Germany’s and Poland’s engagement in missions and operations of the European Union

Karol Janoś

Introduction

The involvement of military forces in foreign missions and operations – as an instrument of foreign policy – has been increasing with the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU). The CSDP’s aim is not only to prevent international security threats in the surroundings of the EU, but also to further the national interests of particular member states.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role and place of the CSDP within the policies of both Germany and Poland on the basis of the involvement of the armed forces of Germany, i.e. the Bundeswehr, and the armed forces of Poland in missions and operations of military character of the European Union. The comparison of the engagement of these two countries has been made on the basis of case studies of chosen military missions and operations of the European Union in the Balkans, Africa and the Mediterranean carried out previously and currently being performed. The comparative analysis relies on such criteria as: motivation to engage in the mission, character of the operation, amount of troops, presence in the command structures of the operation and the type of tasks performed. The analysed operations have been carried out mainly during the previous decade and are ongoing.

The EU’s missions and operations with a military dimension

Challenges connected with structural changes to the status quo of international security after the fall of the Soviet Union and the aspiration to strengthen the political role of Europe as an active participant in international politics have led to the development of capacities of the European Union in the field of security and defence policy. Only after the Treaty of Nice of 1 February 2003 had come into force and the CSDP had been pro-
claimed, did the EU gain full power to carry out the Petersberg tasks (agreed in 1992), which covered the spectrum of military actions that the European Union can accomplish within its crisis management operations. The EU’s entitlement to carry out missions and operations was also confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty. According to its provisions, the EU is entitled to lead missions comprising: peacekeeping, prevention of conflicts, strengthening international security, common diffusion tasks, humanitarian and rescue missions, military consulting and support, missions aimed at crisis management and restoring peace and stabilisation after conflict expiry.

Analysing the EU’s activity in the field of operations over the last years, one should mention their progressive diversity (Gnesotto, 2012, p. 74). The EU has widened the spectrum of the operations within the CSDP. In previous years there have been many various missions, e.g.: diffusion of conflicts, consultancy missions to reform the security sector, humanitarian missions and operations aimed at combating sea piracy; whereas the scope of execution of missions and operations underwent minor changes. Military engagement is still concentrated in the area of Balkan countries and Africa.

One should note that the number of partner organisations of the EU has multiplied. In the beginning, NATO was the main partner with whom military operations were carried out. The meaning of the EU as a contributor to global security grew gradually, which in turn led to raising its attractiveness in the eyes of external partners – in 2006 the United Nations became the EU’s privileged partner. Soldiers from non-EU member states are engaged almost in all missions and operations of the EU. An example could be the European Union mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), aimed at helping Darfur refugees, which also involved Albanian, Croatian and Russian troops. To date, six missions and operations have been carried out by the EU. At present there are seven active operations: European Union Force (EUFOR) “Althea” (since 2004), European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) “Atalanta” (since 2008), European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia (since 2010), European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali (since 2013), European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) “Sophia” (since 2015) and EU military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) since 2016.
Germany’s and Poland’s positions

Since the 1990s Germany has belonged to a group of states that actively support the process of developing the EU’s military capability. Germany’s intensified efforts to strengthen the European security and development policy were performed in particular during the rule of SPD/the Greens. Germany’s main direction of activity was related to conflict prevention. This reflected the main guidelines of Gerhard Schröder’s programme in which Germany’s foreign affairs and security policies were seen as actions directed towards the enhancement of peace (*Friedenspolitik*) (Malinowski, 2015, p. 137). An illustrative example is the intense diplomatic pressure taken to establish the EU’s Political and Security Committee, which was aimed at playing a key role within formulating the EU’s operational goals addressing crisis situations. In addition, Germany declared itself in favour of establishing the Military Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS). Subsequently, Germany, France and the UK initiated the EU Battle Groups. This project was incorporated in the “Headline Goal 2010” and was intended to constitute a real contribution to the external intervention capabilities of the EU. From Germany’s perspective, participation in the Battle Groups was supposed to be a preparation mechanism for the Bundeswehr to fulfil altered tasks comprising the performance of new types of operations involving interventions (Miszczak, 2012, p. 292).

The next government formed by the coalition of the CDU/CSU-the SPD, continued and pursued Schröder’s efforts to develop the CSDP. The coalition agreement expressed the desire for its further development and the creation of international Battle Groups that should maintain their interoperability with NATO (Anon., 2005). Angela Merkel’s government also announced further actions towards the development of the CSDP during its presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2007. What remained puzzling was the fact that it did not present any initiatives to strengthen the military capability of the EU (Die Bundesregierung, 2007). The present government and coalition still express themselves in favour of strengthening the CSDP, however they are concentrating above all on its civilian dimension. The most recent German initiatives involve adapting

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1 During the negotiations of the Treaty of Nice Germany engaged itself strongly for both Military Committee and Military Staff to be mentioned in the Treaty. Due to strong protests of other EU member states this demand was denied.
one of the emergency Battle Groups to perform training tasks, as well as the Enable and Enhance Initiative, whose aim is to support consultancy and training projects through state structures and the EU’s support of military forces of third countries (Miszczak, 2014, p. 69).

Before Poland’s accession to the European Union, all its governments starting from the beginning of the 1990s evaluated positively the aim of developing the CSDP and the development of its own military capabilities. The formation of the CSDP offered no real guarantee of security. In the view of the Polish authorities, the only solid security base for Poland and Europe was NATO (Miszczak, 2016, p. 86). On the other hand, together with Poland’s EU accession, its engagement in European military capability grew. The development of the CSDP began to be understood as gaining additional support to a state’s security. One of the main factors regarding Poland’s engagement in the CSDP with other partners representing a more pro-Atlantic attitude was, on the one hand, the will to avoid the development of the CSDP such that it would lead to an alternative to NATO with the U.S. in the leading role, and on the other hand – the threat that it would be dominated by west European superpowers such as Germany and France (Malinowski, 2016, p. 150).

Poland’s engagement in the development of the military capabilities of the EU became more visible after the assumption of power in 2007 by the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Moreover, an improvement of general relations between Poland and Germany came afterwards. In Germany, in turn, the more toned-down politics of the CDU/CSU-FDP government in terms of the development of the CSDP and stressing that it could not compete with NATO had been noted.

Poland’s government during its presidency of the EU in 2011 suggested strengthening the EU’s capability in terms of planning and carrying out operations. The aims of the Polish presidency, however, relating to the CSDP were not achieved. The government succeeded only in stimulating discussion about strengthening the CSDP’s capabilities. The reason for this was the absence of political will of other member states that were at that time focused above all on saving the Eurozone, which was endangered by a crisis. Poland’s demands and suggestions were understood as being premature and having no real chance of being carried in the given political and economic situation of the EU at the time (Miszczak, 2016). The last initiatives taken for the CSDP by Poland involved the project to develop a Global Strategy of the EU, which was discussed during the summit of the Council of Europe in June 2015.

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Germany’s and Poland’s participation in the EU’s missions and operations – case studies

With regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, it has been engaged in four out of six EU-led missions and operations. German soldiers took part in the EU’s first operation under the name “Concordia”, carried out between March and December 2013 in FYROM and in two operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo) as well as in the operation EUFOR RCA (the Central African Republic). Currently, the Bundeswehr is taking part in two operations and two missions of the EU, namely: naval operations EUNAVFOR “Atalanta” and EUNAVFOR MED “Sophia” as well as training-mentoring missions aimed at supporting security and armed forces reforms in Somalia and Mali. About 550 out of 3,310 soldiers of the Bundeswehr have been directed to take part in such missions and operations.

Table 1. Carried out missions and operations of the European Union (2003–2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Participation of the Federal Republic of Germany</th>
<th>Participation of the Republic of Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR “Concordia”</td>
<td>The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>March 2003 – Dec 2003</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artemis</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>July 2003 – Sept 2003</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/RCA</td>
<td>Chad, Republic of Central Africa</td>
<td>2007–2009</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Libya</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011 (no action taken)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RCA</td>
<td>Republic of Central Africa</td>
<td>2014–2015</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMAM*) RCA</td>
<td>Republic of Central Africa</td>
<td>2015–2016</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) EU Military Advisory Mission

Source: Author’s own research.
Table 2. Current missions and operations of the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Commencement date</th>
<th>Participation of the Federal Republic of Germany</th>
<th>Participation of the Republic of Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR “Althea”</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR “Atalanta”</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Med “Sophia”</td>
<td>The Mediterranean</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM RCA</td>
<td>Republic of Central Africa</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own research.

Concerning Poland, the participation of its military forces in (humanitarian) missions and operations performed by the EU is comparable to Germany’s. The Polish Armed Forces as well as the Bundeswehr took part in the following missions and operations: EUFOR Concordia, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR RCA and EU Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) RCA, which were carried out between 2015–2016. Currently the Polish army is involved in: EUFOR “Althea”, performed since 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUNAVFOR “Atalanta” as well as the training-mentoring mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) (Table 1., Table 2.).

In the course of research, case studies of missions and operations performed by the EU with the participation of the Bundeswehr and the Polish Armed Forces have been analysed. They were chosen according to the following criteria: area of deployment, type of operation and its aims.

European Union Force (EUFOR) “Althea” in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Operation EUFOR “Althea” started in December 2004 and replaced NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which had been in turn created on the basis of the previous Implementation Force, IFOR. “Althea” is the biggest operation led within the CSDP. It is seen as demonstrating the growing intervention possibilities as a result of the CSDP’s development (Keßerling, 2010, p. 62). The legal framework for it is United Nations
Security Council Resolution No. 1088 of December 1996 as well as the Dayton Accords (General Framework Agreement for Peace, 1995). “Althea” is being carried out in cooperation with NATO within the “Berlin plus” formula. In the early stages 6,500 soldiers were deployed to the area of operation. The operation’s mandate involves supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining security (the so-called executive mandate) and supporting the Ministry of Defence (in consulting matters) as well as capacity building and the training of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s armed forces (the so-called non-executive mandate). In addition, the operation supports local authorities in solving problems of weapons and ammunition surpluses through mentoring and provision of specialised courses in the area of capability building and training.

The aim of Germany was the continuation of its previous engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cooperation between the two states was intensified since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1994. Germany’s activities involved, beside its military-defensive tasks, supporting economic reform and infrastructure development, providing an administrative structure, helping to create and improve the functioning of the border guards, which was connected to the issue of refugees and illegal immigration (Sokolowska, 2010, pp. 341–348). Also for Poland, taking part in EUFOR “Althea” is a continuation of its previous engagement in NATO-led missions and operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Polish soldiers took part in both IFOR and SFOR).

For Germany “Althea” was one of the most important operations within the CSDP. Since the beginning, representatives of Germany took up the most important positions at its Headquarters (HQ) in Sarajevo, i.e. the Commander-in-chief of the operation, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff. Between 2006–2007 Rear Admiral Hans-Jochen Witthauer was Chief of the operation. The troops amounted to about 1,100 soldiers at the beginning of the operation and were one of the most numerous at that time. At the beginning the operation’s main tasks carried out by the Bundeswehr involved: supervision of the fulfilment of the Dayton Accords, maintaining regional security, collecting and destroying weapons, demining, prevention of weapons and drug smuggling, combating organised crime and pursuing war criminals (Deutscher Bundestag, 2004). Between 2007 and 2011 the engagement of German troops concentrated itself in partaking in four Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT) responsible for maintaining contact with local authorities and the population as well as with NGOs to monitor the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(Bundeswehr, 2014). Since 2011, during the last phase of engagement in EUFOR “Althea”, the tasks of the Bundeswehr concentrated on supporting and mentoring Bosnian armed forces in the area of the operation’s non-executive mandate. Additionally, Germany and Austria were responsible for maintaining reserve forces (battalion-size) for the operation.

Germany ended its participation in the operation in December 2012. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guido Westerwelle, and Defence Minister, Thomas de Maizièere, explained the decision concerning the end of participation in the operation with the completion of all its military tasks in a letter to chairpersons of the Bundestag parliamentary groupings. According to the Ministers’ opinions, armed forces and police in Bosnia and Herzegovina were able to independently maintain security in the country. They also underlined the fact that Germany demands furthermore an end date in relation to the EU’s operation’s there (Decker and Knuf, 2012).

Poland is still involved in the operation. To begin with, Polish troops amounted to 275 soldiers (Zięba, 2012, p. 164). Its tasks were focused – as well as those of Germany – on stabilisation. In 2005 the organisational structure of the Polish Military Contingent PKW (Polski Kontyngent Wojskowy) EUFOR involved, besides the command and control (C2) structure, a manoeuvres company, two Liaison and Observation Teams, the National Support Element and staff at the operation’s HQ. PKW EUFOR, also involved in stabilisation tasks, ended its function after restructuring “Althea” into a mentoring-training mission. The mentoring-training tasks were assumed in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the PKW EUFOR/MTT, i.e. including four Mobile Training Teams and two Liaison and Observation Teams. The main tasks of the PKW EUFOR/MTT include training and the building of military capabilities of the military forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, monitoring the security situation and cooperation with the council authorities, public institutions and NGOs (Dowództwo Operacyjne Sił Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych, n.d.). With regard to the resolution of the President of Poland, the limit of Polish troops was set at 50 soldiers and currently 39 soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces are taking part in the operation (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 2016). According to the decision of the President from June 2016 the Polish troops should be engaged in the operation until the end of December 2016 (Postanowienie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej, 2016).
European Union Force (EUFOR) RD Congo

Operation EUFOR RD Congo was carried out between June and November 2006\(^2\). The decision about its implementation was connected to the first democratic parliamentary and presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for 45 years. The main responsibility to maintain security during the election resided with the DRC’s authorities and on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (UN MONUC), active since 1999 and comprising about 17,000 soldiers. Due to the scale of the venture (the biggest and most complicated elections ever performed by the UN from a logistical point of view) in December 2005 the UN requested the EU’s help. The Council of Europe responded positively.

The Congo operation was the first during which the EU’s Battle Groups could be used. At that time the French-German EU Battle Group was on stand-by. However, on 23 January 2006, during the Franco-German summit, Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected the French President’s suggestion to send their common Battle Group to the Congo. Because of this fact and the major involvement of Germany in the Balkan Peninsula they decided to build an *ad hoc* tactics group, in which, according to previous agreements, Germany was supposed to play the role of framework country. As Andrzej Ciupiński points out “this fact might be understood as the first failure of the EU Battle Groups concept” (2013, p. 250).

Germany’s government defined the conditions of participation in the operation: a precise UN mandate, the agreement of the Congolese government, the participation of other European states besides France and Germany, the deployment of forces in Kinshasa, the capital, and a time limitation on the engagement, set at four months. The participation of the Bundeswehr caused much controversy within Germany. It was yet another occasion on which strong differences came to the fore between the political class and German society as to the participation of the Bundeswehr in peace-related operations. There were also differences of opinion between political parties in the Bundestag. Strong opposition against the participa-

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\(^2\) EUFOR RD Congo was not the first operation carried out by the EU in this country. In 2003 the EU engaged in operation “Artemis”, the aim of which was to stabilise the situation due to conflict escalation and the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe in the eastern province of Ituri. At the time of EUFOR two missions were being carried out in the DRC (EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo). Their aim was to reform the security structures.
tion of Germany’s forces was voiced by the Free Democratic Party (FDP), whose members argued that the Bundeswehr was at that time engaged in many countries and that they could not always help by sending troops (Kruk, 2014, p. 69). Former Minister of Defence Franz Josef Jung, explaining the application of the federal government for a mandate, reminded detractors that the peace and stabilisation of the Congo were in Germany’s interest. Finally, on 24 March 2006 the Bundestag decided with a large majority of votes to give the Bundeswehr the mandate to take part in the operation.

Despite strong scepticism at the beginning, Germany engaged fully in the operation. Besides sending one of the largest contingents of troops, almost 800 in total (500 soldiers and 280 logistics and medical staff), took up operational command as well. Commander-in-Chief was General Karlheinz Viereck. In Germany the operational command of the mission had its seat in Potsdam. Germany also paid the largest operational costs – 33.7 million euro. The Bundeswehr’s tasks during EUFOR RD Congo comprised support of operational command at a military-strategic level, taking part in tasks of Kinshasa command at an operational level as well as evacuation in the case of danger (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006).

Regarding Poland, its decision to take part in the operation can be explained by its growing aspiration to form and carry out the CSDP as well as gaining support in achieving Poland’s interests at the EU forum. Former Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski, explaining Poland’s engagement in the operation, pointed out that it was “another example of the government’s action […] in the spirit of European solidarity”. This way, in his opinion, “we gain the right to demand Europe’s solidarity in matters even more important to us, such as energy security” (Misja w Kongo będzie nas kosztować kilka milionów złotych, 2006).

Poland sent a military contingent in size smaller than those of Germany, France and Spain. The tasks of Polish soldiers were connected with providing security to the EUFOR forces HQ in Kinshasa. It should be mentioned that the supervision of the Kinshasa camp was one of the most difficult tasks during the entire operation (Lasoń, 2008, pp. 232–238). The costs of Polish participation in the operation were estimated at approximately 4.25 million euro (Ibidem, p. 238).

The execution of EUFOR RD Congo was criticised, mostly in relation to the engagement of too few forces in the DRC area, poor positioning of peace forces (only Kinshasa and the west of the country) as well as the short period of the operation. The mission ended immediately after the
elections of 30 November 2006; the staff was not fully present during the announcement of the result – at a time when it could have been most needed. Despite its inadvertence the operation fulfilled its aims. Because of the presence of EU forces the elections went relatively smoothly, beyond some skirmishes after the election of Joseph Kabila as president.

The Polish Military Contingent officially ended their participation in the operation on 1 December 2006. Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski during the welcoming of soldiers returning from the Congo mentioned that thanks to the engagement in operations, Poland’s obligations to its European partners had been fulfilled. Even where there was no direct interest for Poland, active support for the CSDP had been shown. Regarding the Bundeswehr, it ended its participation in the operation on 22 December 2006. Both before and during the operation there was much controversy concerning the Bundeswehr’s participation in EUFOR RD. The federal government failed to convince the public of its motivation to engage in the operation, mainly because of the absence of a political and economic interest. From Germany’s point of view the image of Germany among its allies as an active, capable of acting, partner and promoter of the CSDP was strengthened.

**European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) “Atalanta”**

Operation “Atalanta” was the first sea operation led by the EU within the CSDP. The genesis of this as well as other operations\(^3\) in the Horn of Africa was connected with the growing problem of piracy. The increasing danger of piracy in the Horn of Africa became especially visible when ships of the United Nations World Food Programme became increasingly targeted by the attacks. On 2 June 2008 the UN Security Council in its resolution No. 1816 found the danger to international peace and security coming from the Horn of Africa so serious that it acknowledged the usage of means described in chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (entitled “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”). This resolution (adopted unanimously) gave ships of

\(^3\) Operations led by NATO, such as Allied Provider (November – December 2008), Allied Protector (March – August 2009) and Ocean Shield (starting in August 2009).
other states the possibility to enter the waters of Somalia to prevent and combat piracy with all accessible means, including military.

Operation EUNAVFOR “Atalanta” achieved its operational readiness on 13 December 2008. It was planned for 12 months, but was prolonged on two occasions. The current mandate remains in force until December 2016. The operational area covers from the Red Sea to the Seychelles. Its aims, as set out in UN Security Council resolution No. 1846, are the protection of other ships coming to the coasts of Somalia and the prevention and combating of piracy acts as well as robbery.

The Bundeswehr has taken part in the operation since its inception. The first mandate that permitted German military forces to join the operation was issued in November 2008. According to the Bundestag’s mandate the maximum involvement of German troops could amount to 1,400 soldiers (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008). Minister of Defence Franz Josef Jung has explained Germany’s involvement in the mission in his numerous speeches, citing the fact that the security of sea routes is of key significance for Germany’s exports (Stinner, 2009, p. 111). For Germany the participation in EUNAVFOR “Atalanta” is also a continuation of their previous engagement in this region. The German navy was sent to Somalia as early as 2002 under the auspices of NATO during the “Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa”. This operation was understood as part of NATO’s response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

To begin with, the German navy put up one frigate for use in operation “Atalanta”, but as early as in May 2009 the participation of Germany grew to three such ships, two replenishment oilers and P3-C Orion surveillance aircraft. In recent years the German navy has sent frigates, corvettes, replenishment oilers and surveillance aircraft to missions. Two hundred and sixty eight soldiers are currently in military service in the operation. German navy units involved in this operation are presently the frigate “Bayern” and the replenishment oiler “Spessart” (Deutsche Marine, 2016). To date, officers of the Bundeswehr have occupied the position of Force Commander on three occasions. In March 2016 the function was taken up by Admiral Jan C. Kaack. According to the last Bundestag mandate in force until the end of May 2017, a maximum of 600 German soldiers can participate in the operation. In contrast, Poland’s engagement in EUNAVFOR “Atalanta” is minimal in comparison to that of Germany and other states. Poland supported on a political level the decision to take up the operation; whereas only two officers were sent to take part in it – one of them serves in the Northwood HQ, the other one in Brussels (Dura,
2014). Such a limited engagement level is explained by a lack of suitable vessels to lead such operations.

**European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali**

The EU’s military engagement in Mali is connected to a series of armed conflicts between the Mali army and Tuareg rebels from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (the northern region of Mali) and their previous or former allies from Islamist extremist groups from 2012. In January 2013, at the request of the government of Mali, France began an intervention aimed at supporting, via air forces, land operations carried out by the Mali army (operation Serval). After developing the theatre of military operations, France decided also to engage land forces. In Mali the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was also engaged. The organisation supported government forces within the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)⁴.

The Council of the EU took the decision to implement the mission on 18 February 2013. The aim of the mission as set out in the decision of the Council of 17 January 2013 is to react to the operational needs of the Mali military through securing necessary training support for Mali soldiers, and training and mentoring in terms of command and control, logistics chain and human resources, as well as training in the area of international humanitarian law, protection of civilians and human rights (*Decyzja Rady 2013/34/WPZiB*, 2013).

The EUTM Mali mission has a mentoring-training character. The mandate excludes the possibility to lead military actions and to operate in regions where military actions take place. The main tasks of EUTM Mali are: to train four battalions of Mali’s armed forces, together with elements of combat support (taking training concerning international humanitarian law, protection of civilians and human rights into consideration); mentoring – regarding the functioning of the command system; support in the area of improving the logistics security system; and in the long run also mentoring in the area of the effective management of the human resources system.

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⁴ After carrying out strategic aims by the French military and ECOWAS forces, the UN Security Council decided in mid-2013 to create the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
Germany decided to engage in the mission in Mali in the autumn of 2012, pointing out that their engagement would be concentrated on stabilisation efforts. The explanation of this decision lay in the combatting of terrorism in Northern Africa as being of vital interest to Germany (Kruk, 2014, p. 71). Regarding Poland, its government decided on its participation in the operation in January 2013. Poland’s authorities stressed that Poland’s participation would concentrate only on stabilisation tasks. Donald Tusk, former Prime Minister, assured France’s President François Hollande that there “is no need for Polish soldiers to participate directly in combat tasks” and stressed that the participation of the Polish Armed Forces in the mission should only “help to maintain stability in the region” (Polskie wojsko jedzie na misję do Mali, 2013).

Germany, on the other hand, decided to direct a contingent of 180 soldiers to take part in the operation\(^5\). It is, after France, the second largest input to the operation. The Bundeswehr’s tasks with a given Bundestag mandate involve command staff actions, support in the area of sanitary actions, training of the Mali armed forces and the armed forces of Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali (Group of Five Sahel – G5), mentoring to the Mali Ministry of Defence and the general staff as well as securing support and help to MINUSMA (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016). At present, 138 Bundeswehr soldiers are engaged in the mission (Bundeswehr, 2016). In July 2015 Germany took up command of the mission.

Poland’s government, however, decided to send 20 soldiers to Mali. Besides this, Poland decided to give additional support to Mali armed forces with 170 tons of weapons and ammunition, worth approximately 2.75 million euro (Polska bróż i amunicja dla Mali – przekazaliśmy nieodpłatnie 170 ton uzbrojenia, 2013). The main tasks of the Polish Armed Forces in Mali involved logistics training of the Mali armed forces, carrying out activities connected to securing the base in terms of anti-mine security as well as carrying out tasks in the command of the staff of EUTM Mali.

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5 According to the last Bundestag mandate concerning the extension of participation in the operation, German troops can involve a max. of 300 soldiers.
European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med)
“Sophia”

The decision on establishing the marine operation EUNAVFOR MED and carrying out actions in Southern Central Mediterranean, was taken on 22 June 2015. In September 2015 the new name for the operation was accepted: Operation “Sophia” (from the name of a child born on a ship performing operations within EUNAVFOR MED on 22 August 2015). The operation’s command is located in Rome.

EUNAVFOR MED Sophia consists of four phases; however due to legal difficulties, only the first one, i.e. deployment of forces, was able to commence. Its most important component was surveillance actions aimed at the identification of smugglers’ routes and their locations. The vessels of the mission were also, according to obligations of international law, used for search and rescue operations. Next, in September 2015 the Council of Europe assumed that conditions existed that allowed the latter phase of the operation to commence – the taking over and destruction of smugglers’ vessels in international waters; which finally occurred on 7 October 2015. At present 1,400 soldiers from 24 EU states are taking part in the operation. The main input is contributed by: Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, France and Luxembourg (European External Action Service, 2016).

The Federal Republic of Germany was one of the states supporting the commencement of EUNAVFOR MED. To begin with, Germany engaged two ships in the operation: the frigate “Schleswig-Holstein” and an auxiliary ship “Werra”. Germany’s government spoke in favour of commencing operations aimed at the seizure and destruction of smugglers’ vessels. During consultations related to starting this phase of the operation, Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier pointed out that actions involving combating smugglers are inevitable and that the Bundeswehr’s soldiers should have a mandate to use force (Gebauer, 2015). The Bundestag, on 16 September 2015, gave its permission to use the Bundeswehr in the operation. According to it, German troops could amount to a maximum of 950 soldiers (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015). At present, 127 soldiers of the Bundeswehr are taking part in the operation and two German ships are also engaged in it. In July 2016 the Bundestag prolonged the Bundeswehr’s mandate until the end of June 2017.

However, the position of Poland towards the commencement of operation EUNAVFOR Med was characterised by temperate enthusiasm. During negotiations on its commencement, information appeared that Poland
had considered sending a surveillance aircraft and one ship for EUNAVFOR Med. This was denied by both the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Grzegorz Schetyna and former Minister of National Defence Tomasz Siemoniak (*Polska bez deklaracji o udziale w misji UE na Morzu Śródziemnym*, 2015). Eventually, Poland seconded one officer to the operation’s command in Rome.

**Conclusions**

During recent years the position of Germany and Poland towards participation in the EU’s foreign missions and operations is similar in respect of many issues. Since 2007 the intensified cooperation of both states in supporting the development of the CSDP is noticeable, which is exemplified by the initiatives taken up within the Weimar Triangle. Currently, the differences between the positions of Poland and Germany include the balance to extend the military and civilian dimension of the CSDP. In Poland’s case a greater concentration on strengthening the military potential of the CSDP is visible; whereas Germany is directing its attention more towards extending the civilian dimension of the CSDP. This is an outcome of Germany’s complex security policy, in which military and civilian means have the same meaning.

In summing up the engagement of Poland and Germany in operations and military missions under the EU’s auspices, one should point out that between these states there are no considerable differences when it comes to the number of interventions of the EU in which military forces have been involved. The number of missions carried out and currently being performed in which Germany and Poland participate is similar. There are also no major differences when it comes to the range of tasks performed. Similarities also exist in the range of political motivation as to decisions about participating in given missions and operations. An example of such might be operations of the EU in Africa, where both Germany and Poland engaged themselves despite a lack of direct interest in the region. There are fairly pronounced differences between Poland and Germany concerning the size of engaged troops and equipment sent, if one takes into consideration all missions and operations undertaken by the EU since 2003.

Analysing Poland’s engagement in the first missions and operations of the EU, one should note that they were modest in scale (operation “Concordia” in 2003 – 17 soldiers, EUFOR “Althea” – 220 soldiers). This was
the outcome of quite a sceptical view towards the development of the CSDP, which was understood by Poland as being competitive towards NATO. In the following years Poland’s engagement grew gradually – the main engagement in missions and operations was between 2006–2009. Polish Armed Forces took part in operations in the DRC and missions in Chad and RCA, and sent one of the largest shipments of troops. In recent years the participation of Poland has decreased. Poland has engaged mostly in training-mentoring missions as an observer (EUTM Mali, EUMAM RCA, EUTM RCA). Participation in operations had only a symbolic meaning (EUNAVFOR “Atalanta” – 2 soldiers, EUNAVFOR MED “Sophia” – 1 soldier). The decreased engagement can be explained not only by the lack of ability, as is the case with operations in the Mediterranean and on the coast of Somalia, but above all by the realisation of the demands of what is referred to as the “Komorowski doctrine” of 2013. Its main assumptions involve the transfer of Poland’s strategic priorities from taking part in expeditionary missions, to tasks connected to supporting national security directly, i.e. national defence (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2013). This assumption was mentioned in the White Book of National Security of the Republic of Poland of 2013.

Taking into consideration Germany’s involvement (the size of carried-out and current missions and operations within the CSDP) one should state that compared to that of Poland it has been much greater. Germany has decided in most cases to send a greater number of troops and more equipment. Differences concerning the level of engagement in missions and operations have been connected to political motivation. An example could be operation EUNAVFOR “Atalanta”. The level of engagement results from the fact that the security of trade routes is of key significance to the German economy. The number of troops and resources has had an impact on participation in the commanding position of a given mission. Officers from the Bundeswehr, because of the size of their engagement, take command positions more often than their Polish counterparts.

Concluding, the scale of involvement of the Bundeswehr and the Polish Armed Forces in missions and operations of the EU shows that the CSDP plays a much more significant role for Germany than it does for Poland in their respective foreign and security policies. Germany’s engagement in operations taken within the CSDP leads to a strengthening of its political position within the EU and is understood as strengthening Germany’s security, with the defence dimension of the EU being equal to NATO. Tendencies that can be observed in Poland’s action towards the CSDP consist
of a high-level of activity in the political dimension, serving the improvement of military capabilities of the EU and, at the same time, a decrease of engagement at the operational level. One of the main reasons for this is the change in Poland’s strategic priorities, based on its concentration of efforts on strengthening the state’s security in a global perspective.

Summary

The aim of this article is to show the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union for both Germany and Poland on the basis of the engagement of the Bundeswehr and the Polish Armed Forces in operations of the European Union. The comparison of Poland’s and Germany’s involvement is made on the basis of selected previous and current foreign missions and operations of the European Union in the Balkans, Africa and the Mediterranean.

Keywords: CSDP, European Union, Germany, missions and operations, Poland

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Decyzja Rady 2013/34/WPZiB z dnia 17 stycznia 2013 r. w sprawie misji wojskowej Unii Europejskiej mającej na celu przyczynienie się do szkolenia malijskich sił zbrojnych (EUTM Mali).

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