Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Oscar Mazzoleni (Ed.)

Political Populism

A Handbook

1. Edition 2017, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-2534-2, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-7149-1,

Series: International Studies on Populism, vol. 3

Bibliographic information
Nomos H ei ni sc h | H ol tz -B ac ha M az zo le ni [e ds .] Political Populism Po lit ic al P op ul is m 3 Heinisch | Holtz-Bacha | Mazzoleni [eds.] International Studies on Populism | 3 A Handbook ISBN 978-3-8487-2534-2 All over Europe, we are currently witnessing populist political parties and figures enjoying success in elections and mobilising the electorate against the supposed elite. The most recent example of this political development is the Brexit campaign in the UK, which demonstrated that populists can exert considerable influence over political decisions. Populist parties are also enjoying election successes outside Europe; this phenomenon has been occurring in the US and Latin America for a long time, for example. The new Handbook offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical introduction to populist politics in Europe, the Americas and beyond. It focuses on explaining the phenomenon of populism as a consequence of the crisis of the representational system and aims to highlight the controversies and limits of current academic research and debate on the subject. The editors: Reinhard Heinisch is Professor of Austrian Politics in Comparative European Perspective and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Salzburg, Austria. Christina Holtz-Bacha is Professor in Communication at Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen- Nürnberg, Germany. Oscar Mazzoleni is Professor at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, and Director of the Research Observatory for Regional Politics. With contributions from: Tjitske Akkerman, Wolfgang Aschauer, Hans-Georg Betz, María Esperanza Casullo, Paula Diehl, Sarah C. Dingler, Flavia Freidenberg, Sergiu Gherghina, Vlastimil Havlík, Kirk A. Hawkins, Reinhard Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Robert A. Huber, Gilles Ivaldi, Benjamin Krämer, Maria Elisabetta Lanzone, Zoe Lefkofridi, Dietmar Loch, Vanessa Marent, Miroslav Mareš, Alfio Mastropaolo, Oscar Mazzoleni, Sergiu Miscoiu, Teun Pauwels, Franca Roncarolo, Saskia Pauline Ruth, Carlo Ruzza, Steven Saxonberg, Christian H. Schimpf, Damir Skenderovic, Sorina Soare, Lone Sorensen and Sandra Vergari. BUC_Holtz-Bacha_2534-2.indd 1 04.10.17 09:26 International Studies on Populism herausgegeben von / edited by Prof. M.A. Ph.D. Reinhard C. Heinisch, Universität Salzburg Prof. Dr. Christina Holtz-Bacha, Friedrich-Alexander- Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg Prof. Dr. Oscar Mazzoleni, Universität Lausanne Wissenschaftlicher Beirat / Scientific Advisory Board: Daniele Albertazzi (Birmingham), Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Santiago), Sarah L. de Lange (Amsterdam), Steven Saxonberg (Praha), Ph.D., Emilie van Haute (Bruxelles), Donatella Campus (Bologna), Steven Wolinetz (Newfoundland) Band / Volume 3 BUT_Holtz-Bacha_2534-2.indd 2 29.09.17 13:07 2.Auflage A Handbook Political Populism Nomos Reinhard C. Heinisch | Christina Holtz-Bacha Oscar Mazzoleni [eds.] BUT_Holtz-Bacha_2534-2.indd 3 29.09.17 13:07 The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at ISBN 978-3-8487-2534-2 (Print) 978-3-8452-7149-1 (ePDF) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-3-8487-2534-2 (Print) 978-3-8452-7149-1 (ePDF) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Heinisch, Reinhard C. / Holtz-Bacha, Christina / Mazzoleni, Oscar Political Populism A Handbook Reinhard C. Heinisch / Christina Holtz-Bacha / Oscar Mazzoleni (eds.) 438 p. Includes bibliographic references. ISBN 978-3-8487-2534-2 (Print) 978-3-8452-7149-1 (ePDF) 1st Edition 2017 © Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2017. Printed and bound in Germany. This work is subject to copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to “Verwertungs gesellschaft Wort”, Munich. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Nomos or the editors. BUT_Holtz-Bacha_2534-2.indd 4 29.09.17 13:07 Preface Reinhard Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha, and Oscar Mazzoleni This handbook is part of a series of works devoted to the study of political populism published by Nomos in cooperation with Bloomsbury. The three editors of this volume also share overall responsibility for the entire series and view this new handbook as a conceptual introduction to the different topics related to populism featured in this programme. We opted specifically for the title ‘political populism’ to demarcate the subject matter of this handbook from literature devoted to the study of cultural manifestations of populism, including popular religious beliefs. Thus, many of the concepts, issues and empirical cases analysed in this work should be viewed as calls for further research and, more broadly, an invitation to engage in scholarship on populism as it relates to political actors, political mobilisation, political institutions, as well as political discourse and style. A project of this magnitude and range necessitated the collaboration of scholars from different disciplines—most notably political scientists, scholars of communication, historians and sociologists. In all cases, the authors were asked to bear the following points in mind when approaching their respective contributions: 1) The authors were expected to use their own expertise and judgement to identify the pivotal issues, controversies and new directions in their respective areas of scholarship. Thus, contributors had considerable freedom to present their particular approaches. However, they were also asked to reflect on the core idea that populism can be conceived as a response to a crisis of conventional politics or, more precisely, a crisis of legitimacy that established institutions, mainstream political actors and the business of politics as usual have encountered. 2) Due to the diversity of disciplines and research traditions involved, it was clear that the handbook would not present a uniform conceptualisation of and perspective on populism. Instead, the fundamental purpose of a handbook such as this was to introduce readers to a range of ideas. However, all contributors were expected to focus on current debates, discuss the dominant approach and most prominent conceptualisation, and present shortcomings and criticisms. While this handbook included chapters coming from different disciplines, it mainly focuses on core aspects in political science and in communication sciences. These are arguably two disciplines whose insights into the study of political populism are central to understanding the phenomenon and whose respective works most complement one another. Scholars in political science are keenly aware that media and communication play an outsize role in the process of understanding populism’s appeal and impact, but political scientists often lack the analytical tools to examine populism’s dimensions in terms of communication. By the same token, much of the rapidly increasing political science literature on populism still remains to have an impact on communication and media studies. Although we are aware that these subfields are often divided as a consequence of increasing specialisation in the social sciences in general, we think that it is nevertheless necessary for scholars in different fields to also talk to each other and 5 draw on each other’s ideas. Thus, one of the aims of this book was to foster a closer relationship between these two strands of scholarship. Another goal of this handbook was to focus both on empirical scholarship and current issues. As such, we did not want to present populism as a settled concept, but instead wanted to show the tension between different approaches and also present the controversies and new directions that characterise activity in this research community. At the same time, we hoped to prevent the handbook from becoming too eclectic and also avoid the often-heard lament that populism is an inscrutable concept. As a result, the authors of this volume discuss several of the most widely used conceptualisations at present but also highlight their respective shortcomings. Within this context, we also introduce a conceptually novel approach designed to address crucial problems within existing ideas and propose a way to bridge divisions between the current frameworks. The Challenges and Opportunities of Populism Research Scholarship on populism has made substantial progress and is, according to Mudde (2016), poised to move into a new, fourth wave of populism research. After mostly historical and descriptive work from 1945 to the 1980s, which was focused on the historical continuity, the 1990s saw an infusion of social science theories in the study of populism. Subsequently after 2000 scholars began to focus on supply-side aspects of radical right-wing populist politics and more clearly on the populist party, its organisation, operation and membership. As far as contemporary research is concerned, Mudde encourages new work to go beyond the narrow themes and policy issues, such as immigration, that have often characterised publications on populism and embrace the phenomenon in its entire complexity, especially when presented in manifestations and located in areas that have, thus far, been under researched. The enormous attention populism now receives in the media, among the public and within the social science community presents scholars of populism with numerous opportunities but also new pitfalls. As research on populism has moved from the margins to the scientific mainstream, it has become easier to secure project funding and present relevant research in public fora. At the same time, the term populism is almost universally employed to describe a large number of different political phenomena, political actors, policy decisions and regimes that often have little more in common than the label alone. The surge of populism has also increased the pressure on social scientists to come up with clear and easily communicable answers that satisfy the curiosity of people trying to understand the political changes unfolding from the Americas to Europe and beyond. The renewed interest in populism is drawing in new scholars who have not been part of this previously close-knit research community, whose members have been used to labouring in the margins of social science networks. This development is hugely welcome as it incorporates fresh perspectives and new insights. However, it also means that several ideas about populism that were once believed to be settled are now being called into question once again, renewing the impression that little has been learned thus far. At the same time, other scholars, for whom the question of conceptualisation is indeed settled, have embarked on the next phase of scholarship by no longer treating populism as an outsider or protest phenomenon but as one that Preface 6 has become mainstream in the sense that it has taken hold in the centres of political power. As a result, several scholars are increasingly engaging in the study of the impact of populism on government, party systems and policy-making (see, for example, Akkerman et al. 2016, Wolinetz and Zaslove 2017). Despite the clearly global nature of political populism at the present time, research communities are still fairly segregated and remain reluctant to take issue with each other’s approaches or draw on each other’s insights and conceptualisations. For a long time, the Western European research community all but ignored decades’ worth of works on Latin American populism, although recently scholars have begun to work more comparatively (see, for example, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). These different ways of approaching the subject matter were also rooted in different research cultures and epistemologies. In fact, even within the European context, it is desirable, to achieve a more successful integration of the scholarship on populism in Western Europe, the Nordic countries, Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, and the Mediterranean. An even bigger challenge has been the effort to overcome disciplinary boundaries, such as those that exist between political science, history, sociology and communication. It is with these challenges and opportunities in mind that we approached the design of this handbook. It is intended to present a snapshot of social science scholarship on populism, which is both on the verge of embarking on new research agendas and is in need of greater transdisciplinary and international cooperation. Our Objectives By their nature, handbooks seek to be as comprehensive as possible. While we agree that such a work needs to reflect a substantial number of different issues and geographic areas, selectivity and focus also matter: First of all, a handbook is not an encyclopaedia but should rather point to those areas of research and discussions in the field that are most promising or most controversial. Thus, we have asked our authors to show why their respective topics matter within the overall debate and to identify the major controversies in their areas of research. Our contributors were also invited to demonstrate directions of progress and suggest where scholarship in their different areas might turn next. This was important as we also conceived this handbook to be something according to which scholars just entering the populism research field could orient themselves. Second, the book is subdivided into three parts and 24 chapters covering in Part I the foundation and conceptualisation of populism, in Part II populist manifestations in Europe and the Americas and in Part III emerging conceptual challenges and new research agendas. Throughout the handbook, the focus is placed on empirical research, and thus the conceptualisations and theoretical accounts introduced in the first part are intended to provide the tools for empirical analysis either for cross-national comparisons or individual case studies in the subsequent chapters. Third, the handbook is selective not only in its concentration on theory and empirical application but also in its focus on contemporary expressions of the phenomenon. Thus, party-based populism in Europe in its various aspects forms the core of the analysis, but there are also ex- Preface 7 tensive sections devoted to populism in the Americas and other novel manifestations of populism. Fourth, an important editorial decision was made to cultivate a deliberate focus on communication and to bridge scholarship between communication and political science. Following the rise of populist parties in Western Europe and the Nordic countries, communication researchers have only recently taken up the topic. This coincided with the emergence of the Internet and social media networks, which provide political actors with direct access to the electorate, thus shaking up the political communication process and the role of the traditional mass media. To stress the interconnected nature of political science and communication in understanding populism, the book does not have separate parts devoted to these two fields but presents the different types of analysis alongside each other in the same conceptual context. We, the editors, hope that the readers of this handbook will take away a deeper understanding of the complexities and challenges of research on populism. We also believe that they will appreciate our intention not to convey definitive answers but rather to maintain a degree of openness towards different theoretical approaches that are each elaborated with their respective strengths and weaknesses. We believe that it is not for us, the editors, but rather the readers to decide for themselves which ideas seem most persuasive and, thus, for a new generation of researchers to determine what frameworks to employ and avenues of enquiry to pursue. We hope that this handbook will make a significant contribution to this process. Preface 8 Acknowledgements A handbook is, by definition, a collaborative endeavour and we, the editors, want to thank the many contributing authors for their dedication and commitment to the project. Apart from the editors and authors, there are many other individuals without whom this project would not have come to fruition. We are especially indebted to Vanessa Marent, a doctoral fellow at the University of Salzburg, for corresponding with the authors and managing the texts during their various stages of development and review. We want to thank Christina Anderer, Fabian Habersack and Markus Schwaiger from the University of Salzburg and Maxime Bottel from the University of Lausanne for their assistance with final editing. We must also acknowledge the generous financial support we received from the University of Lausanne to assist with index development, translation and language editing. We also wish to thank our many colleagues whose counsel and helpful comments on various chapters have helped improve them and have enriched this handbook’s content. 9 Table of Contents Preface ....................................................................................................... 5 Acknowledgements ....................................................................................... 9 List of Figures .............................................................................................. 15 List of Tables ............................................................................................... 17 Introduction ................................................................................................ 19 PART I: Defining and Analysing the Concept POPULISM: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT ...............................CHAPTER 1: 41 Damir Skenderovic POPULISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION ........................CHAPTER 2: 59 Alfio Mastropaolo CONCEPTUALISING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULISM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT .................................................... CHAPTER 3: 73 Dietmar Loch THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ....CHAPTER 4: 87 Carlo Ruzza ANALYSING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM: BRINGING FRAME, ACTOR AND CONTEXT BACK IN ............................................ CHAPTER 5: 105 Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni MEASURING POPULISM: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES ........................................................................ CHAPTER 6: 123 Teun Pauwels POPULISM IN COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, EVIDENCE ................................................................. CHAPTER 7: 137 Lone Sorensen 11 PART II: Assessing the Success of Populist Actors in Europe and in the Americas Europe ELECTORAL BASIS OF POPULIST PARTIES ................................CHAPTER 8: 157 Gilles Ivaldi POPULIST PARTIES IN POWER AND THEIR IMPACT ON LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES IN WESTERN EUROPE ....................... CHAPTER 9: 169 Tjitske Akkerman SOCIOCULTURAL LEGACIES IN POST-TRANSITION SOCIETIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE RESURGENCE OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM AND POPULISM IN THE REGION ........................ CHAPTER 10: 181 Vlastimil Havlík and Miroslav Mareš HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? AN OVERVIEW OF POPULIST PARTIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE ......... CHAPTER 11: 193 Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina Soare ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE: EXAMPLES FROM AUSTRIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC .......... CHAPTER 12: 209 Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg NEW POPULISM ....................................................................CHAPTER 13: 227 Maria Elisabetta Lanzone The Americas CONTEMPORARY POPULISM IN THE UNITED STATES ..............CHAPTER 14: 241 Sandra Vergari POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA ............................................................................. CHAPTER 15: 255 Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins POPULIST AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS .................................................. CHAPTER 16: 275 María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg Table of Contents 12 PART III: Emerging Challenges and New Research Agendas POPULIST PARTIES OF LATIN AMERICA: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA AND ECUADOR ................................................. CHAPTER 17: 293 María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg SOCIETAL MALAISE IN TURBULENT TIMES: INTRODUCING A NEW EXPLANATORY FACTOR FOR POPULISM FROM A CROSS- NATIONAL EUROPE-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ................................. CHAPTER 18: 307 Wolfgang Aschauer POPULISM AND DEMOCRACY—THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................... CHAPTER 19: 329 Robert A. Huber and Christian H. Schimpf THE GENDER DIMENSION OF POPULISM ...............................CHAPTER 20: 345 Sarah C. Dingler, Zoe Lefkofridi and Vanessa Marent THE BODY IN POPULISM ........................................................CHAPTER 21: 361 Paula Diehl POPULISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA ............................................CHAPTER 22: 373 Hans-Georg Betz MEDIA POLITICS AND POPULISM AS A MOBILISATION RESOURCE ............................................................................ CHAPTER 23: 391 Franca Roncarolo POPULIST AND NON-POPULIST MEDIA: THEIR PARADOXICAL ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFUSION OF A RIGHT- WING IDEOLOGY .................................................................. CHAPTER 24: 405 Benjamin Krämer NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ....................................................................... 421 INDEX ....................................................................................................... 429 Table of Contents 13 List of Figures Figure 11.1: Best Electoral Results in Parliamentary Elections ............................ 199 Figure 11.2: The Number of Legislative Terms (1990-2016) ............................... 201 Figure 15.1: The Impact of Populism on Formal Representation ......................... 264 Figure 15.2: The Impact of Populism on Descriptive Representation .................... 266 Figure 15.3: The Impact of Populism on Substantive Representation .................... 267 Figure 18.1: The Macro-micro-macro Explanation Scheme for Populism in Europe .................................................................................. 308 Figure 18.2: A Typology of Six European Regions Based on the Varieties of Capitalism Approach and Welfare State Research ..................................... 313 Figure 18.3: Factor Analysis Confirming Concept of Societal Well-being (Based on Total EU Sample, 2012) ............................................................ 316 Figure 18.4: Trust in Society, 2006 and 2012 (Northern and Western Europe) ........ 318 Figure 18.5: Trust in Social Relations, 2006 and 2012 (Northern and Western Europe) ................................................................................. 319 Figure 18.6: Trust in Society, 2006 and 2012 (Eastern and Southern Europe) ......... 319 Figure 18.7: Trust in Social Relations, 2006 and 2012 (Eastern and Southern Europe) ................................................................................ 320 Figure 19.1: Democracy Scores Compared—Austria (1990–2012) ....................... 337 Figure 19.2: Democracy Scores Compared—Hungary (1990–2012) ..................... 338 Figure 19.3: Democracy Scores Compared—Slovakia (1990–2012) ..................... 339 Figure 19.4: Democracy Scores Compared—Venezuela (1990–2012) .................... 339 Figure 23.1: Media Coverage and Citizens’ Attitude Towards Anti-elitist and/or Exclusionary Messages ............................................................. 397 Figure 23.2: Populistic Communication Style as a Mobilisation Resource During Campaigning and Governing ...................................................... 400 15 List of Tables Table 5.1: Overview of the Principal Definitions and Conceptualisation ............. 117 Table 5.2: Overview of the Application of Frame Analysis to Empirical Research (Example) .............................................................................. 119 Table 6.1: Overview of the Different Methods of Measuring Populism ............... 128 Table 6.2: Four Measurements of Populism among German Parties (2002-2013) ........................................................................... 130 Table 9.1: Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Office ................................. 172 Table 11.1: A Comparison between Several Features of Populist Discourse in Central and Eastern Europe ............................................................ 198 Table 12.1a: Elections for the Austrian National Parliament (Lower House) ........... 214 Table 12.1b: Elections for the Czech National Parliament (Lower House) .............. 215 Table 12.2: Factor Analysis1 of Social Liberalism for the Czech Republic ............. 219 Table 12.3: Cronbach Alpha Test of Reliability for Austria ............................... 219 Table 12.4: Logistic Models for the Czech Republic, Voting for ANO1 ................ 221 Table 12.5: Logistic Models for Austria, Voting for Team Stronach .................... 222 Table 15.1: Sample of Latin American Presidents ............................................ 269 Table 16.1: Populist and Programmatic Models of Party Institutionalisation in Latin America ......................................................................... 285 Table 17.1: Populist Parties of Latin America: The Cases of Alianza País and Peronism ..................................................................................... 301 Table 18.1: Operationalisation of Macro Indicators ........................................ 312 Table 18.2: Overview of operationalisation of restrictions on living conditions ...... 314 Table 18.3: Operationalisation of societal perceptions of crisis with ESS indicators ...................................................................................... 315 Table 18.4: Evaluation of cross-national equivalence (fit indices based on MGCFA) ............................................................................... 317 17 Table 18.5: Results of the multilevel analysis to explain societal malaise in the European Union ...................................................................... 322 Table 19.1: Summary of Effects .................................................................. 335 List of Tables 18 Introduction Reinhard Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha, and Oscar Mazzoleni Living in a Populist Era From Brexit and the presidency of Donald Trump to elections in Poland, Spain and Austria, from referenda in Greece, Switzerland and Italy to radical political change in the Philippines, international headlines point to one common factor: populism. It is a term that has become synonymous both with the rejection of unpopular out-of-touch elites and the descent of politics into demagoguery and irrational discourse. Along with a similar emphasis in other publications, The Washington Post called 2016 ‘the year of populism’1. The large and growing number of scholarly publications devoted to this phenomenon attests that this is not just media hyperbole. As a research area, the study of populism has long since moved from the margins to the centre of attention in the community of researchers. The growth and spread of populism, along with associated developments, have been nothing short of stunning. In the elections for the European Parliament in 2014, right-wing populist and Eurosceptic parties made significant gains in 21 of the 28 EU member states, winning between about 20 and 28 per cent of the vote in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Major referenda in Switzerland, the UK and Italy have favoured populist opposition movements, representing a resounding rejection of the political mainstream. There are now no longer countries that can be considered ‘safe’ from populism and populist parties. Whereas previously Germany was thought to be relatively immune to far right populism because of its history, and the UK was thought to have a barrier against resurgent third parties in the form of its first-past-the-post electoral system, these expectations clearly no longer apply. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) had been making strong gains in the recent elections and was poised to enter the German parliament as these lines were written. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was not only the major force behind the Brexit vote, in which the tepid Remain campaign was ultimately overcome, but they have ambitions to succeed Labour as the country’s second major party. Even the Nordic countries—often admired for their efficient and transparent political systems, corruption-free governments, and extensive welfare states that have protected their populations from the effects of globalisation—have each developed formidable populist parties. In Denmark and Norway, these parties have either already entered public office or supported conservative governments. Southern Europe, which had long been bypassed by the populist wave, has in recent years seen the emergence of new left-wing populist protest parties in Greece and Spain. In Italy, two different populist parties, one older —the Northern League (LN) —and one newer—the Five Star Movement—are competing with each other. Although the main causes of populist protest in Europe are often seen as related to the impacts of globalisation, fears of a European superstate eroding national sovereignty or public corrup- 1 Adam Taylor, ‘The global wave of populism that turned 2016 upside down,’ The Washington Post, 19 December 2016. 19 tion, one struggles to explain how two of Europe’s most prosperous and, by reputation, wellgoverned countries, Switzerland and Norway, which are not even members of the European Union, each have their own right-wing populist party. Populism is not only attributed to a complex set of factors and conditions, but it is also not limited to the far right or the far left. In fact, it can be found in different parts of the political spectrum. In Eastern Europe and elsewhere, we have seen business tycoons enter the electoral arena with personalised parties and promises of radical change but who fit neither left-wing nor right-wing political models. The Czech billionaire Andrej Babiš and his newly founded party ANO 2011, which achieved almost 18 per cent of the vote in their first parliamentary election in 2011, is probably the best example within the EU. The year 2016 also reminded us that populism is not limited to Europe but is indeed a global phenomenon, as reflected in the elections of Donald Trump and the new Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, in addition to the various populist regimes in Latin America, most notably in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The growing success of populists points to the wholesale repudiation of conventional politics and the political establishment in many democracies. This attests to a fundamental crisis of representation by existing political institutions and representatives. In a sense, we are witnessing the breakdown of established political distinctions and the reconfiguration of fault lines, as a result of which previous conceptions of left and right are difficult to maintain. The campaigns of Donald Trump and various right-wing European populists, such as the French National Front (FN), have disseminated mixed messages that echo leftist positions in their rejection of free trade, liberal markets, and economic integration, while at the same time campaigning on religious, ethno-nationalist, racist, and authoritarian ideas typically championed by the far right. Populists have injected emotion, spectacle, and demagoguery into politics to an extent unprecedented in the West since the end of the Second World War. These political changes are bolstered by a rapidly transforming media and communication environment in which established institutions are losing control over information and its distribution. What critics consider to be the echo chambers of social media and the ability of populists to gain unfiltered access not only to their activist base but much larger receptive audiences have been clearly on display in recent elections and referendum campaigns. Fake news accounts, calculated provocations, manufactured outrage and false claims were factors in elections in 2016. For example, in both the US and Austria, the candidates running for office had to fend off internet campaigns claiming they were suffering from fatal diseases. A bizarre conspiracy theory circulated through social media that Hillary Clinton was supposedly running a child pornography ring out of a suburban Washington pizzeria. The story was pushed by someone associated with the Trump camp and even led to a shootout between the police and a disturbed individual who took the story to be true. ‘Post-truth’ politics, declared by Oxford Dictionaries’ 2016 Word of the Year, has been particularly associated with events like the Brexit campaign and the 2016 presidential election in the US. In these and other cases, the principal problem has not only been the patently untrue nature of the populists’ claims and blatant demagoguery but frequently the denial by populist politicians and activists that a common factual basis even exists. As a result, on issues ranging from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and economic predictions about the consequences of Brexit to climate science and US intelligence briefings on Russian interference in the US elections, experts whose findings conflicted with ideological assumptions and popular claims found them- Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni 20 selves derided or under attack. In a televised debate during the Brexit campaign, the UK’s Secretary of State for Justice Michael Gove famously stated that ‘people in this country have had enough of experts,’2 while falsely claiming that Britain was sending £350 million (€408 million) to the EU every week.3 Populism in its various manifestations represents a rejection of societal and political elites. The central argument in this book is that political populism is largely a response to a fundamental crisis of legitimacy of political institutions and actors. However, as will become clear, the underlying explanations neither have singular causes nor are they simple. Moreover, not every form of protest nor every electoral success of a far left or far right party is attributable to populism. In fact, one can make problematic oversimplifications when all manners of unconventional or unexpected political events and developments are subsumed under the label of ‘populism’. There are two dangers one has to guard against in particular here: First, the term populism may refer to entirely different frames of reference that need to be distinguished. For example, a conservative Bavarian politician choosing colourful language and emotive expressions to connect with ‘ordinary’ voters in his home district may be engaging in populist style or rhetoric. Likewise, a Green Party billboard campaign using provocative imagery and exaggerated claims against the dangers posed by TTIP may be employing a populist strategy. Yet, in neither case are the political actors and their respective parties ‘populist’ in an ideational sense, which is the way populism is understood by many authors in this handbook. By ideational populism, we mean the construction of a dichotomy comprising, on the one hand, an amorphous people, generally seen to be virtuous and hardworking and, on the other hand, a sinister elite or out-group whose interests and actions pose harm. Populists claim that the sovereignty of the people is subverted and betrayed by the elites, who are often depicted as conspiring with outside agents. In their campaigns, populists typically promise radical change and a return to some idealised previous state of the community in which people will feel protected and to which they have an emotional connection. The other major danger when working with the concept of populism is to mistake all ideologically motivated protest for populism. People rejecting the EU or ‘Washington politics,’ or politicians invoking Islamophobia, racist ideas, and appeals to traditionalism may in fact be Eurosceptics, right-wing conservatives or far right radicals but not populists. Being populist implies a degree of ambivalence and opportunism in the interest of maximising votes, which is less common among hard right-wing parties more beholden to political principle and programmatic ideology. An example of such adaptation, with the intent of maximising voter support and abandoning previously held ideological positions, was undertaken by the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), arguably one of the oldest and most successful populist parties in Europe. It has transformed itself over the past 20 years from a pro-European, anti-clerical, anti- Semitic, German-nationalist, economically liberal, middle-class party into a Eurosceptic, Austro-patriotic, pro-Israeli but anti-Islamic, economically protectionist body that appeals especially to blue-collar voters and presents itself as the defender of European Christendom. 2 Henry Mance, ‘Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove’, Financial Times, 3 June 2016, content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c (accessed 12 December 2016). 3 Sam Ashworth-Hayes, ‘Why Vote Leave’s use of £350m figure is a lie’, InFacts, 27 May 2016, ote-leave-lying-saying-send-eu-350-million-week/ (accessed 12 December 2016); ‘EU referendum: The claims that won it for Brexit, fact checked’, The Telegraph, 29 June 2016, ferendum-fact-checking-the-big-claims1/ (accessed 12 December 2016). Introduction 21 Surveying the Phenomenon: Precursors and Regional Variation Nearly as ubiquitous as articles and commentaries on populism is the assertion that it is a contested concept and difficult to define. Accordingly, populism is believed to have a complicated history and to be closely connected to various belief systems. In relation to this, Damir Skenderovic discusses the etymology and history of the term in Chapter 1, and Dietmar Loch writes about ‘Conceptualising the Relationship between Populism and the Radical Right’ in Chapter 3, where he discusses the party families to which radical right-wing populist parties belong. His contribution also focuses on their core agenda of advocating nativist protectionism in a globalised world. Indeed, in the field of populism research there have been numerous conceptualisations, which are themselves derived from several fundamental approaches that differ, as has already been mentioned, in their ideas on whether populism is primarily ideational, discursive, stylistic, or strategic in nature. While the details of this debate, along with a more nuanced conceptualisation, will be discussed throughout this book, it is important to understand that these differences in approach have much to do with the way populism has been concretely experienced in distinct historical, political and social contexts. The variation in the way populism has been perceived at different stages and in different locations has shaped how it is understood by the public and also by scholars. This applies as much to the use of the term ‘populism’ and its political connotations as it does to its scientific classification as a social phenomenon. Therefore, before we tackle the question of defining and conceptualising populism, we need to undertake an initial survey of the phenomenon, briefly tracing its evolution and geographic spread as a complement to how populism will be covered in this handbook. Origins When populism surfaced as a broader trend in Western Europe some three decades ago, it was initially perceived as a new phenomenon despite political precursors such as Qualunquismo in Italy in the 1940s and Poujadism in France in the 1950s. In the Americas, by comparison, populism has had a long tradition and rather different ideological associations. The term populism is inseparably linked to the word populus—the people—from which it partly derives its meaning. It is also closely connected to the adjective ‘popular’, with which its shares an operative logic. Populists must first and foremost remain popular to maintain credibility and legitimacy. Like the Populares, pre-imperial Roman senators who stood in opposition to the Optimates, the senatorial aristocracy, populists may be politically self-serving, but they need to be perceived as serving above all the interests of ordinary people. Similarly to ancient Rome, where these populist senators were associated with the plebs, the unsophisticated ‘common folk’, the populists of today tend to find their voters especially among the ranks of blue-collar workers, those without university level education, and people from small towns and rural areas. Although it is easy to observe and even measure the sections of the population that support populism, the ‘people,’ as evoked in populist rhetoric and imagery, are often vague and ill-defined. ‘What people?’ Alfio Mastropaolo asks in Chapter 2 on populist representation, since populism often chooses to be purposefully ambivalent about the people it wants to represent. Throughout its history, populism has been associated both with class divi- Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni 22 sions and a centre-periphery dialectic. Its provenance is the ‘heartland,’ a euphemism for the hinterland, where people feel imposed upon by far-off elites in the central cities. The etymology of the term populism in Anglo-Saxon and Western European usage, as Damir Skenderovic suggests in Chapter 1, is closely associated with the history of populism in the US, which arguably began with the ‘Jacksonian revolution’. In the early part of the nineteenth century, Andrew Jackson styled himself as the advocate of the yeoman farmers, the simple homesteaders, and frontiersmen, whose support carried the outsider Jackson into the presidency. His followers had lost patience with the policies and posturing of the coastal elites and wanted to wrest power away from big business and the Jeffersonian ‘aristocracy’ in office in Washington. Nativism and Rural Populism: The United States and Elsewhere From early on, American populism has also been strongly connected with nativism, which was vividly on display in Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric and is a common feature of populist parties’ discourse from Austria to Bolivia. As Hans-Georg Betz writes in Chapter 22, nativism contains strands of nationalism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and racism, and has been predominantly centred around demands to protect domestic labour against competition from migrant workers. In extreme cases, it is directed against every kind of immigrant and even refuses to recognise native-born minorities. American populism has frequently mobilised the native population against especially poor immigrants, such as the Irish and, later, Jews, Eastern Europeans and Italians, as well as, more recently, Latin Americans and Asians. Both early and more contemporary forms of populism in the US succeeded in connecting common sensibilities to big political ideas to suggest a new direction for the country. The populism that in the contemporary US of Donald Trump finds expression in the wall on the border to Mexico or the ‘tearing up’ of free trade agreements and the associated order of liberal internationalism, was expressed in Jackson’s time through the idea of a free land grab, supported by ‘manifest destiny,’ running all the way to the Pacific coast. Not unlike Trump’s supporters, who relish the idea of ‘draining the swamp’ in Washington, the Jacksonians also wanted to curb the power of the central state in favour of greater local control. The urban modernisation propagated by American business and supported politically by the Whigs remained anathema to Jackson and his support base (Benson 1961; Decker 2000: 139). In the end, Jackson, who was a polarising figure like Trump and sought to communicate with people directly in a straightforward manner, reshaped America by expanding the power of the presidency and turning the nationalism of southwestern frontiersman into the central ideational framework that has defined the country ever since. Whereas the founding fathers appeared to be more like accidental revolutionaries who otherwise resembled English country gentlemen and were treated in popular narratives as an exalted and saintly group, the heroes in Jacksonian and post- Jacksonian America were different: the new mythology celebrated rugged individualism and the ‘common man’ doing uncommon things. It is this radical break with the elites and the positioning of the common person at the centre of America’s story that makes Jackson the precursor to populism in the US, as the man who laid the foundations of its positive future image. Following the Civil War, the US underwent yet another period of tumultuous societal and economic change to which—not unlike today—the established political system failed to respond Introduction 23 adequately. The increasing concentration of economic wealth, the growing power of industry, the economic decline of rural populations, especially in the South and the enormous influx of immigrants crowding into urban areas led to the formation of political movements that embraced a common man ethos. Often these movements were strongly xenophobic and, especially in the South, overtly racist. In urban and industrial areas, similar pressures resulted in the emergence of radical leftist political currents with syndicalist and anarchist tendencies. Common to both was the idea that simple hardworking people were threatened by a conspiracy of powerful elites and their economic interests. These elites were said to have betrayed the foundational ideals of the US, which is reminiscent of Donald Trump’s theme that America needs to be taken ‘back’ to an earlier, better place. The idea of conspiracies and backroom deal-making by unaccountable insiders permeates populist discourse the world over. It is this very notion that, in the eyes of populists, has given representative democracy a bad name as it is often associated with trading off general interests for special interests and, thus, making undue compromises and engaging in deception behind the people’s back. Frustrations with the political order in the US culminated in the foundation of the Populist Party (1892–6), which sought to establish itself as a third force in politics. The central figure at the time was William Jennings Bryan (1860–1925), an advocate of small-scale farmers against big industry. Ultimately, the Populist Party did not survive the political embrace by the Democrats, who offered Bryan the opportunity to run as their joint presidential candidate in 1986 and 1900. However, the memory of the Jacksonian revolution, the Populist Party and the Progressive Era that followed these phenomena has given populism a more positive image in the US—even President Obama referred to himself at one point as a populist— than it attracts in other countries, where populists generally reject the label. Although populism in the US has largely remained a third-party phenomenon, such as in the case of Henry Agard Wallace and Ross Perot, who ran for the presidency as third-party candidates in 1948 (Wallace) and 1992 as well as 1996 (Perot) respectively, the Republican Donald Trump is undoubtedly the most important political figure in recent history to be widely labelled as a populist. His ascent to the White House shows, as Chapter 14 by Sandra Vergari explains, how an established party was taken over by what was once thought to be an outsider phenomenon. If we take populism to be a rural answer to capitalist modernisation and industrialisation, as has been suggested by the historian John B. Allcock (1971), then the Russian Narodniki also deserve a mention, who, as approximate contemporaries of the American populists, organised themselves in traditional village communities in the pursuit of an idealised, simple rural life. However, the futility of the Russian populists’ efforts to change society persuaded other radicals to pursue another direction. For the Marxists, it was not the rural villagers but the industrial proletariat who was to become the agent of transformation. Presidentialism and Social Mobilisation: Latin American Populism Whereas in Europe, the United States and Russia, populism remained at the margins of politics for a long time, it has often been at the centre of political change in Latin American history. In fact, when Europeans began grappling with what they considered to be a novel phenomenon, Latin America was already moving from its second wave of populism, also known as neo-lib- Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni 24 eral populism, to a third associated with the leftist regimes of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. Latin America’s presidentialised political systems have been far more receptive to personalities and leader figures who purport to be the saviours of the people than the parliamentary and party-based systems that prevail in Western Europe. Representing a tradition going back to the colourful strongmen or caudillos in the nineteenth century, these figures have shown disdain for established and often corrupt elites, styling themselves as men of action on behalf of ordinary people. María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg show in their Chapters (16 and 17) how in the twentieth century spurts of modernisation resulted in political mass mobilisation. However, under conditions in which the political institutions were insufficiently developed, such movements could often not be channelled in order to implement the necessary political changes. As a result, charismatic leaders, like the Argentine president Juan Perón, sought to bypass traditional politics and institutions by turning directly to the masses to push for political reforms. Whenever economic developments brought about popular mobilisation that could no longer be absorbed and directed by the existing political system, a new wave of populist leaders rose to prominence such as Juan and Eva Perón, Carlos Menem and Néstor and Cristina (Fernández de) Kirchner in Argentina, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Lázaro Cárdenas and Andrés M. López Obrador in Mexico, as well as Juan Velasco Alvarado, Alberto Fujimori and Alan García in Peru. In recent decades, Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, among others, have become the leading exponents of leftist populism. What this latest group of populist politicians share with their predecessors is the presentation of themselves as charismatic agents of change who want to deliver, especially for poorer people, the kinds of political achievements the previous system could not. Right-wing and left-wing populists the world over now share a disdain for liberal internationalism and globalisation in favour of national autonomy. The claim of being able to deliver for the poorer strata of Latin American society rests on the argument that populism has boosted the representation of the lower classes in the institutions of governments, thus creating a more inclusive and also more democratic model of society. Chapter 15 by Saskia Ruth and Kirk Hawkins tackles this question, and they find that indeed populism does better in terms of descriptive representation, such as in the inclusion of ethnic minorities, than other forms of representation. The Western European Populist Right: From Protest Politics to Migration and Identity In Western Europe, populism resurfaced in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of political protest. In 1972, the former Danish lawyer Mogens Glistrup founded the Progress Party [Fremskrittspartiet] to protest against his country’s high taxes. Its enormous popularity soon made his party the second largest in Denmark and spawned a sister party in Norway. Whereas taxes and an overbearing (welfare) state were fuelling sentiments of protest in Scandinavia, excessive forms of insider politics and partitocrazia were stoking the anger of citizens in parts of continental Europe, such as Austria, France, and Italy. The perception that mainstream parties had a monopoly on power, were engaging in extensive clientelism, and were often implicated in high-profile cases of political corruption prepared the ground for political outsiders and new bodies to take on the political establishment. The FN in France and the FPÖ are two early Introduction 25 examples. In other instances, populist parties sprang up in the context of secessionist protests against ‘corrupt’ or ‘non-responsive’ national governments, such as the Flemish Block (VB) in Belgium and the LN in Italy. Protests against the erosion of national sovereignty through accession to the European Union was another factor in the rise of populist protest, as exemplified by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), an early champion of the anti-European cause, which led several referendum campaigns that contributed to keep Switzerland outside the EU. Another motivating factor for anti-European populists in the richer Western European and Nordic member states was the accession to the EU of poor countries from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, given that this required significant subsidies from the wealthier members and caused substantial labour migration across Europe. Initially, Western European populism came to be associated with ‘charismatic’ leadership because of its manifestations in France, Italy and Austria: three of the earliest cases of radical right-wing populism in Europe had individuals like Jean-Marie Le Pen, Umberto Bossi and Jörg Haider who represented a departure from traditional politicians. While the term charismatic has been subject to much debate in populism research (cf. McDonnell 2015), these leaders were clearly politicians of a new type. Using hyperbole and sharply polarising messages, breaking regularly with political conventions and understanding their audience’s desire to be entertained and enthralled by political spectacle, all three party leaders created political templates for other parties to follow. However, as European political systems are—with the notable exception of France—party-based, European populist formations were less beholden to the success and duration of the leadership of single individuals than the more presidentialised and personalised political systems elsewhere. As a result, party-based populism was able to pass power on from one generation of leaders to the next, as long as the new leaders were able to follow the same winning formulas (Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016). As the populist parties mutated from middle-class protest parties into parties for voters who felt threatened by modernisation and internationalisation, especially men with lower levels of education in traditional and non-professional occupations, populists adapted their agenda accordingly. The fact that radical right-wing populist parties were less dogmatic than other far right bodies, which were more attached to their ideological principles, was an advantage in the electoral marketplace. The current strength of populist parties in Europe raises the question of its electoral basis, which is examined by Gilles Ivaldi in Chapter 8, which probes the motivations of voters in supporting such formations. The politics of identity, anti-immigration positions, Euroscepticism, the criticism of globalisation and free trade, as well as law and order became fixtures in the programmes of nearly all populist parties across the continent (cf. Minkenberg 2001; Mudde 2007: 158–98; Van Spanje 2010; but: Rooduijn et al. 2014). The European financial and economic crisis only deepened these sentiments. However, no agenda has been more important to populists in recent years than the issue of refugees, migration, security, and also Islam, which has resonated across Europe but has been especially salient in Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, and Norway (see, for example, Marzouki et al. 2016). As stated earlier, a country long considered ‘safe’ from populism was the United Kingdom, since it was thought to be not only too liberal for nativism, but its first-past-the-post election system was viewed as an effective curb on the power of third parties. Nonetheless, strong anti- European sentiments and different rules in European elections contributed to the success of Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni 26 UKIP, which subsequently entered the European Parliament and used it as a platform for attacking the EU and its policies (Ford et al. 2012; Tournier-Sol 2015). The party’s leader and principal spokesman Nigel Farage became a household name who, along with much of the right-wing and conservative media, as well as the large Eurosceptic wing of a bitterly divided Conservative Party, gradually prepared the ground for Brexit. In a closely contested referendum in 2016, which by all accounts was influenced by misinformation, exaggerated claims and bitter recriminations, the Leave campaign prevailed. As these lines are being written, Europe is headed into a period of great uncertainty brought about by populism in its different manifestations. How Brexit is to unfold remains as unclear as the policies towards Europe that will be pursued by the new Trump administration. With elections in France, Germany, the Netherlands and subsequently Italy— Eurosceptic and populist parties are expected to do well in all of them—the political consequences of the populist phenomenon can hardly be overstated. As 2016 drew to a close, only the presidential elections in Austria did not result in a populist victory after the largely expected triumph of the right-wing populist candidate of the FPÖ, Norbert Hofer, was averted. However, this ‘defeat’ of the FPÖ candidate still delivered over 46 per cent of the votes to Hofer, representing arguably the biggest triumph for a rightwing populist party in a national election anywhere in Western Europe up until 2016.4 The most recent transformation of populism in Western Europe is its increasing role in public office either by supporting minority governments or entering government office outright. However, government participation always exposes populist parties to mainstreaming and potential change. The complex effects of this step on the parties themselves and on policy are examined in Chapter 9 on ‘Populist Parties in Power and Their Impact on Liberal Democracies in Western Europe’ by Tjitske Akkerman. Nonetheless, the clearly defined pattern of populist outsider opposition versus insider mainstream government may be breaking down as a result of these developments, something that has already happened in Eastern European countries. Identity Politics in Post-transition Societies: Populism in Central and Eastern Europe In Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Balkans, populism, as discussed by Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu, and Sorina Soare in Chapter 11, seems to be ubiquitous. In these regions, it is not merely an oppositional phenomenon, as is mostly the case in Western Europe, but appears to be an attribute of the major parties and even some governments. Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary are most often associated with it and each have competing groups with similarly radical right-wing and populist programmes. However, the chameleonlike nature of far right and populist parties (Taggart 2000), along with the fluid character of the political systems across the region, also makes it more difficult to identify and classify political actors as being clearly populist. As a result, there has been much debate about whether political leaders like the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz should be labelled as populist or simply conservative nationalist. The same can be said of the various Polish governments controlled by the Law and Justice party (PiS). In Chapter 10, Vlastimil Havlík and Miroslav Mareš discuss sociocultural legacies in post-transition societies and the 4 Jean-Marie Le Pen also achieved impressive success by making it into the second round of the 2002 French presidential elections. However, in the final count he received ‘only’ 17.8 per cent of the total vote. Introduction 27 emergence of a ‘crowded’ world of populist politics’, (Heinisch 2008: 29) in which populist actors need to differentiate themselves from each other by adopting a variety of positions. An essential difference to populism in Western Europe is the fact that all parties in post-communist societies stand in some relation to the previous regime or the transition and its effects. This forms a subtext in which populist agenda items such as anti-capitalism, anti-Western rants and ethnocultural identity politics (for example, the Slavophile devotion to Russia, as is the case for the Ataka party in Bulgaria) on the one hand and anti-communism on the other take on a different meaning compared to Western Europe, where such past experiences are absent. A history of distrust of the state and its officials, a long tradition of insider politics, and rampant corruption all reward political outsiders who appear decisive and promise to deliver change. Instead of appealing to liberal political traditions and the new democracy—a system more often viewed as flawed than is the case in Western Europe—, appeals to ‘the nation’ or ‘the people’ and its destiny as a grand historical project are the more common approach and also provide an emotional glue that connects populist leaders and their supporters. Whereas Western European populists want to recover a supposedly purer version of the political system —hence, slogans such as taking the country back to its truer form and promoting forms of direct democracy—, Eastern European populists often aim to take the country in a new direction based on some claim of historical destiny (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). This is because most countries in the area cannot connect to a previous system as they were (parts of) communist, fascist or imperial states. Moreover, many Western populist parties have descended from libertarian economic and antidirigiste roots, which often leads to contradictory policy positions when protectionism, welfare chauvinism, and anti-globalisation rhetoric is mixed with liberal economic positions and criticism of regulations. In Central and Eastern Europe, radical populism seems to have ceded this liberal economic agenda to the mainstream parties, which, in response, have also begun mobilising their supporters around protectionism and identity. The fact that Central and Eastern Europe has long been dominated by outside empires and only became fully independent after the end of the Cold War makes these countries especially wary of external influences. At the same time, their integration into the Western economic system, along with their transformation and modernisation, has brought to the surface repressed or dormant sociocultural divisions that can be readily exploited by new political parties. Thus, fears of outside domination, unresolved ethnic conflicts and competing claims of victimhood can be easily used for political gain (Heinisch 2017). Another factor in the surge of populism in Central and Eastern Europe is the generally low level of political trust citizens place in domestic elites. This has contributed to a political environment in which anti-establishment parties have flourished more than in Western Europe. As a result, established parties have also moved to embrace populist, ethnocratic, and authoritarian positions in an effort to avoid being associated with liberal internationalism or to be seen as standing up to Brussels and Western member states. Finally, national populism in the Balkans adds another aspect to the mix in that ethnicity is often not a question of language or custom but of religion and religious denominations. In this context, the formal adherence of often secular populations to religions is used by political actors to construct conceptions of ‘good people’ worthy of protection against its enemies and unwanted outsiders. Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni 28 Protest Movements and Mediterranean Populism The social roots and repertories of populist actions may be understood as variations of protest movements, as Carlo Ruzza suggests in Chapter 4. Also, from this point of view, contemporary populism in the Mediterranean countries of Greece and Spain appears to have similarities to manifestations of populism in Latin America, as they share some ideological traits in their leftist ideological orientation and the ways in which they take issue with liberal internationalism and global capitalism. This Southern European form of populism strongly favours national autonomy in economic decision-making, pursues a redistributive agenda and rejects the interference of European and global institutions and international corporations in national policymaking. Its rather recent emergence is clearly linked to the economic and financial crisis in Europe, but it is also a consequence of the decline of domestic party systems, especially of the traditional left, which has seen its support erode (in Spain) or plummet (in Greece). Leftist Mediterranean populism is not only the most recent addition to the populist ‘family’ in Europe, but it is also distinct in its emergence out of protest movements. The Italian Five Star Movement [Movimento 5 Stelle] is also descended from a protest movement and is a populist party founded and led by the comedian Beppe Grillo. It shares a strong disdain for the country’s economic dependence on European institutions with Greek and Spanish leftist populism and thus rejects outside interference in domestic affairs, especially in formulating economic policy. The strength of Grillo’s movement is also a reflection of the low credibility of Italian political institutions and parties. As such, the Five Star Movement (M5S) mobilises its supporters against national and European elites, which it considers to be corrupt and incompetent. From the beginning, it has been difficult to pinpoint the party’s ideological orientation as it does not fully fit the profile of either a right-wing or left-wing party. However, Grillo’s party often comes across as being on the right, and it has also formed a loose alliance with other right-wing populist parties in the European Parliament. In Chapter 13, titled ‘New Populism’, Maria Elisabetta Lanzone analyses new populist parties in detail, such as Syriza, Podemos, and M5S, which have emerged from social movements and protest groups. Variation in the Manifestation and Perception of Populism This short overview of the different manifestations of populism helps to explain why understandings of populism in the European and American traditions have been different. This has also influenced debates in scholarship about whether populism should be seen as a style, strategy, discourse, ideology, frame, or related concept (Weyland 2001; Madrid 2006; Roberts 2006; Subramanian 2007; Madrid 2008; Stanley 2008; Barr 2009; Hawkins 2010; Jansen 2011; Aslanidis 2015). However, the variability of populism also means that in relatively stable party systems, new populist parties can suddenly appear and thrive, as Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg show in their Chapter 12 on a novel phenomenon which they consider to be a centrist form of populism. In fact, populist actors may neither be clearly right-wing nor left-wing but instead position themselves as centrist change agents. In their account, titled ‘Entrepreneurial Populism and the Radical Centre’, Heinisch and Saxonberg empirically examine two such cases in Austria and the Czech Republic. What is puzzling here is that the electorate supports business- Introduction 29 people and their personalised parties but often exhibits social and economic policy preferences that run counter to the programmatic pronouncements of the entrepreneurial populist leaders. The chapter also shows some of the difficulty of fitting centrist populism within the larger dichotomous framework defined by radical leftists or rightist populists and mainstream centrists. Notwithstanding the recent election of Donald Trump, who may not really fit the mould of the centrist business tycoon turned populist, the American business leader and erstwhile third-party candidate, Ross Perot, is a better example of what one might call the radical centre, which has, in part, affected the perception of populism in North America. As a result of North America’s inherent egalitarianism, and concomitant strong anti-elitist bias, a certain degree of populism, especially during political campaigning, is not only always tolerated but even welcome as an antidote to elitism. Consequently, populism has come to be regarded in the US as more of a style, strategy, or ethos designed to reach ordinary people, appeal to commonly held beliefs, and convey anti-Washington sentiments. But it has rarely been seen as an ideology in itself. In Latin America, where there has been a long tradition of popular strongmen promising political change and where personalised presidential political systems have dominated, populism is often seen to express itself through the rhetoric leaders employ to reach the people (Weyland 2001; Madrid 2008; Hawkins 2009; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). Populism has also been regarded as a discourse designed to attract and channel the sentiments of politically orphaned classes or societal groups mobilised by economic modernisation (Filc 2010). This notion of discursive populism also seems to fit well with the perception of populism in Eastern Europe (Minkenberg 2010). Charismatic figures, either those already in government or in opposition, employ discursive strategies designed to appeal to voters through appeals to nativism and nationalist narratives. Both the Latin American and Eastern European models suggest that populism occurs along a continuum where political actors engage to varying extents in making populist claims. In Western Europe, where typically one populist outsider party confronts the entire political mainstream, the perception of populism is more black and white. Accordingly, the conceptualisation of populism that has emerged in Western European scholarship takes a dichotomous approach, viewing populists as being clearly distinct from mainstream parties. Because ideologies and programmes are central to political parties, European scholarship has understood populism not only as a style or mode of discourse but, crucially, also as a (thin) ideology, pitting the (virtuous) people against sinister elites and outsiders (Norris 2005; Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2008; Mudde 2007; Art 2011; Berezin 2013). Another influential factor in the European academic reception of populism was that in major research communities, such as those in the UK, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and Germany, attention was paid to populist parties of the right rather than the left. As a result, there was initially a significant debate in academic literature on the topic as to what extent these new parties were in fact populist rather than merely being new forms of the old far right (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Ignazi 1996; Koopmans 1996; Betz and Immerfall 1998). Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni 30 Populism as a Theoretical Problem: Towards a New Conceptualisation? To suggest that different approaches to populism should be attributed equal weight would be a mischaracterisation, as we have seen that some theories became more dominant than others in terms of their impact. The previously widespread understanding of populism as a form of discourse, following the arguments of Laclau (2005; see also Panizza 2005; Filc 2010), has come under increasing criticism for having normative Marxist roots, a high degree of theoretical abstraction and a lack of empirical applicability. It was also criticised for equating political discourse with political practice (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Therefore, the emergence of the idea of populism as a thin-centred ideology, proposed especially by Cas Mudde (2000; 2004), was something of a breakthrough for it provided a means of identifying populism and populist manifestations more unambiguously. Whether based on actual conviction or mere pragmatism and a long-lasting search for an appropriate model, a sizeable share of the populism research community has adopted this approach, which appropriates Michael Freeden’s (1996; 2003) idea that some ideologies have a thin centre, and applied it to populism. However, as populism has continued to proliferate, penetrating new political systems and attaching itself to different parties and host ideologies in different contexts, its very hybridity and diversity continues to pose enormous empirical challenges. The essentialist Muddean approach based on dichotomous criteria and categorical classifications is seen to have significant limitations of its own on account of the range of populist manifestations that are in evidence. This has led to growing criticism of the model, especially by scholars working on populist actors outside the ‘classical’ cases of Western European right-wing populist parties (for a full discussion, see Aslanidis 2015). In fact, in a keynote address at the Prague conference on populism in 2016, Freeden (2016) distanced himself from the notion that populism is a thin-centred ideology because, in his view, it is ‘too thin’ to be meaningfully conceived as an ideology. As a result, the triadic approach to populism as an ideology, a discursive style and a form of political mobilisation (see also Pauwels 2011; Moffitt and Tormey 2013) still dominates the discussion. Building on these approaches and criticism of the ‘dominant paradigm,’ in Chapter 5 Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni introduce a more finely grained conceptualisation that can be employed in empirical research and bridges existing conceptualisations in political science and communication by arguing that populism is not dichotomous but exists along a spectrum. As such, it needs to be conceived both as discourse and practice. In fact, this new approach holds that populism can be heuristically defined as a series of intrinsically ambivalent claims diffused by individual and collective actors to challenge the status quo in favour of people’s empowerment and elite change. Ambivalence is taken to be a multidimensional phenomenon, which involves both a discursive frame and a relationship between discourse and practice. The ambivalent claims that define populism are made about people, elites/out-groups, democracy, the state, society, the economy, women and so on. While these claims are often connected to host ideologies, the underlying concepts (that is ‘the people,’ ‘the heartland,’ ‘real democracy’ and so on) remain purposefully vague and flexible. These dimensions can be empirically measured based on the extent of the claims themselves and the ambivalence expressed therein. For example, populist actors attack female emancipation as an elitist agenda having gone too far while at the same time defending the status of liberated women Introduction 31 when criticising Islam. Thus, the intensity and direction of such a claim can be measured and correlated to other claims and variables. Frames have also been employed in communication research to study populism (Jagers and Walgrave 2006), and it is in this area that a framebased approach can be connected to communication. Populism as an Empirical Phenomenon As much as both populism itself and the reasons for its emergence present us with important theoretical challenges with respect to its conceptualisation and hypothetical causes, populism poses important empirical questions that need to be measured and analysed using comparative data. Chapter 6 by Teun Pauwels presents methods of operationalising and measuring populism empirically and thus creates a link to the second part of the handbook in which the empirical dimension of populism is examined. Empirical Challenges and New Research Agendas A frequently mentioned but empirically still not fully explored question asks to what extent the conditions that give rise to contemporary populism are grounded in a distinct socio-economic situation. This approach reminds us that populism is also a sociological phenomenon. Wolfgang Aschauer tackles this question from a sociological perspective in Chapter 18, titled ‘Societal Malaise in Turbulent Times’, in which he seeks to understand how globalisation und unresponsive political systems have contributed to precarious economic conditions and increased people’s fear of declining social standards and diminishing economic opportunities. Many more empirically unresolved puzzles concern 'The Gender Dimension of Populism'. These are identified in Chapter 20 by Sarah C. Dingler, Zoe Lefkofridi, and Vanessa Marent, who discuss populist parties’ ideology, leaders, candidates, members and electoral support from a comparative empirical perspective. In the past, a great deal of scholarship focused on populism as a dependent variable and was thus dedicated to understanding its underlying causes. The most recent wave of populism research is centred more closely around its effects and consequences. Populism itself and the emergence of populist actors as influential political figures are shaping national and international politics in profound but uncertain ways. This calls into question, first and foremost, the nature of liberal democratic systems, since populist regimes seem to question key principles of liberal and representative democracy in the sense that the ‘popular will’ is held to be above criticism and thus beyond any third-party constraint. Instead of accepting checks and balances, these actors seem to favour majoritarian voting and/or plebiscitary forms of political decision-making, which are better suited to the mass mobilisation strategies in which populists excel. Left-wing and right-wing populists alike promote political views that are both anti-pluralist and anti-political. Moreover, by suggesting that established parties are all alike, populists engage in de-differentiation (Schedler 1996) and deny the representative function of other parties. In populist rhetoric, the people are often portrayed as being uniform. Divisions are seen instead as the re- Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni 32 sult of outsider meddling so that compromises designed to resolve differences are seen to serve the interests of outsiders and are often regarded as less than fully legitimate. These debates have led to claims and counter claims about the role of populism and democracy. The strongest argument in favour of populism is its role in mitigating what many scholars have called a growing crisis of representation (Mair 2002; Taggart 2002; Kriesi 2014) in the sense that traditional governments have ceased to be representative. As populist parties succeed in breaking up sclerotic political structures and drawing previously marginalised or depoliticised population groups into the political process, populist mobilisation may in fact improve the quality of democracy. Few have tackled this question empirically on a large scale, especially by comparing Latin America and Europe. In this sense, Chapter 19 by Robert Huber and Christian H. Schimpf takes exception as they provide a comprehensive theoretical debate and detailed empirical analysis of the relationship between populism and democracy. Populism may, of course, be a dependent and independent variable by strongly interacting with other phenomena. One of the most important is arguably the relationship between populism and Islam and Islamophobia. Right-wing populism in both Europe and the United States draws on, and promotes, Islamophobia. Especially in conjunction with the refugee crisis and the spread of international terrorism, the fear of Islam and Muslim immigrants has arguably become the most important stance of populist parties in many countries. In current electoral campaigns across France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US, the question of Islam is a central issue as it affects both the dimension of individual identity, national character and values, as well as personal security. The aforementioned Hans Georg Betz tackles this question in Chapter 22, titled ‘Populism and Islamophobia’. Populism and the Communication Dimension Apart from political science, communication research has long neglected the impact of populism on political communication. This has changed with the rise and success of populist parties in Europe and, at about the same time, the emergence of a new media environment. Communication has a constitutive role in the political field. The overall growing importance of the media in fostering understanding within society has also made politics more and more dependent on the media for addressing citizens and legitimising its decisions. This dependence, and the attempt to nevertheless keep the power of agenda setting and framing the discourse, has led to an increasing mediatisation of politics, in the sense that the political arena has continuously adapted to the logic of the media. The development of the internet, and social-networking sites in particular, has thoroughly redrawn the communicative map and opened new ways for political actors to speak to citizens directly without the uncomfortable interference of journalists. From a communication point of view, populism primarily presents itself as a specific communicative style. On this basis, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) developed a concept that can be applied to all kinds of political actors and all forms of populism. At the core of it lies a ‘thin definition’ that considers populism to be “a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people” (Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 322, original emphasis). Appealing to the people, identifying with the people and purporting to speak in their name is the ‘master Introduction 33 frame’ (Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 322) that underlies and constitutes populist discourse. Thin populism becomes thick populism if appeals to the people combine with an anti-establishment/ anti-elitist position against vertical distinction, instead promoting a homogeneous/exclusive position for horizontal differentiation (Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 323–5). Reinemann et al. (2017) point to the fact that anti-elitist and anti-out-group messages are functional equivalents inherent in references and appeals to the people and thus strengthen social identity. As Franca Roncarolo shows in Chapter 23, increasing mediatisation has changed the relationship between the media and politics and has also attracted attention to the role of the media in the spread and growth of populism. Their coalescence and intertwined nature is reflected in terms such as ‘telepopulism’ (Peri 2004), ‘télépopulistes’ (Taguieff 1997) and ‘media populism’ (Mazzoleni 2003). In terms of media populism, Esser et al. (2017) distinguish between three perspectives: “populism by the media, populism through the media and populist citizen journalism” (Esser et al. 2017: 367). Populism by the media primarily builds upon an anti-establishment attitude towards political elites and, at the same time, attempts to align with and represent the common citizen. While the anti-elitist stance also derives from the control and criticism functions that the press has in democratic systems, the media inevitably, but mostly unwillingly, supports the cause of populism, establishing the paradoxes that are also elaborated by Benjamin Krämer in Chapter 24. Populism through the media is exercised by creating “favourable opportunity structures for populist actors” (Esser et al. 2017: 370). These arise out of political and commercial interests, the dependencies of media owners and certain characteristics of media logic. The latter refers to the media's preference for conflict and strategic framing as well as personalisation. Frames are interpretative patterns of media reporting that emphasise certain aspects of an issue, attribute causes and responsibilities for problems and suggest solutions. Thus, frames can influence the interpretation of issues and events by the media audience and guide their attention to certain elements, direct the ways in which the news is processed and, in this way, may have an impact on the audience’s attitudes. The term conflict framing identifies the media’s use of a conflict perspective in the coverage of an issue. Strategic framing is employed to steer the audience in a desired direction, as is done, for instance, with poll reporting. Populist citizen journalism (Esser et al. 2017: 371) involves the inclusion of comments by members of the audience in the established media, usually on their websites. If they are used for populist appeals, and even if the editorial content stands in contrast to citizens’ comments, the media run the risk of furthering the populist cause. Thus, in addition to structural reasons, the media’s selection and production criteria tend to— mostly unintentionally—serve the interests of populist actors, who make the media their ‘accomplices’ (Esser et al. 2017: 371) in the spread of populism. Nevertheless, the mainstream media often draw criticism from populist movements and are attacked for putting populist actors at a disadvantage and for supporting the political establishment. They are seen as part of the political elite and therefore become the object of the populists’ anti-elitist sentiments. The recent development of new forms of communication, and the changes to the media environment that have ensued, have played out in favour of populism (see, for example, Engesser et al. 2015). Political newcomers and outsiders often face a barrier in the media to getting the visibility they need to address voters, climb in the polls and increase their electoral support. The internet and social networks allow political actors to circumvent the established media, Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni 34 which is regarded as being close to, or even part of, the political elite and so therefore becomes the object of populist attacks. In Chapter 7, through reference to three sites of mediation, Lone Sorensen demonstrates the closeness of populism to the new communication technologies. In addition to the aforementioned possibility of speaking to citizens without journalistic interference, social networking sites align with populist appeals to emancipation, democracy and community. When defined as a communication style, populism is by no means restricted to ‘populists’ and extends to all kinds of verbal, visual and non-verbal expressions. Elements of the populist style can be found in everyday populism in the media and the communication of political actors who are not deemed populist. Research from several countries, often in the form of case studies, has analysed the strategies of populist actors in self-representation and news management, and how they are reflected in media coverage (see, for example, Bos and Brandts 2014; Bos et al. 2010; Hawkins 2009; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Roncarolo 2005). Wodak exposed the ‘politics of fear’ (2015) in the discourse of right-wing populists and how their strategies of provocation and scandalisation gain attention in the media. In Chapter 21, Paula Diehl argues that the body has a particular function in populism through its activation of emotions and as an object for identification. This also corresponds with Moffitt and Tormey’s (2014) concept of populism as a political style in which they focus on the performative features of populism and how it is represented. Final Note As has already been mentioned, this handbook consists of three parts, the first of which covers theories, approaches, conceptualisations and measurements in relation to political populism. The second part presents populist manifestations in Europe and the Americas and the third part focuses on emerging phenomena and new research agendas. Part three deals with emerging challenges and introduces new research agendas. In an effort to stress the interdisciplinary nature of populism research, this book is not organised by discipline, and, thus, chapters focusing on communication, sociology and political science appear next to each other and draw on each other’s findings. While it was not the book’s intention to provide a geographically comprehensive account of populism and its manifestations, an effort was made to cover as many different cases and variations of populism in Europe and the Americas as was possible within the constraints of this project. 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Rooduijn, Matthijs, Sarah L. de Lange, and Wouter van der Brug (2014) ‘A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe’, Party Politics, 20(4), 563–75. Schedler, Andreas (1996) ‘Anti-Political Establishment Parties’, Party Politics, 2(3), 211–312. Stanley, Ben (2008) ‘The Thin Ideology of Populism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 13(1), 95–110. Subramanian, Narendra (2007) ‘Populism in India’, SAIS Review, 27(1), 81–91. Taggart, Paul (2000) Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press). Taggart, Paul (2002) ‘Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics’ in Yves Mény and Yves Surel (eds.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge (Basingstoke: Palgrave), 62–80. Taguieff, Pierre-André (1997) 'Le populisme et la science politique du mirage conceptuel aux vrais problèmes', Vingtième Siècle, revue d'histoire, (56), 4–33. Tournier-Sol, Karine (2015) ‘Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative: UKIP's Winning Formula?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1), 140–156. Van Spanje, Joost (2010) ‘Contagious parties: Anti-immigration parties and their impact on other parties’ immigration stances in contemporary Western Europe’, Party Politics, 16(5), 563–86. Weyland, Kurt (2001) ‘Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics’, Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. Wodak, Ruth (2015) The politics of fear. What rightwing populist discourses mean (Los Angeles: Sage). Wolinetz, Steven and Andrej Zaslove (eds.) (2017) Absorbing the Blow. Populist Parties and their Impact on Parties and Party Systems (Colchester: ECPR Press). Introduction 37 PART I: Defining and Analysing the Concept CHAPTER 1: POPULISM: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT Damir Skenderovic1 “There can at present be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is quite clear what it is,” write Ghita Ionesco and Ernest Gellner (1969b: 1; emphasis in original) in the introduction to the influential anthology, Populism. Its Meanings and Characteristics, which appeared in 1969. While the current relevance of populism has led to a revival of interest in the almost forgotten populist movements of the nineteenth century, as Ionesco and Gellner go on to state, the question arises as to whether ‘populism’ is “simply a word wrongly used in completely heterogeneous contexts” (Ionesco and Gellner 1969b: 3). More than forty years later, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2012a: 1) make a similar critique that, “one of the most used and abused terms inside and outside academia is undoubtedly populism,” and point out that there have been repeated calls to simply abandon the term and that the scientific debate is some distance away from reaching a minimal consensus on the definition and meaning of populism. The history of the concept ‘populism’ has been accompanied by scepticism over its definition and reservations over its phenomenology, which have not only led to the stimulation of regular academic debates, but has also continually reflected strong concerns about the common and everyday political usage of the term. The lack of semantic precision and ambiguity with regard to content lead to it being used for very different phenomena and developments in politics and society, which results in doubt over its heuristic and explanatory value. In addition, the term ‘populism’ is normatively loaded in political and scientific language and thus always includes statements and findings on the state of democracy. Even the core idea of the term that populism speaks, as the etymology of the word implies, in the name of the people, rather than the elites, power blocks and privileged special interest groups, is rooted in normative dichotomies. Conjuncture and Controversy in Politics and Science Despite these substantial weaknesses, in the course of the last ten years, there has been a striking increase in the use of the concept of ‘populism’ in the public media as well as in the everyday political life of Europe, and particularly in the context of the increase and consolidation that has been seen in recent years among parties on the right-wing margin of the European party system. The expression ‘(right-wing) populist’ has established itself as the description for a number of parties, such as the Austrian Freedom Party, Alternative for Germany, the Swiss People’s Party, the National Front in France, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Fidesz in Hungary or Ataka in Bulgaria. However, ‘populism’ is not only used specifically for parties, tendencies and 1 This text is a revised and expanded version of the article entitled Populisme, which appeared in French in: Christin, Olivier (ed.) (2016) Dictionnaire des concepts nomades en sciences humaines (Paris: Éditions Metailié), p. 87-106. 41 politicians, but is also often used much more generally, whereby it is seen as a supposedly new way in which politicians and parties seek to woo their supporters and, in the process, to employ new means of communication and strategy. On the whole, the term ‘populism’ has been widely established in terms of language and the media, and for some it even seems to fulfil the claim of contributing to raising and nurturing awareness of various social and political developments at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the vocabulary of politicians and parties, too, ‘populism’ as a political catchword has experienced a pronounced boom. In its function as a negatively connoted battle cry, it is primarily used in politics to disavow the opponent, serving as a reproach and attack, as denunciation and accusation. With the use of the term ‘populist’ in political day-to-day events, it is suggested to the adversary that he or she responds to complex facts with phrases and simple formulas, and ultimately pursues the goal of polarising society in order to take advantage of instantaneous moods and make unscrupulous political capital. Something that also contributes to the pejorative understanding of the term is the long shadow cast by the plebiscitary mass politics, demagogic mobilisations and the invocation of the so-called ‘will of the people’ by leaders who have caused historical catastrophes in Europe. Basically, the political and public debates about populism are constantly concerned with the dangers it may pose to democracy and its cornerstones of freedom, plurality and representation (Decker 2006; Urbinati 2013). In recent years, therefore, the controversy surrounding the issue has intensified in academic debates over the question of whether populism should be seen as a threat or a corrective to democracy and whether, alongside its negative impacts, it might also have positive influences on the function and legitimation of democracy (Canovan 2002; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012b). Many authors suggest that populism has an ambivalent relationship with democracy, which is built on the population participating as broadly as possible, but is also characterised by a complex, partially opaque decision-making system, which is associated with the representative and delegating character of (parliamentary) democracy. It is suggested that populists seek to exploit a lack of transparency and immediacy and the resulting dissatisfaction with political institutions in order to promote a return to ‘true’ democracy, which must be realised beyond intermediary institutional settings and political elites. It should not be forgotten, however, that populists do not reject the principle of representation, per se, but rather those who are, in their eyes, the wrong representatives. Consequently, there is no doubt that there can be “populism without participation” (Müller 2014). It is emphasised, furthermore, that populist actors insist on the indivisible power of the majority, thereby undermining not only liberal democratic principles, such as minority rights and the division of power, but also important democratic practices, such as the principle of checks and balances or the search for political consensus solutions. There has also been a marked increase in interest in the subject of populism in empirical research. In countless social science studies, the wide variety of contemporary political movements and parties has been examined and their affiliation and organisational structure analysed, along with their parliamentary and programmatic work, their political and institutional opportunity structures, and their social framework conditions. There is also a lively debate over the question of the analytical and operational uses of the concept of ‘populism’. On the one hand, there is a group of authors who primarily seek to identify certain characteristics of movements and parties as conceptual criteria, while on the other, there are those who view stringing together characteristics as an insufficient means of working out a concise conceptual- Damir Skenderovic 42 isation of ‘populism’, and therefore call for more generally valid core elements of the kind that are useful for a broader comparative analysis (Taguieff 2007a). In the root cause analysis, there has been a growth in explanatory approaches, in which many interpret the recent upswing of populism as a side effect of globalisation and Europeanisation, and the medialisation and personalisation of politics (Decker 2013). It is also often argued that the reasons behind the examples of successful populist mobilisation are a crisis of political legitimacy that the system of democratic representation created, and not least, as Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson (2012) argue in connection with the Tea Party in the USA, that in the decline of traditional political participation, such as electoral turnout and party membership, populism is, as it were, a new form of political engagement. For many, it does not seem to be surprising that in times of an increased sense of crisis among parts of the population, there should be a call for the soothing and assuring responses of politics, to which populist actors respond with offers of interpretations and solutions in which community feeling, cohesion and orientation are central references. In view of the inflationary, but often historically amnesic, use of ‘populism’, it is all the more important to cast a historical look at its scientific conceptualisation. As Federico Finchelstein (2014: 467-68) recently remarked, “at worst, populism appears as a concept without history” and this view reduces populism “to a transcendental (or trans-historical) metaphor of something else”. The study of continuities and changes in populist phenomena, as well as central moments in academic debates, makes it possible to show certain denominational characteristics and analytical categories that have proved to be sustainable in the definition of ‘populism’. In addition, the epistemic negotiations on concepts, meanings and definitions – and this is often forgotten today – involved representatives from a number of different disciplines, including history, social anthropology, economics, political science and sociology, with the result that meanings have also been generated on the basis of specific empirical foundations and methodological approaches. As a consequence, the conceptual history of ‘populism’ is strongly linked to the study of concrete historical phenomena and conditions; heuristic findings have resulted from the fact that structural analogies and functional equivalences have been produced, and different contexts and framework conditions considered. In a history of what is meant by ‘populism’, it is also a question of acknowledging the historicity of the concept, thus contributing to a historicisation of the scientific approaches and interpretations that accompany the historical development of an important key concept of political and academic language (Steinmetz 2011). To a certain extent this is how, at the forefront of theory formation, a mixture of linguistic and material history emerges, which is concerned with social and academic rules and seeks to expand the interpretative horizons of ongoing public and scientific debates that mainly focus on the present. Lexical History of the Concept A look at the dictionaries, lexicons and encyclopaedias that are important indicators of knowledge production and are among the central function carriers of knowledge transfer illustrates the relatively late onset of the problematisation of the concept of ‘populism’. Until the 1990s, the lemmata for ‘populism’ were concerned almost exclusively with concrete historical phenomena, without discussing ‘populism’ as a concept or establishing the content of its meaning. CHAPTER 1: POPULISM: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 43 The earliest entries deal with the political movements in Russia and the USA in the nineteenth century, with the People’s Party and the Narodniki, both of which, despite being created in completely different contexts, were long regarded as the epitome of populism. Thus, in 1922, in the 26th volume of the Spanish language Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana (1922: 451), at the time by far the most extensive reference work in the world, a brief entry describing the American movement was to be found under the heading ‘populista’. The Encyclopedia Americana (1919: 560-561), which was published three years earlier, also contained longer articles on the ‘People’s Party’ and ‘Populists’, but contented itself with a brief presentation of the history of the party, like that which can be found in the most recent edition, published in 2000 (The Encyclopedia Americana 2000: 413-14). In France, the term ‘populisme’ was first introduced to French dictionaries in 1929, and denoted a literary trend based around Léon Lemonnier and André Thérive, which stood as a countercurrent to the tendencies of the literature of the time, which was perceived as being bourgeois, exclusive and detached (Hermet 2001: 20). The authors were concerned with writing down-to-earth texts that were close to the everyday life of the simple man. Until the 1990s, the French language lexicons also limited themselves to naming historical examples in literature and politics, in which it is noticeable that significantly more space was dedicated to the Russian Narodniki than to the American farmers in the Dictionnaire d’Histoire Universelle (1986: 1706-1707), for example, or in the Dictionnaire encyclopédique d’histoire (1986: 3760), where talk was of the ‘rather vague’ ideology of the Narodniki, which was described as having “a messianic foundation, a belief in the privileged faith of the Russian people”. It is also the case that under the keyword ‘populism’ in the German language Brockhaus Enzyklopädie (1972: 813), there are, until the 1980s, only brief references to the French literary movement, whose aim it was to portray ‘the life of the common people’. From the beginning of the 1990s, there is an accumulation of entries that give ‘populism’ both an analytical and a heuristic function. It seems that the change in the experience of contemporary politics and the strong journalistic interest led to a rise in the demand for explanatory and interpretational lexical knowledge, with the result that to a certain extent ‘populism’ grew from being a descriptive to an elucidating concept. Accordingly, an entry on ‘populisme’ can be found in the ninth edition of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (published since 1992 and accessible online), which lists the usual historical examples, but also interprets the term in a broader context of political action. Populism is here described as an “often pejorative attitude, as the behaviour of a person or a political party, which, in opposition to the ruling elites, act as defender of the people and as a mouthpiece for its aspirations, putting forward ideas that are most often simplistic and demagogic”. In the 19th edition of the Brockhaus Enzyklopädie (1992: 364), too, the definition of ‘populism’ is now extended and is briefly described as an “opportunist, demagogic form of politics”, which “seeks to win the approval of the masses (with regard to elections) by overstating the political situation”, before being described in a longer entry in the last published edition (Brockhaus Enzyklopädie 2006: 75) as “a strategy used by political elites and individual leadership personalities to mobilise and secure consensus”. A similar development can be seen in the specialist social science lexicons, which reflect the exponential increase in the number of studies, articles and research projects on populism since the 1990s. In the meantime, substantial contributions on ‘populism’ have appeared in the important encyclopaedias of sociology and political science, which not only contain research Damir Skenderovic 44 summaries, but also take a position on ongoing academic debates and thereby make a contribution to improving the conceptual awareness and analytical operationality of the term (for example, International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 2001; Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft 2005; The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology 2007). This tendency is also reflected in the fact that renowned, sometimes controversial scholars in the field have acted as the authors of contributions, for example Torcuato S. Di Tella, who appeared in The Encyclopedia of Democracy, published by Seymour M. Lipset in 1995, Pierre-André Taguieff in the Encyclopaedia Universalis, which came out in 2008, or more recently Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser in The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, which was edited by Michael Freeden and Marc Stears and published in 2013. While, for example, Das Politiklexikon (Schubert and Klein 2016: 244) operates on the basis of the instrumentalisation thesis, and thereby postulates that populist politics use “the emotions, prejudices and fears of the population for its own purposes”, the contribution in The Concise Oxford Dictionary Of Politics (2009: 422) speaks more generally of ‘populist beliefs’ that involve a “defence of the (supposed) traditions of the little man against change seen as imposed by powerful outsiders, which might variously be governments, businesses, or trade unions”. On the whole, this broad entry into the specialist lexicons of knowledge transfer emphasises the boom in the reception and the use of the concept of ‘populism’ in academic research and in the social sciences in particular, while the respective explanations also show the fundamental difficulty that there is when it comes to meeting certain theoretical requirements and generalising about conceptual proposals for the analysis of populism as a political and social phenomenon. Accordingly, the detailed contribution on ‘populism’ in the International Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioral Sciences (2001: 11816) arrives at the somewhat sobering fact that the analysis of populist subtypes, with “their distinct logics and dynamics, may be more useful than an ultimately elusive effort to achieve a common overall conceptualisation of populism”. The Founding Forms of Populism The conceptual genesis of ‘populism’ is strongly influenced by the use of specific historical case studies which served as the subject for the diagnosis of populism and which were mainly researched by historians (Rioux 2007; Finchelstein 2014). Their focus lay above all on classic populism, or, as Guy Hermet (2001) called it, the “founding populisms”. By this he meant the American farmers’ movement with its party political arm, the People’s Party and the Narodniki in Russia, both of which were formed in the second half of the nineteenth century. For Anglo-Saxon and Western European conceptions, dealing with the American populists was central. As neologisms ‘populism’ and ‘populist’ entered into the vernacular and everyday political circulation in the USA at the beginning of the 1890s (The Oxford English Dictionary 1989: 128). It was to a certain extent the birth of the political and journalistic debate on ‘populism’, in which the expression simultaneously found itself being used as the actors’ self-designation, a political slogan and an analytical concept, thus transgressing the boundaries between political and construal use. The starting point was the founding of the People’s Party in 1891, which was also known, significantly, as the Populist Party, and which developed out of a number of farmers’ alliances in the South and the Midwest of the USA over the course of the 1870s CHAPTER 1: POPULISM: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 45 and 1880s. Consisting mainly of farmers, the lower middle classes and agricultural workers, the party made financial and economic policy demands, such as the nationalisation of the railways, the abolition of the national banking system, a progressive income tax and increased money supply, on the one hand. While, on the other hand, it also demanded reform of the political system, including the direct election of senators, a limiting of the presidential term and the introduction of direct democratic means (Postel 2007). The research history of the American farmers’ movement illustrates in an exemplary way how controversial discussions have been when it comes to the assessment of populists, as well as to the content and meaning of the notion of populism, and how interpretation and conceptual understanding have changed over time within the field of the historical research. The central question in all of this was whether it was a reactionary, backward-looking and authoritarian movement, or whether it had a progressive, social-reformist and grassroots orientation (Canovan 1981: 46-51). The idea that long dominated the research on the People’s Party and its agrarian precursor movement was that populism was to be seen as a democratising and socially progressive phenomenon, a point of view that was mostly inspired by the influential work The Populist Revolt, published in 1931 by the social historian John D. Hicks. In the book, Hicks presented the farmers’ movement as the expression of an agrarian proletarian protest that had rightly drawn attention to the grievances of agrarian capitalism and the corruption in American politics. From this standpoint, populism is also mainly to be viewed in terms of its reformist effect on the political and economic system of the USA. Such a positive use of the term ‘populism’ was increasingly questioned in the 1950s, to the point that it is possible to talk of a ‘revisionist turn’ in the American research debate. Not least against the backdrop of the emerging McCarthyism, which, with its paranoid, anti-intellectual and ostracising features, was seen by many contemporaries as a new form of American populism, US historians began to re-evaluate the farmers’ movement, adding additional meaning to the concept of populism. While emphasising the ideological dimension of populism, Richard A. Hofstadter highlighted nativism, anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories as the hallmarks of the farmers’ movement in his work The Age of Reform (1955). On the side of the sociologists, too, critics, such as Edward Shils (1956), who spoke of an ‘ideology of resentments’, or Wilhelm Kornhauser (1959), who, in his work on the so-called Mass Society, described populism as a rejection of social pluralism, and as the maintenance of uniformity in reaction to increasing levels of social differentiation. A new twist in the interpretation of the term can be determined in the 1970s and can be seen in the context of the spread of radical participatory issues and the associated movements for grassroots democracy. Once again, ‘populism’ was now being given a positive connotation when linked with the broad forming of political opinion, direct participation in democratic decision-making processes and socially progressive ideas. Of particular influence was Lawrence Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise (1976), which emphasised the direct experience of democratic politics and cooperative collaboration as being central to the farmers’ movement. As he noted, it was crucial for the mobilisation of the time that “the Populists believed they could work together to be free individually” (Goodwyn 1976: 542). It was this combination of the individual and the collective, the fulfilment of the individual through collaboration in the movement that produced the movement’s strength and solidarity. While Hofstadter had particularly emphasised the conspiracy theory elements in farmers’ political and economic criticisms, Good- Damir Skenderovic 46 wyn was now largely content to reproduce the movement’s assessments, namely that the concentration of financial and economic power lay in the hands of a few large companies. Essentially, according to Goodwyn’s core statement, as critics and reformers, the populists pointed the way to a democratic organisation of industrial society, harking back to the ‘democratic promise’ of the founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. For Goodwyn, it was also a question of broadening the notion of populism, rather than just being a party political phenomenon: “Self-evidently, the People’s Party was a political institution. But it was also ‘Populism’ – that connotes something more than a party, something more closely resembling a mood or, more grandly, an ethos” (Goodwyn 1976: X). Until today, therefore, in American debates, populism is widely interpreted as a reaction to centralist Statism and the omnipotence of public officials and experts, and therefore stands as a symbol of federalism, local autonomy and direct democracy. To a certain extent, populism is also a part of a democracy’s horizon of experience, and thus also stands as proof of democratic participation in politics. Such considerations have also recently been found among some voices decidedly critical of the President-elect Donald Trump, the latest powerful representation of American populism. The Russian Narodniki constitute a second incarnation of the founding forms of populism. The movement consisted mainly of intellectuals and students who began to move from the cities to rural areas in the early 1870s – in some way ‘going to the people’ (narod = people) – in order to live with the peasant population and to carry out revolutionary educational work in the countryside. Inspired by pioneering thinkers such as Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Cernyševskij, they saw a social model capable of posing a challenge to emerging agricultural and industrial capitalism in the archaic Russian village community and its collective, cooperative traditions. In their romanticised notion of Russia’s peasant population, the Narodniki firmly believed that there was revolutionary potential in the rural population and in the traditions of the Russian peasantry (Venturi 1960). From 1875, in an attempt to describe this current and its ideas, the term narodničestvo emerged, translated into English as ‘populism’ (Pipes 1964; Ionescu and Gellner 1969b: 2), while the terms Volkstümlertum and Volkstümler were to be found in German as translations for Narodniki (Breitling 1987: 28). In narodničestvo, a social revolutionary self-image was expressed, which was based on the idea that the revolution not only corresponded to the interests of the people, who became a revolutionary subject, but that the revolution was actually in direct accord with the will and the desire of the people. Among Marxist theorists, narodničestvo increasingly took on an economic significance because it showed the potential for realising a socialist order in Russian society without having to go through a phase of capitalism (Pipes 1964; Walicki 1969). Among French historians, too – to a certain extent ex post – the founding forms of populism of the late nineteenth century also include Boulangisme among their number (Hermet 2001; Winock 2007). Thus populisme became, as it were, a kind of substitute term in French, replacing other terms such as Césarisme or Bonapartisme, which had been used by contemporaries as well as by historical literature for Boulangisme. The use of the notion of ‘populism’ is intended to help develop continuities in certain forms of thought and action in French politics. Factors that are seen as being indicative of the populist character of Boulangisme include its radical rejection of the ruling classe politique, the plebiscitary credo and the call for a strong president, but also the marked cult of personality, as well as the communicative and media marketing and self-presentation of the movement. These are also characteristics that were identified in a series of twentieth-century movements and parties, from the interwar Ligues to CHAPTER 1: POPULISM: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 47 Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front. There are also contextual factors, such as the lack of reform of the Third Republic, and constitutional revision with little democratic improvement and rampant corruption, which led the Boulangistes to see themselves as a movement of the discontented, who were waiting for their saviour. Furthermore, Boulangisme cannot be filed away within the French political dualism of republicans and monarchists at that time, but was rather the expression of the opposition between oligarchs and democrats, and combined forces from both the left and the right (Hutton 1976; Garrigues 1992; Prochasson 1994). It is noteworthy that this belated designation of Boulangisme as an early expression of populism took place in literature at a time when, in connection with the rise of the National Front, the term ‘populism’ experienced a remarkably increasing use in French scientific language (Dupuy 2002; Taguieff 2007b). Originally published in 1979, the book by the historian Pierre Birnbaum, Le peuple et les gros, can be taken as evidence of the presumably also profitable (for the publishing industry) use of the concept of ‘populism’, which appears in its 2012 reissue under the revised title: Genèse du populisme. Le peuple et les gros. While Birnbaum shows in his book how, since the end of the nineteenth century, the assumption that ‘the good people’ have been worn down by leading figures in economics and politics has had a striking continuity in the political life of France, his analysis does not deal with the concept of ‘populism’, despite what the new title might suggest. The same can be observed in the research on Pierre Poujade and his Union de défense des commerçants et artisans of the 1950s. In the classical study by Stanley Hoffmann (1956), the movement is by no means described as ‘populist’, yet it is declared some forty years later by Alexandre Dorna (1999: 75) as a “paradigm of French populism”. This not only gives Poujadism a precursor role in post-war right-wing populism in Western Europe generally, and particularly in France, but highlights once again the effectiveness of using ‘populism’ as an analytical concept. Transnational and Transdisciplinary Expansion Despite the wide variety of application fields for ‘populism’ already described, it was relatively late on that the concept began to be discussed from a cross-national perspective. From the mid-1960s onwards, the use of the concept began to intensify across national and disciplinary boundaries and to circulate within the international scientific community. In the sense of Mieke Bal’s (2002: 24) notion of a “travelling concept”, ‘populism’ increasingly began to travel “between disciplines, between individual scholars, between historical periods, and between geographically dispersed academic communities”. The question thereby arose as to whether there was a ‘populist minimum’ that would make it possible to capture past and present phenomena of populism and enable a journey through space and time with the concept. It was also shown that while it had previously been historians who were primarily interested in populist movements, they were increasingly being joined by social scientists, and issues concerned with the contemporary social and political framework were more and more the focus of research into their causes. From the middle of the 1960s onwards, the entry of the concept of ‘populism’ into research on South American movements and regimes (Dix 1985; Conniff 1999; de la Torre 2000) can be seen as the first indicator of this transnationalisation and transdisciplinarity. Sociological studies, especially those of Gino Germani (for example 1955), on the respective regimes of Getúlio Damir Skenderovic 48 Vargas in Brazil (1930-1945) and Juan Perón in Argentina (1946-1955) were the starting point. In an article published in 1965, it was Torcuato S. Di Tella—a sociologist and a student of Germani—who subsequently imported the concept of ‘populism’ when he first applied it against the background of the specific socioeconomic and political situation in South America. In contrast to Europe, neither liberal nor socialist currents had great influence here, which made the social and political space more open to populist movements. The specific nature of the Latin American variety of populism is also linked to the region’s late industrial modernisation and its subsequent economic crises. What is characteristic of populism in South America is, on the one hand, its anti-status quo agenda and its nationalist and anti-imperialist features. On the other hand, it was able to draw on relatively broad support among different social classes, and the subsequent lack of organisation proved beneficial for the installation of populist regimes (Di Tella 1965). Ultimately, the marked influence of personalism played a much more central role in many Latin American examples of populism (Weyland 2001) than the historical examples of the Narodniki and the American farmers’ movement. The examples from South America have greatly contributed to the fact that questions over the structure of leadership as well as the style, appearance and personality of leader figures have been incorporated into the definitions of ‘populism’. The leadership of South American populist movements was highly individualised and personalised, and the connection between the leader and the supporters usually took place directly and immediately, without intermediary organisations. Leaders such as Perón and Vargas also exerted an authoritarian style of leadership, acting like peoples’ tribunes and casting themselves as representatives of the people and defenders of the popular will. To their followers, they were attributed – in the sense that Max Weber uses the term – with a charisma, which in turn decisively contributed to the cohesiveness of the supporters (Craig 1976; Conniff 1999; Roberts 2006). A second caesura in recent populism research came in the form of an international conference staged at the London School of Economics in 1967 and organised by the journal Government and Opposition, and the resulting, aforementioned anthology, Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics, which was edited by Ghita Ionesco and Ernest Gellner (1969a), and which Paul Taggart describes as “the definitive collection on populism” (Taggart 2000: 15; emphasis in original). On the one hand, the conference, which was attended by political scientists, sociologists, historians, social anthropologists and economists, highlighted the strong interdisciplinary interest in the subject. On the other, there was the intention to subject ‘populism’ to a kind of conceptual and theoretical examination, and to test its reach as a comparative concept, with a broad scope of focus in terms of time and geography and encompassing a wide spectrum of example countries. Although Isaiah Berlin was somewhat laconic in his concluding comment to the conference, saying that all the participants agreed “that the subject was much too vast not merely to be contained in one definition, but to be exhausted in one discussion” (Berlin et al. 1968: 179), he identified a range of characteristics and circumstances that had arisen from the case studies presented: a specific notion of community, or Gemeinschaft, as a coherent and unified society; speaking in the name of the majority; a basically apolitical stance, since society is favoured over the state; the transfer of values from the past to the present; the evocation of enemies and threats that menaces the united, integral group; the belief in an ideal, unbroken man who is CHAPTER 1: POPULISM: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 49 neither oppressed nor deceived by anyone; and the transitional edge of modernisation as the framework conditions favourable for populism (ibid.: 173-75). These two important moments in the history of scholarship of populism were due not least to the academic interest in the ongoing processes of decolonisation and the strengthening of the liberation movements, which were accompanied by mobilisation or led to the establishment of regimes whose formation could be grasped with the analytical categories of ‘populism’. They were also the starting point for a new methodological dynamic, which was characterised by globally comparative perspectives, but did not lose sight of the heterogeneity and contextuality of the phenomena investigated. Margaret Canovan made a significant contribution to this search for comparative, practicable criteria in her book Populism from 1981, when, on the basis of a typology, she designed a historically and spatially comprehensive outline of populism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Her aim was to sharpen the notion of ‘populism’ by detailing “different functions of the term as well as to the different phenomena to which it can refer” (Canovan 1981: 300). Proceeding phenomenologically, Canovan distinguished between two main types of populism, the agrarian and the political, whose central commonality was their appeal to the people and the mistrust of the elite. Canovan subdivided agrarian populism into rural radicalism (with the Farmers’ movement in the USA, the agrarian movement in Germany of the 1890s and the Canadian Social Credit Movement of the 1930s serving as examples), intellectual agrarian socialism (represented by the Russian Narodniki and various twentieth-century movements in Algeria, Tanzania and Bolivia), and the peasant movements in Eastern Europe of the early twentieth century. According to Canovan, populist dictatorships, such as the regime of Juan Perón, were also a part of political populism, as well as populist democracies, where the call for direct democratic means was particularly strong, as the impression prevailed that certain groups and interests were over-represented in the dominant representative democracy. In addition, there was reactionary populism, among whose ranks Canovan included the Governor of Alabama, George Wallace, with his segregated racial policy, the British politician, Enoch Powell, with his anti-immigration policy, and the so-called ‘politicians’ populism’, which was, according to Canovan, characterised by the fact that it was built on a non-ideological coalition that came together by means of an appeal to the people. Essentially, however, Margaret Canovan found it difficult to filter out a nucleus of populism, and she limited herself to create a taxonomy of populism by means of the case studies discussed. This is reminiscent of the understanding of ‘populism’ as a syndrome, as Peter Wiles (1969) described it when he identified a number of characteristics and factors whose common occurrence was essential to populism. Canovan (1982: 551) also conceded, therefore, that the types of populism she identified “do not really look like seven varieties of the same kind of thing: on the contrary, some of them seem quite unconnected with others”. Populism as a Strategy or Ideology? A central discussion that continues to characterise definitions of ‘populism’ even now revolves around the question of whether, first and foremost, the concept encompasses the strategies and forms of politics of movements and parties, or whether it is more of an ideology, a worldview Damir Skenderovic 50 (Aslanidis 2015). For example, Pierre-André Taguieff (2008: 457) insists that today a rigorous use of the term can only be a limited one, that ‘populism’ can only denote a dimension of “political action and discourse” and is not epitomised by a “defined type of political regime“, nor in “specific ideological content“. In this understanding, populism is seen as a political method, a discursive means and a rhetorical style, and its appeal to the people is primarily about political communication and performative repertoires (Jagers and Walgrave 2007, Moffitt 2016). If populism is to be understood as a political strategy, then there is a need to examine the incentives for gaining support, the way in which it is positioned with respect to the political system, and the links between citizens and political actors. Depending on the context, populists use their rhetorical means to differentiate between different target groups, such as farmers or workers, while the anti-attitude towards the establishment remains constant (Barr 2009). All populist movements would therefore pursue a policy of negation, opposition and protest in keeping with their anti-elite selfunderstanding and anti-establishment attitude. So it is hardly surprising that the so-called ‘protest-voter thesis’ is particularly popular in electoral research on populist parties, as they see mistrust and resentment of the political and social elites and institutions as being the central voting motives for adherence to these parties (Bergh 2004; Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013). Overall, the dominant conviction in these positions is that the notion of ‘populism’ primarily covers functional and strategic aspects and makes no kind of statement about ideological quality and content (Aslanidis 2015). This is also supported by the assessment that populist movements lack their own comprehensive, theoretically oriented programme, as well as by the fact that there are hardly any populist theorists (Betz 1994). Thus, Paul Taggart (2000: 4) writes of the ‘empty heart’ of populism, for since it contains no core values and no great visions, populism is marked by its ideologically empty interior. According to Karin Priester (2007: 13; emphasis in original), it is this kind of interpretation of the concept that has led to the fact that in recent literature on populism “there has been a lot of research into how populists act and communicate, but too little, by contrast, into what it is they actually have to say”. On the other hand, there are authors who stress that the concept ‘populism’ is less an indication of strategic, instrumental aspects, but rather first and foremost a question of ideological dimensions (for example, MacRae 1969; Rensmann 2006). It is not so much about the way in which ideology is mediated and introduced into politics, but rather the content of the ideology and the ideas and perceptions that lie behind it. In the search for a ‘populist minimum’, the Manichaean image of the world and of society, in which society is divided into two antagonistic and homogeneous groups, the ‘true people’ and the ‘dishonourable elite’ (Mudde 2004) comes to the fore. While ‘the people’ in populism is regarded, according to Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (2007: 6), as “a homogeneous and virtuous community”, and any divisions among the people are described as inappropriate, as something created and nurtured by the intellectual and political elite. In fact, these lines of conflict could easily be bridged, “as they are of less consequence than the people’s common ‘nature’ and identity” (ibid.). This also has the effect, as Jan-Werner Müller (2014: 487, emphasis in original) notes, that “according to the populist Weltanschauung, there can be no such thing as a legitimate opposition”. Thus the populists, with their understanding of a homogenous ‘people’, end up in an ideological conflict with pluralistic conceptions that originate from a heterogeneous society con- CHAPTER 1: POPULISM: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 51 sisting of different groups, individuals and interests (Müller 2014). The populist base narrative is also continually determined by the same line of conflict that places the people in opposition to the elite. With this comes a fundamental scepticism towards representative democracy (Canovan 1999). Politics must, from a populist perspective, not only always be the expression of a volonté générale, but it is also crucial that the people are ultimately sovereign, as Jean- Jacques Rousseau emphasised, and that they themselves exercise their sovereignty without delegating it. In order to fathom the conceptualisation of ‘populism’, the question also arises as to which notions of the ‘people’, the central reference value of the populists, are being used. Are there differences – not least because the notion of ‘the people’ is one that only appears in its respective equivalents in different national languages, and its conceptual history is therefore shaped in each case by a different interpretative culture (Koselleck 1992: 142)? For example, in Anglo-Saxon language usage, ‘the people’ can mean both singular individuals and a collection of individuals, a political collective, particularly in the sense of a sovereign people. It is therefore not surprising, according to Margaret Canovan (2005: 86), that “anglophone political discourse [...] makes it easy for populism and liberalism to share common ground”, because they can each bring different notions of people into play. This also explains the dissent in the American debate over the interpretation of populism. By contrast, in French language usage since the French Revolution, peuple has largely been intended to refer to the whole community of citizens, a collective as a whole, so to speak (Julliard 1992). In the conceptual tradition of continental Europe, the individual disappears into the communal to a much greater degree, especially in the French term peuple and in the German term Volk. It is also clear that the semantic amalgamating of Volk, people, peuple or narod with the notion of the nation is central to populist movements from the right, for example, where the shift from demos to ethnos is decisive. In the ideology of right-wing populism, the emotionally charged and symbolically stylised image of the people is combined with the idea of a clearly definable homeland, or ‘heartland’ (Taggart 2000). Membership of the national community and absolute loyalty towards the people as a nation constitute the defining frame of reference for action in politics and society. According to Yves Mény and Yves Surel (2002: 6), this also illustrates how “classic democratic orthodoxy uses ‘the people’ as an abstract construction […], while the populist ideology or rhetoric may add other dimensions and also perceive ‘the people’ as a community of blood, culture, race and so forth”. Since populism can certainly not be considered one of the ‘big’ ideologies, such as liberalism, socialism and conservatism, and is too one-sided to approach it only on the strategic and rhetorical level, adopting the ‘thin ideology’ approach offers a kind of middle way for identifying the central aspects of the concept of ‘populism’. Following Michael Freeden (1998), from this perspective, populism is to be understood as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ because it has no elaborate, comprehensive doctrine at its disposal (Mudde 2004; Rovira Kaltwasser 2011). Or, as Ben Stanley (2008: 95) formulated it, “its thin nature means that it is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology: it lacks the capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution to crucial political questions”. Accordingly, populism needs additional ideological set pieces and connects effortlessly with other worldviews. The thin-ideology approach also proves fruitful in defining the populism of the right since the 1990s. It is a characteristic of right-wing populism that the anti-pluralist populist reference to “a normatively idealised and homogenised ‘people’ is directed not only, on the vertical level, towards the Damir Skenderovic 52 ‘corrupt’ elite (against ‘those above’), but also, explicitly, on the horizontal level, towards the outside” (Frölich-Steffen and Rensmann 2005: 7). In right-wing populism, therefore, the ‘antielitist (vertical) affect’, as it is generally found in populism, receives in addition a ‘xenophobic (horizontal) affect’ (Pelinka 2002: 284). Starting out from the assumption of a natural inequality among human beings, it is the exclusionist and anti-egalitarian elements of ideology that are predominantly determinant in right-wing populism. Through the attribution of national, ethnic and cultural characteristics, differences are marked and used as a legitimation for inequality and exclusion. Thus, it is a characteristic of right-wing populist actors that nationalist and xenophobic attitudes are expressed in their agendas and politics. Finally, in populism from the left, which, not least, received theoretical attention in the analyses of the Latin American cases conducted by Ernesto Laclau (1977; 2005) and was thereby presented as a driving force for democratisation processes, its claim to social egalitarianism and a criticism of power is at its forefront. In addition, it often has specific historically determined features, as is the case with the social revolutionary Narodniki in Russia or the radical reform movements in Latin America, where romanticised ideas of the peasantry or anti-imperialist ideas played an important role. In left-wing populism, the ‘corrupt elite’ is primarily associated with the social, economic and financial power of the bourgeoisie, while in the understanding of ‘people’, the classless society serves as a utopian vision (Priester 2012). Here, too, the constitutive populist element is that little space is set aside for dissent, opposition and pluralism, and it is ultimately assumed that something like a people exists as a central political subject. According to Yannis Stavrakakis (2014: 506), therefore, democratic politics can hardly be imagined without populism, that is, “without forms of political discourse that call upon and designate the people [...] as their nodal point, as a privileged political subject, as a legitimising basis and symbolic lever to further egalitarian demands”. Conclusions The history of the concept of ‘populism’ goes hand in hand with disagreements over its definition, methodological scepticism and lively academic debates. As a travelling concept, ‘populism’ represents a story of varying degrees of intensity in terms of intellectual interest and scientific output, of transfer between disciplines and changing spheres of academic communication, but above all of changes in the subject of investigation. Since the 1960s, it has constantly been a question of trying to enable a general conceptual application of ‘populism’, as well as a means of comparing concrete phenomena, in order to increase the analytical capacity and the empirical reach of the concept, that is, one which is not merely dedicated to describing populism’s phenomena, but also to achieving a certain degree of abstraction. These challenges lie, as it were, within the nature of any conceptualisation; they are a part of the work on concepts, terms and categories, and are inherent in the search for linguistic conceptualisations and generic concepts. In the case of ‘populism’, however, some aspects that play an important role in the intriguing history of the concept and the controversies that continue to persist today end up in the foreground. It must be noted, first of all, that the concept of ‘populism’ is characterised by a marked degree of hybridity. This can be seen in the malleability and adaptability of its definition, and is reflected in its varied, often woolly semantic content, with the result that a multitude of histori- CHAPTER 1: POPULISM: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 53 cal phenomena and political movements are, as it were, absorbed within it. Semantic elasticity and changes also mean that in research language ‘populism’ regularly takes on a substitution function, as the case of Boulangisme has shown. The porous semantics, furthermore, make it tempting for various different phenomena to be equated with or, to a certain degree, explained as identical manifestations, which is the case with the example of right-wing populism and right-wing extremism, which is popular in contemporary academic and public debates. In addition, the desire for schematic analytical frameworks and functionalist models, which the social sciences are particularly fond of, also seems to lead to the fact that variability, changeability and historicity have appreciably been lost sight of, and approaches are preferred “that replace the theory and history of populism with a more quantitative descriptive, and self-proclaimedly pragmatic approach” (Finchelstein 2014: 472). One of the most intriguing aspects in the debates about populism is the often normatively asked question of whether populism represents a threat or a corrective to democracy. According to this logic, when it comes to establishing the significance of the concept of ‘populism’, democratic ideals are always also considered and negotiated; populism is explained as a symptom of serious dysfunctions in democracy. Or, as Nadia Urbinati (1998: 116) puts it, “the debate over the meaning of populism turns out to be a debate over the interpretation of democracy”. While in public and political understanding, populism serves, to a certain extent, as a means of measuring the pulse of democracy, from a democratic theoretical perspective, it is seen as a gauge of democracy. One of the questions that then arise is whether the opportunity for individuals, for all individual citizens, to participate and engage is sufficiently guaranteed to ensure that democracy functions. Or is it not the actual engagement and participation of as many people as possible that determine a functioning democracy? From this perspective, participation and representation are seen as crucial elements of democracy and the emergence of populism is interpreted as a democratic warning sign, whereby the selective, opportunistic and ultimately contemptuous manner in which populists treat representative and participatory principles is seldom taken into consideration. So far as the homogenising understanding of the participating ‘people’ is concerned, with the suffix –ism, populism becomes an appellative form of exaggeration that also apparently underlines its fundamental contradiction with democracy. However, all these argumentations, which are mostly presented normatively, often fail to include the notion that, historically, it is possible for diverse ideas and interpretations of democracy to exist, as the difference between the American and European discussions on populism makes clear. In Europe, therefore, unlike in the USA, it is rare to find the view that populists can advocate participatory egalitarian democracy or represent a socially progressive, reformist agenda. Considering these difficulties and uncertainties, one might follow Margaret Canovan’s (1981: 301) dictum that the concept of populism is “ambiguous” and that if “the notion of ‘populism’ did not exist, no social scientist would deliberately invent it”. At the same time, however, the fulminant rise and the progressive consolidation of a series of political parties and movements, all characterised by ‘principled anti-pluralism’ (Müller 2014), demand that these conceptual and analytical questions are dealt with and the historicity of populism is understood. 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At the same time, there is a widespread belief that populism is the negation of representation. Populism is an extremely vague concept, which indicates very different phenomena (Canovan 1982). Nonetheless, populists claim to speak on behalf of someone else. Therefore, populism is also a form of representation, although a peculiar one. This will be our second issue. The third will be how its observers, critics and rivals represent populism and populist parties. This representation is no less important than that generated by populists themselves, as it becomes part of their representative actions. According to several authors, the rise of populism is a symptom of a deep crisis of political representation (Taggart 2002). According to Peter Mair, one of the most insightful political scientists of our generation, who shares this view, the indicators of this crisis are a decline in voter turnout—even in democracies where the phenomenon was previously limited—a rise in electoral volatility and protest vote, an increase in discontent with mainstream parties and traditional institutions, and the success of populist parties. Recalling the theory of the ‘cartel party’, which he developed with Richard S. Katz (Katz and Mair 1995), Mair has provided an exemplary analysis of the current state of democratic representation (Mair 2000; Mair 2002; Mair 2013) by focusing on the atrophy of parties’ fundamental function as a ‘linkage’ between state and society. In the not too distant past, parties were large voluntary associations that voiced the needs of specific social groups. In contrast, twenty-first century parties identify themselves with government. Thus, they have abandoned their role as citizens’ advocates. Due to the influence of the media, contemporary parties address an undifferentiated audience and, for the most part, are more interested in serving as brokers of different interests than in their traditional role as spokespeople. Consequently, the position of mainstream parties has become awkward. According to Katz and Mair’s ‘cartel party’ theory, parties have defended themselves in various ways, but the discontent that they attract has not decreased. In actual fact, the task they face is rather difficult. On the one hand—and despite the fact that voters are offered only vague promises during electoral campaigns—, these parties tend to create high expectations around certain issues. On the other hand, they are urged on by interest groups to promote specific agendas that often arise out of the mainstream parties’ conflict with voters’ expectations and 59 their failure to meet them. Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, mainstream parties smash against the cliffs of electoral discontent, which are readily and fruitfully exploited through forms of protest on which populist parties capitalise. These parties sow even further discontent and perform the same representative function that mainstream parties have abandoned. According to Mair (2000; 2009), this dynamic has generated a peculiar division of labour in which mainstream parties dedicate themselves to government-related activities, while populist parties invest their resources in representation. At the same time, the rhetoric and symbolic acts populists employ and perform in campaigns cause significant damage to democratic life. Hanspeter Kriesi (2014) is another well-known political scientist who has offered an alternative viewpoint on political representation. He criticises Mair by arguing that representation is not at all in crisis but rather that the traditional function of representation is no longer carried out by political parties. These parties have ceased to guarantee representation not because they are more interested in government, but because the world around them has changed. This is due to the fact that Western societies are now governed differently for several reasons, including multi-level governance and new techniques of media communication. Nevertheless, this does not mean that representation is in crisis if we consider that electoral representation has never been the only form of representation. Citizens can still make use of alternative channels to push their demands, protest movements have earned their political place, and the European Union and other international actors have “reinforced representation in the administrative channel to the detriment of the electoral channel” (Kriesi 2014: 365). Hence, according to Kriesi’s thesis, we do not see a crisis of representation leading to the success of populist parties but rather the opening up of a new structural cleavage in Western societies, which are now divided between the ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalisation. The first are the social strata that have experienced the delocalisation of enterprise, deindustrialisation, unemployment and an inevitable decrease in welfare-state services, while they have limited abilities to adapt to change. The winners, we can assume by contrast, are the well-educated, creative, cosmopolitan and flexible individuals who have been able to rapidly adapt to these inescapable transformations brought about by technological progress and globalisation. Populist parties have mobilised the losers’ discontent and become their defenders. While claiming to protect national culture and traditions, right-wing populists oppose immigration regimes and refugee resettlement programmes. Moreover, these parties stand for a strong nation state and are against European integration. In contrast, left-wing populists oppose the liberalisation of financial markets, multinational corporations, deregulation policies and privatisation, and they mobilise the discontent of citizens, which has been generated by the downsizing of the welfare state. According to Kriesi’s interpretation, not only do the ‘losers’ respond to populists’ anti-establishment appeal, but they are also culturally or socially conservative and incapable of adapting to change. A similar view is widely shared in both political and media debates. In considering the many comments made in political and media arenas concerning the United Kingdom’s EU membership referendum in 2016, alongside those related to the effects of France’s European Constitution referendum in 2005, we find that, according to such an interpretation, the more ‘traditional’ elements of British and French societies prevailed over the modern ones, thus giving both right-wing and left-wing populists a reason to rejoice. Also, the interpretation promoted by Mair is widely shared. The radical leftist critics of social democratic parties, who endorse the Third Way or similar positions, share his views. Nevertheless, the two interpretations Alfio Mastropaolo 60 —the one promoted by Mair and the other suggested by Kriesi—are far from being as incompatible as it may seem at first sight. According to Mair, once mainstream parties’ representative representative function declines, populists fill the political void left by them. Kriesi rejects the idea of a crisis in representation in general, but acknowledges that populists play the role of advocates on behalf of the social strata that resist change de facto by supplying an alternative to the void left by mainstream parties. In any case, in both interpretations there is some political bias. Mair is critical of mainstream parties, while Kriesi interprets populists’ success as a sign of the defensive reaction and anti-modern conservatism of the ‘left behind’. Representing the People: Which People? According to a widely held viewpoint, populism and representation are incompatible. Populists formally respect democracy and its electoral practices but, at the same time, question the rules of political representation. In their rhetoric, the people are one, their unity must not be called into question by party political competition, and their voice should not be distorted by forms of pluralistic representation (Müller 2016). Thus, populists imagine a ‘plebiscitary’ democracy or a personal leadership-centred democracy (Urbinati 2014: 173), which they already practice within their own organisations. Nevertheless, populist parties are fully fledged representative agencies, depending, of course, on the definition of representation one is willing to accept. If populism seems complicated, then political representation is even more so. The conventional view of representation suggests that the represented come before the representatives. The first are the principal and the second the agent (Pitkin 1967). But this view is not the only plausible one in the political domain, where the principals are made up of collective bodies. There are good reasons to believe that political representation works the other way around. The principal is represented, and even exists, only because someone provides representation by claiming to speak on their behalf (Bourdieu 1991; Saward 2010). Modern political representation came into being in seventeenth-century England when members of the new ruling political class who had entered parliament sought political legitimacy by proclaiming themselves to be representatives of the people. Ever since then, we have been able to perceive representatives as political entrepreneurs who engage in the struggle to claim power in order to represent somebody. Therefore, representation manifests itself, first of all, in a performative act. Through their discourses, political entrepreneurs identify, classify and categorise people. Furthermore, considering that from time to time the represented must be exhibited, political entrepreneurs organise and gather people into lasting or temporary collectives. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), through their theory of cleavages, provided an exhaustive map of the social, cultural, religious and economic premises on which the modern activity of political representation has developed in Europe. Of course, if we consider that representation implies the complicated action of gathering people who usually do not even know that they have something in common, the actions of representatives necessarily also require a great deal of fabrication, manipulation and translation (Latour 2003). As is usually the case in the analysis of populist parties, one of the first questions to be asked is: Whom do they represent? Who are their supporters and voters? This question is answered CHAPTER 2: POPULISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 61 —without total agreement among them—by electoral specialists who delineate in detail who votes for whom. In accordance with the different perspectives on representation summarised above, one can raise the question differently: How do ‘populist parties’ construct, define and represent those they claim to represent? And how do they define themselves as representatives? The representatives also have to invent and represent themselves. They must assume a role vis- à-vis those they claim to represent and play it out on the theatrical stage of representation. The obvious answer is that populists claim to be representatives of the people. Perhaps this is the reason that they have been labelled populists. However, it is a very generic label that raises some serious doubts. Populist parties are neither the first, nor the only ones, to have championed the people. Democracy legitimises itself as ‘government of and by the people’. Since the invention of representative regimes, not a day has passed without someone invoking government of and by the people and declaring themselves a representative of the people. The parties that celebrate the people in their official names or define themselves as ‘popular’ are countless. Many confessional parties, of the Christian democratic kind, refer to themselves as ‘people’s parties’. At the present moment, all these formations are joining together (often with other parties) in the European Parliament to make up the European People's Party group (EPP group). Moreover, this term has also been used by many left-wing parties. In the 1930s, parties participating in the Communist International called for political convergence with the socialists against fascism; the alliances that followed were called ‘popular fronts’. In France, the Front Populaire won the 1936 elections, while at the same time in Spain the Frente Popular opposed Francoist insurrections. In 1948, Italian socialists and communists joined together in the elections as the People’s Bloc. Therefore, populists do not have a monopoly on the term ‘the people’, and no single conception of the people has ever existed. On the contrary, there are various ideas about what ‘the people’ signifies. These conceptions are inconsistent with each other and incoherent when placed together (Canovan 2005). What is, therefore, the populist perspective on the concept of the people? Traditional mass partiesused to define the people as the demos, an ambivalent term that was not fully clear even to the ancient Greeks who coined it. The demos were both the citizens who took part in the democratic government of the polis and the lower classes. The same could be said of the concept of the people recognised in mass parties. In both cases, the underlying idea is very distant from that shared by right-wing populists and is rooted in radically different political beliefs. The populist idea of the people is that of ethnos (Portinaro 2013). Nonetheless, not many observers are willing to admit that this notion of the people is not so different from that promoted by the Nazis (Volk) and the Vichy regime (peuple). The ethnos corresponds to a communitarian and undifferentiated image of the people, unified by blood, land, history, language and culture. Right-wing populists invoke ‘the people’ chiefly in cultural and racial terms, promising to keep this group safe by reviving its traditions. They do so, principally, to counter threats of cosmopolitism, which promotes transnational policies, such as open markets and increased migration. An instructive example of the people as ethnos is provided by arguably the forefather of all the current generation of right-wing populists: the French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen. A former paratrooper in Indochina who took part in the Battle of Suez, Le Pen entered politics by joining a right-wing party, which today would be labelled populist, led by Pierre Poujade. Later on, Le Pen left his seat in the French National Assembly and volunteered to fight in Algeria. Alfio Mastropaolo 62 Finally, in 1972, he founded the Front National (National Front) by gathering Vichy veterans and veterans of the Algerian War, while emphasising the qualities of the French people within the terms of the ethnos. While addressing his ‘dear compatriots’, Le Pen had begun to stress the perilous issue of immigration by the early 1980s. His stance was based on three aspects: demographics, economics and culture. Immigrants, he asserted, had already been welcomed into France with excessive generosity, and were soon to alter French demography, considering their high birth rate. In addition, according to Le Pen, they were ‘polluting’ French culture and religious traditions. Le Pen also argued that they were too much of a financial burden since they increasingly took advantage of the French welfare system at the expense of French taxpayers, who, at that point, had been unjustly ‘abandoned’ by the state. Le Pen thus called for the rejection of immigrants. The second evil he denounced was the poor condition of French workers, taxpayers and national, especially small to medium-sized, enterprises. The people as ethnos were overtaxed and received inadequate and inefficient services from the state, namely poor education and insufficient healthcare. In Le Pen’s eyes, nobody defended the rights of new mothers or did anything to secure their children’s upbringing. Equally, nobody fought against crime, which was spiralling out of control. And nobody provided aid to French companies that were facing hardship on the international market. To combat all this, France, Le Pen concluded, had to be “strong, fraternal, French”.1 Not too different issues were emphasised by Jörg Haider, the leader of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) between 1986 and 2000 in his invocation of the ‘fatherland.’ The party’s mission is to defend values, culture, language, families and children against ‘multicultural experiments’ (Wodak and Pelinka 2002: 28). Such statements are similar to those made by the Italian Lega Nord (Northern League) too, which lumped immigrants together with Southern Italians (Diamanti 1993), and also to those of the UK Independence Party (UKIP). Its 2015 electoral manifesto stated that “UKIP celebrates Britain and will promote a unifying British culture. We will not condone the philosophy of multiculturalism because it has failed by emphasising separateness instead of unity”.2 Socialist parties used to divide the demos into classes, while confessional parties acknowledged the deep social cleavages within society but attempt to overcome them. In contrast, right-wing populists consider the people to be unitary. For them, any kind of division is strictly artificial. The ethnos consists of the ‘common’ and ‘small’ people (for example, small-scale entrepreneurs, tradesmen, craftsmen, farmers, blue-collar workers and so on), who are the ‘real’, authentic people. These people are the embodiment of morality, honesty and hard work, taxpayers who are in need of efficient hospitals, good schools, fair pension payments and so on. Nevertheless, if it is not divided, the ethnos has fierce enemies. The first category of enemies consists of the establishment, namely professional politicians, mainstream parties, trade unions, public bureaucracy, major corporations and international financiers, Eurocrats in Brussels and Frankfurt, who are corrupt and unjustly privileged. A second category within this perspective are immigrants (though rarely do official populist discourses and manifestos explicitly use xenophobic and racist language), particularly Muslims. The third category, coherent with the ethnos model, are drug addicts, homosexuals, unmarried mothers and other vulnerable categories of people assisted by welfare programmes. Right-wing populists differ 1 ( 2 ( CHAPTER 2: POPULISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 63 among themselves only with regard to the EU. While Northern European populists criticise EU policies for being too generous towards Mediterranean Europe, populists from Southern Europe criticise Brussels for being mean-spirited and tight-fisted. Nonetheless, all populists advance the same strategy for standing against these adversaries: national sovereignty must be fully restored. Concerned with the ethnos, the new far right parties have no objections to the market economy. Curiously, however, in their rhetoric they take advantage of, and profit from, the deteriorating socioeconomic situation of the middle and lower classes and social inequalities, which have intensified as a result of globalisation. This raises an interesting question regarding European populism in comparison to other experiences of populism, for instance the frequently cited Latin American one. According to Gino Germani (1978), the latter supplied a sense of identity to the lower classes and called for substantial redistributive policies that benefited them. In a significant difference, this doesn’t seem to be a function European populists want to fulfil. In contrast, what do they want to do to reduce social inequality once they get into power? Their experience of taking part in coalition governments with right-centre and conservative parties teach us that no welfare policies were be promoted but, au contraire, they supported policies aimed at cutting taxes and privatising public services should be pursued (Akkerman et al. 2016). It is highly probable that populist parties learned from each other through tactical emulation. Le Pen’s first achievement as leader of the French National Front (FN) dates back to 1984, when the party successfully passed the 10 percent threshold in the European Parliament election. Since then, political emulation has become evident. The FPÖ, which initially viewed itself as a nationalist and pan-German party—albeit with a large number of ex-Nazis among its ranks—and had even supported a social democratic government, became a right-wing populist party under the aegis of Haider. In the 1990s, Christoph Blocher took over the leadership of a moderate Swiss party—the traditionalist Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party/SVP) —transformed it into a far right populist party, led it to victory and turned it into the largest party in Switzerland within a ten-year time span. This model was then imported to both Scandinavia and the United Kingdom. Certainly, there are plenty of variations to the aforementioned model. The family of right-wing populists has become crowded, and also includes some ethno-regionalist parties that divide the people into subnational categories: the Northern League in Italy, the Flemish Vlaams Blok in Belgium, which was replaced by Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) in 2004, and the Lega dei Ticinesi (Ticino League) in Switzerland. The Flemish party is overtly secessionist, whereas the Italian Northern League has now abandoned its separatist cause—though it continues to defend the rights of the ‘Padanian people’; the party based in the canton of Ticino does not wish to let go of the rights they enjoy within the Swiss Confederation, but proudly defends the Italian-speaking people of the territory. In addition, we face a true paradox in populist discourse. Right-wing populists negate representation but represent themselves as the people’s spokesmen and spokeswomen, and there is no doubt that they represent something and somebody. Furthermore, they make great efforts to organise their people in the ways in which mainstream parties once did (Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016). ‘Narrating the people’, which by itself does not really exist, is clearly a form of representation. What the populist parties do is balance their representative activity with a pe- Alfio Mastropaolo 64 culiar democratic fundamentalism. They usually appoint their leaders by acclamation, which implies, however, a heterodox form of representation. Populists give noteworthy preference to referenda, but this is after all a means of mischaracterising representation as direct democracy. This was the case with UKIP when it claimed that the referendum on British membership of the EU was “the opportunity for real change in our politics, rebalancing power from large corporations and big government institutions and putting it back into the hands of the people of this country”.3 Furthermore, populists add another distinct and rather disquieting feature to political representation. Their idea of democracy is anchored in their prejudice against pluralism (Müller 2016). Not only do they characterise the people in absolute terms as an inviolable collective totality, but they downsize, if not actually exclude, minority rights and any other fundamental rights protecting the single individual. The tradition of European constitutionalism is based on the rule of law and a system of checks and balances. After the world had witnessed the manipulation of popular sovereignty and electoral democracy by fascism and Nazism, in the post-World War II era, these elements were reinforced by, among other things, the introduction of national constitutional courts. The point here, as argued by Yves Mény and Yves Surel, is that populism may simply be the other side of the democratic coin (Mény and Surel 2000). Following their view, we might argue that populism has currently been rediscovered, along with the spectres that accompany it: most significant here is the tyranny of the majority. According to populists, the people as ethnos exist due to their oneness, and they must have granted the right to unitarily rule themselves through identification with those who guide it. This is clearly not the most conventional or healthy way of conceiving representative and pluralistic democracy. Nevertheless, even if populists might not be fully aware of this fact, there is no doubt that they still ultimately find themselves in the realm of representation. Western societies are, on average, more educated and better informed today than they were after World War II. Therefore, citizens are more inclined to criticise those who represent and govern them (Gaxie 2004: 152). This inclination is certainly one of the causes of what is commonly referred to as democratic discontent, which Mair (2000; 2002; 2013) identified when discussing the crisis of political representation. The reaction by mainstream parties has been to emphasise popular sovereignty and reinforce direct democracy through referenda, primaries, personalised leadership and the presidential turn of representative government (Poguntke and Webb 2005). Should we therefore consider this to be an indirect success for right-wing populist parties? Contemporary democratic regimes have been defined as “output-oriented democracy” or “government for the people” (Scharpf 1999: 6). Traditional representative institutions, such as parliaments and parties, have been marginalised, while the executives have been upgraded. A part of governmental activity has also been displaced to technocrats, independent authorities and European Union institutions. In order to balance these changes and reduce voter discontent, mainstream parties increasingly support direct democratic practices, such as primaries, deliberative assemblies and referenda. Of course, this does incur a risk akin to the outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership and similar events with unexpected results. Democracy 3 ( CHAPTER 2: POPULISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 65 itself has been redefined repeatedly. Mair suggests that it is becoming a “partyless democracy” (for example, a democracy against parties) and therefore a “populist democracy” (Mair 2002). Populist parties are, consequently, perfectly in tune with the spirit of the time that their action helped to create. Right-wing populists claim to represent the people but only use this argument in line with their own understanding of the concept. Nonetheless, they are not the only ones to do so, as has already been mentioned. All political actors manufacture their own versions of ‘the people’, including those that someone defines ‘left-wing populists’ (Kriesi 2014: 362). The act of gathering together and representing the people, as executed by right-wing populists, is not a particularly intellectual achievement but little more than the improvised amalgamation of a collection of loose ideas. This points to a significant difference between today's populism and fascism, whose conceptual foundation was indebted to several important intellectuals, such as Giovanni Gentile, Carl Schmitt and Drieu La Rochelle. In comparison with its right-wing manifestation, left-wing populists, such as the Spanish party Podemos, which was created by a group of young academics at the Complutense University of Madrid, include members who are capable of making sophisticated theoretical arguments inspired by the writings of Antonio Gramsci and Ernesto Laclau. Laclau taught in the UK for many years but never forgot his Argentinian roots. He developed a theory of the people that was explicitly inspired by constructivism. According to Laclau, in a global society the Marxian interpretative frame, that is, the idea of a society divided into different classes, is entirely obsolete. Contemporary societies are scattered and contradictory; populism is a political technique able to aggregate social demands (to be reconstructed later in more universal terms) with the aim of building political identity and groupings (Laclau 2005). The leadership of Podemos took these ideas very seriously. They are willing to mobilise and construct the "people" opposing it to the elites, and they suggest the end of the dichotomy of Right versus Left. Nevertheless, their system of dichotomous and antagonistic relations, such as lower/higher social classes, democracy/oligarchy, majority/elite, old/new politics and change/continuity (Cano 2015; Caruso 2017) is extremely different from the right-wing dichotomy between the pure ethnos and the corrupt cosmopolitan elite. According to Podemos, one part consists of a popular majority, which is national, republican and loyal to the 1978 constitution: this is the people. The other part consists of “a minority of the privileged who systematically disregard the law” and “systematically live on the margins of the law because of their corruption and tax evasion activities”: this part consists of politicians, businessmen, bankers and financial speculators (Caruso 2017). However, it must be clear that Podemos understands the people to be a pluralistic and unrestricted demos. There is no prejudice against immigrants, and Podemos supports the politics of acceptance, while recognising social diversity. The party acknowledges the multinational character of Spain, and endorses the Catalan, Galician, Valencian, and Basque populations’ right to self-determination. Therefore, unlike other Spanish parties, Podemos has no objection to the Catalan referendum on the region’s independence. This kind of pluralism also exists within the party, where former activists from the Communist Party of Spain, protesters from the Indignados movement and Izquierda Anticapitalista supporters, as well as regionalist activists, have all found their place. Equally compatible with their pluralism is their endorsement of participatory and direct democracy, even when exercised online. But the latter is practiced to strengthen democratic representation and not to replace it. Despite this, there is no trace of plebiscitary or Alfio Mastropaolo 66 ‘populist’ democracy within Podemos. It promises to fully uphold Spanish constitutionalism, which must be based on the separation of powers and on a system of effective checks and balances. Finally: could the demos Podemos means to represent be more different from the ethnos right-wing populists call upon? Representing the Populist Parties As it turns out, political representation is more complex than first expected. The represented exist because they are represented by the representatives. Nevertheless, the performative act of representation is not unilateral in all cases but rather relational. Representation is also a product of elaborate acts of representation by other political agents, who are neither disinterested nor indifferent. Representation happens in a competitive sphere, crowded with numerous actors—competitors and observers of more or less sympathetic inclination—who all comment, criticise and, above all, classify. This makes the act of representing a matter of contingency, above all things. No party, movement or ideology remains the same over time. Contingency is unavoidable; this is also the case for populist parties, which are only rarely aware of themselves being populist. It is here that we can trace one of populism’s major features. Political parties usually align themselves with a specific political family (Seiler 1980; Mair and Mudde 1998). Socialist parties belong to the socialist family and communist parties to the communist family. The same is equally true for liberal, confessional and fascist parties. This is to say that most parties from different countries are usually willing to share the same label when representing common ideological positions and thus adhere to a political family (most tangibly at the international institutional level). The European Parliament, for instance, has even institutionalised such political affiliation by grouping nationally elected parties under the same label. By contrast, the populist family is a complete invention by observers and political competitors. Populist parties have neither a clear international umbrella nor, for instance, a unique space in the current European Parliament. Consequently, the label populist is a paradoxical Nansen passport for homeless parties. Who invented the populist family? Certainly not those who have been labelled populists (leaving aside the Russian and American populists who belong to a completely different time and political modus operandi). Contemporary European populists, as well those from Latin America, Africa and Asia, are not born with the populist label. When this term was first attributed to some parties and regimes in South America and post-colonial countries—where the masses were being mobilised as a political force—it was fairly residual and vague (Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Canovan 1981). The act of classifying Peronism, Nasserism, Nakrumah’s regime in Ghana and that of Sukarno in Indonesia, among others, was extremely difficult by Western standards. These were neither socialist nor fascist regimes. However, they were egalitarian and anti-imperialist. Therefore, observers made a choice to classify them as populist. Not so different was the classification of a number of outsider parties that have emerged in Europe since the 1970s. They could not be clearly assigned to, and/or refused the right to belong to, any known political family. This probably explains why academic debate on the definition of populism has become so contested (Hubé and Truan 2017). The process of classifying such heterogeneous phenomena, which developed in markedly different circumstances, could not avoid a degree of inaccuracy. As a result, there is often the impression that each stu- CHAPTER 2: POPULISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 67 dent of populism has his or her own way of describing populism, which is variously defined as a political and communicative style, a kind of rhetoric, a discourse, an ideology (maybe just ‘thin’) or a peculiar way to occupy democratic institutions. All classifications make simplifications to some extent. However, in this case the classification not only simplifies but is also far from being flattering (Collovald 2003; Collovald 2004). In addition, those labelled populists have only recently accepted this representation. It is, after all, a stigmatising classification. Nobody takes into account the tradition of North American populism. Accordingly, the attribution of the same label to a new generation of European parties and movements, hardly compared to the liberal idea of democracy, does not dignify them with sufficient status at all. The people of non-western populists were made of anonymous and formless masses and, therefore, the opposite of the social classes represented by European parties. And formless and frustrated popular strata seem to be the people for European populists, as observed and defined by some commentators who are far from being as generous as Laclau was. Equally ungenerous and unsympathetic is the label of ‘modernisation’s losers’, representing them as individually beaten by change and responsible for their own condition. After all, there are many good reasons to consider them victims of modernisation. Is there any other label one could attribute to the populists? Calling them fascists would be too hasty. There are no traces, for instance, of scientific racism, although the former inarguably draw on the most murky repertoire of the extreme right. The French National Front has an evident fascist ancestry, and previously invoked flagrant anti-Semitism. It even made use, albeit with minor changes, of the same symbol as the Italian neo-fascists. The origins of the Austrian FPÖ, Swedish Democrats and the Northern League in Italy are not so different. UKIP has some connection to the anti-immigration stances of Enoch Powell (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015). On the other side of the political spectrum, the attention paid to social inequality, injustice and exclusion, as well as the demand for more egalitarian policies and redistribution, reveals the ideological ancestries of both Podemos and Syriza. It is also possible to draw some conclusions from the parties’ leadership. Pablo Iglesias, the leader of Podemos, has mentioned his past record as an activist for the communist left. Syriza in Greece is an agglomeration of different left-wing groups, while its leader, Alexis Tsipras, comes from the ranks of the Greek Communist Party. Among the members and activists of UKIP, the FN and Alternative for Germany (AfD) , there are many former activists from the British Conservative Party, the French Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The question of who votes for right-wing populist parties is not at all clear. Commentators from different milieus (politics, the media and academia) compete against each other, while putting forward their own representations of populist voters. Let’s consider, for instance, the French case. According to some observers, the Front National’s success is the result of a dramatic shift to the right of many former leftist voters (Perrineau 2001). Others assume that even though a shift did occur, it was not dramatic (Lehingue 2003). On the one hand, it is a wellknown fact that a significant share of right-wing voters has always come from the working class. On the other hand, nothing is more questionable than labelling those who support the SVP in Zurich, the Ticino League, Flemish Interest in Belgium or the Northern League in Italy as losers. Herbert Kitschelt and Andrew J. McGann (1995) argue that the supporters of populist parties are nothing but ‘welfare chauvinists’. In any case, if a considerable number of UKIP voters are indeed ‘left behind’, their political roots are to be found more in the Conser- Alfio Mastropaolo 68 vative Party than in the Labour Party (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015). This is similar to the French National Front’s voters (Crépon et al. 2015) and those of the Italian Northern League, who came mainly from the Christian Democracy Party. This has also been the case for Podemos and Syriza (from the other side of the political spectrum), both of which attracted many former voters from the mainstream left. On closer inspection, there are ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ everywhere. Therefore, the hypothesis regarding the radicalisation of former mainstream rightwing voters, including the working class, is as plausible as it is for the mainstream left. This would confirm Mair’s hypothesis, but would also call into question underlying political loyalties. Have they really changed? Or is voting for populists simply a form of protest, perhaps transitory yet more vigorous than the traditional form of abstention? Populist parties are also represented as (destructive) protest parties in contrast to the (constructive) programme-based parties. In fact, with the exception of some populist parties that do develop complex political programmes (in the case of the AfD and Podemos), the weakening of programmes is a general phenomenon, which Otto Kirchheimer, in his famous article on catch-all parties (1969), coupled with another general phenomenon: the personalisation of politics. Anti-intellectualism is another general typical addition to populist attributes. Nevertheless, if the level of intellectual development of post-World War II mainstream parties was very high, and their leaders were often well-known intellectuals, current party leaders are not. Moreover, we must acknowledge that the leadership of Podemos comprises a large number of academics from the Complutense University of Madrid and that of the German AfD was initially run by a serious economist. A similar consideration concerns leadership itself. Charisma is often attributed to populist parties (Taggart 2004), and the cultivated elites are keen to consider the uncultivated masses to be particularly receptive to appeals to the emotions. There is no doubt that some populist parties also owe their initial success to the popularity of their leaders. Nonetheless, if we take into account the history of party politics, we would find this either new or remarkable. The appeal of the ‘founding fathers,’ whoever they may be, is not new to politics but rather the political norm. Kirchheimer, in his article on catch-all parties (1969), commented on how, in order to adapt to the new media (particularly television), the figure of the leader was becoming a symbolic shortcut on the way to making parties recognisable, while diminishing the relevance of controversial issues. By aiming to expand political reach through propaganda, personalised parties could appeal to a larger number of voters than had been previously possible. Personalisation is common to many parties nowadays, mainly because of the ‘media logic’ that seeks out attractive figures in order to increase audience share. In addition, populists tend to employ simplistic, emotional, informal, provocative, coarse and even violent language (Canovan 1999: 5-6). But not all of them are the same, and they do not use the same language in all circumstances. Different leaders of the same party can speak very differently. Besides this, language is subject to constant change. Moreover, informal and emotional language has become much more common in current politics. It might reflect the need of an audience through the media. In the case of populist parties, it might even be considered a necessity. Let’s not forget that they face an already crowded political marketplace with intense competition, where established parties have many more resources at their disposal, such as the possibility of making use of public policies. Populist ‘start-ups’ do not usually have public funding to hand. CHAPTER 2: POPULISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 69 Politics is always rich in paradox. Right-wing populists often make unacceptable statements. On formal occasions, they may moderate their tone, but they are used to preaching xenophobia and racism. More than half a century after fascist regimes collapsed, the success of populists highlights the difficult conditions that plague contemporary democracies. Yet, this does not stop mainstream parties from adopting an ambiguous attitude towards right-wing populists. On the one hand, mainstream parties deal with right-wing populists as if they were a threat to democratic life, considering them unworthy and unreliable. On the other hand, calling them populists is also a way, perhaps unconsciously, to play down that same threat to democracy without excluding the possibility of the political exploitation of populists by mainstream parties. The exploitation of right-wing populists has a long history. It was anticipated by the leader of the Socialist Party in France, François Mitterrand, who changed the French election law in 1981 to enable the National Front to win seats in parliament, which consequently made things difficult for mainstream right-wing parties. After it had already formed an alliance with the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) , the FPÖ joined the Austrian government in 1999. The Northern League has joined Italian governments several times, as has the Danish People’s Party (DPP) , and both of them deeply influenced immigration policies in their respective countries. At the same time in France, mainstream right-wing parties vigorously debated the option of joining forces with the National Front at the local level. It is too early to know whether the same treatment will be reserved for left-wing populists as well: at the end of 2016 in Spain, the Socialist Party preferred to support the Popular Party rather than joining with the alliance between Podemos and Izquierda Unida (Unidos Podemos) . Labelling right-wing parties populist is much less unfair than labelling them fascists or extremists. There might also be an argument for calling them anti-system parties (Sartori 1976: 132-33). After all, they undermine the legitimacy of representative democracy. What mainstream parties probably do not take into account is that the vague and rough classifications attributed to these parties might have helped the populists. Not only might this label have provided populists the opportunity to gain new voters, but it may also have indirectly normalised their political discourse. A ‘populist’ party does not seem as repulsive as a fascist one and thus does not discourage voters from voting for it (though many such voters tend to conceal their votes, as many surveys reveal). Meanwhile, racism and xenophobia seem to have become less illegitimate. This is not really surprising considering that established parties, which are dogged vote-seekers, sometimes endorse truly questionable policies regarding human rights. It is very likely that populism will continue to challenge democratic regimes, and also social scientists, for many years to come. It is difficult to imagine a sudden decline in the appeal of populist parties. Let us not forget that political representation is an extraordinary invention by Western politics. For more than a century, the ‘outsiders’ who have crossed the threshold of political representation have, in many cases, if not all, been polished, tamed and, consequently, transformed. Can we imagine that the populists of today may go through the same process of political assimilation as those who preceded them? It is an argument that deserves great attention, and it is worthwhile observing carefully in terms of the future of populist parties. The state of political representation changes all the time. Political opportunities and circumstances influence political parties in many different ways. How do and will the so-called populist parties react to their success? Furthermore, populist parties are not all the same. They are different from one country to the next, and right-wing and left-wing populists are extremely different. Will they have different destinies? A second issue that needs to be studied is how these Alfio Mastropaolo 70 parties manage their representative actions both at the local and national level. A third issue that deserves attention is how and to what extent the political agenda will be influenced by populist parties. 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Alfio Mastropaolo 72 CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALISING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULISM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT Dietmar Loch Introduction The rise of radical right populist parties began in the 1980s in Western Europe with the French Front National (FN), the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), the Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB), the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FrP), Die Republikaner in Germany, and others (Betz 1994). With the transformation of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) after 1989 and the subsequent enlargement of the European Union, political parties such as Jobbik in Hungary, the SNS in Slovakia, Ataka in Bulgaria or the Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) in Poland joined this family of parties with their specific regional profile (Minkenberg 2015). Initially interpreted as a product of post-industrial society in Western European politics (Ignazi 1992), the populist radical right has become a central research object in the context of party politics and globalisation, first in Western Europe (Kriesi 2008; Loch and Heitmeyer 2001) and then through the political impact of the economic and financial crisis of 2008 on all of Europe (Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Loch and Norocel 2015). This role underlined the electoral importance of so-called ‘globalisation losers’ during periods of modernisation and highlighted the issue of economic protectionism in the ideology of radical right parties. Yet, the subsequent ‘migration crisis’ shifted the focus of research again, directing the latter to the anti-immigration core of these parties. Finally, Brexit and the role played in it by Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party drew special attention to these parties’ importance as Eurosceptical and Europhobic political actors, who have accelerated the crisis in the European Union and prepared the ground for Britain’s departure from the EU. Meanwhile, radical right populist parties have established themselves in European party systems, achieving different rates of success. Gaining access to political power, they moved from a position of marginality to one of having the potential to blackmail larger parties and finally to full participation in subnational and national governments (Mudde 2016). Even a country like Germany, long considered a special case given its historical legacy (Loch 2001), now has a formidable radical right populist party in the form of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). In the following section, I will first provide a short historical overview of the rise of populism and the radical right to show how these two strands have converged into today’s populist radical right. Second, I will focus on populism by analysing the ideological limits of this concept. Third, in the main part of this section, I want to examine the ideological profile of the (populist) radical right and its links to economic, cultural and political globalisation more deeply by taking into consideration supply side and demand side explanations. This includes a contrasting analysis of the populist radical right at the end of this part in relation to other party 73 families and ideologemes—fundamental ideational elements on which ideologies and belief systems are based—such as nationalism and racism. Populism and the Radical Right: A Historical Perspective From the Extreme Right to the Contemporary Radical Right Populism and the radical or extreme right have different historical, geographical and ideological origins. As a part of European history, the extreme right emerged at the end of the 19th century. From the beginning, nationalism and racism were its ideological pillars. Despite all the contextual differences between the 19th century and contemporary societies, both have been central in the ideology of the radical right up to this day: nationalism serves as protection against globalisation, and racism/Islamophobia calls for structural and systematic discrimination against migrants/Muslims. This kind of thinking was also present in European fascism, a unique and incomparable phenomenon which was nevertheless a violent expression of the extreme right in its aggressive and imperialistic pursuit of nationalism as well as its genocidal pursuit of racism and anti-Semitism respectively. After World War II, the extreme right was morally and politically discredited. In the decades thereafter, its electoral successes were embedded in specific political contexts and types of society. In fact, during the thirty years of post-war economic growth in West European industrial societies, the extreme right was practically non-existent. The marginal Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands (SRP) and the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), which appeared immediately after the war, can be neglected as a political force. Even the short-term electoral success of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in West Germany has to be seen, from a sociological perspective, in the same light, namely as a sort of deviant behaviour in the context of normal politics. Thus, the extreme right was interpreted as a “normal pathology” in liberal industrial society (Scheuch and Klingemann 1967). This view began to change with the rise and establishment of the radical right after the 1980s. Coinciding with the end of the post-war economic boom and full employment in the 1970s, the rise of the radical right fell into the period associated with the emergence of the post-industrial society (Wieviorka 2013: 17-24). In the 1980s, this produced an authoritarian “silent counter-revolution” (Ignazi 1992) in reaction to the libertarian and post-materialist values that had developed in the decade before as a “silent revolution” (Inglehart 1977), which refers to a quiet shift in middle-class values and orientation in the mass Western public. The polarisation between these libertarian and authoritarian values has reshaped West European party systems (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), resulting in stark opposition between Green parties, on the one hand, and those of the new radical right, on the other. This polarisation continued to develop and can be explained by cleavage theory as being a major contemporary societal split between those advocating ‘open’ cultural integration and promoting ‘closed’ cultural demarcation. We may conclude that the populist radical right is currently experiencing its electoral success by representing nativist protectionism against globalisation and denationalisation (Kriesi 2008; Zürn 1998). Dietmar Loch 74 From Populism in the World to “Neo” Populism in Europe As already discussed in this book, the origins of populism—in contrast to the history of the radical right—lie in the Narodniki movement in Russia and the People’s Party in the United States. There, the leaders had, in the Russian case, revolutionary objectives and, in the US case, reformist ones against modernisation. From there, populism spread to other parts of the world, taking root especially in Latin America (Hermet 2001). It reached Europe mainly only after World War II, impacting first France, where the traditions of an identity and a protest populism gave way to Poujadism, a movement named after its leader, Pierre Poujade (Winock 1997), and then Denmark, where it manifested itself in the Fremskrittspartiet under Mogens Glistrup, an anti-tax crusader. The temporary success of both parties was due to an anti-taxation movement supported by the ‘old middle class’, merchants and craftsmen, whose mode of production was in decline due to modernisation in the decades after the Second World War. It was only in the 1980s that populism became a more common phenomenon in Europe, first on the right and then on the left. Thus, both tendencies—populism and the radical right—and the research about them converged in that decade with the result that some authors have called this new phenomenon national-populism (Taguieff 2007; 2012; 2015), while others refer to it as the populist radical right (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; 2013). Populism: More than a Thin Ideology? Comparatively speaking, populism can be characterised by the differences with which it presents itself: these lie in the historical (country) and structural context (political system), the ideological tendency (right-wing, left-wing, religious, and so on) as well as the kind and degree of organisation and institutionalisation (‘charismatic’ personality, political party, political regime and so on). Given this multitude of differences, using the term populism has often been considered ‘concept stretching’ (Canovan 1981). However, there are at least three commonalities or similarities that may justify treating populism conceptually as belonging to its own category (see especially Mény and Surel 2000): first of all, there is the context of modernisation in which populism develops; second, there is the corrective function it can have in liberal democracy by representing ‘ordinary people’, which can hardly be qualified as ‘pathological’. Instead, it is characterised by demands for more plebiscitary democracy, more charismatic political leaders, and more emotion in politics. The third similarity is the political ease with which it aligns itself with various political ideologies. Although populism’s constant reference and appeal to ‘the people’ is its central defining characteristic, this, too, may be analytically subdivided into three connected spheres: economic populism (class people), cultural populism (nation people), and ‘political’ populism (sovereign people). Thus, we may conclude first that, based on its underlying similarities, “populism may be considered neither a political ideology nor a type of regime, but a political style based on the systematic use of the rhetoric of the appeal to the people and on the implementation of a kind of charismatic legitimation, the most appropriate to value the ‘change’” (Taguieff 2007: 9). Second, populism can have a mediatory function through plebiscitary democracy in times when the ‘intermediary institutions’ of representative democracy (political parties and so on) are in crisis. CHAPTER 3: POPULISM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT 75 In fact, the idea of populism as a political style and also as performing a mediatory function are widely accepted in research. By contrast, the main controversy concerns populism’s ideological content as it is not based on a substantive core. Populism has no value system of its own, but is built on a concept of relationships to other phenomena (Priester 2012). For these reasons, it has been qualified as a thin ideology (Fieschi and Heywood 2004; Freeden 1996) such as nationalism, feminism, and the like, which depend on a host ideology such as liberalism or socialism. The thin centre of the ideology is based on four core ideas: the existence of two homogeneous groups, ‘the people’ (as distinct from the state) and ‘the elite’; the antagonistic (and vertical) relationship between the two; the idea of popular sovereignty; and a ‘Manichean outlook’ that combines positive valorisation of ‘the people’ with the denigration of the ‘elite’ (Kriesi and Pappas 2015: 4). Research rarely treats populism as a ‘thick’ ideology, such as the attempt by Priester (2007: 9), who defines populism “(…) as a revolt against the modern state and a popular variation of conservative thinking which is situated in a triangle between anarchism, liberalism, and conservatism”. Populism’s dilemma of incoherent form and substance also relates to the similarities and differences between right-wing and left-wing populism, as represented by Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, and the Parti de Gauche of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France. If both leftist and rightist populism use the same political style, then the differences that remain are ideological. In fact, both tend to invoke the dialectical form of inclusion and exclusion. But whereas leftist populism stands for the inclusion of socially disadvantaged groups (‘class people’), right-wing populism stands for the exclusion of culturally different groups in favour of the autochthonous ‘nation people’. Here again, the main difference lies in the opposite content of the host ideologies on which the various types of populism depend. To sum up, the fact that populism does not contain a sufficient ideological core is inadequate in yielding a satisfying definition. Thus, we have to shift our analytical focus to the radical right and its ideological content. A New Party Family: Populist, Radical and Right-wing Terminology, Ideology, Concepts In the ‘war of words’ the terminology employed depends on various criteria: Linguistic preferences usually depend on national academic culture, such as the use of right-wing extremism or radical right in the Anglo-Saxon context, extreme right (extrême droite) in France, or rightwing extremism (Rechtsextremismus) in the German-speaking world. The choice of ‘extreme’ can also be based on a research interest in political attitudes and the objective to measure such positions methodologically along the left-right scale. Also, the theory of democracy contains, but for different reasons, the notion of ‘extreme’ in connection with the concept of totalitarianism. In fact, rightist and leftist political extremism often rejects the fundamental rights of liberal democracy. For this reason, political parties such as the German NPD and the British National Party (BNP) can be qualified as part of the extreme right. In ideological respects, this type of extreme rightism is akin to neo-fascism. In contrast to this terminological choice and its legitimation, we agree with Rydgren (2007) by defining the phenomenon by its substantial political ideas or ideology. This means, first of all, that radical right populist parties belong to the political right. They represent rightist values, Dietmar Loch 76 such as individual liberty, versus leftist values, such as equality, solidarity and social justice. Norberto Bobbio (1996) has shown that the fundamental values of the right and the left remain; only their significance varies in relation to social and political change. Second, these parties are radical, particularly with respect to their values, given that these formations reject individual and social equality (essentially on the basis of racism) and, thus, universalistic principles of liberal democracy. Third, all these formations apply a populist political style. In order to define these parties, it is furthermore necessary to know their organisational forms (cf. Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016) and their connection to the intellectual ‘new right,’ a discussion of which in its various forms would go beyond the scope of this chapter (cf. Camus and Lebourg 2015). Moreover, the political radical right goes beyond the idea of the party and can manifest itself in various forms: as a proper political party, a social movement or a subcultural phenomenon (for example, the often violent skinhead-milieu) (Minkenberg 1998). Normally, the social movement precedes the party, but populist parties generally maintain their movement’s character. These radical right manifestations may attain different levels of prominence in different contexts: For example, the violent skinhead-milieu was quite important in Germany for a long time because then right-wing extremism had no political legitimacy in that country. Koopmans (1995) has shown the interactive effect between party and this milieu in terms of organisation when comparing France and Germany. The absence of extreme or radical right parties in Germany pushed the phenomenon onto the street, whereas in France, the strong party organisation of the Front National managed to absorb and integrate this milieu into its youth organisation. Of all these forms, the political party is the dominant one. This insight takes us to the concept of the party family, which is historically and sociologically based on cleavages and their effect. Cleavage theory explains how basic and conflictual developments in society—such as industrialisation or the formation of the nation—have formed political conflicts and, with them, entire party systems. The cleavage structure of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) reflected the conflicts of the modern nation state in industrial society. However, ethnic conflicts did not exist in this ‘frozen’ cleavage structure and the extreme or radical right was not foreseen. More recently, Hanspeter Kriesi (2008) especially has given this factor new significance by showing the role of globalisation in cleavage formation. In terms of economic and cultural positions ranging from ‘integration’ to ‘demarcation’, radical right parties are seen as firmly positioned close to the end of the axis marking the demarcation pole. By contrast, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, other cleavages have emerged, the most important of which is the one that pits the centre against the periphery (Bafoil 2006). This cleavage, which is related to globalisation, has also been conceptualised in terms of a polarisation between ‘globalists’ and ‘plebeians’ (Lang 2009) where the position of the radical right in CEECs is located on the side of the periphery and ‘plebeians’. Cleavages form and modify political parties, allowing us to regroup them into party families. Importantly, radical right populist parties constitute a new party family of their own. The concept of party families (Mair and Mudde 1998) includes, on the one hand, historical, geographical and cleavage-related sociological aspects and, on the other, more political aspects, such as ideas and programmatic positions. Employing the concept of cleavages allows us to discuss, in the economic, cultural and political sphere, first, the link between globalisation and the radical right populist parties, second, their respective positions, third, their electorate and, fourth, the corresponding explanations for (the absence of) their success. CHAPTER 3: POPULISM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT 77 Economic Protectionism: Class Politics for ‘Modernisation Losers’ The hypothetical link between economic globalisation and the electoral success of the populist radical right is plausible but difficult to verify. However, for the time following the economic and financial crisis of 2008, this effect has been shown by Kriesi and Pappas (2015), among others. Cleavage theory can provide us with important insights (Kriesi 2008): the economic cleavage between integration and demarcation tends to structure what is supplied politically by the populist parties and also shapes the alignment of the electorate. However, what radical right parties offer politically reveals an old ambiguity. “Socially, I am on the left, economically I am to the right, and nationally, I am from France,” said Jean-Marie Le Pen in the presidential campaign of 2002. This is the traditional ambiguity between the pro-capitalist and socio-ethnically (pseudo-)egalitarian positions of the extreme right. In the 1980s, the radical right used to represent more liberal positions. However, since the 1990s there has been a shift towards economic protectionism. Radical right parties have become a ‘new type of working-class parties’, whose political discourse is particularly directed against globalisation and has received a boost since the economic and financial crisis of 2008. This prompts the question of whether the party’s positioning actually matches its electorate. Who votes for these parties? Indeed, the voters may be qualified as the ‘losers of globalisation’, meaning that they come from the lower classes and are less well educated than other parts of the electorate (Arzheimer 2008; Rydgren 2013; Werts et al 2013). If we asked where these voters tend to live in Europe, we would often find them in or near to urban areas characterised by the social impact of economic decline due to deindustrialisation. In contrast to such similarities, national particularities are more linked to specific regions with their corresponding political culture, such as the Alsace in France, Thurgovia in Switzerland, Carinthia in Austria, or partially in the former East Germany. Research on the French case has shown, for example, that FN voters often live in intermediary areas between the centre and the periphery (Fourquet 2014), and in the rural periphery itself, where they feel excluded and frustrated. Finally, we need to ask why people vote for these parties. Here it is important to note that the voters in question are often considered an electorate of fear (de Vries and Hoffmann 2016). How can this be explained? For one, there has been a renewed focus on socio-structural causes (Rydgren 2013). Corresponding demand-side explanations have a long tradition and analyse the ‘breeding ground’ for populist party voters, so to speak. They are mostly based on modernisation theory and consist of two research streams offering the sociological approach of anomia and that of relative deprivation (status politics). The aim is to explain the radical right through modified social ties or/and with respect to social structure. For instance, the rise of the French Front National has been interpreted as “the political echo of urban anomia” (Perrineau 1988; 2014: 105-171). Yet, although anomia is not a recent phenomenon in the disintegrating working class milieu of the ‘red suburbs’, the success of the FN continues. Thus, status politics seems a more plausible explanation for the FN’s electoral success. In fact, status politics attracts voters who experience or face a real loss of their status. These individuals either find their aim of upward social mobility thwarted or fear losing their position. This can result in the experience of relative deprivation (Gurr 1970) because the goal to be achieved does not correspond to social reality. The ensuing frustration can then transform itself into political behaviour (such as voting for a xenophobic party) when the political party succeeds in providing a scapegoat in the form of immigrants who are blamed for people not achieving their goals. In Dietmar Loch 78 the context of status inconsistencies, the radical right is not only present at the margins of society, but even more so in the midst of it. This ‘extremism of the centre’ thesis (Lipset 1981) suggests that we may be seeing a shift from the “normal pathology” of industrial society (Scheuch and Klingemann 1967) to “pathological normalcy” in modern contemporary society, as expressed by the successes of the populist radical right (Mudde 2010). In fact, Mudde argues that this means a shift in the respect that previously marginalised radical right values are becoming mainstream. In sociological respects, research would then have to revise the use of the concept of ‘deviant’ behaviour for the radical right given that the radical right and its voters have become too important to be considered either marginal or deviant in their behaviour. To sum up, socio-structural explanations help us understand the relevance of socio-economic factors, but they are not sufficient to give us a full account of them. Cultural protectionism: nationalism and Islamophobia Cultural and political approaches can complete these explanations. Cultural issues are related to the cleavage positions of either cultural integration or cultural demarcation, which extends to the opposition between libertarian and authoritarian values. The latter largely overlaps with the ideology of the radical right. In fact, the very ideological core of the radical right consists of the ‘rejection of individual and social equality’. The cornerstone and even legitimation of this ideology is racism and (to a lesser extent) nationalism, which matters in the context of national identity in two ways: Internally, national identity relates to the relationship with immigrants, which, in turn, is affected by racism in two ways, as both inegalitarian (biological) and differentialist (cultural) claims (Taguieff 2012) are directed against migrants. As such, ‘immigration’ represents the main cause advocated by radical right parties. It defines their positions on migrants, refugees, multicultural society and other issues linked to migration. In Western Europe, such anti-immigration positions are increasingly turning against Muslims. Islamophobia can be considered a particular form of racism. By contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe, the functional equivalent of Islamophobia is Romophobia or anti-Tsiganism. Externally, national identity refers to the relationship with ‘Europe’. Here, it is important to note that nationalism is per se not a contradiction to the cultural and political nature of Europe. In fact, nationalism has even become ‘polycentric’ as there are arguably many different variants of it on the continent. Moreover, even Europe as a whole is accepted and defended by the radical right on Christian and cultural grounds (“Europeanism”). However, ‘Europe’ also implies transnational community building, which causes a breakdown in the division between internal and external factors. In short, for the radical right, this means that the threat of ‘communitarianism’ is now coming from both directions, from the poor neighbourhoods and from abroad, and is thus raising the issue of ‘security’ or ‘crime’, two kinds of authoritarian solutions to which are proposed: internally, the radical right uses them to justify law and order positions, such as tougher criminal laws for delinquent immigrant youths. Externally, the fear of terrorism particularly is instrumentalised by radical right populist parties to broadly label Muslims as Jihadists and involved in international terrorism. As for the voters of the populist radical right parties, they are characterised by “strong nativist opinions” and by a “strong emphasis on the nation state coupled with an aversion to strange CHAPTER 3: POPULISM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT 79 others, more precisely negative attitudes against immigrants” (Rooduijn 2016). Furthermore, voters with traditional values are closer to radical right populist parties than those of other parties (de Vries and Hoffmann 2016: 22). The case of the French Front National shows great consistency in that ‘immigration’ has been the important motivation for its voters over the years. Cultural explanations, such as the “silent counter-revolution” (Ignazi 1992), also show very well how the radical right managed to profit from its resistance to the libertarian and postmaterialist values that were then sweeping across European societies. For certain groups, the values of the liberal elites and the middle class appeared to be going too far (de Vries and Hoffmann 2016). Yet, this explicitly cultural approach has only limited historical depth. In light of the fact that ‘immigration’ is the central cultural core issue of the radical right, its effect may be explained specifically by two theories: the ethnic competition thesis explains voting for the radical right on the basis of the ethnicisation of social problems (for example, competition with migrants in the labour market). Then there is the ethnic backlash thesis, which refers to the regulation of cultural differences. The latter concerns the relationship between the political and cultural inclusion of immigrants. Since neither republican colour blindness nor multicultural identity politics seems effective in mitigating ethnic conflicts, the radical right has been able to benefit politically. As a result, these parties have proved to be successful both in republican France and in multicultural Britain. Finally, national models of citizenship formation do not work as well as in the past any more. As pragmatic approaches to conflict regulation have disappeared, urban riots based on economic dissatisfaction have ensued, as again both the French and the British cases show (Loch 2014). How can the radical right conceivably be countered when ethnic conflicts play such a prominent role in modern society? Political culture plays an important role here. This is the concept to which we need to pay attention if we want to know whether the fascist past of a country may be a plausible historical explanation for the success (or its absence) of the radical right. Mudde (2007: 243-248) has shown that in more than half of the European countries he selected to examine this question, there was a systematic relationship between the existence/absence of a fascist past and the presence/absence of a radical right party. For the cases in which the fascist past is relevant, political culture has an impact on the extent to which the radical right is seen as a legitimate political actor (Winkler et al. 1996). In Germany, for instance, this threshold for the legitimation of extreme right actors has always been high. This was a result of the student movement of May 1968, which publicly confronted the older generation and the students’ parents for their involvement with the Nazi regime, thus institutionalising a political culture that protected Germany from the extreme right. By contrast, in Austria this part of history was largely suppressed after 1945. There, the leader of the right-wing populist FPÖ, Jörg Haider, through his political activities, helped lower the threshold of accepting the far right (Betz 2004), thereby legitimising offensive speech and action before collective memory work could develop an appropriate public awareness and a corresponding political culture. Finally, in France, the political culture always succeeded in defeating fascist parties and movements. Yet, today, the threshold in Germany appears to be decreasing, as indicated by the moments of success of the AfD, while in France the growing power of the Front National is becoming a serious challenge to the country’s political culture. If we want to summarise what role economic and cultural factors have played in the rise of the radical right, it is crucial to link both by asking why a worker or an employee would vote for Dietmar Loch 80 such parties. The evidence seems to suggest that even though socio-economic motivations have become stronger since the economic and financial crisis, the main motivation for these voters has been cultural: cultural issues can be considered a kind of identitarian filter for socio-economic problems (Rydgren 2013). Finally, whereas the two cleavages discussed here represent the politicisation of the economic and cultural sphere in profound ways, there are narrower political issues and conflicts that matter as well. These relate to the political ideas the radical right holds about the institutions of the state and democracy, specifically about the sovereignty of the nation state and representative democracy. Advocating Euroscepticism in Favour of National Sovereignty Political globalisation does not seem to be an alternative to the nation state. By contrast, political denationalisation (Zürn 1998) in the form of European integration has become a real challenge to national autonomy. While the development of the EU has been shaped by federalist and supranational ideas, there is a renaissance of a Europe of nation states which destabilises the integration process all the way to Brexit. Populist radical right parties are the spearheads of Eurosceptical and Europhobic criticism of the supranational regime the EU represents. However, this does not mean that the radical right is fundamentally opposed to a political Europe, but according to them, it must be based on the idea of a Europe of nation states. Their demand for national sovereignty is based on the concept of a nation as defined by ethnically exclusive solidarity. The Europhobic positions of the radical right populist parties correspond to the negative attitudes of their voters, who believe that the integration process of the EU has undermined their country’s popular sovereignty. For these reasons, there are calls for the process of integration to be decelerated; certain countries even intend to break away altogether (Werts et al. 2013). Whereas this Europhobic criticism can be interpreted as a nationalist reaction to political denationalisation, the situation is different in Central and Eastern Europe. There, national sovereignty was initially regained through democratic nationalism in the context of velvet revolutions. Many of these regimes became more authoritarian and ethnically exclusive only later. A Populist Authoritarian Voice in Representative Democracy In European nation states, political denationalisation can be interpreted as one of the external reasons for the ‘crisis’ of political representation. In fact, the decreasing congruence between these nations and democracy coupled with the partial denationalisation of the political and administrative elites have produced a lack of democratic legitimacy in these political systems. Individualisation, cultural differentiation and social inequality accompanied by urban segregation are some of the internal reasons for the ‘crises’ of representative democracy. Its indicators include “declining party membership and party identification, declining voter turnout, increasing volatility of the vote, and declining shares of voters who choose the mainstream parties” (Kriesi and Pappas 2015: 2). Yet, although the nation and democracy are no longer congruent, the elections at the national level remain the most important ones. This is the moment of tri- CHAPTER 3: POPULISM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT 81 umph for populism, for which the elites have become the main target. The paradox is that, by showing off movement characteristics, populism criticises political parties despite being itself a political party. The appeals made to the people reach voters who are dissatisfied with politics and for whom the populist radical right constitutes a credible alternative (for example, Arzheimer 2008; Rooduijn 2016). The main question is whether a vote for a populist party is ‘only’ political protest or, more deeply, one of political support? Finally, in this political process, the success of a populist party depends on several variables, such as the political opportunity structure, the role of the populist party as a political actor (Art 2011) and its position in its interaction with other political actors (cooperation or confrontation). Enemies and Friends of the Radical Right The interaction between radical right populist parties and other political actors leads to the question of how this party family can be distinguished from others. Who are their ideological enemies and who are their friends? Without doubt, differences exist, within the radical right populist party family and across party families. An internal differentiation can be made according to the position the parties take vis-à-vis the sovereignty of the nation state and in the context of globalisation and denationalisation (cf. Zürn 1998). In fact, in Western Europe, the party family of the populist radical right is characterised by national populist parties (FN, FPÖ, Dansk Folkeparti, and so on) as well as by regional separatist and populist parties (Lega Nord, Vlaams Belang, Plataforma per Catalunya, and so on). In Central and Eastern Europe, the positions are different and marked, as already described, by the cleavage between the centre and periphery. A distinction to other right-wing parties can be made on ideological grounds, separating radical right populist parties from clearly neo-fascist and anti-constitutional extreme right parties, such as the former MSI in Italy, the BNP in Great Britain, the NPD in Germany and Golden Dawn in Greece. Moreover, these parties for the most part do not use the populist style. On the other hand, there are and have been populist parties with neo-liberal or conservative tendencies, such as Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and Fidesz in Hungary. This means that in contemporary European societies populism can ally itself with almost every set of ideas but has primarily manifested itself on the radical right. Furthermore, there are still other ‘thin ideologies’, such as nationalism, racism or Islamophobia and/or anti-Semitism (Taguieff 2015), which can also overlap with several party families and ‘host ideologies’. Nevertheless, the radical right seems to succeed best when bringing them together and propagating them in the public and political space. Conclusion The populist radical right has been analysed based on party typology and cleavage theory as an expression of nativist protectionism against globalisation in Europe. One of the core questions was to determine the relationship between the radical right and populism. If radical right parties are categorised conceptually as subordinate to populism, a terminological dilemma ensues because of the ‘thinness’ of the core concept and the absence of a common ideological de- Dietmar Loch 82 nominator. By contrast, if populism is subordinated to the radical right category, this allows for clear ideological definitions, but excludes, for example, populist neo-liberal and populist left-wing parties. For these reasons, the focus here has been an ideological one which provides a distinction between different populist parties or party families, such as the radical right and the neo-liberal one. This means that the radical right and populism are two different, but overlapping phenomena. This is similar to other ‘thin ideologies’, such as nationalism, which can also be found with left-wing parties. With its position of defending nativist protectionism against globalisation, the populist radical right is very visible in Europe today. It represents social fears about globalisation as well as authoritarian values implied in nationalist, racist, and protest positions. In terms of the electorate, this means that the lower the levels of education and income and the older European voters are, the higher the probability is of them perceiving globalisation as a threat (de Vries and Hoffmann 2016). This corresponds to ‘closed’ positions along the economic and cultural cleavage defined by (open) integration and (closed) demarcation. Here, a political response would arguably be social and economic policies designed to address the fears of those who perceive themselves to be the losers of globalisation. In ideological terms, the populist radical right supplies nativism, that is, nationalism and racism. Whether a response based on promoting universalistic and cosmopolitan values would serve as an effective counter-measure remains questionable. 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Winkler, Jürgen R., Hans-Gerd Jaschke, and Jürgen W. Falter (1996) ‘Einleitung: Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS), 27, 9–21 Winock, Michel (1997) ‘Populismes français’, Vingtième Siècle, 56 (1), 77–91. Zürn, Michael (1998) Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp). CHAPTER 3: POPULISM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT 85 CHAPTER 4: THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS Carlo Ruzza Introduction: The Relation Between Parties and Social Movements In recent years, substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to radical right populist parties (RRPPs). Scholars have particularly considered the role of such variables as electoral laws, coalition-building strategies of mainstream parties and other supply-side variables pertaining to the workings of party systems in different countries. Demand-side variables of an attitudinal nature have also been extensively considered. However, the radical right as a political ideology also constitutes a fertile ground for social movements—for instance, the English Defence League in the UK—which are not parties but significant protest-oriented forms of political participation. These formations are prominent campaigners on several controversial issues; they interact with other RRPPs, sometimes forming broad coalitions; and they have large followings in several European countries. It will be argued that, without an understanding of the social roots, cultural significance and grievances of these movements, it is difficult to explain the appearance trajectory and sometimes institutionalisation of RRPPs. This is also because, in many contexts, parties and social movements of the radical right coexist with and complement each other. Yet the connections between movements and parties of this type are rarely explored. This chapter will consider these connections with particular reference to Europe. In doing so, it will connect two bodies of literature – the literature on social movements and the literature on RRPPs (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015; Mudde 2007; Zaslove 2009). There are several reasons why the linkages between movements and parties of this type have not been sufficiently examined. First, movement specialists and party specialists do not often collaborate, and this particularly concerns studies of the radical right (Hutter and Kriesi 2013). While the multifaceted importance of movements in relation to parties has been demonstrated, the social movement research community has emerged and developed by studying different types of movements—typically the student movements of the 1970s, the new leftliberal movements of the 1980s, and the anti-globalisation movements of recent years. With some exceptions, this has almost invariably characterised the research agenda of social movements’ scholars. Secondly, in addition to a relatively limited academic focus, many movement scholars encounter problems of access in studying the radical right because the socio-economic and cultural make-up of activists and cadres of the radical right is often foreign to them. Thirdly, processes whereby politics is decentred from representative institutions are taking place. Politics is moving to new arenas because of processes such as the growing dominance of executives over parliaments and related processes of personalisation of politics. Arenas such as the media redefine the sources of power of political agents. In these arenas, social movements become visible and accepted interlocutors and acquire new importance. 87 Fourthly, contemporary political culture increasingly redefines political legitimacy away from representative institutions and state bureaucracies and in favour of a conceptualisation of legitimacy that empowers a host of minorities as proper interlocutors in political debates (Rosanvallon 2011). As interpreters of self-perceived minorities, social movements acquire especial importance in contemporary political culture. Their role in relation to parties, particularly cartel parties, then becomes one of providers of legitimacy, which is increasingly needed in the recurring situation of discredited and corrupt politics. As right-wing populist movements increase in salience and are often prominent supporters of right-wing candidates in elections at all levels of government, neglecting their role is increasingly consequential in our limitations in explaining the success of RRPPs, despite their growing prominence. Finally, the relation between radical right populist movements (RRPMs) and RRPPs is often under-thematised because the importance of movements is not always self-evident, especially if one mainly focuses on electoral arenas. However, as the resource mobilisation approach (RM) emphasised several decades ago, social movements are now often large organisations with professionalised personnel, a stable role in political systems, substantial resources and continuity over time (McCarthy and Zald 1973). Their size and stability has changed over time; it varies across different political systems and for different movements, but in Europe as well as in most Western societies they must be considered stable and important actors. Large movements, such as the environmental movement, at times, peace movements, feminist movements and increasingly RRPMs, coordinate efforts across national boundaries, mobilise large followings, exert advocacy at all levels of governance and have a stable presence in the public sphere. Their interaction with societies and their party systems is therefore a major source of mutual influence. This is also the case with movements related to the populist radical right. Like the new movements of the 1980s, this family of movements and parties has established strong social roots. They are then cultural as well as political phenomena with an ability to link the political and cultural sectors of societies, as evidenced, for instance, by their presence in the music industry, with a substantial level of internationalisation (Love 2016). This chapter then argues that the role of political parties, as well as the formation and diffusion of populist attitudes, should be considered in relation to the milieu of organised social and cultural initiatives that might or might not lead to direct electoral consequences, but which are key to explaining long-term voting behaviour, particularly with reference to this family of parties. Emphasising the role of this milieu is an approach not often utilised by scholars of the radical right. More commonly, a direct linkage is assumed between political attitudes and socio-economic variables. By emphasising these socio-cultural factors, as well as movement-mediated organisational roots, this chapter innovates and broadens explanations of the populist radical right. Integrating the Parties and Movements Approaches to the Radical Right The literature on movements and parties benefits from a contextual examination for several reasons, most notably because similar variables often explain both forms of political participation and their frequent co-occurrence. Two main approaches seek to explain the success of RRPPs and RRPMs. One focuses on the grievances and expectations of voters, that is, on de- Carlo Ruzza 88 mand-side variables. The second focuses on what political systems offer, that is, on supply-side variables. The literature that focuses on voting for RRPPs identifies specific socio-economic groups and their grievances, and it is equally relevant in explaining participation in social movements of this kind. Demand-side approaches often explain voting for RRPPs in mainly economic terms. Their success is explained by connecting the electoral outcomes of the radical right to the changing economic situation of specific sectors of the population, such as the often mentioned ‘losers of globalisation’, that is, the unskilled sectors of the labour market that have been experiencing downward mobility as their jobs migrate elsewhere. Their changing economic prospects have then been linked to specific grievances and to the radical right populist vote as forms of electoral protest and as a demand for protectionist policy changes in labour markets (Norris 2005). Similar electoral choices have also been seen as the consequence of ethnic competition for jobs, which is a consequence of a globalisation-related increase in migratory flows. A different but related argument has emphasised demand-side variables of a more cultural kind (Bornschier 2010). In this case, a sense of cultural estrangement ensues from conflicts over cultural values and lifestyles as individuals react to changing features and notably to the changed ethnic composition of their communities. There is ample evidence to suggest that both these economic and cultural grievances are at work in RRPPs (Norris 2005). They are also found to occur together in several contexts (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Supply-side explanations for the recent success of RRPPs typically cite the role of struggles over the saliency of issues and over issue position ownership (Mudde 2010). Structural supplyside explanations stress factors such as opportunity structures arising from realignment processes; convergence between established parties in political space; electoral systems and thresholds; the presence or absence of elite allies or, more specifically, the relationship with the established political parties within the party system (Rydgren 2007). Recent explanations stress the interaction between supply-side and demand-side factors (Golder 2016). Similar variables are found in radical right populist movements (RRPMs). For instance, nativist cultural ideas are strongly represented in a movement like the English Defence League (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015). In the same movement, economic issues are key factors in support for the EDL (Goodwin et al. 2016). This is because, in several instances, the activist bases of RRPPs and RRPMs largely overlap. However, some additional considerations on the nature of social movements are necessary to interpret the outcomes of this intersection. If one moves from demand-side to supply-side accounts, explanations of the success of RRPMs are well examined by the literature on them, but it is necessary to clarify the boundaries of a social movement because this is defined differently by different authors. The supplyside literature on movements—that is, accounts that do not focus on grievances and the psychological dynamics that contribute to their emergence—emphasises the distinctive impact of their unconventional repertoire of political action, their ability to mobilise networks of individuals, their framing activities, which often consist in selecting specific goals seen as politically relevant and congruent with preferred systems of ideas, and their ability to act in the public sphere. Thus, a movement typically has an agenda, a constituency, one or more organisations, a set of preferred forms of action and some continuity over time. It is different from a party because it does not seek to participate in elections. CHAPTER 4: THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 89 Just like RRPPs, movements have often been studied using the concept of political opportunity – a concept that, in fact, has its origins in the study of protest events. Hence, a similar set of variables can be utilised to conceptualise the success and failure of both parties and movements, and can therefore be integrated into a single model. The list of opportunities cited in the literature to explain movements is broader, however, because it encompasses societal dynamics wider than the opportunities considered in studying parties, and the concept has sometimes been criticised as overstretched (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). However, a broader concept of opportunity is better suited to studying the decentring of politics described above. Essentially, it is a concept utilised to identify the vulnerabilities of a political system, which constitute opportunities for challengers. The opportunities considered range from stable or relatively stable features of political systems, such as the state’s openness to non-institutionalised actors, via their propensity for strong repression, electoral laws and constitutional arrangements, to contingent features. The latter include the availability of institutional allies that can channel resources to movements, specifically relevant policy issues on the political agenda, and patterns of interactions between movements and the media on specific issues. We believe that, although the concept of political opportunity has indeed been used to cover a growing and possibly excessive number of opportunities, there are key opportunities that have been examined by movements’ scholars but not considered by party analysts. A broader societal conceptualisation of opportunities aids understanding of RRPPs and their relation to RRPMs. We will focus on two key opportunities and show how they shape RRPPs’ chances of success. The first is the specific relation between movements and counter-movements. The second is the relation between movements and the media. However, before we do this, we need to clarify the specific relation between RRPPs and RRPMs because we posit that the issue of the relation between parties and movements is of key importance in understanding how broad social factors affect not only movements but also parties. Parties, Movements and the Populist Radical Right The boundaries among a movement, a movement party, but also a movement sympathiser and a movement ally are differently conceptualised by different analysts, who often use different definitions of social movements. Here, we will refer to movements as forms of political participation that have a cognitive characterisation—a set of beliefs favouring fundamental policy changes (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217–18)—and actors’ involvement in forms of protest action. As a result of this approach, many party activists may also qualify as social movement participants if they share movements’ cognitive frameworks and take part in movement sponsored protest events. This takes into account the fact that in many instances movement activists prefer not to be members of movement organisations but share their beliefs and occasionally participate in forms of action. This may be due to the limited attractiveness of movement organisations—these are often short-lived organisations, only or mainly concerned with a single issue, and fairly unorganised, as was the case with several new movements of the 1980s (Rucht and Neidhardt 2002). Carlo Ruzza 90 Party activists, as well as members of the public, may also prefer not to be identified with a movement although they share its objectives and methods. This appears to be the case with several movements. For instance, European Commission personnel who support environmental movements or anti-racist movements may participate in protest events but prefer not to become formal members of organisations in order to safeguard the impression of impartiality that their role requires (Ruzza 2007). These considerations are particularly salient for RRPP supporters, given their prevalent anti-system image. In their case, the emergence of integrated political formations, which share some of the attributes of parties and some characteristics of movements, appears likely. In such a case, it would be beneficial to consider approaches to RRPPs and RRPMs contextually and integrate them. Specifically, we posit that the overlapping of RRPMs and parties is frequent and is indeed a characteristic of these formations and a foundation of their success. The overlap of parties and movements in hybrid formations has been noted in several contexts before RRPPs and movements. The party literature acknowledges that some movements may become parties but never complete the transition or form stable alliances with some parties, as exemplified by the relationship between environmental movements and green parties. In such cases, they form or interact with hybrid formations, which the literature on this subject has characterised as movement parties (Kitschelt 2006; Bomberg 1993; Offe 1990). However, relations between parties and movements are not always supportive. In some cases, movements may compete with parties for the time and energy of activists, or they may attempt to redefine or radicalise the policy agenda of ideologically like-minded parties. In order to frame these relations, it is useful to utilise the social movement category of ‘conflictual cooperation’ (Bozzini and Fella 2008). According to this perspective, like-minded parties and movements interact at various levels. They compete for the loyalty, time and energy of activists. They occupy different political sectors. Movements are members of the protest sector of society, whilst parties compete in the electoral arena. Convergences and cooperation can then occur in the support that each form of political participation can lend to the other in their reciprocal sphere. However, in some cases, endorsement can be counterproductive and may lead to conflict. These complex relations are also central to the dynamics between RRPMs and RRPPs. It is useful to summarise potential relations according to a typology that categorises relations as described in the following subparagraphs: Relations of Accepted and Consensual Interpenetration Many RRPPs have solid roots in civil society and mobilise networks of activists that may or may not be closely connected to the party but constitute its milieu (Louis et al. 2016; Knoke 1994). Some of the party’s activist base—typically the more radical and often younger components—function as bridges between this cultural milieu and the party. On occasions, this cultural milieu expresses independent organised forms, which have some relations with the party but are distinct from it. Conversely, in some cases, the party emphasises, supports and sponsors, or even manufactures, these organisations. This is, for instance, evidenced by the case of the Italian Northern League, where a wide network of civil society organisations is utilised by the party to retain and solidify its roots in society. In the case of the Northern League, they CHAPTER 4: THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 91 include hunters’ associations, sports clubs and language protection associations, and they can be conceptualised as belonging and giving organisational form to a larger ethno-regionalist movement (Ruzza 2010). Thus, in these cases, parties see movements as ways to legitimate themselves with their anti-system constituents. This role of movements is stressed by authors working on nationalist and right-wing parties— both those espousing nation state nationalism and those with an ethno-regionalist focus. This is often the case with regionalist parties, which are often seen as rooted in regionalist movements (see for instance: De Winter and Türsan 1998; Swenden 2006). Building on this theoretical and empirical background, social movement approaches have also been utilised to examine the social background of radical right populist parties (Caiani and Conti 2014; Ruzza and Fella 2009). All these studies illustrate particular aspects of the relation between parties and movements, and they focus on strategic interrelations between the two forms of political participation. Movements may also powerfully influence sections of large parties and help them in internal conflicts. This is the case with all movements, not only RRPMs. For instance, at the EU level, the environmental movement has been a historical ally of DG Environment and the Environmental Committee of the European Parliament, taking their side in recurrent conflicts with less environmentally concerned parties, as well as with other branches of the EU’s bureaucracy, such as DG Industry. In doing so, they often face industrial lobbies as opponents (Judge 1992; Ruzza 2007). Similarly, in several member states and at EU level, there are pockets of labour or socialist parties that support anti-racist, pro-migrant or feminist movements and try to instil similar values and movement-friendly policies into the rest of the party (Fella and Ruzza 2012). However, in the case of RRPPs, this interaction tends to concentrate on single issues. This is, for instance, the case with the populist Berlusconi party, which, even when it was in government, supported and participated in large events with names such as the ‘Family Day’ supported by pro-family and anti-abortion activist groups (Staff-Reporter 2007a). This amounts to a party strategy to integrate the benefits of the incumbent role with those of the opposition. In some cases, parties create and sponsor more sectorial activist organisations, or accept and support activists who also engage in political protests. This is the case of movements mobilising on specific issues with the full support of the party and overlapping membership. An example is provided by northern Italian farmers’ movements protesting against EU-enforced restrictions on milk production in the late 1990s and the following years. These protests utilised theatrical methods, such as pouring milk on motorways and street blockages, and they were fully supported by the League. Relations in Which Party and Movement Memberships are Distinct and to Varying Extents Conflictual This is, for instance, the case in relations between the ‘English Defence League (EDL)’ movement and UKIP. Many EDL voters vote for UKIP and display UKIP signs at their demonstrations, but this is frequently opposed by UKIP. For instance, former EDL members or activists are expressly forbidden from joining UKIP. Nigel Farage, the founder and ex-leader of UKIP has expressed ‘grave disappointment’ at the recurrent use of UKIP signs at EDL demonstra- Carlo Ruzza 92 tions (Culbertson 2015). Similar dynamics take place when Italian extreme right activists belonging to organisations such as Avanguardia Nazionale (National Vanguard) infiltrate demonstrations by the Northern League and provoke reactions which have varied over the years. They have been tense in the past, although they have become more supportive in recent years (Staff-Reporter 2016). Distinct but Generally Supportive Relations This is, for instance, the case with the Forconi (Pitchforks) movement in Italy and its relations with the Italian Northern League. The Forconi movement emerged in 2013 as a set of populist protests unrelated to the League and with a repertoire of disruptive action, such as blocking streets. It continued with irregular protests in the following years (Davies 2013). The Northern League supports this movement, even if it is rather different in terms of geographical base and, to some extent, ideology. Support has, for instance, been expressed by the current League leader, Matteo Salvini, in a December 2015 radio interview reported about on the website of the Northern League (Salvini 2015). Strong and reciprocal influences between parties and movements can take place regardless of size and the extent of their radicalism. For instance, a large party like the Republican Party in the US has solid and influential relations with the Christian Right movement, or there are equally strong relations between the Republican Party and the Tea Party movement (Green et al. 2001; Skocpol and Williamson 2013). These influences can take place due to overlapping membership, but also due to convergent pressure on the media, as a now classic body of literature on the relations between the media and movements clearly shows (Gamson 1993). The media need news with highly emotional and personalised content; and often theatrical and either alarming or supportive reporting on social movements provides this. These interactions make movements and the media mutually dependent and amplify the reach of movements (Gitlin 1980). It also makes them potentially useful to political parties. This clearly also concerns RRPPs and RRPMs (Burack and Snyder-Hall 2013). In most polities, there will be sectors of the media that oppose movements, but there will equally be sectors which espouse them and carry their message. The concerted efforts of RRPPs and RRPMs will then provide their framing strategies with additional strength and ideational materials. The media’s/movements’ reciprocal influences in relation to all political formations, but also specifically RRPPs and RRPMs, also increasingly involve new media (Van de Donk et al. 2004; Caiani and Parenti 2013). In all these instances, it is useful to conceptualise relations between RRPMs and RRPPs by using insights from Resource Mobilisation theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McCarthy and Zald 2002). This conceptualises relations between movements as taking place in a broad social movement sector which comprises all the movements coexisting at a specific point in time and further organised into competing social movement families—a subsector of like-minded movements (Zald and McCarthy 1980). Families expand and differentiate according to the global opportunities available to their subsector. In recent years, mainly because of the demand-side factors previously outlined, the subsectors have grown and developed differently in terms of the radicalism of their action, their willingness to form coalitions, their ideological variations CHAPTER 4: THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 93 and their strategies towards other political formations. For reasons of space, this chapter will concentrate on the first type: hybrid party-movement formations. Civil Society, Movements, Counter-movements and PRRPs as Interacting Systems If movement parties are a relatively general feature of contemporary European politics, it is necessary to ask the general question of why movement action repertoires are popular and even frequently adopted by parties. It will be argued that movement repertoires are adopted not only by RRPPs but also by movement parties of the left. The opposition between the two blocs, or the two ‘industries’ in the language of resource mobilisation theory, is important not only in the electoral arena but more broadly in a set of social arenas, which have, however, an impact on electoral dynamics. Such is the importance of this cleavage that it is played out in a number of social arenas as well, and it characterises movement-counter-movement relations. A process of venue shopping takes place with reference to arenas in which the two blocs compete for intermediation. Mayer and Staggenborg argue that ‘the choice of arena is shaped by activists’ ideologies and resources and by their perception of openings in a range of social and political institutions’ (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1648). A few additional clarifications are necessary on the nature of the competing movement party systems. In this context, a relevant finding from social movement research is that successful movements often lead to the creation of counter-movements, which in turn shape and constrain their agenda, political opportunities and coalition behaviour. Over time, a relationship of competition emerges, which is played out in several arenas, such as the national parliamentary arena but also the media arena, the local politics and supranational arena and political spaces within intermediary institutions, such as the trade unions. This competition is often focused on the political opportunities offered by emerging contextual events. In the present European context, RRPMs and RRPPs are the insurgents. In response to them, a set of counter-movements has emerged in many EU countries, and the political opportunity that has arisen is a perceived need to regulate migration. Migration has then become the key signature issue that offers a distinct identity to RRPPs and that is an equal source of identity to anti-racist movements in many EU countries and at supranational level (Ruzza 2013). It has become a major cleavage in national and EU-level policy, and as such it permeates several areas of political life (Kriesi et al. 2008). It is now perceived as significantly structuring the EU political level, where RRPPs have made significant advances in recent elections. This emerging cleavage permeates the intermediary social and political institutions that mediate the emergence of these sentiments and their translation into voting behaviour. The relationship between left-liberal views on migration and the movements that they inspire, on the one hand, and the views of RRPPs and RRPMs, on the other, is best described as a relationship between movements and counter-movements. Equally important are other political opportunity structures emphasised by movement scholars but neglected by party specialists. These notably include the role of repression. Action carried out by RRPMs and parties is often illegal. For instance, a frequent form of action taken by RRPMs is harassment of minorities. Carlo Ruzza 94 A couple of examples from the Italian Northern League should suffice. These include the forceful destruction of Roma camps or the intentional humiliation of Muslim minorities by spreading pig excrement on sites where the building of mosques is planned (Staff-Reporter 2007b). These illegal acts can be repressed in different ways. To the extent that the state does not engage in forceful repression of these activities, RRPPs will engage in media-relevant activities such as these. However, the willingness of states to repress them is influenced, on the one hand, by the degree of institutionalisation of these formations, their coalition-building strategies and salience in party systems. On the other hand, repression will be influenced by relatively stable features such as states’ effectiveness in controlling their territory, their propensity to use repression and the effectiveness of the penal system. One has to add variables related to the positions of states in the system of international governance to state level variables. Thus, with reference to the previously mentioned attacks against Roma camps, Italy as a member of the EU has been investigated for condoning xenophobia by European and international organisations (OSCE 2009). For these reasons, the quality and quantity of repression is a key variable that mediates the visibility of radical right populist formations, which in turn is related to their chances of success. In addition, theatrical forms of action like the one mentioned are key to the success of these formations, not only in terms of media impact but also as means of rooting RRPPs in their cultural milieu. In a period in which political discourse is dominated by the fears of the ‘losers of globalisation’, states are increasingly less willing to engage in repression. The populist political discourse of the ‘losers of globalisation’ is, in many contexts, vehemently nationalist and protectionist to such an extent that it threatens key assumptions of constitutional democracies and their upholding of human rights. However, the populist political discourse is now so central to important sectors of the media, so naturalised in wide strata of public opinion that a repressive stance would punish incumbents. Harsh repression of the acts of protest by populist formations might produce negative consequences for ruling coalitions. In this context, the advantages of engaging in action that is visible and helps movement parties to establish roots in civil society often outweigh the risks connected to repression. By engaging in action that relies on using a repertoire of ‘politics of the enemy’ to create solidarity, RRPPs are able to confront their counter-movements, and the re-establishment of civil society roots is crucial for all political formations in the present period. Of course, attempts to establish and retain roots in civil society are not only made through disruptive forms of action. They also often take place through the creation of associative networks (Ruzza 2009). For instance, in addition to the previously mentioned networks of associations, they also include neighbourhood watch groups, which have been accused of harassing minorities. Thus identity-building action, service delivery action and media-relevant action are often integrated into complex action repertoires that cement loyalty to the party. They serve the purpose of anchoring political formations to a community, providing the latter with a sense of identity, agency and legitimacy. They are then means with which to rebuild processes of intermediation and to counter the disintermediating impact of recent economic changes and their impact on forms of social intermediation. This process of community building is essential to ensure the success of issue definition and issue positioning by RRPPs, but it is typically opposed by other movement parties that pursue opposite strategies. Thus, there are frequent protests in favour of victimised minorities, in sup- CHAPTER 4: THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 95 port of racialised groups and to voice values opposed to the nativism of RRP movement parties. A contest often emerges around the interpretation of conflicting forms of action. It is played out in the media and in a set of other intermediary institutions, such as workplace-related institutions, voluntary groups and religious institutions. Yet this movement-countermovement dynamic has been neglected by the literature on RRPPs because of the under-thematisation of the relationship between them and social movements. Nevertheless, this relationship is key to the literature on social movements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). The literature on the relationship between movements and counter-movements has pointed out how they interact and the complex ways in which their struggles continue in electoral arenas, in media arenas and in intermediary institutions. They make rival claims in politics and in policy, often recruiting competing experts to support their views. The outcome of RRPPs is therefore strongly shaped by the presence, effectiveness and framing strategies of their countermovements, which, as mentioned, often have a base in labour parties and other mainstream political actors that may well channel resources and legitimacy, and support their campaign initiatives. In times of the mediatisation of policy crises, the media themselves create counter-movements by seeking an alternative view and by personalising proposed policy solutions. Thus, typically, purportedly charismatic leadership is created by the media, which need to identify credible, outspoken and reliable spokespeople. The success of RRPPs is then often mediated by their political personnel and their ability to compete in a mediatised arena (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1642). However, this competition also takes place in elected institutions. For instance, at the EU level, anti-racist organisations and human rights groups, relevant members of the civil liberty committee of the European Parliament and sympathetic Commission officials collaborate in forming a nexus to provide legitimacy and research funds for activities that limit and marginalise any advancement of RRPPs in the Parliament. This contributes to creating a climate in which RRPPs remain isolated and ineffective at the EU level. They also provide information and foster relations among member state-based movements that oppose RRPPs. The likelihood of success of RRPPs is significantly shaped by these dynamics. For instance, the European Network against Racism (ENAR), which describes itself as ‘the voice of the anti-racist movement in Europe’, is a well-funded, broadly accepted and influential organisation which regularly advances policy proposals, conducts social and political research and advocacy, utilises strategic litigation and supports protest events in member states. It interprets and reinterprets media and political events in an ongoing competition with RRPPs, their connected associations and their related movements. Without understanding this competition, one cannot make sense of the successes and defeats of RRPPs. This is because, at least to some extent, social and political elites have an impact on the formation of the prevalent political culture and thus on the coalition behaviour of parties and the related electoral outcomes. This is so even if, as widely acknowledged, the populist vote is often an expression of anti-elite sentiments. In the competition between RRPMs and their opponents, a process of venue shopping takes place, whereby each movement seeks allies, often at different levels of government, which then constitute differentiated political opportunities. For instance, the success of a centre-right coalition at national level may relocate opposition to RRPMs to the supranational level. Evidence of this emerged during the Berlusconi centre-right governments in Italy, when pro-mi- Carlo Ruzza 96 grant associations were often closed and their advocacy moved to EU level or even city level. Thus, additional levels of government provide RRPPs with different venues in which to advance their claims (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1637). Clearly, a special role is played in this competition by what comes to be perceived as a policy crisis, such as an unexpected event that can be more easily exploited by one of the competing actors. This has typically been the case with events exploited by RRPPs, such as security concerns around issues of migration. Conclusions and Further Steps of the Research Agenda This chapter has argued that a dual process of disintermediation and of new and different reintermediation is taking place, and that social movements are key actors in this process. Political socialisation experts have shown that, for several decades, institutions mediating the formation and transmission of political orientations, such as the family but also community institutions, have lost much of their effectiveness as the electorate has grown more fragmented and less anchored to positions and values emerging from the workplace. This process, and the related decline of traditional political subcultures, implies that parties find it much more difficult to ensure continuity, to establish grassroots allegiances and to staff the network of events, festivals and political rituals that anchored parties to social communities in the past. In this context, social movements and movement parties emerge as functional replacements for some of the functions previously performed by parties. This role can be usefully framed by utilising some of the most prominent social movement theories and applying them to the relationship between RRPPs and RRPMs. Social movements’ approaches, and particularly ‘New Social Movement’ theories, have explained the role of social movements in providing anchors for personal identities (Polletta and Jasper 2001) well. As the literature on this subject shows, social movements can act as alternative channels of formation and maintenance of political identities and can then integrate or substitute identity provision by parties. This applies to several political identities, but also, and distinctly, to the ethnic and national identities promoted by RRPPs and RRPMs. Participation in forms of movement action is then used to create cohesion and to support devotion of the time and energy needed by political formations of this kind (Johnston 1994). This identity creating and maintaining role can also be usefully combined with the organisation-building capacity that social movements allow and that resource mobilisation theory has emphasised (Klandermans 1986). A strong identity is an organisational resource that movement organisations foster and strategically mobilise. In addition, the success of RRPPs and movements is often explained by their anti-system ethos, which translates into strong emotions by activists and voters and which in turn is utilised to create a climate of moral indignation, which PRRPs and movements use in their political communication. In this context, it is useful to consider the recent emphasis that social movement theory accords to emotions, their use by political organisations and their definition and redefinition during protest events (Flam 2005; Goodwin and Jasper 2004). More generally, it would be difficult to frame the success of RRPPs properly without reference to their distinctive culture of xenophobic nationalism, which survey analyses have often demonstrated, as in the case of UKIP in Great Britain in the run-up to the referendum on its EU membership (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Social movement theories have often reflected on the importance of culture in political decisions, and from CHAPTER 4: THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 97 different perspectives they have interconnected the cultural and structural aspects of political action (McAdam 1994; Jasper 2007). Thus, this chapter has argued that a movement-centred approach is useful in several ways. By utilising key insights from social movement theory, the chapter has explained the recent successes of many RRPPs as the outcome of an articulated collaboration/competition between parties and movements of the radical right. This fruitful application of social movement theories could in the future be extended to other areas of party-movement relations on the populist right. We will conclude with some examples of how to move the research agenda forward. At a general level, it is necessary to establish the level of network overlaps between movements and parties of the radical right. It would be important to document the electoral choices of movement activists and their changes over time as political opportunities evolve. In addition, institutional constraints play a different role in different types of party-movement interactions, which need to be classified and compared in terms of key variables, such as electoral laws, institutional arrangements and states’ support of democratic procedures. With reference to the typology of ‘interpenetration’ presented above, ‘conflict-cooperation’ and ‘distant support’, it is necessary to focus on framing strategies and the extent to which they are coordinated. The large literature on social movement framing can be employed usefully to study convergence or divergence between parties and movements and to relate these to media dynamics (Johnston and Noakes 2005). One can assume that framing convergence is taken for granted in cases of consensual interpenetration, or in cases in which an associational network is manufactured by a movement party, as argued in the case of the Northern League. However, even in this case, one needs to be cautious in assuming that parties, as more institutionalised and resourced structures, have greater power to shape agendas than social movements or, more generally, civil society associations. The organisational environment of parties includes interest groups and other organisations which may also be related to social movements, such as promotional, campaigning and public interest groups. They may not have the same access to state resources as parties, but they may well have the power to shape agendas due to their relations with the media, alternative sources of funding, etc. Traditionally, relations between parties and intermediary bodies have varied from a situation in which mass parties belong to civil society and share ideologies and personnel with intermediary institutions, to a situation in which parties act as brokers between civil society and the state (Katz and Mair 1995). However, this brokering role is changing in a situation of a widespread anti-system, and specifically anti-party, ethos. This new situation can provide movements with legitimacy, and the direction of the brokering role may then be reversed. This is particularly the case of anti-system RRPPs whose voters are particularly disenchanted with their party system of reference, as research on several EU countries has shown (Ruzza 2009). These considerations suggest a research agenda which needs to focus on the relative power of different institutional structures in different arenas; a research agenda which has yet to be pursued. Uneasy arrangements of mutual influence, competition for framing, and issue ownership are likely to develop in cases of conflict and cooperation between parties and movements. In such cases, the transnational and supranational dimension becomes important and needs to be examined. To return to the previously cited example of the relations between the EDL and UKIP, one notes that the Islamophobic discourse of the former may well have embarrassed the latter, Carlo Ruzza 98 but it has a substantial impact on public opinion in the UK, giving the EDL essential framing autonomy and influencing power over UKIP. In addition, one might argue that the power of the EDL to shape agendas is fashioned and empowered by a pan-European network of likeminded organisations, which are actively communicating online and in person, and which, in several respects, are better connected among themselves than UKIP is with parties of the same family (Caiani and Parenti 2013). A study should therefore be carried out on the modes of communication and mutual influence of parties and movements across different levels of governance. It is also necessary to examine the presence and role of potential overlapping networks and potential strategies of infiltration between different radical right organisations. The relationship between movements and parties that are organisationally unconnected but belong to the same radical right populist family is also complex and still under-thematised. The absence of interpersonal connections does not limit the overall impact of the global radical right bloc on the public sphere. Different organisations may unwittingly be perceived as part of a congruent ideological package and with their presence contribute to legitimising and incrementing the salience of radical right grievances and prospective solutions. For this reason, political communication approaches, which have been successfully employed in the study of social movements, need to be employed in studying the combined impact of different radical right populist movements and parties (Gamson 1992). In addition, it is necessary to consider relations between the political discourse of the left-liberal nexus of movements and parties and the populist radical right. An important and still under-studied area of research would arise from a broader conceptualisation of relations between a RRPP bloc and a counter-movement bloc currently formed by a left-liberal ‘social movement industry’ as a whole (a key Resource Mobilisation concept), which is still important in several countries. Relations between the two have been studied in terms of mutual influences. For instance, a key area of interaction is the ideology of ethno-pluralism or ethno-differentialism, whereby the left-liberal discourse of defending the rights to one’s cultural differences is applied by the right to constructs such as ‘European civilisations’ and comes to be reinterpreted as a right to marginalise other cultures. A few decades ago, prominent right-wing intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist adopted typical left-wing constructs, such as the Gramscian concept of struggling for cultural hegemony, and reinterpreted them as key components of the programme of the radical right (de Benoist 2011; Spektorowski 2003). This adoption is now widespread in the political programmes of many formations of this party family. Studying the interaction between contrasting ideologies is important for several reasons. One of them is that it yields better understanding of new formations that adopt a combination of RRPP frames and leftist frames. Such formations are becoming important actors in European politics. They include, for instance, the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Spanish Ciudadanos (Mosca 2014; Rodriguez Teruel and Barrio 2015). They are becoming powerful competitors in the protest market – that is, the entire domain of social protest as conceptualised by RM theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977). This has been noted by both academics and activists. For instance, Beppe Grillo, the leader of the Italian M5S, has frequently pointed out that the prominence of his movement party has stopped the growth of the populist radical right, thus acknowledging their interconnections. Like similar formations, this movement party utilises a repertoire of typical social movement action, but in expressing anti-migration stances, significant aspects of its ideological package are closer to the right, whilst the emphasis on deliberative democracy is typically borrowed from the repertoire of new social move- CHAPTER 4: THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 99 ments. These formations then compete with both the left liberal and the RRPM markets, often shifting their alliances over time for strategic reasons. For instance, in recent years, the Five Star Movement has formed a group in the EU parliament with UKIP; but in early 2017, for tactical reasons, it attempted to leave the group to join the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Its application for membership was rejected by ALDE, however, and the M5S abandoned its plans to move to what is, in effect, a completely different political formation. Thus, in order to understand the strategies and outcomes of the populist radical right, it is essential to understand its roots in the global social movement sector of a society and the complex nature of its competition, which can easily justify purely tactical stances and abrupt reorientation. This is facilitated by the strong control on parties’ programmes by the charismatic leadership frequently found in movements of this kind. This research programme is still in its beginnings, however. Finally, it should be noted that in several political systems, the social movements of the 1980s have institutionalised and come to confront the radical right as ideological and policy allies of the neo-liberal pro-market consensus. For instance, the prominent feminist Nancy Fraser notes that ‘progressive neo-liberalism is an alliance of mainstream currents of new social movements (feminism, anti-racism, multiculturalism and LGBTQ rights), on the one hand, and high-end ‘symbolic’ and service-based business sectors (Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood), on the other. In this alliance, progressive forces are effectively joined with the forces of cognitive capitalism, especially financialisation’ (Fraser 2017). Ideologically, Fraser points out that ‘progressive neo-liberalism’ as a form of integration of the values of emancipation and of societal financialisation leaves radical right populism as the only remaining political and ideological opponent, and she explains its success in these terms. This analysis, and similar ones, highlight that, in order to explain the success of RRPPs and RRPMs, analysts should focus on broader processes of the institutionalisation of earlier social movements and their relations with the ‘losers of globalisation’, who are no longer willing to embrace their ideologies, but whose quality of life has deteriorated to the point that they are seeking an anti-system answer – a radical right solution, which might be perceived as the only one currently available. Their acceptance of protectionist and xenophobic values and policies can therefore be interpreted as the last resort adoption of a protest stance in the absence of rival ideologies. Accounting for the success of the radical right therefore requires consideration of the protest sector in its entirety and comparative analysis of the processes whereby social movements and parties become institutionalised and their impact on the populist radical right. 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While disagreements have continued over whether populism is a style, a mode of expression, political strategy, discourse, ideology, zeitgeist, political logic or related construct (Roberts 2006; Stanley 2008; Barr 2009; Gidron and Bonikowski 2013), controversies still persist about the criteria that should be used to identify some current parties, movements or leaders as ‘populist’ and to gauge the extent of the phenomenon. One of the crucial obstacles is that the label populist is above all a creation of observers and political competitors, which has tended to infuse the term with a normative, polemic and/or pejorative connotation. Populists also often refuse to identify themselves as populist because the attribution is seen as coming entirely from outside. In fact, it is much less controversial to argue socialist parties belong to the socialist family and communist parties to the communist family. The same is equally true for liberal, confessional and fascist parties. The historical antecedents from which the name was largely derived, the so-called Russian and American populists, belong to a completely different time and political modus operandi, especially when viewed from the vantage point of contemporary European party politics. When this term was first attributed to some parties and regimes in South America, post-colonial Asia and Africa—where masses were being mobilised as a political resource—, the concept was fairly residual and vague (Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Canovan 1981). Classifying Peronism, Nasserism, Nakrumah’s regime in Ghana and that of Sukarno in Indonesia was extremely difficult by Western standards. These were neither socialist nor fascist but nonetheless egalitarian and anti-imperialist, so observers chose to categorise them as populist. The classification of some ‘outsider parties’ emerging in Europe in the 1970s, especially the anti-tax parties in Scandinavia, followed a similar pattern. A particular problem in developing conceptual and taxonomic categories has been the ideological and strategic heterogeneity of political actors. Populism is always linked to ideological frameworks beyond populism itself. Thus, populist actors always embrace additional ideological positions, right-wing, centrist, or left-wing ideas, or combinations thereof. Despite belonging to the same ideological family and regardless of the stigma they carry in their own respective political systems, populists often share the same prejudices about each other and refuse to be seen as cooperating with each other. For instance, populist parties have found it difficult to form coherent institutional expression in the EU Parliament. In fact, they prefer to ‘marry up’ if given a chance, as McDonnell (2016) has concluded. Importantly, populists refuse to be assigned to or belong to any known political family. 1 This chapter is based on a paper presented at the Fourth Mid-Term Conference of the Political Sociology Research Network, Brussels, 28–29th October 2016. 105 ‘Populist’ has often been a label applied to ‘homeless’ actors, which probably also explains why the academic debate on the definition of populism and classification has become so assiduous (Hubé and Truan 2017). Apart from scholars who do not consider populism a useful term, two main tendencies arose in recent years: a first and dominant tendency persists in the form of a somewhat philosophical or ‘essayist’ view. It suggests that democratic regimes, especially in Europe and the US are facing a sudden and unexpected proliferation of what observers and media have labelled ‘global populism’. Thus, almost every form of ‘anti-establishment’ or protest resentment tends to be subsumed under the label ‘populism’ (see Müller 2016: 1-3). This has contributed to the term populism becoming ubiquitous in its presence and allusive in its meaning, which has often resulted in normative and polemic uses of the label. The second trend, represented by scholars in political sociology, in political science and recently in political communication, is to try to develop new analytical tools in order to understand populism as an empirical phenomenon. Agreeing with this second approach, we argue in favour of the development of a more comprehensive framework of analysis for comparative research, which seeks to address several unresolved conceptual, taxonomic and methodical issues. First of all, we want to develop a conceptualisation that captures the intrinsically ambivalent nature of the populist claim, thus pushing beyond the constraints of the essentialist and normative approaches. Second, we suggest that the concept of ambivalence lends itself to a more gradational approach and framebased analysis. Third, we want to draw attention to the underlying conditions, as they relate both to actor and context, so as to be able to explain the rise and diffusion of the populist frame and its employment by political actors in current democratic regimes. From Ideological Dichotomy to Ambivalence One of the most frequent laments in political science and political sociology regarding populism is that scholars continue to struggle to define this concept (for an overview see Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). In response there have been numerous attempts to render populism as a simpler and empirical-oriented concept related to ‘people’ and the ‘elite’. Broad common conceptualisations that define populism as a set of ideas that encompass anti-elitism, the belief in a general will of the people and a Manichean outlook (Hawkins 2009; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Rooduijn 2014) arguably incorporate important aspects of populism and provide definitions on which most scholars agree (Rooduijn 2014). However, these categories are still rather broad and allow us mainly to distinguish clear-cut populist actors from non-populists but are less well-suited to comparing different manifestations of populism with each other. They are also often ill-equipped to assess many of the borderline cases outside Western Europe and Latin America. Although, as van Kessel (2015: 8) has argued, different interpretations of populism are not problematic from an empirical perspective “as long as there is a consensus about the concept’s attributes”, we are not sure that this is necessarily the case. In this regard, the emergence of the idea that populism is a thin-centred ideology, as proposed especially by Cas Mudde (2007), has represented something of a breakthrough because of its simplicity. Whether based on actual conviction, mere pragmatism or simply exhaustion from the interminable debates about the nature of populism, a sizeable share of the populism re- Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni 106 search community, particularly in the UK, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, has adopted this framework since the 2000s, for it provides a means of identifying populism and populist manifestation more unambiguously. In doing so, scholars have appropriated Michael Freeden’s (1996) idea of ideologies with a thin centre and applied it to understanding populism. Nonetheless, Freeden (2016) himself has remained sceptical that populism would indeed fit the definition of a thin-centred ideology any more than, for example, ‘nativism’ and remarked about this publicly in his keynote address at the 2016 Prague conference on Current Populism in Europe. The growing tendency to conceive populism as a thin-centred ideology stands in some contrast to the also widespread understanding of populism as a form of discourse following Laclau (2005; see also Panizza 2005; and Filc 2010). The latter has come in for increased criticism for its normative roots, its high degree of theoretical abstraction and its lack of empirical applicability, as well as its failure to link political discourse convincingly to political practice (for example, Moffitt 2016). Nevertheless, as populist claims continue to proliferate and morph after appearing in new contexts and as they attach themselves to different parties and host ideologies in ever more settings, populism’s hybridity and diversity continues to pose significant empirical challenges. Thus, the Muddean perspective, which arguably minimises populism to a parsimonious classificatory pattern, seems to show distinct disadvantages both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Not only did Michael Freeden view populism as ‘too thin’ an ideology to be meaningful, but there is also new dissent by other scholars who raise important objections. First of all, it is worth noting that once we apply the label populism as a(n) (‘thin’) ideology to a political actor or group of actors, we engage in an essentialist enterprise and run the risk of treating populist parties/leaders in a derogatory and thus normative manner (Aslandis 2015: 7). Although the intention is always to avoid normative appraisal, populism and its protagonists are often assumed to be forms of pathology to be studied in order to be eliminated rather than understood. Second, it is rather difficult to distinguish ‘thin’ and ‘not thin’ in ideological terms. Even though it may be argued that populism does not exist in a pure form as a ‘full’ or ‘thick’ ideology (like socialism or liberalism), this view still runs the risk of rendering populism as a catch-all concept (Moffitt 2016:19), thus reducing the chances of us differentiating between a generic populist claim and those traits more or less rooted in other ideological legacies. Third, without additional criteria (often added tacitly in empirical studies, see again Moffit 2016: 19), the Muddean conception limits the opportunity to analyse the extent to which a discourse or a party is or are populist on the basis of theory. This is because a dichotomous approach avoids ‘grey zones’ and, more generally, refuses to recognise the possibility of a continuum between populists and non-populists. Until now this has been less of a problem in Western European party systems, where there have been clearly identifiable populist formations (typically only one) that stand apart from the other mainstream parties. However, as some right-wing populist parties are moving into the mainstream and mainstream parties have begun to integrate some of the former’s issues and orientations, the borderlines are becoming less impermeable (Akkerman et al. 2016; De Lange 2012; Bale et al. 2010). Above all, in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, where mainstream parties have adopted nativist, illiberal and also populist messages, and where leftist and conservative parties have morphed in order to adopt a discourse on immigration, ethnicity and the EU, which is broadly similar to that of CHAPTER 5: ANALYSING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM 107 populist parties in Western Europe, a reductive or dichotomous conception of populism is illequipped to make global comparisons. Moreover, treating populism as an ideology in the context of a binary classificatory scheme also ignores one of its more crucial features, namely the intrinsically variable and ambivalent character of populist claims. Scholars such as Paul Taggart have pointed out that populism lacks “universal key values, taking on attributes of its environment” and instead creates “an episodic, anti-political, empty-hearted, chameleonic celebration of heartland in the face of crisis” (Taggart 2000: 5; see also Taggart 2002: 68). At its heart is a series of ambivalent claims about the people, the elites/outgroups, democracy, the state, society, the economy and so on. For example, the ‘people’ may refer to ‘us in general’, to ‘natives’ but not all nationals or citizens, to ‘the people of the heartland’ but not of the metropolis, to so-called ‘genuine citizens’, or to the ‘common folk’, to ‘hardworking tax payers’ or to certain kinds of voters alluded to in political campaigns. Generally, the terms employed by populists remain purposefully vague and flexible. Although the term ‘people’ often does denote ethnos in the sense of ‘natives’, it does not always apply. For example, in the Balkans, religious affiliation matters more than language or national heritage. Moreover, especially in left-wing populism, the ‘people’ include lower-class and poor people but there is less concern about citizenship. The ambivalence serves to divide a population in an effort to reconstitute a popular majority with which to gain political control. Thus, the kind of exclusionary rhetoric applied by populists depends on the ideological background of those making the claims and the existing opportunity structures. For example, the former Freedom Party (FPÖ) governor of the Austrian province of Carinthia, Jörg Haider, called upon ‘real’ Carinthians to vote for him. This implied that the members of the Slovenian-speaking minority of that partially bilingual Austrian province were somehow less genuinely real citizens of Carinthia than the German-speaking majority although both groups have been living there since the early Middle Ages and have long since intermingled. Moreover, the ubiquitous presence of Slavic family names in that state suggests that a large share of the so-called German-speaking population who voted for Haider were themselves of Slovenian ancestry but had become assimilated over the centuries. Thus, neither ethnos nor demos really mattered. Later, Haider’s Carinthian branch of the Freedom Party broke away from the national party and joined the somewhat more moderate Alliance Future Austria (BZÖ). Nonetheless, Haider as state governor, kept up the anti-Slovenian rhetoric because of the favourable political conditions. Using a dichotomous and reductive framework would make it difficult to assess the populist characteristics of the FPÖ compared to the BZÖ. Perhaps even more ambivalent than ‘the people’ is the term populism uses for its enemies, who are often broadly labelled ‘the elites’ or the ‘others’. Even people of the same ethnic ancestry may be perceived as outsiders and aliens. For example, the Bolivian populist leader Evo Morales and his MAS party refer to their main electorate as the originarios, meaning the original inhabitants as opposed to the European colonisers and their descendants. However, the Bolivian population is nearly 70 percent mixed (mestizo) and 20 percent genuinely indigenous. The number of whites is quite small, amounting to only five percent.2 Yet, the claims made by Morales and his party and the rhetoric employed conjure up a fictitious population of original 2 South America: BOLIVIA". CIA The World html. Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni 108 inhabitants who speak indigenous languages, dress in traditional clothes, engage in pre-modern practices and live outside the central cities. In reality, there are few countries in Latin America in which ethnos and demos overlap as much as in Bolivia. The people in the cities may be culturally different, more urban, prefer Spanish to Quechua or Aymara, wear Western clothes more often and attend better schools, but ethnically speaking, they are no less originarios than their fellow mestizos in the countryside. Although current literature tends to perceive the alleged opposition between people and elite as clear-cut, the relationship between these two categories is rather complex because of the difficulty of defining who the targeted elites actually are. Depending on the populist party and its leader and also contingent upon the specific situation, populist claims may defend or condemn specific people, groups, institutions and arrangements. The often denounced so-called ‘political class’ may include (members of) the government, mainstream parties, businessmen, intellectuals, journalists, bureaucrats, judges, corporations, the EU and its officials, interest groups, international societies and so on. What is more, the populist universe includes additional ‘enemies of the people’, such as immigrants, minorities, refuges, ‘welfare cheats’, criminals of various types and others. As one of the oldest and most successful populist formations, the Austrian Freedom Party has often adapted their messages to shifting circumstances. Despite appearing outwardly consistent, it has morphed from a pro-European, German-nationalist, anticlerical, pro-business party into an anti-European, welfare chauvinist, Austro-patriotic party that presents itself as the defender of Christendom and draws most of its support from blue-collar workers. Every time the party changed, so did the subtext of what the party meant through it juxtaposing ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’. While scholars do not always recognise it, populists are not only opponents of the existing political reality but also present themselves as agents of change. Although this may not necessarily mean revolutionary change, the promise of a more or less radical transformation of the (economic or political) situation to restore power to the people is the central appeal of populists. In some cases, change might be a systematic goal embodied in a clear strategy, while in other cases it is rather vague. According to Meny and Surel (2000: 181; see also Canovan 2005: 81-82), populism promises change in order to provide power to the people betrayed by the elite. ‘Change’ may express a demand for the dismissal of a government, policy change, but also the whole transformation of a polity. Populism has an inherent plasticity and is thus politically highly malleable. Nonetheless, it entails a profound tension underlying its core promise in that it claims to deliver people from the present and lead them to a future in the name of the past. The promise of restoring popular sovereignty by acting in the present to return to a status-quo ante in the future, that is, to a time and place before the elites had allegedly usurped power, is the core appeal and a prerequisite for the emotional connection between populists and many of their supporters. People are not necessarily emotionally invested in populist politicians but in the vision of a time and place they cherish and seem to have lost (see Betz and Johnson 2004). It is not surprising that research in the US found that many Trump voters “wished they had lived in the 1950s”, a period which candidate Trump singled out as a time when things were great.3 3 “Why Trump voters wished they lived in the 1950s”. BBC Report 24th August 2016 orld-us-canada-37161449. CHAPTER 5: ANALYSING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM 109 Populism’s fundamental promise is the salvation of ordinary people from current conditions (Canovan 2005: 89). In fact, populism’s appeal for change occurs precisely in a changing context: When political trust is low and the role of the media (including the new media) as critics of the dissatisfactory status-quo is extraordinarily strong, ambivalent populist claims about unspecific but sweeping change seem to be particularly favoured. Despite promises about sweeping change, populists know how to tailor their claims in such a way that they may achieve their intended strategic ends. Depending on the extent of change demanded, they are able to position themselves as radical anti-regime opposition far outside acceptable political norms, or they can open up the possibility of cooperating with mainstream parties and perhaps even be included in government. In the former case, a populist party may end up politically ostracised, as was, for instance, the case with Vlaams Blok (VB) and Vlaams Belang in Belgium. The linkage between government and populism also highlights the inherently ambivalent nature of that relationship both in terms of discourse and practice. Populists often use representative institutions to change policies and engage in office-seeking strategies even though they push for plebiscitary measures and routinely denounce aspects of representative democracy. Likewise, their claims about the importance of sovereignty of ‘the people’ are contradicted by their top-down organisational models and authoritarian tendencies. Given the complexity of populism, it seems overly reductionist to employ a minimal definition of the phenomenon. Instead, we suggest populism should be understood as making inherently ambivalent claims diffused by individual and collective actors designed to challenge the statusquo in favour of people’s empowerment and of elite change. It would be heuristically and empirically useful to analyse populist claims and their variation across time and space to see how they are adapted under given circumstances. Ambivalence is a multidimensional phenomenon: It may occur vis-à-vis ‘the people,’ whom populists define in various ways (see above) or may not define at all (for instance, all non-outsiders); and it applies to ‘the others’, an equally nebulous category in populist rhetoric. Ambivalence is also attached to other concepts populists often invoke, such as democracy: there, populists may argue in favour of certain liberal rules such as freedom of speech but oppose others such as the power of judges and the freedom of media. Populism’s relationship to established ideologies is equally flexible. In terms of economic policy, the ambivalence expressed in populist discourse varies between deregulatory demands and criticism of capitalism and free trade. Likewise, populists claim to want to increase or restore the power of the people, while also calling for more state control, expanded police power, better security and more law and order. Moreover, while talking about expanding democracy, the organisational model of populist parties is often rather undemocratic with power highly centralised in the top leadership (Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016). Given that populism depends on such ambivalent claims, which form part of a carefully constructed narrative that is made to fit a specific political context, in the subsequent segment we propose that populism should be best understood as a frame and less as an ideology (see for instance Aslanidis 2015). Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni 110 Gradation and Frame Scholarship has considered populism an ideology, a discourse, a strategy, a political logic or a style (cf. Laclau 2005; Moffitt and Tormey 2013; Moffitt 2016). Despite this range of approaches, only some of this research has tried to develop rigorous empirical frameworks (cf. Pauwels 2011). Nevertheless, the aforementioned dichotomous conceptualisation has emerged as something of a standard in the field. Yet, in recent years there has been a growing interest in treating populism empirically as a gradational phenomenon (Hawkins 2009; Akkerman et al. 2014; see also Pauwels in this volume; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Scholars working with different conceptualisations of populism seemed to converge on similar ways of analysing speeches, texts and citizens’ attitudes by using content analysis and surveys to measure the extent to which populist claims are made. Despite the diversity of underlying theoretical assumptions about the nature of populism, the main unifying feature of this empirical work is that parties, leaders and activists can be more or less populist at different points in time and in comparison with other parties, leaders and activists. This means that the ‘degree’ of populism (whether seen as an ideology, discourse or style) depends on some quantifiable presence of certain themes, words, tones, metaphors and images (Reese et al. 2001). Usually, the gradational approach has been justified by the necessity to understand both how the mainstreaming of populist actors occurs and how it is that mainstream politics adopts populist claims all too readily (Mudde 2016: 15; Pauwels 2011; Deegan Krause and Haughton 2009). However, one might argue that the gradational approach also corresponds very well to understanding populism as being ‘chameleonic’ and ambivalent by nature. By focusing on how different tactics and messages occur in different fields and at different times, the gradational approach permits us to show empirically how ambivalence is expressed. This observation leads us to our next key point: If ambivalent claims are central to this phenomenon, this would additionally support the idea that populism or populist claim-making can be conceived as a frame. Frame analysis offers a powerful tool, as an increasing number of scholars have pointed out (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Caiani and Della Porta 2011; Ruzza and Fella 2011; Aslandis 2015; Aalberg et al. 2017). Despite internal differences and controversies associated with this type of analysis (Benford and Snow 2000; Scheufele 1999), frames are generally seen as providing authoritative interpretation of particular social phenomena by activating larger discourses or highlighting certain properties that place the phenomenon in a particular light. Thus, “framing becomes a strategic attempt to guide the activation of particular narratives and repertoires of understanding with the purpose of mobilising consensus” (Lindekilde 2014: 201). An extreme example would be the suggestion that immigration as the target phenomenon to be interpreted was mainly a tool used by elites to replace one people with another that was more pliant. The idea of population transfer or Umvolkung has been a recurring staple in FPÖ campaigns since the 1990s. Like ideologies, frames try to explain what is wrong, whose fault it is and what has to be done (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 3). As such, frame analysis is compatible with most of the concepts related to populism and lends itself to both qualitative and quantitative methods. The core of the analysis is to empirically examine texts, oral speeches and images to determine to what extent a populist frame occurs. CHAPTER 5: ANALYSING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM 111 The master populist frame is generally expressed (a) by claiming that the ‘people’—typically conceived as a single homogenous entity—are in need of defending, (b) by identifying the sources of the threat and subsequently by directing criticism at the elites (and outsiders), and (c) by promising deliverance from the status quo through more or less radical change (Mény and Surel 2000; Canovan 2005). Given that the presence and the relevance of each of these three components vary among and within actors, we should be able to map actors, parties, movements and other populism-related attributes along a continuum in terms of the direction, salience, ideological connotation and extent of the claims employed. The same applies to subframes on issues such as democracy, European integration, immigration, Islam and the like.4 For instance, the anti-establishment sub-frame adopted by candidates and party leaders during an electoral campaign is presumably not the same in terms of position and intensity as the one adopted by that party’s representatives in government, which is likely to be closer to mainstream sub-frames. Ambivalence may thus occur within discourse and between discourse and practice. For instance, a frame analysis focusing on the relevance of anti-establishment critiques in official party speeches may not necessarily correspond to the legislative behaviour of that party. The early Trump White House provided many examples of this seeming disconnect, especially since the president continued his campaign rhetoric in office, drawing on anti-establishment sub-frames while his surrogates were simultaneously trying to assuage the fears of international allies and members of Congress by sounding more mainstream. The tension between different sub-frames—one more mainstream, the other based on the narrative of the popular insurgent outsider—were quite clearly visible as different staff, some drawn from the populist campaign, others from circles of experts and career civil servants, were intermixed when having to craft policy proposals and make public statements. At the same time, the Trump Administration also shows that discourses do have an effect on political practice itself in that populist politicians who were elected based on their outsider credentials feel the need to act as disrupters and launch a variety of initiatives designed to shake up the political status quo. In frame analysis it is important not to conceive populist claims as mainly a discursive phenomenon but to assess its impact on political practice. For example, when populists employ a frame depicting ‘the people’ with certain attributes—for instance, defined neither in terms of ethnos nor class but as a hybrid category representing an idealised community of imagined authentic people—, then this follows a strategy of dividing and reconstituting groups of voters with the purpose of creating electoral majority populations. Research has shown that the use of ‘people’ varies across contexts and cases. A comparative analysis of party manifestos of six Western European parties yielded the following four types of appeals concerning ‘the people’: ethnic-nationalist, civic, collectivist and particularistic (Raadt et al. 2004). Thus, it is generally important to ascertain the variability of the boundary and definition of a concept such as ‘the people’ and also to understand why a certain meaning was employed in a particular context or in connection with other sub-frames (Betz 1994: 69-106; Kuisma 2013; Marzouki et al. 2016). 4 Despite our heuristic interest in their approach, we question whether Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) focus on three distinct types of populism—“empty populism”, “anti-elitist populism” and “complete” populism—is able to overcome the shortcomings of reductionism. Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni 112 In frame analysis, it is important to distinguish between supply-side and demand-side dimensions because the populist frame expresses ambivalence both with respect to the ‘sender’ and the ‘audience’ of claims. Thus, populist framing and practices have to be considered both dependent and independent variables. These mutually reinforcing linkages between party manifestos and leaders’ speeches, on the one hand, and the attitudes of their various constituencies, on the other, have not yet been sufficiently explored by the scholarship on populism and represent fruitful new research avenues on populism. Explaining the Rise and the Spread of Populism Across Contemporary Democracies In many democratic systems where actors expressing populist frames were successful in the electoral arena, societies were undergoing crises and grave uncertainties. The common linkage that has emerged is the one between populism and societal, economic and cultural change. Addressing the question of the extent to which the populism frame occurs and matters is crucial; but it is equally important to understand why populist (sub-) frames arise and how they spread. To answer this question, one must look at the actors engaging in a populist discourse and the context: What matters here is first of all what we may call the endogenous condition of possibility. Endogenous Conditions These conditions refer to the innate abilities, resources and structural assets available to and shaped by populist actors. These include the origin and formation of the political actors themselves, including their personality and wealth as well as the pattern of the organisation of the party or movement in which they operate. For example, populist leaders like Jörg Haider, Christoph Blocher (although he was never actually the party leader) and Jean-Marie Le Pen each enjoyed the advantage of considerable personal wealth, which gave them a measure of autonomy both from internal party factions and external interests. Moreover, it allowed them to shape aspects of their party to suit their preferences. However, access to a financial fortune is only one aspect: They need certain abilities and resources inherent in themselves and in their organisation to communicate their messages effectively. If they lack communicative abilities, they will not be listened to. If they lack fame or the ability to muster promotional resources, they will be ignored by the media and public. If they lack organisational strength, they will not be able to concentrate power in the leadership or project their claims with sufficient intensity. We need to distinguish those conditions which are under the control of actors or which may be shaped by them from those which may not be altered and to which populist actors must adapt if they want to be politically successful. CHAPTER 5: ANALYSING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM 113 Exogenous Conditions Exogenous conditions of possibility refer to the given context in which actors opt to express their populist claims but which is beyond the control of the actors themselves. These conditions are defined by a complex configuration of structural dimensions, popular predispositions and communication patterns, to which populist actors must react. In a society with an ethnic minority population, populist actors may opt to build their claims around ethnic divisions, whereas in systems with a centre-periphery cleavage, populists will likely invoke heartland mythologies. In the latter, existing local predispositions against the capital city and the national media located in the metropolises may be readily exploited. Exogenous conditions vary not only across space but also over time. As already mentioned, such conditions entail various crises and uncertainties as a result of societal, economic and cultural change. They also include the revolution in information technology, increasing economic interdependence and a changing relationship between the economy, the state, society and the individual. These are well-known factors which drive different forms of socio-economic polarisation and growing mediatisation, both of which have an impact on everyday politics and life in general (cf. Castells 2009). Nonetheless, individual electoral races occur within national borders and thus in a given institutional context with defined constituencies. In order to explain how and why actors expressing populist frames emerge and succeed in electoral arenas, we have to consider more deeply how macro-level changes, such as those attributed to different forms of globalisation, become translated and framed in regional and national contexts. Although several scholars are strongly fascinated by the idea of ‘global populism’ or of the general ‘Zeitgeist’ (Mudde 2004; but also see Müller 2016), comparative research on populism clearly shows that regional, systemic and epistemic differences produce different populist outcomes (for Europe, see Ignazi 1992; Betz 1994; Koopmans 1996; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005; Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2007; Mudde 2007; Art 2011; for Latin America, see Weyland 2001; Madrid 2008; Hawkins 2009; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). One such crucial element are the political rules of the game that exist in a particular context. The election rules, government legacies and other political institutional arrangements may explain the variation in how populists frame their discursive strategy. For instance, as Katz and Mair (1995; 2009) have argued, party cartelisation, a collusion system of mainstream parties within government, may represent an important window of opportunity for anti-establishment opponents. As a result, socio-economic and cultural changes may by themselves not explain widespread populist claim-making. But if we connect these underlying factors with the erosion of old political cleavages and with associated changes in political institutional arrangements, we may develop a plausible argument for how democratic politics in consolidated political systems has been undermined and how this subsequently contributed to the creation of widespread insecurity. Such sentiments are exploited not only by protest parties but mainstream political actors as well. They too, may engage in making populist claims, to some extent using populist subframes to distinguish themselves in a highly competitive and strongly mediated political campaign environment. Candidate-centred electoral campaigns, dramatisation and sensationalism in media coverage, as well as the spread of social media may strongly enhance the rise of populist (sub-)frames (Mazzoleni et al. 2003; Moffitt 2016). One can also assume that the more public opinion embraces the frame of a distance between ‘ordinary people’ and the political Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni 114 elite expressed in opinion polls through waning trust in politicians and their low approval ratings, the more the populist claim is perceived by elites themselves as a tool for their competition in a communication environment shaped by media logic. Thus, populism is not necessarily a pathological symptom of societal crisis, but the most effective response by (including mainstream) actors when pursuing political power under changing—political and media-based —rules of the game. The Role of Endogenous and Exogenous Conditions in Populist Claim-Making Most scholars would agree that discrete contexts shape not only the perception of populism as a construct but also the perception of populist protagonists themselves in the sense that the phenomenon becomes attached to certain leaders, political parties, movements and even forms of communication (Madrid 2008; Subramanian 2007; Hawkins 2010; Jansen 2011). This means that the endogenous conditions related to actors’ traits and the factors under their control are the more crucial dimensions in spreading populism. Whereas exogenous dimensions are necessary conditions, they are not enough to explain the rise, spread and the ambivalence of populist claims. The decision on whether to convincingly claim that women’s liberation is under assault from Islam or to equally persuasively denounce it as undermining the community’s social fabric depends on the populist protagonist’s ability to read a given context and to use their available assets as effectively as possible. Overall, the claims about women remain ambivalent but different versions will be deployed to maximum effect in different contexts. Populist frames need political entrepreneurs capable of developing and disseminating them. A crucial condition for the success of the populist discourse is the credibility of the claims maker as a challenger or change agent. The key is the populist actor’s ‘transformational’ leadership (Burns 1978), although populist scholarship prefers to adopt the controversial term of ‘charisma’ (see for instance, Barr 2009). In doing so, the claims maker can draw on the aforementioned objective resources, such as wealth, networks, celebrity status, media access and the like, to appear credible in effecting change. Depending on the actor and the context, individual and collective dimensions are relevant. The individual dimension, especially once populist leaders present themselves as outsiders, is linked to their capacity to convert non-political (economic, cultural and so on) capital into political capital (for example, public reputation), and, more generally, to mobilise all resources available to oppose (political) elites and call into question the formal/informal political rules governing the political system. The collective dimension can also play a crucial role in increasing a leader’s or party’s ability to spread populist claims. The organisation of the movement or party, which varies between more or less highly centralised and cohesive models, with differing financial and/or activist resources for mobilisation (Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016), and its capacity to link with more or less relevant interest groups in society and the economy all matter in this respect. Again, we notice how the endogenous condition reflected the populists’ ability to shape their party organisation intersects with the exogenous dimension of institutional rules and established practices. In a presidential political system like the US, in which political parties are mainly fundraising vehicles but which are otherwise focused on a ‘horse race’ between two major party candidates, fame and financial resources are key to overcoming the threshold of public awareness. CHAPTER 5: ANALYSING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM 115 Donald Trump’s fame as a media show host and celebrity, his experience in handling himself in front of an audience and his ability to communicate effectively were his assets in the endogenous condition of possibility. It was also an asset that he was able to finance his campaign independently of his party and their major donors. Moreover, Trump was able to mount a successful insurgency campaign more or less against the party that eventually nominated him without shattering the party, as would undoubtedly be the case elsewhere. Thus, he also benefitted from the fact that the US party system is structured loosely enough to allow for considerable internal division and dissent without splitting a party altogether. In other words, the political entrepreneur Trump could engage in claims against and operate in a manner contrary to a party whose leadership he was seeking to an extent which conditions elsewhere would prohibit. By comparison, in a West European party system, populist political entrepreneurs might first try to bring the respective parties under their control by challenging the old leadership or mobilising the base, as Jörg Haider did in 1986 when he took control of the FPÖ. In such a context, leaders may then aim to concentrate power and centralise decision-making so as to project polarisalaing messages without fear of internal dissent (Heinisch 2016). What matters is how populist actors shape the intersection of endogenous and exogenous conditions. This also extends to the populist party’s position in the political system. Whether a party’s place is more ‘peripheral’ or ‘central’, such as by participating in government, shaping public policy and/or using public administration for party goals, matters as it implies easy access to public resources. It also enhances a party’s capacity to be recognised by allies and opponents in the political system as well as by the media and journalists (Akkerman et al. 2016; Aalberg et al. 2016). Since one crucial strategy against populist opposition parties is the ‘cordon sanitaire’5, the ability of populists to ensure their centrality in the political and media system is the most effective strategy with which to protect their reputation and credibility. Nonetheless, the populists’ claim of being a central player includes an important contradiction because seeking office and entering government while simultaneously advocating revolutionary change creates a tension between the constraints of public office and the populist party’s operational logic (for example, Heinisch 2003). The populist frame of being a political outsider seeking power to become an insider in order to change the system on behalf of the people represents numerous challenges. The populists have to convince voters that they, as outsiders, have enough inside wherewithal to effect change without becoming system insiders themselves. Populist actors often fail in this task and pay the price for what is perceived as mainstreaming (Akkerman et al. 2016). Yet under certain circumstances, political success may occur. This happens in strongly polarised and mediatised systems, once the transformational leadership becomes strong enough to shape the rules of the institutional game both in emerging or consolidated democratic regimes. Application and Summary In this chapter, we argued that scholars of populism, especially those working in political science and political sociology should overcome certain limitations of current literature by moving on to a more comprehensive framework of analysis. The growing challenges in scholarship 5 In a ‘cordon sanitaire’ other political actors completely refuse to cooperate with and politically isolate the populists so that the latter become politically ineffective. Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni 116 are related to the capacity to grasp the complexity, the variety and the fluid character of populism. In contrast to proposing reductive, essentialist and normative approaches, we argued in favour of a relational structure-agency approach by asking how populist claims arise and how they may be studied empirically. In keeping with our understanding of populism as a frame, we are most interested in understanding how the populist frame varies across different arenas and constituencies. Inspired by Taggart (2000: 5), who argued that scholars should consider populism an “antipolitical, empty-hearted, chameleonic celebration of the heartland in the face of crisis”, we argued that populism can be heuristically defined as an intrinsically ambivalent claim. It is diffused by individual and collective actors to challenge the status-quo in favour of people’s empowerment and elite change. We take the ambivalence expressed in populist claims to be a dynamic and plastic multidimensional phenomenon: concepts such as people, elites, (liberal-) democracy, constitutional rights, rule of law or the economic system, among others, are all subject to highly ambivalent expression by populists, and so their content and meaning remain purposefully vague and vary depending on circumstances and context. The same goes for the traditional ideologies to which populism has developed a connection full of ambiguity and flexibility. The ambivalence expressed in populist claims is not only a question of discourse but also one of political practice. This means the ambivalence reflected in populist claims finds an expression both in policymaking and political culture. Overview of the Principal Definitions and Conceptualisation CHAPTER 5 [A]ANALYZING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM: BRINGING FRAME, ACTOR AND CONTEXT BACK IN Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni Table 5.1: Overview of the Principal Definitions and Conceptualization Definition POPULISM can be defined as a frame containing intrinsically ambivalent claim(s) diffused by individual and collective actors in order to challenge the status-quo in favor of people’s empowerment and elite change. FRAMES are sets of concepts used to organise, perceive, and communicate about reality. Frames and underlying claims are often connected to host ideologies. The GOAL OF FRAME ANALYSIS is to understand the relationship between frame, actor, and context. In order to analyse the ambivalence of populist claims, we proposed proceeding with a frame analysis (cf. Aslanidis 2015). It begins with the assumption that the populist master frame is restored (Mény and Surel 2000; Canovan 2005). The research would then trace, for example, through content analysis, the variation of these concepts in populist claims: the portrayal of ‘people’, the nature of the ‘elites’ and the extent of the ‘change’. Claims can be measured at the very least in terms of their direction, extremeness, prominence and frequency We then suggested adopting a gradational approach which allows for the study of parties, leaders and citizens with the objective of uncovering the extent of populist (sub-)frames used within themes, words, tones, metaphors and images in relation to their background ideology (left-wing, centrists, right-wing), channels of communication, intended constituencies and arenas of competition. If populism, as expressed by ambivalent claims, is the dependent construct, we suggested that a set of contextual variables can explain the emergence of such populist frames. These include, in particular, exogenous conditions of possibility like societal and cultural change, frames rooted in public opinion (disenchantment, waning trust in politicians and so on), institutional Table 5.1: CHAPTER 5: ANALYSING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM 117 conditions, the configuration of the party system pattern (relations among government and oppositional parties, strength of cleavage politics) and the media structure (for example, the increasing relevance of media logic in contemporary democracies). Within each respective context, it is the actor(s) that play(s) the key role in spreading populist claims. Thus, any analysis of populism has to focus on the means of individual and collective actors and their innate abilities and acquired resources, their credibility as change agents and their capacity to shape strategies and affect political rules. It is important to note once again that discourse and practice are linked to each other. In this sense, populism is not only a discourse but connected to measurable political realities in terms of conditions of possibility, choices of strategy and selection of policies. In our approach, we intended to suggest a way forward designed to bridge the chasm between those who have adopted the Muddean framework because they prefer its ideational aspects and empirical operationalisability, and those who see the discursive and multifaceted dimensions of populism but struggle to both link discourse and practice and measure populism’s causes and effects. Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni 118 Overview of the Application of Frame Analysis to Empirical Research (Example) Table 5.2: Overview of the Application of Frame Analysis to Empirical Research (Example) Hypothesis: The rise and spread of populist claims depend on social, economic, institutional, cultural conditions of possibilities. Dependent Variable MASTER FRAME: “Defense of the (virtuous) ‘people’ against the machination of elites and the promise of political change to restore the power of the people.” Ambivalent claims in the discursive frame: - PEOPLE: ‘Heartlanders’/demos/ethnos/Christians/whites/working people/taxpayers - ELITES: The political class/politicians/bureaucrats/ financial/economic elites/media/judges - DEMOCRACY: Plebiscitary decision-making/unrestraint majoritarianism/curbs on media and judiciary SUBFRAME 1: “Mainstream parties/Leftist parties have abandoned the working men and women because politicians are self-serving and corrupt.” Ambivalent claims in the discursive subframe: - PARTIES: Praise for old left/criticism of the (new) Left or the Left in general/’parties are all the same’ - ECONOMY: Critique of capitalism and free trade/favor economic protectionism/favor deregulation and lower taxes/criticise trade unionism Empirical Measurement: Claims can be empirically analysed by the range of meanings assigned to its component concepts, internal consistency, radicalness, ideological connection, frequency and prominence (salience). Sources: Manifestos, speeches, interviews, public debates, posters, billboards, political ads and commercials, and so on. Independent Variable Exogenous conditions of possibility Rise and diffusion populism claims is causally linked to a) societal and cultural change; b) institutional conditions; c) party system patterns d) the main trends in public opinion and e) the (changing) pattern in media structure… Endogenous conditions of possibility 1) Individual (actor-related) dimension - Innate characteristics of the populist actor(s) (charisma, rhetorical ability, leadership ability) - Economic, cultural, social capital (that can be converted to political capital) - Credibility of the claims maker as a change agent in the given context. 2) Collective dimension - Organizational-networking basis - Level of centralization/control over the organization/formation supporting the populist actor - Cohesiveness of the formation supporting the populist actor - Financial-activist and other resources of the formation supporting the populist actor Table 5.2: CHAPTER 5: ANALYSING AND EXPLAINING POPULISM 119 References Aalberg, Toril, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck, and Claes de Vreese (eds.) 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Democracies and the Populist Challenge (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 62–80. van Kessel, Stijn (2015) Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Weyland, Kurt (2001) ‘Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics’, Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni 122 CHAPTER 6: MEASURING POPULISM: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES1 Teun Pauwels Introduction Despite the increased interest in populism, it has taken a long time for systematic measurements of populism to be conducted. This can probably be explained largely by the fact that there has been little agreement on the definition of populism, which seems a prerequisite for measurement. Furthermore, systematic measurements of populism for a wide range of actors is a labour-intensive task. However, in recent years there has been more agreement on the core elements of populism—mostly conceptualised as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ or discourse drawing on the alleged opposition between the ‘pure’ people and the ‘corrupt’ elite—which has facilitated attempts at measuring it. This has resulted in some large scale attempts to measure populism across time and space. The results of these attempts are interesting in themselves and will be briefly reviewed in this chapter. Moreover, these measurements are now also resulting in practical applications. After all, the simple question of whether a party can be labelled as populist is ultimately not the most interesting one but it seems a necessary starting point from which to address several other more relevant research questions concerning populism. Challenges and Methods Definitions, Data, Dimensions Before exploring different methods to measure populism, we need to discuss some challenges that are relevant for any researcher who undertakes this task. These include definition, sources and operationalisation. First, it is clear that how populism is defined has an impact on how it can be measured. When populism is defined as an ideology or discourse, an analyst will traditionally rely on party manifestos or other party documents (speeches, party membership magazines, content on the website) to measure it. If populism is defined as a style, other sources might be preferred. Moffitt and Tormey (2014), for instance, conceive populism as a political style in which aesthetic and performative elements play a prominent role. As non-verbal aspects become important, party literature seems insufficient to measure populism. Jagers and Walgrave (2007), who also define populism as a political style, draw on party broadcasts to explore how politicians present themselves in the media, although their measurement does not differ fundamentally from other types of content analyses. 1 I would like to thank Kirk Hawkins for allowing me to use his data on the holistic grading of German parties and for his feedback on an earlier draft of this chapter. Furthermore, I would like to thank Vanessa Marent and Reinhard Heinisch for helping me translate the dictionary terms into German. 123 Since most definitions of populism agree that a divide between the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’ is the most important element of populism, many measurements make use of two separate dimensions: they assess whether the people are seen as a homogeneous and virtuous group, on the one hand, and the elite as a homogeneous and ‘corrupt’ group, on the other. However, some scholars argue that populists always exclude ‘dangerous others’, such as intellectuals, immigrants or other groups depending on the context (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2007). In this case, ‘exclusionism’ might be included as a separate dimension when operationalising populism. This strategy was followed by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) but since they measured exclusionism as a separate dimension, one can still calculate the degree of populism with or without exclusionism. The definition of populism might impact on the selection of the sources, as we have just seen. However, even with a similar definition, different sources may be selected. In general, it seems that although party manifestos are easy to access and represent relatively similar sources across different contexts, they are less suitable for expressing populism. Pauwels (2011) found that party membership magazines contained more manifestations of populism when compared with manifestos. This might be explained by May’s (1973) law of curvilinear disparity, which suggests that the rank and file members of a political party tend to be more ideological than both the leadership of that party and its voters. Therefore, membership magazines might reveal ‘radical views’ or, as Mudde (2000) puts it, the ‘true nature’ of a party more than other sources. Similarly, Hawkins and Castanho Silva (2016) found that speeches contained on average more populism compared to party manifestos and explain this by the fact that formal party documents for elite consumption are soberer in tone. Classification by Means of Minimal Definition Researchers using a minimal definition of populism can, quite easily, classify parties or leaders according to the criteria set out in the definition. Mudde’s (2004: 543) definition, for instance, provides strict guidelines in classifying a party as populist or not. A party can be labelled populist if (1) the people are depicted as a homogeneous and pure entity, (2) the elite as a homogeneous and corrupt entity, (3) the people and the elite as two antagonistic groups, and (4) measures in favour of returning power to the people are advocated (for example, direct democracy). Mudde (2007) uses this definition to classify a large number of populist parties in both Western and Eastern Europe. He also distinguishes between populist radical right, neo-liberal populist and social populist parties. A minimal definition suits the classical categorisation approach and has at least three advantages. First, minimal definitions enable a clear and dichotomous categorisation. Sartori (1970) pointed out how a taxonomical ‘either-or’ approach has important value and warns us about the dangers of a less conceptually grounded ‘more-or-less’ thinking. Second, this approach leaves a lot of room for the researcher to interpret the party literature to come to a conclusion. A complex concept such as populism cannot always be grasped easily by methods of content analysis because of their rigidity. Finally, minimal definitions can be specific enough though not too contextualised to classify a large number of parties in cross-national research (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Nonetheless, there are also some drawbacks when using minimal definitions to identify populist parties in practice. Teun Pauwels 124 A first practical problem is that language restrictions make it difficult for a single researcher to investigate party ideology in many countries. Another problem is related to the frequency and the level of a party’s populist expression that are needed to consider it populist. Is it enough when one finds one interview in which a party leader argues that the political system is corrupt, or do we need multiple examples? Third, the condition that the people and the elite have to be homogeneous groups is rather vague and leaves room for interpretation. Some borderline cases might fall in between two categories, and with relatively vague criteria, the classification might be contested. Finally, when applied by a single researcher, minimal definitions do not enable a reliability check. Content Analysis A second method to measure populism is based on content analysis: the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics (Neuendorf 2002). First, the researcher constructs a codebook in which populism is operationalised according to one or more dimensions. Next, extensively trained coders analyse documents in line with the codebook. Finally, one can calculate the percentage of paragraphs or sentences that are populist in different party documents. A content analysis is different from the Sartorian approach since it sees populism as a matter of degree. One of the first content analyses of populism was conducted by Jagers and Walgrave (2007), who developed a coding scheme to measure ‘thin’ (referring to the people) and ‘thick’ (against politics, the state, the media and immigrants) populism among (Flemish) Belgian parties, drawing on political party broadcasts. The content analysis revealed that the Flemish Interest (VB) was by far the most populist of all the parties examined, thereby confirming earlier qualitative assessments. While this study constituted a breakthrough in measuring populism, it was limited to one country, and issues of reliability and validity were not explicitly dealt with. It is also questionable whether referring to the people is enough to speak of (thin) populism. Another seminal study was published by Hawkins (2009), in which populism was measured by means of holistic grading of speeches by chief executives. The author devised a rubric that captures the core elements of populist discourse and then recruited and trained native speakers to analyse speeches according to the rubric. The unit of analysis is the entire speech, which could be ranked along a two-point scale (non-populist; mixed; populist). This strategy enabled the author to measure the degree of populism among executives in an impressive number of mainly Latin American countries. Cases that have often been labelled populist, such as the Latin American political leaders Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales, were ranked high on Hawkins’s measurement scale, and reliability statistics were mostly satisfactory. This approach profits from some of the advantages of the classification approach, such as the scoring of entire documents according to a clear and concise operationalisation, while allowing coders ample room for interpretation. The method was later applied to many more countries in Europe and the Americas and drew on election manifestos in addition to speeches to create one of the most comprehensive datasets to date (Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2016). Other content analyses include Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) and Rooduijn et al. (2014), in which the researchers used party manifestos to gauge populism in different European countries. Each paragraph of these party manifestos has been coded along two dimensions (empha- CHAPTER 6: MEASURING POPULISM: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES 125 sis on the people and anti-elitism). The measurements were typically reliable and their validity also seemed satisfactory since usual suspects, such as the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands or the British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom scored among the highest in terms of populism according to the analysis. Lately, these types of content analyses have become increasingly popular (for example, Bernhard et al. 2015; Reungoat 2010; Franzmann 2016). The main advantage of a content analysis is that the same source—for instance, a party manifesto—is analysed systematically by different coders which allows for reliability testing. Instead of only analysing ‘usual suspects’, one can empirically test to what extent all parties display populism in their documents. A content analysis also provides a more detailed score instead of the dichotomous outcome when using a minimal definition. However, content analyses are not without problems either. First, it is very important that coders understand the codebook well and interpret texts correctly. This is not evident given the complex nature of populism. Second, content analyses tend to be more rigid: one can encounter populism in one paragraph, while another paragraph might contain very elitist language. Often, only the percentage of populist paragraphs or sentences is calculated without taking other elements into account which might lead to invalid conclusions. However, this should not necessarily be the case. Third, scanning entire manifestos or speeches is a very resource-intensive task, while populism is often relatively scarce in these documents. Computerised Content Analysis A computerised content analysis is a variant of the classical content analysis, but the main difference is that texts are no longer interpreted by human coders. Instead, a computer carries out the analysis by means of counting the percentage of words that match an a priori or a posteriori defined dictionary (Laver and Garry 2000; Pennings 2011). Such a method is less timeconsuming and allows for large bodies of text to be analysed. In an era of increasing availability of digital information, this creates fascinating possibilities. The main drawback of a computerised content analysis is that when it is applied strictly, no interpretation is possible because the work is done by a computer, which might undermine validity. In other words, the method might produce too many false results with the result that a researcher then is no longer measuring what he or she intended to measure (for example, the Flemish socialists, as discussed below). This problem is prominent given the complexity of a concept such as populism. Therefore, it is advisable to validate the dictionary manually to remove false positive cases (for example, while a computer detects a term as populist, a manual check reveals that the word is in fact not meant in a populist way). Moreover, the construction of a dictionary might be contested. A different dictionary will generate different results, and particularly when documents contain few words, these differences can be substantial. Pauwels (2011; 2014) measured the degree of populism by means of a computerised content analysis in Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands. Based on theoretical reasoning and using some of the early party literature of the VB as an inspiration, a ‘populist dictionary’ was designed in an attempt to identify populist parties, examining both externally (manifestos) and internally (membership magazines) oriented party literature. By comparing the results with classical content analyses on the same cases, the validity of the method was tested. Most of the Teun Pauwels 126 time, the computerised content analysis produced the highest scores for parties that were also most populist according to human coding. However, the computerised method discriminated much less between populist parties and other parties, while also yielding a false positive result (the Flemish socialist party scored very highly in a particular year although it has never been considered populist by others). Bonikowski and Gidron (2016a) also drew on a dictionary approach to analyse populist claims by politicians and parties in the European Parliament (1999–2004). To tackle validity problems, they gradually adapted the dictionary by iterative rounds of validation in which they manually analysed whether the dictionary words were meant in a populist way. Only words that had an accuracy of more than 50 per cent were retained. Expert Survey The use of expert surveys has been well established in political science, mostly to determine the ideological positions of political actors (Benoit and Laver 2006). Expert surveys provide information on some objective or subjective state of the world based on a review by people with comprehensive or authoritative knowledge on the subject (Wiesehomeier 2016). Typically, this is done by asking multiple experts to position parties on a priori or a posteriori determined dimensions. In general, expert surveys are seen as an economical way to obtain information as they can be set up anytime, do not require party manifestos and may cover a large set of parties and countries if experts are available. Particularly in unstable party systems with few party documents available, expert judgments might be useful. At the same time, there are concerns about the validity of such surveys (Steenbergen and Marks 2007). Owing to the recent interest in populism and its contested nature, populism has not been included explicitly in existing large-scale expert surveys. However, Van Kessel (2015) has relied on experts for the identification of populist parties in Europe, which has also enabled him to ask for some other characteristics, such as the credibility of these parties. Experts were asked to what extent parties could be labelled populist according to three criteria (delineate an exclusive community of ‘ordinary people’; appeal to the ‘ordinary people’; fundamental hostility towards the establishment). This shows that an expert judgement is very similar to a classification by means of minimal definition with the advantage that multiple experts are involved, which allows for reliability testing and solves the problem of language restrictions. Wiesehomeier (2016) similarly conducted two waves of expert surveys, applying two different approaches in order to measure populism in Argentina and Brazil. Both approaches showed considerable overlap in identifying populists, while future research will allow her to validate the method further. The main problem with expert surveys is that the number of country experts on populism is relatively limited, and it is not always clear whether they have actually read the party literature of those parties of which one is asked to make a judgement. Therefore, there is a risk that expert surveys reinforce ‘received wisdom’ instead of making judgements based on original empirical research. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the different possible methods of measuring populism. It shows that each of them has both strengths and weaknesses. CHAPTER 6: MEASURING POPULISM: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES 127 O ve rv ie w o f t he D iff er en t M et ho ds o f M ea su ri ng P op ul is m T ab le 6 .1 : O ve rv ie w o f t he D iff er en t M et ho ds to M ea su re P op ul is m C la ss ifi ca tio n th ro ug h m in im al d ef in iti on C on te nt a na ly si s C om pu te ri se d co nt en t an al ys is E xp er t s ur ve y H ow d oe s i t w or k? A na ly si ng w he th er a pa rty m at ch es a ll m in im al c rit er ia to b e la be lle d as p op ul is t H um an c od er s e xp lo re fo r ea ch (s ub un it in th e) p ar ty m an ife st o to w ha t e xt en t i t co rr es po nd s w ith th e cr ite ria in th e co de bo ok A c om pu te r c al cu la te s t he pe rc en ta ge o f w or ds th at m at ch th e ‘p op ul is t’ di ct io na ry . Ex pe rts a re a sk ed to po si tio n pa rti es o n a sc al e of p op ul is m Lo gi c Ei th er p op ul is t o r n ot (d ic ho to m y) M or e or le ss p op ul is t (d eg re e) M or e or le ss p op ul is t (d eg re e) C ou ld b e ei th er a di ch ot om y or m at te r o f de gr ee U ni t o f an al ys is Pa rty li te ra tu re , in te rv ie w s, et c. El ec tio n m an ife st o El ec tio n m an ife st o an d ot he r w rit te n (d ig ita l) so ur ce s U nc le ar U ni t o f m ea su re m en t N a Pa ra gr ap h (R oo du ijn 2 00 9) or e nt ire d oc um en t (H aw ki ns 2 00 9) W or d (P au w el s, 20 11 ) U nc le ar St re ng th s Le av es ro om fo r i nt er pr et at io n to th e re se ar ch er En ab le s c la ss ifi ca tio n Le ss ti m e co ns um in g In te rp re ta tio n by c od er s A llo w s f or re lia bi lit y te st in g Sy st em at ic N ot ti m e co ns um in g A llo w s f or a na ly zi ng m an y te xt s Sy st em at ic a nd re lia bl e N ot ti m e co ns um in g A llo w s f or re lia bi lit y te st in g W ea kn es se s Le av es ro om fo r di sc us si on (b or de rli ne ca se s) Le ss sy st em at ic (s el ec tiv e ev id en ce ) Po te nt ia l s ub je ct iv ity o f co de rs Po te nt ia lly u nr el ia bl e Ti m e co ns um in g Th e cr ea tio n of a di ct io na ry is n ot st ra ig ht fo rw ar d La ck o f v al id ity (n o in te rp re ta tio n) U nc le ar o n th e ba si s o f w ha t e vi de nc e ex pe rt ju dg em en ts a re m ad e Ta bl e 6. 1: Teun Pauwels 128 A Measurement of Populism among Parties in Germany To demonstrate how different measurement techniques work and to evaluate their outcomes in terms of strengths and weaknesses, this section will focus on measuring populism among German parties. I will draw on a qualitative classification, a classical content analysis (holistic grading) and a computerised content analysis with and without a manual check. Except for the qualitative classification, the other methods use party manifestos of the major German parties between 2002 and 2013 as the unit of analysis. For the qualitative classification I relied on party literature and academic literature on the most important cases to assess whether a party matches the minimal definition of populism as provided by Mudde (2007). The results of the holistic grading have been provided by Kirk Hawkins and his research team. As described above, different coders read the entire documents and ranked them on a two-point scale, after which an average score was produced. The computerised method scanned the proportion of words in each manifesto that matched a populist dictionary including words such as elite*, corrupt*, propaganda*, and others. Finally, I manually checked each positive hit and assessed whether the term was actually meant in a populist way by drawing on a short codebook. More details on operationalisation and the dictionary can be found in the appendix. The results of the different measurements are presented in Table 6.2 with the three highest scores for each method depicted in bold. What appears from this is that mainstream parties such as the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) mostly score very low on populism. Interestingly, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) also scores zero on each populism measurement, while this party has often been labelled as (right-wing) populist in the press. For the Party of Democratic Socialism, which later transformed into The Left (PDS-DL), The Greens, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and the Pirate Party some methods produce high scores for populism while others do not. These cases will be discussed in more detail below as they also show the strengths and weaknesses of each method. According to the computerised analysis, The Greens score relatively high on populism (particularly in 2002), yet the other methods do not consider this party to be populist. The reason for this is that two words in the populist dictionary appeared very frequently in the manifestos of The Greens, namely monopoly and corruption. However, the term monopoly related in almost all cases to the energy market and was not meant in a populist way, meaning this is a ‘false positive’ case of populism. In 2009, the party argued that power should be transferred from corporations to the consumers of energy, which could perhaps be seen as a manifestation of populism, although this is a difficult call. Corruption is another important topic for the Green Party. It calls for a registration system for interest groups, more transparency in party finances and argues that ‘corruption distorts the democratic process’. However, The Greens never depict the political elite as a homogeneous group that is corrupt. Hence, we can conclude that the computerised content analysis is susceptible to producing false positive cases if no manual check is included. A similar analysis can be made for the Pirate Party, which also focuses very much on the breakdown of monopolies and thinks corruption is an important issue, but this does not mean that the party is necessarily populist after a manual check. CHAPTER 6: MEASURING POPULISM: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES 129 Four Measurements of Populism among German Parties (2002-2013) Table 6.2: Four Measurements of Populism Among German Parties (2002-2013) Party Year Qualitative classification Holistic grading Computerised CA Computerised CA with manual check CDU 2002 0 0.3 0.00014 0.00000 2005 0 0.1 0.00017 0.00000 2009 0 0 0.00004 0.00000 2013 0 0 0.00005 0.00000 FDP 2002 0 0.3 0.00025 0.00000 2005 0 0.2 0.00013 0.00000 2009 0 0.2 0.00031 0.00000 2013 0 0 0.00021 0.00000 SPD 2002 0 0.2 0.00046 0.00000 2005 0 0.2 0.00000 0.00000 2009 0 0.1 0.00022 0.00000 2013 0 0 0.00009 0.00000 The Left 2002 0 0.3 0.00036 0.00007 2005 0 0.3 0.00027 0.00027 2009 1 0.4 0.00036 0.00026 2013 1 1.3 0.00022 0.00008 The Greens 2002 0 NA 0.00081 0.00000 2005 0 NA 0.00047 0.00000 2009 0 NA 0.00034 0.00002 2013 0 0.2 0.00025 0.00000 NPD 2009 0 1.4 0.00087 0.00000 2013 0 1.4 0.00029 0.00010 AfD 2013 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 Pirate Party 2013 0 NA 0.00094 0.00000 The NPD is an interesting case in that it is considered populist according to holistic grading and the computerised content analysis but not by the others. After a manual check of the words that appeared in the dictionary, it appeared that they were not used in a populist way, with one exception in the 2013 manifesto. However, this does not mean that the manifesto does not contain populism. A further manual analysis shows that some elements can be considered populist, yet the words that have been used were not in the dictionary. One could call this a type II error or false negative. However, experts on populism in Germany usually do not consider the NPD a populist party. The reason for this is that they consider the NPD to be an extremist neo-Nazi party that rejects parliamentary democracy (Mudde 2000; Carter 2005). This would make the party non-populist as populist parties are formally democratic. Nonetheless, as explained above, party manifestos do not always reveal a party’s ‘true nature’ because they are addressed to the public at large. Since extremist viewpoints are generally seen as harmful to the electoral potential of a party, they might not make it into the official manifesto. This problem might be even more relevant in Germany, where the German Federal Office for Table 6.2: Teun Pauwels 130 the Protection of the Constitution closely monitors whether parties espouse extremist views which might result in a party ban. The party that is most consistently considered populist is the PDS-DL. While it is very difficult to judge a very diverse party that also went through an important transformation, different experts have labelled the party as populist, particularly after 2009 when it campaigned under the name The Left. Hough and Koss (2009: 78) claim that “[t]he LP [Left Party] is, in this sense, populist par excellence—it regularly talks in the language of elites betraying the population at large, and it is frequently disdainful of the wider political process.” Holistic grading also gives DL scores above 0.2, with an exceptionally high score for 2013. The computerised analysis does not provide similarly high scores for DL, but after a manual check, it appears that the words flagged as populist by the dictionary were also meant in a populist sense. The party refers, for instance, to referendums as a means of showing the gap between ruling politicians on the one hand and citizens on the other. Similarly to The Greens, DL wants to break up commercial monopolies and to place energy resources into the hands of the people. Finally, as mentioned, the AfD does not appear to be a populist party. An in-depth study by Arzheimer (2015) exploring the manifesto and web content of the AfD comes to a similar conclusion. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that content analyses are static assessments of one moment in time which might lag behind reality. In 2015 Frauke Petry took over the leadership of the AfD and pushed the party in a more openly right-wing populist direction. Furthermore, it might also have been a deliberate strategy to hide the populist discourse in official party documents, as was suggested by a recent study (Franzmann 2016). Lessons from Studies Measuring Populism Measuring populism has recently become increasingly popular. In this section, I will review what can be learned from these large-scale analyses. Populism is More Prevalent in Latin America Compared to Western Europe One of the few measurements of populism across different regions revealed that populist discourse can be found more in Latin America than in Europe (Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2016). Analysing speeches and the party manifestos of 136 parties in 26 countries, Hawkins and Castanho Silva (2016) found that particularly in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador populism was found frequently while also resonating among the electorates (aggregate country populism scores were constructed by multiplying each party’s populism score and its vote share). Within Western Europe Hawkins and Castanho Silva (2016) found high populism scores for Switzerland, Italy and Spain. Bonikowski and Gidron (2016a) found high scores for populism in Greece, France and Denmark within Europe. CHAPTER 6: MEASURING POPULISM: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES 131 Populism can be Found More at the Fringes of the Party System Given the systematic nature of content analyses, these studies can sometimes reveal findings that go against common wisdom. While in Western Europe populism has been traditionally associated with (radical) right-wing parties, Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015) show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse by drawing on an analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2015). The study suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Bonikowski and Gidron (2016a) come to a similar conclusion while studying populism in the European Parliament. They find that populism is most prevalent on the radical left and right of the ideological spectrum. “Of the five parties that most frequently make use of populism, two are radical-left (the Communist Party of Greece and the French Lutte Ouvriere) and three are paradigmatic examples of radical rightwing parties (the French National Front, the UK Independence Party, and the Belgian Flemish Block)” (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016a: 16–17). Populism Over Time: The Impact of Issues, Government or Opposition and Campaigning Bernhard, Kriesi, and Weber (2015) content-analysed the discourse of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) from 2003 to 2013, drawing on a range of different party documents. This analysis revealed that the level of populism depends on different contextual variables. First, populism appears more in texts dealing with cultural issues, such as European integration, immigration and related institutional issues. This finding seems to be context dependent, however, since the SVP is a populist radical right party. In contrast, Bonikowski and Gidron (2016b) found that when the US Democrats made populist claims, this was mostly related to economic issues, targeting business elites. Second, Bernhard et al. (2015) found that the SVP was more populist when in opposition compared with their time in office. Bonikowski and Gidron (2016a) also found that incumbent parties at the national level made less use of populist claims in the EP. There are exceptions, however, such as the Lega Nord, which did not turn less populist once in government (see also Bobba and McDonnell 2016). In general, it seems that the probability of a candidate’s reliance on populism is proportional to his or her distance from power, which suggests that populism is an important strategic tool for political challengers (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016b). Finally, Bernhard et al. (2015) found that the SVP made more populist claims during the election campaign than when there was no campaigning. An even higher level of populism was found when the SVP launched referendums or initiatives on its own or when it deposited signatures for such measures. Bonikowski and Gidron (2016b) found that in US presidential elections, populism was highest in the three months before the elections and then decreased when election day was approaching. A potential explanation for this is that parties first target the more ideological party base and then the more moderate general public. Teun Pauwels 132 Conclusion and Discussion This chapter began by highlighting the importance of the definition, sources and operationalisation of populism as these all have an important impact on how it can be measured. In a second step, the main methods of measuring populism were discussed. Each of these techniques have their strengths and weaknesses, although it seems that some of them produce more valid results than others. While expert surveys and qualitative classifications certainly have their merits, they risk reinforcing existing knowledge (for example, identifying usual suspects) without empirical verification. It is questionable whether experts will actually read the party literature of all parties in a given party system and verify whether populism is present or not. In theory, a qualitative classification could be based on a thoughtful reading of party literature, but here too we should be sceptical about how feasible it is for a single researcher to do this for many parties across different countries. When it comes to computerised content analysis without human interpretation, it seems that it produces too many random errors (false positives or false negatives) to be considered a reliable and valid method of measuring populism. Therefore, a content analysis, if designed and carried out well, seems to be the most appropriate way to measure populism systematically across time and space. The downside of a content analysis is that it is very resource hungry, and therefore a computerised content analysis complemented with human interpretation might also be an interesting way to explore populism in large bodies of texts. However, large-scale content analyses of manifestos are not without their problems either. To mention only one, we can challenge the choice of party manifestos as the unit of analysis. In general, they lend themselves less to populism given their rather technocratic nature. As we have seen in the German case (NPD, AfD), it might also be possible that some parties shun extremism or populism in manifestos for strategic reasons. Therefore, it is necessary to complement large-scale content analyses with qualitative research (for example, Vossen 2011). Drawing on multiple sources and studying them in depth can reveal interesting details about the nature and extent of populism, thereby possibly nuancing findings from more rigid content analyses. In general, it is of added value to complement different methods and sources to increase the validity of populism measurements. As consistent measurements of populism are becoming increasingly available, researchers can now start to tackle several more substantive questions. For instance, what factors explain high levels of populism (both in terms of discourse and electoral strength) in different regions? And what are the consequences of a populist upsurge for the quality of democracy? These and important related questions can be answered in more detail once a solid and reliable data set on the degree of populism is established and maintained. Appendix Holistic Grading The full description of the holistic grading method can be found elsewhere (Hawkins 2009). It essentially boils down to coders being trained to grade an entire document (in this case, manifestos) based on the elements of the concept of populism and a set of anchor texts defined as CHAPTER 6: MEASURING POPULISM: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES 133 examples of the lowest, intermediate and highest boundaries. These three categories (lowest, intermediate and highest) are defined as followed: – 0: A document in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a manifesto expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will. – 1: A document in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticised notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy. – 2: A document in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. In particular, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist. Because graders in earlier studies reported that it was often difficult to choose between the blunt categories, they could also give decimal scores and were told that 0.5 rounds up to a categorical 1, and 1.5 rounds up to a categorical 2, so they should consider the qualitative difference between the categories when assigning decimal points. Computerised content analysis Computerised content analysis gives the percentage of words in a party manifesto that matches a ‘populist dictionary’, which is a list of words that indicates instances of populism. The dictionary for this chapter has been based on that of Pauwels (2011) and Bonikowski and Gidron (2016a). The following terms were included in the dictionary, with those in bold being actually found in the German manifestos: Gier*; Grosskonzern*; Imerialismus*; Imperialistisch*; Internationalismus*; Kapitalisten*; Lakai*; Monopol*; Oligarch*; Oligarchie*; Plutokratie*; abgehoben*; anti-basisdemokratisch*; anti-demokratisch*; antibasisdemokratisch*; antidemokratisch*; aritsokrat*; aufhals*; aufzwing*; ausbeuter*; autokrati*; elite*; elitär*; eurokraten*; eurokratie*; geldadel*; herrschend*; internationalistisch*; kooptier*; korrupt*; kumpanen*; plünder*; propagand*; technokrat*; ungewählt*; unterjochen* For the computerised analysis with a manual check, I read each paragraph in which a ‘populist’ term appeared and then coded it as populist if it referred to people centrism or antielitism as defined below. 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Modern populism is facilitated by conditions of what Keane (2013: 1) calls “a revolutionary age of communicative abundance … [that is] structured by a new world system of overlapping and interlinked media devices”. Fundamental changes to media regulation coupled with innovations in media technologies, not least the internet, not only mean that such technologies have become embedded in all aspects of everyday life. They have also opened up a profusion of communicative spaces for a variety of political actors and citizens. At the same time, the traditional party system is in decline, or perhaps renewing itself, according to Chadwick and Stromer-Galley (2016). Many citizens are increasingly disillusioned with the lack of authenticity in mainstream politics and seek out marginal political voices. Worldwide, populists have been able to capitalise on these conditions. In media and communication studies, the changing media environment has created at least two concurrent preoccupations. First, the increasing intrusion and power of the traditional mass media – chiefly television, radio and the press – in relation to politics have fostered a focus on the media’s ability to define reality, to naturalise ideology and on this process of ‘constructing’ meaning. Second, developments in new media technologies—especially the internet and social media platforms—have fomented a questioning of the way online technologies privilege previously powerless actors, as well as how such technologies increasingly filter content so that users are largely exposed to information that reinforces existing views. Both areas of study are concerned with changing aspects of the otherwise well-established process of ‘mediation’ whereby the media substantively intervene in the problematic process of communicating ‘reality’. And both areas involve the institutions of the mass media, their technologies and their audiences (Silverstone 2005: 189). To a political communicator who wants to get a message across to a particular audience, the process of mediation is fraught with problems and risks. The message may be selectively simplified, distorted, misinterpreted, contradicted, passed on to unintended audiences or simply ignored at any number of stages in the process. As a result, political institutions are increasingly adapting their operation to the norms and practices of the media to maximise their chances of success (Strömbäck and Esser 2014); yet this practice has in itself become the subject of media scrutiny, and the cycle of mutual influence between the media and politics is serving to en- 1 I am indebted to Jay Blumler, Katrin Voltmer and Katy Parry for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. 137 gender mistrust about the authenticity of politicians (Coleman 2011). A key position in the emerging body of literature on populism’s relationship to the media maintains that recent changes in media systems and technologies, and in the media’s relationship to politics, may be contributing to populist success (Aalberg et al. 2016). Populists, it is argued, have a certain affinity with the media despite their well-known antipathy towards the mass media and mediation in general. This literature, however, still largely relies on single cases and lacks a comprehensive theoretical understanding of the issues that would place it in the context of broader changes in the media environment. What is it about populism, then, that enables it to negotiate the treacherous process of mediation so successfully and to retain an aura of authenticity where mainstream parties often fail? This paper takes a communication-centred approach to political populism as its starting point. After briefly considering the definitional debate, it outlines this perspective. It then goes on to discuss one of the most influential recent general theories in communication studies, mediation, as a framework for conceptualising the link between populism and the media. Finally, it inspects a substantial body of research literature for its conceptual abundance, divergences of approach and gaps needing attention. The review maps the literature to the aforementioned sites of mediation – institutions, technologies and audiences – to specifically consider how close we are to answering the question of how populists negotiate the process of mediation. A Communications Approach to Populism Approaching populism from a communications perspective implies a shift in focus from what populism is to what it does and how it does it. In other words, the concern is less with issues of definition and structure and more with questions of process and practice. Such an approach investigates how populist ideology attempts to become naturalised, the role the media play in this, the extent to which the undertaking succeeds and the conditions under which it does so. This chapter will only briefly engage with the issue of defining populism (for a detailed discussion, see Heinisch and Mazzoleni in this volume). Instead, it will concentrate on that more particular aspect of populism – its relationship to the media and, more specifically, the process of mediating populism. Defining Populism Given the concept’s contested nature, the definitional problem nevertheless has to be considered. The difficulty is partly exacerbated by the fact that most empirical studies are confined to regional pockets and subtypes of populism, such as radical right-wing populists in Europe (for example, Akkerman 2011; Mudde 2007; Rooduijn 2014a; Wodak et al. 2013) or progressive populists in Latin America (for example, De la Torre 2010; Waisbord 2012). This specific focus of much recent scholarship has contributed to further confusion as the concept becomes entangled with local cultural and political factors. In the following, I adopt Mudde’s definition of populism as, an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that po- Lone Sorensen 138 litics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.2 (Mudde 2004: 543) Mudde uses the concept of ideology in its ‘thin’ sense. Rather than constituting a full or coherent set of ideas that form a complete worldview, a thin ideology is “a loose complex of attitudes” (Krämer 2014: 44). It can attach itself to a range of peripheral elements or ‘host ideologies’ that serve to fill in the ideology and give it situational form. This helps to explain the contextual nature of populism, its historical and situational contingency, as well as the enduring strength of its core concepts – the people, the elite and the general will. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013: 498–9) put it, the thin ideology of populism is “a kind of mental map through which individuals analyse and comprehend political reality”. The use of a minimal definition, such as Mudde’s, opens up the possibility of most different comparative studies, of which there have been few so far in populism literature. Indeed, only a handful of interregional, comparative studies have been undertaken (see, for example, De la Torre 2014; Hawkins 2010; Mazzoleni et al. 2003; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Communicating Populism Approaching populism from a communications perspective shifts the focus from what constitutes the thin ideology of populism to how it is communicated. This inevitably involves considerations of style as well as ideology. A brief return to a controversy in the literature on definition may illuminate the relationship between these two categories: Where some scholars see definitions of populism as an ideology and a style3 as mutually exclusive, others, implicitly or explicitly, build ideological elements into stylistic definitions (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Moffitt 2016). In any case, until very recently there has not been much consideration of what is meant by the concept of style. Moffitt (2016: 38) provides the exception and defines political style as “the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain of government through to everyday life”. Performance here involves a process of symbolic meaning-formation (Silverstone 1999: chap. 8); that is, it not only communicates ideology, it also contributes to its meaning. Empirically, the core characteristics of populism clearly manifest themselves in both style and ideological expression, in form and content, in the way that a message is communicated and in the meaning of the message itself: ideology cannot be communicated without style. Moreover, style in and of itself contributes to the formation of meaning; it is not a neutral vehicle in the transmission of the ideological message. It socially constructs, actively and artfully performs and, thereby, also transforms the ideological message in the process of communication. The importance of style in the contemporary media-centric political communication landscape (Corner and Pels 2003) directs attention to the style of populist political communication. Yet rather than using style as the definitional category, it can equally be seen as the process 2 Mudde’s definition, and especially its status as a ‘thin’ ideology, is not seen as an acceptable definition by everyone but does seem to express the essence of the key elements of the concept particularly well. 3 Other approaches include the categorisation of populism as a discourse, a strategy and a political logic. All approaches, however, although using different classifications, largely hone in on the same core elements—populists identify the people as a homogeneous mass in possession of a general will, who are pitched in opposition to an unrepresentative elite and, in some cases, to a threatening ‘other’. CHAPTER 7: POPULISM IN COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, EVIDENCE 139 through which populists communicate their ideology to the people. Thus, we can define populism as an ideology and still pay attention to the political style through which it communicates. In a communications approach, style and ideology are inextricably intertwined, even if we may keep them analytically distinct. Rather than precluding us from considering populist style, a communications approach thus does not so much disentangle the stylistic and ideological perspectives on populism but rather explains why both camps have resulted in almost identical definitions and what part each of these dimensions plays in the manifestation of populist communication. Moreover, style highlights the importance of the medium and of mediation more generally. Different media technologies invite different styles; as do different institutional contexts, audiences and contexts of reception, all of which in turn shape meaning. These aspects all form part of the process of mediation (Silverstone 2005). The following section discusses the concept of mediation as a theoretical framework for reviewing the literature on the media’s relationship to populism. Mediation In everyday English, ‘mediation’ means getting in between, negotiating or resolving disputes, and generating mutual understanding and agreement instead of conflict. However, the term has been ‘repurposed’ in academic English, and in the field of media and communication studies, it now points to a much more problematic process (Livingstone 2009: 4–5). Here, the term is often concerned with questions of the media’s power to shape representations of ‘reality’. In this use, mediation no longer indicates a process of clarification. Rather, it denotes a more substantive intervention where what is being dealt with is itself changed by that intervention, and this includes how ‘reality’—in our case, political reality—is depicted and understood. In the words of Hepp and Krotz (2014: 3), “communication has to be grasped as a process of mediating meaning construction”. The concept of mediatisation goes further by emphasising change over time, denoting an increase in mediation that is taking place with new developments in and of the media (Hepp and Krotz 2014: 3; Livingstone 2009: 7; Strömbäck 2008). In the field of political communication, mediatisation denotes a process whereby the media become more and more of a political actor in their own right, and the ‘logic’ of the media—understood as the norms and routines that govern the media’s operations (Altheide and Snow 1979)—is adopted by, and thereby transforms, political institutions (Strömbäck 2008; Strömbäck and Esser 2014). Mediatisation is thus “much more specific [than mediation] in analysing the role of various media in the further process of socio-cultural change. However, it has to be linked to an analysis of communication as symbolic interaction”, that is, of communication as mediation (Hepp and Krotz 2014: 3–4). Analysis of the process of mediation is thus key to determining how the relationship between ‘reality’ and naturalised ideology is changing as part of the process of mediatisation. In a discussion of a metatheoretical comparative strategy employed in a seminal election study, Swanson (1992: 29) outlines how the media’s depiction of reality may be broken down into three distinct aspects, which are here adopted with reference to the overall process of mediation: Lone Sorensen 140 ‘objective’ political reality (the actual events and conditions that are the referents of journalists’ and politicians’ representations in campaign messages); ‘constructed’ political reality (the content of the representations offered by journalists and political leaders); and ‘subjective’ political reality (citizens’ perceptions of political reality, including political attitudes, beliefs, impressions of political leaders, and so on). These areas of analysis in turn direct attention to the relationships between them, which are open to investigation through different theoretical approaches and objects of study. For example, the relationship between objective and constructed political reality may be investigated from an institutionalist or a materialist perspective (these are elaborated in the following sections), depending on whether the media as an institution or as technology is conceived as the more important factor in constructing reality in a given context. Media effects studies, meanwhile, focus on the relationship between constructed political reality and the subjective reality of audiences. These relationships, then, constitute three sites of mediation: media institutions and, for instance, the impact of commercial imperatives on news values and editorial decisions; media technologies and the limitations and opportunities they impose on the production, distribution and recirculation of content; and media audiences4 and their variously active participation. Silverstone stresses that mediation involves a dialectic between a variety of actors, institutions and the environments that support them (2005: 189). In new media, these relationships are perhaps even more asymmetrical than the term ‘dialectic’ denotes (Couldry 2008: 8). Most importantly, however, mediation involves non-linear interrelations between actors: media work “through a process of environmental transformation which in turn transforms the conditions under which any future media can be produced and understood” (Couldry 2008: 8). The following sections go on to review extant literature on populist political communication and its relationship to the media through the lens of mediation theory. Media Institutions as Sites of Mediation In studies that focus on the role of institutions in the construction of political reality, we can consider institutional sites as the practices of content selection, gatekeeping and framing that emerge from the norms and routines of journalists and other key media workers. Most studies of populist political communication and its relationship to the media focus on such institutional sites of mediation. Here, the concern is exclusively with populism's relationship to traditional media and mostly with the media’s coverage of populist parties. Such studies tend to adopt an institutionalist perspective, leaving technology out of the equation. Institutional practices, norms and routines are seen as shared by the news media collectively as a single institution (Asp 2014; Cook 2006). As such, the institution of the news media wields collective power in relation to the sphere of politics through ‘media logic’. In the literature on populism, the construction of political reality that takes place in the dialectic between media institutions and 4 To avoid confusion about the terms ‘reception’ and ‘consumption’, Thumim (2012: 63–69) argues for the use of the term ‘audiences’ in both new and traditional media in the context of the mediation process, even where audience engagement does not only include active involvement with the media in processes of interpretation but also in those of production. CHAPTER 7: POPULISM IN COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, EVIDENCE 141 populist actors is largely focused on the notion of media logic and on populists’ attempts at news management. Media Logic The notions of news values and ‘media logic’ are common in explanations of traditional media institutions’ favourable mediation of populist content (Mazzoleni 2008). A number of European studies find, for instance, that populists have had positive coverage due to the media portraying immigrants in conflict with local culture (conflict framing), presenting elections as strategic games (strategic framing) and focusing on leaders and their personalities rather than policies (personalisation) (Esser et al. 2016: 372). In the literature on populism, this argument tends to be tied to distinctions between media types and formats. Commercial media’s (the press, especially tabloid newspapers, and private broadcasters) news values favour the drama and spectacle of populists and therefore give them increased attention. Notable examples of such studies include Mazzoleni et al.’s (2003) comparative research, which showed that the elite press in a number of countries was more critical and selective in their coverage of populist parties than tabloid formats due to their news values of social importance and closer integration into the elite structure of society (Stewart et al. 2003: 225). However, “because of their tendency to appeal to mass audiences, to crave sensationalism, scandal, conflict, and to voice social anxieties”, ‘popular’ media such as the tabloid press, talk radio and infotainment TV shows “were more likely to offer support to subjects involved in, or initiators of, ‘newsworthy’ actions”. (Stewart et al. 2003: 233). This view is echoed by Stanyer (2007: chap. 5), who contends that the preference for conflict frames in commercial media outlets chimes with the binary us/them discursive constructions of populists on issues such as immigration and the EU (see also Moffitt 2016). Some more recent empirical studies suggest, however, that the distinction between elite and tabloid formats is not entirely clear-cut (Akkerman 2011; Bos et al. 2010; Rooduijn 2014b). In the Latin American context, the term telepopulism/ télépopulisme was coined to account for the easy fit between the news values of television and populism (Schneider 1991; Weyland 2001; for a non-Latin American example, see also Peri 2004). In television talk shows in particular, political populist and journalistic objectives have been shown to be in close harmony. They share, for instance, anti-establishment positions and a wish to demonstrate closeness to ‘the people’ (Bos and Brants 2014; Cranmer 2011). Here, technology as a site of mediation also plays a role. The talk show format uses a degree of audience involvement as a means of demonstrating the people’s support, as do reality television (Cardo 2014) and talk radio with its ‘talkback’ function of listener phone-ins (Krämer 2014; Stanyer 2007: 126–131). These latter analyses focus more on the qualities of ‘media populism’ (Krämer 2014), that is, populism by the media, than on how a party’s populist message is mediated in this process. They do, however, combine the institutional and technological sites of mediation, which overlap and merge in empirical reality. A potential explanatory factor for differences in results on elite/tabloid formats may be found in Esser et al.’s (2016: 7) argument that the convergence between commercial media and populism is stylistic rather than ideological; that is, based on charisma and rhetorical style such as simplification and polarising drama. In other words, there is a convergence between the me- Lone Sorensen 142 dia’s news values and populist style but not between the norms and self-prescribed roles of journalists and populist ideology. Journalists are not populist as they subscribe to professional norms of objectivity and independence that uphold liberal democracy. However, the news values they conform to leave them wide open to populist communication efforts. Such an interpretation is supported by empirical studies that demonstrate how news coverage and readers’ letters favourably mediate populist messages in contrast to opinion columns (Rooduijn 2014b), and how populists fervently attack the mainstream media despite extensive coverage (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). However, more systematic and conclusive research is clearly needed to clarify this. Attempts at News Management That institutional sites of mediation and their power to construct reality are of concern to populist communicators is evident from their strong attempts at all kinds of media management and control over images (Mazzoleni et al. 2003). At an extreme, such struggles over the mediation process result in populists taking control of media institutions. In Latin America and other less established democratic contexts that have witnessed populists in power, a tendency is evident of populist governments turning state controlled media into personal mouthpieces (see for example Hawkins (2010) on Venezuela and other authoritarian states, Mancini (2014) on Berlusconi in Italy, Císař and Štětka (2016) on the Czech Republic, Corbu el al. (2016) on Romania and Stępińska et al. (2016) on Poland). Waisbord (2012) argues that populist governments in Latin America have launched initiatives to fundamentally change media systems to strengthen the power of the populist leader, bolster community media and exercise tighter control of the press. Such moves demonstrate a uniquely populist view of what ‘media democracy’ entails. According to such a populist perspective, journalism as an institution should support popular sovereignty, social rights and government programmes rather than a liberal-democratic notion of the public good (Waisbord 2012: 516–517). Waisbord’s analysis thus highlights the institutional discordances between populism and the liberal-democratic mass media which exist alongside its consonance with media logic and news values. Media Technologies as Sites of Mediation With the advent of new media, the analytical distinction between mass and interpersonal communication is dissolving (Castells 2013) and is vastly complicating our conceptualisation of mediation. It has also reinvigorated an interest in material aspects of the media (see, for example, McLuhan [1964] 2002) and the ways in which media technologies contribute to processes of meaning formation (see, for example, Lievrouw 2014). Studies in this area focus on the ‘affordances’ of new media—the possibilities of action that a media technology or platform gives to users, such as the ‘Retweet’ button on Twitter or Google’s personalised search. The, albeit never linear (Couldry 2008: 3; Silverstone 2005: 191), process of mediation becomes far more heterogeneous and hybridised in new media. Networked circulation and recirculation of content (Couldry 2008: 8–10) by a variety of users, their changed role as ‘prosumers’ (a term that conflates producers with consumers), interaction between traditional and new media formats CHAPTER 7: POPULISM IN COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, EVIDENCE 143 and institutions in hybrid forms (Chadwick 2013), and media usage that can result in highly selective exposure of viewpoints (Klinger and Svensson 2015) characterise this ubiquitous and interactive form of mediation (Lievrouw and Livingstone 2006). Such technological features favour political actors who can distribute personal and emotional content through personal networks (Klinger and Svensson 2015: 1253): these modes of constructing reality are more likely to be successful and to ‘go viral’. Indeed, emerging studies of populism and new media argue that there is a ‘fit’ between new media technologies and populism (Bartlett 2014; Chadwick and Stromer-Galley 2016; Engesser et al. 2016; Gerbaudo 2014; Groshek and Engelbert 2013; Van Kessel and Castelein 2016). This claim considers media technologies in two parallel dimensions: the symbolic and the material dimensions of technology. Symbolic Technology Media technologies are not only material artefacts but are also “means for creating, circulating and appropriating meaning” (Boczkowski and Lievrouw 2008: 955). In our use of and interaction with technology, symbolic configurations become intricately tied to its material form (Boczkowski and Lievrouw 2008; Silverstone 1999: chap. 3). Couldry (2015), for instance, argues that our collective belief in social media platforms as natural sites of social and collective expression constitutes just such a “myth of ‘us’”, a myth that forms the economic basis of these platforms. In his account of ‘populism 2.0’, Gerbaudo (2014: 16–17) indicates a correspondence between populist ideology and this ‘imaginary’ aspect of social media: Populism 2.0… incorporates much of the techno-utopianism that dominates current debates about the Internet (see, e.g., Shirky 2008; Mason 2012). It operates with the idea that the Net automatically provides a horizontal infrastructure where democracy can flourish… Crucial to the political deployment of such a participatory imaginary of Web 2.0 is an emphasis on the emancipatory character of disintermediation and directness. According to this argument, the symbolic message inherent in social media lends credence to and enhances populists’ claims for democratisation and emancipation, as well as their non-establishmentarian self-representation. Yet such myths are also reinforced by institutional forms of mediation. In fact, social media institutions, such as Facebook and Twitter, capitalise on ideas of emancipation, democracy and community as part of their marketing strategy (Van Dijck 2013) in a process of mutual cultural shaping between institutions and audiences. Populists can in turn utilise these myths, as their ideology chimes with social media’s constructed myth of empowering the common man. Material Technology The correspondence between symbolic frames in social media and populism is reinforced by the material affordances of social media. A few studies address this accord, arguing that digital, especially social, media affordances not only facilitate but also augment populist communication. Inherent in this argument is also the idea of new media technologies as enablers of interpersonal communication, which allow populists to speak directly to the people and thus Lone Sorensen 144 chime with their aversion to institutional forms of mediation (Jagers and Walgrave 2007), including the gatekeeping function of traditional mass media. Two studies by Van Kessel and Castelein (2016) and Engesser et al. (2016) contend that social media offer populists the means of ‘free’ or ‘unmediated’ communication. By this they mean the lack of institutional interference in the form of gatekeeping or editorialising. They thus support the view of social media technology as a site of mediation that favours populist ideology. Further, Gerbaudo argues that populism’s demand for direct democracy is translated into a form of digital mass democracy that utilises Web 2.0 interactivity features according to the principle of “one like, one vote” (2014: 80) in digitally savvy forms of populism. Such a form of populism thus avoids not only the intermediary institutions of the media but also of liberal democratic government. Bartlett (2014: 94) complements these arguments on the unproblematic mediation of populism’s ideological message through technological affordances with an argument about stylistic concord: “The short acerbic nature of populist messages works well in this medium. Humour, outspokenness, pithy put-downs and catchy slogans: these are the DNA of cyber culture.” In their study of double differentiation, whereby populists simultaneously attempt self-representation as influencers and outsiders of the political establishment, Groshek and Engelbert (2013) find that populists’ use of the material affordances of social media and internet technologies not only conveys but also amplifies such self-representation. Yet the study also demonstrates the significance of the contextual use of media technologies. By comparing across two different political cultures—the US and the Netherlands—Groshek and Engelbert find that populists appropriate affordances differently and use different affordances. Their overall purpose—double differentiation—remains the same, but their means of achieving it differs according to context as they position themselves in direct opposition to the local political culture. Casero-Ripollés et al. (2016), however, argue that neither ideological nor stylistic agreement between populism and technological mediation is the ultimate determinant of success. Rather, in their case study of Spain’s Podemos, the populist party’s strategic adaptation of its organisational structure to suit the ‘logics’ of both new and traditional media give it its winning formula to achieve ‘two-way street mediatisation’, that is, a reciprocal transformation of media and party institutions. The party uses social media platforms to organise ‘circles’ in which members of the public can meet and debate policy proposals, which are then adopted by the party. This novel form of an ‘ideologically empty’ party that is shaped by the audience is a feature of the new media environment, according to Chadwick and Stromer-Galley (2016). A dichotomy develops between the technology and audience sites of mediation. Arguments about a close fit between new media technologies and populism are convincing, and new empirical studies are emerging to support much-needed theorisation of this aspect of populist mediation. Yet, as is evident from the previous discussion, the complexity of the mediation process and the way it changes the very environment that supports it means that studies are in danger of oversimplifying the relationship between specific technologies and populism. New studies that consider the interdependence of technology with other sites of mediation would abet this. Moreover, extant research on populism and technological affordances not only focuses almost exclusively on new media technologies—and especially on social media—to the detriment of traditional media technologies and material formats, but it is also entirely de- CHAPTER 7: POPULISM IN COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, EVIDENCE 145 voted to the supply side of the mediation process, that is, to the populist communicator as a producer. As a result, we know practically nothing about how users and audiences appropriate, circulate and recirculate populist messages based on media-specific environments and affordances and the norms and practices of use that they engender. Audiences as Sites of Mediation Users and audiences are active interpreters who do not uncritically gobble up mediated content. Rather, they digest information in a contextual and social process (Martín-Barbero 1993), and, using new media technologies, even produce, distribute and recirculate it. Most extant literature on populism and media effects describes the characteristics of populist supporters: their voting behaviour and sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics. However, as Reinemann et al. argue (2016: 381), “drawing direct inferences from voter characteristics to the communicative processes underlying the success or failure of populist actors is just not possible.” Thus, we know little about how or why audiences are affected by mediated populism and how they participate in the process of mediation. Only a few studies on populism and media effects consider audiences as sites of mediation. These exclusively consider the traditional mass media and are focused on specific aspects of media effects, mainly audiences’ media consumption and the effects of coverage of populist leadership. Media Consumption Some studies have connected populist support to certain patterns of media consumption. Support for UKIP in Britain, for example, correlates with a tendency to read right-wing tabloid newspapers (see, for example, Ford et al. 2012). Watching commercial TV stations has also been found to relate to anti-immigration attitudes in Norway (see Jupskås et al. 2016). However, such studies have not specifically related mediated populist content to populist attitudes or such attitudes to populist support. There is, therefore, a danger of assuming that audiences passively absorb media content. Mass society theories argue that citizens are particularly susceptible to populist propaganda in contexts that combine an urban environment, sophisticated media technologies and poorly educated citizenry (Hawkins 2010: 137). Arguments concerning telepopulism likewise tend to reduce citizens to passive spectators (De la Torre 2010: 128). However, Hawkins (2010: 137– 65) demonstrates that mass society theory is invalidated as an explanation of the causes of populism when corruption is taken into account. Identifying citizens’ attitudes to corruption as a cause of populism in turn assumes a level of rationality and morality in citizens as they react to corruption in favour of populist candidates who stand up to less democratic governments. Hawkins’ argument thus demonstrates that also in the case of populist supporters, an active audience does indeed form a site of mediation. This point is also corroborated by De La Torre (2010: 128, 206), who calls for more audience studies that go beyond the telepopulism argument of reducing audiences to passive consumers. Lone Sorensen 146 Leadership Three studies, all conducted by Bos et al. (2013; 2011; 2010), investigate the effects of media coverage of right-wing populist party leaders in the Netherlands. The authors approach the topic of leadership from an audience, rather than an institutional, perspective, although the two overlap. They find that the electoral success of these parties is preceded by their leaders’ higher level of prominence in the news. Prominent leaders, moreover, appear to be ‘more populist’ in ideological terms – that is, they score higher on scales which measure criticism of representative politics and references to the common man (Bos et al. 2010). This does not, however, mean that all media coverage is good coverage. Bos et al.’s second study (2011) finds that the media can be both ‘friend and foe’ (see also Mudde 2007: 253). When negative coverage questions the legitimacy of right-wing populist party leaders, public perceptions are negatively affected. It is unknown whether this links to electoral support, however. In fact, evidence from several other European countries shows that negative media coverage results in improved standing in the polls (Esser et al. 2016: 366). Here, it is argued that the increased publicity, whatever its sentiment, has benefited populist parties. This is explained by populists’ ability to use the coverage to attack the media for their establishment bias and other parties for being given preferential treatment (see also Koopmans and Muis 2009: 659). Bos et al.’s third study (2013) distinguishes between effects from populist style and from populist ideology, which they test on specific population groups. They find that the lower educated, the politically cynical and the less politically efficacious (that is, the voters who are overrepresented among these parties’ supporters) are more susceptible to persuasion from populist leaders who use a populist style. In such cases, populist leaders are perceived as legitimate. In a representative sample of Dutch voters, however, mainstream party leaders are punished for adopting a populist style (Bos et al. 2011). Such a striking result clearly demonstrates the role of an active audience in the mediation process. A possible explanation may lie in the audience perceiving a potential discrepancy between the populist style adopted as a strategic tool by mainstream parties and their underlying non-populist ideology. Populist leaders are able to use the style with authenticity rather than as an insincere measure to obtain votes, and audiences discern this. An even more active role of the audience is evident in the aforementioned case of ‘ideologically empty’ parties, which are rather united around a leader. The affordances and practices of use of digital media, on the one hand, and digitally enabled citizens, on the other, contribute to audiences remaking political parties in their own participatory—and more populist—image. In such cases, the interaction between technology and audiences transforms the institution of the political party from the outside in. Conclusion The preceding pages have outlined a communications approach to populism that involves a dichotomy between populist ideology and its expression through political style. In the current fragmented debate on populism and communication, mediation theory has proven a useful framework with which to structure extant research. Mapping the literature on populism and the media to the three sites of institutions, technologies and audiences has highlighted their in- CHAPTER 7: POPULISM IN COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, EVIDENCE 147 terconnectedness. Yet it has also brought to light a lack of synthesis of approaches to new and traditional media in the literature on populism. Previous scholarship has noted the affinity between populism and specific media types, such as tabloid journalism, talk radio and social media. So far, however, there has been little coherence of theory on populism’s relationship to new and traditional media. A tendency exists in the literature on populism to, on the one hand, view traditional media from an institutional perspective in terms of news values and their connection to populism and, on the other hand, to view new media from a technological perspective of affordances and the way they accentuate populism. Yet in new as well as in traditional media, institutions and technologies cannot be separated as they interconnect and shape each other, and neither can populist style and ideology. Both sites of mediation, and both dimensions of populism, are interdependent and play a role in constructing political reality, and all have implications for how audiences perceive and construct their subjective political reality. Indeed, although such a conclusion is based on incomplete and unsystematic evidence, there are indications that the source of populist authenticity is its ability to maintain consistency between style and ideology in all sites of mediation. In institutional sites, the professional norms and self-prescribed roles of journalists are in discord with populist ideology, which has a very different idea of what ‘media democracy’ ought to be. Yet the media’s news values have an appetite for populist style, which makes it hard to resist. Especially in media types and genres where such news values trump less commercial considerations, populist style ensures the relatively unscathed mediation of populist ideology. In contrast, we find mainstream politicians laboriously adapting their style to media logic, which in turn impacts on the meaning of their message. It is when the audience finds the performance of style unconvincing, or when they perceive that politicians do not believe their own message, that mistrust develops. In technological sites of mediation, certain media technologies, such as those of social media platforms, combine with institutional arrangements to harmonise with both populist style and ideology. In cases where populism has truly integrated media and network logics into its organisational form, it has even managed to shift the power balance between the media and politics. In these cases, audiences, too, have become sites of mediation that not only interpret politics but also actively shape it in their own image. Such ultimate cases of mediation congruence demonstrate that when populist political communicators manage to interweave the institutional, technological and audience sites of mediation and integrate their logics into their own operations, they not only achieve the smooth mediation of populist ideology. The consistency between populist style and ideology in the mediated message also results in the attribution of authenticity by the audience. Further questions that such a communications approach to populism through mediation theory may answer include, very broadly, how populists relate to different media types in the media ecology and their associated forms of mediation; how the increasingly advanced political communication practices of populists attempt to control the process of mediation; how the paradox of proximity and separation inherent in the mediation process—the media’s ability to bring us closer together but actually keep us apart—relates to populism’s dislike of institutional mediation and promise of responsiveness and closeness to the people/distance to ‘the others’; how populism interacts with media culture to become part of our everyday lives and thereby contributes to the growing trend of lifestyle politics; how and whether populists respond to active audience involvement in the mediation of their messages; and which aspects of Lone Sorensen 148 populist ideology and style encourage recirculation and virality in the hybrid media system. 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Weyland, Kurt (2001) ‘Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics’, Comparative Politics 34, 1–22. Wodak, Ruth, Majid Khosravinik, and Brigitte Mal (eds.) (2013) Right-wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse (London: Bloomsbury). CHAPTER 7: POPULISM IN COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, EVIDENCE 151 PART II: Assessing the Success of Populist Actors in Europe and in the Americas Europe CHAPTER 8: ELECTORAL BASIS OF POPULIST PARTIES Gilles Ivaldi The electoral success of populism has been one of the most significant political developments of recent decades, which has accelerated dramatically in the 2010s. While most of the research on populism has concentrated on conceptual issues, the analysis of populist discourse or explaining the rise of populist parties, the relevance of the ‘demand-side’ of populist politics is increasingly recognised in the literature on this subject (Pauwels 2014; Van Kessel 2013). This article engages in a review of that literature on the basis of electoral support for populist parties, and the motives of voters for supporting those parties. Working from the predominance of populism being defined as a ‘thin ideology’ (Mudde 2004), it addresses two dominant strands of research, which relate to the radical right-wing and left-wing manifestations of populism, to propose a review of current knowledge on the social and attitudinal basis of voting for radical populist parties. The last section identifies future research avenues in the field of populist electoral politics. Populism Left and Right The work by Cas Mudde (2004) marked an important turning point in the field of populism. A large swathe of the research on populist parties has endorsed Mudde’s idea of populism as a ‘thin-centred’ ideology which attaches itself to other ‘thicker’ sets of ideas. From this argument, it follows that populism rarely exists in isolation and that it manifests itself across ideologically diverse political parties with distinct appeals to voters (Pauwels 2014). In the European context, populism has been predominantly associated with the radical right. Mudde (2007) defines the ideological core of the populist radical right as a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Mudde’s framework clearly focuses on nativism as the key feature of this ideology, and a similar emphasis is found in most of the populist radical right literature. Recent studies suggest that populism is increasingly found at the left end of the Western European party system. The transformation of former communist and socialist parties, together with the rise of new parties, such as Podemos in Spain, the Five Star Movement in Italy or Syriza in Greece, has resulted in the emergence and consolidation of a distinct radical left party family. March (2011: 8) defines the radical left ideology as one that rejects the structure and values of contemporary capitalism, and advocates alternative redistributive policies in opposition to dominant market liberal economics. Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015) suggest that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. There is, however, greater heterogeneity in the programmatic and ideological appeals of those parties when compared with their radical right counterparts. Gomez et al. (2016) suggest, for instance, distinguishing 157 between ‘traditional’ and ‘new politics’ radical left parties. Similarly, Ramiro (2016) warns against the danger of simplifying the complexity of the radical left family, acknowledging the plurality of policy mixes among those parties. The malleability of populism and its ability to attach itself to a variety of parties and host ideologies pose a challenge to the apprehension of its electoral appeal, prompting the question of which ‘independent variable’ must be considered for the analysis. The dynamics of populist electoral mobilisation continue to be strongly associated with the ideologies to which populism is anchored. In most cases, voting preferences are explained by variables relating to those ‘deeper’ ideologies, making it difficult to disentangle the possible effect of populism from the various sets of cultural and economic issues that are traditionally identified as sources of voting behaviour. Because of this emphasis on the ideologies to which populism attaches itself, there is virtually no comparative research that takes ‘populist’ voting as a distinct phenomenon by linking populist attitudes to party preferences. The few studies that address the distribution of populist attitudes among voters and the consequences of those attitudes for electoral politics relate to predominantly single country case studies in Slovakia (Stanley 2011), in the Netherlands (Akkerman et al. 2014; Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013), in the United States (Hawkins et al. 2012) or in Flanders (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016). While inevitably limited in scope, these few single country studies nevertheless provide a valuable starting point and source of insightful exploration of the electoral dynamics of populism, which can be referenced into the broader comparative framework of the supply-side and causes of the various manifestations of the populist phenomenon across time and space. The Social and Attitudinal Basis of Populist Voting Hawkins et al. (2012) show that populist attitudes have consistent correlations with a number of socio-demographic attributes and attitudinal predispositions. Supporters of populist parties are often specified by their distinctively lower social position, higher levels of political distrust and dissatisfaction, ideological extremism and opposition to European integration (Pauwels 2014). A Populist Gender Gap? Most studies of the populist radical right have shown that a gender gap exists and have found that men are generally more likely to support those parties (Givens 2004; Arzheimer 2009; Zhirkov 2014; Kehrberg 2015; Han 2016). Harteveld et al. (2015) argue that men are more likely to attach greater salience to traditional radical right issues and that they may also be less repelled than women by the extremist reputation and political stigmatisation generally associated with those parties. Recent studies suggest, however, that the size of this gender bias varies strongly across countries (Immerzeel et al. 2013; Spierings and Zaslove 2015; see also Dingler et al. in this volume). Gilles Ivaldi 158 The gender gap seems of lesser relevance in the cases of other populist manifestations (for example, Hawkins et al. 2012; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016). Studies of the radical left report that men are not more likely than women to support radical left views (Beaudonnet and Gomez 2016; Visser et al. 2014). Ramiro (2016: 15-16) also finds considerable variation in the effect of gender across Western European countries, which may account for the absence of a more general discernible pattern. Populism and the Secularised Voter In the case of the populist radical right, the relative propensity for women to support those parties is often associated with religiosity, pointing to the fact that female voters tend generally to be older and more religious (for example, Montgomery and Winter 2015: 394). Arzheimer and Carter (2009) find that religious voters are less inclined to radical right voting despite those parties claiming to defend traditional Christian values, and that religious voters remain primarily attached to traditional Christian Democratic and conservative parties. Montgomery and Winter (2015) find robust support for the assumption that Christian religiosity negatively correlates with radical right populism, while increasing the odds of voting for a party of the mainstream right. Research on radical left voting provides similar evidence of those parties predominantly drawing their electoral support from secularised voters, which reflects the traditional ideological antagonism of the radical left vis-à-vis religion. Gomez et al. (2016) find, for instance, that radical left parties are successfully attracting non-religious voters and that the negative relationship with Christian religiosity is significantly stronger in the case of radical left parties with a ‘new left’ appeal. Moreover, according to Visser et al. (2014), religiosity is an important deterrent of radical left voting, which pits non-religious people against religious people. Ramiro (2016) provides further evidence that the likelihood of radical left support decreases with both religious affiliation and Church attendance, finding attendance patterns to be stronger predictors than simply belonging to a religious denomination. Are Populist Voters the ‘Losers of Modernisation’? Hawkins et al. (2012) show that populism is predominantly found among the lower socio-economic strata. Their findings suggest that lower levels of education are essentially associated with higher populism. Similarly, findings from Elchardus and Spruyt (2016: 115) on the distribution of populist attitudes in Flanders indicate that people with low levels of education are more likely to support populism, due to their weaker position in society. The numerous empirical studies of the populist radical right confirm that the affinity for those parties is stronger among voters with a lower education and that the lower socio-economic strata are overrepresented among the radical right electorate (Arzheimer 2009; Kehrberg 2015; Han 2016; Lubbers and Coenders 2017). This is accounted for by the fact that voters with a higher education tend to hold more liberal values, that they also have more favourable socioeconomic positions and that they exhibit lower levels of political distrust, which make them less susceptible to the xenophobic and authoritarian appeal of those parties. There is a social CHAPTER 8: ELECTORAL BASIS OF POPULIST PARTIES 159 desirability bias associated with the radical right, and individuals with high levels of education may also be less inclined to report they vote for those parties. There is no consistent evidence that people with a lower education are more likely to support populist radical parties of the left, however. Gomez et al. (2016) find education to have a significant effect on the probability of voting for traditional radical left parties and that those parties have a larger base of support among the least educated. Ramiro (2016) reports a relatively complex U-shaped curvilinear effect, whereby support for the radical left is higher among both those with the highest educational levels and those with no formal education. Other scholars, such as Visser et al. (2014: 552), demonstrate that voters with a lower education are less likely to support the radical left than people with a tertiary education. Ramiro and Gomez (2016) suggest that Podemos voters differ from the conventional descriptions of globalisation losers found predominantly among those with a lower education. This is corroborated by Beaudonnet and Gomez (2016: 10), who examine radical left voting covering a large number of parties in the 2009 and 2014 European elections, and find that education has no clear effect on the likelihood of someone supporting the radical left. These divergences are reflected in analyses of the social class determinants of populist voting. A large block of research focuses on the strong appeal of radical right populist parties to working-class voters (Rydgren 2013). The ‘proletarianisation’ of the social bases of the radical right has been extensively documented in the literature on populism, and it is generally explained by economic, cultural and political factors (Oesch 2008). Kriesi et al. (2008) argue that radical right populist parties draw most of their electoral support from ‘globalisation losers’ among the working class, the lower middle class and the unemployed, who are affected the most by modernisation, economic competition and feelings of cultural insecurity. Workingclass and lower-middle-class voters are more likely to feel threatened by rapid changes in postindustrial societies and fears of ethnic competition in the job market. They tend to hold less culturally liberal views on immigration, while supporting economic redistribution, and they are also more prone to show anti-establishment attitudes (Van Der Brug and van Spanje 2009). Van der Brug et al. (2012: 70) suggest that the electoral weight of working-class voters varies among radical right parties, but show that parties such as the Danish People’s Party and the French Front national share more substantial lower-class support and that Eastern European radical right parties have a larger working-class base than their Western counterparts. Harteveld (2016) generalises these findings and shows that economically centrist or centre-left pro-welfare radical right parties attract larger shares of voters with lower socio-economic backgrounds, compared with their more market liberal counterparts. Looking at the relationship between populism and the economic position of voters, Hawkins et al. (2012: 21) suggest that populist attitudes are less pronounced among American voters in higher income bands, although the size and significance of the effect varies across samples and also when measures of education are eliminated from their models. In their study of Flanders, Elchardus and Spruyt (2016: 125) fail to identify that the economic position of voters—taken from a composite measure of income, financial assets and occupation—has a significant direct effect on their populist inclination. The authors argue that economic vulnerability may have an indirect effect on populism inasmuch as it fosters feelings of relative deprivation and a declinist view of society, which may fuel populist sentiments. The recent study by Han (2016) finds support for the radical right to be generally higher among the ‘poor’. Looking at interactions between country-level and individual-level variables in Western European countries, Han Gilles Ivaldi 160 stresses that rising income inequality in a country increases support for the radical right among low income earners—particularly manual workers and the lower salariat—, while decreasing it among voters with a higher income. Han contends that in adverse economic times, the poor seek to identify “with a cross-class sociocultural identity and increasingly shift their attention to their sociocultural traits, such as nationalism” (63). Comparable findings are reported in Visser et al. (2014) concerning the radical left. The authors highlight the greater propensity for the unemployed and people with a lower or middle income to subscribe to a radical left ideology. Introducing contextual variables, however, they find that a higher level of income inequality in a country reduces rather than increases the likelihood of individuals holding radical left views. There seems also to be growing evidence that the populist radical left may be increasingly tapping into wider sectors of the electorate. Visser et al. (2014) find little difference between manual and non-manual workers in their propensity to support the radical left. Other studies provide mixed findings that increasingly contradict the traditional link between the working class and the radical left-wing vote (for example, March 2011). Recent work by Beaudonnet and Gomez (2016: 10) also refutes the assumption that manual workers or the unemployed are more prone to vote for radical left-wing parties. Ramiro and Gomez (2016) point in the same direction and show that Podemos voters in Spain do not fulfil the traditional profile of the populist voter. Their data suggest that the party is drawing support from a broader coalition of voters across all social strata, and that it is relatively more successful among educated voters hit by the economic crisis. As Ramiro (2016: 18) concludes: “there is no longer an obvious reliance of radical left parties on disadvantaged social groups”. Political Distrust as a Unifier of Populist Voters It is generally acknowledged that the background characteristics of voters have only limited explanatory power and that populist voting is primarily influenced by general ideological orientations (Van der Brug et al. 2000). Existing research on the ideological profile of populist voters suggests, however, variability in the issues and attitudes that motivate support for the populist radical right and left, respectively. There is a large consensus in the literature on populism that radical right populist parties typically mobilise support on the sociocultural dimension, most particularly by politicising immigration and law-and-order issues (Norris 2005; Rydgren 2008; Dunn 2015). Anti-immigrant attitudes are presented as crucial determinants of radical right voting and the strongest predictors of electoral support for those parties (Lubbers et al. 2002; Ivarsflaten 2005; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer 2009; Zhirkov 2014; Kehrberg 2015; Stockemer 2016a). Populist radical right voters perceive immigrants as both a cultural and economic threat. The study by Lucassen and Lubbers (2012) reveals that cultural fears are predominant among radical right supporters. Other research, such as that by De Koster et al. (2013), shows that those voters exhibit significant welfare chauvinism, that is, a “system of social protection only for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it” (Kitschelt 1995: 22). Lubbers and Coenders (2017) find that voting for radical right-wing parties is associated with national pride and an ethnic conception of nationhood. CHAPTER 8: ELECTORAL BASIS OF POPULIST PARTIES 161 In contrast, traditional economic issues are generally considered of lesser relevance to radical right populist voting (Mudde 2007). Cross-national studies suggest that the social groups attracted by the radical right often share heterogeneous if not conflicting views about the economy, which are filtered by cultural issues (Ivarsflaten 2005). The study by Allen (2015) emphasises regional differences, pointing to the more leftist economic orientation in post-communist far right voters in Eastern Europe. Authors such as De Koster et al. (2013) propose that diverging socio-economic preferences among populist voters are reconciled by a mix of egalitarianism and welfare state criticism. Derks (2006) argues similarly that electoral support for right-wing populism is strongly influenced by ‘economic populism’, which is defined as the combination of egalitarianism and anti-welfarism. Economic issues achieve greater importance among the populist radical left, although these issues remain largely understudied in the current literature on left-wing populism. Visser et al. (2014) suggest that preferences for income redistribution are a main determinant of support for a radical left ideology, particularly among voters in lower income groups and the unemployed, who generally show higher support for redistribution. Since 2008, economic issues have also been associated with the unfolding of the global financial crisis. Beaudonnet and Gomez (2016) find, for instance, that voters with negative retrospective views on the economy show a greater tendency to support the radical left. The authors find the impact of economic evaluations to have significantly increased since 2009. As suggested earlier, there seems to be convergent evidence that the economic crisis has enabled the radical left to build a broader yet more heterogeneous electoral base of support (Ramiro and Gomez 2016; Beaudonnet and Gomez 2016). One aspect which stands out as a possible unifier of populist voters across time and space is political distrust and disillusionment with mainstream politics. Many studies outline the relationship between populist voting and dissatisfaction with the political system, demonstrating that those who are less satisfied with politics are more prone to support populist parties. The vast literature on the radical right corroborates this link (for example, Arzheimer 2009; Lubbers et al. 2002; Werts et al. 2013; Zhirkov 2014; Kehrberg 2015; Lubbers and Coenders 2017), a pattern which is of course consistent with those parties’ profile as populist anti-establishment actors. Similarly, political distrust is identified as a key factor in the electoral dynamics of the populist radical left. Studies such as that by Gomez et al. (2016) indicate that dissatisfaction with democracy considerably increases the probability of radical left voting, while others point to the significance of a ‘disaffected voter’ syndrome (Ramiro 2016: 20). Looking at the attitudinal basis of support for Podemos in Spain, Ramiro and Gomez (2016) confirm that the party has assembled a cross-sectional coalition of voters hit by the crisis and deeply dissatisfied with mainstream politics, who hold negative views on both the government and the opposition. Further empirical evidence of the relevance of political disaffection in populist voting is provided by comparative studies of left-wing and right-wing manifestations of populism. Ivaldi and Zaslove (2015) find that supporters of European populist parties on the left and right demonstrate higher levels of mistrust towards political institutions. Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) demonstrate that ‘protest attitudes’, which the authors define as an expression of antielitist feelings, are strong motivations for people to vote for populist parties both left and right, and that populist voters differ in this respect from those of the mainstream. Similarly, the findings by Akkerman et al. (2014) from a sample of Dutch voters show that populist par- Gilles Ivaldi 162 ty preferences are interrelated with populist attitudes and that holding such attitudes significantly increases the probability of people supporting populist parties. Using a path analysis of Dutch panel data, Rooduijn et al. (2016) look symmetrically at this relationship, demonstrating that political discontent fuels support for populist parties but that the anti-establishment message of these parties may also cause political dissatisfaction among voters. Populists Opposing Europe? Finally, there is a wealth of empirical evidence which shows that populism today is being increasingly directed against European integration, which also attests to the connection between populist anti-establishment and anti-EU attitudes among voters. It has been shown that Euroscepticism is a common trait of most radical right populist parties (Vasilopoulou 2011), which stems from the perception of the EU as a major driver of immigration, multiculturalism and economic liberalisation, and as a primarily elite-driven project. A large number of studies have highlighted that opposition to European integration is strongly related to voting for the populist radical right (for example, Arzheimer 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). The more recent work by Werts et al. (2013) demonstrates that Euroscepticism is a predictor of voting for the radical right and that it has a significant independent effect beyond the perceived ethnic threat and political distrust(see also Lubbers and Coenders 2017: 111). Similar evidence is found to the left of the European party system. Recent research points to an increase in the salience of European integration issues and growing Euroscepticism among radical left voters. March and Rommerskirchen (2015) show that macroeconomic adversity and a high level of public Euroscepticism in the country provide fertile ground for the electoral success of the radical left. Looking at individual-level determinants of voting for the radical left, Ramiro (2016) finds support for those parties to be strongly associated with negative opinions about EU membership. The analysis by Gomez et al. (2016) corroborates the relationship between Euroscepticism and voting for the radical left, suggesting that negative views of the EU are more pronounced among supporters of traditional leftist parties compared with those of the radical ‘new left’. Looking more specifically at the impact of the global financial crisis, Beaudonnet and Gomez (2016: 16) find that voter support for the radical left in Europe is increasingly based on Eurosceptical attitudes, and argue that those parties have also been able to attract pro-EU voters dissatisfied with the management of the economic crisis and austerity policies imposed by national and EU elites. Future Populism Research There are a number of questions worth exploring in future research on the electoral basis of populism. CHAPTER 8: ELECTORAL BASIS OF POPULIST PARTIES 163 A Global Perspective on Populism First, future studies should expand on the burgeoning literature that focuses on a comparative analysis of the left-wing and right-wing variants of electoral populism (for example, Lefkofridi and Casado-Asensio 2013; Visser et al. 2014; Ivaldi and Zaslove 2015; Bakker et al. 2016). Mudde (2016) proposes that we adopt a pluralistic approach to populism and suggests using the concept of ‘functional equivalence’ for the analysis of populist parties across the spectrum by looking at the functions those parties perform in their respective party systems. More research is needed on the electoral dynamics of populist politics, exploring which common features populist voters across the spectrum may share and which may, on the other hand, oppose them. More cross-regional analyses of populism are also desirable in future studies. Contemporary populism is widespread in Europe and America, and scholars should be encouraged to cover populism across a broader geographical range. To date, there has been little systematic empirical research conducted on the dynamics of populist mobilisation in different regional contexts. Recent innovative studies have laid out the theoretical foundations for a global perspective, which should influence future work on the demand-side of populism across Europe as well as in North and Latin America (De la Torre 2015; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Different political opportunity structures may have important consequences for the electoral politics of populism. Future research should address the generalisability and travelling potential of concepts and theories of populist mobilisation across both established and new democracies. The literature on radical right politics in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe suggests, for instance, that the radical right has been able to capitalise on specific political and economic grievances that have emerged from the processes of democratisation and transition towards a market economy (for instance Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Bustikova 2014; Minkenberg 2015; Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016; Allen 2015). Studies of populism in Latin America point to the significance of public distrust in the traditional political institutions of liberal democracy and high levels of perceived corruption as correlates of populist attitudes. Populist leaders in Latin America have mobilised mass resentment against established governments during periods of economic recession and growing social inequality (Doyle 2011; Hawkins 2010). Exploring the interconnection between the experiences of populism across continents further might help inform our understanding of the current impact of the economic recession on the electoral performances of European populism. Meanwhile, the recent rise of Trumpism in the United States will certainly open new research avenues for the transatlantic analysis of right-wing populism (for example, Oliver and Rahn 2016). Populist Politics in Multilayered Polities Significant progress could also be made by embedding populism research in a framework including various socio-spatial levels—global, national and sub-national—which looks at the relationships between those levels and how these contexts may shape populist mobilisation. Contemporary populism operates across different arenas of electoral competition in multilayered polities, taking advantage of the political opportunities offered at the state and substate Gilles Ivaldi 164 levels, while also competing in supranational institutions such as the EU. We need to improve our understanding of the factors that explain the diverse electoral capacities of populist parties at different levels of competition, their regional affinities and their links with territorial claims, interests and the dynamics of mobilisation. Future research should look at the development of populism in subnational party systems and how populist parties focus their strategies to adapt to specific opportunity structures. It is certainly worth noting the growing scientific interest in integrated multilevel approaches that seek to combine individual and contextual factors of populism, and look at how the effects of local context may vary over time (for example, Poznyak et al. 2011; Rydgren and Ruth 2013; Green et al. 2016; Stockemer 2016b). In the European context, we also need more studies that bridge the literature on populism and that related to Euroscepticism to explore the connection between populist and anti-EU voter attitudes and help refine the traditional ‘horseshoe’ hypothesis (Van Elsas et al. 2016). Populism as an Independent Variable Finally, an important and fast expanding area of empirical research relates to the measurement of populism as an ‘independent’ variable in the analysis of electoral politics (see Pauwels in this volume). 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Vasilopoulou, Sofia (2011) ‘European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition’, Government and Opposition, 46(2), 223–44. Visser, Mark, Marcel Lubbers, Gerbert Kraaykamp, and Eva Jaspers (2014) ‘Support for radical left ideologies in Europe’, European journal of political research, 53(3), 541–58. Werts, Han, Peer Scheepers, and Marcel Lubbers (2013) ‘Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical right’, European Union Politics, 14(2), 183–205. Zhirkov, Kirill (2014) ‘Nativist but not alienated. A comparative perspective on the radical right vote in Western Europe’, Party Politics, 20(2), 286–96. Gilles Ivaldi 168 CHAPTER 9: POPULIST PARTIES IN POWER AND THEIR IMPACT ON LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES IN WESTERN EUROPE Tjitske Akkerman Populist parties are widely perceived as a threat to liberal democracies. Now that populist parties are increasingly participating in national governments, their impact on policies and polities should be at the centre of scholarly attention. This chapter will discuss the effects of radical right-wing populist parties on liberal democracies when they gain executive power. Its focus will be on their impact on consolidated democracies in Western Europe. Populist parties entered the Western European political scene as important players in the 1990s. These parties were predominantly right-wing parties. Left-wing populist parties have been far less successful until now, and hardly any of these parties have managed to gain governmental power. Rightwing populist parties, in contrast, have entered office in various countries. Right-wing populism is predominantly a radical right-wing phenomenon in Western Europe (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2015). Although there are some centre-right populist parties, such as Forza Italia, radical right-wing parties, like the Freedom Party of Austria, the Danish People’s Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, the Finns Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom and the Lega Nord, have been the most successful in setting up a populist profile. Rooduijn et al. (2014) demonstrated that mainstream parties are not characterised by their populism. Although some mainstream parties also deploy populist rhetoric, they do so only marginally in comparison to various non-mainstream parties. The disloyalty of populist parties to the political establishment and their aspirations of changing both the formal and informal rules of the game contrast starkly with the commitment of established parties to the status quo (Akkerman et al. 2016; Abedi 2004; Capoccia 2002). Moreover, populists differentiate themselves from centrist parties—namely Christian democratic, conservative, liberal and social democratic parties—by taking radical positions on economic or cultural issues (Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005). Defining Populism Populism has become a large encompassing framework for understanding political phenomena. Studies of populism often appear to be talking about different things. To achieve consistency, it is important to begin by distinguishing between the different ways in which the terminology of populism is used (Gerring 2001: 120). The most elementary characteristic of populist ideology in Western Europe is the separation of society into two antagonistic groups: the pure people versus the corrupt elites (Mudde 2007). The antagonism between the people and the elites can be defined in political, cultural or economic terms (Mény and Surel 2000). The definition of the people varies historically as well as regionally (Canovan 1981). Nowadays, pop- 169 ulists in Western Europe define the people and the elites primarily in political terms. Left-wing and right-wing populists both position political dissatisfaction with the domination of elites in liberal and representative democracies at the centre of their discourses. While both types of populists target political elites, left-wing populists also attack economic elites. In contrast, radical right-wing populist parties (RRPPs) tend to emphasise cultural antagonism between elites and the people. They define the people as culturally homogeneous, adhering to the idea that only members of the native group belong to the people, and that non-native people and ideas are fundamentally threatening to the nation state (Mudde 2007). This nativist populism has been translated programmatically into anti-immigration stances, and more recently into anti- European Union and anti-Islamic positions. The Impact of Radical Right-wing Populists in Government The debate about the impact of populism has been mainly waged in theoretical and normative terms. The term is often used to discredit opponents. Only recently have some scholars emphasised the need to develop a more neutral and empirical approach (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). Its opponents characterise populism as being bad for liberal democracy, while a minority of advocates insist that populism is a positive, corrective force (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). In the academic world and in the media, (radical right-wing) populists are regularly characterised as (neo-) fascists (Riker 1982). Since the 1980s, radical right-wing populist parties have taken steps, sometimes half-heartedly, to distance themselves from classic extremist subjects, such as anti-Semitism, racism or references to Nazism and fascism. Some parties, like the National Front, the Flemish Interest or the Sweden Democrats, have a problematic extremist reputation. The predominant academic understanding, though, is that populism fundamentally differs from fascism. Radical right-wing populists are not anti-democratic, but they are opposed to the predominant liberal form of Western democracies (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Mudde 2007; Müller 2016). Populists reject a conception of democracy based on the idea that the rule of law, division of power through checks and balances, and constitutionalism are essential for the protection of individual rights. Liberal democracy also presumes that society comprises plural groups with diverging interests, while populists perceive society to be divided by a single cleavage between the people and elites. Their ideal is a majoritarian type of democracy founded on the general will of the people. For them, the will of the majority—often channelled through a strong leader—should be supreme. Some scholars argue that populism is not only a threat but also a corrective to liberal democracy. Populism may counter the propensity of liberal democracy to move too far away from its foundations in popular sovereignty and to delegate too much power to elites (Schmitter 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Plattner 2010; Meny and Surel 2002). The idea that populism should be regarded as a potential corrective to democracy presupposes that populists aim to restore the balance between pluralist elite rule and the will of the majority. These three views of populism—as an anti-democratic threat, an anti-liberal threat or a corrective to liberal democracy—all skate on rather thin theoretical ice. Populism is a thin ideology with little intellectual backing from authoritative texts. Populist analyses of what is wrong with current democracies, what kind of future society should replace them and what means are required to build up an alternative society are not very well elaborated. No wonder that Tjitske Akkerman 170 some would call it a style or discourse rather than an ideology (Aslanidis 2015; Stanley 2008). The thinness of populism does not provide sufficient grounds for settling the key debate about its impact on liberal democracies. It leaves room for a wide range of interpretations. Empirical evidence is therefore crucial. Evidence to substantiate one claim or another is often randomly gathered from various regions, even though the political contexts in regions like Western Europe, Latin America or Eastern Europe differ fundamentally. Populists like Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa in Latin America or Viktor Orbán in Eastern Europe are often used as examples to demonstrate what the phrase ‘empowerment of the people’ really means. These populist leaders have undertaken constitutional reforms that systematically curtail the power of parliament, the media, the judiciary and civil society. The results are authoritarian, illiberal regimes based on plebiscitarian politics combined with strong leadership. It is rash to presume that RRPPs in Western Europe not only aim to copy them but will also be able to do so. Normative discussion about populism can hardly be avoided. However, a normative perspective should incite empirical research rather than replace it. Moreover, one should be aware that most populist policies cannot simply be translated into good or bad effects for liberal democracies. Whether restrictive policies in the fields of immigration or integration, for instance, go beyond liberal principles is a complex discussion with narrow dividing lines (Bauböck and Joppke 2010; Joppke and Morawska 2014). Empowering the people through forms of direct democracy might serve as a corrective to elite domination, but judging under what conditions referenda are a blessing or a peril is far from easy. A research agenda that approaches populism normatively is suitable as long as it is empirically oriented and does not take moral judgements for granted. Mapping the Research Field Radical right-wing populist parties (RRPPs) in Western Europe have not only been electorally successful during the past few decades, but they have increasingly joined coalitions in various countries. The first party to enter government in Western Europe was Lega Nord in 1996. This was a short experiment that demonstrated the difficulties populist newcomers experience in governing. After the turn of the millennium, beginning with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which entered a coalition government with the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) in 2000, RRPPs have been on the march towards executive power. Based on the definition outlined above, we can identify nine radical right-wing populist parties that have participated in 17 cabinets either as formal coalition parties or formal supporting parties of minority governments in Western Europe since the turn of the millennium (Akkerman et al. 2016: 3). CHAPTER 9: POPULIST PARTIES IN POWER AND THEIR IMPACT ON LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 171 Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Office CHAPTER 9 [A] POPULIST PARTIES IN POWER AND THEIR IMPACT ON LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES IN WESTERN EUROPE Tjitske Akkerman Table 9.1: R dical R ghtwing Populist Parties in Office Country Party Cabinet Composition Period Austria FPÖ Schüssel I ÖVP–FPÖ 2000–2005 BZÖ Schüssel I ÖVP–BZÖ 2005–2006 Denmark DF A.F.Rasmussen I V–KF–(DF) 2001–2005 DF A.F.Rasmussen II V–KF–(DF) 2005–2007 DF A.F.Rasmussen III V–KF–(DF) 2007–2009 DF L.L.Rasmussen I V–KF–(DF) 2009–2011 DF L.L.Rasmussen II V–(DF) 2015– Finland PS Sipila II KESK–KOK–PS 2015– Italy LN Berlusconi I FI-AN–LN–CCD–UCD 1994–1994 LN Berlusconi II/III FI–AN–LN 2001–2006 LN Berlusconi IV PdL–LN–MpA 2008–2011 Netherlands LPF Balkenende I CDA–LPF–VVD 2003–2003 PVV Rutte I VVD–CDA–(PVV) 2010–2012 Norway FrP Solberg I H–FrP 2013– Switzerland SVP - - 2003–2007 SVP - - 2007–2011 SVP - - 2011– Notes: FPÖ: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; BZÖ: Bündnis Zukunft Österreich; DF: Dansk Folkeparti; PS: Perussuomalaiset; LN: Lega Nord; LPF: Lijst Pim Fortuyn; PVV: Partij Voor de Vrijheid; FrP: Fremskrittspartiet; SVP: Schweizerische Volkspartei Notes: FPÖ: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; BZÖ: Bündnis Zukunft Österreich; DF: Dansk Folkeparti; PS: Perussuomalaiset; LN: Lega Nord; LPF: Lijst Pim Fortuyn; PVV: Partij Voor de Vrijheid; FrP: Fremskrittspartiet; SVP: Schweizerische Volkspartei Given that this is a relatively new phenomenon, it is not surprising that research devoted to RRPPs’ performance in government and the effects of incumbency on them is still relatively scarce. There is little general academic attention paid to new parties in governments. Systematic comparative research is also scarce regarding the Greens and regionalist parties (Müller- Rommel and Poguntke 2002; Deschouwer 2008). Compared to other new parties such as the Greens, however, RRPPs have been the most successful new family of parties in terms of electoral results and government participation since the turn of the millennium (Mudde 2013). Moreover, no family of parties has been studied so intensively as that of the radical right-wing populists. Against this background, government participation is still remarkably understudied. Table 9.1: Tjitske Akkerman 172 There are numerous case studies but only a few systematic studies investigating the impact that these parties have when they participate in national governments. Admittedly, systematic research in this field is not always easy. Impact is a complex phenomenon that can be exerted in various fields including public opinion and debate, electoral competition, policy fields and political institutions. Moreover, impact can be exerted in different political arenas at the same time. RRPPs may have considerable indirect influence once they break through electorally and gain entry to national parliaments (Schain 2006). Electoral success pressures other parties to reconsider their policy agendas with respect to the key issues that RRPPs have successfully politicised. The step from opposition to government provides these parties with opportunities to increase their impact directly through executive action. The difficulty is that, in the latter case, agenda setting and policy effects are still also mediated at several levels through interaction with other political parties and parliament (Heinisch 2003). Analytically disentangling the impact of RRPPs through government power from their impact as successful opposition parties can be a daunting task. Case studies can successfully provide some insight into distinctions between indirect and direct impact (see Bale and Hampshire 2015). Systematic comparative research on the impact of RRPPs in opposition and in government, however, is still lacking. A Threat to Liberal Freedoms and Rights? Although populism is perceived to be an anti-liberal ideology, RRPPs in Western Europe do not foreground anti-liberal elements in their campaigns. No leader of a radical right-wing populist party in Western Europe has voiced their aversion to liberalism as explicitly as Viktor Orbán, Hungary's prime minister and leader of the populist party Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance. He openly defied liberal democracy and praised ‘illiberal democracy’ when he was reelected in 2014. RRPPs in Western Europe tend to refrain from openly promoting an alternative, illiberal model of democracy. Nevertheless, their policy proposals and legislative initiatives in government betray the fact that they have little respect for the fundamental freedoms and rights of ‘non-native’ groups. RRPPs in government have frequently promoted policy proposals or legislative acts that come into conflict with fundamental human rights, according to constitutional tribunals or international courts. The FPÖ proposed taking the fingerprints of all foreigners, the Lega Nord proposed a ‘security package’, which included proposals that were thrown out by the European Court of Justice as conflicting with fundamental human rights, and the Swiss People’s Party used popular initiatives to restrict religious freedoms, such as the building of minarets, which breached the European Convention on Human Rights. However, overall RRPPs have not been very successful in implementing such policy proposals (Albertazzi and Müller 2013). Case studies confirm that the negative impact of RRPPs on liberal rights and freedoms in Western Europe is still limited (Akkerman and De Lange 2012; Minkenberg 2001). A few studies that have systematically investigated the impact of populist governments on freedoms and rights in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Western Europe make clear that each respective region makes a significant difference in this respect (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016). While cases in Latin America and Eastern Europe demonstrate that populists have managed to erode fundamental freedoms and rights, the cases of Berlusconi’s governments in Italy and the initial coalition government, which included the CHAPTER 9: POPULIST PARTIES IN POWER AND THEIR IMPACT ON LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 173 FPÖ, in Austria indicate that in Western Europe such negative effects are absent (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Fallend and Heinisch 2015). The initiatives of RRPPs to curtail fundamental freedoms and rights are mainly driven by an ethnic view of the people and are linked to their core policy issues. RRPPs are first and foremost anti-immigration parties. They perceive the people as culturally homogeneous, and regard certain non-native groups, such as immigrants, Muslims or other cultural minorities as a threat to the nation. This ethnic view of the people might entail a threat to liberal democracy by increasing intolerance and advancing restrictive policies that make democracies less inclusive and pluralist, especially when RRPPs do not hesitate to trade fundamental rights and freedoms for homogeneity or security. RRPPs have pushed to make immigration and integration policies more restrictive. Most studies confirm that the electoral successes of RRPPs have incited mainstream right-wing parties to move to more restrictive positions with respect to immigration and integration (Bale 2008; Howard 2010; Marthaler 2008; Schain 2006; Williams 2006). Although some case studies have questioned the putative influence of RRPPs on other parties (Duncan 2010; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008), systematic research tends to confirm that RRPPs incite mainstream right-wing parties to adapt their positions on multiculturalism or immigration (Han 2016; Van Spanje 2010). While the electoral rise of these parties indirectly contributes to more restrictive trends in some countries, it is far from clear that their access to executive power accelerates such trends (Akkerman and De Lange 2012). Once they are in government, RRPPs do not contribute significantly more to implementing the restrictive legislative reform of immigration and integration policies than incumbent centre-right parties do. The latter appear to have been equally effective in this respect (Akkerman 2012). Electoral success and blackmailing power are probably as effective in shaping policies from opposition as when RRPPs actually gain executive power (see Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 209). Empowering the People? It might be expected that RRPPs would initiate or support legislative reforms to introduce or extend direct forms of democracy in order to empower the people. Mudde (2007: 153), for instance, claims that all RRPPs in Western Europe put the introduction and use of plebiscitary democratic initiatives at the centre of their propaganda. On the other hand, Mudde (2004) has argued elsewhere that RRPPs do not give much priority to the empowering of citizens through direct forms of democracy. Strong leadership is more important to them and their supporters than direct democracy according to this view. Although research is scarce in this area, what there is suggests that the latter view of Mudde is the most convincing. Kristof Jacobs (2010) concludes that populists do not systematically endorse recall elections, popular initiatives or referenda. When in government they hardly introduce any reforms, and their impact on democratic reforms is more effective when they are in opposition. The finding that democratic reforms are not high on the agendas of RRPPs is not surprising given the fact that the voters of RRPPs do not give any priority to democratic participation (Bowler et al. 2016). Referenda have been on the rise in Western Europe for some time, but this trend has evolved regardless of the electoral success and participation of RRPPs in government (Butler and Ranney 1994; Scarrow 2001; Dalton et al. 2003). From a long-term perspective, the impact of RRPPs on reforming democracies to make them more direct is clearly limited. Tjitske Akkerman 174 RRPPs might be effective in empowering the people in other ways. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) have argued that populist parties are likely to give a voice to groups that do not feel represented politically and succeed in mobilising excluded sections of society. In this respect, they may prove to be a blessing for liberal democracies. This claim has not yet been applied in terms of government participation, but when we review the evidence, it is not a promising avenue of enquiry. The idea that RRPPs manage to make democratic participation more inclusive by mobilising disaffected non-voters is based on some case-studies. For instance, the Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands and the Flemish Interest in Belgium have managed to engage specific groups of citizens (De Lange and Akkerman 2012; Van Praag 2003; see also Laycock 2013). However, this does not always lead to an increase in turnout among dissatisfied voters (De Lange and Akkerman 2012). Moreover, systematic analysis of turnout at national elections in Western Europe shows that RRPPs do not foster the turnout of groups of voters who feel excluded (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015). RRPPs can only be credited for making policy agendas more inclusive. They have most consistently and successfully given a voice to dissatisfied voters by adding to the importance of issues related to immigration and integration (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012). In other words, RRPPs’ positive impact on liberal democracies can mainly be attributed to the ways in which they give a voice to those groups that prefer more exclusive policies in relation to immigrants or people with an immigrant background. That is a far cry from the claim that populists correct the uneven balance between popular sovereignty and elite rule. To sum up, there is little evidence that RRPPs have a positive impact on liberal democracies, regardless of whether they are in opposition or government. Fears that these parties might have a negative impact when they enter government are more warranted, but RRPPs clearly have not managed to fundamentally reshape polities so far. Fundamental freedoms and rights have not been harmed during their incumbency. That is not to say that RRPPs are careful to respect individual rights. In the context of their anti-immigration and anti-Islamic policies, RRPPs do not hesitate to propose legislative reforms that clash with fundamental human rights. Explanations Comparative research on RRPPs is scarce and based on case studies. Systematic quantitative analyses are still lacking. It is clear, though, that the impact of populists in government is much more limited in Western Europe than in regions like Latin America or Eastern Europe. In Latin America or Eastern Europe, populists have established illiberal and authoritarian democracies by gaining a supermajority in government and/or by taking advantage of weak democratic institutions. In Western Europe, RRPPs are political newcomers that have predominantly governed as junior partners in coalition governments. (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016). They are often new parties that still have to learn to build up organisations and to recruit and train competent personnel in order to be able to govern effectively (Akkerman and De Lange 2012; De Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012; Deschouwer 2008). With the exception of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), they still do not constitute government majorities. Their executive power to establish fundamental reforms through constitutional changes is relatively weak. Moreover, they have to operate within the CHAPTER 9: POPULIST PARTIES IN POWER AND THEIR IMPACT ON LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 175 context of vested democracies, where they encounter considerable political and civil opposition, and strong checks and balances. Although RRPPs are electorally on the march, it is less easy to gain majorities or supermajorities with an openly anti-liberal programme in Western Europe. Voters in Western Europe value the legitimacy of parties. When voters perceive RRPPs to be anti-democratic, they are less inclined to vote for them (Bos and Van der Brug 2010). Electoral considerations are, therefore, also important in restraining these parties from too openly attacking liberal democracies in Western Europe. RRPPs not only lack executive power, but they also face stronger resistance in Western Europe. Strong judiciaries, in particular, prevent RRPPs from curtailing fundamental freedoms (Albertazzi and Müller 2013). Rigid constitutions and constitutional courts are also highly important when fundamental freedoms are at stake. In the case of Switzerland, for instance, the absence of a constitutional tribunal, in combination with strong, direct democracy, provides the SVP with relatively favourable preconditions (Mazzoleni 2016). European courts and conventions, however, are proving to still be an important backup in this respect. (Müller 2013; Batory 2016; Fallend and Heinisch 2015). The role of strong parliaments in restraining RRPPs is also an important factor. Parties in opposition have effectively resisted the anti-liberal reform agendas of RRPPs. Left-wing parties, in particular, can be an important constraining force here (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Fallend and Heinisch 2015). Coalition governments are important for limiting executive power, but the role of coalition partners should not be overestimated. In some incidental cases, coalition partners have contributed to constraining the policy approaches of RRPPs (Fallend and Heinisch 2015). Overall, however, the importance of coalition partners tends to be limited. RRPPs are largely dependent on coalitions with mainstream right-wing parties in Western Europe. Comparative research indicates that mainstream right-wing parties scarcely manage to pressure RRPPs to moderate their anti-immigration positions, their EU scepticism or their populist rhetoric when forming coalitions. They only have some constraining effect on their anti-establishment behaviour (Akkerman et al. 2016). Populists are the usual suspects when the erosion of liberal democracy is investigated. This could easily lead to tunnel vision that excludes other possible suspects. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012: 210) observed in the case of Venezuela, the effects of the populist government of Hugo Chávez on the erosion of liberal democracies may be overrated. There is a more general trend towards authoritarian regimes delivered by leaders that have been democratically elected and retain legitimacy through elections. Not all these leaders are populists (Bermeo 2016). In the case of Venezuela, for instance, erosion already began before Chávez came on the scene (Roberts 2012). What is called for is research that not only focuses on the effects of populist governments, but also takes other factors into account by including long-term trends and comparing the effects of non-populist governments. A quick look at data from Freedom House, for instance, makes clear that democracies in Western Europe score consistently high on political rights and freedoms generally, but there is variation that indicates their subtle decline under mainstream governments. In summary, research assessing the impact of RRPPs should recognise the possibility that other factors are equally or even more significant in the decline of liberal rights and freedoms. Tjitske Akkerman 176 Conclusions The access RRPPs have gained to executive power in Western Europe has not yet fundamentally affected liberal democracies. Reforms to make liberal democracies more direct in order to empower the people do not appear to have been central to the agendas of these parties. In so far as they have supported these reforms, RRPPs have been more effective in opposition than in government. Moreover, taken from a long-term perspective, the impact of these parties on the proliferation of referenda is limited. The idea that populists contribute positively to democratic representation by giving a voice to dissatisfied voters has not been verified. Dissatisfied voters do not turn out to vote more when these parties come on the scene. Overall, the conclusion seems to be warranted that populists cannot be credited for correcting the balance between elite rule and popular sovereignty in liberal democracies. While there is little evidence that RRPPs have a positive impact on liberal democracies, fears of a negative impact when these parties enter government are more warranted. Yet, RRPPs clearly have not managed to fundamentally reshape polities so far. Although RRPPs do not refrain from policy proposals and legislative initiatives that conflict with fundamental individual rights, they have not been very effective. The opposition of parliaments, national and international courts, and civil societies is still strong in vested democracies in Western Europe. While the electoral success of these parties has certainly indirectly contributed to more restrictive trends regarding the rights of immigrants and asylum seekers, it is far from clear that their access to executive power has accelerated such trends. In this respect, as well as in others, empirical research is still in its infancy. The impact of RRPPs in government is a difficult subject to study, as it is not easy to distinguish impact through executive power from impact through electoral competition and opposition in parliament. Research has focused mainly on indirect impact. Most scholars agree that RRPPs have an indirect impact in core policy areas, such as immigration and integration, through electoral competition. Impact in government is more difficult to investigate as it is challenging to disentangle the direct and indirect impacts of parties in power. Case studies that closely explore this issue are much needed. The amount of research on the impact of RRPPs in government is increasing, but some aspects are still largely unexplored. Descriptive studies investigating the impact of RRPPs in fields like public opinion and debate, electoral competition and in policy areas like immigration and integration are well developed, while policy areas like welfare arrangements, economic policy and foreign policy are beginning to be explored as well. However, their effects on liberal democracies—constitutional rights, checks and balances, and representative and direct forms of democracy—have scarcely been investigated yet. Systematic and quantitative studies, in particular, are difficult to find. Explanatory studies which investigate systematically why RRPPs fail or succeed to use executive power effectively are generally still scarce. Research concerning populist parties is easily eclipsed by normative approaches. 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Verbeek Bertjan and Andrej Zaslove (2015) ‘Italy: a case of mutating populism?’, Democratization, 23(2), 304–23. Williams, Michelle H. (2006) The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Tjitske Akkerman 180 CHAPTER 10: SOCIOCULTURAL LEGACIES IN POST-TRANSITION SOCIETIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE RESURGENCE OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM AND POPULISM IN THE REGION Vlastimil Havlík1 and Miroslav Mareš Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) can be considered a specific geopolitical area in terms of the spread of populism and research on this phenomenon. The communist era in this region blocked the development of a pluralist party system and open societies. After the fall of the non-democratic regimes, the rise in nationalist tensions in many countries was accompanied by the growing strength of far right parties. Research on these phenomena has been a fairly well-developed part of current social sciences. Many questions are still unanswered, so we will try to explain paradigmatic approaches of research on extremism, on the one hand, and research on populism, on the other hand, although in much of the research these concepts are closely interconnected. Before we move to the examination of the sociocultural legacies in post-transition CEE societies which have contributed to the rise of far right parties, a short terminological note is needed. Various authors use different concepts and terms in order to identify the specific parts of the political spectrum – right-wing extremism (von Beyme), the radical right (Minkenberg), rightwing radicalism (Weichsel) or the far right (Hloušek, Kopeček). These scholars used the terms synonymously and therefore we adopt a similar approach in this chapter. Focusing on extremist elements of right-wing politics in comparison with extremist elements of left-wing politics is typical of the research on extremism that has been conducted in Germany (the so-called ‘theory of extremism’). Tom Thieme—one of the theoreticians of extremism—applied approaches of this research in the East and Central European area, and he compared the legacies and strength of the communist and right-wing extremist parties (Thieme 2007). As a starting point, we accept the existence of a far right party family, which can be divided into two groups. We understand the term right-wing extremism to be the ideologies and movements aimed against the main values of a democratic constitutional state (mostly against pluralism, equality and democratic procedures), based on ideas of biological inequality (Bötticher and Mares, 2012). On the other hand, the ideology of right-wing populist parties is based on a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007). In accordance with the introductory chapter of this book (Heinisch and Mazzoleni in this volume), populism is understood here as the “intrinsically ambivalent claim diffused by individual and collective actors in order to challenge the status-quo in favour of people`s empowerment and elite change”. 1 Vlastimil Havlík`s work on the chapter was supported by the project of Masaryk University Grant Agency "Determinants of the Rise of Extremism and Populism in Times of Crisis." (MUNI/M/1748/2014) 181 In other words, populism constructs the moralistic divide between the corrupt and allegedly incompetent elites and the pure people, whose power, previously held by the elites, should be restored (Mudde 2004a; Stanley 2008; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). Nativism is defined here in accordance with Mudde, that is, as “an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that the normative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening the homogeneous nation state” (Mudde 2007: 19). By authoritarianism, we understand “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde 2007: 23). The main aim of this chapter is to examine both right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe, and research on them within the context of sociocultural legacies with specific attention devoted to the legacies of communism. The main focus will be placed on the identity and the emergence of right-wing extremism and populism, partly from a perspective which compares both phenomena to West European experiences. After examining the current state of research, we summarise the main areas of contemporary research on rightwing extremism and populism in Central and Eastern Europe and outline possibilities for further research in the future. The State of Research on Right-wing Extremist and Populist Legacies Right-wing extremism occupied a relevant position within the party system of new democracies in East Central Europe shortly after the start of the democratisation process. In the first or second elections after the fall of communism, right-wing extremist parties were successful in several countries (for example, the Serbian Radical Party). Also at that time there was the first surge in right-wing extremist violence in Eastern and Central Europe (mostly against the Roma, immigrants and political opponents; specific cases are the Baltic states, where Russian nationalists incited violence against local targets) (Mareš 2005; Mudde 2005). It is also important to mention that in the 1990s temporarily established right-wing authoritarian regimes existed (for example, the so-called Meciarism in Slovakia). Right-wing extremism during this era has been investigated in studies on transformation. There are studies on democratic consolidation (Beyme 1997: 34-7) within the broader context of consolidation of representation (Merkel 2010: 120), studies on nationalism (as an expression of ethno-nationalist tensions in the post-communist era) (Jahn 2008) and studies on nondemocratic regimes (as a constitutive element of several new right-wing authoritarian regimes) (Balík and Kubát 2015). The more important legacy of current research, however, is connected with research on the radical right. Published by Klaus von Beyme (1996), it is based on the concept of organised intolerance (Ramet 1999) and comparative approaches within the research on political parties. Beyme also connected the issue of right-wing extremism with the spread of populism (Beyme 1996: 424-34). A debate about the character of right-wing radicalism proceeded on the pages of the German journal Osteuropa in 2002. Its starting point was an article written by Tim Beichelt and Michael Minkenberg about the conditions of establishing and explaining the model of the radical right in transformation societies. The authors argued that the formation and consolidation of the radical right was a result of the social changes which took place after the socio-economic and sociocultural modernisation in post-communist Europe (Beichelt and Minkenberg Vlastimil Havlík and Miroslav Mareš 182 2002a: 260–2). Several authors published case studies on the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe in this journal; other authors discussed the question of whether right-wing radicalism could be considered a phenomenon sui generis (Weichsel 2002). This debate was again summarised by Beichelt and Minkenberg (2002b). Minkenberg later analysed legacies of the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe with the help of the following categories: nation type, existence of external homelands, existence of strong national minority, regime conflict (regime contested by major political forces), transformation costs, non-reformed post-communist parties with “communist-nationalist” predecessors and nationalist parties. Minkenberg labelled the radical right a “syncretic construct” and he stated: “it is derived from both pre-communist and communist legacies” (Minkenberg 2010: 20-4). Specific attention was paid to the East and Central European radical right by Cas Mudde. He published an article about political parties (Mudde 2000a) and then he edited the book “Racist extremism in East and Central Europe”, in which he analysed not only political parties but also militant non-parliamentary movements and subcultures, and racist incidents. Mudde concluded that the real political power of the right-wing extremist parties was limited and the level of racist violence in East and Central Europe was higher than in Western Europe (Mudde 2005). In his later contributions, Mudde researched the Eastern and Western radical right and extremist parties within a single analytical framework which included populism, radicalism and extremism (Mudde 2007; Mudde 2016). The far right parties have also been researched within the context of party family research. An interesting approach can be found in the work of Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček. They stated: ‘Comparing the identity of the East-Central European far right with the Western European far right at the end of the 20th century, generally the East-Central European far right was much more influenced by the historical legacy left over from the first half of the last century. In this sense the East-Central European far right was much “older” and “traditional”’ (Hloušek and Kopeček 2010: 216). The initial rise of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe is usually explained as a result of the “silent counter-revolution” of the late 1960s (Ignazi 1992). While the resurgence of the green and libertarian parties stemmed from the counter-revolution within the context of the rising salience of post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977), right-wing populist parties emerged as the defenders of those feeling under threat from the changes brought about by post-industrial societies and globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2008). However, the original modernisation losers thesis (Betz 1993) can hardly be applied to the rise of right-wing populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of communism in 1989. Instead, taking into account the effects of the legacies of (post-) communist societies, we can use an innovative approach to modernisation theory as a heuristically interesting explanatory framework for the emergence and the ideology of the populist right in Central and Eastern Europe. As stated by Minkenberg (2002: 336), “[b]esides country-specific histories and opportunity structures, the overall analytical frame for the CEE radical right is multiple modernisation processes, that is, a transformation from authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies, from state socialist to capitalist market economies, and from industrialism to post-industrialism.” All three dimensions of modernisation have increased (the perceived) economic and cultural insecurity, which has created a breeding ground for the mobilisation of support for right-wing populist groups, which CHAPTER 10: Sociocultural legacies in Post-transition societies in Central and Eastern Europe 183 offer simplistic solutions to those negatively affected by the transformation. Kitschelt (1995) noted in the mid-1990s that nationalist authoritarian appeals had often been combined with the leftist position on the economically defined axis of competition. This created a ‘winning formula’ that was different from the often economically neo-liberal right-wing populist parties in Western Europe (although the defence of extensive welfare spending has become an integral part of the programmatic base of populist radical right parties in Western Europe in recent years) (De Lange 2007; Jungar and Jupskås 2014). In other words, right-wing populist parties emerged as defenders of ‘transition losers’ suffering from the economic transformation and opposing the free-market capitalist environment. Moreover, unlike West European countries, the region of post-communist CEE has not (yet) experienced extensive immigration from non- European countries. This lack of non-European immigration has had important effects on the exclusionary ideology of CEE right-wing populist parties in defining the enemy of the nation as either “within the state but outside the nation” (national or ethnic minorities) (Mudde 2007) or even beyond its borders. As stated by Minkenberg (who takes into consideration the previous process of nation building), ‘“external homelands” and “lost territories” have been especially prominent themes for the radical right, who use “offensive ultranationalism” that targets neighbouring countries rather than defensive nationalism (typical of the radical right in Western Europe), which aims at protecting a nation’s culture, welfare etc. from immigrants’ (Minkenberg 2013: 26). Consequently, the Roma minority became the target of nativist discourse of the Czech Association for the Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Hanley 2012), the Slovak National Party (Spáč 2012) and Jobbik in Hungary (Havlík 2012). In Bulgaria, the Turkish minority became the target of Ataka’s nativist appeal. Expansive appeals by the Hungarian Jobbik (attacking the Trianon Treaty), the Greater Romania Party and the Bulgarian Ataka are the most important representatives of this offensive ultranationalism in the CEE (Pirro 2014). To sum up, the most important consequences of communist legacies (and sometimes even the legacies preceding the instalment of the communist regimes) had important consequences on the ideological profile of right-wing populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe. First, they were established primarily as defenders of the losers of transformation, who criticised the introduction of liberal economic reforms. Second, the absence of an immigrant population and the presence of either national or ethnic minorities made the nativist appeal of right-wing populist parties considerably different from the majority of their Western counterparts. In his study of populism in Central and Eastern Europe, Cas Mudde (2000b) examined the effects of the communist legacy on the presence of the three types of populism: agrarian populism, economic populism and political populism. According to Mudde (2000b: 41), the nonexistence of agrarian populism was accounted for not just by the process of industrialisation but also by communist policies of collectivisation, having effectively liquidated the old family farms, which were traditionally the basis of agrarian populism in Europe and elsewhere. Exceptions were seen in countries in which the rural population resisted collectivisation (the rise of Self-Defence in Poland) (Stanley 2015) or where collectivisation was not as effective due to the partial liberalisation of economic policies (Hungary Independent Smallholders’ Party). Despite the potential rise of economic populism stemming from socialisation under ‘protective’ state socialism, economic populism did not materialise in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. Mudde explained the lack of economic populism (with the partial exceptions of Slovakia and Belarus) with reference to both the prevalent pro-market economic reform of the Vlastimil Havlík and Miroslav Mareš 184 transition period and the persistent dominance of the neo-liberal economic paradigm on international markets. As for political populism (equated with populist right-wing parties), the Leninist legacy created favourable conditions for several reasons. First, the existence of antipolitical sentiments or anti-partyism as a result of the negative perception of former state parties is comparable to the Manichean division between the pure people and the corrupt elites, which is typical of populism. Moreover, it is reinforced by the nihilist, atomised post-socialist society. What is also important is that these anti-political sentiments were also expressed by some of the most influential intellectuals of the transition period, such as Václav Havel or Lech Waleşa. Havel’s famous thesis about “non-political politics” emphasises the role of citizenship in contrast to politics as a “technology of power and manipulation with it or as cyber-management of the people or as the art of pragmatism and intrigues” (Havel 1989: 106). Another example is the narrative of the first Solidarity in Poland, which stresses the non-political role of the independent trade unions (Ost 2006). The anti-political sentiment in polarised post-transition societies was later ‘captured by opportunists and anti-democrats’, be they right-wing (for example, the Association for the Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) or former communist parties. Nevertheless, to get a more detailed picture of the effects of communist legacies on the emergence of right-wing populist parties, the commonalities described need to be supplemented with a more idiosyncratic view which takes into consideration the specifics of the countries. Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009) used the well-known typology of communist regimes (patrimonial, national accommodative and bureaucratic authoritarian) (Kitschelt 1995) as the explanatory framework in their quantitative study of the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE. The former national accommodative communist regimes (for example, the states of the former Yugoslavia, Hungary) turned into a less polarised party competition with both the governing and the opposition parties supporting the liberal democratic and economic reforms and, at the same time, trying to preserve the ‘quasi-welfare state’ inherited from the previous communist regime. The lack of contestation on the economically defined dimension of competition soon led to the opening of the social-cultural dimension of contestation between national conservative (sometimes emphasising Christian values) and liberal secular, universalistic, libertarian and cosmopolitan political parties. Moreover, the economic success of the 1990s accompanied by social policy compensation left only limited space for the rise of right-wing populist parties in the former national accommodative communist regimes. Although the economic decline that followed after the period of prosperity opened the door for the resurgence of right-wing populist parties, the strategy of intensifying the social-cultural dimension of competition pursued by the mainstream parties diminished the chances of success for the populist right (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). In contrast, according to Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), the former patrimonial communist regimes provided more favourable conditions for the rise of right-wing populist parties. The democratic transition was accompanied by great political (unstable institutions) and economic problems, although part of the authoritarian and nostalgic grievance generated by economic turmoil fuelled support for unreformed successor communist parties. The potential for the rise of right-wing populists remained quite high even after the partial economic recovery of the 2000s, partly because of the partial change in governmental policies towards the market-oriented economic reforms. As for the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes (the Czech Republic and the former East Germany), a polarised party competition between the centre-right and so- CHAPTER 10: Sociocultural legacies in Post-transition societies in Central and Eastern Europe 185 cialist forces over economic reform was established. Despite the introduction of (neo-) liberal economic reforms, the potential for the rise of right-wing populist parties remained only at a modest level because “[t]he intransigent communist party always remained available to rally voters disappointed with the introduction of the capitalist market regime.” (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009: 465). Another factor Bustikova and Kitschelt took into consideration was the ethnic composition of post-communist countries with the greatest potential for the rise of right-wing populist parties in countries “with small, entrenched ethnic minorities, as well as with irredentist claims against their neighbours” (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009: 468), such as Hungary and Romania. Ongoing Debates and the Limitations of Right-wing Extremism and Populism in Central and Eastern Europe Current debates refer to previous research. The relatively strong presence of right-wing extremist parties with a ‘traditional’ profile in the East Central European party systems in the middle of the 2010s is a challenge to democracy in this area (the Jobbik in Hungary, the People´s Party Our Slovakia, the National Movement in Poland and so on). The consolidation of several Central and Eastern European democracies was connected with EU enlargement. However, recent extremist trends are discussed in the analytical framework of the possible de-consolidation of democracy. Extremism is only one of more possible de-consolidation phenomena (Dufek, Holzer and Mareš 2016). An important debate is still focused on the issue of a possible specific character of right-wing extremism in Central and Eastern Europe. In research, this sui generis character is connected mostly with deeper links to the traditional fascist and right-wing authoritarian legacy (including irredentist goals or the existence of paramilitary units). However, we can observe tendencies towards the modernisation of right-wing extremism in East and Central Europe, on the one hand (the rise of new anti-Islamist movements) (Mareš 2014), and the rise of the ‘traditional’ right-wing extremist parties in other parts of the continent (for example, Golden Dawn in Greece), on the other. Since the EU enlargement, some of the right-wing extremist parties from Central and Eastern Europe have been involved in EU parliamentary politics and in cooperation with Western European partners. The presence of the extreme right parties is described by Michael Minkenberg and Oliver Kossack: “The maturation of democracies in Eastern Europe, along with their integration into the Western capitalist order and the European Union, did not lead to a withering-away of ultranationalism in the region. Evidently the first outbreaks of ultranationalism and racist extremism during and after the collapse of communist regimes in 1989 failed to consolidate themselves into permanent features of the political order, as has happened with the radical right in most West European countries since the societal and political shifts of the 1980s.” (Minkenberg and Kossack 2015: 349) The right-wing extremist spectrum in Central and Eastern Europe can be divided according to geopolitical changes in the region. Right-wing extremists in the new member countries of the European Union are directly involved in multilevel EU politics. Right-wing extremist Eurosceptics occupy a specific position in EU candidate countries. In the Western Balkans, this Vlastimil Havlík and Miroslav Mareš 186 part of the political spectrum is determined by the legacies of ethnic wars in the 1990s (Stojarová 2014). The rise of traditional right-wing extremism, including paramilitary units, is connected with the recent conflict in Ukraine (Færseth 2015). A phenomenon sui generis is right-wing extremism in Russia, where it is divided into pro-regime and anti-regime factions. The Russian extreme right has contact to Central and Western European countries, and the current Russian regime is an inspiration to or supporter of several right-wing extremist parties and movements in the European Union (Mareš and Laryš 2015). The recent research on right-wing populism has gradually left the (previously not dominant) perspective of legacies. The Eastern enlargement of the European Union has resulted in the examination of the relationships right-wing populist parties have towards European integration. It is usually one of the topics of political analysis in broader cross-national comparative studies (Mudde 2004b; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Lewis and Mansfeldová 2006) and national case studies (Kaniok and Havlík 2016; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). Not surprisingly, the nativism of right-wing populist parties determines their Eurosceptical stance, in which they either call for European integration to be turned into an intergovernmental form of collaboration or ask to leave the European Union. The parliamentary and sometimes even governmental presence of right-wing populist parties (the League of Polish Families between 2006 and 2007 or the Slovak National Party between 2006 and 2010) provoked an intensive discussion about the impact of (right-wing) populism on the quality of democracy (Hanley 2012; Deegan- Krause 2012; Stanley 2016; Havlík 2016), with ambivalent findings stemming mostly from the nature of populism as ‘democratic illiberalism’ (Pappas 2014). A number of studies have focused on the effects of the global financial crisis and the crisis of the Eurozone on the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Hernández and Kriesi (2016) found that the economic crisis led to the improved electoral performance of the radical right, radical left and non-mainstream parties on average. The edited volume on the impact of the economic crisis on populism in Europe (Kriesi and Pappas 2015) emphasises the effects of both economic and political crises. However, the impact of the economic crisis remains ambiguous in countries without a successful populist right, despite the fact they were heavily hit by the crisis (Romania and Slovenia). On the other hand, there are several countries that did quite well during the crisis but still experienced a (modest) rise in right-wing populist parties (the Czech Republic, Poland or Slovakia) (see also Kriesi and Pappas 2015). In other words, the effects of the economic crisis on the rise of right-wing populist parties are one of the issues that needs further examination in the future. Conclusion Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe have been strongly influenced by historical legacies (including the legacies of the fascist and communist eras and the Versailles border system). The development of the first half of the 20th century left strong ethnic minorities outside their national states (most typically the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania and the Romanian minority in Hungary). That has become an important issue in the nationalist mobilisation of both extreme and populist right-wing actors in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, while communism suppressed the ethnic tensions in the multinational federations (the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), post-1989 democ- CHAPTER 10: Sociocultural legacies in Post-transition societies in Central and Eastern Europe 187 racy transition created an opportunity for the nativist and separatist appeals of the extreme and populist right. Unlike the extreme and right-wing populist parties in Western Europe, their nativist xenophobic appeals were not primarily aimed at non-European immigrants but very often at the Roma minority. Furthermore, the market-oriented economic transition often turned populist and extreme parties into advocates of ‘transition losers’, defending rather egalitarian policies with an emphasis on an extensive welfare state which protects the social groups most severely hit by the economic transformation. However, recent developments (including the immigration crisis) show a growing interconnection with pan-European issues, on the one hand, (Muslim immigration, in particular) and the influence of Russia, on the other. While scientific research into right-wing extremism and populism seems to be well developed, several important challenges for future research can be identified, including the ‘Russian card’, the perception of immigration, radicalisation of the mainstream and the rise of new populist actors. The future research agenda on right-wing extremism in Central and Eastern Europe should verify the impact of the historical legacies on the character of this phenomenon. The possible sui generis element should be identified as a result of a comparison with other geopolitical areas. The historical trajectories of the rise and the loss of influence in individual countries need to be explained (for example, the return of strong right-wing extremist parties to parliaments in Hungary or Slovakia). The coexistence of traditional right-wing extremist scenes with rightwing authoritarian governments (for example, in Poland) or with new ‘westernised’ anti-Islamist populism is also an interesting challenge to scientific research. The unclear borders between extremism, populism and the established spectrum should be also clarified in the future. Due to international development, the ‘Russian card’ is an important factor in the development of right-wing extremism in this area. Some right-wing extremist groupings are strongly pro-Russian (for example, the National Democracy in the Czech Republic), and some are anti- Russian (for example, the Right Sector in Ukraine). Russian right-wing extremist groupings are active in the Russian diaspora in Central and Eastern European countries. Scientific interest should be focused on countermeasures against right-wing extremism too. In Central and Eastern Europe, various instruments of militant democracy were applied (including a ban on right-wing extremist parties or associations); however, their short-term and long-term effects have not been described or analysed more deeply. This issue is an important part of the pan- European debate about the sense and effectiveness of counter-extremist measures (Mudde 2016: 129-36). The ‘Russian card’ mentioned in the context of the extremist right is also relevant in the study of the right-wing populist parties that have expressed pro-Russian attitudes. One of the possible research topics that has arisen from this is the motivation for these attitudes – is it an ideologically driven choice resulting from Euroscepticism and/or the anti-liberalism of the populist right (the well-known ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’)? Or is it a pragmatic quid pro quo step stemming from Russian ‘incentives’? The current immigration crisis provides at least two challenges for further research. First, it is the ‘Westernisation’ of right-wing populist parties in CEE that is making anti-immigration the most salient issue for these parties. Second, it is possible to observe what Michael Minkenberg called ‘radicalisation of the mainstream’. The policies of the Orbán cabinet in Hungary, the Szydlo cabinet in Poland, and the xenophobic rhetoric of Czech President Miloš Zeman and the Slovakian Prime Minister Ficoare the most visible examples of the illiberal, populist turn of politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Rup- Vlastimil Havlík and Miroslav Mareš 188 nik 2007; Dawson and Hanley 2016). This makes the participation of populist parties in government and their impact on the quality of democracy one of the most important topics for future research, since Hungarian, Polish and most recently Czech experiences throw the rise of populism as a litmus test for the quality of democratic representation into doubt. Instead, the illiberal face of populism has gained the upper hand in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. A detailed examination of the ongoing changes and, more importantly, the reasons behind the rise of populism are necessary. In fact, mainstream parties are becoming radical and – vice versa – radical parties are becoming mainstream. The fact that formerly moderate parties are moving towards authoritarian and nativist positions is also relevant from the perspective of the conceptual discussion about the nature of right-wing populism, which seems to have become a strategic rhetorical tool vis- à-vis the xenophobic majority of electorates. One of the questions that has arisen is whether we can still talk about the category of right-wing populist parties or ‘just’ about a degree of right-wing populist rhetoric which serves as a temporarily effective tactic in electoral competition. The role of the legacy of communism in underdeveloped civil societies and political parties that are not firmly socially rooted (Biezen 2003) and therefore more flexible in their programmatic and strategic choices is obvious. 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Beyond the regional focus, over the last two decades a particularly fertile collection of literature has brought numerous conceptual refinements to populism, clarified its meaning and addressed the challenge of its normative valence (Mudde 2016). By now, although scholars continue to mean different things when using the same term (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016), populism is considered both a legitimate and a necessary concept. However, most of the literature on it endorses the need to reinforce populism’s analytical value by avoiding classifying all the new parties with weak ideological features as populist, a constant menace in post-communist party politics (Sikk 2009). The literature on populism refers both to empirical facts, such as the expansion of electoral support for populist parties across Europe and on almost all other continents (Gherghina et al. 2013), and to the so-called perception of a major challenge for contemporary democracies (Mudde 2007). This is also the case in Central and Eastern Europe, where most of the research uses the common denominator of “the worshipped people” (Ionescu and Gellner 1969: 4) to assess populism and its variants. More recent studies have also shown the utility of using populism as a scale, implying that parties can be assessed as more populist or less populist. This chapter aims to provide an overview of populist parties across Central and Eastern Europe with a focus on six countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) between 1990 and 2016. The most recent elections taken into consideration are those in Slovakia in March 2016. The chapter starts with a theoretical section about the ambivalent framing of populism in the region. This section also includes details about the varieties of populist actors, and presents their electoral fortunes and general features of development. A caveat has to be mentioned. The vast majority of post-communist parties that correspond to the criteria identified in our theoretical part are classified as radical right forms of populism. Among the most well-known cases of inclusionary populism in post-communist Europe are the Socialist Labour Party (PSM) in Romania and Self-Defence in Poland. Still, in order to provide an in-depth, although succinct, analysis of the features of post-communist populism, sections one and two focus exclusively on its radical right forms. [B] 193 Considering the above, the second section presents a qualitative content analysis of the party programmes belonging to six populist parties, one from each country, in the most recent legislative elections. Next, we discuss the ambivalent relationship between discourse and practice by revealing populism’s two major contradictions. At this level, in order to broaden the discussion, the last section goes beyond the category of radical right populists. Hence, we integrate insights into our analysis about left-wing forms of populism and leaders that strategically use a populist-based discourse in order to mobilise their voters although they cannot be considered representatives of populist parties according to our definition and the consolidated literature. These two additional insights are used as so-called control cases in order to frame the peculiarities of populism better in the area of reference of this chapter. The conclusions summarise our main findings and shed light on avenues for further research. The ambivalent framing of populism in Central and Eastern Europe Populism in post-communist Europe has become a major concern of academic research since the early 1990s. While, in the early days, scholars focused mostly on single case analyses, over the last decade several comparative analyses have deepened the knowledge on the post-communist variants of the phenomenon. The most recent literature on populism goes beyond the emphasis on regional peculiarities (for example, repertoires based on both material and identity-based interests) and engages more intensively with the literature on Western Europe (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Stojarová 2013; Minkenberg 2015a; Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016). Building on this literature and in coherence with the minimal definition endorsed by this handbook, we refer to populism as a discursive frame which aims to challenge the status quo with the aim of restoring the power of the people and replacing the establishment (the élites), their dominant ideas and values. In other words, we assume that before being “a reaction against power structures” tout court, populism is “an appeal to a recognised authority” (Canovan 1999: 4), namely the people seen as the unique source of sovereignty and the genuine depositary of virtues. Implicitly, the emphasis on the pureness of the people echoes the rottenness of the antagonistic group: the élites in power that have proved to be incapable of dealing with the (real) post-communist problems. A caveat has to be mentioned. Drawing on Mudde’s and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2013) methodological precautions, we are aware that the implicit consequence of referring to a minimal definition is that our point of departure is rather high on the ladder of abstraction and as such we refer to a highly inclusive definition, accounting for a wide variety of parties and movements. The limitations in terms of precision due to this highly inclusive definition are however counterbalanced by the extension of the cases covered. Conceptual Delimitations: A Multifaceted Political Phenomenon Building upon Mudde (Mudde 2004: 543), we can use two core criteria to identify a populist party: 1) its anti-establishment criticisms and 2) its exaltation of the iconic role of a harmonious people in democracy. The two criteria are necessary and sufficient conditions; focusing on only one of the two criteria does not justify a party’s inclusion in the family of populist parties. In line with the chameleonic quality of populism (Taggart 2000), the content and the Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina Soare 194 intensity of the two criteria can vary across time and space according to the specific context in which the populist parties evolve and, as such, affect the degrees of populism. The first criterion focuses on parties’ voicing of the malfunctioning of post-communist democracy. Significantly, most of the post-communist populist parties did not challenge the legitimacy of democracy per se. They depict themselves as the ‘true democrats’, those who translate the real problems of society and advocate correctives for a more transparent democracy which is interested in the people. This ‘allegiance’ to democracy has to be connected with the legal dispositions adopted since the early 90s through constitutions and party laws across the region (van Biezen 2012). Inspired by the German model of ‘militant democracy’, the post-communist legal framework promotes civil and political freedoms and cautiously restricts certain ideologies and party activities on the grounds that they contradict democratic principles (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014: 299–300). With different levels of explicitness and intensity, bans on fascism, Nazism or communism, and also on a wider category of extremist behaviour (for example, separatist, insurrectionary, etc.), are in place across the region (van Biezen and Borz 2012). These legal instruments do not have full control over the forms of extremism chronicled by the literature on populism, in particular in relation to a myriad of movements and groups that multiplied outside the parliamentary arena; still, they can be considered an important deterrent and explain the relatively few cases of radical fascism across the region. In all the cases under scrutiny in this chapter, the parties have siphoned away violence as a solution to the democratic malaise. For the sake of precision, it is important to specify the limited agreement in the literature on a clear-cut distinction between post-communist radical right parties and extremist radical right parties that position themselves in open contestation with the democratic constitutional order (Pirro 2015, 23-27). The extension of explicit or implicit legacies of the pre-communist authoritarian experiences is put into direct connection with the anti-democratic features of numerous post-communist parties (Minkenberg 2002). However, we fully agree with Pirro’s detailed argument: “the ‘nostalgic’ discourse of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe is still employed within the framework of parliamentary democracy and, at least nominally, abides by its rules” (Pirro 2015, 25). Pirro’s arguments are reinforced by Bourne and Casal Bértoa’s (2017) most recent analysis. The two scholars illustrate that there are relatively few bans of post-communist parties that are considered to undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system (Bourne and Casal Bértoa 2017). However, the bans chronicled by the literature (e.g., the Slovak Community-National Party (2006), the Romanian Communist Party (Nepeceristi) (2008), the Czech Workers’ Party (2010)) (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014, 300) address less the ideological features of the parties and more their anti-democratic activities (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014, 300). This limited focus explains how it is possible to identify 13 new (extra-parliamentary) parties in contemporary Romania whose founders, names or ideology echo ‘nostalgic’ interpretations of national identity. Finally yet importantly, most of these legal aspects documented across the region in relation to this topic have dealt with small parties but did not involve legal action against major parties with increased potential of contestation. The 17 parties analysed in this chapter are characterised by different degrees of radicalism, yet they abide by democratic rules and can as such be considered representatives of a radical right populist family that (differing by intensity and content) embodies an opposition to the establishment in the name of a pure organic community and a restored popular sovereignty. CHAPTER 11: HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? 195 The second criterion translates the Manichean populist repertoire. Like their Western counterparts, post-communist populist parties distinguish between the people (depicted as pure, homogeneous and simple) and the deceitful elites. All in all, as in the Western case, the way the idea of “the people” is encompassed is context-dependent, and, as such, the definition of people may vary “from populist to populist, even within one country” (Mudde 2004: 546) and, most importantly, across time. Unlike interwar fascism, most of the post-communist populist parties praise values of equality within the community of reference, although the usefulness of traditional hierarchies maintains its rhetorical power, in particular in relation to the dominant position of the party leader. Across the region, the enemies populism reacts against are not exclusively located within the establishment; they are mainly fought off in an attempt to hamper the intrusion of an ethnic sources of heterogeneity (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Minkenberg 2015a). As illustrated by Pirro (2015), the ethnic dimension is an omnibus issue for this political family. The myth of a homogeneous nation directly targets the local ethnic minorities (for example, Magyar, Jews, Roma) not only in relation to their disruptive effect on the culturally homogeneous community, but also in relation to their impact on the social-economic benefits (in primis the Roma community) and the alleged involvement of the Jewish community in antinational conspiracies. On this dimension, the literature on populism consensually assesses that post-communist populism has ab origine had a stronger exclusionary identity; the parties’ discourses have been more openly racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic, echoing the relatively higher levels of aggregate xenophobia at a society level and the absorption of intolerant, aggressive and vulgar discourses by the media (Minkenberg 2015a: 40). Across time, the populist parties found increased resonance within the political environment, considering the mainstream political parties’ constant reluctance to denounce discriminatory speeches (Mudde 2005; Cinpoes 2015), coupled with their progressive radicalisation (for example, Fidesz or PiS (Law and Justice)).1 Across the region, there are numerous examples of legitimised ethnic, religious, social or moral taboo-breaking, not only among the representatives of the populist family but also among the mainstream parties, transformed into nearby competitors of radical right populism (Minkenberg 2015a; Pirro 2015; Bustikova 2016; Pytlas 2016). The ethnic dimension has been mainly used in two different ways. There have been attempts to isolate the out-group in order to reinforce the congruence within the in-group (for example, Gipsy crime in Hungary, the allegation of irredentism against the Hungarian minority in Ro- 1 The peculiarity of the entire region is the increasingly blurred boundaries between radical populist parties and radicalised mainstream parties (Bustikova 2016). If we accept that populist parties are characterised by a socalled 'thin-centred' ideology (Mudde 2004) and, as such, lack a coherent and complex grand vision of the society, we consider that both Fidesz and PiS are first of all bearers of a 'full' conservative ideology. They have a thick ideology on which radical-right populist elements have been progressively crafted. Most notably, beyond the increased emphasis on the nativist dimension, these parties’ relation with the democratic settings has been questioned, in particular in relation to their attempt to undermine the checks and balances (e.g., control of the constitutional court, neutralisation of the media, etc.) (Börzel and Schimmelfennig 2017). We consider these parties to be part of a limbo like state—lost in between their original full ideology and the appeal of populist features. A rather different case is the Slovak SMER, born as a protest party openly avoiding any ideological collocation. In the early 2000s, SMER was considered a populist party (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009). However, SMER progressively abandoned the initial features and moved towards a traditional full ideology. Strategically, SMER gathered different small social democratic parties, increasingly appealing to voters of the social-democratic party from which Robert Fico originates. In parallel, the Party's program has put progressive emphasis on social justice as a main topos of its programmes. In brief, we can say that while SMER is in a process of "mainstreamisation", Fidesz and PiS are migrating towards populism. These elements explain why these parties haven’t been covered in this chapter. Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina Soare 196 mania or Hungary). In parallel, the ethnic definition of the community has also been also used in order to reinforce the congruence among the members of the nation beyond the borders of the state by strengthening relationships with external kin-communities (for example, the relations with the diasporas of minorities belonging to other independent states and the projects of territorial reunification). Although different in terms of content, the two variants can coexist within the same party. A nuance has to be mentioned though; the intensity and extension of the ethnic definition of the community is influenced by indicators such as ethnic heterogeneity, cultural legacies and economic performance (Bustikova 2016). Populist Diversity On this common ground, the post-communist populists deploy a variety of repertoires and programmatic contents with both inclusionary and exclusionary populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). While the left-wing dimension of populism has remained underdeveloped across the region, most of the cases chronicled by the literature on it exhibit predominantly radical right populist features, with a major emphasis on an exclusive ethnic identity (Pankowski 2010, Minkenberg 2015b; Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016).2 The very few examples of left-wing populists include criticism of the exploitation of the people in their discourses (that is, farmers in the case of Self-Defence in Poland). In the following pages, we will focus exclusively on the parliamentary populist radical right frameworks of mass mobilisation. Focusing on the nativist dimension allows us to circumscribe the nature and the causes of the birth and endurance of post-communist populist parties over the last quarter of century better. We identified 17 parliamentary parties that can be labelled as radical right populist parties. These parties are: Ataka (Attack), the IMRO (Bulgarian National Movement)3, and the NFSB (the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria) in Bulgaria; the SPR-RSČ (Coalition for a Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) and Úsvit (the Dawn of Direct Democracy) in the Czech Republic; Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) and the MIEP (the Hungarian Justice and Life Party) in Hungary; the KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland), the LPR (the League of Polish Families), the ROP (Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland), the UPR (Real Politics Union) and ZChN (Christian National Union) in Poland; the PRM (Greater Romania Party), the PP-DD (People's Party – Dan Diaconescu) and the PUNR (Romanian National Unity Party) in Romania; the ĽSNS (People's Party – Our Slovakia) and the SNS (Slovak National Party) in Slovakia4. If we adopt a time caesura linked to accession to the EU, we can see that nine radical populist parties obtained their first parliamentary representation in the pre-accession period although, according to the literature on democratic conditionality, EU sanctions for antidemocratic behaviour were more dissuasive before rather than after accession. Indeed, the implementation and applicability of sanctions in the case of breaches of democratic values after accession can- 2 Other exclusion criteria range from religious to gender and from social to cultural issues (Minkenberg 2015, 28). 3 As illustrated by Krasteva (2013), IMRO has formed alliances with parties holding different views on nationalism, some of which are definitely non-nationalist, like the UDF in the 1990s. Starting with the 2001 legislative elections, its partners have exclusively been connected with a nationalist rhetoric, and the party progressively radicalised its profile. 4 We have excluded from our sample different splinters. In Slovakia, for instance, we have excluded the PSNS (the Real Slovak National party) and the United Slovak National Party (ZSNS). These are short-lived political experiences, for the most part reintegrated in the SNS. CHAPTER 11: HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? 197 not compete with the radical threat of withholding membership during the pre-accession phase (Sedelmeier 2014; Gherghina and Soare 2016). A Comparison between Several Features of Populist Discourse in Central and Eastern Europe CHAPTER 11 [A] HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? AN OVERVIEW OF POPULIST PARTIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina Soare Table 11.1: A Comparison Between Several Features of Populist Discourse in Central and Eastern Europe Primary message Nationalism Anti-elite State Anti-international Ataka Nationalism Strong Strong Strong Strong (NATO, IMF) Úsvit Public goods and education Moderate - Minimal No Jobbik Economy and diaspora Strong Strong Moderate Selective cooperation UPR Decentralization and taxation Moderate - Minimal Anti-EU PP-DD Nationalism Strong Strong Strong No ĽSNS Employment Strong Strong Moderate Strong (EU, NATO) Note: - is used when an issue was not explicitly mentioned in the program Source: Party programs Source: Party programmes If we analyse the duration of their parliamentary representation, only one party, the Slovakian SNS, has been in Parliament from 1990 until today, but with two interruptions (2002-2006 and 2012-2016). On average, the parties under scrutiny here have been in Parliament for 2.3 terms (the top position being held by the Slovakian SNS, followed by Ataka, the ZchN and the PRM). The position of ZchN in our sample needs to be examined in detail. The party has been part of different coalitions (Pankowski 2010, p. 79); by 1997, the ZchN enters the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). However, its power in seats is definitely less relevant than the electoral percentage of AWS in both 1997 and 2001 elections. Considering this caveat, if we refer to the electoral results of the other 16 parties from our sample, only one party (the Hungarian Jobbik in 2014) scored more than 20% in parliamentary elections, followed closely by the Romanian PRM in 2000 with 19.48%. Two other parties scored more than 10% and eleven fewer than 10%. All in all, populist parties are a relatively underdeveloped political family (on average less durable than their mainstream counterparts, less electorally successful, less organisationally developed, etc.). Nonetheless, these parties have been easily accepted into governmental coalitions (Minkenberg 2015a: 36). These parties are like Phoenix birds, parties cyclically reborn, sometimes arising from the very ashes of their predecessors (for example, Jobbik in Hungary). In order to explain the widespread diffusion of the contestation based on exclusionary populism, specific cultural and structural factors can account for the endurance of this family. At the basis of this line of argument, the emergence of the populist radical right in post-communist Europe has been largely associated with post-communist stimuli generated by the triple or even quadruple transition to democracy, together with the cumulative weight of pre-communist (for example, irredentism, fascist experiences and clericalism) and communist (for example, types of communism, minority issues and features of state socialism) legacies (Mudde 2000; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Pop-Eleches 2010; Pirro 2015). Table 11.1: Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina oare 198 Figure 11.1: Best Electoral Results in Parliamentary Elections (1990-2016)5 1 Figure 11.1: Best electoral results in parliamentary elections (1990–2016)1 Source: European Election Database and our data Figure 11.2: The number of legislative terms (1990–-2016) Source: European Election Database and our data 1 In 2014, the IMRO and the NFSB are part of the Patriotic Front alliance. We have included IMRO electoral results after the 2001 legislative elections and the alliance with George's Day Movement. In 1991, the ZchN is part of the Solidarity Electoral Action. Source: European Election Database and authors’ data On the cultural dimension, three main legacies can be identified: the type of nation and nationalism in relatively recent states, the ethnic borders cutting across other independent states and minority-majority relations (Minkenberg 2015a: 38). Although the literature on populism lays more emphasis on the crisis of values that has been produced by the accelerated social and cultural changes of 1989 (Minkenberg 2002), the economic transformation also contributed to the framing of radical populist discourse. With very few exceptions (for example SNS), most of the radical right populist parties adopted a leftist positon on economic issues, as a direct consequence of their mobilisation in favour of (national) state control over the economy. Similarly, these parties converged on the rejection of both Western individualism and a liberal model of democracy (Pop-Eleches 2010). On this basis, two complementary topics have fuelled their discursive frames: the illegitimacy of the wealth accumulated by domestic elites and the high levels of corporate state capture (Minkenberg 2015b; Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016). Not only were post-communist states confronted with the economic costs of the transition to democracy (for example, increased social and economic inequalities), but they had to deal with the political elites, who prioritised economic, social and cultural compliance with EU criteria over ‘national’ interests. Both left and right forms of radicalism criticised the loss of national autonomy over economic policies. In both cases, globalisation was perceived as a source of evil. The radical right framework has further fine-tuned its critical position against the EU, by referring to the cosmopolitan and culturally inclusive model of EU citizenship, which is increasingly associated with special rights for ethnic, sexual or social minorities (O’Dwyer 2012; Kitschelt 2015). Populist Discourse These different forms of populism are also reflected in the types of discourse and policies promoted by these parties. For illustrative purposes, this section briefly analyses the content of the political programmes used by six populist parties – one from each country – in the most recent elections. Our selection includes: Ataka (Bulgaria) in 2014, Úsvit (the Czech Republic) in 5 In 2014, the IMRO and the NFSB are part of the Patriotic Front alliance. We have included IMRO electoral results after the 2001 legislative elections and the alliance with George's Day Movement. In 1991, the ZchN is part of the Solidarity Electoral Action. CHAPTER 11: HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? 199 2013, Jobbik (Hungary) in 2014, the UPR (Poland) in 2015, the PP-DD (Romania) in 2012 and the ĽSNS (Slovakia) in 2016. We analyse these party programmes because they reflect the long-standing positions of the parties and they are often used as election manifestos. Only in the case of Jobbik did we use the policy programme. All the programmes were available on the parties’ websites (see bibliography). Our qualitative content analysis will focus primarily on the topics broached in the programmes and the priorities given by these parties to some policy areas. At a glance, most of the programmes analysed have a holistic approach to the problems without getting into too much detail. They are limited to the identification of the main problems in society and rarely describe the matters in depth or provide solutions. An exception to the rule is Jobbik, which focuses on several dimensions of policies, such an approach being partly due to its continuous representation in the legislature since its formation. In general, the populist parties investigated seek to include the core elements of their ideology in concentrated messages that catch the eye of voters. In that sense, four parties (Ataka, Úsvit, the PP-DD and the ĽSNS) structure their message according to a number of points, and the UPR in Poland partially does the same. Ataka uses the 20 points that promoted them to parliament in 2005, Úsvit focuses on 18 points that touch upon key issues in Czech society, the Romanian PP-DD presents 100 points with eclectic and contradictory statements, while the ĽSNS structures its ideas according to 10 points (called commandments by the party). As a result of these features, these populist programmes are minimalistic and have several strong messages to convey. Table 11.1 includes a comparison of several features of populist discourse among the parties analysed. The first column summarises the general message conveyed by the party programme. In the previous section, it was shown how the emergence and development of populism in Central and Eastern Europe followed the lines of ethnic divisions, strong nationalism and a radical, anti-elitist approach. Reading the programmes used during the most recent parliamentary elections in their countries indicates that these parties diversified their messages to address other prominent issues in society. In this sense, the conservative parties are Ataka and the PP- DD, which promote nationalism at the core of their programmes. Both advertise the importance of nationality and call for a ban on ethnic parties. Ataka ends its programme with “Let’s regain Bulgaria for the Bulgarians!”, while the PP-DD programme is filled with utopian promises targeting Romanian citizens (Gherghina and Miscoiu 2014). The other four parties chose to cover different issues in their programmes. Úsvit focuses extensively on the provision of public goods for Czech citizens, to help reduce disparities between them and Western Europe, and on the necessity of education for a broad segment of society. Jobbik, known for its anti-minority and anti-elitist discourse, focuses on the issues of economic development of the country through growing productivity (industry plus agriculture) and selective external cooperation with big European actors, for example Germany and Russia, in its policy programmes. The topic of nationalism is approached through the lenses of diaspora, with Jobbik advocating the necessity of the Hungarians living in neighbouring countries to have rights. The Polish UPR speaks primarily about decentralised decision-making and refers to the necessity of lower taxation at national level (and allowing local level authorities to collect a higher number of taxes, which can be reinvested). A similar economic concern is displayed by the ĽSNS, which focuses on reducing unemployment in Slovakia. Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina Soare 200 Figure 11.2: The Number of Legislative Terms (1990-2016) 1 Figure 11.1: Best electoral results in parliamentary elections (1990–2016)1 Source: European Election Database and our data Figure 11.2: The number of legislative terms (1990–-2016) Source: European Election Database and our data 1 In 2014, the IMRO and the NFSB are part of the Patriotic Front alliance. We have included IMRO electoral results after the 2001 legislative elections and the alliance with George's Day Movement. In 1991, the ZchN is part of the Solidarity Electoral Action. Source: European Election Database and authors’ data The dominant themes in populist discourse – nationalism and anti-elitism – are not embraced or used to a similar extent by the six political actors investigated here. Two of the parties (Úsvit and UPR) are quite moderate in their nationalist approach and they have no explicit statement about the elites. They have isolated references to corruption but do not point to elites as being the beneficiaries of such practices. Úsvit has a slightly higher tendency than the UPR to refer to the dichotomy people vs elites by expressing its support for direct democracy in which people are given a direct say in decision-making. The other four parties have strong nationalist messages combined with religious (for example, the UPR or ĽSNS), cultural (the PP-DD) or territorial messages (Jobbik). The variation in their approach increases in terms of the role of the state and anti-international perspectives. The ideological fuzziness that is placed under the broad umbrella of populism is quite visible when the differences between the ways in which these parties see the state are discussed. Atak and the PP-DD favour a strong state that provides a series of g ods for its citizens and goes beyond the usual bundle of public goods. According to these parties, the state is responsible for the welfare of its citizens and its degree of assistance and subsidies for them should be extensive; this is very visible in the case of the PP-DD, which favours state controlled resources and extensive provision of goods to citizens (Gherghina and Miscoiu 2014: 191–192). Jobbik and the ĽSNS believe state involvement should be moderate: Jobbik considers the state should be active in the process of industrialisation and in providing a framework that allows ethnic minorities to live peacefully within the country; the ĽSNS refers to a certain level of welfare provided by the state but emphasises the individual responsibility of citizens. The Slovakian party refers to people who refuse to work as parasites and claims that such individuals should not be entitled to receive any assistance. Úsvit and the UPR advocate in favour of a minimal state in which taxes should be lower and the authorities should be mainly concerned with the provision of public goods. Among these, education is highly valued by both parties. In terms of anti-international discourse, Ataka and the ĽSNS are against international organisations. Both argue against NATO, which they see as a disruptive organisation, Ataka has issues with the IMF (due to the loans provided to Bulgaria), while the ĽSNS takes issue with the EU. The UPR is another party that argues against the EU, having particular problems with the centralised way in which decisions take place within European institutions. As previously ex- CHAPTER 11: HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? 201 plained, Jobbik favours selective cooperation with some of the big economic countries in Europe and does not launch a direct attack against the EU or any international organisation in its most recent policy programme. The remaining two parties do not have an aversion towards international organisations: Úsvit opens its programme with a statement regarding cooperation between members and non-members of the EU, explicitly mentioning that it is “for a free Europe without barriers regarding the movement of goods, services, investment and people”; the PP-DD does not display an anti-international attitude due to the high level of consensus among the Romanian public regarding the country’s membership of international organisations. This short qualitative content analysis of party programmes has illustrated a diversity of approaches towards several issues that lie at the core of populist developments in Central and Eastern Europe. For a more nuanced view, the following section delves into the ambivalent relationship between discourse and practice, using several populist parties and leaders from the region as examples. The Ambivalent Relationship Between Discourse and Practice: Populism’s Two Major Contradictions As far as the relationship between the populist discourse and its political practice is concerned, one of the most current analytical efforts was to measure the distance between the two and to celebrate (or more rarely to deplore) the apparent incapacity of populist leaders to keep their (electoral) promises (Arditi 2005: 72–74). Such approaches present populist discourses in purely instrumental terms: discourses are simply meant to support a populist platform for achieving a higher score in elections and have no structuring effects on that populist party’s ideology or strategy. Although this is not the place to present the discourse theory’s argument concerning the constitutive effects of discourses (Miscoiu 2012), we will just underline the fact that the diversity of populism throughout the world (including Central and Eastern Europe) should be considered not only as an effect of the cultural variety of our planet but also as a consequence of the permanent metamorphosis of the shapes of populism – an operation where the discursive dimension plays a key role (or even the central role). This section analyses two major aspects in order to assess the nature of Central and Eastern European populism. The first is the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, its denunciation of representative democracy as illegitimate and anti-popular and, on the other, its struggle to obtain higher numbers of elected officials in various local, regional, national and even transnational assemblies. Originally, populism railed against people’s political representation both as a principle of organisation and especially as a practice. In a nutshell, this stance is mainly due to two reasons (Taggart 2002). First, populism is opposed to the very concept of representation and builds its entire argument on the idea that the people are not representable and that parliaments are simply not representative. As we have seen in some of the cases of post-communist countries, such as Romania or Slovakia, the ‘left-wing’ populists of the former communist parties’ radical factions depicted the parliaments in terms of ‘great national as- Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina Soare 202 semblies’, which, during the communist period, were entirely controlled by the states’ authoritative leader.6 Then, it claimed that this lack of representativeness is due to the structural impossibility of the establishment elite understanding and supporting the needs and demands of the people. In Central and Eastern Europe, this discourse is more noticeable in the aftermath of European Union integration, after the middle of the 2000s rather than in the 1990s, and mainly denounces the Europeanised and cosmopolitan elite. In Hungary by the end of the 2000s, Viktor Orbán had campaigned precisely against the increasing gap between the internationalised elite, made up of the liberal and socialist leaders, and the ‘national people’ that his neo-conservative party pretended to represent. On the other hand, it is precisely the distance between the people and their allegedly non-representative politicians that motivates populist parties to deploy various office-seeking strategies. The populists accuse the establishment parties’ pacts of banning them from parliament using different technical tools (such as high thresholds, two round majority electoral systems or gerrymandering) or by building cordon sanitaire-like coalitions in order to prevent the election of some populist MPs. Thus, being present in parliament equals having at least partially defeated the ‘system’. For instance, in 1992 and 1996, the accession of his national populist Romanian party in the Parliament facilitated the emergence of Corneliu Vadim Tudor as a politician; later on, he succeeded in qualifying for the second round of the 2000 presidential election and consolidating his party as the second political force of the Romanian spectrum (Miscoiu 2015). Moreover, the populists are generally among those MPs who extensively use the tribunes of parliament to increase their public visibility, for instance by tackling governments or by provoking conflicts during the legislature’s sessions. This was the case with the far right populist party Ataka in Bulgaria, whose leader, Volen Sidorov, used the entrance of his party into Parliament in 2005 to calibrate his assaults on precarious Bulgarian institutions in a more legitimate way (Novakovic 2013). Finally, as far as local councils or regional assemblies are concerned, several Central and Eastern European populist politicians were able to emerge as national leaders after having gained (sometimes partial) control of municipal or provincial legislatures’ majorities. Consequently, the opportunity to be locally elected as a member of the legislature or as leader of the executive and to attack the mainstream parties from a more visible position appeals to a skilful populist leader, who seeks national recognition. The second major contradiction is the one between the discourses that demand more power for the people and those projecting a new political order based on strong leadership and topdown management. In fact, on the one hand, populism’s main claim is that the establishment’s elites pretend to govern for the people, while they rule for themselves. In order to make a rhetorical difference, the populists pretend to restore the people’s role within the decision-making system by various means. First, they favour direct democracy and the multiplication of popular referenda as tools for increasing the people’s participation in decision-making processes. For example, one of the points of the 2006 campaign by the Slovakian populist leader, 6 This was the case with Ion Iliescu in Romania and Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia. The first qualified the second post-1989 parliament as “having almost no popular support, as opposed to the President, who is the genuine incarnation of the will of the people”. CHAPTER 11: HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? 203 Robert Fico, was to introduce a general referendum on issues such as the reintroduction of the death penalty and the reintroduction of severe punishments against recidivist offenders. Then, they claim there is a need to involve the people in policymaking processes, too. This includes some fields that have never been subjected to popular scrutiny and validation through voting before (and that generally constitutions prevent them from being made the object of referenda or non-institutional participatory debates), such as the administration of the judicial system or the level of taxation. Finally, populism pretends that the exclusion of the people from the systems of governance is due to their capacity to take much more reasonable decisions favouring themselves than those taken by the elites. Well entrenched in the people’s everlasting cultural heritage, ‘popular good sense’ allegedly contrasts with ‘elites’ hypocritical refinement’ and allows the ‘genuine people’ to know better what to do for themselves. The good sense discourse was, for instance, one of the main discursive ingredients of one of the emerging leaders of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, Oldřich Bubeníček, who, by mixing populism and anti-neo-liberalism, succeeded in becoming the first regional governor belonging to this party. However, on the other hand, populism underlines the necessity of promoting strong leadership in order to deeply reform the political system more than the other currents. To start with, in order to gather the popular forces on a common platform, there is a need for a charismatic leader (generally issued from the people and able to understand their needs and fight for their demands) (Pombeni 2007). This stance goes hand in hand with populism’s lack of trust in any institutional framework, including the populist movement’s structures, and with its insistence on a direct relationship between the people and its leader. For example, one of the main topics of Traian Băsescu’s 2004 and 2009 populist presidential campaigns was to show that an authentic popular leader stands above (and most frequently against) any institutional system. Then, the people’s good sense needs orientation in order to become effective and to transform itself into public policy. This transformation cannot take place without the energetic action of a strong leader, who is capable of galvanising and shaping the popular will and imposing it on the establishment. For instance, in 2009, the leader of the right-wing populist movement GERB, Boyko Borisov, claimed that the measures of his would-be Bulgarian government would materialise the natural good sense of the people in such a way that the ‘normal hierarchic order’ would prevail once again (Miscoiu 2014). To conclude, the inner contradictions of the Central and Eastern European forms of populism could be seen as related to the tougher constraints the populist leaders of the region have to face: unlike their Western counterparts, who are free to attack democracy and liberalism per se, they cannot afford to openly rail against liberal and democratic principles because of the frustration people accumulated under the communist period (Mudde 2002: 222–223). Consequently, they have to permanently invent alternative rhetorical strategies in order to mobilise the people against liberal democracy and the price they pay is their confrontation with this series of fundamental contradictions. Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina Soare 204 Conclusion Populism has been regularly used to analyse post-communist party politics. It has often been framed as a general contestation of post-communism together with the exclusionary claims of domestic minorities as well as any groups perceived as a potential source of disharmony (that is, sexual minorities or, more recently, immigrants). As such, the literature on populism consensually assessed post-communist populism as predominantly right-wing with an ethnicbased and exclusivist identity. On these grounds, the literature on populism has suggested a variety of possible explanations for the proliferation of populism. So far, most approaches have focused on the importance of historical legacies, the socio-economic side effects of the transition to democracy, political opportunity structures, or elements linked to post-communist structural (for example, limited civic and social participation) and cognitive aspects (for example, limited trust in political institutions, partial tolerance towards different people and incomplete trust in others). This chapter has provided an overview of populist parties across post-communist Europe over the last 26 years, with a focus on six countries Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia covering 17 political parties. Although rightfully depicted as a particularly fertile breeding ground for populism, our analysis has illustrated that, with the exception of Jobbik in 2014 and the PRM in 2000, none of these parties has achieved the electoral success of Western radical right parties. In addition, very few radical right parties have been involved in post-communist governments. We can hence conclude by identifying these parties’ diffuse electoral success with a couple of electoral peaks spread across the region. Still, for those familiar with post-communist party politics, nationalist discourses and anti-establishment stances have been common features across the region since the early 1990s. The apparent contradiction is explained by the strategic shift of the mainstream parties on dimensions common to the populist framework, in particular in the aftermath of their countries’ EU membership. This last element has further diminished the opportunities for these parties to gain influence over the governmental agenda. The second section’s qualitative content analysis illustrated the heterogeneity of the post-communist populist family, with a focus on six radical right parties. The analysis of the programmes of Ataka in Bulgaria, Úsvit in the Czech Republic, Jobbik in Hungary, the UPR in Poland, the PP-DD in Romania and the ĽSNS in Slovakia showed a variety of discourses, reflecting the heterogeneity of the forms taken by populism in the region. The analysis of the relationship between discourse and practice reveals a strategic use of populist themes by post-communist political actors (parties, party leaders or heads of state). Over time, the Central and Eastern European countries appear as challenging empirical laboratories seeking to capture the essence of a heterogeneous type of populism. Such a type, with only few exceptions, has never challenged the democratic settings and rarely moved away from fringe politics. Chameleonic by definition, the populist parties in this region have been subject to different programmatic mutations across time. The result, after more than two decades, is the existence of a diverse array of parties that combine nationalist and anti-elite rhetoric with issues insufficiently (and inefficiently) addressed by the mainstream parties. They have gradually become a voice of protest in spite of their limited continuity in the political arena. CHAPTER 11: HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? 205 References Arditi, Benjamin (2005) 'Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics' in Francisco Panizza (ed.) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso). 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PP-DD (2016) PP-DD party programme, ncte-ale-noii-revolutii-a-pp-dd, date accessed 22nd December 2016. LSNS (2016) LSNS party programme,, date accessed 22nd December 2016. CHAPTER 11: HOW FAR DOES NATIONALISM GO? 207 CHAPTER 12: ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE: EXAMPLES FROM AUSTRIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg The international literature on populism has mostly paid attention to radical right-wing populism and, to a lesser extent, leftist populism. However, as the phenomenon of populism has grown and proliferated, we have seen a greater diversity of manifestations of populism. An important new variant of populism has arisen in Europe that we call ‘entrepreneurial populism’. By this we mean primarily political formations competing for public office that are led by charismatic business leaders, who claim that their ability to run businesses successfully means they will also be able to run government well. While in the past similar parties have appeared in political systems that were centred on personalities or where the political systems were in turmoil, such as in Italy prior to Berlusconi, recently two such parties garnered enough votes to achieve parliamentary representation where these conditions do not apply. The parties ANO 2011 (ANO) and Team Stronach für Österreich (Team Stronach for Austria – TS) entered the Czech and Austrian parliaments respectively in 2013 and were thus successful in countries that are prima facie unlikely candidates for this phenomenon. Moreover, Austria and the Czech Republic have otherwise not shown any convergent trends in party politics. Entrepreneurial populism is emerging as part of a broader populist phenomenon, which can be seen by the fact that over the past decade other non-radical protest parties have entered national and/or regional legislatures in these two countries: Věci veřejné (Public Affairs) in 2010 and Úsvit přímé demokracie (Dawn of Direct Democracy) in 2013 as well as Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria/(BZÖ) in 2006 and 2008 respectively. In each case, these formations pursued an anti-elitist message and purported to act on behalf of the ‘common people’. Yet, despite presenting themselves as anti-establishment parties, they also sought to distinguish themselves from radical right-wing populist parties by signalling a willingness to join centrist governments, and generally did not engage in racist or ethnocratic rhetoric. We may perhaps consider these parties as belonging to the ‘radical populist centre’. All this suggests that despite the substantial differences between Austrian and Czech party politics, important demand-side factors are present in both countries that explain the willingness of a significant segment of voters to embrace such parties. In this chapter, we will explore the rise of entrepreneurial populism in general and examine the Austrian and the Czech cases specifically as two empirical examples. We are especially interested in understanding why voters find the message of entrepreneurial populists persuasive. Austria and the Czech Republic make good comparisons because although the two countries share some fundamental characteristics—comparable size, economic development, a shared history and formal political mode —, they have both had rather distinct patterns of party behaviour and electoral politics as well as different political legacies (Heinisch 2003; Saxonberg 2003). 209 Conceptualising Entrepreneurial Populism In the era of Donald Trump, one is tempted to view the populist billionaire businessman turned president as the quintessential embodiment of entrepreneurial populism. However, while significant aspects of Trump’s agenda and appeal relate to him being a successful businessman and celebrity and although his ‘drain-the-swamp’ philosophy underscores his role as a political outsider and change agent, in other respects he resembles the radical right-wing populists we find in Europe and elsewhere. In fact, from the start, he framed his election campaign in terms of racist, nativist, and nationalist issues by broadly labelling Mexican immigrants as rapists and drug dealers. Therefore, it remains debatable to what extent Trump fits the concepts of entrepreneurial populism, which is more centrist in orientation and the subject of this chapter. We consider Ross Perot, who ran as a third party candidate in the 1992 US presidential elections, to be the first well-known archetype of this phenomenon. More recently, business tycoons turned political leaders have won elections in Thailand (Thaksin Shinawatra), Georgia (Bidzina Ivanishvili) and the Ukraine (Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko) (cf., Mizuno and Phongpaichit 2009; Sakwa 2013). In the European context, the most famous case is undoubtedly Silvio Berlusconi. His party, Forza Italia has been classified in terms of party politics as a business-firm party, which distinguishes itself from its more common conceptual cousin, the cartel party, by generating its revenue from the private sector, whereas the latter extracts resources chiefly from the state (Krouwel1999: 261). In business-firm parties, elected officials often do not consider political power an end in itself, but have other motives, such as advancing business interests. The party leader is the face of the party and acts very much like the chief executive, running the party like a firm (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999). Such parties are less oriented toward interest groups, but instead employ modern demand-oriented marketing techniques to “sell policy products wrapped in the most attractive package” (Krouwel1999: 261). Conceptually, the business-firm party is a descendant of the electoral-professional party (Panebianco 1988), which shares a weak ideological orientation and no particular attachment to voter groups with the former. Their de-emphasis of ideology and their catch-all nature make them embrace broadly popular ideas to succeed in the electoral market place, while seeking to protect the economic interests and revenue sources of the business side of the party. Another conceptual precursor to entrepreneurial populism is the businessperson as a political entrepreneur in the sense of Dahl’s “self-made man” (Dahl 1961: 25), whose social status and financial resources allow him to command special political attention, especially in personalised political systems. In this manner, economic resources can be converted into political capital to achieve outcomes in the political area that benefit an entrepreneur’s business or business in general. In the case of both ANO and Team Stronach, we recognise aspects of the aforementioned characteristics. Both parties are headed by successful businessmen who draw on their personal wealth and their firm’s fortune to advance political ambitions. They run their parties like businesses and act as change agents in the sense that they, too, talk about changing the rules. Yet, it is less clear what draws voters to these parties, because the Austrian and the Czech cases are rather different from those where we have seen such parties emerge. The tradition of business Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 210 leaders going into politics might be well-established in American politics, which are characterised by the domination of charismatic personalities over organisationally weak parties. But the Czech Republic and Austria have rather strong party systems. It is also not so surprising that strong leaders, who command loyalties, would emerge in political systems with strong clientelistic political cultures, such as Thailand and Georgia’s. To the extent that we see clientelism in Austria and the Czech Republic, however, it is mostly associated with the established parties not political newcomers. The rationale that political systems undergoing sweeping change may provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs clearly applies to Italy and Silvio Berlusconi following the Tangentopoli scandal and the resulting systemic crisis in 1994. However, in all these cases, the systemic crisis was far more extreme and thus the underlying conditions are rather different from those in Austria and the Czech Republic. In short, these factors do not seem to provide a clear starting point for an investigation except for some general observations. It seems that all entrepreneurial populists have in common that they are catch-call and eschew a well-defined ideological framework. Instead, they exhibit clear convictions about who is best fit to rule and how the country should be governed. More than typical business-firm or businessperson parties, entrepreneurial populists claim to be antielitists and direct themselves to 'the people' as a whole. They point specifically to wholesale corruption and incompetence on the part of the political elites as the chief source of national problems. In this respect, entrepreneurial populists meet two widely accepted criteria that identify parties as populist. Accordingly, we define entrepreneurial populist parties as those that, like all populist parties, embrace a common man/woman ethos, purport to represent ‘the people’ as a unified whole (Canovan 1981: 265) and claim the people are so poorly served by the existing political system that sweeping change is necessary. This focus on the ‘people’ versus the ‘elite’ is seen as the core criterion in populism (Mudde 2004; Albertazzi und McDonnell 2008: 4; Hawkins 2009; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Rooduijn 2014). Populism pits virtuous and homogeneous people against elites and dangerous ‘others’, who are together "depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice" (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 4). Along with a common man/woman ethos and the "centrality of the purported popular will", as Decker (2000: 45) put it, populism is also characterised by opportunistic and frequently inconsistent programmatic positions—Taggart (2004: 4) referred to this as populism’s “empty heart”—as well as by a strong preference for plebiscitary politics, direct and emotional appeals to the population, and the reduction of political issues to simple choices and ambivalent claims. This book expresses the opportunistic rather than dogmatic nature of populism in a previous chapter by defining populism in terms of the ambivalence of the claims populist actors make not only about the people and elites, which remain vaguely defined categories, but also about the state, democracy and societal groups such as women (see Dingler et al. in this volume). Thus, like other populists, entrepreneurial populists take aim at unaccountable elites and pursue a catch-all strategy by making ambivalent claims and offering popular but vague proposals on a number of salient policy issues. The policy area where entrepreneurial populist parties appear to be most specific is the economy. Their positions are generally pro-business and favour economic deregulation, privatisation and less taxation. They also take a firm stance against state interference in entrepreneurial decision-making. CHAPTER 12: ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE 211 Although the policy solutions favoured by entrepreneurial populists draw on neo-liberal ideas, entrepreneurial populists are neither merely neo-liberal business parties nor small government liberals. In fact, they often want to increase support for social welfare programmes, which they claim they can afford to do without increasing taxes because they will make the government work more ‘efficiently’. Thus, in their public rhetoric they argue for a more fundamental reform of the political system but remain generally vague about specific policy proposals (for example, ‘reining in the power of bureaucrats’, ‘hard work has to pay off again’). Like protest parties in general, entrepreneurial populists profess to be beyond traditional politics and distance themselves sharply from the (old) mainstream parties, whom they portray as corrupt and generally alike. This is to say that like other protest parties, they follow the strategy of “De- Differentiation” (Schedler 1996: 294), denying that there are important differences among their political opponents. Instead, the appeal of entrepreneurial populist leaders is centred on their personal character and managerial savvy in transcending previously intractable problems. However, what sets entrepreneurial populists apart are two important characteristics: Their tendency a) to be more pragmatic and engage in practical policymaking, and b) to show less verbal aggressiveness and relative moderation in their discourse on race, culture and ethnicity. Even in situations where entrepreneurial populists are critical of the status quo, they are generally less xenophobic, less Europhobic and less chauvinistic than is typical of radical populist parties. Thus, we find little evidence that entrepreneurial populists are particularly connected to the radical, xenophobic populist movements, such as the Austrian Freedom Party, the French National Front, the Italian Northern League and the Belgian Flemish Block, that have made headway in changing the political landscape of Europe. Mudde (2007) differentiates between radical right-wing populist parties (which oppose liberal democracy) and non-radical populist rightist parties (which accept liberal democracy). In fact there is great variation in right-wing populist parties in Europe. For example, parties such as Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands and Fremskrittspartiet in Norway appear to accept democratic principles, but have a staunch anti-EU and anti-immigrant stance, whereas entrepreneurial populist parties seem to be more centrist, not necessarily xenophobic and not always anti-EU. Instead, they operate on the notion that the country can be saved by entrepreneurism because it is not beholden to entrenched interests and old ideological divides. They also appear to be focused on seeking office or at least clearly proclaim their willingness to join other parties in government. This too, is different from the more radical populists, where similar efforts have been ancillary to voter-seeking strategies and have resulted time and again in problems because the radical nature of these parties made governing difficult (cf. Heinisch 2003). For this reason, other populist parties have preferred to stay away from government and exercise influence from behind by supporting conservative parties in staying in office. By comparison, the logic of entrepreneurial populism rests on the very ability to showcase superior executive decision-making and thus be in a position to demonstrate this ability. This raison d'être changes the entire political dynamic because the leader in a right-wing populist party is measured by their ability to garner votes and build electoral support—being in opposition and distinct from ‘those in power’ is part of the party’s identity. However, in entrepreneurial populism the leader is also measured by their ability to execute or help execute policies in the Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 212 manner outlined in the campaign. This, in turn, should also be reflected in the kinds of voters that support entrepreneurial populists. Case Description Almost simultaneously, parties advocating entrepreneurism as a remedy to the nation’s problems have emerged in Austria and the Czech Republic. They are catch-all, tend to be rather market-liberal, but without rejecting generous social policies, and are not xenophobic or mobilise support based on cultural identity—for an overview of the Austrian and Czech political parties and their electoral performance, see Tables 12.1a and 12.1b at the end of this segment. The Austrian Case—Synopsis In 2012, the Austro-Canadian billionaire, Frank Stronach, announced that he was fed up with what he called the corrupt rule of party apparatchiks in Austria and formed a new party. Well financed, it performed extremely well in three state elections achieving 11.3 per cent, 9.8 per cent and 8.3 per cent of the vote respectively. In fact, for most of 2012 and 2013 Team Stronach polled between 8 per cent and 12 per cent nationally, which is extraordinary for a new political party as it drew voters away from all parties (SORA 2013a). In the end, Team Stronach received ‘only’ 5.7 per cent of the votes and 11 seats in parliament. Yet, there was little indication that entrepreneurial populism had suddenly fallen out of favour with voters. Instead, the party leader, Stronach, made several major verbal gaffes in the final phase in the campaign, which caused his party to lose ground. Stronach’s Canadian background, political inexperience and ignorance of certain political conventions eventually became a liability. Yet, it is not difficult to see how a more experienced and professional campaign management team would have avoided the tactical errors committed in the final weeks of the campaign. Despite his later blunders, exit polls indicated the party supporters were motivated by the belief that it was “time for change” (45 per cent), as well as Stronach's personality (38 per cent) and his business competence (38 per cent) (SORA 2013b). The Czech Case—Synopsis In the Czech Republic, a more ‘traditional’ type of radical right, xenophobic populist party— the Republicans—emerged in the early 1990s, but they quickly disappeared after failing to make it back into parliament in the 1998 elections. At the same time, a tradition arose in which small market liberal parties surfaced as alternatives to the more dominant market liberal party, Občanská demokratická strana (ODS), then led by the charismatic economist Václav Klaus. This includes Občanská demokratická aliance (ODA) (in parliament from 1992-1998), Unie svobody (US) (in parliament from 1998–2006) and now TOP09 (in parliament from 2010 to the present). Surveys showed that the voters of these parties placed themselves to the left of the ODS, while the actual leaders of these parties placed themselves to the right of the ODS, or at least considered themselves to be market liberal rather than sharing the centrist, CHAPTER 12: ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE 213 social liberal views of their voters (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999 for data). Consistent with our argument that voters are not as attracted by the market liberal philosophy as by a desire for change and centrist economic policies, these smaller market liberal parties quickly disappeared (ODA, US) or quickly suffered a great loss of seats in parliament (TOP09) (Saxonberg und Sirovatka 2014). In short, the likely explanation is that voters initially supported them not because they wanted a market liberal alternative to the market liberal ODS, but rather because they were hoping that these new parties would be more social liberal and bring about a change of the political status quo (cf. Saxonberg und Sirovatka 2009). Elections for the Austrian National Parliament (Lower House) CHAPTER 12 [A] ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTER: EXAMPLES FROM AUSTRIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg Table 12.1a: Elections to the Austrian National Parliament (Lower House) Political Parties1 Year of Election Greens Social Democrats (SPÖ) People’s Party (ÖVP) Freedom Party (FPÖ) Alliance Future Austria (BZÖ) Liberals NEOS Team Stronach 2002 % of votes 9.5 36.5 42.3 10.0 3 - - - - % of seats 9.3 37.7 43.2 9.8 - - - - 2006 % of votes 11.1 35.3 34.3 11.0 4.1 - - - % of seats 11.5 37.2 36.1 11.5 3.8 - - - 2008 % of votes 10.4 29.3 26.0 17.5 10.7 - - - % of seats 10.9 31.1 27.9 18.6 11.5 - - - 2013 % of votes 12.4 26.8 24.0 20.5 - - 5.0 5.7 % of seats 13.1 28.4 25.7 21.9 - - 5 6 1 Only parties which received seats in parliament are included in the table. The parties are ordered along the left-right dimension. The grey cells indicate the parties forming the government after the respective elections. 2 Legislative and government periods do not always correspond exactly in Austria. General elections often take place at the end of the calendar year, that is why most new governments only take office at the beginning of the following year (this was, e.g., the case in 1987, 1996, 2000, 2003 and 2007). 3 The second ÖVP-FPÖ cabinet lasted only until April 2005, when the BZÖ formally replaced the FPÖ as the ÖVP’s coalition partner, without new elections being called.. Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior. Thus, as these smaller, market liberal parties have had short lifespans, political entrepreneurs in recent years have switched to a more populist strategy that might capture the support of the more centrist voters. Rather than trying to build distinctively social liberal policies that would place them in the centre of the political spectrum, these new leaders have tried to combine market liberal issues (such as low taxes) with issues that would gain wider support, such as advocating generous social policies, and claiming that they would fight corruption and even introduce more direct democracy. Similarly to Berlusconi’s party, one businessman dominates ANO. As a businessman, he takes up rather market liberal economic themes, such as opposing tax increases, but he learned from the failure of the previous market liberal competitors to the ODS. In a country where support for generous social policies is rather high (for example, Saxonberg 2005; Saxonberg und Sirovatka 2014), he probably concluded that his party would follow the same fate as previous smaller market liberal alternatives to the ODS. Since there is Table 12.1a: Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 214 no room for so many market liberal parties—especially since the market liberal TOP09 remained in parliament despite losing about one third of its voters in the last election—and since most of the voters are clearly negative towards the recent austerity policies and prefer more centrist policies, ANO has become a ‘catch-all party’ that tries to combine market liberal issues (such as low taxes) with promises of increasing support for social policies (such as taking away fees from the healthcare system). Such policies appear contradictory, but he claims social policies can be made more generous by making government work more efficiently. Thus, the party is following the Berlusconi tradition of claiming that as successful businessmen, they could run any organisation—including government—efficiently. They are like saviours who can liberate the country from corruption and poor management. Elections for the Czech National Parliament (Lower House)Table 12.1b: Elections to the Czech National Parliament (Lower House) Political Parties1 Election Year Social Democratic Party (CSSD) Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Communist Party (KSCM) KDU- CSL- US- DEU Christian & Dem. Union- Czechoslovak Peop. Party (KDU- CSL) Green Party (SZ) TOP 09 Public Affairs (VV) ANO 2011 Dawn of Direct Democracy (Usvit) 2002 % of votes 30.2 24.47 18.51 14.27 - - - - - - % of seats 35 29 20.5 15.5 - - - - - - 2006 % of votes 32.32 35.38 2 12.81 - 7.23 6.29 - - - - % of seats 37 40.5 13 - 6.5 3 - - - - 2010 % of votes 22.08 20.22 11.27 - - - 16.7 10.88 - - % of seats 28 26.5 13 - - - 20.5 12 - - 2013 % of votes 20.45 7.72 14.91 - 6.78 - 11.99 - 18.65 6.88 % of seats 25 8 16.5 - 7 - 13 - 23.5 7 1 Only parties which received seats in parliament are included in the table. 2 Between 2006 and 2010 the Czech Republic had three different governments. A minority government of the ODS from 4.9.2006 till 9.1.2007 followed by a CSSD-KDU-CSL-SZ coalition. After the resignation of the cabinet a technocrat government was formed (8.5.2009 – 25.6.2010). Grey coloring indicates participation in government. Source: Czech Statistical Office ( Explaining Entrepreneurial Populism – Argument and Hypotheses There have been no noteworthy convergent political trends in Austria and the Czech Republic: Whereas the Austrian Conservatives (ÖVP) have been all but the staunchest supporters of European integration, the Czech Conservatives (ODS) have been ardent critics of European integration. While Austria’s dominant parties of the centre-left and centre-right have tended towards cooperation and political convergence, the main Czech parties of the left and right have preferred competition and divergence. While a radical far right populist party emerged and blossomed in Austria, it did so in the Czech Republic only briefly in the 1990s. At the same time, neither country is especially known for embracing economic liberalism or entrepreneurism, least of all Austria. Neither case can be said to have weak institutions and a party system, which would otherwise facilitate personalistic politics. Table 12.1b: CHAPTER 12: ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE 215 In both countries, those discontented with the political status quo would seem to find any protest sentiments already well served. In Austria, there is a major radical populist opposition party (Freedom Party) and a centre-left anti-establishment Green Party. In the Czech Republic, there is even a wider range of choices available, including a market liberal anti-corruption party (TOP09), a far leftist anti-system party (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) and an anti-corruption conservative liberal party (SNK European Democrats). Unlike Austria, the main Czech leftist and conservative parties have alternated in government, thus providing clear alternative choices. Yet, despite these differences, both political systems converge with the appearance of entrepreneurial populist parties. Identifying common factors in otherwise divergent cases sheds light on the causes of entrepreneurial populism. Despite their many differences, both countries can be said to be suffering from a political crisis, primarily involving the established mainstream parties, that is prompting voters to search for new political choices. In Austria, the maintenance of grand coalitions between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats can give the electorate the feeling that there are no important differences between the main parties. Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic the previously dominant parties, the Social Democrats and the ODS, have reputations for putting corruption and power ahead of ideology. So although they have not formed coalitions at the national level, there still seems to be a widely held perception that the two parties do not differ much in practice (Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2014). Moreover, these two parties have quite often formed coalitions at the local and municipal levels. In addition, from 1998 to 2002 the Social Democrats ruled with the support of the ODS in parliament (Saxonberg 1999). This explanation fits well with the arguments put forth by Katz und Mair (1995) about former mass parties turning into cartel parties which, through the penetration of state institutions, can extract resources to such an extent that they become relatively immune to voter input. Why would such voters then not avail themselves of other party political choices? The likely answer is that voting for the other parties would not make much of a difference, or they considered these parties to be too extremist in other respects (people who want radical political change are not necessarily extreme xenophobes or racists). Therefore, we argue that it is the political crisis that renders the existing main parties undesirable to many voters, while radical populist parties, market liberal reform parties and other niche parties also remain unattractive to these voters. This, in turn, causes them to search for a new political alternative and provides a window of opportunity for entrepreneurial populists. Voters who are political centrists but who favour radical change are drawn to capable and credible change agents, especially if they feel that otherwise it does not matter which party one votes for because nothing will change. In Austria, the long history of grand coalitions would support this view, whereas Czech voters are likely to conclude that it does not matter which party one votes for because the main parties (the ODS and Social Democrats) are more interested in gaining private wealth through corruption than in running the country. Thus, surveys in both countries consistently show low levels of trust in the government or in political parties (for Austria, see SORA 2013b1; APA/OGM 2012; for the Czech Republic, see Mishler und Rose 1997; Saxonberg und Sirovatka 2014; Vlachová 2001). 1 See especially the table: “Parteien wollen nur Stimmen der WählerInnen, ihre Anliegen interessieren sie nicht“ (Parties just want the votes but don’t care about the voters’ concerns”). Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 216 We may therefore summarise our argument as follows: First, a new form of populist parties has emerged; and second, at least in Austria and the Czech Republic, their voting base comprises (mostly middle-class) voters who are more centrist in orientation, normally would have voted for moderate mainstream parties and are not in favour of dismantling the existing welfare state. However, they are looking for a political actor most likely to effect change. By contrast, entrepreneurial populist parties are less attractive to rather marginalised, less well educated (typically male) voters, who are drawn more to the xenophobic types of populist parties. It is the desire for ‘radical’ but not ‘extremist’ change on the part of voters that provides entrepreneurial populist parties of different stripes with the opportunity to compete successfully. However, those voters for whom charisma and leadership ability (typically in the form of demonstrable and tangible competence) are overriding concerns will gravitate towards the tycoon-led entrepreneurial populist parties. Hypotheses H1: Voters who perceive little distinction between the existing major parties of right and left are more likely to support EPPs. Explanation: Populist parties often succeed in portraying the rest of the political spectrum as all the same and equally culpable for the undesirable status quo. As populists, the EPPs make no exception. H2: Voters with middle-class backgrounds in terms of education and income are more likely to support EPPs rather than radical populist parties IF these voters are dissatisfied with the political status quo. Explanation: The electoral niche that EPPs have found is to appeal to discontented middleclass voters. H3: Voters whose social views are on the whole tolerant are more likely to support EPPs IF they are dissatisfied with the political status quo. Explanation: Discontented middle-class voters desiring sweeping change are not necessarily intolerant and thus reject radical right-wing parties in favour of EPPs. H4a: Voters who regard leadership as central are more likely to support tycoon-led EPPs. H 4b: For voters supporting EPPs, the leader (charismatic leadership) is the primary motive for supporting such a tycoon-led EPP. Explanation: Voters of EPPs are persuaded by the ability and personality of the leader/top candidate of EPPs to be a better steward of national politics. CHAPTER 12: ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE 217 H5: Voters supporting EPPs display social liberal attitudes by supporting generous existing welfare states. Explanation: Supporters of EPPs differ from typical neo-liberal and pro-business voters in that they share the common man ethos of populist parties and thus welcome welfare state protection. The voters of EPPs accept the claim that current government revenues are not put to effective use, so EPPs can maintain or even improve welfare policies by making the system more effective and accountable. Data Sources and Method When testing our assumptions we relied on survey data from the Czech Republic and Austria. For the purposes of this paper, our empirical focus lay on ANO and Team Stronach given that for the Czech Republic, the overall tiny number of voters for Dawn did not provide us with a sufficient number of respondents to test our argument sufficiently. We also dropped the Austrian BZÖ from this analysis because the party failed to re-enter parliament. For the logistical regression analysis employed in this analysis, in the Czech case we used the most recently available public opinion survey before the 2013 elections, which was conducted in September, 2013 by the Centre for Research on Public Opinion (Centrum pro výzkum verejného mínení) at the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Politická orientace ceských obcanu – zárí 2013). Since the survey was conducted one month before the election, it is the most accurately available survey of political opinions for the period around the elections. Unfortunately, no exit polls are publicly available, as they would provide even more reliable data. As is often the case, new parties—especially populist ones—tend to be underestimated in such polls, partially because some potential voters are afraid to admit their true voting intentions (as they might be aware that it is not considered ‘respectable’ to vote for these parties) and also partially because such parties tend to get the protest votes of people who were undecided until election day or right before it. Consequently, ANO only has the support of slightly more than 8% of the population in this survey although in the actual election they received over 18%. In analysing social liberal values in the Czech Republic, we performed factor analysis and saw that there were two distinct dimensions: support for liberal economic policies and human rights, and support for increased welfare spending. In other words, social liberalism has a dimension of classical, rights-based liberalism and a dimension of supporting generous welfare policies (see Table 12.2). In order to deal with missing variables, we performed multiple imputations (28 imputations) using the Stata ‘mi impute mvn’ command. Since none of the variables had complete observations, we eliminated the cases with missing observations if the number of missing observations was ten or under. Thus, we dropped missing cases for sex, support for state involvement in the economy, profession, education, and age-level. This brought the total number of cases down from 1029 to 1002. Then we used these variables to impute the scores for trusting the government, being satisfied with the political situation, trusting the representatives of the party one voted for, supporting the EU, and the factors liberalism and welfarism, using the variables: Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 218 professional worker, self-employment, clerk, pensioner, unemployed, housewife, manager, education, sex. Factor Analysis1 of Social Liberalism for the Czech RepublicTable 12.2: Factor Analysis 1 of Social Liberalism for the Czech Republic Variable Factor Score: Economic Liberalism and Human Rights Factor Score: Social Welfare Kaiser-Meyer- Olkin measure of sampling adequacy supporting human rights .62 .24 .76 free enterprise .75 -.25 .8 against state ownership .68 -.3 .84 against the state guiding economic development .52 -.28 .8 against the state guiding large enterprises .67 -.16 .8 freedom of assembly .66 .19 .76 state should guarantee jobs -.06 .79 .71 state should provide social security -.09 .81 .7 redistribution -.14 .66 .76 overall .78 In the case of Austria, we were not able to draw on a data set that was as detailed with respect to the questions we wanted to ask and for this paper had to rely on the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES), specifically the Austrian National Election 2013: Voters and Voting Behaviour.2 Whereas employing two different data sources is unfortunate, the indicators were sufficiently similar with respect to several key variables to allow us to test the main argument with respect to both cases. In the following, we will present our preliminary findings. The Austrian survey did not ask questions about tolerance and private entrepreneurship in order to be able to create a two-dimensional scale as in the case of the Czech Republic. So, instead, we created a one-dimensional scale for welfare support, which included support for increased spending on education, healthcare, unemployment, pensions and welfare. The Cronbach alpha score of 0.58 is moderately acceptable (see Table 12.3). Cronbach Alpha Test of Reliability for AustriaTable 12.3: Cronbach Alpha Test of Reliability for Austria Variable alpha alpha if item removed spending on education .6 .54 spending on healthcare .67 .49 spending on unemployment .59 .55 spending on pensions .56 .56 spending on welfare .65 .5 test scale .58 Notes: (1) varimax rotation Table 12.2: Table 12.3: 2 See AUTNES Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Post-Election Survey 2013 – Questionnaire (German) http:/ /; for the data see: https://dbk.gesis.or g/DBKSearch/SDesc2.asp?no=5856&tab=0&ll=10¬abs=&af=&nf=1&search=AUTNES&search2=&db=E CHAPTER 12: ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE 219 In performing the multiple imputations, we eliminated cases of when there were no observations, or if the number of missing observations was under ten, so that we could impute the scores of the variables with many missing observations using variables without any missing observations. This involved dropping missing observations from university education, profession parties making a difference and dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working and welfare attitudes. The imputations were made according to income group and Stronach being charismatic. The independent variables for the imputations also included gender, for which there were no missing cases, as well as the aforementioned variables after cases with missing observations were eliminated. We conducted 28 imputations. Since we did not want to do imputations for the dependent variables, this further brought down the number of cases to 907. Hypotheses Test and Empirical Findings In the following, we present our findings when testing our hypotheses. The first question related to the voters’ perception that all major parties seem alike: Hypothesis 1: Voters perceive little difference between parties ANO voters are indeed more likely to be dissatisfied with the political situation and more likely to be distrustful of the government (cf. Table 12.4, Model 1); however, the relationship is not statistically significant. This is probably because Czech respondents in general were dissatisfied with the political situation and distrustful of the government regardless of political affiliation. On a scale of 1-5, with 1 being very dissatisfied and 5 being very satisfied, being satisfied with the political situation had a mean of 1.88, while trust in the government had a mean of 2.03. Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 220 Logistic Models for the Czech Republic, Voting for ANO1Table 12.4: Logistic M dels for t e Czech Republic, Voting for ANO1 Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Hypothesis 1: Voters Perceive Little Difference Between Parties trust government -.25 -.21 satisfied with political situation -.11 -.24 Hypotheses 2: Supporters are from the Middle Class education .12** .03 professional .14 -.17 worker -.6 -.2 self-employed 1.15* .93 clerk 1.17* .77 pensioner -.35 -.62 unemployed -1.29 -1.3 housewife .51 .37 manager .79 .43 Hypothesis 3: More Likely to be Tolerant EU support .26 .19 liberalism .27* .25 Hypothesis 4: Leadership Important trust representatives of ANO .57** .78*** Hypothesis 5: Support for Welfare support welfare -.222 -.11 centrist (3-7 on scale of 1-10) 1.00*** 1.28*** Control Variable sex .05 age .1 constant -1.74*** -1.80*** -2.63*** -2.86*** -2.42*** -4.25*** -3.04*** -5.98*** Notes: (1) n=950, two imputed Variables We also ran age-level and educational level as ordinal independent variables, getting scores for each level, but since it did not change the final results, for reasons of space, we chose to only report the coefficient for the entire variable. The one substantive difference is that when only using educational level as the independent variable it turns out that the lowest educational level (level 2) is the only level that is significantly correlated with voting for ANO (it is negatively correlated). (2) Probability of .06. In the case of Austria, the post-election survey includes the more direct question as to whether one thinks it matters who is governing. However, it turns out that there is no statistically significant relationship between voting for Team Stronach and believing that it does not make a difference who governs (see Table 12.5 Model 1). Nevertheless, there is a very significant relationship between voting for Team Stronach and being dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in Austria. While we cannot confirm this hypothesis, it is nonetheless clear that Austrian voters who support Team Stronach are politically unhappy and see no other party political alternatives. Table 12.4: CHAPTER 12: ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE 221 Logistic Models for Austria, Voting for Team StronachTable 12.5: Logistic Models for Austria, Voting for Team Stronach Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 coefficients coefficients coefficients coefficients coefficients H1: Perceive Little Difference Between Parties make diff .01 .09 not satisfied with democracy .77** .75** H2: Voters are Middle-Class employee -.43 -.17 manual .85 .32 civil servant -.42 -.21 Self-employed .65 .53 income group -.09 -.1 university educated -.09 -.08 Hypothesis 4: Leadership More Important Stronach charismatic .95*** .86*** Hypothesis 5: Social Liberal Values support welfare policies -.58 -.45 Control Variable gender -.58 constant -5.75*** -3.63*** -6.83*** -1.83 -6.2 Notes: n=907 Hypothesis 2: Those with middle-class backgrounds are more likely to support EPPs Even though educational level is statistically significant in the case of the Czech Republic (Table 12.4 Model 2a), being a professional is not significant (Model 2b); however, in contrast to the more xenophobic extremist parties, being a worker is not statistically significant. Furthermore, being self-employed or being an entrepreneur who hires other people is positively correlated with voting for ANO, which shows that entrepreneurially oriented people are more likely to vote for entrepreneurial populism than other voters. Being a clerk is also positively correlated with voting for ANO, which again shows that its voters tend to come from the middle and upper classes. Educational level no longer remains statistically significant when one controls for profession (results not shown), which indicates that being a clerk or self-employed are more important than being highly educated. In the case of Austria (Table 12.5 Model 2), there is no statistically significant connection between having a university education and having voted for Team Stronach. Neither is there any significant correlation between one’s profession and voting for the party. So even if this does not support our argument that voters for EPP parties are more likely to be well educated professionals, the fact that there is no statistically significant negative correlation at least disputes mainstream literature, which claims that voters for EPP parties come from less educated, more socially excluded groups. Hypothesis 3: Voters are more likely to be tolerant Table 12.5: Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 222 These new party leaders have not emphasised xenophobic positions, which is something that differentiates them from other populists. Thus, according to our calculations, Euroscepticism is actually lower among supporters of ANO than among the population in general, with only 19.8% of ANO supporters claiming that the EU has been bad for the country, compared to 27.3% among the entire adult population. However, this relationship is not statistically significant (Table 12.4, Model 3a). Another way to measure tolerance is the question as to whether one believes the state should limit the right to freedom of assembly. There is actually a positive correlation between favouring the right to free assembly and voting for ANO, but the relationship is not statistically significant, so once again the hypothesis that voters for this EPP are more likely to be tolerant or at least not likely to be intolerant (since the relationship was not statistically significant) is supported. Furthermore, our scale of classic liberalism shows a statistically significant relationship between liberalism and voting for ANO (Table 12.4, Model 3a). Nevertheless, this relationship remains significant only at the1-level after one controls for attitudes towards the EU (results not shown). As the Austrian survey did not ask any questions dealing with tolerance or the EU, the issue will have to be revisited when new panel data taken before the elections become available. Hypothesis 4: Leadership is more important for EEP voters In the case of the Czech Republic, ANO voters are indeed much more likely to trust the party’s representatives than voters of other parties (Table 12.4, Model 4). The Austrian survey did not include a question about trusting party representatives, but it contained other questions that are useful. For example, over 47% of TS voters find Stronach charismatic, while only 28.6% do not find him charismatic and 23.8% find him a little bit charismatic. There is also a very strong correlation between voting for Team Stronach and believing that he is charismatic. Hypothesis 5: Voters display social liberal attitudes Our calculations show that supporters of ANO in the Czech Republic appear to be centrist with social liberal economic values. ANO voters overwhelmingly support relatively generous social policies. On the one hand, they want relatively generous social policies, as 55.9% of ANO voters think the state should be responsible for social security, while only 13.1% think people should take care of themselves. This indicates some support for a rather generous welfare state, but only 22% of ANO voters indicated that income should be relatively equally distributed. Thus, ANO voters are more centrist and social liberal than social democratic. This can also be seen by the fact that most put themselves in the centre. On a scale of 1-11, with 4-8 being the centre, a highly significant relationship emerges between being centrist and voting for ANO (see Table 12.4 Model 5). Table 12.4, Model 5 actually shows a negative relationship between supporting increased welfare spending and voting for ANO, but this is because support for generous welfare policies in general is very strong in the country, rather than because ANO supporters are against relatively generous welfare policies. CHAPTER 12: ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULISM AND THE RADICAL CENTRE 223 Team Stronach’s voters also support relatively generous welfare policies. 40% of TS’s voters favour increased welfare spending, while only 15% favour decreased welfare spending (and 45% are satisfied with current levels). Similar results arise for questions on spending on specific programmes. For example, 50% of TS voters favour increased spending on pensions, while only 10% want to decrease spending; 45% support increased spending on healthcare, compared to 5% who favour cutting back spending. In the area of education, fully 84% of TS voters favour increased spending, while 16% think current levels are OK and 0% favour decreased spending. However, when it comes to unemployment benefits their views were more negative as only 10% favoured increased spending, compared to 35% who preferred decreased spending. Even though TS voters basically have a social liberal profile in their support for welfare spending, the relationship between voting for TS and supporting welfare spending is not statistically significant for any of these issues, as Austrian voters in general support generous welfare policies, thus leaving little variation between TS voters and voters for other parties. The full model shows that in the case of the Czech Republic, placing oneself in the centre on a left-right scale and trusting the representatives of ANO were the only statistically significant variables. These confirm our hypotheses about the importance of leadership and the idea that entrepreneurial populist parties in Europe tend to attract centrist voters rather than extremists, as is the case with the more xenophobic types of populist parties. In the case of Austria, believing Stronach to be charismatic and being dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning are the two variables that remain statistically significant in the full model. These confirm some of our hypotheses for entrepreneurial populists. On the other hand, these results would also confirm expectations about those who vote for more traditional populist parties. Conclusion We have conceptualised a new type of populist party that we dubbed entrepreneurial populist. The concept was derived from the literature on personalised parties and businessperson parties but is developed further by us linking it to contemporary theories on populism, which define such parties as having a thin centred ideology that is focused on a homogeneous, unified people threatened by unaccountable and sinister elites. Entrepreneurial parties are more moderate on sociocultural issues than radical populist parties and they are rather explicit about officeseeking. Why do voters who are generally not neo-liberal in orientation and who already have a range of protest party alternatives available support a business tycoon who claims that a country should be run like a business? Our data indicate that our arguments correspond better to the Czech Republic. In both countries, the supporters of entrepreneurial populist parties were not neo-liberal in orientation and seemed drawn to the respective leader because of their dissatisfaction with the political status quo. In the Czech Republic, the positive relationship with education is significant and does indicate an electorate beyond the typical supporters of right-wing populist parties. In Austria, a relatively large share of workers flocked to support Stronach, which may have to do with his particular image as a successful working man and job creator. In no case do we find evidence that people are drawn to ANO and TS because of the usual sociocultural issues that fuel radical right-wing populist campaigns. Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 224 We chose to include this chapter in the handbook, although the data available were far from perfect, because it underlines the idea that populism does not have to be radical right-wing or left-wing but can be more centrist. After developing our conceptualisation, we presented an empirical illustration of this phenomenon in the Austrian and Czech context. Our hope is that this provides a solid foundation for further research not only on these cases but issues related to entrepreneurial populism as a whole. References Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell (eds.) (2008) Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy (Basingstoke England, New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 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SORA (2013b) Wahltagsbefragung und Wählerstromanalyse Nationalratswahl 2013. Available from: (date accessed 24th June 2015). Taggart, Paul (2004) 'Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe.' Journal of Political Ideologies, 9(3), 269–88. Vlachová, Klára (2001) 'The Legitimacy of Democracy and Trust in the Political Institutions in the Czech Republic', Czech Sociological Review, 9(1), 13–33. Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg 226 CHAPTER 13: NEW POPULISM Maria Elisabetta Lanzone Introduction: A New Wave of Populism Pervades Europe The political and socio-economic conditions in Western Europe—characterised both by the sunset of traditional ideologies and the economic crisis—have led to new forms of political mobilisation by parties outside the mainstream. Peripheral, disparate anti-establishment actors have recently received large electoral support across a number of European countries. In Italy, the 2013 General Election represented an unprecedented case in the country’s national political history. For the first time, a new party (the Five Star Movement – M5S) obtained more of the 25 per cent of the electoral consensus. Not even Forza Italia in 1994 earned similar results. Also, in the 2014 European elections, the M5S won 17 MEP seats. In Spain, the new party Podemos (‘We Can’) has five elected members in the European Parliament (EP) and won 20.7 per cent of the vote in the 2015 parliamentary elections, becoming the third largest party nationally, with 138 seats and two presidencies in Legislative Regional Parliaments, too. In a similar context, in Greece, a party like SYRIZA indicated a new trajectory in protest voting. Due to its electoral performance in the 2012 general elections, SYRIZA represents a previously unknown Greek political formation of the radical left, which has gained unprecedented visibility within the European public sphere (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). In general, these new phenomena indicate a new trajectory in the analysis of anti-establishment parties in opposition to mainstream parties. In fact, in more and more cases, it is possible to identify protest voting outside the right-wing area, even if the electoral success of right-wing populist parties persists in some countries, such as France, Denmark and the UK. All these political actors are often described under the general label of ‘populism’, which according to scholars, can be assumed to share common traits and intentions (Canovan 1981; Mény and Surel 2000; Taggart 1995; 2000; 2004). Certainly, these parties thrive on anti-establishment attitudes, political discontent and socio-economic unrest, while also mobilising the Eurosceptic vote in a large sense. Following Mudde, (2004) populism can be defined as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ that considers society to be ultimately separated into two antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’. However, populism is able to attach itself to other ideological features, which can also be very diverse (such as nativism, nationalism and regionalism on the right and socialism on the left). So the development of the so-called ‘new populist parties’ is able to produce different effects in likewise different countries. This is just what is happening now. In the European context, populism has been predominantly associated with the radical right (Mudde 2007), but the recent electoral success of new parties such as SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain and the Five Star Movement in Italy attests to a new breed of populism located to the left of the political spectrum or outside the right-wing heritage. So the rise and the electoral success of these extremely diverse populist phenomena is sparking a renewed discussion about what populism is and which features may be common to both its left and right- 227 wing (or post-ideological) manifestations. Do these parties, as Woods (2014: 11) suggests, represent a case of ‘diverse but not disparate’ populism? Moreover, the broadly accepted distinction between left and right populism may be ill-suited to parties that often claim to be ‘neither left, nor right’, as is the case, for example, with the Italian Five Star Movement in Italy. Thus, an important question in contemporary debates on populism concerns the political and ideological characterisation of the current parties using a claim about the people to mobilise voters. As Laclau (2007) points out, the substance of populist politics appears as widely divergent, from right-wing xenophobia to egalitarian socialism, which impedes the identification of a common ideational core among diverging occurrences of populism. For all these reasons, the first purpose of this chapter is to analyse different traits in the current expressions of populism, with a particular focus on Western Europe. In fact, for many decades the debate about ‘populism’ was reserved for the extra-democratic context, and the populist label was used specially to describe the extra-European regimes, such as the Argentinean model (and the Juan Perón regime). In the mass party era, especially in Western European democracies, the populist message was only considered as flash in the pan. In fact, the main forms of political participation were inside the party and the examples of populist forces were only outlined by episodic forms of democratic degeneracy (Mény and Surel 2000). For example, we could remember the case of the Ordinary Man in Italy and the Poujade Movement in France. Other populist expressions were often captured by extreme right-wing forms of politics and were put at the service of authoritarian regimes and ideologies. So this chapter aims to describe relationships between Europe and contemporary new expressions of populism. Who are the new ‘people’ and the new ‘elite’ (political/cultural/economic/all)? What are in particular the analogies and differences between contemporary populist parties? Which traits do different political subjects in different countries have in common? A second aspect of interest relates to the political and ideological characterisation of the same parties and the extent to which they may represent ‘post-ideological’ expressions of populism in the current political landscape. So the following paragraph (the second) will describe two contemporary examples of new protest parties which are clearly left-wing: the Spanish Podemos and the Greek SYRIZA. The first question relates to their populist nature: Why is it possible to consider these parties populist? What are the analogies and differences between the two cases? Also, is it possible for them to have common traits with other examples of populist forces across Europe? In particular, we want to look comparatively at these various occurrences of populism and conduct an analysis considering the populist core in the most important contemporary populist parties outside the traditional right-wing arena. In the third section, we consider another specific case of contemporary European populism, that of the Italian Five Star Movement. This political subject represents an unprecedented case of populism with heterogeneous traits. In the fourth part of the chapter, we will consider the current debate on the concept of populism: can it be considered an ideology, a strategy, a communication style or all of those? In the conclusion (the fifth section), we will attempt to summarise contemporary tendencies in populist expression. We will consider the variation of current populist phenomena illustrating different effects in different countries and institutional contexts. In general, we will remark on the need to redefine the concept of ‘populism’ and the importance of increasingly linking the rise of new populist organisations with the periods of strong socio-economic crisis. Maria Elisabetta Lanzone 228 Understanding Contemporary Left-wing Populism in Spain and Greece As we mentioned before, the rise of protest parties with unseen traits suggests a new variant of populism, which is located outside the right-wing tradition. According to Mudde (2015), the recent electoral success of some left-wing populist parties has given the debate on populism in Western Europe new impetus: ‘Until now, populism was almost exclusively linked to the radical right, leading to an incorrect conflation of populism and xenophobia. In its original form, populism is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups (pure people vs. corrupt elite), and argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. Practically, in the development of their electoral project, populist parties almost always combine it with other ideologies, such as ‘nativism’ on the right and ‘socialism’ on the left (Mudde 2015: 1). Of course, ‘the people’ remains a central element in any conception of populism. However, beyond a general claim about ‘the people’, it is possible to identify a great deal of variation in interpretations of that same concept. Context, history and leadership style play key roles in giving content to the abstraction of ‘the people’ in current populism. As Kriesi (2014: 364) argues, ‘it is impossible to arrive at a clear-cut definition of the phenomenon without giving the people a more specific meaning’. In this section, we suggest that it is the ideological core of populism that provides ‘the more specific meaning’ to populism. Exactly because it is a thincentred ideology, populism attaches its restricted core to other ideological features, and it can therefore be found across political cleavages. In the European context, populism has been predominantly associated with the radical right, but more recently the rise of new parties, such as Podemos in Spain or SYRIZA in Greece, indicates the development of a new variant of populism, which produces a new debate. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) suggest that the populist left tends to have an economically inclusive notion of the people (inclusionary populism), while the populist radical right exhibits cultural views based predominantly on exclusionary ethno-nationalist notions (exclusionary populism). So we will now consider the case of a new party in Spain as an example of contemporary left-wing populism strictly related to its national context. Then, we will take into consideration the case of SYRIZA in Greece in order to compare the two proposals. Recently, a large academic debate with no general consensus started on the populist nature of a new political phenomenon in Spain: the rise of Podemos. However, there are now some contributions on the ‘populist hypothesis’ regarding its agenda and its strategies (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2015). Certainly, the party arose with the intention of protesting and proposes a strong political message of rupture and change directed against the economic and political establishment (the ‘caste’) to ‘common citizens’, but at the same time it defines itself as a leftwing force with clear affiliations to post-Marxist ideology and with references to Gramsci’s vocabulary. Despite the enormous discontent and the lack of political legitimacy brought about by the crisis, it was not easy to create a new ‘us’ in Spain (Rendueles and Sola 2015: 21). The formation of an inclusive national popular identity should not resort to the memory of the long-lived dictatorship regime. Also, the concept of patria (‘homeland’) was not an effective way to create a new collective entity. Moreover, Spain is characterised by a delicate multinational context, with disputed identities and territorial conflicts in places such as Catalonia and the Basque CHAPTER 13: NEW POPULISM 229 Country. In this framework, the notions chosen by Podemos were a particular meaning of the ‘people’ (el pueblo) opposed to the ‘caste’ (la casta). The caste – as in the case of the Italian M5S – is a collective made up of politicians, big corporations, the media, speculators and privileged groups in general. It is a diffuse category at the disposal of anyone to express their outrage towards the establishment with (Gomez-Reino and Llamazares 2015). The caste became the best enemy against which Podemos supporters define themselves. The emergence of the concept of el pueblo appears more controversial: the multinational character of Spain and its quite recent dictatorship past make it difficult for the party to use this concept in a ‘positive’ and ‘emancipatory way’ (Mouffe 2011: 111; Errejón 2012: 441). The Francoist use of the terms nación (nation) and pueblo especially leads us to consider its claim of being for the people in a negative way. So Podemos – in a first conception (in a political sense) – has constructed a concept centred on la gente. This is still a concept about the people but with more pluralistic connotations and fewer ‘ancient’ ideological references. With the expression la gente de este país (‘people of this country’), Podemos proposes a type of popular sovereignty which is always in opposition to the privileged, the previously cited la casta (Errejón and Mouffe 2015: 126). The same concept of popular sovereignty can be replaced by la mayoria social, or la ciudadania (‘citizenship’). So the main goal of the party is to construct an inclusive political project and not an exclusionary identity-based community. For these reasons, this Spanish party has detached itself from other current examples of populism in Western Europe (the French NF, for instance). In Podemos’ claims of being for the people, a reference to a society based on cultural or ethnic identity is totally absent. Actually, the party embraces the project of a politically integrated and solidary country, it defends immigrants and socially marginalised sectors of society, and it proposes a political agenda strongly based on social rights. The affinities of Podemos with left-wing populism are confirmed by some similarities with other examples, such as Chavismo in Latin America and especially with SYRIZA in Greece, which we will analyse in the second part of this section. In fact, in an affective register, the message of Podemos seeks to attract massive support by stimulating feelings of joy and hope (ilusiόn), by striving for ‘victory’ and by inspiring confidence in the possibility of imminent rupture. Additionally, as opposed to what happens in right-wing populism, ‘the feelings of anger and fear nourished by job insecurity are projected onto the “domestic caste” rather than onto immigrants’ (Kioupkiolis 2016: 103). In particular, Podemos arose from the protest movements of the Indignados and it was able to catalyse citizens’ distrust from a leftist point of view. So this new Spanish party was able to use the cleavage between left and right in favour of the antagonism between common people and the corrupt elites. For all these reasons, it placed its strategies in a new style of populism that has favoured left-wing parties in other countries, too. In this framework, it is possible to retrace another important element in Podemos’ populist strategies: the party never renounced its leftist identity. Using an evident left-oriented lexicon, Podemos has managed to position itself at the left of the ideological spectrum, also as a careful and strategic measure (Errejón and Mouffe 2015). Actually, in Europe there are some examples of populist forces (also parties with clearly right-wing ideas) using the effective slogan ‘neither right nor left’. This is precisely the case with the French Front National (FN – ni gauche, ni droite) and the Italian Five Star Movement. However, similar rhetoric in Spain risks evoking associations with the fascism of the 1930s and the subsequent long-lived regime, or a more general ‘anti-politics’ sentiment, which is interpreted in a negative way by a large section Maria Elisabetta Lanzone 230 of voters. So declaring its affiliation to the left appears to be an effective strategy for Podemos in Spain. SYRIZA was initially founded as an electoral coalition (alliance) of radical left political parties and extra-parliamentarian organisations in 2004. Its main constituent, Synaspismos (founded in 1992), originates in the Greek Euro-communist tradition. In May 2012, it became a political party led by Alexis Tsipras. It is now the largest party in the Hellenic Parliament, with party chairman Tsipras serving as Prime Minister from 26th January 2015 to 20th August 2015 and from 21st September 2015 to the present. Due to its impressive electoral performance in the two general elections of May and June 2012, SYRIZA gained unprecedented visibility in the European public sphere, which was anxiously following developments at one of the epicentres of its deep economic crisis. Within a very short period, SYRIZA had managed to climb from 4.60 to 26.89 per cent of the vote, performing an electoral leap rather unique in modern Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). Today, literature offers very few contributions regarding SYRIZA as an example of populism. However, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) proposed an impressive contribution in this sense. First of all, the question is: ‘Do we accept the populist characterisation of SYRIZA? Is the discourse articulated by SYRIZA and by its leader Alexis Tsipras a populist one? Does it fulfil the two criteria highlighted by Laclau (2007), namely a central reference to “the people” and an equivalent antagonistic discursive logic?’ According again to Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014: 124), Greece is no stranger to populism. The country’s recent history, following the democratic transition marking the end of a seven-year military dictatorship (1967–1974), has been marked by populist movements of all kinds, ranging from the popular democratic left to the religious far right. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the political stage was dominated by PASOK’s populism, which put forward the demands of the so-called ‘non-privileged’ for social justice, popular sovereignty and national independence against an establishment accused of monopolising political access and economic privilege in various ways since the end of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). However, today’s re-emergence of ‘populism’ comes in a completely new context, indicating a new tendency to the left. After three years of austerity measures and massive budget cuts, the country, which entered the Eurozone in 2001, is facing one of the most difficult moments in its contemporary history. In the context of the global economic crisis, Greek’s debt and deficit were declared unsustainable and the austerity measures were demanded by the EU, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund . Against this background, the Greek radical left, SYRIZA, managed to appeal to and mobilise a noteworthy section of the voters. In their research, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) noted that ‘the people’ in SYRIZA’s discourse did not occupy a central position: ‘Its presence was rather indirect, through synecdoche and metonymy. Signifiers such as “youth”, “movements” or simply “society” were largely preferred; mass youth mobilisations against university reforms (2007) and a strong identification with social movement structures and activities thus overdetermined SYRIZA’s discourse.’ However, the unprecedented economic, social and political crisis in Greece has initiated a twofold process that has transformed both its discourse and its constituency. So the ‘people’ increasingly became a central element in SYRIZA’s discourse. At the same time, SYRIZA’s discourse was clearly articulated on the basis of a dichotomous schema, with the antagonistic pattern ‘us/the people against them/the establishment’ being the dominant one. So the authors concluded that SYRIZA’s discourse is a populist one. The problem remains the definition of CHAPTER 13: NEW POPULISM 231 this concept of the people in the sense of SYRIZA. Without doubt, in Podemos the reference to the same concept is clearer, as is its meaning. However, the point of contact between Podemos and SYRIZA is to be found in their power to resist austerity measures and defend democratic and social rights. The ‘people’ of the two leftist parties is presented as plural, inclusive and active. Also, it is possible to underline the fact that the emerging protest movements/parties from the left have especially arisen in countries strongly affected by the politics of austerity and the economic crisis. This is precisely the case in Spain and Greece. An Unprecedented Example of Populism: The Case of the Italian Five Star Movement Another example of contemporary European populism with unseen traits is the Italian Five Star Movement. The M5S probably represents the most important novelty in the Italy’s political landscape since the 1990s. Founded in 2009 by the comedian Beppe Grillo, , in the 2013 general elections it became the largest single party in the lower house, obtaining the 25.6 per cent of the votes. Not even Forza Italia in 1994 earned similar results: on that occasion, Berlusconi’s party achieved only 21 per cent of the electorate’s approval. Precisely in this period, a new vacuum was created by the decline of the ‘Berlusconian era’: the vast majority of the existing parties were confronted with a new type of crisis and they attempted to reorganise themselves. From this breakable framework emerged a new political organisation, the M5S, marked by a strong protest sentiment. Literature on populism nowadays accepts a general definition of the M5S as an example of post-ideological populism (Lanzone 2015) or ‘webpopulism’ (Corbetta 2013; Tarchi 2015). However there is no consensus over the conceptions of the people contained in its specific political project. What kind of populist claim does the party propose? What is moreover the nature of the antagonistic relationship contained in the M5S populist message? And more specifically, is it possible to categorise the party’s populist claim along the traditional left/right dimension? So, under these circumstances, the protest vote for the M5S appears to be a new populist answer to the citizens’ needs for renewal of the political class. However, the party’s characteristics show some contradictory elements that distinguish this case from other examples of European and Italian populism in the contemporary landscape. At first sight, the M5S is not a typical case of ‘thick’ populism, such as the French Front National. Certainly in its political project it is possible to retrace strong anti-system characteristics right away. Also, the party proposes a populist message as a political strategy. Its analysis of populism as an ideology and in particular its identification of the three conceptions of the people (political; cultural and economic) appears more controversial. With its effective slogan ‘the parties are dead’ and with the statement ‘It is necessary to bring back the country to the people’s will’1, Grillo’s party resolutely declares its populist purpose (in a political sense) and its distrust of traditional parties. In addition to this ‘war’ against the parties, the M5S also emphasises its general opposition to the traditional media, that they are responsible for and ‘abettors’ of politicians’ scandals and their corruption. So there is no distinction between party power and old media power. The opposition to the traditional media is part of a wider project 1 (date accessed: 21st October 2016). Maria Elisabetta Lanzone 232 of the elite’s denigration. So in the M5S’s populist claim it is possible to retrace a strong and broad appeal to the sovereign people, with an opposition towards the political class (political elite) in particular and traditional political institutions in general. Instead, this party maintains a slightly ambiguous position with regard to the class-people claim (social and economic populism), and in this project especially the cultural (identity) claim is totally absent. So a strong predominance of its first claim of standing for the sovereign people emerges in its analysis of its conceptions of the people. This peculiarity probably detaches this example from other cases of contemporary populism: in fact, several important populist parties have included all three people conceptions in their projects. For example, in the Italian context, the Northern League, during its long electoral path, expressed all three (Biorcio 2003). This specific nature of the M5S probably represents a weakness, too. The global political project proposed by the Five Stars took advantage of a strong sociopolitical crisis, and protest voting has been one of the main reasons for them mobilising a large section of the electorate (those ‘disappointed’ by current politics) with no clear ideological tendencies. So it is now very difficult to characterise the ideologies embodied by this party. Certainly, its purposes are not motivated by ethno-nationalism, which is instead appropriate for a description of right-wing populism. To confirm the M5S has no clear ideological position on the traditional left-right dimension of competition, there is now some data regarding its voters and its members. As suggested by Bordignon and Ceccarini (2013), the M5S started as a left-wing pro-environment party before turning to a more ‘catch-all’ strategy, attracting voters from both sides of the political spectrum. Also, the party progressively incorporated a larger number of former right-wing supporters. Pedrazzani and Pinto (2015) observed a similar trend in their polling analysis: they underlined a significant increase in the proportion of party voters leaning to the right of the political axis, especially before the 2013 legislative elections. A high degree of heterogeneity also emerges at the level of party membership. The results of a web survey (2012-2013) pointed out an increase in its right-wing members (Lanzone 2015: 99). After 2011, a large portion of M5S supporters declared their support for right-wing ideologies. For example, in 2009 only 13 per cent of members declared they advocated rightist values; in 2013 that percentage has risen to about 30. It is possible to interpret this gravitation to the right-wing political spectrum by taking into account the anti-EU stance proposed by the M5S since the 2014 European Elections. The party’s decision to join the EFDD European Party Group (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy) has probably contributed to this change. The same group was formed following the 2009 EU Parliamentary election, declaring its strong hostility to European integration and advocating the preservation of nationalistic and anti-immigration attitudes. In the current parliamentary term, the EFDD group has been rejuvenated with significant changes to membership and with some modifications to its statute, too. In general, the EPG maintains its opposition towards EU integration and ‘favours open, transparent, democratic and accountable cooperation among sovereign European States and rejects the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised European superstate’2. So the EU alliance between the M5S and UKIP (the most important national delegation in 2014) leads us to reconsider the ideological stance of the Italian delegation. The decision of the M5S to be a member of the EFDD represents a new phase in its party history. At the same time, it is possible to combine this choice with a strategic operation. 2 EPG Statute, p. 3, Political Platform. CHAPTER 13: NEW POPULISM 233 However, among party members a significant number (over 30 per cent) has also chosen not to declare their ideological position. This is a position in line with the party slogan of ‘neither of the right nor of the left’. So the M5S remains a party characterised by an unclear ideological stance, which we can define as a kind of ‘post-ideological populism’. Their membership and their voters, too, maintain a high level of heterogeneity. This aspect has been one of the main factors in the party’s successful results in terms of electoral approval, but, at the same time (especially over long periods), the absence of ‘ideological cement’ may become a weakness for the party’s stability and cohesion. Populism Is Everywhere? Current Debates on the Concept of Populism According to the notorious scheme proposed by Mény and Surel (2000), there are three conditions that historically have aided the emergence of populism: a progressive weakening of the traditional apparatus of mediation (the political parties) around which the representative democracy was structured; the continuous growth of the personalisation of power with the predominance of ‘personal parties’ (Calise 2010; 2015); and the development of the media’s influence (the so-called ‘video-politics’). Under these circumstances, and according again to Mény and Surel (2000; 2002), any democratic political system now appears able to be swamped by a surge of populism. So in this volatile framework, populism becomes an element which democracy should live with for a long period: a symptom of the crisis of the representative mechanisms. Also, it appears to be completely inherent in the institution of democracy and no longer an anti-democratic phenomenon. However, taking into consideration these aspects, the following question remains crucial: What are we talking about when we talk about ‘populism’? In this respect, Moffitt (2016) argues for the need to rethink the concept of populism. While still based on the classic divide between the people and the elite, populism’s reliance on new media technologies and the personalisation of politics leads us to redefine the concept. Moffitt (2016) contends that populism is not one entity, but a political style that is performed, embodied and enacted by different political actors and across different cultural contexts. This new understanding makes sense of populism in a time when the media pervades political life, a sense of crisis prevails and populism has gone truly global (Moffitt 2016). So this section proposes a conceptualisation of new populism by distinguishing between global populist projects (born as anti-system parties), a populist style and populist rhetoric, which characterise some mainstream parties, too. According to De La Torre (2014), when citizens demand ‘power to the people’, they evoke corrupt politicians, imperialists or oligarchies that have appropriated power from its legitimate owners. These stereotypical narratives belie the vague and often contradictory definitions of the concept of the people and the many motives of those who use populism as a political tool. Under a similar perspective, Rolfe (2016) places the general request for power to the people in a context of permanent tensions between insiders and outsiders, between the political class and the populace, which are inherent in representative democracy. Since 2014, Europe has been pervaded by a strong wave of protest voting. In this context of tension, it is possible to retrace some elements propagated by both mainstream and new parties. The financial crisis, the refugee crisis and terrorism have exacerbated Maria Elisabetta Lanzone 234 the welfare conditions of many European citizens, contributing to the aggravation of their distrust regarding political representation in general. These critical issues have catalysed some political consensus towards political parties that are characterised by populist references (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Kriesi 2014). Even though research on European populism has been traditionally focused on anti-system parties, especially on the right (De Raadt, Hollanders and Krouwel 2004), there are other mainstream parties (on the centre-left, too), which have been involved in this process of ‘populisation’ of politics (Cranmer 2011; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). In this political framework, the situation in Italy deserves special emphasis, due to the communication style, the anti-political roots and the spread of populist activities that go back to the early 1990s (Biorcio 2007; 2015; Luengo 2016). In recent years, the growing discontent with mainstream parties (Bordignon 2014a; Roncarolo 2014) reached its peak with the success achieved by the M5S, but, at the same time, it has encouraged existing parties to reorganise themselves around new strategies using slogans and rhetoric that are more ‘popular’ and thus more able to be linked to populist phenomena. The success achieved by political actors traditionally considered populist has started a sort of emulative process of their populist communication style, which results in their political parties being accused of being populist (Mudde 2004). The adoption of a populist communication style seems to be the key to getting closer to citizens, often playing on anti-political feelings (Aalberg et al. 2017). So populism also becomes a style, a language and a discourse that corresponds to media needs and the mediatisation process (Diamanti 2010; Mazzoleni 2014; Bracciale and Martella 2016). Conclusion: New Populism for a ‘New Politics’? In this chapter, we have considered current expressions of populism in Western Europe. First of all, we identified a new wave of populism strictly related to protest voting and the economic crisis. However, the ‘thin’ definition of populism characterised by a general opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ now appears inappropriate for an effective analysis on contemporary examples of populism as an ideology and as a political strategy, too. A first tendency of current populist parties relates to their attaching themselves to ideologies and to their ideological placement along the left/right political spectrum. In fact, for a long time populism was especially combined with right-wing phenomena often attached to nationalism or other nativist ideologies. Recent events in some European countries, however, have triggered a large debate on examples of populism which have emerged outside the right-wing tradition. In this context—characterised by socio-economic crisis, citizens’ distrust and electorate volatility—the Italian Five Star Movement represents a very distinctive case in the contemporary political landscape. The party strongly claims itself to represent citizens in general and is opposed in its political agenda to the caste and the existing political class. In its original project, its reference to the people as a nation or a specific ethic community is totally absent. However, inside the party (which remains very heterogeneous) there are some different positions. Since 2014, party leadership has taken a stand against EU policies and the refugee crisis with quite exclusionary ideas. Its claim to the class-people is ambiguous and it leads the party to a post-ideological stance with not clear placement across the traditional right-wing spectrum (Lanzone 2014; 2015). Parties like SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain, on the other hand, represent two cases clearly embedded in the left-wing tradition. In particular, they CHAPTER 13: NEW POPULISM 235 propose an inclusionary version of populism (Katsambekis 2016). So an extremely relevant aspect in the analysis of new populism is the distinction between the different claims about the people deployed by the parties that want to use the opposition ‘people vs. elite’ in their political projects. This perspective allows us to categorise different examples in different countries in order to retrace analogies and differences between contemporary cases of populism (Pappas 2016). Taking again into account the breakable contemporary context, a second important aspect in the debate on populism is related to political communication and the style of some contemporary parties. In fact, the previously cited ‘mediatisation’ of politics and also the process of personalisation are able to influence strategies among the mainstream parties, too. Also, the recent electoral success of protest parties has encouraged the most important mainstream parties to adopt their strategies. In particular, the Italian context has worked again as a ‘political laboratory’ for populism and its development. For example, the recent changes in the leadership of the Democratic Party (PD) conduce to a populist style especially in communication strategies (Biorcio 2015; Bordignon 2014b). So it is possible to underline the presence of a form of populist political communication able to interest all contemporary parties (Aalberg et al. 2017). However, it is crucial to separate this last tendency from populism as a global political project (ideology and strategy) with its different claims about the people. In general, these two main tendencies in contemporary political systems enable us to embrace the assumption that ‘populism is here to stay’, even in Europe (Zaslove 2008; 2011). However, it is possible (and necessary, too) to separate different types of populism and to redefine the same concept of ‘populism’. First of all, it is crucial to separate two very different conceptualisations of the ‘people’: one inclusive, democratic and emancipatory, which is typical of leftwing parties; the second, which is characteristic of right-wing parties, is racially, ethnically and often authoritarian, too (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). Also, in times of economic and political crisis, we can identify a new form of populism outside the left/right tradition. In the same context, populist parties’ arch-enemy became ‘the caste’ and corruptive politicians in general. So the point of contact with all these new populist phenomena remains crisis: austerity policies and corruption that are able to produce new animosity between the people and the elites. For all the reasons described in this chapter, the countries more able to be affected by this new wave of populism are Spain, Greece and Italy. The same countries are affected by the strong socio-economic crisis from 2007-2008. Another important distinction is that between a populist political organisation (a party and/or movement born with populist aims which proposes a clash between the people and the elite in different ways – political, economic and cultural), a political strategy able to evolve along time and space and a political communication style that is also able to interest mainstream and more traditional parties. In general, today evidence shows how the framework has been significantly changed and that traditional research orientations in the study of European populism should also be completely reviewed. References Aalberg, Toril, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck and Claes de Vreese (eds.) (2017) Populist political communication in Europe (New York: Routledge). Maria Elisabetta Lanzone 236 Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell (eds.) (2008) Twenty-first century populism (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Biorcio, Roberto (2003) ‘The Lega Nord and the Italian media system’, in Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield (eds.) The Media and Neo-populism. A Contemporary Comparative Analysis (Westport: Praeger), 71-94. Biorcio, Roberto (2007) ‘Democrazia e populismo nella seconda Repubblica’ in Marco Maraffi (ed.) Gli italiani e la politica (Bologna: il Mulino), 187-207. Biorcio, Roberto (2015) Il populismo nella politica italiana. Da Bossi a Berlusconi, da Grillo a Renzi (Milano: Mimesis). Bordignon, Fabio (2014a) ‘Dopo Silvio, Matteo: un nuovo ciclo personale? La democrazia italiana tra berlusconismo e renzismo’, Comunicazione Politica, XV(3), 437–61. Bordignon, Fabio (2014b) ‘Matteo Renzi: a “Leftist Berlusconi” for the Italian Democratic Party?’, South European Society and Politics, 19(1), 1–23. Bordignon, Fabio and Luigi Ceccarini (2013) ‘Five Stars as a Cricket. Beppe Grillo Shakes Italian Politics’, South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 427–49. 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Il popolo di Grillo dal web al Parlamento (Novi Ligure: Edizioni Epoké). Luengo, Oscar G. (2016) (ed.) Political Communication in Time of Crisis (Berlin: Logos Verlag). Mazzoleni, Gianpietro (2014) ‘Mediatization and Political Populism’, in Frank Esser and Jesper Strömbäck (eds.) Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of Western democracies (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Mény, Yves and Yves Surel (2000) Par le peuple, pour le peuple: le populisme et les démocraties (Paris: Fayard). CHAPTER 13: NEW POPULISM 237 Mény, Yves and Yves Surel (2002) ‘The constitutive ambiguity of populism’, in Yves Mény and Yves Surel (eds.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan). Moffitt, Benjamin (2016) The Global Rise of Populism Performance, Political Style, and Representation (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Mudde, Cas (2004) ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 39(4), 542–63. 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Woods, Dwayne (2014) ‘The Many Faces of Populism: Diverse but not Disparate’, in Dwayne Woods and Barbara Wejnert (eds.) The Many Faces of Populism: Current Perspectives (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited), 1-15. Zaslove, Andrej (2008) ‘Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type’, European Review, 16(3), 319–36. Zaslove, Andrej (2011) The Re-invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press). Maria Elisabetta Lanzone 238 The Americas CHAPTER 14: CONTEMPORARY POPULISM IN THE UNITED STATES Sandra Vergari Introduction The term ‘populism’ appears frequently in discussions of the 2016 United States presidential election campaigns. Was Democratic Party candidate Senator Bernie Sanders a populist? Was the Republican Party presidential nominee Donald J. Trump, Jr. a populist? What about the Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton? Journalists and pundits casually toss the term ‘populism’ around, while scholars disagree on how to define populism, whether particular politicians qualify for the label and the implications of populism for democracy. Some scholars view populism as a negative force that appeals primarily to ignorant, uneducated populations and threatens democracy. However, there is no singular form of populism. The research literature on populism focuses largely (but not exclusively) on right-wing and authoritarian variants of populism, yet populism can also be moderate and left-wing. The nature and consequences of populism vary depending on the economic, social and political contexts in which it occurs. This chapter examines contemporary populism in the United States with a focus on the 2016 presidential campaigns. First, I review populism definitions in the research literature and present the conceptualisation used in this chapter. Second, I discuss the historical context of US populism. Third, I examine factors that make populism a viable force in contemporary US politics. I argue that a crisis of political representation created a window of opportunity for populist appeals in 2016. Fourth, I discuss populism and the 2016 presidential campaigns of Sanders, Trump, and Clinton. Finally, I present conclusions and suggestions for future research. Defining Populism There are three main approaches to populism research: populism as a political ideology, discursive political style and political strategy (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). First, according to Mudde (2004), populism is “a thin-centred ideology” that views society as divided into two homogeneous, antagonistic groups of the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” Mudde (2014: 433) argues that populism is “fundamentally anti-pluralist” and therefore contrary to liberal democracy. Mueller (2016) agrees, asserting that populists not only criticise elites but also claim that they are the only legitimate representatives of the people. During his nomination acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican National Convention, populist candidate Trump declared: “Nobody knows the system better than me, which is why I alone can fix it.” Rovira Kaltwasser (2014) also offers arguments in favour of Mudde’s approach. 241 Consistent with Mudde’s framework, Inglehart and Norris (2016) maintain that three key features of populism are anti-establishment sentiment, authoritarianism and nativism. They observe “anti-establishment populist challenges to the legitimacy of liberal democracy” and potential disruptions to long-established patterns of party competition (31). They characterise populism in sweeping terms as a “syndrome” that “favours mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over international cooperation and development aid, closed borders over the free flow of peoples, ideas, labour and capital, and traditionalism over progressive and liberal social values” (7). Inglehart and Norris (2016: 7) suggest that populism might be described as “xenophobic authoritarianism”. In contrast to Mudde’s framework, a second approach to populism focuses on discursive style. Aslanidis (2016), for example, rejects populism as an ideology, proposing instead that populism is best viewed as a discursive frame. According to the populist frame, “corrupt elites” have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the “noble People”’ and this problem can be solved when the people are mobilised in order to regain power (Aslanidis 2016: 99). Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) also reject conceptualisations of populism as a stable ideological property of political actors. Instead, they view populism as an attribute of political claims, asserting that it is “a discursive strategy that juxtaposes the virtuous populace with a corrupt elite and views the former as the sole legitimate source of political power” (Aslandis 2016: 1593). They argue that political challengers, especially those with legitimate claims as outsiders, are most likely to rely on populism as a strategic tool. Moffitt and Tormey (2014) and Moffitt (2016) view populism as a political style with three key features: appeals to the people versus the elite, culturally defined ‘bad manners’ in the rhetoric of populist actors and the perception of a crisis or threat requiring decisive, urgent action. The third approach is populism as a political strategy. Like Moffitt, Roberts (2014) emphasises the notion of crisis but views populism as “a specific type of response to crises of political representation” (2014: 141). Rather than focusing on discursive criteria, Roberts argues that populism is a “political strategy for appealing to mass constituencies where representative institutions are weak or discredited, and where various forms of social exclusion or political marginalisation leave citizens alienated from such institutions” (ibid.). Jansen (2014) combines elements of the second and third approaches, viewing populist mobilisation as a sustained political project that blends populist rhetoric and popular mobilisation. He argues that populism is a form of political practice that “mobilises ordinarily marginalised social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an antielite, nationalist rhetoric that valorises ordinary people” (167). “There is no set of features that exclusively defines movements, parties, and people that are called populist” (Judis 2016: 13). Judis (2016) characterises populism as a logic or way of thinking about politics rather than an ideology. He distinguishes between left-wing and rightwing populism. Left-wing populism emphasises the people versus the elite establishment, whereby the bottom and middle are aligned against the top. Left-wing populism differs from socialism and is not necessarily opposed to capitalism. According to Judis (2016), right-wing populism focuses on the people versus the elite, but right-wing populists also accuse the elite of supporting an ‘out-group’, such as immigrants. Both forms of populism embrace democratic competition for power (Judis 2016). Conflict between the people and the elite is at the heart of populism. Populists advance particular demands that define this conflict and do not think Sandra Vergari 242 that those currently in power will address the demands (Judis 2016). Populist candidates and parties “signal that the prevailing political ideology isn’t working and needs repair, and the standard worldview is breaking down” (Judis 2016: 17). Next, I discuss the approach to populism used in this chapter. In the United States context, it is useful to view populism as a political strategy employed by outsider candidates for elective office. Pundits and the electorate view the outsider as having credibility as someone who exists outside of the dominant, elite political establishment. The candidate enjoys credibility as having operated in the past and/or as operating now outside the control of the elite establishment. Outsider candidates may rely on populist claims partly because such claims demonstrate a strong contrast to establishment candidates and are more likely to be viewed as more credible when uttered by an outsider than by an establishment insider (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016). The outsider candidate characterises members of the elite political establishment as corrupt and mobilises voters to challenge establishment power. Voters are mobilised to reclaim the power they previously delegated to incumbent elites and to delegate that power to the outsider candidate and, possibly, to candidates for other offices endorsed by the outsider. Advocates of policy change often assert the existence of a crisis that demands action (Kingdon 2010). The outsider populist often promotes the notion of a crisis in the economic, social and/or political arenas. Examples from the 2016 US presidential campaigns include candidate declared crises in campaign finance, trade, employment and wages, healthcare, opioid drug addiction, national security, immigration, crime, police shootings, programmes for military veterans and postsecondary education finance. The outsider populist candidate uses the mass media and social media (for example, Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Instagram and YouTube) strategies to gain attention and mobilise support. Social media enable populists to communicate directly with supporters rather than having messages mediated by the traditional mass media. The outsider also encourages small dollar donations from millions of contributors. In doing so, the candidate demonstrates broad support and challenges the power of elite establishment money in the political system. Historical Context of Populism in the United States A type of populist politics that began in the US in the 1800s has since reappeared periodically (Judis 2016).1 While US populism can be traced back to the American Revolution, the People’s Party of the early 1890s established a new precedent. The populist farmers’ alliances and People’s Party had “a profound effect” on US politics between 1885 and 1894 and were “an early sign of the inadequacy of the two parties’ view of government and the economy” (Judis 2016: 28). Later, many populist proposals, such as a graduated income tax, were included in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. William Jennings Bryan ran for president in 1896, 1900 and 1908. During the 1896 Democratic Party Convention, Bryan delivered his famous Cross of Gold speech, in which he chal- 1 This section of the chapter draws heavily from Judis’ (2016) concise history of US populism. CHAPTER 14: CONTEMPORARY POPULISM IN THE UNITED STATES 243 lenged the gold standard and promoted silver as part of a bimetallic monetary standard favoured by silver miners and some farmers. The People’s Party endorsed Bryan in 1896. Louisiana Democrat Huey Long campaigned for governor with populist themes and was elected in 1928. He was governor until 1932 and subsequently served as US Senator. In 1934, Long delivered a radio address promoting his Share our Wealth plan, whereby no family would live in poverty. Local political organisations called Share our Wealth clubs proliferated. Long’s most active supporters were members of the middle class “who feared that they would be cast down by the Depression into the ranks of the very poor” (Judis 2016: 31). Roosevelt and his fellow Democrats were concerned about Long running on a third party ticket and tilting the 1936 election in favour of the Republicans. Long pushed those in power to address public concerns about unequal wealth and power and create programmes that became long-standing “pillars of American policy” (Judis 2016: 32). In 1935, Congress began to adopt the ‘Second New Deal’, a series of policies and programmes that addressed inequality and were more liberal than the original New Deal. These included the Social Security Act, the National Labour Relations Act and a major national public works project to provide jobs for the unemployed. Long announced his candidacy for US president in August 1935 and was assassinated in September 1935. In the 1960s and 1970s, Governor George Wallace of Alabama was a populist who held a mixture of left-wing and right-wing positions (Judis2016). He ran for president four times between 1964 and 1976 and served four terms as Alabama governor. His initial base was among voters who identified as middle class and perceived a conflict with those above and below. Wallace and his followers had New Deal liberal positions on many issues but not on racial issues. In his 1963 inaugural address, Wallace declared “segregation forever”. While campaigning for president in 1972, Wallace was shot, causing him to be paralysed from the waist down. Wallace’s racial views later changed dramatically. In his 1982 gubernatorial election, he received strong support from Alabama’s black voters. In 1985, Wallace was awarded an honorary degree from Tuskegee University, a historically black university. More recent populists, including presidential candidates Ross Perot, Pat Buchanan, Bernie Sanders and Donald J. Trump, have challenged the US conception of neo-liberalism and its implications. As noted by Judis (2016), US neo-liberalism entails revisions to New Deal liberalism rather than its complete elimination. US neo-liberalism preserves the New Deal safety net yet emphasises market-based forces in government and society, such as privatisation and deregulation. In 1992, Texas businessman Ross Perot ran for president as a populist Independent, portraying himself as an “unpaid servant of the people against a corrupt government and inept corporate hierarchy” (Judis 2016: 47). Like populists to follow, Perot argued that the US should stop shipping jobs out of the country. During the 1992 campaign, he famously declared that the controversial North American Free Trade Agreement (later adopted in 1994) would result in “a giant sucking sound” of manufacturing jobs transferred from the US to Mexico. Perot received an impressive 19 per cent of the popular vote in 1992 (despite having dropped out and returned to the race) and ran again in 1996. Similarly, Pat Buchanan, who campaigned for the Republican nomination in 1992 and 1996, criticised the political and financial establishment, the North American Free Trade Agreement and illegal immigration. Perot and Buchanan gained attention and support because Democratic and Republican leaders “were ignoring popular concerns” about US manufacturing, immigration and government lobbying (Judis 2016: 46). Sandra Vergari 244 The Tea Party movement in the Republican Party and the short-lived Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011 on the left also challenged elements of neo-liberalism with populist themes. Both were decentralised movements that nonetheless influenced US political discourse. Tea Party rhetoric included concerns about people who had worked hard and ‘played by the rules’ yet were compelled to pay for entitlements for others perceived as less deserving, including people who had entered bad home mortgage deals and illegal immigrants. Occupy Wall Street emphasised ‘the 99 per cent’ battling against the greed and corruption of the elite one per cent. The 2016 presidential campaign rhetoric of Sanders and Trump shared similarities with that of Perot, Buchanan, the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street and earlier populists. For example, both Sanders and Trump criticised the North American Free Trade Agreement and promised new trade policies which would benefit US workers. Sanders railed against Wall Street and ‘the billionaire class’ for profiting from a ‘rigged’ system.2 Trump proposed a five-year ban on congressional and White House officials becoming lobbyists after leaving government service and restrictions on foreign lobbying.3 Economic and Political Context of Contemporary US Populism Numerous economic and political factors, including globalisation and a crisis of representation, make the contemporary US a hospitable context for populist candidates. In a June 2016 poll of registered voters, 84 per cent said that the economy was ‘very important’ to their vote in 2016. Terrorism was second at 80 per cent, followed by foreign policy (75 per cent), healthcare (74 per cent), gun policy (72 per cent) and immigration (70 per cent) (Pew Research Center 2016). Globalisation has contributed to significant underemployment and wage stagnation in the US labour force. For example, some people who earned bachelor’s degrees are saddled with debt from student loans and cannot secure good jobs with good salaries. Some of these degree holders now sit in Chemistry 101 courses at two-year community colleges, pursuing new career paths in the healthcare sector.4 The United States lost 5.7 million manufacturing jobs from 1998-2013. These losses were caused by trade deficits with low-wage nations, such as China and Mexico, the Great Recession and a weak recovery (Scott 2015). Large US companies, including Disney and Toys ‘R’ Us, have replaced long-time, skilled US workers in accounting, computer technology and project management with foreign workers. Both Disney and Toys ‘R’ Us pressured US workers to train their own foreign replacements. The largest mutual life insurer in the US, New York Life, also had its long-time US workers train their foreign replacements as the company moved work to India (Preston 2015a; 2015b; 2016). Even the public sector is not immune to this dynamic. In 2016, the University of California San Francisco announced plans to lay off 17 per cent of its Information Technology staff, but not before this staff had trained their foreign replacements from India (Thibodeau 2016). In 2016, air conditioner company Carrier announced that it was moving more than 2,000 jobs from Indiana to Mexico. Union leaders said Carrier would pay Mexican workers about $3 per 2 See Sanders’ campaign website at 3 See 4 Thanks to Colin Henck, adjunct chemistry professor, Hudson Valley Community College, NY for this vignette. CHAPTER 14: CONTEMPORARY POPULISM IN THE UNITED STATES 245 hour compared to an average of more than $20 per hour for the company’s US workers (Carey 2016). Also in 2016, Ford Motor Company announced plans to shift all of its North American small car production to Mexico. Candy makers including Hershey and Brach’s have shifted production from the US to Mexico due to cheaper labour (Hawley 2009). Critics have also blamed establishment elites for allegedly widespread abuses of the H-1B visa program that have led to foreign workers displacing US workers. The preceding cases are sample illustrations of how globalisation has affected US workers across the labour force. Long-time workers in their 50s replaced by cheaper workers may find it especially difficult to secure new jobs with wages and benefits comparable to what they had before being replaced. In addition, analysts estimate that there are between 11 million and 12 million illegal immigrants in the US. Critics of the elite establishment, including some legal immigrants who dutifully met requirements for becoming US residents and citizens, have questioned why US immigration laws have not been enforced in an equitable manner. In summary, US voters who have ‘played by the rules’ yet suffer from job loss, wage stagnation, high healthcare costs and grim prospects for a better standard of living may assign responsibility for their plight to a greedy, unresponsive establishment elite. This creates a window of opportunity for a populist candidate to convince such voters that someone cares and will act on their behalf to improve things. In addition to formidable economic challenges, there is evidence of a crisis of political representation in the US. While Congress has received low approval ratings for decades, recent ratings of Congress from Americans across the political spectrum rank close to historic lows (McCarthy 2016). Political polarisation has also reached historic levels. Recent public opinion data indicate that “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines—and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive—than at any point in the last two decades” (Pew Research Center 2014: 6). Political polarisation is strongest among the most politically active, while many with mixed ideological views are relatively uninvolved in politics. For example, 39 per cent of those with a mix of liberal and conservative views report that they vote regularly, compared to 78 per cent for consistent conservatives and 58 per cent for consistent liberals. Moreover, eight per cent of those with mixed ideological views report donating to a candidate or campaign group in recent years compared to 26 per cent for consistent conservatives and 31 per cent for consistent liberals (Pew Research Center 2014). Establishment Barriers to Outsider Candidates As discussed later, Trump, and to a lesser extent Sanders, can be characterised as outsiders in the 2016 presidential campaigns. However, both chose to run campaigns within the two-party system. The institutionalised two-party system in the US makes it extremely difficult for independents and third party candidates to gain attention and win office. Most states have strict requirements for ballot access and winner-takes-all systems that favour the two major parties. In 2016, Libertarian Party presidential candidate Gary Johnson was the first third party candidate in two decades to secure ballot access in all 50 states and the District of Columbia (D.C.). Green Party nominee Jill Stein secured ballot access in 44 states and D.C.5 In most states, 5 Stein was an eligible write-in candidate in three additional states. Sandra Vergari 246 write-in candidates must file ‘declaration of intent’ paperwork days or months prior to the election, and some states do not permit write-in candidates (National Association of Secretaries of State 2016). The mass media focus almost exclusively on candidates aligned with the two establishment parties. While social media technologies can help outsiders to mobilise support, institutionalised obstacles confronting independent and third party candidates remain formidable. In order to qualify for participation in the presidential debates in the autumn of 2016, candidates had to achieve a minimum 15 per cent level of support in a polling average across several major national polls. On 16th September 2016, polling averages for the Democratic, Republican, Libertarian and Green Party candidates were: Hillary Clinton (43 per cent), Donald Trump (40.4 per cent), Gary Johnson (8.4 per cent) and Jill Stein (3.2 per cent). Thus, only Clinton, Trump and their vice-presidential running mates were permitted to participate in the presidential and vice-presidential debates, respectively (Commission on Presidential Debates 2016). The 2016 Campaign: Will the Real Populist Please Stand Up?6 During a press conference in summer 2016 following a summit with the leaders of Mexico and Canada, US President Barack Obama received many Trump-related questions. Near the end of the conference, Obama said that he wanted to address “this whole issue of populism” and proceeded to deliver a self-described, six-minute “rant.” Casting populism in a favourable light, the president asserted that he was a populist, Bernie Sanders qualified for the title, and that Donald Trump was not a populist (though Obama did not cite Trump by name). Obama remarked: “I’m not prepared to concede the notion that some of the rhetoric that’s been popping up is populist….Now, somebody else who has never shown any regard for workers…doesn’t suddenly become a populist because they say something controversial in order to win votes. That’s not the measure of populism. That’s nativism, or xenophobia, or worse. Or it’s just cynicism. So, I would just advise everybody to be careful about somebody attributing to whoever pops up at a time of economic anxiety the label that they’re populist.” Obama asserted that Sanders “genuinely deserves the title” of populism because he has been “in the vineyards fighting” on economic issues. He added: “Somebody who labels ‘us versus them’ or engages in rhetoric about how we’re going to look after ourselves and take it to the other guy, that’s not the definition of populism” (White House 2016). Consistent with Roberts’ (2014) concept of crisis of political representation, Oliver and Rahn (2016) argue that the Trump phenomenon is the result of a representation crisis. As in the case of earlier populists, voter concerns are not well reflected in the positions and actions of the two major parties. Thus, “the opportunity for a Donald Trump presidency is ultimately rooted in a failure of the Republican Party to incorporate a wide range of constituencies” (Oliver and 6 U.S. television game show To Tell The Truth features three people claiming to be the same person with a special skill or job; two are imposters and one is sworn to tell the truth. At the end of the game, the host says “Will the real [truth teller’s name] please stand up?” CHAPTER 14: CONTEMPORARY POPULISM IN THE UNITED STATES 247 Rahn 2016: 202). The results of the 2016 General Election, in which Clinton ostensibly enjoyed numerous advantages as an establishment insider, also suggest a failure of the Democratic Party. At its core, populism is anti the elite establishment, and populist candidates have credibility as outsiders. Focusing on outsider status as a central element of the definition of a populist, Trump is a populist, Sanders qualified for the label during the 2016 nomination process and Clinton was not a populist. While Trump has enjoyed lifelong membership in the country’s economically elite class, he was not a politician prior to the 2016 presidential campaign. Moreover, many establishment Republicans charged that Trump was a ‘Republican in Name Only’ (RINO) and not a true conservative. Operating within the two-party establishment system, Sanders received more than 12 million votes in the caucus and primary elections for the Democratic presidential nomination and is a long-time US senator. However, Sanders is also the longest serving Independent in US Senate history and is one of only two Independents in Congress. In the eyes of many observers, Sanders lost much of his credibility as an outsider when he endorsed Clinton during the 2016 Democratic National Convention and began campaigning for her the following September. Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton is a long-time member of the establishment and does not have a history of operating outside establishment power. Establishment elites facilitated Clinton’s run for US Senator in New York even though Clinton was neither a native resident nor a long-time resident of the state. She was elected US Senator from New York in 2000, re-elected in 2006 and first ran for president in 2008. In 2009, Clinton left the US Senate to become US Secretary of State in the Obama Administration, serving in that role until 2013. Thus, while some of Clinton’s campaign rhetoric embodied populist themes, she lacked credibility in attempting to pose as a populist. During the 2016 presidential nomination and election campaigns, Clinton was criticised for not being more accessible to the press. In contrast, Trump was highly accessible to the press, holding ‘news conferences’ and participating in many interviews with the mass media. A ‘showman’ with years of experience hosting his former reality television series, The Apprentice and The Celebrity Apprentice, Trump strategically attracted plentiful free publicity from the mass media during the campaign. One of Clinton’s main campaign slogans was “I’m with her.” The Trump campaign, seeking to portray him as the populist candidate aligned with the people, subsequently adopted the slogan: “I’m with you.” Clinton’s campaign appearances were often tightly scripted affairs as she read from teleprompters and ‘stayed on script.’ In contrast, for many months of his campaign, Trump was known for speaking off script.7 While this was a risky practice with numerous negative consequences, it also likely made Trump more authentic in the eyes of his supporters. This dynamic is related to the concept of ‘bad manners’ discussed by Moffitt and Tormey (2014) and Moffitt (2016). Throughout the nomination and election campaigns, Trump delivered rhetoric that displayed culturally defined ‘bad manners’. Portraying himself as a champion in the fight against political correctness, Trump engaged in name-calling, mocked people’s physical features, questioned the hero status of Vietnam prisoner of war Senator John McCain, proposed a temporary ban 7 During later stages of the campaign, Trump began to read from a teleprompter more often. Sandra Vergari 248 on Muslims entering the US, implied that his own ‘sacrifices’ were comparable to that of a Muslim veteran who died in the Iraq War, made references to gun violence against Clinton and more. Both Trump and Sanders secured substantial campaign donations from small dollar donors. A Republican who led digital fundraising under George W. Bush noted that, due to Trump’s ability to both self-finance his campaign and secure tens of millions of dollars in small donations, the establishment elite could not use the threat of withholding funds as leverage over Trump. Trump’s fundraising from small dollar donors far exceeded small donations to 2012 Republican nominee Mitt Romney, who relied more heavily on large contributions (Confesorre and Corasaniti 2016). During the Democratic nomination process, about two-thirds of donations to the Sanders campaign were from small dollar donors compared to one-fifth of Clinton’s donations (Mehta et al. 2016). The Sanders campaign emphasised populist themes. He criticised Clinton’s support from the Wall Street establishment and charged that Clinton should release transcripts of paid speeches she had delivered in closed-door appearances before elite establishment audiences. Establishment powers within the Democratic Party strongly favoured nominating Clinton over Sanders. Shortly before the Democratic National Convention, Democratic National Committee (DNC) emails publicised by the hacking website WikiLeaks revealed DNC bias against Sanders. While DNC officials and the Clinton campaign had asserted that the Democratic primary and caucus processes were open and fair, DNC emails revealed official efforts to help Clinton and hamper Sanders. Following these revelations, DNC head Debbie Wasserman Schultz resigned, and there were additional firings and resignations among DNC officials. Winning the Democratic nomination required 2,382 delegates.8 Clinton secured 2,807 delegate votes, while Sanders secured 1,894. Clinton received 602 of 712 superdelegate votes, while Sanders received only 48 superdelegate votes. The superdelegates were establishment party leaders and elected officials who could vote however they wanted at the Democratic Party convention. Sanders argued that the superdelegate system gave too much power to establishment elites and pushed successfully for reform of the system. Beginning in 2020, two-thirds of Democratic superdelegates will have to vote the way their respective states voted. In the popular vote for the Democratic nomination, Clinton received about 16 million votes and Sanders received about 12 million votes. On the Republican side, Trump beat a large group of 16 mostly establishment Republican Party candidates for the nomination. He received more than 13 million votes.9 Winning the Republican nomination required 1,237 delegate votes and Trump secured 1,543 delegates.10 At 8:00 p.m. on Election Day, 8th November 2016, the New York Times’ live election forecast web page predicted that Clinton had an 80 per cent chance of winning the election. A few hours later, Trump had prevailed in a victory that caught many pollsters and pundits by surprise. Trump secured 306 electors who pledged to vote for him in the Electoral College and almost 63 million (46 per cent) in the popular vote. Clinton secured 232 electors who pledged to vote for her in the Electoral College and almost 66 million (48 per cent) popular votes. 8 Nomination election data in this section are from Real Clear Politics: 9 Ted Cruz received 7.6 million votes, John Kasich, 4.2 million, and Marco Rubio received 3.5 million votes. 10 Cruz received 559 delegates, Rubio, 165, and Kasich, 161. CHAPTER 14: CONTEMPORARY POPULISM IN THE UNITED STATES 249 While Clinton won the popular vote, the 538 electors of the Electoral College determine the winner. When the electors cast their votes on 19th December, 2016, the winner had to secure at least 270 votes. Political parties choose their slate of electors in each state but the US Constitution does not require electors to vote for their party’s candidate. In rare cases, a ‘faithless elector’ votes for someone other than the party nominee. In 2016, seven electors voted for someone other than their party’s candidate, a historic number. Two Texas Republican electors voted for John Kasich and Ron Paul respectively, rather than for Trump. In Washington State, three Democratic electors voted for Colin L. Powell, the former US Secretary of State, rather than for Clinton. A fourth Washington Democratic elector voted for Faith Spotted Eagle, a Native American activist, and a Democratic elector in Hawaii voted for Sanders (Schmidt and Andrews 2016). Some analysts have speculated that voter education level was a key factor in the election. Exit poll data suggested that the vote among the college educated was closer than some had predicted: 49 per cent of college graduates voted for Clinton and 45 per cent for Trump. Trump received 49 per cent of the vote among white college graduates compared to 45 per cent for Clinton. Among whites with lower education levels, 67 per cent voted for Trump and 28 per cent for Clinton. Both Clinton and Trump had high unfavourability levels. About 11 per cent of voters thought Trump was unfavourable but still voted for him (Supiano 2016). Clinton received strong support from blacks and Latinos but at lower levels than Barack Obama received in 2012; Trump received slightly stronger support from these two groups compared to Mitt Romney in 2012 (Luhby 2016). Trump’s victory demonstrated that many voters wanted major change rather than the status quo establishment represented by Clinton. Conclusions and Future Research During the campaign, Trump criticised the Carrier air conditioning company for plans to move Indiana jobs to Mexico and the Ford Motor Company for plans to build a new plant in Mexico for small car production. Shortly following the 2016 election and before Trump took office, he took credit for major announcements from both companies. In late November 2016, President-Elect Trump, Vice President-Elect and Indiana Governor Mike Pence, and Carrier announced a deal to keep about 1,000 jobs in Indiana rather than moving them to Mexico. As part of the deal, Indiana provided $7 million in tax breaks and Carrier would invest $16 million in its Indiana facilities. Carrier’s parent company, United Technologies, earns about ten per cent of its revenue from the US federal government, especially from military contracts (Schwartz 2016a; 2016b). Some observers have suggested that Carrier was motivated by concerns about these contracts. In January 2017, the Ford Motor Company announced that it had cancelled plans to build a $1.6 billion plant in Mexico and would instead invest $700 million in an existing Michigan plant, including the creation of 700 new jobs. Ford CEO, Mark Fields, framed the decision as “a vote of confidence for President-elect Trump and some of the policies that they [sic] may be pursuing.” Fields added that the “primary reason” for the decision was reduced consumer demand for small cars (Snavely and Gardner 2017). Sandra Vergari 250 The Carrier and Ford announcements were scrutinised by critics and did not represent holistic national economic, workforce and trade policies. However, the two cases received national attention and held huge symbolic value for Trump. They offered hope to many that positive change might be possible under a Trump presidency. Populism is a political strategy employed by outsider candidates for elective office. Economic and political conditions in the US made it a favourable setting for the populist political strategies of Sanders and Trump. The economic impacts of globalisation, combined with political polarisation and a crisis of political representation, led to historic support for both candidates. The fact that Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson secured nationwide ballot access and garnered support in opinion polls approaching ten per cent offers further evidence of voter dissatisfaction with establishment elites. In future research on populism in the US, it would be useful to examine the extent to which candidates for Congress, governor, state lawmaker and mayor adopt populist strategies. Second, there is a need for additional studies of how populists approach the traditional mass media and use newer social media. Following Election Day, Trump frequently continued to communicate his views on Twitter. Twitter enabled Trump to control his message and speak directly to the public. Third, researchers might assess whether the dynamics and results of the 2016 presidential campaigns convince the two establishment parties to address the crisis of political representation in tangible, productive ways. Fourth, populism scholars might take care to manage researcher bias. It is important to avoid sitting atop one’s own comfortable, elitist perch while casting disparaging glances down upon ‘ignorant masses’ who support diverse populist candidates. In assessing concerns about immigration voiced by politicians and voters, for example, some analysts frame these concerns as unquestionably rooted in nativist, xenophobic dispositions. The research literature on populism would benefit from more nuanced examinations of immigration issues in a given context. Using a reasonable person standard, some concerns about immigration might be classified as legitimate, rational and without mean-spirited intent. In turn, there may be consensus that some claims are best classified as nativist and xenophobic. Finally, candidates employing populist strategies do not compose a neatly homogeneous class of political actors. Political dynamics and the implications of populist strategies differ across economic, social and political contexts. The research literature would benefit from additional analyses of the positive and negative implications of populism for democracy. References Aslanidis, Paris (2016) ‘Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective’, Political Studies, 64, 88–104. Bonikowski, Bart and Noam Gidron (2016) ‘The Populist Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952–1996’, Social Forces 94(4), 1593–1621. Carey, Nick (2016) ‘Anger, Resignation as Massive Pay Gap Prompts Carrier's Mexico Move’, Reuters, 16th February,, date accessed 23rd January 2017. Commission on Presidential Debates (2016) ‘CDP Invites Hillary Clinton and Donald J. 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CHAPTER 14: CONTEMPORARY POPULISM IN THE UNITED STATES 253 CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins “The concept of representation … is a continuing tension between ideal and achievement. This tension should lead us neither to abandon the ideal, retreating to an operational definition that accepts whatever those usually designated as representatives do; not to abandon its institutionalisation and withdraw from political reality." (Pitkin 1967: 240) What is the relationship between populism and what political scientists refer to as democratic representation? At first glance, the question seems redundant since the study of populism and democracy already has a rich tradition. For over two decades, political scientists have studied the mixed effects of populism on democracy, as well as the origins of populism in the principle of popular sovereignty (Canovan 1999; Urbinati 1998; Mair 2002; Mény and Surel 2002; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a). However, most of this literature considers only the relationship between populism and liberal democracy, the latter defined in procedural terms as contestation, participation and a set of supporting institutions designed to uphold individual liberties and minority rights. The study of democratic representation gets at something broader than the institutions of liberal democracy, although there are clear points of intersection. If we take as our starting point Dahl’s definition of democracy as “the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to its citizens” (Dahl 1971: 2), then democratic representation refers to the relationship between the inputs and outputs of democratic institutions, liberal or otherwise, and whether or not they embody this responsiveness. Although this responsiveness can mean several things, which we outline below, most scholars see it as a core characteristic of modern democracies (Manin et al. 1999b). Democracy, in Hannah Pitkin’s words, “re-presents” citizens and their aspirations (1967). In saying this, we accept the fundamental distinction enshrined by Dahl and others between democratic procedure and policy outcomes, and we sympathise with the claim that liberal procedures are most likely to achieve congruence between policy outcomes and popular inputs (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Schumpeter 1950). But democratic representation and liberal institution are not the same, and liberalism’s claim to superior representation must be defended. One of the challengers to liberalism’s claim is populism. Populist parties and movements assert that political elites have failed in their duty to represent the people and that they have done so systematically, protected by liberal institutions. Populists do not so much claim that liberal institutions are inherently bad—who is against freedom?—as they argue that they are insufficient to the task of representation. Only by removing elites and transforming institutions to ensure broad representation can freedoms be fully enjoyed. Thus, populism claims to remedy the lack of correspondence between government outputs and citizens’ preferences. 255 In this chapter, we assess the scholarly literature on populism and democratic representation and develop a clearer theory on their relationship, based on a so-called ideational approach to populism. This theory draws on the work of others, especially Pitkin (1967) and her framework of representation. We argue that populism’s impact on democratic representation is more ambiguous than some of the literature suggests and populists themselves claim. Populist ideas do remedy some of liberalism’s representational failures; where these failures are greatest, populism is most likely to be electorally successful and have its maximum impact. But populist ideas in practice also have strong tendencies towards exclusion that make any project at building democratic representation difficult. The impact of these ideas depends much less on the ideological flavour of populism (left or right), as some of the literature on populism asserts, as it does on the size of populist coalitions and the strength of their opponents. We study the relationship between populism and representation with a specific focus on the Latin American region. We do so for two reasons. First, the region has been prominent in scholarly literature and informs much of our thinking on the association between populism and representation; it seems fitting to start here. But second and more importantly, left-wing populists in the region are thought to be important examples of democratic inclusiveness, and thus provide the ‘most likely’ cases for testing our argument. Our descriptive analysis shows that left-wing populists do not always achieve their lofty goals, and that they are more capable of providing some types of representation than others. At the end of the chapter, we suggest some ways forward as scholars apply these insights from Latin America to Europe and elsewhere. The Poorly Studied Relationship between Populism and Democratic Representation What is democratic representation? In this chapter, we draw from the classic framework laid out by Pitkin (1967) in The Concept of Representation. Pitkin sees representation as a possible function of any government, but a crucial one for democracy. This function can be conceptualised in four different ways. The first refers to a mere formalistic view on representation, which alludes to procedural definitions of democracy, seeing elections as instruments that enable citizens to authorise elected officials and hold them accountable for their actions (see also Powell 2000; Manin et al. 1999a). The other three views on representation, on the other hand, focus on the content of the representative link between citizens and their representatives: descriptive, symbolic and substantive representation. Pitkin (1967) argues that from a descriptive view of representation, the link between a citizen and its representative is based on resemblance (see also Mansbridge 1999); for instance, “it depends on the representative’s characteristics, on what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing something” (1967: 61, italics original). Relatedly, symbolic representation is also referred to as an act of standing for something; however, in this view the representative does not have to be a person or resemble the represented (as in the type of descriptive representation). Instead, the represented may be a group or a whole nation who are represented via a symbol, for example a political leader or a flag (see Pitkin 1967: 92ff). The idea is that the group is dignified, or recognised in a normatively positive way as helping to constitute the democratic sovereign. Substantive representation, in contrast, is defined as “the nature of the activity itself, what goes on during represent- Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins 256 ing, the substance or content of acting for others, as distinct from its external and formal trappings” (Pitkin 1967: 114). While the former two views on representation centre on representing through mirroring either the different parts of society based on identity or class markers or through symbolising the society as a whole, the latter centres on representation as acting in the interest of citizens (see also Saward 2008). This latter view lies at the heart of most theories on democracy, although envisioned institutionally in many different ways (Dahl 1971; Manin et al. 1999b; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Underlying this is the broader claim that democracy can be conceived of in part as an institutionalised effort at representation. We return to these views below when we flesh out our theory on populism and representation. What is populism? In line with what we and others call an ideational approach (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), or what is elsewhere referred to in this volume as a frame based on ambivalent claims, we define populism as a political discourse that posits a struggle between a unified will of the common people and a conspiring elite. Whether referring to populism as a discourse, discursive frame or thin-centred ideology, all scholars using this approach see populist ideas as the main driving force behind the (un)democratic behaviour of populist leaders and followers, providing the motivating force for their policy choices (Heinisch and Mazzoleni in this volume; Rooduijn 2014). But whether expressed in these minimal terms or in the other ways mentioned in this handbook, nearly all definitions see populist discourse as a crucial component of the parties and movements that we think of as populist. And the important point is that these political actors are ultimately making an argument not for any particular set of institutions but for the ideal of democratic representation (see also Caramani 2017). For populist actors, the citizens are the rightful sovereign, and the government should reflect their interests and identities. As such, the rise of populism is closely related to a perceived ‘crisis of representation’ (Kriesi 2014; Mair 2002; Taggart 2002), for instance, the claim that governments have ceased to be representative: citizens’ interests are consistently harmed (substantive representation), and their views and voices are suppressed, fragmented and delegitimated (descriptive and symbolic representation). This lack of representation is the result of selfish machinations by the very elite that was supposed to be representing the people; hence, a drastic response is required, one that can restore a rightful representative government. Liberal institutions, such as nominally competitive elections, are still important for registering the voice of the people (formal representation), but they may be temporarily compromised as the people struggle against the domination of powerful elites who manipulate these rules. Ultimately, the function of democratic government is to represent the people, and liberal institutions (or any other set of policies—note this, economists!) are means to this end. Over the past two centuries, actual populist parties and movements have won elective office in many countries, both as principled opposition parties as well as to the highest government positions. Naturally, the question is whether these populists are effective at improving representation and, furthermore, whether we should have expected them to be so. One answer to these questions comes from Latin Americanists, who have historically taken a positive view of populism and representation. If we ignore the voice of some early naysayers who saw populism as a sham that ultimately failed to deliver on its promises (Di Tella 1965; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Germani 1978; Ianni 1975; Weffort 1978), we find a number of scholars who see populist forces in a positive light precisely because those forces increased not just for- CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 257 mal representation (especially through extension of the franchise and the legalisation of civil society organisations created by middle and lower sectors) but descriptive, symbolic and ultimately substantive representation. Populist forces have brought excluded racial, socio-economic and gender-based groups into elected positions while redistributing important state benefits, all while rhetorically dignifying popular voices and acknowledging them as part of ‘the people’. The products of these governments—in the early twentieth century, radicalism; in the mid-twentieth century, Peronismo, Varguismo and Velasquismo; and in recent decades, Chavismo and its Bolivarian allies—have supposedly brought profound changes that reduced inequality and heralded critical junctures in these countries’ democratic institutional histories (Chalmers et al. 1997; Collier and Collier 1991; Laclau 2006; Drake 1978; Stein 1980). However, many of these studies on Latin America have not focused primarily on populism, and those that do often use older, structuralist definitions of populism, which make it hard to pinpoint whether it was populism that brought about these changes or some traditional ideological component of the leader’s programmatic vision. Furthermore, most of these studies have selected on the dependent variable, identifying and analysing cases of populism that brought about successful change, while ignoring other populist movements that failed at these attempts, or non-populist movements that brought about the same improvements through pluralist means. European scholars, in contrast, are more focused specifically on populism, and most of them use ideational or political-institutional definitions that, at least in theory, would allow them to analyse these connections. Most of their work studies the relationship of populism to democracy’s liberal elements, especially contestation and occasionally participation. As Huber and Schimpf outline (in this volume), this literature either sees populism as an entirely negative force (Abts and Rummens 2007; Urbinati 1998) or as both a threat to and a corrective for liberal democracy (Arditi 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a; Panizza 2005). On the one hand, populism’s presumption of a unified popular will closes off the space required for opposition, and its faith in popular know-how, together with the assumption of charismatic leadership, encourages the elimination of independent government institutions; thus, contestation declines (Panizza 2005; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Houle and Kenny forthcoming; Huber and Schimpf 2015; Allred et al. 2015). On the other hand, populism can have a beneficial effect on democratic participation, insofar as it incorporates the views of previously ignored segments of the electorate or mobilises their vote. Furthermore, the negative impact of populism on contestation is not always a given; it is more likely when populists are in government and have the ability to capture and control institutions, while populist challengers may force incumbent traditional parties to become more attentive without having a direct, negative impact on the political system (Heinisch 2003; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a; Otjes 2012; Allred et al. 2015; Ruth forthcoming; Ruth and Welp 2014). Although these more recent arguments have obvious implications for democratic representation, the scholars who make them avoid framing their claims in these terms. Instead, they focus on the procedural elements of liberal definitions, or what Mény and Surel (2002) call the “constitutional” pillar of liberal democracy. The focus on liberal democracy is valuable, and we contribute to this conversation in some of our own work elsewhere (Allred et al. 2015; Ruth forthcoming). But it struggles to address questions about democratic representation, be- Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins 258 cause liberal arguments frequently leave untested the assumption that liberal institutions achieve the goal of connecting popular inputs with outputs or outcomes. One exception to this trend is the work of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013).1 Although their book (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012b) conceives of this impact in liberal terms, in a later article they reconceive of this impact more broadly in terms of democratic inclusion and exclusion. Their focus on material, political and symbolic inclusion (or exclusion) roughly parallels Pitkin’s notions of substantive, descriptive and symbolic representation. Specifically, an inclusive regime represents the material interests of citizens (substantive representation), accords them political participation in a way that ensures they have a real voice in how government is constituted (formal representation and descriptive representation), and dignifies them symbolically by making clear that they are part of ‘the people’ (symbolic representation). Through a rough comparison of four countries, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) show that populist regimes in Latin America (Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian movement in Venezuela and Evo Morales’ MAS in Bolivia) are much more inclusive than populists in Europe (the Front National in France and the Freedom Party in Austria). This behaviour reflects the ideology of these actors (left versus right), which in turn derives from the different situations of these countries in terms of class stratification and the relative sizes of the lower strata. Although Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s work is a clear step forward in the study of populism and representation, they do not engage Pitkin’s framework directly. In particular, they stop short of providing an explanation for populism’s effects in each of these three areas of inclusiveness. That is, they describe the effects with reference to their four cases, but they do not propose a clear set of causal mechanisms linking populist ideas to representational consequences. Consequently, they struggle to explain whether leftist ideology is the decisive factor in explaining the impact of these actors on representation. A Theory of Populism and Democratic Representation Our argument is that populist ideas per se matter for representation. Although these ideas interact with other features of the political environment, the ideas themselves have significant, traceable effects that are at least partially independent of the populists’ left-wing or right-wing ideology. Hence, to explain the impact of populism on democratic representation we build on the ideational approach defined earlier. This approach does not discard the impact of material constraints, but sees those constraints as moderators of populist ideas (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). And while it does not claim that politicians always use the discourse sincerely, it assumes that the support of voters generally forces politicians who do use the discourse to act as if they were sincere. Using the ideational approach, we start more or less as other scholars have, with an appreciation of the likely positive effects of populism on representation. Populism is essentially an argument that traditional political actors are undermining democratic representation, and populist actors make some effort to rectify this gap in the link between representatives and citizens. We can identify two aspects of populist ideas and their connection to the material environment that—irrespective of the region or host ideology—should influence populism’s rela- 1 See also Caramani (2017) for a theoretical demarcation between populism, technocracy and party government. CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 259 tionship to representation. The first is that—as the literature on populism and liberal democracy already argues—populism is never an entirely benign force. While the literature on populism and liberalism frequently emphasises the impact of charismatic leadership and populist ideas on horizontal accountability and the quality of electoral contestation, here we draw attention to its impact on civil liberties and minority rights. Populism may champion unrepresented sectors of citizens, but it also vilifies what it perceives as the elite and their cronies. Once in power, populists promise to systematically exclude them, for instance, to ‘unrepresent’ them in all four ways: formally (by circumventing legal rights, especially the vote or the right to form political associations and run for office), descriptively (by removing them and ‘their kind’ from office), symbolically (through rhetoric that dehumanises them) and substantively (by imposing conditionality on government benefits or rewriting policy to systematically disadvantage former insiders). Thus, populism is good for democratic representation of ‘the people’ but bad for that of ‘the elite’. This leads to a second aspect of populism’s impact on democratic representation: size. Actual populist movements rarely represent a majority, and they certainly do not represent all of the citizenry. It matters how large ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ are. Smaller, niche populist parties such as radical right-wing populists in Western Europe are more likely to alienate large segments of the citizenry, while larger majoritarian movements that win office with supermajorities, such as those in Latin America or Southern Europe, may in fact improve representation for much of the population. Thus, the benefits of populism for democratic representation should be greater (but still incomplete) where populists win complete control of government through free and fair elections, because it is in these countries where the representational gap is greatest. Although this provides our background argument, we also expect populism to have distinct, specific consequences for different types of representation. Starting with formal representation, or the way in which institutional arrangements provide authorisation and accountability, we expect populism to be somewhat negative—but not entirely. As some critics have argued, populism has a difficult relationship with formal representative institutions, seeing elections as imperfect means of knowing the popular will, and discounting the importance of institutions that enshrine minority rights or enforce a separation of powers (see, for example, Caramani 2017). Relatedly, Taggart points out that populists “challenge the functioning of representative democracy … while at the same time championing the virtues of representation” (2004: 269). However, we disagree with arguments which claim that populism leads inexorably to fully autocratic or even totalitarian regimes that eschew competitive elections in favour of purely plebiscitary, symbolic experiences (Abts and Rummens 2007; Urbinati 1998). Populist actors mainly argue against horizontal accountability mechanisms – which are a core principle of liberal constitutionalism – and in favour of expanding vertical accountability mechanisms, especially majoritarian ones (Taggart 2004; Ruth forthcoming; Ruth and Welp 2014). They value the seal of popular approval that only a formally open, competitive election can provide, and they frequently champion direct participatory mechanisms such as recall, initiative and referenda—including those that can be initiated by citizens (Ruth and Welp 2014). Thus, we see ambivalence among populists towards formal democratic institutions. The quality of electoral competition may decline (as defenders of the liberal perspective have empirically demonstrated), but committed populists should support regular elections in which there is still some pos- Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins 260 sibility of the populist incumbent losing. The result is hybrid democracy rather than outright autocracy or totalitarianism (Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Allred et al. 2015). In terms of descriptive and symbolic representation—the ways in which representatives ‘stand for’ the represented either as a person that resembles them or as a signifier—we expect populists to do unambiguously well. This is not because populism is really all that inclusive (again, even highly popular populists vilify a non-insignificant subset of the population) but a matter of demographics. Most of the traditional political class comes from an intellectual and economic elite that embodies a small segment of society. There are few secretaries or plumbers who win public office, and when race or identity-based categories overlap with economic ones, whole segments of the population may go unseen in government. The populist emphasis on the virtues of ordinary citizens and their know-how, together with its tendency to exclude the most privileged sectors, means that a populist movement in power may bring a more diverse cross-section of the population into office and celebrate their democratic virtues in its rhetoric (see also Caramani 2017, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). This is not to say that the size of the coalition is unimportant. Populist niche parties will naturally draw on a smaller crosssection of the population than a majoritarian populist party, and their definition of ‘the people’ will accordingly shrink. But trading a few Ivy League lawyers for members of the middle class, even if they are white and male, may represent a dramatic improvement for a population craving leaders that look more like them. Finally, we expect populist parties and movements to have very mixed consequences for substantive representation—the actions taken by representatives in the interest of the represented. On the one hand, populist parties and movements raise high expectations about the performance of democratic systems, since populist actors usually campaign for complex and extensive policy change (see Ruth forthcoming). In line with the inclusive way of defining ‘the people’ in Latin America, this should lead to increased welfare spending on the poor, while the same logic applies to welfare chauvinism by the rather exclusivist populist parties in Europe (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; 2015). However, the success of these programmes depends not only on the reallocation of public resources but on the efficient and impartial implementation of these funds, for instance their distributive impact. Governing populist parties in Latin America often behave like clientelistic systems of representation, distributing goods and services conditionally, based on partisan rather than universalistic criteria (Ruth 2012; Kitschelt et al. 2010). The result can be negative for groups that oppose the government in elections, at least some of which are not from the wealthiest sectors. While we expect majoritarian populist coalitions like those in Latin America to be better than niche parties at redistributing wealth or changing the policy agenda to address broadly felt needs, the conditional, partisan logic of their policymaking makes them unlikely to offer fully public goods. Empirical Analysis: Patterns of Populism and Representation in Latin America To subject these arguments to a first empirical test, we now turn to the descriptive analysis of contemporary representative governments (both populist and non-populist) in contemporary Latin America (1999-2014). We focus on Latin America not only because this is traditionally one of the most widely studied regions in terms of populism, but because it offers a number of CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 261 contemporary populists in power, almost all of which are leftist. These are majoritarian movements that represent ‘easy’ cases for competing arguments that generally see these as inclusive. In contrast, our expectation is that the impact of these left populists will be much more varied. To measure the degree of populism we rely on a unique polity-level dataset that captures the populist discourse of chief executives (see Hawkins 2009; Hawkins and Kocijan 2013; Allred et al. 2015). This dataset covers 36 Latin American leaders in 18 countries from 1999 until 2014. Thus, it captures much of the current variation of populist and non-populist regimes in Latin America. The indicator measures populist discourse through a human-coded content analysis of political speeches, using the ideational definition mentioned above as its point of comparison. The score for each leader is an average of four speeches using a quota sample to ensure comparability across chief executives; sampling techniques and the coding procedure (including the rubric and anchor texts) can be found in Hawkins (2009) and Hawkins and Kocijan (2013). The interval scale runs from 0 (no populism) to 2 (intense populism). By way of note, intercoder reliability for the codes is quite high,2 and correlations with other data from scholarly literature are also high (Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2015). The measure of the populist discourse has a mean of 0.35 and a standard deviation of 0.47 in our sample. To measure the different types of political representation discussed above, we build on several other sources. To capture formal and descriptive representation, we use data from the Democracy Barometer project (DB, Merkel et al. 2016). This project provides panel data (countries and years) on a variety of institutional and behavioural measures capturing different principles and functions of democracy, including several aspects of representation, and is available for 18 Latin American countries with more than 250,000 inhabitants (Merkel et al. 2016). Hence, it covers all the chief executives included in our populist discourse dataset. More specifically, we use the following three composite indicators from the DB dataset, which most closely resemble the democratic aspects theorised above: First, we measure formal representation through two aggregated indices of the structural opportunities for the inclusion of citizen preferences into the political process (items REP_SR1 and REP_SR2), such as electoral disproportionality, a high number of parliamentary seats and direct democratic institutions (Bühlmann et al. 2012; Bochsler and Hug 2015; Merkel et al. 2016). Second, we measure descriptive representation through, on the one hand, an aggregated index of political participation (item PARTICIP) which contains different indicators that capture both the effectiveness of institutional and noninstitutional forms of participation – for example, rules facilitating participation or the frequency of petitions—as well as the equality of participation rights and their use among different segments of society—for example, the percentage of registered voters or the distribution of turnout according to education and income (Paxton et al. 2003; Teorell 2006). On the other hand, we use an index of descriptive representation (item REP_DR) that captures the access to political office for ethnic and structural minorities, including the absence of legal restrictions or constraints as well as the adequate representation of women and ethnic groups in national political institutions (see also Bochsler 2010; Hänni 2016).3 To capture substantive representation, we analyse the change in political output and outcome measures with respect to three important political issues that rank highest among the policy 2 The 2011 Latin American update has at least 89 percent agreement, a Cohen’s kappa of between 0.66 and 0.72, and a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.75 to 0.82, depending on the coders (Hawkins 2012). All of these are moderate to high levels of reliability (Krippendorff 2013, 241-242, Landis and Koch 1977). 3 For a detailed description of the indicators included and the construction of the indices, see (Merkel et al. 2016) Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins 262 priorities of Latin American citizens. According to the AmericasBarometer regional report from 2004 until 2014, three issues constantly figured among the top policy priorities of Latin American citizens: the role of the state in tackling economic problems (including unemployment, poverty and shortages of basic services), the prevention of crime and violence, and the problem of political and economic corruption (Zechmeister 2014). To capture the development of these three issues, we use data on social spending (as a percentage of total public spending) from CEPALSTAT (ECLAC 2016), data on intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) from the World Development Indicators database (The World Bank 2016)4 and data on the control of corruption from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project (Kaufmann and Kraay 2016). For all of these indicators, we calculate the change over time for each chief executive’s first term (as well as completed consecutive terms, if applicable). We use the year before an incumbent assumed office and their last year in office as reference points5. Note that, to the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any dataset that captures the degree of symbolic representation. We suspect that the populist discourse dataset we use captures at least some aspects of symbolic representation. Many of these political leaders become symbols of the popular will themselves and their rhetoric typically identifies previously excluded groups as part of that will (Hawkins 2009). For example, in this passage from a speech used in our coder training, Evo Morales of Bolivia reacts to perceived attempts to symbolically exclude indigenous peoples from the category of legitimate citizens: They have tried to impose policies of hunger and poverty on the Bolivian people. Above all, the ‘rule of law” means the accusations that we, the Quechuas, Aymaras and Guaranties of Bolivia keep hearing from our governments: that we are narcos, that we are anarchists. This uprising of the Bolivian people has been not only about gas and hydrocarbons, but an intersection of many issues: discrimination, marginalisation, and most importantly, the failure of neo-liberalism. Likewise, in a 2010 speech to a Tea Party convention (also used in coder training), former Republican vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin applauds the “real people—not politicos, not inside-the-Beltway professionals—[who] come out and stand up and speak out for commonsense conservative principles.” For her, these ‘real people’ are: everyday Americans who grow our food and run our small businesses, teach our kids, and fight our wars. They’re folks in small towns and cities across this great nation who saw what was happening. However, describing this rhetorical effort and measuring its impact requires a more systematic analysis than we can provide here. 4 Note that data on homicides was not available for the whole period under study, which results in missing data for the following five cases: Kirchner (ARG), Fernandez de Kirchner (ARG), Mesa (BOL), Lula (BRA) and Lagos (CHL). 5 In case an incumbent assumed office after 30th June, we use the same year as the reference point. Likewise, we use the previous year as a reference point if an incumbent left office before 1st July. CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 263 Formal Representation Figure 15.1 shows the bivariate correlations for the degree of populism and two indicators capturing vertical accountability mechanisms: the proportionality of electoral institutions (left panel) and the provision of direct democratic institutions (right panel). While we initially find a positive correlation between populism and these two measures of formal representation, the direction and significance of each correlation is highly dependent on one individual case. Ultimately, the relationship is largely nil. Figure 15.1: The Impact of Populism on Formal Representation Source: Change in Proportionality includes the number of electoral districts and parliamentary seats per inhabitant (DB item REP_SR1, Merkel et al. 2016). Change in Direct Democracy includes the provisions for direct democratic instruments and the absence of participation and approval quorums (DB item REP_SR2, Merkel et al. 2016). See Table 1 in the appendix for more information on the individual cases. Note that dashed correlation lines are based on all cases while the solid line in the left panel excludes the case of Correa and the solid line in the right panel excludes the case of Chavez. With respect to the proportionality of representation, the case of Rafael Correa in Ecuador drives the relationship. The Ecuadorian electoral system reform introduced through the new constitution in 2009 increased both the number of seats in the legislature and introduced the election of some legislators in a nationwide district through proportional representation (Bowen 2010). Paradoxically this increase in the proportionality of the electoral system led to the continued majority control of the president's party (Alianza PAIS) in the unicameral congress, a situation unprecedented in the highly fragmented and polarised Ecuadorian party Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins 264 system before 2009 (Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich 2011; Mejía Acosta 2006). While other countries in the region experienced electoral reforms as well, these reforms did not lead to a considerable increase in the proportionality of electoral rules. Moreover, many reforms rather strengthened majoritarian vertical electoral accountability through the abolition of presidential re-election bans, a trend that took place under both populist and non-populist rule and was rather related to the popularity of presidents than their populist discourse (Corrales 2016). In line with the expansion of consecutive presidential re-election rules, the introduction of direct democratic instruments is also considered to strengthen vertical accountability in a majoritarian way (Breuer 2007). As can be seen in Figure 15.1 (right panel), with respect to the provision of direct democratic mechanisms, the correlation is highly dependent on the case of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, who introduced several direct democratic mechanisms for the first time in this country through the writing of a new constitution in 2000, shortly after his rise to power. If we exclude this influential observation, the relationship changes signs and becomes insignificant. This highlights the importance of being cautious with respect to generalisations based on only a few cases and the need to compare populists to non-populist cases as well. For example, we find Ricardo Maduro in Honduras (a non-populist) also increased the provision of direct democratic mechanisms in his country (Altman 2011). Moreover, the provision of direct democratic mechanisms does not necessarily mean that these instruments are activated. As can be seen with respect to the introduction of direct democratic mechanisms in Bolivia (by Morales and his predecessor Carlos Mesa), apart from the use of these instruments in the approval process of the constitution in 2009, these instruments have not (yet) been used effectively to influence policymaking in a bottom-up process (see Welp and Ruth 2017). Hence, while individual cases may improve the structural opportunities for citizens to introduce their preferences into the political process, we cannot identify a clear pattern between the two concepts and the degree of a chief executive’s discourse. Descriptive Representation Figure 15.2 (left panel) shows the bivariate association between the degree of populism and the change in the effectiveness and equality of participation at the end of a president’s (combined consecutive) term (mirroring Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2013) dimension of political inclusion). Here, as we expected, the relationship is highly positive. With the exception of Alan García’s second presidential term in Peru, all populist presidents have a considerable positive association with democratic participation (including both electoral and non-institutional). The correlation is positive and moderately strong with a correlation coefficient of r=0.51 (at the 99% confidence level). Moreover, these changes are by no means minor, as the case of Morales in Bolivia indicates. Morales considerably improved the effectiveness and equality of participation by including large groups of marginalised voters, for instance, ethnic minorities, low income voters, and women (Madrid 2008; Rousseau 2010). Considering the range of the participation function in our sample (which runs from a minimum of 36 to a maximum of 63), an increase by more than 20 points is a substantial improvement in the quality of participation. Figure 15.2 (right panel) shows the relationship between populism and the political representation of ethnic groups and other structural minorities. CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 265 Again we find a significant positive correlation between populism and descriptive representation (r=0.40, p<0.05). In line with our findings on participation, this association is considerably dampened by the case of García in Peru. If we exclude the observation for García, the correlation increases to 0.52, significant at the 99% confidence level. All other populist presidents affect descriptive representation in a positive way (irrespective of their ideological leanings). Figure 15.2: The Impact of Populism on Descriptive Representation Source: Change in Distribution of Participation includes the equality and effectiveness of formal and nonformal participation according to education, income, gender and age (DB item PARTICIP, Merkel et al. 2016). Change in Minority Access refers to an index of the adequate representation and access to power of women and ethnic minorities (DB item REP_DR, Merkel et al. 2016). See Table 1 in the appendix for more information on the individual cases. These patterns also reveal another potential finding. In line with the case study literature, we find that García—who had already governed the country as a left-wing populist president in the 1980’s (Graham 1990)—ran for office in 2006 for a second time deploying a populist discourse. However, he abandoned his populist appeal right after assuming office for his second term and took a turn to the right, especially with respect to economic policies (Schmidt 2007). Hence, Figure 15.2 potentially highlights the distinction between a sincere and a strategic use of the populist discourse (Heinisch and Mazzoleni in this volume; Weyland 2001; Mair 2002). Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins 266 Substantive Representation As expected, we also find a mixed pattern with respect to substantive representation. To begin with, Figure 15.3 (left panel) shows that presidents with a strong populist discourse tend to considerably increase social spending (as a percentage of total public spending). Note that social spending is not significantly correlated with left-right ideology; in separate calculations, we find that the correlation between ideology and social spending is only moderately negative (r=-0.248, p=-.145)—for instance, the more leftist a president, the higher the change in social spending—but the correlation falls short of conventional significance levels in our sample. In contrast, with respect to crime we find that populist presidents are associated with an increase in homicides in their countries (r=0.36, p<0.05). Populists in Latin America do not have a strong track record of improving public safety. Finally, we find a mixed pattern with respect to the control of corruption (Figure 15.3, right panel); we can find improvements and setbacks in the control of corruption for both populist and non-populist presidents. This latter finding is especially disappointing for proponents of these governments, given that one of the main claims for representation that populist challengers make is to replace the ‘corrupt elite’. Figure 15.3: The Impact of Populism on Substantive Representation Source: Change in Social Spending captures the change in social spending as a percentage of total public spending (CEPALSTAT, ECLAC 2016). Change in Homicides captures intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (The World Bank 2016). Change in Control of Corruption captures the perceived extent to which public power is exercised for private or political gain (WGI, Kaufmann and Kraay 2016). See Table 1 in the appendix for more information on the individual cases. CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 267 These results are echoed in the case study literature on populism in power. For example, while Correa introduced redistributive social policies that benefited the poor, these fell short of tackling the highly unequal distribution of income and property in the country (de la Torre and Ortiz Lemos 2016). Moreover, his top-down style of governing sidelined large groups in society that contested his leadership, such as indigenous social movements and conservative subnational movements (de la Torre 2013; Eaton 2014; 2011). In a similar fashion, the Morales administration has considerably increased spending to the poor as part of a progressive economic policy agenda (Gray Molina 2010). Nevertheless, Morales has also increased the nationalisation of natural resources to finance social spending, which remains a highly contested issue between the government and its opposition (Eaton 2014). Both of these substantive changes took place in a highly conflictive and polarised political context, in which both sides denied their opponents the right to make legitimate, representative claims (Gray Molina 2010; Schilling-Vacaflor 2011). Perhaps the case that best highlights these ambiguities is that of Chávez in Venezuela. His government redirected billions of dollars in oil revenues to a series of social programmes and community development projects designed to advance participatory democracy. Although these programmes had palpable effects on poverty levels, reducing them by over 50% in only a few years (Weisbrot 2008), several studies find evidence of partisan conditionality in the distribution of programme benefits (Handlin 2016; Hawkins et al. 2011; Penfold-Becerra 2007). Furthermore, the ultimate impact of these programmes on key outcomes such as literacy rates is highly disputed (Ortega and Rodríguez 2008), and weak management of funds contributed to an increase in corruption during this period, as is evident in the data point for Chávez in Figure 15.3 (right panel). Conclusion Our chapter shows that the concept of representation proposed by Pitkin (1967) serves as a useful analytical tool for theorising the ambiguous relationship between democratic representation and populism. In doing so, we seek to augment the current focus of the literature on the institutions of liberal democracy. If we look more closely at the multiple aspects of representation, we may find that populism influences some of them positively but not others; this influence depends more heavily on the nature of populist ideas and the size of the coalitions that embody them than on left-right ideology or region. In particular, our analysis shows that the degree of the populist discourse of Latin American presidents is positively correlated with descriptive representation, including for example the political inclusion of minorities. But the relationship is more ambiguous with respect to formal and substantive representation. Thus, even in a region with predominantly left-wing populism representing large numbers of excluded citizens, the effects of populism on representation are mixed. However, our goal in exploring the relationship of populism to democratic representation empirically is to do more than present another dataset; we want to provide future directions for research. We see three such avenues. First, while our analysis forms a first step in understanding the empirical connection between these concepts, we still lack adequate measures for all types of democratic representation, especially symbolic and substantive representation. Future research needs to tackle this data availability problem and generate indicators that more closely resemble the theoretical concepts. Saskia P. Ruth and Kirk A. Hawkins 268 Second, while we concentrated our analysis on a most likely region—Latin America—scholars need to test these arguments across regions and time. Contemporary Latin America has a number of unique features that might confound our results, such as presidentialism, and represents a narrow band of variation for testing crucial causal factors, such as coalition size. Inequality, class divisions and low levels of good governance have historically created much stronger populist movements. And while a region of left-wing populists represent an important set of cases for testing older arguments, which tend to see populism in a uniform light, minoritarian rightwing populists represent an equally important set of cases for testing our own theory with its mixed predictions. Obvious possibilities are to include European and US cases of populist parties (in government and in opposition) and to compare contemporary cases of populism with historical ones. Finally, taking Pitkin's (1967) own suggestion seriously, future research has to highlight how different types of representation are related to each other to identify the overall effect of populism on democratic representation. For example, how do different formal representative procedures increase or constrain the potential positive and negative effects of populist government on descriptive and substantive representation? Are descriptive and substantive representation interrelated? And does symbolic representation increase the legitimacy of substantive outputs of the democratic process? Appendix Sample of Latin American Presidents Country President Years in Office Populism Score Argentina Néstor Kirchner 2003–2007 0.2 Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 2007–2015 0.0 Bolivia Carlos Mesa 2003–2005 0.1 Evo Morales 2006–2015 1.6 Brazil Luiz Lula da Silva 2003–2010 0.3 Dilma Rousseff 2011–2014 0.1 Chile Ricardo Lagos 2000–2006 0.1 Michelle Bachelet 2006–2010 0.0 Sebastián Piñera 2010–2014 0.0 Colombia Álvaro Uribe 2002–2010 0.0 Manuel Santos 2010–2014 0.0 Costa Rica Abel Pacheco 2002–2006 0.2 Óscar Arias 2006–2010 0.0 Laura Chinchilla 2010–2014 0.0 Dominican Republic Leonel Fernández 2004–2012 0.3 Ecuador Luis Palacio 2005–2007 0.4 Table 15.1: CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 269 Country President Years in Office Populism Score Rafael Correa 2007–2013 1.3 El Salvador Antonio Saca 2004–2009 0.6 Mauricio Funes 2009–2014 0.6 Guatemala Óscar Berger 2004–2008 0.0 Álvaro Colom 2008–2012 0.1 Honduras Ricardo Maduro 2002–2006 0.0 Manuel Zelaya 2006–2009 0.5 Porfirio Lobo 2010–2014 0.3 Mexico Vicente Fox 2000–2006 0.3 Felipe Calderón 2006–2012 0.1 Nicaragua Enrique Bolaños 2002–2007 0.0 Daniel Ortega 2007–2012 1.3 Panama Martín Torrijos 2004–2009 0.2 Ricardo Martinelli 2009–2014 0.5 Paraguay Nicanor Duarte 2003–2008 0.5 Fernando Lugo 2008–2012 0.0 Peru Alejandro Toledo 2001–2006 0.3 Alan García 2006–2011 0.8 Uruguay Tabaré Vásquez 2005–2010 0.3 José Mujica 2010–2015 0.1 Venezuela Hugo Chávez 1999–2013 1.9 Source: Hawkins (2009), Hawkins and Kocijan (2013). 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CHAPTER 15: POPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 273 CHAPTER 16: POPULIST AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg Populism and stable party systems: can they coexist? The Latin American experience Populism is often said to be antithetical to a stable democratic system (Weyland 2013). Populism is based on personalistic rule and charismatic authority, whereas a well-functioning democracy should be based on solid programmatic parties. Moreover, populist leaders compete for votes on the basis of emotional appeals (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 3), whereas political parties should compete by putting forward comprehensive programmes that clearly articulate public policy preferences in universalistic terms.1 In particular, populism is often considered something akin to a political pathology that is especially prevalent in the semi-peripheral parts of the globe (Habermas 1989: 370), particularly— but not only—in Latin America. The normative-theoretical distinction between populism and an emphasis on programme is often discussed in connection with a complex historical narrative about modernisation and globalisation: Populism, it is said, is the norm in those areas of the globe that have yet to complete the transition from pre-modern forms of political organisation to fully rational ones; in time, all countries are said to advance towards a party democracy, which is the endpoint of the global process of political convergence into political modernity (Kitschelt et al. 2010). The more frequent accounts of the prevalence of populism in semi-peripheral countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Turkey and India emphasise that in these countries the slow ‘normal’ trajectory towards political modernity was derailed by rapid state-led industrialisation in the early or mid-twentieth century. The sudden proliferation of factories caused urbanisation, which brought the displacement of rural workers into newly created metropolitan areas in search of higher paying industrial jobs. These migrant workers, cut off from their traditional political, cultural and even religious affiliations in the countryside, became ‘available’ masses that could be mobilised by smooth-talking demagogues. These rabble-rousers were carried to power by the waves of popular activism but were completely uninterested in advancing 1 It is commonly believed that voters who choose within the constraints of programmatic party systems can do so based on rational expectations about what each party will do if elected to office because policy preferences are explained in the relevant party platforms; however, voters that are forced to choose between non-programmatic parties lack these ideological indicators, so party elites have to replace them with something else: charismatic leaders and/or clientelistic appeals. “Various Latin American party systems are noted for having powerful political machines, [sic] that enforce discipline, [sic] through clientelistic rather than programmatic means; likewise, Latin American politicians working at the behest of feared or revered charismatic leaders show considerable unanimity.” (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 66) 275 democracy. The personalistic and authoritarian appeal of these demagogues was said to preclude the consolidation of programmatic party systems in those countries. Though simplified here, this account was in fact the predominant explanation for the rise of mid-twentieth century populism for two decades (Lipset 1960; Di Tella 1965; Germani 1968; Cardoso and Faletto 1976; Hurtado 1977; Baykan 2016). However, the clear-cut normative and historical distinction between populism and liberal democracy came under criticism as the twentieth century ended and democracy expanded around the globe. This has become even more evident in the last three decades after the so-called Third Wave of transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule took place in Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia. With the successful extrication of Spain from authoritarian rule in 1974 (Linz 1989), countries as diverse as Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and all of post-Communist Eastern Europe, plus many others, adopted multiparty political systems. They have been remarkably stable in their adherence to (at least formal) democratic stability. However, the expected withering away of populism in the semi-peripheral areas of the world that was supposed to take place as more and more countries adopted capitalism and democracy has not happened yet, and it is doubtful that this will ever happen. Rather, it seems as if in these new democracies populist and programmatic parties coexist (Cavarozzi and Casullo 2002) and that populism is one of the ‘normal’ ways in which political competition is conducted. The second factor causing the re-evaluation of populism today is the fact that populist leaders and movements are enjoying great political success in the global core countries as well. A surge of populism appears to be taking place in Eastern and Western Europe as well as in the United States. The political importance of the Geert Wilder, Marine Le Pen, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, Pablo Iglesias, Nigel Farage, Donald Trump, and the success of populist rightwing parties in Austria and the Netherlands call into question the supposed immunity of advanced democratic systems to the temptation of populist leadership (Freidenberg 2007; Mudde 2007). It is only natural that a well-deserved revaluation of global populist politics is taking place in political science under this new context (Moffitt 2016). For instance, some authors argue that populism is a reaction to the crisis of the institutionalised parties, which gives way to alternative forms of representation and parties (Roberts 1999; Weyland et al. 2010). Others go beyond this notion and push for the recognition that populism is not an antithetical impulse to democracy but a by-product of democracy itself, which coexists and competes with other modes of political identification in any democratic system (Canovan 1999; Panizza 2005). The objective of this chapter is to answer the question of whether populism is a threat to the stability of party systems in Latin America (Zanatta 2008) or constitutes a political tradition that can coexist with democratic stability (De La Torre 2004) from a theoretical point of view. The chapter will argue that populism can, in fact, coexist with stable party systems. The argument then moves onto the second question: If we assume that populist parties and leaders compete and coexist with programmatic parties on a daily basis, how can this interaction be described and theorised? The main answer to this query is that populist and programmatic parties coexist in an ordinal relationship with each other with the result that the difference between the two types is largely a matter of degree and not of ‘nature’ or ‘essence’. The fact that a party is ‘more populist’ or ‘more programmatic’ depends on strategic choices and the style of María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg 276 leadership; parties can and do fluctuate between the two poles in different historical times as well. The goal here is also to show that populist movements routinely evolve into populist parties in this region and that, moreover, these parties are as resilient and as effective in winning elections and governing as any other type of parties. Sometimes they succeed in performing these tasks and sometimes they fail, but they do not seem to be a priori condemned to do one thing or the other. The Current State of Research into Populism and Political Representation The first explanation about the emergence of populist movements and governments in the twentieth century emphasised the degree of modernisation of a given society (Germani 1968; Di Tella 1965). In this seminal approach, dubbed Modernisation Theory, populism was explained as an answer to the problems created by stunted or incomplete modernisation and was thus viewed as an ‘abnormal’ transition from traditional to modern politics in underdeveloped countries. Most mid-twentieth century scholars of populism viewed it as ‘deviant’ political behaviour that would have to be necessarily superseded in the course of the ‘normal’ historical evolution towards a more modern and ideological form of politics.2 Populism was thus regarded as a deviant alternative to more modern forms of representation. The US and especially Europe were considered the templates for the progressive realisation of democratic institutional development around the globe (Lerner 1958). In Europe, the process of political modernisation supposedly involved what Gino Germani called “the model of integration” (Germani 1963: 421; authors’ translation), meaning that the newly mobilised working classes were incorporated into the political system through a process characterised by widespread respect for the political norms and institutions. In Europe, the mass publics secured their inclusion in politics step by step by participating in liberal or working-class parties. The whole process helped to consolidate rather than undermine representative democracy.3 But Latin America followed a different path that led to ‘disintegrated’ forms of political action, of which populism was the main type. In the twentieth century, the new industrial classes began pushing for democratic incorporation in Latin America. Because the proper political instruments for such incorporation (the liberal or working-class parties of Europe and the US) were in short supply, the ‘available masses’ were recruited and manipulated by intra-elite factions or personalistic leaders that hoped to gain power based solely on their support. Thus, the incorporation of the masses into political life was achieved largely through informal and noninstitutional means.4 The dominant narrative that identified populism with demagoguery and anti-democratic backwardness was promptly criticised. Defining the behaviour of the popular classes as being simply the unreflective expression of an amorphous, homogeneous whole went against the mere 2 For a critique of such a mode of thinking, see Chatterjee (2004: 48). 3 In contrast, Charles Tilly makes the case that there were multiple trajectories to democracy within Europe itself, and that some European countries came to liberal democracy via a more contentious path than others. The prime example of the contentious path is France, of course (Tilly 2003). 4 With the notable exceptions of Costa Rica and Uruguay (Cavarozzi and Casullo 2002). CHAPTER 16: POPULIST AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 277 possibility of conducting an empirical analysis of populism centred on methodological individualism. Moreover, modernisation theories (both from the left and from the right) simply did not leave room either for the comprehension of the political and economic contexts within which such mobilisation happened or for understanding the contingent factors crucial in each particular case. The self-evidently elitist and even reactionary undertones when equating the popular sectors with undifferentiated ‘irrational masses’ became the basis for criticising this view of populism (Altamirano 2001). In the 1960s, an alternative explanation of the origins of populism was introduced in the context of the emergence of Dependency Theory (O’Donnell 1972; Ianni 1975; Cardoso and Faletto 1976). Although Dependency Theory shared the identification of populism as one particular historical phase with the preceding Modernisation Theory, it parted ways with the latter in that it did not regard underdevelopment in teleological terms but rather viewed it in a more deterministic fashion as a historically necessary by-product of the relations of dependency that connect the centre (the industrialised nations) with the periphery (Latin America). Linear progress was impossible, they argued, and real modernisation would require the systemic change of the global relations of power. Dependency Theory explained the adoption of import substitution policies as an effect of the favourable conditions brought about by the Great Depression and the Second World War. The implosion of the global trade networks allowed for higher degrees of economic autarchy as Latin American countries were forced to turn to their internal markets for economic growth. Imports-substitution industries bloomed, creating a new economic elite and a working class, in what Ianni has called “a class society” (1975). The rapid social changes caused the sudden destabilisation of the oligarchic systems of governance, which were intimately connected with the old capitalist order based on the exportation of commodities. In turn, this development disrupted the pre-existing social and political structures and gave way to the active mobilisation of groups that were previously passive (Germani 1963: 412). The mobilisation of these groups became a constitutive element of state formation in Latin America in the first half of the twentieth century. Populist leaders rose in response to the demands of the newly mobilised classes. Born out of mass activism, the new populist governments logically sought to strengthen the hand of the working classes by creating a new development model based on internal market-oriented industrialisation, the nationalisation of resources and increased economic state interventionism. The populist governments that emerged during this period of relative economic autonomy were characterised by redistributive politics that channelled resources to the popular sectors in the hopes that state intervention would act as an effective mechanism for their social and political inclusion. It was thought the enhanced economic redistribution would prop up internal demand, which would spur economic investment in turn. The whole project was planned as an inter-class alliance between the working classes, the middle classes and the newly formed industrial bourgeoisies against the dominant factions of the previous oligarchic regimes. Nonetheless, the plan had its own major weakness. Sustaining the process required that the interests of the ‘national industrial bourgeoisie’ and the emergent urban working classes were, if not identical, at least complementary. Such complementarity, however, was far from natural since the bourgeoisie was supposed to retain economic control, the popular classes were expected to subordinate themselves willingly, and the state was supposed to control all decisions. These premises were always doubtful, to say the least. This model of development required a María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg 278 high degree of anti-elite mobilisation on the part of the working class and, at the same time, that same mobilisation had to be kept within the limits that a strong state deemed compatible with capitalist development. In this vision, the ‘populist state’ was the sole agent of development: a supreme entity acting simultaneously as the engine behind capitalist accumulation and guarantor of its social and political viability by activating and controlling of the popular bases of support. One hardly needs to emphasise that this Herculean task proved almost impossible once the stabilisation of the global order after World War II brought the prices of commodities down. Moreover, the old and new economic elites were in the end never fully supportive of the new political order, even though it arguably benefited them (Sidicaro 2002). Although Dependency Theory was crucial in the development of a more nuanced and historicised understanding of populism, it was flawed in that it associated political populism with one particular development model, industrialisation through import substitution (ISI) (Viguera 1993: 61). Dependency theorists of populism did not take into account that there is no essential connection between populism and industrialisation or working class strength, or even with heightened state intervention. There have been agrarian populist movements along with leftist and rightist populist leaders, not to mention neo-liberal populist governments, which shrank rather than increased the size of the state.5 One of the earlier proponents of unlatching the study of populism from economics and development theories was Ernesto Laclau (1986) as he noted that populism was by no means unique to the underdeveloped world but had existed in core countries such as Italy (fascism and Qualunquismo) and the US and Russia (agrarian populism). Laclau centred his critique on the developmentalist division between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies and on the deterministic understanding of social change that, explicitly or implicitly, underpins political functionalism (2005). A theory that attaches populism to one predetermined phase of historical evolution and restricts progress to economic growth simply cannot explain why there have been populist governments in countries that simply never had import substitution industrialisation (such as, for instance, José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador), or why populist governments sometimes pursue politics that generate de-industrialisation, as was the case with Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Argentina in the nineties (Knight 1998; Roberts 1999). The criticisms of the economic and sociological theories of populism opened a way for a radical rethinking of the theories of populism, which resulted in an open-ended political discussion that is still taking place. More and more voices began calling for the recognition of populism as a proper political phenomenon not wedded to one particular mode of economic development but used for advancing a variety of ideological agendas. These theories run the gamut from viewing populism as a sociocultural phenomenon (Ostiguy 1997, Ostiguy 2014), to defining it as a mode of identification (Panizza 2005), a practice for mobilisation (Jansen 2011) and a thin ideology (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012), among others. 5 The governments of Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, Abdalá Bucaram Ortíz or Fernando Collor de Mello combined populist appeals with neoliberal policies that included deindustrialisation, the shrinking of the state, trade liberalisation and de-unionisation.) Conversely, state bureaucracies grew larger and unions grew stronger in many countries after 1930, as did protectionism, without the intervention of populist governments (Luebbert 1991). CHAPTER 16: POPULIST AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 279 Populism and Parties If populist mobilisation is neither to be understood as a predetermined phase in a teleological process of modernisation nor as the political correlate of a certain model of economic development, the question still remains as to what it is. The next section will focus on two of the main contemporary theoretical answers to this question. They are the definition of populism as a political strategy based on the works of Kurt Weyland and the discursive theory of populism of Ernesto Laclau. They have been chosen because it is instructive to see how two definitions that operate with widely different epistemological and methodological foundations end up nonetheless at the same blind spot: They both construct a dichotomy between populism as a whole and institutionalised party politics as a more specific phenomenon–a theoretical assertion that is difficult to maintain without further qualification in the context of Latin American politics. The first paradigm views populism as a political strategy that becomes more salient in times of representational crises. This recent explanation affirms that populist movements, parties and leaders emerge when the traditional parties become unable to represent the interests and preferences of the citizenry adequately. A crisis of representation can happen due to a variety of reasons, such as the inadequacy of electoral designs and regulations. It can also be due to parties becoming functionally unable to perceive or articulate what the citizenry demands for improving their lives’ conditions at a particular time, which can itself be caused by demographic changes, rapid social mobility or other factors (Weyland 2001; Weyland et al. 2010). Populism is directly connected with internal or external shocks that lead to institutional weakening and a breakdown of representation (Roberts 1999; Roberts 2003). The systemic loss of representation is defined as a crisis brought forth by the inability of a party system to adapt itself to new social and economic realities and in which politicians no longer respond adequately to social demands under one particular set of game rules (Paramio 2006, 67). In a crisis of representation, traditional parties lose votes rapidly because their own voters become disenchanted and their fealty becomes unmoored. This erosion of traditional loyalties is, at the same time, a cause and effect of the crisis. Voters feel that their demands are not being heard. If the demands of the citizenry go unanswered for an extended period of time, people will rally behind outsider political figures that promise to punish the traditional party elites (‘la partidocracia’ or ‘partitocracy’) that have betrayed them. In such a context, populist leaders will deploy an anti-political discourse that promises a radical refoundation of the political system which alters both the rules of political competence and the social configuration of the elites themselves. From this perspective, the macroeconomic agenda of a government becomes secondary to the methods and instruments that a leader uses to accumulate and deploy power (Vilas 2003). According to Kurt Weyland, populism can be thought to happen when a personalistic individual leader is able to obtain the support of a large mass of the population and relies on it as the only source of legitimacy for their political project. Weyland defines populism as “a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, non-institutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganised followers” (Weyland 2001: 14). Charisma is an important component of populist leadership (Weyland 2001: 13, Freidenberg 2007: 35) because the leader’s authority is based on the María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg 280 deeply held popular conviction about his or her supernatural political ability. Such leaders are thought to govern in the name of the people, with whom they share some characteristics of ‘the common folk’. The particular bond between populist leaders and their followers is constructed in a top-down, paternalistic or plebiscitary manner without the mediation of formal institutions and organisations. However, this definition of populism as an instrumental strategy can be scrutinised as well. Criticisms might be directed toward its reductionism: Its exclusive focus on the type of bond established between followers and their leader obfuscates the importance of other dimensions. This, in turn, may cause observers to mistake superficial similarities between disparate cases for conceptual identity. The excessive interest in the figure of the leader renders the expectations, demands and political culture of the followers largely invisible and of lesser importance, when in truth the followers of populist movements retain the ability of putting pressure on and negotiating with the leadership (James 1990; Levitsky 2001). Even more relevant to the goals of this chapter is that the data do not seem to support the notion that populist authority is always antithetical to institutions. The relationship between populist leaders and political institutions is much more complicated than previously thought. Some populist governments created fundamental state institutions in their respective countries; some of these arrangements exist even to this day (New Deal institutions in the US, labour regulations and the public hospital system in Argentina, and national and state bureaucracies in Turkey.)6 Populist leaders usually create their own parties as soon as they reach power or immediately before. While populist leaders do try to maintain control over their movement, many were explicitly interested in merging populist power with institutional forms, also including the creation of political parties. Such was the case, for instance, with Víctor Haya de La Torre and the Peruvian APRA, with Lázaro Cárdenas and the Mexican PRI, and with Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina (Knight 1998). Along with the strategic approach to populism, there has also been the so-called discursive approach. The main figure of this school of thought was Ernesto Laclau, who gave ontological primacy to discourse, affirming that “discourse is the primary terrain of the constitution of objectivity as such” (Laclau 2005: 68). His expansive definition of populism viewed it “not as a type of movement … but a political logic”; that is, a certain political productive dynamic (Laclau 2005: 117). Laclau does not see populism as a form of anti-democratic pathology but rather as the inevitable by-product of the processes of political institutionalisation, and a positive by-product at that. Political and bureaucratic institutions are unable by definition to process all social demands at once because their standard operating mode is to particularise the demands so that they can be dealt with one at a time. However, under certain conditions demands accumulate at the margins of the political system to such an extent that “an equivalencial relation is established between them” (Laclau 2005: 73). According to Laclau, a populist movement is created when the impersonal dynamics of discursive identity-formation processes unify the demands of seemingly disparate groups of people with the figure of a leader in a single chain of meaning (this is the “equivalential chain”).7 This 6 For Francis Delano Roosevelt as a populist, see Kazin (1998). 7 “(T)he symbolic unification of the group around an individuality (...) is inherent to the formation of a people” (Laclau 2005: 101) CHAPTER 16: POPULIST AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 281 process of identification creates a powerful political identity that can serve as the foundation and legitimation of a transformative political praxis (Laclau 2005; Barros 2014). In populism, ‘the people’ itself is a political creation and is, at the same time, the cause and the effect of the dichotomisation of the political space into two antagonistic camps:8 an ‘us’ (the people) that is identified as the heroic underdog (Panizza 2005: 3) and a ‘them’ which is defined as the anti-people, the elite. The leader’s very existence becomes (there is a degree of impersonality to the process) the unifying symbol that makes the coalescence of a political identity possible. For Laclau, populism is the main source of democratic innovation because it exists in direct contrast with the institutional day-to-day problem-solving that he regards not as politics but as administration.9 In his view, the dichotomisation of society into two antagonistically-related camps means that the people is defined (much like Ferdinand De Saussure’s idea of oppositional value) as that which it is not; or as Pierre Ostiguy says: “For Laclau the people is, by definition, on the oppositional side of the antagonistic frontier, antagonistically confronting empowered institutionality and its administration (of demands). (...) By definition this model or conceptualisation logically implies that cases of populism being institutionally in power cannot exist.” (Ostiguy 2014: 346; authors’ translation, emphasis added). As a consequence, Laclau arrives at a position that is strikingly similar to that of the strategic theory of populism, even if he does so via a different path. Both Weyland and Laclau argue that populism, whether defined as a personal strategy or as a collective identity, can only exist in opposition to institutional forms of representation. The definitions of populism as a strategy or as a performative discourse theory could not be more diverse in terms of their epistemological premises and normative orientation; Weyland (2001) is much more critical of populist mobilisation, whereas Laclau was much more sympathetic, even going so far as to equate populism simply with democratic politics. However, both theories share a blind spot because a prominent feature of both Weyland and Laclau’s theorisations is that they both leave no room for the contingent business of day-to-day politics. There is manipulation on the one hand and the impersonal pull of the logic equivalence on the other. In Laclau’s case, the popular base of a populist movement does not seem to have much agency. On the contrary, populism is a personal strategy, but the question remains as to why that particular leader chose that particular strategy at that particular time, or why such strategies succeed or fail. They both pit populist mobilisation (anti-systemic, reactive and antagonistic) against political institutionality, which is thought to be programmatic and rule-oriented. For both of them populism exists to challenge established forms of representation and as such it is the opposite of political parties. However, this logically coherent theoretical premise simply does not square with empirical evidence. The relations and connections between populist mobilisation, however defined, and programmatic parties are much more nuanced. Populist leaders create parties that are able to participate in and win elections all the time. These parties can, at times, challenge the leader and are even able to carry on after the founder’s death (Mustapic 2002). What is more, it is 8 In Laclau’s words: “So we have the formation of an internal frontier, a dichotomisation of the local political spectrum through the emergence of an equivalential chain of unsatisfied demands” (2005: 74). 9 Following Jacques Rancière’s distinction between politics and “the police”, which in English resonates with the distinction between politics and policy (Rancière 1996: 43). María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg 282 not only the case that a populist party can transform itself into a programmatic party but that programmatic parties can become vessels for populist leaders as well. Moreover, forms of populism have proven to be surprisingly resilient once they come to power. In the last decade and a half, South American left-wing populist movements have been remarkably successful in electoral terms, and they have shown themselves to be surprisingly adept in the art of not only enduring but also achieving political and social change. Latin American populist presidents have been able to reform the constitutions of their countries (Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia) and pass relevant legislation (such as the nationalisation of oil and gas in Bolivia, the nationalisation of the largest oil company and of the private pension funds, and the legalisation of egalitarian marriage in Argentina). These populist governments also deployed a panoply of expansive social policies that, backed by the revenue from a boom in commodity exports, reduced poverty and, even in some cases, inequality.10 The longest-running populist government of South America, Venezuelan Chavismo, came to power in 1998. It has managed to govern Venezuela for 18 years, and continues to do so even after Chávez’s passing. Even in its present and highly problematic state, Chavismo has proven to be much more resilient than most observers would have expected. It has been able to reinvent itself over and over again and has surprised many observers by its ability to survive in the face of internal and external problems (including those of its own making) that have ranged from a dramatic drop in the price of oil, enormous economic problems including shortfalls in food supply, the unexpected death of a charismatic leader and increasing opposition pressure. Evo Morales has governed Bolivia since 2005; Rafael Correa was elected in November of 2006. Néstor Kirchner and Cristina de Kirchner governed Argentina for twelve consecutive years, surpassing the mark of both Juan Domingo Perón (1946–1955, 1973–1974) and Carlos Menem (1989–1999) (who were, of course, also populists). In fact, one might say that in Argentina it has proven to be much more difficult for non-populists to govern effectively, if by ‘effectively’ we mean the ability to finish one’s term in office. Álvaro Uribe, a right-wing populist, must be counted among the effective South American populist presidents (Fraschini 2014).11 Far from being incapable or unwilling to build their own form of institutionality, movements and leaders in South America have shown that ‘populist institutionality’ is far from being an oxymoron. It is also not the case that this resilience is always or even often constructed without or outside political parties. In South America, the situation is often the reverse: Populist leaders invest a substantial amount of resources and efforts in party-building. Evo Morales is a charismatic leader, but there is no denying that his rise to the Bolivian presidency could hardly be comprehended without understanding the role played by the thick network of social movements, unions, Cocalero and indigenous organisations that propelled his candidacy forward (Sivak 2009; Cyr 2012; Durand Ochoa 2014). In the case of Chavismo, the mere survival of Nicolas Maduro’s dysfunctional government rests partially upon the grassroots groups it creat- 10 A key factor in poverty reduction were the innovative conditional cash transfer policies, such as the Bono Juancito Pinto in Bolivia, the AUH in Argentina and other forms of transfers to women in Ecuador. For evidence of the impact of state policies on poverty reduction, see the 2016 Human Development Report published by the UNDP (PNUD 2016). 11 This is true of other regions: populist governments have proven to be resilient in Turkey (Baikan 2016), Italy and Poland. CHAPTER 16: POPULIST AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 283 ed (Velasco 2015). The party MÁS has proven to be equally dominant in Bolivia. Very much like Rafael Correa’s PAÍS, the Bolivian MÁS has evolved from a loose network of anti-systemic social movements into a multi linkage party that combines linkages with unions, movements, clientelistic networks, state bureaucracies, and even middle class and business organisations. For instance, if, according to Sartori’s minimalistic definition, a political party is “any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office” (1976: 64), then there is simply no question that Peronism must be thought of as a very successful political party. Peronism has competed in every national election in Argentina since 1946 (except for the eighteen years when it was legally proscribed, between 1955 and 1973). From 1983 to today, Peronist candidates have won the presidency through the electoral votes in 1989, 1995, 2003, 2007 and 2011.12 Peronism has held a majority in the Senate since 1983 and has been in the majority in the lower house of Congress in most election cycles as well. Peronists also govern most of the Argentine provinces.13 In Ecuador, Rafael Correa’s Alianza País has proven to be an electoral juggernaut as well: His new party won the 2006, 2009 and 2013 national elections, the 2014 subnational elections, the popular consultation plebiscites and the Constitutional Convention election of 2007. He managed to do all that by coordinating many of the territorial bosses connected with territorial clientelistic networks called ‘caciques’, the indigenous movement (at least originally) and the ‘forajidos’ (or ‘outlaws’, as the groups that protested against former president Gutiérrez were called) who were unhappy with the previous government. It is time to reject the notion that populist mobilisation is incompatible with party politics; reality shows us every day that this is not the case. As Carlos De La Torre, Kurt Weyland, and Pierre Ostiguy have shown, the populist appeal is not only compatible with party politics, it is an ever-present tool in the toolbox of aspiring politicians. According to Weber, modern political parties function as organisations that “provide themselves with a following through free recruitment, present themselves or their protégés as candidates for election, collect the financial means, and go out for vote-grabbing” (Weber 2009: 99). Political parties function as instruments for power and as forms of socialisation. Thus, both populist parties and programmatic parties can and do perform those functions in an effective manner. They seek power for their leaders, place some of their members in office and socialise their followers. They achieve these goals through different means. Populist parties build their day-to-day operation on the direct connection between its leader and its followers; the former determines the party’s goals, chooses its strategic course, and prioritises relationships based on personal, direct clientelistic relations with the lower-level party officials and voters. Programmatic parties, by contrast, employ formal procedures to select candidates and set up party priorities. In our analysis, we propose to differentiate between populist parties and programmatic parties. To quote a relatively straightforward definition of programmatic parties: “A political sys- 12 Before 1983, Peronism won the presidential elections of 1946, 1951 and 1973. 13 Non programmatic parties can participate in free elections, command votes in an impressive manner and be, in short, both resilient and successful; however, they achieve these things in a somewhat ‘premodern’ manner that does not advance the collective rational discussion of important common issues and is not anchored by consistent policy preferences; populist-clientelistic parties are personalistic and have only weak ideological principles. To quote Kitschelt et al: “Recent studies of Latin American legislatures find extremely high levels of party discipline in countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela that equal or rival those in advanced industrial democracies with parliamentary regimes, yet the attitudinal indicators explored in this volume show that these countries have only moderate levels of programmatic structure.” (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 65). María Esperanza Casullo and Flavia Freidenberg 284 tem is programmatic when the parties within it predominantly generate policy, mobilise support, and govern, on the basis of a consistent and coherent ideological position.” (IDEA 2011: 7). Programmatic parties have a structured and stable set of political positions that constitutes its political programme and through which it is publicly recognisable. They possess a certain degree of coherence and internal consensus about that shared programme and have a joint commitment to fulfilling at least some of those programmatic promises if and when the party finds itself in elected office. They pursue recruitment in such a way as to emphasise programmatic allegiance over other incentives. Populist parties are constructed around the authority and appeal of a charismatic leader, have a much weaker and fluctuating ideological programme, use clientelism and patronage to obtain votes, and can rely on a personalized mechanism for recruitment that is largely based on the leader’s vertical connections. The differences between programmatic and populist parties can be summarised in Table 16.1. Populist and Programmatic Models of Party Institutionalisation in Latin America CHAPTER 16 [A] POPULIST AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS María Esperanza Casullo and Flav a Freidenberg Table 16.1 Populist and Programmatic Models of Party Institutionalization in Latin America Populist party institutionalization Programmatic party institutionalization Leadership Open to charismatic outsiders Favors insiders Mediation No organizational mediation between leader and followers The organization mediates and coordinates between leader and followers Relative autonomy of organization vis a vis the leader No autonomy Autonomy Level of organizational systematicity No systematicity Informal party organization Systematicity and routinization of party procedures Established recognizable repertoire of symbols and ideas No repertoire except the exaltation of the leader Core repertoire of symbols and narratives Strategies for winning votes Clientelism, patronage Programmatic Source: authors‘ elaboration In programmatic parties, the source of the linkages between the party and its followers is grounded in the common allegiance to the organisation and its programmes. In populist parties, however, the organisational mediation is weaker and the ideological enunciations are shallower, or they might not even exist. By comparison, populist parties are based on “emotional appeals to symbols, group identification or the charisma of the candidate” (Kitschelt et Table 16.1: CHAPTER 16: POPULIST AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 285 al. 2010: 3; emphasis added) and they are usually formed as the electoral vehicle for a leader or a movement (Levitsky and Roberts 2013: 13). These are ideal typologies that very rarely exist in a pure form in reality. Political parties— even the more institutionalised ones—must combine their programmatic dimension with the element of mobilisation and vice versa.14 However, in times of social upheaval and rapid political change, new political identities and parties are indeed created, and old ones die. Such a juncture happened in Latin America in the decade after the turn of the century when many, if not most, of the political systems of the region underwent systemic change. Conclusions Whether populist or programmatic, at the end of the day almost all parties are in it to win and have similar goals: to enhance their respective share of power (in terms of votes, executive offices and/or seats in parliament). Therefore, they must adapt their organisation to the conditions presented by the environment in which the party is situated, to the preferences of the voters, to the party’s organisational capacities and to history. Under the conditions of electoral democracy, populist parties will strengthen their internal organisation so as to obtain votes for the leader. Even in the context of a widespread political crisis that might even include the breakdown of the established political parties; political movements do not come to power in a vacuum and they seldom reshape the political map entirely. A populist government will have to come up with an electoral strategy to compete in elections or it will fail. One aspect that is often overlooked is that new populist parties usually end up recruiting officials and leaders from the ‘old’ parties who then are presented as ‘politicians without a party.’ If and when the populist movement is able to institutionalise itself into a populist party, a paradoxical reversion occurs: the former anti-systemic movement becomes the status quo and the former ‘establishment’ parties and politicians morph into the new challengers.15 When a populist leader is successful in establishing a new hegemony, opposition parties will reconstruct themselves and challenge the new order. Alternatively, some new party or parties will be created to fill that role. Populist parties have to perform a difficult balancing act, however, because even though they function better when they are more institutionalised, they cannot afford to completely lose their antagonistic edge. It is for this reason that populist parties have to try to retain their ‘novelty’ and freshness by continuing to denounce the old ‘partitocracy’ even though they are, in fact, ‘the new old’. 14 Panebianco (1990) roots his definition of party institutionalisation on the notions of autonomy and systematicity of the party. However, autonomy and systematicity are two different dimensions which might operate in tandem or directly act against one another, depending on the context. In some cases, a lower degree of systematicity might actually increase the party’s autonomy if the party operates within a largely