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Elena Calandri, Simone Paoli, Antonio Varsori (Ed.)

Peoples and Borders

Seventy Years of Migration in Europe, from Europe, to Europe [1945-2015]

1. Edition 2017, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-3452-8, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-7786-8, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845277868

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Nomos Journal of European Integration History Revue d’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration SPECIAL ISSUE Calandri | Paoli | Varsori [eds.] Seventy Years of Migration in Europe, from Europe, to Europe [1945–2015] Peoples and Borders Nomos Peoples and Borders Seventy Years of Migration in Europe, from Europe, to Europe [1945-2015] Elena Calandri | Simone Paoli | Antonio Varsori [eds.] 1. Edition 2017 © Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2017. Printed and bound in Germany. This work is subject to copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, re-cording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to “Verwertungs gesellschaft Wort”, Munich. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Nomos or the autor(s)/ editor(s). Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de ISBN 978-3-8487-3452-8 (Print) ISBN 978-3-8452-7786-8 (ePDF) Contents / Table des matières / Inhalt Elena CALANDRI and Simone PAOLI Peoples, borders and the European nation state, 1945-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 PART 1: MANAGING THE POSTWAR DEMOGRAPHIC ORDER DURING LES TRENTE GLORIEUSES (1945-1975) Yvette SANTOS Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe : l’émigration et le difficile rapprochement entre le Portugal et les pays de la CEE 1945-1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) as part of the post-WWII ‘world-making’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Roberto VENTRESCA Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European integration process: fruitless attempts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Yves DENÉCHÈRE Regulating a particular form of migration at the European level: the Council of Europe and intercountry adoptions (1950-1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Willem MAAS Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Journal of European Integration History Special issue Pages 5-322 Revue d’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration Editors: Published twice a year by the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians (Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne), this publication is part of an independent international network of scholars and researchers. All articles submitted are double blind peer reviewed. The Journal is financed by the Liaison Committee. Editorial Board: Antonio VARSORI (chairman), Università di Padova (Jean Monnet Chair) | Charles BARTHEL, Archives Nationales, Luxembourg | Gérard BOSSUAT, Université de Cergy-Pontoise (Jean Monnet Chair) | Elena CALANDRI, Università degli Studi di Padova | Michel DUMOULIN, Université catholique de Louvain (Jean Monnet Chair) | Michael GEHLER, Universität Hildesheim (Jean Monnet Chair) | Fernando GUIRAO, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (Jean Monnet Chair) | Johnny LAURSEN, University of Aarhus | Wilfried LOTH, Universität Duisburg-Essen (Jean Monnet Chair) | N. Piers LUDLOW, London School of Economics | Kiran Klaus PATEL, Maastricht University | Nicolae PĂUN, University of Cluj-Napoca | Sylvain SCHIRMANN, Institut d'études politiques, Strasbourg | Gilbert TRAUSCH, Centre Robert Schuman, Université de Liège | Jan VAN der HARST, University of Groningen (Jean Monnet Chair) www.eu-historians.eu Moshik TEMKIN Europe and travel control in an era of global politics: the case of France in the long 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Jacek TEBINKA The movement of Poles to Great Britain during the Cold War. Breaking the Iron Curtain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 PART 2: THE DEMOGRAPHIC REORGANISATION OF THE CONTINENT: THE RETURN OF THE MULTIETHNIC NATION STATE (1975-2015) Marcel BERLINGHOFF Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Paweł JAWORSKI Through the Iron Curtain. The 1974 Polish-Swedish Treaty covering travel without visas and its consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Alice CUNHA A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 Simone PAOLI France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Beatrice SCUTARU Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem . . 281 Guia MIGANI La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration: gérer l'urgence, trouver un consensus et construire une politique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 Peoples, borders and the European nation state, 1945-2015 Elena CALANDRI and Simone PAOLI In the opening of Postwar, his now classic history of Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, Tony Judt describes the demographic consequences of the Second World War. After counting the dead and the dispersed, he turns to the living and, in particular, to those millions displaced to another part of Europe by the conflict. Though Judt offers a detailed and potent account, he adds nothing new in terms of data: starting with the French school headed by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, who counted demography among the ‘forces profondes’, the phenomenon has been carefully studied.1 However, Judt does make a powerful case that these movements and the consequent ethnic and cultural transformations were true founding elements of the postwar European order; due to the particular configuration of the socio-political structures in some European states, the change in the ethnic map coincided with a social and political revolution. Tony Judt describes how, between 1939 and 1943, Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler forcibly transferred, deported and dispersed some 30 million people, along what was, largely, a west-east line. Stalin moved millions of Poles, Ukrainians and Balts to the eastern borders of the Soviet federation. Meanwhile, Hitler, following his own plan for the ethnic re-organisation of the continent, killed and deported Poles, Jews and Slavs, replacing them with ethnic Germans in the new eastern territories of the Third Reich. The process was inverted as the Axis armies retreated: millions of people in the east chose or were obliged to move westwards. Balts, Poles, Ukrainians, Cossacks, Hungarians and Romanians escaped to the west from war or the dangers of Communist rule. The Croats, who had supported Ante Pavelić’s Fascist regime, fled from Tito’s partisans, while Russian, Ukrainian, Balt, Croat, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian and French collaborators ran from the Red Army. At the same time, slave labourers and those who had survived the concentration and extermination camps began to move. To some extent, these were spontaneous movements. But there were also, in the immediate postwar period, massive transfers of entire populations and ethnic ‘cleans- 1. Pierre Renouvin, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationales, Paris 1964; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours. Vie politique et relations internationales, Paris 1975. 7 ing’, planned and directed by national governments.2 Bulgaria expelled tens of thousands of Turks and Yugoslavia forced out hundreds of thousands of ethnic Italians from Istria and Dalmatia. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Soviet Union, Poland and Lithuania exchanged, meanwhile, whole ethnic communities, and the Soviet authorities organised forced transfers between Ukraine and Poland. The Germans paid the highest price, butchers becoming victims.3 Thirteen million Germans living in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania and, above all, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union were forced to leave their homes: about eleven million Germans, who had managed to survive, sought refuge. Most travelled to Allied-occupied Austria and Germany. At the conclusion of the First World War it was borders that were invented and adjusted, while people were on the whole left in place.4 After 1945 what happened was rather the opposite: with one major exception boundaries stayed broadly intact and people were moved instead.5 […]. With certain exceptions, the outcome was a Europe of nation states more ethnically homogeneous than ever before.6 From the early 1930s to the mid-1940s the dramatic, but paradoxically soon to be forgotten, demographic re-arrangement of Europe changed the face of many European nation states and gave them a homogeneity that they had never before had.7 2. Jean-Jacques Becker, Paul Lévy, Les Réfugiés pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, Confolens 1999; Gustavo Corni, Tamas Stark, People on the Move. Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and its Aftermath, Oxford 2008; Gérard Cohen, In War’s Wake. Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order, Oxford 2011; Ben Shepard, The Long Road Home. The Aftermath of the Second World War, New York 2011; Peter Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee, Oxford 2013; Keith Lowe, L’Europe barbare, 1945-1950, Paris 2013. See also: Dzovinar Kévonian, Exilés, déplacés et migrant forcés: les réfugiés de la guerre-monde, in: Alya Aglan, Robert Frank (eds.), 1937-1947 La guerre-monde, Paris 2015, pp. 2253-2283. 3. Eugene Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes 1917-1947, New York 1948, pp. 253-273; Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum heimatlosen Ausländer: Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland, 1945-1951, Gottingen 1985, pp. 244-253. 4. The significant exception was the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece after the Treaty of Lausanne, signed 24 July 1923 by the representatives of Turkey and of the Allied Powers in the First World War. Renée Hirschon, Crossing the Aegean: an Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, Oxford 2003. See also: Panikos Panayi, Minorities, in: Jay Winter (ed.), The Cambridge History of the First World War. Civil Society, Cambridge- New York 2014, pp. 216-241. 5. The major exception was Poland. Its geographical re-arrangement after the end of the Second World War was dramatic; it lost a large part of its eastern borderlands to the Soviet Union and was compensated with rather better land from German territories east of the Oder-Neisse rivers. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War. A New History, London 2005, pp. 20-22. 6. Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, London 2005, p. 27. 7. Eric Hobsbawm emphasises how the Second World War, as well as creating tens of millions of refugees in Europe, was directly or indirectly responsible for creating further millions in Asia. Here, Hobsbawm notes the fifteen million people involved in population exchanges between India and Pakistan, the five million refugees resulting from the Korean war, 1.3 million Palestinians, who were obliged to escape after the creation of the state of Israel, and 1.2 million Jews who emigrated to the new country. This phenomenon, in turn, contributed towards creating Asiatic states which were ethnically more homogeneous. Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, London 1994, pp. 51-52. 8 Elena CALANDRI and Simone PAOLI The ancient diasporas of Europe – Greeks and Turks in the South Balkans and around the Black Sea, Italians in Dalmatia, Hungarians in Transylvania and the north Balkans, Poles in Volhynia, Lithuania and the Bukovina, Germans from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from the Rhine to the Volga, and Jews everywhere – shriveled and disappeared. A new, 'tidier' Europe was being born.8 Mark Mazower, in Dark Continent, expressed the same idea: massacres and, above all, the movements of people, during and after the end of the Second World War, created an almost perfect coincidence of state and nation and of nation and ethnic group. The dream of Versailles was achieved, only thirty years late and at the cost of 90 million men, women and children who had lost their lives and all their belongings. The result [of killing, expulsion and resettlement] was the virtual elimination of many minorities in Eastern Europe – falling from 32% to 3% of the population in Poland, 33% to 15% in Czechoslovakia, from 28% to 12% in Romania.9The German Volk was now more closely aligned with the boundaries of the (divided) German state; so, too, the Ukrainians. War, violence and massive social dislocation turned Versailles’ dreams of national homogeneity into realities.10 The sudden ethnic homogenization of European populations defused one of the factors which most contributed to the exceptional level of violence in the early and midtwentieth century. This was the ethnic question, understood as the difficulties caused by the social and political integration of the various minorities in European nation states. The new Europe, ‘cleansed’ of the ethnic mix which had historically characterised it and set on a path of sustained economic growth, was to enjoy stability and peace. Europe had, in fact, put behind it, what Niall Ferguson, in The War of the World, defines as ‘the Fifty-Year War’. The postwar generation thus created the myth of the ethnically homogeneous nation state, heedless of the dramas which had made its existence possible and deluding themselves that it had always existed and that it always would.11 However, large-scale historical processes soon challenged the demographic picture which emerged from the Second World War and which was set in place by the Cold War. The ethnic question, far from being resolved, re-appeared in new shapes and forms. Indeed, it proved still potentially dangerous for the internal cohesion of states and, more generally, for the entire continent.12 In November 2014, Padua University held an international conference entitled ‘Peoples and Borders: Seventy Years of Movement of Persons in Europe, to Europe, from Europe (1945-2015)’. The conference had been organised under the auspices of the EU Liaison Committee of Historians/Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes. Its 8. Tony Judt., note 6, p. 28. 9. Joseph Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, New York 1946, p. 363. 10. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, London 1999, pp. 221-222. 11. Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred, London-New York 2006, pp. 3-42. 12. Robert Knight, Western Perspectives on Ethnic Politics, in: Robert Knight (ed.), Ethnicity, Nationalism and the European Cold War, London-New York 2012, pp. 13-26. Peoples, borders and the European Nation State, 1945-2015 9 aim was to describe the movements of peoples, and to analyse and explain how, developing as these movements did in the postwar decades, they influenced the nature of the nation state and of the European order as defined by, first, the Second World War and, then, the Cold War. This volume, made up as it is of a selection of contributions from that conference, deals with the same issue. The first important process, which challenged the new demographic order in Europe, was certainly postwar economic growth. This volume takes, in fact, the ‘Trente Glorieuses’ as the first of its two parts: the second part covers the longer post-boom period. From 1945 to 1975, taking advantage of socio-economic differentials with Mediterranean countries, Northern Europe benefitted from an abundant foreign labour supply. This labour supply sustained reconstruction and then contributed to the extraordinary industrial expansion of the 1950s and 1960s. Though foreigners were essential for economic development, however, all countries importing labour sought to avoid the reconstitution of large ethnic minorities. France attempted to assimilate its migrants in the name of shared republican values; Switzerland and the new Federal Republic of Germany long refused to consider foreign workers as immigrants at all, preferring ‘temporary guests’.13 As regards the countries of emigration, the case of Salazar’s Portugal, analysed in this book by Yvette Santos, shows how emigration caused an interdependence which appeared to work against national autonomy and sovereignty. Portugal attempted to limit this by encouraging Portuguese emigrants to cross the Atlantic. Italy, on the other hand, as the essay by Roberto Ventresca shows, resolutely chose to address the problem through international organisations, which came into being after the war to manage migration or to stimulate Western collaboration in general. There was, in fact, a second process, namely, the rise of international organisations and their attempts to achieve the shared and regulated management of moving people who, for various reasons, had left their own countries. The essay by Dimitris Parsanoglou and Giota Tourgeli deals with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), created to manage intra-European migration flows. The chapters by Ventresca and Yves Denéchère are about, respectively, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe, established within the framework of the Western Bloc. Willem Maas, lastly, brings out the central role of the early European Communities. Although with the prudence dictated by member states, jealous of their own sovereignty, the Communities did affirm the principle of free movement and residence for Community workers. This represented a more ample form of citizenship, which went beyond single national citizenships 13. Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, Mark Miller, The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World, Basingstoke-New York 2014, pp. 102-125. 10 Elena CALANDRI and Simone PAOLI and, at the same time, recreated a new and intentionally more evolved form of belonging: European citizenship.14 The third process was decolonisation, which the chapter by Moshik Temkin deals with in both political and social terms. As amply documented by postcolonial historiography, the former colonial powers like Belgium, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands chose to maintain an ample definition of citizenship, which often included the citizens of their ex-colonial possessions.15 They did so hoping to maintain privileged relations with ex-colonies and the illusion of imperial might. This ‘generous’ redefinition of citizenship, combined with tumultuous demographic growth and serious socio-economic problems and political instability in developing countries, led to influxes of large numbers of migrants from Africa and Asia. Europe thus went from being the main world area for emigration to becoming a crucial pole of attraction for international migratory flows. The ethnic question now re-appeared dangerously in the heart of Europe. The memories of the appalling consequences of racism were still too raw to allow for a return to openly discriminatory policies and practices against foreign nationals and ethnic minorities: not least because postwar European constitutions had introduced liberal principles and norms on this very topic. However, the popular reaction to the ‘rivers of blood’ speech by the British Conservative politician Enoch Powell in 1968 and the attacks on Algerian residents in Marseilles in 1973 were clear signs that ethnic tensions could easily rear up in apparently peaceful European societies.16 Meanwhile, studies on Eastern Europe show that the Iron Curtain was more permeable than has often been thought.17 There was the well-known transfer of workers from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, which largely ended with the construction of the Berlin Wall. But this was not the only phenomenon of East-West migration during the Cold War. The truth is that the flow of people who, for political or economic reasons, moved from the Communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe to those of Western Europe was never completely interrupted. It even continued in the two decades preceding the Great Détente, as 14. Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens, Lanham 2007; Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European integration. Beyond fortress Europe?, Manchester-New York 2008; Christina Boswell, Andrew Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, Basingstoke-New York 2011. 15. Raymond Betts, Decolonization, New York-London 2004; Prasenjit Duara, Decolonization. Perspectives from Now and Then, Abingdon 2004; Giuliano Garavini, After Empires: European Integration, Decolonisation, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957-1985, Oxford 2012; Mohammad Chaichian, Empires and Walls, Globalization, Migration, and Colonial Domination, Leiden-Boston 2014; Leslie James, Elisabeth Leake, Decolonization and the Cold War. Negotiating Independence, London-New York 2015. 16. James Hollifield, Philip Martin, Pia Orrenius, The Dilemmas of Immigration Control, in: James Hollifield, Philip Martin, Pia Orrenius, Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective, Stanford 2014, pp. 3-30. 17. Bernhard Santel, Migration in und nach Europa. Erfahrungen, Strukturen, Politik, Opladen 1995, pp. 28-54. See also: Krystyna Slany, Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe since the Early Fifties till the Late Eighties, Polish Sociological Review 104 (1993), pp. 355-386; Heinz Fassmann, Rainer Münz, Vergangenheit und Zukunft der europäischen Ost-West-Wanderung, in: Heinz Fassmann, Rainer Münz, Ost-West-Wanderung in Europa, Wien-Köln-Weimar 2000, pp. 17-26. Peoples, borders and the European Nation State, 1945-2015 11 Jacek Tebinka’s contribution to our volume shows. At the same time, the citizens of Central-Eastern European countries who had remained or fled to Western countries during or immediately after the end of the Second World War played, as described by Slawomir Lukasiewicz, an important, albeit often neglected, role in rethinking the basic ideals of Western Europe’s political system. A turning-point came between the late 1960s and mid-1970s. According to official data, in 1973 immigrant populations stood at 8% in Belgium, 7% in France, 5% in Sweden, Germany and Great Britain, 16% in Switzerland, and went as high as 26% in Luxembourg: note that these numbers certainly underestimated the phenomenon. In the thirty years of economic expansion after the end of the Second World War, 40 million people were on the move in Europe. Some transferred from one region to another within their own country. Some went from one European country to another. Some, of course, travelled from another continent to Europe.18 Although Italians played a major part in the first phase of this migratory boom, later flows to or within continental Europe came mainly from Spain and Greece, Spain, then Portugal, Morocco and Tunisia and, lastly, from Turkey and Yugoslavia.19 The numbers involved, together with the growth of the extra-European component and the economic crisis of the early to mid-1970s, brought about rapid change. All European immigration countries assumed a more restrictive attitude towards migration. The chapter by Marcel Berlinghoff shows how the European Communities seconded and, to a certain extent, encouraged this trend. In particular, the EC institutions played a determinant role in amalgamating new needs into a system of rules: these, without emphasising the frontiers of the postwar nation states with respect to migratory flows, helped them to remain intact. In this context, the relevant European states interrupted the recruitment of foreign labour. Meanwhile, ex-colonial powers decided, in some form or another, to reduce citizenship, as described in the study on Great Britain by Giulia Bentivoglio. At the same time, for fear of recreating dangerous ethnic conflicts within their own societies, European countries promoted or reinforced their integration policies for the benefit of regular foreign residents. Similarly, the European Communities took on an increasingly defensive attitude towards migration and migration policies. The enlargement to include Greece and above all Spain, as examined by Cristina Blanco Sío-López, and Portugal, by Alice Cunha, demonstrates how the fear of migratory flows had now become an important factor in Europe’s external politics. Migration concerns were even capable of affecting the EC adhesion process and influencing the ways in which member states observed the prospect of integration and the territorial concept of the state, which integration was supposed to produce.20 18. United Nations, Labour Supply and Migration in Europe. Demographic Dimensions 1950-1975 and Prospects, New York 1979. See also: Denis Maillat, Long-Term Aspects of International Migration Flows. The Experience of European Receiving Countries, in: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Future of Migrations, Paris 1987, pp. 38-63. 19. Federico Romero, Emigrazione e integrazione europea 1945-1973, Rome 1991, pp. 89-92. 20. Andrew Geddes, Migration as Foreign Policy? The External Dimension of EU Action on Migration and Asylum, Stockholm 2009, pp. 19-22. 12 Elena CALANDRI and Simone PAOLI In the same period, however, there was an important phenomenon that took Europe in the opposite direction. Movements and transfers across the Iron Curtain, in fact, intensified.21 In the new climate of détente which began in the late 1960s and culminated in the mid-1970s with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), limitations on frontier crossing between the two halves of the continent were relaxed, as in the case of movements between Poland and Sweden, examined here by Paweł Jaworski. Due to the economic crisis afflicting the Communist bloc, large numbers of Central-Eastern Europeans took the opportunity to travel and then, in some cases, transfer themselves and their families to Western Europe. Growing numbers of westerners visited, instead, the Eastern countries, often for the first time. The Second Cold War later led to an interruption of free movement. Nevertheless, it could not cancel the memory of the short but vibrant season of intensified exchanges from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. The collapse of Communist regimes in Central-Eastern Europe and the implosion of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s re-opened the question of migratory relations between the two halves of the continent. However, the scale of movements and the implications of these movements were now completely different.22 The considerable socio-economic imbalances between the two parts of Europe led to fears about massive and potentially unmanageable influxes of economic migrants from the ex-Communist countries, influxes which would create conflict. The tormented Western stance toward its eastern neighbours, reconstructed in Simone Paoli’s chapter, was substantially an ‘open’ one, in strident contrast with attitudes towards developing countries in the same period. This choice also involved accelerating the redefinition of national ‘belonging’ and the very bases of ‘European citizenship’. However, this opening to the east also meant that migratory flows from Central- Eastern Europe created problems and were met with resistance in destination countries.23 Both before and, above all, after the entry of the ex-Communist countries into the European Union, this new kind of immigration gave rise to debate and to tensions in all the countries involved, as in the case of Romanian emigration, examined by Beatrice Scutaru. Meanwhile, the fast-growing east-west migratory flow added to the exponential growth in numbers of migrants and refugees along the south-north axis. One of the consequences of this was that the European countries increasingly sought the aid of the European Union. As reconstructed by Guia Migani in her study of the Barroso Commission, they hoped together to solve a problem which, combined with a serious economic crisis, risked destroying all the fragile political, social and de- 21. Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE, Brussels 2009, pp. 114-119. See also: Jussi Hanhimäki, Détente in Europe, 1962-1975, in: Melvyn Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Crises and Détente, Cambridge 2010, pp.198-218; Skjold Mellbin, From Helsinki to Belgrade, in: Poul Villaume, Odd Arne Westad (eds.), Perforating the Iron Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985, Copenhagen 2010, pp. 244-251. 22. Michael Hunt, The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present, New York 2014, pp. 372-379. 23. Klaus Bade, Migration in European History, Malden-Oxford-Carlton 2003, pp. 276-333. Peoples, borders and the European Nation State, 1945-2015 13 mographic equilibria which had been so painfully constructed over the past 70 years. The crises in North Africa and the Near East has now forced European states to face a scale and depth of migration that will make the assimilation of new migrants extremely difficult. The European nation states are suddenly realising that they are multi-ethnic and multi-cultural: something that they had actually been for centuries and something that they had collectively forgotten that they had been. Understandably, the dominant emotion is now one of fear. 14 Elena CALANDRI and Simone PAOLI PART 1: MANAGING THE POSTWAR DEMOGRAPHIC ORDER DURING LES TRENTE GLORIEUSES (1945-1975) Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe : l’émigration et le difficile rapprochement entre le Portugal et les pays de la CEE 1945-1968 Yvette SANTOS Abstract Cet article analyse la politique portugaise d’émigration depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale jusqu’au départ de Salazar du pouvoir, en 1968, pour apporter des éléments de réponse sur l’ambiguïté de la position étatique portugaise entre les pays de l’outre-Atlantique et les pays de la CEE. Il s’agit en particulier de comprendre comment la politique d’émigration définie et adoptée durant le régime dictatorial sert à renforcer les liens avec les pays transatlantiques tout en soutenant son projet d’autonomie politique et économique par rapport aux pays étrangers. D’autre part, comment l’émigration vers la France puis vers l’Allemagne a su remettre en cause cette politique d’émigration et a indirectement contribué, bon gré mal gré, au rapprochement avec les pays de la CEE. L’étude se base sur l’analyse des mesures prises pour exécuter la politique d’émigration, des pratiques administratives mises en place pour organiser les sorties et des accords signés avec les pays transatlantiques et les pays de la CEE. Introduction Il s’agit d’analyser la nature des rapports extérieurs du Portugal durant le régime dictatorial jusqu’à la substitution de Salazar par Marcello Caetano en 1969, en sachant que dès l’instauration de l’Estado Novo en 1933, le modèle économique salazariste s’est basé sur une volonté d’affirmer une autonomie politique et économique par rapport à l’extérieur. Sa position géopolitique, à mi-chemin entre le monde atlantique et européen, constitue un élément clé qui détermine sa politique extérieure. De cette position va dépendre le modèle d’internationalisation de l’économie portugaise adopté,1 notamment son rapport avec les pays de la CEE. Les colonies occupent par exemple une place prépondérante dans la définition et dans l’exécution de ses politiques, étant donné que c’est en grande partie sur la base de leur exploitation, en tant que fournisseur de matières premières et de pays impor- 1. Edgar Rocha, Portugal nos anos 60 : crescimento económico acelerado e papel das relações com as colónias, Análise Social 51 (1977), pp.596-617. Du même auteur, Crescimento económico em Portugal nos anos 1960-73 : alteração estrutural e ajustamento da oferta à procura de trabalho, Análise Social, 84 (1984), pp.621-644. 17 tateurs de produits finis portugais, qu’est définit le système économique national, notamment les modes de production des secteurs industriels les plus importants. En dehors des colonies, le maintien des liens avec le Brésil est aussi un des objectifs de la politique salazariste. Bien que les relations commerciales se fassent essentiellement avec les pays européens, ce rapprochement politique, économique et commercial outre-Atlantique a toujours été revendiqué par Salazar, et l’émigration a toujours joué un rôle clé dans cette stratégie. Elle peut être d’ailleurs représentée comme un outil pour freiner le rapprochement avec les pays de la CEE. Dans cet article, il s’agit donc de comprendre d’une part comment la politique d’émigration définie et adoptée durant le régime dictatorial sert à renforcer les liens avec les pays transatlantiques, tout en soutenant son projet d’autonomie politique et économique par rapport aux pays étrangers. D’autre part, il s’agit d’analyser comment l’émigration pour la France puis pour l’Allemagne a su remettre en cause cette politique d’émigration et a indirectement contribué, bon gré mal gré, au rapprochement avec les pays de la CEE. Pour cela, nous nous appuierons sur l’analyse des mesures prises pour exécuter la politique d’émigration, des pratiques administratives mises en place pour organiser l’émigration et des accords signés avec les pays transatlantiques et les pays de la CEE. L’émigration transatlantique et la revendication d’une autonomie politique et économique Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, tout porte à croire que le gouvernement portugais va maintenir la trame administrative et la réglementation sur l’émigration définie antérieurement.2 2. En 1944-1945, seulement deux principales mesures ont été prises. En septembre 1944, deux décretslois réglementent la concession des passeports dans lesquelles il a été créé pour la première fois un passeport réservé aux émigrants et dont les conditions d’accès diffèrent du passeport de touriste (ou ordinaires). L’objectif est d’éviter la sortie par le passeport de touriste à certaines catégories socioprofessionnelles (comme les ouvriers et les travailleurs agricoles), ainsi qu’à des membres de familles d’émigrants qui migrent dans le cadre d’un regroupement familial. Voir le décret nº33918 du Ministère de l’Intérieur – Cabinet du Ministre. Diário do Governo (DG), Ière Série, nº197, 5 septembre 1944 et le décret nº34330 du Ministère de l’Intérieur – Secrétariat Général. DG, Ière Série, nº286, 27 décembre 1944. En octobre 1945, la police politique appelée PVDE est remplacée par la PIDE (Police Internationale et de Défense de l’État). Cette police politique maintient ses fonctions de prévention et de répression criminelle contre les actes illégaux; le contrôle des activités des intermédiaires, des frontières terrestres et maritimes et l’organisation des dossiers criminels contre des actes illégaux identifiés dans le cadre de l’émigration. Décret-loi nº35046 des Ministères de l’Intérieur et de la Justice. DG, Ière Série, nº234, 22 octobre 1945. Voir aussi Irene Flunser Pimentel, A história da PIDE, Lisbonne 2007, pp. 31-37. 18 Yvette SANTOS Depuis l’instauration de l’Estado Novo en 1933, l’émigration demeurait une question secondaire pour l’État dictatorial. Jusqu’en 1947, la priorité était donnée à la stabilisation et à la consolidation du nouveau régime qui passait par la mise en place d’un nouvel ordre social et économique basé sur le système corporatif. L’émigration, de par son nombre peu significatif, ne devient un problème qu’il faut solutionner qu’en 1947 de manière à ce qu’elle soit utilisée à bon escient. Mais il n’empêche que certaines mesures sont prises et ont un impact significatif sur la politique d’émigration adoptée au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ces initiatives sont prioritairement axées sur le durcissement de la réglementation concernant les conditions de transport maritime et l’assistance médicale des émigrants, sur une gestion administrative des sorties par un service de l’émigration appartenant à la police politique et sur la réalisation d’une première expérience d’émigration subventionnée pour le Brésil.3 L’action de l’État face à l’émigration continue à se définir comme policière et administrative, et il faut attendre que la crise nationale s’accentue, à la fin de 1946, pour que soit reconsidérée la fonction de l’émigration. C’est seulement à ce momentlà qu’elle est assumée comme un facteur socioéconomique nécessaire pour le désengorgement de la situation nationale et comme moyen de rapprochement avec les pays transatlantiques, en particulier avec le Brésil. Très rapidement s’organisent depuis le Portugal les sorties, malgré les difficultés à rétablir les routes maritimes en 1945 et en 1946. Les intermédiaires de l’émigration, bien que fragilisés économiquement par le contexte défavorable des années 1930 et des années de guerre, d’autre part par le contrôle resserré de leurs activités par la police politique, voient dans ce renouveau migratoire une opportunité de refaire du négoce sur l’émigration. Toutefois, et durant ces deux années, la question de l’émigration n’est abordée ni comme une solution aux problèmes socioéconomiques nationaux ni comme facteur international de rapprochement avec l’outre-Atlantique ou d’éloignement aux pays de l’Europe.4 L’objectif est alors d’exploiter les ressources nationales par le biais d’une rationalisation plus efficace des moyens de production et du capital humain, possible par la mise en place de nouvelles directives économiques qui assureraient l’indépendance du pays vis-à-vis de l’extérieur. L’émigration n’est pas perçue comme une solution aux problèmes de la société portugaise, excepté lorsqu’il s’agit de pla- 3. Voir par exemple Ivete Sobral dos Santos, A Junta Nacional de Emigração e a política de emigração no Estado Novo, Thèse de Doctorat en Histoire Contemporaine, Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Humaines, Université Nouvelle de Lisbonne (2014), pp.54-112. 4. Intervention de Silva Dias. Diário da Sessão (DS), nº118, 12 janvier 1945, p.108. Il n’est jamais fait référence par exemple à l’émigration comme moyen pour réduire le contingent de main-d’œuvre non qualifiée et souvent analphabète libéré par la réorganisation des industries existantes et incapables de l’absorber dans sa totalité, pour atténuer la situation du chômage ou pour utiliser les devises des émigrants pour garantir la réorganisation et la modernisation des secteurs économiques. Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 19 nifier la colonisation blanche pour répondre au problème de l’excédent de population5 ou de résoudre la situation démographique et économique de l’île de Madère.6 Dès la fin de l’année 1946, la position du gouvernement portugais sur l’émigration change. Le Portugal rencontre des difficultés socioéconomiques et financières, comme des tensions sociales, des problèmes d’approvisionnement provoqués par une baisse importante de la production agricole nationale l’obligeant à se fournir de matières premières à l’étranger et à maintenir le rationnement, la hausse de l’inflation et un déséquilibre de la balance des paiements.7 Ce contexte socioéconomique national, de difficile retour à la stabilité, allié à l’organisation de sorties en constante augmentation que l’État contrôle difficilement, amène le gouvernement à reconsidérer sa position vis-à-vis du Plan Marshall, rejeté quelques mois auparavant,8 de l’émigration et de son rôle dans l’économie et dans la société portugaise. Il est dès lors décrété par le ministre de l’Intérieur Cancela de Abreu de la suspension temporaire de l’émigration en mars 1947 et créée le mois suivant une Commission chargée de déterminer la nouvelle politique d’émigration à suivre.9 Peu d’informations nous sont disponibles concernant les conclusions des réunions de cette Commission constituée par des représentants des différents ministères ainsi que par le directeur de la police politique. Néanmoins, et en dépit d’absences de rapports et d’enquêtes sur l’émigration, il en ressort trois grandes directives qui doivent encadrées la future politique d’émigration portugaise à appliquer: terminer avec l’exploitation des émigrants par les intermédiaires de l’émigration; assurer la 5. Voir par exemple les interventions d’Henrique Galvão. DS, nº30, 14 février 1946, p.521. DS, nº63, 12 décembre 1946, pp.110-116. Sur ce sujet, voir aussi les conclusions des comptes généraux pour l’année 1945 présentées à l’Assemblée en 1947. Apêndice I “A pobreza e a riqueza do país” das Contas Gerais do Estado de 1945. Avis de la commission chargée d’examiner les comptes publics fermés le 20 février 1947 et présentés au DS nº100, 12 mars 1947, p.116. Le rapport a été réalisé par: Henrique Linhares de Lima, Artur Águedo de Oliveira, João Luís Augusto das Neves, José Ezequiel et par José Dias de Araújo Correia. Sur les problèmes démographiques, voir Mário Leston Bandeira, Demografia e modernidade. Família e transição demográfica em Portugal, Lisbonne 1996, p. 153; Sur les programmes de la colonisation blanche, voir Cláudia Castelo, Passagens para África: o povoamento de Angola e Moçambique com naturais da Metrópole (1920-1974), Lisbonne 2007, pp. 125-128. 6. Le député Alberto Araújo est le seul à demander une intervention de l’État pour organiser une émigration subventionnée à partir de l’île de Madère, de par les difficultés socioéconomiques et démographiques rencontrées sur l’île. Ce type d’intervention a déjà été enregistré en 1939. Alors que le gouvernement vient de faire l’expérience ratée et fortement contestée par les élites d’une émigration subventionnée pour le Brésil, le gouverneur civil des îles demandent à Salazar que soit organisée cette émigration à partir des îles sur la base des mêmes motifs donnés en 1946 par le député. Voir DS, nº30, 14 février 1946, p. 516. 7. Sur l’instabilité de l’après guerre, voir Maria Fernanda Rollo, Portugal e a Reconstrução Económica do Pós-Guerra. O Plano Marshall e a Economia Portuguesa dos anos 50, Lisbonne 2007, pp. 33-147. Du même auteur, 1947, uma crise anunciada, História 18 (1999), pp. 40-49; Heranças da Guerra : o reforço da autarcia e os ‘novos rumos’ da política económica, Ler História 50 (2006), pp. 115-153. 8. Rollo, note de bas de page 7, p. 148. 9. Santos, note de bas de page 3, pp. 127-131. 20 Yvette SANTOS colonisation blanche et maintenir un contingent suffisant de travailleurs sur le territoire portugais pour mener à bien les travaux public programmés. Bien que non formulés, d’autres objectifs doivent être pris en considération, comme le besoin d’organiser une émigration vers les pays transatlantiques pour maintenir les liens commerciaux avec le Brésil et ainsi assurer la défense des intérêts de l’élite portugaise installée dans ce pays. L’émigration est alors utilisée comme moyen de rapprochement des deux pays pour faciliter la signature d’accords bilatéraux.10 D’autre part, il sera décidé de la création d’un nouveau service d’émigration appelé Junta Nacional de Emigração (JNE) le 28 octobre 1947,11 15 ans après l’instauration du nouveau régime dictatorial. Il a alors pour fonctions d’organiser et d’encadrer les mouvements migratoires portugais, indépendamment de leur destination, et devient la principale institution à définir et à exécuter les mesures gouvernementales liées à l’émigration. Bien que l’on compte sur la représentation des différents ministères au sein de l’institution, celle-ci sera avant tout gérée par son président, António Manuel Baptista, aux visions conservatrices sur la politique migratoire à adopter, c’est-à-dire centrée sur le développement d’une émigration transatlantique. Pour la première fois, l’État portugais, à travers la JNE, s’assume comme le principal responsable de l’organisation des sorties dont la priorité est l’émigration transatlantique. Il s’agit alors de valider la réglementation sur le transport maritime d’émigrants de la fin des années 1920 et du début des années 1930 et d’établir des mécanismes légaux qui assurent la protection de la Companhia Colonial de Navegação de la concurrence étrangère depuis qu’elle se voit chargée, par le gouvernement portugais, d’assurer le lien maritime entre le Portugal et le Brésil. D’autre part, l’objectif sera d’éliminer et/ou d’intégrer les collaborateurs dans les procédures administratives de l’émigration. Cette responsabilité implique une reconfiguration des procédures administratives de l’émigration, en plaçant les collectivités locales et la JNE au cœur de l’organisation administrative des sorties, excluant ainsi des procédures les agents de passages et de passeports et les gouverneurs civils des districts. De ce fait, il s’agit de mettre en place un réseau de confiance qui lie la JNE au reste du pays de manière à pouvoir assurer le monopole des procédures administratives de l’émigration par des entités dépendantes du Ministère de l’Intérieur et à éviter l’intromission d’intermédiaires jusqu’alors considérés comme les principaux responsables de l’émigration illégale. En dehors de l’organisation d’une trame administrative capable d’assurer le contrôle des sorties jusqu’à l’arrivée de l’émigrant à l’étranger, la JNE met en place tout une série de conditions à la sortie de manière à pouvoir envoyer les émigrants 10. José Sacchetta Mendes et Tiago C. P. dos Reis Miranda, O Tratado do 1º. Centenário. Ou a retórica das “duas Pátrias” (26.9.1922), in: Zília Osório de Castro / Júlio Rodrigues da Silva / Cristina Montalvão Sarmento (éd.), Tratados do Atlântico Sul. Portugal-Brasil, 1825-2000, Lisbonne 2006, p. 189. 11. Décret-loi nº36558 du Ministère de l’Intérieur – Cabinet du Ministre. DG, Ière Série, nº250, 28 octobre 1947. Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 21 vers les destinations qu’elle considère opportune. En effet, la Commission reconnait dans le préambule du décret-loi nº36558 « ne pas être possible de fixer avec rigueur et de manière définitif – surtout dans une période de crise et d’instabilité que le Monde traverse – ces principes légaux qui doivent régir de manière minutieuse et ce dès à présent notre émigration dans le cadre de sa naturelle subordination aux intérêts économiques du pays. Il manque aussi des éléments d’études suffisants pour estimer, selon les industries et les régions, la convenance que ces intérêts indiquent ».12 En accord avec les directives gouvernementales, les sorties pour le Brésil, le Venezuela ou l’Argentine sont considérées comme des destinations à privilégier en dépit des difficultés d’insertion des travailleurs dans le marché du travail ou de l’utilisation de moyens illégaux pour émigrer.13 Au contraire, l’émigration pour la France sera interdite puis fortement restreinte à partir de 1954 pour des raisons essentiellement idéologiques et politiques.14 Bien que non désirée, l’émigration devient un mal nécessaire auquel il est important de recourir pour alléger la pression démographique. Dans l’incapacité d’absorber toute la main-d’œuvre disponible sur le territoire national, le Ier Plan Économique de 1953 établit à 30 000 par an le nombre de sorties légalement autorisées.15 Le respect du nombre par la JNE ne correspond pas forcément à une logique rationnelle d’utilisation de la main-d’œuvre disponible et adaptée aux besoins en main-d’œuvre dans le secteur industriel et agricole. Bien qu’il y ait une préoccupation à éviter la sortie de certaines catégories socioprofessionnelles (notamment les qualifiés et les spécialisés), il ne semble pas y avoir de méthode claire de sélection et de recrutement des travailleurs.16 Si les fonctionnaires de la JNE sont responsables de parcourir le pays pour identifier les communes où il existe un excédent ou une absence de main- 12. «Reconhece não ser possível fixar com rigidez e carácter definitivo – sobretudo numa época de crise e instabilidade como esta que o Mundo atravessa – aqueles princípios legais por que deve reger-se em pormenor, desde já, a nossa emigração, dentro da sua natural subordinação aos interesses económicos do País. Faltam também, por agora, elementos de estudo suficientes para se avaliar, por ofícios e regiões, qual a conveniência que esses interesses indicam». In décret-loi nº36558 du Ministère de l’Intérieur – Cabinet du Ministre. DG, Ière Série, nº250, 28 octobre 1947. 13. Santos, note de bas de page 3, p. 124-125-126. 14. Voir par exemple les Bulletins de la Junta de Emigração dans lesquels il est fait référence aux motifs de refus du passeport d’émigrant. La France constitue jusqu’en 1954, l’un des motifs de refus, en parallèle aux raisons de santé. Ministério do Interior – JNE, Boletim Anual da Junta da Emigração, Lisbonne 1954, p. 26. Voir aussi l’analyse faite par Victor Pereira sur l’image conservatrice des autorités portugaises sur l’émigration pour la France, Victor Pereira, La dictature de Salazar face à l’émigration. L’État portugais et ses migrants en France (1957-1974), Paris 2012, pp. 45-49. 15. Plano de Fomento, Proposta de lei. Propostas adicionais. Decreto da Assembleia Nacional. Pareceres da Câmara Corporativa. Programas de investimentos. Vol. I e II, Lisbonne 1953, p. 14. 16. Durant la première moitié des années 1950, on ne recense qu’une seule intervention, celle du député Carlos Mantero Belard en 1952, qui remet en cause le système de sélection des émigrants et son inadéquation avec la situation du secteur industriel. Voir Intervention de Carlos Mantero Belard. DS, nº136, 14 mars 1952, p.515. 22 Yvette SANTOS d’œuvre dans certaines professions,17 le travail de repérage se fait de manière superficiel. Les statistiques sont fournies par les Municipalités, et il n’existe aucun travail de coopération interministérielle ni de collaboration avec les syndicats nationaux ni avec les organes corporatifs. A la fin des années 1940 et au début des années 1950, un ensemble de restrictions et de procédures migratoires sont établies de manière à organiser une émigration qui puisse satisfaire les intérêts de l’État et des élites (économiques installées au Portugal et au Brésil). Il s’agit ainsi d’organiser une émigration essentiellement transatlantique par le biais des réseaux familiaux tissés entre le Portugal et les pays de destination et sur lesquels la JNE cherche à avoir un contrôle le plus efficace possible pour éviter une sortie non contrôlée et massive des émigrants. L’émigration par le biais de la sélection et du recrutement de travailleurs pour répondre aux demandes des pays de destination n’est véritablement prise en considération qu’avec l’émigration pour les pays européens. Si un ensemble de documents est exigé pour pouvoir acquérir le passeport, le document d’appel (contrat de travail ou lettre d’appel) constitue la clé de sortie. Il doit être émis de préférence par un membre de la famille. Les réticences de la JNE à l’organisation d’une émigration par contrat de travail émis par une tierce personne s’expliquent par sa difficulté à authentifier l’identité du recruteur et à éviter des pratiques illégales dans le recrutement de travailleurs.18 Dans le fond, le contrôle par la catégorie socioprofessionnelle des émigrants reste secondaire tant que les sorties ne dépassent pas les 30 000 par an, tant qu’elle ne provoque aucune désertification des campagnes et tant qu’elle ne suscite aucune réaction de la part des élites, au contraire de ce qui se passe avec l’émigration vers les pays européens. Ce système permet donc de maintenir un statu quo économique et social en adéquation avec le modèle économique salazariste dans lequel la production des secteurs d’activités est basée sur l’utilisation massive d’une main-d’œuvre disponible, abondante et peu qualifiée, évitant ainsi la reconversion et la modernisation des secteurs d’activités, notamment de l’industrie traditionnelle (comme le textile) et de l’agriculture. Bien qu’il existe une émigration pour la France depuis la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale organisée par le biais de contrats de travail et assurée par les réseaux tissés 17. Les communes sont rangées en trois catégories : 1) communes où la main-d’œuvre n’est pas suffisante pour assurer la production des secteurs d’activités et pour lesquelles l’émigration est interdite; 2) communes dans lesquelles il est possible de maintenir l’émigration pour assurer un équilibre entre disponibilité et nécessité de main-d’œuvre; 3) communes dans lesquelles l’émigration est avantageuse et nécessaire car il existe un excédent de travailleurs. D’autre part, les professions pour lesquelles les fonctionnaires de la JNE s’intéressent particulièrement sont : agriculteurs, charpentiers, électriciens, plâtriers, forgerons, mineurs, maçons, peintres, cordonniers et serruriers, tailleurs et couturiers, employés commerciaux et de bureau, motoristes, joailliers et boulangers, ouvriers des industries graphiques, du textile et de conserve. Voir Ministério do Interior – JNE, Boletim da Junta da Emigração. 1952, Lisbonne 1954, p.22 et Ministério do Interior – JNE, Boletim Anual da Junta da Emigração. 1953, Lisbonne 1955, p.84. 18. Santos, note de bas de page 3, p. 166. Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 23 entre les deux pays,19 la JNE résiste dès les années 1950 au développement de cette émigration, de par l’image négative que ce pays véhicule – celle d’un pays marqué par de nombreux conflits sociaux pouvant influencer les émigrants et transposer ces conflits sur le territoire national, parce que la priorité doit être donnée aux relations avec le Brésil mais aussi parce que l’on redoute une sortie incontrôlée de travailleurs indépendamment de son niveau professionnel. De ce fait, un ensemble de restrictions ont été érigées pour éviter la sortie légale pour la France comme l’obligation de posséder un certain niveau scolaire depuis 1954.20 Si la JNE réussit à contrôler le nombre de sorties par la voie légale, la situation se complexifie à mesure que les sorties illégales deviennent le moyen le plus utilisé pour migrer vers la France, surtout depuis 1956 quand les autorités françaises décident de faciliter l’entrée et la régularisation des portugais.21 En même temps, des tentatives de rapprochement sont menées par les autorités françaises pour organiser une émigration légale. Il est dès lors autorisé la sortie de travailleurs par contrat de travail anonymes et nominatifs22 mais à un nombre limité, de manière à éviter une sortie incontrôlée de migrants issus de certaines professions. Comme le dira le sous-secrétaire d’États du Commerce et de l’Industrie portugais, Magalhães Ramalho, «tant que cette sortie se maintient à un bas niveau, il n’y a pas d’inconvénient à concéder les autorisations. On peut prévoir toutefois l’hypothèse d’une hausse inattendue de cette émigration qui, si elle se vérifie, pourrait causer des embarras à l’industrie nationale ».23 Mais les efforts fournis par le Ministère de l’Intérieur et par la JNE sont insuffisants, et l’émigration illégale prend de plus en plus d’ampleur, au point que soient décrétées en 1959 et en 1960 deux amnisties pour régulariser les portugais en France par les autorités portugaises. 19. Voir par exemple Yvette Santos, L’État portugais face à l’émigration et aux impératifs de la Première Guerre mondiale, Revue Riveneuve Continents et revue Exils et Migrations Ibériques au XXe siècle, Nouvelle Série 15 (Printemps 2013), p.152; Santos, note de bas de page 3, p. 45. 20. Voir le discours de l’élite conservatrice sur l’émigration pour la France. Pereira, note de bas de page 14, pp. 43-46, p.148 et pp. 307-311. 21. Alexis Spire, Étrangers à la carte. L’administration de l’immigration en France (1945-1975), Paris 2005, pp. 107-108. 22. Avec l’émigration pour les pays européens, deux types de contrat de travail sont à distinguer : le contrat de travail dit anonyme et le contrat de travail nominatif. Le premier étant un contrat dans lequel il n’apparaît pas le nom du bénéficiaire du contrat; Le deuxième au contraire, est un contrat dans lequel apparaît le bénéficiaire. Ce second contrat est fourni par un patron auquel il a été recommandé un travailleur portugais par un de ces employés qui appartient à la famille du bénéficiaire du contrat. 23. «Enquanto esta saída se mantivesse em baixo nível não [havia] inconveniente na concessão das respetivas autorizações. Prevendo-se, no entanto, a hipótese do aumento brusco da respetiva emigração – o que a verificar-se poderia vir a causar embaraços à indústria nacional». Capítulo VIII: emigração de operários especializados. In Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (MNE/Direcção- Geral dos Assuntos Consulares e das Comunidades Portuguesas (DGACCP)/Arquivo da Junta Nacional de Emigração (AJNE), ref. 1.5/2: SR – Ministério do Interior – Junta da Emigração: «Compilação das determinadas das ordens de serviço publicadas nos últimos 8 anos (1950 a 1957)». 24 Yvette SANTOS En dépit d’une menace croissante de hausse de l’émigration pour la France, la JNE va chercher, de manière timorée, à consolider ses relations avec les pays transatlantiques par la signature d’accords. Cette réticence s’explique par une volonté de garder une certaine autonomie dans l’organisation de l’émigration et à éviter l’intromission d’institutions étrangères au Portugal et ceci au dépend de la protection des émigrants comme le recommandent les organisations internationales.24 De ce fait, elle est aussi réfractaire à la signature d’accords avec les pays transatlantiques, notamment avec le Canada ou avec le Brésil. Lorsqu’il s’agit d’organiser une émigration vers un pays nouveau basé sur des contrats de travail fournis par les services nationaux d’immigration et pour lequel il n’existe pas de tradition migratoire, l’option est de ne pas signer officiellement un accord pour éviter un engagement officiel avec les autorités étrangères. C’est le cas pour le Canada. Que ce soit pour les deux partis, chacun refuse la signature d’un accord, préférant baser leur relation sur un compromis oral, un gentleman’s agreement, que chacun peut défaire à n’importe quel moment.25 Par ailleurs, les négociations et la mise en application du Traité d’Amitié et de Consultation signé en 1953 entre le Portugal et le Brésil montrent la difficulté des deux pays à abdiquer des méthodes de contrôle administratif régissant la mobilité des émigrants, au point de rendre impossible la mise en place d’une libre circulation d’individus entre les deux pays. Suggéré dès les années 1910,26 le projet de traité est repris par Salazar durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale car il y voit une opportunité de placer le Portugal au même 24. Le Portugal ne s’aligne pas aux recommandations internationales du BIT qui encouragent à une coopération étroite entre les États par la signature d’accords bilatéraux. Voir les conventions R061 – Migration for Employment Recommendation, 1939 (No. 61). Adoption: Geneva, 25th ILC session (28 Jun 1939) – Status: Replaced Recommendation. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f? p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID,P12100_LANG_CODE:312399,fr:NO..(dernière consultation le 1er octobre 2016); C066 – Convention (n° 66) sur les travailleurs migrants, 1939. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:55:0:::55:P55_TY- PE,P55_LANG,P55_DOCUMENT,P55_NODE:CON,fr,C066,/Document. (dernière consultation le 1er octobre 2016); R062 – Migration for Employment (Co-operation between States) Recommendation, 1939 (No. 62). Adoption: Geneva, 25th ILC session (28 Jun 1939) – Status: Replaced Recommendation. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRU- MENT_ID,P12100_LANG_CODE:312400,fr:NO.(dernière consultation le 1er octobre 2016); R086 – Adoption: Geneva, 32nd ILC session (01 Jul 1949) – Status: Up-to-date instrument.(dernière consultation le 1er octobre 2016) http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f? p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID,P12100_LANG_CODE:312424,fr:NO. (dernière consultation le 1er octobre 2016). La convention CO97 de 1949, relative aux travailleurs migrants, n’est ratifiée que le 12 décembre 1978. 25. Santos, note de bas de page 3, p. 190. 26. Marie-Jo Ferreira, Portugal-Brésil (1910-1922) : refonder une politique d'espace de voisinage culturel, Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps 1 97 – 98 (2010), p. 87, www.cairn.info/revuemateriaux-pour-l-histoire-de-notre-temps-2010-1-page-82.htm (dernière consultation le 20 décembre 2015). Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 25 niveau international que les grandes puissances tout en respectant sa nature atlantique.27 Laissé de côté, ce projet est repris en 1951, dans un contexte de Guerre Froide, d’affirmation et de volonté de préserver les intérêts portugais à l’échelle international à travers la formation et la protection d’un bloc luso-brésilien pour servir les intérêts portugais dans la question coloniale, notamment face aux Nations Unis alors soucieuses de préparer l’indépendance des colonies africaines.28 Ce traité a l’avantage de rapprocher « naturellement » deux pays aux relations culturelles, historiques et idéologiques étroites.29 Dans les rapports du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, il est placé en complète opposition avec la Communauté Economique Européenne (CEE), dont les relations entre les pays sont basées sur un compromis « forcé » provoqué par la situation de l’après-guerre, obligeant ainsi à une coopération entre pays sans liens historiques et culturels. Selon l’Ambassadeur Diamantino Real, « La communauté authentique survient, très naturellement, aux marges de ces sentiments impulsifs et occasionnels: leurs obligations sont surtout de nature spirituelle que de natures matérielles, ou du moins, les intérêts matériaux sont subordonnés aux intérêts moraux et résultent de ces logiques corolaires. Elles ne sont pas une finalité, elles sont un moyen de favoriser encore plus, si possible, les liens qui unissent les membres; […] Peu sont de nos jours les communautés liées au concept qui nous tentons d’expliquer. Toutefois, il n’est pas difficile de comprendre la Communauté luso-brésilienne. Comparée à ses congénères, elle nous semble être celle qui correspond le mieux au sens exact du mot. »30 Quatre ans auparavant, Salazar explique dans une circulaire sa vision de la politique extérieure que le Portugal doit suivre, marquée par une volonté de se distancier clairement de la coopération européenne,31 en dépit des programmes économiques dont le Portugal bénéficie (comme le Plan Marshall) qui oblige le Portugal à l’inté- 27. Amado Luiz Cervo et José Calvet de Magalhães, Depois das Caravelas. As relações entre Portugal e o Brasil. 1808-2000, Lisbonne 2000, p.253. 28. Voir Fernando Martins et Pedro Leite Faria, Tratado de amizade e consulta entre Portugal e Brasil de 16 de Novembro de 1953: in Castro / Silva / Sarmento (eds.), note de bas de page 10, pp.267-268 et pp.273-274. Voir aussi Jerry Dávilla, Hotel Trópico. Brazil and the 2 challenge of African Descolonization, 1950-1980, USA 2010, pp. 50-51. 29. Williams da Silva Gonçalves, O realismo da fraternidade: Brasil-Portugal, Lisbonne 2003, p.99. 30. «A comunidade autêntica decorre, muito naturalmente, à margem desses sentimentos impulsivos e ocasionais: os seus liames são mais de ordem espiritual do que material, ou pelo menos, os interesses materiais são subordinados aos morais e resultam destes como lógico corolário. Não são um fim, são um meio para se alicerçarem ainda mais, se possível, os laços que prendem os membros; […] Poucas são nos nossos dias as comunidades envolvidas pelo conceito que tentámos descrever. No entanto, não se torna difícil meter na sua compreensão a Comunidade Luso-Brasileira. Comparada com as suas congéneres, parece-nos ser a que melhor corresponde ao exato significado do vocábulo». In «Breves considerações sobre a Comunidade Luso-Brasileira – Seu aspecto político». Rapport Annuel de Diamantino Real sur l’année 1956, Lisbonne, juin 1957. In Arquivo Histórico Diplomático (AHD)/Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (MNE): PEA 169 – A. 31. Alice da Conceição Monteiro Pita Brito da Cunha, O alargamento ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia : a experiência portuguesa, Thèse de Doctorat en Histoire Contemporaine, Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Humaines, Université Nouvelle de Lisbonne (2013), p. 33. 26 Yvette SANTOS gration et à la coopération au sein d’agences européennes et en dépit de son rôle dans la mise en place d’organisations internationales durant l’entre-deux-guerres. La signature du Traité le 16 novembre 1953 scelle le compromis de la consultation réciproque entre les deux pays sur les problèmes internationaux d’intérêt commun et sur la concession de facilités commerciales et financières. Le Traité prévoit aussi l’élargissement des droits définis par les Lois dites Ordinaires, la réciprocité des droits dans la circulation, dans l’entrée et dans l’installation des individus entre les deux pays ainsi que la liberté d’entrée dans chacun des deux pays.32 Il faut attendre l’année 1960 pour que s’initie les négociations pour la réglementation avec la création de la Commission Nationale Permanente pour l’Application du Traité d’Amitié et de Consultation.33 Ce retard serait provoqué par l’affaire Humberto Delgado et par la montée des nationalistes brésiliens peu enclins à un rapprochement luso-brésilien.34 Malgré les principes définis dans le Traité, le Portugal comme le Brésil excluent la mise en application d’une liberté totale d’entrée et de sortie des portugais et des brésiliens possible par la suppression du passeport. En alternative, certaines restrictions doivent être abolies pour faciliter la circulation, l’entrée et l’installation des individus.35 La JNE n’abdique pas du système administratif mis en place pour contrôler les sorties. Permettre sa flexibilité équivaut à retourner selon elle à un système obsolète et non adapté au nouveau contexte migratoire de l’après-guerre.36 Le maintien de cette trame administrative est aussi justifié par le contingent significatif de portugais qui partent pour le Brésil et par l’obligation de garantir leur protection. Mais surtout, il comble l’absence d’une pré-sélection professionnelle de travailleurs, prouvant de nouveau l’absence de rationalisation dans la gestion du capital humain national. 32. Il prévoit une entrée et une sortie libre. Les conditions de résidences sont le mêmes que celles des nationaux, mais elles sont restreintes au respect de la santé publique et de la sécurité nationale. 33. Décret-loi nº42869 du Ministère des Affaires étrangères. DG, Ière Série, nº53, 5 mars 1960. 34. Sur l’affaire Delgado, voir Gonçalves, note de bas de page 23, pp.223-237. 35. Il est suggéré la gratuité du visa, l’allègement des charges fiscales ou la dispense de la reconnaissance des documents d’appels. En contrepartie, les autorités brésiliennes confèrent à la JNE la responsabilité des formalités policières et médicales brésiliennes et éliminent les restrictions d’entrée imposées à certaines professions, aux moins de 18 ans et aux plus de 60 ans et aux femmes domestiques recrutées par des étrangers. Voir le chapitre II “Entrada em vigor do Tratado” du rapport de la Commission chargée d’étudier les modalités d’exécution au Portugal du Traité d’Amitié et de Consultation luso-brésilien, s.d. In AHD/MNE: PEA 169. 36. Rapport de la JNE sur l’application du traité, 6 novembre 1955. Ibidem. Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 27 Les accords sont finalement signés mais jamais ratifiés car ils sont bloqués en 1961 par l’arrivée à la présidence brésilienne de Jânio Quadros37 et par le début de la guerre coloniale portugaise.38 Cette année marque le début d’une période de refroidissement des relations entre les deux pays, que l’émigration portugaise difficilement peut résoudre étant donné que le Brésil perd son statut de principal pays de destination. L’émigration pour la France et l’incontournable ouverture vers les pays de la CEE Les pays de l’Europe, principalement la France, constituent dorénavant les principaux pays de destination des émigrants portugais. Le poids quantitatif de l’émigration pour la France organisée principalement de manière illégale et son impact dans la société et dans l’économie portugaise rompt avec le cycle nostalgique d’une émigration transatlantique qui ne soulevait aucun problème selon le Président de la JNE, car « le volume total des émigrants, fidèle à l’équilibre économique, ne constituait pas un motif de préoccupation, local ou régional, quant au maintien de la main-d’œuvre nécessaire et disponible».39 L’émigration pour la France, qui offre des salaires, une formation professionnelle et des opportunités de travail plus intéressantes qu’au Portugal, est considérée par les études portugaises comme l’un des principaux facteurs des « changements invisibles »40 nationaux des années 1960 en même temps que le Portugal s’ouvre progressivement vers l’extérieur avec son entrée à l’AELE en 196041, et que l’exode 37. Il est notamment validé : la réciprocité des droits entre les portugais et les brésiliens sans contrarier les droits constitutionnels; le statut spécial facilitant l’entrée et la permanence, le développement d’activités économiques et commerciales et permettant la réciprocité dans l’accès aux établissements d’enseignement. Il est aussi concédé : un visa gratuit pour les séjours de moins de six mois; l’abrogation des conditions de santé et physiques exigées aux étrangers et de la carte des étrangers; l’accomplissement d’un seul service militaire quand l’individu possède la double nationalité; l’application de la législation nationale pour l’ouverture et le fonctionnement d’une société, d’une filiale ou d’une entreprise. 38. Martins / Faria, note de bas de page 29, p. 279. 39. «O volume total de emigrantes, fiel do equilíbrio económico, não chegava a constituir motivo de preocupação, local ou regional, quanto à manutenção das necessárias disponibilidades de mão-deobra». Rapport d’António Manuel Baptista, Lisbonne, 15 avril 1959. In MNE/DGACCP/AJNE, ref. 10.8/18: «Informação sobre a imigração clandestina». 40. Voir par exemple Carlos Almeida et António Barreto, Capitalismo e emigração em Portugal, Lisbonne (1970), pp. 130-154 et pp. 246-252. Voir aussi les articles publiés dans la revue Análise Social qui mettent en évidence les inégalités dans la répartition des richesses, les problèmes liés à l’exode rural, à l’urbanisation, à l’utilisation du capital humain. João Moura, Modernização industrial e emprego, Análise Social 2 (1963), pp. 206-224; Adérito Sedas Nunes, A Perspectiva Socio- Cultural do Desenvolvimento Económico, Análise Social 3 (1963), pp. 375-401. 41. Nicolau Andresen-Leitão, O convidado inesperado: Portugal e a fundação da EFTA, 1956-1960, Análise Social 171 (2004), pp. 285-312. 28 Yvette SANTOS rural vers les zones du littoral et vers le secteur industriel s’accentue. En contrepartie, les asymétries nationales et les inégalités socioéconomiques (désertification du monde rural, concentration de la population sur le littoral, répartition inégale de la population active) se renforcent, dans une phase d’affirmation du processus d’industrialisation – au détriment de l’agriculture.42 Les chocs entre les visions conservatrices et modernisatrices sur l’économie portugaise et sur les politiques à adopter sont constants. Ils sont notamment visibles lorsqu’il s’agit de remettre en cause la politique d’émigration adoptée depuis la fin des années 1940 par la JNE face à la constatation des effets controversés de l’émigration pour les pays de la CEE sur la société portugaise qui servent de pression pour maintenir ou pour rompre avec le modèle économique salazariste. Si les industries les plus modernes (comme l’industrie lourde, les industries chimiques et métallurgiques) appuient une sortie plus libérale de l’émigration de manière à tirer profit des devises des émigrants (leur permettant l’achat de biens d’équipement à l’étranger), au contraire le secteur agricole ou les industries traditionnelles comme le textile se montrent très critiques à la sortie massive de travailleurs, indépendamment de leur qualification et de leur spécialisation, car cela les oblige à augmenter les salaires, à adopter des moyens de productions plus modernes et à investir dans la formation professionnelle des travailleurs. Jusque-là, l’utilisation d’une maind’œuvre abondante et peu chère, ainsi que des techniques de production obsolète évitaient une hausse des salaires et des dépenses liées à l’achat de machines et de biens d’équipement, et à la formation professionnelle nécessaires à la modernisation de l’industrie.43 C’est au sein du gouvernement que ces divergences se reflétent. Trois principaux ministères – le Ministère de l’Intérieur, le Ministère des Corporations et de la Prévoyance sociale et le Ministère des Affaires étrangères44 – s’affrontent dorénavant sur la politique d’émigration à adopter. La gestion administrative de la JNE sur l’émigration est constamment remise en question car elle est considérée comme inadaptée face aux nouveaux objectifs et aux nouveaux défis socioéconomiques nationaux. L’émigration joue un rôle essentiel, en particulier dans l’utilisation rationnelle du capital humain pour assurer la croissance économique à partir de l’articulation de la politique d’émigration avec la politique de l’emploi recommandée par des fonc- 42. Maria Fernanda Rollo, A industrialização e os seus impasses, in: Fernando Rosas / Fernando Martins / Luciano de Amaral (eds.), O Estado Novo 7º volume, in: José Mattoso (dir.) / Fernando Rosas (coord.). História de Portugal, Lisbonne 1994, p.462. 43. Elizabeth Rachel Leeds, Labor export, development, and the State: The political economy of Portuguese emigration. Thèse de Doctorat en Philosophie, Boston (1984), pp. 122-175. 44. On retrouve ces conflits surtout à partir des années 1960, dans le cadre des accords de main-d’œuvre et de leur application, de la gestion de l’émigration clandestine, ou durant la discussion et pour la mise en application des recommandations du Conseil des Ministres en 1964-1965. Voir Pereira, note de bas de page 14, pp. 177-297. Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 29 tionnaires du Ministère des Corporations et de la Prévoyance sociale, notamment durant les réunions du Conseil des Ministres en 1964-1965.45 La JNE veut continuer à donner la préférence à une émigration transatlantique et à soutenir une machine administrative et des conditions de sorties qui rendent difficiles l’émigration pour la France de manière à défendre les intérêts des élites conservatrices et agricoles. Au niveau des rapports avec les pays de la CEE, les études confirment le maintien d’une résistance gouvernementale portugaise pour le développement des relations durant les années 1960, bien que les pays européens constituent les principaux partenaires commerciaux du Portugal. Si son entrée dans l’AELE est perçue comme un facteur de pression pour son ouverture à l’extérieur et à l’internationalisation, ce rapprochement, réalisé en 1964 et en 1967,46 se fait toutefois de manière timoré et orchestré par un groupe réduit de hauts fonctionnaires. Ce sont donc par des voies alternatives que se fait le rapprochement entre le Portugal et les pays de la CEE. L’émigration portugaise représente l’une de ces voies. Sans la planifier ni la désirer clairement, le Portugal se rapproche inévitablement de l’Europe à partir d’en bas, c’est-à-dire par les propres individus à la recherche d’une vie meilleure à l’étranger. Elle oblige au renforcement de la coopération bilatérale, à la remise en cause de la politique d’émigration adoptée jusqu’ici, et à la reconfiguration des pratiques administratives et de la réglementation établie par la JNE pour contrôler les sorties. Cette coopération commence par la signature de la Convention sur la Sécurité Sociale qui répond à une exigence des autorités consulaires portugaises. Dès le début des années 1950, ces autorités réclament les mêmes droits aux portugais que ceux concédés aux espagnols et aux italiens, dont les principes sont régis par des accords. Jusqu’en 1957, une Commission est créée au Portugal pour soumettre aux autorités françaises une proposition de Convention. Sa signature à la fin de l’année 1957 est suivie de la négociation des arrangements administratifs pour réglementer les procédures en cas de maladie et de maternité, d’invalidité et de vieillesse et d’accidents du 45. Mário Murteira, Emigração e política de emprego em Portugal, Análise Social 11 (1965), pp. 261-262. 46. Jusqu’en 1968, date à laquelle Salazar est remplacé par Marcello Caetano comme Président du Conseil, un premier rapprochement se fait en 1962 et accompagne la demande d’adhésion du Royaume-Uni à la CEE. Les négociations sont avortées par le veto de De Gaulle sur l’entrée du Royaume-Uni. Le deuxième rapprochement se fait en 1967 de nouveau dans le cadre de la demande anglaise. Mais encore une fois, le veto de De Gaulle rompt toute négociation. Voir par exemple Cunha, note de bas de page 32, pp. 30-50. 30 Yvette SANTOS travail et de maladies professionnelles et pour déterminer les conditions d’accès aux allocations familiales.47 En novembre 1963, la signature de l’ «Accord entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement portugais concernant la migration, le recrutement et le placement de travailleurs portugais en France»48 met fin à de longues années de résistances des autorités portugaises. Cette réticence portugaise, qui vient spécialement de la JNE, s’explique par l’obligation d’un changement important dans l’organisation des procédures administratives de recrutement et de sélection des travailleurs et de la peur d’une perte de contrôle portugais sur les sorties au détriment du service français d’immigration (ONI). La signature d’un accord signifie pour la JNE le compromis formel qu’elle a toujours cherché à éviter de manière à pouvoir mener seule l’organisation des sorties. Elle le signe finalement parce qu’elle entend l’accord comme une solution pour le contrôle de l’émigration clandestine. En effet, l’accord est accompagné de lettres confidentielles assurant le compromis français de refuser les régularisations aux portugais illégaux et de mettre définitivement fin à ces entrées. Cette peur du compromis n’est pas exclusive à la JNE. Dans le cadre des premiers recrutements organisés après la signature de l’accord de main-d’œuvre, le ministre des Corporations et de la Prévoyance sociale émet sa crainte de l’impact sur l’industrie d’une demande massive de main-d’œuvre qualifiée et spécialisée par les autorités françaises que le Portugal ne pourrait refuser. Toutefois, l’accord n’établit aucun contingent de travailleurs, permettant aux autorités portugaises d’avoir un contrôle numérique sur les sorties légales.49 Il s’agit d’organiser une émigration légale par le biais de contrats de travail anonymes et nominatifs, obligeant ainsi la JNE à adapter sa machine administrative pour renforcer les procédures de contrôle au moment de la sélection et du recrutement des travailleurs dans les différentes communes et de resserrer les conditions légales de sortie, de manière à éviter l’interférence de l’ONI à ce moment de la procédure. La sélection des travailleurs se fait dans des zones du pays bien spécifiques, respectant la volonté des municipalités considérées les seules aptes à pouvoir connaître les besoins locaux en main-d’œuvre de manière à garantir aux élites (industrielles et agricoles) le contrôle sur l’effectif des sorties. Le recrutement se fait principalement dans les communes où ferment les industries pour éviter une hausse du chômage et de la 47. Arrangement administratif nº1 relatif aux modalités d’application de la Convention Générale entre la France et le Portugal sur la Sécurité Sociale du 16 novembre 1957. Arrangement administratif nº2 relatif aux modalités d’application de la Convention Générale entre la France et le Portugal sur la Sécurité Sociale (Accidents du travail et maladies professionnelles. In AHD/MNE: 2º Piso, Maço 558, Armário 7.1958: «Convenção Geral sobre Segurança Social entre Portugal e a França – Textos». D’autres arrangements administratifs sont négociés puis signés en 1964. Ils permettent de combler les failles du système de protection sociale portugais réparti de manière inégale dans la population active, en particulier dans le monde agricole, principale fournisseur de main-d’œuvre pour la France, du moins jusqu’en 1969. 48. «Convenção sobre emigração entre Portugal e a França, expediente geral ». « Accord entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement portugais concernant la migration, le recrutement et le placement de travailleurs portugais en France». In AHD/MNE: EEA 142. 49. Acte nº24 du 22 janvier 1964 de la réunion des représentants de la JNE. In MNE/DGACCP/AJNE. Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 31 contestation sociale. L’ONI intervient à partir d’une liste de travailleurs aptes à partir pour la France, notamment dans la réalisation d’une inspection médicale et professionnelle et pour finaliser la procédure administrative d’émigration en collaboration avec la JNE. Elle doit notamment assurée l’égalité des salaires et des droits dans l’emploi avec les nationaux. S’il n’existe aucune limite numérique dans l’organisation des sorties par le biais du contrat de travail anonyme, la situation diffère pour ce qui concerne les contrats nominatifs, car si la JNE sélectionne les travailleurs pouvant émigrer dans le cas des contrats anonymes, elle ne peut éviter la sortie de main-d’œuvre qualifiée à travers les contrats nominatifs. Ainsi, et pour contrôler numériquement ces sorties, la JNE met en place une série de conditions légales pour l’acquisition de ce contrat, comme la confirmation d’un lien de parenté qui se limite au 3ème degré.50 A l’instar du travail de reconfiguration de la machine administrative permettant le contrôle des sorties légales pour la France, la JNE entre aussi en contact avec des pays alternatifs à faible présence portugaise comme l’Allemagne51 pour contrecarrer l’attraction que la France exerce sur les travailleurs. C’est non sans difficulté que le rapprochement avec l’Allemagne se fait. D’une part parce qu’à la fin des années 1950, l’émigration italienne remplacée progressivement par l’espagnole lui assure un contingent suffisant de travailleurs étrangers. D’autre part, parce qu’elle refuse de se considérer officiellement comme un pays d’immigration et veut éviter l’intégration des étrangers en Allemagne, bien que les études cherchent à démontrer l’existence de cette politique d’immigration.52 L’absence d’entente et d’une stratégie uniforme entre les différents acteurs (le pouvoir fédéral, des Länders, les syndicats, le patronat) expliqueraient l’absence d’une politique claire et assumée.53 L’Allemagne opterait préférentiellement pour une gestion et une négociation personnalisée des entrées et des conditions de sortie avec les pays d’émigration, sans réellement respecter les accords signés, comme l’on peut voir avec le cas espagnol.54 Cette situation se vérifie avec le Portugal. La première proposition de main-d’œuvre portugaise faite à l’Ambassade allemande à Lisbonne est rejetée, prétextant la forte présence de travailleurs italiens, mais 50. 1er degré : Parents – enfants; 2ème degré: petits-enfants, frères et sœurs, grands-parents; 3ème degré: neveux, nièces, oncles, tantes, arrière-grands-parents. 51. Dans les années 1950, les services consulaires portugais ne comptabilisent qu’une poignée de portugais installés en Allemagne. 52. Riva Kastoryano, L'État et les immigrés : France, Allemagne, Grande-Bretagne et États-Unis, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 5, nº5-1, (1989), p.11. http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/ home/prescript/article/remi_0765-0752_1989_num_5_1_1192. (Dernière consultation le 10 août 2013). 53. Anne von Oswald, Karen Schönwalder et Barbara Sonnenberger, “Einwanderungsland Deutschland: A New look at its Post-war History”: in Rainer Ohliger / Karen Schönwalder / Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (éds.), European Encounters. Migrants, migration and European societies since 1945, ASHGATE 2003, p. 21. 54. Carlos Sanz Díaz, España y la Republica Ferderal de Alemania (1949-1966): Política, Económia y Emigración, entre la Guerra Fría y la Distension, Thèse de doctorat en Histoire Contemporaine, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Geografía e Historia 2005, pp.943-945. 32 Yvette SANTOS aussi parce que l’Allemagne refuse d’être considérée comme un pays d’immigration comme la France. Toutefois, les autorités allemandes reviennent sur leur position et proposent l’organisation d’un recrutement de femmes pour travailler dans les industries de conserve de Bremen. En 1962, l’émigration pour l’Allemagne s’accentue, sans pour autant atteindre les niveaux français.55 En parallèle aux négociations sur l’accord de main-d’œuvre entre la France et le Portugal, la JNE décide de proposer la signature d’un accord de main-d’œuvre avec l’Allemagne qui, fidèle à sa première réaction, voit avec un certain pessimisme la signature de cet accord, d’autant que son utilité soulève des divergences d’opinion entre le pouvoir fédéral et le pouvoir des Länders.56 Mais le gouvernement à Bonn accepte finalement de négocier avec le Portugal, sous la condition que l’Allemagne ne soit pas considérée comme un pays d’immigration et que la présence de travailleurs portugais soit temporaire. Initiées le 4 mars 1964, les négociations sont conclues très rapidement le 17 mars. Deux lettres confidentielles sont annexées à l’accord prévoyant, comme dans le cas français, la promesse allemande de répression de l’émigration illégale et l’appui à l’organisation de la formation professionnelle. De manière générale, l’accord luso-allemand de main-d’œuvre est très similaire à l’accord luso-français. La JNE maintient l’autonomie pour organiser les procédures de recrutement et de sélection des travailleurs. Il est créé un service allemand d’immigration (ELA) responsable de l’envoi des demandes de main-d’œuvre contenant le nombre et le profil socioprofessionnel recherché. Les contrats de travail sont majoritairement anonymes mais l’accord n’exclue pas l’émission de contrats nominatifs. Une fois la liste de travailleurs potentiels établie, le service allemand peut réaliser sa sélection et l’inspection médicale et professionnelle si nécessaire. Toutefois, et contrairement à l’accord avec la France, l’accord luso-allemand définit les conditions de résidence des travailleurs portugais en Allemagne de manière à ce que soit respecter le caractère temporaire de leur présence. Conformément aux exigences allemandes, la fin du contrat de travail implique le retour du travailleur, excepté s’il réussit à trouver un autre emploi. Son retour ne l’empêche pas toutefois de partir de nouveau travailler pour l’Allemagne dans le cadre d’une autre phase de recrutement et de sélection de la main-d’œuvre réalisée par la JNE. Si les autorités allemandes optent pour une émigration pendulaire qui lui assure une certaine flexibilité dans la gestion de la main-d’œuvre portugaise et des flux sur son territoire, cette situation renforce la précarité du travailleur dans l’accès à l’emploi et à ses droits sociaux. Pour les autorités portugaises, l’intérêt d’une émigration pendulaire se table sur différents niveaux : elle allège l’excédent d’une population active 55. 100 pêcheurs seront recrutés pour travailler dans le secteur de la pêche et son industrie et 150 ouvriers spécialisés seront recrutés pour travailler dans le chantier naval de l’entreprise Howaldtswerke Hamburg A. G. 56. Le pouvoir fédéral défend une émigration légale réglementée par un accord tandis que les Länders préfèrent une émigration illégale pour faciliter la sélection et le rejet de travailleurs étrangers. Acte nº24 du 22 janvier 1964 de la réunion des représentants de la JNE. In MNE/DGACCP/AJNE. Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 33 difficile à absorber par le secteur industriel; elle améliore les conditions de vie et de travail des portugais et de leur famille restée au Portugal tout en évitant le regroupement familial57; elle garantit le lien avec le pays d’origine et, de ce fait, assure au travailleur l’acquisition d’une expérience professionnelle à l’étranger pouvant être réutilisée au Portugal. En 1964 s’initient les premières opérations de recrutement des travailleurs pour la France et l’Allemagne. Bien qu’aucun des deux accords ne prévoient de contingents minimum de travailleurs et en dépit des similitudes dans les caractéristiques professionnelles de la main-d’œuvre demandée par les autorités allemandes et françaises, la JNE réserve surtout la main-d’œuvre portugaise pour la France. Néanmoins, et ce en dépit de cette préférence, les insatisfactions françaises se font sentir:58 On critique la lenteur des procédures et les conditions trop restrictives ayant pour conséquence le maintien d’une émigration illégale en parallèle aux sorties légales, et l’impossibilité française à refuser cette arrivée illégale. Voulu ou non, la JNE refuse tout allègement des procédures. Pour l’Allemagne, les autorités consulaires portugaises critiquent l’absence de rigueur dans la sélection des travailleurs recrutés pour accomplir des fonctions sans avoir les compétences requises, et exigent la négociation d’une convention de la Sécurité Sociale pour améliorer la protection des portugais. Les nombreuses critiques françaises amènent la JNE, malgré ses réticences, à alléger les conditions de sortie.59 En effet, les recommandations, décidées en réunions du Conseil des Ministres réalisées en 1964-1965 et qui visent à remettre en question les avantages de l’émigration dans la société portugaise et les besoins de reformuler la politique d’émigration et de la mettre en adéquation avec la politique de l’emploi, établissent un allègement des procédures administratives et des conditions de l’émigration dans le cas des contrats de travail nominatifs.60 Par contre, rien n’est prévu pour l’Allemagne, à l’exception d’un renforcement peu significatif de la représentation consulaire pour assurer une meilleure protection aux portugais. Pendant environ un an, les facilités concédées à la sortie de travailleurs garantissent une sortie principalement légale. Mais la forte hausse de ces sorties, alliée à la récession économique traversée par la France en 1966, amène la JNE à décider de la suspension temporaire de la sortie en avril 1967.61 En Allemagne, le pays connaît aussi une phase de récession économique à partir de 1966 qui l’amène à licencier un nombre significatif de portugais et à suspendre 57. L’accord stipule que le regroupement familiale ne peut se réaliser que si le travailleur possède un logement considéré adéquat par les autorités allemandes. 58. Lettre de l’Ambassade de France au Portugal pour le ministre des Affaires étrangères portugais, Lisbonne, 8 février 1966. In AHD/MNE: EEA 264. 59. Note de Magalhães Cruz sur la réunion de la Commission Mixte, Lisbonne, 4 juillet 1966. Ibidem. 60. Lettre de l’Ambassade de France au Portugal pour le ministre des Affaires étrangères portugais, Lisbonne, 8 février 1966. Ibidem. 61. Pereira, note de bas de page 14, p. 232-235. 34 Yvette SANTOS temporairement leur entrée.62 Face à cette situation, les autorités consulaires portugaises remettent en cause l’absence de protection sociale adéquate que la signature d’une Convention de la Sécurité Sociale, retardée par les autorités allemandes, aurait permis d’améliorer. Il faut attendre l’arrivée de Marcello Caetano au pouvoir à la fin de l’année 1968 pour que la situation se débloque et que soit relancée l’émigration légale pour la France et pour l’Allemagne. Conclusion La politique d’émigration a servi depuis les années 1940 à maintenir le statu quo du modèle économique salazariste. Cette politique ainsi que les moyens administratifs mis à disposition pour contrôler les sorties visent au contrôle avant tout du nombre de manière à éviter quelconque contestation des élites. D’autre part, l’émigration sert à maintenir et à renforcer les rapports entre le Portugal et le Brésil parce que l’émigration est considérée comme un bien public qui doit servir les intérêts nationaux, retirant ainsi à l’individu le droit de décider par lui-même de son émigration. Elle sert de justificatif pour le développement des relations économiques et commerciales et d’éloignement vis-à-vis des pays qui ne l’intéresse pas. Mais ce rapprochement ne doit jamais remettre en cause une autonomie dans la gestion des sorties pour assurer les intérêts économiques et politiques nationaux. La procédure de négociation pour la signature du Traité d’Amitié et de Consultation et des accords réglementant ce Traité en est un exemple. L’émigration pour la France et pour l’Allemagne ont servi à rapprocher le Portugal des pays de la CEE. Elle contribue aux changements socioéconomiques et politiques nationaux nécessaires à l’internationalisation de l’économie portugaise. Elle a favorisé le conflit interne et la remise en question de la politique d’émigration jusque-là adoptée. Malgré les résistances, la coopération avec la France et l’Allemagne a permis de repenser la position et le rôle de l’émigration et à reconfigurer ses priorités et ses intérêts, ainsi que sa stratégie au niveau de sa politique extérieure. Elle a notamment un impact important sur la mentalité administrative qui régisse les procédures administratives de l’émigration et qui représente un frein évident au développement d’une émigration libre et au rapprochement avec les pays de la CEE. En dépit des fortes réticences dans le rapprochement avec les pays de la CEE, du moins jusqu’à la sortie du pouvoir de Salazar, l’émigration sert, et ce depuis 1969 avec l’arrivée de Marcello Caetano au pouvoir, de motif valable pour amorcer un rapprochement durant les années 1970. Cette fois-ci, le maintien d’une émigration pour la France et la forte présence quantitative d’émigrants n’est plus perçu comme 62. Office du consul du Portugal à Düsseldorf, Tomaz Andresen pour le MAE portugais, nº918 – Proc 109,4, 13 décembre 1966. In MNE/DGACCP/AJNE, réf. 9.4/28: «Recrutamentos para a Alemanha. 1967-1968». Entre l’Atlantique et l’Europe 35 un facteur déviant de la politique économique et extérieure portugaise. Elle devient au contraire l’une des principales raisons « naturelles » qui justifie ce rapprochement. 36 Yvette SANTOS The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) as part of the post-WWII ‘world-making’ Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI Abstract The idea of international management of migration seems to be dominant since the beginning of the 21st century. The idea, however, of the possibility and plausibility of a global migration management was coined already in the Interwar period within the League of Nations and took a specific form at the aftermath of the WWII, when substantial steps towards this direction were undertaken. The establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (precursor of the International Organisation for Migration – IOM), which replaced the International Refugee Organisation in 1951, was the first initiative for a management of migration at a global scale. By May 1960, one million European migrants had been moved under the auspices of the ICEM. In this chapter we examine the context and particularly the content given by the member states and the ICEM overall to the concretisation of the notion of managing migration from Europe to overseas countries. Through the concretisation of the ICEM’s services, specific administrative and operational patterns were constructed shaping part of the Western world’s ideological apparatus within the Cold War. Finally, seen through the post-war international institutional building, implicit links of the ICEM with the European integration process are researched at the very initial stage of the European Economic Community. Introduction The main issues we discuss here come from a twofold historic situation: the birth and consolidation of the idea of ‘migration management’ as a way of approaching the question of regulating human mobility, and links between the shifts generated by the efforts to regulate mobility and the process of European integration. We thus focus on the specific ways in which migration management was effectively implemented at an international level at the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Basing our study on material in the IOM archives in Geneva and Athens, in the National Archives of the United States, and Australia, as well as in the archives of the Inter- 37 national Labour Office in Geneva,1 we reconstruct the machinery established by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in order to conceive and apply plausible and efficient measures for the promotion, monitoring and sustainability of international migration. Regulation of human mobility certainly has deeper historical roots than only the post-WWII era; it had already appeared, not only as a proclaimed desire but also as an operating principle, during the period between the two world wars. Already in 1927, the first director of the ILO, Albert Thomas, was stating during the World Population Conference in Geneva that “the moment [had] yet arrived for considering the possibility of establishing some sort of supreme supranational authority which would regulate the distribution of population on rational and impartial lines, by controlling and directing migration movements and deciding on the opening-up or closing of countries to particular streams of immigration”.2 However, despite efforts to deal with the refugee problem produced by WWI and the collapse of empires, efforts mainly deployed under the aegis of the League of Nations,3 it was only after the end of WWII that effective regulation of migration became a problem for states and international organisations. Furthermore, in the imminent Cold War period, European flows were deemed political enough to attract Western attention and gain legal protection and material assistance. Despite widespread population displacements after the war, the expanding post-war institutional regime was not intended to acquire a global proportion; it was required to respond mainly to the ‘European surplus crisis’ and to take advantage of the political opportunities it presented.4 The creation of a specialised migration agency The end of WWII found Europe in total disarray. One of the urgent problems which emerged was that of unemployment, which in some cases took endemic dimensions. 1. Conducted within the research project Migration Management and International Organizations: A history of the establishment of the International Organization for Migration (http://mimio.uop.gr/ site/?q=en), which was funded by the European Social Fund and Greek National Resources (2012-2015). 2. Thomas, Albert, International Migration and its Control, in: M. Sanger (ed.), Proceedings of the World Population Conference, London 1927, p. 262. 3. For more, see Parsanoglou, Dimitris & Tsitselikis, Konstantinos, “The Emergence of the International Regulation of Human Mobility”, in Lina Venturas (ed.), International “Migration Management” in the early Cold War: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Corinth, 2015, pp. 13-32. 4. Cohen, Gerald Daniel, In War's Wake. Europe's Displaced Persons in the Post-war Order, Oxford, New York 2012, pp. 11-12. Madokoro, Laura, Unwanted Refugees: Chinese migration and the making of a global humanitarian agenda 1949-1989. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation), Vancouver 2012, pp. 26-27; Loescher, Gil, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Oxford 2001, p. 57. 38 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI High birth rates and involuntary migration in Italy, Greece and the Netherlands had created an ‘overpopulation crisis’ undermining Europe's prospects for political stability and economic recovery – not to mention the millions of refugees and displaced persons in Germany and Austria for whom immediate humanitarian action was indispensable. With the latter problem in mind, a special international agency of the United Nations, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) was created in 1947, comprised of eighteen member governments5 and undertaking a much wider range of tasks than those previously performed by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (1943-1946).6 The IRO was designed from the start to have a five-year operational life, during which it was to “solve that part of the world refugee problem represented by the ‘displaced persons’ who were uprooted by the second World War and by the political disturbances which followed in its wake”.7 Even within its short lifespan, the IRO managed to resettle about one million displaced persons (DPs).8 Many of them were still living in Europe and needing humanitarian assistance, while new refugees fleeing from Communist states continued to flood into Western Europe, attracting more and more attention from the US foreign policy administrators. After a short period of contemplation and negotiations among the main stakeholders, i.e. those representing member governments of the IRO, with respect to which and what kind of organisation would undertake and extend the tasks until then performed by the IRO, dominant Western states led by the United States decided to establish a new intergovernmental committee outside the orbit of the UN. It is important to note here that, during the discussions which took place in the brief period just before the liquidation of the IRO, i.e. in the second half of 1951, another international organisation having already shown great interest in migration attempted to establish itself as the competent agency regulating international migration movements: the International Labour Organisation (ILO). These efforts culminated in the organisation of a special Migration Conference in October 1951, held in Naples, which did not, however, achieve any significant results. In the words of the French delegate to the Brussels Migration Conference that followed that in Naples: “We must admit that results so far have been somewhat disappointing. The multiplicity of efforts has led to nothing but resolutions and partial successes; no one, so far, has migrated except ourselves, from Conference to Conference”.9 5. Those of Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Guatemala, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America and Venezuela. 6. Ducasse-Rogier, Marianne, The International Organization of Migration 1951-2001, Geneva 2001, p. 13. 7. IRO, Migration from Europe … a report of experience, Geneva 1951. 8. Bouscaren, Anthony T., International Migrations since 1945, New York 1963, p. 13. 9. “Statement made by Mr. Rochefort (France)”, Summary record of the fifth meeting, held at the Hotel Atlanta, Brussels, at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 28 November, 1951, MCB/SR/5/Annex 4, Geneva, 26 December 1951, p. 19, National Archives Records administration (NARA), Washington D.C. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 39 In fact, the failure of the above-mentioned endeavours was strongly linked to US policy priorities. In the early Cold War era, in their effort to implement an independent anti-Communist policy in areas of geostrategic interest, the United States favoured the creation of flexible multilateral agencies, with a provisional character and restricted mandate, under its own administrative, economic and political control.10 As regards migration problems, the US government tried to sidestep the United Nations by undermining, on the one hand, the ambitious migration plan of the ILO and, on the other, the position of the newly founded United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).11 The US plan envisaged a small and less costly technical agency which would deal with all migration problems, comprised of non-Communist member states and operating on a cost-reimbursable basis. It was a solution favoured by all the Western states involved, since they could thus retain control of flows and protect their economic and social interests.12 In this context, delegates from twenty-seven emigration and immigration countries, as well as from countries “interested in migration”,13 met in Brussels in December 1951 to discuss the most effective way of dealing with what had previously been undertaken by individual states, institutions and networks. The conference resulted in the establishment of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME).14 The new organisation was to be based on the experience and resettlement facilities acquired by the IRO during the five years of its existence, although it would be exclusively composed of liberal states friendly to the United States. Although outside the UN system, the new organisation was intended to collaborate with UN bodies, American and international NGOs and the newly established US Escapee Program, aiming at assisting defectors from Communist countries.15 10. Such were the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 11. The fate of the UNHCR was in the beginning extremely uncertain given its temporary non-operational character, its limited budget and purview (focusing mainly on ‘unwanted’ refugees who still remained in camps) and above all, its non-American leadership: Loescher, note 4, pp. 50-57. 12. Murdock, Mary Anne C., An Analysis of the Intergovernmental Committee of Migration (master’s thesis), Princeton 1983. pp. 11-13; Karatani, Rieko, How History Separated Refugee and Migrant Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins, International Journal of Refugee Law, 17(3) (2005), pp. 517-541; Loescher, note 4, pp. 50-57; Venturas, Lina, Conclusion. Rationales for Steering European Outflows and the Migration Apparatus of Peripheral States in the Early Cold War, in: Lina Venturas (ed.), International “Migration Management” in the early Cold War: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Corinth 2015, pp. 314-318. 13. According to the classification proposed from the beginning by the US government: see “A Plan to facilitate the movement of surplus populations from countries of Western Europe and Greece to countries affording resettlement opportunities overseas (Submitted by the United States Delegation)”, Brussels Migration Conference, MCB/3, 24 November 1951, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Washington D.C. 14. “Resolution to establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted at the 13th Meeting, December 5, 1951),” Brussels Migration Conference, MCB/9, 6 December 1951, National Archives Records administration (NARA), Washington D.C. 15. Loescher, note 4, pp. 59-61; Bouscaren, note 8, p. 16. 40 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI Within a year, PICMME acquired a permanent status and was renamed to Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). It was comprised initially of sixteen member states,16 and acquired its own Constitution in November 1954. The Committee was organised into three organs; the Council, in which all decisions were made and all member states participated, the Executive Committee, comprised of delegates from nine member states, and the Administration, headed by the Director- General and divided into five departments. From the very beginning, the ICEM endorsed a fully operational character and had at its disposal one of the largest budgets amongst other important international organisations.17 Moving people: an unusual way of working The main purpose of the ICEM was “to make arrangements for the transport of migrants, for whom existing facilities [were] inadequate and who could not otherwise be moved, from European countries having surplus population to countries overseas which offer opportunities for orderly immigration”.18 Apart from this major concern, monitored by a permanent Subcommittee for the Coordination of Transport, the organisation had to plan several other details, defined as services auxiliary to the movement, in accordance with member governments’ financial interests and in the best possible conditions.19 The migration system introduced by the ICEM was based on a classification of schemes, subdivided into two main types: ‘mass migration’ and ‘individual migra- 16. The initial member states were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, the USA. By 1960 ICEM had increased its members to twenty-nine having added Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Rhodesia & Nyasaland, Spain, Sweden, Union of South Africa and Venezuela, while Bolivia and Turkey had withdrawn. 17. Murdock, note 12, pp. 13-22; Indicatively, in the 1953 comprehensive (administrative and operational) budget of the ICEM, annual member states’ contributions reached a total of $14,196,600. In 1957, this amount rose to $37,253,335. US contributions covered approximately half of the total budget: in 1953 they amounted to $7,451,728 and in 1957 they reached $17,720,947. In comparison, the UNHCR which was not supported by the US had an initial annual budget of only $300,000; the ILO budget in the years 1954-1960 was on average about a fifth of the respective ICEM budget; the World Health Organisation WHO in 1955 disposed less than a fourth of the ICEM budget, while those of the Food Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in 1956 and 1957 was close to that of ILO. On the other hand, from 1947 to 1951 the IRO received $430 million, funding four times superior than the budget of the United Nations at that time, half of which was provided by the US. See Franghiadis, Alexis, Who pays: Financing and Budget of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, in: Lina Venturas (ed.), International “Migration Management” in the early Cold War: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Corinth 2015, p. 108, 120-121. 18. See “ICEM Constitution”, MC/55, November 1953, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA, Washington D.C.), article 1(a). 19. For more details on the organisation of the transport, see Limnios-Sekeris, Ioannis, Stakeholders and competition in the transportation of migrants: moving Greeks to Australia in the post-War era, Journal of Transport History 36 (1) (2015), pp. 97-115. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 41 tion’ schemes, sponsored mainly by Voluntary Agencies. Internal divisions within each type created a multiplicity of categories, such as the ‘assisted passage schemes’ (movement under the terms of bilateral agreements, e.g., Canada, Australia), the ‘workers’ schemes’ (urban and agricultural workers selected by immigration countries according to qualifications), the ‘open placement movements’ (workers with trades and skills required by certain immigration countries), ‘pre-placement movements’ (migration with specific labour contracts), the ‘dependent and family reunion scheme’ (movement of first-degree relatives) and ‘refugee schemes’ (qualified as eligible for assistance from the UNHCR, the United States Escapee Program, the IRO Trust Fund and the Voluntary Agencies’ Revolving Fund).20 In their turn, refugees were moved according to programmes, such as the European Refugee Programme, the Hungarian Refugee Programme, the Trieste Special Programme, the Near East Programme and the Far East Programme.21 22 Through this variety of schemes and programmes, international organisations and national governments attempted to regulate post-war mobility in a flexible and efficient way according to their economic and political goals. Therefore, the multiplicity of categories of people assisted by the ICEM provided the possibility to its senior officers to continually broaden its mandate, its geographical scope, its operational role, and certainly its lifespan and power. Taking into account the competition between international organisations and their struggle for existence, it is understandable that the Committee tried to justify its necessity by providing assistance each time to newly-defined – by its bureaucracy – vulnerable social groups.23 In the 1950s, refugees in particular became a group which fell under the mandate of many important organisations, such as the ICEM, the UNHCR, the United Nations network, and the Council of Europe, not to speak of governmental agencies and programmes, such as the United States Escapee Program or the Refugee Relief Act, each of them adopting a different definition of the term.24 As regards ICEM, the organi- 20. ICEM, ICEM Handbook, Geneva 1960. 21. Even though these two programmes expanded ICEM’s geographical scope, they were included in the organisation’s operations since they concerned refugees of European origin. The Near East Programme concerned Europeans of Jewish, Italian and Greek origin fleeing from Egypt after the Free Officer’s Movement in 1952 and the Suez crisis of 1956, whereas the Far East Programme attempted to resettle refugees of European origin living in communist China (mainly Jews who had fled Germany and White Russians). For more details, see Papadopoulos, Yannis & Kourachanis, Nikos, Overall European Overseas Outflows and Internationally Assisted Movements (1945-1960): who was helped to move? Where to?, in: L. Venturas (ed.), International “Migration Management” in the early Cold War: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Corinth 2015, p. 184-187. 22. ICEM, note 20, p. 12; Papadopoulos & Kourachanis, note 21, pp. 173-187. 23. Karatani, note 12, pp. 532-541. 24. In the Refugee Convention of 1951, the refugee definition was limited to persons who became refugees as a result of: a) de facto statelessness or more exactly lack of protection and b) events occurring before 1 January 1951”. On the contrary ICEM interested in migration per se applied less specific criteria considering as refugee anyone who was not a national migrant (i.e. anyone who was outside his country of nationality or habitual residence). See ICEM, Twenty Years Dedicated to the Free Movement of People, p.108, 30th Anniversary, IOM Archives, Geneva. 42 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI sation did not adopt any specific definition or geographical limitation of the term ‘refugee’ in its Constitution. By keeping the description of individuals open and flexible, it could adapt its refugee-related services to the varied and ever-changing circumstances of the post-war era. Its assistance could also be subjected to negotiations with the governments of the countries concerned, or be activated by the priorities set by the US Cold War policy.25 In addition, this wide definition of the term allowed the organisation to extend its mandate to other persons in ‘refugee-like’ situations, such as those who found themselves, because of political polarisation, in the condition of refugees even in their own country of origin.26 Such was the case of the 700.000 ‘guerrilla-stricken’ Greek civilians, fleeing from the generalised oppression of the Civil War era and its resulting poverty, who oscillated between the status of clearly identifiable economic migrants and political refugees.27 Equally broad was the content accorded by the Committee to the term ‘migrant’. Europeans who wanted to migrate but did not have the means to do so constituted the main target group of ICEM’s assisted programmes.28 In fact, unemployed and destitute people, the vast majority of whom came from rural areas in war-ravaged and ‘overpopulated’ countries in Western and Southern Europe, were assisted in various ways. Lacking skills and having neither overseas connections nor the legal, financial and technical means to reconnect with their networks in traditional destinations such as the United States and British Commonwealth countries, they could use ICEM services to avoid poverty and search for better opportunities as workers overseas. Among them were family groups (dependent members, i.e., spouses, minor children, unmarried sisters or engaged women, many of whom were below working age) and, for the first time in 1953 female workers, i.e. sponsored single women migrating independently under domestic workers’ schemes.29 The degree of ICEM’s participation in the preparation and organisation of the movement varied from country to country, depending on the capacity and competence of local migration departments and other relevant authorities and services. ICEM most often assisted interested states through its liaison offices by providing knowhow to national officials and organising or coordinating the necessary formal steps 25. Elie, Jerome, The Historical Roots of Cooperation. Between the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration, Global Governance 16 (2010), p. 359, note 53); Perruchoud, R., From the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration to the International Organization for Migration, International Journal of Refugee Law 1(4) (1989), p. 506. 26. Statement made by H.E. Mr. Zutter (Switzerland), Summary Record of the 4th Meeting, Tuesday 27 Nov. 1951, MCB/SR/4/Annex 2, p. 10, Brussels Conference, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Washington D.C. 27. Citroen, H.A., European Emigration Overseas. Past and Future, The Hague 1951, p. 23; Close, D. H., Greece since 1945. Politics, Economy and Society, London 2002, p. 37-39; Bouscaren, note 8. p. 85. 28. Following the logic of the Committee’s Constitution; see above, note 19. 29. Alexandraki, C., Services rendered by ICEM to Migrant and Refugee Women, International Migration 19(1-2) (1981), pp. 225-240. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 43 prior to and during embarkation.30 In Greece for instance, due to the absence of relative services, the ICEM field office was responsible, according to the agreement signed between the organisation and the Greek government,31 for all pre-embarkation services considered necessary to maintain an organised movement. In Italy, most emigration-related tasks were accomplished by government services, whereas ICEM participated in pilot projects of pre-selection, including vocational and language training, medical examinations, and documentation. In the Netherlands all procedures and services for organising emigration flows remained under the responsibility of government and voluntary agencies, whereas ICEM only provided the means of transport.32 Thus, ICEM officials were in charge of operational activities ranging from informing migrants on how to participate in relevant schemes to tracing job openings and potential sponsors and employers abroad. Within the continuum between place of origin and place of settlement, ICEM provided assistance and services for registering migrants, approving and channelling family reunion cases, assisting migrants in preparing, translating and verifying documents required for travel such as passports, visas, medical certificates and political documents, putting pressure on governments to simplify and accelerate procedures, as well as to reduce costs. ICEM staff also organised the movement of migrants from remote rural locations to training centres and ports of embarkation, as well as their accommodation before and after the journey. In fact, ICEM staff escorted migrants during their journey, assuming full responsibility for the safety and well-being of passengers aboard and providing counselling, orientation and language courses, as well as recreational activities. ICEM representatives were also present at all disembarkation ports and assisted migrants with landing procedures and temporary accommodation arrangements.33 The discussions and concerns of ICEM planners and member governments’ representatives also focused on ‘technical questions’ related to the integration of mi- 30. For an overview of services directly related to movement see: “Report of the Director on migration services”, MC/200, 21 August 1956, p. 3-8, Fifth Session of the Council of the ICEM, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Washington D.C. 31. “Ratification of the Agreement between the Greek Government and ICEM”, Proceedings of the Greek Parliament, 2/10/1953, Agreements and Annexes, Archives of Athens Mission of IOM, Athens. 32. Marks, Edward., Internationally Assisted Migration: ICEM Rounds Out Five Years of Resettlement, International Organization 11(3) (1957), p. 485; ILO, International Migration 1945-1957, Geneva 1959, p. 294; Citroen, note 28, p. 37; Hofstede, B. P., Thwarted Exodus. Post-War Overseas Migration from the Netherlands, The Hague 1964, pp. 74-95. 33. Tourgeli, Giota & Venturas, Lina, Guiding the Migration Apparatus in Peripheral States of the ‘Free World’, in: L. Venturas (ed.), International “Migration Management” in the early Cold War: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Corinth 2015, pp. 240-242, 247. 44 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI grants into host societies.34 In the mid-1950s, the need for specialised migration services became even more pressing, and ICEM was forced to re-evaluate its priorities and emphasise technical programmes aiming at improving first the qualifications of persons wishing to migrate and, secondly, the absorptive capacities of developing receiving states.35 Deeply imbued with the development doctrine of the post-war era, the ICEM administration strove to match labour supply in Europe with labour demand in overseas countries. More precisely, Latin American countries, which constituted a promising destination area for ICEM planners but increasingly less so for migrants themselves,36 were seeking qualified workforce. For this purpose, the ICEM designed specific vocational training policies aiming at transforming unskilled prospective migrants into semi-qualified workers. In addition, by enhancing the capacity of immigration countries to attract and integrate large numbers of European workers into their labour markets, the organisation was also attempting to respond to the ongoing ‘problem of repatriation’. Considering the high rate of returnees as a ‘failure’ for everyone involved in the migration process, the Committee’s concerted action in this field was considered to be an indispensable endeavour with mutual benefits.37 Supportive services could ensure the successful settlement of immigrants, produce greater mobility, and subsequently increase financial contributions to ICEM’s budget. They could also relieve emigration countries from surplus manpower, provide receiving ones with suitable workers, and enhance ICEM’s role in managing international migration flows. Other promotional activities included pre-emigration services, i.e. intensive training aiming at preparing potential migrants coming mainly from Southern Europe and lacking linguistic and professional skills. Courses on Spanish, English and Portuguese language were associated with cultural orientation and development of technical skills required by immigration countries. There was also interest in developing postemigration activities, i.e. the provision of reception and effective placement services 34. This concern was obvious even before the establishment of the ICEM; it is indicative that in the framework of the Naples Migration Conference a specific Subcommittee on Technical Questions was set up, comprised by two Working Groups, one on Advisory Services and one on Operational Services. The latter focused on measures of international action needed by emigration and immigration countries to further migration, including selection, recruitment, training and reception of migrants. Salvesen, K., “Working Group No. 1 (Advisory Services) and Working Group No. 2 (Operational Services): Draft Report”, C.Mig/I/CP/TQ/D.1, 11 October 1951, ILO Archives, Geneva. 35. “Migration Services Program: Report of the Director”, MC/154, 20/09/1955, 3rd Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17-22, 1955, National Archives Records Αdministration (NARA), Washington D.C. 36. Latin America attracted unskilled emigrants from Southern Europe mainly during the first half of the 1950s when the more developed Commonwealth countries were not willing to receive them. For more information on statistical data and migration trends see Papadopoulos & Kourachanis, note21, pp.149-158. 37. The ICEM officials were preoccupied especially with the case of the Italian migrants. During the period 1950-1954 the total repatriation from overseas destinations was equal to one year’s outward movement (about 26,000 emigrants returned home annually whereas about 130,000 persons left Italy each year) see “Migration Services Program”, MC/154, op. cit., p.154. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 45 to newcomers by specialised migration officials, new national agencies, and a constantly expanding network of sub-offices and international collaborators. For this purpose, ICEM also started to experiment with multilateral technical projects, carrying out field-trip manpower surveys and collecting comparative data on the living conditions and purchasing power of people in emigration and immigration countries. They also established channels of cooperation with technocrats, experts, other institutional bodies and voluntary agencies, as well as with private stakeholders.38 Although ICEM’s directors had ambitious expansion plans and tried to be adaptable to the ever-changing situations, the organisation had hesitantly shifted its priorities away from the ideas of those who had created it.39 During the 1950s, almost all ICEM’s total expenditure, i.e. more than 80%, was spent on transportation services, whereas supported activities represented a very limited portion.40 In Naples in May 1960, the organisation celebrated with a broad marketing campaign the ‘One Millionth Migrant’ who had been transported under its auspices.41 It is true that the United States and the Commonwealth countries were mostly interested in securing transportation for the resettlement of refugees and for large numbers of unemployed persons in Europe, but they were reluctant to accept ICEM’s definite engagement with costly large-scale operations. ICEM undertook such initiatives only to promote specific migration schemes from Southern Europe to developing countries. Nevertheless, even in this limited way, it did contribute to the construction and dissemination of administrative patterns and techniques in managing international mobility. Constructing ideological patterns: ICEM in the Cold War ICEM was one of the organisations created within the impetus for global regulation of social issues. Focusing specifically on refugee and migrant problems emerging after the end of WWII, the Committee soon ensured its place as the global regulator of human mobility. However, ICEM should not be seen strictly as a specialised migration agency; it should also be perceived and conceived as part of the institutional building of the post-war era. It was one of several organisations, e.g. IRO, ILO, UN- HCR, Council of Europe and OEEC, dealing with some aspects of European mobility and contributing to the cohesion of the Western – or the so-called ‘free’ – world, by constructing mechanisms and disseminating ‘rational’, measurable and cost-effective administrative patterns. Thus, international migration was seen as a vehicle which played an important role in forging a free world and binding people in an international 38. Tourgeli & Venturas, note 33, pp. 273-284. 39. Reinalda, Bob, The International Organization for Migration and its Directors-General in the History of International Organization. (Paper for the International Conference ‘Migration Management’ and International Organizations in the 20th Century), Athens 2015. 40. Franghiadis, note 17, 110-119. 41. From 1952 to 1960 ICEM transported 1.059.000 persons of whom 596.000 were migrants (about 60%) and the rest refugees: see Papadopoulos & Kourachanis, note 21, p. 151. 46 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI family: according to this conviction, the money spent on planning migration was the best possible investment in ‘world building’.42 This process included among others the promotion of administrative models and techniques of public opinion management, the regulation of people’s ‘free’ circulation and the diffusion of normative discourses. Following the administrative and operational patterns established by the UNRRA in providing emergency relief,43 ICEM developed and extended its field of intervention, while it focused on providing services to enhance mass transportation of European migrants from ‘overpopulated’ areas or resettling refugees fleeing from Communist-dominated countries. As regards the latter, the 1956 Hungarian crisis “established ICEM’s expert standing in matters of international humanitarian transportation”.44 The experience in refugee-related services, which ICEM acquired during the Hungarian crisis, established its operational profile as an agency specialising in ‘crash’ programmes.45 ICEM also adopted operational experience and, more importantly, material infrastructure, i.e. ships, from the IRO although it finally “prove[d] to be more than a simple ‘IRO successor branch’ for the resettlement of refugees and migrants”.46 Many procedures and services related to selection and placement had already been inaugurated by the IRO. The latter distributed its one million assisted refugees according to the economic and demographic needs of countries being in the process of reconstruction.47 All three institutions, UNRRA, IRO and ICEM, formed the organisational backbone created in the post-war years under the influence of the United States to handle the political problem of human mobility in allegedly technical terms. Although they were designed with a limited geographical and temporal mandate, their objectives went beyond humanitarian relief of people who had suffered the repercussions of the war. Lastly, each in its own way, they all contributed to consolidating “a habit by which the nations [would] learn to work together for their common prosperity and thereby lay the foundations for lasting peace”.48 Their leaders, most of them American officials deeply influenced by the progressive and New Deal way of thinking of the early 20th century, shared the post-war enthusiasm for international planning and public welfare.49 42. Marks, note 32, p. 494. 43. Reinisch, Jessica, Introduction: Relief in the Aftermath of War, Journal of Contemporary History 43(3) (2008), p. 376. 44. Ducasse-Rogier, note 6, p. 60. 45. Marks, note 32, p. 491. 46. Ducasse-Rogier, note 6, p. 21. 47. Ducasse-Rogier, note 6, p. 13; Cohen, note 4, pp. 101-104; Karatani, note 12, p. 530; Citroen, note 27, pp. 25-30. 48. A goal set in 1942 by Philip Noel-Baker, a British politician, member of the Labour Party; cited in Reinisch, note 43, 379. 49. Reinisch, note 43, pp. 376-377; Cohen, note 4, p. 60; Krige, John & Rausch, Helke, Introduction – Tracing the Knowledge: Power nexus of American Philanthrophy, in: John Krige & Helke Rausch (eds.), American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century, Göttingen 2012, p. 27. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 47 In this early Cold War context ICEM could not present itself as a neutral, impartial agency. From the beginning therefore, it espoused and promoted the liberal principle of ‘free movement’ differentiating itself from Communist states which imposed restrictions on their citizens’ movements. Since President H. Truman had emphasised his administration’s commitment to a new ‘Fifth Freedom’ – that of movement – the Cold War imaginary was profoundly shaped by the dichotomy between the ‘openness and tolerance’ of the Western states and the ‘closeness and autarchy’ of the rival powers.50 In this spirit, Article 2 of the Constitution of ICEM stated that “the members of the Committee shall be (…) Governments with a demonstrated interest in the principle of the free movement of persons”.51 Nevertheless, labour mobility outside overpopulated Europe, although desired and encouraged, was not rendered really freer. Actually, what was recognised and celebrated by the Western World was the freedom to emigrate rather than the freedom to immigrate.52 In addition, the legal channels of movement created at that time also contributed to a more feasible governance of populations: mobile persons were subjected to new forms of surveillance and control through migration services, i.e. during the processes of pre-selection and documentation. In other words, the post-war mobility of people in economic need or under political persecution became a process of ‘measured liberalisation’53 or ‘regulated openness’.54 It entailed the increased involvement of various political and administrative actors: intergovernmental and nongovernmental institutions, state authorities, expert groups and administrative agents. Debated in international forums and administered through advanced technical systems and bureaucratic mechanisms, the Western notion of ‘freedom of movement’ was celebrated, although it was usually ‘used’ in ways that benefitted the propaganda and plans of Western governments within Cold War rivalry.55 These plans included population redistribution, the spread of the development doctrine and, of course, containment of the Communist danger. It is true – as its name implied – that ICEM clearly facilitated the movement of Europeans. Among its tasks was to channel European (skilled or semi-skilled) workers – after being turned away from the United States – into specific labour markets, such as Latin America, Oceania and South Africa. Thus, privileged mobile people in the early Cold War era were either war refugees who had not yet been resettled permanently, escapees from Communist states of Eastern Europe, or economic migrants 50. Carruthers, Susan L., Cold War Captives. Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing, Berkeley Los Angeles, London 2009, p. 9, 21. 51. “ICEM Constitution”, note 18, Art. 2(b). 52. ILO, note 32, p. 275. 53. Xiang, Biao & Lindquist, Johan, Migration Infrastructure, International Migration Review 48 (2014), p. 124. 54. Geiger, Martin & Pécoud, Antoine, The Politics of International Migration Management, in: Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management, Basingstoke 2010, p. 3; Kalm, Sara, Liberalizing Movements? The Political Rationality of Global Migration Management, in: M. Geiger & A. Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management, Basingstoke 2010, p. 37. 55. Kalm, note 54, p. 36-37. 48 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI from overpopulated European countries; in other words, the people who were eligible for ICEM assistance. Even within these categories, however, internal divisions, selective mechanisms and discriminatory measures were implemented by the bureaucracy of both ICEM and related national agencies and stakeholders. Receiving states never really adopted a policy of open borders. On the contrary, they safeguarded their sovereign right to regulate the number, the origin and the qualities of the people who were crossing their borders. In addition, whole regions which could provide emigrants, e.g. Asia, were excluded from ICEM membership and remained outside the organisation’s mandate and scope of action. The preference of receiving countries for European migrants reflected selectivity not only according to political criteria, but also on the basis of cultural stereotypes. In the ‘prestigious’ British World (i.e. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa), the colonial mentality privileged the ‘admission based on desirability’ or selection of the numbers and composition of immigration programmes according to a constructed cultural hierarchy. Workers who were favoured in the international labour market continued to be the migrants of Anglo-Saxon origin. With their accredited and vocational qualifications in high demand and sharing British culture and democratic and liberal values, this group of migrants could easily gain full membership in their chosen societies of settlement.56 Nevertheless, since the supply of such ethnicities reduced, receiving countries were more eager to relax their immigration policies and, mainly through bilateral agreements, to allow the arrival of ‘less desirable’ white workers. Southern Europeans were thus categorised as ‘acceptable white races’ and were considered as eventually assimilable, although they did not belong to the ‘superior Western’ culture. Without being exempted from internal rankings,57 Italians, Greeks and Spaniards were chosen in smaller numbers in 56. Taylor, Savitri, From Border Control to Migration Management: The Case for a Paradigm Change in the Western Response to Transborder Population Movement, Social Policy and Administration 39(6) (2005), pp. 563-586; Madokoro, note 4, pp. 13-15; The British could be naturalised after twelve months of permanent residence in Australia whereas other ethnicities needed five years. Naturalisation was easier for the first group since they possessed the linguistic ability: see Limnios- Sekeris Ioannis, Greek Emigration to Australia during the first post-war decades) (Unpublished MA thesis), University of Crete 2013, p. 37. 57. Greeks, for example, were usually considered by Australian authorities to be worse than the Italians. This is why Australia maintained fully-staffed migration offices and adequate selection services in Rome and signed official agreements, constantly renewed, for mass recruitment of Italians (Limnios, note 56, 58-59). Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese were also favoured by Latin American countries because of their common ethnic and religious background. See ILO, note 32, p. 224; von Holleuffer, Henriette, Seeking New Horizons in Latin America: The Resettlement of 100.000 European Displaced Persons between the Gulf of Mexico and Patagonia (1947–1951), Jahrbuchfür Geschichte Lateinamerikas 39 (2002), pp.125-161. Greeks supplemented the immigrant stock of receiving countries or were preferred for specific schemes. Young Greek women, for instance, compared to Italians, were much preferred by Canadian authorities for domestic services because they were considered to be more docile and willing workers. See Tastsoglou, Evangelia, ‘The temptations of New Surroundings’: Family, State, and Transnational Gender Politics in the Movement of Greek Domestic Workers to Canada in the 1950s and 1960s”, in Evangelia Tastsoglou (ed.), Women, Gender, and Diaspora Lives. Labor, Community, and Identity in Greek Migrations, Lanham: 2009, pp. 81-114. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 49 order to fill specific employment vacancies. They were submitted to strict medical tests (height, weight and physical state) in an attempt to select those who did not differ significantly from the standards of the national population.58 Procedures of political screening were also set up for security reasons, since prospective migrants were coming from countries with strong Communist influence.59 They were also obliged to be trained and acquire skills required by receiving countries. ICEM’s training programmes did not only aim at transforming rural migrants into skilled industrial workers and make them equally competitive to the international labour market. They also had a strong cultural component, which more or less followed constructed cultural hierarchies. Thus, most of these training programmes focused on Southern Europeans and attempted to transmit to them social skills on which they could immediately capitalise in their new countries of residence. Gender was also important: in the case of men, programmes focused mainly on qualification and orientation for the fastest possible integration into the formal labour market; women were offered training programmes which also had a ‘civilising mission’ that went beyond the acquirement of specific professional skills. Training programmes for domestic workers, which prepared young women from Southern Europe before their departure to Commonwealth countries, mainly aimed to ‘raise women’s cultural level’ and familiarise them with the standards of ‘modern’ housekeeping.60 Specific national concerns of emigration countries also restricted in practice the degree of freedom of movement. In addition, through the ICEM, sending countries acquired more effective means of controlling and restricting the departure of specific categories of citizens. Member states of the organisation, such as Greece, feared that ICEM assistance in organising emigration movements might lead to a mass exodus. Therefore, the Greek government, although temporarily,61 banned emigration in order to keep prospective migrants at home: such was the case of young single women, as well as families and residents of Northern Greek border provinces who could leave the country only according to age and strict numerical quotas.62 National governments also started to regulate the movement of their citizens through a complicated identification procedure. Thanks to ICEM processing services, European workers who were moved in an organised way were protected from a time-consuming and costly bureaucracy, but they were not exempted from any documentation process as such. In fact, the authorisation to move depended on more documentation than before, due not only to legal but also to economic and professional criteria. ICEM granted the 58. It is indicative that the ICEM Mission operating in Greece justified rejected cases as being “too dark” or having “deformed face”. Applicants having height of less than 155 centimetres and body weight less than 54 kilos were not admitted. Restrictions also expanded to infectious diseases considered as endemic in Southern Europe and easy to be spread on the aircraft, such as smallpox and plague (Limnios-Sekeris, note 56, p. 37, 60). 59. Tourgeli & Venturas, note 33, p. 241-242. 60. Tourgeli & Venturas, note 33, p. 242-247. 61. Such restrictions were imposed mainly in 1954; see Al. Ioannides, “Some aspects of our early relations with the Greek Government” 1960, pp. 3–4, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, Archives of Athens Mission of IOM, Athens. 62. Tourgeli & Venturas, note 33, p. 235-239. 50 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI right to move under its assistance destitute persons, the financial status of whom had to be documented, together with their nationality, age, gender, health, and family status, political orientation and professional skills. Certainly, ‘free movement’ under the auspices of ICEM did not necessarily mean ‘free of charge’. ICEM did not follow a uniform system of reimbursement for its services but maintained a more proportional approach mainly privileging countries with financial constraints, like Greece. The various migration schemes organised by ICEM included self-paying migrants, migrants contributing partially to the cost of their transportation or, in the case of the neediest, migrants exempted from all costs. In addition, poor states, such as Greece, transferred unilaterally many of the expenses incurred during the pre-embarkation services to the migrants themselves. After 1955, the ICEM administration, forced by its increasing deficit, espoused a more liberal financial policy and started to prepare various ‘Migrant Contribution Plans’.63 According to its rationale, “for moral, psychological and financial reasons the contributory elements should be applied in principle to all Committee-assisted migration instead of being limited, as in the past, to certain specific schemes”.64 In fact, ICEM officials increasingly associated the successful outcome of migration movements to the active role of individuals. They argued that, by undertaking more financial responsibilities and incentives for training and accreditation, migrants would be psychologically better prepared to undertake hard work and settle permanently in their new country of residence. By establishing an infrastructure which conditioned, protected and steered the mobility of Europeans overseas, ICEM operated not only as a new legitimate intermediary between emigration and immigration countries, but also as an agent of development offering assistance to both states and migrants. It provided extended services covering many stages of migration and many places of origin and destination, while it tried to expand migrants’ range of choices by enhancing their skills.65 At the same time, a great deal of effort was put into the formalisation and centralisation of movement control. For the first time, large-scale processing as well as procedural costs, previously undertaken or controlled by national agents and many intermediaries (e.g. steamship companies, commercial brokers, migrant networks, private recruitment agents, moneylenders) were outsourced to an international agency operating through the action of international civil servants in field missions and local offices.66 63. Marks, note 32, p. 490-491. 64. See analytically: “Migrant Contribution Plan”, Geneva 1st January 1954, ICEM/MIG/184, 1955/4/1, AGFMA, Athens; “Migrant Contribution Plan. Report of the Director”, 2 December 1959, MC/EX/ 95, ICEM 14th Special Session of the Executive Committee, 5 January 1960, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Washington D.C. 65. Agunias, Dovelyn, Guiding the Invisible Hand: Making Migration Intermediaries Work for Development, United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Research Paper 2009/22, p.2. 66. Lindquist, Johan ., Xiang, Biao & Yeoh, Brenda S. A., Opening the Black Box of Migration: Brokers, the Organization of Transnational Mobility and the Changing Political Economy in Asia, Pacific Affairs 85 (1) (2012), p. 11; Agunias, note 65, p. 3-9. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 51 Thus, ICEM became the main vehicle for the creation of an international infrastructure which could build a long-term model for regulating migrant movements. From the onset, the organisation acted as an intermediary agency, formulating its own strategies, practices and rationalities in cooperation with many other types of intermediaries: commercial (businessmen, ship-owners), humanitarian (NGOs and other IOs) and social/cultural (ethnic communities, religious institutions and organisations).67 This role allowed ICEM to intervene in peripheral countries as regards their bureaucratic capacity. By assisting states in codifying legislation, devising techniques and constructing an administrative infrastructure, ICEM helped them overcome institutional fragmentation or insufficient administration in addressing migration challenges on their own. In other words, by developing their capacities to regulate mass migration movements successfully, ICEM helped a series of nation states to “monopolise the legitimate means of movement”.68 More precisely, ICEM was active in tailoring services and providing scientific, technical and managerial expertise, particularly in southern European countries. In Greece, Spain and Italy ICEM was vested with the authority to reconfigure substantial parts of national or local administrations and to ‘rationalise’ decision-making processes related to employment and migration, by training national officials in modern managerial techniques and by assessing and improving the ‘quality’ of prospective migrants, respectively. In this way, ICEM became another vector for circulating modernisation knowledge and prescribing rationalisation norms and practices according to liberal concepts promoted by its leading member states, i.e. the United States, to its weaker member-states.69 ICEM thus managed to strengthen the cohesion of a highly heterogeneous and asymmetric ‘Western world’. In fact, administrative techniques and organisational expertise became a vector for disseminating to the poorer, politically powerless and culturally discredited countries of the periphery perceptions and narratives about the strength of Western multilateralism and the importance of belonging to it. Participation in post-war institutional building, a theoretically egalitarian, reciprocal and nondiscriminatory system operating in a rule-based framework, provided weaker members with the sense of a greater voice, standing and leverage in the post-war era.70 By sharing common objectives (development doctrine) and being harmonised with the principles of powerful players (Western superiority, liberal consensus), subordinate states were further incorporated in the Western ‘free world’. As happened with most of the international organisations which provided some kind of humanitarian services, the latter were not the only objective; neither could the ‘politics of intervention’71 remain hidden behind humanitarianism. For many 67. Lindquist, Xiang & Yeoh, note 66, p. 124. 68. Torpey, John, The invention of the passport. Surveillance Citizenship and the State, Cambridge 2000. 69. Krige & Rausch, note 49, p. 13; Tourgeli & Venturas, note 33, p. 290-291. 70. Venturas, note 12, p. 324; Stewart, Patrick, Best Laid Plans. The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War, Lanham 2009, p. xiii-xvi. 71. Gatrell, Peter, The Making of the Modern Refugee, Oxford 2013 (p.109). 52 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI member states and partners of the organisation, particularly for the United States, the role played by the ICEM in facing the Hungarian crisis provided clear evidence that the Committee could serve as “a standby organisation”,72 operating in the future as “a sort of ‘fire brigade’”73 whenever a political emergency erupted, e.g. the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968. The Committee advertised itself as an agency which “existed to deal with a sudden refugee flow before it occurred [emphasis added]”.74 In fact, ICEM’s readiness to mobilise rapidly its human and material resources in order to assist escapees from Communist countries,75 without neglecting its regular activities and programmes and despite its growing deficit, confirmed the strong engagement of the American-led organisation with Cold War geopolitics of the region.76 Conclusion: ICEM as part of the European integration? As mentioned above, the ICEM was part of the creation of the post-war international institutional building. However, despite the transnational character of its work and its extension to many geographical areas, the scope of its actions was mainly limited in Europe. Apart from the fact that the refugees and displaced persons were mostly Europeans and apart from the preference for European workers in all immigration countries, ICEM’s focus on Europe can also be construed as part of the general management of European reconstruction, in both material and ideological terms, i.e. alleviating the ‘overpopulation problem’, strengthening the economy and, above all, containing of the spread of Communism.77 In this sense, an intriguing question which might open up new avenues of research is the connection between the creation and the development of ICEM and the European integration process; particularly since the first steps of the latter were taken at the very moment when ICEM was formed as the main international organisation charged with the task of regulating migration movements. 72. See the confidential remarks of the Australian official Tasman Hudson Eastwood Heyes about the usefulness of ICEM: Tasman Hudson Eastwood Heyes to David Hay, 04-12-1961, ICEM – Australian attitude/ A446-1962/67291, National Archives of Australia (NAA), Canberra. 73. See the Confidential ILO report: “The present difficulties of the ICEM”, 8/11/1961, p.3-4, ICEM- ILO. Assistance in Manpower and Training Matters. 1961-1963/ IGO 022-2-2, ILO Archives, Geneva. 74. ICEM, note 20, p. 19. 75. Figures and dates are quite revealing regarding the readiness of the organisation: by 31 December 1956 more than 157.000 Hungarians had left their country for Austria and another 20.000 for Yugoslavia; the first movements out of Austria with the assistance of ICEM took place on 7 November and during the 116 critical days (early November to the end of February 1957) 110.000 Hungarian refugees were moved in European or overseas destinations (at an average of over 2.000 persons a day attaining a peak of 5.410 outflows on 30 November). See ICEM, note 20, p. 18. 76. Papadopoulos & Kourachanis, note 21, p. 181. 77. Marks, note 33, p. 481. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 53 Although not directly included in the Schuman Declaration of May 9 1950, the ‘free movement of people’ – in the form of population redistribution – was soon considered one of the basic elements of the initial steps of European integration.78 Already included in the Treaty of Rome under ‘Title III – The Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capitals’, and particularly in Articles 48-58 on Workers and on the Right of Establishment, the ‘free movement of people’ was part of the backbone of European integration. It is important to note here that neither the creation of the European Economic Community nor its content left ICEM indifferent. In fact, the provisions of the Treaty of Rome aroused discussion among the representatives of ICEM member states. It also coincided with a considerable shift in the direction of movements,79 which provoked an existential moment of choice for ICEM delegates: (…) in reply to the suggestion of the representative of the United States that some thought be given to the future position and task of the ICEM, he suggested that ICEM could play a prominent part in the implementation of the treaty recently signed with a view to establishing a European common market. That treaty, which also aimed at free movement and settlement within Europe, might bring about a far-reaching reappraisal of migration policies. In the forthcoming consultations for joint action, ICEM could play a prominent part in drawing up a common conception of intra-European migration, and of new migration relations between Europe and other continents.'80 Although the close connection of the ICEM with the European Community project by undertaking the task of managing intra-European movements did not seem an option shared by all ICEM member states,81 it was admitted that “undoubtedly, if the common market developed, a powerful new economic area would be created in Western Europe which would absorb a greater amount of European manpower. It was thus possible that Europe would spontaneously become much less interested in migration in the future”.82 It was, therefore, foreseen as early as 1957 that Europe would very soon – if it had not already – stop being a pool of emigrants. It was also foreseen that the bulk of European movements would be restricted within the geographical limits of Europe. In other words, the era of the ‘free movement’ (of Europeans) around the (non-Communist) globe would come to an end much earlier than anticipated.83 78. Cohen, note 4, p. 122. 79. In fact, the increasing demand for labour in industrialised countries of Central and Western Europe and the range of employment opportunities, social security rights and wages offered there, had diverted a considerable number of workers to European destinations. It is indicative that whereas 452,000 migrants left Western Europe in 1959, the figure for 1960 fell to 390,000. Especially, immigration to Latin American countries in 1960 dropped by nearly one-half since 1957. See Bouscaren, note 8, p. 38-40). 80. "Summary Record of the Fifty-first Meeting held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on Wednesday, 10 April 1957, at 10 a.m.", 6th Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/C/SR/51, p. 11, 24/05/1957, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Washington D.C. 81. The United States was objecting to this perspective, insisting that the Hungarian refugee crisis was an exception: ibid., paragraphs 68-70. 82. Statement made by Gordon Jockel, the Australian representative; see ibid., paragraph 80. 83. In Cohen’s words “culminating around 1960, the organised exit of ‘excess’ displaced persons and refugees marked the final episode of the Great Atlantic Migration”: see Cohen, note 4, p. 125. 54 Dimitris PARSANOGLOU and Giota TOURGELI A new period of European migration, explicitly or implicitly linked to the process of European integration, would be born: that of rendering Europe a major destination area than a sending one. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 55 Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European integration process: fruitless attempts? Roberto VENTRESCA Abstract Among all the Western European countries that joined the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), Italy was one of the most active nations in the shaping of post-WWII European migration policies. Unlike a number of its international partners (i.e. France and the UK), Italy’s Christian-Democratic Government put aside the goal of internal full employment and dealt with its high unemployment rates through the way-out strategy of promoting emigration flows. In doing so, the Government aimed at achieving not only the reduction of unemployed amounts and the inflow of remittances, but also the decrease of social conflict that massive jobless discontent was supposed to foment in the country. Consequently, Rome sought to open up, through bilateral agreements or multilateral measures promoted in the framework of the OEEC, new outlets suitable for Italian unemployed. This essay examines the actions that Italy promoted at both national (in terms of emigrants’ recruitment) and OEEC level. It also outlines in which terms Italy considered the issue of workers’ migration as a pivotal element of its national economic program as well as of its post-war foreign policy, and finally it explores the complex reasons why this strategy proved to be unsatisfactory for Rome’s emigration goals. Introduction After the end of WWII, Italy experienced the problematic challenge of its political and economic process of reconstruction. The fall of the fascist regime, as well as the end of the Monarchy and the consequent establishment of the Republic, deeply reshaped the country's institutional system. At the same time, economic conditions were quite precarious. In the aftermath of the war, high inflation rates, the decline of international trade flow and massive unemployment threatened Italy's political and financial stability.1 Thus successive Italian Governments, led between December 1945 and July 1953 by the Christian Democracy Party (DC) leader Alcide De Gasperi, managed Italy's return in a Western capitalist context – characterized by the onset of 1. See Carlo Spagnolo, La stabilizzazione incompiuta. Il Piano Marshall in Italia (1947-1952), Rome 2001. 57 the Cold War2 and the launch of the Marshall Plan3 – under the constraint of these economic features.4 Taking into account the global post-war European migration policies, Italy is believed to represent a special “case”: not only “since most European migrants wishing to leave were Italians”,5 but also because the Italian political leadership (both the left wing and conservative parties) used mass emigration as tool to accomplish its postwar economic programs:6 and even up to 1955, the concept of “emigration” basically meant “manpower circulation”. For these reasons combined, Italian representatives in international institutions – such as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC),7 that managed the distribution of the Marshall Plan funds in Western Europe – promoted significant effort to facilitate the massive circulation of people within and outside of Europe and, above all, to find suitable outlets for the large Italian unemployed manpower force, thus bringing migration issues to the top of Italian foreign policy concerns. Here, some of the most important aspects of Italy's emigration strategies between the late 1940s and the early 1950s are analysed. Firstly, it will be investigated how post-war Italian Governments dealt with the Italian migration phenomenon from the point of view of bureaucratic coordination. This is significant since it is thought that the lack of accurate administrative coordination among the State's bodies (Ministries, public agencies, etc.) involved in emigration management affected the achievement of the main Government objective, that is to foster expatriations so as to reduce unemployment rates. Next, we will consider Italy's international position on manpower circulation. Due to the fact that migration issues – more in Italy than in other countries8 – were “shaped to meet the nation's economic goals”,9 the proposals that Rome promoted in the OEEC are analysed, as well as their impact within the international political context. Finally, we reflect on the reasons why Italy did not achieve most of its aims, considering the national as well as international aspects that influenced Italy's emigration outcomes in the aftermath of WWII. 2. See Melvyin P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Cambridge 2010. 3. See Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951, London 1984; Francesca Fauri, Paolo Tedeschi (eds.), Novel Outlooks on the Marshall Plan. American Aid and European Re- Industrialization, Brussels 2011. 4. See Stefano Battilossi, L'Italia nel sistema economico internazionale. Il management dell'integrazione. Finanza, industria e istituzioni 1945-1955, Milan 1996. 5. Francesca Fauri, European Migrants after the Second World War, in: Eadem (ed.), The History of Migration in Europe. Prospectives from economics, politics and sociology, London 2014, p. 112. 6. Michele Colucci, Lavoro in movimento. L'emigrazione italiana in Europa 1945-57, Rome 2008, p. 41. 7. See Richard T. Griffiths (ed.), Explorations in OEEC History, Paris 1997. 8. Sandro Rinauro, Politica e geografia dell'emigrazione italiana negli anni della ricostruzione, in: Luigi Ganapini (ed.), L'Italia alla metà del XX secolo, Milan 2005, pp. 261-262. 9. Federico Romero, Migration as an issue in European interdependence and integration: the case of Italy, in: A. S. Milward et alii, The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and theory 1945-1992, London-New York 1992, p. 33. 58 Roberto VENTRESCA Italy's economic and institutional background When, in June 1947, the Truman Administration announced the setting up of what would become the Marshall Plan, the Italian Government – based on the pivotal role of the DC and its alliance with the Partito Liberale Italiano, Partito Repubblicano Italiano and Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani10 – was already dealing with a very critical economic condition, especially with respect to unemployment rates. There were several reasons underlying this trend. Beyond the traditional limits of Italian capitalism – i.e. the scarceness of investments in the agricultural and industrial sectors, the lack of capital and technological backwardness11 –, the economic consequences of the war led to an increased surplus of manpower. Industrial production – although the air raids had largely avoided to destroy the factories of Northern Italy and the country’s industrial system as a whole – declined in the aftermath of the war and, in addition, a high number of ex-soldiers and refugees (around 1.400.000) were repatriated.12 For example, in the early post-war years the Foreign Ministry Emigration Office calculated that nearly two million people were unemployed and a further two million more were underemployed.13 Since 1947 the surplus of manpower has resulted in policies to improve considerable migration flows to deal with both the massive economic burden of unemployment and also with the threat of ensuing social disorders. The centrist coalition aimed to reduce the amount of job seekers not only to restore the domestic economic condition and consequently to attain a higher general standard of living, but also to decrease the impact of social conflicts in factories and rural areas, since social tension was believed to reinforce anti-Government opposition that was headed by the Communist Party.14 Thus De Gasperi's cabinet considered an increase in emigration as an indispensable tool to maintain domestic social stability and strengthen the Government's electoral consensus: in brief, the Italian approach to migration issues very much belonged to the “Cold War game”.15 As mentioned above, in accordance with the main features of Rome's post-war political economy – which sought: a) a balanced budget; b) a decrease in inflation rates; c) a reduction in the circulation of currency and d) containment of salaries and consumption levels16 –, the goal of the internal full employment policy was not even 10. See Francesco Barbagallo, La formazione dell'Italia democratica, in: Id (ed.), Storia dell'Italia repubblicana, vol. I, Turin 1994, pp. 5-128. 11. See Rolf Petri, Storia economica d'Italia. Dalla Grande guerra al miracolo economico (1918-1963), Bologna 2002. 12. Sandro Rinauro, Il cammino della speranza. L'emigrazione clandestina degli italiani nel secondo dopoguerra, Turin 2009, p. 33. 13. Romero, note 9, p. 36. Statistics on early post-war unemployment and emigration rates can be found in ISTAT, Annuario statistico dell'emigrazione italiana, 1955, and also in Luigi Favero/Lucrezio Monticelli, Un quarto di secolo di emigrazione italiana, in: Studi emigrazione (25-26) 1972, pp. 1-91. 14. Federico Romero, Emigrazione e integrazione europea 1945-1973, Rome 1991, p. 32. 15. Rinauro, note 8, pp. 275-276. 16. See Augusto Graziani, Lo sviluppo dell'economia italiana. Dalla ricostruzione alla moneta europea, Turin 2000, pp. 18-25. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 59 considered as one of the Government's core interests, which differed from the activities of other Western European countries (i.e. Great Britain).17 The economic policy promoted by the Government found in the institutional support of jobless' permanent expatriation one of the keys of its accomplishment. The Government reinforced its control over the migration process to ensure maximum workers migration, and this was supervised exclusively by State bodies, such as the Foreign Affairs and Labour Ministries, or by other public agencies, such as the ICLE (Istituto per il credito del lavoro italiano all'estero).18 The State monopoly over migrations represented one of the crucial aspects of postwar Italian policy, and at the same time such a pivotal role of the State influenced Rome's international strategies with respect to manpower circulation. Until the introduction of the Quota Acts (1921 and 1924) by the USA – through which Washington obstructed immigration flows, which consisted largely of workers from Italy – and before the advent of Mussolini's dictatorship,19 Italian citizens had been free to move abroad to find better life and work conditions. Bureaucratic agencies or travel companies managing emigration did not completely depend upon the State and there were no legal measures that strictly regulated the movement of people.20 After WWII, this pattern changed in Italy as well as in the Western world. According to the Italian cabinet, control of expatriation was supposed to guarantee not only the reduction of unemployment, but also the inflow of remittances (i.e. international currencies) from abroad.21 To support this perspective, several members of the Government depicted emigration as a sort of dutiful personal “sacrifice”, and made it “an individual mission (to make more appealing the hiring of Italian workers in the eyes of foreign employers) to be realized in favour of the nation”.22 Prime Minister De Gasperi repeatedly stressed the tight connection that in his opinion linked the free circulation of manpower and the accomplishment of peace and cooperation among the European States in the post-war Europe.23 Finally, the exclusive attribution of the management of emigration to State bodies would prevent, according to the Government, any political influence of left-wing actors (socialists, communists and the leftist trade union Con- 17. Sandro Rinauro, Italian illegal emigration after the Second World War and illegal immigrants in Italy today, in: Fauri, note 5, p. 176. On British participation in the early European integration process see Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration 1945-1963, Basingstoke-New York 1996. 18. Fauri, note 5, p. 116. 19. Until 1924 the USA had represented one of the preferred destinations of Italian emigrants. On the other side, the Fascist regime – as a consequence of its aggressive nationalistic policies – sought to improve migrations within national borders or, since the 1930s, towards African colonies. On these aspects see Francesca Fauri, Storia economica delle migrazioni italiane, Bologna 2015, p. 129 and pp.169-178. 20. Ivi, p. 51. 21. The phenomenon of remittances is analysed by Andreina De Clementi, L'assalto al cielo. Donne e uomini nella ricostruzione italiana, Rome 2014, pp. 213-218. 22. Rinauro, note 8, pp. 274-275. This statement was made by an important member of the DC, Mariano Rumor in 1949. 23. Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi (ed.), De Gasperi e l'Europa. Scritti e discorsi, Brescia 1979, pp. 77-78. 60 Roberto VENTRESCA federazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori, CGIL) in the realisation of its migration programs. In this respect, one issue must be borne in mind. As stated above, the “State monopoly over migration issues” does not imply, in the Italian case, that the management of emigration was accorded to a single public body. Indeed the two most important institutions that dealt with migration flows were the Foreign Affairs and the Labour and Social Security Ministries (which was rebuilt in 1945 after its suppression by the Fascist regime).24 The former dealt with the arrangement of bilateral agreements with the countries of destination;25 managed the negotiations with international Organisations (such as the International Labour Organisation – ILO26 – or the OEEC), and provided help and assistance to Italians abroad. The latter coordinated the internal recruitment of individuals ready to leave Italy and transmitted the candidates list to the Foreign Ministry. However, assignation of recruitment tasks to the Labour Ministry and attribution of the management of expatriations to the Foreign Ministry destabilised the political and practical management of Italian migration strategies,27 which were already exacerbated by the different political approaches of the two Ministries with respect to emigration. For example, on the one hand, the Foreign Ministry's priority was to achieve the maximum number of expatriations, whilst the Ministry of Labour was more careful about material conditions (in terms of contract of employment, housing, etc.) of those who chose or were compelled to go abroad.28 Due to the post-war conditions in Italy at that time, this highly fragmented approach was therefore not effective and actually achieved the reverse where, instead of encouraging emigration, it contributed to discouraging the legal departures of the Italian workers.29 For example, even up to the 1954, the Italian embassy in London strongly criticized the slowness of Rome's recruitment stages for emigration to the UK, which, according to the embassy, were due to delays by the Ministry of Labour in sending accurate information about the availability of Italian skilled workers that were required by British employers. Consequently, Italian representatives in the UK feared that British businessmen would refuse to hire Italian emigrants.30 Moreover, with respect to migrations to France, some inquiries among Italian emigrates in Lyon in 24. Colucci, note 6, p. 82. 25. See paragraph 2. 26. See Jasmien Van Daele/Magaly Rodriguez Garcia/Geert Van Goethem/Marcel van der Linden (eds.), ILO histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World During the Twentieth Century, Berlin-Bern 2010; Lorenzo Mechi, L'Organizzazione internazionale del lavoro e la ricostruzione europea: le basi sociali dell'integrazione economica (1931-1957), Rome 2012. 27. Colucci, note 6, p. 80. 28. Ivi, p. 92. 29. Rinauro, note 17, p. 176. 30. Archivio Centrale dello Stato (hereafter: ACS), Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici e della Previdenza Sociale (hereafter: MM. LL. PP.), 466, Emigrazione italiana in Inghilterra – Informazioni e notizie sull'emigrazione italiana 1948/1957 – Decisione OECE, Emigrazione in Gran Bretagna, 30.11.1954. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 61 1949-50 highlighted the poor living conditions faced abroad,31 despite being recruited through the framework of bilateral agreements between Paris and Rome. According to the Italian consul in Lyon, the complex bureaucratic procedures of recruitment and departure had produced a double effect where, one the one hand, large numbers of first-wave emigrates had decided to repatriate, and on the other those who were eager to move to France preferred to “avoid the official recruitment process and expatriate illegally, or change their profession and place of residence from those assigned to them, which meant they were abroad unlawfully”.32 Obviously these negative outcomes originated not only from the ineffective procedures set up by the Italian authorities; the migration policies promoted by the recipient countries also did not facilitate the circulation of Italy's manpower. Indeed, although Rome's lengthy bureaucracy finally hampered the increase in expatriations, perhaps the largest obstacle that Italian migrants had to face was the international economic framework that dominated the post-war West as a whole. As will be discussed more fully in the following pages, after WWII the majority of European (and to some extent overseas) States strictly regulated their immigration and emigration policies. For instance, the main receiving countries (such as France, the UK, or even the US) hampered workers' free immigration, because Western democracies valued “full employment” as the fundamental tool for maintaining international peace and democratic consent at home. Thus, in order to assure “full employment” at home, immigrant-receiving countries adopted a restrictive migration policy.33 Starting from these preliminary observations, we will show how Italy tried to combine its interests in fostering national emigration within an international context where, contrary to expectations, the availability of outlets proved to be very limited. Internationalising the Italian labour surplus issue: from bilateral to multilateral approaches To realise its aims, Italy signed several bilateral agreements between 1946 and 1947 with Western European countries, such as Belgium, France, Switzerland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom (and in 1955 with West Germany); and from 1949 to 1951-2 with overseas Sates, such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Australia.34 De Gasperi's cabinet aimed to send significant numbers of Italian workers towards nations that, at least apparently – as in the case of France –, needed foreign workers 31. ACS, MM. LL. PP., 375, Emigrazione italiana in Francia – 1946/1949, Situazione dell'emigrazione per il 1949, Italian consulate in Lyon to Italian Embassy in Paris, 28.2.1950. 32. Rinauro, note 17, p. 176. 33. Ibidem. 34. Fauri, note 5, pp.112-116; see also Andreina De Clementi, Il prezzo della ricostruzione. L'emigrazione italiana nel secondo dopoguerra, Rome-Bari 2010, pp. 46-43. 62 Roberto VENTRESCA because of their “slow demographic growth and persistent labour shortage”.35 However, these bilateral accords not only meant that foreign jobless would receive only a limited quota of the available work permits (for instance, the bilateral agreement with Switzerland allowed only seasonal influxes of workers),36 but, most importantly, these agreements sought to strictly regulate the free flow of people within the European area: single individuals could not “move abroad and seek employment on their own”.37 In fact, one of the most significant innovations of the post-1945 European migrations relied on employers in the destination countries being able to directly select emigrant candidates. These selections were made on the basis of health, region of origin (which revealed the existence of racial prejudices against people that came from specific country zones, such as the Mezzogiorno)38 and job skills. To accomplish this task, European Governments promoted the creation of specific employers committees that went to Italy to choose individuals or groups apparently possessing the required skills.39 This recruitment scheme highlighted the extent to which the call for foreign manpower derived from the unstable economic situation of public or private companies within the destination States, where the requests for immigrant workers were linked to fluctuations in national and international economic cycles. This alone explains why European outlets and post-war bilateral settlements proved not to be sufficient to meet even the basic Italian goals for emigration. Between 1945 and 1957 Italian emigrations to European outlets did not reach the minimum goal of 200.000 permanent departures per year (except for 1951) that Rome had indicated as the aim in the aftermath of WWII, so that “total net emigration amounted to just 73 per cent of what the Government had hoped to achieve as a minimum goal”.40 From 1948-1949 De Gasperi’s cabinet recognized the reluctance of nation-state partners to open up their borders to receive large amount of Italian jobless through bilateral agreements, and realized that the only suitable path to activate considerable emigration flows would be to enter into multilateral negotiations, embodied by international organisations like the OEEC. This meant that the burden of the Italian manpower surplus had to be internationalized: indeed, the authorities in Rome believed that national unemployment would decrease only if international partners recognized that the Italian manpower surplus represented a European concern, to some extent even a “threat” to the Western area as a whole.41 To justify this in terms of foreign policy, Rome's representatives continually promoted the free circulation of all European workers within the OEEC area, whilst being aware that it was highly unlikely that a massive influx of foreign workers would come to Italy.42 35. Romero, note 9, p. 40. 36. Fauri, note 5, p. 114. 37. Ivi p. 103. 38. French charobonnages, for instance, explicitly declared that Italian miners would be recruited only among inhabitants of Italy's Northern regions. See ACS, MM. LL. PP., 376, telegram from Tucci to the Foreign Ministry, 30.11.1951. 39. Fauri, note 19, pp. 193-194. 40. Romero, note 9, p. 40. 41. Ibidem. 42. Rinauro, note 8, p. 270. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 63 The Government's efforts led to the call for a Conference on Manpower in Rome at the beginning of 1948, where the participant countries created the European Migrations Committee (EMICO). However, the powers held by this institution proved to be very limited, especially because of the opposition from Great Britain, Belgium and France (namely the main European recipient countries) against the attribution of the power of this supranational institution to make crucial decisions on national emigration and immigration programs.43 During the conference, the Italian delegates supported the extension of national welfare protection to immigrant workers who were perceived as unlikely to accept living abroad, unless the hosting countries provided housing and health care guarantees44 alongside the work permits. This suited Italy's specific interests, since the Government had to make the expatriations more appealing to local unemployed workers. Nevertheless the EMICO was ended in 1949 and its activities had been already replaced by the OEEC Manpower Committee, where Italy obtained the Chairmanship in 1948 with Giuseppe Parenti and in 1949 with Giovanni Malagodi, the latter being already a member of the Italian delegation to the OEEC.45 Rome's purposes on manpower circulation were then specified in the Long-term Plan that Italian delegates submitted to this Organisation at the end of 1948.46 In this document, which contained Italy's general program of expenditure of Marshall Plan funds for the period 1948-1952, Italian officials fixed at 832.000 the minimum amount of permanent expatriations expected until the US aid termination; more specifically, nearly 350.000 people would move to European countries and the remaining part to overseas outlets (mainly Latin America, but also Canada and Australia).47 In addition, Rome forecast an inflow of nearly 205 million dollars of remittances by 1953, as to cover about 10% of the country's total imports.48 Nevertheless, the inflow of remittances was frustrated by foreign countries' fiscal policies, which tended to drastically reduce the outflow of national currency in order to protect it from financial speculation or devaluation.49 In order to balance the disappointing performances shown by emigration trends towards the European States, the “internationalisation” of Italian labour surplus resulted in the growing promotion of Latin American and Australian destinations as the favourite outlets of manpower departures. Italian authorities aimed at pursuing 43. Romero, note 14, p. 44. 44. Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereafter: ASMAE), Direzione Generale degli Affari Economici (hereafter: DGAE), B, 158/bis, Memorandum presented by the Italian delegation. Social conflicts stoppages of work, January 1948. 45. See Giovanni Malagodi, Aprire l'Italia all'aria d'Europa. Il diario europeo 1950-1951, edited by Giovanni Farese, Soveria Mannelli 2011. 46. The Italian Long-term Plan has been published in many versions. Here we refer to: Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica (ed.), La programmazione economica in Italia, vol. I, Rome 1966, pp. 3-100. See also Roberto Tremelloni, Italian Long-Term Plan Submitted to the OEEC, in: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review (8) 1949, pp. 12-24. 47. Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica, Rome 1966, pp. 68-71. 48. Romero, note 14, p. 38. 49. Andreina De Clementi, Il prezzo della ricostruzione. L’emigrazione italiana nel secondo dopoguerra, Rome-Bari 2010, pp. 122-132. 64 Roberto VENTRESCA this objective through a double action. On the one hand, Rome signed a series of bilateral agreements with overseas countries that had declared their availability to receive significant amounts of Italian manpower; one of these accords had been already accomplished in February 1947 with Argentina; then in July 1950 with Brazil and in March 1951 with Australia.50 On the other hand, as it will be further explained, Italy repetitively tried to divert significant parts of its Marshall Plan funds, already devoted to industrial and technical assistance, towards migration programs (such as the purchase of ships for emigrants transport through transatlantic routes). Taking into account the most significant post-war extra-European outflows of Italian workforce, that is the Argentinian one,51 it might be observed that just two years after the validation of the bilateral agreement with Italy an economic crisis occurred in the Latin American country. This led the Argentinian Government to reduce the demand of foreign manpower and to deal with the deep devaluation of the peso-dollar exchange, which also lowered the value of remittances sent to their motherland from the Italian workers already placed in Argentina.52 These events strongly discouraged the expatriations of Italian workers towards Buenos Aires: emigration from Italy to Argentina decreased from 97.792 units in 1948 to 78.531 in 1949, whilst repatriations grew from nearly 7.000 to 15.000 in the same years.53 Consequently the Italian Foreign Ministry stated that forecast emigration trends towards Argentina had to be rethought: Given the economic condition of the countries that represent our main outlets, [emigration] forecasts have to be based on prudential figures, not so far from the effective amounts reached this year.54 Despite this trend, Italian requests to leave for Buenos Aires reached their peak between 1949 and 1951 with 232.000 expatriations, while in the following years, “due to Italy's economic miracle and Argentina's recurrent economic crisis”, these figures fell down.55 In fact in 1950 the Argentinian inflation rate was estimated around 49% and the new peso's devaluation seriously eroded both savings and remittances owned by Italian emigrates. It was not by chance if, in parallel with the start of Buenos Aires' crisis (which partially also occurred in Brazil),56 Italian authorities made efforts to find new outlets for national emigration: Canada and Australia.57 These events show not only how post-war emigrations were strongly influenced by foreign nation-states economic trends, but also to what extent Italy's strategy to “internationalize” its manpower surplus had to be rethought at the beginning of 1950s in the light of unsatisfactory performances shown even by main traditional flows, such as the Argentinian one. To sum up, Italian emigration performances towards Argentina rise some fun- 50. Ivi, pp. 12-19. 51. Fauri, note 5, p. 115. 52. De Clementi, note 49, p. 215. 53. Ivi, pp. 49-51. 54. ASMAE, Piano Marshall, 17, file 2, Internal report, December 1949-January 1950. 55. Fauri, note 5, p. 116. 56. De Clementi, note 49, pp. 12-15. 57. Fauri, note 19, p. 197. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 65 damental questions: to what extent did the Italian Government consider the volatility of Latin America's needs of Italian manpower, and to what extent did Italy ignore the high degree of uncertainty deriving from the assumption to absorb internal labour surplus within Southern America destinations? In which terms, finally, did Rome's attitude to “treat the headache with decapitations”58 affect the accomplishment of its emigration policy? It is true that frequently Italy prepared emigration plans or outlooks that, due to economic conditions of the recipient countries, were unlikely to be achieved.59 Although there were no explicit international guidelines and despite the sudden variations of post-war international economy which contrasted an accurate forecast on Latin American (or European) countries' needs of Italian workforce, it is also undeniable that since the beginning of 1950s Italian authorities had received from their international representatives in Southern America plenty of information about the employment decrease in those regions. For example, as remarked by the Italian consul in Buenos Aires, the fiscal constraints on remittances, as well as the peso devaluation and housing lack, had already pushed many people to repatriate around 1952.60 Italian families had been brought to Brazilian or Venezuela's rural colonies under tough work conditions and low levels of salaries, which provoked harsh protests and repatriation requests by Italian emigrates. Above all, these people blamed the discrepancy they noticed between the information provided by Italian authorities before expatriation and the real material conditions they had to face once abroad.61 Therefore, it must be questioned whether the low performances shown by the emigration trends to overseas States could be explained also by Rome's attitude to aim at manpower expatriations towards almost any destination, sometimes ignoring its foreign representatives' complaints about inadequate life and work conditions that Italian workers had to face once in their new destination.62 At the same time, there is no denying that receiving countries often did not appropriately inform Rome's authorities on the amount, characteristics and skills required to candidate workers.63 For instance, it could be mentioned the case of Jacques Fouques Duparc, French ambassador in Italy, according to whom Paris had been showing a sort of “schizophrenic” behaviour with respect to Italy's requests on manpower circulation. If in the aftermath of the war France had given the impression to favour Italians inflows as a consequence of its internal lack of manpower, then Paris changed direction, setting up new barriers (quota, length bureaucratic procedures, 58. This is the metaphor used by De Clementi to describe the general Italian attitude towards its post- WWII emigration programs. See Andreina De Clementi, Curare il mal di testa con le decapitazioni. L'emigrazione italiana nel secondo dopoguerra. I primi dieci anni, in: 900 8-9 (2003), pp. 11-27. 59. De Clementi, note 49, pp. 12-19. 60. Ivi, pp. 158-159. 61. Ivi, pp. 160-162. 62. Ivi, pp. 24-25. 63. United Kingdom National Archives (hereafter UKNA), Foreign Office (hereafter: FO), 371/87281 -21810/2/50, British Embassy in Rome to Foreign Office, 12.1.1950; See also UKNA, FO, 371/87281- 2186/3/50, British Embassy in Rome to Foreign Office, 13.1.1950. 66 Roberto VENTRESCA etc.). Moreover, the French Government, which officially (was fighting?) illegal immigration, to some extent had tolerated it: this happened not only because of the inefficiency of the legal recruitment system, but also because French businessmen preferred to “receive illegal immigrants who were thus docile, cheap and precarious”.64 All these contradictions would result, in Duparc's opinion, in the discouragement of Italian skilled workers' demands of emigration towards France, where only “second or third order elements” would be eager to go.65 Similarly the British ambassador in Italy, Sir Victor Mallet, explained to his Foreign Office superiors how he perceived Rome's approach to the problem of internal labour surplus. According to Mallet, The Italians themselves are not content merely to wring their hands and ask other nation to solve their problem. If they appear to adopt this attitude it is because there are so many steps in the development of emigration which can only be taken after the essential steps have been taken by would-be recipient countries in notifying not only a general possibility but particular demands by age, trade and qualification. When these are known the Italians are quite prepared to go all out to meet the demands; and in particular to send forward a good type of qualified worker who will in time counteract the prejudices against the Italians which undoubtedly exist.66 All these aspects represent a downside that should be taken into account in order to comprehend the obstacles that hampered the growth of Italian manpower outflows in late 1940s and early 1950s also in the framework of international organisations as the OEEC. Italy's requests in the OEEC Focusing our attention on the role played by Italy in the shaping of migration policies within the OEEC, a further specific aspect must be highlighted, that is Rome's requests in order to decrease its shortage of ships and other means of transport for transoceanic journeys. To face this problem, between 1948 and 1949 the Italian Government explicitly asked the ECA67 members for special funds' concessions aimed at the transport of emigrants to Latin America, Canada or Australia. In late 1948 Italian authorities promoted several negotiations with American officials who had shown their intention to sell a certain number of ships previously employed for military purposes.68 Initially inclined to accept this opportunity, in a second stage Rome's authorities 64. Rinauro, note 17, p. 177. 65. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Europe 1944-1970 Italie 1944-1955, 219, L'immigration italienne en France, telegram from Duparc to the French Foreign Ministry, 11.97.1950. 66. UKNA, FO 371/87281 – UR 491/26, telegram from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 13.1.1950. 67. Economic Cooperation Administration, the American office that supervised Marshall Plan's accomplishment in Europe. Between 1948 and 1951, ECA was led by the US businessman Paul Hoffman. 68. ASMAE, Piano Marshall, f. 9, telegrams from Tarchiani to the Italian Foreign Ministry, 10.12.1948. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 67 slightly changed their mind, since Italian ship owners feared that American ships purchase would reduce their monopoly within the Italian ship market. In addition, they did not accept to cover a cost percentage for ships conversion to civil and transport use.69 They made pressures on the Government in order to discourage it from proceeding with commercial negotiations on American ships, and for this reason Alberto Tarchiani, Italian Ambassador in Washington,70 strongly protested against Rome's behaviour, asking the Italian Foreign Ministry whether Our hesitations [on US ships purchase] originated from Italian ship owners' interests (which in this case do not coincide with Government's ones) in shrinking the availability of ships, as to keep high ticket prices for passengers.71 Such an affaire, which embarrassed Italian representatives in the USA and OEEC,72 showed how Italian choices in the field of emigrates management was deeply influenced not only by the Government's strategy and its well known goal of massive expatriations, but also by private industrialists aims, which in this case did not correspond to the Government's prevailing strategies and purposes.73 Nevertheless, Italy's hopes to receive extra-support (that is funds not already allocated to the country in the framework of ERP's distributions) from Marshall Plan managers did not vanish. In mid 1949 the Government asked ECA for 32.5 million dollars to support overseas emigration of Italian manpower surplus.74 Italy sought to stress in the eyes of US and OEEC allies the “exception” of its unemployment rates, which would be reduced, in the opinion of Italian political authorities, only if receiving countries accepted to share labour market needs at international level, especially through OEEC or ILO agreements. Already in late 1948 Attilio Cattani, member of the Italian OEEC delegation, had noticed that Italy should Ask the USA to use their influence to support Italian requests within the OEEC to increase international absorption of Italian manpower […] this is likely to entail financial extrasupport from the USA so as to realise our program.75 As it had happened in similar circumstances, Italian requests soon were stopped by the doubts of Paul Hoffman (head of ECA) and other members of the Truman Administration, which disapproved, first of all, the huge consistency of Italian demand. Secondly, they feared that, providing Italy with these funds, other OEEC countries could raise similar requests, generating remarkable problems in the allocation of ERP 69. ASMAE, Piano Marshall, f. 9, telegram from Italian OEEC delegation to Egidio Ortona, Italian Embassy in Washington, 30.12.1948. 70. See Domenico Fracchiolla, Un ambasciatore della “nuova Italia” a Washington. Alberto Tarchiani e le relazioni tra Italia e Stati Uniti 1945-1947, Milan 2012. 71. ASMAE, Piano Marshall, 17, 1, letter from Tarchiani to De Gasperi, 20.5.1949. 72. ASMAE, Piano Marshall, 17, 1, letter from Egidio Ortona to Luca Pietromarchi, 11.5.1949. 73. See Francesco Petrini, Il liberismo a una dimensione. La Confindustria e l'integrazione europea 1947-1957, Milan 2005. 74. ASMAE, Piano Marshall, 17, 1, Fondi per Emigrazione, letter from Tarchiani to the Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry, 8.7.1949. 75. ACS, MM. LL. PP., Divisione IX, OECE 407, Problemi della manodopera, 16.11.1948. 68 Roberto VENTRESCA resources among all European Governments. Indeed, ECA's managers were aware that, in order to provide this extra-aid, it would be necessary to re-allocate funds previously planned for other reasons (in this case, the funds would derive from the Technical Assistance Program). This hypothesis was unlikely to be accepted not only by ECA itself, but also by the US Congress, which – as Tarchiani outlined – was not willing to allow a surplus of grants and aids for OEEC countries, especially if they did not provide an accurate business plan, as in the case of Italy.76 In addition the Americans, already disappointed by the ships case, required that Rome proved the real interest of Latin American and overseas countries in absorbing permanently considerable amounts of Italian manpower: something that, as we have seen, Italian authorities could not demonstrate. In the light of these events, ECA and American Administration rejected Rome's request of 32.5 million dollars to support Italian emigration purposes, even though Hoffman had frequently confirmed his “great sympathy”77 for Italian unemployment issue. Moreover, trying to meet – at least partially – Italian interests, during the first half of 1950 ECA addressed to Italy a special concession of 11.3 million dollars for manpower issues, of which only 1.3 from ECA since the outstanding majority would come from the Lire Counterpart Fund, the Italian Treasury account used to convert in national currency the sale of products made available to Italy in the Marshall Plan framework.78 Although such an outcome did not completely satisfy Italy's expectations, it proved at least a partial recognition of Rome's “special” needs by international partners. To sum up, it was evident that Americans, truly concerned about the Italian manpower problem, claimed that this matter should be solved through funds already provided for this specific purpose. Moreover, according to Attilio Cattani, in this period both ECA and the Truman Administration were more likely to focus their efforts on trade and payments liberalisation79 rather than migration issues:80 around 1950, Italian purposes seemed to enter a dead-end. Nevertheless, at a later stage it seemed that the Italian strategy could receive more political openness from its partners. This happened when the European economic growth resulting from the rearmament process due to the Korean War (1950-1953) persuaded the USA to “look with concern at the imbalance between countries with full employment and localised shortage of skilled workers and other nations with 76. ASMAE, Piano Marshall, 17. 1, Fondi per Emigrazione, letter from Tarchiani to the Italian Foreign Ministry, 16.7.1949. 77. Ibidem. 78. See Fauri, note 19, p. 195. On Italian counterpart funds see Chiarella Esposito, America's Feeble Weapon, Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy 1948-1950, Westport 1994. 79. In September 1950 there was the establishment of the European Payments Union. See Jacob J. Kaplan, Günter Schleiminger, The European Payments Union. Financial Diplomacy in the 1950s, Oxford 1989; Juan Carlos Martinz Oliva, Maria Lucia Stefani, Dal Piano Marshall all'Unione Europea dei Pagamenti. Alle origini dell'integrazione economica europea, in: Franco Cotula (ed.), Stabilità e sviluppo negli anni Cinquanta, vol. 1, L'Italia nel contesto internazionale, Rome-Bari 2001, pp. 111-399. 80. ASMAE, Piano Marshall, 17, telegram from Cattani to the Italian Embassy in Washington, 13.1.1950. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 69 dangerously large groups of idle manpower”.81 Under the pressure of these events, a Working Group within the OEEC Manpower Committee was established in March 1952, with the aim to analyse the theme of manpower's free circulation among OEEC countries through a multilateral approach, not just a bilateral one. In a significant move, the chair of the group was assigned to Rome, that proposed Giovanni Malagodi,82 who – as indicated above – had been working in the OEEC Manpower Committee since 1949. This was a great chance for Rome to present to its European partners a specific program that could concretely contribute to make significant efforts towards a durable solution of the labour surplus issue. The plan envisaged the improvement of foreign workers’ quota – fixed with international accords – within each OEEC country, assuming that new multilateral quota would be added to the quota of immigration already scheduled within bilateral agreements. In addition, people admitted with multilateral quota could gain permanent residence and work permit. According to these measures, workers' freedom of movement would strongly increase, reaching complete abrogation of quota and barriers within ten years starting from 1952. An international authority similar to the European Payments Union Managing Board would supervise people circulation.83 Moreover, the crucial point of the plan was that employment contracts would acquire only a private status between employer and worker. In this way, national Governments, as well as Trade unions, would not be able to intervene and avoid, if in the case, potential violations of workers' rights, possibly deprived of national welfare legislation protections. As a consequence of this new institutional pattern that would strongly improve workers’ movement within the OEEC area, debates on labour policies would permanently shift from a national to a European level of negotiation, which was exactly what De Gaspeir's cabinet sought (differently from receiving countries like France or UK).84 As already in 1948 Pietro Campilli, former head of OEEC delegation, had outlined, Jobless must be considered as an international pool, to which every European State can refer in order to attain needed manpower amounts.85 Malagodi's Plan explicitly revealed the real characteristics of Italy's approach to manpower and emigration issues: although De Gasperi had rhetorically tried to depict Italy's call for «Italians' spread within Europe» as a mean to obtain «peace through cooperation in work»,86 prevailing orientations within its cabinet (and Malagodi 81. Romero, note 14, p. 45. 82. See Malagodi, note 45. See also Malagodi's personal papers in Archivio della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi (Rome), papers Malagodi, files 8, 10 and 430. 83. UKNA, FO 371/100286, M 4914, Working party on the Liberalisation of Manpower Movements, 23.6.1952. 84. ACS, MM. LL. PP., Divisione IX, OECE 407, 8, Appunto- Gruppo di lavoro sulla liberalizzazione dei movimenti di manodopera, 4.10.1952. 85. ASMAE, DGAE, B, 108/a, Programma di ricostruzione, 10.11.1948. 86. Catti De Gasperi, note 23. 70 Roberto VENTRESCA himself had supported these measures since 1950)87 led to promote the achievement of balanced budget and inflation containment rather than investments, to increase job opportunities and support internal demand, which indeed were supposed to threaten the fulfilment of financial stability. As it could be easily forecast, Malagodi's proposals caused deep objections of Great Britain, France and Belgium, which feared the loss of national sovereignty on labour legislation issues and consequently were worried about related consequences in terms of internal electoral consensus. They accused Italy to deal with manpower circulation as if it was a matter of “free movement of goods”.88 As noticed by the Foreign Office, also Washington – which had globally appreciated Rome's proposal89 – did not criticize the British opposition against Malagodi's project.90 In addition, the Italian plan was likely to establish a sort of double system of guarantees for immigrant workers: those who had moved abroad before the approval of Malagodi’s plan would be treated in accordance with receiving countries’ existing legislations; on the contrary, people emigrating after 1952 would have complete freedom of circulation within Europe, but under a totally deregulated pattern of social protection and labour right guarantees. Malagodi himself observed, as mentioned above, that international partners' strongest objections originated from their intention to preserve a “strictly national” pattern of full-employment policy, while he believed – in line with Italian interests – that it would be better to “shift this question towards an Atlantic and European level of debate”.91 The negotiations lasted until the end of 1952, and Italian authorities often reaffirmed their support to the plan,92 but OEEC countries rejected it, and it was finally replaced, in October 1953, by a more cautious and moderate “Code of liberalisation of manpower” through the OEEC area. According to this last version, European Governments kept substantial control on national labour legislation, allowing a simple and gradual harmonization of work market rules among OEEC countries: extreme pro-liberalisation measures contained within Malagodi’s plan were finally refused.93 87. ACS, MM. LL. PP, 382, Conferenza degli esperti per l'emigrazione Parigi 1950 – Relazione della Delegazione Italiana – Verbali della Conferenza Resoconto dell'esposizione della Delegazione italiana alla conferenza di esperti per l'emigrazione, 24.07-12.08 1950. 88. Romero, note 9, p. 54. See also ACS, MM. LL. PP., Divisione IX, OECE 407, 8, Osservazioni generali alla proposta italiana e risposte date al riguardo dalla Delegazione italiana, June-July 1952. 89. Romero, note 14, p. 53. 90. UKNA, FO 371/100286, M 4914, Working party on the Liberalisation of Manpower Movements, 23.6.1952. 91. ACS, MM. LL. PP., Divisione IX, OECE 446, 8, Appunto – Gruppo di lavoro sulla liberalizzazione dei movimenti di manodopera, 4.10.1952. 92. In October 1952 Giuseppe Pella, Italy’s Finance Minister, protested against OEEC partners' opposition to the plan and declared: «I would like at this stage to interpolate an incidental remark. Some people seem inclined to reproach us for our vitality, our annual contribution to the expansion of white race». UKNA, FO 371, 100286, M 4914, Council – Statement made by the Italian Minister of Finance, M. Pella, on the problem of surplus population in some European countries, 21.10.1952. 93. ACS, MM. LL. PP., Divisione IX, OECE 446, 8, Riunione del gruppo di lavoro per la liberalizzazione dei movimenti della manodopera, telegram from Attilio Cattani to the Italian Foreign Ministry, 20.6.1953. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 71 Thus it seems clear that Italy and its European partners were concerned about the same problem: how to cope with employment and manpower issues, seeking to manage side effects (especially in electoral terms) that these matters would inevitably generate both at national and international level. Moreover, all Western Europe countries – as Romero has outlined – pursued the goal of economic development in a context of gradual trade liberalisation and improvement of productivity standards,94 but by means of different and conflicting political paths. Within this general framework, Italy's post-war diplomatic and economic weakness contributed to the marginalization of its requests on manpower circulation within the OEEC or other international organisations.95 As we have seen, it originated from multiple factors, among which we could mention: a) Rome's refusal to promote internal full-employment policy, since it was supposed to foster inflation rates and to prefigure a sort of “Keynesian” way to the national economic reconstruction; b) bureaucratic fragmentation and political discrepancy among public structures committed to migration management; c) instability of international economic cycles and, consequently, of foreign workforce demand; d) restrictive immigration policies of recipient countries. Conclusion As indicated in a report prepared in early 1952 by the Inter-ministerial Committee for Reconstruction (Comitato Interministeriale per la Ricostruzione, CIR), where figures of Italian emigration appeared very optimistic and emigration trends were compared with employment needs of Italian post-war economy, Despite an expected necessity of about 400.000-500.000 [sic] per year and for many years, there is reality which indicates that in this post-war period emigration flows from Italy reached a peak in 1949 with 190.000 units, varying in the remaining periods around 160.000 units per year. If statistics will follow this trend […] we can place newcomer workers, but we cannot reduce the ongoing surplus of labour supply.96 In the same memorandum structural reforms were required – in order to improve internal and external coordination – within emigration's bureaucratic machine, which involved the Foreign Affairs and Labour Ministries, Italian delegation to the OEEC, the Premiership's offices, etc. If in early 1952, that is at the end of Marshall Plan, important sectors of Italian Public Administration were still hoping for an accomplishment of bureaucratic reforms, this meant that Italian migration and labour policies had not yet fulfilled the expected performances. However, although less sizable than expected, the net amount of Italian emigrates in the immediate post-WWII was significant. Starting from the statistics of the Mar- 94. Romero, note 14, p. 6. 95. The role played by other international organisations (like PICMME, IRO, ILO) in the supervision of European migration flows is analysed by Fauri, note 5, pp. 104-112. 96. ACS, MM. LL. PP., 485,191, CIR – Lineamenti di politica emigratoria, 17.1.1952. 72 Roberto VENTRESCA shall Plan four-years period (1948-1952), Fauri has recently analysed the Italian outflows and their corresponding repatriation rates:97 Table 1. Italian emigration and main destination countries Years France Belgium Germany Switzerland Canada USA Argentina Brazil Australia Total Returnees % % to Europe 1948 40231 46365 // 102241 2406 16677 69602 4697 2047 308515 39 63 1949 52345 5311 // 29726 5991 11460 98262 6949 10939 254144 47 37 1950 18083 4226 74 27144 7135 8998 78531 8980 13156 200306 36 27 1951 35099 33308 431 66040 21467 10225 55630 9183 17453 293057 31 51 1952 53810 22441 270 61593 18742 7525 33366 17026 26082 277535 35 52 Focusing our analysis on net emigrations to OEEC countries from 1949,98 they were 2271 in 1949; 16.550 in 1950; 95.765 in the following year and 71.947 in 1952. If in the 1948 Long Term Plan it was indicated a minimum goal of about 364.000 units, final results showed that “only” 187.000 people left Italy during the ERP. Overseas net emigration presents the following trend: 138.564 units in 1949, 111.722 in 1950; 105.388 in 1951 and 108.688 in 1952. As a result, in the 1948-1952 period about 464.000 Italian citizens moved abroad. In addition, Italian emigration generated the inflow of a considerable quota of remittances, which reached the average of 200 million dollars per year between 1951 and 1954 (more or less the 10% of imports).99 To sum up, the total amount of people who left Italy in the Marshall Plan period did not exceed 651.000 units. If we compare these figures with the minimum goal of 832.000 permanent expatriations specified in the Long Term Plan submitted to the OEEC, the real dimensions of Italy's performances become evident. In addition, another crucial figure must be taken into consideration, that is unemployment rate. At the end of Marshall Plan, there were still 1.118.000 official unemployed (in 1945 they were about 2 million); since one of the most important concerns of De Gasperi's cabinet consisted in decreasing jobless amount by the means of massive emigration flows, it might be clearly argued that such goal was not attained. There are multiple reasons that might explain why Italy did not realise its own programs on emigration and manpower circulation, and some of them are enumerated at the end of the previous chapter. Indeed, as Romero has pointed out, Post-war Italy had to «export» manpower, but its interlocutors had not. They of course needed immigration but relatively limited and, above all, controlled (for economic, polit- 97. Fauri, note 19, p. 117. Statistics derive from Fauri's own calculation of figures from Isttituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), Annuario, ISTAT; Annuario statistico dell'emigrazione italiana; ISTAT, Un secolo di statistiche italiane. 98. Romero, L'emigrazione operaia in Europa, in: Piero Bevilacqua/Andreina De Clementi/Emilio Franzina (eds.), Storia dell’emigrazione italiana, vol. I, Partenze, Rome 2001, p. 401. See also Dora Marucci, Le statistiche dell'emigrazione italiana, in: Ivi, pp. 61-75. Statistics are taken from ISTAT and from Favero/ Lucrezio, note 13, pp. 78-79. 99. Romero, note 98, p. 401. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 73 ical and social reasons). To sum up, Italian backwardness itself – which basically imposed emigration and dictated a foreign policy that required the opening of spaces for [emigration] flows – caused an intrinsic, structural material and diplomatic weakness100 This seems to be one of the crucial contradictions of the Italian economy after WWII: the presence of massive and unskilled unemployed had to be combined with regulated and “relatively limited” international demand of skilled labour. Such an imbalance between Italian needs and international requests constituted a bottleneck that only the start of Italy's economic boom in late 1950s would overcome. Moreover, migration plans developed by De Gasperi's cabinet represented a crucial point – to some extent the precondition – of its national economic program as a whole. Since Italy entered the Western economic context through the Marshall Plan and its participation in the OEEC, it must also be recalled that, according to Alan Milward's opinion, The only country where economic policy in 1948 and 1949 was so obviously different as to call the immediate economic objectives into doubt was Italy. Rigorously balanced budgets, a sharp deflation, a steep rise in registered unemployment, and the control of economy as far as possible by merely monetary and fiscal measures set Italy quite apart from the other OEEC countries.101 If international partners' economic and migration policies clearly represented an obstacle to the achievement of the Italian goals, it must be questioned to what extent the administrative and political fragmentation occurring within the Italian institutional machine affected the outflows management. As indicated above, this fragmentation produced also a lack of material and administrative safeguard for Italian workers abroad, which often chose to repatriate (especially from Switzerland, Belgium, France, with an average of nearly 30% compared with the expatriations).102 Therefore, the Italian Government showed significant difficulties in organising and directing the flows, since there existed interplay between a complicated system of internal recruitment and the extremely unstable demands of Italian workforce made by recipient countries. In addition, very scant life conditions met abroad by emigrates finally contributed to the discouragement of new expatriations. To sum up, in this article Italy's international emigration strategy has been linked to the Government's internal economic and social goals in the first stages of its republican history. As a consequence of political and ideological resistances within the centrist coalition against the idea of economic planning,103 it might be said that in post-war years Rome did not develop a balanced and coherent program of economic reconstruction for Italy. Consequently, it seems that Italian emigration policy did not consider the importance of steering the flows in order to pursue clear economic goals and, at the same time, favour a balanced reorganisation of local economic development: the main concern of the Government was, again, quantitative maximisation of 100. Ivi, p. 406. 101. Milward, note 3, p. 197. 102. Rinauro, note 17, p. 66. 103. Rinauro, note 8, pp. 265-266. On this subject see also Mariuccia Salvati, Amministrazione pubblica e partiti di fronte alla ricostruzione, in: Francesco Barbagallo (ed.), note 10, pp. 414-536. 74 Roberto VENTRESCA expatriations.104 Of course the great relevance of migration issues is undeniable both in political as well as in quantitative terms, even though it did not produce the expected results. But the occurrence of these frequent “defeats”, suffered by Italian authorities at both national and international stage, reveals to what extent migration issues represented in post-war Italy not only the way in which De Gasperi's cabinets tried to solve internal unemployment or attenuate the impact of Italy's social turmoil. Migrations appeared indeed as a crucial framework for the establishment of a new foreign policy of post-fascist Governments through both bilateral and multilateral international agreements.105 In this context, migration policies constituted a source of harsh political conflict106 at multiple levels: among different bodies of the State machine or among national and international actors (like the OEEC) involved in the migration flows' management. In conclusion, limits and incoherence of Rome's strategies, characterised by what we may call a sort of “migratory obsession”, as well as objective international hindrances, led to miss, at least partially, the fulfilment of the great hopes nurtured by De Gasperi Government concerning Italian migration policies during the first decade after WWII. 104. Rinauro, note 17, p. 47. 105. Colucci, note 6, pp. 237-238. 106. See Francesco Petrini, Bringing Social Conflict Back in the Historiography of Industrial Milieux and European Integration, in: Contemporanea. Rivista di storia dell'800 e del '900 2 (2014), pp. 525-541. Italian migration policies at the beginning of the European in-tegration process: fruitless attempts? 75 Regulating a particular form of migration at the European level: the Council of Europe and intercountry adoptions (1950-1967) Yves DENÉCHÈRE Abstract The post-war period favoured intra-European movements of displaced, refugee, lost, and surviving children. These transfers constituted de facto intra-European movements of people, of which international adoptions were the most successful legal manifestations. The creation of a legal parent-child relationship in order to give a family to a child who does not have one (and not the opposite), it could also be considered as a particular form of migration. Here, it is a question of returning to the origins of intercountry adoptions and studying how this nascent transnational social phenomenon was seen from the beginning as a particular type of migration which necessitated regulation at the international level. Europe found itself at the centre of the first movements – with the children's home countries and their host countries – how did the Council of Europe, institution created in 1949, take hold of this question and how did it contribute to regulating the phenomenon? Introduction As during the Second World War, the postwar period favoured intra-European movements of displaced, refugee, lost, and surviving children.1 These transfers constituted de facto intra-European movements of people, of which international adoptions were the most successful legal manifestations. The history of these intercountry adoptions, as they were called at the time, shows that in the 1940s and 1950s, movement within Europe was coupled with a movement from Europe toward the United States. Then from the 1960s onward, an intercontinental movement developed from Asia toward Europe, then another from Latin America toward Europe (very significant in the 1980s) and finally in the 1990s from Africa toward Europe, and new intra-European movements from the East toward the West.2 The three dimensions indicated in the title of the conference (in Europe, to Europe, from Europe) have thus been well pre- 1. Kjersty Ericsson/Eva Simonsen (eds.), Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy, Oxford/ New York 2005. Tara Zahra, The Lost Children. Reconstructing Europe’s Families after World War II, Harvard 2011. 2. Yves Denéchère, Des enfants venus de loin. Histoire de l’adoption internationale en France, Paris 2011. 77 sented in the study of international adoption. Although this is, above all, the creation of a legal parent-child relationship in order to give a family to a child who does not have one (and not the opposite), it could also be considered as a particular form of migration, whether seen as a modern version of traditional circulation of children – well studied by anthropologists – or as a solution to demographic, economic, and social problems.3 Impressive peaks of the number of international adoptions in the 1980s and 1990s strengthened the migratory approach. However their clear drop over the past several years has brought experts back to the question.4 Here, it is a question of returning to the origins of intercountry adoptions and studying how this nascent transnational social phenomenon was seen from the beginning as a particular type of migration which necessitated regulation at the international level. Europe found itself at the centre of the first movements – with the children's home countries and their host countries – how did the Council of Europe, institution created in 1949, take hold of this question and how did it contribute to regulating the phenomenon? The sources mobilised firstly for this contribution were obviously the archives of the Council of Europe itself. Unfortunately, the Central Archives of the Council of Europe conserved in Strasbourg, in particular Thematic file 105 "Children", could not be consulted. Despite a request sent in due form in July 2014, then a letter addressed to the general secretary, they were inaccessible "because of a lack of personnel and relocation of a part of the archives..." and remain so now.5 Fortunately, documents produced by the Council of Europe (such as reports, projects, and various committee work) are available for consultation in the Archives of the French Foreign Affairs Ministry (in La Courneuve), particularly the collections "Administrative Conventions and Consular Affairs" and in the archives of the Ministry of Public Health and Population (Archives Nationales). Migrations of children in postwar Europe I. Lost children, sought-after children In Europe, the demographic results of the Second World War were very different to those of the First because of the great number of civilian victims. Data specific to 3. Richard H. Weil, International adoptions: The quiet migration, International Migration Review, 18-2 (1984), p.276-293. Brigitte Trillat, Une migration singulière : l’adoption internationale, L’adoption des enfants étrangers, Paris 1993, p.15-25.. 4. Kirsten Lovelock, Intercountry adoption as a migration practice, International Migration Review, 34 (2000), p.907-949. Peter Selman, Intercountry adoption in the new millennium: the "quiet migration" revisited, Population Research and Policy Review, 21 (2002), p.205-225. 5. Consultation request dated 10 July 2014 and letter to Bjorn Berge, Director of the Cabinet of the COE Secretary General, 11 July; response from Ute Dahremöller, Director General of Administration of the Council of Europe, 25 August 2014. 78 Yves DENÉCHÈRE children are even heavier because they figured, like other categories of the population, among the victims or the survivors. Added to the orphans of soldiers killed in combat were orphans whose parents were victims of bombings or the concentration and extermination camps of Nazi Germany. There were also hundreds of thousands of children born from rapes or love affairs during invasions, occupations and detentions, left behind in the disorder at the end of the war, and whose fate illustrated the disarray of European societies.6 The question of the place reserved for children born to Allied soldiers arose very early in occupied Germany.7 In France, from its creation in April 1945, the High Consulting Committee on Population and the Family (Haut Comité consultatif de la Population et de la Famille, or HCPF) recommended turning the flows of refugees coming from Germany toward France. During a meeting on 18 May 1945, General de Gaulle asked the HCPF to examine bringing children of all nationalities to France, who were "currently orphaned or isolated in Germany." Immigration proved essential to guarantee France's recovery. It meant welcoming children who bore promises for the future and to make French citizens out of them to replace those who were lacking due to a low birth rate. For Pierre Pflimlin, Undersecretary of State to the Population, it meant carrying out a veritable "blood transfusion."8 In April 1946, he specified "that it was no longer only a question of children with French blood in their veins." And adoption could help this regeneration. In nationality law (Ordinance of 19 October 1945), Article 35 stipulated: "The child who was subject to adoptive legitimization (adoption while breaking links with the biological family) acquires French nationality if his adoptive father is French." For simple adoption – (maintaining links with the biological family), Article 55 applied: "The child adopted by a person with French nationality can, until he reaches legal age, declare […] that he claims French nationality."9 These reflections wholly illustrate the population policy common in postwar France. The country had to keep all its children, including those born to French mothers and occupying German soldiers or American GIs come to liberate the country: after the war, specialised nurseries took responsibility for Franco-American babies. The number of children born to French mothers and German soldiers under the Occupation, from 1940 to 1944, is estimated to have been in the tens of thousands.10 Those abandoned by their mothers were adopted by French families, particularly thanks to the association La Famille Adoptive Française. It was also called upon to organise the adoption of children coming from Germany after 1945. Born to 6. Zahra, note 1, introduction: “Civilization in disarray”, p.1-23. 7. Heide Fehrenbach, Race after Hitler. Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany, Princeton 2007, Chapter 5: "Whose children, theirs or ours? Intercountry adoptions and debates about belonging". 8. Zahra, note 1, p.146. 9. Paul-André Rosental, L’intelligence démographique. Sciences et politiques des populations en France (1930-1960), Paris 2003, p.110-113. 10. Fabrice Virgili, Naître ennemi, Paris 2009. Regulating a particular form of migration at the European level 79 German mothers and occupying French soldiers,11 often not recognized by their fathers and abandoned by their mothers under social pressure, several hundred were adopted in France between 1946 and 1950, constituting one of the first large movements of intra-European international adoption.12 French authorities estimated it necessary to retrieve French children born in Germany and decided, depending on the case, either to bring them back to France to live with their paternal family, or to entrust them to Child Aid Services for placement or adoption. General Koenig, Commander-in-chief of French forces in the Zone Française d’Occupation (ZFO), gave orders to take a census of the children born to French or Allied soldier fathers. The Service of Personnes Déplacées et Réfugiées (PDR) was responsible for verifying if the father had acknowledged paternity and if the mother intended to raise or abandon her child. The first question raised was the acknowledgement of paternity by occupying soldiers. Cases varied greatly: known or unknown pregnancy, rape, departure of the father with no forwarding address, refusal to acknowledge, acknowledgement but no taking of responsibility. Thus, a non-commissioned officer wrote about the mother of his child: "I acknowledge that she is pregnant as a result of our relations. I consider however this girl as a friend and I honourably request that the child be delivered to the French government."13 In this way, hundreds of children born in Germany were adopted in France by French families who most often hid the child's origins and even the adoption itself. It must be stated that these movements of children were organised in secret and in the context of completely unstable Franco-German relations.14 II. The beginnings of intercountry adoptions After the Second World War, aid to children was reorganised internationally. UNICEF, created in 1946, aimed first and foremost to support children facing the misery of the end of the war; it did not and would never see to adoption. The International Union for Child Welfare (IUCW) was very wary of international adoptions. Its publication International Child Welfare Review regularly and heatedly mentioned a practice which it did not consider necessary to come to the aid of children in need.15 International Social Service (ISS) was the international organisation most 11. Rainer Hudemann, Secret loves: French Soldiers and German Women, It Started with a Kiss. German-Allied Relations after 1945, Allied Museum, Berlin 2005, p.28-37. 12. Yves Denéchère, Des adoptions d’Etat : les enfants de l’occupation française en Allemagne (1945-1952), Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 57-2, (2010), p.159-179. 13. Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères – France (from now on AMAE-F), Archives de l’occupation française en Allemagne, Fonds des Personnes déplacées et réfugiées, PDR 285, "Recensement des enfants dont l’un des parents est ressortissant des nations unies", s.d.; DPR 396, letter from a non-commissioned officer, 31 August 1946. 14. To know more: Denéchère, note 12. 15. Christopher Bagley (ed.), International and Transracial Adoptions, Newcastle 1993, p.160-163. 80 Yves DENÉCHÈRE involved in the reflection on international adoption as a response to the existence of children without parents, while making sure of a certain number of guarantees.16 Faced with the great distress of numerous children, a surge of international generosity manifested itself to adopt children who had little to no chance of being adopted in their own countries. The Swedish were particularly attentive to this question. Finnish children were adopted in Sweden, and then in the 1950s, Swedes working in other European countries adopted children on site from Greece, Yugoslavia, or elsewhere. Of these children, 240 were brought back to Sweden between 1950 and the mid-1960s.17 Since that time, the country has had one of the highest rates of international adoption. The same phenomenon existed among French expatriates: in 1952, authorities pondered ways to validate acts of adoption of foreign children when the adoptive French families lived abroad.18 In certain European regions (like in Italy and Greece) the overall economic situation and the absence of fathers killed in the war also gave rise to hordes of children taken in by institutions who were available for adoption at home or in neighbouring countries. In 1954, the artist Josephine Baker, after having adopted two children from Japan, brought little Jari home from one of her tours in Finland and then continued building her "Tribu Arc-en-ciel" (Raimbow tribe). Given great media coverage in France, Belgium and Switzerland particularly, it is very difficult for the historian to evaluate the impact this single experiment had on the development of intercountry adoption.19 But international adoptions in the 1950s were especially done from European countries toward the United States. In bringing European children across the Atlantic, Americans were often unable to successfully conclude an adoption procedure as home governments had not supplied them with papers.20 It was to solve this type of problem that the ISS – which had a consulting role in the UN – was led to intervene in adoption cases. It tried hard to meet the requests for information which had been brought before its national offices by collaborating with the social services of the countries of origin. The French branch of the ISS, the Service Social d’Aide aux Emigrants (SSAE) played a large role in the adoptions of German children by American couples garrisoned in France. In the 1950s, a German mother who abandoned her child at the Youth Office (the German equivalent of Assistance publique) knew it was likely to be adopted by Americans living in Europe. For those in France, the Youth Office asked the SSAE to enquire on candidates. After a child was placed, the SSAE was 16. Jean-Claude Nicolle, Le service social d’aide aux émigrants et l’adoption, L’adoption internationale, colloque Louis Chatin, 1994, ronéotypé, p.41-44. 17. Françoise Maury, L’adoption interraciale, Paris 1999, p.26. 18. AMAE-F, Série Conventions Administratives et Affaires Consulaires (from now on CAAC) AC Volume 1, Box No. 3, Letter from the Justice Minister to the Foreign Affairs Minister, 26 August 1952. 19. Josephine Baker adopted twelve children of all colours, origins, religions and nationalities in order to raise them according to her ideal of universal brotherhood. Yves Denéchère, Vivre un idéal de fraternité universelle : la « Tribu Arc-en-ciel » de Joséphine Baker, in: F. Boudjaaba, C. Doucet, S. Mouysset (éds.), Frères et sœurs du Moyen Age à nos jours, Berne2016, pp. 589-602. 20. Yves Denéchère, La migration singulière des adoptés dans l’espace euro-américain depuis 1945, AMNIS, 2013, URL : http://amnis.revues.org/1980. Regulating a particular form of migration at the European level 81 once again called upon to establish a report on his integration into his new American family. The intervention of the SSAE was thus strictly social, legal questions were attended to between the German and American governments.21 It is understood then that in no circumstance did the ISS and its national branches play the role of gobetween in the placement of children, rather it had a role of support and help in in facilitating the legality and transparency of procedures.22 In most cases, the governments themselves, European and American especially, appealed to the ISS.23 In doing so, the administrators and social workers of the ISS regularly pointed out the inadequacy of national laws and international rules in addition to the poor application of existing legislation. In substance, the ISS position on adoption was clear: "finding adoptive parents for children who particularly needed them and who did not have the possibility to be adopted in their own countries, rather than supplying children to parents who wished to adopt a child from a another country."24 This was the philosophy of international adoption expressed from the 1920s onward. In concrete terms, the ISS realistically and constructively intervened in intercountry adoptions in order to introduce the best guarantees possible, as much from a legal as a social point of view. Throughout 1956, ISS offices dealt with 3,500 placements of children in foreign families concerning fifty-four countries.25 The large number of international adoptions can largely be explained by the enactment of an American law, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, which provided for the admission of four thousand children to the United States before the end of 1956.26 In the 1960s, a European couple who went to Greece with thoughts of adopting could do so in a month (statutory time limit in Greece), be entrusted with a child, and obtain a ruling of adoption. This very short period, and its corollary reflection on both sides, was sometimes detrimental to the child's best interest: a case was reported of a French woman adopting a child, and then returning to France without him after changing her mind…27 Adoptions of Italian children took place in France. The head of Health and Social Affairs of the Maine-et-Loire highlighted the fact that an Italian charity from Turin organised the placement of some children in that département. But according to Italian authorities, too many French couples easily crossed the border with an Italian child handed over to them by an institution for abandoned children. 21. Camille Olivier, Adopter un enfant, Paris 1965, p.132-133. 22. Karen A. Balcom, The Traffic in Babies. Cross-border Adoption and the Baby-selling between the United States and Canada 1930-1972, Toronto 2011, p.161-162. 23. Olivier, note 21, p.130-131. 24. AMAE-F, CAAC, AC 1, No. 3, « Adoption entre pays: rapport d’un groupe d’experts européens, Genève 21-25 janvier 1957 », United Nations, 1958, TAA/EG Rep.3, p.3-4. 25. Ibid, p.4. 26. Bagley (ed.), note 15, p.148-149. 27. Olivier, note 21, p.135-136. 82 Yves DENÉCHÈRE Through its consulates in France, Italy then asked the ISS and the SSAE to assure that adoptions of Italian children be carried out lawfully.28 The great evolution of the 1960s, however, was that from that point onward a movement of adoption developed from Asia toward Europe. Arriving from Lebanon, India, South Korea, and Vietnam, hundreds of children arrived each year in Europe to be adopted in France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway...very few in the United Kingdom, where international adoption was and has remained marginal. As the countries of origin became more and more numerous the countries of Western Europe all more or less became host countries; once a country of origin, Italy became a host country. This evolution of the migratory movements of intercountry adoption pushed the Council of Europe to propose a convention. The contribution of the Council of Europe I. The necessity for inter-institutional dialogue In 1952, the World Health Organisation (WHO) organised a meeting on adoption in New York with the aim of drawing up universal statutes. Obviously, governments were very reticent to accept guidelines on a practice over which they had exclusive jurisdiction.29 Yet, in transnational adoptions, a minimum amount of harmonisation is necessary to preserve the rights of the children as well as those of the biological and adoptive parents. On the international level, the first reflections of the ISS on this new phenomenon were shared by the UN services concerned and the brand-new Council of Europe (COE), which gathered the main host countries of international adoption in the 1950s and 1960s (Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden) and also countries of origin (Italy and Greece).30 In the 1950s then, the new European institution started to look into these intercountry adoptions. Indeed, at the time there existed no regulatory guidelines, no international text which organised and controlled this particular type of migration of thousands of European children, intra-European migration coupled with intercontinental migration. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in a special message on 20 May 28. Archives départementales du Maine-et-Loire, 303 W 82, annual activity report of the Direction des Affaires sanitaires et sociales DASS (1968-1969); Fonds Jean Foyer, 818 J, Report from the DASS of Maine-et-Loire "les adoptions en Maine-et-Loire" for the years 1967-1969. 29. Rachel Gayman, Le problème de l’adoption, Cahiers français d’Informations. Quatre études sur la jeunesse socialement inadaptée, 283 (1955), p.20-26. 30. At its creation in May 1949, the COE counted ten member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Joining later were Greece (1949), Turkey (1949), the Federal Republic of Germany (1950), Iceland (1950), Austria (1956), Cyprus (1961), Switzerland (1963), Malta (1965), and others followed after our period of study. For the history of the institution, see particularly Birte Wassenberg, History of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2013. Regulating a particular form of migration at the European level 83 1954, proclaimed its intention "to study the means of unifying and harmonising the legislation of member states" and wished to receive the suggestions of the consulting Assembly. In this way, the Social Committee and the Legal Commission initiated work to reflect upon, define and establish statistics on the migratory phenomenon of transnational adoptions.31 In August 1956 in Germany, the ISS brought its personnel together and drew up a certain number of principles. Then, in accordance with the United Nations' European Office of Technical Assistance, a group of European experts met in Geneva from 21-25 January 1957 to decide what action to take. The fundamental principle which inspired the group's work was that "adoption, whatever its form, must have only one objective: the good of the child." This was consistent with the UN position "which considered adoption to be one of the important principles in its policy of the protection of childhood." The beginning assessment was clear and well defined the situation of international adoption at the time: "in many countries, the verification of the delivery of passports to emigrating children […] is careless […] and encourages the placements of children from one country to another without the necessary preparation and protections."32 During the work in Geneva, two directions were explored: first "to increase possibilities for adoption within each country, which would reduce the need for adoption between countries," then to establish "conditions in which intercountry adoption could be carried out […] with the most serious guarantees in cases where it is judged to be necessary and desirable, given that one would expect cases of this type to continue to come up."33 The first direction entailed a reflection upon adoption in general in each country, which was not always well accepted by governments; the second was to find a modicum of legal harmonisation among governments in order to establish rational bases to confront the unbridled development of a growing phenomenon. The work of these experts resulted in the drawing up of twelve principles, short and very expressive. They stated that the good of the child was the principal element upon which all aspects of adoption should be based.34 In November 1959, at the UN General Assembly, the international community unanimously adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Based on the previous great declarations of human rights, the text lists ten great principles so that each child may have "a happy childhood and enjoy for his own good and for the good of society the rights and freedoms herein set forth." Here was a veritable recognition of children's rights, to that point the legal status of children had especially been specified. Adoption was not mentioned, but Principle Six stipulated that the child "shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and, in 31. CAAC, AC 1, Box No. 3 contains documents on transnational adoption issued by the Council of Europe (1957-1968), particularly several reports on the different steps of the consideration of the transnational adoption question by the COE. 32. CAAC, AC1, No. 3, "Adoption entre pays : rapport... ", p.44. 33. Ibid, p.2 and 4-5. 34. Ibid, annex 3, p.55-58. 84 Yves DENÉCHÈRE any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother. Society and public authorities shall have the duty to extend particular care to children without a family and to those without adequate means of support."35 At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the number of international adoptions known to the ISS soared: 6,316 cases in 1961 – of course other cases existed, not known to the ISS.36 The group of experts meeting in Geneva in January 1957 had recommended the meeting of an international seminar, whose work could make proposals which the UN would address to governments and the Council of Europe. II. Drawing up principles The Social Committee of the Council of Europe, at its Eighth Session (30 November – 4 December 1959), after having heard a talk by a UN representative on the problems linked to transnational adoption, decided to contribute to finding solutions. The Council of Europe looked to write a regional convention with model regulations whose principles would apply to member states. The first measure for the Council of Europe was to send an observer to the seminar the group of experts had wished for in 1957, held in Leysin, Switzerland from 22 – 31 May 1960.37 The seminar was organised by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration as a part of the special programme of social service for Europe, and in collaboration with the Swiss government, the ISS and the IUCW. The seminar was reserved for European participants who, through their experience, could bring a positive contribution to the studies and promote the spread of new ideas in their countries. So that meant social workers dealing with adoption, legal experts, and civil servants. The Council of Europe, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference sent observers.38 The work done in Leysin was based on "two axioms": "1 – Adoption is the best replacement for a biological family […] 2 – The aim is above all to promote the wellbeing of the child." The different work groups in Leysin took up the twelve principles formulated by the group of experts in Geneva in 1957 and would propose practically the same text to create a fundamental charter to diffuse and apply. The six first principles related to adoption in general and the last six were proper to intercountry 35. UN General Assembly, 20 November 1959; Françoise Dekeuwer-Défossez, Les droits de l’enfant, Paris 2006. 36. CAAC, AC 1, No.3, "L’adoption des enfants entre pays", report of the Division des Questions sociales, CE/Soc (60) 24, 3 November 1960, p.2. 37. CAAC AC 1, No. 3, "Rapport de mission rédigé par l’observateur du Conseil de l’Europe au Cycle d’études européen de Leysin sur l’adoption entre pays ", CE/Soc (60) 12, 25 July 1960, p.1-2. 38. Ibid, p.3. Regulating a particular form of migration at the European level 85 adoption. Principle One focused on adoption's goal: "Adoption is the best replacement for the care given to a child by his parents or his immediate family, on the condition that this adoption be principally founded on the well-being of the child." All possibilities for adoption in the home country must be studied before a foreign placement is considered, "given that it is risky to transplant a child outside of his cultural environment" (Principle Two). According to Principle Three, the adoption of children placed in an institution should be carried out as early as possible. In each country, efforts should be made to find families for physically or mentally disabled children (Principle Four). The fifth principle stated that every parent should be in a position to evaluate the consequences of adoption for his child before consenting to it. The same necessity applied to the adopted child if he was of an age to understand and to make a choice (Principle Six).39 Out of the last six principles came the statement of the guarantees which should accompany each international adoption. An investigation must absolutely be done into the home of the adopting parents as well as into the child (Principle Seven). This investigation must determine the choice of a child's adoptive family by the child protection agency, particularly by taking religion into account (Principle Eight). The necessity of a placement lasting at least six months in the family before the adoption is clearly confirmed (Principle Nine), which aimed to eradicate the practice of adoption by mandate, in other words an adoption carried out before the adopting parent had even seen the adoptee. The fact of insisting on the necessity of possessing all documents in due form in order tocarry out the adoption (Principle Ten) proves that this was a practice which was not always respected. Principle Eleven considered the period between the arrival of a child in a foreign country and his official adoption as one of the most critical regarding the protection of the child. Finally, the best interest of the child also demanded that his adoption be acknowledged in his country of origin (Principle Twelve), which was hardly the case in 1960 as national legislation on the subject varied greatly.40 As far as the manner in which these principles were applied is concerned, the Leysin meeting recommended the "social casework" method in the different phases of adoption, in reaction to the all too frequent intervention of unqualified people: "their ignorance of social, psychological, and legal elements can have tragic consequences for the children, their biological parents, and their adoptive parents." It was then indicated that a "service of trained casework is vital to inform candidates for adoption and the biological parents of the legal consequences of adoption and to enlighten them about its psychological consequences." The list of recommendations was long. The experts seemed to have foreseen every instance, every difficulty which came up or which could come up in the legal or social domain or the protection of children. The Leysin seminar also produced a draft of a convention, in six titles and sixteen articles, "intended to inspire the authors of a European tool," whose goal 39. Marie-Pierre Marmier, L’adoption, Paris 1972, p.100-102. 40. Olivier, note 21, p.137-142; Marmier, note 39, p.103-104. 86 Yves DENÉCHÈRE would be to "protect the interest of the adopted child, whose well-being is absolutely predominant."41 III. Toward a European Adoption Convention As seen above, the main principles of intercountry adoption were unanimously defined in 1957 and 1960. Neither formalised nor inscribed in international law, they were not restrictive for governments, international organisations, or the national associations which handled adoption. The role of the different organs of the Council of Europe were then of paramount importance in moving toward an international text. In 1960, the Social Committee raised the following point on intercountry adoption: "Such is the problem at hand: that of general inadequacy." It was thus urgent to "go back over the logic de transnational adoption of children in trying to improve it at its different stages." The convention draft of sixteen points established by the experts in Leysin seemed to be an interesting base for writing a convention whose object was to "protect the interest of the adopted child, whose well-being is absolutely predominant."42 The Legal Commission insisted that legislation of member states of the Council of Europe be harmonised "in compliance with modern concepts." Legal conflicts brought about by intercountry adoption were indeed very numerous. The main question lay with determining the competent local authority, and so the law to apply, to authorise the adoption and to manage its impacts: was it the law of the adopter's country or that of the adoptee's?43 Drawing on this report, the Social Committee decried the lack of precise statistics but considered that from the evidence, "adoptions among member states of the Council of Europe were few compared to the adoptions carried out between European countries and other countries." It affirmed that the problems relative to intercountry adoption were to be put in the wider framework of adoption in general. It noted the very great disparities in national legislation and the impossibility of moving towards uniform regulations or a restrictive convention. So it proposed establishing "a convention only containing a minimum of essential principles" accompanied by recommendations that each member committed to implementing in its legislation.44 This option completely suited all the member states, particularly France who did not want a text which was too legally restrictive in order to preserve "pluralism of forms when it has historically existed and meets a pluralism of needs." Reference was of course 41. CAAC AC 1, No. 3, "Rapport de mission…", p.13. 42. CAAC, AC 1, No. 3, "L’adoption des enfants entre pays", report of the Division des Questions sociales, CE/Soc (60) 24, 3 November 1960, p.2. 43. CAAC AC 1, No. 3, " Rapport sur le droit de l’adoption", Legal Commission of the COE, AS/Jur XV (12) 5, 5 April 1961.F. 44. CAAC AC 1, No. 3, "Conclusions du sous-comité d’experts pour l’adoption des enfants entre pays", Council of Europe, CE/Soc (61) 3, 17 April 1961, p.2. Regulating a particular form of migration at the European level 87 being made here to the specificity of the two forms of French adoption, with or without a break with the biological parents.45 In Recommendation 292 (1961), the consulting Assembly of the Council of Europe, "Considering that adoption exists as a legal institution in all member countries of the Council of Europe, but that national legislation on the subject differs both as to the form and as to the substance of adoption," invited the Committee of Ministers, "should appoint a committee of governmental experts […] to draft a convention which would contain a minimum of essential principles in regard to adoption."46 This is what was done starting in 1962: a sub-committee on adoption met regularly and worked on writing a convention draft. It endeavoured to deal with adoption in general whilst always keeping in mind the problems of international adoption.47 The Hague Conference on Private International Law, which had sent -- it too -an observer to Leysin, set to work a special commission which settled upon a draft for a "Convention on International Adoption" in March 1963. It was debated and led to a final document on 7 October 1964 aiming to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction and assure the recognition of granted adoption decisions. The twenty-four articles of the convention "concerning the jurisdiction of authorities, the applicable law and the recognition of decisions on the subject of adoption" concluded 15 November 1965 particularly dealing with the authorities competent to grant adoptions (Article Three), the conditions of social enquiries (Articles Six and Seven), questions of nationality (Article Ten) or adoption bans, for example the age conditions between adopter and adoptee (Article Thirteen). The main principle is that in legal conflicts, the judge applies his own law, meaning most often the law of the host country, except for what concerns the consent of the child's birth parents.48 After several years of reflection and writing, the European Convention on the Adoption of Children was opened to the signature of Council of Europe members on 24 April 1967. Containing twenty-eight articles organised in four parts, it was the most complete text on adoption to date.49 Its impact was to insure that child protection measures were applied equally to the adoptions of foreign children, whether European or from other countries of origin. To do this, it took the main principles drawn up earlier but cut them back to a minimum so that they would be acceptable for all states which had to integrate them into their own legislation. It also provided an additional list of measures which states were free to implement if they so choose. The three main principles chosen were the following: the adoption must be ordered by an adminis- 45. Letter from the French Minister of Public Health and Population to the FAM, AG 4-5531, 4 July 1961. 46. Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 292 (1961) on the law of adoption, 26 September 1961. 47. CAAC AC 1, No 3, "Réunion d’un groupe de travail du sous-comité pour l’adoption", Note of the Secretary General of the Committe of Ministers, CM (62) 22, 26 January 1962. 48. Hans van Loon, Genèse et historique de la Convention du 29 mai 1993, L’adoption internationale, colloque Louis Chatin, Paris 1994, ronéotypé, p.9-17. 49. Part I: Undertakings and field of application (Articles 1-3); Part II: Essential provisions (Articles 4 -16); Part III: Supplementary provisions; Part IV: Final clauses (Articles 21- 28). 88 Yves DENÉCHÈRE trative or legal authority, the decision to offer a child up for adoption must be freely accepted by the parents, and the adoption must insure the child's well-being. Signed by eleven countries and ratified by six of them, it went into effect on 26 April 1968; in total, eighteen states ratified the convention and three signed it.50 The convention then could not settle all cases of international adoption, particularly between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. Certain countries would then contract bilateral conventions, such as the Franco-Polish Convention of 5 April 1967 which stipulated that the conditions and effects of adoption are those of the adoptee's law and that the forms of adoption are subject to the national law of the adopter, or the Franco-Yugoslav Convention of 18 May 1971 which stipulated that the authorities of both countries have the jurisdiction to grant an adoption.51 Conclusion The efforts of the Council of Europe to regulate a complex transnational social reality like international adoption on the European level, illustrates how the institution tried to tackle a problem which could hardly find a way forward in the bilateral relationships between governments. On the contrary, the Council of Europe fit within a group of interactions with other international organisations like ISS or the Hague Conference on Private International Law, and made possible the proposition of a general approach to a very unique type of migration. The COE arrived at the conclusion that a convention was necessary, laying out essential principles as per the respect of the rights of children (in reference to the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child). Within the Council of Europe, a long negotiation effort ended in the writing of the European Convention on the Adoption of Children (1967). International adoption was still developing in the 1970s, and this minimalist text quickly became insufficient. Many Council of Europe member states had indeed revised their legislation according to social and legal changes, and certain provisions of the Convention became obsolete. As early as 1977, at the first European conference on family law, the necessary update of the convention was brought up.52 For their part, Third World nations, countries of origin for international adoption, considered that the convention was written to benefit the European host nations which had put it together.53 As if in reaction, in La Paz in 1984 Latin American countries drew up a convention on legal 50. European Convention on the Adoption of Children, Council of Europe, (CETS No. 058), 1967. 51. Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, Le droit français de l’adoption internationale, Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 42-2 (1990) p.567-597. Caroline Mécary, L’adoption, Paris 2006, p.104-105. 52. van Loon, note 48, p.9-17. 53. Maev O’Collins, The influence of Western adoption laws on customary adoption in the Third World, in: Philip Bean (ed), Adoption. Essays in Social Policy, Law and Sociology, London 1984, p. 288-304. Regulating a particular form of migration at the European level 89 conflicts in adoption. It gave jurisdiction to judges of a child's home country applying the laws of their country, except for the criteria aimed at the adopters.54 In 1988, the Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on Family Law put certain questions on adoption on its working agenda, but a new text was written on an international level as a part of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. This work led to the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption in May 1993.55 This convention has generally presided over international adoption in the world since it went into effect (1 May 1995). On a European level, Recommendation 1443 (2000) launched an effort to review and adapt the 1967 convention in order to ensure compliance with the convention of The Hague. This process concluded in 2008.56 54. Francisco J. Pilotti, Intercountry Adoption: A view from Latin America, Child Welfare, LXIV-1 (1985), p.25-35. 55. van Loon, note 48, p.9-17. 56. European Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised), Council of Europe, 2008, (CETS No. 202). 90 Yves DENÉCHÈRE Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes Willem MAAS Abstract Free movement in Europe differs from arrangements in other regional integration efforts because of the introduction of individual rights at the European level, later captured under the legal umbrella of European Union citizenship. In place of previous bilateral and ad hoc arrangements to manage migration between their states, Europe’s political leaders created a new constitutional category: the European citizen, with rights that EU member states cannot infringe except under limited circumstances. The development of European rights means that free movement in Europe can be compared with internal free movement in other multilevel political systems, such as federal states, demonstrating the similar political logics at work in dissimilar contexts. One of the core values of shared citizenship is a project of equal political status, which is not always compatible with retaining local particularity. This is why central authorities in democratic systems almost invariably work to lower internal borders and boundaries, while local authorities often work to retain them, setting up potential conflicts. Introduction From postwar bilateral labour migration accords and the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community to the present day, the project of European integration has been deeply shaped by the politics of free movement, first of workers, then of members of their families, then (via intermediate categories such as students, retirees, and others) to all European citizens and arguably, via legislation and Court interpretation, to everyone living in Europe.1 Free movement reflects the aim of changing the meaning of borders – from Schuman’s aim “to take away from borders 1. For example Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are longterm residents; Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; and Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State. A first version of this paper was presented at the Peoples and Borders conference at the University of Padua in November 2014. This research was supported by a Marie Curie International Incoming Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework Programme, based at the European University Institute, whose support is gratefully acknowledged. 91 their rigidity and…their intransigent hostility”2 to what Mitterrand called his grand projet, to “turn the whole of Europe into one space.”3 The idea of changing the meaning of borders and turning the European continent into one space is coupled with a political project to create a “broader and deeper community among peoples with a destiny henceforward shared” (in the words of the European Coal and Steel Community treaty), a project that has gradually adopted the mantle of a shared citizenship. Starting from an overview of the evolution of this shared citizenship, this chapter asks what difference citizenship makes. At the most basic level, European Union citizenship differs from arrangements in other regional integration efforts. For example, despite the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans do not enjoy rights to live and work in each others’ countries; indeed, the United States federal government (to speak nothing of some state governments, such as that of Arizona) has invested significant resources into discouraging immigration from Mexico, and between 2009 and 2016 even Mexican travellers to Canada required a visa to be allowed entry. By contrast, citizens of EU member states do not require any permits or visas to live, work, or study in each others’ territory, and even the physical border checks have been eliminated for border crossings within the “Schengen” space which, as of this writing, includes twenty-two of the twenty-eight EU member states plus the four EFTA states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.4 But the introduction and rise of a common European Union citizenship has arguably had much more significant impacts on Europe than the elimination of such barriers and impediments. By substituting a common citizenship for what had previously been bilateral and ad hoc arrangements to manage migration, Europe’s political leaders created a new constitutional category: the European citizen, with rights that member states cannot infringe except under limited circumstances. Free movement in Europe can be compared with free movement in other multilevel political systems, such as federal states. Doing so demonstrates the similar political logics at work in very dissimilar contexts. For example, some in European institutions such as the Commission lament what they see as the low numbers of people crossing borders to study or work, yet the rates in Europe are rising and are no longer disproportionately low compared to those in the United States (where the number of people moving betweens states has been declining steadily since the 1980s) or Canada (where for example less than ten percent of students study outside their home province and where the federal government often privileges hiring temporary 2. Schuman wrote “It is not a question of eliminating ethnic and political borders. They are a historical given: we do not pretend to correct history, or to invent a rationalized and managed geography. What we want is to take away from borders their rigidity and what I call their intransigent hostility,” my translation from Robert Schuman, Pour l’Europe, Paris 1963. 3. Cited in Ronald Tiersky, François Mitterrand: A Very French President, Lanham 2003, p. 115. 4. EU member states Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania are on track to eventually join the area. The United Kingdom and Ireland maintain opt-outs, though they have a Common Travel Area with no routine border checks for travel between them. The effects, if any, of the Brexit referendum on Schengen are unclear as of this writing. For more on Schengen, see note 54 below. 92 Willem MAAS foreign workers over encouraging interprovincial mobility). Comparing Europe to other multilevel systems also highlights the political dynamics of migration, both internal and international: protectionist policies promoted by populist parties such as the Front national, the UK Independence Party, or the Danish People’s Party are not completely different from political tensions surrounding free movement elsewhere. A key motivating idea of this book is that “European migration policies and their impact on national societies and economies in the postwar period cannot be fully understood without taking into account the Community framework,” an argument flowing from the related observation that “existing historiographical literature […] has generally analysed the issue of migration from a national viewpoint” even though “[m]ovement of persons has been a key feature in the whole history of European integration.”5 The triple aims of my contribution to this book are to demonstrate 1) that freer movement of persons within Europe has indeed been central to the political project of creating an ever closer union of peoples since the immediate postwar era, 2) that the push for freer movement of people has developed alongside the idea of a supranational European citizenship that, in turn, has acquired constitutional status since the treaty of Maastricht, and 3) that the political dynamics surrounding intra- European migration are comparable to similar dynamics operating in other multilevel political systems. Postwar free movement and citizenship The first myth to be dispelled is that the idea of European citizenship was an invention of the Maastricht Treaty, an idea shared by many legal commentators as a result of the fact that the term was not introduced into the treaties until Maastricht.6 In fact, the great majority of Europe’s postwar political leaders were convinced of the necessity of creating a supranational community in which individual citizens would share a common status and political identity. For example, Winston Churchill called for “a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent.”7 In a speech preceding the 1948 Hague Congress he presided, Churchill said: “We hope to reach again a Europe... [in which] men will be proud to say ‘I am a European.’ We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think as much of being a European as of belonging to their native land.... [And] wherever they go in this wide 5. From the call for papers for the conference which brought together the authors in Padua. 6. For a sense of those arguments, see Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens, Lanham 2007, especially chapter 3, “Maastricht’s Constitutional Moment.” 7. Winston Churchill, Speech Delivered at the University of Zurich (Sept. 19, 1946), in: Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace: Winston Churchill's Post-War Speeches Collection 198–202 (Randolph S. Churchill ed., 1949). In the same speech, Churchill also called for the creation of “a kind of United States of Europe.” Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes 93 domain... they will truly feel ‘Here I am at home.’ ”8 The Hague Congress gathered some 750 delegates from across the political spectrum including Churchill, three former French prime ministers, François Mitterrand, Konrad Adenauer, Harold Macmillan, Altiero Spinelli and his wife Ursula Hirschmann, Walter Hallstein, Salvador de Madariaga, Raymond Aron, and other leaders in the field of politics, academia, business, religion and others; it resolved that an essential ingredient of European union was direct access for citizens to a European court guaranteeing their rights under a common charter and also proposed “a European passport, to supersede national passports and to bear the title ‘European’ for use by the owner when travelling to other continents.”9 Many of the Hague Congress speeches focused on common citizenship, such as the intervention by Hendrik Brugmans, co-founder and first president of the Union of European Federalists (and later Rector of the College of Europe from 1950 to 1972) who argued that “we are agreed here that we must organize a European political consciousness, in which alone federal democracy can work. This European public opinion will not be the sum of individual national public opinions, it will be something sui generis, an occurrence quite new in history, the discovery of common citizenship of Europeans as such.” This idea of a shared European citizenship was not invented at the Hague Congress, either.10 Indeed, in Italy in 1943, the Movimento Federalista Europeo (European Federalist Movement) envisaged the creation of a European continental citizenship alongside national citizenship, consisting of direct political and legal relationships with a European federation.11 In the Netherlands, the European Action group also called for a European citizenship to operate beside that of nationality. Similarly, plans drawn up by Giovanni Gronchi (later President of Italy), Count Stefano Jacini (Senator and later president of UNESCO), and labour union leader Achille Grandi, called for the “option to take out European citizenship in addition to national citizenship.”12 8. Winston Churchill, Speech Delivered to the Congress of Europe (May 10, 1948), transcript available in the Netherlands National Archives, catalog 2.19.109 Europese Beweging in Nederland en Voorgangers, inv. 95. Cited in Willem Maas, European Union Citizenship in Retrospect and Prospect, in: Engin Isin and Peter Nyers (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies, London 2014, pp. 409–17. 9. Ibid. 10. The arguments in the rest of this section are discussed in more detail in Maas, Creating European Citizens, above note 6, especially pp.12-17 and in Willem Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 43 (2005), pp. 1009–25. 11. Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, Cambridge UK 2002. The MFE was co-founded by Altiero Spinelli, later European Commissioner for Industry (1970-76), Deputy in the Italian Parliament (1976-1983), and Communist Member of the European Parliament (1979-86). Imprisoned between 1927 and 1943 for his opposition to Mussolini, Spinelli in 1941 on the island of Ventotene co-wrote the eponymous Ventotene Manifesto, which argued that a “free and united Europe” was necessary because national sovereignty caused war. 12. Piero Malvestiti, There Is Hope in Europe: Addresses Delivered on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 16-23 September, 1959, Luxembourg 1959, p. 58. 94 Willem MAAS Many political leaders made similar speeches, but progress towards actual intergovernmental agreements started with French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s announcement on 9 May 1950—the tenth anniversary of the German invasion of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg—of a plan for a European coal and steel community, a proposal with idealistic aims. The Schuman Declaration stated that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”; the Declaration thus aimed at the “coming together of the nations of Europe”. Though some believed that the Schuman Plan would narrow the scope for independent state action and possibly herald the eventual demise of state sovereignty,13 negotiators focused almost exclusively on economic issues. Free movement of workers had low significance in the bargaining among the potential member states in the summer and fall of 1950, except for Italy. The promise of free movement for Italian workers to live and work elsewhere within the Community was a key reason for Italian participation in the ECSC.14 In the earlier OEEC and Franco-Italian Customs Union negotiations, Italy had presented emigration requests for large numbers of unskilled workers but in return received only limited offers for skilled workers. Although political support for the “European idea” and the economic desire to acquire raw materials cheaply also figured in the negotiations, the principal incentive for Italian participation in the Schuman plan was “to permit export of its surplus labor.”15 Indeed, for “at least fifteen years after the war, the primary interest of most Italians in a European federation was the hope of finding an outlet for the emigration of large numbers of their excess population.”16 The issue of labour migration was broached by the Italian negotiator, Paolo Taviani, who later wrote that free movement rights for workers constituted a fundamental principle of the Community. Its realization was the key condition for Italian participation, and Taviani even envisioned creating a single European ministry of labour.17 During the negotiations, Taviani pushed for a better deal on migration by suggesting that the High Authority, the precursor to the European Commission, should have the power to set and enforce wage levels across the Community.18 As this was an important issue for the other potential member states, the negotiations proceeded with “the Italians using the issue as a bargaining counter for a resolution on the migration question and the Dutch and Germans resolute in keeping HA powers 13. P. H. Spaak, “The Integration of Europe: Dreams and Realities,” Foreign Affairs October (1950): 95. This paragraph and the next draw on Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, pp. 1012-1013 14. Giuseppe Pella, La Comunità Europea del Carbone e dell’Acciaio: Risultati e Prospettivo, Roma 1956; Francesca Serra, Alcune osservazioni sulla presenza della rappresentanza degli interessi nella delegazione italiana al Piano Schuman, in: Andrea Ciampani (ed.), L’altra via per l’Europa: Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell’integrazione europea (1947-1957), Milan 1995, pp. 137– 48. Cited in Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, p. 1012. 15. Henry L. Mason, The European Coal and Steel Community: Experiment in Supranationalism, The Hague 1955, p. 5. 16. F. Roy Willis, Italy Chooses Europe, New York 1971, p. 150. 17. Paolo Emilio Taviani, Solidarietà atlantica e comunità europea, Milan 1954. 18. Ruggero Ranieri, Italy and the Schuman Plan Negotiations, EUI Working Paper No. 86/215 (Florence: European University Institute, 1986), p. 22. Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes 95 to an absolute minimum.”19 Because negotiators from the Netherlands and West Germany were concerned that the High Authority would overturn domestic economic compromises, they agreed to the Italian demand for a flexible resolution to the migration question, at least partially because, like Italy, the Netherlands and West Germany were labour exporting countries in the early 1950s.20 Indeed, West Germany also favoured the emigration of German-speaking workers from central and eastern Europe (the last waves of the postwar expulsions of German-speaking populations towards West Germany) to neighbouring European countries, as well as the recruitment of workers from Italy – a proposal which some German leaders later saw as way to combat the ‘poison’ of Communism in Italy.21 Opposition might have come from the only potential member states which had significant numbers of foreign coal workers: Belgium (70,594 foreign workers in 1951) and France (56,535). In Belgium, more than two out of every five coal workers were non-Belgian, primarily Italian. In France, the proportion was half that of Belgium: foreigners accounted for one out of every five coal workers. Most of these foreign workers in France were Polish, and thus unaffected by any potential ECSC treaty provisions. 19. Richard T. Griffiths, The Schuman Plan Negotiations: The Economic Clauses, in: Klaus Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans, 1950/51, Baden-Baden 1988, p. 42. 20. Albert Kersten, A Welcome Surprise? The Netherlands and the Schuman Plan Negotiations, in: Klaus Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans, 1950/51, Baden-Baden 1988, p. 296; Daniel Vignes, La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier: Un exemple d’administration économique internationale, Liège 1956. Cited in Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, p. 1013. 21. Emmanuel Comte, “La rupture de 1955 dans la formation du régime européen de migrations,” Relations internationales, no. 166 (2016): 137–58. In the 1953 elections, the Italian Communist Party received 22.6% of the vote. Comte argues that proposals to extend the free movement of workers in the 1955 Messina conference that would lead to the Treaty of Rome (as opposed to the negotiations over the earlier Treaty of Paris) were driven primarily by West German rather than Italian negotiators. 96 Willem MAAS Number and proportion (% of total labour force) of foreign coal workers22 1950 1951 1952 Germany 3,243 0.7% 3,500 0.8% 3,796 0.8% Belgium 55,750 36.4% 70,594 43.4% 70,510 43.7% France 58,106 20.4% 56,535 20.0% 53,728 19.5% Saar 135 0.2% 116 0.2% 119 0.2% Netherlands 4,285 9.1% 3,969 7.8% 3,888 7.2% Total 121,519 12.2% 134,714 13.2% 132,041 12.8% Bolstered by strong public support for the Schuman plan, and intent on forging a deal, the French delegation under the leadership of Jean Monnet was willing to grant concessions to the other prospective member states; and as early as October 1950, French public opinion favoured the Schuman plan by a margin of two to one, despite being rather ill-informed about its contents.23 The Belgian position was a pragmatic one, more concerned with the fate of its ailing coal and steel industries than the prospect of increased immigration of workers.24 Indeed, if coal mines were to close, it seemed likely that foreign workers would return to their countries of origin rather than settling permanently. Since there were already between 70,000 and 80,000 Italian coal and steel workers in the other five prospective ECSC member states, the Italian negotiators argued that, failing labour mobility on a general scale, it should surely be possible to achieve a sectoral arrangement for coal and steel workers.25 The Italian delegation received strong support from parliamentarians such as Christian Democrat Deputy Bima and Grupo Misto Senator Merzagora, who regarded the ultimate outcome of the negotiations as the achievement of a political goal they had long desired.26 The Italian delegation ultimately succeeded in its effort to include free movement rights in the draft treaty, and the first steps to free movement rights for workers in the area that would become the European Economic Community were enshrined in the ECSC treaty. Article 69 of the final Treaty announced that “Member States undertake to remove any restriction based on nationality upon the employment in the coal and steel 22. Adapted from , table 6, p.54. Cited in Maas, The Genesis of European Rights. Data for France includes employees. No available data for Luxembourg. The numbers for Italy are negligible. 23. Institut français de l’opinion publique, Sondages: Revue française de l’opinion publique 13 (1951); Raymond Racine, Vers une Europe nouvelle par le Plan Schuman, Neuchâtel 1954; Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Paris 1976, cited in Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, p. 1013. 24. Michel Dumoulin, La Belgique et les débuts du Plan Schuman (Mai 1950 – Février 1952), in: Klaus Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans, 1950/51, Baden-Baden 1988, pp. 271–84; Alan S. Milward, The Belgian Coal and Steel Industries and the Schuman Plan, in: Klaus Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans, 1950/51, Baden-Baden 1988, pp. 437–54. 25. William Diebold, The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1950-1959, New York 1959; Ranieri, Italy and the Schuman Plan Negotiations, pp. 22–23. 26. European Coal and Steel Community, Le Traité C.E.C.A. devant les Parlements Nationaux (Luxembourg: Assemblée Commune, 1958). Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes 97 industries of workers who are nationals of Member States and have recognised qualifications in a coalmining or steelmaking occupation, subject to the limitations imposed by the basic requirements of health and public policy,” thus laying the groundwork for the future free movement of workers.27 Despite optimistic assessments immediately following the finalization of Article 69’s provisions, the agreement’s full implementation would be delayed until after all the member states had ratified it. Italy, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands ratified the agreement by the end of 1955. However, the German Bundestag delayed ratification until May 1956 and Luxembourg blocked the entire process by postponing its ratification until June 1957.28As a result, the agreement on free movement of workers finally took effect in September 1957, four and a half years after work on it had begun. This delay proved a constant irritant to the Italian delegates between 1952 and 1957. Most of the speeches by Italian members of the Common Assembly (the supranational parliament created by the Paris treaty) concerned issues related to migration, in particular the delay in working out Article 69’s provisions.29 The Italian preoccupation with migration may be explained by these numbers: ECSC officials calculated in 1954 that “present labour migration across frontiers within the Community is confined to Italian agricultural labourers employed in Belgian coal mines. Some 40,000 of the 150,000 miners in Belgium are Italians. Most of the Italian workers in the Belgian mines, however, regard their employment as temporary. The other main group of migrants are some 12,000 workers who live near frontiers of the Community nations and now can cross at will for work without encountering obstacles.”30 Though some Italian economists discouraged the idea that “opening the frontiers could free a massive emigration of Italian workers and eliminate unemployment in a flash,” the political interest shown during the ECSC negotiations persisted in Italy.31 The delayed introduction of free movement raised such ire among the Italian delegates that the Common Assembly included the issue in its constitutional proposals for rewriting the ECSC Treaty as a result of the negotiations taking place on the European Economic Community, the future Rome treaty. The question of free movement rights was the sole policy issue in a document otherwise concerned with the relationship between the High Authority and the new institutions that the proposed new treaties would introduce. Dissatisfied with the application of Article 69, the Common Assembly concluded that the member states were acting too slowly to implement free 27. ECSC treaty article 69, cited in Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, p. 1020. 28. In 1953 the Luxembourg Christian Socialist deputy Margue feared “a rash and unreasonable migration which would do more harm than good to both the labour market and the standard of living of the workers.” Meeting of the Common Assembly, 13 May 1953, p. 83 cited in Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation, London 1994, p. 175. 29. Mason, The European Coal and Steel Community: Experiment in Supranationalism, p. 100. 30. European Coal and Steel Community, Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel, Luxembourg 1954. Cited in Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, p. 1017. 31. Confederazione Italiana Sindicati Lavoratori, La politica sociale della Comunità Economica Europea, Rome 1959, pp. 70–71; Willis, Italy Chooses Europe. Cited in Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, p. 1017. 98 Willem MAAS movement rights for coal and steel workers. Therefore, it proposed that the High Authority should take over from the member states the responsibility to establish “common definitions of skilled trades and qualifications,” propose immigration rules, and settle “any matters remaining to be dealt with in order to ensure that social security arrangements do not inhibit labour mobility.”32 The Common Assembly further proposed to insert into the future Rome Treaty a new article giving the High Authority the power to propose measures to address possible disproportionalities between the supply of and demand for labour. The aim of all these proposals was, in the words of Jean Monnet, the “fusion of the European peoples.”33 The next section briefly traces the political pressures for freer movement of workers forward to the present, demonstrating how the free movement of workers ultimately resulted in a shared citizenship as suggested by postwar thinkers and leaders such as those quoted above. From free movement of workers to free movement of citizens Learning the lessons from the difficult and delayed enactment of the ECSC’s free movement provisions, proponents of freer movement ensured that the Treaty of Rome extended the scope of free movement provisions to all workers (except for those employed in the public service), in the process also recasting the earlier employment provisions as individual rights rather than bilateral agreements between states.34 The Treaty of Rome gave workers the right to move freely within Community territory to accept employment, to reside in any member state to work, and to continue residing there after having been employed. Though member states could avoid having to implement mobility rights based on public policy, health, or security concerns, these free movement rights were much more extensive and fundamental than those of previous bilateral agreements – and employing the language of rights ensured they would be much more difficult to infringe than simple agreements which could be amended regularly. Bilateral agreements were important in the early years, but the difficult experience of enacting the ECSC provisions demonstrated the need to simplify free movement decisionmaking in the Treaty of Rome.35 The ECSC treaty had left member states responsible for drafting and implementing free movement provisions, but the Treaty of Rome empowered the Commission – the successor to the High Authority – to make proposals to achieve free movement for workers, rather than relying on member states to do so. 32. Gerhard Kreyssig, Révision du Traité instituant la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, Strasbourg 1958, pp. 24–25. Cited in Maas, The Genesis of European Rights, p. 1018. 33. Entry in Diary of Jean Monnet, 5 August 1956 (“la fusion des peuples européens”) consulted at the archives of the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne, cited in Willem Maas, The Origins, Evolution, and Political Objectives of EU Citizenship, German Law Journal 15 (2014): 176. 34. The first part of this section expands on Maas, Creating European Citizens, pages 17-22. 35. Federico Romero, Emigrazione e integrazione europea 1945-1973, Rome 1991. Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes 99 The new mobility rights were implemented in three stages. The European Parliamentary Assembly – the successor to the Common Assembly36 – advocated immediately introducing free movement, claiming that delay would risk “provoking a dangerous disequilibrium between the economic and the social measures being undertaken by the EEC, which would harm the move to speed up economic recovery.”37 The economic climate was propitious: unemployment in the six member states decreased from 2.8 million to 1.5 million between 1958 and 1964 despite a substantial inflow of non-Community workers, allowing full implementation of free movement for Community workers by 1968, ahead of schedule.38 Despite the introduction of free movement rights, however, only a small portion of all migration—that of the Italian emigrants after the mid-1960s—was actually governed by the new supranational procedures rather than bilateral agreements.39 Indeed, within the Community, “the only important movement beyond the phenomenon of frontier workers was that of Italian labor.”40 High economic growth across most of the Community meant that most member states were relying on increasing numbers of foreign workers, leading to calls for faster implementation of free movement provisions so that Italian workers could move more easily. As a 1960 parliamentary report (the Rubinacci report) noted, since Italy was the only member state with “sufficient reserves of labour to satisfy both its domestic as well as foreign needs…it is in the interest of the Community as a whole to adopt measures that would facilitate the employment of Italian labour in the other Community members.”41 At the same time, the Italian Commissioner Lionello Levi Sandri was confident that the implementation of the Treaty of Rome’s free movement provisions would bring to fruition hopes and endeavours which have for many years past been preparing the ground for the final abandonment of the traditional concept of emigration based on the system of bilateral and multilateral agreements. This system inevitably tended to sacrifice the ideal of non-discrimination against migrant manpower to the varying needs of the receiving countries and would not therefore have been adaptable to the objectives of the Treaty and to the new spirit of European solidarity which is an important element in its structure. For this soli- 36. The European Parliamentary Assembly was renamed European Parliament in 1962. 37. Assemblée parlementaire européenne, “Rapport sur le règlement relatif aux premières mesures pour la réalisation de la libre circulation des travailleurs dans la Communauté” (Rubinacci Report) 1960, p. 9. 38. Cormac O’Grada, The Vocational Training Policy of the EEC and the Free Movement of Skilled Labour, Journal of Common Market Studies 8 (1969), pp. 79–109; European Council, “Directive 68/360 of 15 October 1968 on the Abolition of Restrictions on Movement and Residence within the Community for Workers of Member States and Their Families”; European Council, “Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on Freedom of Movement for Workers within the Community”. Cited in Maas, Creating European Citizens, p. 19. 39. Federico Romero, Migration as an Issue in European Interdependence and Integration: The Case of Italy, in: Alan S. Milward et al. (eds.), The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992, London: 1993, p. 34. 40. Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community, Baltimore 1966, p. 108. 41. European Parliament, “Rapport Sur Le Règlement Relatif Aux Premières Mesures Pour La Réalisation de La Libre Circulation Des Travailleurs Dans La Communauté (Rubinacci Report).”. 100 Willem MAAS darity presupposes the existence of a Community labour market, from which should not be disassociated the series of policy measures laid down in the Treaty for the better use of the Community’s human potential, and in which full and absolute equality of treatment will lead to the rapid replacement of the notion of the “emigrant” by that of the “European worker.”42 After expressing the hope that the concept of emigrant would cede place to the new concept of “European worker” with a positive connotation, Commissioner Levi Sandri continued by arguing that the migrant worker must everywhere feel his European citizenship to be a source of strength and pride. For this, in the last analysis, must and will be the most important political and social result of the liberalization of the labour market: to the extent to which it is attained, we shall all be made to appreciate the effective range of European solidarity and the progress of the idea of unity.43 In other words, Levi Sandri argued that European citizenship and the idea of unity would result from free movement rights for workers. In a precursor to present public opinion – where free movement rights continue to be enormously popular across the European Union44 – free movement rights enjoyed widespread popular support: majorities in all member states favoured being allowed to work wherever they wished in Europe, while allowing workers from other countries to do the same. The highest support was in Italy (78%) while the most opposition was in France (32%). Among workers, support for such rights ranged from a high in Italy (82% in favour, 7% against, 11% did not know) to a low in France (50% in favour, 35% against, 15% did not know). Germany (72%, 9%, 18%), Belgium (69%, 18%, 13%), and the Netherlands (69%, 21%, 10%) were in the middle, while Luxembourg was not surveyed.45 The achievement of free movement for workers caused one observer to assert that Community workers were now no longer “foreigners” nor even “gastarbeiter” (the German term guest workers, which suggests circular or return migration rather than possible permanence), but had rights to work and would lead to a new form of citizenship.46 Another observer had made the same point even before full implementation: free movement was “a field in which the citizens of the Six will progressively 42. Lionello Levi Sandri, The Free Movement of Workers in the Countries of the European Economic Community. Bulletin EC 6/61, 1961, pp. 5–6. 43. Ibid., p. 10. 44. Opinion on free movement is surveyed twice annually in the standard Eurobarometer survey. The most recent survey available as of this writing (published in July 2016) shows that 79% of Europeans support “the free movement of EU citizens who can live, work, study and do business anywhere in the EU” – ranging from a high of 95% in Latvia to a low of 63% in the United Kingdom. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2130. 45. Gallup International, Public Opinion and the European Community, Journal of Common Market Studies 2 (1963), pp. 115, 123. 46. Eberhard Grabitz, Europäisches Bürgerrecht zwischen Marktbürgerschaft und Staatsbürgerschaft, Cologne 1970, p. 7. Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes 101 be treated as if they had not French or Italian, but Community citizenship.”47 Sharing this hope, the Parliament and the Commission were enthusiastic proponents of prompt implementation. Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European Commission, called the achievement of free movement for workers one of “the most spectacular points in the programme which is to lead to the integration of Europe.” He continued: “On the basis of this success alone, the Community could claim the right to call itself the ‘European Economic and Social Community’. The consequences in terms of constitutional policy are incalculable. Do they point to the beginning of a common European ‘citizenship’?”48 Hallstein echoed his Vice-President, Lionello Levi Sandri, the Italian Commissioner who had written in 1968 that free movement of persons “represents something more important and more exacting than the free movement of a factor of production. It represents rather an incipient form—still embryonic and imperfect—of European citizenship.”49 Altiero Spinelli later explained that the achievement of free movement rights within Europe had been possible because there was such high demand for workers “in the other five countries and in northern Italy as soon to make the flow of Italian workers from the south insufficient and to induce the various countries to open their gates to the immigration of workers from the Iberian peninsula, from Greece, Turkey, and the Maghreb.”50 Indeed, following the introduction of free movement rights the level of Italian emigration to the other member states actually fell rather than increasing, and never subsequently regained anything approaching its 1965 level.51 As Italian emigration declined, so did immigration in the other member states: the total volume of Community workers entering each member state had been declining since 1956, except in Italy—where the numbers were negligible but rising— and Germany, whose economy was booming and which replaced France and Belgium as the main destination of Italian emigrants.52 European rights were necessary to fully achieve the goal of opening Europe’s borders not simply to goods, services, and capital but also to people, but by the time the rights were instituted the most urgent need had passed. As I have shown elsewhere, support for extending the scope and expanding the content of the rights of migrant European workers ebbed and flowed over the years, from Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti’s 1972 suggestion that “We could as of now decide to establish a European citizenship, in addition to the citizenship which the inhabitants of our countries now possess,” through the 1973 accession of Den- 47. Uwe W. Kitzinger, The Politics and Economics of European Integration: Britain, Europe, and the United States, vol. Revised (New York: Praeger, 1963), 46. 48. Walter Hallstein, Europe in the Making, London 1972, pp. 173–74. Hallstein was Commission president from 1958 until 1969. 49. Lionello Levi Sandri, “Free Movement of Workers in the European Community, Bulletin of the European Communities 11/68, p. 6. 50. Spinelli, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community, p. 108. 51. Heather Booth, The Migration Process in Britain and West Germany: Two Demographic Studies of Migrant Populations, Aldershot 1992, p. 19. 52. Helen S. Feldstein, A Study of Transaction and Political Integration: Transnational Labour Flow within the European Economic Community, Journal of Common Market Studies 6 (1967) p. 31. 102 Willem MAAS mark, Ireland, and the UK, which tempered enthusiasm, to increasing support following the accession of Greece followed by Portugal and especially Spain.53 The citizenship proposals spearheaded by Altiero Spinelli for the Single European Act were not enacted because the member states could not reach agreement, but the Schengen process was started to abolish physical borders within the European space,54 and the Maastricht Treaty finally enshrined European citizenship in the treaties. Some questioned whether the Maastricht Treaty really “broke new ground”55with the concept of EU citizenship, arguing that Union citizenship was introduced only as a “cynical public relations exercise,” a “symbolic plaything without substantive content”: “citizenship of the Union is not really a citizenship at all, but just some fancy words on a piece of paper” that in any case did not confer any new rights and would remain “an elite preserve.”56 Legal scholars generally agreed with the position that, even if we “take the entire gamut of rights … granted under the treaties to European citizens, we would be struck by the poverty of provisions normally considered as political and associated with citizenship.”57 European policymakers disagree, arguing that a key merit of the “Maastricht Treaty is that, by recognizing the right of Union citizens inter alia to move and reside freely in the territory of another Member State, it pointed to a new objective: to extend, without any discrimination, the right of entry and residence to all categories of nationals of Member States.”58 53. Maas, Creating European Citizens. Especially chapters 2 and 3. 54. The Belgian secretary of state for European affairs affirmed that the ultimate goal of the Schengen agreement was “to abolish completely the physical borders between our countries” and Luxembourg’s minister of foreign affairs said that the agreement marked “a major step forward on the road toward European unity,” directly benefiting the nationals of the signatory states, and “moving them a step closer to what is sometimes referred to as ‘European citizenship’.” Cited in Willem Maas, Freedom of Movement Inside ‘Fortress Europe,’ in: Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter (eds.), Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity, Portland 2005, p. 234. Schengen arguably came about not merely because of economic calculations (though the desire to reap the economic benefits of increased mobility no doubt played a role) but because of the political will to create a Europe with free travel, as exists between US states, or Canadian provinces, or most other withincountry travels. For an argument that Schengen was promoted primarily by French president François Mitterand in concert with German chancellor Helmut Kohl, see Simone Paoli, France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation, chapter 15 of this book. 55. Richard Corbett, The European Parliament’s Role in Closer EU Integration, Houndmills 1998, p. 327. Corbett argues that the Maastricht Treaty “broke new ground with the concept of Union citizenship”. 56. J. H. H. Weiler et al., Certain Rectangular Problems of European Integration. Working Paper WP-24 (European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, 1996), 20; Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira, Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?, in: Allan Rosas and Esko Antola (eds.), A Citizen’s Europe: In Search of a New Order, London 1995, p. 82; Elspeth Guild, The Legal Framework of Citizenship of the European Union, in: David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook (eds.), Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, New York 1996, p. 30; Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder, Hammersmith, London 1994, p. 133. 57. J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge 1999, p. 326. 58. European Commission, Report of the High Level Panel on the Free Movement of Persons (Veil Report), Luxembourg 1998. Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes 103 European citizenship and comparative multilevel citizenship Despite common assertions that European Union citizenship is sui generis and unique, comparative analysis demonstrates that it is but one form of supranational or multilevel citizenship, part of a general phenomenon of divided and overlapping sovereignties.59 As discussed above, European citizenship grants the rights to live and work freely within the territory of the member states but there is continual attention to limits imposed on these rights. Similarly, national constitutions in other democratic systems usually guarantee rights to internal free movement but often also limit these rights: Germany’s Basic Law declares that all Germans shall have the right to move freely throughout the federal territory, but specifies that this right may be restricted if the absence of adequate means of support would result in a particular burden for the community; Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms similarly declares that Canadians have the right to move to and take up residence in any province but specifies that this right is subject to any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services; and India’s constitution states that all citizens have the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India, but also subordinates these rights to “reasonable restrictions.”60 The question then becomes who decides what constitutes a reasonable restriction. Consider the conclusion that “Governments will eliminate…any residency-based policies or practices which constrain access to post-secondary education, training, health and social services and social assistance unless they can be demonstrated to be reasonable” – a statement that sounds as if it were written by the European Commission, admonishing member states to simplify freedom of movement. In fact, it is from the 1999 intergovernmental negotiations on Canada’s social union, which also concluded that “the freedom of movement of Canadians to pursue opportunities anywhere in Canada is an essential element of Canadian citizenship” which, except for the reference to Canadians, similarly sounds like a statement by the European Commission or Court.61 Those intergovernmental agreements developed from a conflict between Canada’s federal government and several of its provinces concerning migration, both internal and external. Only days after the 1995 Quebec referendum (in which Quebec voters narrowly voted not to seek independence), the government of Canada’s western-most province of British Columbia imposed a three-month residency requirement on Canadians entering the province before they were eligible to receive social assistance. Successive British Columbia governments had complained of social dumping; in a poor fiscal climate exacerbated by funding cuts from the federal government, provinces such as Ontario (Canada’s largest province by popu- 59. Willem Maas, Multilevel Citizenship, forthcoming in Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad, Maarten Vink, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2017). 60. Willem Maas, Free Movement and Discrimination: Evidence from Europe, the United States, and Canada, European Journal of Migration and Law 15 (2013), pp. 91–110. 61. Ibid. 104 Willem MAAS lation) and Alberta (bordering on British Columbia and hence relatively easy to move from; particularly as Alberta’s Premier boasted about providing one-way tickets to “welfare bums”), were reducing their social benefits, resulting in an influx of people claiming social assistance in British Columbia. This direct challenge to free movement in Canada was ultimately resolved in 1997 by an agreement between the federal and British Columbia governments in which the federal government agreed to compensate British Columbia for “the special pressures faced by B.C. as a result of internal migration,” as well as providing British Columbia with extra resources to help integrate new immigrants from abroad.62 In the United States, too, questions of citizenship and internal migration remain salient: the 1999 United States Supreme Court decision in Saenz v. Roe, involving a mother receiving social assistance who moved to California but was initially denied continuation of her benefits, reaffirms federal rather than state jurisdiction over citizenship and social rights; but, in dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justice Thomas opined that the “right to travel and the right to state citizenship are distinct, non-reciprocal, and not a component of the other. This case is only about the right to immediately enjoy all the privileges of being a California citizen versus the State’s ability to test the good faith assertion of the right.”63 This relatively recent example —there are others, such as the efforts of cities such as New York and San Francisco and states such as Hawaii to encourage US citizen social welfare recipients to move to other parts of the US—recalls earlier contestation over internal migration. For example, during the Great Depression many US states maintained strict vagrancy laws and required long periods of residence before which US citizens moving from other parts of the country could quality for social assistance; in 1936, Los Angeles Police Chief James Edgar Davis even set up a border patrol (dubbed the “bum blockade”) of over 100 police officers stationed at sixteen checkpoints along the California border, which Davis promised would stem the flow of poor families from Oklahoma and other Dust Bowl states, saving California millions of dollars in welfare payments and criminal prosecutions.64 California’s 1937 “anti-Okie” amendment to its welfare law (targeted at poor American migrants from Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and elsewhere seeking a better life in California) prompted an appeal to the Supreme Court, which ultimately ruled the amendment unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson (who would later become the chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials) wrote that the effect of the California law would be that “those who were stigmatized by a State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds [would] be relegated to an inferior class of citizenship. It would prevent a citizen, because he was poor, from seeking new horizons in other states. It might thus withhold from large segments of our people that mobility which is basic to any guarantee of freedom of opportunity. The result would be a substantial dilution of the 62. Ibid. 63. Saenz v. Roe 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 64. Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act: Blowing Off Steam or Setting Wildfires, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 23 (2009), pp. 293–363. Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes 105 right of national citizenship, a serious impairment of the principles of equality.”65 Despite this ringing endorsement of federal citizenship, emerging scholarship demonstrating that, like debates over immigration and civil rights, conflicts over internal migration raise questions about what rights should attach to national citizenship and “the relationship between local and national citizenship.”66 Meanwhile, the legal enforcement of the right to internal migration in the United States remains tenuous: “After over 200 years of decisions, it is clear that the Court generally supports the right to travel, but cannot agree on why, or under what conditions it can be curtailed.”67 The point of these comparative examples is to show that the supremacy of central/ federal/EU over local/provincial/state/member state citizenship remains uncertain and open to political contestation. The political dynamics surrounding migration, both internal and external, are not sui generis or unique in Europe but can fruitfully be compared with similar dynamics in other multilevel political systems.68 One result of such comparison is to demonstrate that European migration policies in the postwar period can indeed be understood only within the context of European integration. Conclusion: quandaries of citizenship and free movement By gradually substituting individual rights based on a common citizenship for what had previously been bilateral and ad hoc arrangements to manage migration between European states, Europe’s political leaders created a new constitutional category: the European citizen, with rights that member states cannot infringe except under very limited circumstances. Though perhaps continuing to be seen as largely symbolic in some aspects,69 the free movement provisions of European citizenship are enforced by supranational institutions with real authority and at least a modicum of bureaucratic capacity.70 Attempting to further develop the concept of EU citizenship by creating European citizens and encouraging them to use their rights is a role undertaken by the European Commission and the European Parliament, undergirded by the Court of Justice, which has over the years also promoted an expansive reading of European rights. The most notable current formulation, repeated time and again with 65. Edwards v. California 314 U.S. 160 (1941), at 181-3. 66. Elisa M. Alvarez Minoff, The Age of Internal Migration: Destitute Migrants, Liberal Reformers, and the Transformation of American Citizenship, 1930-1972, book proposal on file with author, 2014. 67. Matthew Longo, Right of Way? Defining the Scope of Freedom of Movement within Democratic Societies, in: Willem Maas (ed.), Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People, Leiden 2013, pp. 31–56. 68. Willem Maas, (ed.), Multilevel Citizenship, Philadelphia 2013. 69. Willem Maas, Another Piece of Europe in Your Pocket: The European Health Insurance Card, in: Colin J. Bennett and David Lyon (eds.), Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective, New York 2008. 70. Willem Maas, Equality and the Free Movement of People: Citizenship and Internal Migration, in: Willem Maas (ed.), Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People, Leiden 2013. 106 Willem MAAS the same wording in a series of Court judgments since 2001, is that “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.”71 There is debate about how much of this is rhetoric and how much is not, underlining a potential or actual move away from the common assumption that only unified, territorial nation-states can provide the solidarity and social citizenship necessary for redistributing resources – a debate that touches on EU citizenship as well as nascent efforts at creating similar supranational efforts elsewhere, such as South America.72 Let me suggest that European citizenship still often falls short as a “fundamental status,” given continuing discrimination against European citizens not only by individuals and groups,73 but also by governments, most notably toward Roma and other “undesirable” European citizens.74 Furthermore, despite the rise of European citizenship, immigrants continue to migrate to national polities and become European largely by virtue of incorporation into national states.75 This remains true even though we can identify a Europeanization of citizenship: treaty language and jurisprudence safeguards the ability of member states to exclude individuals despite shared EU citizenship, but member state competence concerning citizenship must be exercised in accordance with the treaties and even member state decisions about naturalization and denaturalization are amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of EU law.76 Balancing the rights of individual European citizens to move, consume services, or find employment or housing across the entire territory of the EU on the one hand, with the desire on the other hand of member state governments to maintain some degree of preferential treatment for their own citizens, will distinguish the politics of EU rights for the foreseeable future.77 71. Grzelczyk, case C-184/99, ECR 2001 I-06193 (20 September 2001). 72. Willem Maas, Varieties of Multilevel Citizenship, in: Willem Maas (ed.), Multilevel Citizenship, Philadelphia 2013, p. 5; Willem Maas, Trade, Regional Integration, and Free Movement of People, in: Joaquín Roy (ed.), A New Atlantic Community: The European Union, the US and Latin America, Miami 2015, pp. 111–21. 73. Michael Johns, Under-Appreciated, Under-Employed and Potentially Unwelcome: The Long-Term Future of Polish Migrants in Ireland and Britain, in: Willem Maas (ed.), Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People, Leiden 2013, pp. 91–113. 74. Jacqueline Gehring, Free Movement for Some: The Treatment of the Roma after the European Union’s Eastern Expansion, in: Willem Maas (ed.), Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People, Leiden 2013, pp. 143–74. 75. Willem Maas, Migrants, States, and EU Citizenship’s Unfulfilled Promise, Citizenship Studies 12 (2008), pp. 583–95. 76. Willem Maas, European Governance of Citizenship and Nationality, Journal of Contemporary European Research 12, no. 1 (2016), pp. 532-551. 77. Maas, Equality and the Free Movement of People: Citizenship and Internal Migration. Free movement and the difference that citizenship makes 107 Europe and travel control in an era of global politics: the case of France in the long 1960s Moshik TEMKIN Abstract This chapter analyzes the movement of people to and in Europe through the historical lens of “travel control”. Focusing on the so-called Long 1960s, it looks at how French authorities controlled, monitored, and sometimes outright stopped the movement and activity of individuals and groups that they deemed politically troublesome and menacing. In the guise of maintaining “public order”, the double goal of French travel control policies was to prevent the “import” of what national authorities considered international or external political issues and causes, and the “export” of what these authorities considered internal political issues into the global public arena. In this way, authorities emphasized French sovereignty in international affairs, prevented or contained global political networking on French soil, and kept the political sphere organized in the way they saw fit, with a separation between the “national” and the “international”. In order to illustrate what travel control means in this historical context, the chapter focuses on three separate yet related examples: the African-American political activist Malcolm X, antiwar activists during the Vietnam War, and African students after decolonization. Introduction In this chapter, I seek to analyze the historical dynamics of international politics and the movement of people to and in Europe through the prism of “travel control”. I will do so by focusing primarily on the Cold War period, notably the so-called Long 1960s. During this period (circa late 1950s-early 1970s) international political activism, for a variety of reasons, reached new heights of intensity. These were years of exponentially growing international travel, not only for the purposes of tourism, migration, or business, but also for the purpose of promoting new kinds of politics. This was a period of political globalization, driven to a large extent by the long-term postwar boom in Western Europe and the Americas (North and South) and led by individuals and groups whose specific goals may have been differently stated and pursued, but whose common agenda was internationalist, in the sense that they conceived of their own national struggles in global terms while simultaneously considering political struggles taking place in other countries as their own. From Malcolm X to the Black Panthers to Vietnam War protesters to African students to Latin American revolu- 109 tionaries to Spanish refugees to Eastern European dissidents, politically motivated individuals and groups sought to forge new connections and establish powerful transnational networks of activism, often with a radical platform. Their main arena for this activity was Europe, particularly Paris and London.1 This sort of internationalism, or internationalist approach to political action, was not new to the Cold War era.2 And of course, large, powerful nations had always had a stake and considerable involvement in the affairs of other countries. But the ability and determination of so many people, often private citizens and especially younger people, to travel the world out of purely political motivation was perhaps unprecedented.3 And yet even in such an era of accelerated internationalism, as numerous political travelers discovered, any international political activity that entailed the physical crossing of national borders was ultimately bound and restricted by the whims and power of sovereign nation-states. National authorities have not always been inclined to enable a certain degree or type of internationalism, and have not hesitated to exercise their ability to control, limit, or even shut down political travel. Such was the case in Europe during the Cold War and in the era of decolonization. The response of national authorities in Western Europe to this accelerated activity in international politics was, in turn, to accelerate their own efforts at controlling, monitoring, and sometimes outright stopping the movement and activity of individuals and groups that they deemed politically troublesome and menacing. It is this contest, or tension, between the remarkable rise of internationalist politics in and around Europe on the one hand and the resistance to that phenomenon on the part of European nation-states on the other that I wish to focus on here. Although the scope of the contest between political travel and travel control extends to the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, Latin America, Africa, and East Asia, for methodological and substantive reasons this chapter focuses to a large extent 1. For the global 1960s see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge, UK 2007; Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente, Cambridge, Mass 2003; Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties, Princeton 2010; Andrew W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner & Wilfred Mausbach (eds), America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives, Cambridge, UK 2003; Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany, Durham 2012; Gerard J. de Groot, The Sixties Unplugged: A Kaleidoscopic History of a Disorderly Decade, Cambridge, Mass. 2008; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, New York 2006, pp. 390-449; Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, Oxford 1998. 2. See Giuliana Chamedes, Internationalism, in: The Routledge Encyclopedia of Modernism, Vincent Pecora (ed.), New York 2014; Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann (eds), The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, Oxford 2001; Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, Baltimore 1997; Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, New York 2012. Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, Philadelphia 2013. 3. On this point see Richard Ivan Jobs, Youth Movements: Travel, Protest, and Europe in 1968, 114:2 (April 2009), pp. 376-404. 110 Moshik TEMKIN on France. In particular, Paris was an important site for political travel in this era, due among other things to its storied history as a hub for international (and internationalist) political activity, the presence of students and activists from around the world, the city’s role as a “gateway” to travel from the West (including from the United States) to so-called Third-World countries and to the Communist world, and especially the effects of decolonization, such as the rapid growth of migration from the former African colonies. At the same time, the French state, especially during the presidencies of Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, possessed centralized and powerful means of surveillance and border controls, via which they adjudicated who could and could not enter the country, and if so, under what conditions, and they also kept close watch on foreigners already inside the country. When the French authorities deemed it necessary, they held and exercised the option of deporting politically problematic travelers and non-French citizens.4 In the guise of maintaining “public order”, the double goal of French travel control policies in this period and thereafter was to prevent the “import” of what national authorities considered international or external political issues and causes, on the one hand, and the “export” of what these authorities considered national or internal political issues into the global public arena, on the other. In this way, French authorities (as did their counterparts in West Germany, Britain, and Italy) emphasized French sovereignty in international affairs, prevented or contained global political networking on French soil, and kept the political sphere organized in the way they saw fit, with a separation between the “national” and the “international”. In addition, authorities were able to promote French geopolitical interests, particularly in post-independence Africa, through the use of travel control. In order to illustrate what travel control means in this historical context, I focus on three separate yet related examples: the African-American political activist Malcolm X, antiwar activists during the Vietnam War, and African students after decolonization. Malcolm X, Global Black Politics, and Refoulement at Orly Malcolm X is a key figure in the history of political travel and global travel control, and his political and religious travels in the last year of his life, before he was assassinated in February 1965, is rich in meaning for scholars of international, American, 4. Border control has been thematized mostly in relation to migration or immigration; see, e.g., Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders, New York 2008. But political travelers and their encounters with border control policies have not seen the same kind of scholarly attention. For studies of passports, see John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State, Cambridge, UK, 1999, and Craig Robertson, The Passport in America: The History of a Document, New York 2010. Foreigners in democracies have been of interest to political theorists. Saskia Sassen has written about the connections between the nationstate, migrations, and different forms of globalization–see, e.g., Guests and Aliens, New York 2000. See also Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner, Princeton 2001. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 111 and European history–and the movement of peoples across borders.5 Indeed, we can learn much about the phenomenon of travel control from one odd, seemingly minor, yet revealing incident involving Malcolm X. It took place on the morning of February 9, 1965, a mere 12 days before his murder in New York City. While traveling abroad to promote his new organization, the Organization of Afro American Unity (OAAU), Malcolm X was refused entry into France upon his arrival in Paris. The French authorities offered only the terse, elusive explanation that Malcolm X–who had already visited France a few months earlier, without incident–represented a threat to the “public order”.6 The incident was widely reported in the press on both sides of the Atlantic and provoked both surprise and outrage. But this was not an isolated event or the extraordinary occurrence that Malcolm X and many others believed it to be. Rather, it was representative of a broader phenomenon. Malcolm X was only one of many figures to encounter border control policies dictated by the need to maintain “public order”. For the French state, in his case as in many others, protecting the “public order” meant not simply the prevention of disturbances, but the maintenance of a controlled political space in which foreign political influence, and the introduction of struggles considered international, were unwelcome. Malcolm X was widely seen–and presented himself–as one of the most militant African American political and social activists of his era. Rejecting the mainstream view of the civil rights movement that the goal of the African American struggle should be for the end of racial segregation in the United States, Malcolm X, a member for several years of the Nation of Islam (NOI), advocated for separation between blacks and whites. And whereas civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. fought for the ideal of equality, as promised (in their view) by the founders of the American republic in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, Malcolm X instead generally spoke in terms of liberation from America, arguing that the country was fundamentally corrupt and built upon the oppression of black people, both during and since the days of slavery. He also rejected Christianity in favor of Islam, claiming that Christianity was a religion imposed on black people by their white slave-owners and that Islam represented a connection with their roots in Africa. All these differences, and especially the militant aspects of his activism and politics (Malcolm X was associated with the term “by any means necessary”, which was a source of fear for many white–and also many black–Americans) made him a target for, among other people, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, who considered black radicals to be the most 5. For Malcolm X’s career in global context, see Moshik Temkin, From Black Revolution to ‘Radical Humanism’: Malcolm X Between Biography and International History, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 3:2 (Summer 2012), pp. 267-288. 6. For a discussion of Malcolm X’s earlier visit to France, see Temkin, Malcolm X in France, 1964-1965: Anti-Imperialism and the Politics of Border Control in the Cold War Era, in Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake (eds), Negotiating Independence: New Directions in the Histories of Decolonization and the Cold War, New York and London 2015, pp. 219-238. 112 Moshik TEMKIN dangerous “subversives” in America. It also led Malcolm X, eventually, to be viewed with great suspicion by foreign governments as well.7 In early 1964, after months and even years of tension with the leader of the NOI, Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X broke with the NOI and embarked on his independent political and religious path–converting to Sunni Islam and founding two new organizations, the Organization of Afro American Unity (OAAU) and Muslim Mosque Inc. (MMI). As the leader of these two new groups, Malcolm X had spent much of the 11 months prior to his refoulement at Orly traveling extensively in Africa and the Middle East–meeting with heads of state and intellectuals, involving himself in anticolonial politics, and publicly practicing his new religion of Sunni Islam. During his travels, Malcolm X explicitly attempted to “internationalize” the black struggle in the United States. Arguing that civil rights was an American internal matter that allowed the United States to maintain control over the fate of African Americans, Malcolm wished to frame the struggle in terms of “human rights”, which for him meant appealing to the global community for help against the American mistreatment of black people. His goal–cut short when he was assassinated–was to bring the issue before the United Nations, using the U.N. Charter and its human rights declaration of 1948 as foundations upon which to denounce the United States on the global stage.8 This sort of politics also meant that Malcolm X took a growing interest in the peoples of Africa and Asia–which he saw as allies in the general struggle against white imperialists – and, specifically, the Africans who had settled in Western Europe (primarily France but also Britain) in the wake of decolonization. At the time of Malcolm X’s attempted visit to France in February 1965 (and already when he visited earlier, in November 1964) the French authorities were becoming increasingly worried about the political activities of African students and migrants in France–in particular, their links to French radical groups, as I will show below. Because Malcolm X’s goal was to link the concerns and grievances of Africans and other “dark-skinned people” (as he put it) in Europe to the plight of African- Americans in the United States, he alarmed the French government–which was determined to keep what it considered its internal affairs from spilling into the larger global public sphere, and to keep what it considered “foreign politics” (of the sort that Malcolm X represented, in their view) out of the French public and political sphere. While in Paris Malcolm X planned to continue working setting up a local branch of the Organization of Afro-American Unity, his political group based in New York. Named after the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the supranational body of African states that was considered radical enough to worry western governments (including the United States and France), Malcolm’s plans were not acceptable to the 7. Clayborn Carson, Malcolm X: The FBI File, New York 1991; Temkin, Malcolm X in France; Ernest R. May & Richard F. Neustadt, Malcolm X, Harvard Kennedy School of Government Case Study, Series C15-81-366. 8. Temkin, From Black Revolution to ‘Radical Humanism’. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 113 French authorities, which were already busy with surveillance on some of his local Paris contacts and hosts.9 In subsequent years, the French authorities would repeatedly apply border control policies to other African American activists they deemed unacceptable for political activity on French soil. One prominent case was that of the black power activist Stokely Carmichael, who was initially prevented from entering France in 1967 (a period of great turbulence in France, as elsewhere in Europe, marked by growing protest over the escalation of the American war in Vietnam). The American authorities saw Carmichael, like Malcolm X before him, as a militant activist whose politics represented a menace to American national interests abroad; but the French had their own reasons–similar to the ones they had had two years earlier, with Malcolm X–to prevent him from entering. (In Carmichael’s case, for complex reasons, de Gaulle himself intervened to allow him to enter the country after he was first rejected at the border).10 Americans in Paris: the Vietnam War and French travel control The years subsequent to Malcolm X’s 1965 refoulement saw a distinctive transformation in the ways the French authorities saw transnational political activists coming from outside the country, especially the U.S. To understand this shift, it is worth juxtaposing two official government reports on Americans in France, one from 1966 and the other from 1970. In June 1966, the French National Police delivered a report to the Minister of the Interior, generically entitled “Les Américains en France”. That report, which was prepared by the Renseignements Generaux (RG), the state’s principal internal intelligence service, was a fairly routine affair; the government regularly commissioned such classified reports on foreign national communities residing in or visiting the country. Seemingly, there was little in it that might worry government officials.11 In one sense, it seemed to confirm a longstanding, commonplace perception of Americans in France. It characterized most of these expatriates as indulging in a lively club life, and their ties to France as primarily sentimental. The most prominent among them were former captains of industry spending their golden years in pleasant sur- 9. Temkin, Malcolm X in France. 10. Peniel Joseph, Stokely: A Life, New York 2014. 11. Directions des Renseignements Généraux (henceforth RG), “Les américains en France”, June 1966, Archives Nationales de France, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (henceforth AN-CAC), 19850087/60. 114 Moshik TEMKIN roundings. With some exceptions, the Americans in France kept their distance from the surrounding society–and that, presumably, was a good thing.12 But the report also contained many ominous signs for the government–in retrospect they stand out even more–that not all was completely tranquil when it came to Americans traveling to Paris. A number of them were active or former CIA agents; others–mentioned in the report by name–were CIA contacts and informers. (Most of them had arrived in France during World War II with the purpose of fighting fascism). Others engaged in moderate political activity, much of which mirrored civil rights activism in the US. On August 21, 1963–one week before the famous “March on Washington” in the U.S.–about 150 Americans, led by what RG called “a few black public figures passing through Paris”, participated in what the police called an “antisegregation demonstration” outside the US embassy (the report, following French intelligence policy, distinguished between white and black people, counting forty of the 150 among the latter). The report noted that the demonstration did not attract the attention of most American expatriates in the city, who, at that time, took little interest in civil rights. Few French citizens participated. Also, by the mid-1960s the American military campaign in Vietnam was beginning to stir more protest, though full-blown antiwar activism was still a way’s off. On November 27, 1965, a few dozen people, most of them American, protested the escalation of the war by the Johnson administration by marching in front of the American embassy. There were also growing protests in 1966. But despite the reference to what RG called “quelques éléments communisants” within the American community, including one group based in the International Quaker Center (informally led by the novelist and actor Henry Pillsbury, heir to the food fortune, who had been living in Paris since the 1950s) by and large the report concluded that the Americans in France did not present major concerns to the government. RG and other intelligence services, the Minister was assured, would continue monitoring the American community, as they did all foreigners in France. But by 1970, it was clear many things had changed, at least from the point of view of the French state. In June that year, Les Renseignements Generaux delivered a report to the government on the Americans in France, titled “Revolutionary Activism Within 12. For the American community in France, see Nancy L. Green, The Other Americans in Paris: Businessmen, Countesses, Wayward Youth, 1880-1941, Chicago 2014; Warren Irving Susman, Pilgrimage to Paris: The Backgrounds of American Expatriation, 1920–1934 (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin 1957. Harvey Levenstein, Seductive Journey: American Tourists in France from Jefferson to the Jazz Age, Chicago 1998. Levenstein, We’ll Always Have Paris: American Tourists in France since 1930, Chicago 2004; Moshik Temkin, The Sacco-Vanzetti Affair: America on Trial, New Haven 2009, Ch. 3 (“The Transatlantic Affair”). Brooke Blower, Becoming Americans in Paris: Transatlantic Politics and Culture between the World Wars, New York 2011; Nancy F. Cott, Revisiting the Transatlantic 1920s: Vincent Sheean vs. Malcolm Cowley, American Historical Review 118:1 (February 2013), pp. 46-75. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 115 the American Colony in France”.13 Students of American, French, and international history will not be surprised at this report’s title. Historians have documented the dramatic transformations in the international politics of those years. In particular, the escalation of the war in Vietnam brought about an increasingly vocal antiwar movement, in the United States and worldwide; and out of the more radical elements of the civil rights movement came the rise of the black power movement, with ambitions and activity not only in the U.S. but also abroad. In France, decolonization and the birth of independent African nations in the former French colonies had created new considerable social, economic, and geopolitical challenges for the government as well as a richer and more combustible context for the growth of radical politics. And this RG report came just two years after the events of Spring-Summer 1968, with uprisings in France, the US, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and other parts of the world.14 The Americans in France not only reflected these political developments, but also, in the eyes of French officials, heavily contributed to them. RG’s main message in 1970 to its overseers in the government was that foreigners, including and especially Americans, had seen fit to get involved in political goingson in France and that their general approach to politics was international–i.e., that what concerned protesters and activists in the US should concern their counterparts in France, and that what happened in France (or anywhere else, for that matter) should matter to American and other foreigners. Two years after the turbulent events of May 1968, RG was convinced that “American agitators” had, along with other foreigners, played a large role in what was, for the governments of de Gaulle and his successor Georges Pompidou, a traumatic event. What particularly troubled the authorities was the way in which, in their perception, internal political issues had become entangled in various unsavory and dangerous ways with external, international politics. (For the Minister of the Interior Raymond Marcellin, for example, the May 1968 uprising was a sinister international plot, perhaps concocted in Havana but certainly instigated by foreigners).15 The inevitable and unwelcome result of this, from the government’s perspective, was that French people were involving themselves in global political causes, and they did not even have to leave France to do so. They were simply incited by foreigners. The government’s response to all this was swift and decisive. Beginning in 1967, but especially after the events of 1968, the French authorities tracked foreigners visiting the country, in particular Americans, with increasing vigor and attention. Many Americans and other foreigners were barred from entering France, or deported if they had already entered France. As the government took its revenge against foreigners 13. RG, Les menées révolutionnaires au sein de la colonie américaine en France, June 1970, AN-CAC, 19850087/64. For background on “expats”, see Green, Expatriation, Expatriates, and Expats: The American Transformation of a Concept, American Historical Review 114:2 (April 2009), pp. 307-328. 14. See fn. 2. 15. Raymond Marcellin, L’ordre public et les groups révolutionnaires, Paris 1969. For background, see the essays in the two-part forum on “The International 1968” hosted by the American Historical Review in 2009. 116 Moshik TEMKIN generally, and American specifically, who were either actively or even seemingly involved in the events of 1968, it made its position on international politics clear: it would not abide by it. We do not have full data on how many Americans (or non-Americans) experienced French travel control in its various forms, but the individual classified files in the French archives range from obscure students and activists to celebrities such as the actress Jane Fonda and the singer Joan Baez, who were allowed to enter France only under certain conditions and then closely tracked while in the country. There are also long lists of people not let into the country, either in advance or upon their arrival at the border. It was sometimes enough that the authorities received word of someone merely planning to travel or considering traveling to France for the travel restriction be produced, even if the person in question did not actually travel and did not have a concrete plan to do so. Still other travelers were let in but expressly warned not to engage in any political activity. Fonda had a film about Vietnam seized at the airport and the French police kept tabs on her as well as on all her Parisian friends. SDECE, the External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service (which can be seen as the French equivalent of the CIA) had a file on her as well, which included an exhaustive list of her friends in Paris that reads like a who’s who of the city’s cinematic bon ton: Jean Genet, Alain Delon, Simone Signoret, Jean-Louis Trintignant, Jean-Luc Godard, Mary Mc- Carthy, and Agnès Varda, among others. One typical report labeled her “an unremitting militant of the extreme left”.16 Baez was asked, upon her arrival, not to talk about the Vietnam War while giving a live performance on French television; when she did anyway (she later stated that she had refused the French request in advance), the TV station cut her off, leaving her fuming and refusing to leave the stage.17 And some American travelers wound up deported, or not let in again, when they failed to heed the warnings about political activity to the government’s satisfaction. The French authorities almost always used the term “disturbing the public order” in justifying, for example, their orders for deportation and/or blocking entry to the country. When I first encountered this term (troubler l’ordre public) at the outset of my research on travel control, and in the context of Malcolm X’s réfoulement in February 1965, I understood it literally–as a fear of demonstrations, or actual violence. Over time I came to see its real meaning, which is figurative–reflecting the way in which state authorities wished to keep the political sphere organized. Many who were barred from the country or deported from it, had dared, as foreigners, to involve themselves explicitly in political goings on in France, and even more alarmingly, had tried to connect politics in France to politics at the global level. These, then, were grave disturbances of the “public order”. 16. AN-CAC 19850087/62 see footnote 11. 17. AN-CAC 19850087/64 see footnote 13. See also “Joan Baez interrompue a ‘Télé-Dimanche’: Elle voulait lire un message politique”, France Soir, June 1 1971; “Joan Baez: Comment j’ai été censurée”, L’Humanité, June 2 1971. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 117 It should be noted that the effort to keep internationalism from crossing its borders was not a one-sided French effort. When looking at specific dossiers in the French archives, very often one comes across notes in English, transmitted from the US embassy–my estimation is that they came from the FBI or CIA attaché–asking their French counterparts to keep an eye or someone or other, or to pass on information on certain people’s activities, or sometimes help in finding someone who had slipped the US authorities and was suspected to be somewhere in Europe. Similarly, in the US National Archives one can find documents, from the American side, on some of the same people who turn up in the French files. In this sense, travel control, which was designed to contain the spread of internationalist politics, or its importation into a tightly wound national public sphere, entailed in itself a distinct form of internationalism. State bureaucracies (in this case, the Americans and the French) cooperated closely in order to make the policy of travel control work most efficiently. In other words, one form of transnationalism worked to curtail, or outright stop, another. Travel control, deportation, and the politics of Françafrique Another representative example of French travel control policies is that of independence-era Africa. The long 1960s were a period of intense political transition for several of the former French colonies, now independent nations, in Sub-Saharan Africa. Independence came with strings attached. Most of these new nations gained independence at the same time that they joined the euphemistically named French Community, founded as part of Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic, in 1958. A cynical way of looking at this political transition would be to say that newly formed African nation-states faced a stark choice: 1) become either an enemy of the French government, or 2) remain a colonial (or neo-colonial) outpost.18 The most common choice, and usually the easiest one for a new country’s ruler, was choice number 2. A number of new states adopted (some scholars would say were forced into) a system that would later earn the derogatory term “Françafrique”. This play on words, loosely and informally translated, could mean either “Africa of France” or “Moneyed France”. These countries included the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, and Mali, among others. They were led after independence by regimes whose top priority, it appeared, was maintaining a good relationship with de Gaulle’s government.19 18. Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present, New York 2002. 19. John Chipman, French Power in Africa, London 1989; Jean-Pierre Dozon, Frères et Sujets: La France et l’Afrique en Perspective, Paris 2003; Stanislas Adotevi, De Gaulle et les Africains, Paris 1990; Frédéric Turpin, De Gaulle: Pompidou et l’Afrique: 1958-1974: Décoloniser et Coopérer, Paris 2010; Claude Wauthier, Quatre Présidents et l’Afrique: de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand, Paris 1995; Dorothy Shipley White, Black Africa and De Gaulle: From the French Empire to Independence, University Park 1979. 118 Moshik TEMKIN French “experts” and advisors long dominated the economies and institutions of these nations, and France was not shy about intervening more directly in their internal affairs when, for example, the friendly regime was in danger. Some (the Ivory Coast and Senegal) were relatively stable and their authoritarian leaders (respectively, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Félix Houphouët-Boigny) needed less outside intervention in maintaining power (though the key to their stability would be the strong connection to France). Other leaders (for instance, Gabon’s Léon M’ba) required more hands-on French support, often of the military variety. What all these countries had in common was an understanding with the French government that the Françafrique system was mutually beneficial and to be protected. One important but overlooked way that this system was manifested was in the domain of travel control. The French government, in tandem with each of the African governments participating in the so-called Françafrique system, controlled and monitored the presence in France of Africans, most of them students, from those specific countries, through intensive surveillance.20 The French government archives reveal the ease and frequency in which the state deported Africans, for various reasons, but the one that most interests me here–and the one that was most frequently invoked for deportation–was political. The French policy of deporting Africans for political purposes was most intensely implemented between 1960 and 1968. Afterward, it underwent a crucial shift. Until 1968 (more or less) the deportations were done primarily at the behest of the African governments themselves, though the French authorities were, for the most part, willingly cooperative. After 1968 (more or less) the deportations of Africans from France continued but were now instigated primarily by the French government and in spite of a new resistance on the part of some of the same African governments that in previous years had been enthusiastic about the policy. This shift had to do with the changing political context of the Françafrique system and relationship, along with changing social conditions inside France, particularly the condition of migrants from the sub-Saharan African countries. At any rate, the politics of surveillance and deportation of Africans from France, in particular students, reflects the evolution of French policies regarding politically active foreigners. And it also tells us a number of things about the history of travel control and its connection to politics and both the French and international levels. In the years following African independence, it was for all intents and purposes illegal for Africans – whether students or migrant workers – to participate in political demonstrations or have any kind of explicit political affiliation or activity. Violations of these restrictions could be grounds for deportation. The initiative for deportations usually came from the home countries, whose French-supported regimes did not like a particular African’s activities. 20. See Gillian Glaes, Policing the Post-Colonial Order: Surveillance and the African Immigrant Community in France, 1960-1979, Historical Reflections 36:2 (Summer 2010), pp. 108-126. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 119 The archives of the French National Police and the French Ministry of the Interior contain documents on individuals from, most prominently, Cameroon, Mali, the Ivory Coast, and Gabon. Here I will highlight a few cases from Gabon and Cameroon, though I could have focused on other countries. (The Ivory Coast had perhaps the most direct link with France in the Françafrique system, and, probably not by accident, it most extensively engaged in the deportation of its own students from France).21 As I have mentioned, the head of state in Gabon was Leon M’ba, the increasingly authoritarian ruler who during these years was propped up by the French state and rescued a number of times from uprisings through direct intervention (and who, by the way, had actually resisted independence from France on behalf of his people for as long as he possibly could). He played the biggest role in determining who actually wound up getting deported from France: people that M’ba himself identified as potential political opponents.22 The first few years of Gabonese independence saw some of the same processes as other former colonies that were part of the so-called French Community. Political opposition and dissent were gradually and then systematically suppressed, generally with the tacit or outright supervisory approval of the French government. In France, this process resulted in increasing agitation on the part of students from African countries participating in the Françafrique system. These students, usually working within the Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique noire en France (FEANF), demanded for their home countries democratic reform and reduced French control. (The more radical African students, many of them inspired by Marxism, often demanded more revolutionary measures).23 As early as 1961, increasing numbers of African students in France participated in demonstrations. When they were arrested (their participation in demonstrations being de facto illegal), the Police Prefecture normally asked the Ministry of the Interior whether they should be deported. The files in the archives include lists of arrested African students, many of whom were protesting not necessarily goings on in 21. Documentary sources for the following cases are from AN-CAC 19960311-6, henceforth AN-CAC. 22. For Gabon and M’ba, see Wilson-André Ndombet, Partis Politiques et Unité Nationale au Gabon, 1957-1989, Paris 2009; Michael C. Reed, Gabon: A Neo-Colonial Enclave of Enduring French Interest, Journal of Modern African Studies 25:2, 1987, pp. 283-320; Florence Bernault, Démocraties Ambiguës en Afrique Centrale: Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, 1940-1965, Paris 1996; Nicolas Metegue N’nah, Le Mouvement Nationale de la Révolution Gabonaise (1964-1971), CAMES B 3:2 (2001), pp. 148-155. 23. For the FEANF, see, e.g., Charles Diané, Les grands heures de la F.E.A.N.F, Paris 1990; Amady Aly Dieng, Les grands combats de la fédération des étudiants d’Afrique noire: de Bandung aux indépendances, 1955-1960, Paris 2009; Fabienne Guimont, Les étudiants africains en France: 1950-1965, Paris 1998; Sékou Traore, La Fédération des étudiants d’Afrique noire en France: FEANF, Paris 1985. For radicalization, see Abdoulaye Gueye, The Colony Strikes Back: African Protest Movements in Postcolonial France, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 26:2 (2006), pp. 225-242. 120 Moshik TEMKIN Africa but also, for example, against nuclear proliferation. Even in these cases, the police would recommend deportation.24 February 1961 was a particularly tense time, set off by the murder of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo – a crime widely considered at the time (and to a large degree since confirmed by historians) to be the responsibility of Western countries, including Belgium and the United States, with the alleged complicity of the United Nations.25 After one protest outside the Belgian consulate in Lille, the local préfet signed expulsion notices for four Africans (three Cameroonians and one Malian). This préfet seems to have been offended on behalf of the neighboring Belgians: “En raison de la situation particulière de mon département limitrophe de la Belgique…il est impossible de tolérer une telle attitude d’hostilité des étudiants africains envers une nation alliée et amie qu’ils doivent respecter au même titre que le pays qui les accueille.”26 French officials who signed or accepted expulsion orders such as this one did so in the understanding that this was a mutual desire of the French and the African governments of the countries from which the students came. The background to the arrests of Africans in France, the surveillance of their activities, and their deportations was rooted in the Françafrique system. Gabon provides some of the clearest examples of the connections between travel control and Françafrique. A December 1961 letter from the Ministry of the Interior to the Directeur Général de la Sûreté Nationale shows that M’ba had made two demands of his French counterparts –demands that turned out to be typical. The first was a request to deport three Gabonese students whose activity in France (calling for more democracy in Gabon) he did not approve of. The second was for the dissolution of the Paris-based Gabonese Student Association, which M’ba considered (correctly) a hotbed of activism against his regime. The association’s journal, L’Étudiant du Gabon, had declared a war of sorts on M’ba and their issue of November 1961 carried impassioned writing against his undemocratic regime, the support he had from France, and his threats against activist Gabonese students in France and their families in Gabon. The French authorities accepted M’ba’s first demand but not his second; but for M’ba the goal was accomplished, since getting rid of the politically troublesome students rendered the Association more neutered anyway.27 This deportation process reveals the lack of clarity concerning citizenship in the immediate aftermath of decolonization and independence. There was, for example, much confusion among government and legal officials over whether the Gabonese students in question were to be treated as French or Gabonese. It turned out that, from a legal standpoint, although the students were Gabonese their association was French, and so could not easily be banned or disbanded. Even after taking the reigns of power 24. AN-CAC 19960311-6, see footnote 21. 25. See, e.g., Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, London 2001; Emmanuel Gerard & Bruce Kuklick, Death in the Congo, Cambridge, Mass., 2015. 26. AN-CAC 19960311-6 see footnote 21. 27. Letter dated Dec. 15 1961 from the Ministry of the Interior to the head to the Directeur Général de la Sûreté Nationale, AN-CAC 19960311-6. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 121 from France, Gabon itself still could not clearly determine who was a citizen and who was not.28 Additionally, within the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there were some heckles raised concerning the deportations. According to a 1945 French law, deportees had the right to choose their own destination country (assuming that country allowed them entry), whereas M’ba (like others) demanded that they be sent to Gabon – where, presumably, they would be punished and silenced. In cases like these, M’ba usually got his way. In a handwritten letter, the Minister explained to one of his underlings that an accord between Gabon and France allowed for direct deportation without any input from the deportee. According to him, the French state had done the same, discreetly, with Cameroon and its troublesome students in France.29 The desire to deport politically problematic students was not a one-sided African effort; the French government was on the same page. In this regard, the files on Cameroonian students are suggestive. Already in 1960, the Cameroonian President Ahmadou Ahidjo complained to the French government that France had become the site of activism on the part of Cameroonian students affiliated with the Union des Populations du Cameroun, his longtime radical rivals for power, who wished to bring an end to his rule (and who had suffered French harassment prior to independence). The director of the Renseignements Generaux regularly sent letters to his higher-ups in the Ministry of the Interior, detailing the surveillance of the Cameroonian activists, and recommending deportation of Cameroonians who were in defiance of their home regimes. Defining these students as “dangereux”, he explained that “en raison des activités anti-françaises manifestées par ces ressortissants africains depuis leur arrivé en France, j’estime que leur présence sur notre sol n’est pas souhaitable et je vous propose leur expulsion.”30 The Minister concurred. Despite prefacing his response with the caveat that in some cases the authorization of the Prime Minister would be needed, he made clear that was happy to assist in the deportation of persons “dont la présence en France constituerait un danger pour l’ordre public et la securité du pays.”31 This confusion between citizen and non-citizen would continue to grow, and over time there seemed to be more rather than less doubt about these Africans’ legal status. Some of them had arrived in France before their country’s independence and were still residing in France after it. So were they now, post-independence, colonial sub- 28. Dec. 14 correspondence between the Ministry and the Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale, AN-CAC 19960311-6. 29. Ibid. 30. Feb. 7 1961 letter from the Ministry to the Director of RG, AN-CAC. For background on Ahidjo and Cameroon, see Richard A. Joseph, Gaullist Africa: Cameroon Under Ahmadu Ahidjo, Enugu, 1978; Victor Julius Ngoh, History of Cameroon Since 1800, Limbe 1996; Nicodemus Awasom, Politics and Constitution Making in Francophone Cameroon, 1959-1960, Africa Today 49:4 (2002), pp. 3-30. 31. “Expulsion d’extrémistes africains”, AN-CAC 19960311-6. 122 Moshik TEMKIN jects or foreign nationals? Were they de facto citizens of their new country or not? And if so, what was their status in France? One bureaucrat in the Ministry of the Interior–Jean Gouazé, Directeur de la réglementation – grew troubled by these questions, and he became a bit of a thorn in the side of his colleagues. In 1963, after three years of steady deportations of dubious nature, Gouazé began sending pesky letters to his superiors as well as to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He pointed out the odd situation that some of these African students were in. Because they were from countries that had previously been under French colonial administration, they entered France not as foreigners, but as French subjects, needing to present only a passport or even simply a National Identity Card. But as soon as the state deemed these Africans to be inappropriately politically active, they were suddenly considered foreigners and thus, he explained, “ils peuvent faire l’objet de mesures d’expulsion du territoire français lorsque leur comportement constitue une menace pour l’ordre public.”32 For Gouazé, this raised thorny legal and bureaucratic issues. Foreigners coming into France were (and still are) made to get the Carte de Séjour, which came with certain rights and protections. For example: during the 1960s, as I have shown above, many Americans in France who ran afoul of the government or the National Police because of their political activities experienced a more complicated process, and in their cases, deportations were trickier to execute. Usually, foreigners were first warned to desist from political activity, and if matters continued or (from the government’s perspective) got worse, they were allowed to sit before a sort of ad-hoc committee at their city’s prefecture. Shouldn’t this same process be applied to the Africans as well, asked Gouazé? After all, as he pointed out, “il peut paraître choquant que les originaires des États d’Afrique Noire qui, par ailleurs, jouissent en France d’un regime priviligié en raisons des liens particuliers qui les unissent à la France, soient privés lorsqu’il s’agit de les expulser du territoire des garanties accordées par la loi aux étrangers soumis au droit commun.”33 Gouazé’s point captures the essence of the system. It was easy for these Africans to enter the country, and it was even easier for the French government to send them back. For several months Gouazé did not receive an answer to his queries, but he kept at it. Eventually, the Minister of the Interior realized that something was wrong, at least procedurally, and he sent a letter to all the préfets, letting them know that Africans who were candidates for deportation should undergo the same process as other foreigners whose political bent the state did not like.34 This new wrinkle, however, was primarily a formality, a nervous tick on the part of a bureaucracy whose policies continued uninterrupted. The deportations went on 32. Jean Gouazé to the Ministry of foreign affairs, Direction des Affaires africaines. (14 March 1963), AN-CAC 19960311-6. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 123 and appeals were rarely accepted. Unlucky deportees were given 15 days to prepare. If they could not afford their trip back home, the Ministry would pay. On the scheduled date, deportees would be accompanied by RG inspectors, led directly to the airport and their plane and placed forcibly on board. At their destination (in the Cameroonian case, Douala) they would be met by local authorities. Their fates once back home are not reported in the French sources but we may surmise that they were not good. African resistance to travel control Since the colonial era, Francophone African students went to France to train for their roles as members of the élite.35 Most of the African rulers whose regimes the deported students were protesting against had themselves gone through this trajectory.36 But the younger African students in France after the wave of independence in Africa had the misfortune of coming of age at a time when their home countries were already locked into authoritarian rule that depended on French support. These students – like their predecessors in the pre-independence era – tended to be enrolled in science, engineering, medicine, and law; and those who had the most demonstrable influence were the most likely to be targeted for deportation. One internal Ministry of the Interior memo, regarding an expulsed Gabonese student from Lille, noted: “Son attitude politique et l’influence qu’il exerce dans les milieux des étudiants africains, relativement calmes jusqu’à présent, le désignent comme un meneur qu’il y a lieu de sanctionner à titre d’exemple.”37 Not surprisingly, the deportation system created anger, resistance, and pushback, and over the next several years the system fundamentally changed. A handful of deported African students fought back and were assisted by French activists and legal associations. In this regard, one case stands out. In 1961, a Cameroonian student named Yondo Epanya went to court to appeal his deportation. He was helped by the Commission de sauvegarde des droits et libertés individuels, whose President, Maurice Patin, a member of the Conseil Constitutionnel, wrote to the Minister of the Interior, demanding to know by what legal statute Epanya, along with another student from Cameroon, were ordered deported. After some years of legal wrangling, in June 1965 the Paris Administrative Tribunal decided in Epanya’s favor and ordered the deportation order canceled, ruling that the government had been unable to prove its claim that he represented a genuine menace to the public order.38 35. Dominique Chathuant, L’émergence d’une élite politique noire dans la France du premier 20e siècle, Revue d’histoire 101:1 (2009), pp. 133-147; Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars, Chicago 2005. 36. For two of the best-known examples, from Senegal and the Ivory Coast, respectively, see Janet G. Vaillant, Black, French, and African: A Life of Leopold Senghor, Cambridge, Mass., 1990; Frederic Grah Mel, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, l’épreuve du pouvoir, Paris 2010. 37. AN-CAC 19960311-6, Feb. 23 1961. 38. File on “Sr. Epanya Yondo contre le Ministre de l’intérieur”, AN-CAC 19960311-6, ibid. 124 Moshik TEMKIN The problems that Gauzé had recognized with the deportations system turned out to form the background for Ebanya’s legal victory. The government, forced because of the legal process to find formal justifications for these arbitrary and politicallymotivated expulsions, trudged out the 1945 law according to which the deportation of a ressortissant from France needed to be preceded by the right to have a hearing before a special committee at the Prefecture, “sauf en cas d’une expulsion motivé par un caractère ‘d’urgence absolue’. The government claimed that Ebanya fell into this latter category. The court found that Ebanya neither had the opportunity to make his case at the Prefecture, nor did he represent an “urgent” menace to state security. Ebanya’s victory, however, was principally a moral one. By 1965 he had already been back in Cameroon for four years and neither his own government nor the French were about to allow him to return to France. And the French understandings with the undemocratic African regimes friendly to it continued, even after the procedure changed. But the court decision helped bring about some changes, and in the later part of the 1960s this phase of the Françafrique system went into decline. Deportations of Africans from France back to the participating Françafrique countries continued throughout the 1960s and well beyond, but their nature and background shifted in key ways. Some of these African governments, which had originally requested or demanded the deportations, began to protest against the policy. By 1967 or 1968, these regimes (with some variation) felt less threatened by student radicals. They no longer saw these deportations as political necessities, but rather as driven by the French government’s desire to rid itself of unwanted immigrants. In addition to African students, the French also increased the deportations of African migrants (workers, not students) for reasons that were not directly politically but rather linked to crime and social order. This new phase of the deportations policy marks two links to future developments. The first is the ongoing issue of France’s treatment of immigrants, particularly African. As the African population in France grew, and as these Africans remained in France for longer periods, and as they transitioned in the 1960s to a semi-permanent Foyer system, the top priority of the government became controlling their social influence in the country as much as preventing unwanted kinds of political activity.39 Secondly, 1968 – for obvious reasons – marks the moment in which the French state worried even more intensely about radical internationalist politics, in which Africa and its diaspora played central roles (as we see in the case of Malcolm X, for instance). Also, authorities in France begin to grapple with the often-harsh realities and social implications of the immigrant presence in the country. And as they increasingly deported African migrants who got in trouble with the law (as opposed to those who got in trouble for political behavior), the African governments begin to push back. In 1967, numerous French nationals in Africa found themselves being 39. For background, see Jean-Philippe Dedieu, La parole immigrée : les migrants africains dans l'espace public en France, 1960-1995, Paris 2012; Manuel Ruben N’Dongo, Regard sur l’immigration africaine en Europe: les dictatures africaines, causes et effets de l’émigration, Paris 1999. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 125 handed deportation orders back to France, a new development that seemed to be an African form of payback. It so alarmed authorities in Paris that the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to his ambassadors in all fourteen Francophone African countries directing them to lodge official complaints over the deportations of French nationals for reasons that the minister considered weak. But it also led the Foreign Ministry to complain to the Ministry of the Interior that their harassment and deportation of Africans in high numbers was what was driving the African governments to react in this way.40 As a result of this, the French government suggested that the African countries set up the same kind of process of ad hoc hearings for these French nationals that the French had started for African deportees in 1963. The Africans then began requesting that French nationals obtain a Carte de Séjour upon their arrival in Africa, and in turn, the French Ministry of the Interior recommended that France do the same for African immigrants. It also led the Ministry to recommend the implementation of the now famous (or infamous) medical examination for Africans (and eventually, all foreigners) wishing to stay in France.41 In the words of Jacques Aubert, the Secrétaire général pour la police at the Ministry, this medical exam “s’avère de plus indispensable en raison de la situation sanitaire particulièrement préoccupante de ces populations qui est de nature à avoir des répercussions sérieuses sur l’ensemble de la communauté française”.42 This was no longer the logic of keeping political activists at bay; it was part of a racially motivated effort to control an immigrant population with which the state would go on to have a long, complex, and often unpleasant relationship. And the basic contours of this relationship, from the standpoint of government procedures, lasted long after the 1960s. Conclusion The French authorities, here as in other instances in which they enacted political travel control policies, invoked the importance of maintaining the “public order” (l’ordre public), meaning the way that the authorities wished to keep their political sphere organized. The French government employed the various mechanisms of travel control in order to accomplish domestic and foreign political goals. In the case of the African students, the early phase of politically motivated deportations in the Françafrique period was motivated and determined by the mutual needs of the French government and the African regimes with which it was friendly. The later phase of deportations, driven principally by the French official desire to control immigration from Africa, no longer suited these regimes, which then began to resist the part of the 40. 27 Apr. 1967, letter of the Minister of the Interior to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Mesures d’expulsion à l’encontre de nationaux français dans les pays africains d’expression française”, AN- CAC 19960311-6. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 126 Moshik TEMKIN policy that did not concern radical threats to their rule. But as these African leaders learned, travel control policies, once unleashed, can rarely be contained to the types of people that one wanted to target originally, and not to others. The result of their changing attitude, and of the compromises and arrangements that followed from their reaction, was a more formalized and contested immigration policy that in many ways still exists in France and is the subject of much heated scholarship and debate.43 In this sense, travel control also points to the ultimate the limits of internationalism, and of global mobility, and can serve as an important lesson for international historians. Simply put, when it came to political travel, as in all international travel and movement of peoples, the nation-state still held the cards. It could reject a passport, deny a visa, refuse entry, deport a foreigner, keep tabs on people and groups, and keep citizens separate from non-citizens. As we see in the current day, this applies doubly to refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers when the nature of their arrival to Europe is deemed political in nature. Finally, this is not just a story about the long 1960s, the Cold War, or France in the postcolonial era. This history also has an epilogue, one that can tell us quite a bit about the connections and contradictions between global politics and European national interests. It may help us to understand the organization and dynamics of European politics to this day, in issues ranging from immigration to border control policies to the relationship with international institutions and other parts of the world to economic cooperation to intelligence sharing. In particular, it has implications for understanding the ongoing and profound tension in European affairs between questions of national sovereignty and transnational political authority. This history also has implications for understanding the fate of radical politics of different stripes. We tend to view radical groups and movements of the long 1960s as successful in the short term but failures in the long run. Radical ideas and internationalism failed, we are largely told, because they failed to capture the broad public imagination beyond a particular momentary Zeitgeist. Young people matured and wised up and radical politics were discredited in a rapidly changing world. But this commonplace interpretation is too simplistic and selective. The sorts of people and movements that feature in my research “failed” because, more than anything else, they were made to fail. Powerful nation states worked, separately and in collaboration with each other, to prevent their success. Here we can make a very brief comparison between international politics of the sort I have described with what constitutes international politics today. Normatively, national authorities have made sure that their official representatives, via such institutions as the United Nations, conduct global affairs. National governments have been willing to “compromise” their national sovereignty through supra-national bodies like the European Union, where they wield 43. Didieu, ibid. For background on immigration, see the various works by Gérard Noiriel – e.g., État, nation, et immigration: vers une histoire du pouvoir, Paris, 2001; see also the important works of Patrick Weil – e.g., La France et ses étrangers: l’aventure d’une politique de l’immigration, 1938-1991, Paris 1991. Europe and travel control in an era of global politics 127 the most influence and over which they have the final say. But the compromise ends there. In a sense, this history is about the triumph of the nation-state over alternative individuals and groups working transnationally in the global public sphere. The days of a Malcolm X – a person who represented his own ideas and organization on the global stage and did such things as deal directly with heads of state, all while forging connections between the politics of the US, Europe, and Africa in a unified conceptual framework – are gone. The European nation-state, thanks to its use of travel control, has a lot to do with that. 128 Moshik TEMKIN The movement of Poles to Great Britain during the Cold War. Breaking the Iron Curtain Jacek TEBINKA Abstract The aim of the paper is to explore how the experience of migration of Poles to Britain after the war and during the Cold War influenced the migration of Polish workers to the UK after Polish accession to the EU. The beginning of the mass settlement of Poles in the British islands was a proposal by Winston S. Churchill in February 1945 to settle in Great Britain and the empire, those members of the Polish armed forces who do not want to go back to the communist Poland. Opportunities of legal travel to the West for Poles living in communist Poland emerged in 1956. The existence of the Polish community in the British Isles made Great Britain an important direction of trips for Poles to work illegally, but most of Polish workers returned to Communist Poland. In the 1980s, the trend changed and most of the departing Poles wished to remain permanently in the West, because of the lack of perspectives in Poland. However, British authorities hampered influx of Poles and relatively few of them settled in British Isles obtaining political asylum or the right of residence. Nevertheless tradition of illegal labor from the 1980s, network connections and knowledge facilitated the influx of Poles after 1st of May 2004. The decisive factor for the attractiveness of Great Britain, however, was the abolition of restrictions within the EU to work. United Kingdom together with Ireland, Sweden did it immediately after accession to the European Union by Poland. Poles and Britain after the war: a peculiar relation The influx of Poles (both political and economic refugees) to the British Isles dates back at least to the nineteenth century. In 1931, there were about 40,000 Polish-born residents in the United Kingdom. A new stage in the arrival of Poles started during the Second World War when, after the fall of France in June 1940, more than 20,000 Polish soldiers and civilians were evacuated to the British Isles and London became the seat of the Polish Government in exile. The government created a Polish army which was to fight German Nazis together with its British ally.1 1. Peter D. Stachura, The Poles in Scotland, 1940–50, in: Peter D. Stachura (ed.), The Poles in Britain 1940–2000. From Betrayal to Assimilation, London 2005, pp. 39-41. 129 Ever since the Teheran Conference (November 28 to December 1 1943), London and Washington had reconciled themselves to Stalin's territorial demands against Poland. The loss of the Eastern Borderlands, gained by the Soviet Union, would deprive many of the Polish soldiers who fought alongside their Western allies of their homeland. Although Churchill supported the frontier on the Curzon Line (the demarcation line proposed by the British on July 11 1920), he also took seriously the commitment made to Polish Armed Forces in the West (Polskie Siły Zbrojne na Zachodzie). He did not intend to force them to return under Soviet occupation, although many of his colleagues from the War Cabinet viewed the idea of accepting the Poles in the British Empire after the end of war unfavourably. Churchill realised that, no matter how things were going, Polish soldiers had to be given the opportunity to settle within the British Empire. He spoke about it for the first time at the meeting of the War Cabinet on December 30 1944, stressing the need to consider granting refuge to soldiers of Polish Armed Forces in the West who would not want to go back to postwar Poland.2 The number of potential refugees increased as Communist rule was strengthened in those areas which the Soviet Union recognised as part of Poland, west of the Curzon Line. The Yalta agreement (February 11 1945) not only deprived Polish soldiers from the Eastern Borderlands of their family homes, but opened up the real prospect of strengthening Soviet rule in Poland, which was then under the control of a Communist Provisional Government. The idea of initiating a mass settlement of Poles in the British Isles was introduced by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in his speech to the House of Commons on February 27 1945, after the Yalta Conference. He proposed to settle those members of the Polish armed forces who did not want to go back to Communist Poland in Britain and the Empire3. Churchill met strong resistance in Whitehall. At the War Cabinet meeting on March 28 1945, Home Secretary Herbert Morrison (Labour Party) pointed out that the operation included a large number of people (perhaps as many as 150,000 soldiers), some of whom did not fight at the front. There were also many Polish Jews among them and, according to Morrison, increasing their numbers in Great Britain might lead to riots, due to strong anti-Semitism in many parts of the country. However, it was eventually agreed that if the Polish soldiers recognised an agreement with the Soviet Union on the future of their country as unsatisfactory, they would be able to obtain British citizenship. This principle was not to be applied to other nationalities fighting alongside the British, because they were not threatened by the imposition of puppet regimes by the Soviet Union. The relations of the Czechoslovak governmentin-exile with Moscow were then seen by the British as an example of good cooperation and there was no danger that soldiers of the Czechoslovakian army, much 2. The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), CAB 65/48, WM (44)176th, Conclusions, 30 XII 1944; PREM 3/352/6, Aubrey Herbert to C. Churchill, Churchill to A. Eden 28 XII 1944. 3. Parliamentary Debates. Houses of Commons Official Report (further: Hansard), vol. 408, no. 39, c. 1284, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com (last accessed on 27 September 2014). 130 Jacek TEBINKA smaller than the Polish one, would not be able to return to their country after the end of the war.4 Churchill and the Conservative Party lost the elections in June 1945. However, the winning Labour Party intended to honour British promises to Polish soldiers who did not want to go back to Communist Poland or as residents of the Eastern borderlands; they had lost their homeland. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin informed the House of Commons on May 22 1946 about the government’s plan to transform the Polish Armed Forces into the Polish Resettlement Corps. Its members would be formed from the soldiers who refused to return to Poland before becoming civilians. The Polish Resettlement Act of 1947 paved the way for more than 110,000 Polish soldiers, some with families, to stay in Britain. Such a large group of foreigners, the majority of them Catholic, caused social and political problems in many parts of the United Kingdom. British society was very reluctant to accept migrants. In June 1946, a Gallup poll of public opinion showed that 30 per cent said yes, but 56 per cent answered no when asked if they would agree with a government decision to allow Polish soldiers to remain in Britain.5 Prime Minister David Cameron was not the first British politician who warned against the influx of Polish workers, as he did in December 2013. In May 1946, Winston Churchill, as leader of the Opposition, came out in the House of Commons against bringing the Second Polish Corps from Italy to Scotland, because there had already been too many Poles there during the war. Churchill preferred a more even distribution of Polish soldiers throughout Great Britain.6 Despite the country's economic problems, in the second half of the 1940s, the Labour government managed to settle over 100,000 Poles in the British Isles. Many Poles chose to emigrate to the United States and the British dominions. However, in 1951, about 152,000 UK residents were born in Poland, 70% of them male and 8.0 per cent of all foreign-born residents were Poles.7 Conversely, the flow of new migrants from Communist Poland to Great Britain between 1947 and 1956 was stopped by strict border control and passport restrictions introduced by the Communist government. It is not surprising that the most determined tried to escape from Poland even to distant Britain. For example, Antoni Klimowicz, a dock worker from Gdynia, attempted to escape from Poland in July 4. TNA, PREM 3/352/6, WM (45)37th Conclusions, 28 III 1945. 5. Hansard, series 5, vol. 423, cc. 299-302; Inge Weber-Newth, Johannes-Dieter Steinert, German Migrants in Post-war Britain. An Enemy Embrace, London 2006, pp.24, 126-128. 6. Steven Swinford/Peter Dominiczak, Stop unrestricted immigration from poor EU countries, David Cameron suggests, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10517128/Stop-unrestricted-immigration-from-poor-EU-countries-David-Cameron-suggests.html (last accessed on 25 September 2016); Hansard, series 5, vol. 423, pp. 302-306; on demobilization of Polish Forces see also Mieczysław Nurek, Gorycz zwycięstwa. Los Polskich Sił Zbrojnych na Zachodzie po II wojnie światowej 1945-1949, Gdańsk 2009. 7. The British statistics in this paper is based on information accessed from: www.statistics.gov.uk; 2011 Census and article: Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011, Office for the National Statistics, 2013. The movement of Poles to Great Britain during the Cold War. Breaking the Iron Curtain 131 1954 as a stowaway on board the ship 'Jarosław Dąbrowski'. The exhausted fugitive was discovered by workers at the port of London on July 28. His disembarkation was prevented by the captain of the vessel, who imprisoned him on board. British immigration officials did not intend to grant Klimowicz the right to stay in the United Kingdom. Yet upon the court’s decision, based on the Habeas Corpus Act, British police had boarded the ship and freed Klimowicz. Soon after, on September 23 1954, seven fishermen from the Polish trawler ''Puszczyk' overpowered the skipper and directed the ship to the port of Whitby. All the men were allowed to stay in the United Kingdom. Churchill as Prime Minister personally intervened, so they were not sent to Poland.8 Migrations in post-Stalinist Poland Opportunities for legal travel to the West for Poles living in Communist Poland emerged in 1956, thanks to a power shift in Warsaw and the political thaw in Poland. The key moment of the process of de-Stalinisation in October 1956 was the rise to power of Władysław Gomulka as First Secretary of the Communist Party and liberalisation of the system: suspension of collectivisation, greater freedom in culture, and dialogue between the state and the Catholic Church. The liberalisation of the passport policy was also the result of social pressure on the authorities and the weakness of the Communist government. In 1955, only 121 Poles travelled privately to Great Britain; in 1956 this had already become 1601, and in 1957 the number rose to 9676. Some Polish prisoners returned the same year from snowy, frosty Siberia and received passports in Communist Poland, being able to visit their families in London, who had been residing there since the 1940s. Poland was the first, and for decades the only, Soviet Bloc country which extensively opened its borders for people travelling to Western Europe.9 From 1956 onwards, several thousand Poles came temporarily to the United Kingdom each year, mainly the families of those who lived there. Employment was illegal for Polish citizens except on an au pair basis or as medical interns. The British authorities, for economic reasons, generally discouraged newcomers from Communist Poland to ask for political asylum and settle down in Great Britain permanently. The number of British residents born in Poland totalled 120,000 in 1961, but only 13 per cent of Polish-born residents in 1961 remained resident in 2011. The existence of a Polish community made Great Britain an important destination for those travelling in search of work as of October 1956, but temporary workers often returned to Communist Poland after a few months. In 1964, almost 9,000 Polish citizens visited Britain, and in summer 1965 the visa section of the British Embassy 8. TNA, PREM 11/728, Warsaw to FO 25 IX 1954, G. Lloyd George to Churchill 21 X 1954; minute by Churchill 22 X 1954. 9. Dariusz Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949-1989, Warszawa 2010, pp. 478-479. 132 Jacek TEBINKA in Warsaw was unable to processs so many visa applications, although liberal procedures were used. For reasons of security and fear of communist spying, the British government did not intend to abolish visas for Poles. The visa system helped the Security Service (MI5) to find potential agents for Polish intelligence (Służba Bezpieczeństwa – SB), as well as those who could be recruited as British spies. Wishing to facilitate official and private travel to the United Kingdom for the highest functionaries of the Communist state and their children, in 1965 the Foreign Office agreed with MI5 to a new procedure for issuing visas to them, based on previously prepared lists of persons sent from London to the British Embassy in Warsaw.10 An important factor which facilitated the movement of people was the British- Polish Convention on Healthcare, signed on July 21 1967. This agreement ensured health services within the public health system for the citizens of one country travelling or residing in the other. In both states, hospital staff simply checked the nationality of patients against a list of countries with mutual agreements for health coverage. It was a unique agreement, apart from one with Sweden, which Poland concluded with the countries of Western Europe before 1989. It was still in force when Poland joined the European Union in 2004.11 In 1968, during the anti-Semitic campaign induced by the nationalist faction in the Communist Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza), the attitude of the Foreign Office was unfavourable to supporting the migration of Polish Jews to the British Isles. The British had their own problems with migrations from their own dominions and colonies. An internal note from the FCO dated October 1968 and entitled 'The Jewish exodus' stated: “Undoubtedly H.M.G. has to bear in mind that there are many thousands of Commonwealth citizens, many with U.K. passports, who do not have the right of entry into the U.K. and to open the doors to Jewish refugees and other such as Czechs would certainly raise a storm of protest in Commonwealth countries such as Kenya, India and Pakistan”.12 It is difficult to ascertain the number of Polish Jews who obtained British visas in 1968. British estimates, made on the basis of surnames, show that they were granted to 107 people of Jewish descent in April 1968, 105 in May, and 115 in June. Only on January 24 1969, following an intervention by the Jewish lobby in Great Britain, did Home Secretary James Callaghan decide to simplify the procedure of granting entry visas to Jews from Poland, especially those who had some family or else a guaranteed place of work in the United Kingdom.13 10. Jacek Tebinka, Policy of Great Britain towards Poland between 1956 and 1970, Acta Poloniae Historica, 93 (2006), p. 167. 11. Dziennik Ustaw 1970 nr 1 poz. 1, Konwencja między Rządem Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej a Rządem Zjednoczonego Królestwa Wielkiej Brytanii i Północnej Irlandii o świadczeniach zdrowotnych, sporządzona w Warszawie dnia 21 lipca 1967 r., http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet? id=WDU19700010001 (last accessed on 29 September 2014). 12. TNA, FCO 28/304, minute by Ivor J. Rawlinson, 1 X 1968. On British policy towards Poland see Jacek Tebinka, Nadzieje i rozczarowania. Polityka Wielkiej Brytanii wobec Polski 1956-1970, Warszawa 2005, p. 336. 13. TNA, FCO 28/732, J. Callaghan to B. Janner 24 I 1969. The movement of Poles to Great Britain during the Cold War. Breaking the Iron Curtain 133 In Poland, after new Communist leader Edward Gierek came to power in December 1970, Communist authorities further facilitated access to passports. In 1970, applications for permission to go to the West were made by 250,000 people, and fewer than half of them were approved. In 1980, applications were submitted by more than 800,000 people, of whom nearly 90% received permission.14 Although Britain was in the midst of a economic crisis in the 1970s, it was still an attractive place for Poles to travel to and work, mostly illegally. The entry of Great Britain to the EEC on January 1 1973 did not change the travel regulations for people from Communist Poland. From the migration viewpoint, the 1971 Immigration Act (which became law in 1973) – legislation which consolidated the policies set out in the two previous Acts – was more important. The Act was based on the view that there was no longer any demand for large-scale labour migration to Great Britain. In addition, in the 1970s the Communist regime of Gierek was more liberal in letting Poles travel to the United Kingdom (partly due to the Helsinki Final Act 1975) than the British authorities were. The number of Poles travelling to Britain reached a peak in 1980 – almost 26,000 people. International work camps, organised by private companies for young people, were allowed to bypass the need for work permits. They were popular among young people, including students from Poland. The available jobs were mainly in agriculture and horticulture (fruit-picking, e.g., apples).15 Nevertheless, the British were unwilling to accept the movement of workers from Communist Poland. Even with the possibility of legal employment of Poles in the shipyard at Gibraltar in 1973, the authorities in London objected, considering Polish workers to represent a security risk as potential spies close to an important military installation. In the second half of the 1970s, more British workers were employed in Poland (mainly as construction builders in foreign licenced factories) than Poles in the United Kingdom. During the Cold War, Britain did not want to abolish visas, treating the visa system as a barrier not only against potential spies but also against workers trying to find illegal jobs in Britain.16 No more special relations? The Solidarity Revolution of 1980-1981 and then martial law, introduced on December 13 1981, resulted in the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Poles from their country, although only a few were able to stay in the United Kingdom. Margaret 14. Dariusz Stola, Międzynarodowa mobilność zarobkowa w PRL, in: Ewa. Jaźwińska-Motylska/Marek Okólski (eds.), Ludzie na huśtawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu, Warszawa 2001, pp. 85-87. 15. Ian R.G.Spencer, British Immigration Policy since 1939. The Making of Multi-racial Britain, London 2003, pp. 143-144; Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski…, pp. 283, 369. 16. On problem of employment of Polish workers on building sites in Gibraltar in 1973 see TNA, FCO 86/182. 134 Jacek TEBINKA Thatcher’s government usually gave Poles the right to stay temporarily, but did not want to grant them political asylum. The British also refused to accept Polish workers with families, who were in Austria, to which country Poles could travel without visas before December 13 1981. After the lifting of martial law on July 22 1983, more and more visitors from Poland again undertook work illegally in the British Isles. Obtaining an official invitation to Great Britain from family or friends (quite expensive from the Polish point of view), a Polish passport (obtaining which depended on the decision of officials from the Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa) acting as clerks in the Passport Office), not to mention the visa queues to the British consulate in Warsaw, was time-consuming – it took several months. Nevertheless, even Poland under the rule of Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski was more liberal when came to the question of issuing passports than the other European Communist countries (the exception was Yugoslavia, which had not signed the Warsaw Pact). This was not only the result of the traditionally more liberal policy of Polish leadership since 1956. General Jaruzelski was under the influence of Fidel Castro and, like him, wanted to get rid of political opponents by sending them permanently abroad.17 The main wave of the 'Solidarity' emigration bypassed the United Kingdom mainly because of the policy of Margaret Thatcher’s government. She officially sympathised with the resistence of the Poles against the Communist regime. But, as Conservative Prime Minister, she was reluctant to accept Solidarity activists discharged from prisons in Poland. She thought that, when the question of accepting immigrants arose, her country had a responsibility first and foremost to East Africa and members of the Commonwealth. She secretly gave orders to proceed 'slowly' with Polish political refugees who intended to settle in the United Kingdom. In fact, the visa section of the British embassy in Warsaw took great care in examining the documentation of Poles applying for tourist visas, to ascertain whether they intended to stay permanently in Britain.18 In 1971, Great Britain had 104,000 Polish-born people, but in 1981, this figure fell to 88,000. This shows that the Poles from Communist Poland (PRL) were a small group which was unable to strengthen the Polish émigré community. From the mid-1980s onwards, there was a slow increase in the numbers of those who arrived temporarily in the United Kingdom. In 1985, there were 17,218 Polish citizens and, on the eve of the fall of the Communist regime in Poland in 1988, there were 26,530. This was less than at the height of the Solidarity revolution when in 1981 (until December 13) the United Kingdom was visited by almost 40,000 Poles. Many of them took illegal jobs, mainly in the construction industry, gardening and agriculture.19 After the fall of Communism in 1989, Great Britain and Poland abolished the visa system on 1 July 1992. But there was still a barrier against potential Polish workers, because the final decision on the possibility of crossing the border was taken by 17. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski…, pp. 315-319. 18. TNA, FCO 28/5041, A.J. Cambridge to A. Furnes 10 III 1982; PREM 19/874, minute 2 VIII 1982; L. Brittan to F. Pym 4 VIII 1982. 19. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski…, pp. 478-479. The movement of Poles to Great Britain during the Cold War. Breaking the Iron Curtain 135 British immigration officers at the point of entry to the United Kingdom. It was also difficult to find legitimate work, despite the association of Poland with the European Union. However, thanks to the existing Polish community in Great Britain, it was easier to find cheap accommodation and jobs. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, the settlement of immigration controls according to the approach set out by the British authorities in the 1971 Act was gradually changing. The most important factors affecting the immigration situation were the growing demand for migrating workers – because of the growth of the service sector deregulated by the Conservative government labour markets and increased opportunities for migration from Eastern European countries. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe opened the doors for growing migration from former Soviet Bloc countries to Western Europe.20 The 2001 Census recorded only 60,711 Polish-born people resident in the United Kingdom, compared with 73,951 in 1991. But it was to change dramatically in the following decade. The largest increase, during 2001-2011, was for the Polish-born population, with an almost ten-fold increase, from 58,000 to 579,000. This was the result of Poland joining the European Union in May 2004, together with several other Central and Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This represented a second wave of Polish immigration following earlier arrivals after the Second World War. Other countries in the European Union, with the exception of Sweden and the Republic of Ireland, continued to place restrictions on migration from new member states of the EU.21 Today in the UK, Polish is the second language after English and is spoken by 546,000 people (the next language is Punjabi, with 273,000 speakers). The so-called 'welfare tourism' is largely a myth. The average immigrant from Europe pays the Treasury 34 percent more than the state spends on that person – e.g., on welfare, medical care and education. In contrast, 'native Britons' are 'in the red' – and pay 11 per cent less cash in the form of income tax than they draw from it.22 In addition, it is only recently that Central and Eastern Europe no longer drive migrations. From March 2013 to March 2014, the British Isles were the aim of 69,000 people from the eight countries of the 'new EU' (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) – roughly the same as a year earlier. We must then add 28,000 Romanians and Bulgarians. During this time, 112,000 20. Dušan Drbohlav, Patterns of iImmigration in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. A Comparative Perspective, in: Marek Okólski (eds.), European Immigrations Trends, Structures and Policy Implications, Amsterdam 2012, pp. 183-188. 21. Paweł Kaczmarczyk, Brains on the Move? Recent Migration of the Highly Skilled from Poland and its Consequences, A Continent Moving West?, in: Richard Black, Godfried Engbersen, Marek Okólski and Cristina Panţîru (eds.), EU Enlargement and Labour Migration from Central and Eastern Europe, Amsterdam 2010, pp. 166-170. 22. Christian Dustmann/Tommaso Frattini, The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK, Discussion Paper Series, CDP No 22/13, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Department of Economics, University College, p. 27, http://www.cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/ CDP_22_13.pdf, (last accessed on 4 October 2014). 136 Jacek TEBINKA (previous year: 92,000)23 people arrived from the countries of the 'old EU', mainly from crisis-ridden Italy and Spain. Conclusions The existence of the Polish community in the British Isles since the Second World War made the United Kingdom an important destination for Poles seeking to work illegally, but most of these workers were returning to Communist Poland. In the 1980s, the trend changed and most departing Poles wished to remain permanently in the West, because of the lack of prospects in Poland. However, the Conservative Cabinet, reluctant to accept mass immigration, hampered the influx of Poles and relatively few of them settled in the British Isles. Deterred by the cost of settling them, the British felt that they had no legal or political commitment towards the Poles, compared with the countries of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, a tradition of illegal work and a network of connections facilitated the migration of Poles to Great Britain until May 1 2004. The decisive factor of the attractiveness of Great Britain, however, was the abolition of restrictions to work within the EU. The United Kingdom, together with Ireland and Sweden, did this immediately after Poland had acceded to the European Union. Two other important factors were the relatively liberal labour market in Great Britain and the existence of potential jobs. In addition, English is taught in Polish schools, and a significant proportion of young Poles know it at a basic level. There was a definite decline in the importance of the United States as a target of short-time migration after Poland joined the European Union. Only three per cent of the 579,000 Polish-born residents in 2011 had arrived before 1961; therefore, most of the post-war Polish-born arrivals had either died or left Great Britain by the time of the new migration flows which followed Poland’s accession to the EU. 23. Maciej Czarnecki, Brytyjski minister obrony mówi o imigranckim bagnie, Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 X 2014. The movement of Poles to Great Britain during the Cold War. Breaking the Iron Curtain 137 Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ Abstract Central and Eastern European exile, which started with the outbreak of the Second Wold War, was a phenomenon affecting millions of people. In reaction to the oppression undergone by occupied territories during the war and of the Communist regimes after it, many Central European citizens decided to stay abroad or to escape to the West. Some of them continued to be politically engaged. For them, campaigning for European integration was an opportunity to remind others about the existence of Central and Eastern Europe and to facilitate the pursuit of other political objectives, such as the struggle against Communism. Their political activity was limited, due to the political reality of their host countries, the international environment, and internal conflicts. But they had enough time to observe the changes, discuss them, and write books and papers on European integration and its meaning for the future of Central Europe. Consequently, they may be said to have been prepared for the new challenges emerging after 1989. Introduction The process mentioned in the above title seems, at first sight, to be totally unimportant from the viewpoint of the history of European integration. The economic dimension of the process, discussed and worked out by the Western European countries, also became the basis for political cooperation. Until the 1990s, there was no place within this project for countries representing Eastern parts of Europe. In his analysis of The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Christian Lequesne described some differences between the so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’ countries within the European Community. He stated that the latter 'mostly located in Central Europe and in the Balkans, did not share with the other member states of the EU the same historical experience of the West in the period 1950–1989'.1 This preliminary observation opens a broad perspective for comparative study of the ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ experiences of integration, because it is, to say the least, misleading. More 1. Christian Lequesne, Old Versus New, in: The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Erik Jones, Anand Menon, and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), Oxford 2013, accessed 08 May 2013, www.oxfordhandbooks.com. 139 precisely, it refers to the history of Eastern European states subjugated by Communist regimes, but that is by no means the situation in which many Central Europeans found themselves, because it does not characterise their attitude towards European integration during what came to be known as the 'Cold War'. Western European countries participated in a spectacular and unique process of economic integration during the Cold War. Step by step, they strengthened political ties among themselves, and the emergence of a new institutional order added a new potential to every national state. Eastern and Central Europe (or, according to Oskar Halecki’s concept, East-Central Europe)2 had been falling behind this process for many years; there was only one exception – the émigrés. The history of East-Central European nations was a two-tier phenomenon. The first tier was represented by the official politics of Communist governments, controlled in many ways by the Soviet authorities in Moscow. The countries of the socalled Eastern Bloc took part in a very specific integration experiment within the frame of Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), a project which was based on principles differing from those in the West. The second tier of Central and Eastern European Cold War history was that of exiles. Central and Eastern European nations endured not only the Communist system, a centralised model of integration and politics controlled by the Soviet Union: they differed from their Western counterparts because of the huge communities expelled and thus exiled from their original countries during and after the Second World War. Many Polish and Central European émigrés decided to stay in the West, and some of them played active parts in the European debate on integration. They included such figures as Józef Retinger (co-organiser of the Hague Congress) and his secretary, Jan Pomian. Polish intellectuals in exile carefully observed and sometimes participated in the progress of integration and reported its details to Polish readers. It is not of course possible to exhaust this topic within one article, but this general perspective should accompany our reflection on Central European exiles and their attitude or role in European integration. Mass movements during and after the Second World War Even today, we have no a definitive picture of the movement of peoples in Eastern and Central Europe during and after the Second World War. Demographers estimate that, between 1939 and 1946, 30 million people3 moved or were forced to move, first by the war itself and then by the repressive policies implemented after it, especially in the Soviet sphere of influence. Migrations after war extended throughout Europe. 2. Oskar Halecki, The Limits and Divisions of European History, London-New York, 1950. 3. Krystyna Slany, Między przymusem a wyborem: Kontynentalne i zamorskie emigracje z krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (1939-1989) [Between compulsion and choice: continental and overseas emigrations from East-Central Europe (1939-1989)], Kraków1995, p. 90. 140 Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ In autumn 1945, the number of refugees had reached 14 million.4 Camps for Displaced Persons, mainly located in Germany, where millions originating from Central and Eastern European nations and countries (3.5 million were from pre-war Poland), were the main problem. Their relocation and/or repatriation was first undertaken by UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). Between 1947 and 1951, the IRO (International Refugee Organisation) relocated more than 1 million persons, transferring them to overseas countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia. But refugees also reached other European territories, such as Belgium or the Scandinavian countries. Individual national diasporas also had their groups of émigrés. The former military of the Polish Armed Forces who fought in the battlefields of Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, the so-called European Volunteer Workers, and other smaller groups formed a wave of 260,000 persons. The majority of former Polish soldiers (about 114,200) were transferred to Great Britain and sent to special Polish Resettlement Corps. Counting Poles and their families who stayed in the United Kingdom during the war, the number of Poles reached about 162,000 in the 1950s.5 The political situation in Central and Eastern European countries had triggered new, politically motivated waves of migration. Another Polish group which stayed in Western countries were labour migrants who, temporarily reaching France or Belgium before the outbreak of the war and who had intended to return to Poland, were prevented from doing so by post-war events, the subdivision of Europe and the establishment of Communist regimes. The abovementioned estimates by Krystyna Slany in the 1990s are still the most reliable data which allow us to imagine the scale of the problem.6 Today, Janusz Wróbel estimates that, at the end of the war in Western Europe there were 2,450,000 Poles or persons of Polish origin, and 1,200,000 at the beginning of the 1950s.7 We do not have similar data for other diasporas.8 The very numbers of such exiled populations can help us understand the effects of the war in several ways. It was, of course, a demographic challenge for Western European countries, mainly of which had suffered great destruction, although there 4. Slany, note 3, p. 90. 5. Keith Sword, Norman Davies and Jan Ciechanowski, The formation of the Polish community in Great Britain 1939-1950, London 1989, pp. 445-447. 6. Other works cannot help to improve this picture. Cf. Dariusz Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949–1989 [No-exit country? Migrations from Poland 1949-1989] (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2010). A presentation of main waves, directions and size of migrations in the 20th century may be found in Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1985. 7. Janusz Wróbel, Geografia, demografia i profil społeczny polskich skupisk emigracyjnych w okresie powojennym, in: Polska emigracja polityczna 1939-1990, Sławomir Łukasiewicz (ed.), Warszawa; Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2016, p. 28. Additional detailed information about the creation and evolution of Polish diaspora can be found in another great book such as Anna D. Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann, The Exile Mission. The Polish political diaspora and Polish Americans, 1939-1956, Athens, Ohio 2004. 8. Very promising is the project directed by Anna Mazurkiewicz, still in progress. The assumptions of this project are mentioned in her article 'Political Emigration from East Central Europe During the Cold War', Polish American Studies, vol. LXXII, No. 2 (Autumn 2015): pp. 65-82. Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process 141 were essential differences between, for example, post-war Germany and the United Kingdom. Anthony Messina even stated that although this huge wave of exiles posed a danger for Western states as well as for their own security and sovereignty, neither the United Kingdom nor Germany lost control over immigration.9 It is worthy of note that some émigrés even used the accusation of the so-called 'betrayal of the West' (during conferences in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam) and demanded 'justified' shelter in the West. An excellent analysis of that very 'game' played by émigrés and host countries is given in a work by Yossi Shain, entitled symbolically The Frontier of Loyalty.10 Almost all Central European emigrations created political structures, with their own institutions, parties, social organisations, parishes, etc., and they also became an important element in the Cold War arsenal.11 The existence of this politically motivated community, together with expanding political thinking naturally matched the Cold War politics of the Western world. This was the case of the engagement of Central Europeans in integration debates and initiatives. The bases for these activities had been laid down by wartime governments in exile, and involved almost all Central European governments and committees.12 After the escape of the Polish government to the West in September 1939, continuation and legitimacy were the main pillars of new politics in exile. The Czechoslovak Committee, created by the prominent Czech politician and pre-war president Edvard Beneš, was also looking for good arguments to justify his position in exile. Under the umbrella of British and American authorities, many governments-in-exile as well as their agencies existed in London and New York, pursuing politics on several levels – as internal émigrés and towards the host countries – as well as certain types of diplomacy. They differed because of the extent of their exile, the type of state they represented (monarchy, republic, etc.) – various effects which they could impose on international politics. It was necessary to maintain legitimised structures and to prepare for post-war order. The latter question required debate regarding the possible shape of the Europe of the future. One well-grounded plan by the Czechoslovak- Polish Confederation and discussed by Polish Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski and Beneš, was prepared by their experts in the shadow of wartime cabinets.13 Al- 9. See Anthony W. Messina, The logics and politics of post-WWII migration to Western Europe, New York 2007. 10. Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exile in the Age of the Nation State, Middletown, Conn. 1989; latest edition Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2005). 11. Cf. Sławomir Łukasiewicz (ed.), Tajny oręż, czy ofiary zimnej wojny? Emigracje z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej [Secret weapon or the victims of the Cold War? Émigrés from Central and Eastern Europe], Lublin 2010. 12. More details for the Polish case can be found in Sławomir Łukasiewicz, Polish Political System in Exile, 1945-1990, Polish American Studies, vol. LXXII, No. 2 (Autumn 2015), pp. 13-31; idem, Central European émigré Party and the European integration, in: European Parties and the European Integration Process, 1945-1992, pp. 379-392, Lucia Bonfreschi, Giovanni Orsina and Antonio Varsori (eds.), Bruxelles 2015. 13. Piotr Wandycz, Czechoslovak Polish Confederation and the Great Powers 1940-1943, Bloomington, 1956. Tadeusz Kisielewski, Federacja środkowoeuropejska. Pertraktacje polsko-czechosłowackie 1939–1943 [Central European federation: Polish Czechoslovak negotiations 1939-1943], Warsaw 1991. 142 Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ though the whole project ceased to exist after a Soviet protest in 1943, it revealed the possible role of pre-war governmental structures in such kinds of integration projects. Similar plans, supervised by the British authorities, were discussed at the turn of 1942/1943 by two other monarchies in exile – those of Yugoslavia and Greece.14 After the Second World War, the situation was more complex. Under Soviet control, new Communist regimes were being established in East-Central European countries. New state systems, according to the Soviet model, were based on the omnipresence of Communist ideology, political interference in all spheres of life, and state repression against independent initiatives. In such an atmosphere, some politicians, involved in federalist projects during the war, made decisions with upset and reversed those plans. The case of Czechoslovakia is striking. The Czech leader, Edvard Beneš, deciding to support Soviet policy, returned to Czechoslovakia and became its new president. His death in 1948 was followed by the assassination of another Czech politician, Jan Masaryk (the son of the famous Czech politician of the interwar period, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk), former minister for foreign affairs and an advocate of wartime plans for a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation. These deaths were followed by a new wave of emigration of Czech politicians to the West, known as the post-February emigration. They mainly reached such countries as the United States, looking for political support in the West, although some of them also settled in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom, France or Germany, convinced that the only effective activity against Communist regimes could be conducted by Western European democracies. However, it should be emphasised that political projects, like possible cooperation and a future Polish-Czechoslovak confederation, were taken up by individual prominent politicians. Wartime plans became an inspiration for new talks between the former partners in the 1950s. Hubert Ripka,15 Czechoslovak wartime minister for Foreign Affairs, reproposed a possible common federation.16 The answer was given by 14. Nicolas Mirkovich, The Yugoslav Treaty and the Balkans, New Europe (January 1942), pp. 67–68. Cf. Elżbieta Znamierowska-Rakk, Projekty unifikacji państw bałkańskich w latach II wojny światowej, Dzieje Najnowsze, vol. 33, No. 3 (2003), pp. 85–96. 15. Hubert Ripka (1895-1958), Czechoslovak politician and diplomat. Before the Second World War, he was a political adviser to President Edvard Beneš. After the so-called Münich Agreement, he moved to France and, after the collapse of the latter, to the United Kingdom. There he became Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile. After 1945, he decided to return to Czechoslovakia together with Beneš, and worked as Minister for Foreign Trade and at the National Assembly. After the February coup d’etat, he escaped from Czechoslovakia and spent the rest of his life in exile in the United Kingdom, France and the USA. He was also a Member of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. 16. Huber Ripka, A Federation of Central Europe, New York 1953. Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process 143 Edward Raczyński,17 a Polish aristocrat, diplomat and politician who was involved in the confederation's negotiations during the war and who participated in many federalist initiatives after the war.18 In the USA, a Czechoslovak-Polish Research Committee was created to explore the idea of a future Polish-Czechoslovak federation.19 Wartime experiences and post-war emigration played a very similar role in the case of other Central European countries. For Romanians, Grigore Gafencu,20 former minister of Foreign Affairs, was a symbolic personality in the field of European integration; for Hungarians, this figure was Pál (Paul) Auer.21 Auer, Gafencu, Ripka and Raczyński, mentioned above, were even known as 'The Four' – the most influential Central European diplomats. They represented their 'states in exile' and took active parts in international politics. They cooperated in many fields, looking for the best solutions for their Central European countries. European integration: activities and ideas We can distinguish at least five dimensions of the involvement of Central European émigrés in European integration projects. First, there was a kind of continuation and extension of wartime plans, examples being the talks between Poles and Czechs represented by Raczyński and Ripka, mentioned above. Then came the Congress of 17. Edward Raczyński (1891-1993), Polish diplomat and politician. His diplomatic career he started in 1919, working in Copenhagen, London and Geneva. Just before the outbreak of the World War II he was a Polish ambassador in the United Kingdom and he kept this post till July 1945. During the war he combined this with the post of the minister of foreign affairs (1941-1943). This period was described in memories W sojuszniczym Londynie [In allied London] (London: Instytut Polski i Muzeum im. Gen. Sikorskiego, 1974). After the war he participated in many political projects of Polish exile, trying to merge divided political centres. 1979-1986 Polish President in exile. 18. Edward Raczyński, Europeizm czy regionalism [Europeanism or regionalism], Kultura, No. 5/79, (1954), pp. 98–108. 19. Cf. Sławomir Łukasiewicz, Third Europe. Polish Federalist Thought in the United States – 1940-1970s, Budapest [2016] in print. 20. Grigore Gafencu (1892-1957), Romanian politician and diplomat. Starting his career in the interwar period, in 1938 he became minister of Foreign Affairs. His task for the next few years was to keep Romania neutral after the outbreak of the Second World War. He described his efforts in memoirs: Préliminaires de la guerre à l'Est (Fribourg 1944) and Derniers jours de l'Europe (Fribourg 1946). In 1940, he became Romanian ambassador to Moscow and, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in June 1941, he escaped to the West. He spent the rest of the war in Geneva, Switzerland. After the war, he moved to Paris, and in 1947 to the United States, where he was connected with New York University. It was probably there that he met Roman Michałowski, a Polish diplomat, later secretary of the so-called Tuesday Panel, chaired by Gafencu (Cf. Łukasiewicz, Trzecia Europa…, p. 110). They participated in the origins of the Free Europe Committee. He was also a member of the Romanian National Committee. 21. Pál Auer (1885-1978), Hungarian jurist, politician and diplomat. Before the Second World War, he was a legal adviser to the French legation in Budapest. During the war, he was connected with the Hungarian Smallholders Party. In 1945, he became the President of the National Assembly and the representative of the Commission of Foreign Affairs. After 1946, he was the Hungarian ambassador in Paris, but defected from the post in June 1947. He spent the rest of his life in Paris. 144 Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ Europe in The Hague and the creation of the European Movement, where an important role was played by Józef Retinger, formerly secretary to General Sikorski. Retinger’s actions were made possible thanks to his extensive contacts with presidents, prime ministers, ministers and other influential decision-makers in post-war Europe, which all enhanced the main consequences of his political talks in wartime London, where many such exiled leaders met. Another type of activity was participation in new integration initiatives, especially federalist ones. For example, many Central European federalist organisations were affiliated to the Union Européenne des Fédéralistes.22 Among such organisations, there were the Mouvement fédéraliste hongrois, headed by Paul Auer, the Mouvement fédéraliste bulgare, the Union Tchecoslovaque des Fédéralistes européennes under the leadership of Vlad Brolik, the Union des Fédéralistes Lituaniens with Eduardas Turauskas, and Les Fédéralistes Estoniens. There were three Yugoslav groups: the Yugoslavian Union of Federalists (L’Union Yougoslave des Fédéralistes), later divided into Mouvement Federaliste Croate with Juraj Krnjevic and Mouvement fédéraliste slovène with Fran Erjavec. The Polish group also split into two organisations, unable to find common ground: Związek Polskich Federalistów (Union des Fédéralistes Polonais or Union of Polish Federalists), founded in London in 1949, and Unia Polskich Federalistów (Union Polonaise des Fédéralistes, or Polish Union of Federalists), with headquarters in Paris. The first was based on politicians and political thinkers affiliated to the Polish Political Council (Rada Polityczna), which included Raczyński. The second organisation was based mainly on cooperation between the Polish Peasant Party (led by Stanisław Mikołajczyk) and the Polish Labour Party, gathering Christian Democrats around Karol Popiel.23 Of course, such a rift weakened Polish representation. Unfortunately, we have no good in-depth studies of their structure and activities. It is even not possible to estimate their numbers or political strength. The only certain thing is that they were mostly élite initiatives established by individuals. There were also other organisations affiliated to the UEF, like the Centre international des syndycats libres en exil, under the leadership of M. Mikhelson. These brief examples show how rich the Central European federal movement might have been after the war. Yet political weakness, splits, quarrels, the unfavourable international situation, and schisms which affected the UEF in the mid-1950s disturbed these kinds of activities. Federalist organisations from Central Europe only survived in the case of individual actions, like that of Jerzy Jankowski, described below. The third level of analysis describes the American policy of the Cold War. European integration, including the specific plans of the Central European federation, were used as the instrument of American policy, in the form of psychological warfare. Central European émigrés were gathered under the umbrella of the National Com- 22. Sergio Pistone, The Union of European Federalists: From the Foundation to the Decision on Direct Election of the European Parliament (1946-1974), Milan, 2008. 23. For more information on the Polish and Central European part in the European federalist movement, cf. Sławomir Łukasiewicz, Poles in the European Federal Movement after WWII, Warsaw, 2005. Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process 145 mittee for Free Europe, later the Free Europe Committee. We can distinguish many fields of shared NCFE/FEC and émigré activities in support of European integration: Radio Free Europe broadcasting on the Unity of Europe (e.g., in the 1950s, these were special series of programmes by Wiktor Sukiennicki on European Unity); analyses for the Mid-European Studies Center in New York; financial support for international federations such as Christian democrats, peasants' parties, socialist parties, etc., and support for transnational organisations like the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN). This support weakened as early as the late 1950s, although many initiatives survived until the 1990s (an example is the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe – a kind of Central European CDU). It should be noted that some political networks were more independent, although it is very difficult to estimate the scale of American support. For example, the cooperation of the Christian democrats was mainly based on the European organisation Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI – New International Teams), but the creation and existence of the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe, although connected with this European project, was only possible thanks to NCFE financing.24 The last area involves individual initiatives. Many Central European politicians and intellectuals were personally involved in European projects. We can illustrate such examples in the history of Polish exiles. Thanks to cooperation with the Christian Democratic Youth movement in the 1950s, Jan Kułakowski25 became a leader of Christian democratic trade unions in Europe, and later a leader of the World Confederation of Labour. In the 1950s, thanks to his part in Christian Democratic organisations, he met many Western European leaders such as Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, and was also building personal networks at the same time. It was a great inspiration for individual careers and stronger engagement in European affairs. Young Polish Christian democrats belonged to the Conseil de la Jeunesse Libre de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale and Jeunesses Européennes Fédéralistes. Another example is Jerzy Rencki,26 also deeply involved in the Union Fédéraliste Interuni- 24. An interesting comparative study of Central European Christian Democracy and social democracy may be found in Peter Van Kemseke, Towards an Era of Development: The globalization of socialism and Christian democracy, 1945-1965, Leuven 2006. More information about CDUCE in Sławomir Łukasiewicz, Third Europe, subchapter titled Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (in print). 25. Jan Kułakowski (1930-2011), Polish lawyer, politician, diplomat and unionist. He took part in the Warsaw Rising and emigrated to Belgium after the war. Graduating from the Catholic University of Leuven, in the 1950s he became a member of the General Secretariat of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, and later secretary and general secretary. In 1976-1989, he was general secretary of the World Confederation of Labour. In the 1990s he represented Poland to European Communities and the European Union, as ambassador. In the late 1990s, he was designated as the main negotiator of Poland’s accession to the European Union. 26. Jerzy Rencki, b. 1923. Like Kułakowski he took part in the Warsaw Uprising. Imprisoned by the Germans, after the war he emigrated to the United Kingdom. Graduating from the London School of Economics, in the 1950s he was engaged in the European Assembly of Political Youth in the late 1950s. He started his career in the institutions of the European Communities, as a high official responsible for agricultural and regional policies. His papers are deposited in the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence. 146 Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ versitaire (UFI) as its Secretary-General for Administration. In February 1950, the UFI became a regular member of the UEF and took part in the meetings of the Central Committee of the UEF on its behalf. Then, in the 1950s, Rencki was also engaged in the Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse. From 1958 until the 1970s, he was variously employed in European institutions, e.g., as a director in the European Communities Commission, an expert in the Common Agricultural Policy and in Regional Policy. Another example is Jerzy Łukaszewski, professor of the College d’Europe in Bruges from 1960 and its head from 1972 until 1989. These three personages were very active in the 1990s in Poland, during the transition period from the Communist system to a democratic state and free economy. Jan Kułakowski became the ambassador of Poland to the European Communities, and was later the main negotiator in the pre-accession negotiation with the European Union. From 1993 onwards, Jerzy Rencki helped Polish governments prepare the reform of their administration. Jerzy Łukaszewski became a diplomat (as ambassador in Paris) as well as the initiator of the Polish branch of the College of Europe in Natolin. There are also other less spectacular examples. Similar personal stories may be found in other Central European emigrations, although more research on the subject is needed.27 This individual approach created the best effect during the transition period – many politicians and intellectuals engaged in integration initiatives were active in their home countries after the collapse of Communism. This point deserves more attention. The question arises, although it is not easy to answer: Did Poland and other Central European countries make good use of the potential of Polish émigrés during the transition period? We have given several examples, but the question is whether their efforts were sufficient. A quarter of a century after transformation, it is still a starting-point for future research. Émigré campaigns for European integration Very interesting, although not fully explored, is the problem of the mechanisms of political mobilisation among the émigrés in Western Europe. Personal involvement is one obvious mechanism, closely connected with personal political beliefs as well as with adjustment to the Western European model of political career-making. The former factor explains the main motivation; the latter personal success. But there are also examples of mass movements. What compelled people to take part in such campaigns? Central Europeans citizens were deprived of their home politics – they were unable to participate in elections, political processes, etc., in their home countries. Even personal contacts with family and friends were often very limited. This stimu- 27. In the case of Estonian emigration, such research is conducted by Paul Heikkilä. Cf. idem, Estonians for Europe: national activism for European unification since the 1920s until the end of the Cold War, Brussels, 2014. . Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process 147 lated their political activity and temperament. There were three possible areas of action. The first, we may call an exiled community, with fragmented political construction and leaders focusing on exile politics. The second area was the Central European émigré politics, although in fact this dimension of politics was controlled and regulated by larger players – the American case is the most meaningful, thanks to the creation of the National Committee for a Free Europe.28 On one hand, émigrés were instruments of US politics; on the other, they manipulated US policy for their own goals. The third area, sometimes combining the other two, was that of host country politics. Through lobbying, petitions, letters to the media and politicians, mass protests, etc., the Central European diasporas reminded the rest of the world about the existence of East-Central Europe, its subjugation and its ambitions to become part of the European community. At certain moments, they felt powerless, but sometimes they believed it was the only way to remember their existence and uniqueness. What helped them to prepare such campaigns was their greatly cherished political thinking. One of the most interesting mass projects was the Committee of Naturalised Poles in France, a project which was to mobilise their communities politically.29 The whole initiative was closely connected with Jerzy Jankowski.30 As a staunch anti-communist (connected with Paix et Liberté)31 and federalist, creator of the Union of Polish Federalists, together with his friends in the 1950s he worked on another very interesting plan for mobilising Polish workers in the European Coal and Steel Community: this deserves more attention. Although a project of this kind was quite utopian, Jankowski became the leader of the above committee, and for many years mobilised Poles in France just before municipal elections, under the slogans of anti-communism and federalism. Jankowski wrote about the strength of Polish exile: 'If we claim that Poland is in Europe, we must demonstrate that Poles are Europeans. No matter where they live'.32 For him, this was a good reason to mobilise the Polish community in ECSC countries, especially France. The best results were achieved in the eastern part of the 28. Cf. Katalin Kádár Lynn (ed.), The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe, St. Helena, CA, 2013. 29. More on the committee cf. Florence Vychytil-Baudoux, Le Comité électoral des Polonais naturalisés (1953-1976). Une expérience polonienne en France, in: Relations internationales No. 1/141(2010): 65-81. 30. Jerzy Jankowski (1912-1981), Polish scout, journalist and politician. During the Second World War in France, he worked for Reseau 'Monika' gathering intelligence. After the war, he was a member of the Polish Freedom Movement “Independence and Democracy”. Attached to the French federalist movement, he was close to André Voisin, chairman of 'La Fédération'. He was the initiator and one of the leaders of the Union of Polish Federalists, editor-in-chief of the journal 'Wiadomości Związku Polskich Federalistów' [News of the Union of Polish Federalists], since 1963 'Polska w Europie' [Poland in Europe] and initiator and chief organiser of the Committee of Poles Naturalised in France. 31. Bernard Ludwig, Paix et Liberté: A Transnational Anti-Communist Network, in: Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War, Luc Van Dogen, Stéphane Roulin and Giles Scott-Smith (eds.), Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, 2014, pp. 81-95. 32. Jerzy Jankowski, Siła emigracji, „Trybuna”, No. 51(1954): 4. 148 Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ country, especially Lorraine and near Lille, where a huge community of Polish coalminers lived. Émigrés were watching the early phase of Western European integration very carefully and even proposed a special 'Eastern Schuman plan', completely utopian at that time, although resembling the Western pattern.33 Jankowski also promoted the creation of a Polish cell at the High Authority of the ECSC, and talked about this project to Polish, Belgian and Italian politicians. There are some indications that he even enlisted the support of Robert Schuman. He even received information that the representatives of the High Authorities, headed by Jean Monnet, were interested in the project. Jankowski saw American support as a crucial factor in carrying out the project. He estimated that 920,000 Poles were living and working in the ECSC countries.34 He stated: 'If we presume that a Polish coal-miner dying in French mines for the European construction industry deserves the same respect due to a soldier killed in Tobruk35 in defence of the same Europe – the awareness of our strength in Western Europe would be more general among Poles, and our place in the United Europe would be ensured'. 36 The same position was advocated by his colleague Zygmunt Michałowski, who noted that Poles working in the ECSC area should be recognised as the first citizens of the future United Europe.37 In the face of the Communist threat in Western Europe, he proposed the creation of the Office of Foreign Manpower within the structures of ECSC, the Western European Union or NATO. In his opinion, such an office should have not only its Polish division, but also Ukrainian, Baltic and even Italian divisions. This project was even bolder than that of Jankowski. Michalowski's additional argument was that, without European interest, such people would be more likely to turn towards Communism, which would be extremely dangerous for Europe. Although neither of the above projects succeeded, they had their consequences in further anti-Communist actions, as well as in the creation of the Committee of Naturalised Poles in France. The first initiative was taken in spring 1953, before municipal elections. Jankowski described it for his colleagues as follows: 'I garnered the interest of the French government and all political parties in France. I have 130,000 leaflets in Polish and 1,500 bilingual posters'.38 Jankowski thought about the Polish representation at the level of local government – canton, Conseil Général and districts, as well as at that 33. The plan has been discussed by such economists as Jan Wszelaki, O wschodni 'Plan Schumana’ [The Eastern ‘Schuman Plan’], Kultura, No. 6/68, 1953, 43–50. Cf. East-European 'Schumann Plan', Anglo-Polish Review, vol. 2 no. 2, (February 1951). 34. Jerzy Jankowski, Siła emigracji, Trybuna, London, No. 51(1954): 4. 35. A famous battle in Africa during the Second World War, in which Polish soldiers participated before serving on the Italian front. 36. Ibidem, 5. 37. Archiwum Akt Nowych (Central Archives of Modern Records, Warsaw), Stanisław Grocholski papers, p. 898, Zygmunt Michałowski’s manuscript, The problem of the Polish population in France (and its importance for the European policy of Western Powers, Paris, November 1954. Michałowski estimated that 10 to 20 per cent of workers employed in factories in ECSC countries were Poles. 38. Archiwum Akt Nowych (Central Archives of Modern Records, Warsaw), Stanisław Grocholski papers, 898, Letter of Jerzy Jankowski to Jan Nowak, Paris, April 6, 1953. Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process 149 of national elections. After some years of this action, in 1967 Jankowski estimated that 800,000 Poles had been raised for the action, of whom 600,000 had French citizenship. However, according to 1968 police statistics, there were 118,552 citizens of Polish origin who were not refugees. Later, the action was promoted even among other groups of French citizens of Central and Eastern European origin. Thus, Jankowski and his colleagues felt that they had influence on local politics in France; they fought against Communists and Fascists, but they also expected specific declarations from potential candidates: of their sympathy to Poles, education for Poles in schools, support for the Oder-Neisse frontier between Poland and Germany, and support for European integration. As a result of his actions in 1962, Jankowski was on good terms with the Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP). In May 1974, the committee received a letter from Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, starting with the words 'Amis Polonais.'39 He promised to defend Polish cultural rights and involve himself in the negotiations of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He declared he was in favour of a united, strong Europe, which could be a guarantee of international balance, and also beneficial for Eastern Europe.40 After Giscard d’Estaing’s victory in the presidential elections, Jankowski was sure that it was also the success of the committee.41 Cold War studies on European integration – the Polish case The last aspect of the involvement of Central European émigrés in the European integration process had an intellectual character. Through contacts, brochures and speeches, on every occasion the émigrés tried to remind people about the existence of the Eastern part of Europe. But political reality prevented it becoming fully integrated in Western Europe. The question was: How can these circumstances be overcome? For almost half a century, there was no political solution, although émigrés were trying to follow the essence of changes in the Western part of Europe. They would sometimes put forward interesting albeit utopian projects (like the so-called Eastern Schuman plan in 1952). But they also produced detailed handbooks on European integration for Polish leaders, both in exile and in Poland. The brochures and books by Feliks Gross, Zbigniew Jordan, Aleksander Bregman, Piotr Wandycz, Michał Gamarnikow, Jan Krok-Paszkowski and Zdzisław Najder were the best sources of knowledge about European integration for Poles and Central Europeans. During Communist times, they were barely known in Poland. Only experts had access 39. Lettre de M. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing au Comité électoral de Polonais naturalisés, Polska w Europie [Poland in Europe], Paris, No. 6-8(1974): 8. 40. A letter describing the electoral campaign was published by émigré journal Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, May 23, 1974. 41. Société Historique et Littéraire Polonaise and Bibliothèque Polonaise de Paris, Jerzy Jankowski papers, akc. 5644, copy of letter from Jerzy Jankowski to Jerzy Giedroyc, June 14, 1974. 150 Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ to such books in special libraries. In addition, contacts with Polish federalists in the West were even dangerous – two people were imprisoned because of their contacts with Jerzy Jankowski.42 Paradoxically, even after a decade of the Polish membership in the European Union, Central European countries had not prepared a comprehensive collection of writings comparable to those published by Walter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth, e.g., 'The Documents on the History of European Integration'.43 Poland is a good example. Under the auspices of the Office of the Committee for European Integration, and later with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Library of European Unity was founded and a few anthologies were published.44 But even compared with the short chapters from Lipgens and Loth, we still do not have an overall picture of Polish thinking on Europe in the 20th century. What was the value of those writings? For example, Crossroads of Two Continents, by Feliks Gross, published in 1945 by Columbia University,45 described almost the entire exile discussion and exchange on the projects of Central European federation. Although the work did not influence the course of world politics, it is a very important testimony of wartime. After the war, émigrés did not abandon discussions and, during the meetings of Polish federalists, they explored the different forms of a possible Central European federation. A good example are the writings of the philosopher Zbigniew Jordan,46 covering political (even global), economic and cultural aspects of such solutions. With the resumption of Polish-Czechoslovak talks in exile, the establishment of the Polish-Czechoslovak Research Committee in New York together with 'The Central European Federalist' (1953-1972), some new concepts arose, based on the so-called regional method of European integration. Those involved in the initiatives later authored the first book on (Western) European integration. Journalist Aleksander Bregman published Polska i nowa Europa [Poland and New Europe] in which he described not only Polish traditions and interest in European integration, but also analysed the question of the UK’s accession to the European communities.47 Historian Piotr Wandycz, together with economist Ludwik Frendl, published the first handbook on European integration, Zjednoczona Europa: Teoria i praktyka (United Europe: Theory and Practice). This was the first comprehensive introduction to the history, politics and economy of the European integration and European communities published in the mid-1960s. Very interesting also was a book 42. Cf. Sławomir Łukasiewicz, Federacja jako zagrożenie. Działania wywiadu PRL wobec polskich federalistów na Zachodzie po drugiej wojnie światowej [Federation as a threat. Activities of Polish communist intelligence against Polish federalists in the West after World War II], Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, no. 12 (2008), pp. 345–367. 43. Walter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth (eds), The Documents on the History of European Integration, 4 vols., Berlin–New York 1985–1991. 44. Among them Sławomir Łukasiewicz (ed.), Towards a United Europe: An Anthology of Twentieth- Century Polish Thought on Europe, transl. Robert Looby, Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011. 45. Feliks Gross, Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe, New York 1945. 46. Cf. Zbigniew Jordan, Niepodległość a federalizm [Independence and federalism], London, 1955. 47. Aleksander Bregman, Polska i nowa Europa, London, 1963. Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process 151 by Michał Gamarnikow on Poland, the Common Market and united Europe, published almost at the same time.48 Some further analysis of European economy can be found in works by Jan Krok-Paszkowski. He even embarked on a comparison of two models of integration: one represented by the European Economic Community and the other by Comecon. There is also another author worthy of mention: Zdzisław Najder, a Polish opposition activist who escaped to the West, became the chief of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe and, in the 1980s, published a compilation of documents and texts on European integration.49 Of course, this is not the whole picture and we can indicate similar important publications on the subject prepared by other Central European émigré groups. Conclusions Ever since the beginning of the Cold War, East Central European émigrés had advocated the merging of the whole continent – both Western and Eastern parts. Some Western European politicians and intellectuals supported this idea; some did not. To take advantage of that support and overcome indifference, émigrés pioneered many initiatives devoted to studying and promoting European integration, including that of the Central European countries. Examples of such initiatives were the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe, the Polish Federalists’ Union, and others. They also tried to act through trade unions (like the International Centre of Free Trade Unions in Exile) and youth movements (or Conseil de la Jeunesse Libre de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale). Since the late 1940s, the American policy conducted through the Free Europe Committee had been very supportive of such initiatives, with several centres in Europe. This provided an additional stimulus for Central European cooperation in exile. In connection with such strictly political issues, there was also a socio-political phenomenon. The East European émigrés who settled in Great Britain, France and other European countries after the Second World War were mostly ex-military, diplomats, politicians or intellectuals. But the new situation forced them to adapt to the conditions of their host countries. In Great Britain, many of them found employment as regular workers, e.g., weavers or coal-miners. This had many consequences: from personal and local, and from the new forms of trade unions in exile to attempts to build a mass party in exile based on this social stratum. Thus, the exiles attempted to organise their activity on three levels: inside the emigration community as such, the host country, and internationally. This generated the favourable conditions necessary for legitimising the position which the émigrés were trying to build up in 48. Michał Gamarnikow, Polska, wspólny rynek i zjednoczona Europa: próba perspektywicznej analizy [Poland, common market and united Europe: an attempt of a perspective analysis], London, 1966. 49. Bogusław Grodzicki [real name: Zdzisław Najder] and Jan Pomian, Wspólnota europejska: Przewodnik dokumentalny [European Community: A Documentary Companion], transl. by Halina Carroll-Najder, London, 1982. 152 Sławomir ŁUKASIEWICZ European political life. This state also allowed them to observe the phenomenon of European integration from various perspectives, waiting for the moment when it would also be possible to make their countries part of the process. Some of the émigrés, owing to their experience during that period, actively participated in the political transformation of Central European countries after the Cold War. Some of them were even negotiators of accession agreements between their own countries and the European Union before 2004, showing how strong their connections were with their integration in Europe, and the contemporary shape of the European Union. Central and Eastern European Cold War émigrés in the European integration process 153 PART 2: THE DEMOGRAPHIC REORGANISATION OF THE CONTINENT: THE RETURN OF THE MULTIETHNIC NATION STATE (1975-2015) Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s Marcel BERLINGHOFF Abstract The European migration regime in the long 1960s was shaped by transnational labour migration both inside the European Community and from third countries. A substantial amount of this migration was regarded as temporary ‘guestworker’ migration, but when the recruiting states detected longer sojourn and tendencies of settlement, they halted recruitment programmes and restricted legal labour immigration from most third countries. Whereas according to the Treaties of Rome, the European Commission was only authorized to act on labour migration of EC nationals, the Committees for the free movement of workers at the Commission discussed the migration of third country nationals as well. This paper argues that these committees played an important role in the emergence of the European recruitment stops that ended the ‘guestworker’ regime. It will explore the impact of the Commission’s attempts to concert a common European migration policy and to create an undiscriminatory European labour marked for EC-member and third country nationals alike. Furthermore it will trace the emergence of a perceived ‘Foreign Workers Problem’ in Western Europe which can be described as Europeanisation of migration policy avant la lettre. Introduction The European Community (EC) and migration policy have a long history in common.1 One of the 'four freedoms' proposed in the Treaties of Rome of 19572 was the free movement of persons. And even before, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) provided workers in its industries with free mobility among the six member states.3 However, it was not until 1968 that regulations covering the free movement of workers and their families came into force4 and, by that time, crossborder labour migration to Western Europe was rising quickly. A peak was reached 1. Cf. Parsanoglou and Tourgeli in this volume. 2. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Art. 48. 3. Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Art. 69. 4. Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68. Cf. Wilfried Loth, Building Europe. A History of European Unification, Berlin/Boston 2015, p. 92. 157 five years later, when European Commission statistics calculated the number of foreign workers in the EC to be more than six million, three-quarters of them originating from countries outside the EC.5 What seems to be a success story of the establishment of a common European labour market soon raised concerns about social problems accompanying these largescale migrations, as well as aspects regarding the control of immigration. Attempts to establish a common social policy for migrant workers and their families were made at European level and, in their many searches for solutions to the emerging problems, the member states developed a common perception of a migrant labour problem. In the early 1970s, all Western European states stopped recruitment or restricted both legal and irregular labour immigration from most third countries.6 These European Immigration Stops mark the end of the post-war guestworker era and the onset of a restrictive immigration control policy throughout (Western) Europe. But why did all these Western European governments turn to a restrictive labour migration policy in the course of only a few years? Was the end of the guestworker era the result of an external occasion such as the oil crisis, as we often read?7 Or was it an early Europeanisation process in migration policy?8 Which role played by the European Commission and its committees regarding the free movement of migrant workers in the EC? And how did national governments interact in this policy field as regards a core of national sovereignty? This paper analyses the EC committees’ role in the emergence of the common perception of immigration as a problem among member states (and beyond), which led to the alleged solution of the 'problem' by halting immigration in the early 1970s. I first describe the development of labour migration in post-war Europe and the characteristics of the guestworker system, and then introduce the committees which the European Commission established in order to promote the free movement of workers from EC member states. In this second part, I analyse the interests of both Commis- 5. Commission of the European Communities, Press-Release: Europe and the Migrant Worker, Brussels, 12.12.1975. IP (75) 222. Hartmut Kaelble, Sozialgeschichte Europas. 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, Bonn 2007, pp. 246f. counts 10.7 million foreigners living in Western Europe in 1970/71. 6. Against this general rule, exceptions were made for workers from other 'Western' third countries such as Canada or the USA, migrants from future member states such as Portugal and Spain, and for employees in economic sectors with special labour needs. Marcel Berlinghoff, Das Ende der 'Gastarbeit'. Die Anwerbestopps in Westeuropa 1970–1974, Paderborn 2013. For the Portuguese case cf. Cunha in this volume. 7. Cf. e.g. Stephen Castles / Hein de Haas / Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World, Basingstoke et al. 52014, p. 103; Heinz Fassmann, European Migration: Historical overview and statistical problems. in: Heinz Fassmann / Ursula Reeger / Wiebke Sievers (eds.): Statistics and reality. Concepts and measurements of migration in Europe, Amsterdam 2009, p. 29. 8. Cf. Berlinghoff, note 5; Adrian Favell, The Europeanisation of Immigration Politics, 2000, http:// www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/favell/EIOP-C&C.htm (28.8.2016); Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, London 2003; Virginie Guiraudon, Les politiques d’immigration en Europe. Allemagne, France, Pays-Bas, Paris 2000. 158 Marcel BERLINGHOFF sion and member states in the work of these committees and discuss its importance for the European immigration stops. Labour migration in postwar Europe From the late 1950s and early 1960s onwards, driven by the enormous economic growth known as the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’, the ‘Trente Glorieuses’ or ‘Wirtschaftswunder’, Western Europe became a region of immigration – at least statistically, as increasing numbers of people were moving into Europe while figures of emigration went down.9 The greater part of this movement may be described as (post)colonial and labour migration, both forms overlapping. It was promoted by regimes of free mobility and recruitment agreements between ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries.10 A great many men and women also migrated on their own, disregarding official ways of recruitment, and making use of weak control and unofficial pathways.11 Until the late 1960s, Italian citizens were the largest national immigrant group in Western Europe, followed by Turks, Portuguese, Yugoslavs, Spanish, Algerians, Greeks and Moroccans.12 Each receiving country also had its own privileged immigrant group, deriving not only from historical migration paths but also political or cultural relations. In West Germany, citizens of the German Democratic Republic and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe (Aussiedler) had privileged access to the state’s territory; in France, Algerians and Africans from former (mainly) sub-Saharan colonies enjoyed unrestricted access to the French labour market; and in the United Kingdom (UK) the largest immigrant groups came from (former) Commonwealth members from the West Indies and Ireland, as well as from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.13 As an approximate differentiation, we could state that (post)-colonial and ethnic immigration was more likely to be perceived as long-term immigration or even definite settlement, while labour migration (including movements taking place in post- 9. Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, Malden, Mass.; Oxford 2003, pp. 217–221. 10. Christoph Rass, Temporary Labour Migration and State-Run Recruitment of Foreign Workers in Europe, 1919–1975: A New Migration Regime? International Review of Social History, 57, (2012). Cf. Ventresca in this volume. 11. Cf. e.g. Carlos Sanz Diaz, "Clandestinos", "ilegales", "espontáneos"… La emigración irregular de españoles a Alemania en el contexto de las relaciones hispano-alemanas, 1960–1973, Madrid 2004. Marie-Christine Volovitch-Tavares, L'illégalité, un élément structurant de l'immigration portugaise en France. in: Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard / Stéphane Dufoix / Patrick Weil (eds.): L'étranger en questions du Moyen Âge à l'an 2000, Paris 2005. 12. Commission of the European Communities, The Housing of Migrant Workers: A Case of Social Improvidence? Results of an Enquiry on the Housing Conditions of Foreign Workers in the European Community, 1976. SEC (77) 3954, (= V/448/76) p. 6. 13. Other (post)colonial migration pathways led from Indonesia and Surinam to the Netherlands and from sub-Saharan Africa to Belgium. Cf. Klaus J. Bade / Pieter C. Emmer / Leo Lucassen /Jochen Oltmer (eds.), The Encyclopedia of European Migration and Minorities, Cambridge 2011. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 159 colonial contexts) was perceived as being only temporary. This view was shared by both receiving and sending countries and by the migrants themselves, and reflected the reality of the mobility of many migrants, who returned regularly throughout the whole phase. The circular character of this mobility was known as the guestworker system’s principle of rotation: migrants from the periphery and economically stronger hubs in the countries of recruitment came to the industrial centres of Western Europe to work for a few years, and then returned to their home countries or went on to employment in other countries. In France, administrative officials referred to this system as 'Noria',14 an ancient bucket-wheel, constantly moving fresh labour forces into the dynamic economy – and removing ‘used’ workers, whose positions were taken by replacements. In fact, this system was largely perceived as a 'triple win', a benefit for all parties involved. The countries of origin could diminish their large labour surplus and thus prevent social unrest. As migrant workers intended to return, they left their families in their home region and sent some of their income back home in the form of remittances, which gained growing importance in foreign exchange balances. The recruiting countries could meet their labour needs, saving the costs of both education and social insurance benefits which they would have had to spend for national labour. In addition, permanent settlement, unwanted by most receiving states, was avoided. The migrant workers themselves could benefit not only from relatively good incomes (compared with those in their original countries) but, in cases of regular recruitment, also had their journeys paid, contracts made out in advance, pay equal to that of nationals, and housing offered by employers. For them, temporary labour migration seemed to pay off, when compared with very precarious long-term emigration including families.15 So, in theory, the guestworker system was profitable for everyone and it worked well for a long time.16 In the case of the Federal Republic, the largest recruiting country, more than 14 million guestworkers came to Germany between the late 1950s and 1973, and more than 11 million left the country over the same period of time.17 The total number of guestworkers recruited in Western Europe between 1960 and 1973 is estimated to be 30 million.18 The growing need for cheap labour during the booming 1960s led to competition between recruiting states, resulting in better working and living conditions for migrant workers who had arrived according to official recruitment regulations. Sending states 14. Cf. e.g Centre des Archives Contemporaines Fontainebleau (CAC) 19900353 Art. 14, DR, Note sur l’encontre interministériel au 25.11.1971 (23.11.1971). 15. Looking more closely at internal economic relations, one could even say a quintuple win, including employers, who could increase their production without cost-intensive rationalisation investments, and trade unions, who could protect the national work force from cheap foreign competition, even allowing them to achieve significant social upward mobility. 16. Looking at the outcome of these policies, researches have also highlighted the exploitative character of the guestworker regime. Cf. Stephen Castles / Godula Kosack, Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe, London 1973. 17. Jochen Oltmer, Migration im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, München 2010, p. 52. 18. Anthony Fielding, Mass Migration and Economic Restructuring, in: Russell King (ed.), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, Chichester, 1993, p. 10. 160 Marcel BERLINGHOFF frequently renegotiated bilateral agreements, using their alleged power as guardians of their national labour force.19 Although most of these agreements also had foreign relations aspects (both political and economic),20 the main reason was to channel existing and emerging migratory movements. Bilateral agreements therefore included principles for selecting designated migrants, regulations for delivering working contracts and residence permits, responsibilities for transport and housing, principles of non-discrimination against national workers, etc.21 But administrative procedures were often too slow and inflexible to meet the needs of both employers and workers. An increasing share of migrant workers thus pursued their projects on their own, migrating ‘irregularly’ on tourist visas or without border controls, to search for jobs on their own.22 Some ‘regularised’ their sojourn after taking up work; others kept their irregular status, accompanied by highly precarious working and living conditions. With the growth of labour migration, more and more migrants extended their stays and sent for their families to join them. The result was that, from the early 1960s on, Western Europe became a region of immigration not only statistically but also in the sense that labour migrants settled in order to stay where they worked for more than just a few years.23 As a result, ‘regular' guestworkers who had been living in accommodation provided by their employers entered the (public) housing market, joining those who had come through alternative migration channels. As reasonably priced accommodation was sparse, especially in large cities and industrial areas, and foreigners often suffered discrimination, migrants and their families usually paid more and had to accept accommodation in worse condition than local residents. In areas of poor building stock, often not suitable for young families, social problems became visible and were a frequent topic of press coverage.24 However, national as well as local administrative bodies continued to use the 'temporary stay' model for a long time, and saw little need to invest in infrastructures such as (social) housing, schools 19. Cf. Rass, note 9. 20. Cf. Heike Knortz, Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte. "Gastarbeiter" in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und Beschäftigungspolitik 1953–1973, Köln 2008. 21. Cf. Rass, note 9. 22. Marcel Berlinghoff, „Faux Touristes“? Tourism in European Migration Regimes in the Long Sixties. in: Nikolaos Papadogiannis / Detlef Siegfried (eds.): Between Education, Adventure and Commerce: Tourism and Mobility in Europe since 1945. Comparativ 24 (2004). Eventually some groups of designated emigrants had to undergo exit checks as sending states like Yugoslavia tried to keep their fully trained skilled labour force or, in the case of the Spanish, Portuguese or Greek dictatorships, tried to limit emigration to politically loyal citizens; dissidents were obliged to emigrate clandestinely. 23. Cf. Bade, note 8. Fassmann, note 6. 24. The worst situation emerged in France where, in 1970, about 46,000 people lived in bidonvilles (slums). Yvan Gastaut, Les bidonvilles, lieux d’exclusion et de marginalité en France durant les trente glorieuses, in: Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 69 (2004); Idem, L'immigration et l'opinion en France sous la Ve Republique, Paris 2000; Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Les immigrés et la politique. Cent cinquante ans d'évolution, Paris 1988. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 161 and medical care for an enlarged population with special needs.25 This discrepancy worsened the social problems which foreign workers faced from the beginning of the guestworker era, especially the sometimes appalling housing conditions. Settling guestworkers with their worsening social implications also became of concern to national governments. Labour recruitment was increasingly regarded as a complex problem involving several spheres: economic structure, urban development, security and racism, to name only a few.26 To deal with this problem, government officials from various administrative levels contacted their opposite numbers in other European countries, to exchange views on this apparently European phenomenon. Meetings at subnational and bilateral levels, as well as conferences of international organisations such as the OECD and the Council of Europe (CoE) were important forums to contact and discuss national views and strategies.27 Contacts made here were frequently used for closer insights into neighbouring countries' policies, either by correspondence or personal visits. A good example with a high impact on government policy was that of the study trips of two officials from the German Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, who went to the Netherlands and Switzerland to see how these countries dealt with problems of migrant labour recruitment. During these trips, which lasted several days and were organised thanks to the intercession of Dutch, Swiss and German CoE representatives, they did not only meet colleagues at governmental level, but also visited trade unions and employers' associations, scholars at universities, local administrators and company managers, as well as the representatives of non-governmental organisations concerned with migrants. Their reports were sent to all the German ministries concerned with labour recruitment and the social integration of guestworkers, and were frequently referred to in the subsequent intra-governmental debates on reform of the recruitment regime.28 One of the most influential arenas to discuss the problems of immigrant labour were the Committees of the European Commission in Brussels.29 25. The city council of Munich is an exception, as it compiled a study on problems related to the settlement of guestworkers as early as 1972. Landeshauptstadt München. Stadtentwicklungsreferat: Kommunalpolitische Aspekte des wachsenden ausländischen Bevölkerungsanteils in München – Problemstudie, München, April 1972. 26. Cf. Leo Lucassen / Jan Lucassen, Winnaars en verliezers. Een nuchtere balans van vijf eeuwen immigratie Amsterdam ³2012; Karen Schönwälder, Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität. Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren, Essen 2001; Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the nation: immigration, racism and citizenship in modern France, London 1992. 27. Berlinghoff, note 5. 28. Eventually, they even led to the idea of an international meeting of officials concerned with labour migration in other European countries and international organisations in Bonn in 1972; see below. 29. Marcel Berlinghoff, Between Emancipation and Defence: The Failure of the Commission’s Attempt to Concert a Common European Immigration Policy, L'Europe en Formation. Journal of Studies on European Integration and Federalism, 50 (2009). 162 Marcel BERLINGHOFF The European Commission and labour migration policies Until the 1970s, labour migration policy had been a predominantly national task of sovereign states.30 It was shaped by traditional migration relations, colonial history, and the self-conception of being a country open to immigration (Einwanderungsland) or not. Economic needs and migrants’ life strategies contributed to the development of very distinctive migration regimes in Western Europe.31 Conversely, with European integration developing in the post-war period, a new European migration regime emerged. Already in 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had combined common control on heavy industries with free movement of workers in its economic sector. Based on these and on good experiences with the common labour market of the Benelux countries, in 1957 the free movement of workers and their families was established in Art. 48 of the Treaty of Rome as one of the 'four freedoms'. It stated that 'any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment' should be abolished. Workers should be able to 'move freely within the Community in order to pursue activities as employed persons should not be subject to any limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health', regardless of whether they were 'permanent, seasonal and frontier workers or freelancers providing services'.32 In practice, this meant that the citizens of EC member states were to be treated as domestic workers on national labour markets.33 Technical and Advisory Committees: Mission, Members, Topics According to the Regulation on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, two committees were established to ensure 'close cooperation between the member states in matters concerning the freedom of movement of workers and their employment':34 these were the Technical and the Advisory Committees. The former 30. Cf. Jochen Oltmer, Einleitung: Staat im Prozess der Aushandlung von Migration, in: idem (ed.): Handbuch Staat und Migration in Deutschland seit dem 17. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2015; Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State, Oxford 1999. Early exceptions of self-restraint by international conventions are the ILO Conventions on 'Migration for Employment' 66 (1939) and 97 (1949). 31. To the concept of migration regimes, cf. Andreas Pott/Christoph Rass/Frank Wolff (eds.), Migration Regimes. Approaches to a Key Concept, Wiesbaden [2016]. 32. Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community. 33. In retrospect, an internal paper of the German Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs rated the European free movement of labour as a special migration regime even going beyond immigration to the nation state. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA) B149 83822, BMA Abt. IIc, „Die Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”,16.1.1973. Cf. Berlinghoff, note 5, p. 212. 34. Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 163 was composed of two national representatives from each member state, concerned with labour migration. They were usually delegates from the national ministries of labour and the interior. The Technical Committee was headed by a member of the commission or – more often – by a representative. The Committee’s tasks were the promotion and advancement of co-operation between the public authorities concerned in the Member States on all technical questions relating to freedom of movement of workers and their employment; the formulation of procedures for the organisation of the joint activities of the public authorities concerned; the facilitation of gathering information likely to be of use to the Commission and for the studies and research provided for in the Regulation, and the encouragement of exchange of information and experience between the administrative bodies concerned; and the investigation at a technical level on the harmonisation of the criteria by which Member States assess the state of their labour markets.35 The Advisory Committee was also composed of two representatives of the member states (usually those of the Technical Committee), complemented by both the representatives of trade unions and employers’ associations from each state and headed by a member of the Commission or a deputy. The committee, which was to meet twice a year, was entitled to examine problems concerning freedom of movement and employment within the framework of national manpower policies, with a view to co-ordinating the employment policies of the Member States at Community level, thus contributing to the development of the economies and to an improved balance of the labour market; make a general study of the effects of implementing the Regulation and any supplementary measures; submit revision proposals to the Commission; deliver opinions on general questions or on questions of principle, in particular on exchange of information concerning developments in the labour market, on the movement of workers between Member States, on programmes or measures to develop vocational guidance and vocational training which are likely to increase the possibilities of freedom of movement and employment, and on all forms of assistance to workers and their families, including social assistance and the housing of workers.36 From 1972 onwards, representatives of Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark participated in the committees’ sessions as observers, as these countries only joined the Community in 1973. Towards a common European migration policy? Coordinating recruitment When the free movement of workers from member states was implemented in 1968, labour recruitment from third countries had already reached its first peak and downturn and was about to move towards unprecedented levels. While in West Germany 35. Cf. Ibid., Art. 33. 36. Cf. Ibid., Art. 25. 164 Marcel BERLINGHOFF for the first time more than one million guestworkers were officially recruited, new competitors, such as the Netherlands, began to recruit foreign labour seriously, and in France the ‘Noria’ kept turning faster than ever, moving increasing numbers of labour migrants into the economy – although more than 80 per cent of them were 'irregular' (i.e., outside the official recruitment procedure).37 The amount of recruitment of third-country nationals by member states began to worry the European Commission. On one hand, it feared cut-throat competition among recruiting countries on migrant labour which only the economical and most successful member states could win, thus increasing already existing imbalances in the Community: la concurrence entre les Etats de la Communauté risque fort de s’aggraver dans la prochaine décennie si les besoins de main-d’œuvre continuent à croître comme il est probable. […] Ainsi le risque d’un développement de certains économies au détriment d’autres économies de la Communauté peut se trouver renforcé par un inégal accès aux réserves de maind’œuvre des pays tiers.38 On the other hand, Brussels understood that the employment of third-country nationals was much cheaper (compared with nationals of EC member states, as they accepted lower wages and fewer social and political rights, especially if they had migrated outside the official recruitment paths). Discriminated against both nationals and EC citizens on one hand, urgently required as a flexible labour force on the other, the Commission detected in the high share of third-country nationals in the European labour market a dangerous imbalance which had to be eliminated.39 As Brussels did not have the competence to regulate labour migration of non-EC nationals, the Commission proposed European coordination of national recruitment policies.40 This coordination was to include the right to internal free movement to third-country migrant workers, which was regarded as essential for the functioning of the common (labour) market. In addition, the Commission expected that, in times of sudden economic crisis in one country, this free movement would prevent member states from sending back several tens of thousands of unemployed third-country nationals, while other countries would have to recruit new workers. In the Commission's view, this would not only cause massive social unrest, but also seriously affect the sending countries and therefore lead to diplomatic concern: Peut-on raisonnablement espérer pouvoir renvoyer dans leur pays d’origine plusieurs dizaines de milliers de travailleurs dès qu’apparaît une crise récessive? Sans parler des conséquences pour ces travailleurs, on peut se demander si, à défaut d’éviter les crises, il 37. Georges Tapinos, L'immigration étrangère en France. 1946–1973, Paris 1975, p. 102. 38. Centre des Archives Diplomatiques Nantes (CADN), RP Bruxelles, 2876, Etude comparative des politiques migratoires des états membres de la C.E.E à l’égard des pays tiers, Juin 1971 (10.931/V/ 70-F rév.) p. 61. 39. Commission of the European Communities, Preliminary Guidelines for a Community Social Policy Programme. SEC (71) 600. 17.03 1971. Bulletin 4-1971, Annex S 2/71. http://aei.pitt.edu/5597/1/5597.pdf (29.8.2016). 40. CADN, RP Bruxelles, 2876, Etude comparative, note 30. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 165 ne serait pas utile d’en prévoir les conséquences. L’instauration d’une priorité d’emploi dans les Etats de la Communauté au bénéfice des travailleurs ressortissants des pays tiers, immigrés depuis une ou plusieurs années dans la Communauté, pourrait aller dans ce sens.41 In addition, benefits for the labour-providing countries were seen, because compulsory common vocational training for migrant workers was perceived as a form of development aid. Therefore, in 1970-71, the European Commission compiled a comparative study on the immigration policies of the EC member states towards third countries and asked them to update the results to the Technical and Advisory Committees.42 Subsequently, in 1972 the mobility of migrant workers from non-member states appeared on the committees’ agendas. At this early – and vague – stage, the idea of a coordinated guestworker policy found support in the EC Committees of both immigration and emigration countries. For example, an internal paper of the German Foreign Office judged the plan of free movement of third-country nationals legally working in a member state as an 'interesting suggestion' and stated that a common European labour market policy towards third countries would be approved.43 For its part, the Italian government hoped that a common European labour policy towards third countries would be useful in strengthening the position of Italian migrant workers in a common labour market. In June 1971, Rome presented a memorandum on labour policy, highlighting the need for forced economic promotion of structurally weak regions (such as the Mezzogiorno) and demanded strict compliance with labour market priority for EC nationals, as well as reform of the regulations of free movement inside the Community. Italy also suggested establishing a system of ‘administered free movement of workers’ which might be characterised as ‘organised migration’.44 National quotas should therefore be negotiated for both workers from EC member states and third-country migrants. This would put Italy in a better position to compete with the forthcoming new EC members, Ireland and the United Kingdom, with their alleged large labour surplus. However, at this point, the other five member states neither had an interest in reforming regulations for the free movement of labour which had come into force only three years before, nor did they have any interest in letting Italy decide where they should recruit their additional labour force. The result was that, after several committee meetings, the Italian request was rejected.45 At a time of increasing criticism of the recruitment policy and its outcomes, the exchange of ideas, thoughts and concepts for a new – and probably common European – labour policy was greatly welcomed by government officials in this particular policy field. Nevertheless, national governments were sceptical about a public debate on 41. Ibid, p. 62. 42. Ibid. 43. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA) B 85 1031, Referat 412 an 513, 18.4.1973. 44. BA B149 17415, Memorandum der Italienischen Regierung zur Beschäftigungspolitik in der Gemeinschaft [1342/71 (Soc) 134], 16.7.1971. 45. BA B149 21660, Berichtsentwurf des Fachausschusses an die Kommission 1972. 166 Marcel BERLINGHOFF migration policy.46 When in October 1972 the Commission suggested the formation of an ad hoc group in the Advisory Committee for Free Movement, to work out a common immigration policy towards third countries, the state delegates reacted with considerable reserve: the German delegation suggested that a working group for these 'technical questions' should be established in the Technical Committee – where member states’ delegates could discuss more openly than in the Advisory Committee, which also comprised members from employers and trade unions. The French delegate confidentially proposed to keep the mandate as vague as possible.47 Three years were to pass before a working group of the Advisory Committee took up its work, but the results were sparse.48 Instead, in October 1972, government officials met to discuss the challenges and future of labour recruitment in Europe outside EC institutions. The West German Federal Government had invited not only the EC member states but also representatives of Switzerland and the UK as well as of the EC Commission, ILO and CoE to an informal 'exchange of experiences' (Erfahrungsaustausch) in Bonn.49 There, administrative officials discussed concepts of migration restriction and control in a frank and open fashion, for the first time without the usual diplomatic restraints, as the Swiss delegate Georg Pedotti reported enthusiastically.50 A French delegate stated: De l’avis unanime des participants l’ensemble de la rencontre s’est déroulé de façon extrêmement satisfaisante et la conclusion que l’on peut en retirer, bien que ne pouvant être consignée dans un document solennel, très positive. […] L’intérêt des discussions a été de permettre, de façon souvent informelle mais très franche et très libre (contrairement aux débats qui se tiennent dans beaucoup d’Organisations Internationales), un échange d’informations et de réflexions, entre les fonctionnaires nationaux ou internationaux présents, et une confrontation des expériences dans ce domaine de l’immigration.51 Social assistance to migrant workers Addressing the manifold social problems of migrant workers, the second pillar of the Commission’s strategy in establishing a truly undiscriminating common labour market (as regarded workers' nationality) was a common social policy for migrants and their families. They were viewed as a disadvantaged group which had to be promoted to participate equally in the common market.52 Therefore, the European Social Action 46. Cf. Adrian Favell, The Europeanisation of Immigration Politics (1998), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/ soc/faculty/favell/EIOP-C&C.htm (last accessed on 30. October 2014). 47. CADN, RP Bruxelles, 2876, Note on the Meeting of the Advisory Committee at 12.10.1972 (17.10.1972). 48. See below. Cf. Berlinghoff, note 28. 49. Cf. Berlinghoff, note 5, pp. 198–201. 50. Bundesarchiv Bern E7175 (B) 221.610. Notiz Pedotti an Grübel, 27.10.1972. 51. CA 19930317 Art. 4, DPM, Note sur la rencontre de Bonn (23–27 octobre 1972). 52. Preliminary Guidelines, note 38, p. 43. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 167 Programme, announced at the Paris Summit in 1972, was to include a special section on migrant workers and their families.53 An ad hoc working group was established at the Advisory Committee in late 1973, and a first draft edited by the Commission was presented to the Committee and the EC Council as early as March 1974.54 Although the 'Preliminary Guidelines for a Community Social Policy''55 compiled by the Commission in 1971 already included vocational training, equal treatment with host country nationals in terms of working conditions, housing programmes, improvements for families whether in the home or receiving countries, and assisted integration for migrant workers and their families, the first drafts of the Action Programme in favour of migrant workers and their families went substantially further. The basic idea was a common European labour market.56 Its key feature, 'assisted freedom of movement'57 was to enable EC workers to benefit more from their opportunity to work in all EC member states. This included further education in language as well as vocational training in both host and receiving countries. The draft also contained an electronic community-wide system of job information (SEDOC), cooperation among national labour administrations, and the establishment of reception centres. As the Community’s internal labour market could not satisfy the needs of all its branches, the draft anticipated the need for consultation on national immigration policies. It therefore proposed regular meetings between the Commission and the member states, to inform each other about recent measures and to formulate common action. The Commission emphasised the will for 'pragmatic' action 'without limitations of strict institutional procedures'.58 As the perspective of the social action programme was not to be limited to the labour market but also envisioned aspects of immigration and integration, the Commission suggested promoting the social situation of both EC-state and third-country nationals.59 Topics included social security, housing, children’s education and the recognition of foreign diplomas and other kinds of certificates. It also envisaged information campaigns directed to both migrant workers and local populations, and better settling of foreigners by establishing local councils for migrant workers. In conclusion, the Commission aimed at the equal treatment of migrant workers from EC-member states with host country nationals in the spheres of labour, housing and education, while acknowledging that there were still problems with taxation and so- 53. Cf. Claudia Hiepel, Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou. Deutsch-französische Europapolitik zwischen Aufbruch und Krise, München 2012, p. 211. Berlinghoff, note 5, p. 185. 54. CAC, 19930317 Vers. 8, CAB/V/25/74-F. Cf. Berlinghoff, note 5, pp. 185–188. 55. Preliminary Guidelines, note 38. 56. For a coherent version of the Commission’s vision, see the speech of vice-president Patrick Hillery at the permanent representatives meeting on 28 March 1974. CADN, RP Bruxelles, 2881, V/390/74. 57. Not to be confused with the Italian concept of 'administered freedom of movement', mentioned above. 58. CAC, 19930317 Vers. 8, CAB/V/25/74-F, p. 9. 59. Cf. CADN, RP Bruxelles, 2881, V/390/74. 168 Marcel BERLINGHOFF cial services. Third-country nationals were to apply for this equal treatment through the inclusion of these topics in bilateral agreements. During the following nine months, the paper was revised by the Council and the Advisory Committee. In December 1974, the Commission presented its 'Action Programme in favour of migrant workers and their families' to the public. The recommendations on social security, vocational training, social services, housing and the education of migrant workers' children were complemented by a section on health, which called for improvements in 'medical examinations on recruitment, preventive medicine, socio-medical services, as well as on the training of migrant workers in prevention of industrial accidents and illnesses'.60 In contrast to the draft, the final paper clearly identified disadvantages and discriminations existing in several countries, such as restricted freedom of movement, limited social and labour-law related rights (as e.g. the right to be elected as union representatives). Consequently it stated: 'The achievement of equality of treatment for Community and non-Community workers, as well as for members of their families, in respect of living and working conditions, wages and economic rights, is an important objective of the […] social action programme.'61 As a solution, it proposed the adjustment of social policy, independent both of the nationality of migrant workers and of the state in which they were working.62 The chapter on living and working conditions was amended by three short sections which exceeded the strict definition of a social programme: civic and political rights, illegal immigration, and coordination of migration policies. As in the earlier drafts, the opinion of the commission was that: 'migrants should also be enabled to defend their interests as far as their living and working conditions are concerned. Because decisions at municipal level have a decidedly direct impact on the living conditions of migrants, representation of their interests at the local level should therefore be established.'63 Unlike the previous situation, it did not restrict its claim to the creation of consulting councils for migrant workers, but instead formulated: 'The objective to be attained is the granting to migrants, at the latest by 1980, of full participation in local elections according to conditions to be defined relating in particular to the qualifying period of residence'.64 The section on the fight against 'illegal immigration' announced a 'common approach to deterrent measures'.65 This was justified by the perception of clandestine 60. Commission of the European Communities, Action programme in favour of migrant workers and their families. COM (74) 2250 final, 14 December 1974. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 3/76. p. 19. 61. Ibid., p. 14. 62. Ibid., p. 17. 63. Ibid., p. 20. 64. Ibid., p. 21. 65. Ibid. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 169 workers as the most 'vulnerable to exploitation and intimidation' and the risk of epidemics as 'clandestine migrants [were not] subject to any medical control'.66 Concluding, the Commission not only recommended coordination of migration policies among member states, but also tried to coordinate the ‘harmonization’ of social and political integration of migrant workers from member states and third countries. It was also an attempt to expand the Commission’s competence on migration from third countries, which was regarded as crucial for the Common Market. By this time, however, both member and non-member states in Western Europe had already taken their own internal measures to restrict further recruitment and labour migration from third countries. National governments’ interests in a common European integration policy had suddenly vanished, and the migrant workers’ action programme was never fully implemented. Instead, the member states agreed to coordinate their efforts in fighting unlawful border crossing and settlement. Throughout 1975, the Standing Employment Committee discussed the topic and, in 1976, the Commission proposed to the Council a Directive about legal harmonisation in the fight against ‘illegal’ migration.67 The only social policy measure taken was the 'Council Directive on education of the children of migrant workers',68 which made it compulsory to teach such children the language of the host country, in order to stimulate their integration process. It also encouraged the teaching of the language and culture of their countries of origin, in order to facilitate their reintegration in the case of return. Although until 1974 the committees’ progress in developing a common recruitment and social policy towards migrant workers from third countries was slow, its importance for the Europeanisation of migration policy should not be underestimated. Emergence of a common perception of the ‘foreign workers problem’ The meetings of the Technical and Advisory Committees for the Free Movement of Migrant Workers were crucial for the emergence of a common perception of what was called the ‘Foreign Workers Problem’. The decisive actors of national migration policies in the member states met regularly to report on the development, experiences, problems and future actions of labour recruitment, immigration regulation and integration policies, i.e., the recruiting countries among the EC member states used the committees to exchange their views on and strategies for dealing with the problems of foreign labour from third countries. Even non-member states such as Switzerland were usually very well informed about the discussions in the Committees, via the 66. The number of clandestine migrant workers was estimated to be 600,000 (plus family members). Ibid. 67. CADN, RP Bruxelles, 2878, V/878/78. See EC Commission, Guidelines for a Community policy on migration, COM (85) 48, EC Bulletin S. 9/85, p. 10. 68. Council Directive 77/486 EC, 25/7/1977. 170 Marcel BERLINGHOFF Swiss representative at the European Community, exchanges at the OECD or the Council of Europe. In these ways, the Committees served as forums for policy interchange between national and European political spheres. This process may also be described as the 'Europeanisation' of migration policy avant la lettre, using a broad definition of the word, as von Hirschhausen and Patel have suggested.69 In bringing their national perspectives and specific experiences together, the delegates created a common perception of the challenges of labour recruitment as a European problem which had to be approached at both national and European levels. This ‘Foreign Workers Problem’ concerned five major issues: the economy, capacity, integration, control, and security,70 all of which evidently required common European action and contributed to the construction of a European identity.71 Concerning the economy, the representatives discussed to what degree recruitment was useful and when it would begin to harm economic development by retarding essential rationalisation measures or generating high investment costs for social infrastructures. This discussion concentrated around four major topics: 1) an ‘unnatural’ extension of growth periods was detected, which not only affected the normal economic cycle but also led to high dependency in sectors with large shares of migrant workers: for instance, what if a foreign crisis caused the exodus of large sections of a special industry’s workforce? What if these workers were suddenly attracted by other sectors or countries? 2) The unlimited reservoir of workforce delayed or even blocked the introduction of innovative production techniques. Essential investments in rationalisation were therefore retarded in work-intensive industries, keeping unprofitable sectors alive. 3) The gap between economically strong centres and weaker peripheries was aggravated, as the former attracted increasing numbers of workers and made the peripheral regions dependent on external payments, in forms of both private remittances and European subsidiaries. 4) The rising costs for infrastructure investments such as housing and integration measures raised the question of national cost-benefit calculations. In all countries, economists and politicians were searching for a magic formula: what rate of foreign labour would provide the greatest benefit to the economy? The topic of capacity was closely connected to the discussion about social problems in certain areas with many foreign workers. The housing situation was certainly the most important subject, but as there were no appropriate investments in the social infrastructure which could cover the demands of fast-growing populations, there were also discussions about the capacity of the medical and educational systems. References were also made to national discussions on the ‘political limits of capacity’, i.e., to what point would foreigners be accepted by locals? This referred mainly to dis- 69. Ulrike von Hirschhausen / Kiran Klaus Patel, Europeanization in History: An Introduction, in: Martin Conway / Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.): Europeanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches, New York 2010. 70. For the following cf. Berlinghoff, note 5, pp. 41–73. 71. Ibid, pp. 357–364. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 171 cussions about Überfremdung in Switzerland and xenophobic riots in the Dutch Randstad in the Netherlands. Closely related was the broad topic of integration, its meaning ranging from cultural assimilation to social assistance for disadvantaged migrants. With this broad and diverse range of meanings, all recruiting states undeniably saw the (at least temporary) integration of migrant workers as important, and the EC's 'Action Programme in favour of migrant workers and their families' aimed precisely at these issues. Although definite policy concepts differed widely between and even within the member states, there was consensus that the integration of migrants living in the country could only be integrated successfully if the entry of new people were halted. Interestingly, this only referred to third-country nationals. The mobility of citizens of member states was not mentioned at all. This may be seen as evidence for the assumption that, in the early 1970s, the borderline between who was perceived as foreign or not, had moved from national to (Western) European borders.72 Another broad consensus regarded the need for more state control on immigration. In the analysis of the Technical Committee, the reason for all these problems discussed so far was the presumed uncontrolled influx of migrant labour, which was seen as the root of all evil and which should be brought to an end. This common estimate is interesting, in view of the fact that the European immigration states differed greatly in their level of migration control.73 Whereas (non-EC member) Switzerland, which was in close contact with the EC member states, had enforced a strict system of admission control, including a forced rotation system, in France the vast majority of labour migration proceeded ‘spontaneously’ until 1974. In Germany, the administration officially tried to keep all migration movements under control, but more or less hidden points of entry were kept open to supply the national labour market. For example, ‘regularisation’ of immigrants with tourist visas was one option, as was entry with work permits issued in German embassies in neighbouring European states. Yet government representatives from all member countries agreed that stricter (or even 'regained') control was necessary, to promote any further action taken in the policy field as a whole. By this time, European cooperation in controlling immigration equalled the fight against ‘illegal’ immigration. The latter soon became part of the security aspect of the ‘Foreign Workers Problem’. Here, better cooperation among security forces was discussed, stretching from common border controls (by that time at the internal European borders!) to information exchange on terrorists, Communist agents and drug traffickers. The security concern was also related to internal security and social peace. The wildcat strikes organised by predominantly migrant workers which affected French and German metal industries broke with established corporative relations and questioned the representative authority of trade unions. In the European political discourse, this was discussed over a range covering Communist infiltration to race riots 72. Ibid, p. 73. 73. Ibid, pp. 59–61. 172 Marcel BERLINGHOFF and rising xenophobia – all of which had to be prevented by stricter control of labour migration. National solutions to a European problem The common idea of a European ‘Foreign Workers Problem’ established in the EC Committees for the free movement of workers (and consolidated in meetings outside EC institutions) decisively influenced national discussions on recruitment and migration policies in member states. Problems observed in one national context were transferred to another and regularly adapted. For example, racist riots and murders in the Netherlands and France nourished the fear that similar developments might also occur in West Germany (although there was no evidence for it). In particular, discussions on capacity spread across national borders, strengthening existing arguments for more control and introducing new perceptions of problems detected in each country's own context. The restriction of settlement for migrants in cities or districts is an excellent example; the spread of policy ideas of forced rotation of temporary labour migrants is another. Consequently, all governments rated the ‘Foreign Workers Problem’ as urgent, suspending recruitment agreements or restricting legal labour migration paths in only five years. The result was what the geographer Anthony Fielding once expressed as 'Suddenly the countries of western Europe seemed to step into line on the question of immigration'.74 In 1972, Denmark stopped granting work permits to third-country nationals. In 1970-73, citizenship underwent a major reform in the UK, making it more difficult for Commonwealth citizens to gain the right to live in the British Isles. In the same years, the Benelux countries made it harder for non-EC migrant workers to enter legally, except for post-colonial migrants. In June 1973, West Germany adopted several measures to limit recruitment and undesired settlement, and finally halted recruitment in November of the same year. France followed in July 1974, issuing an immigration stop which even blocked family migration from former colonies. Lastly, in 1975, Austria passed a law greatly restricting migrant labour, while employers' associations and trade unions had already agreed on diminishing recruitment contingents in the preceding year.75 This last case combined patterns from Switzerland (1970) and Sweden (1972) with French and German policies. In none of these coun- 74. Anthony Fielding, Migrants, institutions and politics: the evolution of European migration policies, in: Russell King (ed.): Mass migrations in Europe. The legacy and the future, London 1993, p. 52. Cf. Tomas Hammar (ed.), European immigration policy. A comparative study, Cambridge 1985; Berlinghoff, note 5, pp. 14f. 75. Cf. Verena Lorber, Gastarbeit in der Steiermark Die Arbeitsmigration im Spannungsfeld politischer und ökonomischer Entwicklungen und konkreter Lebensrealitäten (1961–1976), Göttingen [2017]. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 173 tries76 did the sudden halt in recruitment lead to a reversal of the preceding immigration. Although these decisions were taken in specific national contexts by national governments, they were shaped by the common perception of third-country labour migration as a European problem, which had essentially developed in the EC committees’ sessions in 1972-73. Without knowledge of this problem-discourse, the national policy changes which ended the recruitment of guestworkers – and thus legal labour migration from third countries – are hard to explain. This is one reason why the myth that the oil crisis caused the stop has been so attractive as a misleading explanation for the end of the guestworker era. Describing the model German case may demonstrate this. From 1971 onwards, interdepartmental working groups discussed the social and economic problems of the German guestworker program. Until 1972, 'administrative measures' such as restricted recruitment were discarded. In that year, the Labour Ministry officials went on their study trips, the German government invited neighbouring West European governments and organisations to exchange ideas in Bonn, and the Federal Foreign Office compiled a study on migration policy via the German embassies in countries involved in labour recruitment. This had obvious consequences on internal debates and soon public ones as well. Both problems and alleged solutions from neighbouring countries could be found in the discussions, and debate turned almost exclusively to restrictive administrative measures. In January 1973, the re-elected Chancellor Willy Brandt announced in his government statement a ‘consolidation’ of guestworker recruitment and, in July of the same year, a 'Foreign Labour Action Plan' was presented to the Bundestag, revealing explicit references to the EC Committees' discussions.77 A recruitment stop was not part of the programme and didn’t become a topic until the day preceding its decree on November 23 1973. Minister Arendt used the opportunity provided by employer associations and trade unions to make a common statement that recruitment should be suspended, in the light of economic insecurities due to the oil crisis. Although the actual decision was taken in a specific national context, the preceding debate must be analysed with regard to the European discourse of a ‘Foreign Workers Problem’. 76. With the exception of Switzerland, where the stock of foreign migrants declined between 1975 and 1979, Etienne Piguet, L'immigration en Suisse depuis 1948 – Contexte et conséquences des politiques d'immigration, d'integration et d'asile, in: Hans Mahnig (ed.): Histoire de la politique de migration, d'asile et d'integration en Suisse depuis 1948, Zurich 2005, p. 42. 77. “Aktionsprogramm Ausländische Arbeitnehmer” presented by the Federal Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Walter Arendt at the Bundestag, VII. election period, 38. session, 6.6.1973; cf. Berlinghoff, note 5, pp. 236–242. 174 Marcel BERLINGHOFF Epilogue Only in February 1975 did the Technical Committee make a start on treating the topic of a coordinated migration policy.78 By this time, the member states avoided public discussions, because of the delicate question of free movement for Turkish migrant workers which, according to the association treaty, was to be implemented in a tenyear transitional period.79 Similar questions were discussed for the associated Maghreb countries. Finally, after a delay of more than three years, in May 1976 the 'migration policy' working group of the Advisory Committee met for the first time.80 However, the premises for a successful outcome had now definitely changed. There was deep disagreement about several basic questions underlying the programme. Should the content of migration policy be about immigration, i.e., border control (as the French government delegate Riddell proposed)? Or was it rather an aimed integration policy (as the trade union delegates wanted)? Were binding rules the goal to strive for, or did cooperation just mean continual exchange of ideas and policy concepts? Even who should be considered as a third-country migrant worker was unclear. At the end of the year, there was no longer even a consensus about the need for a common migration policy.81 In these circumstances, the Commission was obliged to admit that establishing a European immigration regime for third-country nationals was unlikely in the near future. In the report of the working group in 1978, it conceded that ‘la concertation ne peut être contraignante pour les états membres’.82 For the time being, the project of a liberal common European immigration policy had failed. 78. Cf. CADN, RP Bruxelles, 2878, V/878/76-F. 79. BA, B149 21659, Protokoll der Sitzung des Fachausschuß EG-Freizügigkeit am 19.2.1975, V/ 243/75; cf. Berlinghoff, note 5, pp. 71–73. 80. CADN, RP Bruxelles, 2878, V/710/76. 81. Ibid, V/1342/76. 82. Ibid., V/878/78, p. 5. Labour migration: common market essential or common problem? The EC Committees and European immigration stops in the early 1970s 175 Through the Iron Curtain. The 1974 Polish-Swedish Treaty covering travel without visas and its consequences Paweł JAWORSKI Abstract In 1971, the leaders of the Polish Communist Party mentioned Sweden as a country with which Poland wanted to have closer relations. The party soon adopted a complex programme to stimulate cooperation with Sweden as a country with highly developed industry, a partner in buying modern technologies, machines and devices of high quality. The 1974 treaty about travelling without visas was one of the most important agreements. The Polish government intended mostly to encourage Swedish tourism, in fact the agreement had unexpected political, social and economic consequences, as it produced waves of economic and political emigration, and diplomatic and political problems with Sweden following discrimination towards Polish emigrants of Jewish origin. In 1981, the numbers of Poles coming to Sweden looking for work increased greatly. However, in December 1981, when martial law was introduced in Poland, the authorities one-sidedly cancelled the visa-free treaty. In May 1982, also Sweden reimposed visas on Polish nationals, conditions for travelling worsened radically and the numbers of travellers decreased on both sides. Introduction Migration abroad is one of the most important issues in the history of Poland, making it a popular research subject. The Communist period was long terra incognita, and for many years very little was known about it. It was only during the 1980s and 1990s that a wave of publications emerged, based on statistics from research on the last migrations.1 Next came detailed dissertations focusing in particular on Polish migrants to Germany,2 many of which concerned the emigration of Polish Jews.3 There was particular interest in Poles who had escaped the Communist dictatorship, i.e. ordinary citizens, but there was also information on military officers and civil ser- 1. W. Misiak, Nowe formy zaradności młodzieży. Emigracja a przemieszczenia społeczne, Toruń 1988. E. Marek, Emigracja z Polski z uwzględnieniem pracowników polskich za granicą, Warszawa 1992. 2. S. Jankowiak, Wysiedlenie i emigracja ludności niemieckiej w polityce władz polskich w latach 1945-1970, Warszawa 2005. 3. See articles by Grzegorz Berendt and Albert Stankowski. 177 vants.4 Statistics gradually emerged and the demographic effects of migrations could be presented. One interesting topic is the question of tourism and cross-border contacts of people within the Communist bloc.5 An important problem connected with migration was the passport policy in countries in the Soviet sphere of influence.6 For a long time, however, Polish migration to Sweden was not investigated, and it was only in the 1990s that Swedish historians first attempted research on the subject. It is only even more recently that a work has been published by a Polish author on the period after the Second World War.7 However, the period between 1974 and 1982 is only presented in a limited way, although its significance in mutual relationships (and also within the context of the mobility of peoples) is indisputable. The purpose of the present work is to analyse the effects of the 1974 Polish- Swedish Treaty, covering the opportunities that travelling without visas brought for the citizens of both countries. The main sources used are documents from the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, complemented by press articles and the memoirs of one Polish migrant. Poland and Sweden after the Second World War When Europe was divided by the Iron Curtain after the Second World War, Poland and Sweden found themselves on opposite sides. For Poland, the profound geopolitical changes meant the loss of independence and also of territory. Sweden defended its borders successfully and was never invaded. After the war, and for the sake of maintaining a political and military balance in Scandinavia, Sweden decided to remain neutral. Poland became part of Eastern Europe under Soviet control, with the Communists in power. The course of mutual relations during the first years after 1945 was determined by the needs of both sides: Poland sought political recognition, and Sweden needed Polish coal. Relations gradually deteriorated as the Cold War confrontation between West and East escalated, although they were better than with other Western countries, because Sweden tried to implement the policy of ‘equidistance’ between East and West. As a neutral country, Sweden wished to play the role of mediator between political and military blocs and maintain good relations with both sides. 4. M. Bortlik-Dźwierzyńska, M. Niedurny-, Uciekinierzy z PRL, Katowice-Warszawa 2009; L. Pawlikowicz, Tajny front zimnej wojny. Uciekinierzy z polskich służb specjalnych 1956-1964, Warszawa 2004; W. Modrakowski, Ucieczki z PRL. Kto, jak, dlaczego? Aspekty prawno-kryminologiczne, Warszawa 1992. 5. See research by Jerzy Kochanowski. 6. D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949-1989, Warszawa 2012. 7. A. Kłonczyński, „My w Szwecji nie porastamy mchem…” Emigranci z Polski do Szwecji w latach 1945-1980, Gdańsk 2012. 178 Paweł JAWORSKI The first long-term trade agreement was signed in 1961. It stated that, over the following three years, Poland was to export metallurgical and textile products, machine tools, building equipment, furniture, agricultural machinery and, traditionally, coal. Sweden was to export iron ore, machines and various machine tools. The Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson visited Warsaw in 1964 – the first diplomatic visit from a major Swedish politician since 1935. Two years later, the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki visited Stockholm. Polish and Swedish diplomats found a common language in disarmament and the creation of nuclear-free zones. These cordial relations resulted in a visit by the Swedish Prime minister Tage Erlander to Warsaw in 1967 and the opening of the Świnoujście-Ystad ferry line one year later. Mutual rapprochement from the late 1960s was due to the improved atmosphere in the international arena (despite the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968) and to the gradual development of relations between Sweden and the states of the Eastern bloc. The will to forge closer mutual ties was also stronger in Poland. In his speech of March 1971, the leader of the Polish communist party, Edward Gierek, mentioned France and Sweden as countries with which Poland sought closer relations. He tried to convince Swedish diplomats and politicians that “a great Polish industrial potential offers a real and firm base for the development of trade and cooperation between our two countries in the scientific, technical and cultural areas”.8 In May 1972, the Polish Communist party adopted a complex programme to stimulate cooperation with Sweden, a country with highly developed industry. This would make Sweden a good partner when the question arose of buying modern technologies, machines and devices of the highest quality.9 Mutual trade increased more than threefold during this period, and both sides appeared to be interested in continuing cooperation. It is worth noting that there was no actual tradition of wider Polish-Swedish political relations, and the activity recorded from the early 1970s was a completely new phenomenon. The Polish Prime Minister visited Stockholm for the first time in 1972 and, in the brief period between 1972 and 1975, as many as twelve Polish ministers visited Sweden and six Swedish ministers visited Poland. Swedish trade unions initiated contacts with Polish trade unions, and parliamentary delegations also began to exchange visits and views. Sweden began its relations with Poland as a model for those with all the other East European countries. Both sides were interested in signing agreements which would confirm ongoing cordial relationships with each other. 8. AMSZ (Polish Foreign Office Archive, Warszawa), D IV, 46/77 w. 8, S. Bejm: A note, 10.3.1972. 9. AMSZ, D IV, 45/77 w. 8, A visit of the Prime Minister to Sweden, [1972]. Through the Iron Curtain. The 1974 Polish-Swedish Treaty covering travel without visas and its consequences 179 No visas from 1974 The treaty between Poland and Sweden allowing travel without visas, signed on 9 April 1974, was one of the most important agreements. The populations of both countries did not need to obtain visas if they wished to stay in the territory of the other country for no longer than three months. The agreement came into effect on June 1 of the same year.10 The agreement with Sweden was an attempt by Poland to open up their borders to the rest of the world. As a neutral country, Sweden had adopted a policy of bridging the gap betweeen the Eastern and Western political blocs, and therefore appeared to be an ideal partner, positioned as it was between more liberal countries and the hermetically closed Eastern bloc. The Polish authorities actively encouraged more tourism and increased the popularity of the ferry lines crossing the Baltic. However, the ministries (especially the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) engaged in preparing the treaty did not consider any of the social problems which might arise. It should be noted that the restrictive passport system between the countries was still in operation, thus limiting the possibility of their respective citizens from travelling abroad. The Polish authorities also increased the currency rate and applied charges for issuing passports to discourage travel. There were also further difficulties in travelling – for example, those who had been outside their country of origin were required to return their passports to the issuing office within one week of their return and then had to ask for them back again before their next journey abroad. People wishing to travel were never certain that their travel applications would be successful, and they might not be able to get their passports back. Nor were the rules clear about the conditions for travel applications, as the rules and regulations were not made public.11 In the broader context, the treaty with Sweden was a test for agreements between small countries and between states with differing political and social systems, and this was highlighted during the negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Poland signed similar agreements with other neutral countries such as Austria (1972) and Finland (1973). After the agreement had been signed, in June and July 1974 there were increases of, respectively, 8% and 15% in travellers boarding the ferry to Poland than during the previous year. The first analysis of the effects of the agreement in August 1974 also showed that more Poles travelled to Sweden. In 1973, before the agreement, 13,000 Poles had done so, but this figure rose to more than 22,000 in 1975 and more than 32,000 in 1977 (two-thirds of these journeys were private visits, and 10% of travellers were students). The number of Swedes coming to Poland increased from 43,000 in 1973 to 80,000 in 1977.12 10. AMSZ, D IV, 19/79 w. 22, T. Janicki (Consular Department) to embassies, 10.5.1974. 11. Zob. Stola, op. cit., chapter 7. 12. AMSZ, D IV, 2/84 w. 2, Col. W. Szarszewski (Ministry of Internal Affairs): Information about traffic of the population between Poland-Sweden 1973–1977, 24.2.1978. 180 Paweł JAWORSKI On the Świnoujście-Ystad route, two car ferries came into use in 1974 and 1977, and a seasonal line was started from Gdańsk to Nynäshamn in 1974. The number of air links from Warsaw to Stockholm of the Polish airline LOT was increased (to three times a week from 1976) and two additional connections were made by the Scandinavian airline SAS (1975). In 1975, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs was very surprised to discover that Poles had arrived in Sweden without visas, and had not been expelled after three months. On the contrary, they had been issued with residence and work permits, and occasionally also received political asylum.13 However, during the 1970s it was unusual for this type of situation to occur, as Communist Poland was generally considered as ‘a country without exit’.14 For years, the Communist authorities had been inflexible about their borders, limiting the flow of information across them and dissuading citizens from leaving the country.15 A period of détente concerning relations between East and West followed, and this was formally set out at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975. The process made it increasingly possible to forge personal contacts beyond the Iron Curtain. Jewish immigrants, people’s right to join their families, and ensuing diplomatic problems At one point, the Swedish press published an article commenting in detail on the discrimination of former Polish nationals of Jewish origin. It concerned some of the 15,000 Polish Jews who decided to leave Poland after a shameful anti-Semitic campaign in 1968. These Polish immigrants had attempted to return to visit Poland, but were not allowed to enter. When Swedish journalists tried to verify the story, the Polish consulate in Malmö denied that Jews were especially targeted.16 The Polish diplomats explained that ethnic origin was not the problem, and that the refusal of entry to Poland concerned single, undesirable persons who were known for their anti- Polish activities. During the visit of the Swedish Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin to Warsaw in 1978, an unusual event occurred, when a group of seven Polish emigrants travelled on the same aircraft as the Swedish delegation, together with a group of journalists. The border guards refused to allow the emigrants to enter Poland. However, after loud protests and pleas made to the Swedish journalists about the obvious injustice of the situation, three of the Poles (who were Swedish citizens) were allowed across 13. AMSZ, D IV, 17/81 w. 11, Report: Polish-Swedish relations, no date. 14. This is the title of the book by Dariusz Stola on the problem of migration from Poland after WWII: Dariusz Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949-1989, Warszawa 2012. 15. Ibidem, s. 47. 16. AMSZ, D IV, sygn. 17/81 w. 11, Report: Polish-Swedish bilateral relations, no date. Through the Iron Curtain. The 1974 Polish-Swedish Treaty covering travel without visas and its consequences 181 the border, but the other four were turned back.17 At the same time, in the port of Świnoujście, 13 Polish emigrants of Jewish origin, who had travelled by ferry, were also turned back.18 This ignited a diplomatic dispute. The premise of the Polish border guards was simple: for years, Polish authorities had made it very clear that emigrants of Jewish origin were not welcome back in Poland. Any attempt to return (especially when connected with the presence of the Swedish media) was therefore regarded as provocation.19 For the Jewish emigrants who were not allowed to return to Poland, although they were not involved in any political activity, this was a clear case of discrimination. One commented to the press: ”We were stopped, because we are Jews”.20 One Swedish journalist speculated that the Polish authorities were simply trying to provoke a Swedish reaction and that this might lead to renunciation of the visa-free traffic treaty.21 Some journalists called for a boycott of Poland, “in the same way that we boycotted the dictatorships in Greece and Spain and as we are now boycotting the racist regime in South Africa!” This might mean that it would no longer be possible to visit Poland, because “cheap goods are also available in other countries”.22 Many Swedes did travel to Poland to take full advantage of lower prices and cheaper goods. It is probable that the Polish authorities did not consider all the ramifications of allowing free entry and travel for former citizens of the Polish People’s Republic. They left with special one-way travel documents and were not welcome back. Meanwhile, after a period of five years, they were able to obtain new – Swedish – citizenship. Most of this group of Polish emigrants to Sweden, numbering between 3,000 and 3,500, exploited the opportunity and later tried to enter Poland to meet family members or friends. The border officials noted these people immediately and reacted in a way which was typical of a Communist dictatorship – to show that those Poles were no longer wanted in their old country. In the meantime, the problem of human rights was becoming increasingly relevant in Sweden's attitude to Poland. As one of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs officials commented: “Sweden is laying stress on the issues of "human rights" [original quotation marks]. They more often than in the past make particular countries feel that their attitude to them depends on their arbitrary evaluation of the observance of these rights as indispensable elements of the process of détente. It seems to be also a 17. Lennart Lindbom, Två judar avvisades när Fälldin anlände, „Svenska Dagbladet”, 13.4.1978; Polska polisen måste förklara sig, „Aftonbladet”, 13.4.1978. 18. Claes Sturm, Tretton polacker vägrades inresa, „Dagens Nyheter”, 12.4.1978; Åke Ekdahl, Fälldin vällsedd gäst i Polen. Irriterad över avvisningarna, „Dagens Nyheter”, 12.4.1978; Peter Martinsson, Polskfödda judar (svenska medborgare) stoppade i Polen. Avvisade utan motivering, „Arbetet”, 20.4.1978. 19. IPN (Institute for National Remembrance, Warsaw), BU 1268/25482, Col. Edward Tarała (Border Guards) to Gen. A. Krzysztoporski (Ministry for Internal Affairs), 12.4.1978. 20. Piotr Szybek, Varför avvisades judarna? „Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten”, 19.4.1978. 21. Ingmar Lindmarker, Kampanj utan folkligt stöd, „Svenska Dagbladet”, 20.9.1978; Per Ahlmark upprörd: Säg upp polsk-svenska avtalet, „Arbetet”, 1.09.1978. 22. Tacka för avvisningar genom bojkott, „Arbetet”, 25.6.1978. 182 Paweł JAWORSKI background of the case of alleged discrimination of persons from the [Jewish] emigration of 1968 in our entry politics”.23 At first the matter was avoided in Polish governmental circles. The protests were considered to have been formulated by marginal political groups without any influence. The question of human rights (discussed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was generally treated as a matter subordinate to other principles, such as internal legal order. Poland was, first of all, interested in obtaining the recognition of the status quo after the war, especially as regarded borders and political order. The problem of former Polish citizens of Jewish origin was, however, the signal that the Conference might lead to consequences which were unintended and unforeseen by Polish diplomats. The range of human rights was significantly wide. It was not treated as one of the internal affairs of a particular state. In this way, the development of the opposition and the evolution of Communist states towards democracy was exacerbated.24 The so-called “family reunification problem” was also a delicate and complex issue. The no visa requirement facilitated the trip to Sweden of single parent with a child or children, who did not intend to stay in contact with the parent who had remained in Poland. Sometimes it was a question of emigration without the consent of the second parent. Swedish authorities often refused to give information about the newcomers, explaining that they wanted to protect the children. There were also varying kinds of situations, in which some parents had decided to emigrate, and then were going to move the rest of the family to Sweden. Sometimes, however, the rest of the family had not, for example, received passports from the authorities and demands for them from the Polish People's Republic were not answered. Sometimes people became so desperate that – shocking Swedish public opinion – they resorted to hunger strikes in front of Polish diplomatic and consular buildings.25 The Polish side tried to convince the Swedes that their decisions should not be guided only by the protesters' because, as they explained, “the majority of Swedish interventions concerns Polish nationals who have their rights, but also duties towards our country”.26 Sweden as a platform for Polish democratic opposition The non-visa agreement, facilitating movement between Sweden and Poland, led to a feverish renewal of activity on the part of the anti-Communist Polish groups. Geographical closeness, the relatively simple trip across the sea, and passing through 23. AMSZ, D IV 1/84 w. 8, A note: Poland-Sweden relations, no date. 24. Wanda Jarząbek, Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie. Plany i rzeczywistość 1964-1975, Warszawa 2008, s. 174-175. 25. Polacker hungerstrejkar, „Dagens Nyheter”, 5.05.1978. 26. AMSZ, D IV 1/84 w. 8, A note: Poland-Sweden relations, no date./undated. Through the Iron Curtain. The 1974 Polish-Swedish Treaty covering travel without visas and its consequences 183 only one border without a visa, meant that Sweden became the mid-point between the Polish democratic opposition and the free world. Polish emigration circles made this method of communication effective. They sent basic information about the opposition to Western Europe, but also made the democratic movement in Poland popular in Sweden. They asked Swedish institutions and organisations to invite representatives of the opposition and arranged for them to meet press representatives. They smuggled money, printing equipment and other materials, and prepared information bulletins for Swedish readers. In 1976, some Poles joined the East European Solidarity Committee, founded in Stockholm by emigrants from the Baltic States. From that year onwards, they had a partner in Poland – the Workers’ Defence Committee – and concentrated their activity in this direction by improving relations with it. First of all, a special bulletin was published and press releases concerning repressions against the opposition were sent to newspapers. In June 1976, a booklet about social protest in Poland was distributed.27 The Swedish branch of Amnesty International used this booklet and published its own report about the situation in Poland in 1977. In the same year, it started writing letters to the Polish authorities, protesting against the arrest of members of KOR.28 The emigrants organised demonstrations and tried to help refugees who were seeking political asylum in Sweden.29 They appealed to the Swedish government to defend rights in Poland. All this activity increased at particular moments – for example, during visits by Polish officials to Stockholm. The fact that the Swedish social democrats had become interested in Polish concerns was one of the emigrants' great successes. The editor of the widely read periodical Tiden, Sten Johansson, became the closest Swedish collaborator of KOR. He visited Poland in 1977 and 1979 and participated in illegal meetings.30 Gunnar Myrdal, who had been awarded the 1974 Nobel Prize for economics, accompanied him on one occasion. Some Swedes were active smugglers. In 1979, Sven Laquist, a Swede entering Poland as a tourist, was arrested for attempting to bring in a simple printer for KOR. The escape – to Sweden, of course – of Tomasz Strzyżewski, an employee of the censorship office, became an additional reason to arouse interest in Polish issues and the reality of everyday life under the Communist regime. Now it was easier to show how the authorities were manipulating the media in Poland.31 27. Dokument från oroligheterna i Polen sommaren 1976. 28. ARAB, Lucjan Szulkins samling, vol. 3, A copy of a letter Amnesty International, 27.5.1977. 29. Protest mot öst-förtryck, „Dagens Nyheter”, 27.2.1977. 30. See: Kronika szwedzka, „Kultura” (paryska), nr 3 (378), 1979, s. 166–167; A. Friszke, Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945–1980, Londyn 1994, s. 446; Kryptonim „Pegaz”. Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec Towarzystwa Kursów Naukowych 1978–1980, wybór, wstęp i opracowanie Łukasz Kamiński i Grzegorz Waligóra, Warszawa 2008, s. 229–230, 236–237, 243–245, 300, 365; Niepokorni. Rozmowy o Komitecie Obrony Robotników. Relacje członków i współpracowników Komitetu Obrony Robotników zebrane w 1981 roku przez Andrzeja Friszke i Andrzeja Paczkowskiego, Kraków 2008, s. 304. 31. Per Sjögren, DN fortsätter avslöjandena om censuren i Östeuropa. ‘Informationen får inte vara för entusiastisk om Sverige-Palme’, „Dagens Nyheter”, 5.12.1977; Tomasz Strzyzewski var censor i Polen: Så föfljugs verkligheten, „Arbetet”, 25.2.1978. 184 Paweł JAWORSKI There is no doubt that Sweden became a platform for KOR, to inform Western public opinion about the situation in Poland, representing it as a state without democracy and demonstrating the actual conditions in which its citizens were obliged to live.32 Illegal workers Polish diplomats quickly noted that some Poles, during their stays in Sweden, had been looking for odd jobs, although none of them went to the consulates to obtain permission for employment. They did not see any problem because, as one of the diplomats stated: “there would be no tragedy, if Polish nationals during their legal stay in Sweden earned a few crowns”.33 It was quite easy to find jobs in Sweden, especially for students, because they did not need permission during the summer holidays. They usually harvested strawberries and other fruit, but often accepted any kind of physical work. Poles were not going there on holiday to have a little rest from their toil, although officially they pretended to be tourists. A picturesque description of their activity was made by one of them in the memoir ‘Na czarno’ (Illegal Work): … Little Fiats with Polish number plates are coming. It is 6 o’clock. The gate is still closed, no entry. There are 25 people to collect strawberries. 20 of them are Poles. Five – Swedes. The rate for a basket – 13 crowns. Daily efficiency (collecting ends at 2 p.m.) from 8 to 12 baskets. It depends on luck. If the row is rich – it will be 12. There is no time for rest. After two hours it’s hard to straighten up. But nobody decides for gymnastics. The strawberry season is short and the time should be used as much as possible. (…) The farmer is casting a friendly eye at Poles. There is a great hope connected only with them.34 Although the farmers knew the dangers they ran in exposing themselves to police looking for illegal workers, the fines were usually lower than the profits made by employing Poles. The system was simple. Here is another example: “The work is easy, but until now nobody has wanted to do it. You have to pour sawdust with sand into foil sacks, tie them up and put them on the pile. The salary? One crown per sack. (…) Why don't the Swedes work? Because they want two crowns per sack.”35 The Poles were satisfied with their wages in spite of everything and on condition that the employer was honest. It is an unpleasant fact that illegal workers could never be sure about being paid.36 However, gradually some critical voices in Sweden did make themselves heard, saying that Poles, coming so easily, very often looked for jobs illegally, especially in agriculture. Some farmers offered jobs to Poles who worked hard for low wages. One 32. Polens huvudvärk, „Dagens Nyheter”, 22.1.1977. 33. AMSZ, D IV, sygn. 19/79 w. 22, W. Bołtacz, A note, 15.8.1974. 34. Mirosław Prandota, „Na czarno”, Warszawa 1987, s. 61. 35. Ibidem, s. 66–67. 36. Ibidem, s. 140–141. Through the Iron Curtain. The 1974 Polish-Swedish Treaty covering travel without visas and its consequences 185 of the Swedish farmers (cabbage producers) explained to the reporter of the daily newspaper „Arbetet" that his role was to secure the presence of workers who collected crops efficiently. And Polish employees were perfect, doing seasonal work. It is true that generally, in spite of the physical effort and working conditions which diverged from Swedish norms, the Poles were satisfied, because they could earn enough to go to Poland and exchange Swedish crowns for Polish currency with profit. Poles working in the Western countries could even earn 20 average Polish salaries.37 The trade unions, however, demanded similar levels of pay for everyone, protested at the way the farmers treated the Poles and, on this occasion, proposed to abolish visa-free traffic.38 In 1981, Swedish journalists told the story of a Pole who was employed in an orchard near Stockholm. In spite of the low pay, he was able to earn 35,000 crowns in eight months. Since the income was not reported to the tax office, no tax, amounting to about 30%, was paid, this was a typical case of evasion. The police recorded cases which sometimes ended with deportation for breaking the law about hiring foreigners. The black economy was regarded as a serious social problem and the police were trying to counteract it.39 The Polish authorities resented roundups against Poles who could easily travel to Sweden as tourists and then worked there illegally. A bad atmosphere developed around Polish workers, combined with accusations that they were spies. One police action against house-to-house sellers in 1979 had repercussions throughout the country. The Swedish police were accused by Polish diplomats of being looking for easy success. Restrictions on Poles were regarded as the result of job market problems. Only in the 1980s did the Swedish authorities looked properly after Poles who came to Sweden for a couple of days, trying to sell alcohol to passers-by in the streets or parks. The Swedish police appealed to Polish travel agencies to limit such short trade trips.40 Polish-Swedish marriages Another social problem, which arose as a consequence of intensive contacts after the establishment of the regular ferry connection and the signing of the 1974 treaty, was that a relatively high number of Polish-Swedish marriages took place. This was not characteristic only for migrants to Sweden, but also to Belgium, Holland and Italy. However, according to Dariusz Stola, the case of Sweden was the most interesting, because until the 1970s it had not been a very popular destination for Polish mi- 37. Stola, op. cit., s. 307. 38. Lantarbetarna har tröttnat på svart arbetskraft. ‘Återinför visumtvång’, „Arbetet”, 15.11.1979; Bo A. Ericsson, 10 000 polacker i svartjobb, „Dagens Nyheter”, 27.11.1979. 39. Leif Dahlin, Åtta månader i Sverige, Svartjobbande polack sparade 35 000 kr, „Dagens Nyheter”, 28.4.1981. 40. Stola, op. cit., s. 379. 186 Paweł JAWORSKI grants.41 One common view of this problem was banal. People believed that Polish women liked getting married to foreigners and the Swedes were sure that Polish women were “good and thrifty”.42 Soon it appeared that there were relatively frequent divorces of Polish women who had married Swedes. Although the numbers of divorces among immigrants were higher than in Swedish marriages, it was highest among Polish immigrants. The Swedish Immigration Office ascertained that the problem usually began when couples got married after a short acquaintance, made after answering newspaper adverts. Swedes usually published matrimonial advertisements in Polish newspapers and many Polish women answered. Sweden became a destination for 400-600 Polish women – marriage emigrants mostly from three districts, Gdańsk, Szczecin and Warsaw.43 Research showed that the Swedish husbands were sometimes men who had problems in relationships with women. In the worst cases, they used physical violence, and some examples of sexual abuse were also registered. In 1979, about 20,000 divorces were recorded in Sweden, i.e., 1.1% of married women divorced their husbands. The rate for Poles was 4.9%, Finns were next with 2.2%, and then Yugoslavs with 2%.44 The scale of this phenomenon requires further sociological research. The end of the treaty in 1981-82 In summer 1981, the numbers of Poles coming to Sweden increased still further. This was yet another feature of the general trend of Polish migrants coming to Western countries because of economic problems and the reaction of other Communist countries against 'the Polish plague' of freedom. An open democratic opposition was in fact created in Poland and, in 1980, the struggle for freedom led to the eruption of the mass movement called 'Solidarity'. Poland's Communist neighbours closed their borders. Meanwhile, the shortage of essential supplies, the poor economic situation and the lack of prospects induced Poles to leave their country. Obtaining passports and permits for departures was made much easier than before August 1980, because of social pressures. Between April and December of that year, several hundred thousand Poles obtained passports. They could go to Western countries to improve their economic situation, and Sweden, Austria and Finland were still the only Western European countries where visas were not required. Visas were not an obstacle for Poles to move to Germany, France or other countries, although Sweden and Austria were popular as transit places in order to travel farther. To facilitate the passage of Poles expected to arrive (in summer 1981 they totalled 12,500), refugee camps in Austria had already been set up. The Poles sought to remain in the West not only for economic 41. Ibidem, s. 209. 42. Prandota, s. 128–129. 43. Stola, op. cit., s. 209. 44. Margit Silberstein, Nya siffror från SCB. Flest skilmässor bland polackerna, „Svenska Dagbladet”, 1.12.1980. Through the Iron Curtain. The 1974 Polish-Swedish Treaty covering travel without visas and its consequences 187 reasons, but because they were afraid of possible Soviet intervention in Poland and of raising political chaos in their native country. In July 1981, the Board of Polish Refugees, a Polish immigrant organisation in Stockholm, announced that, according to its research, about 150 Poles every day were trying to obtain status as political refugees in Sweden. Many of them were sent back to Poland.45 A few days after December 13 1981, when martial law was introduced in Poland (to stop the dismantling of the Communist regime), the Swedish authorities assured Poles that they would not be sent back to Poland, even if they had no passports or money, and their earlier applications for permanent residence had been rejected or even not yet made. On December 17, the Polish authorities unilaterally renounced the visa-free traffic treaty with Sweden, Austria and Finland. On February 1 1982, the Swedish government declared that, in view of the unusual situation in Poland, all Poles trying to obtain asylum in Sweden would be accepted and able to stay. The Immigration Office expected that only Poles who were already in Sweden would like to remain, since after December 13 it was hard to leave Poland. They were therefore not expecting a surge in the number of refugees.46 Sometimes, however, the press described particular cases, such as the couple from the town of Przemyśl on their honeymoon in Yugoslavia who, hearing the news about martial law in Poland, decided to go to Stockholm and ask for political asylum there. They explained that Sweden was closest to Poland and was a state which they did not need visas to enter.47 The press was soon full of news about groups of Poles who went to police stations in Sweden to request political asylum. As expected, they were mainly Polish citizens already living in Sweden. Only a small group of people came by ferry to Ystad, some being employees of the ferry service.48 In May 1982, the Swedish Immigration Office warned that a new wave of Polish refugees would be coming and suggested following Poland and reintroducing visas.49 At that very moment, a large group of Solidarity activists left internment camps in Poland and 130 of them asked to travel to Sweden. They were accepted, but the Swedish authorities were afraid they would soon be followed by economic immigrants. When visas were not required, many people took the opportunity to arrive as tourists and then tried to stay on permanently.50 It soon became obvious that the one-sided Polish renouncement of the treaty would meet a similar response from Sweden. Within a few weeks, 62 people appeared at the border with one-way tickets, without permission to return. It seemed that the Polish government had found a way of getting rid of personae non gratae – just send them 45. Agneta Rolfer, Nio av tio asylsökningar avslås. Tusentals polacker flyr matbrist, „Dagens Nyheter”, 28.7.1981. 46. Polisen får ej utvisa polacker från Sverige, „Dagens Nyheter”, 15.12.1981. 47. Christina Kellberg, Avbröt bröllopsresan. Elzbieta och Jerzy söker politisk asyl, „Dagens Nyheter”, 15.12.1981. 48. Bo Engzell, Risk för flyktingtragedier. 60 sökte asyl i Skåne, „Dagens Nyheter”, 15.12.1981. 49. Invandrarverket: Kräv visum av polacker, „Dagens Nyheter”, 11.5.1982. 50. Sven Öste, Invandrarverket bafarar ny polsk flyktingström, „Dagens Nyheter”, 13.5.1982. 188 Paweł JAWORSKI to the Swedish border. Discussions started about how the Swedish authorities should react. On April 1 1982, polemical speeches were made in the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ola Ullsten, wanted to maintain the status quo. He thought it was not possible to imply that Sweden did not care about the fate of the political opposition in Poland, and hoped that Polish authorities would respect the treaty. However, the argument of Carl Bildt, representing the Conservative Party, sounded logical and more convincing. He had agreed with the decision since December but now he was sure that the situation had changed, because it was obvious that the Polish authorities intended to control their citizens and restrict their travelling abroad. In Bildt’s opinion, they started obliging unwanted people to leave the country, and Sweden became their destination precisely because of its easy visa-free access. He feared that the same situation could soon repeat itself, as it had in Austria, where the numbers of Polish refugees had increased to 24,000. Lastly, he added, visa-free entry to Sweden was easier for Polish security services, which now concentrated their search for Polish political emigrants in Sweden.51 The result was that, on May 13 1982, the Swedish government re-imposed visa requirements for Polish nationals. For a few months, Sweden hoped that the treaty could survive, but finally realised that the influx of Poles from Austria and Germany had to be stopped. Minister Ullsten added that this decision ‘should be regarded as the protest against attempts to expel inconvenient persons by the military regime from Poland’. The head of the Immigration Office, Thord Palmlund, explained that the fact of introducing visa requirements for Poles so late should be recognised as a gesture of sympathy towards the democratic opposition in Poland. Conclusions In this way, the whole period of eight years of mutual relations came to an end. The 1974 treaty was the result of good relations and a signal from both sides that they wished to develop contacts in the future. The treaty stimulated such contacts between institutions and individual persons. Until 1978, students could work without special permits. No visas meant that the earning capacity of the ferry lines increased. It is sufficient to state that the numbers of Swedish citizens coming to Poland increased from 35,000 in 1970 to 80,000 in 1979, and Polish citizens coming to Sweden increased from 6-7000 to 36,000 in the same period.52 Now travelling conditions had worsened radically and the numbers certainly decreased on both sides (only private visits of Poles to Sweden fell from 39,000 in 1981 to 7,000 in 1982). The Polish Foreign Office and Ministry of Finance, however, even supported this attitude to- 51. AMSZ, D IV 8/86 w. 7, Paweł Cieślar (ambassador in Stockholm) to Polish Foreign Office, 6.04.1982. 52. AMSZ, D IV 43/84 w. 9, A note: Polish-Swedish consular relations, 9.06.1980. Through the Iron Curtain. The 1974 Polish-Swedish Treaty covering travel without visas and its consequences 189 wards issuing visas, because they expected high income from visa charges.53 This did not change the Swedish authorities' attitude to the Polish refugees who asked for political asylum; they confirmed that all Poles who wanted to stay in Sweden could do so. In the end, about 2,000 people decided to stay permanently.54 The end of the 1974 treaty came together with the announcement of martial law in Poland in December 1981. The country closed against the external world, returning to the concept of the 'closed state', at least for a certain period. Personal contacts were always regarded by dictatorial authorities as dangerous for a state. When the Polish government and the party decided to liberalise their policy in the early 1970s, they probably thought that the negative consequences of the change (from the centre of power) could be minimalised and wanted to subordinate human rights to the principle of internal laws. However, the opposite occurred: Western countries, following the 1975 Final Act of the CSCE, demanded that basic civil rights should be applied. Shortly afterwards, Solidarity was crushed, the Polish authorities tried to get rid of 'the political disturbers' and force the most active oppositionists to leave the country. Only a few thousand did so. A few hundred went to Sweden. We are still no sure how many of them really emigrated. 53. AMSZ, D IV 45/84 w. 6, A note, no date. 54. According to Polish embassy in Stockholm from the end of 1982 asylum was granted to 2700 persons. See: AMSZ, D IV 8/86 w. 7, Report of the Polish Embassy in Stockholm for the year 1982. 190 Paweł JAWORSKI Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act Giulia BENTIVOGLIO Abstract This chapter investigates the origins, the implications, and the legacy of the 1981 British Nationality Act at the domestic and international levels. Britain has traditionally been one of the great emigration countries, yet after the Second World War this trend started to reverse as the conditions for post-war immigration from the New Commonwealth developed. Gradually a campaign to limit immigration gained support, and a series of immigration control measures were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, together with a move towards a more restrictive definition of “Citizenship”. As for the Thatcher government, the introduction of a new British Nationality Act to define entitlement to British citizenship was not only the fulfilment of an electoral promise, but was also part of a wider strategy of revival of British nationhood, a prominent theme in Thatcherism. The chapter furthermore focuses on the analysis of the political support for the new legislation, which seemed to transcend party divisions and to be an element of consensus that Mrs Thatcher was eager to exploit. Introduction One factor in Thatcher’s electoral victory in 1979 was her commitment to a reduction of immigration. The Conservative Party claimed that British society was threatened, while workers feared competition from immigrants. In this context, the most notable solution adopted by the Thatcher government was a new definition of British citizenship that stopped the long-standing claims of Commonwealth residents. The introduction of a new British Nationality Act to define entitlement to British citizenship had already been part of the 1979 Conservative Manifesto and the government bill saw the light two years later, in 1981, and became effective in 1983. The Nationality Act of 1981 defined British citizenship as something other than being a subject of the Queen. Full British citizenship went to people who resided in Britain or were closely related to citizens. The eligibility of Commonwealth immigrants for citizenship was restricted to people with one parent or grandparent born in the United Kingdom, thus modifying the application of jus soli in British nationality. The Act removed the imperial obligations of Civis Britannicus sum under which all colonial and Commonwealth citizens were British subjects with full rights of citizenship. 191 This chapter investigates the origins, the implications, and the legacy of the Nationality Act at the domestic and international levels. The chapter will also focus on analysis of the political support for the new legislation, which seemed to transcend party divisions and to be an element of consensus that Mrs Thatcher was eager to exploit. Nationality and immigration in post-war Britain The new Nationality Act of 1981 replaced the 1948 British Nationality Act, which was part of the reformed system of citizenship laws produced in the course of the post-war settlement of the Commonwealth. Although historiography has focused mainly on migration flows towards the UK, Britain has traditionally been one of the great emigration countries, in particular to the United States, Canada, Australasia, and South Africa. By the beginning of the twentieth century, emigration had become an important part of imperial policy. This trend reversed briefly only in the 1930s, when earlier emigrants returned to the UK during the Great Depression, while emigration resumed at a high level after the Second World War.1 This conflict represented a watershed, providing both the stimulus and the necessary conditions for post-war immigration from the New Commonwealth: large numbers of colonial servicemen and workers experienced war service in Britain under relatively favourable conditions and many of them decided to settle in the UK, despite efforts to repatriate them.2 By the end of the war, the country suffered labour shortages, which can be attributed to Britain’s need to reconstruct and the reallocation of British labour to skilled work. The Attlee Government, which took office in July 1945 after an unexpected victory over the Conservatives led by Winston Churchill, began looking for immigrants from many sources: the first groups to be allowed to settle in the UK were 1. Zig Layton-Henry, Britain: the would-be zero-immigration country, in Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin, James Hollifield (eds.), Controlling immigration. A global perspective, Stanford 2014, pp. 273-95. On the history of immigration and emigration in Britain see: Howard Glennerster, British Social Policy 1945 to the Present, Oxford 2007; Colin Holmes, John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society 1871-1971, Basingstoke 1988; Catherine Jones, Immigration and Social Policy in Britain, London 1977; Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration: 'Race' and 'Race' Relations in Post-war Britain, Oxford 1992; Ian R.G Spencer, British Immigration Policy Since 1939: The Making of Multi-racial Britain, London 1997; Panikos Panayi, An Immigration History of Modern Britain: Multicultural Racism Since 1800, Harlow 2010; Robert Winder, Bloody Foreigners: The Story of Immigration to Britain, London 2013. On the link between immigration, race and citizenship in Britain we can quote Randall Hansen, Citizenship and immigration in postwar Britain, Oxford 2000; Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era, Ithaca 1997. 2. Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration, note 1, p. 11. 192 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO 157,000 Poles, followed by workers from Southern Europe.3 However, this influx did not meet the need for workers and Britain was not able to employ enough people from the Old Continent. The Government set up a Departmental Committee “to advise whether there was any scope in the United Kingdom for the introduction under the official auspices of surplus colonial labour”; it was not found possible to promote any immigration schemes, considering the discrimination that workers from the colonies would face and the difficulties in assimilating them.4 However, the deliberations of the committee had already been overtaken by events, as immigrant ships began to arrive from the West Indies during 1948, the first, and most famous, being the “Empire Windrush”, which disembarked 492 hopeful settlers from Kingston, Jamaica at Tilbury (near London) on 22 June. That day has become an important landmark in the history of modern Britain, the iconic symbol of the beginning of British multicultural society. The “Windrush” did not lead to an immediate flow of similar voyages, as many (especially among the politicians) had feared; nevertheless, the Prime Minister was urged to make a statement in an attempt to appease anxieties but added that “if our policy were to result in a great influx of undesirables, we might, however unwillingly, have to consider modifying it”.5 Based on this scenario the 1948 British Nationality Act was developed. It created the new status of “Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies” (CUKC) for people born or naturalised in either the United Kingdom or one of its colonies, and making no distinction between people living in the UK and people living in the remaining colonies and dependencies. The 1948 Act, therefore, had no effect on immigration law, since it allowed 800 million subjects in the British Empire to live and work in the UK without needing a visa. The British case was not an isolated one: until the 1960s, the majority of European countries including Greece, Ireland, and Italy faced a similar situation. Due to the massive work force loss, recovering post-war economies of the Old Continent were in need of foreign workers. The European states adopted different strategies: on the one hand, there were countries such as Britain and France, trying to use their postcolonial ties to promote immigration; on the other hand, bilateral treaties were established with underdeveloped countries to create temporary guest-worker schemes, as in the case of West Germany, Austria and, to a certain extent, the Netherlands. As for Britain, liberal policies until the beginning of the 1960s provided for relatively unrestrained immigration opportunities from both New and Old Commonwealth 3. It was first time that a British government took positive action to assist the integration and settlement of alien residents. A Polish Resettlement Act was passed in 1947 and a Polish Resettlement Corps was established. Layton-Henry, note 2, p. 8. 4. The National Archives (from now on TNA), CAB 129/40, CP (50) 113, “Coloured People from British Colonial Territories”, 18/05/1950. 5. David Kynaston, Austerity Britain, 1945-1951, London 2008, p. 340. On the “Empire Windrush” episode see Trevor Phillips – Mike Phillips, Windrush: The Irresistible Rise of Multi-Racial Britain, New York 1999. Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 193 countries.6 However, open immigration was not sought; “unlike France, Germany, and Switzerland, the UK simply did not actively encourage large-scale migration, permanent or temporary”.7 Meanwhile, between 1956 and 1972 (excluding gap from 1966–8), the other Western European countries employed large numbers of migrant workers, mostly from Southern Europe and North Africa, and labour migration in Western Europe reached its peak by the beginning of the 1970s.8 However, gradually a campaign to control New Commonwealth immigration gained support, and a series of immigration control measures were introduced in the decade from 1961–71. There was also a move towards a more restrictive definition of “Citizenship”. The expansive notion of the “British subject” became increasingly untenable as most British subjects from the former British Empire lost their right to immigrate to the UK. Since there was no hard-and-fast definition of British Citizenship, all subjects were citizens, even though most had no right of access to the UK after the immigration laws of 1962, 1968, and 1971, which effectively weakened the 1948 scheme. In particular, only few months after the first application to enter into the EEC, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act tightened the controls, permitting only those with government-issued employment vouchers to settle in the UK. It was a first, clear move away from the Commonwealth and towards the European Community.9 Conservative ideology, race, and immigration The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, the 1971 Immigration Act, and the 1981 Nationality Act have all marked important steps with an ethnic agenda in the postimperial period in the UK. It is no surprise that they were all passed by Conservative governments. Identification with the nation and the nation state has been central themes in Conservative politics for over a century. A “One Nation” political strategy had established the Conservatives as the party of Nation, Empire and Union; the authentic voice of state patriotism built around British identity and institutions.10 The Tories have constantly represented their party as one of the nation rather than of a class, gaining electoral successes beyond its traditional class base.11 6. Sarah Wallace Goodman, Immigration policy-making in Europe, in José M. Magone, (ed.), Routledge Handbook of European Politics, Abingdon 2015, p. 810. 7. Hansen, note 1, p. 8. 8. Eytan Meyers, International Immigration Policy: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis, Basingstoke 2004, pp. 174-5 and notes. 9. David Dixon, Thatcher's People: The British Nationality Act 1981, Journal of Law and Society 10- 2 (1983), p. 162. 10. On the link between the Conservative Party and nation see Philip Lynch, The Politics of Nationhood. Sovereignty, Britishness and Conservative Politics, Basingstoke 1999. 11. See Harry Goulbourne, Ethnicity and nationalism in post-imperial Britain, Cambridge 1991, p. 114. 194 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO The Conservative definition of the “Nation”, moreover, had an ethnic emphasis. The Conservative Party has persistently stressed the ethnic dimension in its expression of a new definition of the British nation, while the Labour Party has endorsed traditional nationalism.12 However, in the 1960s, the end of the Empire, the application to enter into the European Community, devolution, and immigration called the dominant One Nation perspective into question. By the end of the decade, two contrasting positions had emerged on how to update the Conservative notion of nationhood, epitomized by Edward Heath and Enoch Powell. Heath, who was elected leader of the Conservative Party in 1965, had a strong European policy and focused on EC membership, while adopting a liberal view on race relations. On the other hand, Powell, with his nationalist outlook, proposed a post-imperial Tory strategy to preserve national identity against European integration, devolution, and immigration.13 The two politicians clashed on the immigration issue: Enoch Powell became a national figure following his “rivers of blood” speech, given in Birmingham in April 1968. On that occasion, he warned that Britain would face inevitable racial violence and eventual national disintegration due to continued large-scale immigration of non-white people into the country. The immediate reaction was a political storm, leading to his dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet by the party leader, Edward Heath.14 Behind their many and almost irreconcilable differences, both Powell and Heath believed in the need to redefine nationality. They held the same disenchanted opinion of the Commonwealth: Heath saw it as an obstacle to Britain’s national interest in Europe, while Powell considered it as a burden, which precluded the UK from formulating a sense of its own national identity beyond its former imperial commitments. For both men, immigration was a question of political power.15 In the 1970 election campaign voters regarded immigration as the fourth most important issue. Clear Conservative promises to end future large-scale immigration certainly contributed to the party’s success. The new Conservative government rapidly gave substance to the promises made with the 1971 Immigration Act, whose effect was to halt new and permanent migration from the Indian sub-continent, the Caribbean and Africa to the UK. Although it had no practical influence on immigration flow, which had already been limited during the previous decade, the Act had a symbolic importance. It replaced the last vestiges of the old Empire, and the historic categories of “alien” and “British subject” with the essentially racially-defined cat- 12. Goulbourne, note 10, p. 111. 13. Philip Lynch, Nationhood and identity in Conservative politics, in Mark Garnett – Philip Lynch (eds.), The Conservatives in Crisis, Manchester 2003, p. 182. 14. Although the phrase “rivers of blood” does not appear in the speech, the name alludes to the line “As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood’”. Powell’s point on immigration was harsh but within the parameters of Conservative Party policy: it was the tone of the speech that generated such controversy, echoing the racist insults of his voters. See Camilla Schofield, Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain, Cambridge 2013, pp. 208 ff. 15. Hansen, note 1, p. 180. Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 195 egories of “patrial” and “non-patrial”. British or Commonwealth citizens who were born or naturalised in the UK, or who had a parent (or grandparent in the case of British citizens) who had been born or naturalised in the United Kingdom were patrials and free from restrictions; all non-patrials were liable to immigration controls. The Immigration Act of 1971 was closely linked to Britain’s European choice. At that time, Western European countries halted or sharply cut migrant labour recruitment. During the second half of the 1970s, these same countries encouraged former migrant workers to return to their home countries by offering them financial incentives.16 Moreover, non-patrial Commonwealth citizens who came to Britain to work were now regarded similar to guest workers in the Federal Republic of Germany and other European states. From 1971 onwards, non-patrial Commonwealth citizens and aliens came to Britain on the same terms, with no right to settle or to bring their family. The Immigration Act of 1971 became law on 1 January 1973: the very same day that Britain became a Member State of the European Community, adhering to the principle of the free movement of labour. The reduction of immigration restrictions on over 200 million people, including those from countries against which Britain had fought recent and bitter wars, caused very little public discussion.17 Thatcher’s “racecraft” The revival of British nationhood was a prominent theme in Thatcherism. The Thatcher governments made effective use of patriotic discourse, claiming to promote British interests and identity by defending the Union, limiting immigration and promoting a vision of a free market, intergovernmental EC. By the end of the 1970s, British opinion perceived immigration as a major threat. The arrival in Britain of non-white immigrants during the 1960s and 1970s, set against the backdrop of slow domestic economic growth and, periodically, full-blown recession, eventually paved the way for an anti-immigrant populist reactions. The National Front (NF), a far-right political party founded in 1967 in reaction to the phenomena of post-war immigration and immigrant settlement, reached a peak in popularity midway through the decade, with almost 15% of the British public sympathizing with the party. Immigration remained an issue of political controversy throughout the 1970s, with the NF (known as the anti-immigrant party) exploiting the media panic over the Ugandan Asian crisis and a similar media scare over the influx of small 16. Meyers, note 8, pp. 174-5 and notes. 17. The change was symbolized by the new signs which appeared at the principal points of entry, such as Heathrow Airport: ‘United Kingdom citizens and EEC nationals’ now marked the channel for those entering free of restrictions. Spencer, note 1, pp. 143-4. 196 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO numbers of Asians from Malawi in 1976.18 Although the NF was unable to win any local government or parliamentary seats in the 1970s, its provocative marches in areas of ethnic minority settlement caused anger and clashes with left-wing opponents, such as the Anti-Nazi League and the Socialist Workers Party.19 In a public opinion survey conducted in 1978, one-quarter of all respondents agreed that the NF expressed the views of “ordinary working people” and 21% thought that it would be “good for Britain” if candidates of the NF occupied seats in the British House of Common.20 In 1979, the overwhelming majority who replied to a British Election Study survey believed either very, or fairly strongly, that too many immigrants had been allowed into the country.21 Thatcher’s political programme found its roots amongst these widespread fears as well as in the particular political situation of the UK at that time: the country in which she took power was not in a good state. The “winter of discontent” in 1979 was a key event, showing a country on the verge of ungovernability due to the rash of strikes and economic problems. Based on these premises, it was no surprise that race also played a peculiar role in Thatcherism. One factor in Thatcher’s electoral victory had been her commitment to reduce immigration; yet, it would be simplistic to describe the approach taken by Thatcher and the Conservatives as simply “racist”, with a British identity that was only white. The question was much more nuanced and not unequivocal. Firstly, there were different conceptions of national identity among Thatcherites. Some had views on race and immigration that stood on the Left of their party, and even the more “right-wing” members did not call for a racially “pure” society.22 The Conservative party as a whole had mixed approaches to the race issue and the debate had started well before 1981. In 1975, Tories’ “intellectual leader” Keith Joseph expressed his dread to the Shadow Government that the aftermath of mass immigration had yet to emerge in all its seriousness: the solution had to be minimizing future immigration while maintaining a humane stance. However, the issue of immigration “should not be the subject of electoral consideration in either direction, the immigrant vote or the English”.23 Three years later, the future Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson considered immigration as “almost the acid test of whether a political party is in tune with the ordinary people” and therefore 18. Ugandan leader Idi Amin expelled the entire Asian population of Uganda (nearly 80,000 people) in August 1972, giving them 90 days to leave the country. Many who held British citizenship went to the United Kingdom, while others left for India. South Asian migration to East Africa had begun in the nineteenth century, encouraged by imperial connections and economic opportunity; by the beginning of the 1970s, Asians came to dominate the Ugandan economy. 19. Matthew Gibney – Randall Hansen (eds.), Immigration and Asylum. From 1900 to the Present – Volume 1, Santa Barbara 2005, p. 631. 20. Anthony Messina, The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe, Cambridge 2007, pp. 112-3. 21. Political Change in Britain and British Election Study Data, 1964-1979. 22. For instance, the back-bench MP George Gardiner was opposed to immigration and supported the Apartheid regime in South Africa, but he was also close to leaders of the British Sikh community. Quoted in Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain, London 2009, p. 227. 23. Margaret Thatcher Foundation (from now on MTF), Joseph, “Notes towards the definition of policy”, LCC/75/71, 4 April 1975 (110098). Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 197 invited the party not to “shirk the immigration issue”.24 This trend had started in October 1976, when both the Conservative proto-manifesto “The Right Approach” and the speech by the deputy leader William Whitelaw at the party conference indicated that the party was considering ways in which immigration controls could be strengthened.25 In 1977, Whitelaw asked Keith Speed, his new junior spokesperson for Home Affairs, to investigate immigration controls to prepare new proposals to curb immigration.26 This brief was leaked to the press and Thatcher appeared to support this line: a few days later, in a TV interview in January 1978, immigration was the opening subject. On that occasion, she famously remarked about British people fearing they “might be rather swamped by people with a different culture” and, on these premises, it was necessary “to hold out the prospect of an end to immigration except, of course, for compassionate cases”. Although immigration would not be a major election issue, the political parties were reluctant to talk about it and this was a major mistake, according to Thatcher: “If we do not want people to go to extremes, and I do not, we ourselves must talk about this problem and we must show that we are prepared to deal with it”.27 Thatcher’s initiative, taken without advance consultation with colleagues, re-established the Conservatives as the anti-immigration party, starting what has been defined as a “racecraft”,28 and Thatcher was convinced that the electorate wanted this. Her statement on television received considerable publicity and the party’s positive showing in the opinion polls demonstrated dramatically that immigration issues could still provoke a popular response, in spite of the tough control legislation that had existed since the 1971 Immigration Act. One month after her television interview, the Conservatives lead Labour by 9% (48% to 39%), while few weeks earlier, the two parties had been equal in the polls at 43,5%.29 Although the Conservative party did not emphasize its policies on immigration during the 1979 general election campaign, Thatcher had made it very clear where her party stood. This proved popular with sections of the electorate and there were substantial swings to the Conservatives in areas like North and East London, where the National Front had been doing well in the mid-1970s. In fact, there was a complete collapse in the Front vote, which suggests that Thatcher was successful in winning many of those voters for the Conservatives.30 24. MTF, Lawson, “Thoughts on ‘Implementing our Strategy’”, 15 January 1978 (110321). 25. Conservative Party Archive (from now on CPA), NUA 2/1/80, Annual Conference of the Conservative party 1976. 26. Zig Layton-Henry, Race and the Thatcher Government, in Zig Layton-Henry – Paul Rich (eds.), Race, government and politics in Britain, Basingstoke 1986, p. 75. 27. For the integral transcript of the interview, see MTF, Thatcher, “TV Interview for Granada ‘World in Action’”, 27 January 1978. 28. Layton-Henry, note 2, pp. 180 ff. 29. National Opinion Polls, Race and immigration, February 1978. 30. See Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of race in Britain, London 1984, pp. 105-6. In 1979 general elections the National Front gained only the 0,6 % of votes, despite fielding a record 303 candidates. 198 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO In constituencies where there were substantial numbers of ethnic minority voters, the Conservatives made modest efforts to appeal to them and gained the same modest results. The main initiative was the launch in February 1979 of the Anglo-West Indian Conservatives Society, to increase West Indian support for Tory candidates in Hornsey and Croydon Central. Similarly, the Anglo-Asian Conservative Society attempted to gain votes from the Asian communities and two Asians were selected as Conservative parliamentary candidates, although they were not elected. Tory efforts to attract support from ethnic minorities had only minor results and Afro-Caribbean and Asian voters remained overwhelmingly in favour of the Labour Party.31 The 1981 British Nationality Act The origins of the Bill The link between immigration and reform of the nationality laws was explicit for the Conservative. The Tories 1976 proto-manifesto, “The Right Approach”, argued that a new Nationality Act would allay people’s fears of unending immigration and establish a rational basis for British citizenship.32 In 1980, the results of the study set up by Whitelaw when in opposition were published in the Green Paper “Who Do We Think We Are?”. The document recommended that “our immigration policies should be based directly on our nationality laws” and its threefold definition of nationality formed the basis for the Government’s legislation.33 From the very beginning, the Thatcher government experienced unexpected difficulties in fulfilling its manifesto promises, trying to reconcile them with the more pragmatic approach of Whitehall. Practical problems forced to drop two of its most widely publicized commitments – the register of dependants and the worldwide quota systems for non-EC nationals. William Whitelaw, now new Home Secretary, was charged with implementing the manifesto’s proposals, which consisted in eight 31. See Ibidem, pp. 147-53. 32. Conservative Political Centre, 1976. 33. Conservative Political Centre, 1980. Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 199 pledges in the section entitled “Immigration and race relations”.34 Senior Home Office advisers warned on the impracticability of many of these pledges, in particular the creation of a register of dependants that would greatly expand the numbers likely to come to the UK and would outrage Commonwealth governments. Attempting to end the concession introduced by the Labour government in 1974 to husbands and male fiancés was not an easy task. The new rules on immigration were debated on 4 December 1979. According to the opposition, they violated the principle that the rights of all British citizens legally settled in the United Kingdom should be equal before the law. However, the opposition’s case was undermined by the fact that the Labour government had restricted the right of entry of husbands and male fiancés in 1969.35 Women’s groups protested at the unequal treatment of the sexes that rescinding that entry right would involve. In the end, the government felt the need to amend the new rules in February 1980. The amendment extended the right of entry to husbands and fiancées whose wives or fiancées had been born in the UK, if the primary purpose of the marriage was not settlement.36 The government published a White Paper on its proposed nationality legislation in July 1980.37 There were concern and anxiety about the implications of the proposed bill and representations were made to the government and opposition parties by ethnic minority organisations, churches, the Commission for Racial Equality and civil lib- 34. The Manifesto stated: “[…] Firm immigration control for the future is essential if we are to achieve good community relations. It will end persistent fears about levels of immigration and will remove from those settled, and in many cases born here, the label of 'immigrant'. (i) We shall introduce a new British Nationality Act to define entitlement to British citizenship and to the right of abode in this country. It will not adversely affect the right of anyone now permanently settled here. (ii) We shall end the practice of allowing permanent settlement for those who come here for a temporary stay. (iii) We shall limit entry of parents, grandparents and children over 18 to a small number of urgent compassionate cases. (iv) We shall end the concession introduced by the Labour government in 1974 to husbands and male fiancés. (v) We shall severely restrict the issue of work permits. (vi) We shall introduce a Register of those Commonwealth wives and children entitled to entry for settlement under the 1971 Immigration Act. (vii) We shall then introduce a quota system, covering everyone outside the European Community, to control all entry for settlement. (viii) We shall take firm action against illegal immigrants and over stayers and help those immigrants who genuinely wish to leave this country-but there can be no question of compulsory repatriation. We will encourage the improvement of language training in schools and factories and of training facilities for the young unemployed in the ethnic communities. But these measures will achieve little without the effective control of immigration. That is essential for racial harmony in Britain today”. See Iain Dale (ed.), Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900–1997, London-New York 2000, pp. 263 ff. 35. Layton-Henry, note 28, pp. 77-8. 36. Hansard, House of Commons Debate, vol. 979, cc187-9W, 20 February 1980. 37. British Nationality Law. Outline of Proposed Legislation, Cmnd. 7987, HMSO, 31 July 1980. 200 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO erties groups. Nevertheless, the Government did not weaken its commitment and published the Bill in January 1981.38 The new Nationality Act was not only a break with a tradition, but it affected the status of millions of people – in fact, it would define British Citizenship for the first time and effectively make redundant the earlier status of British Subject. The Bill outlined three major categories of citizenship: British Citizenship, Citizenship of the British Dependent Territories and British Overseas Citizenship. British Citizenship was for those citizens of the UK and colonies who were “closely connected” to Britain, either through permanent settlement in the UK or because their parents or grandparents had been born, adopted, naturalised or registered as citizens of the UK; British Dependent Territories Citizenship was for those with a similar connection to one of the remaining dependencies; and British Overseas Citizenship was a residual one with virtually no rights, intended for those citizens of the UK and colonies who did not fall within the previous categories. As a general rule, British citizenship should descend only to the first generation of children born abroad to British citizens born in the UK, spreading concern among expatriate Britons all over the world and also Britons working or serving abroad, many of whom had not themselves been born in Britain as their parents had been involved in imperial service or overseas trade. The Bill also proposed that children born in Britain of certain categories of foreign parents, or whose parents were of uncertain status – because of illegal immigration or through overstaying their period of residence – would not automatically be entitled to citizenship.39 For the first time the Anglo-Saxon tradition of jus soli, granting citizenship by virtue of birth in the territory, was called into question, in favour of the continental tradition of jus sanguinis, conferring citizenship by virtue of descent from a citizen. As for the British Overseas Citizenship, it represented a gradual elimination of British Subject status, with a not so implicit invitation to those British Subjects permanently settled abroad to end the pretence of a continuing British connection. It was a sign that the British government wished to abandon another legacy of its imperial past.40 The role of the Home Office and Labour’s heritage: an example of consensus? Before and during the parliamentary debate, the Tories stressed in as many ways as possible the direct link between their Bill and the Green Paper “British Nationality Law. Discussion of possible changes”, published by the Labour government in 38. British Nationality Bill: Session 1980/1, HMSO, 13 January 1980. 39. William Whitelaw stated to the House of Commons: “The Government sees no reason why a child should ever have citizenship simply because his parents happen to be in the United Kingdom when he is born”. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 997, cols. 931-41, 28 January 1981. 40. Layton-Henry, note 2, pp. 192-3. Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 201 1977.41 Even the Conservative Research Department stated that a reform in Nationality Law had in recent years been supported by all major parties.42 By the mid-1970s, there seemed to be no longer any disagreement in principle among politicians in the two major parties that British citizenship should be created in Britain. What remained unclear was what kind of citizenship both parties wanted. As for Labour’s position, it was not steady. The 1977 Green Paper expressed no enthusiasm for the full incorporation of citizenship rights into the status of British citizenship. Instead, it used the term “privilege” rather than “right” and claimed that civic privileges “do not stem directly from the law of nationality and so are not dealt with in this document”.43 During the parliamentary debates on the British Nationality Bill, William Whitelaw cited several passages from Labour’s 1977 paper, using it to justify the Conservative government’s omission from the bill of substantive aspects of British citizenship. The Bill was presented as the natural outcome of policies implemented by Conservative and Labour governments alike. It seems clear how this was a tactic by the Conservative Party with a twofold aim. On the one hand, it allowed opposition to be treated as hypocrite and successfully forced Labour speakers into wasting much of this crucial debate in trying to defend the record of the Wilson and Callaghan Government. On the other hand and more importantly, this tactic allowed the Tory to present the Bill to public opinion and to main critical groups as receiving an acrossthe-board support. This could help the Thatcher government to sell the new legislation even to Labour’s voters. Yet, a part from this, nationality law reform had a quite distinct ideological significance for the two parties: it linked with other policies and ideological themes in very different ways. A Labour Government would have passed a new nationality legislation to redeem its manifesto promises of liberal reform and the result would have significantly differed from the 1981 Act both in substance (for example, the jus soli would have been maintained) and in its ideological implication.44 Similarly, it is correct to stress the influence of the Home Office on this legislation. The project, which began with the 1962 Act, had to be completed, according to the government willingness to activate the legislative process. The Thatcher administration, unlike the Labour government, was glad and eager to provide this opportunity because its racial politics coincided with those of the Home Office. The “natural conclusion” for which the Home Office had struggled was also the goal of neo-conservatism, fitting both the specific policies on immigration and the broader project of national regeneration.45 41. British Nationality Law. Discussion of possible changes, Cmnd. 6795, HMSO, April 1977. 42. TNA, PREM 19-486, Report “The British Nationality Bill” by the Conservative Research Department, 23 January 1981. 43. Rieko Karatani, Defining British Citizenship: Empire, Commonwealth and Modern Britain, London 2002, pp. 179 ff. 44. Dixon, note 9, pp. 166-7. 45. Ibidem, p. 168. 202 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO The parliamentary debate The Home Secretary William Whitelaw introduced the Bill for its second reading on 28 January 1981. He declared that was necessary to replace the existing law since citizenship created by the 1948 British Nationality Act no longer gave “any clear indication of who has the right to enter the United Kingdom”. The Bill would apply “across all racial boundaries” and was “an important and significant new advance towards sex equality”, providing the right of women as well as men to transmit British citizenship. As for the controversial “clause one” on the abandonment of jus soli, Whitelaw was firm in its defence, stating that it had been the aim of successive Governments, since well into the previous century, to ensure that naturalisation was not being granted to people who had no real intention of living in the United Kingdom. He also stressed how most other countries in Europe shared this system, although Britain’s proposal was “more generous than theirs”.46 In the autumn of 1980, a new Labour front-bench team on Home Affairs had been appointed to lead the attack on the Tory legislation. Roy Hattersley, the Shadow Home Secretary, seized this parliamentary opportunity to give the Bill a hostile reception. Hattersley argued that the Bill was racist and sexist and, in reality, an immigration control Bill dressed up as a Nationality Bill. However, the campaign Hattersley wished to launch against the Bill was weakened by two major amendments announced by the Home Secretary on 6 February. Moreover, his opposition was less credible because of Labour’s commitment to reform the nationality laws quoted before. Apart from the activity of backbenchers, the opposition failed to develop coherent alternative policies to those of the government and in fact, Labour Party policy between 1979-83 largely consisted of ad hoc initiatives by the Shadow Home Secretary and individual backbenchers. Most of these initiatives consisted of simply opposing government initiatives even at the risk of creating public confusion about their position.47 As for the Liberal Party, it had generally opposed to immigration controls and had therefore opposed the immigration control measures introduced since 1962 by Tory and Labour administration. Most notably, they led the opposition to the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act that was supported by both major parties. The Liberals in Parliament strongly opposed the 1981 Nationality Bill, although their impact had been relatively minimal, due to their lack of numbers in particular in the House of Commons. Their leader David Steel described the Bill as “the latest in a long line of rather shabby measures […] reducing basic rights and discriminating against ethnic minorities”.48 Another strong set of criticisms came from the Churches. Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury, in his speech in the second reading debate expressed the con- 46. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 997, cols. 931–41, 28 January 1981. 47. Marian Fitzgerald and Zig Layton-Henry, Opposition parties and race policies, 1979-83, in Layton- Henry – Paul (eds.), note 28, p. 109. 48. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 997, cols. 958–60, 28 January 1981. Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 203 cern of the clergy. While accepting that a new nationality bill was needed, it was causing anxiety and even fear among large sections of population. Runcie raised two main points: that the Bill would leave large numbers of citizens of the Commonwealth either stateless or with requirements of registration that would be daunting for them and cumbersome for the authorities; and that it would sharpen rather than soften the sense of alienation felt by the immigrant communities. He added: “I recognise there are evil forces, from left and right, ready to play on people's fears and to stir up divisions, but we must not present them with any material to do so. What is needed, above all, from a new British Nationality Act is reassurance: reassurance that could only be provided by a measure the basis of which is seen to be equality of respect and regard”.49 Shortly after the debate, two major amendments to the bill were announced. First, that any child born in the UK who did not acquire British citizenship at birth could be entitled to it after ten years’ continuous residence, regardless of the status of the parents. Second, that citizens by naturalisation or registration would be allowed to transmit citizenship to children born overseas similar to British-born citizens. Some right-wing Conservative backbenchers were angry at the concessions made by the government. Ivor Stanbrook, a member of the standing committee, said they showed contempt for backbench opinion and were a betrayal of government pledges on immigration.50 In the meantime, Britain suffered serious riots across many major cities – with the significant ones occurring on the weekend 10-12 April 1981, when hundreds of mostly black youths rioted in Brixton, South London. The worst incidents occurred in the evening of Saturday 11 April, when 279 police officers and at least 45 members of the public were injured. Whitelaw commissioned a public inquiry into the riot headed by Lord Scarman.51 The Scarman report, published on 25 November 1981, pointed out the problems created by unemployment, poor housing, ethnic conflict, and low educational achievement.52 Scarman advocated special training to make the police sensitive to racial resentments, urging “positive discrimination” to overcome the sense of negative discrimination felt by the black population. Although Thatcher agreed with much of the analysis of the Scarman Report, she insisted that inner-city problems did not justify rioting and crime, especially if carried out under the guise of social protest.53 With this riot in the background, and in order to end criticisms, the Government invoke a “Guillotine” motion on the Bill. Ironically, such urgency raised further criticism.54 49. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords Debate, vol. 421, cols. 875-956, 22 June 1981. 50. The Guardian, 5 February 1981. 51. TNA, PREM 19/484, “Brixton: inquiry”, 13 April 1981. 52. The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981, Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. The Lord Scarman, Cmnd. 8427 (HMSO, 1981). 53. On the riots see John Benyon, Scarman and After. Essays Reflecting on Lord Scarman's Report, the riots and their aftermath, Oxford 1984. 54. “What’s the rush?”, The Economist, 2 May 1981. 204 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO The Bill eventually received its third reading on 4 June and returned to the Commons after passing to Lords with ninety amendments: all except one were accepted by the Government and the Nationality Bill came into force on 1 January 1983. Implications on British international relations Europe We have seen how Europe and EC membership had been a key factor in Britain’s immigration laws. A 1976 report issued by the study group on race relations and immigrations established within the Conservative Party Home Affairs Committee defined Britain’s entry into the EC was a watershed: “Now it is the time to end constitutional anomalies which are no longer justified by reality. The concept of a citizenship common to the whole Commonwealth has become a serious disadvantage for Britain, promoting misunderstanding and social friction. It should be ended”.55 On a more technical level, the EC membership also brought to an ad hoc definition of “United Kingdom nationals” for Community purposes. At the time of the Treaty of Accession, the British government made a Declaration that was considered necessary because of the complexities of British citizenship laws. After the Royal Assent to the 1981 British Nationality Bill, the 1972 Declaration had to be altered in order to take account of the new definitions and classifications of citizenship. This happened in October 1982.56 The Thatcher Government’s initiatives on immigration raised a certain concern in Brussels. The European Parliament charged the Legal Affairs Committee to analyse UK Government's proposals for immigration controls. Kurt Malangré presented the research results on March 1981. The committee concluded that, although the area of immigration policy remained the responsibility of the individual States, nevertheless those new provisions affected freedom of movement within the Community as well as essential provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. Both the principle of freedom of movement enshrined in Community law and the European Convention on Human Rights were recognized by Great Britain as binding legal principles. Because of the differential treatment of men and women envisaged in the new rules and the limitation on entry envisaged for nationals from one Community country to another, namely the United Kingdom, the new UK immigration rules could 55. CPA, CRD 3/16/3, Report of the Study Group on Race Relations and Immigration, June 1976. 56. See K. R. Simmonds, The British Nationality Act 1981 and the definition of the term ‘national’ for Community purposes, Common Market Law Review, 21(1984), pp. 675-86. Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 205 contravene fundamental provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in our Community law.57 The European Parliament adopted the Malangré Report by a substantial majority. The British Conservatives (the European Democratic Group) and the Christian Democrats abstained on the vote, while some British Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) expressed criticisms and linked the immigration rules to the Nationality Bill, although the Malangré Report did not refer to it. For the Socialists, Tom Megahy spoke in favour of the report and stressed how the issues involved in immigration were still a matter of live debate in the United Kingdom and were intertwined with the Nationality Bill while Winnie Ewing, from Group of European Progressive Democrats, said the rules were a clear case of sexual discrimination.58 The initiative by the European Parliament was even more striking if we consider the very delicate moment in the relations between London and the European Community in the early 1980s, in the midst of the British Budgetary Question which made the other European partners aware of Mrs Thatcher’s confrontational style. This does not mean that the Community institution had a bias towards Britain, but the Malangré Report surely played a role in the tense relation between London and Brussels. Outside Europe: India and Argentina Not surprisingly, the country that criticized the most the Nationality Bill was India. The Indian Government, the media, and public opinion had a very negative reception of the new law and tried in several ways to lobby the Thatcher Government to amend it. The Nationality Bill was subject of a parliamentary debate in India: there was a motion debated in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Parliament) on 26 February 1981, tabled by eight MPs. The speakers made wide-ranging and critical attacks embracing not only the Nationality Bill but also the whole range of issues affecting Indians in the UK. The calling attention motion was widely reported in the English language press. According to the Foreign Office, the whole debate illustrated how “poorly understood” the Bill was in India, with critics ready to believe the worst before they had the opportunity of making even a superficial examination of its actual nature.59 57. Official Journal of the European Communities, No 1-268, English edition, Debates of the European Parliament, 1981-1982 Session, Report of Proceedings from 10 to 13 March 1981, Europe House, Strasbourg. 58. TNA, FCO 30-4772, “The Malangré report on the UK Government’s immigration controls”, Marsden to Angel, MWE 341/2, 19 March 1981. 59. TNA, FCO 37-2512, “Nationality Bill: parliamentary debate in India”, Hall to Revolta, 3 March 1981. 206 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO The British Embassy in Delhi noted how the Indian immigrant lobby in the UK was exploiting this issue to bring pressure to bear on the Indian Government and through them on London to produce changes in the proposed legislation to suit itself. “It is in the Indian character to continue to press for ‘concessions’ until firm resistance is met”. The only possible response was strengthening British position in the area of the UKPH (United Kingdom Passport Holders) quota: an increase could earn Britain some benefit.60 Lord Carrington, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was particularly concerned to note allegations that the Nationality Bill was racially discriminatory. The British Government regarded such allegations as being without foundation, since there was nothing in the Bill which discriminated against any racial or national group: “The British Government are fully committed to a society in which all individuals, whatever their race, colour or creed have equal rights and responsibilities. Unfounded allegations about racial discrimination themselves adversely affect the cause of improved race relations in the United Kingdom”.61 This harsh stance was particularly clear on Thatcher’s state visit to Delhi in April 1981. The British Prime Minister was welcomed by protests and the throwing of a black flag of disapproval at her car, while The Time of India wrote that Mrs Thatcher had “done more harm to race relations in Britain than any other post-war leader”.62 On these premises, it does not surprise that the Bill was one of the issue raised during the bilateral talks between Mrs Thatcher and Mrs Gandhi on 15 April 1981. Thatcher stressed that many of the accusations made against the Nationality Bill were very unfair; on the other hand, Mrs Gandhi said that she was bombarded with correspondence about UKPH and asked whether the British Government could do anything to increase the numbers being taken. Thatcher replied that this would be difficult at a time when there were 2,5 million unemployed in the United Kingdom and in the aftermath of the inner-cities riots. Anyway, Britain was still taking very large numbers of immigrants from India each year.63 The Times noted that Indians were sensitive about what Britain was doing, especially in a field such as immigration, since they believed Britain, due to her supposedly qualities as fair play, should set an example and behave better than other countries. As Mrs Gandhi herself said at a press conference after the meeting with Thatcher, “Britain has stood for justice and equality in the minds of the world. And that is why when something like this (the Nationality Bill) happens, it upsets people more”. Later Mrs Thatcher appeared on Indian television to talk about the Nationality Bill and her tone resembled the famous Granada interview of 1978. The Bill, she said, was introduced because immigrants were “pouring in” and numbers had to be restricted. “As a small country we cannot go on taking more and more people. We are already more 60. TNA, FCO 37-2512, Delhi Telno 161: Nationality Bill, 2 March 1981. 61. TNA, FCO 37-2512, Tel. n. 202 by Lord Carrington, “MIPT: Nationality Bill”, 23 March 1981. 62. “Links with India strengthened by visit”, The Times, 20 April 1981. 63. TNA, PREM 19-487, “Summary note for the record of a tête a tête discussion between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi, in Delhi”, 15 April 1981. Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 207 densely populated than India”. One of the reasons for restricting immigration was keeping racial harmony in Britain, which was still consistent despite the “sudden flare-up” of Brixton riots.64 The Nationality Bill could also have played a role in the dispute with Argentina over the Falklands: the controversial “Gibraltar amendment”, which gave Gibraltarians special access to British citizenship, was later extended to Falkland Islanders but only after the war. At the time of the conception of the Bill, it seemed possible that a special gesture towards the islanders, making it easier for them to leave if they wished, could adversely affect negotiations with Argentina. There was the risk of giving the impression that Britain was trying to strengthen its position in the negotiations or strengthen its hold on the islands and perhaps discourage Argentina from proposing that the inhabitants could also hold Argentinian citizenship.65 According to British sources, the Argentines interpreted the 1981 British Nationality Act, which replaced the full British citizenship of Falkland Islanders with a more limited version, as a lack of interest in the Falklands, together with the planned withdrawal (as part of a general reduction in size of the Royal Navy in 1981).66 Conclusions In conclusion, we can ask whether the 1981 Nationality Bill actually put a halt to immigration and, more generally, if it can be considered a successful element of Thatcherism. With regard to the first point, the considerable time, energy and resources spent on implementing new immigration controls only brought about a modest fall in New Commonwealth immigration. New Commonwealth people accepted for settlement fell from 37,000 in 1979 to 20,850 in 1987 and then rose to 28,000 in 1991. After 1983, the focus of immigration control turned to asylum seekers, and the government imposed visa requirements on several countries, like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan. In 1987, the Immigration Act made it an offense for airlines or shipping companies to bring people to the United Kingdom without proper documents.67 In the meantime, since 1983 and until 1986, the ratio between emigration and immigration was in favour of the latter.68 64. “Indians told immigrant controls are essential”, The Times, 18 April 1981. 65. TNA, FCO 9-3134, Memorandum: The Falkland islanders under UK immigration and nationality law, December 1980. 66. See Russell Phillips, A Damn Close-Run Thing: A Brief History of the Falklands Conflict, London 2014; Kev Darling, RAF Strike Command 1968 -2007: Aircraft, Men and Action, Barnsley 2012, p. 138-9. 67. Gibney – Hansen (eds.), note 18, p. 633. 68. Long-term Migration into and out of the United Kingdom, 1964-2014, Data from Office for National Statistics. 208 Giulia BENTIVOGLIO As for the second question, the answer can be a partial “yes”. The general election campaign of 1983 focused deeply on immigration and race relations’ issues and the Government displayed a change of attitude. The Conservative poster “Labour Says He’s Black, Tories Say He’s British”, showing a black man wearing a business suit, held out the hope that the Conservative leadership realised that immigration control was no longer a major issue and that the acceptance, security and involvement of black Britons in a multi-racial society was a major priority. Moreover, one major legacy of Thatcher’s tough anti-immigration strategy was the political demise of the National Front in 1979, thus preventing the phenomenon of strong anti-immigrant parties which rose in other West European countries in the 1980s and early 1990s.69 Finally, nationality, citizenship and race were one main test case for a continuation of the post-war consensus, although Thatcher openly attacked the concept itself, making 1979 elections the first such national campaign in which the term became an explicit point of contention. She may have abandoned the language of consensus but could not avoid making use of the underlying rhetorical model on which it was based. The British Nationality Act marked a turning point in another sense, since it involved the creation of a disjointed British citizenship nationality and immigration laws. Immigration and citizenship were now governed by distinct legal regimes and this was a further step towards continental traditions: combining relatively easy access to nationality with strict migration control made Britain closer to her European partners, just in a moment of tense relations with Brussels. 69. Layton-Henry, note 2, p. 210. Redefining immigration through citizenship? Britain and the case of the 1981 Nationality Act 209 Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ Abstract The aim of this article lies in shedding light on the evolving priorities and perceptions of relevant Spanish players at different stages of the country’s engagement in the European integration process, especially with regard to changing migration patterns. These include the views of political exiles, economic migrants and key Spanish decision-makers with a responsibility in migration affairs from the country’s three subsequent integration phases into the EU: when Spain was not a European Community (EC) member, when it was a candidate country for EC accession and since it became an EC member state. Furthermore, this contribution focuses on unveiling a deeply intertwined correlation between migration and EC enlargement, of which Spain constitutes one of the most significant and illustrative case studies. Indeed, from the relation between an active political presence in exile and the Europeanisation of émigré political and intellectual Spanish communities, to the diffusion of democratic political culture by return migrants during the transition to democracy, this case is rife with insightful instances of linkages between the widening and mobility dimensions of the multifaceted European integration dynamics across the continent. Introduction The aim of this article lies in shedding light on the evolving priorities and perceptions of relevant Spanish players at different stages of the country’s engagement in the European integration process, especially with regard to changing migration patterns. These include the views of political exiles, economic migrants and key Spanish decision-makers with a responsibility in migration affairs from the country’s three subsequent integration phases into the EU: when Spain was not a European Community (EC) member, when it was a candidate country for EC accession and since it became an EC member state. Furthermore, this contribution focuses on unveiling a deeply intertwined correlation between migration and EC enlargement, of which Spain constitutes one of the most significant and illustrative case studies. Indeed, from the relation between an active political presence in exile and the Europeanisation of émigré political and 211 intellectual Spanish communities, to the diffusion of democratic political culture by return migrants during the transition to democracy, this case is rife with insightful instances of linkages between the widening and mobility dimensions of the multifaceted European integration dynamics across the continent. The main sources selected to elucidate this migration-EC enlargement correlation come from the Archives of the Spanish Foreign Ministry and the Spanish Secretariat of State for European Union Issues in Madrid, the Archives of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission in Brussels, the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) in Florence, the Historical Archives of the European Parliament in Luxembourg, the Personal Archives of Salvador de Madariaga in La Coruña, etc. These sources also include a series of Oral History interviews conducted with Spanish key decision-makers integrating the lessons of the Spanish exile and economic migration experiences during Franco’s regime into the discussion of their repercussions for Spain’s ‘return to Europe’. These relevant Oral History interview excerpts are reproduced respecting the fidelity to particular utterances and language use so as to enrich the interpretational features of the given players and of the institution that each person represents. Subsequently paying special attention to the influence of the institutional and reconversion challenges posed by Spain’s EC accession in 1986, this contribution also reviews the evolving agenda-setting priorities of Spanish actors endowed with a prominent role at the Community level. In a similar vein, it also explores the successively incorporated feedback from the Spanish outbound migrants’ experiences and on the incoming migration from third countries starting from the 1990s onwards. In short, this contribution emphasises the need to address such historical acquis in view of the current reverse trend in Spain, which would mean confronting the brain drain of young generations as a consequence of the economic crisis and of its interrelated austerity measures. Indeed, this question touches upon the disastrous effects of neglecting the foundational principles of the European integration process: the solidarity principle and its connection with expectations and compromises regarding socioeconomic cohesion. The principle-based ‘exile factor’ during Franco’s regime and its influence in the future migration-EC enlargement correlation in the Spanish case The experience of exile lived by prominent Spanish intellectuals and political figures during Franco's authoritarian dictatorship served to significantly reinforce existing European integration trajectories in the external opposition to the regime, but it also strongly influenced the European integration priority of the domestic clandestine opposition and advanced the equalisation of democratisation and Europeanisation. Such synonymy would, indeed, last till the current turning point towards Euroscepticism 212 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ as a reaction to the conception of the EU as a socioeconomic model increasingly detached from its ‘human factor’. It is also important to note, in this regard, the lasting impact which Spanish economic migrants moving to Western European democracies since the beginning of the dictatorship had on the members of the Spanish democratic pro-European opposition, who would also have an important external role later on. As is the case with Carlos María Bru Purón, former President of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, who recalls that: As a notary in Fontiveros, I experienced the deepest rural Spain, with its hunger, its difficulties, its vicious class divide, etc. And a little later I came to this notary office in Alcobendas, near Madrid, where I was able to witness another phenomenon that made me even more pro-European: Spanish emigrants. Spanish emigrants who left in order to eat — so that they could eat — or send some money home; first to eat and work elsewhere and then to send some money back to their families; they were my clients, but, above all, they were my friends. In this village of Alcobendas I dealt with a lot of people, people who’ve been caricatured, who’ve been portrayed in films with their cardboard suitcases… those Spaniards who went all over Europe…it must be remembered: to Luxembourg for example, where they were welcomed, but also to Switzerland and France, and to Germany, which was growing at the time, and so on. They went to earn a living and send money back to their families, and then they started saving a little to buy a flat or something. I started to deal with them and I saw how much those Spaniards had to put up with, and why? Because the ‘Europe’ that was being built had something very important: the European social model — the welfare state — in other words, male emigrants who were arriving and female emigrants (there were a lot of them too, many women worked in domestic service and in factories as well), since while they were there they had social protection, even though they were foreigners. They were Spanish, but they still had their social protection, and that made me realise how Europe was being built and what the European social model was. All this naturally meant that those of us who wanted democracy in Spain realised that the only way was through European integration. There was an about-turn, just as the system of autocracy was brought to a close, and in order to ensure trade with what was then the European Economic Community.1 Very remarkably, what these Spanish economic emigrants point out as a valuable defining feature is precisely the socio-economic model of the welfare state, which is later adopted by the democratic opposition to Franco as connatural to a democratic system and as its most humane expression in contrast to the fierce class inequalities reinforced by the regime elites for their own benefit. This association is also the basis for a sustained pro-Europeanism in Spain in the truest sense of the word: rooted in a paradigm of social cohesion according to which Spain could never really be trusted to provide due to the exploitative system of its rigid elites, ‘Europe’ seemed more reliable to the people and capable of delivering. Indeed, the rupture of such equivalence nowadays in the context of the post-austerity prolonged crisis since 2011 is 1. 1Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Carlos María Bru Purón, former President of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 13th January 2010. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 213 resulting on a growing social reaction against a version of European integration interpreted as ‘treacherously’ sanctioning an ever increasing social inequality. When asked about how the harsh experience of exile led to the democratic opposition elites prioritising European integration, most involved actors refer to the crucial role played by those who they called ‘our four men in The Hague’, including: “Salvador de Madariaga, a liberal; Indalecio Prieto, a socialist; Doctor Trueta, apolitical but 100 % democrat, and Doctor Xirau, a Valencian and a regionalist”.2 These four figures’ participation at The Hague Congress in 1948 was significant.3 More particularly, Salvador de Madariaga, had been Ambassador to the League of Nations, and when the Civil War began he was said by contemporaries to have stayed out of it: “He didn’t want to know about what was happening in Spain, he got on with his studies and his novels, he was a great writer, a great liberal, he chaired the Culture Committee of the Hague Congress.”4 There were three committees then the political committee with Daladier, the economic committee with Van Zeeland, and the culture committee, which Madariaga was in charge of. The domestic clandestine democratic opposition started communicating with them. A short while later, as a result of these interactions, there was a fundamental move towards the organisation of a meeting which, by bringing together the domestic clandestine opposition and the democrats in exile, aspired to launch Spain’s democratisation via European integration. Carlos Bru explains the genesis of such initially promising turning point with these words: I think there were 23 of them — pro-European associations which joined the European Movement. The European Movement — by means of the Hague Congress — produced the dossier of what had been, or the memorandum of what could be, the basis of the Council of Europe, which the Treaty of London subsequently gave rise to, because once those 23 organisations had united and joined the European Movement, some European Movement emissaries produced that dossier and went to the Foreign Offices saying that a treaty had to be drawn up. And the model the European Movement produced was the one that subsequently gave rise to the literal text of the treaty. Well, the four Spaniards who had been at the Hague Congress thought that they should form a Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, just as there was a German, French, Italian Council, etc. So at number 9, avenue Marceau, in Paris, in a historic building that was owned by Basque exiles — the Basque Government in exile — they invited the political forces in exile to set up the Council and, precisely because Spain has always had a problem of identity communities (Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, etc.), the invitations were sent out, but they said that it was going to be along federal lines. So the important and wonderful thing about all this — something I’m proud of — is that the statutes of the European Movement International include this Spanish federal project, yet it’s not called federal, while the Spanish branch, 2. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Carlos María Bru Purón, former President of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 13th January 2010. 3. Refer to: “Délégation espagnole à Munich”, ME-2157 1962, 1962, Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence. 4. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Carlos María Bru Purón, former President of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 13th January 2010. 214 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ of the 42 branches of the European Movement International, the only one whose name includes the word ‘federal’ is ours — which I think is marvelous. It’s been federal from the outset because there was an understanding between Catalans and Basques, with both governments in exile, but also with the republican government in exile and with the socialists and liberals in particular, so that’s how this movement was built: the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, which people obviously couldn’t talk about in Spain, it was top secret, but we were in on the secret, we made some personal visits, we went to see them and we dealt with them.5 These founding moments in community spaces open to experimentation beyond the limits of the Cold War also allow us to unveil the full pluralist network of Spanish politicians and intellectuals pushing for a common 'European' ideal in a parallel transnational dimension. From a migration perspective, it is also interesting to observe that despite having been inspired by the pressing case of Spanish economic migrants, the actions of these intellectual elites in exile in this particular area rarely venture beyond the sphere of theoretical considerations. Coming back to the change in motion, after having set up the basis for the expected democratization on the horizons, one very influential figure, the socialist and longtime Secretary General of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement Enric Adroher i Pascual, or Gironella, as he was generally called, got in touch with the Secretary General of the European Movement International, Robert Van Schendel. Right afterwards, there was a meeting between the Chairman of the Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea (AECE),6 José María Gil-Robles y Quiñones, its Secretary, Fernando Álvarez de Miranda Torres and Carlos María Bru Purón, who acted as Vice-Secretary. They then established relations with the representatives of the European Movement in exile, while concealing the activities of the AECE by branding them as merely ‘cultural’. Through the European Movement International they tried to set up a meeting around 1961-62 in the Balearic Islands to talk about the conditions — the economic, cultural but also the political conditions — that would allow Spain to join the European Economic Community, but the regime prohibited the Balearic Islands meeting. In that moment, they realised that they had to hold such a meeting in exile, outside of Spain, and they conjointly decided to meet in Munich. Edgar Faure personally invited all Spanish representatives from Spain and abroad: there were 128 participants from Spain and around 80 from other countries that attended the Fourth International Congress of the European Movement, also notably called ‘the Munich meeting’. This was a vitally important meeting whose impact on Europe has not been considered properly: the European Movement International 5. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Carlos María Bru Purón, former President of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 13th January 2010. 6. Conclusiones aprobadas por la Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea (AECE) en los actos del décimo aniversario de su fundación (29 diciembre 1964). ME-2158 1963-1964, 29.12.1964, Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence; Carta de Enrique Moreno Báez a Robert van Schendel (24 mayo 1962). ME-2157 1962, 24.5.1962, Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 215 Congress in Munich in 19627 established for the first time the need for direct elections to the Assembly, the Assembly of the European Communities, now the European Parliament (EP). Indeed, that was the meeting that called for the direct universal suffrage for EP elections that prevails today and that has been a long time in the making, from 1962 to 1979. It was the European Movement that declared it, while raising the ‘Spanish issue’. Moreover, a small committee was going to address Spain’s conditions, since the coming together of Spaniards from within and outside of Spain was seen as so significant, and it developed into the major phenomenon of the Munich meeting in June 1962.8 As Carlos María Bru Purón recalls: Out of curiosity and in order to fraternise, I immediately joined the exiles committee, while some of the exiles joined the internal committee, and so on, and we ended up by merging, we ended up making what Madariaga9 had said that day come true: ‘The two halves of the orange have joined together.’ We were the same, we all had our European calling, Spaniards from within Spain and Spaniards in exile. And I remember an important unscheduled meeting, at night, at which the Spaniards in exile asked why some of us supported the monarchy for the future. And it was a notable liberal monarchist and anti- Francoist, Joaquín Satrústegui — who is remembered very fondly in Spain and who was subsequently a democratic senator, now sadly deceased — who explained how the advantages of the monarchist path of Juan de Borbón or his successor, now our King Juan Carlos de Borbón, could facilitate mutual understanding among Spaniards to ensure a peaceful and pro-European transition. And I remember that the socialists, led by Mr Llopis, said: ‘We will continue to declare ourselves republicans, but if ever a future Spanish democratic chamber debates the form of state, we will not vote against the monarchy.’ That was in 1962 in Munich. It was an emotional moment for us. And it was the solution, we were on the way. Then we were suppressed, some went into exile, others were deported to the islands, it was nothing short of a miracle that I escaped, I spent two years without a passport and with a huge fine, and months and months without being able to work in my profession as a notary, suffering major economic hardship, etc.; in short, we had a really hard time, but it was an example for Europe. And Europe said more than ever: ‘Either the Franco regime changes, or you will never join.’ So then even the regime realised that what the ambiguous expression ‘making provision for the likely outcome of succession’ actually meant was that we would be able to join Europe when Franco died. We couldn’t picture a military solution or a rebellion, and a revolution or military coup was not on the agenda. And what’s more, in light of what was being said, we Spanish democrats — whether 7. “Délégation espagnole à Munich”, ME-2157 1962. Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence; Letter from the European Movement delegation to Madrid to Maurice Faure, President of the European Movement (5 July 1962). ME-2157 1962, 5.7.1962, Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence. 8. Víctor Fernández Soriano, Sin democracia no hay Europa. La irrupción del problema español en los medios europeístas (1960-1962), in: Cristina Blanco Sío-López (co-editor), Converging Pathways. Spain and the European Integration Process, Itinerarios Cruzados. España y el proceso de construcción europea, Brussels 2013, pp. 75-99. 9. “Actividad política en el exilio”. Cajas: 135.15.27, 135.12.3, 135.13.17, 135.13.19, 135.13.19, 135.13.27, 135.14.3, Archivos personales de Salvador de Madariaga, La Coruña. 216 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ socialists, liberals or Christian democrats — were against any violence, so we were totally against ETA, which doesn’t mean that we were in favour of repression, because we were against the violent repression meted out in that respect, we were against the violence of rebellion and we were against the violence of repression. But we saw and worked towards that European integration, it was in the offing as the years went by…10 Also Marcelino Oreja, the former Secretary General of the Council, of Europe largely condemned the brutal repression of the participants in the Munich meeting, while underlining the principle of reconciliation as a constitutive part of any possible democratic future for Spain within Europe: There is this idea of reconciliation. It was something that was a great concern for me. And so at that time, when I worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I saw the idea of reconciliation sought by those who attended the Munich Congress — some 70, 80 or 90 people inside and 70 or 80 people outside, excluding those who were intolerant as there was no place for them in that spirit of reconciliation — as a very noble objective. I knew many people who were there, not necessarily friends, because we were very young, but people I knew; and in particular there were some people with whom I have had very close relationships in my life. They include Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, who was President of the Congress of Deputies and a member of the UCD; Satrústegui, another leading figure in the liberal world and a very likeable person, who passed away recently; and a very close friend of mine who had a house in France where he lived for many years, José Vidal Beneyto, who was one of the great promoters of the Spanish group that was there and who, as a result of his presence in Munich, was then unable to return for a long time and lived in France, where he died just a few weeks ago. For me, the Munich Congress was a huge failure for General Franco’s government and it was something that had a far-reaching impact on the development of Minister Castiella’s European policy. In February Minister Castiella had presented a request for negotiations to be opened with the European Communities,11 and in June the Congress of the European Movement took place in Munich. Obviously, the reaction of the Spanish government, General Franco’s Government, was to prohibit those who had attended from re-entering Spain, send them into exile or order them to stay in certain towns in southern Spain or in the Canaries. It was completely ridiculous. In my opinion, the Munich meeting represented the spirit needed for reconciliation, and one form of reconciliation was recovering the European spirit. In a similar vein, Carlo Bru also addresses the interconnection between the rising of the Spanish political activity in exile, that of the domestic clandestine opposition and the precarious socio-economic situation of the country in the 1960s, with a particular reference to rural Spain, which explains the massive resort to economic migration: 10. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Carlos María Bru Purón, former President of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 13th January 2010. 11. Carta del embajador de España en Bruselas a Fernando María Castiella (21 de noviembre de 1962). España. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo General de la Administración, caja 54/16413; Carta de Fernando Castiella, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, a Maurice Couve de Murville, Presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la CEE (9 de febrero de 1962). España. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo General de la Administración, caja 54/16413; Carta de José Núñez Iglesias a Fernando María Castiella (26 de marzo de 1964). España. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo General de la Administración, caja 66/04054. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 217 So why did this Munich ‘conspiracy’ come about? Well, in 1955–56, when the Franco regime couldn’t go on as a dictatorship for economic reasons, there was a policy known as autocracy, which maintained that Spanish production was self-sufficient; it was totally disastrous, with all manner of untruths, all manner of ridiculous claims … because our economic situation was terrible. In Tangier they handled more money than the Bank of Spain, it’s as simple as that. In Tangier it was to be depreciated progressively every day: it was an unsustainable situation. Well anyway, then they decided to tone the policy of autocracy down and open up trade with the European countries and with North America, etc. But the truth is that that solution wasn’t sufficient because there were no political avenues. So they allowed some cultural associations to talk about Europeanism. Anyway, if you want me to tell you what the official position was, you already know: at the time of the Schuman Declaration and when the Treaty for the European Economic Community was signed the following year, Franco said that it was an indication of the decline of the European democracies. And I remember that in the controlled press as a whole: ABC, YA, etc., it was suggested that they were vague utopian democracies that were doomed to perish, that was the Franco regime’s official position. It had pinned its hopes and its illusions on the United States, Eisenhower’s visit, US bases, etc., but the United States did nothing for democratisation and particularly nothing economically. Another path they sought was the ‘Latin American solution’, but I remember in the offices of the Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea [AECE — Spanish Association for European Cooperation], the Latin Americans themselves who were here, grant holders, academics and teachers, came to Spain and told us that in economic terms the relationship had to be Spain with Europe, because that was where imports and exports were crucial. The production that helped us a great deal was wheat from Perón’s Argentina, but it was only for eating, it wasn’t for trade; so for trade, the Latin Americans themselves and all the fairly well informed economists that were in Spain made us realise that we had to establish relations with the European Community, which was our direct import-export link. So that’s why the regime allowed some ‘cultural’ associations to be formed to study the European phenomenon, and an association known as the Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea came into being, with offices in the Gran Vía and now based in the offices of the Spanish European Movement, and they were to take a cultural approach to the study of European unification rather than a political approach, they didn’t allow us to make political statements. They also allowed a number of research centres in universities — in Zaragoza, Salamanca (overseen by Professor Tierno), Seville (under Carrillo Salcedo), etc. — to carry out a little research into what the political phenomenon of European unification was, but I have to stress that it was only from a scientific and cultural perspective rather than a political perspective. But in the AECE, which I was Vice-Secretary of, political turmoil soon developed. We met in a small room in its offices that has now been preserved even down to the same furniture because it interests us, it’s a historic centre: liberals, Christian democrats, socialists, etc. began to gather there. I was a Christian democrat at the time so I coincided with Mr Gil Robles senior, a conservative but liberal and democratic person who had come back to Spain and was Chairman of the AECE. There were liberals and socialists but no communists yet, because — as you know — they weren’t interested at that time, because Comecon members weren’t in favour of European integration, or at least that was the party line. I say it was the party line, because afterwards in Munich I personally witnessed the interest Spanish communists had in the incipient Eurocommunism and the phenomenon of Spanish integration. And subsequently my European vocation flourished because of a very significant phenomenon: I visited several little villages in deepest rural 218 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ Spain, in Andalusia and Castilla y León, which is real deepest rural Spain and saw emigration as the natural reaction to a mere survival question. International migration debates and EEC migration frameworks in the 1970s. Impact and traces on Spain’s economic and return migration Since the beginning of the 1970s, new political and scholarly considerations regarding the social and economic effects of migration enter the public discourse, causing a lasting influence on the framing of EEC policies and measures geared towards migrants, including economic emigrants from Spain. One important example are the Conclusions of the Committee for International Coordination of National Research on Demography, with a special focus on the CICRED Seminar on Demographic Research in Relation to Economic Development published in 1974,12 in which it is stated that “all economic growth, indeed, involves some form of mobility (internal or international). There is, accordingly, a clear relation between international migration and economic development”. Despite this larger international mindset, Western European countries did not promote freer mobility in the 1970s, thus restraining the liberalisation of the Scandinavian labour market and that of the European Community member states. Concomitantly, migration was not perceived then as advantageous to all parties involved, as it was an instrument designed to serve the short-term needs of the receiving labour markets. Indeed, another aspect of migration which was greatly overlooked was the promotion of development within a larger region, a view which particularly stood in contradiction to the proclaimed cohesion aspirations of Western European democracies in the overall process of European integration. The preference for short-term considerations in EEC migration policy at that time was also evident in the restrictions that some countries (for instance, West Germany) imposed in response to the effects of the oil crisis during that period, but, most importantly, due to social and political factors.13 As a matter of fact, in this particular context, many nationals of industrialised countries who had considered leaving the continent under more stringent economic conditions decided to stay, and many Southern Europeans, including Spaniards, then preferred to move and work temporarily in nearby relevant industrial nodes. Despite these trends, an upsurge of overseas migration, comparable in scale and structure to the rapidly evolving intra-Euro- 12. Georges Photios Tapinos (ed.) International Migration: Proceedings of a Seminar on Demographic Research in Relation to International Migration, Paris 1974 (World Population Year). 13. For a comprehensive overview of the debate on the preeminent political and social factors of migration restrictions in this period, please, refer to Frank Ackerman, Neva R. Goodwin, Laurie Dougherty and Kevin Gallagher, The Political Economy of Inequality, Washington, D.C., 2000; Reginald Appleyard, International Migration Policies: 1950-2000, International Migration, 39:6 (2001); Reinhard Lohrmann, Labour Migration Policies of European Countries, International Migration, 31:2-3 (1993). Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 219 pean migration back then, would have been rather unlikely. Against this backdrop, the receiving countries in Western Europe competed mainly for skilled rather than for unskilled labour, which made up the bulk of intra-European migrants. It is important to specify that, overall, foreign workers in most West European countries did not face very advantageous conditions in the period between the 1960s and the 1970s: they were often forced to accept unskilled, low-paying jobs; they usually could not bring their families with them and their sojourn was strictly limited by contract; they were not supposed to stay in the receiving country to fully integrate; they were regularly discriminated against by the nationals of the given host country and sometimes even by national trade unions.14 If they would take on all these impending difficulties, it meant the economic advantage of emigration had to be really high. And that seemed to be the case: the possibility of securing employment at wages three and four times higher than in Spain was a strong incentive for migration for Spanish workers who did not adjust their private consumption or personal lifestyles to such high wages on a permanent basis, but saw emigration as a way to fund their families' well-being in their home country. If such was the motivation in Spain and other sending countries, their development rate was surely below the level required to adequately use their labour potential.15 In other words, if development was to be accelerated, emigration was expected to decrease. The same should have generally been the case for Southern European countries, but where Spain is concerned, the repression of any organised labour movement kept wages artificially low in contrast with most West European industrialised countries. In such conditions, emigration went on longer, despite progressive domestic development. Especially suggestive of the rapidly increasing labour surplus in the least-developed sending areas in Spain was the incidence of clandestine migration, not only towards key industrial nodes, but also toward Spain, which incipiently became short of certain kinds of low-paid agricultural labourers as a result of excessive outward migration from the 1960s to the 1970s. In this context, EEC industrialised countries were, hence, faced with a choice of three possible options to enhance GNP growth: “(a) To substitute capital for labour, as annual production generated a constant share of savings to be invested (assuming a constant propensity to save); (b) to invest abroad; or (c) to invest in the domestic economy but to import foreign labour to man the factories”.16 Since the end of the Second World War, Western European industrialised countries were more in favour 14. Wolf-Rüdiger Böhning, The Social and Occupational Apprenticeship of Mediterranean Workers in West Germany, in Massimo Livi Bacci (ed.), The Demographic and Social Pattern of Emigration from Southern European Countries, Florence 1972. 15. Tapinos, note 1. 16. Stephen Castles, Godula Kosak, The Function of Labour Immigration in Western European Capitalism, New Left Review I/73 (May-June 1972), pp. 3-21; Ruth Becker, Gerhard Dörr, Karl Hermann Tjaden, “Fremdarbeiterbeschäftigung in Deutschen Kapitalismus”, Das Argument – Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften 68, (1971), pp. 741-756; Günter Schiller, “Die Auswanderung von Arbeitskräften als Probleme der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung”, Das Argument – Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften 68, (1971), pp. 800-809. 220 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ of the last option. Indeed, it was for this reason that migrant workers posed a challenge once full employment had been attained and the industry was unable to guarantee further reserves from the agricultural sector. From a more global perspective and on a contextualising note, it is important to bear in mind that both inward and outward migration flows were institutionalised during this period within the framework of Multilateral Treaties, including those consolidated by various international organisations such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe, which were engaged in the coordination and unification of treaties in this field. The aim of these agreements was to avoid conflict between different systems and to ensure some basic common standards. For example, the ILO Agreement 97 from this period promoted a convenient free service designed to assist migrant workers and, in particular, to provide them with accurate information. Moreover, the Council of Europe adopted a European Social Security code and incorporated in the European Social Charter a section on the right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance.17These bodies also made recommendations to their member states aimed at unifying and coordinating action taken by the various national authorities. Some examples include ILO recommendations on the housing of workers and the EEC recommendation on Social Services for migrants18 Furthermore, also the influence of the judiciary at the EEC level left a lasting impact on the implementation of EC-wide measures regarding intra-European migration. One significant example could be that of the 1975 Rutili Judgment, in which the European Court of Justice provides a ruling on restrictive public policies that curtail the free movement of workers in the EEC Member States. As an exception to a fundamental principle of European Community law, its application must comply with all EC rules. Accordingly, any measures taken by a Member State against a person must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual and whether he poses a genuine and sufficiently serious threat, and this must apply indiscriminately to nationals of the host country and to all other EC nationals.19 How- 17. This code comprised facilities for departure, travel and reception of migrants, regulations on equal treatment and special provisions for the maintenance of established rights. See European Social Charter. Council of Europe “Research 1966”- Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers – Reports from the Social Committee of the special representative for refugees and surplus population, Strasbourg, 1966. 18. See Klaus Kamp, Population Registers, Individual-Data Banks, and Official Population Statistics, in: William Brass / Raluk Cillov (eds.) Report on Population Data Needs and the Use of such Data in Demographic and Social Analysis, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1971, p. 30-36; CICM, Social policy of the European Community considered in the context of migration. Study on the free circulation of workers from the European Economic Community; Patrick Werquin, Recommendations from the Commission of the E.E.C. to the member States concerning the work of the social service departments with workers migrating within the community: Summary 1960 – Brussels, Follow-up to the Recommendation of August 1962 to December 1964 -1969 to 1970. 19. Court of Justice, Rutili Case 36/75, Luxembourg 28 October 1975. http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/fba5ff56-a872-4ae4-a8f2-a505ed57cb54/publishable_en.pdf (last accessed on 27 October 2016). Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 221 ever, it is important to note that a new and more open course was defined in contrast to this judgment when Eduardo García de Enterría was elected: in April 1978, he was the first Spanish judge at the European Court of Human Rights, a position he held until 1986. Indeed, he upheld that Spain became party to the various conventions and treaties adopted by the Council of Europe, such as the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, thus introducing leverage as well as a tempering measure with respect to previous and more restrictive rules in Community migration issues. This is a paradigmatic example of how migration and enlargement correlate with facilitating a democratic, freer space for acclimatising and truly experiencing belonging to the ‘Community’. Political transitions and socioeconomic dimensions of Spanish migration from the negotiations to EC accession to full-membership The context of change of the mid-1970s in Spain was also defined by an important new trend, namely, return migration,20 which coincided with a major parallel process of transition to democracy and political negotiations for EEC accession. This trend was explained by the economic impact and, most importantly, by the socio-political effects of the oil crisis especially in West Germany and in France, who temporarily closed their borders to immigration, leaving them open only for migrants coming from EEC Member States and for nationals of countries with special cooperation agreements. More specifically, it is important to note that these borders temporarily closed to labour immigration were left open only for relatives of already established immigrants and EEC migrants.21 Within this context, the number of Spaniards regarded as emigrants in 1970 has been estimated to be about three and a half million. The majority – especially as far as emigration to EEC member states is concerned – reflected a rural mindset in relation to the attained level of occupation, attitude, outlook on employment and career plans, etc. Emigration records of other states in the Mediterranean area, like Italy, Greece, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, evidenced similar features. Regarding the notion of return migration, Spanish migrants seemed to prioritise the accumulation of foreign currency over occupational promotion and career concerns. At the same time, the paradigmatic Mediterranean migrant of this period seemed to prefer “the multiplication of hours of overtime to the sacrifice of some time and money to various training courses. He does not appear to be as much 20. Ernâni Lopes, Address given to the Assembly of the Republic, Lisbon, 9 July 1985. http:// www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/2/18/6f00ae75-55b4-436b-aa5b-441558436c6c/publishable_en.pdf (last accessed on 27 October 2016); Marion Bernitt, Rückwanderung spanischer Gastarbeiter: Der Fall Andalusien, Materialien zur Arbeitsmigration, Königstein 1981; Rien Van Gendt, Gonzalo García Passigli, Return migration and reintegration services, Paris 1977; William H. Form, W.H., Julius Rivera, The place of returning migrants in a stratification system, Rural Sociology 23 (1958), pp. 286-297. 21. Marta Latorre Catalán, “Ciudadanos en democracia ajena: aprendizajes políticos de la emigración de retorno española en Alemania durante el Franquismo”, Migraciones y Exilios, 7(2006): 81-96. 222 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ interested in social mobility in the host society, in relation to which he feels himself in a fringe situation, as in economic and social improvement in his society of origin”.22 Against this backdrop, “his frequent aims are generally related to the purchase of an apartment and of agricultural machinery, to generating bank savings and selfemployment, etc. This explains that only 6% of foreign workers employed in the Federal Republic of Germany in the mid-1970s were in the specialist grade”.23 However, Spanish migrants, and the Mediterranean migrant in general, are usually considered merely as labourers in this context, both as a result of a lack of technical knowhow and due to the fact that they were more useful and profitable in practical and low-skilled tasks. As the flow of Spanish emigration to other EC countries picked up, it underwent a period of crisis as the possibility of accumulating savings gradually decreased. That was the case of Spanish migration to France, where migration policies encouraged longer stays. Spanish citizens adapted to this new context through associative activities, which gathered together a good number of Spaniards living and working in France.24 Such associations, also promoted integration tools within a variety of EC initiatives,25 provided a space for socialisation and a means of recreating the culture of origin. Some of them, furthermore, even acquired a critical awareness of the emigrant condition.26 These activities also played a fundamental role in offering a radically different socialisation with transnational civic values and a politicisation experience to migrant workers coming from countries with dictatorships – as was the case with Spain – since it allowed them to contact and participate in labour organisations, in democratic political parties and in political organisations addressing the particular conditions of economic and political exile, which also had a remarkable influence on activism patterns during transition periods in return migrants’ communities. This specific Spanish migration wave27 to the EEC, from 1973 to 1986, also coincided with the first oil crisis and with a general lack of contracts for Southern European migrants in the most developed EEC member states. In the next phase, from 1986 to 1992, Spanish migrants ceased to be considered as such to become EEC workers, holding equal rights to those of EEC member states, even if free circulation was dependent on transition periods. 22. See Salustiano Del Campo, José A. Garmendia, “The Return of Emigrants”, in G. Tapinos (ed.), op. cit. 23. Ibid. 24. Guillermo Díaz-Plaja, La condición emigrante. Los trabajadores españoles en Europa, Madrid 1974. 25. See J.P. Garson, A. Loizillon, “Changes and challenges: Europe and Migration from 1950 to Present”, in Proceedings of the Conference ‘The Economic and Social Aspects of Migration’, Brussels, OECD, 2003. 26. See J. Babiano, “Emigración, identidad y vida asociativa: Los españoles en la Francia de los Años Sesenta”, in Hispania, LXII/2, n. 211 (2002), Madrid, Centro de Documentación de la Emigración Española. Fundación I de Mayo. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC). 27. Santiago Mancho Gómez, Emigración y desarrollo español, Madrid 1978. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 223 Coming back to the crucial period of Spain’s negotiations for EC accession, Manuel Marín, the former Vice-President of the European Commission and one of the first Spanish Members of the Commission right after accession, reminds us of the importance of the particular national reluctances to Spain’s accession as regards to migration patterns: Each and every EC member state was then having doubts, on two of the accession negotiation packages: the agricultural package and the fisheries package, basically, because they thought that those were Spain’s strong suits. Then, we had the immigration problem with Germany, because with the Germans, whenever there is an accession, they pull out the old ‘Polish plumber’ syndrome. During the most recent elections in France then, people also said that there was going to be an influx of Spaniards to the country … But as you know, the effect in Spain was just the reverse.28 There was no need for a seven-year transitional period. As Spain entered a period of rapid expansion, many people who were part of the immigration phenomenon returned to Spain. This brought us professional experience, qualified workers, people interested in setting up small and medium-sized businesses, etc. The return of those immigrants who had spent 20 years living and working in Europe was very useful for us too. The reverse effect occurred. Taking also into account the concomitant configuration of a ‘People’s Europe’ and of the progressive Schengen Area with its interrelated fundamental notion of ‘free movement of persons’ since the mid-1980s, it is significant to refer to a less known development involving Spanish workers in the continent. In 1986, and in the midst of key turning points in the history of European integration, such as the signature of the Single European Act29 modifying the Treaty of Rome and the accession of Spain and Portugal to the Community, there was a lively debate —especially kept going by the EP— on the key question of the virtual cost of a non-united Europe in relation to Schengen area debates. Against this backdrop, the EP urged the Commission to make public the actual total cost — including the social costs — of a potentially non-united Europe and to provide the European Parliament with the information necessary to undertake political action to stimulate the Council to arouse public interest in the European Community on this matter.30 28. See also Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Director of the Directorate B in charge of Candidate Countries, Directorate General for Enlargement (DG ELARG), European Commission, held in Brussels on 1st December 2005. The interviewee corroborated the lack of fundament of the fear towards a massive Spanish migration towards the EC in the wake of accession, since this migration had already taken place in the period from the 1960s to the 1970s. 29. On the Single European Act, see: Facts Sheets on the European Union. Developments up to the Single European Act http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html? ftuId=FTU_1.1.2.html (last accessed on 30 October 2016). Regarding the third enlargement of the EU, see Sebastián Royo, Paul Christopher Manuel, Spain and Portugal in the European Union: the first fifteen years, London, 2003. 30. Resolution of the European Parliament of 12 June 1986 on the cost of a non-united Europe, OJ C 176, 14 July 1986, p. 125. 224 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ In 1988 this question took a new turn, since the issue of the free movement of persons was analysed and put forward by the EP in the form of a consolidated concept of a ‘People's Europe’, placing again the human factor of European integration at the centre of the political discussion. Hence, the free movement of persons auspicated and launched by the Schengen Agreements was then carefully examined as the seed for a European Community based on the democratic expression and impact of citizens' voices, in line with the EP's guiding principles. It is then that the notion of a People's Europe also came to encompass —as shown by the evolution of EP debates at the time— the overarching principle of solidarity, implying not only alleviation of poverty, but also the redistribution of social welfare provisions and securing their sustainability. In a similar vein, Spanish MEP Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia (S-ES) emphasised the need to conciliate the creation of a 'European consciousness' through the press and communications media with the socio-economic development of the European Community, but also touched upon the interrelated factor of tenable welfare procurement for a 'People's Europe': I also agree that is fundamentally competitiveness in economic relations that will make our Community even stronger. But I believe in a People's Europe which cares about the poor, the deprived, the unemployed, those who suffer from the lack of collective solidarity in this Peoples' Europe that so many love to evoke, the one that firmly turns its back on the tragedy of everyday subsistence that many families experience. Madam President, I believe in a People's Europe where our Parliament shows solidarity to those who suffer most or with those who have most to bear.31 Indeed, if there is a freedom associated with the Schengen Agreements which evidences the dynamic interplay between the solidarity principle and the constructive potential of facilitated upward social mobility, it is precisely the freedom of movement of persons guaranteed by the Schengen Agreements in 1985, enshrined in the Single European Act of 1986, and further deepened in the 1990 Convention that came into force in 1995. One interesting discussion in this context covered the special case of East Germany's EC integration and how it links with the demand of the right of free movement of persons for Spanish and Portuguese citizens. Indeed, as a result of German unification, the citizens of the former German Democratic Republic acquired the full rights laid down in the Treaties and in EC secondary legislation with regard to the free movement of workers without transition period. This aroused criticism from Portuguese and Spanish EP representatives, who considered it inadmissible that any discrimination or comparative disadvantage, albeit transitional, should persist in this area between citizens of the Member States. Hence, they called for freedom of movement for Portuguese and Spanish workers in the other Member States and for the transition period to be brought to an end.32 31. European Parliament debates of 13 September 1988 on a motion for resolution by Mrs. Veil and others on the People's Europe, No 2-368, p. 51. 32. Motion for a Resolution of the European Parliament of 21 December 1991 on freedom of movement for Portuguese and Spanish workers, OJ C 2150/90, 21 December 1991. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 225 The active role of Spanish MEPs in the EP Schegen area debates was also very remarkable, especially taking into account their principle-based normative approach. This is the case with MEP Mohamed Alí (GUE-NGL-ES) who also warned about the progressive emergence of significant new forms of discrimination linked to the free movement of persons: “As regards the functioning of the Schengen Agreements, we regret the emergence of new forms of discrimination: on the one hand between citizens of the Union on grounds of nationality, and on the other with regard to the citizens of third countries legally residing in the Union".33 He also criticised a Schengen Information System (SIS) as a database of undesirable aliens, which could list even those who had no criminal records: "I should like to voice my concern about the fact that the Schengen Information System is used chiefly as a databank for undesirable aliens, including foreigners with no previous criminal record or who are without means."34 Furthermore, this Spanish representative also condemned the advancement of a 'Fortress Europe' via Schengen by asserting the need to avoid "any kind of discrimination against citizens of non-member countries legally residing in the Union and turning Europe into a veritable fortress".35 This involvement also evidenced the incipient analysis of new positions in Spain towards an increasing immigration from third countries which took into account both the previous experience of Spaniards as primarily economic emigrants to the EEC and also the fundamental identifying principles ascribed to the European integration process itself by new Spanish representatives in the European Institutions.36 Spain’s full membership and the modalities of incorporation of outbound migration feedback to tackle inbound migration since the 1990s From the 1990s onwards, Spanish workers started moving to different EEC Member states as highly qualified professionals,37 and also benefited from high educational capital to develop transnational careers, seeking particular working environments, 33. European Parliament debate of 10 March 1997 on the future of Schengen, pp. 6-13. 34. European Parliament debate of 10 March 1997 on the future of Schengen,pp. 6-13. 35. European Parliament debate of 10 March 1997 on the future of Schengen, pp. 6-13. 36. In this respect, it is worth notig that there is a rich historiographical debate on the impact of Schengen and the EC on the Spanish immigration policy. See, in particular, Wayne Cornelius, Akeyuki Tsuda, Philip Martin, James Hollifield (eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Stanford 2004; Joaquín Arango, Martin Baldwin-Edwards (eds.), Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe, Basingstoke 1999. 37. PIONEUR Project, Pioneers of Europe’s Integration 'from Below': Mobility and the Emergence of European Identity among National and Foreign Citizens in the EU, European Commission, Fifth Framework Programme, Key Action 'Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base', 2006. 226 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ innovative lifestyles and diverse consumption patterns.38This trend was consolidated remarkably via EEC/EU diploma recognition schemes, which gradually implemented a harmonised standard of professional qualifications in old and new EU member States, constituting a key socioeconomic factor for the deepening of European integration.39 In this respect, it is also fundamental to address the political and socioeconomic impact of the Schengen Agreement and of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997),40 as well as the special attention paid to the EU Social Policy Agreement, and to the subsequent EU-wide provisions on the free movement of persons with regard to visas, asylum and immigration. As already mentioned, the Spanish economy had experienced a very significant development in the mid-1970s. In this context, migrants’ remittances became an actual trigger of economic growth.41By contrast, the overall economic growth which followed EEC accession drew a wave of extra-European migration during the late 1980s, especially focused on agricultural labour in the Mediterranean basin, which came to be socially acknowledged only at the end of the 1990s. In this regard, Spain started following the same pattern of Greece and Italy, notably characterised by lower fertility rates and an aging population as well as by higher education levels in Southern Europe. This resulted in a refusal of younger generations to concentrate on the primary sector, instead prioritising a search for more qualified jobs. Hence, the internal demand coming from sectors such as agriculture, household jobs, construction work and catering increased accordingly. This new extra-European migration provided manpower mainly to SMEs, but fell, in many occasions, into the realm of informal economy. From this viewpoint, it is important to bear in mind that “in highly segmented labour markets, immigrants occupied and still occupy the worst positions, not only regarding salaries and work conditions, but also in terms of instability and lack of Social Security protection”.42 In the period that extends from the 1990s to the beginning of the 21st century, Southern Europe, but Spain in particular, became the main destination of a new wave of extra-European migration to the EU. Indeed, according to Eurostat, “Italy and Spain received 56% of total EU immigration that arrived during the period 38. Antonio Alaminos, Óscar Santacreu Fernández, La emigración cualificada española en Francia y Alemania, Universidad de Alicante – Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo Social y Paz Papers 95/1, (2010), pp. 201-211; Thomas Straubhaar, The Accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC from the Aspect of the Free Movement of Labour in an Enlarged Common Labour Market, International Migration 3 (1984), pp. 228-238. 39. Antonio Alaminos, Living abroad. Intra-European Migrations, Alicante 2006. 40. European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the Schengen Agreement and political asylum, 6 April 1995; Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997. 41. Charles Powell, The Long Road to Europe: Spain and the European Community, 1957-1986, in: Joaquín Roy, María Lorca-Susino (eds.), Spain in the European Union: The First Twenty-Five Years (1986-2011), Miami 2011, pp. 21-45. 42. Aurelia Álvarez, La transposición de directivas de la UE sobre inmigración, Documentos CIDOB Migraciones 8 (2006), pp. 9-121. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 227 1997-2008, while Spain alone received 50% of the total during the past decade, 2000-2009”.43 The fact that Spain was at the forefront of a new wave of extra-European migration deeply transformed its role and attitude in relation to the measures taken by the EU in this field. For instance, Spain gradually acquired a more proactive role in the design of an evolving EU migration policy and promoted the establishment of FRONTEX in 2004. At the same time, the country maintained demands that the Northern EU member states get involved in addressing the challenges of migration in the EU. Moreover, “the establishment in 2007 of a European financial fund for the return of irregular migrants or the launching of European repatriation joint flights were also results of this Spanish demand for bigger implication of Northern countries in the financial cost of immigration management”.44 It was also remarkable that social integration initiatives and associated activities regarding extra-European migration in Spain were mainly encouraged and maintained within the sphere of Spanish civil society. In 2008, Spain was also actively involved in the elaboration of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, resulting from a French proposal, which included the restrictive notion of creating an “immigration contract”. However, such an initiative was later refused by the Spanish government at that time, despite the concession to incorporate an institutional option to block mass regularisations of immigrants’ status within the Pact. In this respect, “the European Union has played a double role in the Spanish immigration process: Spain has obtained EU support in the financial and political effort to reduce irregular migration, especially coming from Africa, and has used EU decisions as external legitimization for the introduction of domestic policies that could arouse opposition”.45 43. In comparative terms, the effect of this migration wave is bigger in Spain than in Italy, as the size of the native population is much smaller. All in all, Spain received more than 5 million new migrants (i.e. net migration) during the 2000s, over a population of 40 million at the beginning of the period in a process of unknown intensity in Europe. From being 0.5% of the population in 1985, the number of immigrants amounted to 14% in 2010.Refer to Carmen González Enríquez, Spain: The Making of Immigration Policies in the Southern Frontier of the EU, 1985-2010, in: Joaquín Roy, María Lorca-Susino (eds.), note 21, p. 118. 44. Ibid. 45. Joanna Drozdz, Spanish leadership in developing a 'common' European immigration policy: Intergovernmentalist supranationalization approach, College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations 92 (2011); Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin and James Hollified (eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Stanford 2002; EC, Reguralisation Programmes for Irregular Migrants, Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels, July 6 2007; Adam Luedtke, One Market, 25 Stats, 20 Million Outsiders? European Union Immigration Policy, Washington 2005; Dietmar Herz, European Immigration and Asylum Policy: Scope and Limits of Intergovernmental Europeanization, Nashville 2003: Chien-Yi Lu, Harmonization of Migration in the European Union: A State-Centric or Institutionalist Explanation?”, Pittsburgh 1999; Giuseppe Callovi, Part II: Western Europe. New, Old and Recast of Immigration Questions in the Post-Cold War Period. Regulation of Immigration in 1993. Pieces of the European Community Jig-Saw Puzzle, International Migration Review 2 (1992), pp. 353-372. 228 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ Spanish EU decision-makers from the 1990s onwards tended to incorporate the values and norms of the European integration in their approaches to tackle the rising external migration coming both from the Mediterranean and from the East. In this regard, their views served to further illustrate the aforementioned deeply intertwined correlation between enlargement and migration, which was, rather paradoxically, characterised by giving priority to new democratic elite actors which became progressively less and less concerned about upward mobility. As a result, the weight of solidarity and cohesion in community building as an intrinsic element of European integration re-emerged, by contrast, within popular opposition in the wake of the current economic crisis. Manuel Marín, for instance, refers to the fact that in terms of identity, European values are what they are. It should be much easier to control the excesses of racism and xenophobia, to reach a basic agreement on the immigration issue in order to provide some equilibrium in the matter, to consolidate the systems for protecting European citizens; this can also be achieved and we will then be able to guarantee the applicability of these systems to all Europeans and then to the rest of the world, because we are a peaceful continent and one which above all wants to export its values and to help and cooperate, but if you mix all this up with politics which is often, as they say in French, minable, pathetic, in order to win your constituency and so on, the system breaks down, really breaks down.46 From a different perspective, Marcelino Oreja relates the immigration phenomenon to the European Union’s (EU) need to clearly define the guiding principles of its relations with third countries: I believe that Europe must play a leading role in European issues, which are also universal issues. It has to find solutions to the major problems facing humanity, including climate change, which is a hugely important topic, and our position in Copenhagen was completely inadequate. I am also thinking of immigration issues, and in this regard we should lay down guidelines within a global legal framework that guarantees respect for human dignity. We also need to find solutions to the problems of the continents that are deprived of a decent standard of living, such as Africa; we need to ensure that the focus is on those who are in need and those who are neglected. We can’t forget that there is a continent that is completely on the margins when it comes to human welfare, and that is a responsibility. Europe has to be aware of the idea of universality. In other words, Europe is differentiation, because it has specific characteristics of its own, Europe is humanity, it is respect for individual rights and it is universality: that means that we have to be open to the rest of the world and be a continent that welcomes people rather than excluding them. (…) I believe Europe is unfinished because Europe is constantly being created. However, in my view, what we have to do is ensure that we do not forget about European values: there are economic ideas, technological ideas and so on, but European values — freedom, solidarity — are the most important values, and we must help to develop them, promote them and improve them. We must never rest if someone else is cut off from the civilised world, not just within 46. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Manuel Marín González, former State Secretary for Relations with the European Communities and Head of the Negotiating Team for Spain's Accession to the European Communities (1982‒1985) – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 13th of April 2010. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 229 Europe, but outside it, too. That is Europe’s duty and its primary goal; it must put an end to the global apartheid of peoples, races and civilisations who at this moment in time do not have a decent life, a life that encompasses respect for the individual. That is our primary goal and until we achieve it Europe will always remain unfinished.47 In a mindset which interrelates the various stages of enlargement with the shifting attention of European integration from the Mediterranean to Eastern Europe, Jordi Pujol, former President of the Assembly of European Regions, indicates that “the European centre of gravity used to be in France and Germany. Then there was a period when the Mediterranean gained weight (before entering the current somewhat turbulent period, which has so far lasted 20 years) because Italy had gained weight. Spain, Portugal and Greece joined. They too developed well, and, indeed, North Africa began to be thought of as important. I always used to say as I travelled through Europe that the Mediterranean was Europe’s most delicate frontier, especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Mediterranean frontier is the frontier with underdevelopment, demographic explosion, major migration and ideological risk from Islamists and so on, but Europe finds this very difficult to understand; Northern Europe won’t hear anything of it. I have given conferences in Hamburg and Stockholm on the subject or in England and noticed that they weren’t interested. Anyway, the centre of gravity moved south, but now it has moved back north, of course, because Poland has joined, the whole of Eastern Europe has joined […] powerful Central Europe, Eastern Europe. In short, Italy, France and Spain have not done things well, but it’s difficult because there are many problems in the Mediterranean.”48 Pujol elaborates on this view by problematising immigration rather than exploring the economic and social development potentials that were contemplated in earlier periods: Immigration is a major challenge. One of the problems in Europe, incredible though it is, is that European politicians have never attached importance to demography. I’m one of those who think that there are many elements in politics but that three are more necessary than others: a knowledge of history, a knowledge of geography and a knowledge of demography. How many of us are there? Who are we? How many of us will there be? — that’s an easy one to calculate — how many of us will there be in 20 years? We know that now. How many young people will we have in 20 years’ time? We know that now. How many elderly people will we have in 20 years’ time? We know that now, more or less. And that is the basis for constructing policy. Not in Europe … There are only three countries, four at the most, which have had a birth-rate policy: France and the Scandinavian countries; Ireland has not implemented a birth-rate policy, but has had a birth-rate policy; Spain has experienced complete resignation and complete disinterest in this matter. So that’s the situation on the one hand, and on the other we have ageing. Then there is immigration because there are major imbalances between our world and the African world, the South 47. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, former Secretary General of the Council of Europe (1984) – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 24th of March 2010. 48. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with Interview with Jordi Pujol i Soley, former President of the Generalitat de Cataluña (1980‒2003) – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 19th of March 2010. 230 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ American world, the Asian world, Filipinos and Pakistanis come here, etc. Immigration is really very high, it’s a major challenge in Catalonia because, so I believe, Catalonia is the European country where immigration is highest, we have little political power and we’re a small country and it is therefore a problem from many points of view, including in terms of identity. Leaving Catalonia to one side for a moment, it is an issue that has been very difficult for Europe and much more so for Spain to understand that it is a matter — let’s not call it a problem, because it’s true that it’s also a challenge, a chance or an opportunity, but it is something that we have to manage well, conduct well, because although it could be an opportunity it could also become a huge drawback. I believe it would be good for Europe to have the most uniform immigration policy possible; one hundred per cent uniformity will clearly not be possible because the countries are different. But this question must be examined seriously. José María Gil-Robles, former President of the European Parliament and son of the aforementioned exiled Spanish representative of the same name, also considers the challenges of immigration from the viewpoint of the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean policy: Well, I think that the European Union has more or less reached its limit in terms of the new members it can incorporate, but it should establish very special relations with its neighbours: on the one hand, the neighbourhood policy is specifically directed towards the East and, on the other, one aspect of neighbourhood policy is the Euro-Mediterranean policy. These are the regions from which we were invaded throughout our history, so it is in our interests that they are well developed and prosperous and enjoy good relations with the European Union. The Mediterranean, like the East, is now an area of peaceful immigration — the peaceful invasion of the present time. As such, it is the subject of a Community policy. I think we have managed to avoid the Union for the Mediterranean becoming a process solely for the European countries on the Mediterranean. It is a process with implications for the entire Community and in which all the countries of the Community should participate. Secondly, it’s a process that will take a great deal of time, because we have a situation where the Union is an integrated whole, with a highly evolved civil society, whereas neither of these conditions are in place for the countries south of the Mediterranean: they do not form an integrated whole, have no interest in integration and have only a fledgling civil society, which means that relations are unstable. They can be improved with this or that Mediterranean country, but it’s difficult to build on them with these countries as a whole.49 Gil-Robles’ initiative to create the so-called ‘migrant card’ was developed during his Presidency of the EP. Indeed, such an initiative very much summarises his take on immigration from the Southern Mediterranean to the EU: Immigration policy is a sensitive one, because it’s caught between two needs. Firstly, Europe needs immigration — we will still need at least 20 million immigrants over the next decade, which is easily said. Yet on the other hand, these immigrants need to be integrated, otherwise they will return to their countries of origin — though the majority do not — so they must be integrated. And this is a tricky process, in which it is still too 49. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Interview with José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, former President of the European Parliament – Project 'Spain and the European Integration, held on the 9th of March 2010. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 231 early to speak of any great success. Instead, the avalanche of immigrants is provoking very strong grass-roots opposition, with the risk of xenophobia or outbreaks of xenophobia and racism in European countries — today nobody is in a position to preach, because we have all suffered or are all suffering from this situation to a greater or lesser extent. We therefore need to act while maintaining this difficult balance: integrating immigrants while attempting to regulate the flow to prevent an overload. We’re tackling it using trial and error. We must wait and see whether we have any success, but it will be difficult. You asked me about the migrant card: it would be of crucial value for integration, but it’s also crucial that it is not conceived as an empty gesture; the card must be given to people who have been in the European Union for some time and who are acquainted with it, to those with a real desire to integrate, and various systems are being trialed in different countries to verify the existence of this desire to integrate. If both conditions are met — a sufficiently lengthy period of residence and the desire to integrate — the card should grant immigrants the same opportunities for travel, work and association that Europeans enjoy. Ignacio Samper, former Director of the EP Office in Spain, also considers that “third country nationals’ migration has a direct positive potential impact on the future development of their own countries upon return via the qualifications they obtain in the EU.”50 Nonetheless, he interprets the EU’s need for migrants’ manpower as a development retardant for their home countries of equally negative effects. This would perpetuate poverty in the global South, but, in the eyes of this practitioner, the solution to this challenge is not to be found in mere bilateral cooperation agreements, but in the coordinated engagement of the EU as a whole. Nowadays, many of these concerns have been tied to different key political issues, including the increasing disposability of the workforce and the question of the waning advocacy and lobbying on behalf of EU workers. Whereas in previous periods their requests had to be acknowledged due to the fact that workers’ leverage was their labour itself —which the economic model was dependent on— such negotiation power has subsequently indeed been weakened. For when labour becomes overabundant, dispensable and increasingly ubiquitous, these negotiations enter an era of challenging redefinitions. Hopefully, these redefinitions will be at the level of the issues at stake and will possibly include considerations based on past experiences and good practices derived from foundational principles of European integration (solidarity, socioeconomic cohesion…) in order to avert any involution of community-building towards the largely condemned ‘Fortress Europe’. Conclusion The Spanish case does not only constitute a most significant instance of the correlation between migration and enlargement, but its complexity also brings about a number 50. Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Cristina, Interview with Ignacio Samper Cimorra – former Director of the European Parliament Office in Spain – Project 'Spain and the European Integration Process', held on the 26th of November 2009. 232 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ of insightful questions which may be key for the future of Europe. The first question refers to the potential positive impact of migration on the economic growth of host countries. This would be in direct relation with an inquiry into the effects of migration in home countries: Could such vectors lead to an underuse of human capital in host states? Furthermore, in the current context of a multilevel crisis and of attacks to the European social model, it would be relevant to ask about the effects of a dismantlement of the welfare state and of austerity measures on those already willing to move without being forced, once again, by economic hardships. In a similar vein, it would also be advisable to take into account the problematic of European innovation and technology centers and peripheries, which, very interestingly, corresponds with the economic crisis’ re-emerging geographical cleavages in the continent. This ties in, once again, with the possibility of a long-term loss in the socioeconomic, cultural and human capital in countries of origin. Another important question in this realm would be how to enhance cohesion as a result of mobility within the EU and to ponder the interrelated effects for EU foreign relations. From a social perspective, the increasing number of Spaniards who leave because of the crisis but who would not have left otherwise, tend to experience such situations as a personal and intimate tragedy and as a generational failure since they observe that their living conditions are worse than those of their parents. Very importantly, the Spanish case appears to evidence how a common ‘space’ can become a ‘vehicle’ in the sense that European integration, the European economic area and the Schengen area were used as a ‘vehicle of opportunity’ and potentiality for life and work prospects and as guarantors of an integrated supranational area mobility. However, the creation of a functional structure, which has neither become an organic sustainable ecosystem nor an entity enhanced by a consciously promoted common sense of civic value and of community-building, currently feels that it has reached its own potential development limits. We might wonder whether there has been an excessive influence and competence of EU Member States in mobility and migration and not enough Community-based actions. In fact, has this actually hindered the evolution of the principles of solidarity and socio-economic cohesion and their application to migration policies? It is very relevant to observe now, in this sense, the evolving networks of Spanish intra-European migrants, which are made up of, on the one hand, qualified ‘forced/ no choice’ labor migrants who experience migration as a personal and family tragedy and who focus on associations. The other group is constituted by (economically enabled) Spanish citizens who willingly move and, in turn, focus on networks devoted to practical issues and cultural activities. Very remarkably, Spanish networks abroad focusing on career advancement and professional development are international, multicultural and sector/discipline oriented, not nationality-based. The pressing question from this perspective would be: Do they favor the establishment of an integrating and globally comprehensible public space? Is there possibly a dialogue between these two types of Spanish intra-European migrants beyond past commonalities and abstract categories such as ‘intellectuals in exile’ and ‘economic migrants’? Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 233 The incongruity between merits, qualifications and experience on the one hand, and job opportunities on the other hand, along with a degradation of a stable upward social mobility and career development, is a trend that spreads like fire from South to North in the EU. However, the EU could potentially reignite a space of solidarity and opportunity. Lastly, we should also wonder about which are the multilevel longterm effects of this growing inequality resulting from the economic crisis? Scholarly analysis in this field, also placing the Spanish case in a broader context, debates the facts that “(a) EU enlargement had a significant impact on migration flows from new to old Member States, (b) restrictions applied in some of the countries did not stop migrants from coming, but changed the composition of the immigrant groups, (c) any negative effects in the labour market on wages or employment are hard to detect, (d) post-enlargement migration contributes to growth prospects of the EU, (e) these immigrants are strongly attached to the labour market, and (f) they are quite unlikely to be among welfare recipients. These conclusions point out the difficulties that restrictions on the free movement of workers bring about”.51 As a response, and in a context characterised by the socioeconomic challenges of a multilevel crisis and the depreciation of the social dimension of the European community, it would be advisable to openly address the issue of how regional imbalances could be resolved more easily through coordinated action towards free circulation of workers within the EU. In sum, a more pan-European perspective, beyond national interests, would help in finding comprehensive migration strategies in line with the evolution and potentialities of the European integration process. From the start, these processes have been triggered by economic measures while pursuing an essentially political objective. This meant the progressive transformation of a common market and legal framework into a contested yet consensual entity more and more willing to deal with the challenges of a deeper political union. In conclusion, it is precisely now that the free movement of persons within a EU framework is decidedly at stake, that it is important to bear in mind that the EU is more than a market, politics more than a business model and to reaffirm the idea of the EU as a political player ethically committed to upholding the human rights, solidarity and social cohesion dimensions of the European integration process. This could be approached, for instance, by revisiting the debated principles of a ‘People's Europe’ at the inception of the Schengen area, which saw no distinction between citizens, legal or illegal residents, etc. Especially many Spanish players at the European level, either coming from a political or from a civil society background, have largely upheld that particular 'we the people' emphasis, so clearly mirroring the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is probably our turn now to link the notion of 51. See M. Kahanec, K. F. Zimmermann, “Migration in an enlarged EU. A challenging solution?”, in F. Keereman, I. Szekely (eds.), Five Years of an Enlarged EU. A positive sum game, Heidelberg,Springer, 2010, p. 63-94; S. Carrera, M. Merlino (eds.), “Assessing EU Policy on Irregular Immigration under the Stockholm Programme”, Brussels, CEPS, 2010; R. Shafagatov, M. Aygun, “Immigration Policy as a Challenging Issue in the EU Policy-making Process: A Study of Immigrant Integration Policy”, MA thesis, Linkopings University, 2005; A. Messina (ed.), West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century, Westport, Praeger, 2002. 234 Cristina BLANCO SÍO-LÓPEZ an essential quality of democracy at the EU level to the potential and transformative power of participatory democracy involving free mobile citizens. Such daunting questions are especially important in times characterised by the reversal of fundamental rights concerning migration and asylum, by the degradation of the quality of democracy and by the forced pre-eminence of a view52 on migration that focuses on security rather than on conciliating migration and a much-needed sustainable development principle. Therefore, it is fundamental to learn from the historical experience of the most socially engaging and suitable elements of any relevant migration-development retroaction cycle, even if the case of Spain is rife with much tense complexity and neglect. This view might then also enhance the re-emergence of essential principles in hindsight, like the aforementioned solidarity and socio-economic cohesion, as renewed motors capable of reviving the compelling force and ethical imperatives of the European integration process. 52. On the humanitarian consequences of an exclusive security-oriented focus on the consolidation of the Schengen area and the free movement of persons, please, refer to: European Parliament, Urgent Motion for a Resolution of the European Parliament of 10 May 1990 on the additional protocol to the Schengen Agreement, OJ C 994/90, 10 May 1990; European Parliament, Motion for a Resolution of the European Parliament of 14 February 1991 on the Schengen Agreement, OJC 0104/91, 14 February 1991; European Parliament, European Parliament debates of 6 April 1995 on Schengen and the right of asylum, No 4-461, pp. 202-206. Unveiling covectors. Correlating migration and EC enlargement in the case of Spain 235 A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement Alice CUNHA Abstract Whereas immigration from outside Europe makes the news headlines, there is a tendency to pay little attention to European citizens moving inside Europe, except when a large number of states are on the verge of membership. In the context of the European Economic Community policy regarding the free movement of workers during the 1970s and 1980s, this chapter analyses the narrative of freedom of movement for workers in the Portuguese accession negotiations, which lasted from 1978 to 1985, and the demands of the EEC and member states, especially Luxembourg, to explain the role of the EEC as an enabler (or not) of mobility of European workers and the establishment of a common European labour market. Introduction European integration has been a story of success and failures, but it has retained the “people of Europe” at its heart. Unlike during the earlier centuries in Europe’s history when its internal borders were continually shaped and reshaped, mainly because of conflicts and wars, the European integration process engaged a different approach to the design of European borders, in part due to a successful enlargement policy. In fact, both European integration as a whole and enlargement policy in particular have “affected perceptions about borders and boundaries.”1 After each round of enlargement the European Economic Community (EEC) / European Union (EU) has expanded its external borders and, on a domestic level, reshaped its internal borders, thus changing people’s lives in a number of practical ways, such as those provided by the freedom of movement for people, goods, services and capital. The freedom of movement of workers represents a significant advance in one of the most sensitive political areas of the modern state today: i.e., economic emigration, since it deals with people’s lives in a number of ways. In addition, despite the different ways, each receiving member state has handled this issue, the freedom of movement of workers has certainly become a “Community” issue, and the notion of the “immi- 1. James W. Scott, Borders, Border Studies and EU Enlargement. CRN Working Paper http://comparative-research.net/fileadmin/user_upload/CRN__Working_Paper_01-_02-2008.pdf (last accessed on 22 October 2014), p. 3. 237 grant” has been replaced by that of the “Community worker,” despite reality weakening this ideal in many cases. Thus, regardless of how we conceptually distinguish the term, the so-called Community workers are often regarded purely as immigrants. Although the free movement of people is enshrined in the European treaties, mobility of labour remains a sensitive issue. This was evident during the third (Iberian) enlargement, but also during the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds when member states feared that cheap manual labour from Central and Eastern Europe, personified by the “Polish plumber”,2 would “invade” the older member states and that this would lead to wage dumping. Indeed, the free movement of people and consequently their inclusion into the Schengen area became one of the most important and concomitantly one of the most delicate issues debated during the Eastern enlargement negotiations. Finally, following the Iberian enlargement experience, a transition period of seven years was established for freedom of movement3 so that each member state could decide when it was ready to welcome workers from the new member states. Kahanec and Zimmermann found empirical evidence that EU enlargement has a significant impact on migration flows from new to old member states. In addition, evidence suggested that post-enlargement migration contributed to the growth prospects of the EU. Finally, they demonstrated that restrictions applied by some countries did not stop the flow of migrants and that negative effects in the labour market on wages or employment were hard to detect.4 The founding treaty of the EEC, the Treaty of Rome (1957), established the abolition of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services, and capital (Article 3c). Article 48 nº 3, on the other hand, acknowledges that workers can move freely within the territory of member states, stay in a member state for the purpose of employment, and remain in the territory of a member state after having been employed in that state. Prior to this, the Treaty of Paris (1951) – which established the European Coal and Steel Community –had first introduced the free movement of workers among member states to facilitate the recruitment of a specialized workforce across national borders, although this was limited to workers with qualifications in the coal and steel industries (Article 69). The free movement of workers, and later of any other persons, has since become a chief goal of European integration and this remains the 2. The metaphor of the “Polish plumber” symbolized not only the emigration of Poles but also of workers from other East European states, who were candidates for the 2004 enlargement. It represented a type of not-so-welcome immigrant in Western European countries since public opinion in the older member states feared these immigrants would accept lower wages that would lead to a decline in work standards and conditions. 3. See in particular: Adelina Adinolfi, Free Movement and Access to Work of Citizens of the New Member States: the Transitional Measures, Common Law Review 42:2 (2005), pp. 469-498. 4. Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann, Migration in an Enlarged EU: A Challenging Solution?, Five Years of an Enlarged EU (2010), pp. 63-94. 238 Alice CUNHA case today, even though the 1951 “immigrant workers” are now known as “EU movers”5 within the ever-expanding EU. After the devastation of the Second World War, Europe began to recover in the 1950s and experienced a period of economic growth for which labour was needed. This led many northern European countries to introduce guest worker programs allowing migrant workers to be recruited, primarily from countries in southern Europe, thereby encouraging labour mobility. This lasted for over two decades. During the 1970s, however, the oil crisis that started in 1973 and the slowdown in economic growth resulted in an end to the “open-door” policy, with Western European states stopping recruitment and restricting legal labour immigration from third countries. This led to the beginning of a restrictive immigration control policy throughout Western Europe. Even though these were decisions taken in specific domestic contexts by national governments, ultimately they would have implications for the accession negotiations. When Portugal and Spain became EEC member states in 1986, completing the third enlargement round, the external and internal borders of the EEC changed and the issue of the free movement of workers (at the time a national topic) became a much-debated issue in the negotiations. Undeniably, one of the most complex chapters in the Portuguese accession negotiations which took place between 1978 and 1985, was the Social Policy chapter6 which –, besides the social security of migrant workers, access to the European Social Fund, and other aspects of the EEC social policy, such as the protection of workers against risks of exposure to chemical and biological agents, which represented the existing acquis at the time –, also included the free movement of workers to other member states. Indeed, after applications from Greece, Portugal, and Spain, the free movement of workers became, for the first time, an important issue in accession negotiations. Today, immigration from outside Europe has become headline news, and there is a tendency to pay scant attention to the movement of European citizens inside Europe, except when a large number of states are on the verge of membership. Thus, in the context of the EEC policy regarding the free movement of workers in the 1970s and 1980s. This chapter analyses the freedom of movement for workers in the Portuguese accession negotiations, and the demands from the EEC and member states, especially Luxembourg, an explanation of the role of the EEC as an enabler (or not) of the European mobility of workers and the establishment of a common European labour market. Although debate over the meaning of the free movement of people commenced during the 1980s, existing literature has mainly focused on discussions of the economic rationale for a selective immigration policy and the effects of current selection 5. Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi, Pioneers of European integration: an introduction, In: Ettore Recchi / Adrian Favell (eds.), Pioneers of European Integration. Citizenship and Mobility in the EU, Cheltenham 2009, p. 9. 6. Alice Cunha, O Alargamento Ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia: A Experiência Portuguesa, Lisboa, 2012 [Ph.D. thesis]. A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement 239 mechanisms. It has also focused on the effects after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, of migration flows on the receiving and sending countries, and the connections and implications for their labour markets, welfare benefits and employment measures.7 Despite existing Portuguese historiographical literature having extensively analysed its path towards integration into “Europe,” and the presence of relevant research on Portuguese EEC accession negotiations,8 the free movement of workers has not been studied extensively and has not been discussed in any academic literature to date. This chapter is mainly researched from archive materials, and using primary sources only recently made available from the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Archive on the accession negotiations of Portugal to the European Communities (ANAPCE) and from the former European Integration Bureau Archive – Ministry of Labour (GIE-MT). Accession negotiations and the Social Policy chapter Free movement of workers was granted to nationals of member states by the Treaty of Rome (Articles 48 and 49) and endorsed by the Council Regulation (EEC) Nº 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on the free movement of workers within the Community. This determined the “abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States regarding employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment, as well as the right of workers to move freely within the Community in order to pursue activities as employed persons,” subject only “to any limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.” The EEC foresaw that the free movement of workers was an essential condition for a true common market to function optimally. This, in turn, implied the right of 7. See, for example, the works of: Amelie Constant and Klaus F. Zimmermann, Immigrant Performance and Selective Immigration Policy: A European Perspective, National Institute Economic Review 194:1 (2005), pp. 94-105; Jimmy Donaghey and Paul Teague, The free movement of workers and social Europe: maintaining the European ideal, Industrial Relations Journal 37:6 (2006), pp. 652-666; Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann, Migration in an Enlarged EU: A Challenging Solution?, Five Years of an Enlarged EU (2010), pp. 63-94; d’Artis Kancs and Julda Kielyte, European Integration and Labour Migration, European Integration online Papers, Vol. 14 Article 16 (2010); Michela Martinoia, European Integration, Labour Market Dynamics and Migration Flows, The European Journal of Comparative Economics 8:1 (2011), pp. 97-127. 8. See, for example: Alice Cunha, O Alargamento Ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia: A Experiência Portuguesa, Lisboa 2012 [PhD thesis]; Francisco Niny de Castro, O Pedido de Adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias – Aspectos Político-Diplomáticos, Cascais 2010; Luiz Gonzaga Ferreira, Portugal e as Comunidades Europeias – Do 25 de Abril ao Pedido de Adesão, Lisboa 2001. An interesting project on the memories of the Portuguese technical staff has also been carried out, the main goal being to preserve their personal experience and memories regarding this matter (Memórias da Adesão) recently published: João Rosa Lã e Alice Cunha (org.), Memórias da Adesão. À Mesa das Negociações, Santa Cruz 2016. 240 Alice CUNHA establishment and residence as long as the workers did not represent an additional burden on the public finances of the receiving state. Moreover, member states retained the prerogative to impose limitations on the free movement of workers, justified on the grounds of public policy, public security, or public health (Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964). Later, Regulation (EEC) Nº 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 determined the right of workers to remain in the territory of a member state after having been employed in that state. When Portugal and Spain started their individual accession negotiations to join the EEC, there were only nine “social” directives and these were the existing acquis communautaire regarding the free movement of workers, and the Council Regulation (EEC) Nº 1612/68 would be the basis for the EEC delegation’s position on the matter. Portuguese accession negotiations lasted from 17 October 1978 until 12 June 1985. During this seven-year period, negotiations were carried out by nine different constitutional governments and went through 14 rotating presidencies of the European Council and three different compositions of the European Commission (Jenkins, Thorn and Delors). Despite this turnover at the political level, Portugal retained a stable structure for the technical basis of the negotiations. The Commission for European Integration (Comissão para a Integração Europeia – CIE) was responsible for coordinating all the technical aspects of the negotiations and synchronizing them with political directives. The Secretariat for European Integration (Secretariado para a Integração Europeia – SIE) delivered specialized technical support; and each ministry had a European Integration Bureau (Gabinete para a Integração Europeia – GIE), which also supplied technical advice in their respective field. Both the CIE and the SIE had no political support in the sense that the accession dossier was not one of the main concerns of the consecutive governments. That being said, these institutions had the sole responsibility to outline the Portuguese position on all chapters. Both the CIE and the SIE contained a small team of experts (almost all being higher public servants from the ministries), that were charged with studying the acquis communautaire, the state of affairs in the country, and what Portugal could demand and expect in return. It was only the later (final) stages that the minister (and in exceptional cases, the head of government) would intervene, by accepting or refusing the draft position. This meant that throughout the entire negotiations, the CIE and SIE officials were solely responsible for formulating the proposals that were ultimately delivered to the EEC, with little governmental supervision. The Social Policy chapter, was discussed during six governments (IV to IX), and always remained under the scope of the Ministry of Labour, headed by ministers9 who all had the same type of intervention, as described above. Maria Odete Vital was the Ministryʼs representative in the CIE, and she worked on this issue and participated in the negotiation meetings in Brussels and Luxembourg. Another civil servant from the 9. Eusébio Marques de Carvalho; Jorge Sá Borges; Eusébio Marques de Carvalho (second term); Henrique Nascimento Rodrigues; Luís Morales (twice on the same government) and António Queirós Martins; Amândio de Azevedo. Source: http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/o-governo/arquivo-historico/ governos-constitucionais.aspx (last accessed on 7 January 2016). A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement 241 Ministry, Madalena Pinheiro, assisted her and Pinheiro fully acknowledged her commitment and importance in the negotiation of this chapter.10 The Social Policy chapter was one of 20 chapters11 that were negotiated. The chapter was assigned to the Ministry of Labour12 and, together with the Agriculture and Fisheries chapters (which were the most complex); it was, as a former CIE President recalls, “the most politically sensitive chapter both for Portugal and for those member states with high unemployment rates and large immigrant communities from third countries.”13 It is therefore not surprising that the freedom of movement of workers was defined the “most fastidious” issue,14 “one of the most sensitive”,15 and even taken as “the most difficult to negotiate,” while some also noted that to some extent there was a “ʻparanoidʼ approach toward this problem” in some member states.16 Portugal has a long tradition of its people emigrating to Brazil, the United States, Canada, and Venezuela and, since the mid-1950s, to European countries, especially France and Germany, which has been primarily driven by the demand for labour in Europe. As a result, the various dimensions of Portuguese emigration have been studied, especially in relation to the EEC/EU.17 This chapter, however, focuses 10. Madalena Pinheiroʼs speech in Ciclo Memórias da Adesão de Portugal à CEE, session ”Liberdade de Circulação de Trabalhadores”, Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 18 February 2016. 11. For an in-depth analysis on how these chapters were negotiated individually, see: Alice Cunha (Coord.), Os Capítulos da Adesão, Lisboa 2016 (forthcoming). 12. Such complex and important negotiations would suggest a large team of technicians, but in fact there were only two devoted to this subject. All the sources available do not make it possible to determine the Secretary of State for Emigration’s intervention although some documents suggest or even confirm his participation, even if only on a sporadic or residual basis. 13. António Marta, Portugal e a C.E.E.: O Processo de Adesão, in: Jorge Borges de Macedo / António de Siqueira Freire / António Marta (eds.), A Adesão de Portugal à C.E.E., Lisboa 1986, p. 52. 14. Secretariado para a Integração Europeia, Negociações de Adesão à CEE: Resumo, Lisboa 1981. 15. António Vitorino, O Desafio da Mobilidade das Pessoas, Europa: Novas Fronteiras 26/27 (2010), p. 211. 16. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/01, “Proposta de posição negocial: Assuntos Sociais”, written by Manuel Areias, Missão de Portugal junto das Comunidades Europeias, 8 April 1982. 17. See, for instance, the works of: Maria Beatriz Rocha-Trindade, Migrações no quadro do Mercado Único Europeu, Análise Social XXV:107 (1990), pp. 465-477; José Carlos Laranjo Marques, A emigração portuguesa para a Europa: desenvolvimentos recentes, Janus (2001), pp. 146-147; Maria Ioannis Baganha, From closed to open doors: Portuguese emigration under the Corporatist Regime”, e-Journal of Portuguese History, 1:1 (2003), pp. 1-16; Aline Schiltz, Lʼemigration Portugaise au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. Analyse de lʼimpact local dans le village de Fiolhoso, Bruxelles 2003; Grassi, Marzia e Daniel Melo, Portugal na Europa e a questão migratória: associativismo, identidades e políticas de integração, Lisboa 2007; Marta Nunes Silva, Redes de emigração económica clandestina com destino a França (Penedono, 1960-1974), Lisboa 2008; Malika Ghemmaz, Des Portugais en Europe du Nord – Un Comparaison France, Belgique, Luxembourg. Contribution à une Sociologie Electoral de la Citoyenneté de lʼUnion Européenne, Lille 2008; Alexandra Corina da Silva Ferreira, A Emigração Portuguesa e as Políticas Migratórias Europeias, Aveiro 2009; Albano Cordeiro, Portugal, l’émigration vers l’Europe ou l’européanisation par le bas, Grande Europe 17 (2010), pp. 19-26; Aline Schiltiz, Migrations et développement dans un espace politique changeant – analyse de la mobilité intra-Européenne entre le Portugal et le Luxembourg, Luxembourg 2013. 242 Alice CUNHA specifically on the concept of the freedom of movement of workers, as enshrined in the acquis, considering, as the Portuguese government did, that “the discussion was not about immigrants, but about workers.”18 Even before negotiations had started, the European Commissionʼs opinion on the Portuguese application (19 May 1978) mentioned that the opening up of borders and the application of Community rules on freedom of movement for workers might encourage a trend towards emigration, which was likely to create additional difficulties for member states. However, it also noted that past research and the EECʼs own experience in this area showed that, even with freedom of movement, migratory flows tended to vary substantially according to the perspectives offered by the labour market in the receiving country. On the other hand, despite the limited employment opportunities in member states, it was also possible that spontaneous movements might occur, particularly during the first few years after membership, but improvements in living and working conditions, as well as lower unemployment in the sending countries, would make this less likely.19 The opening of the Social Policy chapter occurred at an early stage of the negotiation process at the 6th Deputiesʼ meeting held on 7 December 1979 in which “the great importance attached to the free movement of workers” was stressed.20 In the enlargement negotiations, the EEC has the power of initiative so it is the first to present its position, based on the existing acquis for each area. In this particular case, however, for reasons we could not find in the documentation consulted, it was the candidate, Portugal, who was the first to submit its statement.21 In this, some points were highlighted such as the utmost importance of the chapter, the close connection to other chapters and the acceptance of the whole existing acquis, although with some transition periods considered.22 18. Interview with Madalena Pinheiro, former Ministry of Labour technical officer. The interview was conducted in Lisbon on December 12, 2012. 19. European Communities – Commission, Opinion on Portuguese Application for Membership, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/78 (1978). 20. Secretariado para a Integração Europeia 1981. 21. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Nota n.º 18/83: Negociação do ̒ dossierʼ Assuntos Sociais”, 22 April 1983. The free movement of workers had already been addressed earlier in the negotiation of the Protocol between the EEC and Portugal in 1976. This had only established the principle of nondiscrimination based on nationality with regard to working conditions and remuneration (Article 10), and also social security (Article 11). 22. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/34/79, “Déclaration de la délégation portugaise lors de la 6ème session de la Conférence au niveau des Suppléantsˮ, 13 December 1979. A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement 243 All sources available23 support the fact that the Portuguese delegation always reiterated: (i) the principle of free access to employment for Portuguese workers who lived in an EEC member state on the date of accession; (ii) freedom of movement within the Community from 1 January 1988 for workers who had had a regular job in one or more member states for at least seven years; and (iii) the rejection of the Luxembourg safeguard clause. In general, the Portuguese delegation was always concerned to ensure the rights of Portuguese nationals already working in the EEC and of those who would work in a member state in the future. On the other hand, Portugal clearly knew that, despite its claims, it was in a weak position to enforce its arguments, so some argued that the ultimate goal should be a transition period of seven years with the inclusion of a review clause24 – which was ultimately achieved. In response to the Portuguese statement, the Commissionʼs reply was direct and clearly states that this was a sensitive issue for the EEC and its member states and that the Portuguese people “should not expect miracles.”25 That became obvious when the EEC presented its first statement on the matter on 27 June 1980. In addition to identifying the underlying problems related to the free movement of Portuguese workers within the EEC member states it considered the need to adopt transitional measures – terms and duration to be defined at a later moment – in order to avoid disorderly movements of manual labour and severe tensions for the employment market. In addition, it proposed an indeterminate transition period with progression in the acquisition of benefits. Finally, it reaffirmed that at no time might Portuguese citizens enjoy more favourable treatment than citizens of other member states.26 The basis for this position was that the EEC took into account the characteristics of the country, notably the unemployment rate, living, and remuneration conditions and migratory movements. But in the end, the ultimate goal of the EEC as a whole, and member states in particular, was to restrict access to their labour markets following the restrictive immigration measures adopted in particular by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium in 1973-74. In other words, what was at stake was free access to employment and it was this that was being conditioned. 23. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Nota n.º 30/82: Projecto de declaração da Comunidade sobre ʻAssuntos Sociaisʼ – Documento interno n.º 104 (P)”, 11 November 1982; GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Nota n.º 12/83: Assuntos Sociais – Última evolução das negociações”, 18 March 1983; GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Nota n.º 20/83: Assuntos Sociais – Ponto de situação negocial de adesão”, 31 June 1983; GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Nota n.º 39/83: Negociação do ʻdossierʼ Assuntos Sociais, no date; GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Nota n.º 1/84: Negociação do ʻdossierʼ Assuntos Sociais, no date; GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Negociações de adesão de Portugal às CEs – Assuntos Sociais”, no date [possibly end of 1982 or beginning of 1983]. 24. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/01, “Proposta de posição negocial: Assuntos Sociais”, written by Manuel Areias, Missão de Portugal junto das Comunidades Europeias, 8 April 1982. 25. Archives Historiques des Communautés Européennes (AHCE), BAC 250/1980 n.° 40, “Briefing for Vice-president Natali, Meeting with Mr. Freitas do Amaral on 5 February – State of Progress in the Accession Negotiationsˮ, 31 January 1980. 26. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/35/80, “Déclaration de la Communauté lors de la 10ème session de la Conférence au niveau des Suppléantsˮ, 30 juin 1980. 244 Alice CUNHA Like other freedoms, the free movement of workers is restricted. It was not in the past nor is it now, and in the end it is always a member state’s prerogative to limit the free movement of workers, especially when it comes to the right to work in the public sector. What is more, this free movement of workers is still an area of cooperation between member states, subject to restrictions, especially during times of crisis. Such was the case of Portugal, whose Social Policy chapter was negotiated at a time of serious imbalance in the Portuguese labour market, reflected in the high rate of unemployment (6,8-6,1% during the 1980s), large regional disparities and inequalities among the population (concerning employment and income), and in the broader context of an international economic recession (with the adoption of neoliberal economic policies). Nevertheless, in the end, we cannot really assert that the increase in intra-European migration is primarily the consequence of freedom of movement as migrations in the EEC/EU are primarily determined by labour demand: if demand is low, the free movement of workers does not really work. According to official data, back in 1979 there were over one million Portuguese nationals living in EEC countries, of whom 570 000 were working,27 thus being the second most important foreign community originating in third countries after the Turkish community. Therefore, it was in Portugal’s best interests to minimize transitional measures and to shorten the transition period in order to not only facilitate the free movement of workers to the EEC, but especially to abolish existing discrimination between Portuguese migrant workers and national workers from their respective member states.28 As Madalena Pinheiro, the former Ministry of Labour representative on this issue, points out, it “was decisive to obtain equal treatment” but no one expected “to get better conditions than Greece.”29 Besides, Greeceʼs transitional period was going to end on 1988 and member states were apprehensive of what would happen regarding free movement of Greek workers. In the end, due to both the enlargement precedents and the same fears, Portugal got the same deal as Greece (same transitional periods and benefits for workers), but it got a better deal regarding the benefits for the families of those workers who already lived in an EEC member state at the date of accession. Following the 5th Ministerial meeting, held on 27 October 1981, the EECʼs position diverged from the position Portugal had presented (which would remain throughout the negotiations), it even introduced new constraints, such as the Luxembourg safeguard clause, and left the duration of the transition period to be discussed at a later date.30 At this point, Portugal wanted the acquis to be applied immediately after accession and with no restriction to Portuguese workers and their families,31 that 27. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/34/79, “Déclaration de la délégation portugaise lors de la 6ème session de la Conférence au niveau des Suppléantsˮ, 13 December 1979. 28. Luís Brito Correia, A Adesão de Portugal à C.E.E. e a Livre Circulação de Trabalhadores, in: IDL (ed.), Adesão de Portugal à Comunidades Europeias: Questões Sociais, Lisboa 1985, p. 36. 29. Interview with Madalena Pinheiro. 30. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/34/81, “Déclaration de la Communauté lors de la 5ème session de la Conférence au niveau ministérielˮ, 30 October 1981. 31. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/02, “Assuntos Sociais: Projecto de Declaração”, 13 January 1982. A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement 245 is, there should be no transition period. In all truth, at that time it was publicly known that Portugal could not expect any support on this matter from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, or Luxembourg.32 Noticeably, there were disagreements between both parties, particularly accentuated with the introduction of the Luxembourg clause. However, the Portuguese negotiation team was convinced that both the economic and social arguments behind the EECʼs position lacked foundation.33 They were also aware of the fact that the administrative language used in the official documents covering the negotiations fell short of the restrictions that public opinion in the above mentioned countries and their lobbyists would like to see imposed on the accession treaty with regard to Portuguese workers”.34 Luxembourg and the safeguard clause Portugal had still not officially presented its membership request when, during Mário Soaresʼ European tour,35 some member states were already expressing misgivings about the future effects of this membership application. Luxembourg was particularly concerned about the free movement of workers,36 and throughout the whole negotiation process would express its fear of an excessive increase in the Portuguese working community in the country. This was already the largest in relative terms, representing over 10% of all the manual labour.37 Hence, from the start, Luxembourg demanded the inclusion of a safeguard clause,38 which would allow Luxembourg to apply safeguard measures under national provisions governing access to and changes in the labour market. 32. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Nota 5/82”, 30 March 1982. 33. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/5/82, “Déclaration de la délégation portugaise lors de la 17ème session de la Conférence au niveau des Suppléantsˮ, 1 February 1982. 34. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/01, “Proposta de posição negocial: Assuntos Sociais”, written by Manuel Areias, Missão de Portugal junto das Comunidades Europeias, 8 April 1982. 35. A series of trips to member statesʼ capitals between 14 February and 12 March 1977, the aim of which was to get endorsements from member states for Portugal’s intention to submit its application to join the EEC. 36. Francisco Niny de Castro, O Pedido de Adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias – Aspectos Político-Diplomáticos, Cascais 2010, p. 143; Michel Pauly, «Créer des Européens»? Les gouvernements luxembourgeois face à la libre circulation des personnes, In: AAVV, Du Luxembourg à l’Europe. Hommages à Gilbert Trausch à l’occasion de son 80e anniversaire, Luxembourg, 2011. 37. In 1981, 30 thousand Portuguese people lived in Luxembourg, of which 15,900 worked, out of a grand total of 140 thousand foreign workers. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/02, “Enlargement of the European Community – Negotiation with Spain and Portugal”, 15 January 1985. On the evolution of Portuguese emigration to Luxembourg, see: GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/12, “Informação da Embaixada de Portugal no Luxemburgo”, written by António Vitorino Pereira, 14 July 1983. 38. The introduction of the safeguard clause was not unheard of, so the Commission was largely inspired by Article 130 of the Greek accession treaty, in turn supported by Article 226 of the Treaty of Rome. 246 Alice CUNHA At the time, in an attempt to ensure the overall competitiveness of its economy and maintain the employment rate in the context of a deteriorating economic situation and the consequent difficulties in the labour market, the Luxembourg government had taken certain measures, namely prohibiting the entry of immigrants into the country and suspending work permits for new migrants. These measures were not considered provisional but permanent, including in the context of any future EEC enlargement. Yet, this concern with immigration was not new and was already mentioned in the Protocol on the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to the Treaty of Rome (Article 2) that alludes to the “special demographic situation” of the country. The Portuguese delegation considered the Luxembourg clause “totally unacceptable” and rejected it invoking a matter of principle, that is, the demarcation of one member state from the remaining states, and also the fact that the Commission should not decide on the feasibility of implementing certain measures in Luxembourg which were different from those applied in all other member states.39 What was at stake was discrimination between Portuguese workers living in Luxembourg and those working in other member states. Portugal maintained this rejection throughout the negotiations, despite several diplomatic efforts made by the Portuguese officials to change the clause, although in the end it ultimately accepted a transition period of 10 years for access to employment for new migrants provided that after accession there would be no restrictions on changing employment. This was a compromise solution that was advocated by the Secretary of State for Emigration, who believed it to be the most suited to defend the rights of workers in that country.40 The EEC, on the other hand, always supported the safeguard clause;41 but, in contrast, the largest Luxembourg workersʼ union, the OGBL (Onofhängege Gewerkschaftsbond Lëtzebuerg), opposed the restrictive transitional measures for those Portuguese nationals who were legally working in the country.42 Additional data also showed that the Luxembourg demographic balance was negative and that it was only counterbalanced by migration. Luxembourg needed temporary workers who could work in manual labour deficit sectors such as construction, agriculture, tourism, and domestic service, and there was no kind of social mo- 39. GIE-MT, Pasta 04.04/02, “Projecto de declaração da delegação portuguesa sobre ʻlivre circulação de trabalhadores e política socialʼ”, 25 January 1983. 40. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/01, “Telecópia recebida em 12.2.85 sobre as negociações com Portugal”, 13 February 1985. 41. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/6/83, “Déclaration de la Communauté lors de la 11ème session de la Conférence au niveau ministérielˮ, 28 January 1983; GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/67/83, “Déclaration de la Communauté lors de la 15ème session de la Conférence au niveau ministérielˮ, 5 December 1983; GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/63/84, “Déclaration de la Communauté lors la 21ème session de la Conférence au niveau ministérielˮ, 6 September 1984. 42. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/01, “Proc. 8.7. n.º 171 de 25/8/83”. A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement 247 bility, which could be explained by the potential competition between migrant workers and the national Luxembourgish citizens.43 As the literature has demonstrated,44 there is little room for manoeuvre for applicant countries since the EEC and existing rules benefit the older member states and so the candidate must comply with the existing acquis with a minimum of derogations. However, the two delegationsʼ positions continued to differ since Portugal always battled for the immediate application of the acquis on free movement of workers upon accession,45 while the EEC believed that there should be a transition period46 in line with the outcome of the Greek accession negotiations on the matter. In this regard, Eirini Karamouzi identifies the problem of surplus labour in the EEC as a third complexity regarding the second enlargement round, especially in relation to Greeks in the Federal Republic of Germany, and underlines the political debates held at intergovernmental and community level which confirmed the need for a transition period and a safeguard clause.47 It was also clear at this point – as in other accession chapters and issues – that whatever was agreed for Greece would set the precedent for Portugal and Spain. Spain also experienced the concerns of the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg in this matter48 and had similar problems to those of Portugal. The first “package of chapters” was finished in the first half of 1982 during the Belgian presidency, but the most troublesome ones remained, as was the case of Social Policy. At this point, it seemed important to redirect attention to other substantial chapters, namely the Agriculture and the Fisheries chapter, in order to keep up the pace and to approach the ultimate goal – membership.49 Negotiations on the 43. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/12, “Apontamento” from the Portuguese Embassy in Luxembourg, January 1982. 44. Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, London 1997; Lorena Ruano, Origins and Implications of the European Unionʼs Enlargement Negotiations Procedure, RSC Nº. 2002/62 (2002); Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement, East European Politics and Society 17 (2003), pp. 42-57. 45. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/7/83, “Déclaration de la délégation portugaise lors de la 11ème session de la Conférence au niveau ministérielˮ, 28 January 1983. This position had already been stated in GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/5/82, “Déclaration de la délégation portugaise lors de la 17ème session de la Conférence au niveau des Suppléantsˮ, 1 February 1982. 46. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/6/83, “Déclaration de la Communauté lors de la 11ème session de la Conférence au niveau ministérielˮ, 28 January1983; GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/67/83, “Déclaration de la Communauté lors de la 15ème session de la Conférence au niveau ministérielˮ, 5 December 1983. 47. Eirini Karamouzi, Greece’s Path to EEC membership, 1947-1979: the view from Brussels, London 2011 [PhD thesis], http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/217/ (last accessed on 20 November 2015), p. 153 and p. 182. 48. Vanessa Núñez Peña, Entre la reforma y la ampliación (1976-1986): las negociaciones hispanocomunitarias en tiempos de transición y approfondissement, Madrid 2013, p. 308 [PhD thesis]. 49. ANAPCE, CONF-P/47/82, “8th meeting of the conference at ministerial level, Statement by Mr. Leo Tindemans, President-in-office of the Council of the European Communities, on the progress of the conference”, p. 5; ANAPCE, CONF-P/72/82, “9th meeting of the conference at ministerial level, Statement by Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, President of the Council of the European Communities, on the progress of the conference”, p. 3. 248 Alice CUNHA Social Policy chapter never stopped50 and at the beginning of 1983 the Federal Republic of Germany, at the time President-in-office of the Council, also started to exert pressure to conclude this chapter, due to the hardening of positions by some member states, which did not accept the Community’s position lightly. Nevertheless, in the end Germany did not succeed on this purpose. At that point, in early 1983, besides the other “minor” chapters that were being negotiated, the conclusion of the negotiations largely depended on finding solutions to the three major chapters. Regarding the chapter on Social Policy, it “dragged on without major arguments51” clearly depending on a political decision since the issues listed were essentially political in nature. As pointed out by António Marta, “this issue had more political impact than economic and social effects”52 because if workers were prohibited from moving freely, they were not forbidden to emigrate as long as the receiving state granted them authorization to work in the country. Meanwhile, in an attempt to boost, and even to “de-dramatize,”53 the negotiations on this chapter, Portugal submitted a memorandum where the flows and trends of Portuguese emigration to EEC member states, and particularly to Luxembourg, were analysed. They concluded that the evolution of the Portuguese migration flow would not aggravate existing disturbances in the labour market, nor would it modify the social fabric of member states. They also added that the Luxembourg clause was unwarranted and likely to create a situation whereby Portuguese workers were discriminated against in relation to those of the Community.54 Table 1: Number of arrivals of Portuguese in Luxembourg (1970-2013) Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013 No. 2 852 2 222 3 388 2 193 3 845 4 590 Source: adapted from data provided by Le Portal des Statistiques du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/tableView.aspx (last accessed on 30 October 2014). Both the Portuguese and Spanish delegations argued that EEC membership would foster economic development in their respective countries, that it would become “an incentive to return to the Peninsula for many of those who had decided to emigrate 50. Commission, Bulletin des Communautés Européennes 9. Bruxelles 1982, p. 44; ANAPCE, CONF- P/84/82, “Statement by the Portuguese delegation at the 9th session of the conference at ministerial level, Statement made by Mr. Salgueiro, Minister of State and Minister for Finance and Planning of Portugal”, p. 2. 51. Interview with Madalena Pinheiro. 52. Marta, p. 53. 53. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/01, “Proposta de posição negocial: Assuntos Sociais”, written by Manuel Areias, Missão de Portugal junto das Comunidades Europeias, 8 April 1982. 54. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/12, MEMO-P/1/83, “Émigration portugaise – aspects relatifs à la libre circulationˮ, 11 March 1983. A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement 249 in previous decades”55 and that it would not have the opposite effect, that is, a greater number of workers leaving the country. As shown in Table 1, in fact after accession and the end of the transition period there was no particularly significant increase in the flow of Portuguese workers to Luxembourg. The figures only slightly increased after 2010 because of Portugal’s difficult economic and financial situation. In effect, on the one hand, joining the EEC/EU does not automatically and significantly increase outward migration or cause major outflows of workers from new to old member states; but, on the other hand, Portuguese economically motivated migration or worker-based migration has still continued over the years in different forms and with different legal frameworks provided by EU institutional and legal developments. The Portuguese delegation complained regarding (i) the generic nature of the EEC positions; (ii) the systematic postponement of the discussion of the points that could help the improvement or adaptation of the Portuguese proposals on this matter; and (iii) the introduction of new disturbing elements into the negotiations such as the Luxembourg clause.56 All putted together, by the end of 1983, there was still no consensus regarding the transition period for the free movement of workers.57 The Portuguese delegation kept fighting for a distinction between workers who had resided and worked in a member state before the future date of accession58 and those that had not. For those who had worked before the accession, Portugal wanted special treatment, with the application of the acquis on 1 January 1988, while for those that had not it wanted the EEC to not apply new restrictive laws, regulations, and administrative provisions governing entry and residence after the signing of the accession treaty.59 At the beginning of 1985, there were still some last-minute conversations regarding freedom of movement of workers, workersʼ social security, and social benefits for their families60 and it would only be at the “marathon” ministerial session of 27-29 March that the chapter would be concluded.61 As expected, the most salient outcomes were the agreement of a transition period of seven years during which national criteria and permission before emigration would prevail. In addition, Articles 1 to 6 of Regulation (EEC) Nº 1612/68 would only come into force after the transition period, de- 55. Vitorino, note 9, p. 211. 56. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/02, “Nota n.º 1/84: Negociação do ʻdossierʼ Assuntos Sociais”, no date. 57. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/06, “Nota n.º 37/83: Negociação do ʻdossierʼ Assuntos Sociais”, 25 October 1983. 58. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/08, CONF-P/52/84, “Déclaration de la délégation portugaise lors la 20ème session de la Conférence au niveau ministérielˮ, 26 July1984. 59. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/02, “Ante-projecto de declaração relativo ao capítulo dos Assuntos Sociais”, 6 November 1984. 60. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/02, “Enlargement of the European Community – Negotiation with Spain and Portugal”, 15 January 1985. 61. ANAPCE, CONF-P/28/85, “27ème session ministérielle – projet de relève des conclusions”. 250 Alice CUNHA spite a review clause five years after accession, while in the case of Luxembourg, the transition period would be extended to 10 years.62 Table 2. Social Policy chapter meetings (1979-85) Year Meeting Date Delegation positions 1979 6th deputies meeting 07/12/1979 PT (CONF-P/34/79) 1980 10th deputies meeting 27/06/1980 EEC (CONF-P/35/80) 1981 13th deputies meeting 5th ministerial 29/04/1981 27/10/1981 PT (CONF-P/9/81) EEC (CONF-P/34/81) 1982 17th deputies meeting 29/01/1982 PT (CONF-P/5/82) 1983 11th ministerial 12th ministerial 15th ministerial 25/01/1983 15/03/1983 29/11/1983 EEC (CONF-P/6/83) PT (CONF-P/7/83) PT (MEMO-P/1/83) EEC (CONF-P/67/83) 1984 20th ministerial 21st ministerial 23/07/1984 03/09/1984 PT (CONF-P/52/84) EEC (CONF-P/63/84) 1985 26th ministerial 27th ministerial 20/02/1985 27-29/03/1985 --- --- Source: data collected from the ANAPCE and GIE-MT archives. As noted on Table 2, this was essentially a chapter negotiated at the ministerial level and not at deputies’ meetings, but only one meeting was dedicated exclusively to this chapter. The results achieved in the negotiations were incorporated in the accession treaty (Articles 215-220 and Article 379 paragraph 4)63 and enshrined the freedom of movement of workers as from 1 January 1993, and in the case of Luxembourg from 62. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/02, “Document interne n.º 257 (P): Affaires sociales – Project de conclusions à annexer au relevé des conclusions de la Conférence (Annexe 1), suite à lʼaccord de la Conférence CE-Portugal des 28/29 mars 1985ˮ, 3 May 1985 (2nd version). 63. Actos Relativos à Adesão do Reino de Espanha e da República Portuguesa às Comunidades Europeias, Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias, 15 November 1985. A “standstill” clause was also agreed according to which member states pledged not to apply any new restrictions that might eventually be adopted regarding employment of foreigners to Portuguese nationals who lived or worked regularly in their territory as from the date of signing of the accession treaty. Besides this, a review clause was also included which provided that an assessment would be made five years after accession, which might then determine certain adjustments under the transitional regime. A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement 251 1996 onwards. The bilateral agreements with Luxembourg would continue to be in force64 as prior authorization for emigration was possible and Portuguese workers would have priority in access to employment in the case of a member state having to resort to labour from third countries. Although the Portuguese accession team envisaged the participation of social partners, Portuguese unions had a much smaller involvement than their Spanish counterparts did. In fact, in all the documentation consulted, we only found two instances: the position of the General Workersʼ Union (União Geral de Trabalhadores), which endorsed the position of the European Trade Union Confederation, which was in favour of applying free movement on the date of accession, in the case of Portuguese workers already working in the EEC, and in 1988 with the end of the Greek transition period for the rest;65 and an opinion from the Portuguese Industrial Association (Associação Industrial Portuguesa), which concluded that liberalization of the movement of workers would bring macro-economic benefits to the country and would not cause serious problems to the EEC.66 Altogether, even though this topic was of much importance for Portugal, there was little debate on the topic. The most important was assuring equal treatment for the Portuguese already working in the member states and obtaining good conditions for all that wanted to go abroad after accession. A new border for Portuguese workers: main findings On 1 January 1986, Portugal officially became a member of the EEC, thus starting a new phase in the relationship between Portugal, Europe and the member states of the EEC/EU, which became the “new Portuguese border.”67 Although the Treaty of Rome promoted the removal of barriers to labour mobility, the principles of freedom of movement lacked application for a long period of time, primarily due to the vote by unanimity rule in the Council of Ministers, which postponed many of the directives proposed by the Commission,68 a situation that would only change with the Single European Act in 1986 and later with the Maastricht 64. The last of which dated from 1970 (Acordo entre a República Portuguesa e o Grão-Ducado do Luxemburgo Relativo ao Emprego de Trabalhadores Portugueses no Luxemburgo, signed on 20 May 1970), with amendments in 1977 and 1978. 65. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/01, “Direito de Circulação de Portugueses na CEE é cláusula inalienável – reivindicam a CES e a UGT”, letter of 19 November 1984. 66. GIE-MT, Pasta GIE 04.04/01, “Liberalização da circulação de trabalhadores com a CEE: Nota da AIP para o Conselho Consultivo da Comissão de Integração Europeia”, 22 June 1981. 67. Francisco Lucas Pires, Na Fronteira da Europa – Uma Política para a Integração Europeia de Portugal, Democracia e Liberdade (1984), p. 52. 68. On the Commissonʼs role regarding immigration policy, see: Marcel Berlinghoff, Between Emancipation and Defence: The Failure of the Commissionʼs Attempt to Concert a Common European Immigration Policy, LʼEurope en Formation Vol. 3, 353-354 (2009), pp. 183-195. 252 Alice CUNHA Treaty (1992). In the end, it is almost ironic than 30 years later similar problems have been discussed within the EU (namely in the UK) regarding one of the European integration pillars: free movement. When Portugal submitted its application to join the EEC, it was a net supplier of manual labour to several member states, but accession negotiations took place in a less favourable social-economic situation, thus not favouring the Portuguese claims with regard to the free movement of workers. On the other hand, this issue met with serious opposition from some states, especially Luxembourg, which feared a huge influx of cheap Portuguese labour, which was almost a paradox, since it is widely acknowledged that what causes emigration is not free movement per se but employment offers. The “invasion theory” also lacked confirmation and free movement of Portuguese workers to Luxembourg ended up to be anticipated in two years. The Social Policy chapter was, however, only a small part of the whole negotiation process. It could not be dissociated from the set of chapters, and needed to be viewed with other dossiers. Moreover, the negotiations held on this chapter were based on the Greek precedent and on what had been agreed earlier with Greece in the context of its accession to the EEC. By accepting almost all the Community demands, Portugal did exit these negotiations diminished or embarrassed. One must highlight that the equal treatment for workers already settled in the EEC on the date of accession was indeed the greatest achievement of the Portuguese delegation in this matter. The Luxembourg clause triggered some apprehension in Portugal, which from the outset totally disagreed with it and rejected it. Despite the Portuguese discontent, this was hardly a matter that could be subject to fair negotiations, even more so if we consider what was agreed to in the two preceding enlargements. We should emphasize that both the Portuguese and EEC delegations agreed in their positions. Indeed, both remained virtually unchanged from the beginning to the end of this chapter’s negotiation. In fact, the crucial point was actually to determine when and under what conditions freedom of movement could be applied to Portuguese workers. Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, emigration during this period appeared to be difficult owing to the economic situation. Additionally, the negotiations of this particular chapter were dominated “by an environment of psychosis compared with the delicate situation in the employment sector that existed in almost all European countries”,69 so the transitional and derogation measures were formulated particularly to “prevent what the detractors of enlargement presented as the risk of an invasion of Portuguese and Spanish workers”.70 On this point, time has proven that after accession there was indeed no invasion of neither Portuguese nor Spanish workers in other member states. In conclusion, the development of the free movement of labour within the EEC/ EU must be seen as part of the larger movement for integration, politically and eco- 69. Pedro Álvares, Portugal na CEE: A Indústria, a Agricultura, a Pesca, os Trabalhadores, os Investimentos, os Fundos, o Presente e Futuro, Mem-Martins 1986, p. 371. 70. Vitorino, note 9, p. 211. A new border for Portuguese workers: EEC accession and freedom of movement 253 nomically speaking. Moreover, although the free movement of workers was one of the EEC’s principles, the fears of member states prevailed and the Council, as well as the Commission, did not act as a booster but as an obstacle to the intra-European mobility of Portuguese workers until 1993. At this point, Portuguese workers began the process of integration into a more enlarged European labour market and began to exert their right to work in any of the other member states under the same conditions as nationals of that same state. From then on, in principle, Europe was no longer a barrier for Portuguese workers to overcome. 254 Alice CUNHA France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation Simone PAOLI "Signalons enfin l’apparition d’une nouvelle possibilité pour les clandestins. Il s’agit des “accords de Schengen”, du 14 juin 1985, ratifiés en juin 1992. Signés par les États du Benelux, l’Allemagne et la France - avec l’espoir d’y attirer d’autres pays de la Communauté européenne ces accords établissent la libre circulation des personnes à l’intérieur de cet espace - auquel veut se joindre l’Italie et prévoient la suppression progressive des contrôles aux frontières communes. Or les législations sur l’immigration ne sont pas les mêmes dans les pays membres, et sont bien loin d’être harmonisées." Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L’"invasion"1 Abstract The chapter focuses on the role of France in the negotiations for the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and the Convention implementing it in 1990. It shows that François Mitterrand, together with Helmut Kohl, was the real architect of the Schengen system, although it was much less influential during the cohabitation period between 1986 and 1988. It also argues that Mitterrand was not only motivated by economic considerations but also by political ones: the need to prevent the entry of unwanted migrants at external borders was as important as the willingness to open internal frontiers within the imminent Single Market. In addition, the choice to act outside the Community framework was not only due to opposition from Great Britain; both the French Presidency and government preferred intergovernmental agreements, because they allowed participants to marginalise Community institutions and exclude unreliable Community member states. Lastly, the chapter demonstrates that, after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, Kohl and his government took the lead in setting the pace and contents of the project, while Mitterrand and his government were forced to adopt a defensive approach. This, incidentally, greatly influenced the implementation of a generous visa policy for nationals of Central and Eastern European countries. 1. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L’"invasion" Les migrations humaines. Chances ou fatalité?, Paris 1992, p. 194. 255 Introduction This chapter examines the contribution made by France to the birth of the Schengen system. In particular, it analyses the role played by France in the negotiations for the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and the Convention implementing that Agreement (CISA) in 1990. The Schengen Agreement was an intergovernmental arrangement, aimed at removing internal border controls while simultaneously introducing measures to harmonise and strengthen external border controls and fight drug-trafficking, international crime and illegal immigration. But it was more a working programme than a detailed plan of action. After the Agreement had been signed, negotiations were therefore opened to decide upon a Convention implementing it. The CISA specified the measures which were to compensate for the abolition of internal border controls; it also established the Schengen Information System (SIS), to support external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen states. These two documents are of crucial importance, because the entire Schengen system, which started to work in 1995, is based on them. The documents used for the present study are reports and minutes of the meetings of the Schengen Central Group of Negotiation, which were essential to negotiations for the CISA. They are housed in the Historical Archives of the Council of the European Union in Brussels. Use was also made of reports from the European Commission, consulted at the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence and the Historical Archives of the European Commission in Brussels. Notes and letters from the Presidency of the French Republic and the French government are stored in the National Archives in Paris and the Diplomatic Archives in Nantes, respectively, and complement European Community sources by providing, when possible, an account of internal debates. Lastly, press cuttings kept in the Historical Archives of the European Union were useful in understanding the main features characterising public debate. A review of the literature France has always occupied a central position in the process of European integration, and it was also particularly active during the Schengen process. A bilateral treaty signed by France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in Saarbrücken was the starting-point of the process leading to the signing of the Schengen Agreement. In addition, together with West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, France was a founding member of the Schengen Agreement and the Convention implementing it. 256 Simone PAOLI In view of the importance of France, findings and conclusions drawn from this research can effectively contribute to a broader reassessment of the motivations underlying the Schengen agreements. The mainstream way of thinking about the emergence of Schengen was provided by Andrew Moravcsik. In his opinion, mere economic interests lay behind the Franco- German arrangement to simplify and eventually abolish border controls on persons and vehicles; with a view to establishing the Single European Market, the governments in Paris and Bonn decided to make progress on liberalising intra-Community circulation at bilateral level. The subsequent choice to include the members of the Benelux Customs Union, i.e., Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, was in turn motivated by the commercial imperative to enlarge the borderless area. Conversely, the decision to act outside the Community framework was primarily intended to put pressure on Great Britain, which was unwilling to establish a travel area in common with continental European countries.2 Unlike Moravcsik, Jörg Monar recognised that more strictly political considerations, such as national security, also played a role. However, he agreed with Moravcsik in arguing that Great Britain’s opposition to an agreement at Community level was the main reason why France, West Germany and the three Benelux countries resolved to act outside the EC.3 According to Monar, in particular, the Schengen founders perceived themselves as a sort of avant-garde; right from the start, therefore, they had every intention of integrating the Schengen system into the EC as soon as it was politically possible.4 In a similar fashion, Andrew Geddes argued that the intergovernmental framework was chosen because of the need to circumvent the opposition of more reluctant states, especially Great Britain. In his view, all five founding members of Schengen were very much in favour of integration, and were keen to move quickly towards more ambitious objectives. In this sense, Schengen was a laboratory, which was to prepare the ground for the inclusion of its policies in the formal EC framework.5 2. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, New York 1998, pp. 359-360. 3. Valsamis Mitsilegas, Jörg Monar, Wyn Rees, The European Union and Internal Security. Guardian of the People?, Basingstoke; New York 2003, pp. 27-31. See also: Jörg Monar, The Project of a European Border Guard: Origins, Models and Prospects in the Context of the EU’s Integrated External Border Management, in: Marina Caparini, Otwin Marenin (eds.), Borders and Security Governance. Managing Borders in a Globalised World, Zurich; Münster 2006, pp. 193-194; Jörg Monar, The “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”: “Schengen” Europe, Opt-Outs, Opt-Ins and Associates, in: Kenneth Dyson, Angelos Sepos (eds.), Which Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration, Basingstoke; New York 2010, pp. 279-292. 4. Jörg Monar, The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs, Journal of Common Market Studies 4 (2001), pp. 747-764. 5. Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European integration. Towards Fortress Europe?, Manchester; New York 2000, pp. 80-84. See also: Andrew Geddes, The European Union. Supranational Governance and the Remaking of European Migration Policy and Politics, in: James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius (eds.), A Global Perspective. Controlling Immigration, Stanford 2014, pp. 438-439. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 257 Although this hypothesis captures some of the core features characterising the emergence of Schengen, it is not fully convincing. One objection concerns the motivations underlying the system. If, as argued by Moravcsik, economic considerations were the primary force, it would have been in the interests of the proposing states to include as many countries as possible right from its inception. Instead, the sixth founding member of the European Community, i.e., Italy, which was clearly interested in participating, was excluded from the group of founders. Another problematic point concerns the relationship between the European Community (EC) and the Schengen system, mentioned by Moravcsik, Monar and Geddes. While the European Single Market was conceived within the strict boundaries of the European Community, the Schengen regime was developed as an alternative and, to a certain extent, in competition with it. Despite the cautionary remarks of its proponents, therefore, Schengen had the potential to weaken or even disrupt the European Community as the primary mechanism of European integration; in this sense, Schengen was not conceived as a facilitator but as a surrogate for the Community process. The present chapter contends that political, not economic, motivations were crucial to the decision to sign the Schengen agreements, the CISA in particular. Paradoxically, it was the strengthening of external border controls, rather than the relaxation and eventual abolition of internal border controls which best explains these accords. In addition, the decision to act outside the Community framework was not a painful necessity due to opposition from Great Britain. Rather, it was a deliberate attempt to exclude the institutions of the European Community from the decisionmaking process on immigration and police cooperation. More: it was a way of putting pressure on Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain, Portugal and Greece, to adapt their migration policies to the more restrictive politics pursued among northern EC members. In addition to motivations, this research also aims at identifying the main protagonists of negotiations and the political culture which drove them. There is a tendency in the literature to undervalue the role of political leaderships. According to Didier Bigo, the Schengen agreements, and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in particular, were due more to the activities of practitioners specialising in the security field, rather than to rational strategies of political decision-makers. Actors such as police officials, border guards and security consultants played upon the collective anxieties and insecurities of European citizens regarding the immigration of non-Community nationals, the ultimate aim being to gain more power and visibility. By producing and reproducing fear, these actors created the conditions for the establishment of a new 'Europeanised' field of security.6 6. Didier Bigo, Polices en réseaux: l’expérience européenne, Paris 1996, pp. 97-129. See also: Didier Bigo, L’Europe de la sécurité intérieure, in: Didier Bigo (ed.), L’Europe des polices et de la sécurité intérieure, Bruxelles 1992, pp. 13-94. 258 Simone PAOLI Although this interpretation does have its important points, it is our contention that it cannot offer a compelling account of the emergence of the Schengen regime. Security practitioners were in fact drawn into the initiative, rather than actively supporting it; they were also divided among themselves and many of them were bitterly opposed to Schengen and its underlying philosophy. In addition, assuming that security practitioners played a role in this process, it is not clear how they convinced decision-makers to adopt their views or even how they had acquired these positions in the first place. It is certainly true that security practitioners played an important role, especially in the working groups charged with drafting the CISA. It is also true, as noted by Virginie Guiraudon, that the Schengen agreements were the result of the activities of several actors, including not only high-level decision-makers, but also a multitude of local, national, trans-, inter- and supra-national agencies, institutions and groups actively involved in the security field.7 However, we argue here that the decision to create the Schengen system and the main compromises in negotiations were made at the highest political levels by key national decision-makers. Conjectures were also made about the ideologies motivating the decision-makers. According to a recent study by Ruben Zaiotti, in particular, the main architects of the Schengen system, although European nationals, were driven by a post-national culture of border control. Seen in this light, the emergence of a new border control regime in Europe may be understood with the evolution from one culture of border control, called 'Westphalian', to another, called 'Schengen', which represented a substantial post-national reformulation of traditional strictly national notions of sovereignty and territoriality in Europe.8 While this hypothesis is fascinating, we still believe it has significant shortcomings. There is no doubt about the fact that the Schengen border control regime broke with traditional approaches to territorial governance. Yet there is much evidence that the Schengen system was not intended by its founding members to be a way of giving up sovereignty over border control; on the contrary, it was a way of sharing it, in order to make controls more effective and less expensive. In this sense, despite appearances, the Schengen system did not imply a nation state's retreat from border management, but an attempt to regain control over it. Lastly, this research assesses the roles played by the respective founding members in the negotiations on the Schengen agreements. 7. Virginie Guiraudon, The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A Political Sociology Approach, Journal of European Public Policy 2 (2003), pp. 263-282. 8. Ruben Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control. Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers, Chicago; London 2011, pp. 14-16. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 259 With a number of notable exceptions,9 scholars focusing on the origins of the Schengen agreements emphasises the leading role played by France. It is generally acknowledged, in particular, that France provided the overall political leadership to bring forward the project and that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) contributed mainly technical expertise.10 France, it is fair to say, was a protagonist in negotiations; many of its proposals found their way into the final arrangements and its opinions were crucial in the enlargement process, especially the southern enlargement. Nevertheless, we show that France was often much more hesitant in adopting far-reaching proposals for compensatory measures; in crucial areas such as cross-border cooperation, the FRG took the lead and France lagged behind. After the collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, France was even obliged to adopt a defensive attitude in many respects, including visa policies. Delicate balance between commercial interests and security concerns (1984-1985) At the beginning of 1984, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl resolved that the time had come to accelerate towards easier circulation of persons and vehicles in the Western European area. He was convinced that abundant controls at the internal European border checkpoints were incompatible with the European ideal and the project of a European Single Market. In this context, he was particularly worried that France would close its borders because of its balance of payments difficulties.11 The new idea was quickly adopted by his French opposite number, President François Mitterrand. The turning-point clearly coincided with the domestic 'turnaround' in 1983-1984, after which French policy moved boldly in a liberal and European direction. Although French border controls were more strict, careful and regulated than German ones, Mitterrand became aware that free movement of persons 9. Franziska Doebler-Hagedorn, The state at its borders: Germany and the Schengen negotiations, Ann Arbor 2003, pp. 110-112. See also: Monika Bösche, Trapped Inside the European Fortress? Germany and European Union Asylum and Refugee Policy, in: Gunther Hellmann (ed.), Germany’s EU Policy on Asylum and Defence. De-Europeanization by Default?, Basingstoke 2006, pp. 29-84; Simon Bulmer, Shop till you drop? The German executive as venue-shopper in Justice and Home Affairs, in: Petra Bendel, Andreas Ette, Roderick Parkes, Marianne Haase (eds.), The Europeanization of Control. Venues and Outcomes of EU Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation, Münster 2011, pp. 41-70. 10. Jean-Sebastian Louette, Les États du Benelux et la France face aux accords de Schengen, Bruxelles 1998. See also: Nicole Guimezanes, La Convention de Schengen: une présentation française, in: Alexis Pauly (ed.), Les accords de Schengen: abolition des frontières intérieures ou menace pour les libertés publiques?, Maastricht 1993, pp. 5-10. 11. Jörg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization as a Government-Controlled Process, in: Kenneth Dyson, Klaus Goetz (eds.), Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint, Oxford 2003, pp. 309-312. 260 Simone PAOLI was crucial to the economic and political strategies of the EC. He was also worried that German standards were blocking imports and was consequently interested in simplifying and eventually eliminating formalities at the French-German borders.12 Protests from truck-drivers, angered by long queues at border crossings and insisting on the removal of obstacles to cross-border passages, provided French authorities with a further incentive to act. Protest began as a response to the work-to-rule of Italian customs officers, which, in mid-February 1984, blocked the transit of trucks going to Italy. Greatly annoyed by situation, truck-drivers from the Netherlands, West Germany, Austria and France decided to block not only trucks, but all vehicles, the aim being to draw the public’s attention on their difficulties. The situation was particularly dramatic in France. With the aim of putting an end to lengthy border formalities and receiving political and financial support from the government, French trucker unions paralysed the country. At the peak of protests, there were more than 200 barricades on the main roads of 47 French départment. The government in Paris even considered the possibility of sending in the army to dismantle the barricades. In fact, French Socialist and Communist ministers were haunted by the spectre of Chile, where strikes by truck owners in the early 1970s largely contributed to the overthrow of Salvador Allende’s government and the subsequent seizure of power by Augusto Pinochet. When, on 24 February 1984, the trucker union leaders announced the removal of blockades, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and Minister of Transport Charles Fiterman were obliged to admit that systematic customs controls of truckers’ waybills were no longer compatible with the increasing volume of traffic in the EC area. This concession, which was decisive in appeasing the trucker unions, opened up the way to reducing and in the longer term eliminating border formalities.13 After a series of preliminary conversations at the bilateral summit in Rambouillet on 28-29 May 1984, Mitterrand and Kohl agreed to negotiate the abolition of all controls on goods traffic and movement of people when the European Council met in Fontainebleau on 25-26 June 1984. Although Kohl preferred a solution at European Community level, Mitterrand and his government thought that the EC framework was not the most suitable locus in which to discuss and implement the abolition of control on persons and vehicles, at least for the time being. This was exemplified by the fact that they staunchly opposed the adoption of any Directives dealing with the suppression of internal border controls. French authorities preferred to avoid interference from the EC institutions on such a sensitive issue. They also wanted to exclude members of the EC who were not 12. Jacques Attali, C’était François Mitterrand, Paris 2005, pp. 289-300; Mathias Bernard, Les Années Mitterrand. Du changement socialiste au tournant libéral, Paris 2015, pp. 41-99. 13. Guillaume Courty, Les routiers: contribution à une sociologie des groupes d’intérêt, Nanterre 1993. See also: Guillaume Courty, Barrer, filtrer, encombrer: les routiers et l’art de retenir ses semblables, Cultures et Conflits 12 (1993), pp. 143-168. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 261 considered ready to join the borderless area. Lastly, though this was not the main explanatory factor, they urgently needed to bypass opposition from a group of EC countries.14 Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark, in particular, were reluctant to establish a common travel area at European Community level and were consequently ready to oppose any initiatives in that direction. The governments in London, Dublin and Copenhagen questioned the effectiveness of their partners in the EC and wanted to maintain sovereignty in a particularly delicate domain. In addition, the Danish authorities were determined to remain part of the Nordic Passport Union, a borderless area composed of all the Scandinavian countries. Meanwhile, the Irish authorities were resolute in their intention to remain in the Common Travel Area with Great Britain.15 At the conclusion of brief negotiations, the French Minister of European Affairs, Roland Dumas, and the Head of the Chancellery of the FRG, Waldemar Schreckenberger, came to a bilateral arrangement. The French-German agreement, signed in Saarbrücken on 13 July 1984, involved the immediate abolition of control on persons and the easing of checks on vehicles. At the same time, it did approve of the transfer of these controls to external borders, harmonisation of visa policies and legislation on foreigners, drugs, arms, and passport delivery together with strengthening of cooperation between police and customs officials.16 The EC countries which showed interest in the project were Italy and the Benelux countries. The new French government headed by Laurent Fabius immediately turned down the Italian request for an agreement with France modelled on the Saarbrücken Agreement. At that time, abolition of border controls with Italy was considered as an unacceptable threat to national security.17 Despite the suspension of recruitment programmes in the mid-1970s and the promotion of voluntary repatriation of immigrants in the late 1970s, migration flows to France were not declining. The sharp decrease in labour migration was largely compensated by the increase in asylum-seekers, dependents of the original economic 14. Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC), BAC 153/1990 216, Commission des Communautés Européennes, Suites à donner aux conclusions de la Présidence française relatives à l’Europe des citoyens, retenues lors du Sommet de Fontainebleau, Bruxelles 9/7/1984. See also: Jean Claude Eeckhout, Réunion du Comité des Représentants permanents: Allègement des contrôles des personnes aux frontières, Bruxelles 5/7/1984; Günther Burghardt, Groupe ad hoc “Europe des citoyens”, Bruxelles 16/7/1984. 15. Grete Brochmann, Controlling Immigration in Europe, in: Grete Brochmann, Tomas Hammar (eds.), Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies, Oxford 1999, pp. 308-309. 16. Agreement between France and the FRG on the gradual abolition of checks at the Franco-German border, Saarbrücken, 13/07/1984. 17. Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (ADN), Consulat Général de France à Florence (CGF), 39 – 227 PO 1, Premier Ministre. Comité Interministériel pour les Questions de Coopération Economique Européenne, Sommet franco-italien, Paris 23/10/1984. See also: Georges-Henri Soutou, L'Italie et le "couple" franco-allemand, in: Piero Craveri, Antonio Varsori (eds.), L'Italia nella costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957-2007), Milano 2009, p. 60. 262 Simone PAOLI migrants, and illegal aliens. At the same time, the gradual replacement of European migrants with Africans, which began in the 1960s, was accelerating. In spite of the decrease in Algerian immigrants, between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, there was a steady increase in the arrivals of people from Morocco, Tunisia and sub-Saharan countries, plus Turkey. Most of them entered France illegally.18 This phenomenon, which was socially alarming, became also politically compelling.19 After having won control of the city of Dreux in the municipal elections in 1983, the Front National (FN) led by Jean-Marie Le Pen was remarkably successful in the European Parliament elections on 17 June 1984. Its platform called for a reform of nationality laws to replace jus soli with jus sanguinis, a complete halt to immigration, the expulsion of illegal immigrants and stricter control of national borders.20 Immigration, in the opinion of the FN, was a threat to French ethno-national identity and a major cause of criminality, unemployment and problems with the welfare state.21 The National Front’s electoral breakthrough came as a shock to the mainstream political parties in France, including the Parti Socialiste (PS). Key members of the government and even the President of the Republic took more care to reassure public opinion that they were fully committed to fighting illegal immigration.22 The Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Transport, traditionally close to the transport industry, was willing to abolish checks on persons and vehicles at the French-Italian border.23 However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs objected that Italy first needed to adopt stricter border control measures and sign a readmission agreement with France. At that time, Italy was a transit country for migrants coming from Turkey, and the Maghreb and sub-Saharan countries to France. The risks implicit in the abolition of border controls with Italy were the transfer of 800,000 clandestine immigrants who were then living there and, in the longer term, the systematic, uncontrolled arrivals of migrants passing up the peninsula.24 Meanwhile, the governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg declared a similar interest in joining the Saarbrücken Agreement. Their strategy reflected an ideological commitment to European unity and traditional concern for po- 18. Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, Mark Miller, The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World, Basingstoke; New York 2014, pp. 102-125. 19. Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the nation. Immigration, racism and citizenship in modern France, London; New York 1992, pp. 70-94; Catherine Raissiguier, Reinventing the Republic. Gender, Migration, and Citizenship in France, Stanford 2010, pp. 14-31. 20. Robin Cohen, Zig Layton Henry, The Politics of Migration, Cheltenham 1997, pp. 709-711. 21. Jens Rudgren, The Populist Challenge. Political Protest and Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization in France, New York; Oxford 2004, pp. 157-189. 22. Sally Marthaler, Nicolas Sarkozy and the politics of immigration policy, in: Tim Bale (ed.), Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe. Why Politics – and the Centre-Right – Matter, London 2009, pp. 70-72. 23. ADN, CGF, 39 – 227 PO 1, Ministère de l'Urbanisme, du Logement et des Transports, Note sur les transports routiers de marchandises entre la France et l’Italie, Paris 09/10/1984. 24. ADN, CGF, 39 – 227 PO 1, Ministère des Relations Extérieures, Eventuel allègement des contrôles à la frontière, Paris 22/10/1984. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 263 litical and economic partnership with both France and West Germany. It was also influenced by their recent experience: the 1960 Benelux Convention was the first European agreement on the suppression of controls at internal borders and the transfer of these controls to external ones. Lastly, their policy was based on the ambitions of the Benelux Secretariat, which wanted to strengthen its own position. By offering itself as an institutional 'backbone' to the enterprise, the Secretariat of the Benelux Union hoped to find a new mission and to avoid dismissing some of its personnel.25 The government in Bonn was favourably disposed towards the Benelux countries. Significantly, the Federal Minister of Transport had reached an agreement with his Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg colleagues to ease border controls on persons and vehicles in Neustadt an der Aisch on 31 May 1984; these decisions were confirmed through a technical agreement signed on 11 December 1984.26 Mitterrand and his government, Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and Interior Minister Pierre Joxe in particular, were thinking very much along the same lines.27 It was clear that France had a commercial interest in lifting border controls with these countries. It was also clear that their admission did not raise security concerns. Unlike Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg did not have terrestrial and maritime borders with emigration countries. More importantly, their governments pursued restrictive migration policies and had already signed readmission agreements which France.28 Emboldened by this positive feedback, on 12 December 1984, the Committee of Ministers of the Benelux Union forwarded a memorandum to the governments in Paris and in Bonn, proposing to combine the conclusions of the German-Belgian- Dutch-Luxembourg meeting in Neustadt and the French-German Agreement of Saarbrücken into a new treaty.29 As both French and West German governments warmly agreed with this proposal, negotiations with the Benelux countries were opened. While both the Neustadt conclusions and the Saarbrücken Agreement focused on the abolition of controls at the common frontiers, negotiations for the new agreement were much more concerned with measures designed to safeguard security and combat illegal immigration by non- Community nationals. The removal of internal border controls remained the essential point of the strategy, although increasing emphasis was put on measures aimed at compensating the loss of internal control. At the same time, whereas the meeting in Neustadt brought together Transport Ministers, and the Saarbrücken Agreement was primarily negotiated by representatives from both Transport and Foreign Affairs 25. Marco Martiniello, Andrea Rea, The effects of the construction of Europe on national immigration and refugee policies: the case of Belgium, in: Andrew Geddes, Adrian Favell (eds.), The Politics of Belonging: Migrants and Minorities in Contemporary Europe, Aldershot 1999, pp. 162-165. 26. Barbara Marshall, The new Germany and migration in Europe, Manchester 2000, pp. 119-120. 27. Gaëlle Renault, Schengen: un modèle pour l’Europe pénale?, Bruxelles 1995, p. 34-39. 28. ADN, CGF, 39 – 227 PO 1, Ministère des Relations Extérieures, Immigration clandestine, Paris 25/10/1984. 29. Vendelin Hreblay, Les accords de Schengen: origine, fonctionnement, avvenir, Bruxelles 1998, p. 25. 264 Simone PAOLI Ministries, the negotiations for the new treaty attracted increasing attention from Interior Ministries, including the French Ministry of the Interior.30 The Ministry in Place Beauvau was important, together with the Quai d’Orsay, in the final decision to make provisions for cooperation in fighting crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration as well as for harmonisation of visa and immigration policies. Both considered these measures as fundamental antidotes to prevent the negative consequences of the opening of internal borders.31 Yet, significantly, French representatives were not responsible for introducing the idea of complementary measures. Reinhard Rupprecht, representative of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, was the proponent and the strongest supporter of the idea of compensating the loss of internal frontiers with strict measures at the external borders.32 In addition, the French Interior Ministry was crucial in excluding Italy from the new agreement. Like Cheysson and his even more inflexible successor to the Quai d’Orsay, Dumas,33 Joxe considered Italy as a dangerous transit country for illegal immigration from southern Mediterranean countries to France.34 In addition to this, he was also concerned that the abolition of border controls with Italy might favour international terrorism and criminal traffics, including counterfeit money, artwork, stolen car and drug smuggling, into French territory. Without bilateral cooperation among border guards, drastic tightening of its immigration policy and a readmission agreement with France, Italy could not hope to form a borderless area with its northern neighbour.35 At the conclusion of relatively easy negotiations, on 14 June 1985, representatives from France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed an agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders in Schengen. The Secretary of State for European Affairs, Catherine Lalumière, was the representative from France. The Schengen Agreement, composed of 33 articles, was divided into two parts. The first part was devoted to measures applicable in the short term. It noted that, with regard to the movement of persons, police and customs authorities should, as a general rule, carry out a simple visual checks of private vehicles crossing the common frontier 30. Anne Van Lancker, Transparency and Accountability of Schengen, in: Monica den Boer (ed.), Schengen, Judicial Cooperation and Policy Coordination, Maastricht 1997, pp. 63-66. 31. ADN, CGF, 291 – 227 PO 1, Ministère des Relations Extérieures, Circulation des personnes. Immigration clandestine, Paris 05/1985. 32. Cyrille Fijnaut, The Communitization of Police Cooperation in Western Europe, in: Henri Schermes (ed.), Free Movement of Persons in Europe, London 1993. 33. ADN, CGF, 291 – 227 PO 1, Ministère des Relations Extérieures, Sommet franco-italien. Procédure d’allègement des contrôles aux frontières avec l’Italie, Paris 28/05/1985. 34. ADN, CGF, 291 – 227 PO 1, Ministère de l'Intérieur, Réflexions sur le contrôle transfrontalier à la frontière franco-italienne, Paris 06/1985. 35. ADN, CGF, 291 – 227 PO 1 291, Ministère de l'Intérieur, Note relative à l’ouverture de la frontière franco-italienne, Paris 05/06/1985. See also: Archives Nationales de France (ANF), Archives de la Présidence de la République (APR), Archives de la Cellule diplomatique (ACD), 5 AG 4 / CD 300 Dossier 4, Élisabeth Guigou, Hubert Védrine, Note pour le Président de la République: Votre entretien avec M. Craxi, Paris 13/11/1985. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 265 at a reduced speed, without requiring such vehicles to stop. In addition, it noted that, in order to avoid any adverse consequences resulting in the field of immigration and security from the easing of controls at the common frontiers, the parties should endeavour to approximate as soon as possible their visa policies and procedures for admission to their territory. They should also cooperate in fighting crime, particularly illicit crime in drugs and arms, customs and tax fraud, irregular capital movements and the unauthorised entry and residence of persons. The second part was focused on the measures applicable in the long term. With regard to the movement of persons, the parties committed themselves to abolishing the controls at the common frontiers and transferring them to their external frontiers. To this end, they should endeavour to harmonise in advance, where necessary, the laws and administrative provisions concerning the prohibitions and restrictions which formed the basis of those checks and take complementary measures to safeguard security and combat illegal immigration by nationals of states which were not members of the EC. In this context, they should open discussions on arrangements for police co-operation. They should also seek to harmonise visa policies, conditions for entry to the respective territories and laws and regulations, in particular on drugs, arms, explosives and registration of travellers in hotels.36 Preponderance of security concerns (1985-1989) After the Schengen Agreement had been signed, negotiations were opened to define the measures to compensate the abolition of internal border controls. In France, the beginning of the second stage of negotiations on Schengen coincided with one important political event.37 As a result of the legislative elections on 16 March 1986, a centre-right coalition composed of the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) and the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) obtained a parliamentary majority. Also, for the first time since Vichy, the extreme right, in the form of Le Pen’s Front National, was represented in the National Assembly. Jacques Chirac, leader of the RPR, was appointed Prime Minister in the first cohabitation government in the history of the Fifth Republic and Charles Pasqua, a prominent businessman and Gaullist politician, became Minister of Interior. Convinced that the Socialists had failed in managing the migration issue, Pasqua announced his intention to direct French migration policy in a more restrictive di- 36. Agreement between the governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, Schengen 14/06/1985. 37. John Tuppen, Chirac’s France, 1986-1988. Contemporary Issues in French Society, Basingstoke 1991, pp. 60-82. 266 Simone PAOLI rection.38 This strategy was part of a broader process of redefinition of the ideological identity of the French right, which dated back to the mid-1950s. Traditionally, French nationalism defined itself in relation to Germany and only in the context of Europe. However, the French defeat in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, which coincided with the loss of Indochina, and the beginning of the Algerian War in 1954, marked clearly defined turning-points; since then, French nationalism had increasingly redefined itself in relation to Africa and in the context of the decolonisation process.39 Between the mid-1950s and the early 1980s, this idea was not particularly publicised, not least because xenophobia was widely discredited and large-scale immigration was indispensable to sustain economic growth. It resurfaced in the mid-1980s, when a group of leaders of the RPR, including Jacques Médecin and Charles Pasqua, tried to respond to the challenge of the FN and renew Gaullism after its defeat in the 1981 presidential elections; to these ends, they prioritised the concepts of people, nation and homeland, arguing the presumed ethnic homogeneity of French citizens.40 Both before and after these elections, a wave of terrorist bombings in Paris, mainly perpetrated by the Shia Lebanese movement Hezbollah, helped to legitimise the new 'get-tough' policy with respect to foreigners. These dramatic events, combined with vivid memories of the Algerian war and the more recent fears about the Iranian Revolution, contributed to anti-Arab and anti-immigrant sentiments in the French public opinion.41 The perception that there was a strong connection between illegal immigration and terrorist activities in France, in particular, became increasingly widespread; this, in turn, created a favourable climate for the adoption of restrictive policies, especially with regard to Northern African and the Middle Eastern peoples.42 Internally, French Interior Minister Pasqua moved to reinforce border controls by giving sweeping new powers to the Police de l’Air et des Frontières to detain and immediately deport anyone who did not have proper papers; he also reinforced the power of the internal police forces to conduct random identity checks of any foreign or suspicious-looking individual. In addition, he tried to limit entry of false asylumseekers, denying their right to appeal to the Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA). Finally, he introduced a bill changing the French nationality code, so that children born in France of foreign parents would no longer be automa- 38. James Hollifield, Immigration and the politics of rights: the French case in comparative perspective, in: Michael Bommes, Andrew Geddes (ed.), Immigration and Welfare. Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State, London; New York 2000, pp. 122-123. 39. René Rémond, La droite en France de la Première Restauration à la Ve République, Paris 1968, pp. 263-268. 40. Pierre Birnbaum, “La France aux Français”. Histoire des haines nationalistes, Paris 1993, pp. 29-82. See also: Jean-Marie Donegani, Marc Sadoun, Le jeu des institutions, in: François Sirinelli (ed.), Histoire des droites en France. 1. Politique, Paris 1992, pp. 473-481. 41. Dominic Thomas, Africa and France. Postcolonial Cultures, Migration, and Racism, Bloomington; Indianapolis 2013, pp. 89-105. 42. Rémy Leveau, Migrations et imaginaires sociaux: l’épreuve de la guerre du Golfe, in: Bertrand Badie, Catherine Withol de Wenden (eds.), Le Défi migratoire. Questions de relations internationals, Paris 1994, pp. 131-139. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 267 tically given citizenship at the age of eighteen; instead, they would be required to apply for citizenship and take an oath of fidelity to France. This bill did not re-establish the jus sanguinis but it did seem to undermine the longstanding principle of jus soli.43 Consequently, it met with criticism from the Council of State and a storm of protest from pro-immigration groups such as the Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Immigrés (GISTI), SOS Racisme, the Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples (MRAP) and France Plus. Pasqua and Prime Minister Chirac, in this context, were forced to withdraw the bill from consideration. Attempts to tighten asylum laws radically were also frustrated by widespread public protests.44 Externally, Pasqua often acted in concert with the Foreign Minister, the moderate Gaullist politician and diplomat Jean-Bernard Raimond. On one hand, they agreed to go back to the idea of extension of visa requirements first developed by Cheysson.45 The original plan for this had been abandoned because of protests from sending countries, especially in the Maghreb and Francophone sub- Saharan Africa. Mindful of that experience, Raimond, in agreement with Pasqua, carried the idea of extension of visa requirements to extremes, by deciding to impose visas on all countries of the world apart from Switzerland and the Community countries. The aim was to contribute to the fight against international terrorism and illegal immigration, especially from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan African countries, without undermining bilateral relations with their governments. The universal character of that measure, which raised a storm of protest from the Council of Europe,46 was the only way in which France could impose visas on the nationals of its former colonies without their perceiving that the measure represented an intolerable discrimination against them.47 On the other hand, the centre-right government in Paris confirmed support for Schengen.48 Although it deprived French authorities of the possibility of controlling national borders, Schengen might give France important advantages. In addition to facilitating intra-Community trade, in particular, Schengen was expected to reduce 43. João Carvalho, Impact of Extreme Right Parties on Immigration Policy. Comparing Britain, France and Italy, London; New York 2014, pp. 44-47. 44. Christina Boswell, European Migration Policies in Flux. Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion, London 2003, pp. 20-21. 45. Patrick Weil, La France et ses étrangers. L’aventure d’une politique de l’immigration de 1938 à nous jours, Paris 2004, pp. 278-285. 46. L’Assemblée du Conseil de l’Europe demande à M. Chirac d’exempter de visa les ressortissants de tous les pays membres, Le Monde, 29/8/1987; Le Conseil de l’Europe réclame plus de souplesse pour les visas, Luxemburger Wort 29/8/1987. 47. ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 39, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Extension du régime du visa de court séjour, Paris 07/11/1986. See also: ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 205, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Note d'information: Les visas, Paris 13/1/1988. 48. Jacques Barou, Europe, terre d’immigration. Flux migratoires et intégration, Grenoble 2006, pp. 110-112. See also: Didier Bigo, Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?, in: Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild (eds.), Controlling Frontiers. Free Movement Into and Within Europe, Aldershot 2005, pp. 68-91. 268 Simone PAOLI the number of persons entering France irregularly while simultaneously reducing costs and bypassing the legal constraints implicit in such an attempt. By their nature, border controls were expensive activities. Schengen might allow France to move such work to its peripheral partners, thereby easing the financial burden associated with them. Meanwhile, border controls were becoming more and more controversial: opposition from pro-immigration groups and the pro-immigrant stance of the national judiciary proved to be formidable obstacles to more restrictive policies. Schengen might allow the French government to pursue its own strategy without facing stringent public and judicial opposition.49 At the same time, the centre-right government in Paris innovated the French approach to Schengen in two important respects. Interior Minister Joxe and Foreign Affairs Ministers Cheysson and Dumas emphasised the link between Schengen and the European Community; at least officially, they presented Schengen as a sort of laboratory for future cooperation at Community level. Conversely, Raimond and above all Pasqua and the Minister for Security, Robert Pandraud, insisted on the need to preserve the intergovernmental character of Schengen. This attitude was linked to the wish of continuing to marginalise the EC institutions; it was also motivated by the continuing wish to exclude members of the European Community, especially Italy and newly arrived Spain, whose border control policies were considered as completely unreliable. In this context, they stressed the need to preserve national sovereignty. And to this end, they supported the idea of allowing the contracting parties to reintroduce border checks when public policy or national security were deemed to require them. Meanwhile, whereas the Fabius government considered abolition of internal border controls as the main advantage of the Schengen system, Chirac’s government prioritised compensatory measures over the abolition of checks at internal borders. It was also resolute in subordinating the entry into force of the convention to the fulfilment of precise preconditions, the ultimate aim being to reassure the French public opinion that all Schengen countries were equally able to control external borders. Originally conceived as a system to abolish border controls, Schengen thus became an instrument primarily designed to strengthen and transfer them to the external frontiers.50 The security approach was basically shared by all the partners of France, especially the FRG. The restrictive migration policies adopted in the 1970s had failed miserably. Labour migration was in fact decreasing. However, the numbers of relatives of original economic migrants and illegal migrants continued to rise; more im- 49. HAEC, BAC 130/1996 37, Commission of the European Commission: Office de Lord Cockfield, Informal Meeting of Interior Ministers: London 20 October 1986, Bruxelles 23-24/10/1986. 50. Historical Archives of the Council of the European Union (HACEU), Accord de Schengen – Groupe Céntral de Negociation (ASGCN), Présidence française, “Non-Paper” au Groupe Céntral de Negociation, Bruxelles 25/5/1987. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 269 portantly, more asylum-seekers were rapidly arriving.51 Meanwhile, after decades in which the words 'migration' and 'asylum' had been taboos, those same issues were becoming increasingly politicised in West German public debate. The Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) introduced these topics in its campaign for state elections in 1982. The aim was to put pressure on Social Democrats and capitalise on rising xenophobic sentiment. Migration was also essential to the campaigns for the Bavarian state elections in 1986 and the federal election in 1987. The Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU), in particular, took a firm anti-immigration stand in order to counter Die Republikaner (REP), a national conservative party founded in 1983 by former members of the CSU. In this context, both Chancellor Kohl and the vice-chairman of the CSU and Federal Interior Minister, Friedrich Zimmerman, became increasingly concerned with security matters and were thus keen to emphasise measures compensating for the abolition of internal border controls.52 In the crucial period between 1986 and 1988, however, the representatives of the French government stood out as the most security-oriented in all the groups in which the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement was discussed: meetings between and among ministers, the Central Group of Negotiation and the working groups, i.e., “Police and Security”, “Cross-Border Circulation”, “Transportation” and “Customs and Movement of Goods”. When the first draft Convention, dealing with border controls, visas, right of residence and asylum, was adopted in Remich on 14 June 1988, it fully reflected the French view that external border controls should be strengthened and migration and asylum policies tightened. An agreement was reached on the need to implement effective and homogenous controls at external borders. However, in order to safeguard national sovereignty, each member state remained responsible for their management and was free to decide rules and procedures. Arrangements were also made to harmonise visa policies, a problem in which French representatives showed a great interest. In particular, a decision was taken to create a common list of third states whose nationals were subject to visa requirements from all contracting parties; this list could only be changed by a unanimous vote. As far as asylum was concerned, national policies were not harmonised, since this problem remained a sensitive matter. There was, however, agreement on one important principle: only one contracting party should be responsible for processing applications for asylum. This provision aimed at eliminating the phenomenon of asylum-seekers 'in orbit' – that is to say, people who were moving between and among states, none of which was willing to accept their applications for entry. 51. Heather Booth, The Migration Process in Britain and West Germany, Aldershot; Brookfield 1992, pp. 116-143. See also: Rainer Münz, Ralf Ulrich, Changing Patterns of Immigration to Germany, 1945-1995: Ethnic Origins, Demographic Structure, Future Prospects, in: Klaus Bade, Myron Weiner, Migration Past, Migration Future. Germany and the United States, Providence; Oxford 1997, pp. 65-110. 52. Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling, Anton Kaes, Germany in transit: nation and migration, 1955-2005, Berkeley; Los Angeles; London 2007, pp. 107-115; Bastian Vollmer, Policy Discourses on Irregular Migration in Germany and the United Kingdom, Basingstoke; New York 2014, pp. 110-155. 270 Simone PAOLI Despite the fact that a treaty had been decided upon in principle, by no means all issues were already settled. Perplexity remained about a number of minor issues, and no agreement, significantly, was reached on police and judicial cooperation. While West German representatives were in favour of close forms of collaboration at supranational level, delegates from France were much keener to safeguard national sovereignty; in this context, French representatives were particularly opposed to the principle of cross-border pursuit, which was considered incompatible with the powers of national police and inviolability of national frontiers.53 In the meantime, political conditions in France radically changed once again. After the re-election of Mitterrand as French President on 8 May 1988, Michel Rocard, a moderate Socialist, was nominated as Prime Minister. Although the legislative elections on 5 and 12 June 1988 gave the Socialists a small parliamentary majority, Rocard was able to form a government in which crucial positions were held by members of the Parti Socialiste. Joxe replaced Pasqua as Minister of the Interior, Dumas replaced Raimond as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Edith Cresson, who became responsible for Schengen in the French government, was appointed Minister of European Affairs. Although these new ministers did not completely reverse the previous restrictive attitude towards immigration, they did change the harshest pieces of legislation introduced by the Chirac government. They also began to assume a more liberal approach to complementary measures under discussion in the groups charged with drafting the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. In a sense, the abandonment of traditional Socialist policies and constituency coincided with a search for new values and more determined advocacy of the rights of minorities, including migrants.54 After a long series of pointless debates in the second half of 1988, the French government took the initiative to restore momentum to negotiations. Conditions seemed favourable, not least because France held the rotating presidency of Schengen in the first half of 1989 and the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Community in the second half.55 However, the attempt by Cresson to reach a 'package deal' on pending issues resulted in a failure. The impossibility to settle the highly disputed question of cross-border pursuit stood out as the single most important factor.56 This topic, in fact, was becoming increasingly controversial in France, where it evoked concerns about the loss of sovereignty and even the nightmare of the German occupation during the Second World War.57 53. HACEU, Accord de Schengen: Ministre et Secrétaires d’Etat, Conclusions de la réunion tenue à Remich le 14 juin 1988, Bruxelles 7/7/1988. 54. Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, London; New York 1996, 647-690. See also: François Hincker, The French socialists: Towards post-republican values? in: Donald Sassoon (ed.), Looking Left. European socialism after the Cold War, London; New York 1997, pp. 109-123. 55. Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), François Lamoureux Fonds (FLF), François Lamoureux, Accord de Schengen, Bruxelles 25/1/1989. 56. HAEU, FLF, Adrian Fortescue, Accord de Schengen, Bruxelles 15/9/1989. 57. Georges Marion, La libre circulation dans la Communauté, Le Monde, 15/11/1989. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 271 When the FRG government assumed the presidency of Schengen in the second half of 1989, it was strongly committed to doing better than Paris had done and relieving the situation. The federal government was eager to ensure freedom of movement for persons and vehicles with a view to the imminent implementation of the Single Market. At the same time, it wanted to be sure that this was not to the detriment of security and strict enforcement of border checks.58 Due to its criticism of government migration and refugee policies, the REP achieved remarkable results in the West Berlin election in early 1989 and in the European Parliament election in mid-1989. This contributed towards making the government in Bonn more aware of the political and electoral importance of those topics and of the role which Schengen could play in helping the FRG to deal with them.59 The West German presidency initially seemed successful. In the ministerial meeting that took place in Bonn on 12 and 13 November 1989, most of the minor controversies were resolved and an agreement was reached on the contentious issue of cross-border pursuit.60 As strongly requested by German representatives, this right was eventually established. Its modalities, however, could differ considerably between contracting parties; unsurprisingly, France was the country that imposed most limitations and that most discriminated police on the grounds of nationality.61 Although the admission of southern European countries remained an open question and secondary issues remained to be settled, there were very real grounds for optimism: the signing of the convention, consequently, was set for 15 December 1989. A few weeks before the planned completion of negotiations, however, the context of negotiations radically changed, yet again. Closed to the South, open to the East? (1989-1990) In spring 1988, the government in Bonn introduced a more relaxed visa regime for Hungarians. The West German authorities evaluated this experiment positively. In mid-1988 and again in early 1989, they therefore asked their Schengen partners to follow their example by exempting Hungarians from having to obtain visas. In mid-1989, after the Hungary's decision to remove the border fence with Austria, the government in Bonn renewed its request. The relatively open border between Hungary and Austria had allowed many East Germans to migrate to West Germany pas- 58. HAEU, FLF, Adrian Fortescue, Schengen, Bruxelles 7/12/1989. 59. Dietrich Thränhardt, The political uses of xenophobia in England, France, and Germany, in: Emek Uçarer, Donald Puchala (eds.), Immigration into Western Societies: problems and policies, London 1997, pp. 175-189. 60. HAEU, FLF, Adrian Fortescue, Schengen Ministerial Meeting, Bonn, 13 November 1989, Bruxelles, 10/11/1989. 61. HAEU, FLF, François Lamoureux, Accord de Schengen, Bruxelles 14/11/1989; Jan de Ceuster, Réunion des Ministres et Secrétaires d’Etat du groupe de Schengen à Bonn les 12 et 13 novembre 1989, Bruxelles 21/11/1989. 272 Simone PAOLI sing through Hungary and, afterwards, Austria. The federal government was clearly intentioned to encourage this process even further.62 France remained divided over this request. Mitterrand was in favour of exempting Hungarians from visas in exchange for Germany’s support for the 'negative visa list', which comprised the states on which all Schengen countries imposed visas. Instead, the Minister of the Interior Joxe thought that this price was too high. He was convinced that a common visa list was the central pillar of the Schengen system. At the same time, as remarked by his diplomatic adviser, François Nicoullad, "nous remporterions une victoire à la Pyrrhus en marchandant le principe de la liste négative contre une concession sur un pays majeur tel que la Hongrie".63 In addition, it was difficult to explain this exemption to the governments of Northern African countries where, as emphasised by French ambassador Jacques Huntzinger, the association between Schengen and "Europe Forteresse" was becoming all too credible.64 Things came to a head between early November and mid-December 1989. A process of peaceful protests and revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe took place, the most emblematic event of which was the fall of the Berlin Wall in the night of 9 November. These revolutionary changes led the government in Bonn to make new requests. It asked its partners to accept the bilateral arrangements on relaxation of border controls which it had made with the government in Vienna in 1984, despite the fact that the German-Austrian border was the external frontier of Schengen. More importantly, it asked them not to consider the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a foreign country in relation to the FRG and its citizens as foreign persons in relation to those of the FRG. Aware that the latter request would meet with criticism, especially in France, the government in Bonn mandated its representatives in the Central Group of Negotiation to withdraw the candidacy of Wiesbaden for the role of seat of the SIS, as a gesture of goodwill. The SIS was an information system which allowed authorities responsible for checks at both external borders and within the Schengen Area to issue and circulate alerts about wanted or missing persons and objects. The government in Paris considered this system to be a pillar of the Schengen regime and was very interested having its hub based in France. In place of Wiesbaden, representatives from the FRG backed the French city of Strasbourg, thereby leaving the Netherlands alone in supporting the candidacy of The Hague.65 This, however, did not dissipate doubts in Paris. In order to put more pressure on France, therefore, the FRG government decided to call off the signing of the Con- 62. ANF, APR, Archives d’Alain Holleville (AAH), 5 AG 4 / AH 18, Lutz Stavenhagen, Lettre à Edith Cresson, Bonn 26/9/1989. 63. ANF, APR, AAH, 5 AG 4 / AH 18, Ministère des Affaires Européennes, Schengen. Compte-rendu de la réunion interministérielle, Paris 20/10/1989. 64. ANF, APR, ACD, 5 AG 4 / CD 135 Dossier 1, Jacques Huntzinger, Conference "Securité en Mediterranee", Rabat 20-21/04/1989. 65. HAEU, FLF, Adrian Fortescue, Schengen, Bruxelles 7/12/1989. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 273 vention implementing the Schengen Agreement. It was on 13 December, two days before the date planned for the signing.66 The Schengen debacle signalled for the first time an incipient change in Germany’s attitude towards European politics. The FRG blocked the process of integration on account of instrumental considerations as to how Europe might serve its national interests, which were recognition as a united state. After that drastic action, a dramatic struggle between the government in Bonn and the French government took place. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany insisted that citizens of the German Democratic Republic should be able to enjoy free movement, even with a GDR passport. Chancellor Kohl, the Minister of State in the Federal Chancellery Lutz Stavenhagen and the new federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble all made it clear that, without acceptance of that condition, Germany would not join the Schengen system.67 The other Schengen partners were hesitant, especially France.68 The government in Paris opposed the de facto admission of a non-signatory country which, in addition, could easily transform itself into a dangerous transit zone for illegal immigrants from the East. It was also irritated by the unilateral and assertive approach taken by the federal government.69 Meanwhile, the government in Bonn again asked its Schengen partners to cancel the requirements for travellers from Hungary, plus Czechoslovakia; instead, it was initially reluctant to exempt visas for Poles, since Poland was then considered as a worrying source of migration flows. The federal government went so far as to threaten to oppose the crucial principle of visa harmonisation if its partners refused to give Hungary and Czechoslovakia exemption from visas. This, however, was a point on which the French government was likely to be tenacious. In its view, without a common visa policy, the very concept of common external frontiers was brought into question.70 The government in Paris seemed uncertain about what strategy to follow. As emphasised by the man then responsible for international relations at the French Ministry of the Interior, Jean-Claude Mallet, France was faced with two contradictory requirements. One was that the French government did not want to accede to German requests, not least because of fears of massive migrations from the East. The other was that it was seriously concerned about the crisis in relations with the FRG. There was also the fact that France did not want to abandon a political venture, i.e., the Schengen project, to which it attached great importance, not only for economic but 66. HAEU, FLF, Jan de Ceuster, Réunion du Groupe Central de Négociation de Schengen à Bruxelles le 13 décembre 1989, Bruxelles 15/12/1989; Riccardo Perissich, Convention complémentaire à l’Accord de Schengen, Bruxelles 18/12/1989. 67. RFA-RDA-France-Benelux Frontières. Bonn veut une libre circulation des Allemands de l'Est en Europe, Reuters, 31/1/1990. 68. Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht, Paris 2005, pp. 103-272. 69. ANF, APR, AAH, 5 AG 4 / AH 18, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Note, Paris 7/2/1990. 70. ANF, APR, AAH, 5 AG 4 / AH 18, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Note, Paris 12/2/1990. 274 Simone PAOLI also for political reasons; after all, "nous avons un brevet d'Européens à défendre".71 When, at the time of the first free elections in the GDR on 18 March 1990, it became likely that German reunification would take place, the president of the delegation of the FRG to the Central Group of Negotiation, Horst Glatzel, asked for official negotiations at Schengen level to be re-opened.72 After a French-German meeting in Bonn on 20 April and a French-Dutch meeting in Paris on 23 April 1990, negotiations were resumed in Brussels on 27 April and concluded in Schengen on 19 June 1990. Delegations to the Central Group of Negotiation and participants in the ministerial meetings eventually settled all the main disputes.73 All deputations agreed in principle to cancel visas for East Germans. After all, German reunification was by then a matter of fact. Also, they agreed to accept the German proposal to exempt Hungarians and Czechoslovakians from visa requirements. Belgian representatives were the last to abandon opposition to these measures; the French delegates, instead, quickly gave in to what Germans asked in exchange for the Germany’s approval of the principle of visa harmonisation, which Mitterrand considered as the top priority.74 On 19 June 1990, on board the pleasure boat 'Princesse Marie-Astrid', moored in Schengen, representatives from France, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg finally signed the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. The Minister for European Affairs, Edith Cresson, represented France. One article of the Convention stated that internal borders might be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out, and movement of goods at internal borders was also facilitated. Nonetheless, if public policy or national security required it, a contracting party might decide that, for a limited period, national border checks appropriate to the situation would be re-established at internal borders. Most of the other 141 articles contained compensatory measures.75 The first group of such measures aimed at ensuring that checks on cross-border movements at external borders were made in accordance with the principles of effectiveness and uniformity. A commitment was made to adopt a common policy on 71. ANF, APR, AAH, 5 AG 4 / AH 18, Ministère de l'Intérieur, Libre circulation des personnes en Europe: pour une relance d'un dialogue franco-allemand, Paris 2/2/1990. 72. ANF, APR, Archives de Caroline de Margerie (ACM), Accord de Schengen -Groupe central de négociation, Lettre du Président de la Délégation de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne au Secrétaire Général de l'Union Economique Benelux, Bruxelles 22/3/1990. 73. ANF, APR, ACM, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Coordination Schengen: Compte-rendu de la réunion du Groupe Central de Négociation (Bruxelles – 27 Avril 1990), Paris 30/4/1990. 74. ANF, APR, AAH, 5 AG 4 / AH 18, Secrétariat général du Gouvernement, Obligation de visa pour les ressortissants d’Europe centrale et orientale, Paris 10/5/1990; Le Chargé de Mission auprès du Président de la République, Politique des visas à l'égard des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, Paris 11/5/1990; Le Chargé de Mission auprès du Président de la République, Politique des visas à l'égard des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale Hongrie et Tchécoslovaquie, Paris 20/6/1990. 75. Pieter Boeles, Maarten den Heijer, Gerrie Lodder, Kees Wouters, European Migration Law, Antwerp 2009, pp. 41-42. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 275 the movement of persons and in particular on visa arrangements: the contracting parties undertook to pursue harmonisation of their visa policies by common agreement. Another commitment was made to process any application for asylum lodged by an alien within the territory of any one of the Schengen countries: however, regardless of the contracting party to which an asylum-seeker addressed an application, only one was to be responsible for processing that application. This provision should be read in conjunction with the Convention determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the member states of the European Community, which was signed in Dublin on 15 June 1990. The Dublin Convention stated that the country to which asylum-seekers first applied for asylum was responsible for either accepting or rejecting the status of refugee, and the seeker might not restart the process in another member of the EC; normally, the entity responsible was the state through which the asylum-seeker first entered the European Community.76 In doing this, central and northern members of the EC aimed at preventing the practice of 'asylum shopping', according to which asylum-seekers applied in a particular state according to the benefits it provided; the political and financial burden of asylum was thus placed on the southern members of the EC, which were closer to the main sources of refugees.77 Harmonisation of asylum policies was not ruled out, but it was made subordinate to a preliminary inventory of national policies, without any definite deadline. The second group of complementary measures concerned police and security. The contracting parties undertook to ensure that their police authorities assisted one other in order to prevent and detect criminal offences. This was to take place in compliance with national legislation and within the limits of their responsibilities. Lastly, the third group of compensatory measures concerned the Schengen Information System. The contracting parties expressed their willingness to set up and maintain this joint system, consisting of a national section for each of the contracting parties and a technical support function. France assumed responsibility for the latter; it was to be located in Strasbourg. A note in the protocol to the convention by the FRG regarding the inclusion of the whole of Germany was added to the treaty. The contracting parties noted that, after the unification of the two German states, the scope of the convention should also extend to the territory of the German Democratic Republic; in the meantime, the GDR was not to be considered as a foreign country in relation to the FRG. Nor should the CISA jeopardise the arrangements between the FRG and Austria, which aimed at simplifying checks at their common borders. 76. Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, Dublin 15/06/1990. 77. Anthony Messina, The logics and politics of post-WWII migration to Western Europe, Cambridge 2007. See also: Anthony Messina, Colleen V.Thouez, The Logics and Politics of a European Immigration Regime, in: Anthony Messina (ed.), West European Immigration and Immigration Policy in the New Century, London 2002, pp. 99-102. 276 Simone PAOLI As clearly stated in the final provisions, the document was not directly and immediately applicable in the Schengen countries. The Convention was subject to ratification in all the member states; in addition, it was expected to come into force only when the prior conditions for its implementation had been fulfilled in the signatory states and checks at external borders deemed to be effective. Any member state of the EC, significantly, could become a member to the Schengen system. Such an accession, however, was subject to an agreement between that state and the contracting parties, and also to ratification by the acceding state and by each of the Schengen countries.78 As a matter of fact, once the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement had been signed, the founding members felt that, in order to be fully successful, the initiative had to involve as many Community countries as possible. The expansion of the regime could prove that Schengen was in fact a Europe-wide project and a precursor to a fully-fledged Community venture. In addition, the southern enlargement of the regime could help the countries at the geopolitical core of the EC to pass the political and financial costs associated with border controls and asylum on to the peripheral members.79 Italy was the first country to be admitted, thereby setting a precedent for all future enlargement waves.80 In particular, the Italian authorities were allowed to sign the Schengen agreements on 27 November 1990.81 This came about because the Italian government accepted signing a re-admission agreement with France, whereby Italy was obliged to re-admit irregular migrants transiting from Italy to France. It also came about because the Italian Parliament agreed to pass a law bringing its national legislation into line with the Schengen system. This law abolished geographical limitations on asylum, which restricted the recognition of the status of refugee to Europeans. It also strengthened rejection and detention procedures for irregular immigrants, tightened sanctions for migrant smugglers and traffickers, and introduced penalties on carriers transporting undocumented persons. Most importantly, as emphatically requested by the French government, the Italy’s signature came only after the Parliament in Rome reluctantly imposed visa requirements on travellers from Turkey, the Maghreb and sub-Saharan countries.82 This was during the period when, it must be remembered, all Schengen countries decided to remove Hungary and Czechoslovakia 78. Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, Schengen 19/06/1990. 79. ADN, CGF, 227 – PO 1 291, Gilbert Pérol, Rencontre du Président de la République avec Andreotti, Rome 27/9/1989. 80. ANF, APR, ACM, Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, Ratification de la Convention d'application de l'accord de Schengen; Négociation de la Convention relative au franchissement des frontières extérieures; Harmonisation communautaire des politiques en matière d'immigration, Paris 11/10/1990. 81. HACEU, Accord de Schengen: Ministre et Secrétaires d’Etat, Conclusions de la réunion des Ministres et Secrétaires d’Etat tenue à Paris le 27 novembre 1990, Bruxelles 28/11/1990. 82. Mario Fridegotto, L'accordo di Schengen: riflessi internazionali e interni per l'Italia, Milano 1992, pp. 17-20. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 277 from the Schengen 'Black List' and seriously considered the possibility of removing Poland as well.83 France and the Schengen club paid a price for this strategy. The governments and the public in southern Mediterranean countries were convinced that they were discriminated against, in favour of Eastern European countries. They suspected that Schengen was primarily aimed at closing the southern borders of the EC.84 Conclusions Mitterrand, together with Kohl, was the main architect of the Saarbrücken Agreement in 1984 and the Schengen Agreement in 1985. He was committed to restoring momentum to the process of European integration and, in this context, to the French- German relationship. He was also eager to implement the European Single Market and, in particular, to facilitate trade with West Germany. However, at that early stage, the intergovernmental framework was considered as more in line with national interests and views. It was in fact not only designed to bypass opposition from a group of EC countries. It was also intended to marginalise EC institutions and to exclude one of the six founding members of the EC, i.e., Italy, which was willing to participate but unable to reassure its partners of the effectiveness of its border control system. The exclusion of Italy, incidentally, is convincing evidence that security concerns had been at the heart of the Schengen system since its inception. Mitterrand was less influential in the process leading to the signing of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990. In the crucial period between 1986 and 1988, the French President was obliged to cohabit with a centre-right government. The combination of the increase in illegal migration flows to France, the recrudescence of Arab terrorism and the political and ideological stances of the governing parties led to a change in the French approach to Schengen. More emphasis was put on the need to safeguard national sovereignty. More stress was also placed on the aim to provide security to citizens by compensating for the abolition of internal border controls with stricter measures at the external borders. The French tendency to give priority to security concerns matched the securityoriented path pursued by the West German government. Instead, the nationalist stance taken by the government in Paris came into conflict with the pro-Community attitudes 83. HAEU, FLF, Florent Huard, Réunion des Ministres et Secrétaires d’Etat de Schengen tenue à Paris le 27 Novembre 1990, Paris 27/11/1990. 84. Sarah Collinson, Shore to Shore. The Politics of Migration in Euro-Maghreb Relations, London 1996, pp. 52-58. 278 Simone PAOLI of the government of the FRG, especially as far as police and judicial cooperation was concerned. Between 1989 and 1990, the influence of Mitterrand and the new centre-left government in Paris was challenged by the revolutionary events that took place in Central and Eastern Europe. As a consequence of those events, the government of the FRG became increasingly assertive and took the lead in the Schengen negotiations. In particular, the Schengen visa policy was rewritten in accordance with the new geopolitical interests of the federal authorities, thus creating the preconditions for a European Union which was open to the East and closed to the South. France and the origins of Schengen: an interpretation 279 Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem Beatrice SCUTARU Abstract Since the 1990s, Romania has become one of the main source countries for migrants to Western Europe. Romanians’ mobility rapidly gave rise to negative stereotypes in both public and political debates. The Roma faced even harsher treatment, as their presence in Western Europe came to be perceived as a problem by both sending and receiving countries. Although Roma migration continues to be treated mainly from an ethnic perspective, research has demonstrated the similarities between Roma and non-Roma migration patterns and strategies. Its main feature is its visibility in the public space. In this chapter, I argue that Roma and non-Roma Romanian migrations are, in fact, different parts of the same migration wave. This analysis stresses that treating Roma migration should be separated from ethnic representations and more emphasis placed on the need for improved socio-economic conditions. Using the expulsion of Romanian Roma from France in 2010, this study reveals their precarious situation, seen by mainstream society as belonging neither to their home state nor to the countries to which they chose to migrate. This chapter also highlights the discrepancy between the official, politically correct discourse, defended by European institutions, and the racism characteristic of day-to-day interactions at national level. The conflicting representations of Roma among the many actors involved (civil society, the EU, national governments, etc.) have made it impossible to find a solution deemed satisfactory to all parties. This case-study also provides information on the new specificities of national identity-building in the post-Cold War context. Introduction Following the breakdown of Europe’s Communist regimes, liberalisation of border controls and massive economic and political changes resulted in one of the most important features of the post-Cold War era: increased human mobility. A significant number of Central and Eastern Europeans migrated to Western Europe in search of better opportunities.1 This phenomenon posed new challenges and rapidly amplified 1. Remus Gabriel Anghel, Romanians in Western Europe. Migration, Status Dilemmas, and Transnational Connections, Plymouth, 2013. 281 fears of mass immigration. Interpreted as being fraught with risk,2 this new-found mobility triggered an upsurge in negative feelings towards Central and Eastern European immigrants.3 Since the 1990s, Romania has become one of the main source countries for migrants to Western Europe.4 Migration to the West increased exponentially after 2002, when Romanians gained the right to travel freely within the European Union (EU).5 Another change occurred after 2007, when Romania officially became a member of the EU. Romanians (Roma6 and non-Roma) became European citizens, acquiring new rights in the process. Not only could they move freely within Europe; they also enjoyed political and welfare benefits, at least in theory. In practice, the situation was more complicated. The EU’s two significant enlargements in 2004 and 2007 aroused concern among existing member states about uncontrolled mass labour migration. In response to this apprehension, they were given the opportunity to introduce restrictions to their labour markets for citizens from the new member states. This was done by imposing transitional limits for a maximum of seven years: known as the 2+3+2 formula, which limited a person's right to work in another EU country but not freedom to travel.7 Until January 2014, Romanians, like other Central and Eastern Europeans, thus had only limited access to the labour markets of certain countries.8 As Romanian citizens took full advantage of their newly acquired rights, their mobility gave rise to negative stereotypes in public and political debates.9 The Roma faced even harsher treatment.10 Despite being 'Europe’s largest ethnic minority',11 2. Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU, London, 2006. 3. Marcel Canoy, Rickef Beautin, Anna Horvath, Agnes Hubert, Frédéric Lerais, Peter Smith, Myriam Sochacki, Migration and public perception, Bureau of European Policy Advisers, European Commission (09/10/2006); Stefano Volpicelli, Who’s Afraid of … Migration? A New European Narrative of Migration, IAI Working Papers 15/32 (September 2015). 4. Dana Diminescu (ed.), “Visibles mais peu nombreux…” Les circulations migratoires roumaines, Paris, 2003. 5. Swanie Potot, Circulation et réseaux de migrants roumains: une contribution à l’étude des nouvelles mobilités en Europe, 2003, PhD defended at Université de Nice-Sophie Antipolis. 6. The Romani people are known by a variety of names: Gypsies, Sinti, Roma, Manush, Kale, etc. The term “Roma” is most commonly used in a political context as an umbrella, to refer to the Romani people as a whole. 7. Tito Boeri, Herbert Brücker, Migration, Co-ordination Failures and EU Enlargement, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1600, May 2005; Dorothee Bohle, Dora Husz, Whose Europe is it? Interest Group Action in Accession Negotiations: The Cases of Competition and Labor Migration, Politique européenne 15 (2005), pp. 85-112. 8. Diana Mihaela Pociovalisteanu, Workforce Movement: Romania and the European Union, Proceedings of the FIKUSZ’12 Symposioum for Young Researchers (2012), pp. 71-73. 9. Simon McMahon, Assessing the impact of European Union citizenship: the status and rights of Romanian nationals in Italy, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 20 (2012), pp. 199-214; Simon McMahon, Immigration and Citizenship in an Enlarged European Union: The political dynamics of intra-EU mobility, Basingstoke, 2015. 10. Samuel Delepine, Atlas des Tsiganes. Les dessous de la question Rom, Paris 2012, pp. 84-85. 11. EU and Roma, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en.htm (last accessed on 20 October 2014). 282 Beatrice SCUTARU they have been and still are victims of prejudice and social exclusion, suffering from extreme poverty and difficulty in gaining access to socio-economic provisions (healthcare, education, housing, employment).12 Even after becoming EU citizens, Roma faced barriers to mobility, based on the pretexts of the need to increase security and reduce crime.13 For example, Italy (2007-8) and France (2010) decided to dismantle all irregular Roma camps existing on their territory and to send these EU nationals back to their home countries (Romania/Bulgaria). 'For the first time EU citizens, in this case Romanians, were deported from the country for security and public safety reasons.'14 These measures, 'on the fringe of legality', also demonstrated the inequality and hierarchy between new and old EU citizens.15 On one hand, as Romanians and therefore European citizens, Roma were free to travel within the EU. On the other, they were obliged to cope with restrictions imposed on new member states: in order to find jobs, Romanians had to obtain work permits, delivered by local authorities – a long and costly process, and discouraging for potential employers. Due to the Roma's lack of necessary skills and networks, the situation was more problematic for them than for non-Roma migrants. Their exclusion from the official labour market forced them to lead lives on the fringes of society.16 Because of their lifestyle and living conditions, Roma migrants acquired visibility, their presence often giving rise to strong reactions, ranging from compassion to rejection. The precariousness of their legal and socio-economic status mobilised citizens from host countries who urged local and national authorities to intervene. Roma 'poverty immigration' soon became a 'public issue' requiring state action.17 This also put great pressure on the Romanian government, as host countries such as France and Italy demanded that it address the situation by preventing its citizens of Roma origin from travelling abroad.18 In Romania itself, in keeping with a long history of racism and discrimination, large sections of the Romanian population saw the Roma as being responsible for the country’s negative image abroad. 12. European Commission, The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union. Fundamental Rights and Discrimination. Brussels, 22 April 2004. The Romani community numbers 10-12 million members across the EU. 13. Vincent Geisser, Brûlez cette caravane que je ne saurais voir, ou l’invention d’un nettoyage “républicain”, Migrations Société 18 (2006), pp. 3-13; Peter Vermeersch, Huub van Baar: Expulsion Fever in Europe. The Case of the Roma, 26 September 2010 http://nationalities.wordpress.com/ 2010/09/26/huub-van-baar-expulsion-fever-in-europe-the-case-of-the-roma/ (last accessed on 10 October 2014). 14. Anghel, note 2, p. 2. 15. Irina Diana Madroaie, Roma, Romanian, European: A Media Framed Battle over Identity, Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines 5:2 (2012), pp. 102-103. 16. Olivier Legros, Campements et bidonvilles roms en France: quelle(s) solution(s) pour quell(s) problème(s)?, Précarisation et grande exclusion. Profession Banlieue (2011). 17. Olivier Legros, Tommaso Vitale, Les migrants Roms dans les villes françaises et italiennes: mobilités, regulations et marginalités, Géocarrefour 86 (2011), p. 7. 18. Madroaie, Roma, note 16, pp. 102-103. Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 283 Although the Roma presence in Western Europe was perceived as a problem by sending and receiving countries,19 research has demonstrated the similarities between Roma and non-Roma migration patterns and strategies. In addition, the percentage of Roma within Romanian emigration matches that of their presence in Romania itself.20 Although Roma migration continues to be considered and treated mainly from an ethnic perspective, its main feature is its visibility in the public space. In this chapter, I argue that Roma and non-Roma Romanian migration are in fact different parts of the same migration wave. This analysis stresses that the treatment of Roma migration should be distinguished from ethnic representations and more emphasis placed on the need to improve socio-economic conditions. The Roma should also be considered as part of the overall Romanian migrant population, rather than as an ethnicised and often demonised minority. Using the expulsion of Romanian Roma from France in 2010, I show how the conflicting representations of Roma among the many actors involved (civil society, EU, national governments, etc.) made it impossible to find a solution which satisfied all parties.21 This case-study also allows me to illustrate how all these actors played a part in building Roma ethnicity. This particular case-study was chosen because the events which took place in France gave rise to strong reactions from various actors at macro, mezzo and micro levels. Unlike other studies which have analysed this event from only one viewpoint – focusing on French policy, the EU’s response, or the Roma mobilisation22 – this chapter addresses it from various angles, in order to highlight the complexity of the situation. After examining the events which took place in France in 2010, I show how Roma organisations and the EU reacted. Roma activists tried to mobilise both national and transnational actors to guarantee the rights of free movement and residence for all EU citizens, including Roma. At EU level, the European Parliament and the European Commission asked the French and Romanian governments to improve the situation rapidly. The final part of this study, which analyses the reactions of Bucharest, demonstrates how national and European perceptions of Roma influenced both Romanian foreign policy and the national identity-building process. This chapter is not so much concerned with examining the migrants’ experience and perceptions of events, as with how their presence in France became a major national and transnational political issue. Identifying the principal stakeholders’ perspectives of their responsibility towards Roma is an important part of this analysis. 19. Martin Olivera, Les Roms migrants en France – une réalité qui derange, Diversité 159 (2009), pp. 181-182. 20. Diminescu, note 5; Potot, note 6. 21. For this study I draw upon French and Romanian press, official reports (national, Roma organisations, EU, European parliament), and Roma organisations’ archives (European Roma Rights Centre, Romani CRISS). 22. Alexandra Nacu, From Silent Marginality to Spotlight Scapegoating? A Brien Case Study of France’s Policy Towards the Roma, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38 (2012), pp. 1323-1328; Robert Gould, Roma rights and Roma expulsions in France: Official discourse and EU responses, Critical Social Policy 50 35 (2014), pp. 24-44. 284 Beatrice SCUTARU Romanian Roma sent packing23 In July 2010, following violent confrontations involving the police, Nicholas Sarkozy, the French president,24 announced 'a relentless fight against crime'. Two apparently unrelated events led to this strained situation: 1) on July 15 2010, near Grenoble, the police killed Karim Boudouda, a French citizen, after he and an accomplice had robbed a casino; 2) a few days later, Luigi Duquenet, a French citizen belonging to the Travellers group,25 was killed after he failed to stop at a checkpoint and collided with a police officer. These two events sparked riots and violent confrontations with the police.26 Despite the lack of a direct link between these events and the Roma, in an address to the Council of Ministers on July 21 2010, Sarkozy focused on 'the problems caused by the behaviour of certain Travellers and Roma'. The President described the Roma from Eastern Europe as living in illegal camps and as a 'source of illicit traffic, of profoundly undignified living conditions, of exploitation of children for begging, prostitution and crime'. These alleged activities were presented as threats to public security and to society in general. Sarkozy announced that the government would dismantle and evacuate these camps, because foreigners living in France in violation of the European legislation on freedom of movement had to be expelled. He also promised legislative amendments aimed at broadening the possibilities of removing EU citizens of other states from French territory.27 Many public debates and controversies, which had come to the fore during the 2000s, had produced biased representations of the informal settlements largely populated by Roma migrants. This image, reiterated by Sarkozy on many occasions, also emphasised the Roma’s disregard for property. The hardships encountered by Roma migrants and the events which had forced them into this precarious situation were largely ignored. By calling their settlements 'illegal' and 'informal', and stressing the unauthorised occupation of land, the French president depicted Roma as intruders. This led to what Gérard Noiriel calls the 'assignation identitaire', meaning that 'Roma' and 'Roma migrant' became the equivalent of 'problematic migrant', the ‘Other’. Within this model, solidarity only extends to people with whom the national community can identify.28 The distance 23. Ovidiu Ciutescu, Franta ne trimite romii la pachet, Jurnalul National (3 Avril 2008). 24. Nicolas Sarkozy (1955-) was President of the French Republic from 2007 to 2012. 25. Gens du voyage (travellers) is an administrative term used in France since the law adopted on the 3 January 1969, in order to name groups with an itinerant lifestyle, Roma and non-Roma. Moreover, only 15% of the Roma are actually itinerant. 26. Saint-Aignan saccagée après la mort d’un jeune, L’Express (19 July 2010); Yves Bordenave, À Grenoble, des policiers ont de nouveau essuyé des tirs d’armes à feu, Le Monde (20 July 2010). 27. Horia Barbulescu, Constructing the Roma People as Societal Threat. The Roma Expulsions from France, European Journal of Science and Theology 8 (2012), pp. 282-284. Thomas Sheldrick, France launches crackdown on Roma and travelling communities, Deutsche Welle (29 July 2010). 28. Segolène Barbou des Places, Solidarité et mobilité des personnes en droit de l’Union européenne: des affinités selectives?, in Chahira Boutayeb (ed.), La solidarité dans l’Union européenne, Pierre angulaire d’un système juridique, Paris (2011), p. 28. Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 285 thus created between Roma migrants and French society justified the implementation of security policies.29 On July 30 2010, during what has been called the Grenoble Speech, Sarkozy declared a 'war on traffickers and criminals' and called for a policy reform to improve the fight against 'informal settlements of Roma encampments', described as 'outlaw areas that we cannot tolerate in France'.30 With this speech, Sarkozy officially established a direct connection between crime and Roma migration,31 marking the evolution towards 'a new phase of State xenophobia'.32 On August 5, the French Ministry of the Interior sent a circulaire33 to all préfets,34 as well as police and gendarmerie directors, asking for the removal of 300 illegal camps, explicitly and repeatedly targeting Roma encampments as a 'priority': The President of the Republic set specific objectives, on the 28th of July, for the evacuation of illegal camps: 300 encampments or illicit settlements must be dismantled in the next 3 months, prioritizing those inhabited by Roma. […] It is therefore up to each prefect, in each department, to launch, on the basis of the situation from the 21st and 23rd of July, a systematic dismantling of illegal camps, prioritizing those inhabited by Roma.35 Because of the controversial nature of these statements, this document was not made public by the French authorities. This was 'the first time in decades that French authorities explicitly designated one ethnic group as a supposed threat to French identity, using the rhetoric of xeno- 29. Olivier Legros, Tommaso Vitale, note 18, pp. 6-8. 30. Le discours de Nicolas Sarkozy à Grenoble dans son intégralité, My TF1 NEWS, http://videos.tf1.fr/ infos/2010/le-discours-de-nicolas-sarkozy-a-grenoble-dans-son-integralite-5953237.html (last accessed on 13 September 2014). Marie Desnos, Sarkozy: “C’est une veritable guerre”, Paris Match, 30 July 2010. 31. Alexandra Nacu, The Politics of Roma Migration: Framing Identity Struggles among Romanian and Bulgarian Roma in the Paris region, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37 (2011), p. 148. As several researchers have shown, this connection between crime and immigration is not a new phenomenon (See: Driss Ajballi, Violences et immigration, Strasbourg, 2001; Laurent Mucchielli, Délinquance et immigration en France: un regard sociologique, Hommes & migrations 1241 (January-February 2003), p. 20-31.). 32. Emmanuel Blanchard, Claire Saas, L’immigration, un regime pénal d’exception, GISTI, 2012, p. 11. 33. A circulaire is a text (often official) through which notifications or orders are transmitted to the members of an administration, a service. 34. The préfet is the state’s representative at a local level (departments, regions). 35. Original French version: “Le Président de la République a fixé des objectifs précis, le 28 juillet dernier, pour l’évacuation des campements illicites: 300 campements ou implantations illicites devront être évacués d’ici 3 mois, en priorité ceux des Roms. […] Il revient donc, dans chaque département, aux préfets de s’engager, sur la base de l’état de situation des 21 et 23 juillet, une démarche systématique de démantèlement des camps illicites, en priorité ceux de Rom.” Circulaire IOC/K/10/17881/5, Circulaire du ministère de l’Interieur, de l’Outre-mer et des Collectivités territoriales à Monsieur le Préfet de police, Monsieur le Directeur general de la police nationale, Monsieurs le Directeur general de la gendarmerie nationale, Mesdames et Messieurs les Préfets (pour action), Monsieur le Sercétaire general (pour information), Paris (5 August 2010). 286 Beatrice SCUTARU phobia against it'.36 The French administration’s strategy in dealing with Roma migration thus revolved mainly around deportation and forced evacuation of camps, made possible by a new legal and regulatory framework.37 Ever since Jean-Marie Le Pen’s unexpected success in the 2002 French presidential elections, immigration policy had become a governmental priority.38 Sarkozy played a crucial role in this evolution, first as Minister of the Interior and later as president. In order to neutralise Le Pen and gain Front National voters, he co-opted Le Pen’s discourse on immigration and supported several amendments to legislation dealing with asylum and migration.39 This representation of immigration as an illegitimate social phenomenon and a threat to French identity was institutionalised after the 2007 presidential elections by the creation of the Ministère de l’Immigration, de l’Intégration et de l’Identité nationale et Codéveloppement.40 The dismantling of Roma camps and the expulsion of their residents to Romania began in early August 2010. The first flight transporting Romanian Roma landed in Bucharest on August 19 and was followed by an intensification of camp dismantlement, forced evictions and deportation operations.41 In exchange for their departure, Roma received 'humanitarian' aid of €300 per adult and €100 per child.42 They were also obliged to sign a form making it impossible for them to receive this payment a second time. On some occasions, their fingerprints were also taken,43 thus recalling 36. Nacu, note 23, p.1324. See also Aidan McGarry, Helen Drake, “The Politicization of Roma as an Ethnic “Other”: Security Discourse in France and the Politics of Belonging”, in: Umut Korkut/Greeg Bucken-Knap/Aidan McGarry/Jonas Hinnfors/Helen Drake (eds.), The Discourses and Politics of Migration in Europe, New York 2013, p. 86. 37. Olivier Legros, Tommaso Vitale, note 18, p. 8. 38. Jean-Marie Le Pen (1928-) is a French politician who led the Front National (National Front), the main right-wing party in France, from 1972 to 2011. In 2002 he qualified for the second rounds of the presidential elections. It was the first time someone with such far right opinions qualified for the second round of the French presidential elections. 39. For details on the legislative aspect see Grégoire Cousin, Francesca Mariani, Il passepartout dell’ “ordine publico”. Politica e diritto nelle prassi di allontamento dei “Rumeni detti Rom” in Italia e Francia, in Paolo Bonetti, Alessandro Simoni e Tommaso Vitale (eds.), La condizione giuridica dei Rom e Sinti in Italia, Milan (2012), pp. 415-454. 40. Joao Miguel Duarte de Caroalho, Bringing politics back in: the impact of right wing parties on immigration policy in the UK, France and Italy during the 2000s, thesis University of Sheffield (February 2012), pp. 185-241. 41. Laura Mitran, Aurelia Alexa, Problema romilor dintre Romania si Franta in atentia Europei de la repatrierile din 2010, Mediafax (12 September 2012). 42. On the ways in which Roma expulsions became a new symbol in French policies, see Christophe Bertossi, France and Deporting the Roma: How did we get there?, ARI 146/2010, Madrid http:// www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CON- TEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/demography+population/ari146-2010#.VFk0dyg0rao (last accessed on 20 October 2014). 43. European Roma Rights Centre (henceforth ERRC), Submission in relation to the analysis and consideration of legality under EU law of the situation of Roma in France: factual update, 27 September 2010. Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 287 the Roma fingerprinting campaign initiated only two years before in Italy.44 Introduced in 2006, France’s Humanitarian Assisted Return programme (ARH)45 was designed to encourage foreign nationals, including EU citizens, to return to their home countries permanently. Since its creation, there has been a significant increase in the number of returns classified as voluntary.46 The fact that most of the 'beneficiaries' of this policy are migrants living in camps, mainly Roma, reveals the ethnic targeting of these migrants.47 As quickly and as abruptly as it had started, the Roma crisis in France came to an end. By mid-September, government and media interest in Roma had declined, their attention being drawn to other matters. As Alexandra Nacu argues, timing was essential in this unprecedented campaign of stigmatisation: everything occurred during the summer holidays, when little else was going on in France. The French media’s quest for sensational stories led them to pay special attention to Roma and their eviction.48 This was nothing new, as other researchers have emphasised: over the years, increased attention has been paid to Roma in July, August and September.49 The short-term interest shown by the media towards the Roma may also be explained by the very wide gap between policy aims and subsequent outcomes. Indeed, as recognised by the French public authorities, the ARH policy did not have the desired effects. Soon after their return to their home country, most migrants decided to come back to France. Despite the continual efforts of French authorities, the main result of the ARH was the development of circular migration. According to several associations, migrants came all the way from Spain to Lyon or Saint-Etienne, in order to obtain a free ticket home.50 The aid which was supposed to convince them to stay in Romania served to buy a new ticket for France.51 French government actions may therefore be seen as a communication strategy. Dismantling camps and repatriating Roma migrants were one way in which public authorities could impress French citizens and prove that they were dealing with the problems created by this 'poverty migration'. Considering the limited effect of the ARH policy, French public authorities had no interest in attracting attention to the high levels of return migration. 44. Isabella Cloug Marinaro, Between Surveillance and Exile: Biopolitics and the Roma in Italy, Bulletin of Italian Politics 2 (2009), p. 265-287; Massimo Merlino, The Italian (In)Security Package. Security vs. Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights in the EU, Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, Research Paper No. 14 (March 2009), 33p. 45. Aide au retour humanitaire in French. 46. The numbers go from 1 500 in 2006 up to 10 000 in 2008 and fall to 8 000 in 2010. 47. Emmanuel Blanchard, Claire Saas, note 33, p. 9. 48. Nacu, note 23, p. 1327. 49. Marion Dalibert, Milena Doytcheva, Migrants Roms dans l’espace public: (in)visibilités contraintes, Migrations Société 152 (2014), pp 75-90. See especially “Un groupe hyper-(in)visible”. 50. Emmanuel Blanchard, Claire Saas, note 33, pp. 8-10. 51. Mirel Bran, Les Roms, le sujet qui fâche la France et la Roumanie, Le Point (2 August 2010). 288 Beatrice SCUTARU Roma organisations call for action The Roma expulsions set off a wave of protests, demonstrations, petitions, press releases and other discursive interventions.52 On September 4 2010, thousands answered the call of human rights watch-dog organisations, and initiated street protests in France and outside the French embassy in several EU states.53 The Vatican and the leaders of other churches also expressed their concern.54 However, the first to raise their voice against the French President’s announcements and measures were the Romani national and international organisations. Ever since the 1970s, but especially from the 1990s onwards, there has been an explosion of political and cultural Roma organisations all over Europe. The EU enlargement process has favoured the mobilisation of ethnic minorities, 'providing them with a new interlocutor and new goals, […] with an environment where they can express themselves and where they can be heard'.55 This section focuses on two organisations that became involved in the fight against targeting Roma in France, one national (Romanian) and one European. The analysis identifies the specificities and similarities of their actions and tries to answer the following questions: "How much leeway do these organisations have? Is it easier for nationally based organisations to influence policy? What impacts do the image of Roma as the most important European minority and the EU’s particular involvement have on the associations’ resources and means of action?" The European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) is a public interest organisation, based in Budapest, using law to fight anti-Roma racism as well as human rights violations related to the treatment of Roma in Europe. Established in 1996, its aim is giving Roma the necessary tools to 'combat discrimination and achieve equal access to justice, education, housing, health care and public services'.56 At the beginning of the French Roma crisis, on July 29 2010, the ERRC wrote a letter to Sarkozy, stating its concern regarding the measures he had announced which 'collectively implicate 52. Les critiques pleuvent contre la politique sécuritaire de Nicolas Sarkozy, Le Monde, 24 Août 2010; Matthias Langhoff condamne la politique anti-roms française, Libération (3 novembre 2010); BBC NEWS, France-Roma expulsions, (19 October 2010) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11027288 (last accesed on 12 October 2014). 53. Laura Mitran, Aurelia Alexa, Problema romilor dintre Romania si Franta in atentia Europei de la repatrierile din 2010, Mediafax (12 September 2012). 54. Arnaud Leparmentier, Les critiques de l’Eglise contre la politique securitaire gênent l’Elysée, Le Monde (25 Août 2010); Marion Solletty, “Les chretiens ne peuvent rester indifférents” au sort des Roms, Le Monde (23 Août 2010); Carmen Plesa, Biserica in “afuriseste” pe politicieni pentru evacuarea romilor, Jurnalul National (23 Août 2010). 55. Aidan McGarry, The Roma Voice in the European Union : Between National Belonging and Transnational Identity, Social Movement Studies : Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest 10:3 (2011), pp. 290-291. 56. ERRC, About us, https://www.errc.org/about-us-overview (last accessed on 25 October 2010). Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 289 French Travellers and migrant Roma in crimes and call for their eviction and expulsion'.57 The ERRC also argued that Sarkozy's statements reinforced discriminatory perceptions about Roma as a group. The wish to proceed with the deportation of migrant Roma – citizens of other EU member states – and to amend the law in order to make this process more effective was presented as 'deeply at odds with national and international housing rights provisions, particularly when the process risks rendering people homeless' and 'might be in violation of France’s obligations under the EU Directive 2004/38/EC (henceforth EU Directive) on freedom of movement'.58 This Directive authorised the expulsion of EU citizens only under certain conditions: each case had to be considered individually and migrants could only be expelled if they had exceeded the three-month residence clause, were unable to prove sufficient financial means to stay or posed a 'genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat […] to public policies or public security'.59 During the summer of 2010, the compatibility of the French measures with EU law became a matter of concern for both civic society and international organisations. The ERRC requested the French President to refrain from 'making statements which collectively characterise Roma and Travellers in a negative light', from 'evictions of illegal settlements in the absence of legally adequate alternative housing', and from 'collectively expelling EU citizens or other persons from France'.60 After writing to him, the ERRC contacted the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,61 the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the European Committee of Social Rights, 57. ERRC, Letter to The Honourable Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, 29 July 2010, p. 1. 58. ERRC, Letter to The Honourable Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, 29 July 2010, pp. 1-2. 59. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the European Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the EU. Articles 5, 6 and 7. 60. ERRC, Letter to The Honourable Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, 29 July 2010, pp. 1-2. 61. ERRC, Written Comments of the European Roma Rights Centre for Consideration by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination at its 77th Session, on the occasion of its Periodic Review of France, 11-12 August 2010, 6 August 2010. 290 Beatrice SCUTARU etc.,62 providing them with proof of France’s violations of the EU Directive and urging them to take action.63 Another NGO opposing the French measures was the Roma Centre for Social Intervention and Studies (Romani CRISS). Created in 1993, it 'defends and promotes the rights of Roma in Romania by providing legal assistance in cases of abuse and works to combat and prevent racial discrimination against Roma in all areas of public life'.64 When Sarkozy’s decision was made public, Romani CRISS urged the French government to 'refrain from undertaking racially-biased collective deportations as a means of reprisal'. The organisation used essentially the same means of action as the ERRC (producing press releases, drafting reports, collecting testimonies, etc.). It also repeatedly called upon the EC to 'take a pro-active stand' with regard to the problem and asked the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to refute the bilateral agreements related to Roma expulsion.65 Although it received a detailed but tardy answer from the EC,66 the Romanian representatives were not so considerate. For example, Romani CRISS sent several letters to the president of the Romanian National Commission for Human Rights and Minority Issues, enquiring about the actions undertaken by the institution in support of the Romanian Roma in France. When he finally bothered to reply, Nicolae Paun sent a very brief and discourteous letter, simply outlining the Commission’s general initiatives, with no special mention of the French crisis.67 Both organisations had begun by urging national governments to act, but the lack of response forced the ERRC and Romani CRISS to call for action at transnational level. Although the Romanian institutions had been offended by calls to action, because they had done nothing to defend the Romanian Roma expelled from France, the EC took a stand. This reveals the paradoxical situation in which Roma find themselves. As emphasised by Aidan McGarry in analysing the Italian Roma crisis, when 62. The letter addressed to the French president is forwarded to Viviane Reding, the Vice-President in charge of Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship at the European Commission, to Morten Kjaerum, Director of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and Polonca Koncar, President of the European Committee of Social Rights; See also ERRC, Submission in relation to the analysis and consideration of legality under EU law of the situation of Roma in France: Factual update, 27 September 2010. 63. The dossier contains official French documents (Circular of French Interior Ministry, dated 5 August 2010), several testimonies of Romanian Roma evicted and served expulsion notices, as well as scans of all expulsion notices (Obligation de quitter le territoire français – OQTF) issued by French police to Romanian Roma in August and September 2010. 64. Despre Romani CRISS, http://www.romanicriss.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1570&Itemid=564 (last accessed on 5 October 2014). 65. Romani CRISS, Answer to the “immediate expulsion: immediate public condemning the French Government fundamental rights violations!, Bucharest (30 July 2010), p. 3; Letter from Romani CRISS to Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, Emil Boc, Prime Minister of Romania, Boyko Borisov, prime Minister of Bulgaria, Bucharest (15 September 2010). 66. Letter from the Directorate-General Justice, European Commission, to Ms Magda Matache, Executive Director – Romani CRISS, Brussels (71 January 2011). 67. Raspuns Parlamentul Romaniei, Subcomisia pentru drepturile omului, culte si problemele minoritatilor nationale, Bucharest (14 October 2010). Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 291 Roma encounter discrimination, 'calls to improve their situation occur primarily at the transnational level'.68 The EU even started paying special attention to the Roma, perceived as the very symbol of Europeanness, in the 1990s. With the support of the EU, certain Roma activists have tried to construct Roma as a nation without a territory, to create a Roma identity which goes beyond the nation state. Several activists and researchers have highlighted the dangers of the transnational approach: by reinforcing the idea that Roma are not full citizens of the countries in which they reside, states are relieved of their obligation to protect them. They can thus place the responsibility of fighting for Roma rights on international actors (EU, Council of Europe, OSCE).69 The principal danger of stressing only the difference between the Roma and the dominant ethnic group of the state is 'self-exclusion' on an ethnic basis. In addition, this transnational identity loses its purpose when taken to national level: 'How are the national Roma communities to understand the substance of a transnational identity if they anchor their citizenship in the transnational political context and are not particularly concerned with, or knowledgeable of, transnational mobilization efforts?'70 Despite these dangers, transnational actors are still among the first to become involved, as will be shown in the next section. By showing how several European actors tried to solve the French Roma crisis, I highlight the EU’s delicate situation in dealing with these migrants, as well as its difficulties in imposing measures on member states. The EU solves the crisis – more or less One of the first EU actors to condemn France was the European Parliament (EP). Several of its members criticised the French measures against Roma, requesting clarification and calling for action.71 In September 2010, the EP also adopted a resolution on 'the situation of Roma and on freedom of movement in the European Union', calling upon France to suspend its expulsions of Roma immediately. This resolution expressed similar concerns to those listed by the ERRC, such as the discriminatory French public discourse linking Roma migration with criminality, and stressed the fact that the expulsion of these EU citizens was contrary to EU law. It also stressed the late and limited response of the European Commission (EC), 'the guardian of 68. McGarry, note 56, p. 284. 69. Andrzej Mirga, Nicolae Gheorghe, The Roma in the Twenty-First-Century : A Policy Paper, Princeton (1997); Peter Vermeersch, The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe, New York/Oxford (2006). 70. McGarry, note 56, pp. 285, 286, 291. 71. Emine Bozkurt, Question for written answer. Rule 117. Emine Bozkurt (S&D), 27 August 2010; Olle Schmidt, Question for written answer. Rule 117. Olle Schmidt (ALDE), 3 September 2010; Corina Cretu, Question for written answer. Rule 117. Corina Cretu (S&D), 16 September 2010; Michail Tremopoulos, Question for written answer. Rule 117. Michail Tremopoulos (Verts/ALE), 26 October 2010. 292 Beatrice SCUTARU Treaties', and 'invite[d] the Commission to stand firmly behind the values and principles enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaties and to respond promptly with a full analysis of the situation […] as regards to the conformity of Roma policies with EU legislation'.72 This situation aroused the interest of Viviane Reding, Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship.73 On September 1 2010, Reding and commissioners Laszlo Andor and Cecilia Malsmtröm issued a Joint Information Note to the College of Commissioners on The Situation of the Roma in France and in Europe. This document raised concerns regarding French practices and emphasised that targeting a group based on nationality, race or ethnic origin violated EU law. The French representatives assured Reding that this was not the case, and the situation somehow calmed down.74 Everything changed on September 9, however, when the French press released the August circulaire which had targeted Roma camps. Four days later, the French Ministry of the Interior released another circulaire, deleting all express references to Roma. Unfortunately for France, this did not placate the critics. On the contrary, the news caused an upsurge in criticism of the French treatment of Roma citizens.75 Reding threatened to bring France before the European Court of Justice for violating anti-discrimination laws. On September 14, in a speech on the latest developments in the Roma situation in France, Reding described it as a 'disgrace' and as 'deeply disturbing'”. She stressed: 'People are being removed from a Member State of the European Union just because they belong to a certain ethnic minority. This is a situation I had thought Europe would not have to witness again after the Second World War.'76 The French depiction of a negative relationship between security and foreigners and the ethnic discrimination of Roma created a rift between France and the EC, especially during the September 16 Council Summit in Brussels, in which the Roma controversy dominated debates.77 Lastly, the Commission decided to issue an ultimatum to France, requesting the full transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC into national legislation. When France accepted, the Commission refrained from pursuing an infringement procedure, but 72. European Parliament resolution of 9 September 2010 on the situation of Roma and on freedom of movement in the European Union (2011/C 308 E/12), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 October 2011. See also Huub van Baar, Europe’s Romaphobia: Problematization, Securitization, Nomadization, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 29:2 (2011), pp. 203-2011. 73. Les expulsions des Roms suscitent “une certaine inquiètude” à la Commission européenne, Libération (25 August 2010). 74. Sergio Carrera, “The Framing of the Roma as Abnormal EU Citizens. Assessing European politics on Roma Evictions and Expulsions in France”, p. 38. 75. Elodie Auffray, La Commission a l’impression de s’être fait rouler dans la farine, Libération (16 September 2010); L’UE doit sanctionner la discrimination d’État, Libération (27 September 2010). 76. Carrera, note 75, p. 40; Elodie Auffray, Pourquoi la France est menacée d’une procedure d’infraction, Libération (14 September 2010). 77. “Sarkozy dément avoir eu un “échange très violent” avec Barroso”, Libération (16 September 2010); “C’est la première fois que l’Union intervient sur la question des Droits de l’homme”, Libération (17 September 2010). Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 293 stated that it would 'closely watch over the full implementation of the commitments made by France, in the interest of EU law and EU citizens'. After 'solving' the French problem, the Commission started to focus on the economic and social integration of Roma, examining how EU Funds could help to strengthen their national integration further.78 During the 2008 EU Roma Summit, the EU’s policy towards Roma issues had been described by José Manuel Barroso, President of the EC, as being a national responsibility, despite opposition from Roma activists.79 In Barroso’s words, 'key policies for the inclusion of Roma are the competence of Member States, though they are, or can be, coordinated at the Community level'.80 Researchers have identified the possible reasoning behind the Commission’s position: 'the EU does not want to interfere in the respective minority policies of member states due to the resistance it would face', 'such a policy would legitimize a group-based approach', and 'it could deflect blame if member states cannot find an appropriate solution for Roma communities within their territories'. Yet the problems with this approach are that 'this policy has not worked in the past' and that 'member state governments have already proven unwilling/unable to initiate effective integration policies for Roma within their territory'.81 The contradictions inherent in the EU’s position regarding the situation of minorities in Europe are undeniable. During the enlargement process, the EU had paid special attention to their situation in candidate countries; respect for and protection of minorities became essential for accession (Copenhagen Criteria). Yet the EU did not impose similar requirements on old member states82 such as France, which does not even acknowledge the existence of minorities in its territories.83 Pressure exerted by the EU made Romania adopt reforms aimed at improving the Roma situation in that country, but very little had effectively changed at grassroots level.84 Once Romania became a member state, the EU lost the leverage it had achieved during the negotiations for accession, making it difficult for the EU to impose its desired changes. 78. Carrera, note 75, p. 40; Roms: la France prête à modifier son droit, Libération (15 Octobre 2010). 79. José Manuel Barroso (1956-) was president of the European Commission from 2004 to 2014. 80. Will Guy, EU limitations on Roma: Limitations and ways forward, in: Nando Sigona & Nidhi Trehan (Eds), Romani Politics in Contemporary Europe: Poverty, Ethnic Mobilization and the Neoliberal Order, Basingstoke (2009), p. 27. 81. McGarry, note 56, p. 288. 82. Rachel Gugliemo, Human Rights in the Accession Process: Roma and Muslims in an Enlarging Europe, in Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward, Local Government and Public Service reform Initiative, Open Society Institute (2004). 83. This decision was taken in order to ensure the equality of all French citizens in an indivisible Republic. 84. Three main issues were targeted by the EU in Romania during the enlargement procedure: institutionalised children, international adoption, and the Roma. 294 Beatrice SCUTARU The Romanian reaction … or lack thereof Despite this clear-cut international mobilisation, Bucharest officials reacted rather weakly to the events taking place in France. This final section demonstrates that, even after becoming an EU member state, Romania continued to be subjected to external pressures, as France used the country’s Schengen accession to scare Romania into making the 'right' choices regarding Roma migration. Besides influencing the country’s foreign policy, I also show that the way in which Roma migration is perceived had an effect on the national identity-building process. During the summer of 2010, the Romanian minister of Foreign Affairs, Teodor Baconschi, simply expressed concern regarding possible violations of the freedom of movement for EU citizens, and attracted attention to the possibility of French measures triggering xenophobic reactions against Roma. Although recognising some responsibility on the part of the Romanian government, Baconschi called for a European solution. Since 2008, Romania had been defending the idea that only the EU would truly be able to deal with Roma integration and ensure better access to education, housing, labour, etc. The Romanian president himself often argued that a European programme would be the only possible solution for the integration of Roma.85 Not only politicians but also ordinary Romanian citizens thought that the EU should take charge of the Roma. However, the EC has repeatedly stated its wish for the Roma problem to be dealt with only at national level.86 Similarly, the French secretary of State for European Affairs, Pierre Lellouche, emphasised the need for each country to make efforts to deal with its minorities.87 He even accused the Romanian government of not considering the Roma as a priority and not making any efforts for their integration. It is important to note that, even before the summer of 2010, Roma had already been the subject of discussions and tensions in French-Romanian diplomatic relations: France had been expelling Roma and non-Roma Romanians since the beginning of the 1990s.88 This leads us to wonder why Roma began to attract so much attention. When living in Romania and Bulgaria, they could be perceived as the perfect victims, in need of Western European help and support. However, once they decided to migrate to the West, they were no longer victims but offenders, who had to be sent back where they 85. Jessica Dubois et Piette Duquesne, Roms: le problème est européen, mais les États souverains, Ouest-France (26 August 2010). 86. Peter Vermeersch, Europeanisation: a mixed blessing for the Roma?, Europe: Identity and Integration? December 2009; Peter Vermeersch, The European Union and the Roma: An Analysis of recent Institutional and Policy Developments, European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 10 (2011). 87. Elodie Auffray, Roms: une question européenne “à traiter au niveau national”, Libération (27 July 2010). 88. Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Mission d’évaluation en Roumanie. Médecins du Monde. Situation et condition de vie des Roms roumains en retour volontaire ou contraint de France, juillet 2003, 30 p. Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 295 belonged.89 By improving the living conditions of Roma in their home countries, the West hoped to reduce the 'push' factors of migration.90 In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Roma have been the subject of growing interest. The international consensus on the need to promote their rights led to the implementation of special strategies, such as the Strategy for the Improvement of the Situation of the Roma,91 or the Roma decade.92 The EU also funded many programmes (PHARE funding) so that candidate states could deal with some aspects of the social exclusion experienced by the Roma.93 At the same time, the economic downturn experienced during the transition to a market economy gave rise to 'competitive victimisation' within Romanian society. The non-Roma Romanians, who were also suffering because of the economic circumstances, felt pushed aside both by the EU and by their own political representatives, who seemed to care only about Roma. By focusing their attention on Roma as an ethnic group, the EU programmes created further stigmatisation and prejudice against this population.94 Romanian officials also began to use them to evade their responsibilities and to argue that the Roma community should no longer be dealt with at a national, but at a European level.95 During an official trip to Romania earlier that year, in view of the failure of France’s previous attempts to stop Roma from migrating, Pierre Lellouche had demanded that the Romanian government appoint a representative dealing exclusively with the reintegration of the expelled Roma. Despite Romanian promises, this nomination was never made. France then raised the stakes and took advantage of Bucharest’s weakness: Sarkozy threatened Romania’s accession to the Schengen area if changes were not made. It was only then that Romanian officials decided to act by putting Valentin Mocanu in charge of 'Roma problems' especially in relation to France.96 Courage to resist French pressure came from a discussion with Viviane Reding on September 1 2010, after which Bogdan Aurescu, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that Romanian discrimination would not be tolerated and that the method of removing Roma from French territory was a violation of the presumption 89. Alexandra Nacu, L’émergence de la “question rom” en Roumanie et en Bulgarie. DU consensus au stigmate?, Tumultes 1:32-33 (2009), pp. 215-6. 90. Guglielmo, R. & William Waters, Migrating towards minority status: Shifting European policy towards Roma, Journal of Common Market Studies 43:4 2005, pp. 763–786. 91. In the framework of the EU enlargement process, Romania developed this strategy starting 2001. 92. This initiative was launched, in 2005, by the World Bank and the Open Society Institute. 93. European Commission, The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union. Fundamental Rights and Discrimination, Brussels 2004, p. 1. 94. Nacu, note 90, p. 196, 210, 215-6. 95. Peter Vermeersch, Reframing the Roma: EU initiatives and the Politics of Reinterpretation, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38:8 (2012), pp. 1195-1212. 96. La Roumanie désigne un responsible chargé de la reinsertion des Roms, Libération (31 Juillet 2010); Mirel Bran, Pressé par Paris, Bucarest promet de lutter contre les flux migratoires de Roms. Le gouvernement roumain a nommé un secrétaire d’État chargé de leur reinsertion, Le Monde (4 August 2010). 296 Beatrice SCUTARU of innocence. However, this criticism was limited by Romania’s wish to avoid worsening the conflict with France, a country which had actively supported Romania’s accession to the EU and the OTAN. For example, on August 19, when the first aircraft containing Roma landed in Bucharest, President Basescu stated that he could very well understand the problems created in France by the Roma camps and that his country would collaborate with France in order to find an 'appropriate solution' for both countries and their citizens.97 The Romanian ambassador’s declaration in Paris on September 14 perfectly summed up Romania’s stand: the Roma problem was not representative of the French-Romanian relationship, which went beyond this temporary, albeit pressing, problem.98 Also in September, Éric Besson99 and Pierre Lellouche went to Romania to try to find a solution. In view of their government’s determination to continue dismantling Roma camps and repatriating the Roma in them, they insisted that a bilateral approach was the only reasonable solution.100 Lastly, in the same month, France and Romania signed a bilateral agreement on the reintegration of Roma families returning from France. France also promised to help Romania to adopt a new national strategy for Roma.101 Romania’s attitude towards this crisis might seem surprising, considering that some of the expelled migrants were Romanian citizens and that Bucharest thus had an obligation to intervene to protect them.102 Yet, as long-term victims of exclusion and discrimination in Romania and oft-used scapegoats for economic and political downturns,103 Roma were not considered the equals of non-Roma citizens. It was thus not out of character for Theodor Baconschi, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to state, during a meeting with Piere Lellouche in February 2010, that Romania had some 'physiological, natural, and criminal problems among some Romanian communities, especially among the Romanian Roma groups'. This statement gave rise to serious criticism, and a warning was sent by the National Council for Fighting Against Discrimination.104 This declaration was not, however, an isolated case among Romanian political representatives. In 2001, Petre Roman, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, stated that 'the Romanian government had an obligation to protect 23 million Romanians against the few thousand Tigani'. In 2007, another minister of 97. Luca Niculescu, Tous les chemins ramènent les Roms, Libération (29 July 2010). 98. Laura Mitran, Aurelia Alexa, Problema romilor dintre Romania si Franta in atentia Europei de la rapatrierile din 2010, Mediafax (12 September 2012). Mitran, Alexa, note 19. 99. Éric Besson (1958-) was Ministre de l’Immigration, de l’Integration, de l’Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire from the 15th of January 2009 to the 13th of November 2010. 100. Roms: “Ceux qui s’attendaient à un match France-Roumanie seront déçus”, Libération (9 September 2010). 101. Mitran, Alexa, note 99. 102. UN General Assembly, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General, A/63/677, 12th of January 2009. 103. Jean-Pierre Liégeois, Roms et Tsiganes, Paris (2009). 104. Romani CRISS, Solicitare demisie Teodor Baconschi, minister of Foreign affairs, Bucharest (14 December 2010). Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 297 foreign affairs offered to buy land in Egypt and to transport there all the Roma who did not respect the law.105 According to Alexandra Nacu, 'Racism against Roma crystallises Romania’s main fears: poverty, insecurity, being marginalized within the EU, and demographic decline.'106 The situation deteriorated once the Roma became a burden during the EU accession process and the bid for admission into the Schengen Area. It became worse in the context of Romanian migration to the West. The migrants’ actions abroad came to be considered influential on the country’s image. Their experiences were therefore evaluated through their impact on the symbolic capital of the nation. This led to the construction of two main images of migrants, mainly concerning the relationships established with the local community in destination countries. On one side were 'the heroes', who had behaved in destination countries in a positive way and had been accepted by the local community. On the other, there were those who had not managed to be become part of the community, who had either fallen victim to unfortunate events or become involved in crime.107 As migrants’ actions in destination countries came to be associated with Romania’s international image and because of the dominant negative discourse of Roma migrants in host countries, Romanians themselves held the Roma responsible for the negative Western image of their country. They came to believe that their international image would be much better without the Roma.108 Romania’s frustrations to the EU accession, the limitations imposed upon its citizens, and the country’s bid for admission into the Schengen area had heightened national fears that the Roma were ruining the country’s chances of being seen as truly European. The Roma crisis in France in 2010 reinforced existing stereotypes and motivated non-Roma to state their differences with Roma Romanians. Two attempts had already been made, in 1995 and 2010, to replace the word 'Roma' with 'Tigani' (Gypsies) in all public documents, because politicians thought 'Roma' sounded too similar to 'Romania' and could further endanger the country’s international image. Other public opinion campaigns, specifically targeting Western European citizens, stressed – overtly or more subtly – this difference.109 This contemporary Romanian anti-Roma attitude feeds off old stereotypes, but it is mostly a way of adjusting to the new situation unfolding in a post-Cold War Europe. It is with regard to the EU and its norms that Romanians need to build a new national identity, one that would allow them to be considered equal to other Europeans. 105. Iulius-Cezar Macarie, Half-in, half-out: Roma and non-Roma Romanians with limited rights working and travelling in the European Union, Integrim Online Papers 8 (2014), p. 12. 106. Nacu, note 90, p. 213. 107. Camelia Beciu, Mirela Lazar, Instrumentalising the « mobility argument ». Discoursive patterns in The Romanian media, in Marcel Endres, Katarina Manderscheid, Christopher Mincke (eds.), The Mobilities Paradigm. Discourses and ideologies, London, 2016, pp. 53-54. 108. György Csepeli, David Simon, Construction of Roma identity in Eastern and Central Europe: Perception and Self-identification, Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies, 30:1 (January 2001), p. 134. 109. Nadia Kaneva, Delia Popescu, “We are Romanian, not Roma”: Nation Branding and Postsocialist Discourses of Alterity, Communication, Culture & Critique, 7 (2014), pp. 506-523. 298 Beatrice SCUTARU Conclusions This case-study reveals the precarious situation of Romanian Roma, who were seen by mainstream society as belonging neither to their home state nor to the countries to which they chose to migrate. We have seen that discrimination against the Roma is not geographically concentrated in Central Eastern Europe, but is felt throughout Europe. Although the French Roma crises happened in summer, when interest in sensationalism is heightened, it is also true that it took place against a backdrop of security-related rhetoric about immigration in the EU. The ethnic targeting of the Roma was a new step in Nicholas Sarkozy’s security policy, when the French government did not take sufficient account of European encouragement for states to handle the problems of minorities – only to have the EC intervene. In terms of Europe, the events that took place in France demonstrated the double discourse it was obliged to maintain, because of its limited power when other states refused to cooperate. If France is a little more responsive to pressure because it wants to retain its reputation, Romania is good at pretending to listen and then doing nothing. This study also highlights the discrepancy between the official, politically correct discourse, defended by European institutions, and the racism characteristic of dayto-day interactions at national level. This is why Romania finds it convenient to encourage the transnationalisation or Europeanisation of the problem. Although some Romani organisations have tried to characterise the Roma as a 'European nation', a transnational European minority, the EU and France have tried to increase the impact of domestic policy on the social inclusion of the Roma. However, as indicated by several researchers, this top-down approach does not seem to be working. The discourse on Roma as a 'unique minority in Europe' and the many European-financed programmes have not only not improved the Roma’s situation; they have also given member states arguments with which to evade their responsibilities and to maintain that the Roma community should be dealt with at European rather than national level. This case-study also provides information on the new specificities of national identity-building in the post-Cold War context. As the EU enlargement 'has added one more layer onto the hierarchy of exclusion within the continent', new member states find themselves needing to demonstrate that they belong to Europe. This search for a 'transnational European identity that transcends ingrained East/West divisions' created the need to find 'non-European' others within Europe – in this case, the Roma.110 To conclude, this chapter reveals the common denominator of all the discourses constructing Roma ethnicity: identity, that identity which the Roma give themselves and which others try to impose on them. This emphasises not only the fluidity of the construction of national ethnic or European identities, but also the means used to justify certain constructions rather than others. Rather than a discriminated minority, Roma are constructed as inherently flawed, 'Others', foreigners. This not only reveals 110. Kaneva, Popescu, note 86, p. 519. Roma population on the move: national belonging versus European problem 299 the political flaws in the EU’s inability to impose its policy on its members, but also the mythology of a European identity, or at least the ability to take it off, like a jacket, and put it back on again when it is convenient … 300 Beatrice SCUTARU La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration: gérer l'urgence, trouver un consensus et construire une politique Guia MIGANI Abstract Le but de cet article est d’analyser comment la question migratoire s’est imposée dans l’agenda communautaire entre 2004 et 2014. Si pendant son premier mandat la Commission Barroso apprehende la question du point de vue de la coopération au développement et du renforcement des dialogues régionaux et de la coopération avec les pays tiers, après le Printemps arabe sont la dimension sécuritaire et l’urgence humanitaire à primer. Avec l’adoption de l’Approche globale des migrations et de la mobilité (2011), la Commission essaye toutefois de replacer la question migratoire dans une perspective plus générale et de poser les bases d’une politique migratoire commune. Elle insiste tout particulièrement sur l’importance d’améliorer la cohérence entre la dimension externe et interne de la Communauté. Dans cette optique, d’une part il est nécessaire d’améliorer l’efficacité des politiques pour l’intégration des immigrés, de l’autre la politique de coopération au développement mais aussi le Service européen pour l’action extérieure doivent etre mieux intégrés dans la mise en œuvre de l’Approche globale des migrations et de la mobilité. La tentative de la Commission de construire une politique à moyen terme pour la gestion des flux migratoires ainsi que d’élaborer une approche ‘positive’ se heurte, toutefois, à la nécessité de gérer dans l’urgence une crise migratoire qui menace la solidarité européenne et au fait que l’accueil des migrants reste une compétence strictement nationale. En 2014 le seul point qui semble recueillir l’accord des pays membres est l’externalisation des frontières de l’Union dans le but de limiter l’arrivée des migrants sur le territoire européen. Introduction Quand la Commission Barroso prend ses fonctions, en novembre 2004, la question de la gestion des migrations vient d’être encadrée dans le Programme de La Haye, (adopté par le Conseil européen des 4 et 5 novembre 2004). Le Programme prévoit notamment l'instauration à l'horizon 2010 d'un système européen commun d'asile, la mise en place d'une politique facilitant l'expulsion des immigrants illégaux et leur retour dans les pays d'origine, l'établissement de règles communes en matière de visas ou encore, dans le domaine de la sécurité, un renforcement de la coopération policière et de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le programme prévoit aussi la création de l’agence 301 FRONTEX, qui doit constituer l’instrument de mise en œuvre d’une politique intégrée de gestion des frontières de l’UE avec les Etats membres et les pays tiers. La politique migratoire commune est une jeune politique qui s’est développée dans les dernières 30 années : absente des traités de Rome et de l’Acte unique européen, elle est d’abord apparue sous une forme totalement intergouvernementale dans le cadre de la Convention de Schengen en 1985, puis elle est entrée dans le troisième pilier du traité de Maastricht, régi donc par la méthode intergouvernementale, en 1992. Les limites de la méthode intergouvernementale rendent nécessaire la ‘communautarisation’ d’un certain nombre de politiques : celles consacrées aux visas, à l’immigration et liées à la libre circulation des personnes sont transférées dans le premier pilier par le traité d'Amsterdam de 1997 dont l'objectif est justement la création d'un espace de sécurité, de liberté et de justice. La politique migratoire reste toutefois une compétence partagée entre l’Union et les Etats membres. Avec le Traité de Lisbonne la politique migratoire connait quelques modifications : elle relève maintenant de la procédure législative ordinaire, constitue toujours une compétence partagée et couvre les domaines des contrôles aux frontières, de l’asile, de l’immigration légale et de l’intégration.1 Le but de cet article est donc d’analyser comment la Commission Barroso a essayé de promouvoir l’application d’une politique commune dans un domaine hautement sensible comme celui des migrations. On verra donc dans quelles conditions la Commission formule une première approche globale en matière de migration entre 2005 et 2006. Comment elle a cherché à nourrir le concept de global, rapprochant les migrations aux thématiques du développement et en insérant l’approche dans le contexte des dialogues régionaux développés avec les pays d’origine ou de transit. Ensuite on analysera l’impact du Printemps arabe sur l’approche globale et sa nouvelle formulation en termes de migrations et mobilité, un concept qui monte en puissance depuis au moins 2006. Dans les conclusions on proposera une évaluation de la politique migratoire commune soulignant, à la fois, les éléments qui poussent à plus de solidarité et les facteurs qui restent solidement sous le contrôle des gouvernements des Etats membres. 1. Sur cette partie cf. Corinne Balleix, UE : quelle politique migratoire? Diploweb.com, 21 janvier 2014, http://www.diploweb.com/UE-quelle-politique-migratoire.html, accès du 29/9/2016. « Trois facteurs principaux permettent d’expliquer ces évolutions : l’approfondissement de la libre circulation au sein de l’espace européen a transformé en question d’intérêt commun le contrôle des frontières extérieures de cet espace, toutes sortes de trafics pouvant sinon bénéficier de la suppression des frontières intérieures; les difficultés des États membres, pris individuellement, à gérer le phénomène transnational complexe des migrations, et le fait que les afflux de migrants se concentrent sur quelques États membres a rendu nécessaires des solidarités entre les Etats membres situés aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et les principaux pays de destination. » Ibidem. 302 Guia MIGANI L’émergence d’une approche globale en matière de migration La nouvelle Commission, entrée en fonction en novembre 2004, se saisit rapidement du dossier car le 10 mai 2005, le commissaire en charge de la Justice et des Affaires intérieures, l'italien Franco Frattini, présente les priorités de la Commission européenne pour la période 2005-2010. Elles portent sur la protection des droits fondamentaux, la lutte contre le terrorisme, le développement d'une politique commune en matière d'immigration au niveau européen, la mise en œuvre d'une politique intégrée de gestion des frontières extérieures de l'Union, le développement d'une politique commune en matière de visas, la lutte contre le crime organisé ou encore l'évaluation de l'efficacité des politiques et de l'adaptation des moyens mis en œuvre pour remplir les objectifs de liberté, de sécurité et de justice.2 La question toutefois devient politiquement plus sensible avec l’échec des référendums en France et aux Pays-Bas (29 mai et 1er juin 2005) sur la Constitution européenne. L’échec est selon la Commission, la conséquence des peurs et du manque de confiance des Européens qui “craignent l’avenir, résistent au changement”. La constitution n’est que “le bouc émissaire des peurs des citoyens. Peur de perdre le modèle social. Peur des « délocalisations ». « Peur que l’Europe aille trop vite et s’étende trop loin. Peur de l’Euro ou peur de la mondialisation.”3 La Commission souhaite donc augmenter l’efficacité et l’impact de son action en utilisant les instruments dont elle dispose de manière plus cohérente. Il s’agit de gagner en visibilité et de convaincre le citoyen que l’Union européenne est le meilleur instrument pour défendre ses intérêts dans un monde globalisé.4 La réunion de Hampton Court, organisée en octobre 2005 par Tony Blair, à l’époque Premier Ministre britannique, tourne autour des enjeux liés à la mondialisation. Parmi ceux-ci il y a la question des migrations. Celle-ci en effet, concerne à la fois le domaine intérieur et extérieur de l’UE. La nécessité d’harmoniser les deux aspects et de les rendre plus cohérents est donc particulièrement forte et importante. A conclusion du Sommet le Conseil invite la Commission à élaborer une approche globale des migrations et à concevoir toute une série de mesures concrètes et immédiates en partenariat avec les pays d’origine et de transit. A la suite de Hampton Court la Commission fait donc de la migration un sujet de réflexion qui doit voir des réalisations concrètes, à la fois pour rassurer les citoyens européens mais aussi pour mettre en condition l’UE d’affronter les défis d’un monde de plus en plus globalisé. De ce point de vue les questions prioritaires concernent les moyens pour renforcer la migration légale et maitriser et décourager celle illégale; quel type de partenariat nouer avec les pays d’origine et de transit des migrants; comment renforcer le contrôle aux frontières et être mieux équipé pour faire face à 2. http://www.touteleurope.eu/les-politiques-europeennes/justice-et-affaires-interieures/synthese/l-espace-de-liberte-de-securite-et-de-justice.html, consulté le 29/9/2016. 3. José Manuel Barroso, « Messine, 50 ans après : faire de la crise un atout », Messine, 4/6/2006, Speech 05/327. Éric Bussière, Guia Migani, Les Années Barroso, Paris 2014, p. 46. 4. COM(2005)525, « Les valeurs européens à l’ère de la mondialisation. Contribution de la Commission à la réunion d’octobre des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement », Bruxelles, 3/11/2005. La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 303 des crises, comment mieux lier migration et développement.5 Il s’agit donc de définir une approche qui prend à la fois en compte toutes les implications liés à la dimension extérieure mais aussi intérieure de l’Union. Les propositions de la Commission sont rapidement finalisées dans une communication du 30 novembre 2005.6 Celle-ci se concentre sur la gestion des migrations avec la région méditerranéenne et l’Afrique dans le but de définir un cadre d’action à court, moyen et long terme. A ce propos la Commission propose trois types de mesures : – Le renforcement de la coopération entre les Etats membres et de leur action en matière de migration; – La coopération avec certains pays d’origine clés en Afrique; – La coopération avec les pays voisins; Pour répondre au premier point les activités de FRONTEX seront élargies et valorisées. En particulier l’agence mènera une étude sur la faisabilité d’un réseau méditerranéen de patrouilles côtières qui devra coordonner les autorités chargées de surveiller les frontières maritimes des Etats membres et les services de recherche et de sauvetage et, le cas échéant, mettra également en relation les services homologues des pays d’Afrique du nord. En ce qui concerne deuxième point il s’agit de valoriser le cadre de la migration légale de manière à que le développement soit stimulé et cela dans le cadre de la stratégie de l’UE pour l’Afrique, qui vient tout juste d’être adoptée. Le dialogue avec l’Union africaine (UA) et les organisations régionales africaines sera approfondi sur tous les thèmes touchant à la migration, dans le but de renforcer sa gestion et promouvoir le développement de ces pays. La migration fera donc partie intégrante du dialogue politique entre l’UE, l’UA et d’autres organisations régionales. A cette fin d’ailleurs une conférence ministérielle UE-Afrique sera organisée en 2006. Il faudra optimiser le marché des services de transferts et des remises de fonds, pour réduire leurs coûts tout en améliorant l’accès au marché et en renforçant la concurrence. Par ailleurs les Etats membres de l’UE devront s’engager dans des efforts importants pour améliorer l’intégration des migrants dans leur territoire. Enfin en ce qui concerne la coopération avec les pays voisins, ou pays de transit, on envisage d’adopter la même stratégie développée à l’égard des pays de l’Europe de l’Est, du Caucase du Sud et d’Asie centrale qui ont bénéficié d’une assistance financière pour améliorer la gestion des frontières à travers l’Instrument européen de partenariat et voisinage. Il s’agit donc d’une approche qui repose sur des stratégies régionales déjà en place, (à l’égard de la Méditerranée ou de l’Afrique/pays ACP) qui doit rendre les pays d’origine ou de transit des partenaires responsables et fiables dans la gestion des flux 5. SEC(2005)1464 « Information note on the follow up to the informal meeting of Heads of State and Government at Hampton Court » sans date. 6. COM(2005)621, « Priorités d’action en vue de relever les défis liés aux migrations : première étape du processus de suivi de Hampton Court », Bruxelles, 30/11/2005. 304 Guia MIGANI de migration, pour décourager et réprimer la migration illégale tout en promouvant celle légale. Cette stratégie doit s’accompagner à une coordination plus approfondie de la gestion des frontières de l’UE. La dimension sécuritaire est évidemment très importante même si elle s’accompagne d’efforts pour promouvoir la migration légale de manière cohérente avec le développement des pays d’origine et avec les intérêts économiques des pays d’accueil. La réaction du Conseil européen est positive car lors de sa réunion de décembre 2005 il accueille les propositions de la Commission et adopte officiellement l’ « approche globale sur la question des migrations : priorités d’action centrées sur l’Afrique et la Méditerranée » Migration et développement En 2006, deux évènements sont l’occasion d’approfondir les liens et les modalités du rapport migration et développement.7 D’une part l’organisation, en septembre 2006, en marge de la réunion de l’AG des Nations unies, d’un dialogue de haut niveau sur les migrations internationales et le développement, et de l’autre la tenue d’une Conférence ministérielle UE-Afrique sur les migrations et le développement organisée à Tripoli les 22 et 23 novembre 2006. Le Dialogue de Haut Niveau sur les migrations internationales et le développement permet une première confrontation sur les instruments pour appréhender un phénomène mondial et essayer de maitriser le processus. En même temps, au niveau européen ou africain, la question est devenue politiquement sensible à cause des débarquements et des heurts à Ceuta et Melilla (septembre-octobre 2005) mais aussi à Lampedusa. L’intérêt accentué pour la question est justifié par des préoccupations relatives à une augmentation supposée des migrations ‘illégales’ ou ‘clandestines’.8 Il faut donc développer une approche positive au thème qui permette de surmonter l’impasse politique qui alimente la méfiance et les peurs des citoyens européens. Du coté des organisations régionales africaines existe d’ailleurs la même préoccupation de mieux comprendre le phénomène de migration et d’améliorer sa gestion.9 La réunion de Tripoli (novembre 2006) est précédée par une conférence tenue à Rabat en juillet, réunissant environ soixante pays africains et européens. Elle se termine avec l’adoption d’un partenariat euro-africain pour la migration et le dévelop- 7. Sur migration et développement, Ruby Gropas, The migration-development nexus : time for a paradigm shift, Policy Paper 77, 26/2/2013, Notre Europe/Jacques Delors Institute. 8. Lama Kabbanji, Migration et développement : quelles politiques menées en Afrique subsaharienne?, MAFE Working Paper 6, April 2010, p.4. Sur l’importance des heurts de Ceuta et Melilla sur l’attitude de l’UE, cf. Michael Collyer, Migrants as strategic actors in the European Union’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, Global Networks, 12, 4(2012), pp. 505-524. 9. Kabbanji, note 9, p.5. La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 305 pement. Ce partenariat vise à gérer de façon optimale les flux migratoires entre les pays d’origine, de transit et de destination. A cette fin, il fallait valoriser et faciliter la migration légale ainsi que ses effets bénéfiques sur le développement des pays d’origine de transit et d’accueil, renforcer les capacités de gestion des flux migratoires dans les différents pays, lutter contre la migration illégale, y compris à travers la réadmission des migrants en situation irrégulière et la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains.10 Le lien entre migration et développement est donc défini à double sens. Il consiste d’un côté à mettre l’accent sur le rôle positif de la migration en matière de développement des pays d’origine et de destination, de l’autre à développer les pays d’origine pour endiguer l’émigration de certaines catégories de migrants indésirables.11 La condition sine qua non d’un impact positif des migrations internationales est donc leur ‘bonne’ gestion qui consiste à promouvoir les migrations légales de manière à répondre aux besoins en main-d’œuvre des pays de destination.12 La conférence de Tripoli, tenue quelques mois plus tard, réunit tous les pays membres de l’UE ainsi que de l’Afrique. Le but est de lancer un dialogue sur les questions de migration entre les deux régions. Le dialogue se veut global, car il touche les problèmes liés à la cohésion sociale, l’intégration économique et le développement. La déclaration adoptée à fin conférence couvre aussi tout l’éventail des questions de migration, notamment légale et illégale, migrations et développement, protection des réfugiés, ainsi que les problématiques plus larges de la paix, de la sécurité et des droits de l’homme. La Conférence adopte enfin le plan d’action d’Ouagadougou visant à combattre la traite des êtres humains, particulièrement celle des femmes et des enfants.13 L’objectif plus large des conférences de Rabat et de Tripoli est de formuler une approche migratoire commune. Le sujet est d’ailleurs également abordé dans le cadre de la PEV, (politique européenne de voisinage), du Forum Euromed et des réunions de haut niveau avec l’Union africaine et des organisations sous-régionales. En fait si la Conférence de Rabat pose les bases du partenariat Europe-Afrique c’est à Tripoli que le partenariat est officialisé au niveau continental. Pour la première fois les préoccupations économiques et sociales sont situées au même rang que celles d’ordre plus ‘sécuritaire’. Dans ce sens, la conférence est une étape importante dans l’élaboration d’une approche véritablement globale. Fin novembre la Commission publie un premier bilan de l’approche globale de la question des migrations.14 Dans ce texte la Commission exprime la nécessité d’approfondir l’approche globale, incluant d’autres domaines d’action, (notamment les mesures relatives aux migrations légales et à l’intégration) et aussi de l’élargir géographiquement, en particulier aux frontières orientales et sud-orientales de l’Union 10. Déclaration de Rabat, 11 juillet 2006. 11. Kabbanji, note 9, p.7. 12. Ibid. 13. MEMO/06/437, « L’UE rencontre tout le continent africain à Tripoli, pour lancer un partenariat sur les migrations et le développement », Bruxelles, 20/11/2006. 14. COM(2006)735 « L’approche globale de la question des migrations un an après : vers une politique globale européenne en matière de migrations » Bruxelles, 30/11/2006. 306 Guia MIGANI « compte tenu des graves problèmes que posent ces routes migratoires ». En même temps, malgré le fait qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une priorité à court terme, il faut aussi commencer à réfléchir à la question des migrations dans les relations avec les pays d’Asie et d’Amérique latine. L’approche globale – la Commission en est convaincue – doit être basée sur trois principes : solidarité entre les Etats membres, partenariat avec les pays tiers, et protection des migrants, tout particulièrement les plus vulnérables (mineurs et femmes). La coopération avec les pays tiers doit être approfondie dans le cadre des partenariats régionaux développés par l’UE : si pour l’Afrique le contexte est défini par la stratégie de l’UE pour l’Afrique (officiellement adoptée en décembre 2005 par le Conseil européen), pour les pays ACP le contexte général est défini par l’Accord de Cotonou, tandis que pour les pays méditerranéens le cadre où approfondir le dialogue est offert par la PEV : « Les questions de migration constituent un élément essentiel de nos plans d'action PEV, de notre dialogue politique et de notre assistance financière pour renforcer la capacité de ces pays de gérer plus efficacement les migrations. »15 Les travaux doivent également être poursuivis dans le contexte d’Euromed, le partenariat euro-méditerranéen. Principale nouveauté avancée par la Commission est la mise en place d’une politique commune en matière d’immigration de main-d’œuvre. Cela répond d’une part aux nécessités économiques des pays européens16 mais elle permet aussi d’ajouter un volet ‘positif’ au dialogue avec les pays d’origine. La Commission réclame donc pour l’Union non seulement les compétences pour développer une politique ‘négative’, de protection des frontières, mais aussi une politique basée sur des mesures incitatives positives. De façon évidente la coopération avec les pays tiers a plus de chances de se réaliser si l’Union peut offrir des conditions d’accueil coordonnées. L’intérêt d’accueillir certains migrants qualifiés est particulièrement souligné et on évoque aussi la possibilité d’établir des « programmes de mobilité » avec les pays partenaires une fois réalisée la coopération en matière d’immigration clandestine et conclus les accords de réadmission. A partir de cette époque la mobilité devient un concept important pour la Commission dans le cadre de la gestion des migrations. Le terme est plus souple, plus fluide, politiquement moins sensible; il évoque un choix non définitif et peut couvrir un large éventail de catégories des personnes, notamment les plus qualifiées qui intéressent tout particulièrement les pays membres. En même temps FRONTEX devrait établir, dans le cadre de la politique des relations extérieures de l’UE des accords techniques permettant de mener des opération conjointes avec les pays tiers concernés et inviter ces derniers à participer aux activités 15. Ibid. p.5. 16. « Le 28 novembre 2006, le Conseil ECOFIN a adopté des conclusions sur les politiques visant à accroître les avantages économiques que l'UE peut retirer de l’immigration. Comme il en est fait état dans le programme d’action relatif à l’immigration légale, et conformément aux objectifs de la stratégie européenne pour l’emploi, l’UE a décidé d’adopter pour les années à venir une approche à deux volets consistant à faciliter l’admission de certaines catégories d’immigrants en fonction des besoins (par exemple, travailleurs hautement qualifiés et travailleurs saisonniers) sans porter préjudice à l'application du principe de la préférence communautaire et à conférer à tous les travailleurs immigrés en situation régulière un statut juridique sûr qui leur soit en outre commun » Ibid. pp.7-8. La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 307 opérationnelles. Le réseau d’Officiers de liaison immigration, présents dans les délégations de l’UE dans les pays tiers, devrait aussi être renforcé. En fait, s’il est vrai que la Commission insiste sur l’importance d’une approche qui prend en compte les facteurs socio-économiques, le retour et la réadmission restent un élément fondamental de la gestion des migrations.17 Cela toutefois doit être fait avec un maximum de coordination : les Etats membres doivent être donc aidés à concevoir et mettre en œuvre des programmes de retour volontaire et des plans de retour forcé même si cela ne doit pas se faire à détriment de l’asile et la protection des réfugiés. Pour promouvoir la solidarité entre Etats membres un financement de 4000 millions d’euros est prévu pour la période 2007-2013 pour le programme cadre « solidarité et gestion des flux migratoires ». Cette somme est repartie entre 4 instruments financiers : le Fonds pour les frontières extérieures (1820 millions), le Fonds pour le retour (676 millions d’euros), le Fonds européen pour les réfugiés (699 millions) et le Fonds d’intégration (825 millions). Les propositions de la Commission sont accueillies plutôt favorablement par le Conseil qui lors de la réunion de décembre 2006 lui demande de faire des propositions sur les mesures à adopter concernant l’application de l’approche globale aux régions bordant l’UE à l’Est et au Sud-est. L’importance politique de ces régions de transit n’a fait qu’augmenter et il devient urgent de développer et mettre en pratique une politique cohérente. Migration et dialogues régionaux A partir de 2007 l’UE s’engage dans une série de dialogues régionaux approfondis, notamment à l’égard de son environnement proche. L’idée est qu’une série de questions ne peuvent être bien gérées qu’au niveau régional. En 2007 la Commission propose une « synergie de la Mer Noire », une région qui depuis l’adhésion de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l’UE touche directement les confins de l’UE. L’ambition de la Commission est que la Synergie de la mer Noire puisse servir de cadre politique global à un ensemble d’activités dans les secteurs clés de l’énergie, des transports, de l’environnement et aussi des mouvements de population. Par ailleurs la Commission élabore des propositions pour réformer la PEV18 et le partenariat euro-méditerranéen.19 En ce qui concerne la PEV, sur le plan régional elle doit servir à développer des coopérations en matière de gestion des frontières et de migration (ainsi que 17. Sur la sécurisation des frontières et FRONTEX, cf. Sarah Léonard, EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securisation through practices, European Security, 19 :2, (2010), pp. 231-254; Thomas Demmelhuber, The EU and illegal migration in the southern Mediterranean: the trap of competing policy concepts, The International Journal of Human Rights, 15 :6, (2011), pp.813-826. 18. COM(2007)774, « Une politique européenne de voisinage forte », Bruxelles, 5/12/2007. 19. COM(2007)598 « Le partenariat euro-méditerranéen : faire progresser la coopération régionale pour soutenir la paix, le progrès et le dialogue interculturel » Bruxelles, 17/10/2007. 308 Guia MIGANI d’énergie). L’espoir est que cette coopération sectorielle approfondie permette de renforcer la confiance au niveau politique, tant au niveau bilatéral entre l’Union et ses voisins qu’au plan régional.20 Une conférence tenue en septembre 2007 réunissant tous les ministres des pays couverts par la PEV et des représentants de la société civile, permet à la Commission de présenter une série d’objectifs rénovés de cette politique.21 Ils concernent notamment le commerce, la mobilité et le règlement des « conflits gelés » dans les pays voisins de l’Union européenne. La Commission souhaite ainsi la conclusion d’accords de libre-échange approfondis et globaux avec les pays partenaires, ainsi que des accords sur la mobilité des populations en échange de l’engagement des pays partenaires à améliorer la lutte contre les migrations clandestines.22 En fait la mise en place de coopérations stratégiques dans la gestion des flux migratoires reste un des buts principaux de la politique de voisinage. Le même type d’approche est appliqué dans le cadre du Partenariat euro-méditerranéen. Ici aussi le pari de l’Union est celui de promouvoir une coopération régionale. A cette fin d’ailleurs une réunion est organisée en novembre 2007 au niveau ministériel pour avoir un débat sur les questions liées à l’immigration.23 Dans ce cas aussi on évoque la possibilité d’établir des partenariats de mobilité ou l’adoption d’initiatives en matière d’immigration circulaire. Les questions économiques commencent donc à faire sentir leur influence sur la gestion des migrations de manière plus importante, mais l’approche européenne reste très prudente : on n’évoque que la possibilité de promouvoir la mobilité ou une migration temporaire en fonction des besoins des pays de destination. Le même effort d’approfondissement du dialogue sur les migrations est fait à l’égard de l’Afrique : la tenue de la conférence au Sommet UE-Afrique en décembre 2007 à Lisbonne, la première depuis sept ans, se termine avec l’adoption de la première stratégie conjointe UE-Afrique.24 La stratégie porte sur huit thématiques d’intérêt commun25 parmi lesquelles il y a la migration, la mobilité et l’emploi. Les huit thématiques sont associées à des plans d’action. La stratégie conjointe est supposée 20. Note du Secrétariat général, 10874/07 du 15/6/2007. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/fr/07/st10/st10874.fr07.pdf, dernier accès le 29/9/2016. 21. COM(2007)774, note 19. 22. Bussière, Migani, note 4, pp.188-192. 23. « Cette réunion ministérielle Euromed sur l'immigration permettra de mettre en avant la valeur ajoutée du cadre de coopération régionale tout en soulignant le besoin de tous les pays partenaires de poursuivre les progrès afin d'atteindre l'objectif stratégique de l'optimisation des avantages sociaux et économiques de l'immigration pour les pays d'origine, de transit et de destination. De nouvelles initiatives de l'UE visant à faciliter la gestion de l'immigration autorisée pourraient être hautement intéressantes pour les pays partenaires, par exemple en ce qui concerne l'accent mis sur l'immigration circulaire ou le concept des partenariats de mobilité » COM(2007)598, note 20, pp. 9-10. 24. COM(2007)337, SEC(2007)856 « Assurer le bon fonctionnement du partenariat stratégique UE- Afrique », Bruxelles, 27/6/2007. 25. (Paix et sécurité, gouvernance démocratique et droits de l’homme, commerce et intégration régionale, les OMD, l’énergie, le changement climatique, la migration la mobilité et l’emploi, la science l’information et l’espace). La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 309 ouvrir une nouvelle période basée sur des relations plus équilibrées entre les deux continents et son ambition est de créer un partenariat qui ne se limite pas aux questions ‘africaines’ mais prenne en compte une série de thématiques globales. La question des migrations reste toutefois un des points essentiels du dialogue eurafricain. Les frontières orientales et sud-orientales de l’Union font l’objet d’une communication particulière, présentée en mai 2007.26 L’impact de l’élargissement de 2004 se fait aussi sentir à ce niveau. La fragilité mais aussi l’importance de ces frontières inquiète : « Un tiers environ de tous les ressortissants de pays tiers vivant dans l’UE sont des citoyens des pays voisins de l’Est ou du Sud-Est ou de la Fédération de Russie » précise le texte de la communication. En même temps l’adhésion de 2004 (mais aussi de 2007) a modifié la base juridique régissant les allers-retours entre les frontières de cette région. Si l’intérêt de migrer dans des pays nouvellement membres de l’UE a augmenté, cela renforce aussi la nécessité de contrôler ces flux. La Commission préconise donc de s’appuyer sur les structures de coopération régionale ainsi que sur les accords de coopération déjà signés pour réguler le transit, décourager la migration illégale et la traite, améliorer la protection des réfugiés. Pour encourager la coopération avec les pays frontaliers, la Commission suggère la conclusion de partenariats pour la mobilité avec des assouplissements des formalités d’octroi des visas. Mais cela reste subordonné à la mise en place d’une coopération effective, et surtout à la conclusion d’accords de réadmission. En ce qui concerne la lutte contre l’immigration illégale, il faut accorder à FRONTEX un rôle plus important, estime la Commission. D’ailleurs les priorités géographiques de l’agence pour 2007 concernent exactement ces régions car elle doit s’engager pour développer la coopération avec la Russie, l’Ukraine, la Moldova, la Géorgie les Balkans occidentaux… A cette fin, ses moyens doivent aussi être augmentés et les Etats membres doivent mettre à disposition des ressources adéquates pour participer, en cas de besoin, aux opérations conjointes de FRONTEX et à l’analyse des risques.27 Enfin la Commission réclame l’adoption d’une approche plus coordonnée pour améliorer la gestion des migrations de main d’œuvre. C’est un point crucial, car sans pouvoir offrir des compensations adéquates, les pays tiers n’ont pas d’intérêt à s’engager dans le contrôle des flux migratoires. D’une part cela peut comporter des coûts non indifférents, de l’autre ils sont évidemment intéressés aux remises de fonds envoyées par les migrants. Le problème est que la migration de la main d’œuvre reste sous le contrôle des gouvernements des Etats membres qui sont réticents à ouvrir leurs listes, ou même à donner plus d’autonomie à la Commission.28 Le processus de coopération régionale s’approfondit ultérieurement en 2008 avec le lancement de l’Union pour la Méditerranée (UPM) et du Partenariat oriental qui doivent renforcer la coopération avec ces régions stratégiques pour les équilibres 26. COM(2007)247, « Application de l’approche globale sur la question des migrations aux régions bordant l’UE à l’Est et au Sud-Est » Bruxelles, 16/5/2007. 27. Ibid. p.16. 28. Voir aussi Alain Morice, Claire Rodier, Les politiques de migration et d’asile de l’Union européenne en Méditerranée, Confluences Méditerranées, 4(2013), n°87, p.117-118. 310 Guia MIGANI européens. Le Partenariat oriental permet de voir comment la question de la mobilité et de la migration est gérée par l’UE dans ses rapports avec les Etats environnants. Le Partenariat oriental avait tout d’abord été proposé par la Pologne et la Suède, soucieuses de préserver l’engagement européen à l’Est, lors du lancement de l’UPM. L’intervention russe en Géorgie en août 2008 précipite les choses. En septembre, lors d’une réunion extraordinaire, le Conseil européen demande que ces travaux soient accélérés afin d’affirmer plus clairement l’engagement de l’Union dans la région, compte tenu du conflit en Géorgie et de ses répercussions plus larges.29 En effet, si la réaction de l’Union à l’égard de la Russie lors de la crise géorgienne reste limitée, il y a en revanche un consensus sur le fait qu’il faut s’engager de manière plus importante dans les régions orientales de l’Europe afin de favoriser la stabilisation et la modernisation de ces pays et d’y contrecarrer l’influence de la Russie. C’est dans cette double optique qu’il faut interpréter l’important soutien européen à la reconstruction de la Géorgie et l’accélération sur le Partenariat oriental. Il s’agit de renforcer l’accompagnement des réformes politiques et économiques visant à rapprocher ces pays des normes et valeurs de l’UE. Ce Partenariat s’adresse en fait à l’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan, le Belarus, la Géorgie, la Moldavie et l’Ukraine. Il est censé intervenir aux niveaux bilatéral et multilatéral. De nouveaux accords d’association créeront un lien politique fort avec l’Union, favoriseront une plus large convergence vers les normes européennes et renforceront la coopération dans les domaines de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune.30 L’objectif de l’Union est donc très ambitieux : créer une Communauté de voisinage qui partage les valeurs et les normes de l’Union européenne, et qui soit aussi un partenaire sur le plan de la politique étrangère, voir même de la politique de la défense. Un des objectifs des accords est l’instauration d’une « zone de libre-échange renforcée et globale » avec chacun des pays partenaires, une fois que ceux-ci auront adhéré à l’OMC. Mais le Partenariat devra aussi encourager ces pays à créer entre eux un réseau de zones de libre-échange. A long terme l’Union européenne et ces pays pourront envisager la création d’une Communauté économique de voisinage s’inspirant de l’Espace économique européen. 31 L’intégration progressive dans l’économie européenne doit motiver les gouvernements à réaliser toute une série de réformes économiques difficiles. Il est toutefois clair que la perspective de l’intégration économique est trop lointaine pour les gouvernements partenaires qui font de la mobilité et la migration un test décisif pour évaluer le soutien européen. Dans ce domaine toutefois les marges de manœuvre de la Commission sont limitées et les gouvernements européens sont réticents à toute concession. La Commission prévoit donc de lier mobilité et sécurité. La mise en place d’une certaine facilitation en matière de visas doit s’accompagner de la mise en œuvre d’accords dans les domaines de la justice et de la lutte contre la corruption. Il est donc clair que les mesures qui intéressent le plus les Etats partenaires n’interviendront que 29. COM (2008) 823, « Partenariat oriental », 3/12/2008, p.2. 30. Ibid., p.4. 31. Sur toute cette partie Bussière, Migani, note 4, p. 212-215. La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 311 progressivement et qu’elles sont subordonnées à la réalisation de réformes essentielles et à une coopération effective dans la lutte contre la migration illégale. La politique des visa, l’ouverture des frontières est évidemment un instrument important des relations extérieures de l’Union européenne, mais la Commission n’a pas une compétence exclusive, loin de là. Les Etats membres restent maitres de l’accueil des étrangers, et la volonté d’accueil des gouvernements n’est que très limitée, à cause des réticences des opinions publiques et ensuite par la crise économique. Mais cela a évidemment des répercussions sur la capacité de l’Union d’agir et d’influencer son environnement proche. Migration et Printemps arabe Si entre 2009 et 2010 le thème des migrations reste important mais ne domine pas le débat public (plutôt concentré sur la crise financière et ses répercussions sur la zone euro), la question s’impose avec le Printemps arabe. Le mécontentement profond des populations arabes envers leurs gouvernements explose en effet au printemps 2011 prenant de court tous les observateurs. Le printemps arabe, une série de révolutions populaires, commence en décembre 2010 en Tunisie pour s’élargir ensuite à l’Egypte, à la Libye, au Bahreïn, au Yémen ainsi qu’à la Syrie. De manière plus générale c’est tout le monde arabe qui est touché par ces manifestations même si leurs conséquences ne sont pas toujours spectaculaires. Bruxelles réagit rapidement à ces évènements et publie le 8 mars 2011 un document élaboré par la Commission en coopération avec la Haute représentante, Catherine Ashton : «Un partenariat pour la démocratie et une prospérité partagée avec le sud de la Méditerranée».32 En fait pour Barroso la question se présente sous deux aspects principaux : d’une part il faut aider les sociétés à accomplir la transition démocratique et leur prouver la solidarité de l’Europe, de l’autre il faut répondre aux inquiétudes de certains Etats membres (l’Italie, Malte, mais aussi la France) face à l’afflux d’immigrés. Certains Etats se trouvent en effet confrontés à un afflux soudain de réfugiés et demandent l’aide de l’Union pour gérer cette urgence humanitaire. Nicolas Sarkozy et Silvio Berlusconi adressent une lettre commune en ce sens à Barroso le 26 avril 2011. Sa réponse ne peut être que celle d’une voie moyenne : il faut éviter « de s’orienter vers une vision sécuritaire, qui pourrait paraitre comme niant les valeurs même sur lesquelles se fonde le projet européen, ni vers une vision trop laxiste de la politique de l’immigration qui susciterait des craintes dans nos opinions publiques quant à leur sécurité ».33 Car cet afflux d’immigrés, qui se couple avec la crise éco- 32. COM(2011)200, « Un partenariat pour la démocratie et une prospérité partagée avec le sud de la Méditerranée » Bruxelles, 8/3/2011. 33. Lettre de J.M. Barroso à N. Sarkozy, Bruxelles, 29/4/2011. 312 Guia MIGANI nomique, fait surgir des craintes au sein des populations européennes et certains gouvernements évoquent la suspension des accords de Schengen. Au-delà de Schengen c’est même un des principes base du Marché commun européen qui est à risque, celui de la libre circulation des personnes. En effet l’Italie qui estimait que l’UE ne lui témoignait pas suffisamment de solidarité face à l’afflux d’environ 28000 personnes sur ses côtes avait décidé unilatéralement d’octroyer aux migrants des titres humanitaires de séjour de 6 mois leur permettant de circuler dans le reste de l’espace Schengen. En réaction la France avait réintroduit des contrôles sur sa frontière avec l’Italie.34 Rapidement Barroso intervient sur ce point : « Schengen fournit les réponses adéquates, basées sur l'esprit européen, à savoir la coopération entre les États membres, la solidarité entre tous et la responsabilité de chacun. Ne nous y trompons pas : ce n'est pas un problème italien ou maltais. C'est un défi européen qui passe par une réponse européenne. Toute autre solution serait un recul collectif. »35 Un mois plus tard, face au Parlement européen, il reprend la question pour insister sur le caractère commun du problème posé par l’afflux massif d’immigrés, ce qui demande plus de solidarité et responsabilité de la part des gouvernements des Etat membres : « When thousands of people arrive on the shores of one country, it is not just because they dream of living in Malta or Lampedusa, it is because they are seeking a better life in Europe. Countries that are more directly exposed to massive migrant inflows cannot be expected to deal with them alone. (…) It is the duty of all countries to support countries under particular pressure at one time or another. This means that burdens have to be shared equitably. (…). Solidarity and responsibility are the key words in our response. Immigration is a European challenge, immigration requires a European response. »36 La nécessité s’impose donc de réformer la gouvernance de Schengen, mais pour renforcer la coordination européenne, pas pour permettre plus d’unilatéralisme. En très peu de temps la Commission sort deux communications consacrées à la question des migrations. La première37 vise à fixer le cadre général d’une politique migratoire commune, tandis que la deuxième38 avance des propositions pour faire face à l’urgence du moment et envisage des mesures à moyen et long terme à l’égard de la région méditerranéenne. Dans sa première communication la Commission tient à réaffirmer la nécessité de la solidarité européenne face à un problème qui voit certains Etats en première ligne, mais qui est loin d’être un problème national. Des mesures à court terme, pour 34. Balleix, note 2. 35. Déclaration du Président J.M. Barroso suite à sa rencontre avec F. Fillon Premier Ministre de la France, Bruxelles, 14/4/2011. 36. J.M. Barroso, “Migration flows and asylum and their impact on Schengen, Strasbourg, European Parliament”, Speech 11/322, 10/5/2011. 37. COM(2011)248, « Communication sur la migration », Bruxelles, 4/5/2011. 38. COM(2011)292, « Un dialogue pour les migrations, la mobilité et la sécurité avec les pays du Sud de la Méditerranée », Bruxelles, 24/5/2011. La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 313 renforcer une gestion efficace des frontières, doivent s’accompagner à des mesures à plus long terme. Dans ce sens les efforts pour bâtir un dialogue avec les pays d’origine et de transit ne doivent pas être abandonnés malgré les difficultés politiques. L’adoption d’un principe de conditionnalité plus explicite, « more for more », doit être appliqué aux questions migratoires pour encourager la coopération des pays d’origine et de transit dans la gestion des flux migratoire, pour renforcer le contrôle de leurs frontières, et pour trouver un accord sur l’établissement de politiques de retour et de réadmission des migrants irréguliers. En même temps la Commission insiste sur les besoins importants de l’Europe en termes de ressources humaines. L’immigration (légale) doit aider l’Europe à faire face à son déclin démographique et à répondre aux besoins de main-d’œuvre dans certains secteurs. Les mesures préconisées par la Commission visent donc à renforcer la capacité d’action de l’Union pour augmenter l’efficacité et la rapidité de la réponse face aux crises, mais aussi pour intervenir directement en cas de crise majeure sur une frontière et ainsi empêcher des réactions nationales désordonnées pouvant mettre à risque le principe de libre circulation des personnes. La Commission insiste aussi sur le fait que l’Union ne peut pas se limiter à l’adoption de mesures ‘négatives’. Pour avoir la coopération des pays tiers il faut s’engager dans des mesures ‘positives’ telle que des assouplissements des régimes de visas. Consciente des réticences des Etats européens la Commission précise que de telles opérations sont subordonnées à la mise en place d’accords préalables, mais la libéralisation en matière de visas reste un instrument important dans les rapports avec les pays tiers. Enfin, toujours dans l’optique d’harmoniser les approches nationales, la Commission revient sur le projet de Régime d’asile européen commun qui sera effectivement mis en place en 2013. Moins de trois semaines après cette communication la Commission présente des propositions concernant les pays du Sud de la Méditerranée. A court et moyen terme il faut garantir que l’UE et les pays méditerranéens développent leurs capacités pour gérer l’afflux de réfugiés notamment en provenance de Libye. En même temps il faut apporter un soutien aux Etats de l’Union et aux pays d’Afrique de Nord qui se trouvent en première ligne pour gérer cet afflux de migrants et de réfugiés. A long terme il faut agir sur les causes profondes des migrations promouvant le développement d’emplois et à travers la conclusion de partenariats pour la mobilité qui doivent permettre une facilitation progressive de la circulation de certaines catégories de personne, en échange de l’adoption de mesures susceptibles de garantir la sécurité de cette circulation.39 En septembre 2011 le programme Erasmus Mundus prolonge cette démarche en donnant la possibilité aux étudiants et au personnel universitaire des possibilités nouvelles de mobilité vers l’Union. Les propositions de la Commission sont entérinées par le Conseil européen lors de sa réunion de juin. Des dialogues sur les migrations, la mobilité et la sécurité sont alors engagés avec la Tunisie et le Maroc, ainsi qu’avec l’Egypte. Un dialogue avec 39. Ibid., p.7-8. 314 Guia MIGANI la Libye est envisagé dès que la situation politique le permettra. En même temps, toutefois, une discussion pour une réforme de la gouvernance de Schengen est lancée. Ce processus se termine en octobre 2013 avec l’adoption d’un nouveau règlement qui élargit les critères de réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières intérieures au cas de difficultés sérieuses et persistantes d’un Etat membre dans le contrôle des frontières extérieures.40 Ce renforcement des possibilités d’actions de la part des Etats membres est toutefois contrebalancé par un rôle plus important de la Commission et du Parlement (notamment dans la gestion du mécanisme automatique d’évaluation de Schengen).41 L’approche globale des migrations et de la mobilité Les réflexions suscitées par la nécessité de gérer l’urgence des flux migratoires en provenance des pays méditerranéens, mais aussi plus en général la mondialisation, l’évolution démographique et la transformation de la société poussent la Commission à réviser l’approche globale de la migration qui avait été formulé en 2005. Lors de la réunion de juin 2011 le Conseil européen avait d’ailleurs invité la Commission à présenter une évaluation de l’approche globale de la gestion des migrations et à s’employer à rendre plus cohérent, systématique et stratégique le cadre politique régissant les relations de l’Union avec les pays tiers concernés. Les réflexions de la Commission se concrétisent dans une communication présentée en novembre 2011 qui propose l’adoption d’une nouvelle approche globale des migrations et de la mobilité (AGMM).42 La Commission estime tout d’abord nécessaire d’améliorer la dimension stratégique et l’efficacité de l’approche globale, en renforçant les liens et la cohérence entre les domaines d’action de l’UE, de même qu’entre les dimensions extérieure et intérieure de ceux-ci. A cet égard il fallait faciliter et valoriser la mobilité – plus que la 40. Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog, Joanna Parkin, EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations ?, MEDPRO Technical Report, N°15, August 2012, pp.7-8. 41. « The permanent Schengen evaluation commission, founded in 1998 and composed of Member State representatives, has been replaced by the Commission and the Council. What was an intergovernmental structure is now managed by EU institutions. Furthermore, the Commission's presence at every stage of the evaluation process, especially in the planning and preparation stages, will, in practice, reduce the role of the Member States in the process. Also, each stage of the evaluation process is subject to legal review by the Court of Justice and political review by the European Parliament and national parliaments. The mechanisms for cooperation that were developed outside the legal framework of the EU, effectively to sideline the Commission, Court and Parliament, have been brought around to the Community approach.” Yves Pascouau, The Schengen Governance Package: the subtle balance between Community method and intergovernmental approach, Discussion paper, EPC, 12/12/2013, p.8. 42. COM(2011)743, « Approche globale de la question des migrations et de la mobilité », Bruxelles, 8/11/2011, p.2. La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 315 migration – des ressortissants de pays tiers. Cela concernait un large éventail de personnes telles que les visiteurs de courte durée, les touristes, étudiants, chercheurs, hommes d’affaires… L’instrument pour réaliser cet objectif est une politique des visas. La politique commune de l’UE en matière de visas pour les séjours de courte durée devait donc être mieux intégrée et coordonnée avec les politiques nationales des Etats membres relatives aux séjours de longue durée et à l’approche globale des migrations. C’est pour cette raison que la Commission propose d’élargir le champ d’application de l’approche globale et d’y ajouter la mobilité. Mais l’approche globale doit être davantage liée et intégrée aux politiques extérieures de l’Union. Celles-ci avaient connu des modifications importantes avec l’entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne et il fallait mieux harmoniser l’approche globale avec la coopération au développement de l’UE par exemple. De même le Service européen pour l’action extérieure devait être mieux intégré dans la gestion de l’approche commune. La Commission souligne comment les dialogues en matière de migrations et de mobilité sont à la base de l’AGMM et doivent être autant que possible basés sur une procédure uniformisée. La migration et la mobilité doivent répondre aux intérêts des pays d’origines mais aussi contribuer à la vitalité et à la compétitivité de l’Union. De ce point de vue il fallait donc améliorer l’efficacité des politiques visant l’intégration des immigrés dans le marché du travail. En effet, la mondialisation croissante du marché du travail pour les personnes hautement qualifiées s’accompagne à une course entre pays pour les récupérer. L’UE doit se situer désormais sur le marché mondial des compétences et attirer les personnes hautement qualifiées.43 De ce point de vue les progrès que l’UE doit faire sont beaucoup en comparaison aux Etats Unis. L’AGMM se focalise donc sur quatre thèmes : l’immigration légale et la mobilité, l’immigration clandestine et la traite des êtres humains, la protection internationale et la politique d’asile, la maximisation de l’impact des migrations et de la mobilité sur le développement. Enfin le programme de Stockholm (qui avait pris la suite de celui de La Haye pour fixer les priorités de l’UE en matière de liberté, sécurité et justice) ayant reconnu que les changements climatiques sont un problème mondial induisant des migrations et des déplacements, l’approche globale doit aussi prendre en compte les migrations ‘environnementales’.44 L’AGMM doit s’appliquer à tous les pays concernés même s’il sera adapté en fonction des particularités des pays tiers ou de la région. L’Union pourra aller plus loin avec les partenaires prêts à négocier des engagements réciproques plus importants. Si toutes les régions sont concernées, la priorité est toutefois accordée aux pays voisins, notamment ceux du sud de la Méditerranée et du Partenariat orientale où la question des migrations et de la mobilité 43. Carmen Gonzalez, Roderick Parkes, Alicia Sorroza, Andreas Ette, The EU performance in the global competition for highly-skilled migrants, Policy papers 75, Notre Europe/Institute Jacques Delors, 26/2/2013. 44. Le Programme de Stockholm (2010-2014) définit 6 grandes priorités : Une Europe des droits; l’Europe de la justice; une Europe de la protection; Accès à l’Europe; L’Europe de la solidarité; L’Europe dans le contexte de la mondialisation. http://www.touteleurope.eu/les-politiques-europeennes/justice-et-affaires-interieures/synthese/l-espace-de-liberte-de-securite-et-de-justice.html, accès du 29/9/2016. 316 Guia MIGANI est étroitement liée à la coopération en matière politique, économique, sociale et de sécurité et où les dialogues se déroulent à la fois au niveau régional et bilatéral. Le but de l’AGMM, à l’égard des pays environnants, est la conclusion de partenariats solides et étroits fondés sur des intérêts communs et ouvrant la voie à une intégration régionale plus poussée.45 En ce qui concerne les dialogues sur les migrations qui ont une portée géographique plus large, la priorité doit être accordée au partenariat stratégique UE-Afrique. Enfin il faudra approfondir le dialogue sur les migrations et la mobilité avec les grandes économies mondiales ou régionales telle que l’Inde, la Chine mais aussi le Nigéria ou l’Afrique du sud. Quant au dialogue avec les pays industrialisés il continuera à porter sur les échanges d’informations, sur les priorités et stratégies communes en matière de gouvernance mondiale des migrations et de la mobilité.46 D’un point de vue pratique l’UE négociera avec chaque pays concerné un Partenariat pour la mobilité. Celui-ci doit garantir que la migration et la mobilité apportent des résultats bénéfiques à la fois à l’Union et aux pays partenaires; le partenariat doit donc être façonné en fonction des préoccupations et des intérêts communs du pays concerné et de l’Union. En même temps il doit reposer sur une certaine forme de conditionnalité analogue au principe « more for more ». Alternativement l’UE proposera un programme commun pour les migrations et la mobilité. Cette solution permettrait d’instaurer une coopération approfondie mais pas au même niveau du Partenariat pour la mobilité. En 2013 la tenue du deuxième Dialogue à Haut niveau sur les migrations et le développement est l’occasion de reprendre l’approche globale sous l’angle du développement.47 Toutefois la capacité de la Commission de définir et mettre en pratique une approche ‘positive’ à l’égard des migrations reste fortement limitée. La Commission cherche en fait à promouvoir une véritable gouvernance des migrations et de la mobilité qui devrait permettre de combattre l’immigration clandestine et la traite des êtres humains, tout en organisant l’immigration légale suivant les possibilités offertes par le marché européen du travail. Pour la Commission cette stratégie doit s’accompagner d’une promotion de la protection internationale et du renforcement de la politique d’asile. Mais ces options sont difficiles à mettre en œuvre : elles sont conditionnées par une coopération entre pays qui reste insuffisante, tandis que s’impose la gestion de l’urgence humanitaire. Par ailleurs une telle politique est critiquée pour avoir été adoptée sans une véritable consultation des pays partenaires de l’Europe. Le fait que la question des migrations reste de compétence de la DG Affaires internes, plutôt que du Haut Représentant aux relations extérieures assure la prépondérance des questions sécuritaires sur les autres thèmes. Une telle approche correspond certainement aux préoccupations des Etats membres, mais elle limite la capacité de l’Union à négocier les Partenariats pour la mobilité avec les pays tiers. Ces derniers 45. COM(2011)743, note 43, p.9. 46. Ibid. p.10. 47. COM(2013)292 « Maximiser l’effet positif des migrations sur le développement », 21/5/2013. La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 317 sont en fait très peu motivés à s’engager dans la gestion et le contrôle des flux migratoires en absence de contreparties sérieuses. Egalement ils n’ont pas vraiment d’intérêt à signer des accords de réadmission sans contreparties. Ainsi si l’Union veut impliquer les pays tiers dans la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière, elle doit en payer le prix.48 L’Union doit donc non seulement s’engager financièrement pour encourager les pays tiers à améliorer le contrôle de leurs frontières, mais aussi offrir des contreparties en matière de facilitation des visas. Mais de ce point de vue les compétences de l’UE sont limitées, comme rappelé à plusieurs reprises auparavant : chaque Etat reste compétent pour l’admission d’étrangers dans son territoire et pour définir ses besoins en termes de ressources humains. La crise économique a évidemment encore tendu la situation amenant les gouvernements à limiter ultérieurement les possibilités d’une immigration légale, avec l’exception partielle des travailleurs hautement qualifiés. Conclusions En 2014, à conclusion du mandat de la 2ème Commission Barroso, la politique migratoire consiste donc de trois grands blocs49 : le premier bloc, qui s’est très largement développé, concerne la gestion des frontières extérieures, la politique des visas et la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière. Le deuxième bloc qui a connu un développement et une harmonisation assez importante dans les dernières années est celui de l’asile et de la protection internationale, notamment avec l’adoption en 2013 du Régime d’asile européen commun. Celui-ci offre en effet une procédure unique aux demandeurs d’asile et un statut uniforme aux personnes protégées.50 Le troisième bloc qui concerne l’immigration légale et la définition des règles d’entrée et de séjour légaux sur le territoire de l’Union reste le domaine le moins développé, les Etats membres faisant résistance pour garder leurs prérogatives. Par ailleurs le Royaume- Uni, l’Irlande et le Danemark bénéficient de clauses dérogatoires leur permettant de choisir dans certaines limites de participer ou non aux différents éléments de la politique migratoire commune. La Commission Barroso a donc certainement joué un rôle important, compte tenu du contexte international, dans la mise en place d’une politique migratoire extérieure commune. En même temps elle a cherché d’assurer un meilleur équilibre entre la dimension intérieure et extérieure de la question : entre la nécessité d’assurer plus de solidarité et responsabilité parmi les Etats membres, et en externe entre l’UE et les pays tiers. 48. Balleix, note 2. 49. Giorgio Garbasso, Immigration et asile dans l’UE : quelles réponses aux défis actuels?, Synthèse, Notre Europe/Institut Jacques Delors, 30/7/2014, p.1. 50. Corinne Balleix, Contrôles aux frontières et droit d’asile : quel nouveau cap pour l’UE?, Policy paper 114, 19/6/2014, Notre Europe/Institut Jacques Delors, p.11. 318 Guia MIGANI Le choix d’intervenir le plus loin possible des côtes européennes afin d’empêcher au maximum l’accès des migrants aux territoires des Etats membres facilite la question du partage entre Etats membres du fardeau de l’accueil de ces migrants et demandeurs d’asile, dans la mesure où ils arriveront en moindre nombre aux frontières européennes : « De fait, l’externalisation accrue de la politique migratoire européenne permettrait d’éviter des querelles entre Etats membres sur le partage des charges liées aux migrants, et d’éloigner les tentations de rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières intérieures de l’espace Schengen. »51 Cela s’est encore accentué après le drame de Lampedusa en 2013. Cependant il est évident que cette externalisation de la politique migratoire de l’UE se fait à détriment des droits fondamentaux des migrants pris en charge dans des pays qui n’ont pas les mêmes standards et procédures de reconnaissance du droit d’asile de l’Union européenne. Pour pallier à ce problème, l’UE envisage de renforcer la coopération dans les pays tiers dans le domaine du développement et dans celui de l’asile. Mais il s’agit d’un chantier qui vient tout juste d’être lancé et dont le succès reste conditionné aux financements que l’UE pourra apporter, ce qui en période de rigueur budgétaire risque d’être limité. La Commission a essayé d’équilibrer cette approche sécuritaire de la question des migrations par une meilleure prise en considération de ses effets sociaux et économiques. Toute la réflexion sur migration et développement lui a servi justement pour argumenter en faveur d’une approche véritablement globale. Sur un plan plus large une approche seulement sécuritaire ne contribue pas à promouvoir l’attractivité de l’Union. En effet, si on prend le cas du monde arabe, comme le souligne Florence Gaub, les personnes les plus qualifiées émigrent aux Etats-Unis et non dans l’UE.52 En même temps la Commission a soutenu une plus importante implication du Service des relations extérieures et de la Haute représentante pour renforcer une évaluation plus équilibrée des questions touchant la migration. Mais ces efforts n’ont pas obtenu beaucoup de résultats. Et cela a des conséquences sur la politique étrangère de l’Union : « l’absence d’une politique migratoire européenne cohérente a un fort impact sur l’action extérieure de l’UE, neutralisant en fait les ambitions extérieures de l’UE en termes de politique et de stratégie migratoires. Afin d’exercer une compétence à l’extérieur, l’UE doit l’avoir exercée en interne; cela n’étant pas le cas actuellement, la Commission ne dispose pas d’un mandat pour négocier des accords migratoires avec des pays tiers, ce pouvoir restant du ressort des États membres. »53 La recherche d’une meilleure cohérence entre aspects intérieurs et extérieurs des politiques européennes reste donc encore d’actualité presque dix ans après le Sommet informel d’Hampton Court qui en avait fait une priorité. 51. Balleix, note 2. 52. Chiara Rosselli, A la recherche d’une stratégie migratoire européenne ambitieuse, Synthèse, Notre Europe/Institut Jacques Delors, 29/8/2013, p.3. 53. Ibid. p.3. La Commission Barroso et le défi de la migration 319 Authors Giulia Bentivoglio is research fellow at the Department of Political Science, Law, and International Studies of the University of Padua. Her research focuses on British foreign policy in the twentieth century. Marcel Berlinghoff is member of the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) at Osnabrück University. He currently works on historical migration research, refugee and forced migration studies and privacy in the digital age. Cristina Blanco Sío-López (PhD EUI) is European Commission Expert at the EU Research Executive Agency (REA), EUI Vibeke Sørensen Fellow, EUI Ambassador, Associate Researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History of the New University of Lisbon, Principal Investigator and Established Researcher R3 at the Royal Elcano Institute. Elena Calandri is associate professor of History of International Relations at the University of Padua. Alice Cunha has a PhD in Contemporary History (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2013) and has been a researcher at the Instituto de História Contemporânea and post-doctoral fellow at the same University since 2014. She has participated in various research projects and is the author of several national and international publications, all related to Portugal and European integration. Her research interests include enlargement studies, Europeanization and the history of European integration. Yves Denéchère is full professor of Transnational Contemporary History, Childhood and Gender Studies. He published a research on the role played by French women in the construction of Europe and the first history of international adoption in France. Paweł Jaworski is professor in Contemporary History at the University of Wrocław, Poland. He has published widely on Polish-Scandinavian relations in the 20th century. Sławomir Łukasiewicz, Hab. PhD, historian, Europeanist. Since October 2015, director of the Institute of European Studies, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Canon Law and Administration. Historian of the Historical Research Bureau at the Lublin branch of the Institute of National Remembrance, 2011-2015 coordinator of a research programme on Polish political exile 1939(45)-1990. Willem Maas, Jean Monnet Chair, Associate Professor of Political Science, Public & International Affairs, Social & Political Thought, and Socio-Legal Studies, and Chair of the Department of Political Science, Glendon College, York University, Toronto, Canada. 321 Guia Migani is Associate Professor at the François Rabelais University (Tours). She has published many articles on the relations between Europe and Africa, decolonisation , the cold war and the development aid. Her last book, written with E. Bussière is Les Années Barroso (Paris, 2014). Simone Paoli is research fellow at the Department of Political Science, Law, and International Studies of the University of Padua and Professor of History and Political Science at the International Studies Institute in Florence. Dimitris Parsanoglou holds a PhD in Sociology and he is a Senior Researcher at the Department of Social Policy at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens. He was Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of the Peloponnese. Yvette Santos est Docteure et chercheure en Histoire Contemporaine de l’Instituto de História Contemporânea – Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas-UNL. Beatrice Scutaru is Marie Curie Fellow at the University of Padua, Department of Political Science, Law and International studies. Jacek Tebinka is professor at University of Gdańsk (Chair of Contemporary History). He is author of books on: British policy towards Polish-Soviet Border 1939-1945 (Polityka brytyjska wobec problemu granicy polsko-radzieckiej 1939-1945, Warszawa 1998), Anglo-Polish relations 1956-1970 (Nadzieje i rozczarowania. Polityka Wielkiej Brytanii wobec Polski 1956-1970, Warszawa 2005) and Polish diplomacy during the Cold War (Uzależnienie czy suwerenność? Odwilż październikowa w dyplomacji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej 1956-1961, Warszawa 2010). Moshik Temkin is associate professor of History and Public Policy at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He is the author of The Sacco-Vanzetti Affair: America on Trial (Yale University Press, 2011). His next book, Undesirables: Control, Surveillance, and the Rise and Fall of Global Activism, is forthcoming from Harvard University Press. Giota Tourgeli is a PhD Candidate at the University of the Peloponnese, Greece. Her PhD research deals with “Migration and transformations of sending communities; Greek-Americans and the Peloponnese; economic, cultural remittances and social capital”. Antonio Varsori is full professor of History of International Relations at the University of Padua. Roberto Ventresca received his PhD in Contemporary History from the University of Padua in December 2015. He graduated both at the University of Bologna and at the University of Paris 7 – Denis Diderot. He was Visiting Research Student at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2014. 322 Authors

Abstract

Movement of people has been a key feature in the whole history of European integration. While existing literature has mostly adopted national viewpoints and a socioeconomic perspective, this book integrates these existing fragmented analyses, views them from a broader perspective and places them in the wider context of the social and demographic transformation of Europe and the political and economic narrative of continental integration. It highlights the impact made by EC/EU immigration policies on the external political and economic relations of Europe and acknowledges that pre-1989 migration from East European countries is part of European integration. By showing that migration policies and their impact on European national societies and economies cannot be fully understood without taking into account the EC framework, this book, therefore, contributes to migration studies as a whole.

Zusammenfassung

Migration war immer ein wichtiger Aspekt der Geschichte der europäischen Integration. Die bestehende Literatur hat dieses Thema hauptsächlich von einer nationalen und sozioökonomischen Perspektive betrachtet. Dieses Buch jedoch integriert solche fragmentierten Analysen, betrachtet sie aus einem weiteren Blickwinkel und ordnet sie im breiteren Zusammenhang des sozialen und demografischen Wandels Europas sowie der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Geschichte der europäischen Integration ein.

Das Buch untersucht die Auswirkungen der EU-Migrationspolitik auf die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Außenbeziehungen Europas und erkennt die Migration aus osteuropäischen Ländern vor 1989 als Teil der europäischen Integration an.

Indem das Buch zeigt, dass die Migrationspolitik und ihr Einfluss auf europäische Gesellschaften nur im Zusammenhang der EU-Rahmenbedingungen vollständig verstanden werden können, trägt es wesentlich zur Migrationsforschung im Allgemeinen bei.

Mit Beiträgen von:

Giulia Bentivoglio, Marcel Berlinghoff, Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Elena Calandri, Alice Cunha, Yves Denéchère, Pawel Jaworski, Slawomir Lukasiewicz, Willem Maas, Guia Migani, Simone Paoli, Dimitris Parsanoglou, Yvette Santos, Beatrice Scutaru, Jacek Tebinka, Moshik Temkin, Giota Tourgeli und Roberto Ventresca.

References

Abstract

Movement of people has been a key feature in the whole history of European integration. While existing literature has mostly adopted national viewpoints and a socioeconomic perspective, this book integrates these existing fragmented analyses, views them from a broader perspective and places them in the wider context of the social and demographic transformation of Europe and the political and economic narrative of continental integration. It highlights the impact made by EC/EU immigration policies on the external political and economic relations of Europe and acknowledges that pre-1989 migration from East European countries is part of European integration. By showing that migration policies and their impact on European national societies and economies cannot be fully understood without taking into account the EC framework, this book, therefore, contributes to migration studies as a whole.

Zusammenfassung

Migration war immer ein wichtiger Aspekt der Geschichte der europäischen Integration. Die bestehende Literatur hat dieses Thema hauptsächlich von einer nationalen und sozioökonomischen Perspektive betrachtet. Dieses Buch jedoch integriert solche fragmentierten Analysen, betrachtet sie aus einem weiteren Blickwinkel und ordnet sie im breiteren Zusammenhang des sozialen und demografischen Wandels Europas sowie der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Geschichte der europäischen Integration ein.

Das Buch untersucht die Auswirkungen der EU-Migrationspolitik auf die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Außenbeziehungen Europas und erkennt die Migration aus osteuropäischen Ländern vor 1989 als Teil der europäischen Integration an.

Indem das Buch zeigt, dass die Migrationspolitik und ihr Einfluss auf europäische Gesellschaften nur im Zusammenhang der EU-Rahmenbedingungen vollständig verstanden werden können, trägt es wesentlich zur Migrationsforschung im Allgemeinen bei.

Mit Beiträgen von:

Giulia Bentivoglio, Marcel Berlinghoff, Cristina Blanco Sío-López, Elena Calandri, Alice Cunha, Yves Denéchère, Pawel Jaworski, Slawomir Lukasiewicz, Willem Maas, Guia Migani, Simone Paoli, Dimitris Parsanoglou, Yvette Santos, Beatrice Scutaru, Jacek Tebinka, Moshik Temkin, Giota Tourgeli und Roberto Ventresca.