fans have been getting more organized, the power elites wanted to control this field. Correspondingly political and cultural changing of society reflected to the football and also sport area. The relations between to these levels get more closely effected each other during late 1990 s and 2000 s. In parallel of raising to form new NGOs in the different subjects, football and the supporters established new organizations and association to consolidation the solidarity around the fans. But also these ones have become potential voters to command and mobilize in the favour of the ruling elites. Thus the transition to new century these fields have transformed more political and economic levels. The success on football area is matched with economic and political developments. In this context a new public around the sports and stadiums have mobilized to predict the public discussion both form the bottom and the top. For example, the local and sub-leagues team fans demanded more support from local businessman and municipalities. Football supporters formed a kind of local pressure groups. Social demands have been expressed by these groups beyond any political parties. In 2000 s it has been more professional and organizational way.

2000 s: Raising Organisational Mobilizations

The football economy and the club budgets have raised in Turkey during 2000 s like all over Europe. Neoliberal thought that make rules to the public in the context of consumerism reflected to the football area. According to this view, the path being successful is related with spending more money. Thus public resources and private sector utilized to take support of local fans. The basics of public resources is used by municipalities. “In-
creasing weight of municipalities in Turkish soccer has been the outcome of a unique situation: the commitment of political parties on one side and the economic impoverishment of soccer clubs on the other” (Emrence, 2010: 245). In parallel to transformation of public institutions to private one, football clubs also turned “professional” bodies. Emrence indicate (2010: 246) that the old-style amateur-type club disappear and instead of them professional clubs which have personnel with executives, sales managers, accountants etc. occurred. Turkish clubs accord these changing rapidly and also willingly, moreover they have interested in installing firm hierarchies.

Football supporters also transformed to consumers of the football sector in that period. Consuming and using official products have mean to support the clubs commercially. It was a symbol of identity of football teams and fans. Accompany with this “liberalization” period, fans organizations and associations increased. In the beginning of this proliferation the political cleavages has not distinct clearly, the problem was generally the distance to club president. The clientelism between club officials and fan groups have dominated for a long time the stadiums to control the reactions and reduce the oppositional voices. But in time gradually because of the separation of left-wing and right-wing fan groups, they organized in their own ways. Mostly they attended the national festivals and meetings.

For instance the participation to May Day meetings with a small fan group is one of the biggest changing in football and politics relations. Except of this typical event stadiums and political discourse have always a distance. Football and stadiums are willingly are kept away from political discussion. But this is a political choice of the rulers indeed. In other words, “soccer clubs make sure that they do not step on certain people’s toes by avoiding political discourse and politicization of stadiums. In this regard, fans’ and fan groups’ political quietism simply reflects the dynamics of the well-entrenched clientelist structure” (Yıldırım, 2017: 15). However relatively liberalization process because of the developing relation with European Union has an effect upon sports area and the top-to-bottom running in these places changed slowly towards to some grass-root or autonomous actions that can be seen as maturing civic society attitudes after a decade of 2000 s.
Post-2010s: Oppositional Voices

The civic and political reactions in stadiums and around football fandom organizations have increased in the last years. The one of the most radical event in Turkish football was a friendship match between Adana Demirspor and Livorno clubs at 4 September 2009. Before this event, a group of Demirspor fans had gone to Italy for a fandom festival called Mondiali Antirazzisti (Anti-racist World Cup) established at Bologna. This trigged making a similar event in Turkey at club level. Actually Adana Demirspor have been placing at second division in Turkey and Italian club Livorno was at Serie A, it means that they were in different genre in football scale but the connection of these clubs have based on fan identity. Both clubs were well-known with left-tended supporters. This friendly football match was a project of fans. Thus, the strangeness of the match was the tribunes. Adana 5 January Stadium hosted a kind of leftist festival from different kind of left and socialist tendencies, slogans, banners and songs. It was ultimately unique moment in Turkish stadiums.

After this event the participations to May Day meetings of fan groups become usual especially in Istanbul. But the biggest smash occurred in Gezi Park uprising. The different fan groups dominated the massive crowds during the protest with a huge participation. Even unfriendly team supporters converged and moved together against the governmental policies. A fan-team called Istanbul United established on that days and it symbolized the connection of different even hostile football fans (Yıldırım, 2014). These peacefully steps towards to constitute new grass-root organisations have actually expressed the failure and the lack of oppositional political institutions that people represent themselves, thus it indicated that the failure effectiveness of established political parties. Turkish civil society has needed a new voice or trigger to mobilize them in oppositional way against the government. But firstly the main opposition party and then the other bodies could not galvanize or developed this wave to more effective level in political arena.

Match-fixing operations in Turkish football to the top level at 3 July 2011 like Fenerbahce president Aziz Yıldırım and some popular football players have triggered new discussions. The economic and political relation between football and the elites became one of the popular debate. These process turned a different path with the separation of Gulenist Movement and AKP government. Gulen and his followers have labelled as terrorist and accused to make a “parallel” state to make illegal proce-
dures against the elected government. The match-fixing operation is thought as a conspiracy and its judicial officials have also attached with this illegal organisation. The judges and persecutors was accused by Aziz Yıldırım and other defendants. This has caused a big chaos and cleavages in the society on the relations of football authorities and elites. Some former Galatasaray and national team players have been sued for a part of this organization. Their biggest opponent team Fenerbahce officials and fans have felt proud to be opposition to this illegal movement and not being surrender by the operation.

Then, in 2017 constitutional referendum campaign lots of oppositional grassroots activity appeared in the sports arenas. The No-tendency against the constitutional amendments exposed in the stadiums and basketball halls with some specific songs and anthems like İzmir Anthem which symbolize the struggle of Kemal Atatürk against the enemies in 1920s. It was a spontaneous occurring that started in a few stadiums and then rapidly spill lots of stadiums and the streets. Atatürk banners and images have popularized against the presidential changing of referendum. Especially the basketball halls of the clubs like Fenerbahce and Karsiyaka became strongly symbol of this attitude. A republican public attitude against the ruling conservative hegemony has been created in these sport places. In short the opposition to the ruling government that is not possible other public areas and mainstream media has got a voice in the stadiums. The sport areas give a chance to express the opposition voices of people who could not find any place to do this. This was an important changing in civic society in terms of giving political messages and making democratic protest in the different places.

New Stadiums Construction as Renewal of City

The biggest displaying of AKP-era since 2002 and especially 2010 was the supporting to constructions, new buildings and the renewal projects of cities to create a new urban places as the symbol of new Turkey and economic development. The stadiums and football economy are effected by these policies, because making sponsorship contracts and other financial instruments become usual the market logic in the Turkish soccer world in that period (Emrence, 2010). The huge stadiums was very different and comfortable diversely the old ones that is built in “old-Turkey”. Indeed it was a corporation the business and state, thus local governing and ruling
party showed this building as the development of the country. But also the reorganizing the spaces aim to rearrange the relations between people and also with state. The cities and football clubs officials and in sure the supporters have been expected being respectful to the authorities that allowed the construction these stadiums. To control the fan uprisings or to reduce oppositional voices has facilitated in new stadiums. In this context the build new spaces is a way to control the masses for the states.

On the other hand for the clubs, it was a way to make good relations with strong public authorities. It can be said that Turkish clubs lend themselves for undue political influence via extensive state sponsorship funds, tax forgiveness policies and other financial subsidies (Emrence, 2010: 249). In shaping public opinion and commanding the masses the clubs have a role and mutually the clubs and the state have a corporation to reach the aims. Shortly, “Turkish soccer clubs are governed by populist politicians, top capitalists, political career-oriented entrepreneurs and an emerging corporate structure” (Emrence, 2010: 249). The overall (anti)democratic structure of the country is applicable to football atmosphere and its public effects. The building of new football areas is related with the control of the society in physically and literally. The construction vision has spread out to the everywhere. Like other public issues, the football sector and its places is not regarded for public good, but rather to some specific interests. Thus the public character of the game is damaged because of the private affairs and turned a clientelistic game between the new elites.

Conclusion

The football or sport culture, its places like stadiums and public sphere have a strong relationship each other. The public opinion, discussions, economic and general political tendencies could be seen at these areas. Neoliberal economic trends have affected to different sport branches, and especially football mostly, all around the world and Turkey is not an exception to this situation. The combination of the free market economy and strong state is relevant in the football area. Sport places have shifted market places and the supporters turned consumers in that period. This economic vision could not create a democratic transformation from below but rather it turned the people more passive subjects all over the world. In
sure, there is a resistance to this stream but Turkey could not make a difference in this issue.

Turkey, as a western society which want to keep the eastern values, become concrete in the sport field. Turkish civil society could not create a dynamic free from the state and by this reason Turkish sport and especially football culture have under the effect of the macro political developments. Turkish public discourse reflected to the stadiums and the sport clubs and also the transformation of the economic and political developments could be followed over the sport clubs. They have strong clientelist relation with the private sector and (local or central) ruling elites.

From the 1990s to the 2000s, gradually liberalization period of Turkey occurred new discussion fields and football fandoms relatively build their own organisations as grassroot initiatives. While the football change in the market relations and a huge sector appear in that field, the economic and political elites want to control the relations here. The some football supporters tried to resist to this changing and raised some oppositional voices to affect the trend but the demands of majority for the rapid sportive success have made limited and ineffective to this alternative ways. Turkish democracy has not a bottom-to-up running and it is same as in the football culture. The football supporters expressed some thoughts and made some peaceful protests to general and specific issues but it has not leaded the club developments. Moreover the coordination of football fans is treated as non-governmental organisations in some issues but they have not became a strong key actor to change the public opinion. Like other NGOs, the neoliberal democracy used them to set up governance legitimacy. They were a part of “the game” but not leaders. If they expand their spaces to raise their own word, it may give an opportunity to change something at macro level. Football supporters must organize their specific geography like to control the stadiums to express their demands. However these demands must develop the grassroot democracy, not discrimination or racism, so these communities make a democratic society in long term.

In short, the football club supporters and their organisations have not able to lead the transformation of public discussion and civic society. Nevertheless their effective role on social media symbolizes an alternative way to rethink something against the mainstream patterns. Especially they expose that there is needed a new comprehensive political opposition wing to connect the differences and the grassroot demands that wants to live together in a republican way in Turkey. The football supporters’ communi-
ties as a part of whole society have a raising political and social role to change something from the bottom both in the clubs and the country.

References:


Economy-Politic Approach to Artistic Activities in Public Sphere in Turkey

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With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 following the War of Independence the masses started to go through an extensive cultural shift. The new administration under the military and civic bureaucracy, which aimed to transform the social and cultural structure by steering the artistic activities, saw the culture and artistic activities as one of the most effective tools to make this change. Particularly, during the single party regime between 1923 and 1950, some significant steps were taken through the projects by Republican People’s Party. Many culture, education, and art institutions such as Community Centers, Turkish Linguistic Society, Turkish Historical Society, State Theatres, State Opera and Ballet, state schools, state universities, and state radio were founded and supported. The artistic activities were executed under the roof of those institutions with the supervision of the state. The aim of political power concerning the art and culture activities in those institutions was the development of national culture and art, and taking it to a “contemporary civilizations” level, and masses gaining consciousness of citizenship. A public education space via artistic activities was planned through which masses would fit into the secular, democratic life.

Starting from the 1950s, the time of transition from single-party regime to multiple-party period, various changes in the economic life, and culture and art policies took place. Democratic Party won the elections and came to power which followed liberal economy, and populist, Islamic, and conservative line in culture and art fields. One of the first operations the new government put in action was closing down the basic education and culture institutions of the Republic such as Community Centers and Village Institutions. These interferes carried the cultural life contradiction existing between village and city up to now. During this period, artistic activities continued to exist mostly in the city centers. It could be seen that some of

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the commercial firms that developed at the end of the 30-year period extending from 1950 to the 1980s with multiple-party period support and protect/adopt some of the artistic activities. Art galleries under the patronage of private sector were opened, and independent artistic activities such as biennials, theatre and music festivals started to be organized. Another significant development marking the process following 1980s was the execution of neo-liberal economic decisions. With the neo-liberal economy policies and privatization waves, effect of Islamic-conservative populist culture policies in the culture and art fields also increased.

1990s brought the process of founding a political party by the Kurdish political movement which gradually rose in 1980s (CNN, 2014:1). Partial freedom allowed following this process also increased the number of ethnic-based cultural and artistic activities. Many changes such as opening culture centers in large cities, staging of Kurdish plays, and movies dubbed in Kurdish in the cinemas took place. In the solution process started in January 2010, using different languages and dialects such as Kurdish in the meetings in prisons was provided with the “Human Rights Package” prepared; private television and radio channels were allowed to broadcast in those languages and dialects for 24 hours; decisions were made for founding institute, research center, Living Languages Institution was founded. With the solution process, there were some significant developments in economy, and culture, and tourism activities in the South-Eastern region. Discourses related to Ottomanism and Islamic fellowship by the parties became prominent during the solution process (CNN, 2014:1).

In the context of cultural and artistic activities in Turkey, there had been an increase in independent artistic activities conducted on the streets and in alternative locations in the last decade. Artistic activities became popular in the areas where masses got together or confronted, and in the areas where social movements took place. The Gezi Park resistance in 2013 is a significant example to this. Activists filled the walls and the posters in the city squares with aphorisms each very creative and ironic, organized concerts in the squares, on the streets, in metros, and on the ships, realized artistic activities/shows such as theatre shows, standing man performances, and poetry recitations. During this process, tens of songs were composed, and video clips of those songs were produced by the professional and amateur artists/activists. An effective language was formed in this period which favored art as combating vehicle, and which was built on indirect expression.
Neo-liberal economy policies applied globally transformed the cultural and artistic activities into objects of consumption. Different dimensions of art which could be used as meta such as education, entertainment, propaganda, perception management keeps it at the center of the social life. This state of art has different meanings for the governments and opposition social groups. As Adorno emphasizes in his “culture industry” theory, “art is a tool of culture policies for every political administration/government” (Willetta, 2017: 1). On the other hand, art has an effective and critical function, that is, social groups which opposing neo-liberal and neo-conservative political actions could announce their demands. This function differentiates the art and artistic views of every social group. Those differentiating approaches of the managements and opposing social groups concerning art and artistic activities necessitates the careful analysis/assessment of the process.

The study divided the whole process into three different historical processes. In the first part, cultural and artistic activities conducted under the government’s control and by the government between 1923 and 1950s were the subject of focus. Second part presents the changing quality and function of the artistic activities within the axis of the economy and culture policies from 1950s to 1980s. In the third part, artistic activities and policies within the axis of the neo-liberal policies of the 1980s were mentioned, and alternative artistic activities adopted as tools of expression by the social groups were emphasized. Gezi Park art, 2013 which provided extensive examples on this was focused. Imagery language pointed by the society through art was discussed, cultural and artistic activities approached by the societal groups seeking freedom were evaluated by addressing their historical, economical, political, ideological, and educational dimensions.

Artistic Activities in Turkey Between 1923 s and 1950 s

Turkish Republic was established in 1923 following the War of Independence. However, there was a weak economy and a society in need of basic education in front of the government of the new Republic. The literacy rate of the population of ten million was only 10%. The majority lived in the villages in their traditional, feudal cultural values. During the War of Independence, the fight was not only against the occupation forces but
also the riots of the fundamentalist Islamic groups demanding sharia. The continuation of the Republic would be possible with the education of its basic concepts such as democracy, secularism, and consciousness of citizenship, and formation/provision of culture of living together with those values.

The main goal of the administration is to raise the society to the level of contemporary western civilizations (even if they are invaders). This goal is actually a continuation of the Ottoman government under the leadership of a newly established state that started with Tanzimat. In order to reach the specified goals, a route, by which universal from local would be reached, has been followed in the education, culture and arts policies where the national cultural values are protected, developed. The state has been the determinant and practitioner of these policies. It was the same for the economic investments. Although capitalist economic system was adopted, the weak condition of the “national bourgeoisie” necessitated many investments to be made through the state private enterprise that thought to be going to form the national bourgeoisie in the future was supported.

In the era of early republic, which aims modernization and educating the modern person, art has been put into practice as an effective tool for the education of the society in the direction of this society's desired goals. Formation of the national culture and the processing of this culture with universal culture elements is a basic culture policy. In this period, institutional structures necessary for a new social structure were activated one by one. The years of 1930s were the period where a number of education, culture, and art institutions such as Turkish Historical Society, Turkish Linguistic Society, Community Centers, State Theatres, State Opera and Ballet, universities, and conservatories were founded. Education rather than aesthetic concern was prominent in this foundation period. Art is a tool in providing consciousness of citizenship in society.

Strategic approaches were developed to reach the determined cultural aims. One of those strategies was sending the students talented in art fields such as music and plastic arts to European countries for education and training. One of the examples in this area was the well-known composers called “Turkish Fivers” Necil Kâzım Akses, Hasan Ferit Alnar, Ulvi Cemal Erkin, Cemal Reşit Rey ve Ahmet Adnan Saygun. They returned Turkey after completing their classical music education abroad, and employed and served at some important areas. Second strategy was inviting people to Turkey who were specialized in various art fields in Europe. Some of those people were given the task of organizing the founding and
functioning of art institutions. For example, German musician Paul Hindemith was commissioned by the Ministry of National Education for the organization of the music education of the country. Another German artist Carl Ebert took part in the establishment of the State Conservatory and State Theatres. The third strategy determined was to provide facilities and opportunities for the specialists to convey their experiences in their fields to their Turkish colleagues through conferences. One of the most significant examples of this strategy was the conferences given by Bela Bartok, the architect of Hungary National Music, on the ways to form the Turkish contemporary music. He gave information about the techniques to be followed in folk music pieces, and did some folk song compilation works with Adnan Saygun in Osmaniye region (Sarkaya and Sancar, 2014: 1). During the single-party regime, folk culture values such as folk songs, folklore, and language compilations were collected and put to good use starting from the national cultural values. Traditional folk songs, stories were presented to the society and were popularized. First of the institutional steps of producing a contemporary society Project between 1932 and 1951 was the Community Houses. The second one was the Village Institutes where the children from villages were educated to become elementary school teachers between 1940 and 1954. A significant budget was allocated by the government to the Community Centers opened in 1932 which provided the opening of branches in many cities and towns in a short time. Art climate of the country changed with the planned activities run through those Community Centers. Members would involve in the area they were interested in; art courses were provided; activities such as festivals, balls, exhibitions were organized with the participation of the concert, folklore, and theatre groups formed and artists trained at those centers. Gifted young people were found through the literary journals, and art competitions, and poets, authors, theatre actors and actresses were encouraged (Tunalı, 2013: 58). Village Institutes functioned as educational institutions which were constructed with the participation of the students, and which were self-supporting with their plant and animal nurseries and ateliers. An educational program with emphasized artistic activities was employed in those institutes where learning by doing was the basic educational principle. In this period, a large number of world classical literature pieces were translated into Turkish, read by people, and plays were staged. All these efforts show that there were powerful steps for the formation of a secular, modern society during the single-party period named as founding years of the republic. This enlightened line improved also the social status
of women. Activities towards the art of cinema have also gained a new impetus, and a new era began extending from 1922 to 1939. This era, marked by Muhsin Ertaşoğlu, the founder and the director of the Istanbul City Theater, was called 'Theatrical Period' in the history of the Turkish cinema (NTV, 1991:1). In this period, theatre players opposed to the regime began to make their voices heard in literature and in press. Artists influenced society through their works, and articles published in newspapers and magazines influenced also the future generations. Among those who could be mentioned here are the well-known poet Nazım Hikmet, the humorist Aziz Nesin and the storyteller and poet Sabahattin Ali.

**Artistic Activities in Turkey Between 1950s and 1980s**

1950s point to the changing culture policies with the end of the single-party period. Democratic Party authority exhibited a liberal approach in economy on the one hand and a conservative approach in culture and art when in power. One of the first actions was the closing down of the Village Institutes and Country Houses, two effective institutions established to help change the cultural structure in the rural regions. The absence of those institutions affected the cultural life and artistic activities both in the cities and in rural areas. This new period compressed cultural and artistic activities into a space where only the educated could benefit from. Theatre and other artistic activities were seen as “harmless entertainments” for the middle class (Yüksel, 2012:14). Art institutions such as State Theatres, State Opera and Ballet, Presidential Symphony Orchestra could survive this period despite the controversies.

Commercial firms, becoming powerful since 1950s, started to turned towards culture and art areas/fields through associations and foundations they established. This trend, seen as the vehicle to gain a prestigious place in the society, gradually changed the perception that artistic activities were public duties. Some of the capital/investment groups such as Yapı Kredi and İş Banks, and Eczacıbaşı had their names heard through some cultural and artistic activities they supported. Governments encouraged such initiatives by the private sector by tax deductions. National and international cultural and artistic activities started to be organized by municipalities and non-government organizations as well as the state institutions. Associations, foundations, which functioned in different art fields, amateur and/or professional, such as theatre, music, folklore, photograph, plastic
arts, and literature were founded. Proliferation of cinema with the developments in technology empowered sector of entertainment based on cinema in Istanbul which is called Yeşilçam. Along with the films/movies from western to melodramas, hero to erotic films, and imported adventure movies reached the masses in Anatolian provinces and towns with many summer and winter cinema halls. In 1970s, the socio-realist films/movies of the directors such as Yılmaz Güney and Metin Erksan also reached the masses through this market. The center for the production of folk music and pop music was also the records bazaar in Unkapanı Istanbul from the end of the 1960s. Songs produced by writing Turkish lyrics to the popular foreign origin songs were quite effective. In this market, Turkish classical music singers, Anatolian folk music singers, arabesque singers, and rock music representatives found their places. Leftist musicians such as Cem Karaca, Selda, and Zülfü Livaneli started to become popular with their songs. Stars like Zeki Müren, Ajda Pekkan, Bülent Ersoy, Orhan Gencebay were followed by the masses in the 1970s when concert halls were popular in large cities. Tavern culture became effective in the second half of the 70s. Songs of the tavern musicians like Ümit Besen, and Ferdi Özeğen who sang their songs with an accompanying keyboard became popular.

Those trends, which developed along with the organization of artistic activities by the government, lessened the dependency of the production contents to formality. However, some other criteria stepped in. While elitist criteria formed in the activities run within the supervision and tastes of large commercial firms, the firms engaged in market business adopted criteria according to the consumption habits of different social groups. On the other hand, alternative artistic activities falling outside the determined formats did not receive any support. A significant change in the middle of 1970s was the black and white television broadcasts becoming widespread, and loss of interest of the masses in cultural and artistic activities in public sphere. TRT broadcasts showed their first effect especially on cinemas, concert halls, and theatres, and a considerable loss of spectators was experienced. Many of the cinemas and theatre halls will have become inoperable and will be closed down soon. Socio-realism have become influential in art branches such as cinema, theater, and painting with the strengthening of the left political movements starting in the 1970s. Youth groups in poor neighborhoods struggling for socialism read and had others read the works of authors such as Nazım Hikmet, Sabahattin Ali, and Gorki. Short stories of Aziz Nesin, which were bristled with irony,
were staged by a number of theatrical ensembles that influenced society. In this period, the circulation of leftist humor magazines mostly bought by youth was over a million. Socio-realism, which was the main stream of this period, had also influenced the art of cinema, and many cinema artists such as Yılmaz Güney, Kemal Sunal tried to transform the society through the films they produced.

**Artistic Activities in Turkey from 1980s up to Now**

The year 1980 marks the time in which neo-liberal economy and neo-conservative cultural policies were put into practice simultaneously with the military coup in Turkey. The military government during this period closed down the political and non-governmental organizations and put the oppressed social sections under pressure. It forms the beginning of a process in which the relationship between the large capital groups and the government is more visible than before. The national bourgeoisie, which was once developed by the state, became holdings through company marriages, horizontal and cross merges. Many companies gained international qualification. The economic model (accumulation) that marked the first 50 years of the Republic with the articulation of the Turkish economy to the world capitalist system has also been abandoned. The new economic model brought together becoming conservatist in general meaning in all countries as in Turkey (Çulhaoğlu, 2012: 15). Turkey’s becoming conservatist is also seen as an extension of the conservatism wave in the world. Öztürk (2016), states that the ideological understanding dominating the politics in Turkey had been determined by the neo-liberal and islamic alliance for a long time. With this approach, the social responsibilities of the state either abolished altogether or transferred to a philanthropy complex under the auspices of the state, in which the congregations and foundations play a major role. All right-wing parties with support from the masses have tried to make religious references more visible in the public sphere, along with the liberal economic model they apply since the Democratic Party. With the years of Özal where the neo-liberal ideology and religious references were strictly intertwined in the 1980s, the state cadres were also passed on to conservatives to a significant extend (Öztürk, 2016:2). With the 1990s, the removal of state monopoly on radio and TV broadcasts brought commercial broadcasting. Holding companies that have a close line with the power have become a part of this sector in a short period of time. With the
privatization, TV and radio channels, which were supposed to follow a more liberal broadcasting and cultural policy, soon became power-driven channels. Comedians such as Levent Kırca, known for his opposition, have become unable to do business in those channels. In July of 1992, 32 renowned artists were murdered in the province of Sivas in the remembrance ceremonies of Pir Sultan Abdal the renowned poet of the Alevi community. This suggests that the reactionary political movements still see the strategy of massification over cultural conflicts or the consolidation of the votes as an important argument. The Alevi society (Haberler.com, 2017:1), which constitutes about 15 percent of the total population, is sensitive about secularism since the establishment of the Republic. This group, which is affected by Bektashism, is in a more democratic position with respect to the value and tolerance towards women. The issues about the freedom of faith this group have, which generally voted for the left and the social democrat parties, continues today. In particular, traditional music singers and poets, and whirling are today's symbols of Anatolian culture. Since Pir Sultan Abdal, the folk songs of the famous traditional music singers of the Republican era, such as Aşık Veysel, Neşet Ertaş and Mahsun, have become inspiration for contemporary pop and classical music singers and composers. An important event in which music art is performed in folk culture is the village and city weddings. Wedding halls are the public spaces where local musicians can perform, and people of every generation entertain themselves doing folkloric dance.

It was seen that, during the new are too, holdings such as Eczacıbaşı, Sabancı, Borusan supported national and international music, theatre, cinema festivals, biennials, and other artistic activities through the associations and foundations they established, and run some social and cultural activities through social responsibility projects. Some cultural activities were being conducted with the granted funds given within the frame of EU adjustment laws especially in rural areas. There have been increase in the religious discourses, and prohibitions through religious references have become more evident since the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2001 (Saçlıoğlu, 2013:1). One of the interventions that caused arguments about sexuality in art through sculptures took place during an exhibition visited by the Mayor of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality in 1994. The sculpture of the artist Mehmet Aksoy was reflected in the public opinion and spoken for years (Geçmiş Gazete, 1994:1). The "Monument of Humanity" erected by the same artist in the province of Kars was described as "Freak" by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the
period and was destroyed soon after (Akgüngör and Aydın, 2011:1). Kuban (2012: 5) stated that Turkey, the only Republic based on a secular system among the Muslim societies, was aimed to be made a part of the role of “moderate Islam” cast within the frame of the global economy policies of USA and EU. Fethullah Gülen, who is seen as a representative of this structure, had expanded his organization through privileges he received after the 1980s, and opened schools from Europe to Africa and Asia. Students studying in those schools had been deployed to the highest levels of the state, including military schools. With the applications such as compulsory Religious Studies course, lowering the head-scarf freedom to the level of primary schools, requirement to open prayer rooms in schools, prohibition of selling and drinking alcohol on university campuses and state enterprises, the increase of the budget to be allocated to the Directorate of Religious Affairs, insistent efforts for transforming Imam Hatip Schools into general high school, and finally the law proposal to authorize muftis for conducting official marriage, it could be seen that some significant steps were taken in this way. The government also carries on its neo-liberal aggression together with an obvious hostility towards women. An average number of 5 women are killed per day in the country. Violence against women increased 1400% in the last seven years (Ersoy, 2014: 133).

According to the 2010 TURKSTAT data, the population of Turkey is approximately 80 million, 76% of which live at the centers of the concrete masses so called cities. There is a haphazard social structure in terms of income distribution and cultural structure. While the 20 percent of the society receives about 50 percent of the total income, the low income group with 20 percent receives a very low share of 6 percent from the national income. The share of the upper income group is about 8 times higher than that of the lower income group. This ratio is between 6 and 7 percent in the United States where the liberal economy is applied without any tolerance. TURKSTAT data shows that approximately 10 million people in the population could live in a certain standard, and the remaining 17% is below the level of poverty. To concretize this data with example, it could be seen that about ninety percent of the population does not have a budget to have a week long holiday away from home. There are great imbalances also among the regions in terms of income distribution in Turkey. The differences in the national income rate vary from 500 to 5-10 thousand dollars. These imbalances in the income distribution are also reflected in the level of education and human development. The successes in the universi-
ty and business exams for people in the East and Southeast regions are lower than those in other regions. Gaps in the distribution of income impair the sense of justice in society, and it is not possible to create a consumption habit towards culture and arts from those who do not have sufficient budget. The data reveal that majority of the population lives in cities but does not have sufficient budget to benefit from artistic activities such as cinema, concert, and theater or to participate in those activities as amateurs (Ortaş, 2010:1). A large part of society is doomed to TV programs and TV series. This situation turns the conveying of the neo-conservative cultural policies to the masses, and shaping of the masses to an advantage. The mainstream media, moving in the monopoly of the holdings, are the supporters, directors and practitioners of the cultural policies of the government/power. On the other hand, the Turkish football league, which is an important economic sector, is one of the building blocks that direct mass culture with the astronomical transfers and budgets. One of the most important contemporary architectures which leads mass culture is the shopping centers (Mall) which are built as huge structures in every city. Shopping malls are the public spheres that the international entertainment and recreation sector of every category meet with the masses. In addition to shopping, everything that can provide money, from concerts, traveling exhibitions, drama, ballet courses, playgrounds, interviews with authors, and signing days is met with its buyers at these centers.

Lena (2016: 14), states based on the TURKSTAT data of 2014, the rate of the entertainment and culture expenditures in the total expenditures of the households was 3%. Moreover, entertainment and cultural services include chance games, sports services, package-holiday tours. The cinema sector with an international network, TV series, cinemas, magazines, books, toys, cartoons marketed all over the world with their toys, clothes and similar consumer objects reveal the global dimensions of this sector. This dimension finds its meaning in Adorno's concept of "culture industry". The number of theaters in Turkey dropped from 678 in 2013 to 611 in 2014. There are also significant imbalances in the distribution of theaters and cinemas according to provinces. It is also striking that there is interest in the feature films (in the cinema, comedies and box office films are prominent) while there is no interest in the museums and archeological sites. Society consumes TV series and commercial cinema, which is in the form of its extension, more than the performing arts. The budget allocated to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism as an institution that guides the culture and arts life in the country is not raised above 0.5%. Lena states
that none of the European countries have this proportion emphasizing that a significant part of the ministry budget goes to tourism expenditures. According to the data given at the panel titled "Half Portion Culture" organized by the Istanbul Culture and Arts Foundation in 2012, while France allocates 4 Billion Euros (9 billion 320 million TL), which is 1.5% of the state budget, on cultural activities, and Germany allocates 9.6 billion Euros (20 billion TL), Turkey allocates 705 million with 0.5% budget (Çıplak, 2012: 8). While the budgets on culture are reduced in the axis of neo-liberal politics, the expenditures on artistic activities carried out by the state are made to be perceived as a burden towards the state budget. So much so that when the state gets rid of this burden, there will be welfare. On the other hand, cultural policies emphasizing religious references have become in conflict with the founding philosophy of the Republic. Regulation change in the Istanbul City Theatres, and views on the privatization of the institutions such as the State Theaters and the State Opera and Ballet, have been frequently mentioned (Toprak, 2012: 2; Kaya, 2012: 2). Ballet and theater artists are discredited as elitist and non-governing ATM artists (Güneysu, 2012:18). Establishing an institutional superstructure called TÜSAK (Turkish Art Institution) and ending the autonomy of existing art institutions to this structure is an issue on the agenda. According to the project draft, all stages of the State Theaters will be transferred to the governorships. A performance-based system will be introduced for the players (Güneysu, 2012: 18). When this legislation comes into force, all the departments of the State theaters functioning in 22 cities, State Opera and Ballet and all its departments will be closed (Say, 2013: 2). Another development happening at the same time is in Egypt. The President of the Republic of Egypt has supported the members of the board of directors who want to "ban the grounds of indecency and obscenity, defined as the art of nudity, as being incompatible with Islam." It can be said that the administrations have approached this problem more within the framework of conservative cultural policies than the budget of the institutions. New arrangements are desired that could provide further interference with the management of art institutions and the content of art events. It is stated that the aim of creating a neo-conservative culture with TÜSAK is instigated. The social problem encountered is not the shifting of universal arts such as theater opera, ballet and music, but the art branches are in fact educational institutions and enlightenment institutions (Kösemen, 2015: 88; Say, 2013: 2; Kahramankaptan, 2013: 7). The fact that the Ataturk Culture Center in Taksim, one of the iconic art centers of Istanbul, was closed due
to renovations in 2008 and that it has not been opened to public again despite the passing years is also thought provoking. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who does not find the art of ballet ethical, claims that it is unacceptable that the artists who received salaries by the municipality are staging plays that criticize the administration. He states that if there is a need for the support, it should be given to the appropriate plays. (Toprak, 2012: 2; Hasol, 2012: 2). The interventions to the management of the art institutions are protested by the artists, and those interventions result in seeking rights in the public spaces by the artists and the audience (Çamur- dan, 2012: 8). One of the developments attracting public attention is the prosecution and punishment of the famous Turkish composer and pianist Fazıl Say for the reason of Hayyam rubaie he shared on his Twitter account. While the artists who are not close to the government become targets, those who are close are rewarded through ways such as series player, concert organizations of municipalities and similar institutions, and project support. The main opposition party deputy leader Ercan Karakaş expresses the general situation in culture and art in the press statement published on 27 March 2015 World Theater Day.

“We are in Çağlayan Courthouse on the World Theater Day on March 27th, in order to publicize our solidarity with the artists who made allegations about the people responsible for keeping the Atatürk Cultural Center closed for 7 years. Unfortunately, our theatre is living the darkest days of its history. Theater venues are being closed one by one. Besides the closing of AKM, the closures of the venues such as Muammer Karaca Theater and Taksim Stage are the result of the cultural policy of political power. We learned that the Akün and Şinasi halls in Ankara were also sold. The halls that private theatres open with many difficulties also face the risk of closing down due to economic problems. On the other hand, while state aid is distributed away from objective criteria in the theater, a significant portion is given to prospective companies. Another problem is that the theater artists are captured by the subcontracting system. Many of the players and technical staff lack social security. Despite all these difficulties, young groups try to perform their arts. We wish that the audience will support our artists and thus strengthen this solidarity. As the CHP Culture and Art Platform, we celebrate the March 27th World Theater Day of all the theater workers and thank the efforts of our young theater groups who approach the social problems with a critical eye during the difficult days we live in.”(Karakaş, 2015: 1).

On the other hand, recent statistics show that there is a decline in workers' rights and unionization rates. According to data from January 2014, 1 million 96 thousand of 11 million 600 thousand workers in Turkey are connected to a union. It is seen that the unionization rate of 9.45% is 23% in
the European Union countries and 17% in the OECD countries (Kılıç, 2014:1). According to the poverty index used by the economists, Turkey comes seventh with 21.1 points with the unemployment rate of 11.3% and the inflation rate of 9.8% after Venezuela, South Africa, Argentina, Ukraine and Greece (Esen, 2017:6). The symbiotic relations between the media and the government also play an important role in the application of the neo-liberal economy and neo-conservative cultural policies. The 2000s brought together the formation of holdings in the media. Holdings operating in different sectors entered the media sector (the mainstream media), and became involved in a symbiotic relationship with the government. (Özen, 2015: 19) reveals that the voting rate of the ruling party is very close to the viewing rate of the written and visual media in control. The uncontrolled processing of the official control mechanism on TV broadcasting in democratic countries leaves the viewer, who does not read, have poor reasoning and questioning skills, vulnerable. Kuban (2013: 5) states that it is possible to leave a non-urbanized society that does not speak the language, does not read books, but watches the TV for five hours a day, and ignorant using media.

Artistic Activities within the Protests

Republican People’s Party in the opposition for a long time organizes artistic activities such as theatre, concerts, and festivals at the culture centers through the municipalities it won in the elections. It organizes competitions in the art fields such as literature and plastic arts, and gives incentive awards. Such activities are also carried out by the ruling AKP municipalities in a way that directs conservative cultural policies from a different angle. On the other hand, events sponsored by companies or banks include classical music, jazz, theater events and events that appeal to the upper socio-economic groups. Another area where the artistic activities in Turkey are visible in the 2000s is the rallies organized by opposing unions, associations and non-governmental organizations. Protest poems about the meaning and significance of the day, music bands giving concerts, street theater shows, standing sculptures became more visible in the rally squares. Activists started to develop a new style of expression together with artists by thinking like artists. These activities, organized to support the political discourse, increase the effectiveness and permanence of the discourse. The visual nature of the news programs in the media also pro-
vided a basis for the development of such events. The tens of thousands of opposition who fill the fields want to make more use of the power of the media. Officers' cutting their hair, burning salary bills, carrying symbolic coffins, thematic masks, live sculptures and similar performances could be shown many times on TV news programs. Alternative art works with the cultural and artistic institutions supported by the left socialist institutions were carried out. The Nazım Hikmet Cultural Center and the Community Centers of the present day are influential especially on the university youth through monthly programmed cultural and artistic events.

**Artistic Activities within the Gezi Park Protests**

Taksim Gezi Park protests began in the form of interference in the cutting down of the trees within the “Taksim Pedestrianisation Project” carried out despite the negative decisions of the Istanbul 6th Administrative Court and Cultural and Natural Heritage Conservation Board number 2. It was announced that a shopping mall was to be built in place of Gezi Park, the former location of the Artillery Barracks, which had been built in 1806 and demolished in 1940 to build a park. The Artillery Barracks have a symbolic meaning as the place where the pro-Sharia soldiers started the rebellion against the Constitution II that went down in history as the 31st March Incident (Özkan, 2013: 4). It is also the place which was under attack by the innovative emperor/sultan II. Mahmut to abolish Janissary system (Kuban, 2013: 5). Disproportionate intervention by the police against the activists who intervened in the cutting down of the trees was the beginning of the protests. The protests grew with the insistent statements of the prime minister of the time about the construction to be done, protests turned into anti-government demonstrations. Demonstrations spread quickly to the other cities of Turkey including Ankara, İzmir, Eskişehir. According to a report by the Ministry of Interior, about 2.5 million people participated in the protests in 79 provinces, and more than that number of people joined through social networks with their views and comments. During the protests, 8 civilians and 2 security officers lost their lives, and 8163 people were injured (Şardan, 2013: 1).

During the 3 week-long protests, ironic aphorisms, each more creative than the other, were written to the cities’ parks and squares, and a protest process like carnival was experienced with small concerts, theatre shows, live statue performances on the streets, and in the city squares. In the Gezi
Protests, the opposition slogans with traditional leftist phrases such as “Hooray!”,”Down with…!” left their place to a more artistic language based on an indirect sayings with festivity. During the protest process that began simultaneously, an arts action practice with indefinite time and place also developed. The producers of this new artistic resistance who have never had such experience before, were mostly the educated youth defined as apolitical. The activists also called qualifies workers became the organizers of a protest that simultaneously developed and upset all the balances. Middle-aged generation playing kitchen utensils on the streets or in their homes also joined the protests. Pro-government TV channels did not show any interest in the demonstrations, even that a documentary on penguins broadcast on one channel later became one of the symbols of the protests. İstiklal Street, Taksim and Gezi Park next to Taksim Square were the center of the protests in Istanbul where one fifth of Turkey’s population live. Emergency centers organized by the activists for those affected from gas, free food distribution, cleaning the streets, organizing libraries in the parks, avoiding violence, and observed series of solidarity practice fuelled the freedom spirit and helped the continuation of the action. According to the findings of a study on the characteristics of the activists;

Of the activists, 39.6% were between the ages 19 and 25, and 24% were between 26 and 30. The percentage of the activists participated the protests on the streets was 75.8%. Of the activists, 53.7% had never been involved in a mass action before, and 70% did not feel close to any political party. When the activists defined themselves, 81.2% defined herself/himself the most “libertarian” while 64.5% defined herself/himself as secular. Of the activists, 93.6% stated that they came to Gezi Park not as representatives of a certain group but as citizens. It is understood that in the 2011 elections, 41% of the young activists voted for the CHP, which represents social democrat view while 17% stated that they did not vote because they were under age. The total rate of non-voting, not-voting, or voting for independent candidates or blank-voting was 40%. (Kongar ve Küçükkaya, 2013: 31).

Gezi activists carried out a multicolored and blended portrait, and their actions were carried out with a young, educated, secularist audience with women and men hand in hand. Among the components of this activity, although in minority, were the leftist and socialist activists, feminists, ecologists, advocates of animal rights, and LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, bisexual and transsexual) individuals (Hızlan, 2013: 6). Middle-class young people were the dominant participants of the action, although they were different
generations and came from different social segments. It was the mass actuality of an educated genre going to biennials, music and art festivals, and has interest in the history and nature of the country. Surveys show that among the reasons of the activists participated in the protests came first the authoritarian attitude of the then prime minister with 92.4%. This is followed by the disproportionate power by the police with the rate of 91.3%. Violation of democratic rights is in the third place with 91.1%. The reticence of the media ranks fourth with 84.5%, and the cut of trees fifth with 56.2%. (Kongar ve Küçükkaya, 2013: 32).

This massive participation in the Gezi Protests, which emerged as a middle-class youth movement, was also influenced by the cutting off of the Kurdish problem-based armed conflict by the solution process. De-conflict atmosphere brought together the polarized masses with different ethnic origins, and shared common democratic demands could be expressed. The process revealed the potential energy of the society. It could be claimed that the discourses of the prime minister that despised the opposition, that were dictating, and interfering with the private lives, demolished Emek Cinema, Atatürk Cultural Center –that is closed and is wanted to be demolished, the Silivri Prison trials directed to the massive liquidation of nationalist soldiers, bans on alcoholism, attacks on the people who consume alcohol, bans on abortion and cesarean section, request and instigation for three children, prohibiting the restaurants and cafes in Istiklal Street to put tables outside (Aktunç, 2010: 17), the disproportionate violence that the police used in the demonstrations, and many events engraved on social memory, such as the death of the teacher Metin Lokumcu during the demonstration of Hopa, paved the way for this explosion. Başkaya (2016: 69) finds understandable the presence of the secular versus Islamic arguments despite the discourses of westernizing on Turkey’s agenda. One of the reasons for this could be that the country has not gone through a real enlightenment in its past/history. The process began with the Gezi is faced with the mission of overcoming this frailty. Also, Gezi protests are not temporary, limited, and pertain to us only, but are equivalent of the universal resistance wave. Occupy Wall Street in the USA, demonstrations in the Tahrir Square in Egypt, Rio de Jeanerio and Sao Paulo of Brasil, and protests on the city squares of Spain all have a common reason. They all express standing against the dumb capitalism, which created a complete unsustainability, and the will and desire to overcome it (Taş, 2013: 114; Demirer, 2013: 101). The issues such as unemployment, deepening social inequality, hunger and malnutrition, destruction of public
spheres, looting and seizing of common goods and public resources by a narrow oligarchy under the name of privatization, rapidly destructed environment, natural disasters increasing in number and intensity, polluted air, water, and soil, the disappearing of species, mega-cities, the police state, and the absence of anything that does not convert to the meta are the main problems of the countries where neo-liberal policies are applied. Yıldızoğlu (2017: 9) states that the existing capitalist regime is experiencing the financial crisis of the Fordist capital accumulation regime, which is based on hydrocarbon consumption, and that it is financially dependent on an increasingly digitalized, industrialized industry connected to networks and a supporting culture industry. Yıldızoğlu (2017: 9) states that the existing capitalist regime is experiencing the financial crisis of the Fordist capital accumulation regime, which is based on hydrocarbon consumption, and that it is financially dependent on an increasingly digitalized, industrialized production industry connected to networks and a culture industry supporting it. The prime minister's interpretation of the activists as idiocy/çapulcu was equated with the attitude of the king and the kings who used the definition of nudes against the middle class who rebelled in the French Revolution. A cultural conflict has arisen between the government and the ones who have not been accustomed to a prime minister screaming as if he has given all the TV channels to the service, and who was constantly instructing conservative rhetoric from a microphone in a captive camp. Many discrepancies established through ethnicity, sexuality, education, immigrant and other similar identities converged in the newly established sharing area. There was a form of comradeship, called "Queer", in which everybody could be the other, the identity constructs including supporters were questioned, and everything was shared. The three basic features that force the Gezi resistance in terms of the power were the collectivity, lack of leadership and absence of violence (Altınay, 2014: 294). This generation that is connected to the world with technology, and that is productive and creative, has grown up with art of humor. The activists, who constitute the skilled workers of Turkey, have stood up against by producing hundreds of humorous responses against the co-modification of everything, the destruction of public spaces, environmental destruction, biased television broadcasts, biased law, and the interference in private lives.
Humor in Art

The humorous approach which came out during the Gezi Protests coincides with the approaches of Freud and Bakhtin. Freud states that humor helps undisclosed desires which are suppressed, banned, limited. Bakhtin claims that the carnivalesque humor is a kind of resistance form against “all determined rules, regulations, and hierarchies”. According to this ecole, humor has existed as one of the most basic reality forms concerning human beings as opposed to the rules, traditions, and ideologies which presented life as if it is holy, unchanged, and is a natural fortune. It has been one of the most powerful weapons of the weak, humiliated, and belittled against uncompromising, fanatic, and narrow-minded ideas and official culture of the governing bodies. Humor has been a mental refugee in a world where fear, concern, oppression, and gloomy fatalism, caused by the government and hegemony relationships, has been existing in a “seriousness atmosphere”. Humor turns the pressure upside down, eases fear, and forms a powerful communion regarding the necessity for change (Çolak, 2014: 262). Slogans, graffities, posters produced by the participants of the Gezi Protests softened the sexist and homophobic language and atmosphere. The prevailing humor during the Gezi protests was shared through aphorisms in the streets and on media. Some of the aphorisms of the Gezi Protests:

You banned the alcohol, people became sober!/Damn some things/You did not need to use tear gas sir, we are already very sensitive children./ You threw pepper gas free, make the natural gas free too./ You were very fleet police yesterday./ The only thing they don’t know how to handle is peaceful actions and humor! /No Recep No Cry./ You shouldn’t have banned that last beer./ We have been meeting with TOMA for 8 days, we think seriously./ More parks, more green land.../ Police, do not betray your people/ Peace is not in Islam but in rebel./ I had breakfast, now I can fight./ I’m neither rightist nor leftist; I'm chapulling .../I asked my God, She said resist Gezi./ Even Edison regrets!/We have gas and rage./ The cause of the events is not two trees, it is a wood./ Pepper gas nourishes the skin./ Coward media!/ Police, sell simit live with pride./ Would you want to have three more children like us?

Standing Man Performance

Erdem Gündüz, a 34 year-old performing artist, stood still for hours in front of the Taksim underground station on 18 June 2013 which found place in media. Standing man/woman performance initiated by Gündüz
spread rapidly. Police stepped in when the number of standing men/women got over 300, and arrested a number of people.

**Woman in Red**

The “Woman in Red” who did not know she was going to become a symbol became the criticism of the way the police used pepper gas, and paintings, stencils were produced from this photograph.

**Dervish with Gas Mask**

One of the outstanding performances of the Gezi Resistance was done by Ziya Azazi who was known by almost everybody as the “Dervish with gas mask”. YOU MAY COME TOO movement he started with the photograph artist Deniz Akgündüz was staged in many places including Taksim Square.

**Earth Table/Iftar**

On the first day of Ramadan, an “Earth Table” was set up along the Istiklal Street with the calling of Anti-capitalist Muslims and Revolutionary Muslims.

**Songs and Clips**

During the Gezi Park actuality process, one of the salient artistic activities was the composed songs and their videos. Of the protest songs shared through social media and sung on the streets, 8 lyrics were examined and discourses were put into three different categories. These categories were protests against the leader, protests against the political applications imposed, and democratic demands:
Protests against the Leader

Contradictory statements, decisions made self-ordained, superior attitude, anger, aggressive and marginalizing discourses, disregarding the opposition parties, and inclining towards violence.

Protests Against Political Applications Imposed

Sales of forests, closing down the cinemas and squares, concretion, construction of shopping centers everywhere, pressure and violence to the opposition, marginalizing the opposition. Maverick decisions, arbitrary actions, and sales. Using economic pressure on press, and producing false discourse through partisan media and partisan authors. Application of disproportionate force by the police, religious impositions, fundamentalist mentality and policies, anti-democratic applications, deceptive economic policies, prohibition of alcoholic beverages, and Silivri arrests.

Democratic Demands

Paying attention to the majority in the Gezi, and opposition. Respecting human rights and freedom. Protecting the democratic and secular social structure. Establishing free press and judicial independence. Preventing the interference in private life.

The Gezi Park protests influenced pro-government groups as well. In the analysis of the discourse for two songs (Ismail Türüt and anonymous) shared on social media, it was stated that the demonstrators were deceased, communist, and of foreign origin. The Gezi Park is part of a big game. The demonstrators perceive modernity as wearing short skirts. They were seeking freedom with a bottle of liquor, and they saw themselves as intellectuals by reading a few lines. The demonstrators were attacking head-scarfed women, disrespecting the holy values by belly-dancing in the mosque. They looted the Taksim Square, and attacked the police. For this reason, it was rightful for the police to use gas. Ancestors were treated disrespectfully and the government’s services were not seen either. Demonstrators were not democrats as they were accusing the opposing view with bigotry, ignorance. Gezi leaders had to be punished. The actual settlement was going to be on the electoral roll. It could be seen that the lyrics of
these songs overlap with the words of the prime minister in the period that based his power on democracy. Öztürk (2015:7), states that the Gezi protest had a very negative content in the eyes of the liberal conservative group. This group emphasizes that there will not be a request for freedom from the Gezi. The reason for this is that their components and claims are not libertarians. What is happening is nothing more than an anomaly, anger burst or catharsis. The real dynamic that created the Gezi is an adolescent and irresponsible mind that is alienated from its people. Although there is plurality in Gezi there is no pluralism. An overly individualistic attitude towards one’s own values brought with it a political stance along the border of totalitarianism. What goes into the foreground on the Gezi has no other meaning than street violence and coup attempt. He emphasizes that such an assessment points to the recession in the intellectual capacity of the pro-government discourse (akt: Öztürk, 2015: 7-8).

Art theorist Zeynep Sayın expresses her thoughts art activities on an interview with her own words:

“If we go back to the Gezi Park, the park opened its own field and created its own rhythm. For example, the Whirling Man turned up with a gas mask even on top of AKM; Like Mevlana... who was also an extremely important point, he gave away what he received from the skies. I say "Black Pen, Yuksel Arslan, Cihat Burak", I am talking about the travelers who came here from Central Asia... He came and made a semah; He became a Whirling Man. After that, that swirling motion became a standing motion: Standing Man. Passive resistance since the beginning; But Standing Man was wonderful. It can even be thought of as a continuation of Gandhi. What happened after that? In the carnation giving action, another area opened; carnations were given. I would like to remind you Levni, Fatih Sultan Mehmet portraits, Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha, and carnation in miniature tradition. Yesterday, on the earth tables, a space was opened in İstiklal Caddesi this time. The opening of this area changes my view of Ramadan. Is not this an artistic event? If you ask me, yes, it is an artistic event. And it is holy (İz, 2013:1).

Şen (2014: 1) states that the "street art", which we have encountered during the Gezi Park protests, is the artistic creation of the public space that begins with graffiti, and that the transformation is carried out in a wider range using different styles and materials. Street art is an artistic movement that started to develop in Europe in the 1970s and was influenced by Dadaists and Situationalists, and aims to create, transform and create autonomous regions in a short time. This art style, which accepts publicly-owned streets as artistic surfaces, includes a number of generations such as installation, posters, stencils, and instant acts. "Street Art" intervenes
the design of the city, establishes "counter-publicities", and imposes the rights that the city has on the city through artistic creation.

“As emphasized by Negri and Hardt, ability to imagine the alternative of the existing, original socio-spatial practices, necessity of creating the emotion and sharing imply the need for the abilities of art in the political sphere. The process, started at Gezi Park and spread throughout the country, made possible not only the refreshing of the collective memory but also politicizing of everyday life through art in the lands that suffered by the coups and pressures... Creation opportunities of Street Art had a major role in keeping alive of the memory and in the articulating of the demands. Protesters interfered with the city's design through immediate actions such as gas masked whirling dervish and ballerina, and concerts, and through the street names such as Hrant Dink Street, and Deniz Gezmiş Street. Billboards and city walls which were opened to the capital indefinitely, but prohibited to some public served as a platform for the demands of the demonstrators. Gezi Park activists succeeded to realize their basic aim which could be summarized as "Rebel-Resist-Reclaim" of the StreetArt” (Şen, 2013: 2).

After the Gezi park protests ended, there were press charges to 255 demonstrators in Istanbul 55th Penal Court of First Instance, and the protesters were sentenced to penalties at various rates in the “Gezi Duty”. Four suspects, two of whom were assistant doctors, were sentenced to 10-month-imprisonment each for “dirtying up the sanctuary” (Ökçesiz, 2015). Various art platforms were established during and following the Gezi park protests. Some of them were: a platform for traveling musicians; a workshop on Gezi resistance; a game called "traveling"; a statue of Ali İsmail Korkmaz who was killed during the protests; and a radio channel called Sound World of Gezi.

Conclusion

The path that the artistic activities in Turkey have followed since the proclamation of the Republic is closely related to the perspectives of the governments on art and culture. From the foundation of the Republic until the 1950s, it could be seen that the cultural and artistic activities carried out by the state were mainly educational towards the construction of a new society. All activities, such as music, theater, ballet, opera, which were in the western form of the national values, have been planned and conducted by the state. The developing country bourgeoisie with the 1950s began to support some artistic activities. The process up until the 1980s began to change the perception of seeing culture and art as the function of the state. After
the 1980s, artistic activities were divided into different lanes with the neo-liberal policies carried out. When three distinctive lanes are considered, it could be seen that the activities in the first lane are in a position to be the means of neo-conservative cultural policies put into practice along with the neo-liberal policies. In the second lane, there are activities that are carried out through culture industry, in other words the sector which is itself in the position of an industry. These activities are shaped by the domestic and foreign markets’ needs such as entertainment, education, and so on. The activities in the third lane are artistic activities that take place in the public sphere, and which are adopted as a means of expression by the opposition groups influenced by the neo-liberal and neo-conservative fundamentalist policies. Such activities, which became more evident in the course of Gezi protests, have demolished the capitalist market and the media wall, and have shown a stand against the tradition. The artistic activities carried out have created a new meaning in public spheres. Vertical hierarchical structure that runs parallel to the patriarchal society structure was broken by the artistic activities like concert, theater, etc. where everyone actively participated. In the performances where everyone participated equally, and where the sovereignty of the money did not exist, the artists did not feel responsible for giving something to the audience but instead, they interacted with the audience. Performances in the public sphere directed viewers as well as they made artists more creative (Erkek, 2012; 9; Grizina Kollektif, 2014: 1).

The activists, who are the subjects of the resistance culture coming through life despite the patronizing representation order of the culture industry and the political imperatives of the administration, have created a new representation system through the artistic activities they produced. The possibility of another model of economic and cultural life was revealed through the solidarity and unique creations in the public sphere. The artists participating in the activities shaped together with other artist activists their objections to the present and life models concerning the future, as well as they carried their own aesthetic experiences to the public spheres. The products were created in a collective exchange environment, where the artist turned into an activist, and the activist turned into an artist.

The desire of the government to shape the city is not only about designing the city structure in terms of architecture, but also about the redesign of morality, religion, and family. For this reason, the reactions to the shopping mall and Artillery Barracks planned to be built instead of the Park were aimed at the new lifestyle that is wanted to be dressed with the im-
posing of the majority but not by the architect. With the artistic activities, a resistance was exhibited towards the persistence of the government about three children, abortion and alcohol bans, and towards a new "social construction" process without consent. The artistic language used during the protests also marked the issues that were excluded from the dominant public sphere. Artistic protests and criticism ridiculed the cold, arrogant, and distant language of the government with an artistic language that would evoke admiration. Art has become the most important tool of resistance. Altınay (2014: 294), interprets this process as "an art-focused school in which everybody learns from everybody, discovers the power and creativity within him/her, feels the warmth of equality and solidarity, and where kind of every power was questioned at any moment, new relations were established, and different languages were expressed". Paulo Freire states that the only way out of the oppressed was through such a process of learning, creation, and production, which he calls "critical pedagogy". D Freire's "problem-defining and dialogist education model" becomes meaningful within a teacher-student or student-teacher solidarity that removes the discrimination between teachers and students. (Karaboğa, 2014: 24). Gathering trashes with a volunteer organization without any order, establishing infirmaries with voluntary healthcare providers, establishing food centers where money did not exist, establishing libraries, doing book exchanges, organizing mass forums where everyone can freely express themselves, and giving concerts were the expression of determination about the possibility of another world. Forums held related to all these artistic organizations and the issues experienced bring to mind what Augusto Boal calls the Forum Theater which is a dramatization of a situation with the involvement of the audience. In Boal's theater, the protest is a concrete and real action that takes place within the open fictionality of the play. The convertibility of the objective on stage by means of the theater provokes the audience to perform the same action in real life. For this reason, Boal puts into center the concept of dynamisation instead of catharsis or Brecht's concept of critical consciousness in the theater because the practices of the "theatrical forms" held by the "theater of the oppressed" are an uncomfortable sense of incompleteness that needs to be completed with real action. The audience is a dynamic component of the process as an actor and director. This dynamisation is also directly related to the of Freire's pedagogical goals of humanization and liberation. The Pedagogy of the Oppressed and the Theater of the Oppressed are integrated into a common goal. This phenomenon, called "humanizer", shows that it is pos-
sible to remove the oppressing and oppressed situation through the revolu-
tionary praxis (Karaboğa, 2017: 26). Adorno states that art has developed
within the empirical world, but could exist by separating itself from it. Art
puts its own reality in the face of empirical world reality. This dialectical
process becomes the anti-thesis of the society in the end (Cited in: İz,
2013: 2). Resistance works like a big machine that it moves and changes.
The resistance, which has a certain structure and boundaries like an organ-
ic object, presents to the people a model of thought as an object of art.
Artists are often part of the resistance, taking part in the overall structure
of the resistance by taking part in the activities (Bayraktar, 2013: 7). Dur-
ing the period in which this study was being conducted, an unsuccessful
military coup attempt was made in July 2016 followed by a state of emer-
gency. Many demonstrations and activities were also banned in the public
spheres within the frame of state of emergency practices/implimentations.
There were mass arrests and extraditions during the extraordinary era
practices, and many demonstrations and activities in the public spaces
were banned. Finally, in June of 2017, the main opposition party leader's
Justice March between Ankara and Istanbul, which he initiated in connec-
tion with the unjust arrests, also showed that the Gezi spirit continues to
exert influence. In this march too, the party flags were not allowed, nega-
tive slogans left their place to the words "right, law, justice". A peaceful
practice of action reminiscent of Gandhi was set up, addressed by buzzing
applause, careful attention to cleaning, songs in the malls, and a non-hier-
archical structure. After the completion of the march in Istanbul, Zülfü Li-
vaneli gave a concert in the rally carried out. Gilles Deleuze says that
when governments target life, life is the name of resistance against gov-
ernments. This resistance itself becomes a sanctuary. It is an art in which
the imaginations of new life are shaped. In this life art, the sound of the
artistic activities created by the free actors. As a result of neo-liberal Is-
lamic politics, many of the institutional art constructs have been disrupted.
The presence of institutions in conditions for criticism was used as an ex-
cuse for this disruption. Finally, evolution was excluded in the 2017 na-
tional education curriculum, and the concept of jihad was included. Insti-
tutions have been becoming more dependent to the government, more con-
servative structures that leave the gains of the Republic in every area from
science to art have been set up. In addition to opposing/reacting the dis-
ruptions in the art institutions such as State Theaters and the State Opera
and Ballet, it is necessary to create alternative, independent public art
spheres. The development of these alternative spheres, which would break
the hegemony imposed by the government, can be achieved through the activities of various actors, from the political parties to the municipalities, to the union and civil society organizations.

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Democracy in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems and the Choice of Turkey: A Comparative Analysis

*Emre Bağee* & *Fatih Demir*

For the last few years Turkey has been passing through controversial processes in political, social, economic and military aspects. In the summer of 2016 a coup attempt took place; it did not succeed but hot debates are continuing on its causes and results. Under these debates and state of emergency which was declared in July 2016, a referendum was held in April 2017 for transition from parliamentary to presidential system. Higher Board of Elections (HBE) declared that “Yes” camp won by a margin of 51 to 49 percent. Referendum process produced several debates including the role played by the HBE on the referendum day and they are not close to fading away soon. After 2014 presidential elections Turkey had adopted de facto semi-presidential system; this time it accepted presidential system. With such radical changes that she went through in the last years, Turkey in fact took a radically different path from established parliamentary regimes.

In this section, the basic discussion will be on the reasons and processes of transition from parliamentary to presidential system in Turkey. However, in order that the subject can be settled on more solid foundation and the validity or consistency of arguments for and against this transition can be discerned, the standing of world countries in terms of democracy will be reviewed in the first two parts of this section. Within this framework, Turkey’s place in terms of constituents of democracy will also be evaluated.

Several comprehensive debates were held in comparative politics literature on the advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential systems:¹ the advantage of one system was noted as the disadvantage of the other in several studies. The interest on political systems is also ins-
creasing in Turkey. In this paper, general comparisons between political systems will not be discussed; instead, a different perspective will be taken and the results generated by different systems will be evaluated based on international indexes. First, the type of government of each country will be identified; then, the democracy levels of countries will be compared according to their government types. For this purpose, the status of countries will be reviewed based on such indexes as political rights and freedoms, economic freedoms, freedom of press, rule of law and constraints on government powers indexes which are essential constituents of democracy. In this manner, a solid foundation will be provided for the examination of the meaning of search for political system in Turkey and the consequential transition.

In this framework, the second part of this section will examine the content of the constitutional amendment and arguments for and against it. This part will be followed by the international evaluations and reflections on constitutional amendment and referendum process. Within this scope, evaluations of Venice Commission on constitutional amendment, the findings in OSCE report on referendum voting, and European Parliament decisions which relate the referendum with Turkey’s bid for EU accession will be discussed. Especially the first two reports will be used to display the reasons behind European Council Parliamentarians Assembly decision dated 25 April 2017 for re-opening the monitoring procedure for Turkey.

In the final part, the rationality of Turkey’s choice for constitution and system change and its potential results will be discussed. In addition, the real problems that Turkey is experiencing and the reasons and possible solutions to the deadlocks of the system will be evaluated.


Several difficulties and uncertainties are encountered in classifying countries according to their political systems. One of the leading difficulties is that countries are not constant systems and they change just like other organisms and beings. A country which adopts a certain style of government in a certain period crumbles, disintegrates or experiences system change due to natural (such as disasters, social movements, revolutions, coup d’états or wars), internal and external political, economic and social conditions. In our age several countries have gone through transformations from one system to another. The events during and after the two world wars or changes in government systems of countries after the fall of Soviet bloc are still fresh in memories.

With the exception of radical changes, a country which adopts a certain type of government in a certain period can go through transformation depending on its internal dynamics or global conditions. The change experienced by semi-parliamentary (or semi-presidential) countries is especially remarkable. In European countries where president is popularly elected, the “formal”, “ceremonial”, or “symbolic” role of the president is underlined and it is emphasised that the head of the executive is the prime minister, and that political responsibility and authority rests with the prime minister and cabinet of ministers. In official documents, this emphasis is easily traceable.

In European countries there is an observable turn from semi-presidential to parliamentary system. In addition, among the most prominent countries governed with parliamentary system, there is a tendency towards direct or semi-direct democratic applications which will ensure more popular participation. Among these practices we can mention citizens proposing legislation, recalling the elected officials, and observing equality of opportunity in using rights to elect and be elected. For example, in official documents of Polish government, a report titled “Political System of Poland” includes the following expression: “Republic of Poland is a parliamentary democratic republic with multi-party system where Prime Minister is the head of government and the President is the head of the state.” (Embassy of the Republic of Poland, n.d.). In Finland, the government system is announced with the title “government is run by the prime minister”. In the official webpage of the government, the following information provided under the title “political leadership of the government” is remarkable: “The Prime Minister is the political leader of the Government...
and is responsible for reconciling the differing views on Government policy held by the various groups represented in the Government. The Prime Minister is also responsible for coordinating Government work with that of Parliament.” (Finnish Government, n.d.). Similar tendency is also observable in a number of countries such as Portugal, Slovakia, Austria and Bulgaria.

The transition from one government system to another inclines towards parliamentary system in Asia as well. Mongolia, a country with semi-presidential system similar to Poland, is heading from a semi-presidential system with vast presidential powers to a parliamentary system with decisive powers and responsibilities vested on prime minister. There is another country in Central Asia which recently shifted from semi-presidential system to parliamentary system: Kyrgyzstan.3

One of the factors used to differentiate semi-presidential and presidential systems is the responsibility of the executive to the legislative or lack thereof. This feature is used as a litmus paper to separate parliamentary and presidential systems. One of the leading features of parliamentary systems is that after the elections the executive is constituted within the parliament and by the prime minister who is responsible to the parliament. The leading feature of presidential systems is, on the other hand, that the executive and the legislative are elected with separate elections and the executive is created outside the parliament under the management of the president. The separation of powers between legislative and executive is flexible in parliamentary system but in presidential system there is a more solid separation. Secondly, another determinant feature in differentiating parliamentary and presidential systems is whether the executive consists of one person or not. In parliamentary systems, the monarch or president acts as the head of the state with his/her symbolic and unauthorised-unaccountable role to balance the power of the executive and ensures harmony between all institutions. This role also provides a soft limitation to the representation of the executive by the prime minister only. In parliamentary systems, as members of government are also members of the parliament, prime minister is “primus inter pares”. Consequently, a mechanism of checks and balances is established between multiple factors within the executive in a parliamentary system. In presidential system, however, the ex-

3 For more information, see The National Democratic Institute (NDI) (n.d), and European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity (n.d.).
ecutive consists of one person (for detailed analyses, see, footnotes 1 and 2).

In the following sections of this study, scores and rankings made by indexes developed on such areas as political rights, democracy, economic freedoms, freedom of press, rule of law and constraints on government powers will be examined and selected countries will be compared in terms of their government systems, namely parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential.

**Democracy in Parliamentary and Presidential Countries**

In this section, the democratic position of political systems will be discussed through such concepts as political rights and freedoms, economic freedoms, freedom of press, rule of law and constraints on government powers, which can be considered integral components of modern democracy.\(^4\)

As regards political rights and freedoms, the report prepared by Freedom House displays and compares the situation of countries in terms of political rights and freedoms. In 2016 report, 195 independent countries and 5 dependent and disputed territories are included. The number of countries classified as “free” is 86, which represents 44 percent of the 195 countries in total. According to the report, the number of countries classified as “partially free” is 59 representing 30 percent of the countries. On the other hand, 50 of the 195 countries, meaning 26 percent, are classified as “not free” countries (Freedom House, 2016: 20).

Among the 200 countries included in political rights and freedoms index, 58 of the 88 countries (66 percent) classified as “free” are governed with parliamentary system, whereas 14 (16 percent) and 16 (18 percent) are governed by semi-presidential and presidential systems, respectively. Among the top 20 countries in political rights and freedoms index, 18 countries governed with parliamentary system. The number of presidential and semi-presidential systems is 1 and 1, respectively. Of the 200 coun-

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\(^4\) The discussions in this section will make reference to the reports prepared by internationally recognized bodies such as Freedom House (2016), Heritage Foundation (Miller and Kim, 2016), Reporters without Borders (RWB, 2015), and World Justice Project (WJP, 2015), and based upon the detailed classification and analyses of political systems in Bağce (2016).
tries included in political rights and Freedoms Index, the countries governed with parliamentary system with their mean of 75.97 are above the world average which is 60.35. Countries governed with presidential and semi-presidential systems are below world average with 52.73 and 54.15 mean values. It can be seen that among the 200 countries, there is considerable difference in terms of political rights and freedoms in countries governed with parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential systems. The difference between mean scores of parliamentary and presidential countries was found as 23.24.

Turkey is in 124th rank in political rights and freedoms index with 53 points, and it ranks 69th among parliamentary countries. In political rights and freedoms index, Turkey is below world average, and at a level between presidential and semi-presidential systems.

Another index which measures and reports freedom and democracy level of countries, conducted by The Heritage Foundation, is the Index of Economic Freedom. In 2016 index, the ranking was based on the evaluation of data from 178 countries. The index measures economic freedom based on 10 qualitative and quantitative factors in 4 groups including rule of law. Each of the 10 freedoms in these categories is scored between 0 and 100. The final score of a country is obtained based on the average of these 10 freedoms given equal weight. As a result of the ranking, countries are classified under five categories as “repressed”, “mostly unfree”, “moderately free”, “mostly free”, and “free” (Miller and Kim, 2016: 1-2).

In the 178 countries listed in economic freedom index, parliamentary countries are above world mean value with 66 points on average. Countries governed with presidential and semi-presidential systems are close to each other and below world mean values with 57 and 59 averages respectively. Although 71 percent of parliamentary countries is above world average, only 33 and 36 percent of presidential and semi-residential countries are above world average respectively. In economic freedom ranking, 16 of the first 20 countries are governed with parliamentary system. Even Norway is not included in the first 25 countries of parliamentary system with 70,8 points, whereas Egypt is in the first 25 countries of semi-presidential system with 56 points. Likewise, Nicaragua is among the first 25 presidential countries with 58,6 points. In 2016 ranking, Turkey ranked 79th in the world with 62.1 points, and 48th among parliamentary countries. Turkey was above world average but it was well below the countries governed with parliamentary system.
World Freedom of Press Index is being published annually by Reporters without Borders (RWB) since 2002. The purpose of preparing this index is to measure the freedom of information in 180 countries. Since 2013, each country is given a score between 0 and 100 for more comparability, “0” is the highest and “100” is the lowest score. Accordingly, the situation of media in countries are classified under five categories from “good” to “very bad” (Reporters without Borders, 2015).

Among the 180 countries listed in 2015 World Freedom of Press Index, parliamentary countries are above world mean value with 25.75 average score. Countries governed with presidential and semi-presidential systems are below the world mean value with 34.80 and 36.04 average scores respectively. 77.46 percent of parliamentary countries is above world average, whereas only 62.50 and 48.21 of presidential and semi-presidential countries can exceed world average respectively. In the Freedom of Press Index, 17 of the 20 “freest” countries are parliamentary countries. Even United Kingdom and Japan are not ranked among the top 25 countries of parliamentary system with 20 and 26.95 points respectively, whereas Peru, Gabon and East Timor which rank 92nd, 95th and 103rd in world ranking respectively are in the top 25 of semi-presidential countries. Likewise, Uganda, Brazil and Kenya which rank 97th, 99th and 100th in world ranking are among the top 25 of presidential countries. In 2015 Index, ranking 149th among 180 countries with 44.16 points, Turkey ranked 67th among 71 parliamentary countries. Turkey was well below the averages of all categories namely the world, parliamentary countries, presidential countries and semi-presidential countries. Her ranking in Freedom of Press Index has worsened in recent years.

Rule of Law Index is prepared by World Justice Project (WJP). The index is obtained by measuring 8 factors, namely Constraints on Government Powers, Absence of Corruption, Open Government, Fundamental Rights, Order and Security, Regulatory Enforcement, Civil Justice, and Criminal Justice (WJP, 2015: 12-14).

Among the 102 countries listed in Rule of Law index, parliamentary countries are above world average with 0.63 mean value. Presidential and semi-presidential countries are below the world average, which is 0.57, with their respective mean values of 0.50 and 0.54. Sixty percent of parliamentary countries are above world average whereas only 33 percent of semi-presidential countries exceed global mean value. Countries governed with presidential system have the lowest mean values in Rule of Law Index, and only 17 percent of these countries have mean values above world
average score. In Rule of Law Index the share of parliamentary countries among the countries with mean values higher than average is 67 percent whereas the share of presidential countries is 15 percent. Among countries with lower mean values than world average, presidential countries represent 47 percent. And there are 16 parliamentary countries in the top 20 ranking of Rule of Law Index. Presidential and semi-presidential systems are represented by 2 members, each.

With 0.46 points Turkey ranks 80th in global list and 41st among 45 parliamentary countries to be followed only by Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Cambodia. Thus, Turkey is below average points of all groups namely the world, parliamentary countries, presidential countries and semi-presidential countries.

Constraints on Government Powers is a component of the Rule of Law Index prepared by WJP. This component measures the extent to which the governing elite is bound by law. It evaluates the restriction of executive power consisting of public officials and government bodies and their level of accountability before law. Therefore, existence of extra-governmental controls on government such as free and independent media are also taken into account. In 2015 Constraints on Government Powers, 102 countries are scored and ranked according to their commitment to constraints on government powers (WJP, 2015: 24). Among the 102 countries included in Constraints on Government Powers factor, parliamentary countries occupy the top ranks with 0.64 average score. With 0.51 and 0.55 average scores respectively, countries governed with presidential and semi-presidential systems are at the below global mean value which is 0.58. In Constraints on Government Powers factor, 60 percent of parliamentary countries are above global average compared to only 26 percent and 43 percent respectively of presidential and semi-presidential countries. The mean value of presidential countries is at the lowest level among the three systems. There are 14 parliamentary countries among the top 20 countries in Constraints on Government Powers factor whereas the number of presidential and semi-presidential countries is 3, each.

According to the data, government officials act less arbitrarily in parliamentary system, existing data confirm this situation clearly. These findings reveal the real reason behind such problematic propositions as “presidential system is more effective” or “parliamentary system is troublesome due to its dual structure”.

Turkey ranks 95th among 102 countries with 0.37 points. It is 43rd among 45 parliamentary countries to be followed only by Ethiopia and
Cambodia. According to this result, Turkey is below the average scores of all categories, namely parliamentary, global, presidential and semi-presidential. Turkey’s rankings in Rule of Law Index and Constraints on Government Powers factor have degraded in recent years.

**Turkey’s Transition from Parliamentary to Presidential System**

A number of hot debates have been sparked in Turkey on parliamentary and presidential systems since 1990s. The stances on government systems are usually built on personal opinions of political leaders which is why they lack a solid ground for evaluation. For example, Turgut Özal, the 8th president, pronounced presidential system during his prime ministry and presidency. The support for presidential system was later voiced by Süleyman Demirel, the 9th president (İçener, 2015).

Before and after the 2007 referendum which brought in popular vote for presidential election, the debates on presidential system gained new ground. It was claimed that, as the president would be elected by the people starting from the next election in 2014, executive would have a dual structure because both the prime minister and the president would base their legitimacy on the same source: popular vote. Occasionally the then prime minister Erdoğan accused bureaucratism as the reason for his push for presidential system.

The latest comprehensive debate was launched after the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016. On October 1st the leader of the minor opposition party, MHP, mentioned constitutional amendment and presidential system in his speech at the parliament group which caught the immediate and intense attention of media. On October 17th and November 10th, the leaders of MHP and the governing AK Party came together to discuss the planned changes; on December 1st it was declared that an agreement was reached between two parties on a common text. On December 10th, the representatives of both parties shared the final text with the media.

The constitutional amendment package consisting of 18 articles which were supposed to realise the transition to presidential system was approved on the first days of 2017 by the parliament and submitted to referendum. The constitutional amendment proposal was accepted in the parliament on 21st January, 2017. The amendment consisted of 18 articles and envisaged radical changes in the government system of Turkey (“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasında”, 2017). The voting was scheduled for 16
April 2017 and the amendment was accepted with 51.41 percent of the votes.

**Arguments for Transition: Promoting Democracy and Stability?**

As regards the constitutional amendments, AK Party leaders and representatives emphasised that the amendment would strengthen the republic and improve Turkey’s democracy. In several statements it was underlined that the presidential system which was being introduced with the constitutional amendment would be a government model and that the unitary system would be preserved. Therefore, according to AK Party brochure, what was aimed was not a change of regime but a change of government system. With both legislative and the executive being directly elected by the people, a government model which was more democratic than parliamentary system would be adopted. The brochure claims that with the understanding of “single country, single flag, single state, single nation”, unitary structure would be preserved, republic and democracy would be strengthened, stability in government would be ensured and checks and balances would ensure resolution within government, and last but not the least, separation of powers would be fully realised.

Within this line of discussion, a number of justifications have been highlighted. For one thing, the amendment reduces the age of candidacy for parliament seats from 25 to 18 and, taking into consideration the increasing population of Turkey, the number of seats in the parliament is being increased from 550 to 600. According to the forerunners of “Yes” camp, this step is the result of the trust that government invests in the youth and their will to make sure that young people have a say in government. The candidacy age which was reduced from 30 to 25 in 2006 is being reduced to 18 with this amendment. It is contended that young people who use their voting rights at the age of 18 must also run for office which is the case in most democratic countries.

In addition, it is claimed that the representation of the nation in the parliament is being improved. There is no reduction in the roles and authorities of the parliament; on the contrary, in addition to its classical tasks

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5 See (“Erdoğan: Milletvekili Seçilme Yaşı”, 2017). Prime Minister Yıldırım’s parallel statements can be found in the media; for example, see (“Yıldırım: Seçilme Yaşı”, 2016).
such as proposing laws, approving the budget, or electing members to the supreme courts, it will perform its oversight function more effectively and, by increasing the number of members of parliament, the representation of national will is being strengthened. With the change introduced by the 9th article of the constitution, it is emphasised that the authority for jurisdiction will be used by independent and impartial courts in the name of the Turkish nation. Changes in the formation and structure of Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (SBJP) reinforce the principle of democratic government. With the proposed amendment, the number of members of SBJP is reduced from 22 to 13. The chairman of the board is still the Minister of Justice and undersecretary of the ministry continues to be a natural member. The board will work in two departments. Four members (3 from civil courts and 1 from administrative courts) of the board will be elected by the president and the remaining 7 members will be elected by the parliament (3 from Supreme Court of Cassation, 1 from Council of State, 3 among jurist academicians and lawyers) for a 4-year and renewable term. As a result, democratic legitimacy of the board is being strengthened. The elections held at courts of first instance are eliminated so as to prevent factionalism in the judiciary.

In the first days of 2017, the constitutional amendment proposal was brought to and accepted by the parliament. Both AK Party and MHP members emphasised “stability” during discussions inside and outside the parliament. They suggested that the amendment would introduce more stability and consensus to the country and that with this change, democracy was being strengthened and the people were claiming their place in the frontline of politics. People would hand the governing power to anyone they want. They are also concerned that parliamentary system can lead to some unstable consequences due to frequent changes of governments. Members of the two parties defended that coalition could be good in some countries, but when it comes to Turkey, the country gives back its gains during coalition periods which occur in every 10 years. When presidential system is introduced, instability will disappear for good as parliamentary and presidential elections will be held simultaneously.

Defenders of presidential system strongly attempted to establish an association between presidential system, political stability, and economic development. For instance, just before the amendment for constitutional change was introduced, Turkish Minister of Finance asserted that the “presidential system would make the economy boost” (“Başkanlık Sistemi”, 2016). In a similar vein, Minister of Development emphasised that
for the stability of political system and economic development presidential system was very critical: “Everyone should insist on this system as a government model which guarantees political stability and government stability. On one hand parliament should be strengthened and on the other hand the system has to guarantee stability in government” (“Başkanlık Sistemi”, 2015).

Arguments against Transition: Establishing Authoritarian Rule?

The arguments that constitutional amendment will weaken democracy instead of strengthening it are also widely debated. According to the members of the “no” camp, the President will be reduced from an all-comprehensive level to a lower one where he/she will embrace only the provincial and district organizations of his party while pushing off and marginalising the others. In order to strengthen national unity, the president has to be able to embrace the entire Turkish nation. When the president becomes the chairperson of a political party, the veto power that he holds will lead to such results. The parliament will prepare the lists of potential MPs of his party as the chairperson. Then, as the president of the state, he will approve or veto the laws that the parliament passes. The president will choose the members of parliament who will do nothing but being paid, sitting in fancy rooms, using publicly paid phones and riding luxury official cars. Parliament will be reduced to a much less effective level than it is today.

The chairperson of Union of Bar Associations claimed that all members of the SBJP will be assigned by the president in effect. Six of the members will be directly elected by the president and the remaining 7 members will be named in parliamentary committees and the plenary session. As the majority of the MPs are also from the ruling party, the president will act like the chairperson of his political party and choose the remaining 7 members which is “unacceptable”. He asserted that “the constitutional amendment targets a totalitarian regime by concentrating legislative, executive and even judiciary powers in the hands of one person, by-passing the parliament, and submitting the will of the nation to a single person. This one-man regime which is contrary to the pluralist social structure of Turkey is the death warrant of democracy” (“Türkiye Barolar Birliği Başkanı”, 2017).
A number of political parties including the major opposition party, Republican People’s Party (CHP), People’s Democracy Party (HDP), Felicity Party (SP) and Democrat Party (DP) objected the proposed amendment. CHP leadership claimed that (CHP Brochure, 2017) the purpose of the amendment was to introduce a change of regime and transition to an authoritarian regime with sovereignty concentrated in the hands of a single person. It laid the constitutional foundations of bringing an end to the already fragile Turkish democracy and replacing it with an authoritarian, totalitarian dictatorship. This regime is not based on separation of powers; instead, it concentrates all powers in the hands of the president. It is a dictatorship as the president gains control of the legislative and the judiciary in addition to the executive. The proposed regime lacks checks and balances mechanisms; the system is based on lack of restraints on presidential authorities. The approval and veto authorities of parliament are seen as blockage reasons and thus removed. The president of the new system concentrated all executive authorities in his hands; he will also act as the chairman of the party and interfere with legislative and judiciary. He will have far more powers than today’s prime minister and ministers, but his responsibilities will be much less. As a party-member, the president will be allowed to choose MP candidates and thus interfere with the constitution of the Parliament, dissolve parliament whenever he deems necessary, through presidential decrees he will associate himself with legislative authority, and he will be allowed to veto laws. As the chairman of the party, he will prepare the list of potential MPs and chair the parliamentary group of the party. Thus, he will be able to shape and influence the parliament as he wished. He will also be able to assign the highest judges of the country as a party leader; as a result, the judiciary will be highly politicized. CHP leadership claimed that once presidential system was introduced, the order of the country would be established by a single person. In addition, 6 of the 13 members of Board of Judges and Prosecutors will also have been appointed by the president; thus, “a single man will construct the order which will interpret the laws of 80 million people.”

Felicity Party declared that it was not against the presidential system in principle, but that the offered amendment did not envisage a model which was based on the rule of law and separation of powers; instead, it would lead to the supremacy of the executive. The party chairman Karamollaoğlu announced that they would vote “no” in the referendum for constitutional amendment which proposed party-member presidency. In a press statement, Karamollaoğlu stated that the offered amendment did not preserve
the principle of separation of powers and emphasised that concentrating all powers in one hand would create serious problems in the representation of “national will”. After the constitutional amendment text was signed by the President and published in Official Gazette, Felicity Party began to voice its criticisms more manifestly and shared in detail with the public its reasons for voting “no” in press statements, TV programs and referendum brochures. The main reasons were weakening of the parliament, failure to ensure separation of powers and judicial independence, and insufficient oversight on the executive.

Although MHP leader Bahçeli declared that he would vote “yes” in the referendum and urged the party members to vote in the same direction, an opposition group within the party participated in the “no” camp. The most influential name of this group, Akşener, opposed the constitutional amendment based on some reasons similar to the foregoing. She claimed that party-member president would assign rectors, assign BJP members, and then all MPs whose wills became virtually non-effective would be dependent on the will of a single man. Another opponent in MHP, Halaçoğlu, stated that what presidential system would introduce in Turkey was the dissolution of Republic of Turkey and a one-man rule. He claimed that constitutional amendment would pave the way for autonomy, federalism and disintegration. The increased powers of the president with the amendment were similar to the powers of Ba’ath regimes of Syria and Iraq. He will be able to do anything he wants anytime he wants without consulting anyone.6

In addition to the mainstream political parties, many civil society stakeholders7 in the “No” camp claimed that if the constitution was amended as the government proposed, it would symbolize the end of the democratic republic in Turkey. Having experienced a de-facto presidential system for the last 2-3 years, this amendment proposal envisaged a change of regime. Both in parliamentary systems and in presidential systems, there are indispensable elements such as separation of powers which is being abolished with the constitutional amendment. One of the results of this change is to hand the entire power to a single man and to grant him the authority to dis-

7 They include some influential NGOs such as Turkish Union of Bars (TBB), The Association of Human Rights and Victims (Mazlumder), Association of Human Rights (İHD) and Istanbul Culture and Arts Foundation (IKSV).
solve the parliament which consists of the representatives of the people. A single person obtains the authority to dissolve the parliament which represents the will and sovereignty of the nation.

International Reflections on the Constitutional Amendments and Referendum Process

The 2016 constitutional amendment which introduced presidential system in Turkey had wide reflections in the global arena. In particular some European bodies interested themselves in Turkish politics before and after the referendum. One of these bodies, the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law), which is the European Union body specialised on constitutional law, made some essential points. The report published on March 13th, 2017 by Venice Commission evaluates the constitutional amendment proposed for referendum from the perspectives of democracy and human rights. According to the report, the amendment aims at founding a Turkish-style presidential system which represents a decisive disengagement from the well-established parliamentary tradition of Turkey. It is not based on the separation of powers logic which is the fundamental feature of democratic presidential systems. For example, the amendment proposes that presidential and parliamentary elections will be held simultaneously to prevent potential conflicts between the legislative and the executive. As a result, the formal separation of the two bodies will not be realised in practical terms and the role of the parliament, which has less power, will be marginalized. In addition, the political accountability of the president will be limited to the elections which are held in every five years.

The report also emphasises the social and political environment in which the constitutional amendment was passed and voted in referendum. The amendment was prepared and passed during a state of emergency declared after the failed 15 July coup attempt which imposed comprehensive restrictions on freedoms of expression and assembly. The situation is especially unfavourable for journalism activities. In a public debate environment which is becoming increasingly one-sided, and that side being pro-government, the possibility of holding a meaningful and inclusive referendum process is questionable. As a result, Venice Commission thinks that the constitutional amendment represents a dangerous U-turn from the constitutional democratic tradition in Turkey. The commission puts emphasis
on the threat that the proposed system can turn into an authoritarian and personal regime. In addition, it believes that timing is “rather meaningful” for such an important change thinking that a state of emergency is in force.

Another European body which took active part in referendum debates was Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a body with 57 members (including Turkey). In order to observe the Turkish referendum on constitutional amendment in 2017, OSCE assigned a core team of 11 staff from 7 participating states and 24 long-term observers headed by Tana de Zulueta from Italy. OSCE essentially interpreted the voting procedures. However, it also gives brief description of the background of the voting. In that section the report interprets that the constitutional reform package “transfers some of the parliament’s key oversight functions to an executive presidency” and “empowers the president to appoint some high-level positions in the judiciary”. It also cites the Venice Commission report (2017) stating that “the proposed amendments would result in a system where the separation of powers and the independence of judiciary are not assured” which will result in a presidential regime without checks and balances necessary “to safeguard against becoming an authoritarian one”. In another reference to the Venice Commission report, OSCE team agrees that “in its opinion on the amendments to the Constitu-

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8 For example, observers stated that the Turkish referendum “fell short of international standards” as both sides “did not have equal campaign opportunities”. The report claimed that the “voters weren’t provided with impartial information on key aspects of what they were voting for”. In addition to the report, the statements of OSCE team members are also eye-opening. For example, Tana de Zulueta, head of the ODIHR limited election observation mission, said that “the referendum took place in a political environment in which fundamental freedoms essential to a genuinely democratic process were curtailed under the state of emergency, and the two sides did not have equal opportunities to make their case to the voters.” Another team member, Cezar Florin Preda, who was the head of the PACE delegation, told that “in general, the referendum did not live up to Council of Europe standards. The legal framework was inadequate for the holding of a genuinely democratic process”. The report itself brought grave criticism to the referendum process. Among the preliminary conclusions, the report claimed that “voters were not provided with impartial information about key aspects of the reform, and civil society organizations were not able to participate. Under the state of emergency put in place after the July 2016 failed coup attempt, fundamental freedoms essential to a genuinely democratic process were curtailed” (OSCE, 2017: 1). In addition, the practice of voting 18 amendments affecting 72 articles of the constitution in a radical way was contrary to the international good practice of referenda (OSCE, 2017: 2).
tion, the Venice Commission noted that the state of emergency did not provide for the due democratic setting for a constitutional referendum.”

Finally, on July 6th, European Parliament voted to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey. The report prepared by Turkey rapporteur Kati Piri had called that if the constitutional reform package was implemented unchanged, Turkey’s accession negotiations should be officially suspended; the report was accepted with a wide margin. It is significant that European Parliament relates suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey, which is a first of its kind in the history of enlargement, to the constitutional reform package and asserts that this package will endanger democracy in Turkey.

**Conclusion**

The transition of Turkey from parliamentary to presidential system does not have any dimension which is rational and supportable in terms of stability or democracy. This is because of the fact that when countries ruled with parliamentary and presidential systems are compared, it can be seen that parliamentary countries are strikingly superior. Presidential countries are less stable and more problematic in terms of democracy. It should be noted that the USA is an exception among presidential countries. The facts that checks and balances mechanisms are well-established, legislative and executive are elected on different dates, the president is elected for a fixed term, a strong parliament exists and, last but not the least, most powers are transferred to the states due to its federal structure, ensure that the system works without too much trouble. Its position as the global superpower allows for the sustainability of presidential system in USA in economic terms.

The political system voted in Turkey in April 2017 is radically different from the American presidential system. It consists of several changes which are not compatible with a democratic presidential system. From this perspective, in order to understand the change that Turkey went through, it would be better to look at Latin American, African and Central Asian countries instead of USA system.

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In such presidential countries as Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palau, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe presidential and parliamentary elections are held on the same day. Both elections are held once in every four or five years. In some other presidential countries, the two elections are held on different dates. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Chad, Congo, Cyprus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Philippines, South Korea, Ruanda and Tajikistan10 can be given as example to the countries where presidential and parliamentary elections are held separately.

Although almost none is a champion of democracy, some presidential systems are more problematic than others. The assignment of ministers and some top-level bureaucrats require parliamentary approval. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Palau, Philippines, South Korea, Rwanda, Tajikistan and Uganda seek parliamentary approval for the assignment of ministers. In Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Guatemala, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, assignments are made directly by the president and parliamentary approval is not sought (IPU, n.d.). The system adopted in Turkey leaves the assignment of ministers to the president alone and parliamentary control and approval is not in question. The simultaneity of elections and assignment of ministers by the president alone without seeking parliamentary approval shed light on the nature of the constitutional amendments in Turkey. Likewise, in that scope, many presidential countries in the world allow for control through oral or written questions, but in Turkey asking questions to the president will not be allowed; in addition, ministers are also exempted from information and accountability responsibilities through answering oral questions.

Turkey did not adopt parliamentary system for the first time with the new Republic in 1920s. Albeit a little late, Turkey experienced the evolution from monarchy to parliamentary system in 19th century. Similar to the restraining of absolute monarchy and establishment of parliamentary system in England, the political system in Ottoman Empire gained a constitutional structure with reform movement. After the First World War, parliamentary system was maintained by the young republic. This means that Turkey has an experience of almost 150 years with parliamentary system.

10 Data here are compiled from “Parline Database” of Inter-Parliamentary Union (n.d.).
With 2017 constitutional amendment, Turkey broke with its historical and institutional past and adopted presidential system.

During this amendment, one provision not related to presidential system was injected to the system which could only be seen in authoritarian and party-state systems: the president could also be the chairman of a political party. This practice is not witnessed in democratic parliamentary and presidential systems. However, with its polarizing and fragmenting potential, this practice is observed in some authoritarian African countries such as Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Unlike other provisions of the constitutional amendment, party-member presidency went into effect immediately after the referendum. President Erdoğan became a member of AK Party in early May; a few weeks later he was the elected chairman of the party. This development appears to have deeply affected political, social and economic conditions and the relations between governing and opposition parties. The president being the chairman of a political party during his term triggered the debates on his impartiality and respectability, and gave a serious blow to his capacity as the representative of all citizens.

Judiciary was also reshaped in this process of radical change in political system. Election of members of BJP and its functioning was reorganized and within one month after the referendum, the terms of existing members ended and new members were elected by the president and AK Party and MHP parliamentarians, a practice which ignited the debates on the impartiality and independence of judiciary. The major opposition party and pro-Kurdish HDP did not attend the voting for BJP seats ("TBMM, Hakimler ve Savcılar", 2017). As part of the arrests of members of parliament, the chairman of major opposition party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu began his “march for justice” from Ankara to Istanbul in June 2017. It seems that debates on reshaping of politics will continue in the following months, even years.

Transition from parliamentary system to presidential system in Turkey seems at distance from a democratic framework both in terms of content and the method of transition itself. The discussions in this section show that, amidst intense debates and objections, presidential system will make problems of Turkish democracy more chronic instead of making contribution to their solution. The long-term problem of Turkey was the failure to regulate the structure and functioning according to the principles of parliamentary system and to adequately constrain the executive according to the rule of law principle (Bağce, 2016: 259). The reports of Venice Commission and OSCE list these problems in their relation with the latest change.
in political system. The events of 2016-2017, the implementation of state of emergency and the constitutional change under state of emergency led European Council Parliamentary Assembly to re-open the monitoring procedure for Turkey in terms of human rights and freedoms, rule of law and democracy, which is a clear indication of the status and choice of Turkey.

The fundamental problem of Turkey is its unwillingness to constrain the executive power. In this referendum process, the executive organ itself introduced the demands for constraining government power as the causes of instability and presented practices aiming at concentrating power in one person in an uncontrollable fashion as “stability”. If it could be seen and expressed that the source of the political crisis in Turkey was inadequate constraints on the executive which concentrated most of the power in its hands so that other institutions suffered various weaknesses, the solution could be sought in a more accurate and realist framework. It could be understood that what made problems chronic were 10 percent election threshold and political party system which had been applied for more than three decades which lacks democratic qualifications. The solution of legitimacy problems experienced in the country could be sought not in making the executive stronger than other branches of government and immunizing it from oversight in many respects, but in further institutionalisation of democracy. The current and future problems of Turkey can be solved by participatory democracy, rule of law, constraining government power, accountability, freedom of press, and existence of a civil society independent from government which are basic components of any democracy. We hope that Turkey can draw conclusions from all these experiences by exploring democracy and the importance and meaning of its constituents.

References


Institutional Transformation of Turkey in the EU Negotiation Process: The Case of Ombudsman

H. Kutay Aytuğ*

Introduction

Ombudsman, which has been in use in various countries of the world and aims to stand by individuals in the face of unfair acts and procedures of the administration, protects their rights and freedoms and serve the goal of good administration, was established in Turkey due to European Union (EU) negotiation process. Ombudsman is a construct that may offer new opportunities in helping Turkey to reach its ideal of being a democratic state of law.

This chapter will draw a conceptual perspective of ombudsman institution. First of all, historical background of the ombudsman institution in the world will be laid out. Secondly, this paper will focus on the decision and establishment of ombudsman institution in Turkey. Thirdly, that evaluation of Turkish Ombudsman Institution and its classification for its decisions will be exhibited. Finally, it will share some suggestions about what could be done to improve the success of institution.

Conceptual Perspective: Ombudsman

Today, in most of the EU countries, the Ombudsman institutions play an influential role in defending fundamental rights in accordance with international and European standards (Alyanak, 2015: 2), solving and investigating complaints about maladministration in the subnational, national and supranational bodies. During the 20th century, government administration has extremely expanded and complaints about bureaucratic conduct have grown in parallel (Reif, 2004: 1). In response, the notion of ombudsman

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spread continuously throughout the world in the course of the 20th century (Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008: 1). Although ombudsman is a contemporary institution in the majority of EU countries, its origin goes back to the 1700s thanks to Swedish Ombudsmanship. After a military defeat by Russia in 1709, the Swedish king, Charles XII, fled to Turkey for some years. In 1713, due to deterioration in the country because of the long absence of the monarch, he appointed a representative to monitor the conduct of the Swedish administration and judiciary, and named the official “Justitiekanslern” (Chancellor of Justice) in 1719 (Reif, 2004: 5). Historically, Charles XII had been affected from his observations in Turkey because Turkish Sultan had an adviser close to him, to whom people could come and communicate their comments and complaints about how the laws were followed in the empire (Pickl, 1986: 39; Alyanak, 2015: 3; Şengül, 2013: 73). However, the first independent and contemporary ombudsman-institution was established in Sweden after the King was deposed in 1809 (Reif, 2004: 5). Approximately one hundred years later, ombudsman institution was copied in Finland in 1919. Then, similar institution was established in Denmark in 1955. The ombudsman concept began to spread to the rest of the world after early 1960s (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2005: 14; Ziller, 2001: 105; Reif, 2004: 6; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008: 1-2; Gregory & Giddings, 2000: 7; Buck, Kirkham, & Thompson, 2016: 10).

Today, different countries prefer different words to define Ombudsman such as “le Médiateur” in France, “Defensor del Pueblo” in Spain, “Difensor Civico” in Italy (Gregory & Giddings, 2000: 4; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008: 6) “Kamu Denetçisi” in Turkey. Although every country has different ombudsman institution because of their administration tradition, the core functions of ombudsman institutions remain same (Gregory & Giddings, 2000: 5).

In modern world, ombudsman is a public sector institution and preferably is established by the legislative branch of government to watch over the administrative activities of the executive to receive and to investigate complaints from the public concerning the management of government administration objectively (Reif, 2004: 1-2). Fundamental functions of classical ombudsman institutions are:

To investigate complaints from citizens against public authorities, to initiate own motion investigation,
If complaints are found to be justified to secure or recommend redress for aggrieved persons and,
To recommend improvement, revision in systems, working practice and administration procedures; or if there is no system, advise to minimise the risk of repeating the same mistakes (Gregory & Giddings, 2000: 5).

There are some characteristic features for a successful ombudsman. These are: visibility, accessibility (absence of barriers en route to the office), credibility in the eyes of both general public and administration which are subject to his jurisdiction, being impartial and independent, having adequate power of investigation, completing investigations quickly, being effective and accountable (Gregory & Giddings, 2000: 5-6; Owen, 1999).

Today, there are various types or categories of ombudsman offices and different scholars can categorise them differently (Frahm, 2013: 13-16). This paper categorises them in 5 groups:

1. Governmental Ombudsman (Classical Ombudsman or Traditional Ombudsman) with general jurisdiction over administration conduct;
2. Governmental Single Purpose Ombudsman is concerned with only one area of administration or is responsible for protecting the interest of only one category of complainants such as environment, health service, the armed forces, the police or prisoners etc.;
3. Hybrid Ombudsman (Civil Rights Ombudsman or Human Rights Ombudsman), while continuing to focus the task of classical ombudsman’s

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1 On the contrary some scholar can prefer more detailed classification, for example Reif (2004: 26-28) categorises in 10 groups. These are: 1) Public Sector Legislative Ombudsman, 2) Public Sector Executive Ombudsman, Public Sector Hybrid Ombudsman: Human Rights, Anti-Corruption, Leadership Code Enforcement etc. 4) Public Sector Legislative or Executive Ombudsman with Limited Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (the "Single-Sector", "Single-Purpose" or "Specialty" Ombudsman), 5) Executive Organizational Ombudsman Created by Government Departments, Agencies or State Corporations to Handle Internal and/or External Complaints, 6) Hybrid Public/Private Sector Ombudsman for an Entire Industry or Service Sector Created by Legislation to Resolve Complaints Made by Customers/Clients, 7) Self-Regulatory Ombudsman for an Industry or Service Sector Created by the Industry/Service Sector to Resolve Complaints Made by Customers/Clients, 8) Organizational Ombudsman Created by Private Sector Institutions and Corporations, 9) The International Organization Workplace Ombudsman, 10) Creation of the Classical Ombudsman at the International or Supranational Level of Governance.
conventional maladministration issues, it has a broader focus that includes human rights and anti-corruption activities;

4. Quasi-ombudsman (agency based ombudsman or in-house Ombudsman) addresses grievances within one institution (Gregory & Giddings, 2000: 8-10; Frahm, 2013: 13-16; Ayeni, 2014: 501);

5. Ombudsman at the international or supranational level of governance (Gregory & Giddings, 2000: 9).

In the next chapter, historical background of Turkish Ombudsman Institution, one of the youngest in the world, will be examined.

Establishment and Development of Turkish Ombudsman Institution

Although, there are some historical institutions for investigating complaints about maladministration in Turkey, they are not independent institutions like an ombudsman. The State Supervisory Council, Grand National Assembly of Turkey Committee on Petitions, Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Investigation Commission, Arbitration Committee for Consumer Problems and Council of Ethics for Public Officials are the main control and investigation institutions in modern Turkey.

Even though Turkish Ombudsman Institution is one of the newest ombudsman institutions (Alyanak, 2015, p. 4), the debate of establishment had started in the 1970s (Saygün, 2008: 1046; Sürekli, 2016: 201; Erhürman, 2000: 155; Sezen, 2001: 72). The State Planning Organization (SPO/ DPT: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı)² targeted to found one ombudsman institution in the name of “Devlet Avukatlığı Kurumu (State Advocacy Authority)” to assist the authorities to resolve disputes before they come to trial for the first time in the fourth five-year Development Plan 1979-1983 (DPT, 1979: 484).

In 1990s, discussions about the establishment of ombudsman institution started in parliament. The politicians who are also important scholars and writers working on ombudsman and human rights such as Hikmet Sami Türk (1998) and Zekeriya Temizel (1997) contributed to this debate. At that time, the SPO brought back the agenda with the target of establishment of an ombudsman institution in the seventh five-year Development Plan.

² The State Planning Organization which was founded in 1960 was reorganized as the Ministry of Development in June 2011 with Decree Law No. 641.

Furthermore, some NGOs prepared some reports about ombudsman institution. For example, TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) suggested a broad participation conference to define the feature of ombudsman (TÜSİAD, 1997: 30). TOBB (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) analysed the ombudsman in the context of reorganising of government in EU membership process (TOBB, 2000).

As mentioned above, although Turkey’s interest for ombudsman had started in 1970s, it increased after Helsinki Summit, held in 1999 (Saygın, 2008: 1053). European Commission emphasised the importance of establishment of the ombudsman institution in different progress reports. According to European Commission (European Commission, 2005: 12), ombudsman office would be the key institution in improving the efficiency of public administration and in detecting corruption. Furthermore, formation of an inspection mechanism via the Ombudsman would help defuse tensions between different sections of society by strengthening the rule of law and the protection of individual rights (Commission of the European Communities, 2008: 13).

First important political initiative is the proposal by Ankara University members to establish an ombudsman institution for the protection of rights and freedoms during the preparations of the 1982 Constitution (Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1982: 137-139). Then, the target of joining EU accelerated to establish an ombudsman institution. Thus, a commission was assembled to draft an ombudsman law with the participants from academia, related ministries and judiciary in 1997. This draft was submitted to the Prime Ministry and afterwards to The Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1999, but was shelved until the 2002 elections. Following the election, AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/ Justice and Development Party) government updated this draft in 2004 and it passed into a law on June 2006 for strengthening the EU reform process (Alyanak, 2008: 13).

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3 European Commission published its first regular report in 1998. Commission confirmed that the appointment of an independent Ombudsman had long been under discussion by the TGNA in its first report (European Commission, 1998: 17).
4 Law No. 5521 was passed on June 15, 2006 (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 2006.).
The establishment of ombudsman law was cancelled by The Turkish Constitutional Court due to the incompatibility with the Constitution\(^5\) (The Constitutional Court of Republic of Turkey, 2008). The ombudsman institution could be established after ratification of the constitutional reform package on the 12\(^{th}\) of September 2010 referendum.

Article 74 of the constitution (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 2017) was amended after the 12\(^{th}\) of September 2010 referendum and these paragraphs added with the Act No. 5982\(^6\) and article 8.

“Everyone has the right to obtain information and appeal to the Ombudsperson.

The Institution of the Ombudsperson established under the Grand National Assembly of Turkey examines complaints on the functioning of the administration.

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Chief Ombudsperson shall be elected by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for a term of four years by secret ballot. In the first two ballots, a two-thirds majority of the total number of members, and in the third ballot an absolute majority of the total number of members shall be required. If an absolute majority cannot be obtained in the third ballot, a fourth ballot shall be held between the two candidates who have received the greatest number of votes in the third ballot; the candidate who receives the greatest number of votes in the fourth ballot shall be elected.

The way of exercising these rights referred to in this article, the establishment, duties, functioning of the Ombudsperson Institution and its proceedings after the examination and the procedures and principles regarding the qualifications, elections and personnel rights of the Chief Ombudsperson and ombudspersons shall be laid down in law.”

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5 For a critical analysis of this decision see the article of Saygın (2008) “Ombudsmanı Beklerken: Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu Kanunu İptaline Dair Gerekçeli Karari Üzerine Bir İnceleme”.

After these constitutional amendments, *Law on the Ombudsman Institution* (Law no: 6328), based on the previous Ombudsman Law (Law no: 5548), was legitimised in 2012. According to this law, Turkish Ombudsman Institution is responsible for examining, investigating, and submitting recommendations to the administration\(^7\) with regard to all sorts of acts and actions as well as attitudes and behaviours of the administration upon complaint on the functioning of the administration within the framework of an understanding of human rights-based justice and in the aspect of legality and conformity with principles of fairness. However, the acts of the President on his/her own competence and the decisions and orders signed by the President ex officio; the acts concerning the execution of the legislative power; the acts concerning the execution of the judicial power; the acts of the Turkish Armed Forces, which are purely of military nature are outside the competence of the Institution (Article 5). In addition, according to article 5 of the Regulation on Procedures and Principles Concerning the Implementation of Law on the Ombudsman Institution (*Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu*, 2013), complaints concerning the disputes which are being dealt with or have been resolved by judicial organs; re-lodged complaints, whose reasons, content and parties are the same and are being examined, or which have previously been ruled on; and complaints without a certain subject are not examined.

The institution comprises of the Office of the Chief Ombudsman and the Office of the Secretary-General. In addition, five ombudsmen, a Secretary-General and other staff members work at the Institution. Although headquarters of institution is in Ankara, the institution may open branches if deemed necessary. So, the institution opened its first branch in İstanbul (*The Ombudsman Institution*, 2017).

Today, institution works as a public legal institution with private budget under the Office of the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of...

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\(^7\) The definition of administration in the article 3-e is that “The public administrations under the central government, social security institutions, local administrations, affiliated administrations of local administrations, local administrative unions, organizations with the circulating capital, the funds established under laws, public organizations, public economic enterprises, associated public organizations, and their affiliates and subsidiaries, professional organizations with public institution status, and private legal entities providing public services” (*The Ombudsman Institution*, 2012: 1).
Evaluation of Turkish Ombudsman Institution and Its Decisions

Although the Turkish Ombudsman Institution is situated in a relational field with the other state institutions, the law enacts this institution as an autonomous public authority and thereby bring independence from any other public authority (Alyanak, 2015: 11) It is also a "hybrid ombudsman" because it takes responsibility for examining all sorts of actions ranging from public administration to human rights complaints. On the other hand, a closer look on the reports of the institution displays the fact that the language used in them has a significant political bias under the circumscription of the state identity.

There were 24,851 complaints (7,638 complaints in 2013, 5,639 complaints in 2014, 6,055 complaints in 2015, and 5,519 complaints in 2016) to the institution between 2013 and 2016 years (T.C. Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu (Ombudsmanlık), 2017: 85).

As seen on the table 1, approximately one third of the complaints in 2016 are about public personnel regime. These are problems faced by civil servants in entering public services, being employed on the ground, in financial rights, in assessing their performance and potentials, in appointment and promotion, in governance participation, in in-service training (T.C. Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu (Ombudsmanlık), 2017: 145-146). Complaints of education, youth and sports are more than 12% of all complaints in 2016. These complaints consist of objection to placement dates with KPSS (Kamu Personeli Seçme Sınavı / Public Personnel Selection Examination), objection to exam results, requests for learning credits / scholarships, objections to jury and jury evaluations in Assistant Professor/Associate Professor Examinations, course exemption requests and objection to diploma equivalencies (T.C. Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu (Ombudsmanlık), 2017: 205-206). Approximately one tenth of the complaints occurred on labour and social security issues. These complaints are intensified on old age pension, survivor's pension, retirement bonus, disability, service determination, general health insurance premium claim, social security support problems, additional payment requests, etc. in 2016 (T.C. Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu (Ombudsmanlık), 2017: 169). According to classification of Turkish Ombudsman Institution, more than 6% of complaints...
are on services provided by local administrations; and justice, national defence and security issues. Complaints about services provided by local administrations are composed of zoning services for local administrations, public transport services, municipal police services, etc. (T.C. Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu (Ombudsmanlık), 2017: 221-222). Majority of applications of justice national defence and security division are related with transfer requests to a penitentiary institution close to the families of detainees and prisoners. In addition, applications for deletion of criminal records held in the UYAP (Ulusal Yargı Ağı Bilişim Sistemi- National Judiciary Informatics System), bar management board transactions, weapons license requests, military personnel issues, and enforcement proceedings...

### Table 1: Distribution of Complaints by Years and Subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complaint Subject</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>2016 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Personnel Regime</td>
<td>2,142</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>6,834</td>
<td>31,87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>4,224</td>
<td>12,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour and Social Security</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>2,248</td>
<td>10,07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Provided by Local Administrations</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>6,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, National Defence and Security</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>6,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy, Finance and Tax</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>5,91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>5,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>3,93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietary Right</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>2,81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Rights</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>0,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's Rights</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest, Water, Environment and Urbanism</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>2,17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy, Industry, Customs and Trade</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>2,01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>1,99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, Press and Communication</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>1,94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability Rights</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>1,88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>1,05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, Citizenship, Refugee and Asylum Seeker</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, Agriculture and Livestock</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0,36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Family</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science, Art, Culture and Tourism</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,638</td>
<td>5,639</td>
<td>6,055</td>
<td>5,519</td>
<td>24,851</td>
<td>100,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

are submitted (T.C. Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu (Ombudsmanlık), 2017: 119-120).

Finally more than 5% of appeals are about both human rights economy, finance and tax issues. In the field of economy, finance and tax, especially complaints about banking transactions, insurance transactions, and tender offer transactions are remarkable.

In contrast to other maladministration complaints, in case the complaint is related to human rights, fundamental rights and freedoms, women's rights, children's rights and general issues related to the public interest, investigation could start regardless of the violation of interest. In 2016, violations of freedom of assembly and expression, the right to life, the right to freedom of movement, freedom of thought, liberty of conscience, freedom of religion and belief, the rights of prisoners, the right to obtain information and the right to petition are the main application reasons related to human rights (T.C. Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu (Ombudsmanlık), 2017: 106-109) which is important part of EU Law and Copenhagen Criteria. As mentioned in European Commission report (2014: 11), the recommendations of institution referred to relevant European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments enshrining fundamental democratic principles such as the presumption of innocence, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of assembly, and prevention of excessive use of force by law enforcement officers. On the other hand, Turkish Ombudsman Institution lacks *ex officio* powers to initiate investigations and to intervene in cases with legal remedies (European Commission, 2015: 10).

Generally, the Turkish Ombudsman Institution has been active and has built up its capacity of handling ordinary cases of maladministration. Hence, public administration improved its follow-up on the recommendations of institution to 38% in 2014 from 24% in 2013 (European Commission, 2015: 10). According to European Commission (European Commission, 2016: 12) the public administration’s follow-up to his recommendations continued to increase in 2016.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

In spite of the fact that debate of establishment an ombudsman institution had started in 1970s, it is founded as a hybrid ombudsman in 2012 on the occasion of the EU integration process. Mostly, Turkish Ombudsman Institution has been active and built up its capacity of treatment on malad-
ministration and human rights issue. Hence the public administration’s follow-up to its recommendations has increased since 2013.

On the one hand, the ombudsman institution has given recommendations in line with ECtHR rulings on key issues, such as freedom of assembly and preventing disproportionate use of force by law enforcement officers; on the other hand, it has contributed to raising awareness of citizens’ fundamental rights in Turkey.

In time, ombudsman office may be a key institution in improving the efficiency of public administration and in detecting corruption, may help to decrease tensions between different sections of society and may diminish political polarisation by strengthening the rule of law and the protection of individual rights in Turkey. For this purpose, ombudsman institution has to increase visibility, power of investigation, and credibility in the eyes of both general public and administrators. Ombudsman institution should open new offices in different metropolis of Turkey, publish and broadcast public service announcement to increase its awareness. Moreover, it has to gain *ex officio* powers to initiate investigations, to intervene in cases of legal remedies and to be seen more independent and autonomous from the other state institutions.

References


