Actors of International Cooperation in Prewar Japan

The Discourse on International Migration and the League of Nations Association of Japan

Kuniyuki Terada
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Editorial by Series Editor

The series “Japan in East Asia” publishes the latest research on the historical, social, and intellectual relations between Japan and Asia, in particular East Asia. As we know today, the Cold War has not yet ceased in that region. Regardless of intensified economic cooperation and despite the transnational impact of popular culture and exchange, the East Asian societies have not yet come to terms with their past. Taking a broader historical perspective, we see that the issue of realizing democracy in East Asian countries has remained on the agenda both in the fields of politics and culture, whereas in Western countries it has become an urgent task again. Unlike in Europe and the European Union, in East Asia nation states have not been integrated into supranational units. On the contrary, nation states continue to be dominant and exclusive forms of nationalism are highly virulent in East Asia today. To understand recent and historical developments in East Asia as a region, it is important to study not only individual countries there but to focus on the entire region in terms of its interconnections and interdependencies.

The title of this series is not meant to suggest a cumulative interest in the region in the additive sense of “Japan and China and Korea (and other countries)”. Rather, it proposes a relational perspective of Japan and East Asia in the sense of “Japan’s relations to its Asian neighbours”. While Japan today is generally perceived as a politically and economically Western country, it is culturally often seen as completely different from the West or even portrayed as the West’s Other. The publications in this series do not subscribe to those perceptions of contemporary East Asia that are based on an opposition of “West” versus “East”. Instead, Japan’s pioneering role in the integration of East Asian countries into international institutions and scientific networks deserves more attention. Mutual cultural influences between Europe and East Asia are not the focus of this series. Such research is particularly problematic if combined with an unspecific concept of “globalization”. This applies, for example, to research that does not distinguish between cultural contacts between Europe and East Asia during the European Middle Ages, on the one hand, and the power relations of a new quality between both regions since the 1830s, on the other.
The main focus of this series is the historical interactions within Asia, particularly East Asia, in the modern and contemporary periods, including early modern history. These interactions belong to the areas we know least about in Europe. The adoption of this focus is based on the assumption of an historical East Asian connection that continues to influence East Asia politically, both positively and negatively. Combined with the specific focus of each volume in the series, the study of this connection may provide a better understanding of the region’s present.

This series welcomes contributions that use different methodologies. An important precondition for research into interregional interactions, however, is the use of primary and secondary literature in Japanese and in other Asian languages. In addition, in order to pursue truly international research, it is not sufficient to rely on research results published in Western languages. Only the reception of international, in particular Japanese, research as well as an intensive study of their lines of argumentation facilitate the development of new approaches to the historiography of, and social scientific and humanistic research into regional connections. This includes, of course, contributions from Korean and Chinese perspectives. This means that the language barrier that seems insurmountably high must above all be overcome from the Western side. Put differently, we must first of all learn to read, in the literal sense. The aim of this series therefore is to demonstrate that sound analyses serve to deepen our understanding better than “travel accounts” produced by today’s “science tourism”.

Editorial by Series Editor
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I conceived the idea for the research that led to this book when I found a Japanese newspaper article reporting discussion about a draft resolution on racial equality held in Paris. The article explicated the content of the draft resolution, which elaborated rather detailed rules on the admission of foreigners to a country. The principle of racial equality on which the author of the article placed the greatest emphasis was incorporated into the draft resolution as a part of the rules. I first thought that the resolution was something related to the racial equality proposal made by the Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, to which many history textbooks in this country still devote part of a page. But as an event directly related to the racial equality proposal, the publication year of the article was strange. It appeared in 1925, not in 1919 or 1920. By reading the article, I soon realized that the organization that held the meeting in Paris was not the League of Nations but an organization with a very similar but unfamiliar name, *Kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō kai*. I remember that it took a rather significant amount of time and effort to confirm that the English name of the organization was the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, that the Federation was a private international organization established by those who supported the League of Nations, and that there was a member organization of the Federation in Japan called the League of Nations Association of Japan. I was immediately drawn to the draft resolution mentioned in the article, especially to the fact that it left scarcely any mark on history. Why had the document been forgotten completely? What happened after the meeting in Paris? Was the document adopted or abandoned in the end? The obscurity stood in sharp contrast to the somewhat passionate tone of the article’s author Shigenori Raisuke, who stressed the importance of having the resolution adopted by the Federation.

At that time, I was stuck in the mud of my seemingly never-ending research project at Ōsaka University, which focused on the democratization movement in the Taishō period known as Taishō democracy. I thought it was high time to start my research anew. The Federation and its draft resolution were also suited to my growing interest in international migration. In a research group at Ōsaka University I had read a selection of soci-
ological literature on citizenship and immigration and had come across Hannah Arendt’s puzzling concept of the right to have rights, the right to enjoy the rights of citizenship. I was especially interested in the role of the international human rights regime in guaranteeing that right. I thought, at least at the time when I read the newspaper article, that although the situation in the 1920s was radically different from today, the history of the draft resolution might be an interesting case study of the difficulties of developing international regimes and guaranteeing the rights of people who moved across borders.

This is how the research started whose result is this book. It became somewhat different from what I first imagined, but the following chapters explain what kind of organization the League of Nations Association of Japan was, where the document discussed in Paris in 1925 came from, and where it went.

This book is based on my doctoral thesis, which was submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy at Heidelberg University in July 2015. I am deeply grateful to my mentor Wolfgang Seifert for providing invaluable comments and suggestions at various stages of this book. Conversations with him were the most joyful moments in my PhD years, through which I have learned the importance of thinking carefully to find the right words when translating concepts from one language to another, from the past to the present. He has also been a source of emotional support and always encouraged me to finish this project. It is his kindness that made this book possible. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Madeleine Herren-Oesch. Her imagination that connects international organizations with various unanticipated topics and her unique perspective that discovers hidden networks among individuals around the world always surprise me. I received instruction from both of my wonderful teachers at the Cluster of Excellence “Asia and Europe in a Global Context: The Dynamics of Transculturality” at Heidelberg University. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Cluster over the years, without which it would have been extremely difficult to publish this book.

Before I started my PhD in Heidelberg, I spent more than 9 years at Osaka University and enjoyed the opportunity to learn from excellent teachers there, among whom I would especially like to thank Wolfgang Schwentker for teaching me the basics of academic research and Mishima Ken’ichi for encouraging me to study abroad. It was a logical consequence that I decided to study in Germany after many years of exchange with the two. My interest in globalization and international migration grew from
discussions within a research group on citizenship at Ōsaka University. I am greatly indebted to Kameyama Toshirō, Kimae Toshiaki and Tokiyasu Kuniharu, who organized the research group and imbued me with a sociological perspective. I am very sad not to be able to present a copy of this book to Professor Kimae, who passed away before I completed this work.

I have presented part of this book at several academic conferences, including the 10th Harvard Graduate Student Conference on International History, the 36th Conference of the Society for the History of Social Thought at Nagoya University, and the 15th Conference of German-Speaking Japanologists at the University of Zurich. I have benefited from critical remarks and questions from the participants at these conferences. A special word of gratitude is due to Urs Matthias Zachmann, who provided insightful comments on the paper I presented in Zurich.

This book would have not been possible without the help of many archivists and librarians, the importance of whose works cannot be overemphasized. I appreciate the support and advice of the following archives and libraries: the International Labour Office Archives, the Shibusawa Archives, the Diplomatic Archives at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Modern Japanese Political Materials Room at the National Diet Library, the Central Library of Law at the University of Hamburg, the libraries of Hitotsubashi University, Hokkaidō University, the University of Mannheim, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Ōsaka University, the University of Tōkyō, and Waseda University. My heartfelt thanks also go to the Japan Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, which provided me with a copy of its organ Tomo.

I owe a debt of gratitude to Martin Reichinger at Nomos Verlag, who patiently waited for me to finish writing the manuscript, and Sebastian Maslow, who read and corrected my manuscript before I submitted it to Heidelberg University. I also thank Julian Biontino for kindly answering my question about Korean names mentioned in this book. Any remaining obscurities and mistakes in this book are, of course, my responsibility.

I have been fortunate to have had the friendship and support of my cheerful colleagues at both Ōsaka and Heidelberg Universities. Many thanks to Julten Abdelhalim, Mohammad Ashraf, Amelia Bonea, Louis Cansio, Dhrupadi Chattopadhyay, Bidisha Chaudhuri, Nicoletta Fazio, Martin Gieselmann, Birte Herrmann, Jens Hoffmann, Li Hsin-yi, Jessica Karagöl, Patrizia Kern, Kimura Hiroyuki, Lionel König, Oliver Lamers, Kerstin von Lingen, Kamminthang Mantuong, Nagasawa Asako, Jule
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Finally, I would like to thank Asuka for being with me through my hardest times. Without her support I could not have continued my research.

Sapporo, December 2017

Kuniyuki Terada
List of abbreviations

ALT  Association for Liberty of Trading
      (Jiyū tsūshō kyōkai)
BIRPI Bureaux internationaux réunis pour la protection de la
       propriété intellectuelle
CGT  Confédération générale du travail
      (General Confederation of Labour)
IAJ  International Association of Japan
      (Nihon kokusai kyōkai)
IFLNS International Federation of League of Nations Societies
    (Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations)
ILA  International Labour Association
      (Kokusai rōdō kyōkai)
ILO  International Labour Office
IPR  Institute of Pacific Relations
IUSIPP International Union for the Scientific Investigation of
      Population
JPS  Japan Peace Society
      (Dai Nihon heiwa kyōkai)
LNAJ League of Nations Association of Japan
      (Kokusai renmei kyōkai)
NIPR National Institute of Population Research
      (Kokuritsu jinkō mondai kenkyūjo)
SIL  Society of International Law
      (Kokusaihō gakkai)
SSPP Society for the Study of Population Problems
      (Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai)
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Note on Japanese names and the translation of Japanese texts

Japanese names are given in the Japanese order—family name before given name. Japanese words are transliterated into Latin script according to the Regeln für die Umschrift des Japanischen in schriftlichen Arbeiten (W. Schamoni, Japanologisches Seminar der Universität Heidelberg). All quotations from Japanese texts were translated into English by the author of this book, unless otherwise noted. Some quotations were originally written in English by Japanese authors. Grammatical mistakes found in these texts have been left uncorrected.
Introduction

This book is a study about the history of Japanese international cooperation, the activity which is usually referred to as kokusai kyōryoku (国際協力) or kokusai kyōchō (国際協調) in Japanese. The focus of this study is the League of Nations Association of Japan (LNAJ). Established in 1920 for the purpose of achieving the spirit of the League of Nations, the LNAJ was one of the national League of Nations societies which comprised the International Federation of League of Nations Societies (IFLNS).1 Throughout the interwar period until its reorganization in 1942, the LNAJ

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was at the centre of Japanese international cooperation. This association of enthusiastic League supporters was the largest and most prestigious of its kind, which extended its influence by absorbing other semi- or non-governmental organizations with similar goals, such as the Japan Peace Society (JPS) and the Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). At its heyday in the 1930s, it boasted more than ten thousand members with its chapters in more than twenty cities and over fifty universities and colleges. This book regards the LNAJ and its core members as the main actors in Japanese international cooperation and as its embodiment, which reveals the actualities of interwar international cooperation and, more importantly, its problems.

Previous studies have investigated various actors that devoted themselves to international cooperation in interwar Japan. Apart from a few exceptions, however, researchers have paid little attention to the LNAJ and have left a lacuna in the literature on international cooperation written in Japanese as well as in English and other languages. It is not surprising that there is no major study on the short-lived JPS, but if one compares the LNAJ with the IPR, one is struck by how little attention has been given to the former organization. While several excellent monographs have been written on the Honolulu based non-governmental international organization, which was established in 1925 in order to foster discussion among nations of the Pacific Rim, there have been only a few, relatively short articles about the LNAJ and the IFLNS despite the fact that it was the LNAJ that absorbed the Japan Council of the IPR in 1935, and not vice versa.

The contrast between the LNAJ and the IPR is to a certain extent understandable, considering the vital importance which has been attached to US-Japanese relations. Washinton taisei (the Washington system) has been the dominant narrative of post-war diplomatic history, in which emphasis has been placed upon the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922.
The conference, which was called by the United States and convened outside the auspices of the League of Nations, has been deemed an important event which created the post-war order in the Pacific and East Asian regions, where the League’s influence was relatively weak. This persuasive narrative has led researchers to focus on the relationship between the US and Japan and the US-related IPR, whose members retained non-governmental diplomatic channels with the United States and tried to prevent the collapse of the Washington system in those critical years preceding the Pacific War. By contrast, the League of Nations has been believed to be a predominantly European creation from the early years of its foundation, and the disastrous failure of its attempt to achieve a lasting peace has diverted the attention of post-war academics away from the League and League-affiliated organizations like the LNAJ. It is only recently that interest has grown among Japanese historians in the development of various activities of the League which have been overlooked in diplomatic history such as those in the field of hygiene, intellectual cooperation and opium control. However, this renewed interest in the League has not grown to include the LNAJ yet. The present situation surrounding the study of the LNAJ is reflected most clearly in the fact that the only research which covers the overall activities of the LNAJ from the beginning of the 1920s to the outbreak of the Pacific War is Ogata Sadako’s


article in 1971, and that the piece was published quite oddly in a book series entitled *Nichi-Bei kankei shi* [The history of the US-Japanese relationship].

The overwhelming presence of the United States in the Pacific and East Asian region and the relatively limited influence the League of Nations had on the same region is the main, but not the only, reason for the scarcity of studies about the LNAJ. Another almost equally important reason lies in the organizational character of the Association. It is said that on one occasion journalist and active member of the LNAJ Tagawa Dai-kichirō compared the organization to a legendary animal called *Nue*; the chimera composed of various parts of different animals—the head of a monkey, the body of a raccoon dog and the legs of a tiger—is a metaphor for a person or thing whose true nature is difficult to discern. Indeed, the LNAJ was neither a governmental organization recognized as an official part of Japanese diplomacy, nor a non-governmental organization fully independent of government control. Although the Association often described itself as non-governmental, this self-description was highly doubtful, if not deceptive, considering the fact that it had state officials as its core members and received substantial financial support from the state. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Association was a mere puppet of the government or a mouthpiece which was thoroughly controlled by state authorities. The Association was no doubt an elitist organization collaborating closely with the government, but many of its leaders were private citizens and the initiatives taken by these non-bureaucrat members were not at all negligible. It is this semi-governmental character of the LNAJ, possessing both governmental and non-governmental aspects, that has prevented many researchers from directing their attention to the Association. Generally speaking, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have only secondary value for scholars working within the realist tradition who tend to think that non-state actors play a minor role in power politics. By contrast, researchers with a liberal-idealist bent pay more attention to the role of values and norms promoted by INGOs, but they will also find the LNAJ unattractive, because, unlike today’s INGOs, the LNAJ was so closely linked to the Japanese government that its activity will seem to them to be nothing but government propaganda.

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Furthermore, the LNAJ was also multifaceted like Nue in that it did not specialize in one field but dealt with all kinds of problems from intellectual cooperation, to opium control, to the economy, to international disputes and to disarmament. This diversity of topics dealt with by the LNAJ makes it unlikely that the Association will become a research object in its entirety. Those who are interested in intellectual cooperation, for instance, will focus on the commission of intellectual cooperation only, and those who are interested in international cooperation in the economic field will choose the economic commission, or they may not investigate the LNAJ in the first place but study other organizations which specialize in the economy like Nihon keizai renmei kai (the Japan Economic Federation) or the Japan Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce.

More or less the same is true of the IFLNS, the parent organization of the LNAJ. Most of the recent studies on the League of Nations and League-related organizations have focused on a field where the League achieved a certain level of success, namely, the field of technical cooperation. The IFLNS does not fit into this category with the result that in spite of the present-day renaissance of the League studies, the IFLNS “still await[s] investigation”. The Federation was a non-governmental version of the League of Nations, a mock-up which reproduced the structure of the League accurately. Like the LNAJ, it had a wide variety of commissions corresponding to the League’s works and discussed almost all the issues tackled by the League, but the IFLNS was clearly distinguished from the League and lacked the authority the League had over its member states. The unofficial association of the League’s supporters was an idealistic or, one might even say, ‘airy-fairy’ organization, whose goal was to arouse enlightened world opinion through educational and propaganda campaigns and to mobilize international support for the League.

Considering all the above, it is not surprising that there has been only a limited number of studies on both the LNAJ and the IFLNS. However, this


does not mean that the situation should remain unchanged. In the interwar period, the League of Nations societies around the world were considered to be important organizations, powerful and influential enough to shape public opinion in their own countries thanks to their members’ outstanding reputation. It is this high position of the League societies in the interwar world that makes studying the LNAJ and the IFLNS worthwhile. Since the LNAJ was virtually the only channel for Japanese citizens to connect with the League of Nations, it attracted internationally minded people, or visionaries one might say, irresistibly like a magnet. This made the LNAJ an ideal site for those who wish to explore and understand the actualities of Japanese international cooperation during the interwar years. It was a field where people with different ideas about international order competed with each other in order to gain public recognition for their visions, a marketplace of ideas and opinions about international issues. Admittedly, the LNAJ was heterogeneous like a legendary Nue. However, viewed from another angle, the multifacetedness of the Association means that it offered a unique place where various groups of people with different interests and expertise encountered and discussed with each other. It was a space where one can observe how alleged business and national interests influenced the pursuit of scientific activities on international affairs and how scientific knowledge informed beliefs held by businessmen and bureaucrats.

Studying the LNAJ helps to reveal hitherto unknown episodes in Japanese international cooperation, which is important not only from the perspective of Japanese history but also from the perspective of global history. International organizations have become one of the main objects of research in this newly emerging academic field whose imperative is to transcend the methodological nationalism that has dominated social sciences and humanities until recently. The strength of the global history approach lies in that it can trace the development of transnational networks among individuals and groups which are qualitatively different from intergovernmental diplomatic relations, track the global flow of ideas and information through and beyond these networks, and explain the formation of international organizations according to their own logic of development. Both the LNAJ and the IFLNS will be good objects of study

the potential of this approach. Research in this vein does not regard international organizations as a mere extension of intergovernmental diplomacy but as “observation posts” where the dynamics of globalization that have escaped from national historiography can be observed.\(^8\) International organizations are not only a place where diplomats gather to conduct negotiations. They also create a space where various individuals other than diplomats and groups from different countries and regions exchange ideas and information about international matters and thereby establish transnational networks. These ideas and networks formed through international organizations sometimes help to generate new organizations at both national and international levels, as can be seen, for instance, in the history up to the foundation of the International Labour Organization.\(^9\) The mechanism of such development processes can be made clear only by focusing on international organizations, not on foreign ministries.

The definition of international cooperation

In order to describe the whole undertaking of the LNAJ, this book intentionally uses a rather broad and vague term ‘international cooperation’. This choice might seem problematic, since there are different Japanese concepts often used to refer to the kind of activities performed by the LNAJ, kokumin gaikō (国民外交) and, although used less frequently, minkan gaikō (民間外交).\(^10\) Both words, which can be translated into English as ‘people’s diplomacy’, usually refer to a new trend of diplomacy

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which became manifest especially after WWI, like the growing call for
democratic control of foreign policy and the heightened role of private
actors in promoting international friendship. Both words can be used inter-
changeably, but the exact meanings of the two are slightly different. While *kokumin* means ‘the nation’ or ‘the people’, *minkan*, which is an antonym
of *kō* [the public], can be translated as either ‘private’, ‘private-sector’, or
‘non-government’. The literal translation of *kokumin gaikō* is “diplomacy
carried out by the nation” and that of *minkan gaikō* is “diplomacy carried
out by private citizens and organizations”.

It is true that these descriptions capture one aspect of the LNAJ. The
LNAJ’s chairman Shibusawa Eiichi himself once stated that his mission as
a philanthropist was to promote people’s diplomacy.11 However, both
*kokumin gaikō* and *minkan gaikō* are problematic as descriptive concepts. *Kokumin gaikō* describes a country’s diplomatic efforts as supported by
the whole nation, unanimously by both the government and the people. By
doing so, the concept obscures the potential tensions existing between the
two. Likewise, *minkan gaikō* implies that the private sector, not the gov-
ernment, occupies the leadership role, but this was far from reality in the
case of the LNAJ, which was under the government’s influence. Both
*kokumin gaikō* and *minkan gaikō* can also lead to the misconception that
the people are a monolithic entity and the task of organizations like the
LNAJ was just to represent the already existing will of the people. How-
ever, this ignores the heterogeneity within the people and an often highly
contentious, conflict-ridden process of will formation.

In contrast to ‘people’s diplomacy’, ‘international cooperation’ has the
advantage of being capable of referring to the LNAJ’s activities without
reducing their complexity. This is why this book uses the term despite its
vagueness. However, a little more elucidation is necessary in order to
demarcate clearly what type of international cooperation is the object of
this research. This book defines international cooperation as collaborative
action by states and other actors aimed at developing mutual understand-
ings and achieving common goals by peaceful means. A variety of pat-
tterns of cooperation exists from bilateral state-to-state cooperation to mul-
tilateral endeavours open to various actors other than states, such as epis-

11 Katagiri Nobuo, “Shibusawa Eiichi to kokumin gaikō: Beikoku ni okeru Nihon jin
imin haiseki mondai e no taiō o chūshin to shite [Shibusawa Eiichi and people’s
diplomacy: His reaction to the problem of Japanese exclusion in the United
temic communities and religious organizations. The type of international cooperation pursued by the LNAJ is multilateral cooperation among non-state actors. As such, it was a non-official undertaking, but it maintained a close connection to governments and official international organizations, especially with the League of Nations and the International Labour Organizations. The connection with these latter organizations also testifies to the Western-centric character of the LNAJ’s international cooperation, which is clearly different from the Eastern-centric internationalism espoused, for instance, by those who held pan-Asian conferences in Nagasaki in 1926 and Shanghai in 1927. Although there were pan-Asian members of the LNAJ, the Association never intended to challenge the hegemony of the West. Ideologically speaking, both the IFLNS and the LANJ were liberals, as opposed to anarchists or Marxists, who attempted to overthrow the capitalist system. As moderate, middle-of-the-road organizations, the aim of the IFLNS and the LNAJ was to maintain and, if possible, improve the established international order, not to radically transform it.

The characteristics of Japanese international cooperation

Although the LNAJ described its activity as support for the League of Nations and declared that its goal was to improve the League’s Covenant and foster the League’s spirit, these official accounts do not provide the true picture of the LNAJ. What the Association actually did is better described as agenda-setting and propaganda. Of the two, the latter was much more visible than the former due to the very nature of how propaganda was conducted. The LNAJ tried to publicize the League’s work and educate the general public by publishing booklets and periodicals, holding public lectures all over the country, and producing national radio programmes. Because these propaganda campaigns were mainly aimed at domestic audiences and were conducted on a large scale, their records are still easily accessible throughout the country. For instance, copies of the popular magazine published by the LNAJ, Sekai to warera (The World and Us), are still held by many libraries in Japan. By contrast, the LNAJ’s agenda-setting activities were mainly pursued abroad in collaboration with the IFLNS. Thus, they were more veiled and unknown to the outsider. The agenda-setting activities typically underwent the following process. A member society of the IFLNS decided that an issue deserved international
attention and submitted a proposal to discuss the issue at the IFLNS’s annual conference. The IFLNS discussed the proposal, and if the proposal was adopted, it usually instituted a commission to examine and discuss the problem more in detail. Then, the commission drafted a resolution on measures to be taken on the problem, and if adopted at the IFLNS conference, the resolution was made public in order to urge international discussion and cooperation on that problem. This was what the League of Nations societies and the IFLNS did regularly: raising issues, research and proposing policies. The purpose of this book is to grasp the reality of these less known activities of the LNAJ and the IFLNS. What issues did the LNAJ attempt to bring to international attention, what stance did it take, and how did it try to justify its position? This book tries to answer these questions by identifying key members of the LNAJ, analysing their policy visions and the arguments used in support of their visions, and documenting the development of discussion within the LNAJ and the IFLNS.

Since few studies have been done on the Japanese League of Nations movement, it is not surprising that nobody has paid attention to the most important agenda item of the LNAJ: the equality of races in the matter of international migration. As will be discussed in detail in later chapters, the LNAJ advocated studying racial issues and provoked a heated discussion among the member societies of the IFLNS. The outcome of the discussion was almost the same as what happened after Japan’s racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference; the LNAJ met with severe opposition from the American and British associations, and its efforts to achieve racial equality produced almost no tangible results. The record of this discussion has been buried in oblivion to this day. Ogata Sadako’s study of the LNAJ, for instance, stated only that the LNAJ “made efforts to solve difficult problems like arms reduction, labour and minority” and did not mention its efforts on international migration. The Japanese association, however, rated the issue of race and migration as the most important one. Indeed, concern about international migration was one of the key factors

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that stimulated the establishment of the LNAJ as well as the development of Japanese international cooperation in general in the aftermath of the First World War.

This book argues that one of the major motivations for Japanese elites to participate in international cooperation was to facilitate the international movement of people, goods and capital on terms advantageous to Japan, although what movement they emphasized and whether they advocated it in a universalistic way or a rather particularistic way were significantly different depending on each person’s vision of international order. For them international cooperation was a coordinated international effort aimed at preventing war, and the main cause of war to be eliminated was barriers and obstacles to the international flow of people, goods and capital. They shared the basic assumption that the expansion of international movement—international trade, investment and migration—would become inevitable with the world increasingly connected through commercial and communication networks. The goal of international cooperation was to facilitate these various types of international movement by helping to remove psychological and legal barriers to them.

It was a commonplace idea among Japanese supporters of international cooperation that a state should not, and could not, cut its ties with other states in the increasingly interconnected world. As this book will argue, such a view of the inevitable trends towards greater international integration crystallized in the 1890s, when the Japanese government was trying to establish the legal framework for the abolition of consular jurisdictions and the start of the mixed residence of nationals and foreigners, a period when Japan was preparing to open itself fully to international society. A scholar of private international law, Yamada Saburō, who started his academic career during this period and later played an important role in the creation of the LNAJ, gave expression to this typically Japanese view of growing international interdependency by using the word kokusai kyōdō seizon (international community life: 国際共同生存). Assuming that the world was irresistibly developing towards one community, he called for the equality of races in international migration, which he considered essential to the establishment and maintenance of this community.

The Japanese idea of international cooperation was often expressed as a mixture of vague feelings and sentiments rather than as a rational, systematically formulated doctrine. Most of the Japanese participants in international cooperation repeatedly expressed a sense of insecurity that no vital problem could be solved by any nation alone in the modern world,
where the life of one nation increasingly depended upon the lives of the others. They often voiced this anxiety about the future of their country together with a common fear of ‘overpopulation’. They believed that since Japan was a small, densely populated country, it could not survive without sending migrants abroad or utilizing natural resources in foreign territories through international trade or investment. In addition to this, they also expressed a sense of unfairness that Western countries racially discriminated against Japan. Many Japanese at that time thought that they should be entitled to enter and conduct business in foreign countries at least on equal terms with Western nations as a kind of reward for having opened their own country to Westerners. They believed they had not enjoyed this due reward because of racial discrimination, and thought that international cooperation was needed to abolish racial discrimination and realize this unfulfilled promise.

It may not surprise general readers to insist that race and migration were central issues addressed by Japanese international cooperation, because it is widely believed that the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States was one of the most important international disputes Japan had to deal with in the first half of the 20th century. It is also well known that the Japanese government proposed to insert a racial equality clause into the League’s Covenant and its rejection at the Paris Peace Conference triggered anti-American sentiments throughout Japan. However, researchers who have studied the race and immigration problem have been divided as regards the nature and importance of the problem, that is, whether they see the problem as a matter of the economy or pride and whether they consider if the problem was vitally important to Japan’s foreign policy or not. Most historians have denied the contention that the problem was an economic one on the grounds that the number of Japanese migrants to the United States was small and thus economically insignificant for both countries. According to this view, the immigration issue was mainly a problem of ‘face’.13 But there are two positions within this majority view. One can argue that the problem was just a matter of pride with limited significance. This position maintains that rationally calculating state officials and internationally minded politicians and businessmen on both sides of the Pacific dealt with the issue relatively calmly, unlike

the angry, jingoistic masses in both countries. But one can also argue that
the issue was a matter of pride and therefore highly explosive.\textsuperscript{14} This posi-
tion emphasizes the severity of racial hatred between the ‘white’ and the
‘yellow’ and even sees the origin of the Pacific War in this issue.\textsuperscript{15}

The problem with the existing studies is that they cannot explain the
reason why so many people who participated in international cooperation
actually talked about international migration as an important economic
problem for Japan. Attaching great importance to this fact, this book tries
to paint a more nuanced picture than the existing studies. Viewed from the
present vantage point, international migration does not seem to have been
indispensable to Japan’s pre-war economy. But this does not necessarily
mean that people of that time viewed it in the same way. Back then, Japan
had not experienced the post-war economic miracle, which started in the
late 1950s. The fear of overpopulation, no matter how irrational it may
seem now, was shared by many and it was generally believed that inter-
national migration would be instrumental in resolving the overpopulation
problem. The fear was so persistent that, surprisingly, Japan continued
sending migrants abroad even until 1993.\textsuperscript{16} It is true that there were
prominent economists like Ishibashi Tanzan or Fukuda Tokuzō who
explicitly denied the importance of international migration to the Japanese
economy and its value as a means of solving the overpopulation problem.
But they were a minority at that time. It seems rather to be the case that
two matters, economy and pride, were not clearly distinguished between
in pre-war Japan, and even those who participated in international coope-
ration were vague about this distinction, at least in the early 1920s. It is,
therefore, difficult to discern whether they really believed in the urgency
of overpopulation and the usefulness of international migration in solving
the problem, or whether they just pretended to do so for some reason or
other.

\textsuperscript{14} Asada Sadao, “Nichi-Bei kankei to imin mondai [the US-Japanese relationship and
immigration problems]”, in Demokurashī to Nichi-Bei kankei [Democracy and the
\textsuperscript{15} Miwa Kimitada, ed., Nichi-Bei kiki no kigen to hai-Nichi iminhō [the origin of the
US-Japanese conflict and the anti-Japanese Immigration Act] (Tōkyō: Ronsōsha,
1997).
\textsuperscript{16} Kokusai kyōryoku jigyō dan [Japan International Cooperation Agency], Kaigai ijū
kyōryoku jigyō dan, 1994), 9–12.
This book sees the issue of Japanese exclusion in the United States as the primary cause of animosity between the two countries, and maintains that the issue was a crucial factor that motivated Japanese international cooperation. At the same time, however, it also argues that the way and degree in which Japanese League supporters addressed the issue changed significantly in the interwar years. As will be shown in later chapters, the LNAJ began to avoid the issue in the mid 1920s in the face of strong opposition at international forums. It was around this time that a new understanding emerged which placed less importance on international migration than international trade in terms of Japan’s economy. This view was accompanied by a novel approach to international cooperation that placed greater emphasis on scientific research than political advocacy. Economist Ueda Teijirō, who advocated the liberty of trading (じゆうつうしょう: 自由通商), got actively involved in international cooperation in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and then played a pivotal role in bringing about a change in the direction of Japanese international cooperation.

The Japanese understanding of international cooperation might appear rather strange to the modern observer, because the promotion of international migration is quite often associated with imperialism, and both international cooperation and imperialism are imagined as being in direct opposition to each other. But one needs to shed contemporary preconceptions about international cooperation and look at what was pursued in the name of international cooperation. This book contends that imperialism, understood as a set of policies designed to foster economic and political expansion abroad, largely overlapped with international cooperation in interwar Japan. Of course, imperialism departs from international cooperation completely when the expansion of the sphere of influence is attempted by military means. However, economic expansion in peacetime does not necessarily contradict international cooperation; rather, they often go hand in hand. What is important is the way international movement of goods, money and people is fostered. One needs to be attentive of whether the expansion is attempted in a universalistic manner or in a particularistic manner, peacefully or violently. During the interwar period Japanese international cooperation wavered between universalism and particularism: between policies aimed at realizing universalistic international order as far as possible and policies aimed at advancing Japan’s self-interest. These changes were mostly subtle and difficult to detect. In the relatively calm 1920s, there were attempts at maintaining and expanding Japan’s sphere of influence under the veil of international cooperation. By contrast, even
amid the crisis in the early 1930s there were strenuous efforts to avoid war and build a more universalistic international order, although most members of the LNAJ later supported the Second World War and collaborated on constructing the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (dai tōa kyōei ken). In order to fully understand these subtleties, one needs to pay careful attention to changes, however small they were, in the policy agenda advocated by the LNAJ and at the same time to think about the possible long-term implications the changes might have on Japan and the world. What should be avoided most is rushing to categorize the LNAJ as either imperialist or internationalist by picking up a few fragmentary remarks made by its members.

In its final analysis, this book indicates several possible paths Japanese international cooperation could have followed in interwar years. Needless to say, international organizations, as we know them today, did not exist before the 19th century, although other types of organizations and networks, such as guilds and freemasonry, did exist. The present international organizations—be they the United Nations or the World Trade Organization—have been historically constructed as a result of a large number of past choices made by countless actors. As such, the contours of the organizations are not predetermined. They are contingent and always open to change. The same is true of interwar international organizations. What this book attempts to do by investigating a great number of policy proposals and decisions made by key members of the LNAJ is to describe several possible courses they could have taken and discover what factors prevented them from actually taking them. Talking about possibilities does not mean disregarding positivist historiography. On the contrary, the entire attempt of this book is based on a belief that a realistic possibility will become manifest only through a careful examination of historical facts.

The structure of this book

In this book, four chronologically arranged chapters are organized into three parts: the first part, dealing with the prehistory of international cooperation before the First World War, the second part, discussing the activi-
ties of the LNAJ in the 1920s, and the third part, which mainly examines development before and after the Manchurian Incident.  

Chapter 1 deals with Yamada Saburō and through him tries to depict the vision of international order prevalent in pre-war Japan. The scholar of private international law who was instrumental in organizing the Society of International Law (SIL) and the LNAJ is a person who must not be neglected in telling the history of Japanese international cooperation. This chapter points out that the core of his legal thinking was formed during the period between the conclusion of new commerce and navigation treaties in 1894 and the abolition of consular jurisdiction in 1899, the period that preceded the start of so-called *naichi zakkyo* (mixed residence of nationals and foreigners). While working as a government legal consultant, Yamada developed his legal thinking, heavily relying on the work of *Institut de droit international* (IDI), the organization of renowned international lawyers founded in 1873. His characteristic views on international migration also crystallized through a close examination of the rules on the admission of foreigners adopted by the IDI in 1892, *Règles internationales sur l’admission et l’expulsion des étrangers*. The chapter maintains that both the IDI and Yamada were in favour of a rather liberal regime of international migration in the sense that both defended the admission of labour migrants, but that, unlike the IDI which was undetermined about race issues, Yamada defended the equal treatment of migrants of all races by using his original concept, *community life* (*kyōdō seizon*). He did so in thinking that international migration was necessary for the international community to subsist in the increasingly interdependent world.

The second part examines how the exacerbation of the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States gave rise to Japanese international cooperation after the First World War and how semi-governmental international organizations dealt with the problem. Chapter 2 analyses the activities of the LNAJ with a special focus on its relationship with the IFLNS. This chapter sheds light on a long-forgotten discussion which took place at the IFLNS in the early 1920s about the conditions of the admission of foreigners into a country. Utilizing materials that have been overlooked, this chapter makes clear that the LNAJ called for the equality of races but had to reconsider its policy in the end. Because

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17 The incident relates to the explosion of a railroad near Mukden on September 18, 1931 staged by the Kwangtung Army, and the succeeding invasion and occupation by the Japanese Army of the northern part of China, then called Manchuria.
the advocacy of racial equality provoked the American and British associations, the discussion at the IFLNS reached an impasse in the mid 1920s. Chapter 3 concentrates on a short but critical period from 1925 to 1927 and examines the discussion within the LNAJ regarding the 1927 Geneva World Economy Conference. Seen against the background of the impasse reached at the IFLNS, the importance of this period becomes clear. During this period, in view of the difficulties in realizing its demand, the LNAJ gradually began to avoid advocating racial equality as well as discussing international migration in general. Analysing the LNAJ’s internal discussion about its policies towards the World Economy Conference, this chapter contends that there were three different positions within the LNAJ members about the Association’s future policy course, which the chapter calls labourist, free-tradist and developmentalist. It argues that the Association adopted a middle-ground position between free tradism and developmentalism that emphasized both the liberalization of international trade and the development of foreign natural resources through international investment, the position which attached less weight to international migration than the labourist view did.

The third part analyses Japanese international cooperation as it developed in the period before and after the Manchurian Incident. As does chapter 1, chapter 4 focuses on one scholar as a person who embodied international cooperation in this period, economist Ueda Teijirō. This chapter maintains that in the age of crisis after the Manchurian Incident Japanese international cooperation did not simply decline but evolved into international scientific cooperation which placed the highest value on the scientficity of its claims. Ueda’s population studies in the 1930s were an achievement that represented the culmination of international scientific cooperation as well as its limitations. This chapter situates Ueda’s works in the context of Japanese international cooperation and interprets them as an unfinished attempt at measuring, and quantitatively describing, the actual state of the development of international community life.

It should be mentioned that this book does not purport to be a complete history of the LNAL. There are many topics that cannot be covered by this book alone. Although the successor to the LNAJ, the United Nations Association of Japan (Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai), is still active, this book does not narrate the history of post-WWII international cooperation. Nor does it exhaust all the interwar activities of the LNAJ. As said above, the Association had various commissions, which were different in size and membership, such as the arbitration commission or opium commission. It
had local chapters in all parts of the country and university chapters in major universities. There were also a quite active women’s section and a foreigners’ section. But the focus of this book is on the relationship between the LNAJ and the IFLNS, especially on its international agenda-setting activities. The other side of the Association’s activities, namely propaganda works targeted at the domestic audience, is not examined in this book. The Association propagated the idea of the League of Nations by sponsoring lecture meetings all around the country, publishing books and leaflets and even producing radio programmes. Documents of these propaganda activities may be useful for analysing Japan’s perception of the League in interwar years. But such task is beyond the scope of this book.
Chapter 1: International community life and the limits on the freedom of immigration: Yamada Saburō’s view on international migration

This chapter focuses on a scholar of international law, Yamada Saburō, and examines his views on international migration. The person who took part in the establishment of two important international organizations—the Society of International Law and the League of Nations Association of Japan—was one of several key figures in the history of Japanese international cooperation, a man whose life exemplifies the entanglement of international politics and academia most clearly. By examining Yamada’s early activities and writings semi-biographically, this chapter clarifies his views about international migration, which were characteristic of those who participated in international cooperation in pre-war Japan.

The examination conducted in this chapter demonstrates three points. First, this chapter argues that the historical context in the late 19th century, especially the period from 1894 to 1899, in which the Japanese government carried out a large legal reform project called shin jōyaku jisshi junbi (preparation for the operation of new commerce and navigation treaties with Western countries), was crucially important in the formation of Yamada’s legal thinking. In this period, starting with the conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with the United Kingdom and ending with the abolition of foreign settlements, the Japanese government hurried to implement various items of legislation whose goal was to prepare for the commencement of regular, full-scale intercourse with Western countries, commonly referred to as naichi zakkyo (mixed residence of nationals and foreigners). This government project influenced Yamada profoundly. The young scholar, who worked as a legal consultant to the government, began to adopt a favourable attitude to opening his country fully to Western nations, which would yield international migration to and from Japan.

Secondly, this chapter shows that Yamada relied on the work of the Institut de droit international heavily in the development of his legal thinking. Founded in 1873, the IDI was an international organization of
renowned international lawyers whose aim was to develop international law by giving expression to the ‘legal conscience of the civilized world’.

The intellectual and moral enterprise of the Institute had a paradigmatic value for Yamada throughout his life. He continued to admire the Institute and was selected as its associate member in his later days. In his considerations on international migration, too, he greatly relied on *Règles internationales sur l’admission et l’expulsion des étrangers* adopted by the Institute in 1892.

Lastly, comparing the IDI’s discussion about the *Règles* and its interpretation by Yamada, this chapter makes clear that both the IDI and Yamada were in favour of a liberal regime of international migration in the sense that both defended the admission of labour migrants, which was becoming a critical issue at that time. But there was also an important difference of opinion between the two. Yamada regarded international migration as a prerequisite for the establishment of international community life (*kokusai kyōdō seizon*) and argued for the equal treatment of migrants of all races more explicitly than the IDI, which could not reach a consensus on race issues.

Yamada Saburō and the *shin jōyaku jisshi junbi* project

Yamada Saburō, a leading scholar of private international law (conflicts of law) in pre-war Japan, was born into a family of wealthy farmers in Nara in 1869. Like many others of his generation who were born just after the Meiji restoration and were schooled in the years when the education system was still not well organized, he established himself as a scholar after a long and complicated school career. He first studied at Tōkyō Senmon Gakkō, now known as Waseda University, and then in 1890 moved to

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Imperial University, now called the University of Tōkyō, to study English law. After he had completed his course at Imperial University in 1893, he wished to proceed to graduate school. But it turned out that he was not qualified to be a graduate student because he had enrolled at Imperial University as a non-regular course student. In order to enrol in a regular course, it was necessary for a student to have completed secondary education, which he had skipped. Therefore, he decided to study at a secondary school at the age of 24 and in 1895, after obtaining the qualification to enrol as a regular-course student, started his graduate work at Imperial University, where he would hold the chair of private international law from 1901 until his retirement in 1930.

This is a short, though illuminating, episode in the life of the hard-working man, who came from the provinces to the capital and rose to become a member of the House of Peers (1943–1947) and the President of the Japan Academy (1948–1961) in his later years, a life which was a prominent example of the risshin-shusse-shugi (the orientation towards upward mobility) of his days.

In fact, Yamada, born only one year after the Meiji restoration, was a child of the Meiji period, which was marked by the spirit of bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment). The notion of civilization was always at the centre of his thinking and the so-called ‘standard of civilization’ continued to play a pivotal role in his worldview. The importance of the idea of civilization in his mindset can be ascertained by reading The Origins of European self-government of cities, towns and villages, presumably the first published essay which he wrote while he was still a student of English law at Imperial University. The essay is probably of little value as an academic article today; contemporary researchers will not endorse its main thesis that the first self-government in history was the Kingdom of Jerusalem and Italian city states followed it. This early work is, however, quite interesting as it provides a key to understanding the idea of civilization entertained by the Meiji man.

The dominant tone of the essay was one of optimism. Yamada described in a rather simplified manner a relentless march of progress in Europe that started from the establishment of self-governing bodies in the Middle Ages. According to him, it was after the foundation of Italian city

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states that people started to respect each others’ rights and make an effort to advance general welfare.\(^4\)

This awareness of citizenship led to the rise of entrepreneurship which, in turn, formed a material basis for the emergence of the Renaissance, the refinement of manners, rules and laws in all European countries. Describing the history of medieval and early modern Europe in this way, Yamada praised self-governing city states as a source of modern European civilization: “Explaining the development of self-government in Europe is equal to telling a history of modern European civilization. The establishment of self-governing bodies and European citizens’ awareness of their own rights and freedoms completely transformed the society, bringing an end to the Dark Ages and heralding the dawn of a modern civilization.”\(^5\)

As an admirer of European civilization, Yamada saw his own country through the lens of European civilization. He deplored the fact that the Municipal Government Act—the law on local government which had become effective five years before the essay was written—was a mere formality with little function, and insisted that “an urgent task of our country” was to foster the idea of self-government to fruition.\(^6\) According to his view, self-government was much less developed in Japan than in any European country.\(^7\) This contrasting assessment of Japan and Europe, one in stasis and the other in prosperity, gives readers the impression that this believer in the progress of civilization did not embrace European civilization for the values and norms it represented, but for the purpose of increasing the wealth of his country. And this impression is probably not wrong.

He advocated introducing European civilization to Japan as a way of bringing prosperity to his country. This pragmatic embracement of European civilization was his basic attitude, which continued to define his thinking and activities during the course of his life.

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\(^5\) Ibid., 17.


To better understand why Yamada internalized the idea of civilization so firmly, it is necessary to see the historical context in which he started his scholarly career.

In July 1894, the year when Yamada’s essay on European self-government was published, Japan and the United Kingdom revised treaties which had existed between the two countries, and concluded the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. This was the first revision of the unequal treaties Japan had entered into with Western countries. Although the new treaty still did not grant tariff autonomy back to Japan, it promised to abolish consular jurisdiction when it came into force. After the treaty was signed, the Japanese government hurried to implement the civil and commercial codes, because the British government requested they do so before the treaty came into force.\(^8\) The Japanese government had already promulgated the civil, commercial and criminal codes before the conclusion of the treaty, but the actual operation of the civil and commercial codes had been stopped because the two codes, hastily introduced by the Meiji government, provoked strong opposition among the educated classes.\(^9\) *Shin jōyaku jisshi junbi* was the legal reform project launched by the Japanese government to formulate the new civil and commercial codes. The project started after the conclusion of the treaty in 1894 and ended in 1899 with the successful implementation of the new codes and various other related laws.\(^10\)

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8 The treaty stated, “[…] the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing the advantage of having the Codes of the Empire which have already been promulgated in actual operation when the Treaty stipulations at present subsisting between the Government of Japan and that of Great Britain cease to be binding, engage not to give the notice provided for by the first paragraph of Article XXI of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, signed this day, until those portions of said [sic] Codes, which are now in abeyance, are brought into actual force.” Nihon gakujutsu shinkō kai [Japan Society for Promotion of Science], ed., *Nihon gaikō bunsho: Jōyaku kaisei kankei* [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: On treaty revision], vol. 4 (Tōkyō: Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai, 1950), 236.


10 On the importance of the period between 1894 and 1899 in Japanese history, see Ozawa Takashi, “Keizaihō no seibi: Jōyaku kaisei no seiji keizai gaku [Preparation of economic laws: Political economy of treaty revision]”, in *Teikoku no keizai gaku* [Economics in Imperial Japan], ed. Sugiyama Shinya, vol. 2 of *Teikoku Chapter 1: International community life and the limits on the freedom of immigration*
To successfully complete the project, the Japanese government took great care in reformulating the civil and commercial codes in a way consistent with the standard of civilization. It was not enough that Japan had the codes; the country had to demonstrate that it had the ‘civilized’ codes in order to put the new treaty into effect. In this historical context, it is not difficult to understand that an ambitious young scholar like Yamada, the start of whose academic career coincided with the *shin jōyaku jisshi junbi* project, began to embrace the idea of civilization and regard the introduction of European civilization to his country as a national goal. Before his eyes the major government project was being carried out with the greatest emphasis on adapting Japan to the standard of civilization. He must have thought that the task was a highly important and rewarding one. As will be detailed in the next section, he got involved in the project in various ways.

The *shin jōyaku jisshi junbi* project is important not only in the development of Yamada’s idea of civilization but also in terms of the formation of his legal expertise and thinking. The most important element of it was that many of the laws enacted in the project were those classified as private law. Treaty revision was not only concerned with interactions between governments but also with interactions between the civil societies of the countries involved. In his study on the revision of unequal treaties in late 19th century China, Japan and Thailand, Gerrit W. Gong pointed out the importance of non-state, civil factors in treaty revision. Gong classified the standard of civilization that non-Western countries had to meet in order to attain equal status with Western countries into the following five requirements:

1. A ‘civilized’ state guarantees basic rights, i.e. life, dignity, and property; freedom of travel, commerce, and religion, especially that of foreign nationals.
2. A ‘civilized’ state exists as an organized political bureaucracy with some efficiency in running the state machinery, and with some capacity to organize for self-defence;
3. A ‘civilized’ state adheres to generally accepted international law, including the laws of war; it also maintains a domestic system of courts, codes, and published laws which guarantee legal justice for all within its jurisdiction, foreigners and native citizens alike;

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*Nihon no gakuchi [Science and knowledge in Imperial Japan],* ed. Yamamoto Taketoshi et al. (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2006), 91–124. See also Misaka and Shiraishi, “Jōyaku kaisei to sho-hōten no hensan”, 34–52.
4. A ‘civilized state’ fulfils the obligations of the international system by maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for diplomatic interchange and communication.

5. A ‘civilized’ state by and large conforms to the accepted norms and practices of the ‘civilized’ international society, e.g., suttee, polygamy, and slavery were considered ‘uncivilized’, and therefore unacceptable.\textsuperscript{11}

Although some of these requirements concerned matters usually associated with states, like war and diplomacy, others related to non-state matters like commerce and marriage. This meant that the civilization standard was not only about rules on official, interstate relationships such as the observance of the laws of war or the establishment of diplomatic relations, but was also about rules on private relationships such as the security of commerce and travel and the abolition of ‘uncivil’ manners. These dual aspects of the civilization standard reflected the nature of the global expansion of European international society, which was the globalization of the European interstate system and European civil society at the same time.

The \textit{shin jōyaku jisshi junbi} project was mainly concerned with the non-state side of the expansion of European international society. The adoption of modern private law systems was needed to connect Japanese society with European society. It was a prerequisite for securing interaction between the private citizens of Japan and Western countries. Therefore, some historians who have emphasized the significance of this historically unique character of the project have maintained that it was not the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in the 1850s but the abolition of foreign settlements in 1899 which “heralded a new era when Japanese society truly started to confront foreign society.”\textsuperscript{12}

Due to the private law nature of the \textit{shin jōyaku jisshi junbi} project, Yamada’s work in the project also focused on matters relating to private law relationships, the subject he continued to study throughout his life. It is not exaggerated at all to say that he acquired expert knowledge of private law through the project. What he did in the project was to help design an institutional framework for interactions between Japanese and foreign-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ozawa, “Keizaihō no seibi”, 92.
\end{itemize}
ers. In particular, he played an important role in safeguarding the private rights of foreigners in Japan.

A controversy over article 2 of the Civil Code

In the shin jōyaku jisshi junbi project Yamada assisted in the drafting of hōrei (法例), a law which laid down Japan’s private international law rules. It was no surprise that hōrei was one of the laws which were drastically revised on this occasion. The Japanese government needed to set rules that would regulate the procedure for solving cases relating to private international transactions, because after the abolition of consular jurisdiction international interactions between private citizens would certainly increase. Yamada, who had already started to give legal advice to the government about issues related to the cession of Taiwan in 1895, was selected as an assistant to the chief drafter Hozumi Nobushige and wrote the exposition of the law.13

Although existing documents offer little information about how deeply Yamada was involved in the making of hōrei, it seems improbable that a mere graduate student played the central role in drafting the law. What is clear is that he researched a variety of legislation and scholarly writings in Europe in order to write the exposition of hōrei. This experience must have been extremely valuable for him and his scholarly development, since it gave him a chance to learn about the latest developments in private international law. This up-to-date knowledge also seems to have strengthened his optimistic view of history. Yamada stated clearly in the exposition of hōrei that the extension and intensification of international intercourse would further the progress of mankind:

As the intercourse between nations became more frequent, theories of private international law were improved and the number of private international law rules increased rapidly. Nations started to adhere to resolutions adopted by the Institut de droit international or principles which were formulated on the basis of national court precedents and recognized by the international confron-
What he said was true. Private international law was developing faster than ever in the latter half of the 19th century. *Hōrei* followed the development by extensively incorporating the latest theories, legislation and conventions in Europe. The law itself contributed to the development by becoming one of the first examples of non-European legislation that adopted the so-called nationality principle, the most advanced theory in private international law at the time. This was so path-breaking that one author described the adoption of the principle by Japan and Brazil as “the most momentous and amazing events in the evolution of Private International Law.”

The exposition of *hōrei* was not the only work Yamada did on the *shin jōyaku jisshi junbi* project. He also performed the task of making the results of the project known to Western legal experts. Ordered by the Ministry of Education to study private international law abroad, he left Japan in 1898 and studied in Germany, France, England and the United States until he was appointed to a professorship at Tōkyō Imperial University in 1901. During this ‘grand tour’, he translated the main part of *hōrei* and contributed it to the *Journal du droit international privé*. He also gave a talk on Japan’s new copyright law at an international conference on intellectual property held in Paris in July 1900. The law had just been revised
in the previous year in connection with the shin jōyaku jisshū junbi project. The organizer of the conference was the Bureaux internationaux réunis pour la protection de la propriété intellectuelle (BIRPI)—the predecessor of the present World Intellectual Property Organization—and Japan’s participation in the conference was directly related to the operation of the 1894 treaty. The Japanese government ratified two conventions administered by the BIRPI—the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property—because the Protocol of the treaty obliged Japan to ratify these international conventions for the protection of intellectual property. During his stay in Europe, Yamada also attended another international conference convened by the BIRPI in December 1900.

It is unclear whether there was a directive from Tōkyō to make hōrei and the copyright law known to Western experts; at least Yamada participated in the conference in Paris not as an official delegate from Japan but as a private individual. Whatever the case was, the purpose of these activities was obvious to all. They were aimed at demonstrating to the Western audience that Japan had introduced the most advanced legal system and successfully conformed to the standard of civilization. In this regard, Yamada was quite proud of what his country had achieved. In an introduction to the translation of hōrei, he stated that the Japanese people would be happy to read any criticism from foreign, impartial scholars. This was an expression of confidence in the results of the shin jōyaku jisshū junbi project.

Writing the exposition of hōrei and introducing Japan’s legal reforms to foreign experts were not all the work Yamada did in this period. More important than these was his intervention in a controversy over article 2 of the Civil Code, which was, according to one author, “a symbol of the opening of the Japanese domestic market to foreigners” and “the guiding principle” of the shin jōyaku jisshū junbi project. Yamada played a decisive role in this controversy. His powerful argument in favour of arti-

18 Yamada Saburō, “Le droit international privé au Japon”, Journal du droit international privé 28 (1901): 639. Yamada’s persistent interest in making modern Japanese law known to a Western audience is also seen in a project he conducted as part of the League of Nations Association of Japan’s activities in the late 1920s and 1930s, in which he organized a committee for translating commercial and civil codes into English.
19 Ozawa, “Keizaihō no seibi”, 113.
cle 2 greatly contributed to its retention, and it still exists as article 3 (2) of the present Civil Code.\textsuperscript{20} The controversy established his scholarly reputation and even earned him the nickname of “the doctor of the Civil Code article 2 (minpō dai 2 jō hakase)”.\textsuperscript{21}

What was at issue was the stipulation in article 2 that “Unless otherwise provided by applicable laws, ordinances or treaties, foreign nationals shall enjoy private rights.” In the drafting process of the Civil Code there were few experts who regarded the stipulation as problematic since the old Code contained an almost identical text; the only difference was that the old one used the expression hōritsu (法律, laws) instead of hōrei (法令, laws and ordinances). At the Imperial Diet, too, there was little discussion about the article and the bill of the new Civil Code was passed on March 23, 1896 and promulgated about a month later. However, in the tenth session of the Diet in January of the next year, two members of the House of Representatives, Motoda Hajime and Ōtake Kan’ichi, proposed an amendment to change the stipulation of article 2 to the opposite, namely, “If provided by applicable laws, ordinances or treaties, foreign nationals shall enjoy private rights.” Newspapers reacted favourably to the proposal and reported that the article would probably be revised.\textsuperscript{22} Lurking behind the positive media reaction was a sense of strong opposition held by many of the learned people against the hasty Westernization policy pursued by the Meiji government. According to a scholar of political history, Oka Yoshitake, Japanese anti-Westernizers in the late 19th century had “an inferiority complex” about their own country and worried that the independence of their country might be endangered by an economic invasion of foreign capital.\textsuperscript{23} They especially rejected the abolition of foreign settlements and the start of the mixed residence of nationals and foreigners.


\textsuperscript{21} Yamada, Kaikoroku, 33.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{23} Oka Yoshitake, “Jōyaku kaisei rongi ni arawareta tōji no taigai ishiki [Images of foreigners seen in a treaty revision discussion]”, in Oka Yoshitake chosakushū [Writings of Oka Yoshitake], vol. 6, ed. Shinohara Hajime et al. (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1993), 151.
By contrast, drafters of the new Civil Code regarded article 2 as an almost axiomatic principle that all civilized nations were expected to follow: the principle of equal treatment of nationals and foreigners. Ume Kenjirō, the legal scholar who drafted article 2, thought that the equality of nationals and foreigners was an established principle among civilized nations. Writing in a commentary published just after the promulgation of the Civil Code, he argued that with the advancement of human knowledge nations began to treat each other not as animals but as humans, realizing that international intercourse would, rather than being harmful, be beneficial to all nations. The other drafters of the Civil Code, Tomii Masaaki and Hozumi Nobushige, expressed the same opinion. To them, equality between nationals and foreigners was a fundamental principle on which the Civil Code was based. Revising article 2 to the opposite was an unbelievably anachronistic act which might even endanger the ultimate goal of Japan achieving an equal status with Western nations. Such being the case, the three drafters of the Civil Code strongly reacted to the revision proposal and organized a campaign against the revision; not only did they publish several articles in newspapers but also invited Diet members to a public meeting held at Tōkyō Senmon Gakkō to debate the pros and cons of the revision proposal.

Yamada, who had worked as an assistant to one of the drafters, Hozumi Nobushige, emerged in this campaign as a vocal supporter of the equality principle. “A country’s private law does not belong to the nation of its country alone. Private law is based on humanity at large; it protects the rights of humanity for the sake of humanity. The teaching that private law is universal and private rights are the common property of humanity is a gospel given by 19th century civilization”, held Yamada in the article he contributed to a law journal, *Hōgaku kyōkai zasshi*, and several newspapers at the same time. From the standpoint that it was neither nationals nor subjects but people who had private rights, he supported equal treatment of nationals and foreigners more strongly than any other scholar. The article was so fascinating that Hozumi Nobushige and Terao Tōru decided to reprint it as a pamphlet and distributed it to the members of both Diets.

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25 Yamada Saburō, “Minpō dainijō shūsei an o hyōsu [Criticizing the revision proposal of article 2]”, *Hōgaku kyōkai zasshi* 15 no. 2 (1897): 192.
In the pamphlet, Yamada argued against the revision of article 2 at full length. He investigated scholarly writings and legislation in various countries in order to illuminate the recent development of the status of foreigners in private law. He particularly examined French legislation closely because the French civil code applied the nationality principle only to French nationals and adopted the principle of diplomatic reciprocity towards foreigners. While article 8 of the French civil code stated that “Tout Français jouira des droits civils”, article 11 stipulated that “L’étranger jouira en France des mêmes droits civils que ceux qui sont ou seront accordés aux Français par les traités de la nation à laquelle cet étranger appartient”.

This was apparently a disadvantageous example for those who maintained that all civilized countries treated nationals and foreigners indiscriminately. Yamada examined the latest scholarly writings in France on article 8 and 11 and argued that now the majority opinion in France interpreted them in a way which was compatible with the equality principle. According to him, the French civil code provided these articles because it was the most advanced law at the time of its establishment. Back then, rights enjoyed by French nationals in foreign countries were much fewer in number than those enjoyed by foreigners in France. But legislation in countries other than France had since progressed so much that the majority of French jurists at that time supported the interpretation that foreigners, unless otherwise provided, could also enjoy private rights in France. They applied article 11 only to the rights whose enjoyment was denied to foreigners explicitly by law. Yamada went further to examine civil codes which were established after the French code and insisted that many of them explicitly adopted the principle of equal treatment between nationals and foreigners. For instance, article 3 of the Italian civil code plainly stipulated that foreigners were allowed to enjoy civil rights granted to Italian citizens—“Lo straniero è ammesso a godere dei diritti civili attribuiti al cittadini.”


27 Yamada, Minpō dainijō shūsei an hantai shiken, 17. It was Pasquale Mancini, one of the founders of the Institut de droit international, who did much to reform the Italian civil code. For Mancini and the Italian civil code, see Erik Jayme, Internationales Privatrecht: Ideengeschichte von Mancini und Ehrenzweig zum
As for Japan, Yamada admitted that foreigners had had no rights other than those expressly recognized by laws or treaties before the opening of the country to the West. But the country, he maintained, had developed enormously since the Meiji restoration and had already adopted the equality principle *de facto*. This was reflected in the fact that there were few or no laws which positively granted rights to foreigners, whereas there were many which restricted foreigners’ rights by designating the Imperial subjects as the sole holder of the rights. Moreover, a few precedents indicated that the country had even acknowledged the rights of nationals of non-treaty countries and belligerent countries. All this evidence supported the view that Japan had already adopted the principle of equal treatment between nationals and foreigners. According to Yamada, this happened thanks to “the spontaneous development of legal thinking” (*hōritsu shisō no shizenteki hattatsu*; 法律思想の自然的発達) in Japan.

After discussing a great number of legislation and scholarly writings, the young scholar indicated five reasons why the proposal to revise article 2 should be rejected: (1) it was against present trends in legal theory; and (2) against legislation in modern, civilized countries; (3) it was unjust because it was tantamount to maintaining that foreigners were animals having no capacity to enjoy rights; (4) it would only complicate the Civil Code because private rights enjoyed by foreigners under the Code were greater in number than those that were not enjoyed by them; and (5) it would be inconsistent with the laws and ordinances of Japan, which had already virtually adopted the equality principle. Yamada argued that no problem would occur even if article 2 were omitted, because the same stipulation as article 2 could be deduced from article 1, which did not restrict the enjoyment of private rights to Japanese nationals by guaranteeing it in a universal manner (“The enjoyment of private rights shall commence at birth”). He was nevertheless quite cautious and insisted that it was necessary to stipulate the equality principle expressly in the Civil Code lest those who were unfamiliar with the recent development of legal thinking misinterpret the Code. A country in a transitional period like
Japan needed to inscribe the principle into its code, no matter how obvious and self-evident the principle might appear.\textsuperscript{31}

Yamada’s vocal support for article 2 was so effective that public support for the revision proposal rapidly diminished, as evidenced by the fact that the revision proposal was rejected unanimously at the public meeting held at Tōkyō Senmon Gakkō. Supporters of the revision proposal did not even attend the meeting with the result that the debate became Yamada’s “one-man show”.\textsuperscript{32} Thanks to the campaign conducted by Yamada and his colleagues the proposal was shelved and abandoned in March 1897. Motoda and others submitted a similar proposal at the 12th session of the Diet next year but this proposal was also dropped in the end.

Yamada and the Institut de droit international

After the controversy had subsided, Yamada published an important article entitled “The status of foreigners”, which appeared serially in Hōgaku kyōkai zasshi from December 1897 to March 1898. According to Yamada, the pamphlet on article 2 was partially based on this article, which had already been written before the controversy.\textsuperscript{33} Unmistakably, the article was politically motivated like the pamphlet. One of its clear aims was to defend article 2 and its principle of equal treatment of nationals and foreigners. But the article was basically an academic one. It discussed issues related to the legal status of foreigners in a more thorough and comprehensive manner than the pamphlet did, which was written for the general public.

Yamada began the article with a concept he continued to use in later years, kyōdō seizon or kyōdō seikatsu, which is literally translated as ‘life together’ but can also be translated as ‘community life’ or simply ‘community’. He contended that states had originally developed from families for the purpose of living a community life and now they were in the process of forming a larger international community called ‘the family of nations’. Although the world was still divided into national territories, it was evolving into a small village as modern civilization facilitated transportation and communication among nations. Some readers might think

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 20–21.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Yamada, Kaikoroku, 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Yamada, Minpō dainijō shūsei an hantai shiken, 15.
\end{itemize}
that this contention was reminiscent of Friedrich von Savigny’s famous concept, “völkerrechtliche Gemeinschaft der miteinander verkehrenden Nationen”,\(^3\) but it is unclear whether Savigny’s works had an intellectual influence on Yamada. At least, in contrast to the founder of modern private international law who used the notion of völkerrechtliche Gemeinschaft only metaphorically, Yamada regarded the community as a real entity, a community in the early process of its formation.

Quoting Aristotle’s famous phrase, i.e. “Man is a political animal”, but interpreting it in a unique way, Yamada maintained that the gradual expansion of community life from family to international community was a fundamental law of social evolution.\(^3\) He further claimed that the relationships within the international community intensified with time, deepening from relations among governments to those among private citizens:

“Nowadays not only did states start to enter into the comity of nations. Private citizens also started to exchange goods and ideas across national borders in order to compensate for each other’s shortcomings.”\(^3\) This intensification of community life had led to the advancement of the states’ prosperity and power as well as to the improvement of welfare of nations. To his understanding, the legal status of foreigners in a given country corresponded to the degree of development of that country and, thus, to the degree of its integration into the international community.\(^3\)

Yamada divided the history of this development into five stages—the stages of “hostility towards aliens, disrespect for aliens, exclusion, diplomatic reciprocity, and equality between nationals and foreigners”—and devoted most of his article to describing the characteristics of each stage. It is probably unnecessary here to repeat his detailed description of the development process towards the establishment of equal treatment between nationals and foreigners in private law. What is important is his account of how transition from one state to another occurs. For instance, he saw a turning-point in the re-emergence of natural law theory in the 18th century that marked the transition from the principle of diplomatic

\(^3\) Yamada Saburō, “Gaikokujin no chii [The status of foreigners]”, Hōgaku kyōkai zasshi 15 no. 12 (1897): 1247.
\(^3\) Ibid., 1248.
\(^3\) Ibid., 1252.
reciprocity to that of equality between nationals and foreigners. He described this as follows:

When one looks at the history of Roman law, one will find that the ideas of right and personhood began to be universally applied only after the development of *jus gentium*, which had its origin in the natural law doctrine of Stoic philosophy. Also, in modern countries these ideas had not been applied to all human beings universally until the revival of natural law theory in the 18th century. The theory of natural human rights formed the philosophical backbone of the French Revolution. It transformed the mindset of the Europeans at that time and led to the universal declaration of liberty, equality and fraternity. The United States of America put the theory into practice after the Civil War by abolishing slavery. Since then, all modern civilized countries have rejected the slave system. They have treated slavery in the same way as piracy, regarding it as being against international law and punishing slavers severely as a common enemy of mankind.\(^{38}\)

But what is it that caused the re-emergence of natural law theory in the 18th century? Yamada’s answer to this question seems to lie in the concept of *hōritsu shisō*, which is literally translated as ‘legal thinking’. Adding to the above passage, he explained the reason why the abolition of slavery had become an international norm:

It is because the legal thinking (*hōritsu shisō*) of the present day treats all human beings not as slaves or non-human objects but as people who enjoy their own liberties regardless of their nationality. Of course, as a matter of formality, it is the legislators of each country who have the authority to recognize people and give rights to the people. But the reason why they actually do so is that the ideas of personhood and rights are rooted in the legal thinking (*hōritsu shisō*) of the present day.\(^{39}\)

These passages clearly show that Yamada was neither a naturalist nor a positivist. He did not espouse the theory of natural law naively, no matter how highly he evaluated its tradition in the West. But he did not support the Austian theory of legal positivism, which regarded law as the command of the sovereign only, either. Rather, his account of legal development, which placed great emphasis on the role played by *hōritsu shisō*, was reminiscent of the thinking of the founders of the *Institut de droit international*, who also cherished similar concepts like ‘legal conscience’ or ‘legal consciousness’.

\(^{38}\) Yamada Saburō, “Gaikokujin no chii”, *Hōgaku kyōkai zasshi* 16 no. 3 (1898): 218.
\(^{39}\) Ibid., 219.
The IDI is the organization of international lawyers established in 1873 to study and develop international law. It may seem rather odd to consider Yamada, a scholar of private international law, to be an intellectual heir of the IDI, because private international law is now usually classified as domestic law rather than international law. But the IDI regarded private international law as a subcategory of international law, following Pasquale Mancini, one of its founders who advocated the doctrine that private international law had its roots in international law. Therefore, there is nothing strange in talking about the affinity between Yamada and the IDI. As Martti Koskenniemi mentioned in his path-breaking study on the intellectual history of international law, one of the early works done by the IDI was the drafting of international conventions on private international law rules in civil, commercial and criminal matters. Furthermore, unlike the orthodox public international lawyers, whose focus was on “statehood, diplomacy and war”, the chief works by Mancini and other founding members such as John Westlake and Tobias Asser were those in private international law. The high priority attached to private international law in the works of the IDI and its members was probably no accident, because the discipline that concerns itself with private law relationships of an international character had to address urgent problems posed by the

42 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 62. Because of this historical background, the IDI still selects its members from scholars of both public and private international law.
43 According to Koskenniemi, “Westlake's academic fame rested on his publication in 1858 of a treatise in private international law in which he had introduced continental ideas about legal development to his English readership, that is to say, on the law applicable to international legal relationships between subjects of private law—conflicts of law and legal harmonisation in particular. Asser never published anything larger on public international law. Instead, he was instrumental in persuading his government to support the idea, originally proposed by Mancini, of the development of a code for dealing with international private law relations—the origin of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.” Martti Koskenniemi, “Nationalism, Universalism, Empire: International Law in 1871 and 1919” (paper presented at the conference “Whose international community? Universalism and the legacies of empire”, Columbia University, April 29–30, 2005): 16.
proliferation of national legal systems, on the one hand, and the increase in international interactions between private citizens, on the other. The international context in the 19th century needed scholars of private international law to actively collaborate to solve these problems.\textsuperscript{44} According to Koskenniemi, those who participated in the establishment of the IDI belonged to a new generation of jurists who were totally different from orthodox public international lawyers in the tradition of the \textit{ius publicum europaeum}. The founders of the IDI did not think that law was an expression of sovereign state will. Rather, in a way similar to Savigny and his German historical school, they thought that law was a result of the spontaneous development of society.\textsuperscript{45} To them, the task of academic jurists was to give expression to the development and act as the “legal conscience of the civilized world”.\textsuperscript{46} The IDI was established to perform the task.

Yamada heavily relied on the work of the IDI in the development of his legal thinking. The IDI’s opinions and the writings of its founders were what he always consulted when he needed to learn about present trends in legal consciousness in Western countries. In his texts the name of the Institute appeared many times. For instance, in the introduction to the translation of \textit{hōrei} he stated that the drafter of \textit{hōrei} took account of “savantes et équitables résolutions de l’Institut de Droit international sur cette matière.”\textsuperscript{47} This is only one example of many in which he made reference to the IDI’s works. In “The status of foreigners” he mentioned the IDI’s 1880 resolution on \textit{Principes généraux en matière de nationalité, de capacité, de succession et d’ordre public}, the first article of which stated that “L’étranger, quelle que soit sa nationalité ou sa religion, jouit des mêmes droits civils que le régnicole, sauf les exceptions formellement établies par la législation actuelle.” This resolution, he argued, indicated that “present legal thinking acknowledges that people have the right to life, liberty and property—that is, the right to marry, leave properties to

\begin{itemize}
\item Duncan Kennedy regards “the creation of a first global system of international economic law, based on free trade, the gold standard, and private international law” as the important event which happened in the first period of the globalization of law from 1850 to 1914. See Duncan Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000”, in \textit{The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical Appraisal}, ed. David Trubek et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 29.
\item Koskenniemi, \textit{The Gentle Civilizer of Nations}, 43–44.
\item Ibid., 47–51.
\item Yamada, “Le droit international privé au Japon”, 634.
\end{itemize}
their heirs, nurture children etc.—not only in their own countries but in each and every country around the world.\textsuperscript{48} In the same article, he also cited a famous programmatic article on the unification of private international law rules written by Mancini as a document that marked the transformation of legal thinking from the principle of diplomatic reciprocity to that of equality between nationals and foreigners.\textsuperscript{49}

Although there is no evidence that Yamada’s ‘\textit{hōritsu shisō}’ stemmed from the IDI founders’ pet concept, ‘legal conscience’, the two were similar in that both were assumed to develop in parallel with the development of society. Yamada and the IDI founders were also alike in that both viewed the development of society of their time in a positive light. Of course, many of the IDI founders were reformers who advocated social and political changes in their own countries, and, in this respect, Yamada might be somewhat different. Although he was a supporter of Westernization, he was in no sense a radical reformer. But it cannot be denied that both Yamada and the IDI founders were generally positive about various developments that were happening in the 19th century, such as the expansion of international trade, the deepening of the international division of labour, the acceleration of the international movement of capital, the advancement of communication technology, the establishment of humanitarian organizations all over the world etc.; in short, both were unanimous in thinking that the expansion of international intercourse was driving the development of society in a good direction.

The IDI’s discussion about the admission of foreigners into a country

It would not be wrong to characterize Yamada and the founders of the IDI as classical liberals. They shared the assumption that international commerce would bring peace to the world by ‘civilizing’ sovereign states

\textsuperscript{48} Yamada, “Gaikokujin no chii”, 222.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 219–220. See Stanislao Mancini, “De l’utilité de rendre obligatoires pour tous les États, sous la forme d’un ou de plusieurs traités internationaux, un certain nombre de règles générales du Droit international privé pour assurer la décision uniforme des conflits entre les différentes législations civiles et criminelles”, \textit{Journal du droit international privé} 5 (1874): 221–239.
which quite often acted under the influence of irrational passions.\textsuperscript{50} They studied private international law as if it were an indispensable tool for transmitting this civilizing force of international commerce from country to country. But their commonalities should not be emphasized too much because there was also an important difference of opinion among them. Although they favoured the expansion of international intercourse, they differed about how far the circle of international intercourse should be extended and how much freedom should be permitted within the circle.

The standard of civilization had no answers to these questions. What should be remembered here is the fact that the standard was neither fixed nor thoroughly defined.\textsuperscript{51} It was gradually and only partially elaborated in the process whereby Western countries recognized non-Western countries as equal members of international society. The five requirements of the civilization standard mentioned earlier in this chapter were not clearly spelled out at the outset. As Gong stated, the need to define the standard began to be urgently felt only after Western and non-Western countries came into frequent contact with each other. Specific requirements of the standard were made explicit through the negotiation process, in which non-Western countries earned diplomatic recognition from Western countries.\textsuperscript{52} But still, the standard had remained equivocal in many regards and this indeterminacy often became a source of disputes.

International migration was one of the major areas of potential dispute. Were there any international rules concerning international migration which civilized countries had to conform to in the late 19th century? The answer seems to be negative. At least, the practice of Western countries varied widely. It is now generally believed that the latter half of the 19th century was a golden age of international migration, when people moved freely due to relatively open borders.\textsuperscript{53} In fact, freedom of movement reached an unprecedented level in this period. The total number of free migrants to the American continents finally exceeded that of slaves from


\textsuperscript{52} Gong, \textit{The Standard of Civilization}, 29.

Africa in the 1830s, and migrants from Europe to the United States of America increased rapidly after the Civil War. Although European countries did not completely abolish the requirement for a traveller to hold a passport or a certificate of nationality, they did relax passport control after the revolution of 1848. This being the case, even a doctoral thesis appeared in 1907 which dealt with the passport system as an object of historical curiosity. While the liberalization of movement of people seemed to advance steadily, however, the end of the 19th century also witnessed various counter-trends. Anti-foreign policies were implemented (or at least attempted) in many Western countries around the turn of the century, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 in the United States, the foreigner taxation bills submitted to the French parliament repeatedly from 1884 onwards and the mass expulsion of Polish and Jewish residents from Prussia in 1885.

The uncertain situation around the turn of the century was reflected in the results of a survey conducted by the Japanese government on regulations concerning entry, travel and residence of foreigners in Western countries. In December 1896 the government sent a questionnaire to its envoys in Western countries to enquire into legislation on these matters. The questionnaire contained 57 questions across 14 categories and the first category of questions was on “Entry, travel and residence” of foreigners. It included almost all imaginable questions about immigration such as: (1)
“What restrictions are imposed on aliens, either general or \[sic\] special or by nationality, class or character, respecting the right to enter, travel or reside?”; (2) “What distinctions are made between nationals and aliens and between domiciled and non-resident aliens?”; (3) “Is any distinction made between foreigners of different nationalities in consequence of treaty stipulations?”; (4) “To what extent are passports required?”; or (5) “Is registration in any case \[sic\] required?”58 The government intended to use the survey data for laws on immigration and nationality to be drafted in relation to the shin jōyaku jisshi junbi project. Although there was no reply from Belgium and Holland, the government received responses from Austria, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain and the United States.

Table 1.1 presents the results of the survey. As can be seen from the table, the answers to the first question in the questionnaire were varied. Some countries, like France and Italy, answered that they placed no restrictions on the entry of foreigners, whereas other countries, like England, Russia and the United States, answered that they restricted the admission of foreigners in metropolises or in colonies on the grounds of nationality, religion, economic status or health.

On the matter of the conditions of foreigners’ entry into a country, the opinion of academic jurists was also far from unanimous. There seemed to have been a consensus that states had territorial sovereignty and, therefore, possessed the freedom to exclude foreigners from their territories at their own will. But there were no definite answers to such questions as: can the sovereign right to control a state border be restricted in some way and, if so, on what grounds can a state lawfully refuse foreigners entry into its territory? Needless to say, private international law had no solution to offer to such substantive issues, because its task was only to establish procedural rules that determined which nation’s law was applied to a given case when there were conflicting laws in two or more nations.

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58 Gaimushō [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan], “Kaisei jōyaku jisshi junbi ni kansuru jikō torishirabe kata zai-Ō-Bei kaku kōshi e kunrei ikken [On giving envoys in Western countries instructions on how to enquire into matters related to the preparations of the operation of new treaties]”, December 1896, JACAR: B06151050800, 15.
Table 1.1  Replies to the survey on legislation concerning the entry of foreigners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>No restriction exists apart from in the case of those who are pronounced by a criminal judge and other responsible authorities to be expelled from Austria. Those who have been expelled before and returned to the country are punished by law. Suspicious persons are monitored by the police during their stay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>There are restrictions on foreign gypsies, musicians, showmen with wild animals and the like; ballsmen [sic], clowns, and practicers of feats of strength and similar persons in so far as they by perambulation will try to procure the means of livelihood; foreign labourers in search of work here, when they cannot legitimate themselves by a document issued by the foreign public authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>No restriction exists in the United Kingdom. However, colonies such as Hong Kong, Natal and Queensland place restrictions on the entry of the Chinese or the Indians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Foreigners can freely enter into France. There is a law which requires foreigners to show their passport but the law is not being enforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Crossing the border of the German Empire is de facto free. Although there are restrictions imposed on both nationals and foreigners, like those on customs or quarantine, there is no restriction specially applied to foreigners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>No restriction exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Foreigners who enter into Russia need to have a valid passport according to the passport rules in Russia. There are restrictions on those who have been denied access by the Russian government; those who have been judged dubious by the Russian embassy; gypsies, organ players, peddlers of medicine and plastering, and paupers; poor Jews coming from Rumania, Jesuits, Armenians coming from Poland and Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Foreigners must present their passport on their arrival at ports or frontiers. There is an exception applicable to the Philippines. Foreigners who enter those islands need a special document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>There are restrictions in the case of Chinese labourers; idiots and insane persons; paupers or persons likely to become a public charge; persons suffering from loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases; persons who have been convicted of felonies or other crimes or misdemeanours involving moral turpitude; contract labourers, polygamists, and persons whose immigration has been assisted by others unless it can be shown that such persons do not belong to any one of the above classes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaimushō, “Kaisei jōyaku jisshi junbi ni kansuru jikō torishirabe kata zai-Ō-Bei kaku kōshi e kunrei ikken”, JACAR: B06151050800: 37 (Italy), B06151050900: 25 (England), B06151051300: 32–33 (France), B06151051800: 41 (Germany), B06151051900: 69–74 (U.S.A.), B06151052100: 5 (Austria), B06151052500: 25–29 (Denmark): 93–97 (Spain); “Shin jōyaku jisshi junbi ni kansuru sankō jikō torishirabe sho (rokoku no bu) [Enquiry on the preparations of the operation of new treaties (Russia)]”, JACAR: B10070304400: 2–6 (Russia).

Note: All the answers were offered by legal scholars in each country apart from the Italian one, which was written by the Japanese embassy in Italy.

The IDI held a discussion on the admission of foreigners and adopted the *Règles internationales sur l’admission et l’expulsion des étrangers* in 1892. The discussion reflected the differences of opinion among legal experts. It is worth studying the *Règles* in detail, not only because the text was frequently referred to in a later discussion about international migration, but also because Yamada developed his own view on international migration by closely reading the text.

The Institute started its study on the admission of foreigners in relation to the question of expulsion. At the Lausanne session in 1888, the IDI discussed the manner and limits of a state’s right to exercise expulsion. At this session, the IDI’s secretary general Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns proposed putting on the agenda the questions of the right to permit or refuse foreigners’ access to a state’s territory and of the conditions which could be imposed on foreigners’ residence. In his report submitted to the Lausanne session, Rolin-Jaequemyns argued that state sovereignty was not unlimited. Although the basic principle governing the matter of admission and residence permits of foreigners was territorial sovereignty and every state could impose conditions which it found necessary on their admission and residence, the exercising of territorial sovereignty was restricted by other principles, particularly by the principle that every country belonged...
to the community of nations that composed humanity ("la communauté des nations, dont l'ensemble forme l'humanité"). Because a state also had to adhere to this principle, it could neither forbid all foreigners from entering its territory in an absolute way nor expulse all foreigners residing in its territory indiscriminately. A state could neither isolate itself from the rest of humanity nor avoid communicating with a particular state or nation, at least in peacetime. Thus, he concluded, “On ne pourrait donc considérer comme légitime, en temps de paix, une mesure générale par laquelle un État refuserait indistinctement d'admettre sur son territoire ou expulserait tous les étrangers citoyens d'un autre État.”

In view of the later history of exclusionary immigration policies developed around the world, Rolin-Jaequemyns’ report was foresighted in that it had offered an argument against refusing entry to members of a particular nation. But his report was not officially endorsed by the IDI. Although the Lausanne session adopted a provisional document, Projet de Déclaration internationale relative au droit d'expulsion des étrangers, it avoided making a definitive statement on the question of foreigners’ entry into, and residence in, a country and postponed the discussion about it.

At the next session in Hamburg in 1891, Carl Ludwig von Bar submitted draft rules on the admission and expulsion of foreigners together with a detailed report on the draft rules. It is these documents that became the basis of the Règles adopted by the IDI in 1892. Von Bar was a typical IDI member. Although his main field of study was criminal law, he had produced a two-volume work on private international law entitled Theorie und Praxis des internationalen Privatrechts. The German scholar was also a man with liberal convictions who firmly believed that “Recht und Bilitigkeit in Verein mit dem natürlichen Strom der Dinge, ohne Störung durch willkürliche und künstliche Maßnahmen, regeln den Fremdenverkehr am besten.”

Ein gesteigerter internationaler Verkehr muß auf das geistige und gewerbliche Leben im höchsten Grade befuchtend einwirken. Erfindungen, Erfahrungen, Ideen aller Art auch auf den Gebieten des häuslichen und gewerblichen, wie

60 Ibid., 764.
des öffentlichen und staatlichen Lebens werden ausgetauscht; das Leben wird reicher in jeder Beziehung. So haben wir die mannigfachsten Einrichtungen des täglichen Komforts—das Wort selbst ist ja englisch—in den letzten dreißig Jahren aus England erhalten, und andererseits rühmen die Engländer Vieles, was sie durch die Bekanntschaft mit unseren Sitten gewonnen haben. Der gesteigerte Fremdenverkehr, der die Kultur hebt, macht sie aber auch gleichmäßiger, zerstört die Vorurtheile [sic], die unbegründeten Antipathien; er sichert somit den Frieden, diese kostbarste internationale Gut.62

Von Bar addressed the question of the admission of foreigners in article IV of his draft rules, which stated that foreigners’ free entry into the territory of a country could only be prohibited for reasons of “l’intérêt public et de motifs extrêmement graves”, because the admission of peaceful and law-abiding foreigners was consistent with the principle of international law and was also in the interests of humanity.63 He then examined three categories of people to whom entry might be forbidden, namely, (1) people of fundamentally different race, manners and civilization, (2) labourers and (3) the poor, people with contagious diseases, and criminals or criminal suspects.

Von Bar was of the opinion that among the three categories the first and the third one could be denied access to the territory of a country. With regard to the first, the rapporteur said that he was in agreement with James Lorimer, who had sent him a personal note on this matter.64 Von Bar maintained that the entry and movement of nationals of a civilized country and the admission of nationals of totally different races were quite different matters: “Immigration of totally different races can be a danger to the [receiving] country.”65 This sentence clearly shows that von Bar was not free from racial prejudice. He was afraid that the “mixing of races” might cause “racial degeneration”.66 As for the third category, he stated only that the reason for its rejection was self-evident and listed those who could fall into this category as follows: “tout individu étranger indigent, ou atteint

62 Ibid., 22. According to Yamada’s memoirs, he attended von Bar’s lecture at the University of Göttingen during his study in Europe. He was also invited to a dinner party held once or twice a week at von Bar’s house. See Yamada, Kaikoroku, 37–38.
64 The exact content of Lorimer’s note is unknown since it is not printed in the IDI’s Annuaire. The British jurist is best known for his classification of ‘civilized’, ‘barbarian’, and ‘savage’ nations.
66 Ibid., 1040.
d’une maladie contagieuse, ou fortement suspect de délits non politiques commis à l’étranger contre la sécurité publique, contre la vie ou la santé des personnes ou contre la propriété ou la foi publique, et aux étrangers punis à raison desdits délits.”

On the other hand, von Bar was opposed to denying access to labourers. He maintained that although a state could reject foreigners on the grounds of “dangerous accumulation or organization of foreigners who appeared en masse”, it must not do so for the sole purpose of protecting national labour. He argued that his view conformed to the opinions of French economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and the IDI member Leonid Kamarowsky. It is unclear which of Leroy-Beaulieu’s texts von Bar was referring to here, since he provided no bibliographic information. Likewise, although von Bar must have read a note sent from Kamarowsky before writing his report, the content of this note is unknown because it is not printed in the IDI’s protocol. But it is true that Leroy-Beaulieu was in favour of introducing migrant workers to France. Although he was originally afraid that ethnic cohesion might be destroyed by the increase in immigration, he began to stress the need for foreign workers in the late 1880s when the stagnation of population increase in his country became apparent. His article “La question des Étrangers en France au point de vue économique” published in Journal du droit international privé in 1888 fiercely criticized a bill which proposed to tax foreign workers in France in order to reduce their number. Explaining why the bill should be rejected, he said, “Ce ne sont pas de vagues principes de cosmopolitisme qui le recommandent, c’est l’intérêt national même.” He also argued in 1895 that “La fusion des éléments étrangers s’infiltrant avec continuité chez un peuple à population propre stationnaire, est le seul moyen d’empêcher que la faiblesse de la natalité n’ait pour une nation des conséquences politiques, économiques et morales de trop de gravité.”

67 Ibid., 1029.
68 Ibid., 1028.
71 Quoted in Tapinos, “Paul Leroy-Beaulieu et la question de la population”, 116.
Von Bar seems to have relied upon Leroy-Beaulieu to a great extent, as evidenced by the fact that he referred to the French liberal economist approvingly more than once. In a speech given at the Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft in Berlin, for instance, he stated that Leroy-Beaulieu argued against the idea that immigration of foreign workers to France would suppress the wage level for domestic workers. According to Leroy-Beaulieu, foreign workers were flowing into France because there were not enough workers for low-level, tedious work, which the majority of French workers were unwilling to do. Thus, “Die ausländischen Arbeiter treten also in einer Frankreich nützlichen Weise in eine Lücke ein.” Von Bar added that foreign labourers were necessary not only in France but in many countries in order to keep industries and agriculture competitive with those in foreign countries:

Ein selbstmörderisches Unternehmen aber ist es gar, Fremde von der Leitung gewerblicher und landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe gerade deshalb auszuschließen, weil in Intelligenz und Brauchbarkeit die eigenen Unterthanen von den Fremden wirklich oder angeblich übertroffen werden. Entweder entfernt man so in den Ausländern die besten Lehrmeister des Volkes, oder aber man beseitigt durch die Entfernung der Fremden eine gesunde Konkurrenz, ganz abgesehen davon, daß die Fernhaltung der Ausländer die Benutzung nützlicher fremder Produktionsmethoden, die Berücksichtigung fremder Geschmacksrichtungen, die für den Export stets wichtig bleibt, im höchsten Grade erschwert.

These passages indicate clearly that von Bar was in favour of the introduction of labour migrants chiefly from an economic point of view.

Von Bar’s draft rules were the first official document of the IDI that tackled the question of foreigners’ entry into a country. However, the adoption of the draft rules was not easy. Although some members had already questioned the appropriateness of discussing the matter of foreigners’ entry at the session in Lausanne, the same question arose at the Hamburg session, to which the draft rules were submitted. At the plenary session held on September 8, Augusto Pierantoni, Friedrich von Martens and others abstained from taking part in discussions, calling into question the very assumption that the admission and expulsion of foreigners were matters of international law. In response to their abstention, some partici-

72 Von Bar, Das Fremdenrecht und seine volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung, 24.
73 Ibid., 24–25.
pants proposed sending von Bar’s document back to a commission to re-examine it. Von Bar had to agree to this proposal but he did not forget to ask the session members to determine whether the admission and expulsion of foreigners were matters of international law or not. The plenary session almost unanimously agreed that the matters were “éminemment international” and decided to postpone its discussion to the next session.\textsuperscript{75}

Von Bar revised his draft rules and submitted them at the session held in Geneva in 1892. This time he was careful enough to avoid another postponement. He made a special statement at the opening of the session and reminded participants that the IDI had already decided to examine matters of the admission and expulsion of foreigners and even declared at the session in Lausanne that the matters were not part of domestic public law but private international law (the details of the declaration are unclear since the text of the declaration is not recorded in the minutes of the Lausanne session).\textsuperscript{76} The statement was effective in preventing opposition to his new document.

A heated discussion at the Geneva session led to the adoption of \textit{Règles internationales sur l’admission et l’expulsion des étrangers}. The session approved an article which said that a state must not reject foreigners on the grounds of protecting national labour. It also agreed that a state could prohibit the entry of the poor, people with contagious diseases, and criminals or criminal suspects. But article 4 of the draft rules, which denied free admission to people of fundamentally different race, manners and civilization, provoked serious dispute.

French jurist Paul Pradier-Fodéré argued against the article, saying that foreigners should not be treated as a group but as individuals. Although, he argued, it was understandable for a state to close its borders to the “invasion of Caribbean or Iroquois,” no state could refuse “the entry of a person who is willing to come to a European country and adapt himself to the customs of the civilized world, even if he is a savage.”\textsuperscript{77} Von Bar admitted that the article dealt with the entry of foreigners as a group, but he defended doing so by referring to measures implemented in the United States against Chinese immigration as an example that rejected a group of foreigners based on race. However, Pradier-Fodéré also objected to this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 1068.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Institut de droit international, \textit{Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international} 12 (1892–1894), 185.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 192.
\end{itemize}
justification, insisting that what was at issue in the American continents was human trafficking conducted in the form of contract labour and that the US’s measures were aimed at counteracting this inhumane practice. A complicated discussion followed Pradier-Fodéré’s objection. Ernest Roguin, a Swiss jurist, proposed permitting a state to reject foreigners of different race, manners and civilization if and only if they organized themselves dangerously. On the other hand, some people expressed their opposition to using the word “race”. Calling attention to a surge of anti-Semitism in a great number of countries, Arthur Desjardins insisted on removing the phrase “difference of race”. Concurring with Desjardins, the British colonial administrator Donald Reay argued that in his country the phrase might be used to exclude its “propres sujets” like Indians. Von Bar compromised with these opponents. Being afraid that the term “race” might be abused, he agreed to delete the phrase “difference of race” from the Règles.

It should be noted that the phrase “difference of race” was deleted only to avoid unnecessary confusion. The deletion should not be understood as a clear sign of anti-racism, because it was still possible to provide a loophole through which a state could reject foreigners of different race. The former general secretary of the IDI Alphonse Rivier proposed restoring the provision which was included in the original text submitted to the session in Hamburg but was omitted thereafter, namely, the provision that foreigners could be denied admission to a country for reasons of “l’intérêt public et de motifs extrêmement graves”. Rivier proposed using this neutral but broad expression, in place of the term “race”, to expand the scope of foreigners who could be refused entry. Italian jurist Emilio Brusa was quick to respond that the proposal would spoil the IDI’s efforts to restrict the exercising of state sovereignty. But Rivier’s proposal was adopted by 13 votes to 6 with 5 abstentions.

There are two aspects in the IDI’s stance on international migration which are worthy of attention. The first is that the IDI used economics rather than law in refuting the argument that foreigners’ access to a country could be denied in order to protect national labour. As his reference to economist Paul Leroy Beaulieu showed, von Bar relied on the economic

78 Ibid., 193.
79 Ibid., 193.
80 Ibid., 194.
81 Ibid., 194–195.
orthodoxy of his day when he argued against the protection of national labour. This might have been a problematic approach for a juristic institute like the IDI to adopt, since norms could not be deduced from facts. But almost none of its members disagreed with von Bar. It was only John Westlake who raised objections and pointed out that von Bar offered a reason that did not correspond to international law but to “l’économie publique” and “la politique gouvernementale”. The second is that the IDI’s consensus about the exclusion of racially different people was, unlike its unanimity on the exclusion of the poor, people with contagious diseases, and criminals or criminal suspects, quite fragile and superficial. In fact, members were not in agreement on the matter of race. While some members like Desjardins and Reay explicitly criticized racial discrimination, others did not. Von Bar did not find the exclusion of Chinese migrants in the United States problematic. Even Pradier-Fodéré, who was most fiercely opposed to the rejection of foreigners on the grounds of racial difference, did not denounce the US’s legislation, but instead endorsed it as a humanitarian act against human trafficking. Although the finally adopted text seemed to be based on unequivocal opposition to racial discrimination, this was not necessarily the case, as evidenced by the fact that the IDI left room for denying admission to foreigners of different race on the grounds of “l’intérêt public et de motifs extrêmement graves”.

Limits on the freedom of immigration

In May 1897, five years after the IDI’s discussion about the admission of foreigners, Japanese legal scholars took up the same question. In March of the same year they had established the Society of International Law (Kokusaihō gakkai)—one of the most important international cooperation organizations which was to help the foundation of the League of Nations Association of Japan after the First World War. At the third meeting of the SIL, which was solely devoted to the question of “freedom of immigration”, Yamada assumed the role of rapporteur and introduced to the audience the rules adopted by the IDI. The minutes of the meeting show both

the extent of the influence the IDI had on Yamada’s view on international migration and the uniqueness of his interpretation of the Règles.

Yamada opened his report by stating that “the problem of migration is the one worth studying most seriously among various problems of international intercourse among nations.”\(^{84}\) By migration, he meant “travelling to a foreign country and living there temporarily or permanently”.\(^{85}\) Although there was a difference between emigration of nationals and immigration of foreigners, these were two aspects of the same phenomenon. Therefore, Yamada insisted, in order to examine the problem of migration, it was enough to discuss either emigration or immigration. Yamada focused on the latter, namely, immigration of foreigners, and posed the following three questions:

1. Is a country allowed to prohibit, at its own will, entry into its territory or its possession of a particular race or nation?
2. Is a country allowed to prohibit, at its own will, entry into its territory or its possession of nationals of another country to whom a commerce and navigation treaty between the two countries guarantees freedom of access and residence?
3. Given such a treaty, is a state allowed to prohibit, at its own will, entry into its territory or its possession of labourers of the other country?\(^{86}\)

Yamada took into consideration treaties of commerce and navigation, which were absent in von Bar’s argument. The Japanese scholar must have had the present situation of his country in mind, which was facing the operation of new commerce and navigation treaties with the United Kingdom and other Western countries. He also focused on labour migration, which was only one among many topics covered by von Bar. This was because Yamada was concerned about issues relating to Japanese migrants in foreign countries. He thought that the matter of migration was especially important for his country, whose native-born workers were “increasingly migrating overseas and experiencing unjust treatment there”.\(^{87}\)

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84 Yamada Saburō, “Gaikokujin no raijū [The immigration of foreigners]”, *Shinpōtō tōhō* 6 (1897): 12. There is a slightly different version of the text published by *Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi*. See “Kokusaihō gakkai daisankai reikai [the third meeting of the Gakkai]”, *Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi* 15 no. 6 (1897). This book mainly uses the *Shinpōtō tōhō* version, which is signed by Yamada and is more detailed than the unsigned *Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi* version.

85 Yamada, “Gaikokujin no raijū”, 12.

86 Ibid., 12.

87 Ibid., 13.
to handle issues concerning migration was a matter not only of theoretical importance but of practical significance.

Before answering the above three questions, Yamada examined whether a country had an absolute right to refuse intercourse (kōtsū ōrai) with foreign countries in the first place. His argument here was to some extent similar to that of Rolin-Jaequemyns, who denied the right by arguing that the exercise of territorial sovereignty should be restricted by the principle of international community. What corresponded to the principle of international community in Yamada’s argument was his cherished concept, kyōdō seizon (community life). He mentioned the names of Herbert Spencer and, again, Aristotle as scholars who discovered the essential importance of community life to human race. According to Yamada, Spencer had demonstrated in his Principles of Sociology that human beings started a community life out of necessity to subsist, and Aristotle had discovered that “man is a political animal” more than two thousand years before. These teachings constituted the baseline of Yamada’s argument, i.e. “Human beings are by nature sociable. They must live a community life to stay alive.”

Although both Rolin-Jaequemyns and Yamada thought that a state should be denied the absolute right to withhold international intercourse due to the communal nature of human beings, they were different in some important respects. Unlike Rolin-Jaequemyns, who argued that a state was not permitted to isolate itself from the rest of the world, Yamada thought that a country could not cut its ties with other countries either de jure or de facto. According to Yamada, in the present world with advanced transportation facilities, it was impossible for a nation to subsist without living a community life with other nations. Developments in previous years in which isolated countries had been forced to open their ports to foreign commerce proved this to be true. He wrote: “A state is de facto unable to adopt seclusionism (sakokushugi) and de jure has no absolute right to seclusion.” Furthermore, unlike Rolin-Jaequemyns, Yamada did not think that territorial sovereignty was the most important principle to be considered in determining international rules on migration. The Belgian legal expert argued that the rules were determined by modifying the primary principle of territorial sovereignty with the secondary principle of

88 Ibid., 13.
89 Ibid., 13.
international community. By contrast, Yamada thought that the rules were derived exclusively from the principle of international community, that is, by solely examining what was necessary for maintaining international community life (kokusai kyōdō seizon). He insisted that the purpose of states forming an international community was to sustain their existence. In order to achieve this purpose each member state of the international community had to accept rules necessary for the coexistence of states. But this meant that within the limits imposed by the rules each state might do whatever it needed to sustain its existence. Thus, although a state had no absolute right to refuse the admission of foreigners, it also had no absolute obligation to admit them. “While international law restricts sovereign freedom of states, each state can prohibit foreigners access to its territory within the limits set by international law.”

But then where should the limits be drawn? In order to clarify this, Yamada examined the three questions outlined above. The answer to the first question was quite simple: Refusing to admit a particular race or nation was against the basic principles of international law, such as justice and equity (seigi kōdō), and it also violated a state’s right to equal treatment. Here Yamada mentioned the rules adopted by the IDI. Although he was quite in favour of the rules, he was critical of one article in the rules which excluded the application of the rules to “les colonies où la civilisation européenne n’est pas encore dominante”. He complained that because of this article, the application of the rules was confined to Europe and the rules could not become truly universal ones. He even suspected that the article was inserted to enable European countries to prohibit immigration of Oriental people to Europe. But apart from this article he approved of the rules and said that they generally conformed to the present practice of civilized countries.

As for the second question, Yamada said that it was a matter of course that if two countries had a treaty which guaranteed freedom of entry, travel and residence, one of the countries was not allowed to deny nationals of the other access to its territory at its own will. But he noted that two factors needed special attention: one was what he called shinteki jōtai (physical condition) and the other mibun shokugyō (status and occupation). By

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90 Ibid., 13.
91 Ibid., 14.
92 Ibid., 14.
physical condition, he meant a variety of states, such as poverty, illness and criminality, which made a person dangerous to public safety. This corresponded to the three categories of people whose rejection the IDI approved of: the poor, people with dangerous diseases, and criminals or criminal suspects. Yamada insisted that a state could deny these categories of people access to its territory, even if it was bound by a treaty to guarantee free entry. According to him, a country could do so regardless of whether there was a treaty stipulation allowing one of the treaty countries to refuse the admission of nationals from the other country for reasons of public policy.94

While Yamada approved of rejecting foreigners on the grounds of their physical condition, he opposed rejecting them on the grounds of their status and occupation. He argued that “A state must not deny a person of any occupation access to its territory as long as he has a regular job and lives legally.”95 But did this mean that a state could not refuse the admission of labourers? Yamada maintained—and this was the answer to the third question—that a state was not allowed to prohibit entry by labourers, who he defined as “workers employed mostly for the purpose of farming, manufacturing or construction”.96 Referring to the stipulation in the IDI’s rules that a state must not deny foreign workers access to its territory for the sole purpose of protecting national labour, he insisted that this was the current consensus of international lawyers.

In explaining why a state must accept foreign workers, Yamada turned to economics just as von Bar did. He said that it was difficult to prevent capitalists from accepting industrious and cheap labourers because “it was the basic law of economics that the market prefers good and cheap commodities.”97 He also invoked history to support his argument. Having the New World countries in mind, Yamada claimed that those nations which invaded the territory of other nations for the purpose of founding their countries must respect the freedom of immigration, since they justified migrating and settling in the territory by claiming that “humans have the right to live wherever they wish”.98 At the heart of his entire argument was the belief that international migration was necessary for maintaining inter-

94 Yamada, “Gaikokujin no raijū”, 16.
95 Ibid., 16.
96 Ibid., 17.
97 Ibid., 17.
98 Ibid., 17.
national community life. “Labour is the most sacred capital of human beings. If humans did not have the freedom to supply their own sacred capital to the farthest corners of the world, they could not achieve their purpose in life.”\textsuperscript{99} He referred to this freedom as “the human freedom to live” (\textit{jinrui seizon no jiyū}).\textsuperscript{100}

A dispute in France over a massacre of Italian workers at Aigues-Mortes in 1893 convinced Yamada that his belief was correct. Although after the massacre several anti-foreign bills were introduced which proposed to tax foreign workers or their employers, the French government refused to impose such taxes. One of the opponents to the bills was Leroy-Beaulieu. According to Yamada, the French economist argued forcefully in the September 2 issue of \textit{Économiste français} that to impose a tax on foreign workers or their employers for the purpose of protecting national labour was against the principles of international law and economics.\textsuperscript{101}

Interestingly, Leroy-Beaulieu mentioned China and Japan in his article. Insisting that the rich must provide the poor the opportunity to participate in their wealth and that the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor nations could be achieved through the exchange of goods and migration of people, he said:

Les peuples européens sont sans cesse en instance auprès des gouvernements orientaux, la Chine et le Japon, pour que leurs nationaux puissent s’établir sur tout le territoire de ces pays. Il y aurait, de leur part, une manifeste contradiction à prétendre empêcher que les nationaux d’une contrée européenne puissent s’établir et travailler dans une autre contrée d’Europe.\textsuperscript{102}

However, this did not mean that Leroy-Beaulieu was in favour of introducing Asian migrants to France. On the contrary, he thought that the immigration of European people and that of people “belonging to a totally different civilization” was a different thing. He continued:

Quand il s’agit, comme pour les États-Unis d’Amérique en ce qui concerne l’immigration chinoise, de la fixation sur le sol de nombreux groupes d’hommes appartenant à une civilisation toute différente, par beaucoup de côtés très inférieurs, et qu’il est constant que ces groupes resteront éternelle-

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 17–18.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 18–19.
\textsuperscript{102} Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, “La question des ouvriers étrangers”, \textit{Économiste français}, September 2, 1893.
ment à l’etat de corps étrangers inassimilables, la question peut devenir très embarrassante.
Elle l’est moins pour une nation d’Europe en ce qui concerne les nationaux d’un autre peuple européen. Ceux-ci sont à la longue assimilables; on peut les recueillir et les absorber, eux ou leurs enfants, et on doit s’efforcer de la faire par la naturalisation.103

It is unclear whether Yamada read the whole article published in Économiste français or only a part of the text quoted in André Weiss’ Traité théorique et pratique de droit international privé, which Yamada referred to in his report. Because Weiss quoted only the former paragraph on China and Japan and not the latter on the Chinese immigrants in the United States,104 Yamada might not have noticed the anti-Asian tendency in the writings of Leroy-Beaulieu, who made his position clearer in the 1910s. Out of fear of the ‘yellow peril’, the French economist maintained that France should recruit workers exclusively from European countries like Italy and Poland and not from Asian ones.105

Yamada did not think that a state must always accept foreign labour. Following the IDI rules, he thought that the immigration of foreign workers might be restricted if too many foreigners came to a country and became a danger to the receiving nation. He also thought that if a state wished to restrict the immigration of foreign workers, it could do so by indicating its wish in treaties of commerce and navigation with other states. Therefore, he commented that under the 1894 treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and the United States, which included a clause to this effect, one of the two countries was allowed to restrict immigration of labourers from the other.106

Yamada’s report was endorsed by the majority at the SIL session. Most of the members agreed with him, although there were a few who insisted that a state was allowed to prohibit the admission of foreigners regardless of any stipulation in a commerce and navigation treaty because exercising

103 Ibid.
104 André Weiss, Traité théorique et pratique de droit international privé (Paris: L. Larose & Forcel, 1892), 134.
106 Yamada, “Gaikokujin no raijū”, 20. Article II of the treaty stated that “the stipulations contained in this and the preceding Article do not in any way affect the laws, ordinances and regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of labourers, police and public security which are in force or may hereafter be enacted in either of the two countries.” Nihon gaikō bunsho, vol. 4, 502.
state sovereignty was not restricted at all. At the end of the whole debate, legal scholar Tomizu Hirondo took the floor and emphasized the importance of international migration to his country. His remark showed a strange mixture of cosmopolitan spirit and expansionist ambition, which would continue to be a characteristic feature of Japanese discourse on international migration:

[...] human beings have the freedom to move to and to live where they want to. If in the future each human being understands the sense of justice and humanity, he will perhaps subscribe to the idea that the territory of each state is the common property of mankind. We, all the Japanese, should think broadly and be open-minded. We should encourage our people to think that the world is one home. States must not unrestrictedly prohibit immigration of foreigners and we should not allow foreigners to reject our request for admission.

A unique phrase appeared here: “make the world one home” (sekai o ie ni suru: 世界を家にする). Although it is currently seldom used, the phrase was frequently employed in the late 19th century in order to translate “cosmopolitanism” into Japanese.

At first glance, Yamada’s conclusion does not appear substantially different from that of the IDI. Indeed, both concluded that a state was permitted to deny access to the poor, people with contagious diseases or criminals, and that a state could not refuse the admission of foreign workers for the purpose of protecting national labour. However, there was an important difference between the two. It should be remembered that the IDI deleted the phrase “difference of race” in order to avoid unnecessary complications and left room for denying admission to foreigners of different race on the grounds of public interests and for extremely grave reasons. By contrast, Yamada expressed strong opposition to using race as a reason to refuse the admission of foreigners and justified racial equality by using his original concept, kyōdō seizon. In other words, Yamada and the IDI differed from each other with regard to the strength of their opposition to the use of race as the grounds of the refusal of foreigners. It was only natural that the Japanese lawyer was keener in this regard than the IDI members because the circumstances of Japanese migrants in foreign countries, especially in the United States, were being aggravated. Although Yamada admitted that Chinese exclusion in the United States was mainly due to the

107 “Kokusaihō gakkai daisankai reikai”, 647.
influx of cheap labourers, he was still unhappy about the inconsistency of Western countries which “admitted workers of the European race while prohibiting entry to Oriental, especially Chinese and Japanese, workers.”

Japanese immigration law

Was there any relation between the Japanese government’s enquiry into legislation concerning foreigners entering, travelling to and residing in Western countries and Yamada’s study on the same topic? As mentioned above, the Japanese government ordered its envoys to research Western legislation in December 1896, and Yamada reported at the Society of International Law in May of the next year. Did the government also request him to study problems related to international migration or did he select the topic by sheer coincidence? Yamada recalled in his memoirs that the establishment of the SIL was indeed related to the shin jōyaku jisshi junbi project. According to the memoirs, in 1896 the vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Komura Jutarō, requested Yamada to investigate matters relating to the operation of new treaties with Western countries, but Yamada thought that the task was “too important to be carried out by one scholar”. Thus, instead of doing everything by himself, he proposed “establishing an academic society composed of all the legal experts in Japan and making the society conduct the investigation jointly with diplomats”. The society that was established to achieve this task was the SIL. However, this story of the establishment of the SIL should be examined carefully because Yamada wrote the memoirs much later in his life. The memoirs only provide a vague account of the content of his conversation with Komura and there are no other documents that support his recollections. Such being the case, nothing further can be said about the relation between the government enquiry and Yamada’s research.

In 1899, in time for the operation of new treaties with Western countries, the Meiji government enacted a series of laws concerning immigration control, including, among others, the Imperial Ordinance No. 352 and

110 Yamada, Kaikoroku, 32–33. See also Yamada Saburō, “Kokusaihō gakkai no kako oyobi genzai [Past and present of the Society of International Law]”, Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi 41 no. 3 (1942): 75.
Ordinance No. 42 of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Unlike the revision of hōrei, Yamada was not involved in the drafting of these Ordinances, nor was there any evidence that the government consulted his report to the SIL. Since he left Japan to study abroad immediately after the meeting of the SIL, his influence on the Ordinances, if any, must have been negligible. Indeed, the Japanese immigration control system established by the Ordinances was different from what he recommended. The Japanese government imposed restrictions on foreigners’ residence in order to prevent Chinese workers from migrating to Japan.\footnote{For the immigration control system in pre-war Japan, see Hashimoto Seiichi, “Kindai nihon ni okeru gaikokujin syōgū [Legal treatment of aliens during the years 1853–1945]”, Shizuoka daigaku hōkei kenkyu 44 no. 4 (1996): 195–242; Yamawaki Keizō, Kindai Nihon to gaikokujin rōdōsha [Modern Japan and foreign labourers] (Tōkyō: Akashishoten, 1994).}

Ordinance No. 352 allowed foreigners who did not have the freedom of residence by treaty or custom to reside, move or conduct business and other activities in Japan.\footnote{Yamawaki, Kindai Nihon to gaikokujin rōdōsha, 70.} But it obliged foreign workers to obtain permission from administrative authorities if they wished to reside outside the former settlement zones. In relation to this regulation, Ordinance No. 42 of the Ministry of Home Affairs laid down rules governing the residence of foreign workers. It defined workers broadly as “those who engage in farming, fishing, mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, and other miscellaneous services, as well as rickshaw pullers and heavers”.\footnote{Ibid., 71.} Although this definition did not seem to be targeted at workers of a particular nationality, it was formulated by the government particularly with Chinese workers in mind. Chinese people were the largest foreign population in Japan in 1899. They had been treated as foreigners who did not have the freedom of residence by treaty or custom since the war between China and Japan in 1894, and even after the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was concluded in 1896, they were required to obtain permission from the Home Ministry to enter Japan.\footnote{Ibid., 19.} The Home Minister, Saigō Jūdō, wished to continue this permission system. He thought that the Chinese would “corrupt public morals and be a menace to public order by competing with native labourers and causing a disturbance in industries.”\footnote{Ibid., 71.} The permission system might have been less malignant if
permission had almost always been given upon request, but the government had decided before the enforcement of the Ordinances that it would give little permission to the Chinese. The instructions on operating the permission system stated that the permission to reside and conduct business outside the former settlements should not be given to workers other than those engaging in miscellaneous services, and even in the case of miscellaneous services, the instructions ordered that local authorities should “seek judgment from the Home Minister in each case before giving permission to them.” This means that the permission system was just a sham.

The Japanese immigration control system that was eventually established was totally at odds with Yamada’s view. It was designed not only to refuse a particular nation entry to Japan but also to protect national labour by making provisions based on occupation. Not every member of the government approved of this exclusionary legislation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aoki Shūzō, especially did seem to have an opinion similar to Yamada’s. In the drafting process of Ordinance No. 352, Aoki insisted on the importation of Chinese labourers. In his written opinion to the Prime Minister, Yamagata Aritomo, dated June 26, 1899, the Foreign Minister listed a great number of reasons to treat Chinese and Westerners equally. He argued that it was unjust to keep Chinese people within the former settlement zones since they did not enjoy consular jurisdiction in Japan; Japanese labour was cheap enough to compete with Chinese workers; Japanese merchants would gain a positive stimulus from Chinese traders who had a natural talent for business; a small number of Chinese labourers would not corrupt public morals, nor was it the case that all Chinese were “of lower class”; and the government could introduce administrative measures to restrict the entry of Chinese migrants at any time if necessary. Although, Aoki admitted, native labour had been unable to compete with Chinese labourers in the New World, this was because native labour supply in the New World countries had been insufficient and much of their land had been left undeveloped. By contrast, labour supply in Japan was abundant and most of its land was cultivated. Aoki added further reasons why he thought his country should open its borders to Chinese work-

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116 Ibid., 70–71.
117 Aoki Shūzō, “Meiji 27 nen chokurei dai 137 gō teikoku nai ni kyojū suru shinkoku shinmin ni kansuru ken haishi kata seigi no ken [On abolishing the 1894 Ordinance No. 137 concerning Chinese subjects living within the Empire]”,
ers. Firstly, it was untenable to accept Western people and at the same time reject the Chinese, who were not superior in terms of their competitiveness. Secondly, Japan should have a friendly relationship with China as its most important trade partner. And lastly, if Japan refused to admit Chinese workers, it would provoke both the Chinese government and the Chinese people. This would have had negative effects on the Japanese government’s efforts to eliminate discrimination against Japanese migrants in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{118}

As clearly expressed in Aoki’s written opinion, the Foreign Ministry was unwilling to exclude Chinese labour. This was an attitude generally observed among foreign ministries in the world at that time. They needed to keep good relations with other countries, but not pay much attention to domestic problems.\textsuperscript{119} It was rather the Ministry of Home Affairs that opposed the admission of Chinese workers. It did so for reasons of public order and public security. In his written opinion, the Minister of Home Affairs, Saigō Jūdō, replied to each of the reasons advanced by Aoki.\textsuperscript{120} Firstly, it was not unjust to limit the residence of the Chinese within the former settlement zones so long as China restricted the residence of the Japanese in China. Although European countries accepted the Chinese, this was just because there were few Chinese who migrated to Europe. Countries like the United States and Australia, which had accepted more Chinese migrants than European countries, had already started to restrict the entry of the Chinese. Secondly, the introduction of Chinese workers would increase unemployment and cause social problems. Westerners who started businesses in Japan would employ cheap Chinese labour, and Japanese businessmen would soon follow suit. Thirdly, the Chinese would commit crimes and spread bad customs, which would prevail even under the strictest control. And finally, the immigration of the Chinese, once permitted, would become difficult to repeal for domestic as well as diplomatic reasons.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 33–35.
\textsuperscript{120} Saigō Jūdō, “Jōyaku moshikuwa kankō ni yori teikoku nai ni oite kyōju no jiyū wo mitomeraretaru igai no gaikokujin toriatsukai ni kansuru ken [On the treatment of foreigners who are not allowed the freedom of residence within the Empire by treaties or custom]”, 28 June 1899, NAJ, Rui00851100/020: 17–25.
The Ordinances issued by the government were close to the policy advocated by the Home Minister. They practically prohibited the admission of Chinese workers to Japan under the guise of the permission system. Yamada’s opinion seemed more anti-racist and liberal than the official policy of the government. This impression is strengthened by reading his texts written during the controversy over article 2 of the Civil Code, in which he defended the idea of racial equality recurrently:

In the legal system of the present civilized countries, rights are entitled to a person regardless of his nationality [...]. “Criminal” in the Criminal Code of our country, that is, a person who commits an offence under the Code, includes not only Japanese criminals but all human beings who commit a crime under the Code regardless of whether they are Europeans, Indians or Africans. This principle also applies to a person who suffers damage from a crime. Those who commit a murder or injurious assault are criminals, regardless of whether those killed or injured are Westerners, Blacks or our fellow Japanese.\textsuperscript{121}

However, it should be remembered that Yamada approved of the equal treatment of nationals and foreigners because he believed that to do so was necessary for Japan to gain recognition as a civilized country. He had no doubt about the validity of the standard of civilization itself and thought that China was inferior to Japan in terms of its stage of development. Yamada wrote: “Why should we enjoy extraterritoriality in China and why should China bear such a great disgrace? The only reason is that China has not established the legal system of a civilized country.”\textsuperscript{122} It should also be noted that the residence of foreign workers was restricted by using the very law that Yamada had once defended, namely Article 2 of the Civil Code. The article contained a word the old Civil Code had not used, ‘ordinance’. It stipulated: “Unless otherwise provided by applicable laws, ordinances or treaties, foreign nationals shall enjoy private rights.” The insertion of that word enabled the Japanese government to limit the right of foreigners with a mere administrative order. It obscured an essential distinction between that right which might be restricted in certain cases and that fundamental right which should in no case be restricted. No matter how morally questionable it was, the way the Japanese government restricted the residence of foreign workers was legitimate under the Civil Code of

\textsuperscript{121} Yamada, \textit{Minpō dainijō shūsei an hantai shiken}, 8.
\textsuperscript{122} Yamada, “Gaikokujin no chii”, 15 no. 12 (1897): 1249–1250.
Japan, and Yamada saw no problem in the Code that enabled the Japanese government to do so. 123

Open questions

It is pointless to ask whether Yamada’s argument about international migration was ‘progressive’ according to the standard of his time. To modern eyes, the whole discussion about international migration in the late 19th century appears to have an extremely conservative character. All legal scholars mentioned in this chapter showed a remarkable unity in that they took for granted the exclusion of marginalized people like the poor, the sick and criminals, and in this respect Yamada was no exception. However, what is noteworthy about his argument about international migration is questions he posed but left unanswered, because they point to a presumably essential issue that emerged with the global expansion of international European society.

As mentioned above, the standard of civilization contained requirements concerning private law relationships such as commerce and marriage. These requirements were essential for establishing and sustaining international interactions between private citizens. It was legal experts like Yamada and the founders of the IDI who attempted to determine the exact content of these requirements and to create an institutional framework for secure international intercourse. Private international law was particularly relevant to their purpose in a double sense: As private international law, the discipline was concerned with relations between private citizens, and as private international law, it dealt with matters of international character. But the discussion in this chapter has pointed out that the civilization standard remained unclear as to how much freedom of international intercourse should be permitted among civilized nations.

The question of the limits of freedom became most apparent in the area of international migration. When it came to discussing international migration, even the renowned scholars of the IDI found difficulties in agreeing on what a desirable regime of international migration should look

123 In fact, although Yamada mentioned in his article written after he had studied in Europe that the Japanese immigration system was based on the exclusion of Chinese labourers, he did not criticize the system. See Yamada Saburō, “Gaikokujin no chii o ronzu [On the status of foreigners]”, Kokusaihō zasshi 2 (1902): 25.
like. Yamada stepped into this tangled field and tried to answer where the limits of the freedom of international migration should be drawn. By using the concept of “community life”, he argued that the limits should be determined solely by considering what was necessary for maintaining community life at the international level, not by prioritizing the principle of territorial sovereignty. According to him, international community existed for the purpose of maintaining the coexistence of its member states. Therefore, each member state might do whatever was needed to sustain its existence as long as it accepted the rules necessary for the coexistence of states. The two rules Yamada proposed were that states must not deny a particular race or nation access to their territories and that states must not refuse to admit foreign workers for the sole purpose of protecting national labour.

However, his approach raised questions rather than solved problems. It does not seem that Yamada was much bothered about whether his approach was justifiable. But is it really legitimate to think that the necessity of international community life takes precedence over the claim of territorial sovereignty? Even if his approach can be justified, does it really follow from his approach that states must always treat all races equally and open their borders to foreign workers? Furthermore, even if the limits of the freedom of international migration should be determined by taking into consideration the necessity of international community life, there remains a question about how to determine exactly how much international migration is necessary for maintaining international community life. In this regard, not only did Yamada have nothing to say, but neither did all the legal experts examined in this chapter. The IDI argued that immigration of foreign workers might be restricted if too many foreigners came to a country and became a danger to it. Yamada also subscribed to this view. But neither the Institute nor Yamada proposed a quantitative criterion for judging how many immigrants should be regarded as dangerous.

The members of the IDI assumed that the expansion and intensification of international intercourse would have positive effects on the whole of human society. They also thought that the assumption would be supported by the latest knowledge in social sciences. But they were, as Koskenniemi aptly called it, “amateur sociologists”. They did not have a refined theory of international intercourse nor empirical knowledge about it.124 As has

been seen above, both the IDI and Yamada adhered to Leroy-Beaulieu’s economic teachings regarding the desirability of labour migration. Legal science was unable to create its own criterion about labour migration and needed to rely on economic doctrine. Probably, what was needed was to combine legal and social-scientific methods, clarify the mechanism of international intercourse and its effects on the whole of human life, and offer an objective criterion for judging the appropriate amount of international migration necessary to maintain international community life. But such an approach was (and possibly is) still to be devised.

This chapter has focused on the thinking and activity of the private international lawyer Yamada Saburō, who would actively participate in international cooperation in the interwar years. By semi-biographically investigating his early life, this chapter has demonstrated that in the period from 1894 to 1899, when the Japanese government was preparing to fully open its country to international society, he developed his original view about international migration through the interpretation of the IDI’s rules, the view that saw international migration as a prerequisite for maintaining international community life and pressed for the equal treatment of migrants of all races more explicitly than the IDI. These differences in defining the limits of the freedom of international migration were a crucial factor that caused and perpetuated international disputes. It became ever more important in the development of both international conflict and cooperation in the interwar years. Many of the Japanese saw the exclusion of Japanese immigrants in the United States as a great problem, because they regarded international migration as a necessary condition for sustaining international community life and racial equality as a principle which all civilized nations should adhere to. To them, gaining access to the civilized world on an equal footing with other civilized countries was a reward which should be granted to Japan after it had successfully civilized itself, a vitally important means of survival for a small, ‘overpopulated’ country with limited resources. Yamada and others who would participate in international cooperation started demanding this reward once they realized that it was not going to be given to them.
Part II: International cooperation after the foundation of the League of Nations

In the 1890s, when Yamada Saburō was arguing about the equal treatment of migrants of all races, negative reactions to immigration had already begun to be observed in various parts of the world. As early as at the end of the 19th century, countries had started to implement anti-foreign policies, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States and the mass expulsion of Polish and Jewish residents from Prussia. Japan was no exception in this regard. As stated in the first chapter, the exclusionist spirit of the days clearly marked Japan’s immigration control system, which was implemented in 1899 to prevent the admission of Chinese workers. Soon after Japan introduced this anti-Chinese legislation, Japanese nationals also started to experience discriminatory treatment overseas. In 1906 the city of San Francisco ordered Asian children including Japanese to attend a racially segregated school, and in 1913 the state of California prohibited Japanese immigrants from possessing land in the state. There is no doubt that anti-foreign sentiment had prevailed around the world at the beginning of the 20th century, but, still, it was not until the outbreak of the First World War that trends against international movement of people became manifest. Passport control was reintroduced in Europe at the beginning of the war and would never be abolished even after the armistice. The catastrophe of the war changed the social, political and intellectual landscape irreversibly. A great number of people started to cast serious doubts on the typically 19th-century liberal assumption that the free movement of capital, goods and people would bring peace to the world.

To many Japanese, the rejection of the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference was a watershed event that revealed how strongly Western countries were opposed to accepting Japan as an equal member of international society. They reacted angrily to the event, thinking that the newly established international organization gave assent to the discriminatory treatment of Japanese immigrants in the United States. The denial of the racial equality proposal also made Yamada reconsider his views on international migration. Before the war, he had taught in his university lectures that, according to standard international practice, a country could
reject nationals of treaty countries in peacetime if they were criminals, criminal suspects, the poor and people with contagious diseases. But after the war he added two footnotes to the above explanation of the rejection of foreigners:

(1) The Japanese are experiencing severe discrimination in the state of California. Although this does not directly violate international law, it cannot be denied that this is an act against internationally accepted practice. The League of Nations, whose establishment is now being called for, is based on the assumption that all nations are created equal. If the equality of nations is not guaranteed and still a country agrees to join the League, the country must expect to face discrimination against itself. (2) The British Empire has also implemented an immigration restriction law in Australia.

Although these sentences are too short to understand exactly what he meant, they indicate that he was concerned about the anti-foreign policies in the United States and the British Dominions. He thought that the equality principle was being undermined and the deletion of the equality clause from the Covenant of the League of Nations would have serious consequences for Japan.

Interestingly, however, the Great War did not only bring an end to the era of relatively free borders. It also stimulated the formation of new international cooperation, which aimed at restoring international intercourse and securing perpetual peace. Yamada was one of those who participated in this post-war international cooperation. In 1919 he visited battlefields such as Ypres and Verdun during his official trip to Europe. The calamities of war he witnessed—high towers destroyed to rubble, a hill whose shape had been completely changed by bombardment and a ten-kilometre square area where the lives of five hundred thousand people had been lost—had left a lasting impression on him. He recalled, “Seeing such a horrible spectacle, everybody will feel that wars are the gravest crime […]. It is, therefore, quite natural that the former enemies and allies, afraid of incurring such war damage once again in the future, began to deeply desire measures to prevent war and secure peace.”

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1 Yamada Saburō, *Kokusaishihō* [Private international law], a transcript of a lecture held at Tōkyō Imperial University for the academic year 1913, 155–156.
2 Yamada Saburō, *Kokusaishihō* [Private international law], a transcript of a lecture held at Tōkyō Imperial University for the academic year 1922, 216–217.
4 Ibid., 20.
battlefield might have shaken his belief in progress through the expansion and intensification of international intercourse. But, rather than becoming pessimistic, he became more convinced of the necessity of international cooperation than ever before.

Established in the aftermath of the First World War, the International Federation of League of Nations Societies became one of the most important actors in post-WWI international cooperation. The Federation created a place where academics, businessmen and politicians from all around the world met to discuss various problems of international politics and formulate international principles which all states were supposed to adhere to. Yamada was one of the first Japanese citizens who attended the assembly of the IFLNS in 1919 and helped establish the League of Nations Association of Japan in 1920. The second part of this book aims at analysing the initial period of international cooperation immediately after the First World War, particularly focusing on the IFLNS and the LNAJ.

The following chapters regard the discrimination against Japanese immigrants in the United States as one of the key factors behind the establishment of the LNAJ, and emphasize the Japanese government’s proposal of racial equality and its final rejection at the Paris Peace Conference as a catalytic event that led to the rise in Japanese international cooperation in the early 1920s. As is well known, when the Japanese government proposed inserting a racial equality clause into the Covenant of the League of Nations, it only intended to secure its status as one of the major powers. But the proposal gained an unintended meaning soon after it was made public; in the minds of many Japanese it began to be connected with the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States and the British Dominions. As a result, the rejection of racial equality sparked strong reactions from Japan, and the racial issue became one of the most important issues Japanese semi-governmental international organizations like

5 Shimazu Naoko, *Japan, Race and Equality: the Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). Shimazu analysed the intentions of the Japanese, American and English delegations to the Paris conference. According to her, the Japanese delegation's intention of proposing racial equality can be explained by three factors, namely, domestic politics, immigration issues and its position as a major power. Among them, she emphasized the last factor. It is true that the Japanese government intended to gain domestic support or to solve the immigration problems in the United States and the British Dominions, but its most important goal was to secure its position as the only non-white major power in the League. See also, Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations*, 80–86.
the LNAJ had to tackle. Unlike the Japanese government, which became increasingly unwilling to talk about racial issues after the failure at Versailles, the LNAJ continued to demand racial equality. The Association proposed to take up the problem at the assemblies of the IFLNS and attempted to awaken world opinion to the issue of equal treatment of all races. As this second chapter will show, this organized effort resulted in a unique draft resolution which advocated the principle of racial equality with regard to the admission of foreigners into a country.

Previous studies of the Paris Peace Conference have overlooked the link between the racial equality proposal at Versailles and the LNAJ’s international cooperation in the early 1920s with the result that the LNAJ’s demands for racial equality have largely remained unstudied despite the amount of attention given to the problem of racial equality. Ōnuma Yasuaki’s famous article on the racial equality proposal also does not touch upon the LNAJ, but it is worth mentioning because it offers an analysis which is also useful for the discussion here. He examines the proposal to test the validity of his claim that there were some characteristic patterns in the modern Japanese “attitude towards international legal order (Kokusaihō-chitsujo-kan: 国際法秩序観)”.

What he considers the merkmal of this attitude is a lack of active commitment and an absence of universalistic orientation. According to Ōnuma, Japan’s commitment to universal principles was usually superficial and its support for the gradual and peaceful change of international legal order was for the most part fragile. As a result, throughout its modern history the country has oscillated...
between two extremes: its passive adaptation to the Eurocentric international legal order at one end of the scale and its total rejection of the order by force at the other. Although, at first glance, the racial equality proposal seems an unusual case in which the Japanese government actively attempted to establish a universal principle, Ōnuma argues that one can also find the same patterns in this attempt. By closely investigating official documents and published sources at the time, he shows how dubious the Japanese government’s approach to the racial issue was. What he emphasizes is the fact that while the government demanded racial equality, it did not have the slightest intention of abolishing its own discriminatory treatment towards Chinese and Korean people.\(^9\) This shows that Japan proposed racial equality not for the purpose of promoting universal racial equality but to acquire an equal status with Western countries. Interestingly, Ōnuma found little difference between the Japanese government and its critics in terms of their attitude towards international legal order. Certainly, he admires intellectuals like Ishibashi Tanzan, Yoshino Sakuzō and Kanbe Masao for having criticized the hypocrisy of the government’s proposal by pointing out the existence of discrimination towards the Chinese and the Koreans in Japan. Their attitude was much better than that of the government leaders and anti-foreign nationalists who only denounced racial discrimination in the United States and remained silent about discrimination in their own country. But Ōnuma blames even these dissident intellectuals for not having acted on their own initiatives to eliminate racial discrimination at home and abroad. They only criticized the government and did nothing to make international society acknowledge racial equality as a universal principle. This lack of active commitment is what he regards as the typical shortcomings of the Japanese attitude towards the international legal order.\(^10\)

The second part of this book does not directly challenge Ōnuma’s analysis of the racial equality proposal, since its focus is not on the Paris Peace Conference but rather on the repercussions the Conference had on the succeeding events. It suggests, however, that the post-war development of international cooperation is an interesting and necessary subject of study even from Ōnuma’s perspective, because, contrary to what he would expect, the members of the LNAJ actively attempted to make international

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\(^9\) Ibid., 431–432.
\(^10\) Ibid., 477.
society recognize racial equality as a universal principle. Although they were only able to work within the framework of semi-governmental international cooperation, they did strive to change international order peacefully by mobilizing international opinion in favour of racial equality.

The following discussion tries to offer an elaborate analysis of the post-WWI development of international cooperation, which has not been provided by previous studies. It does not maintain that the LNAJ overcame the shortcomings of what Ōnuma calls the modern Japanese attitude towards international legal order. As the second chapter will show, the LNAJ’s active commitment to racial equality did not last long and failed to establish it as an international principle. In 1925, when it became clear that the British and American League of Nations associations would not subscribe to racial equality, the LNAJ ceased to propagate the idea of racial equality, just as the Japanese government had done after the Paris conference. The semi-governmental organization could not behave in a morally coherent enough manner to make its demand for racial equality credible to international audiences. But this second part also argues that the LNAJ did not simply go back to where it had come from but continued its agenda-setting activities while shifting its focus from international migration to international trade and investment. In contrast to the second chapter, which emphasizes the limits of the activities of the LNAJ, the third chapter indicates the possibility of the development of Japanese international cooperation in the late 1920s. It shows that the way and degree in which Japanese international cooperation addressed the issue of international migration changed gradually in the interwar years. The LNAJ began to formulate a new policy agenda after it realized the strength of opposition to dealing with the issue at international forums. It started to place more weight on the liberty of trading and the expansion of international investment than on racial equality and international migration in general.

In the following, the second chapter examines in detail the development of the LNAJ and the IFLNS in their initial period between 1919 and 1925, mainly focusing on the most important issue addressed by the LNAJ, the equal treatment of all races in the matter of international migration. Then, the third chapter analyses the change of direction in Japanese international cooperation brought about by the failure of the LNAJ’s demands for racial equality, especially paying attention to the discussion about the 1927 Geneva World Economy Conference.
On January 26, 1919, a meeting was held in Paris by representatives of eight societies that had been established independently in France, England, the United States, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Romania and China. These societies were non-governmental organizations which supported Woodrow Wilson’s post-war vision of international order, and their purpose of having the meeting was to encourage the development of the League of Nations, which the Allied powers had agreed to establish the previous day. Unfortunately, little is known about what was discussed at the meeting, but the fact that the societies held the next meeting just two months later was a sign that the first meeting had ended successfully. In fact, the relationship among the societies developed rapidly thereafter. The circle of the societies expanded to include other societies with a similar purpose, with the result that the third meeting, held in Brussels in December of the same year, witnessed representatives of 16 societies from different countries—France, England, Italy, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Poland, Russia, Yugoslavia, China and Japan. It was at this meeting that the representatives decided to set up a federation of the societies called the International Federation of League of Nations Societies (the French official name was l’Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations), whose declared goal was to improve and foster the application of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Those who attended the third meeting—which was later to be called the third ‘Plenary Congress’ of the IFLNS—thought that the establishment of a federative organization would foster communication among member societies. In their plan the federation would offer a place for discussion among member societies, form a consensus of opinion among them, and check government actions by expressing their consensus, while each society was to function as a ‘transmitter’ which would communicate the IFLNS’s opinion to its national public and educate domestic opinion through propaganda. In other words, the IFLNS and its member societies were expected to become an organ for expressing support for the League’s

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ideas worldwide.\textsuperscript{2} One author summarized the function of the IFLNS in three points: “[C]réer, dans chaque pays, par l’éducation des peuples, une opinion favorable à la Société des nations. Unifier l’opinion des diverses nations jusqu’à en faire une base solide pour la Société. Exprimer cette opinion, pour mettre la Société des nations face à face avec la volonté des peuples.”\textsuperscript{3}

Those who participated in the third meeting thought that an organization like the IFLNS, whose mission was to mobilize international public opinion in favour of the League of Nations, was urgently needed to assist the League. Since it did not have its own means of sanction, the League had to rely largely on the moral power of world opinion in order to maintain peace. Of course, it was quite uncertain how far the opinion expressed by the IFLNS could actually influence international politics. To say the least, it was highly doubtful that a non-governmental international organization like the IFLNS could contribute greatly to solving international conflicts. Documents adopted by the Federation at its Plenary Congress, most of which expressed recommendations and resolutions concerning the League’s work, had no binding force. They were only handed to the president of the Assembly of the League and subsequently printed in the League’s \textit{Official Journal}. The overwhelmingly long process which had to be undergone until a lay member’s idea might have an influence on international politics is illustrated by the following passages published in an official journal of one of the most influential member societies of the IFLNS, the British League of Nations Union.

For actual member [sic] of the Union, the International Federation is the “back entrance” to the League. Through our Parliament and by constitutional methods we have one means of access. But through our own organization we have another. A member has an idea. It is adopted by his branch committee and sent to Headquarters. It comes before the Executive. If it is of inter-

\textsuperscript{2} In this regard, the IFLNS somewhat resembled the IDI, which claimed to be the “legal conscience of the civilized world”. But it should also be noted that the IFLNS was not an organization specializing in legal science like the IDI. The IFLNS was an organization composed of various groups of people—politicians, businessmen, scholars etc.—and its field of activity was broader than the IDI. On the other hand, the founding members of the IDI defined the \textit{Institut} as a purely scientific organization and differentiated it from organizations aimed at exerting political influence on international society. See Koskenniemi, \textit{The Gentle Civilizer of Nations}, 40–41.

\textsuperscript{3} “Le Congrès de Varsovie”, \textit{Journal de Genève}, June 30, 1925.
national importance it becomes part and parcel of the policy of the British delegation to the next Congress [of the IFLNS] and goes upon the agenda. Should it be accepted by the full meeting, it is later presented to the President of the Assembly or of the International Labour Conference. Deputations from the Federation wait upon both, and the resolutions are printed in the Journal of the Assembly and so brought to the notice of the delegates themselves.4

Needless to say, official delegations from various countries must have been too busy to read resolutions adopted by a merely private organization.

However, despite the obvious defect that the IFLNS was a weak, non-governmental organization whose decisions had no binding force on governments around the world, people hurried to establish a League of Nations society in their own country and joined the IFLNS willingly. This enthusiasm was based on the widely held belief that, even if the IFLNS could have no direct influence on international politics, its decisions would have an indirect influence on international politics, since its members included highly renowned people in various countries. “Of course, the delegates at these Conferences of voluntary societies do not bind, or even represent, their Governments. Nevertheless, they are mostly men of importance in their own countries, many of whom have held high posts”, said an active member of the British Union, Lady Gladstone, the spouse of Herbert Gladstone, in her report on an assembly of the IFLNS.5 In fact, the Union’s members included distinguished leaders of the British peace movement, like Philip Baker and David Davies.6 It was upon the influence of these prominent figures that IFLNS enthusiasts placed much hope. They thought that, although the IFLNS would be powerless in the world of official diplomacy, it could at least function as an agenda setter. They believed that the Federation was capable of proposing an issue which was of international importance but had not been taken up by the League of Nations, and of encouraging the League to officially deal with the issue. Therefore, the author who described the IFLNS as a “back entrance” to the

6 In this regard, the British association was an organization of those people who were later criticized by E. H. Carr as “utopianist”. On his criticism, see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, ed. Michael Cox (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
League also called the IFLNS’s Plenary Congress a “dress rehearsal” for the Assembly of the League. He wrote:

Owing to their unofficial character it is often possible to broach matters that are as yet unripe for official intervention. Therefore it is possible to see what difficulties and dangers are likely to arise. It is possible to see, too, how they may be circumscribed. And this is what happens. Little by little public opinion in every country is mobilized on that particular point till such time as every government knows that it has well-informed public opinion behind it in its efforts for international co-operation […].

These understandings of the IFLNS were little different from those held by the founder members of the League of Nations Association of Japan. Yamada Saburō, one of those Japanese members of the LNAJ who first attended the third Plenary Congress of the IFLNS, regarded the unofficial character of the IFLNS as its merit. He even thought that the official League of Nations was “less important as a place for discussion than the IFLNS, where people can freely argue what they think.”

He expected every international problem of great importance to be first discussed at the assembly of the IFLNS and then be the subject of the official discussion at the League. The earliest government documents on the IFLNS also stated an opinion similar to the British view of the IFLNS. They recorded a comment by a Japanese participant at the third Congress that “although the IFLNS is an unofficial undertaking, its member societies attract renowned politicians and academics of various countries. Its resolutions, therefore, will influence public opinion in those countries and their governments will eventually have to take the resolutions into account.”

With these understandings of the IFLNS, Japanese supporters of the League established the LNAJ on April 23, 1920. Representatives from various circles—bureaucrats, officers, members of the Diet, academics, religious leaders, journalists and businessmen—were invited to an inaugural meeting held on that day. Those who attended the meeting agreed to define the aim of the Association as “achieving the ideal of the League of Nations” and to perform various missions such as “research on the League

7 “The International Federation”, i.
8 Yamada, “Kokusai renmei ni tsuite”, 16.
9 “Daisankai kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō sōkai kaigi [The third Congress of the IFLNS]”, JACAR: B04013930300, 39.
of Nations, organization of lecture meetings, publications, communication with other organizations with a similar aim, and participation in the activities of the IFLNS”. Among these missions, the founding members of the LNAJ regarded participation in the Plenary Congress of the IFLNS as an important task of the LNAJ along with educational activities aimed at fostering support for the League. In contrast to the latter activities, whose nature was basically propaganda, the former aimed at agenda-setting.

Table 2.1 is a list of those who attended the IFLNS Plenary Congress as delegates from the LNAJ. The Association sent 1 to 10 delegates to (at least) 18 congresses held between 1919 and 1937. The list is impressive not only because it shows a large number of well-known names, but also for the variety of their backgrounds. It includes notable academics, both then and later, such as the leading constitutional lawyers Minobe Tatsukichi and Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, a pioneer in the study of public administration, Rōyama Masamichi, or the man who introduced Kelsen’s theory of international law into Japan, Yokota Kisaburō. On the other hand, the list also contains diplomats, both active and retired, and bureaucrats of other ministries like the Justice Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. Among them, diplomat Sugimura Yōtarō, who became an Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations in 1927, attended more than one congress. A few people are difficult to categorize either as an academic or bureaucrat, such as Ōsawa Akira, who served at the Home Ministry but later held the chair of international law at Kyūshū Imperial University. There are also a few influential people in political and financial circles, such as Inoue Junnosuke, who served as the Finance Minister and the Governor of the Bank of Japan, and Shidachi Tetsujirō, the former Governor of the Industrial Bank of Japan. The person who has the best attendance record is probably one of those who are the least known, Inagaki Morikatsu, who lived in Europe as a staff member of the LNAJ and attended almost all congresses of the IFLNS from 1925 to 1937.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Place, Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brussels, December 1–3, 1919</td>
<td>Akizuki Satsuo (retired diplomat), Horiuchi Kensuke (diplomat), Maeda Masana (member of the House of Peers), Onozuka Kiheiji (political scientist), Suehiro Izutarō (legal scholar), Yamada Saburō (legal scholar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Milan, October 12–16, 1920</td>
<td>Kanō Jigorō (educator), Tanakadate Aikitsu (geophysicist), Miura Yagorō (retired diplomat), Hotta Masatsune (member of the House of Peers), Miyake Masatarō (bureaucrat of the Justice Ministry), Hotta Masaaki (diplomat), Kuriyama Shigeru (diplomat), Koshida Saichirō (diplomat), Kurosawa Jirō (diplomat), Ōsawa Akira (international lawyer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Geneva, June 6–9, 1921</td>
<td>Oka Minoru (bureaucrat of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce), Dazai Semon (scholar of French literature), Satake Sango (bureaucrat of the Railways Ministry), Oritake Tamou (linguist), Ojima Kikue (unknown), Ichihashi Yamato (scholar of Japanese history)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Prague, June 4–7, 1922</td>
<td>Minobe Tatsukichi (legal scholar), Hatoyma Hideo (legal scholar), Kamikawa Hikomatsu (scholar of international politics), Dazai Semon (scholar of French literature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Vienna, June 22–27, 1923</td>
<td>Tachi Sakutarō (international lawyer), Sugimura Yōtarō (diplomat), Inui Kiyosue (English teacher), Takagi Yasaka (political scientist), Fujisawa Chikao (official of the League of Nations), Akamatsu Shūkei (religious scholar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lyons, June 27 –July 2, 1924</td>
<td>Inoue Junnosuke (former Governor of the Bank of Japan), Takayanagi Kenzō (legal scholar), Shiozawa Masasada (economist), Sugimura Yōtarō (diplomat), Usami Uzuhiro (diplomat), Wakatsuki Fukujirō (diplomat), Kusama Shikō (diplomat), Suzuki Tadakatsu (diplomat), Furukaki Tetsurō (diplomat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr.</td>
<td>Place, Date</td>
<td>Participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Warsaw, July 3–8, 1925</td>
<td>Suzuki Bunji (trade unionist), Tanahashi Gentarō (museologist), Sugimura Yōtarō (diplomat), Usami Uzuhiko (diplomat), Furukaki Tetsurō (diplomat), Ishizaki Masatarō (unknown), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aberystwyth, June 29 – July 3, 1926</td>
<td>Makino Eiichi (legal scholar), Nogami Toshio (psychologist), Horiuchi Kensuke (diplomat), Tsuchida Seiichi (Shintoist educator), Haji Morisada (colonial bureaucrat), Rōyama Masamichi (political scientist), Yokota Kisaburō (international lawyer), Fukushima Hantarō (art critic), Furukaki Tetsurō (diplomat), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Berlin, May 26–31, 1927</td>
<td>Shidachi Tetsujirō (Governor of the Industrial Bank of Japan), Inui Kiyosue (English teacher), Furukaki Tetsurō (diplomat), Fukushima Hantarō (art critic), Nagai Alexander (diplomat), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Hague, July 2–7, 1928</td>
<td>Taoka Ryōichi (legal scholar), Narahashi Wataru (lawyer), Fukushima Hanntarō (art critic), Yasuma Norikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Madrid, May 18–24, 1929</td>
<td>Yamada Saburō (legal scholar), Fukushima Hantarō (art critic), Nakamura Yoshinosuke (scholar of economic geography), Kikuzawa Suemaro (bureaucrat of the Education Ministry), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Geneva, June 5–9, 1930</td>
<td>Tanakadate Aikitsu (geophysicist), Hijikata Seibi (economist), Miyazawa Toshiyoshi (legal scholar), Mutō Toshio (legal scholar), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Budapest, May 24–28, 1931</td>
<td>Miyajima Mikinosuke (zoologist), Kawahara Jikichirō (political scientist), Satō Junzō (diplomat), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Paris, July 4–9, 1932</td>
<td>Tsurumi Yūsuke (politician), Yamauchi Shirō (unknown), Satō Junzō (diplomat), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr.</td>
<td>Place, Date</td>
<td>Participants</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Montreux, June 3–8, 1933</td>
<td>Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Folkestone, May 19–24, 1934</td>
<td>Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bruxelles, June 9–13, 1935</td>
<td>Non-attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Glasgow, June 1–4, 1936</td>
<td>Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ), Kitaoka Juitsu (bureaucrat of the Home Ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Bratislava, June 28 – July 3, 1937</td>
<td>Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The annual bulletin of the LNAJ.

Note: When the bulletin contained no information on members of the delegation to the IFLNS, the author used reports wired from the delegation to the Foreign Ministry of Japan and official programs of the Congress. In cases where there were discrepancies between the bulletin, reports and official programmes, the author relied on reports, since they were provided by delegates themselves immediately after the Congress and deemed most credible. The same rule was applied to the year 1925, in which the bulletin is missing.

Although the list is quite informative, it can only provide a rough idea of what the LNAJ’s delegation to the IFLNS’s Congress in each year was like. It cannot show the degree of contribution each delegate made to the discussion held at the Congress. To know the exact nature of the LNAJ’s agenda-setting activities, therefore, it is necessary to make clear (1) who was at the centre of the LNAJ and what was their motivation in participating in the LNAJ and, in more detail, (2) what the LNAJ argued at the IFLNS’s Congress and who articulated the LNAJ’s policies. In so doing, it is also indispensable to examine (3) how other international actors—other member societies of the IFLNS and other international organizations—approached the LNAJ, because it can be assumed that not only did internal factors within the LNAJ affect the course taken by the Association, but so did external ones.
The LNAJ and its relations with business and financial circles

The first question is rather easy to answer: there were two main groups among those who ran the LNAJ. One group was influential people in business and financial circles and the other was diplomats.

The LNAJ’s governing body consisted of a chairman, two vice-chairmen and twelve directors (see Table 2.2). Although Tokugawa Iesato, the 16th head of the Tokugawa clan, was the President of the Association, the post was honorary. The founding chairman was Shibusawa Eiichi and the vice-chairmen were Sakatani Yoshirō and Soeda Juichi. These three were in charge of the LNAJ’s various activities for almost a decade until Soeda passed away in 1929. Sakatani lived until 1941, but he held only an honorary position after Shibusawa’s death in 1931.

Although the three were more or less involved in the business world, it is misleading to describe them straightforwardly as businessmen. All of them were typical examples of the elite in the Meiji era, when the boundaries between the state, business and civil society were still nebulous. Shibusawa was a truly successful businessman who established or managed more than 500 companies in his lifetime. But at the time of the foundation of the LNAJ, he had already retired from the business world and devoted himself to social philanthropy. He was a member of many non-profit organizations including: Hakuai sha (the Philanthropic Society), Nichi-In Kyōkai (the Japan-India Association), Nichi-Futsu Kyōkai (the Japan-France Association), Chūō Jizen Kyōkai (the Central Charity Asso-

Table 2.2 Governing body of the LNAJ at the time of its establishment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Tokugawa Iesato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Shibusawa Eiichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-chairman</td>
<td>Sakatani Yoshirō, Soeda Juichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Inoue Junnosuke, Hayashi Kōroku, Hozumi Shigetō, Oka Minoru, Yoshii Kōzō, Tagawa Daikichi, Takahashi Sakue, Yamakawa Tadao, Matsuda Michikazu, Akizuki Satsuo, Anesaki Masaharu, Miyaoka Tsunejirō</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ciation), Kyōchō kai (the Harmonization Society) et al. Shibusawa’s son-in-law Sakatani was also involved in a great number of profit and non-profit organizations, but unlike Shibusawa, who served at the Ministry of Finance only for a short period from 1868 to 1873, Sakatani spent most of his career as a state official and a politician rather than a businessman. He entered the Ministry of Finance after he graduated from the University of Tōkyō in 1884 and served as the Finance Minister from 1906 to 1908. Later, he became the mayor of Tōkyō in 1912 and a member of the House of Peers in 1917. Soeda’s career was similar to Sakatani’s: he entered the Ministry of Finance in the same year as Sakatani, served as its vice-minister, and became a member of the House of Peers in his later years. But Soeda was more multifaceted than Sakatani. After he left the Ministry of Finance in 1898, he taught economics and public finance at several universities, and then took charge of the establishment of several government-managed financial institutions, such as the Bank of Formasa and the Industrial Bank of Japan. He also served as the president of newspaper companies like Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpō and Hōchi and wrote chief editorials for these papers.

What characterized these three people was that they all had the experience of government finance at the Ministry of Finance and built strong connections with both the business world and the government. Shibusawa especially was known as Zaikai sewanin (財界世話人), a mediator who utilized his personal network to reconcile different interests among businessmen as well as between the business sector and the government. Sewanin helped merge small companies in the same industry into a larger corporation and communicated requests from the business community to the government in order to promote the overall interests of the business world.12 It was thanks to this network bridging between the business community and the government that the three held important positions in many semi-governmental organizations including the LNAJ. There was a mutu-

12 Although the network of sewanin was spontaneous and informal in the beginning, it was later institutionalized as Nihon keizai renmei kai (the Japan Economic Federation), the largest business organization in the pre-war years which was established by a group of leading industrialists in 1922. The Federation was mainly administered by one of the directors of the LNAJ, Inoue Junnosuke, until 1928. For Zaikai sewanin, see Matsuura Masataka, Zaikai no seiji keizai shi: Inoue Junnosuke, Gō Seinosuke, Ikeda Shigeaki no jidai [Political and economic history of Zaikai: the age of Inoue Junnosuke, Gō Seinosuke and Ikeda Shigeaki] (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppan kai, 2002).
ally beneficial relationship between the three and the government. On the one hand, the government could rely on them to attract donations from the business sector. It could also ask them to do what the government could not do officially. On the other hand, they could use their positions in semi-governmental organizations when they needed to urge the government to take account of the special interests of the business community. The role they played in the LNAJ must also be seen in the light of this symbiotic relationship.

Shibusawa’s involvement in international cooperation dated back to the pre-WWI era, and it was related to the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States. The situation surrounding Japanese immigrants on the west coast of the United States began worsening in the early 1900s, and the city of San Francisco passed a regulation in 1906 which required Japanese children to attend a racially segregated school. The United States and Japan negotiated from 1907 to 1908 to solve the problem and reached the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement, whereby the Japanese government agreed to stop issuing passports to Japanese nationals who wished to migrate to, and work in, the United States. But this did not stop the escalation of anti-Japanese sentiment on the west coast. In 1913 the so-called alien land bill was introduced in the state of California. The bill, if passed, would prohibit Japanese immigrants from possessing land in the state. Concerned about the effect the bill would have on the Japanese-US relationship in general, Shibusawa started to make various attempts to ease the conflict between the two countries. Together with two politicians, Nakano Buei and Shimada Saburō, he organized an association called Nichi-Bei dōshi kai in April 1913. The association sent Soeda Juichi and Kamiya Tadao to the United States from May to August in the same year, and made them examine the prevailing conditions in California. It also held a lecture meeting at a clubhouse of the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce in May, inviting Yamada Saburō as a guest speaker. 13

Although the bill was passed in May and the California Alien Land Law came into force in August 1913, this made Shibusawa only more active. A pacifist organization, the Japan Peace Society, and its international network played a major role in the development of his further

activities.\textsuperscript{14} Established on May 18, 1906, a memorial day of the First Hague Peace Conference, the Society was originally an organization of Japanese Christians who had a connection with an American missionary organization, the American Peace Society of Japan. But after Sakatani became a member of the Society in 1911, its membership was extended on his initiative to include influential politicians and businessmen like Shibusawa. Utilizing the Society’s connection with American pacifists, Shibusawa held a meeting in February 1915, inviting Japanese and American citizens who were concerned about the relationship between the two countries. Among those present were Shibusawa, Sakatani, Soeda, Nakano, Kaneko Kentarō and two missionaries, Gilbert Bowles and Sidney Gulick. The meeting developed into the Japanese-American Relations Committee (\textit{Nichi-Bei kankei iinkai}), an organization dedicated to the betterment of the US-Japanese relationship. In the interwar years, Shibusawa devoted much of his time to the activities of the Committee and the LNAJ.\textsuperscript{15}

What is important is that most of the Japanese mentioned above were more or less deeply connected with the migration industry. Kamiya was an executive of the Brazilian Colonization Company, which was established in 1913 to build a Japanese colony in the Iguape region. Shibusawa and Nakano helped the establishment of this company and remained involved with it as advisors. Although the company operated only in Brazil, it could not remain indifferent to the problem in the United States, because anti-Japanese sentiment could also spread in Brazil. No doubt Shibusawa and his fellows acted out of sympathy for their compatriots, but presumably patriotism was not the only factor that prompted their actions. It is highly probable that their efforts were closely related to their business interests, at least in the beginning. This becomes all the clearer if one reads two letters of request which Shibusawa, Nakano and Soeda submitted to the


\textsuperscript{15} For the activities of the Japanese-American Relations Committee in the interwar period, see Itō Masataka, “Nichi-Bei ‘imin mondai’ to Nichi-Bei kōtō ininkai setti undō [The US-Japanese ‘immigration problem’ and the campaign for the establishment of a joint high commission between the two countries]”, \textit{Hokudai shigaku} 46 (2006): 50–70; Katagiri, “Shibusawa Eiichi to kokumin gaikō”, 9–19.
Japanese government in October 1913. These letters clearly show where their real interests lay.

In one of the two letters entitled *Keihatsu undō ni kansuru ken* (On the campaign for education), the three asked the government to establish an association whose ultimate objective was to “achieve harmony between Eastern and Western civilizations as well as among all races”. Although the term ‘international cooperation’ did not appear in this document, Shibusawa and the others seem to have already cherished an idea similar to international cooperation. The association to be established would develop a close relationship between Japan and foreign countries by “encouraging international exchange of ideas, feelings and information”. It would dispel misunderstanding about Japan and the Japanese by sending distinguished scholars from Japan to foreign countries and inviting foreign collaborators to write articles about Japan for internationally influential newspapers; that means the three planned the campaign would become a mixture of intellectual exchange and propaganda. Although its obvious target was the United States, the campaign would not be confined to the North American area. Soeda stated clearly in a published article that the campaign’s aim was to guide the public of “not only Japan and the United States but also the world at large in the right direction”.

But why did Shibusawa and his fellows think such an international campaign was necessary? In the letter, they insisted that the campaign was indispensable in fostering Japan’s *kaigai hatten* (overseas development). Although the term could signify various things, in the early 20th century context it unmistakably meant the expansion of economic activity through colonization and emigration. The ambition for Japanese economic expansion through international migration was more clearly expressed in the other letter entitled, *Imin hōshin ni kansuru ken* (On emigration policy). In the document, Shibusawa, Nakano and Soeda urged the government to support the migration industry in Japan, arguing that a large emigration company which would invest in foreign countries and send emi-

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17 Ibid., 131.
18 Soeda Juichi, “Konpon kaiketsu no yōten [How to solve the problem completely]”, *Taiyō* 20 no. 10 (1914): 153.
grants to those countries was needed to solve Japan’s overpopulation problem. They requested that the government should either help merge four existing emigration companies, or financially assist the most promising one. In their plan, the company would cooperate with the association to be established for the education campaign in order to foster the steady growth of Japanese migration overseas.

What is remarkable about the letter is that the three justified encouraging foreign migration with a pressing need to solve the overpopulation problem in their country. Although the impression that Japan was a small and mountainous country with limited arable land and few natural resources was widespread throughout the country, it is difficult to specify exactly when the fear of overpopulation took hold of the nation. It is at least clear that the major motivation for overseas expansion came from considerations about how to feed a population growing by about half a million to one million per year. According to one author, both colonization and emigration were already believed to be a drastic solution to the overpopulation problem as early as 1887. At the time when the Shibusawa group was writing the request, the sense of crisis was heightened more than before because the United States and the British Dominions had begun to restrict the admission and residence of Japanese immigrants.

Both plans developed by Shibusawa and his fellows, one on education and the other on emigration policy, became a reality, although they assumed a slightly different form than their original ideas. The plan on education was realized by the government as Tai-bei keihatsu undō (The campaign for educating public opinion in the United States). The campaign targeted the United States only and was not carried out globally, as had been envisaged by Soeda. The plan on emigration policy, on the other hand, materialized in February 1914 as the Japan Emigration Association (Nihon Imin Kyōkai). The association was organized by those who were interested in matters related to international migration, and Soeda served as president of the association. As had been proposed in Imin hōshin ni kansuru ken, the association held lectures designed to provide would-be

migrants with practical knowledge and know-how about migration.\textsuperscript{22} The merger of emigration companies was also achieved in December 1917 through the establishment of the Overseas Development Company (\textit{Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha}). The government sponsored enterprise, which merged all the emigration companies existing at that time, sent Japanese immigrants to Brazil, the largest destination country for Japan in the interwar years.\textsuperscript{23}

The close connection a few central figures of the LNAJ had with the migration industry should not be overlooked in assessing the nature of the Association’s interwar activities. But it should also not be forgotten that the migration business was just one of those numerous businesses Shibusawa had to take care of, and he had already retired as a businessman at the time of the establishment of the LNAJ. The existence of a connection between a few leaders of the LNAJ and the migration industry does not mean that the Association was an organization which solely represented the interests of emigration companies. What can be safely said is only that they were attracted to the migration business to such an extent as to develop a somewhat detailed plan for fostering overseas migration.

The two letters of request shed light not only on Shibusawa and his fellows’ connection with the migration industry but also on their strong rela-

\textsuperscript{22} On the relation between the request on emigration policy and the Japan Emigration Association, see Mamiya Kunio, “Tai-Bei keihatsu undō to Nihon imin kyōkai no setsuritsu [The campaign for educating public opinion in the United States and its relationship to the establishment of the Japan Emigration Association]”, in Reimei ki Ajia taiheiyō chiiki no kokusai kankei: Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai no kenkyū [The dawn of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region: a study on the Institute of Pacific Relations], ed. Waseda daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyūjo Nichibei kankei bukai [The US-Japanese relationship section of the Institute of Social Sciences at Waseda University] (Tōkyō: Waseda daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyūjo, 1994), 179–180; Sakaguchi Mitsuhiro, “Kaisetsu [introduction]”, in \textit{Nihon imin kyōkai hōkoku} [The Bulletin of the Japan Emigration Association] (Tōkyō: Fuji shuppan, 2006), 5–6. The association was quite active for some time after its establishment but ceased functioning during the interwar period.

\textsuperscript{23} In January 1917, Kamiya Tadao submitted a proposal for organizing a large emigration company to the Foreign Ministry and, on the establishment of the Overseas Development Company, he became one of its founders. On Kamiya and the establishment of the Overseas Development Company, see Takeuchi Konmei, “Senkan ki no imin seisaku: Ōkura Gaimu Naimu sanshō ni wataru imin seisaku no tenkai katei [The emigration policy in the interwar years: the development of the policy in the Finance, Foreign and Home Ministries]”, Kanazawa daigaku daigakuin shigaku ronshū 37 (2007): 90–91.
tionship with the Japanese government. Surprisingly, the process in which the two letters were written and submitted to the government indicates that it was not the Shibusawa group but the government that first conceived the idea of conducting a large propaganda campaign. Although shortly after the passage of the alien land bill in May the government came up with the idea of launching propaganda against the law, it nonetheless asked Soeda to develop a plan on a propaganda campaign and submit it to the government. The Japanese government took this seemingly redundant step, thinking that if the government ran the campaign, it might draw criticism from the American people as interference in their internal affairs. Therefore, the government decided to conceal the fact that the plan originated from the government and pretend the government was only assisting the private sector initiative. The government’s request was transmitted to Soeda around August 1913 while he was staying in the United States, and the letters on the education campaign and on emigration policy were submitted about two months later. The symbiotic relationship between Shibusawa et al. and the government was reflected in the content of the letters: The proposed association for the education campaign was going to be a semi-governmental organization, rather than a purely private one, and the proposed emigration company would become a government sponsored enterprise.

The LNAJ and its relationship with the Japanese government

While one of the two major forces within the LNAJ was Shibusawa and the people around him who had strong connections with both the business world and the government due to their experience working in the Ministry of Finance, the other was diplomats. The Foreign Ministry was involved in the formation of the LNAJ as deeply as in the propaganda campaign against the California Alien Land Law. It arranged the Japanese delegates’ first participation in the IFLNS and continued to play an important role even after the official establishment of the LNAJ. The Association pro-

fessed to be a non-governmental organization, and, as a matter of fact, non-government members were in charge of its administration. But it was under the shadow of the Foreign Ministry from the very beginning.

There were two diplomats who played a decisive role in the establishment of the LNAJ: Adachi Mineichirō and Matsui Keishirō. These two professional diplomats, who were resident in Europe, one in Belgium and the other in France, were keeping a close eye on the activities of League of Nations societies around the world and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to have a counterpart organization in Japan. What they found to be the most worrying development was the emergence of the Chinese association, which was established earlier than the Japanese association and was planning to raise the Shandong problem at the third congress of the IFLNS. The question about the disposition of German interests in Shandong province in China was the most serious controversy that existed between Japan and China at that time. The Japanese government wanted to avoid drawing international attention to the problem, whereas the Chinese association aimed at mobilizing international opinion in favour of China by discussing the problem at international forums. It was in order to defeat this Chinese association’s plan that Adachi and Matsui encouraged Japanese League supporters to join the IFLNS.

Although it is clear from several sources that the two helped Japan to first participate in the IFLNS conference behind the scenes, there remains uncertainty about how far they orchestrated the event. It has been said that a group of people who wished to establish a Japanese association for the League of Nations had had a meeting in Paris earlier in 1919. A letter from Sakatani to Shibusawa dated July 10 of that year shows that Sakatani, Soeda and several others discussed a plan to establish a Japanese League of Nations society. The letter also notes that Soeda was temporarily acting as chairman and that Akizuki Satsuo, Anesaki Masaharu, Date Gen’ichirō, Hayashi Kiroku and Oka Minoru were elected to a committee on developing a concrete plan.\(^\text{25}\) Although somewhat inconsistent with Sakatani’s letter, Yamakawa Tadao also testifies in his memoir that he held a meeting with Anesaki, Akizuki, Soeda and a few others at accommoda-

tion near the banks of the Seine.\textsuperscript{26} Judging from all these pieces of information, there must have been some meeting among the Japanese in Paris in 1919, but it is not known how concrete a plan they had. More importantly, it is not in the least clear whether they had had contact with Adachi and Matsui before the meeting or whether they had gained information about the Chinese association’s plan to raise the Shandong question at the IFLNS meeting.

By the time six Japanese delegates—Akizuki Satsuo, Horiuchi Kensuke, Maeda Masana, Onozuka Kiheiji, Suehiro Izutarō and Yamada Saburō—attended the third meeting of the IFLNS, they had already learned about the Chinese association’s plan. Yamada admitted later that the very aim of attending the meeting was to undermine the plan.\textsuperscript{27} At preparatory meetings held on November 31 and December 1, a Chinese delegate, Wellington Koo, proposed that the IFLNS should discuss the question of the disposal of Shandong more than once. But his proposal met with strong opposition from Akizuki and finally had to be withdrawn.\textsuperscript{28} It was Adachi Mineichirō who made this withdrawal possible by introducing Yamada Saburō to Baron Edouard Descamps. Descamps was the president of the Belgian League of Nations Association, which hosted the third meeting of the IFLNS, and it was thanks to the good offices of Descamps and another Belgian, Eugène Baie, who acted as secretary for the meeting, that Yamada and the other Japanese were allowed to attend the meeting even before the Japanese association was officially established.\textsuperscript{29} A report Matsui Keishirō submitted to the Japanese government

\textsuperscript{26} Yamakawa Tadao, “Nihon kokusai kyōkai no nijūnen [Twenty years of the Japan International Association]”, \textit{Kokusai chishiki} 20 no. 7 (1940): 78.
\textsuperscript{27} A report on the assembly submitted to Japan’s foreign ministry and Yamada’s talk made after he came back to Japan tell that such was the case. “Daisankai kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō sōkai kaigi [The third assembly of the IFLNS]”, JACAR: B04013930300, 36–38; Yamada, “Kokusai renmei ni tsuite”, 28. In his talk, however, Yamada also said that he had no knowledge about the Chinese proposal until he met Baron Edouard Descamps on November 15. It is unclear whether this was true or not.
\textsuperscript{28} “Daisankai kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō sōkai kaigi”, 37.
\textsuperscript{29} “Daiyonkai rikkai [The fourth meeting of the council]”, JACAR: B04013930400, 94. The Japanese government even awarded medals to Descamps and Baie for their services. “Berugi koku jōin giin kokumudaijin danshaku Edouard Descamps hoka ichimei jokun no ken [On the recommendation of the Home Ministry and member of the Upper House of Belgium Baron Edouard Descamps et al.]”, JACAR: A10112900100.
after the conference also indicated that the Chinese proposal was withdrawn not only because Akizuki had strongly opposed it but because Adachi had held talks about the proposal with Descamps before the meeting.30

In his report, Matsui not only provided details of the meeting, but also asked the Japanese government to facilitate the establishment of a League of Nations association in Japan. Arguing that central members of the League of Nations societies in European countries were renowned scholars and politicians who could strongly influence public opinion in those countries, he requested that Japan should have a close relationship with the IFLNS to “see what other countries were planning [to discuss at the League of Nations] as well as to show Japan’s eagerness to contribute to world peace.”31 In response to the request, the Foreign Ministry held a meeting in an office room in the Treaty Bureau of the Ministry on March 4, 1920.32 Those present were the chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry Matsuda Michikazu, the diplomats Sawada Setsuzō and Sugimura Yōtarō, a councillor of the Navy Ministry Yamakawa Tadao, the international lawyer Tachi Sakutarō, and the journalist Date Gen’ichirō. Although Yamakawa was working at the Navy Ministry at the time of the meeting, he was transferred to the Foreign Ministry soon after the meeting as a successor to Matsuda. The participants in the meeting had no objection to Matsui’s idea of establishing a Japanese association for the League of Nations with the result that the Treaty Bureau assumed the task of developing a concrete proposal including a draft constitution for the association.33 After writing the proposal under the leadership of Matsuda, the Bureau circulated it to higher officers, and then it was decided that the chief of the Bureau should supervise the establishment of the association. With this decision, the association took on a semi-official character.34 The chief of the Treaty Bureau—first Matsuda and later Yamakawa—continued to supervise the association even after its establishment, and young

30 Matsui to Uchida, December 10, 1919, JACAR: B06150911600, 9.
31 “Kokusai renmei kyōkai ni kansuru Matsui taishi no iken [Ambassador Matsui’s opinion about the League of Nations societies]”, JACAR: B04013930300, 42.
33 Yamakawa Tadao, “Nihon kokusaikyōkai no nijūnen”, 79.
34 “Nihon kokusai renmei kyōkai setsuritsu junbi ni kansuru keika [Proceedings on the preparations for the establishment of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B04013930800, 4.
diplomats such as Sugimura and Sawada did all the necessary secretarial work until the association started to employ its own staff members.

The Bureau held two further preparatory meetings on March 10 and 22, inviting those who had been in Paris during the Peace Conference and representatives of private organizations which had a similar plan of establishing a League of Nations association. Those organizations invited were the Society of International Law, the Japan Peace Society, the Association Concordia and the Japan International Society. It is unclear how concrete the plans were that these private organizations had developed before the Foreign Ministry made contact with them. All that is known is that the Japan Peace Society had learned about the League of Nations societies and its Federation through Theodore Marburg. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Organization of the American League to Enforce Peace had informed the Japan Peace Society of the League of Nations movement developing in Western countries.35

Those who were invited to the two meetings—the scholar of religious studies Anesaki, the politician Hayashi and the businessman Soeda to the first one, and the legal scholars Terao Tōru, Nomura Junji, Miyaoka Tsunejirō, the moral philosopher Tomoeda Takahiko and the journalist Tagawa Daikichirō to the second—approved of the Foreign Ministry’s plan to establish a Japanese League of Nations association.36 These meetings were important because many of the participants later assumed important positions in the association: Soeda became its vice-chairman, and Anesaki, Hayashi, Miyaoka and Tagawa became its directors. Although the future chairman of the association Shibusawa had been informed of the meeting held by Soeda and others in Paris, it was not until a meeting held on April 5 that his name appeared in a set of minutes. At the meeting it was decided that the two diplomats Matsuda and Date were to visit Shibusawa with a recommendation letter written by Makino Nobuaki, the former ambassador plenipotentiary on the Peace Conference, and ask him to become the chairman of the association.37 Since the inaugural meeting of the LNAJ was held on April 23, it can be presumed that the Bureau made contact with Shibusawa in the middle of April.

35 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 31–33.
36 “Kokusai renmei kyōkai no setsuritsu oyobisho kansei ni kansuru sōdankai no keika yōryō”, 81–82.
37 “Kokusai renmei kyōkai dainikai tokubetsu iinkai [the second meeting of the special committee of the League of Nations Society]”, JACAR: B04013930300, 95.
### Table 2.3 List of people who declined to be the founding members of the LNAJ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State officials and army and navy officers</td>
<td>Inoue Katsunosuke, Tsuzuki Keiroku, Yamanashi Hanzō, Matsumoto Shigetake, Suematsu Kenchō, Suzuki Kisaburō, Takeshita Isamu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the House of Peers</td>
<td>Tokugawa Yoshihisa, Maeda Masana, Maeda Toshisada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>Kaneko Umaji, Kawakami Hajime, Takano Iwasaburō, Tajiri Inajirō, Miura Kinnosuke, Shimizu Tōru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>Ishikawa Mikiaki, Ōyama Ikuo, Wakamiya Yūnosuke, Tsushima Kennosuke, Motoyama Hikoichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellanies</td>
<td>Yanagita Kunio, Mutsu Hirokichi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The LNAJ, “Hokkinin taru koto o hitei seru mono [Those who refused to be a founding member]”, JACAR: B04013930400, 42.

Note: The classification of occupation was that used by the LNAJ.

In order to better understand the character of the association, it is worthwhile to see a list of people who were invited to the inaugural meeting of the LNAJ but declined to join the Association (see Table 2.3). Nothing is known about the reasons for their refusal: they might have been against the Association’s cause or just unwilling to pay a membership fee, or they might have been willing to pay the fee but unwilling to assume other membership obligations. Those who were on the list were a miscellaneous group of people with few commonalities in terms of vocation and political orientation. On the one hand, it included members of major zaibatsu, family-owned industrial and financial conglomerates in pre-war Japan which continued to assume monopolistic or oligopolistic positions in different businesses until they were dissolved by GHQ after the Second
World War. Those included were Masuda Takashi (Mitsui zaibatsu), Toyokawa Ryōhei and Gō Seinosuke (Mitsubishi zaibatsu), Nakajima Kumakichi (Furukawa zaibatsu), Yasuda Zenjirō (Yasuda zaibatsu), Asano Sōichirō (Asano zaibatsu) and Kuhara Fusanosuke (Kuhara zaibatsu). Although these people did not personally join the LNAJ, some of the financial conglomerates mentioned here provided economic support for the Association. The list, on the other hand, included scholars and journalists who had been keenly interested in social problems at that time, such as the economist Kawakami Hajime, the journalist Ōyama Ikuo and the statistician Takano Iwasaburō. Yoshino Sakuzō, who joined the LNAJ but did not become its active member, was a slightly different case. The political scientist who laid the theoretical foundations for democratization in the Taishō period was an ardent admirer of president Wilson and probably the most powerful supporter of the League in Japan. But it seems he did not find the LNAJ attractive enough to spare the time for its activities. While zaibatsu constituted the Establishment in pre-war Japan, these intellectuals were progressive reformers, some of whom would become socialists in later years. The disregard these critical intellectuals showed for the LNAJ might indicate the conservative character of the Association.

Although the role played by the Foreign Ministry in the establishment of the LNAJ already shows that the association was a semi-governmental, or, at best, a government-affiliated organization, nothing indicates the close relationship between the government and the LNAJ more clearly than the fact that the Association was dependent not only on financial support from the private sector but on government funding (see Table 2.4 and 2.5). The record shows that the Association received 20,000 to 100,000 yen each year from 1923 to 1930. It should also be added that the ‘private sector’ here included government-supported enterprises which were created by national policy, such as the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Japan Mail Shipping Line, and the South Manchuria Railway Company.

As a matter of fact, there were members of the LNAJ who felt uneasy about the dependency of the association on the government. At the first meeting of the Board of Directors of the LNAJ on April 29, 1920, Soeda proposed seeking financial assistance from the government—the amount of support he proposed was fifty thousand yen for the budget of the first year and one million yen for the LNAJ’s fund. But other members expressed the concern that receiving such assistance would compromise the LNAJ’s independence. Even Shibusawa, who had a close relationship with the government, stated that although government assistance would
facilitate the LNAJ’s activities, it was unadvisable to develop too close a relationship with the government. He said, “if, for instance, the Japanese government adopted militaristic policies, the LNAJ’s dependence on the government would drive the Association into a difficult situation.”

Although it is unclear how seriously he took the possibility that the government would take military action in the future, his fear was understandable. He had in mind a situation where Japan would go to war and the LNAJ would be pressed to choose whether it would keep adhering to its

Table 2.4  Government endowment and private sector donations to the LNAJ: 1920–1932 (yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>50,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>49,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>56,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>65,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>40,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>40,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>40,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>35,980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on the LNAJ’s annual accounting report.

Note: There is no report available for 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1931. But some sources indicate that the government provided 20,000 yen in each year from 1920 to 1922. In the same period, the private sector also donated more than 164,080 yen in total. See Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 36, 577; The LNAJ, “Daihachikai rikikai gijii yōroku [The protocol of the eighth council meeting]”, JACAR: B04013930500, 22. For the years 1924 and 1925, only the sums of the government endowment and the private sector donations is available.
pacifist cause or compromise its moral integrity by supporting the war. In contrast to Shibusawa, however, a retired bureaucrat at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Oka Minoru, and a member of the House of Peers, Yoshii Kōzō, strongly defended Soeda’s proposal, insisting that the LNAJ should receive government assistance but “should never allow government interference in its opinion and actions, nor should it compromise its independence.”

In the end, the majority of directors subscribed to the opinion of the two. The board agreed on the principle that the LNAJ would receive financial assistance from the government but would not accept any interference in its activities.

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39 Ibid., 28.
The LNAJ and its racial equality proposal

Although the immediate objective of the Japanese who attended the third Congress of the IFLNS was to block the Chinese association’s plan to raise the Shandong question, there was another motivation behind the LNAJ’s participation in the IFLNS. The Association aimed at creating the opinion in the world which was sympathetic to Japan concerning the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States. The Association attempted to achieve this objective by advocating two principles: the abolition of racial discrimination and the equitable treatment of commerce.

The LNAJ embarked on a campaign for racial equality in 1921 after finishing all the miscellaneous work for the establishment of the Association. On February 25 of the same year, it held a Board of Directors’ meeting to discuss what the Association should propose at the fifth Congress of the IFLNS. Those present were Sakatani, Soeda, Tagawa, Yamakawa, Oka, Hozumi, Date, Sawada, Sugimura and two clerks, Ōkuma and Ojima. At the meeting, the board agreed to propose racial issues and later officially notified the Office of the IFLNS of its proposal to institute three commissions within the Federation, i.e. “commissions on the abolition of racial discrimination, the protection of religious freedom and the equitable treatment of commerce”.

The LNAJ attached little importance to the protection of religious freedom with the result that it soon disappeared from the agenda of the Association. The board included the item in the agenda only because the Japanese government submitted its racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference as an amendment to an article in the Covenant concerning religious freedom. However, the fact that the LNAJ proposed the abolition of racial discrimination together with the protection of religious freedom indicated that the LNAJ was quite conscious of maintaining the continuity between the government’s argument at Versailles and its own. In fact, the Association ordered its delegation to the fifth Congress of the IFLNS to use “the text of the speech given by the ambassador plenipotentiary Makino Nobuaki at the Peace conference” for reference as well as

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40 “Tokubetsu ininkai gijiroku [The protocol of the special committee]”, JACAR: B04013930500, 30. The document shows only the surnames of the participants. Ōkuma is probably Ōkuma Makoto, who worked as a secretary for the LNAJ. Ojima may be Ojima Kikue, who participated in the fifth Congress of the IFLNS.
41 Uchida to Adachi, March 26, JACAR: B06150912100, 9.
Problems of the international free movement of people, a report the Japanese government had given to the Japanese delegation to the Peace conference in order to provide the basic information about the problem of Japanese immigrants in foreign countries as well as the treatment of foreigners in Japan. This shows clearly that the LNAJ’s advocacy of racial equality was a follow-up to the Japanese government’s racial equality proposal at Versailles.

Leaders of the League of Nations associations in other countries who read the proposal by the LNAJ might think that the Japanese association was eager to act as a government mouthpiece, as a spokesman for its government. But the relationship between the LNAJ and the Japanese government was not so simple. The government’s attitude toward the problem of racial equality changed in the period from 1919 to 1921. The Japanese delegation at the Paris conference declared that Japan would propose racial equality at every opportunity, but in reality the country never loudly demanded racial equality at subsequent international conferences. The Washington conference in 1921 was probably the last chance for Japan to intervene in the construction of post-war international order, but at that conference Japan did not raise racial issues. In its official instructions given to the delegates to the conference, the Japanese government stated that, circumstances permitting, the government wished to discuss “the problem of natural resources and that of the treatment of foreigners in connection with the problem of the open-door policy, the solution to which is deemed essential to the existence of the Empire and is also justifiable in terms of humanity”. But the government chose not to discuss these problems at the conference but to use them only as a bargaining chip to “establish Japan’s presence in the world and to make other powers accept her demands”. Thus, the government ordered the delegation not to “go deeply into these problems but to use them only when doing so will facili-
tate solving other issues”, especially the Shandong question.\textsuperscript{46} These instructions show that the government had lost the will to advocate racial equality after Versailles. Of course, the unwillingness of the government to address racial issues did not necessarily mean that the government had abandoned its hope of resolving these issues in the future, nor did it mean that the LNAJ’s advocacy of racial equality went against the government’s policy. On the contrary, it might be the case that the government found the LNAJ’s campaign for racial equality worth supporting in the long run, thinking that the semi-governmental international organization could do what the Foreign Ministry could not do. At least the fact that the government did not stop the Association but allowed it to propagate the idea of racial equality shows that the campaign was not what the government found obstructive to its official policy. The government did not advocate racial equality on its own initiative but it did not prevent the LNAJ from doing so either. It is only in this limited sense that one can say that the LNAJ acted as a government mouthpiece.

When the Japanese government proposed racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference, the objective of the government was to establish Japan’s international position as a major power and to maintain its equality with the other permanent members of the League Council. The instructions prepared for the Washington conference also showed that this particularistic attitude of the government paying little attention to matters other than its own national interests did not change much after the Paris conference. However, the attitude of the LNAJ was somewhat different. Certainly, there were a few members of the LNAJ who held a view different from the government’s. The Association’s official organ, \textit{Kokusai chishiki} (International understanding), published an unsigned article entitled \textit{Appealing to all people of the world before the Washington conference} and offered the reader fresh insights into racial equality. The article, while criticizing the racial discrimination practiced by England, the United States and France, directed its criticism at Japan itself in the following way:

The Japanese! You have bravely fought wars against China and Russia for the purpose of self-defence, and won the wars. But have you treated the Chinese as equal human beings since the wars? Have you not done whatever you wanted to do in China on the pretext of protecting your right to live? Can you claim that there has been no fault in what you did in China, Korea, Formosa or the South Pacific islands? You demand that the United States adopt an

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 188.
open-door policy. You may well do so. But have you never forced Americans to do so in an unpleasant way?47

The anonymous author proceeded to mention Japan’s interests in China and said, “We do not simply tell you to renounce your national interests. We just advise you to acquire something larger. Japan has not yet fully enjoyed what the world has to offer, namely, the fruits of equal opportunities and an open-door policy. If what you do to protect your lesser interests ruins your international reputation and prevents you from pursuing your greater interests, renounce the lesser ones. You must not lose the confidence of the world.”48

Comparing the opinion expressed by the anonymous author with the opinion of dissident intellectuals will help understand the position the LNAJ was located in the political spectrum in interwar Japan. Ishibashi Tanzan, who had criticized Japan’s racial equality proposal as hypocrisy, serves as a good reference point. The editor of the Tōyō keizai shinpō was not a member of the LNAJ, although he joined the Association much later in the 1930s. He is best known for his Small Japan policy (shō Nihon shugi: 小日本主義), which he advocated immediately before the Washington conference. One of the basic tenets of his Small Japan Policy was the abandonment of all its foreign colonies. He said, “Determine to abandon Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin. Not to mention that Japan should stop intervening in China and Siberia.”49 He organized a research group in his newspaper company before the Washington conference to study problems that would be placed on the agenda at the conference. The research group, which included one of the LNAJ’s directors, Tagawa Daikichirō, published its research results which urged the Japanese government to adopt a disarmament policy and recognize the Chinese people’s right to self-determination.50 The Ishibashi group was much more radical than Kokusai

47 “Washinton kaigi ni saishite sekai jinrui ni geki su”, Kokusai chishiki 1 no. 5 (1921), 49.
48 Ibid., 52.
50 Ishibashi Tanzan, Tanzan Kaisō [The memoirs of Ishibashi Tanzan] (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1984), 209–211. On Tagawa’s relationship with the LNAJ, see Endō Kōichi, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai riji tōshite no Tagawa Daikichirō [Tagawa Daikichirō’s work as director of the LNAJ]”, Meiji gakuin daigaku shakai tōgaku shakai tōkushigaku kenkyū 136 (2011).
chishiki’s unnamed writer in that the former clearly recommended the abandonment of Japan’s colonies, whereas the latter’s position on the colonial problem was never clear-cut. But the intentions of the two were not far apart. Both suggested renouncing Japan’s interests in China. Ishibashi opposed Shōyoku (小欲), profit in the short run, in this case, the interests in China, and advocated Taiyoku (大欲), profit in the long run which would be gained from free trade. Likewise, the Kokusai chishiki’s article opposed the lesser interests while advocating the greater interests. To prove the closeness of the positions of the LNAJ and Ishibashi, another article in Kokusai chishiki favourably reviewed the Ishibashi group’s study, saying, “Although there might be an allegation that the group offered only an impractical, visionary scheme, we should respect its courage to have issued an uncompromised statement for the sake of perpetual peace of the world.”51

While the Kokusai chishiki’s unnamed writer was sympathetic towards the Ishibashi group, most of the LNAJ members were not. At the meeting of the Board of Directors held on February 25, the Association divided topics to be discussed by the IFLNS into “those relating to Japan’s special position” and “those relating to the interests of the world as a whole” and classified the abolition of racial equality as part of the former category of topics.52 The classification appeared only once in the documents of the Association but this indicated that the prevailing feeling among the majority of members of the LNAJ was one that regarded racial equality as a problem which solely related to Japan’s particular interests, not as a universally relevant one. The behaviour of the LNAJ towards the Chinese association also bore testimony to its particularistic attitude. The Japanese representatives prevented the Chinese association from bringing up the Shandong question at the fourth and fifth Congresses of the IFLNS, arguing that the IFLNS should not deal with such a political matter.53 Only a few members of the LNAJ regarded this behaviour as morally wrong and voiced their concerns. Among them were Anesaki Masaharu and Tagawa Daikichirō, who maintained that, although it was “too early to discuss political matters like the Shandong question at the IFLNS”, the LNAJ

51 “Saikin Nihon no heiwa undō [The recent peace movement in Japan]”, Kokusai chishiki 1 no. 7 (1921), 62.
52 “Tokubetsu iinkai gijiroku”, 31.
53 Ishii to Uchida, October 21, 1920, JACAR: B06150911700, 60–62; Mushanokōji to Uchida, April 23, 1921, JACAR: B06150912000, 8.
should not, “as a matter of principle”, decline to discuss such topics, nor was it “fair to kill a Chinese proposal each time it is submitted”. Likewise, the diplomat Adachi Mineichirō argued in his telegram sent to the Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai that “Continuing to avoid discussing political problems and killing other nations’ proposals will make the other associations suspicious of our intentions. In order to express our opinion and to find an echo in the political and academic circles of the world, we had better enter into discussion as far as possible no matter how political the subject of the discussion is.” But neither Anesaki and Tagawa nor Adachi expressed opposition to killing the Chinese proposal with stronger words than these.

Although a few minority members of the LNAJ found it somewhat questionable to avoid discussing sensitive issues concerning Japan’s interests in China, no one showed even a modicum of reluctance to stop Koreans from bringing up issues of Japan’s colonial rule to the IFLNS. Accompanying the Chinese association, two Koreans, Yi Kwan-yong (李灌鎔) and Yun Hae (尹海), attended the fourth Congress of the IFLNS and handed the president of the Congress a draft resolution that asked the League of Nations to intervene in the colonial affairs of Japan. The Japanese delegation to the Congress immediately protested against this unpredicted action. Also at the fifth Congress, the Chinese association proposed investigating Japan’s colonial rule in Korea, but again the Japanese delegation raised an objection and the proposal was rejected. The members of the LNAJ did not utter a word or criticize these moves made by the Japanese delegation. Their silence showed the LNAJ’s timid stance towards Japan’s colonial rule in Korea more clearly than anything else.

It can be concluded from all the above information that most of the LNAJ’s members did not have any intention of applying the principle of racial equality universally, and that they tended to consider race issues as a problem concerning Japan’s international position as a major power. It is true that some members expressed sympathy with Ishibashi’s view of a Small Japan Policy, which proposed to build an equal relationship with

54 “Daiyonkai rijikai [The fourth sessions of the council]”, JACAR: B04013930400, 93.
57 Matsuda to Uchida, June 24, 1921, JACAR: B06150912100, 31.
Asian nations, and others showed a readiness to discuss the Shandong question with the Chinese association. But even these minority members did not advocate the complete abandonment of Japan’s colonies, nor did they question the LNAJ’s hostile attitude towards the Korean people and its blunt refusal to talk about colonial issues at the IFLNS meetings. Certainly, this was the prevailing attitude among the LNAJ members who advocated racial equality in the early 1920s.

Discussion of racial equality at the IFLNS

When the LNAJ proposed establishing three commissions on the abolition of racial discrimination, the protection of religious freedom and the equitable treatment of commerce to the IFLNS, it was unclear what tasks the Association expected each commission to perform. This was not surprising given the unpreparedness of the Association, which had not developed its own policy on these topics in detail. The agenda to be pursued by these commissions and the position of the LNAJ were gradually articulated in the subsequent course of discussion at the IFLNS.

The first commission the IFLNS established in response to the Japanese proposal was that on racial equality. At a meeting of the General Council of the IFLNS held on April 21, 1921, the Japanese diplomat Mushanokōji Kintomo insisted that the Federation, which had already had a commission on minority problems, must also have a commission on racial equality. The Council agreed to propose establishing the commission at the next Congress of the IFLNS, and the proposal was approved without opposition at the fifth Congress held in Geneva from June 6 to 9 of the same year.

In October, the General Council of the IFLNS organized the commission on racial equality by selecting its members from the associations of China, England, France, Hungary, Japan and Switzerland and by inviting a representative of the Secretariat of the League of Nations as an observer. The commission member selected from the LNAJ was legal scholar Hatoyama Hideo, who was known as an authority on civil law in Japan. The Chinese representative was journalist Scie Ton-fa (謝東發), and the

58 Mushanokōji to Uchida, April 23, 1921, JACAR: B06150912000, 7.
59 Honda to Uchida, October 20, 1921, JACAR: B06150912200, 3.
French representative was sociologist Célestin Bouglé. Bouglé also acted as a chair of the commission. The Council later added Blaise Diagne, a member of the Chamber of Deputies of France representing Senegal, to the commission as a representative of black people.

The commission held two meetings in Paris on January 22 and March 25 in 1922 for the purpose of selecting its research topics. The commission first decided to exclude Jewish and other minority problems in Europe, which the minority commission of the IFLNS had been in charge of, and then distinguished between “domestic racial problems” and “international racial problems”. Bouglé proposed postponing the study of the latter problems, arguing that concentrating on fewer topics would increase the possibility that the Congress would adopt resolutions drafted by the commission. But this proposal was rejected due to Hatoyama’s strong opposition. The commission eventually selected four topics—the problems of indigenous peoples, Afro-Americans, the Chinese and the Japanese—and appointed Swiss representative René Claparède, Afro-American historian Rayford Logan, Scie and Hatoyama as the rapporteur on each problem respectively. The General Secretary of the IFLNS and French historian of philosophy, Théodore Ruyssen, accepted the task of drafting the final report.

Hatoyama’s report was the first document which articulated the LNAJ’s view on racial equality. In this document, Hatoyama provided basic information on Japanese migration such as laws concerning the admission and residence of Japanese people in the United States and the British dominions, and statistics on Japanese migrant populations by country and occupation. These were informative but easily accessible data which added nothing new to the migration debate. What is noteworthy is the two principles Hatoyama proposed in the conclusion of the document:

1. Chaque Etat peut, à raison de sa souveraineté, imposer à l’immigration quelque restrictions raisonnables. Mais la justice commande l’équité envers toutes les nations;
2. Priver certaine étrangers, autorisés à résider sur le territoire d’un Etat déterminé, de leur base d’existence, de la faculté d’exercer tel métier ou telle profession, du droit d’acquérir des propriétés ou de conclure des

Hatoyama distinguished racial discrimination concerning the admission of immigrants from that concerning the residence of foreigners already admitted into a country. Although the Tōkyō Imperial University professor admitted that a state was allowed to impose restrictions on the admission of immigrants, he expressed opposition to their discriminatory treatment in both their admission and residence. Ruysen accepted these principles and incorporated them into his final report as two of six general principles —“Tout État peut, en vertu de sa souveraineté, imposer des bornes à l'immigration; mais la justice commande un traitement égal à l’égard de toutes les races, et la réciprocité d’État à État” and “Tout immigré une fois admis sur un territoire doit pouvoir jouir de droits égaux à ceux de tout autre immigré.”

The observation of these principles, he said, “would greatly contribute to reducing the present grave inequality among races.”

While Hatoyama was writing his report in France, Yamada Saburō was drafting another document at the request of the LNAJ to draw up instructions to the Japanese delegation to the sixth Congress of the IFLNS to be held in June 1922. The document exhibited a slight difference between Hatoyama and Yamada in their approach to racial issues. Interestingly, at the beginning of his instructions Yamada showed some reluctance to discuss the problem of racial equality, saying that “The proposal to deal with racial issues seems somewhat premature. But now that we have submitted it to the IFLNS, we must take on the responsibility of studying the issues.” This reluctance seemed to stem from his perception that the issues were highly contentious. He thought that the LNAJ needed to act with great care and therefore advised the Association to develop “a long-term strategy and begin with matters on which countries are able to agree more easily.” Although, like Hatoyama, Yamada divided racial issues into “the problem of admission” and “the problem of treatment after admission”, Yamada proposed that the LNAJ tackle the latter, less con-

61 Hatoyama Hideo, SITUATION DES JAPONAIS RÉSIDANT À L’ETRANGER, JACAR: B06150912400, 37.
62 Théodore Ruysen, L’Immigration des Jaunes.—La situation des Noirs aux États-Unis, JACAR: B06150912400, 150.
63 Ibid., 150.
65 Ibid. 5.
tentious problem first. Furthermore, he divided the problem of foreigners’ treatment after admission into “matters concerning their treatment in terms of public law” such as political rights and the right of naturalization and “those concerning their treatment in terms of private law”, and then suggested that at the sixth Congress of the IFLNS the LNAJ propose equal treatment in terms of private law between nationals and foreigners as well as among foreigners. In this way, Yamada proposed solving racial issues gradually, from matters concerning immigrants’ treatment in terms of private law to those concerning their treatment in terms of public law and to the problem of admission.

Yamada’s approach was also different from Hatoyama’s in that the former emphasized the necessity of scientific study on racial issues. He insisted that the issues must be studied from not only “legal” but also “anthropological, ethical and economic” viewpoints. In particular, he argued that “a close examination of the economic condition of various countries” was needed to solve the problem of admitting foreigners into a country. This emphasis on examination (chōsa) was not unexpected, given his opinion that the limits of free movement of people should be determined by taking account of the necessity of international community life. As has been pointed out in the first chapter, Yamada had referred to economic literature like Leroy Beaulieu’s in his discussion about international migration. The call for broader research on racial issues expressed in the instructions only made explicit his long-lasting interest in scientific study, which had already existed in his early writings.

The LNAJ adopted Yamada’s instructions and sent them to the Japanese delegation to the sixth Congress of the IFLNS on May 11, 1922. However, his scientific research-based, piecemeal approach to racial issues seems to have had little effect on the action taken by the Japanese delegation comprised of Hatoyama Hideo, Kamikawa Hikomatsu and Minobe Tatsukichi. Because one of the two principles Hatoyama advocated in his report had dealt with the problem of admission, it was obviously against Yamada’s instructions to submit Hatoyama’s report without modification. But the delegation seems to have done nothing in this regard, and Hatoyama’s report was incorporated into the commission’s final report, which was presented to the Congress.

66 Ibid., 5–6.
67 Ibid., 6.
Because of the lack of primary sources, it is impossible to explain why the LNAJ did not follow Yamada’s instructions by, for example, proposing the withdrawal of the principle of equal treatment of all races with regard to immigration. Nor can it be clarified why the other League of Nations societies—25 associations in total participated in the Congress—did not strongly object to the commission’s report, which advocated the principle of racial equality, the highly explosive idea that had complicated the Paris Peace Conference enormously. The Congress held from June 4 to 7 passed the final report without much trouble. It is true that the English and Dutch associations abstained from voting, but even these associations did not vote against it. Participants in the Congress might not have understood the implications of the report because of its abstract wording, or the absence of the American association might help explain the lack of objections raised at the Congress. Either way, however, it is difficult to understand what made the adoption of the report so easy.

It is no wonder that Kokusai chishiki reported the results of the sixth Congress with delight: “Three years have passed since the Japanese ambassador plenipotentiary proposed the abolition of racial discrimination at the Paris Peace Conference in the spring of 1919. It is our great pleasure that international public opinion has begun to recognize the justice of the proposal. As a result of the sixth Congress, several hundred million coloured races in the world have begun to be recognized as human beings.” But contrary to what Kokusai chishiki insisted, the LNAJ’s proposal of racial equality seems to have done little to foster international public opinion, as evidenced by the fact that most of the major Western media did not even cover the Congress. Although six principles adopted by the Congress were later transferred to the International Conference of Emigration and Immigration held in Rome in 1924, they also drew little attention at the conference.

68 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, Compte rendu des travaux, JACAR: B06150912400, 98.
69 “Kokusai seiji jihyō [Editorial comments on current international politics]”, Kokusai chishiki 2 no. 7 (1922): 51.
The LNAJ did not consider that its goal had been achieved by the adoption of the racial equality principle at the sixth Congress. It continued its campaign for racial equality by proceeding to draft resolutions on the equitable treatment of commerce, which were meant to spell out the idea of racial equality more concretely. The draft resolutions were presented at a meeting of the economic commission held in Basel in March 1923, and the commission agreed to submit them to the seventh Congress of the IFLNS.71

The drafter of the resolutions was Inui Kiyosue, who worked as a staff member of the LNAJ in the middle of the 1920s and continued to be involved in its activities until the 1930s.72 He was undoubtedly one of the key figures who played an important role in the discussion on racial equality, but it is somewhat difficult to explain what he was because of his unusual career path. He was neither a businessman like Shibusawa nor a scholar like Yamada. Having migrated to the United States in 1902, Inui studied at the University of Michigan and distinguished himself as an orator in English. He won the Northern Oratorical League Contest in 1906, and in 1911 participated in the International Peace Congress in Edinburgh and the First Universal Races Congress in London as an American delegate from the Great Lakes International Arbitration Society. Such was his ability to use English that in 1914 the acting consul in San Francisco Numano Yasutarō employed him in the Japanese government’s aforementioned propaganda campaign, Tai-bei keihatsu undō. In the campaign, Inui went on a lecture tour in the West and the Midwest of the United States to create public sentiment favourable to Japan.73 He continued such public relations work until at least 1920, when the Japanese government conducted a propaganda campaign against the new Californian Alien Land Law, which prohibited the state’s Japanese residents from leasing land.

72 In August 1923, Matsuda Michikazu, the chief of the Japan Office of the League of Nations in Paris, recommended Inui as an office staff member of the LNAJ. See Matsuda to Yamakawa, August 25, 1923, JACAR: B06150759400, 59–61. Inui’s name is on the staff list of the LNAJ in the year of 1928. “Kokusai renmei kyōkai shokuin roku [the staff list of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B04013931700, 51.
Even after the campaign had ended, the Foreign Ministry occasionally employed him in some way or other, for example, as a translator at international conferences. Although he taught Japanese culture and history at several American universities and English in a Japanese college, his background shows that he was not so much an academic as a public relations man employed by Japan’s Foreign Ministry.

In his draft resolutions on the equitable treatment of commerce, Inui included the following three provisions concerning the treatment of foreign nationals, persons, firms, corporations, etc:

Resolution 8: Without involving the immigration question, the requirements for admission of the classes of people who fall within the mercantile or commercial group shall be treated equally.
Resolution 9: In the establishment and conducting of usual business, trade, occupation or profession abroad, foreign nationals, persons, firms or corporations shall not be placed under less favourable position than the native nationals.
Resolution 10: The foreigners shall enjoy the equal protection of law and the juridical and tribunal machineries shall be as equally open to them as to the native population.\(^7^4\)

Inui elaborated two principles proposed by Hatoyama and made them more concrete and specific. However, these provisions were less radical than Hatoyama’s in that the former did not explicitly use phrases such as racial equality. In this regard, Inui’s resolutions seemed to follow the course of action suggested by Yamada. Inui also focused solely on civil, or more correctly, commercial matters and did not touch on sensitive political matters, which Yamada had recommended avoiding. However, what Inui proposed was different from Yamada’s recommendations in some important respects. Although the resolutions made it clear that the LNAJ had no intention of discussing the topic of labour migration—as was clearly expressed in the above quotation by the words “Without involving the immigration question”—they still mentioned the issue of the admission of merchants, which Yamada had thought too early to deal with. Furthermore, the resolutions, written up in a short period, were hardly based on scientific studies about racial issues.

However, Inui’s draft resolutions were shelved at the seventh Congress of the IFLNS. Immediately before the Congress held in Vienna, the LNAJ

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requested the Federation to postpone discussing the texts to the next Congress. This was not because the Association finally followed Yamada’s instructions and decided to revise the resolutions but because it became clear that the resolutions were going to be discussed at a commission, to which the Chinese association would present its own draft resolutions. In the resolutions, the Chinese association proposed urging the League of Nations to take the necessary steps in order to solve the problem existing between China and Japan and insisted on the return of the Kwantung leased territory and the denunciation of the 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties, the treaties imposed on China as a result of twenty-one demands. The Japanese delegation composed of international lawyer Tachi Sakutarō and Inui Kiyosue proposed postponing the discussion of its own resolutions since they found it disadvantageous for the resolutions to be discussed together with the Chinese ones. The delegation also requested diplomat Sugimura Yōtarō, an eloquent speaker in French who did his doctoral degree at the University of Lyons, to participate in the Congress and to negotiate with the Chinese association. It was mainly due to Sugimura’s persistent negotiations with the Chinese representative Huang Rong-liang (黄栄良), the Chinese envoy to Austria, that the Chinese association withdrew its resolutions before the opening of the Congress. Sugimura participated in the subsequent IFLNS Congresses and was to become a key figure in the discussion about racial equality.

The ILO intervention

Up to the seventh Congress held in Vienna, it was the LNAJ that led the discussion at the IFLNS. Things might have developed differently if it had not been for an intervention by the International Labour Office (ILO).

The first official international organization that specialized in labour issues had been interested in the IFLNS since its Geneva Congress held in

76 Matsuda to Uchida, June 13, 1923, JACAR: B06150912900, 49; “Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ]”, JACAR: B06150912900, 80–86.
77 The abbreviations of the International Labour Organization and its secretariat, the International Labour Office, are notoriously confusing in English. Hereafter, this paper refers to the former as “the International Labour Organization” and the latter as “the ILO”.

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1921, on which occasion the ILO invited delegates from League of Nations societies around the world to its bureau. The ILO kept sending its representatives to the Congress of the IFLNS from then on, but it was not until the Vienna Congress in 1923 that the Office decided to actively engage in the activities of the IFLNS. At the Congress, the Office’s representative, William Martin, held a conversation with the General Secretary of the IFLNS, Théodore Ruyssen, and discussed how the interests of the IFLNS’s member societies in the ILO could be effectively aroused. Martin had the impression that the member societies were directing their attention only to the League of Nations and were ignoring the International Labour Organization.78 Ruyssen also thought that it was “incontestable que nos Associations s’intéressent plus vivement aux questions d’ordre politique qui relèvent principalement de la S.D.N. elle-même, qu’aux questions qui touchent le B.I.T.”79 The two agreed that a prospective way forward was to add a question closely related to the ILO to the agenda of the IFLNS and organize a special commission for dealing with the question.

The IFLNS and the ILO had coincident interests, which made the agreement possible; while the Federation wished to intensify its relationship with official international organizations so as to increase its influence over international politics, the propaganda function of the IFLNS was highly attractive to the ILO, which had to take public opinion in nations around the world seriously in order to achieve its ultimate aim of fostering the ratification and implementation of international labour conventions. “In the end their success or failure must depend on the extent to which they are supported by public opinion, and public opinion can only be formed when the intelligent understanding of the people has been aroused. That is the direction in which we look for help from the League of Nations Union in each country”, said Harold Butler, the Deputy Director of the Office, to the delegates of the League of Nations societies who were invited to the Office in 1921.80 The ILO induced the IFLNS to pay more attention to its work in order to make the efforts it was making in the fields of labour and social welfare known to the world.

After the conversation with Martin, Ruyssen chose three questions—1) emigration, 2) treatment of foreign workers and 3) labour treaties—and

78 Martin to Thomas, June 24, 1923, the International Labour Organization Archives (hereafter, ILOA): D 600/431/5.
79 Ruyssen to Thomas, July 10, 1923, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
80 ILOA: D 600/431/1.
suggested to the French historian and member of the *Association française pour la Société des Nations*, Jules Prudhommeaux, that the French association bring one of the three topics up for discussion at the IFLNS Congress.\(^{81}\) At the same time, Ruyssen also asked Albert Thomas, the Director General of the Office, to propose alternative questions, if any.\(^{82}\) Responding to Ruyssen’s suggestion, the French association decided to submit the question of emigration to the next IFLNS Congress and Thomas too approved of this choice. In response to the decision, Ruyssen arranged a plan to constitute a special commission for studying the problem of emigration in connection with the problem of the equitable treatment of commerce, which had been addressed by the LNAJ, and his plan soon became reality.\(^{83}\) At a meeting held in the Hague in October 1923, the General Council of the IFLNS organized the special commission for discussing several proposals, including Japanese and French ones.\(^{84}\)

The coordinated intervention made by Ruyssen, the French association and the ILO affected the later course of discussion about the Japanese proposal. Although the LNAJ had begun to restrict the subject of its proposal to the admission of the “mercantile or commercial group” and to avoid dealing with the matter of labour migration, the member societies of the IFLNS began to frame the discussion in terms of migration in general.

The Secretariat of the IFLNS was not particularly interested in migration issues. Although Ruyssen presented three conditions about a question

\(^{81}\) Ruyssen to Thomas, July 10, 1923, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
\(^{83}\) Ruyssen to Thomas, August 11, 1923, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
\(^{84}\) Documents in 1923 and 1924 seem to be missing because of the confusion after the Kantō earthquake on September 1, 1923. Later in this month the LNAJ asked Matsuda Michikazu to select a delegate for the meeting of the IFLNS’s general council. It also asked him to draft a proposal submitted to the council from the association. This was probably because the association could not afford to draw up a proposal immediately after the earthquake. Before the meeting of the special commission held in Paris in 1924, the LNAJ prepared a proposal on its own. This proposal was presented to the meeting as an alternative to a proposal called “Miki proposal”. Probably, the Miki proposal, whose details are unknown, was the one the Japan Office of the League of Nations drafted on the request of the LNAJ in 1923. See Yamamoto to the Plenipotentiary delegation of the Empire of Japan to the Assembly of the League of Nations, September 12, 1923, JACAR: B04013931700, 108; Sugimura to Matsui, April 2, 1924, JACAR: B06150913400, 2–3.
to be chosen by the French association, these conditions were quite broad and general: “1) cette question doit être importante, et d’un intérêt général, même pour des milieux qui ne se recrutent pas parmi les ouvrières ou les industriels: 2) cette question doit être relativement complexe, pour justifier la création d’une commission spéciale: 3) cette question ne doit pas être trop litigieuse pour ne pas exposer l’Union des Associations à un échec.”

The task assigned to the Secretary was to facilitate communication among the member societies of the IFLNS as well as between the IFLNS and outside organizations, and Ruysen was careful enough to refrain from doing anything but his duty. All he wished to do was to establish a closer relationship with the ILO and he used the emigration problem only for that purpose.

In contrast to the Secretariat of the IFLNS, the ILO was genuinely interested in migration issues. Having instituted the Migration Service within its organization, the Office wished to develop its activity in the field of international migration. What was important in this regard was that Italy under Mussonili’s rule was trying to seize the initiative on the matter of international migration by convening an international conference on migration in Rome in 1924. The Italian government was discontent with the inactive Emigration Commission of the ILO, which had been established mainly at the request of Italy but had been inactive because of opposition among emigration and immigration countries. The Office, deeply worried about the Italian action, intervened in the Rome conference in the final stage of its preparations, hoping to keep international public opinion on the side of the ILO. That was why Thomas strongly complained about the IFLNS’s having sent the text of its resolution on racial equality to the Rome conference. In a letter from April 24, 1924, the Office’s Chief of the Migration Service, Louis Varlez, communicated Thomas’ request to Ruysen that the Secretariat of the IFLNS should consider the following points: Italy was holding the Rome conference, ignoring the International Labour Office and the League of Nations, and the latter organizations had adopted the international viewpoint, which was quite different from the national aspect the former was interested in; the two organizations had to win over resolutions satisfying their international position and for that purpose they needed the support of their friend asso-

85 Fleury to Martin, July 20, 1923, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
ciations. Thus, Varlez asked that “votre union insistât un peu sur notre rôle international et signalât nos initiatives déjà nombreuses en même temps qu’elle s’intéressait à la conference de Rome.”

The ILO was not only interested in migration per se but also in establishing a connection with the LNAJ. The ILO Branch Office, which had been established in Tōkyō in November 1923, had a plan to organize a national commission on labour issues within the LNAJ, which would work together with the aforementioned special commission to be instituted by the IFLNS. On May 1, 1924, Asari Junshirō, the Director of the ILO’s Tōkyō Branch Office, visited Takano Iwasaburō and asked him for advice. The statistician known for his study on household expenditure among working-class families in an industrial district in Tōkyō was one of key figures in the interwar labour movement in Japan. Considering the character of the LNAJ as an organization established by businessmen and bureaucrats, the creation of a national commission on labour issues might have changed the shape of the Association by increasing the participation of those who were involved in the labour movement, but no such thing happened. According to an entry in Takano’s diary from May 1, 1924, he opposed Asari’s plan to establish a national commission within the LNAJ, and instead proposed to organize a new association separately from the LNAJ. Takano worried that the autonomy of the commission might be compromised if it were instituted as a subcommission of the LNAJ.

Takano’s concern was understandable in the light of his stance towards the labour movement. The chief of a non-governmental research institute, the Ōhara Institute for Social Research, was wary of government interven-

86 Thomas to Varlez, April 9, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6. Varlez was a Belgian specialist on social problems, known for his initiative in introducing unemployment insurance in Ghent. He was also one of the social reformers who had been engaged in international activities before the First World War. Sacriste and Vauchez regard Varlez as a typical example of international legal experts who emerged in the 1920s. See Guillaume Sacriste and Vauchez, “The Force of International Law: Lawyers’ Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s”, 92. For l’association internationale pour la lutte contre le chômage, the international organization founded by Varlez, see Rainer Gregarek, “Le mirage de l’Europe sociale. Associations internationales de politique sociale au tournant du 20e siècle”, Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire 48 (1995): 109.
87 Varlez to Ruyssen, April 24, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
88 Takano Iwasaburō Nikki [The diary of Takano Iwasaburō], May 1, 1924, at the Digital Archives of the Ōhara Institute for Social Research at Hōsei University.
tion in the labour movement. For instance, he was opposed to a government plan of establishing a semi-governmental, labour-management cooperation organization called Kyōchō kai. In his opinion, such an organization would pre-empt the natural development of trade unionism in Japan. It should be noted that the president of Kyōchō kai, which was established in 1919, was Tokugawa Iesato and one of its vice-presidents was Shibusawa Eiichi, exactly the same personnel as in the LNAJ.\(^89\) Takano might have seen the LNAJ in the same way as he saw Kyōchō kai. Takano had also had the bitter experience of being embroiled in a dispute between the government and the labour unions over the selection of a workers’ representative to the first International Labour Conference. The problem was that the Japanese government appointed a committee to elect a workers’ delegate to the Conference, instead of allowing trade unions to select the delegate by themselves. It was Takano who was chosen to be the delegate and he decided to accept the request, thinking that to do so was the best thing he could do. The largest independent trade union Yūai kai, however, severely criticized the government’s intervention in the selection, although the union itself felt no animosity towards Takano. In the face of the opposition from the labour side, Takano eventually declined to go to the Conference. He also took responsibility for his behaviour and resigned his professorship at Tōkyō Imperial University.\(^90\)

There is no doubt that Takano’s decision had an effect on the relationship between the ILO and the LNAJ in an important way. However, even if Takano had endorsed Asari’s plan, there must have been many problems to be solved before establishing a commission within the LNAJ, because the LNAJ was very unwilling to tackle labour issues. At a Board of Directors’ meeting of the Association on April 11, Hozumi Shigetō proposed revising the statutes of the Association and institute a commission which would deal with issues relating to the International Labour Organization. But the Board rejected his proposal.\(^91\) This indicates that the LNAJ was, to say the least, uninterested in strengthening its partnership with the ILO.

\(^{89}\) Ōshima Kiyoshi, *Takano Iwasaburō den* [Biography of Takano Iwasaburō] (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1968), 120.

\(^{90}\) Ibid., 145–165.

\(^{91}\) The LNAJ, “Kaimu hōkoku, dai 21 shū [The bulletin, no. 21]”, in *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*, vol. 36, 576. Although Hozumi’s idea of creating a commission on labour issues was quite similar to Asari’s plan, it is unknown whether there was any communication between the two.
A letter from Thomas to Asari on June 25 shows that the latter had given up his attempt to institute a national commission within the LNAJ and was now planning to organize a totally new association. Thomas was disappointed that the Tōkyō Office abandoned the original plan, but left the final decision to the Tōkyō Office. He also agreed that the highest priority should be given to gaining autonomy: “Si l’Association [the LNAJ] est, comme vous nous le laissez entendre, une Association solide et efficace, peut-être y a-t-il lieu de ne pas créer en face d’elle une autre Association. Mais elle devrait vraiment comprendre que l’autonomie est nécessaire. La Société des Nations elle-même reconnaît l’autonomie du Bureau. Dans les Associations privées, il serait souhaitable que le même principe fût adopté.”

Asari established Kokusai rōdō kyōkai (the International Labour Association, hereafter, ILA) in March 1925. As could be expected from the above episode, the ILA became an organization completely independent from, or even in conflict with, the LNAJ to such extent that the directorate of the LNAJ rejected Asari’s request to donate 500 to 1,000 yen for the establishment of the ILA.

The central figures of the LNAJ probably did not know that the Secretariat of the IFLNS, the French association and the ILO had cooperated in establishing a special commission within the Federation. The directorate of the LNAJ held a meeting on March 1, 1924, to prepare for a session of the special commission scheduled at the end of the same month. Those who participated in the meeting—Shibusawa Eiichi, Sakatani Yoshirō, Yamakawa Tadao, Hayashi Kiroku, Yamada Saburō, Tachi Sakutarō, Inui Kiyosue, Takagi Yasaka and the two diplomats Kawashima Shintarō and Matsushima Shikao—made minor revisions to the Association’s previous draft resolutions. The new resolutions were as follows:

Resolution 1 “Without involving the immigration question, a member nation of the League of nations [sic] shall apply the same requirements for admission to and departure from that country, to the classes of people of other member nations, who fall within the commercial or mercantile group, irrespective of their origin or nativity.”

Resolution 2 “In the establishment of business, trade, occupation, profession or commercial, industrial, insurance or banking enterprises, foreign nationals, persons, firms and corporations, shall enjoy the equal treatment as the native nationals or establishments of like kind, it being understood that where excep-

92 Thomas to Asari, June 25, 1924, ILOA: C 1402.
93 Aoki Setsuichi to Shiraishi Kitarō, May 2, 1925, Shibusawa archives [hereafter, SA]: 135/04/184.
tions are made by reason of public order or security, they are to be applicable to all foreigners alike.

Resolution 3 “Likewise in conducting or engaging in business, trade, etc same as resolution 2 [sic].”

The Association deleted Resolution No. 10 on the equal treatment of nationals and foreigners under the law, which had been included in the original document. It also divided Resolution No. 9 into two resolutions on starting a business (Resolution 2) and that on conducting business (Resolution 3). The reason for the division was to gain the approval of the IFLNS Congress, at least for the latter provision on conducting business. Another seemingly minor but significant change was that the Association limited the application of the new resolutions to the member countries of the League of Nations, excluding, among others, the United States. This made the resolutions look more moderate than the original ones.

The meeting of the special commission was held in Paris on March 25, attended by familiar members like Célestin Bouglé and Scie Ton-fa as well as new members such as the French politician Bertrand Nogaro and the Greek diplomat and international lawyer Nicolas Politis. The Japanese member of the commission was the diplomat Usami Uzuhiko. At the meeting Politis and Nogaro raised an objection to Resolution 1, arguing that certain countries which were rich but whose populations were small would be afraid of opening their territory to foreigners. Thus, although the commission adopted Resolutions 2 and 3, it was decided that Resolution 1 would be further examined at the eighth Congress, which was to be held in Lyons from June 27 to July 2 in 1924.

The atmosphere of the Congress, however, became unprecedentedly tense because of the 1924 Immigration Act in the United States. The 1924 Act, which effectively barred immigration from Japan to America, provoked the Japanese public. The LNAJ decided at its general meeting on April 23 to send a statement to the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association and the American League of Nations Union and requested these

95 Sugimura to Matsui, April 2, 1924, JACAR: B06150913400, 2–5.
96 Union international des Assoications pour la Societe des Nations, Statut des Etranger, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
organizations do their best to prevent the enactment of the Act. The LNAJ also ordered delegates to the eighth Congress—the former Governor of the Bank of Japan, Inoue Junnosuke, the legal scholar Takayanagi Kenzō, the economist Shiozawa Masasada and several diplomats including Sugimura Yōtarō—to explain to the Congress’s audience “the cause of the Japanese exclusion, the history leading up to the Act, the feelings of the peace-loving Japanese people who patiently endure this humiliation, and the Association’s ceaseless effort to calm down the agitated public opinion.” What made the Congress more conflict-laden than ever was the decision of the American League of Nations Non-Partisan Association to send its representative across the Atlantic to the Congress. The associations of Japan and the United States, which were in an explosive situation, faced each other in Lyons.

The Japanese delegation submitted its resolutions to the final commission meetings held immediately before the Plenary Congress on June 27 and 28. The ILO representative Louis Varlez, who attended the meetings, agreed to the resolutions. He also proposed studying ways of applying the principles formulated by the resolutions, and expressing the hope that the League of Nations and the ILO would examine those ways and that the Secretariat of the IFLNS would enquire into the difficulties present in various countries as well as the conditions in which those principles could be realized. Varlez’s proposals clearly showed that the ILO wished to develop its relationship with the IFLNS. The commission unanimously adopted the Japanese resolutions and Varlez’s proposals. It also decided at the meetings to deal with the problem of immigration in general, as had been planned by the Secretariat of the IFLNS, the French association and the ILO. The Japanese association, which had restricted the subject of its resolutions to the migration of the commercial or mercantile group, might

97 “Shadanhōjin kokusai renmei kyōkai dai 4 kai tsūjō sōkai gijiroku [The protocol of the fourth annual assembly of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B04013932000, 69–72.
98 Shidehara to Wakatsuki, June 27, 1924, JACAR: B05014049000, 67–68. Someone added a few sentences in the telegram, “But openly bringing up the matter of Japanese exclusion is not allowed either, because such an act will have a negative effect on the problem of the twenty-one demands on China. It is, therefore, requested to find appropriate measures to achieve our purpose.” The LNAJ was worried that touching on a political problem might provoke the Chinese association, since the Japanese association had prevented the Chinese association from bringing up its political problems with Japan.
99 Varlez to Thomas, June 30, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
be surprised by this unexpected turn of events, but it also agreed to the
decision, seeing the willingness of the commission to discuss the problem
of immigration.

Although the commission members were generally supportive of the
LNAJ, the Congress was not. At the session of the Congress held on July
1, the American representative and historian Clyde Duniway strongly
opposed the commission’s draft resolutions. He insisted on referring the
resolutions back to the commission, arguing that the majority of his fellow
citizens did not support the principle of racial equality. The resolutions, he
said, entailed “the disadvantage of involving the League of Nations in a
question which lay within the exclusive province of the sovereignty of
States.”100 Sugimura and Bouglé objected to Duniway’s proposal.
Sugimura vigorously insisted on the adoption of the resolutions at the
Congress, and Bouglé maintained that the American argument was “aimed
at preventing all questions affecting the sovereignty of States from being
examined by the Congress.”101 The Congress, unable to settle the differ-
ences of opinion, decided to entrust the task of finding a solution to a com-
mittee composed of Bouglé, Duniway, Inoue Junnosuke and a representa-
tive of the Swiss association, Albert Picot.

The committee modified the commission’s resolutions and the Congress
eventually adopted this modified version of the resolutions. The new texts
approved almost all the original provisions in the Japanese resolutions and
Varlez’s proposals, and further stated that the Congress reaffirmed its prin-
ciples on the equitable treatment of races, which had been adopted at the
sixth Congress. But the resolutions included the sentence that “The
Congress understands that the above resolutions do not involve the
question of immigration.”102

The adopted resolutions were clearly the results of compromise
between the Japanese and American associations, and the compromise
was mutually satisfactory.103 While the American association was pleased

100 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, HUITIÈME ASSEMBLÉE et
SESSION DU CONSEIL GÉNÉRAL, JACAR: B05014049500, 53.
101 Ibid., 54.
102 Ibid., 79.
103 This time American newspapers also reported the results of the assembly. See
“League Societies Drop Haiti Protest Against Americans”, The Washington Post,
July 1, 1924; “American Stirs League Societies”, The New York Times, July 2,
1924. See also “Unions pour la S. d. N. [Societe des Nations]”, Journal de
Genève, July 2, 1924.
that it could prevent the problem of immigration from being discussed at the eighth Congress, the Japanese association was happy that the Congress decided to continue the discussion on this matter. The Congress asked the Federation to institute an enquiry into “the difficulties to be encountered in the application of these principles [on the equitable treatment of foreigners] and into the conditions under which the said principles can be applied”. The Japanese delegation was encouraged by the fact that most of the member societies, apart from the American association, were sympathetic to the Japanese position. Sugimura said, “While the speech given by the American representative caused disappointment and opposition among the audience in spite of his unusual eloquence, the same audience loudly applauded my speech. This, I believe, shows the trend of world opinion about the problem between Japan and the United States.”

To Sugimura, the eighth Congress was a success in another respect. At this Congress, the Chinese association finally abandoned its attempt to bring up the problem between China and Japan with the IFLNS. Although the Japanese association had expected that the Chinese association would present a new proposal on Chinese-Japanese relations, the Chinese association refrained from doing so. Sugimura welcomed this decision, thinking that this was the expression of the Chinese association’s will to develop a friendship with the Japanese association.

Probably, the only party which was disappointed with the results was the ILO. Thomas thought the debate by the IFLNS was not thorough and disregarded it as “assez médiocre”. Varlez was also convinced that much more research was needed before the controversy between Japan and the United States was finally resolved. He must have realized the extent of the discord between the two countries. In a letter from February 23, 1925, he told Thomas that “pour eux [Japonais] l’heure des grandes résolutions en matière d’égalité de races et d’émigration n’est pas encore venue. On n’en est encore qu’aux travaux de recherches: voyez les propo-

104 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, HUITIÈME ASSEMBLÉE et SESSION DU CONSEIL GÉNÉRAL, JACAR: B05014049500, 79.
106 Ibid., 8–9.
107 Thomas to Valrez, July 9, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
French proposal on the admission of foreigners into a country

The General Council of the IFLNS decided at a meeting held in London on October 14, 1924, to entrust the French association with the task of organizing a commission composed of the associations concerned with the problem of immigration. This decision was meant to transfer the initiative for drafting reports and resolutions from Japan to France, but the Japanese association did not object to the decision. Rather, the Japanese association welcomed it because the Japanese association had the impression that the French association was sympathetic to the Japanese position.

The French association selected Célestin Bouglé, Bertrand Nogaro, the trade unionist Hyacinthe Dubreuil and the legal scholar William Oualid as commission members, and appointed the historian Alphonse Aulard as chairman of the commission. Those who participated in the meetings of the commission, held four times from December 23, 1924, to January 27, 1925, were representatives from Armenia, China, Czechoslovakia, England, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania and Russia. The Japanese representative was Shiozawa Masasada, professor of economics at Waseda University.

The Paris commission selected four topics for discussion—the rights and duties of immigrants, the conditions of admission of foreigners to a country of immigration, the problem of assimilation and the international protection of emigrants—and appointed Dubreuil, Oualid and Bouglé as rapporteurs on each topic respectively (Bouglé took charge of the last two topics). Most of the commission members, including Shiozawa, paid the greatest attention to the report on the conditions of admission of foreigners prepared by Oualid, a professor at the Paris Law Faculty who was known as a specialist on migration issues. According to a letter from Ruyssen to

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109 Hayashi to Shidehara, October 17, 1924, JACAR: B06150913500, 6.
Thomas, the French association had already asked Oualid to study the topic in April 1924.\textsuperscript{111}

Oualid’s report included the most detailed analysis the IFLNS made in the interwar period about the problem of immigration. The report’s preamble was as follows:

Considérant que le droit d’admission et d’établissement de l’immigrant dans un pays étranger a, comme limite, le droit souverain de l’Etat d’immigration de déterminer les conditions d’accès de son territoire aux éléments étrangers; Considérant, toutefois, que ce droit souverain doit s’exercer dans des conditions d’objectivité, de publicité, de régularité respectueuses de l’égalité entre Etats et exclusives de tout arbitraire, sous peine de dégénérer en abus et de méconnaître le principe de l’égalité des nations, base de toute vie juridique internationale et garantie du bon fonctionnement et de l’essor de la Société des Nations; Considérant, en conséquence, que les limitations légales ou réglementaires reconnues nécessaires au droit d’accès du territoire, ne sauraient s’appliquer en principe aux Etats ou aux races, comme tels, mais doivent viser exclusivement les individus; Qu’en ce qui tue ces derniers, ces limitations ne doivent être motivées que par des considérations de sauvegarde et de sécurité physique et économique ou morale et intellectuelle de la nation et qu’elles doivent être mises en vigueur, quand elles sont édictées, avec les délais et les notifications, la modération et l’humanité requis pour en atténuer les conséquences dommageables; Considérant aussi que les principes énoncés ci-dessus supposent la mise en vigueur de principes correspondants de la part des pays d’émigration, qui ne sauraient restreindre la liberté de sortie de leurs nationaux ou leur acheminement vers la destination de leur choix qu’en raison de considérations de même ordre et formulées dans les même conditions d’objectivité et de publicité [...]\textsuperscript{112}

The line of argument was not unique. The report started by recognizing that immigrants’ right of admission to and residence in a foreign country was limited by the sovereign right of states to determine the conditions of foreigners’ access to their territory, and then argued that the right of foreigners to enter the territory of a country must not be limited on the grounds of their nationality or race, because even in exercising the


\textsuperscript{112} Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, BULLETIN Nr 2: Les Réunions de Bruxelles et de Paris, JACAR: B05014050100, 92.
sovereign right to determine the conditions of admission states had to respect the principle of the equality of nations, which the report said formed the basis of all “international juridical life”. This was not much different from the argumentation of von Bar examined in the first chapter. The uniqueness of the report rather lay in its specification of the conditions of admission of foreigners. Oualid contended that limiting the admission of foreigners must exclusively refer to individuals, not to states or races, and be motivated only by considerations about the “physical and economic” or “moral and intellectual” protection and security of the immigration country, and concluded that states must select immigrants only according to objective criteria, such as their age, state of health, economic value, educational background or criminal record, and not on the basis of their nationality or race. The detail of the conditions of admission Oualid endorsed was as follows:

Que le droit d’admission en pays étranger, corollaire de la liberté individuelle de déplacement, ne puisse être limité que par application de principes scientifiques et objectifs, tenant compte :
- de l’âge et de la santé des immigrants ;
- de leur valeur économique et de leur degré d’instruction ;
- de leur moralité, objectivement attestée par la production d’un extrait de casier judiciaire, ou une caution émanant de nationaux honorables de pays d’immigration ;
- Que ces conditions d’admission, ainsi que toute modification dont elles feraient l’objet, soient notifiées, en temps utile, aux nationaux ou associations intéressés […] 113

The report incorporated the Japanese point of view by supporting the principle of racial equality, whereas the idea of using the attributes of individual immigrants as criteria for selection was new and foreign to the Japanese association. The French association, founded in the largest immigration country in Europe, had shown a positive attitude towards establishing some sort of international principle on international migration since long before the creation of the Paris commission. As has been mentioned, it was the French association that chose the problem of emigration from among three alternatives suggested by Ruyssen.

The internal documents of the French association have been dispersed with the result that it is impossible to reconstruct what was discussed among the members of the French association. However, the records of

113 Ibid., 92.
one of its constituent organizations, *la Ligue des droit de l’homme*, are still available. The Ligue was a civil liberties organization established in the middle of the Dreyfus affair, whose objective was to defend the rights of man. Importantly, the two central members of the Paris commission, Oualid and Bouglé, were members of the Ligue and they discussed the problem of immigration within the Ligue around the same time as the Paris commission.\(^\text{114}\) Several articles published in *Cahiers des droits de l’homme*, the official organ of the Ligue, show that the two had two motives for dealing with the problem of immigration: the protection of foreigners’ human rights and the regulation of labour supply in France.\(^\text{115}\)

In his article contributed to *Cahiers* in January 1925, Oualid stated that France would become “le refuge des «indésirables» du monde entier” if it abandoned the right of expulsion in the age when in both America and Europe barriers to foreigners being admitted were being erected.\(^\text{116}\) But he did not think that his country should renounce its faith in the individual liberty proclaimed by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen as well as in its own tradition of hospitality.\(^\text{117}\) Rather, he believed that an equitable balance should be achieved between humanitarian treatment of individuals on French territory and the protection of French national labour. It was from these considerations that he developed the idea of using individual attributes as criteria for selecting immigrants. In so doing, however, he seems to have given a relatively higher priority to the labour market regulation. At a meeting of the Ligue held on February 16, Oualid concurred with Henri Guernut’s remark that “on se montre prudent pour l’admission, mais il faut être juste dans l’expulsion”, and proposed making the conditions for the admission of foreigners severer instead of misusing the right of expulsion.\(^\text{118}\) Here he advocated essentially the same criteria as he had advocated at the Paris commission:

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\(^{117}\) Ibid., 34.

Il faudrait exiger, que les étrangers admis à séjourner en France remplissent certaines conditions physiques, morales et économiques. Conditions physiques: qu’ils ne soient pas tarés ou atteints d’affections contagieuses; conditions morales: qu’ils aient de bons antécédents et ne viennent pas grossir les rangs des maltaiteurs; conditions économiques : qu’ils soient capables d’exercer un métier [...].

Bouglé, who was present at the same meeting, was much more outspoken. He insisted on introducing a quota system for immigrants, saying that the system was necessary for the national interests of France, especially for the purpose of protecting national labour. “C’est évidemment un droit de l’homme d’aller où il veut, de faire ce qui lui plaît. Néanmoins, des conversations avec des ouvriers et avec des étrangers m’ont convaincu qu’il fallait une réglementation, surtout pour le contingentement à l’entrée. Et cette réglementation doit être inspirée par un souci d’intérêt national. Les voeux des organisations ouvrières sont conformes à cet intérêt. Elles aussi demandent le contingentement, et le refoulement.” 120 These remarks clearly show that both Oualid and Bouglé, while acknowledging the importance of protecting foreigners’ human rights, approved of selecting immigrants or limiting their number in order to regulate labour supply in France.

119 Ibid., 158.
120 Ibid., 158.
Most of the LNAJ members welcomed the Oualid report as a great step forward. For example, Yamada Saburō showed a positive reaction to the report and informed the Japan committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations of its content. The Japan committee of the IPR was a newly established international cooperation organization, whose membership largely overlapped with that of the LNAJ (see Table 2.6) and whose council members included all of the council members of the Japanese-American Relations Committee.121 At a meeting of the Japan committee of the IPR on April 29, 1925, Yamada, who acted as rapporteur on the immigration problem, talked about the Paris commission’s proposals. In the margin of a document delivered at the meeting, someone wrote a fragmentary line which read, “the League of Nations associations; resolutions; the limitation of admission should be based not on races or religions but on merit”.122

A legal scholar and member of the Japan committee, Takayanagi Kenzō, might have utilized the information provided by Yamada when he wrote a paper submitted to the first conference of the IPR held in Hawaii. Takayanagi’s paper, which is said to have “attracted the audience’s attention as one of the most scientific and important papers presented at the Hawaii conference”, made substantially the same propositions as those in the Oualid report.123

With regard to the conditions on which the admission of immigration should be based, I submit the following:

1. The conditions or standards of admission should be objective and open.
2. They should not disregard the principle of equality of states.
3. They should be administered not arbitrarily, but according to rules.
4. They should not make any discrimination on the grounds of race or nationality.
5. They should be based on personal merit, such as age, health, education, moral and pecuniary conditions of the immigrant.124

122 “Dai 2 kai dai 1 bukai (imin/jinshu) [The second meeting of the first section on immigration and race]”, Takagi Yasaka Papers (hereafter, TYP): 1/1/196.
124 Takayanagi Kenzō, “A suggestion for more enlightened immigration and emigration policies”, in Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session, June 30–July 14, 1925: History, Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses (Honolulu, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925), 111. See also Takayanagi Kenzō,
The international lawyer Tachi Sakutarō also mentioned the Oualid report in his study on the meaning of domestic questions. He conducted the study as part of the project for the codification of international law, the largest enterprise undertaken by the Society of International Law in the interwar years. The aim of the project was to develop international law by drawing up its draft code. Tachi was in charge of the topic of domestic questions, whose scope was often disputed in discussions on immigration problems. In his report, the professor of international law at Tōkyō Imperial University referred to the French association’s proposals and, in a somewhat reserved manner, described them as pointing to the theoretical possibility of applying the notion of “the abuse of rights” to international law.

The Japanese media also reported the details of the discussion at the Paris commission. Shigenori Raisuke, a correspondent for the Ōsaka asahi newspaper in Paris, wrote the most enthusiastic article. “As Ōsaka asahi’s editorial has insisted, the immigration problem in the United States has not been solved yet. And now an ally has appeared who supports us”, said Shigenori in his long article. He praised the Paris commission reports as important documents drafted by an “impartial organization”, and argued, “Although the resolutions, if passed, will not become a binding international treaty [...] they will be regarded as the expression of world opinion and, therefore, give us moral and spiritual support.”

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125 On the project, see Banzai Hiroyuki, “Kokusaihō no hōtenka to kokuren kokusai-hō iinkai [The codification of international law and the UN commission on international law]”, Waseda hōgaku 78 no. 4 (2002): 261–263.

126 Tachi Sakutarō, “Kokunai-teki mondai no igi [The meaning of the domestic question]”, JACAR: B07080300300, 74. But he was somewhat pessimistic about the theoretical possibility and even thought that using such a vague notion as the abuse of rights was dangerous. When he published this study in French, he deleted the reference to the French proposals. Sakutarō Tachi, La Souveraineté et l’Indépendence de l’Etat et les Questions intérieures en Droit International (Paris: Les éditions internationales, 1930), 100.

127 Shigenori Raisuke, “Imin mondai no kōseina kaiketsu saku [A fair plan for resolving the immigration issue]”, Ōsaka asahi shinbun, April 11, 12, 29, 1925.

128 Ibid.
A defeat at the ninth Congress of the IFLNS

To prepare a final report to be submitted to the IFLNS Congress, the Paris commission held two meetings on February 7 and 8, inviting member societies which had not participated in the previous meetings. At the meetings, Shiozawa proposed deleting a sentence in the Oualid report that described the quota system as an acceptable method of limiting the admission of immigrants, and the commission approved his proposal. Obviously, he had the immigration control system in the United States in mind. But apart from this minor revision, Shiozawa was greatly in favour of the commission’s work and paid the highest compliment to Oualid.

By contrast, the American representative William H. Buckler opposed the commission making a final report, arguing that the General Council meeting in London had only entitled the commission to conduct a preparatory study on immigration. The member societies, he said, should be able to conduct a study on the same topic before the commission drew up a final report.129 The delegate from the British association, Walter Napier, agreed to Buckler’s observation and stated that if the commission wished to keep the question of immigration on its agenda, the British association would submit a counter-proposal. Responding to the American and British opposition, the commission checked the protocols of the Lyons Congress as well as the London meeting and confirmed that the commission was authorized to deal with the question of the conditions of admission of foreigners. But the commission agreed that the General Secretariat of the Federation would send the commission’s report to the member societies before the next Congress so that they would be able to examine its content and raise their objections, if any, to it.

Following this agreement, Ruyssen circulated the Paris commission’s documents among the member societies and, in response to them, the British association officially submitted a counter-proposal on June 9, 1925, in which the British association insisted on the postponement of the discussion on the commission’s report. The LNAJ, believing that the intention of the British association was to kill the ideal proposal formulated by the Paris commission, determined to do its best to have the pro-

129 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, BULLETIN Nr 2: Les Réunions de Bruxelles et de Paris, JACAR: B05014050100, 63
proposal passed at the ninth Congress scheduled to be held in Warsaw from July 3 to 8.\textsuperscript{130}

However, immediately before the Warsaw Congress it turned out that the rules of procedure in the IFLNS were disadvantageous to the Japanese association. They prescribed that a counter-proposal must be examined prior to an original proposal. Following this procedure, the commission on political questions held on July 5 discussed the British proposal presented by Lady Gladstone instead of the commission’s report. Here, she argued that adopting the commission’s proposal was difficult in the present circumstances in which South Africa, for instance, was restricting the immigration of Indians. A Japanese delegate, Sugimura Yōtarō, quickly replied to her argument. He stated that the commission’s resolutions were aimed at establishing general principles and that detailed rules concerning the application of those principles could be laid down through negotiations among the authorities of the governments around the world. Sugimura argued that “Our task is to educate world opinion and to establish impartial principles according to our conscience.”\textsuperscript{131} Notwithstanding his vehement opposition, however, the commission adopted the British proposal with only two dissenting votes from the Chinese and Japanese associations with the result that the discussion on the commission’s proposal was postponed to the next Congress.

Immediately after the meeting ended in Japan’s defeat, Sugimura asked Alphonse Aulard for help. Although the French historian had served as the chairman of the Paris commission, he was absent from the meeting of the commission on political questions because he had to chair a different commission held at the same time. He accepted Sugimura’s request and attended the next meeting of the commission on political questions. At this meeting, Aulard demanded to have the British proposal re-examined, complaining that the vote had taken place when he was unable to participate in it. The commission accepted his request and allowed the societies of Britain, France and Japan to discuss among themselves and submit a new proposal during the sessions of the Congress.

Until the very end of the Congress, Sugimura continued to negotiate with member societies to find a solution. The British association, however,


\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 59.
showed little willingness to compromise. The Association proposed a compromise text which deleted only the phrase that circumstances did not permit the adoption of a final resolution. Sugimura, on the other hand, requested the British delegation to approve the principles incorporated into the commission’s reports. But the British side rejected his request, insisting that racial distinction was necessary.132 After the first round of negotiations with the British association had failed, Sugimura held talks with Aulard and drew up a new proposal which maintained that recognizing the principles formulated by the Paris commission, especially the principle of racial equality, was essential to solving immigration problems and suggested adopting all the resolutions that could be adopted at the present Congress and postponing discussion of the rest to the next year.

With the new proposal in hand, Sugimura conducted the second round of negotiations with the British delegation. On July 7 he met with the British scholar Alfred Zimmern, who was known for his contribution to the development of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, the predecessor of UNESCO. But the renowned internationalist rejected Sugimura’s proposal, saying that the British association could by no means accept the principle of racial equality.133 On the same day, Sugimura also met with an American representative and pacifist activist, Theodore Marburg, suspecting that the American association was cooperating with the British behind the scenes. Marburg was one of the founding members of the American League to Enforce Peace who had urged the Japanese to participate in the League of Nations movement before the end of the First World War. But there was no chance of gaining support from him, who argued against Sugimura from the viewpoint of eugenics.

Now, it was obvious to all that the word “race” in the commission’s proposals aroused such strong opposition among the British and American delegates. On July 8, therefore, Aulard and the British association drew up a compromise resolution, carefully avoiding the use of the word. The Japanese delegation had no alternative but to agree to the compromise plan, which stated only vaguely that the original proposals formulated by the Paris commission were in accord with the ideal of the League of

133 Ibid., 86.
Nations. “Now that the British association’s intransigent attitude had become clear, it was futile to insist on changing the wording”, said one of the Japanese delegates named Inagaki Morikatsu in his report on the Congress.134 The Congress decided to adopt only a minor resolution that had been incorporated into the commission’s report and postponed the discussion on the rest of it to the next year.135

This decision was a decisive defeat to the LNAJ, an event which was so devastating that after the ninth Congress the LNAJ members began to withdraw from the attempt to propagate the idea of racial equality one after another. Diplomats were the first to lose their motivation. A telegram sent from the LNAJ to Matsuda Michikazu, then chief of the Japan Office of the League of Nations in Paris, on October 21, 1925, requested Sugimura to attend the meeting of the next General Council of the IFLNS and do his best to pass the rest of the proposals formulated by the Paris commission as early as possible.136 Shibusawa, the chairman of the LNAJ, himself had given his assent to the request.137 But Sugimura refused to be the LNAJ’s delegate to the Council meeting. Considering the confrontation caused by the discussion in Warsaw, he said, it was clear that the situation was not ripe for fulfilling the request: “If our hasty action only provokes the American and British associations, it will in the long run be counterproductive to the solution of immigration problems.”138 Adachi Mineichirō was of the same opinion. In a telegram sent to Shibusawa, he stated that nobody wished to raise the same question once again. “No matter how hard we try,” he complained, “we will be unable to make a small difference. On the contrary, our efforts may provoke the nations concerned and aggravate the conflict with them.”139 He concluded his telegram with a definite sentence that there was “no other way but to shelve the problem [of immigration] for a while.”140 In response to Sugimura and Adachi, the

134 Inagaki, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai rengōkai dai 9 kai sōkai ni kansuru hōkoku imin mondai ni kansuru uramen no keika”, JACAR: B05014050500, 89.
136 Shidehara to Matsuda, October 21, 1925, JACAR: B05014050500, 96.
137 Shibusawa jimusho [Shibusawa office] to Ōkuma Makoto, October 21, 1925, SA: 135/04/135.
138 Sugimura to Shidehara, October 22, 1925, JACAR: B06150914000, 3.
139 Adachi to Shidehara, October 23, 1925, JACAR: B06150914000, 4.
140 Ibid., 4.
LNAJ toned down its request. The Association still asked Sugimura to attend the Council meeting but allowed him to act as he thought proper.\textsuperscript{141} This time Sugimura accepted the request and attended the meeting held in October. But he was no longer enthusiastic about the LNAJ’s activities. He declined to attend further meetings, saying that it was “unpleasant for a diplomat to attend the meeting of the IFLNS, whose objective was to criticize the governments around the world.”\textsuperscript{142} This was Sugimura’s farewell message to the IFLNS.

In the face of the opposition from diplomats who were afraid of jeopardizing the relationship with Western countries, the other non-diplomat members of the LNAJ also began to change their opinion. Although every member society of the IFLNS was free to submit a new proposal to the tenth Congress scheduled from June 29 to July 3, 1926, the Japanese association did nothing. It was only the British association that presented a proposal.

Interestingly enough, the British association announced its intention to deal with the matters of admitting foreigners into a state and the treatment of foreigners in that state after their admission in its proposal. It declared that “the time has arrived when the States which have signed the Peace Treaties or adhered to the Covenant of the League must carefully consider the principles which ought to govern international relations in these matters.”\textsuperscript{143} Although, the proposal admitted, British jurists in pre-war times had regarded both matters as those within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, continental jurists had allowed a wider field for the operation of international law, as could be seen from the 1892 resolutions of the IDI. Considerable changes had taken place since the war and “all matters likely to give rise to war” had been brought into the “international arena”.\textsuperscript{144} In marked contrast to its former attitude, the British association showed its readiness to cooperate with other associations to discuss basic principles concerning international migration.

In relation to the first matter of admitting foreigners into a state, the British association suggested the following four principles:

\textsuperscript{141} Shidehara to Sugimura, October 24, 1925, JACAR: B05014050500, 122.
\textsuperscript{142} Adachi to Shidehara, February 28, 1926, JACAR: B05014050700, 39.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 7.
(1) That any limitations placed on freedom of immigration should be framed so as not to act unfairly as between different States but so as to have due regard to the equality of States, which forms the foundation of all international juridical life.
(2) That such limitations should be objective, specific and clearly defined, and should be published as widely as possible and should not be brought into operation without reasonable notice.
(3) That such limitations should be enforced equally, openly, regularly, without caprice, and with such moderation and humanity as may be required for mitigating prejudicial consequences.
(4) That the States which are members of the League of Nations should cooperate by means of the machinery of the League for securing that any limitations placed on freedom of immigration shall be in accordance with the above principles, and for minimising the risk that injustice or international friction may arise through the methods adopted for regulating immigration.145

The British proposal derived many phrases from the Oualid report, such as “international juridical life” (“vie juridique internationale”), “equally, openly, regularly” (“dans des conditions d’objectivité, de publicité, de régularité”), or “moderation and humanity” (“la modération et l’humanité”). But there were various differences between the two documents. The largest one was that while the Oualid report used the word “race”, the British proposal stated only that limiting the admission of foreigners should pay due regard to the equality of “States”. Furthermore, the stipulation that limiting the admission of foreigners into a state must exclusively refer to individuals and take the specific conditions of admitting foreigners into consideration disappeared completely. As regards the second matter of the treatment of foreigners within a state after their admission to it, the British association was more protective than the Paris commission. It is true that the British document maintained that “all nations should accord to foreigners living within their territories equal legal and economic rights with their own nationals” in the same way as the Paris document, and even stated that “no distinction should be made, on grounds of difference in race or nationality, in the treatment of foreigners after admission.”146 But it added an important qualifying clause to the stipulation: “except when the avoidance of such distinction is incompatible with the political, economic and social security of the State.”147 This

145 Ibid., 6.
146 Ibid., 5.
147 Ibid., 5.
was obviously intended to allow states to make exceptions and, if necessary, introduce racially discriminatory policies.

The LNAJ noticed these crucial differences between the British and Paris documents. Inagaki Morikatsu, who in 1926 was appointed to the resident representative of the LNAJ in Europe,\footnote{The LNAJ, “Dai 60 kai rijikai [The 60th council meeting]”, Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 37, ed. Shibusawa seien kinen zaidan ryūmon sha (Tōkyō: Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō kankō kai, 1961), 38.} presented a report to the LNAJ, in which he compared the two texts and correctly pointed out that the British one did not necessarily follow the principles of racial equality and the equitable treatment of foreigners.\footnote{Inagaki Morikatsu, “Imin mondai to kokusai renmei kyōkai rengōkai [Immigration problems and the IFLNS]”, JACAR: B05014050800, 75–76.} But at the Congress held in Aberystwyth in Wales from June 29 to July 3, 1926, the LNAJ did not raise any strong objections to the British proposal. A Japanese delegate, Rōyama Masamichi, only opposed the stipulation which allowed states to make exceptions on the treatment of foreigners after admission.\footnote{Rōyama Masamichi, “Keizai oyobi Shakai rippō mondai [Problems in the economy and social legislation]”, in Aberisutouisu no taikai [The Aberystwyth Congress], ed. Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ] (Tōkyō: Kokusai renmei kyōkai, 1926), 55–60. Inagaki’s account is somewhat different from Rōyama’s. According to Inagaki, it was the Polish delegate Alfred Halban who at the Aberystwyth Congress insisted on deleting the qualifying clause included in the British proposal. Inagaki Morikatsu, “Dai 10 kai kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō taikai ni shusseki shite [On attending the 10th Congress of the IFLNS]”, Kokusai chishiki 6 no. 11 (1926): 90–94. On Halban, see the next chapter of this book.} Surprisingly, the LNAJ did not propose deleting the qualifying clause (“except when the avoidance of such distinction is incompatible with the political, economic and social security of the State”) but instead proposed removing the phrase “on grounds of difference in race or nationality”. The sentence the LNAJ proposed (“No distinction should be made in the treatment of foreigners after admission except when the avoidance of such distinction is incompatible with the political, economic and social security of the State”) neither explicitly advocated the principle of racial equality nor expressly approved of making exceptions on the grounds of race or nationality. In other words, the Japanese association chose to obfuscate the point and leave racial issues untouched. The commission supported the Japanese opinion and, quite ironically, erased the term “race” at the request of the Japanese association.

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149 Inagaki Morikatsu, “Imin mondai to kokusai renmei kyōkai rengōkai [Immigration problems and the IFLNS]”, JACAR: B05014050800, 75–76.
150 Rōyama Masamichi, “Keizai oyobi Shakai rippō mondai [Problems in the economy and social legislation]”, in Aberisutouisu no taikai [The Aberystwyth Congress], ed. Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ] (Tōkyō: Kokusai renmei kyōkai, 1926), 55–60. Inagaki’s account is somewhat different from Rōyama’s. According to Inagaki, it was the Polish delegate Alfred Halban who at the Aberystwyth Congress insisted on deleting the qualifying clause included in the British proposal. Inagaki Morikatsu, “Dai 10 kai kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō taikai ni shusseki shite [On attending the 10th Congress of the IFLNS]”, Kokusai chishiki 6 no. 11 (1926): 90–94. On Halban, see the next chapter of this book.
The principle of racial equality the LNAJ had long advocated was not incorporated into the IFLNS’s document, and the LNAJ’s campaign for racial equality ended without having developed into a truly global movement. The resolution at the tenth Congress had little impact on world opinion. There was one newspaper article which suspected that the Aberystwyth resolution was one of the motivations behind Lord Cecil’s proposal at the seventh Assembly of the League of Nations to limit the scope of the League’s activities.\textsuperscript{151} \textit{La Réglementation des Migrations: Les traités et les conventions internationals}, a compilation of documents concerning international migration published by the ILO, also briefly mentioned the resolution as one of the texts regarding international migration adopted by private international organizations.\textsuperscript{152} But there were no major publications other than these that mentioned the resolution.

The aftermath of the defeat

The discussion about race and immigration which has been examined in this chapter reveals the nature of the LNAJ’s activities in the early 1920s. Although those who made an effort to formulate the LNAJ’s policy were, apart from Inui, academics such as Hatoyama, Yamada or Shiozawa, those who actually defended the LNAJ’s proposals at the IFLNS’s Plenary Congress were diplomats, such as Sugimura especially. This demonstrates more clearly than anything that the nature of the discussion at the IFLNS was political rather than scientific. The main aim of the discussion was not to improve and share knowledge about international problems but to construct a collective will by drafting and adopting resolutions. But it was quite often the case that an attempt at collective formation of will only produced quarrels among member associations. Shiozawa thought that what he saw at the Lyons Congress was only the dominance of “national interests” over the sense of “international justice”. Describing the confrontation with the American association as a “farce”, he complained that all the allegations made at the IFLNS conference, whose aim was to estab-

\textsuperscript{151} “Seek to Restrict Sphere of League”, \textit{The New York Times}, September 21, 1926.
lish international peace, were, in fact, “purely nationalistic”.

Yamada’s advice that the LNAJ should scientifically study racial issues had little influence on the Association’s course of action. On the contrary, the direction and pace of its activities kept being determined by external international political events, like the conflict with China over Shandong or the dispute with the United States over the 1924 Immigration Act.

The presence of diplomats who saw the discussion at the IFLNS only as diplomatic bargaining of minor importance seems to have made the LNAJ's arguments for racial equality less persuasive than they could have been. Several statements made by Sugimura at the IFLNS meetings were shocking enough to cast serious doubt on his moral sensibility. At a session of the commission on minority problems held in March 1924, for example, he replied to a question about the massacre of Koreans in the aftermath of the Kantō earthquake by saying that it was “rather praiseworthy” that the massacre had not escalated further in emergent situations at that time. Also, when Zimmern stated at the ninth Congress that Japan excluded the Chinese and the Russians, Sugimura argued that Japan had no law which excluded foreigners from entering the country and that “the number of expelled Chinese people was negligible.” But these were obvious lies. Furthermore, he told Marburg at the same Congress that it was “unpleasant for the Japanese to be compared with the black race.” These statements clearly show that the very man who demanded racial equality entertained racist thoughts.

This chapter has also made clear that the International Labour Office intervened in the discussion about the LNAJ’s proposal of racial equality with the aim of establishing a close relationship with the Federation. A special commission for examining the question of emigration was organized according to the plan formulated by the Secretariat of the IFLNS, the ILO and the French association, and the coordination among the three helped the commission develop rapidly and smoothly. At the ninth Congress, the commission was renamed as “the International Labour Office and social legislation commission” and the Office continued to

155 Inagaki, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai rengōkai dai 9 kai sōkai ni kansuru hōkoku imin mondai ni kansuru uramen no keika”, JACAR: B05014050500, 86.
156 Ibid., 88.
strengthen its involvement in the IFLNS. The Office also attempted to establish a connection with the LNAJ, but the attempt did not succeed. The ILO’s Tōkyō Branch Office planned to organize a national commission on labour issues within the LNAJ which would cooperate with the special commission of the IFLNS. But those who were involved in the labour movement in Japan preferred to gain autonomy and decided to establish a new organization outside the LNAJ. This decision, although founded on reasonable grounds, hindered the development of the relationship between the ILO and the LNAJ.

All in all, the organizational character of the LNAJ as an association chiefly managed by diplomats and people in business and financial circles continued to condition its activities in relation to the IFLNS. Since the Association was an elitist organization run by a small group of people, it could not only conceal details of the discussion about racial equality within the IFLNS from outsiders but also from rank-and-file members of the Association. By doing so, it deprived its own members of an opportunity to learn from experiencing failure. The 1925 annual report of the LNAJ only mentioned in passing that there was severe opposition to the Paris commission proposals from the American and British associations. And the report of the next year stated that the IFLNS “to a large extent” adopted the principle of the equal treatment of immigrants, which the Japanese association had long advocated. The LNAJ also published a special pamphlet about the Aberystwyth Congress, which included a chapter telling the history of the LNAJ’s campaign for racial equality up to the tenth Congress. But the chapter written by Inagaki did not mention all the details about the discord with the American and British associations at the Warsaw Congress. Sometimes the insiders of the Association not only concealed the fact that they had lost their battle for racial equality but fabricated stories. In an article published in the organ of the Society of International Law, Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi, for instance, Sugimura described the atmosphere at the ninth Congress as if it were favourable to the Japanese position. “Although the American association sent a prominent person like Marburg to the Warsaw Congress and made him repeat the same opinion that the American association had expressed...”

157 The LNAJ, “Taishō 14 nendo kaimu hōkoku [The 1925 annual report of the LNAJ]”, SA: 235/16/0097, 35.
158 The LNAJ, “Taishō 15 nendo kaimu hōkoku [The 1926 annual report of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B05014051100, 75.
on immigration problems,” he said, “all the representatives of the member societies of the IFLNS showed no sympathy for the American opinion. Far from that, they dismissed it with a laugh.”

But as the above examination has made clear, this was not the case. A rational discussion about racial issues in public was made impossible by such concealment and falsification, and even historians in later years have experienced difficulties in reconstructing and recognizing the significance of the events that took place within the IFLNS in the early 1920s.

159 Sugimura Yōtarō, “Kokusaihō yori bankokuhō e [From international law to cosmopolitan law]”, Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi 25 no. 10 (1926): 20.
Chapter 3: The Geneva World Economy Conference and the LNAJ: 1925–1927

After the ninth Plenary Congress of the IFLNS, where the draft resolution on the conditions of the admission of foreigners to a country encountered strong opposition from the British association, the LNAJ began to see the problem of international migration from a different perspective and started to assess the relative importance of international migration in the development of the national and international economy as compared to other factors such as international trade and investment. This shift in the LNAJ’s perspective occurred in the process of developing its policy for the World Economy Conference held in Geneva in 1927. The idea of convening an international conference on the economy was first suggested by Léon Jouhaux, then secretary general of the French General Confederation of Labour (CGT), and then officially proposed by a French representative to the League of Nations, Louis Loucheur, at the sixth Assembly of the League on September 24, 1925.¹ From the announcement of the Conference in 1925 to its opening in 1927, the LNAJ attempted to influence the outcome of the conference in a variety of ways: by proposing items to be placed on the agenda of the conference, compiling reports on international economic problems viewed from the Japanese perspective, and passing resolutions on the tasks the conference should achieve. The preparation of these documents provided the Association with an opportune moment to discuss economic problems and re-examine its policy on international migration.

Using the same approach and materials as the previous chapter, this chapter investigates the attempt the LNAJ made to exert influence on the direction of the World Economy Conference. By closely examining the course of events up to the opening of the World Economy Conference, this chapter identifies key figures in the Japanese association, illuminates their relationship with other international actors, and makes clear what they argued about the Conference. In so doing, this chapter tries to understand

how the policy agenda of the Association was reformulated after the defeat at the ninth Congress of the IFLNS.

The second chapter followed the activities of the LNAJ from its foundation in 1919 to the failure of its advocacy for racial equality in 1925 and showed that the LNAJ was an organization mainly run by two groups of people, namely, influential people in business and financial circles like Shibusawa, on the one hand, and diplomats, on the other hand, who tried to utilize the semi-governmental international organization to create a world opinion sympathetic to Japan. Although renowned academics were members of the LNAJ, most of them participated in the LNAJ’s activities only sporadically and superficially. The examination of the IFLNS Congresses in the period mentioned has also made clear that the International Labour Office successfully intervened in the discussion about the LNAJ’s proposals on racial equality and the equitable treatment of commerce, and enhanced its relationship with the IFLNS, while the Office’s attempt to establish a connection with the LNAJ failed principally because of the unwillingness of the Japanese sympathizers of the ILO to participate in the government-dependent LNAJ.

The following examination will show that the involvement of diplomats in the LNAJ’s activities was not so frequently observed during the period from 1925 to 1927 as in the preceding years. But this does not necessarily imply that the degree of contribution other members made to the formulation of the LNAJ’s policy markedly increased in the same period, nor does it mean that the LNAJ began to devote more energy to scientific research than to political advocacy. As this chapter shows, it was rather a miscellaneous group of people—businessmen, journalists, academics etc.—who participated in the LNAJ’s discussion about the World Economy Conference. And they reached no consensus on which type of activity—scientific or political—the LNAJ should pursue. Likewise, this chapter will also make clear that the LNAJ’s relationship with other international actors did not significantly change from previous years. Although the International Labour Office gradually increased its involvement in the IFLNS, the connection between the LNAJ and the Office did not develop in a similar manner.

Seen against the background of the impasse in the discussion about international migration at the IFLNS, the crucial importance of the World Economy Conference becomes clear, because what was at issue in the LNAJ’s internal discussion about the World Economy Conference was not only the success of the conference but also the future policy direction of
the Association. The following analysis of the discussion among the LNAJ’s members will make clear that there were three different positions about the policy direction of the Association. This chapter calls the three positions labourist, free-tradist and developmentalist and distinguishes them according to the degree of importance each position attached to the problem of international migration: the labourist attached the highest importance to international migration and the free-tradist the lowest. Although almost all the members of the LNAJ believed that Japan was suffering from ‘overpopulation’ and that the only solution to the problem was to foster Japan’s industrialization, they were different in their assumption about the speed and degree of the future integration of the world economy. Labourists who expected the strongest integration to be realized in the near future placed emphasis on the necessity of improving working conditions and the establishment of the freedom of international migration, whereas developmentalists, although foreseeing integration that was as strong as the labourists predicted and advocating free international migration, assigned more importance to international investment than to international migration. By contrast, free-tradists who made the weakest assumption about the tendency towards international economic integration emphasized the necessity of establishing free international trade and, therefore, opposed proposing the matter of international migration at the Conference. As the following examination will show, the official policy the LNAJ finally endorsed was a mixture of the developmentalist and free-tradist positions.

The LNAJ’s discussion about the World Economy Conference

At the General Council meeting held in October, 1925, the IFLNS decided to express its opinion about and exert influence on the World Economy Conference, and to discuss matters relating to the Conference at its newly established International Labour Office and Social Legislation commission. Following the Council’s decision, the IFLNS requested seven member societies—America, Austria, England, France, Germany, Italy and Japan—to submit a proposal about the Conference. In response to the

2 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kaimu hōkoku dai 34 shū [The bulletin, no. 34]”, JACAR: B05014050700, 22.
request, the LNAJ sent a questionnaire to “appropriate persons and research organizations” in Japan in order to formulate its proposal.\textsuperscript{3} The questionnaire was composed of three questions: “1) Is it necessary to hold an international conference [on the economy]?; 2) if necessary, how broad should the scope of the agenda be and what topics should be included in it?; and 3) what attitude and policy should Japan adopt towards the agenda?”\textsuperscript{4}

There are no materials which help identify who received and replied to the questionnaire. The only document available is a draft proposal the LNAJ drew up based on the answers given to the questionnaire.

1. On the problem of immigration: Although there will be various approaches to the problem, the best way to begin is probably to investigate the possibility of controlling the overall supply of labour in the world from a purely economic viewpoint.

2. On the problem of raw materials: We recognize that, in order to build a world economy, improve overall industrial productivity and ensure the co-existence and co-prosperity of all humans beings, it is necessary to divorce the utilization of natural resources as much as possible from territorial considerations. Facilitating free trade of raw materials and providing equal treatment to all countries is especially urgently needed.

3. On achieving an international agreement for the abolition of differential tariffs: Tariff barriers hinder the free movement of goods and capital, disturb the balance of supply and demand, and exert a bad effect on the life and economic development of nations. Not only do differential tariffs contradict the idea of equity, but they also quite often cause tariff wars and exert adverse effects on each of the countries concerned. Although we wish all countries would agree on not imposing tariffs higher than a fixed ad valorem tariff limit, this is presumably impracticable for various reasons. We, therefore, propose that all countries of the world agree that they will abolish the multiple tariff system and that, if they establish a tariff convention, they will apply the conventional tariff to every country. These proposals should also be applied to colonies.

4. On the problem of exchange and currency: The instability of international exchange is becoming a major impediment to international commerce and trade. To achieve greater stability, countries of the world need to cooperate with each other. Those countries suffering from the fall in the exchange rate especially need to improve their domestic conditions by immediately achieving a balanced budget and by disposing of inconvertible paper currency.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{5} Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 37, 7.
Apart from the above four suggestions, the draft also contained proposals to place those matters on the conference agenda which had been studied by technical committees of the League of Nations and to invite the United States and Russia to the conference.

In order to better represent the opinions of its members, the LNAJ held a special meeting on January 20, 1926, about six months after that disastrous Warsaw Congress. It was rare for the Association to convene such a special meeting open to its rank-and-file members except for its annual assembly. Shibusawa presided over the meeting, which was attended by a large number of people—one source reported that there were more than 50 people, but another described that the number exceeded 70. Inoue Junnosuke gave an opening lecture on the objective of the World Economic Conference, the scope of topics which were going to be discussed and the expected effects the Conference would have on international politics. Although he was one of the LNAJ’s directors, at the meeting he acted as a representative of the Japan Economic Federation, which, as a business organization, was especially interested in the Conference. Supplementing Inoue’s lecture, Soeda Juichi explained the purpose and content of the Association’s draft proposal to the audience. According to the vice-chairman of the LNAJ, the proposal was designed to address the “fundamental economic problems of Japan”, by which he meant a variety of problems:

[...] we have incorporated an item on the problem of immigration into the draft because we think a complete and ideal solution to this problem will be impossible without mobilizing world opinion in favour of Japan. Furthermore, we have mentioned the problem of raw materials as the second item of the draft proposal. In a resource-scarce country like Japan, manufacturing industries will not develop unless it can obtain raw materials from all over the world. Lastly, we have found that the problem of tariffs is extremely important from the point of view of how to sell manufactured goods abroad. Even if we can satisfactorily solve problems other than tariffs, we will be unable to achieve our final goal as long as tariff barriers prevent us from exporting manufactured goods.

The deep causes of these problems were clear to Soeda. Japan had to address these problems because of its fast-growing population and its stagnant export industries. He said, “the root of Japan’s economic problems

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6 Ibid., 7.
7 Ibid., 8–12.
8 Ibid., 13.
lies in the fact that we must devote all our energies to solving the problem of overpopulation and increasing exports in manufacturing industries.”

Soeda emphasized the need to propose the first three items of the draft, namely, the problems of immigration, raw materials and tariffs, but the discussion that took place following his explanation revealed differences of opinion among the LNAJ members. The heated debate mainly centred on three questions: (1) should the content of the proposal be revised and, if so, how?; (2) should the conference aim at arranging an immediately practicable plan or should it be an academic conference whose objective is to develop an ideal, though unrealistic, plan?; and (3) is the population problem really a major economic problem of Japan?

The first person who made a remark on the content of the draft proposal was Asari Junshirō. The Director of the ILO’s Tōkyō Branch Office was generally in favour of the draft. He especially endorsed the suggestion about investigating immigration problems, saying, “this, I suppose, is an issue that we, Japanese, must take the initiative in raising at the coming conference.” But he thought it necessary to bring up not only the matter of immigration but also that of working conditions. “It is impossible”, he said, “to solve problems of tariffs and immigration independently of another fundamental problem lying underneath, namely, the problem of labour protection. It will be impractical to solve these problems unless workers around the world are treated equally and unless they work under similar conditions.” In his recognition, the problems of immigration, tariffs and working conditions were internally related issues which could not be dealt with in isolation from each other.

In a similar but somewhat different vein, Takahashi Kamekichi argued in favour of proposing the matter of working conditions. Takahashi was an economist who worked at Ishibashi Tanzan’s Tōyōkeizai shinpō. Like Asari, Takahashi thought that the problems of immigration, raw materials and tariffs were interrelated with the labour problem, but he emphasized the former set of problems rather than the latter. He said that in order to achieve the equal treatment of workers around the world, “nations must be treated equally in matters of raw materials, population and tariffs”, and then maintained that, “since the League of Nations has already adopted a resolution that workers around the world be treated equally, nations must

9 Ibid., 13.
10 Ibid., 14.
11 Ibid., 15.
also be treated equally in matters of immigration, raw materials and markets for goods.”

Although he did not specify what the resolution was, he probably meant Article 23 (a) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which proclaimed “to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend.”

In contrast to Asari and Takahashi, who wished to broaden the scope of the conference’s agenda, Shidachi Tetsujirō proposed to restrict it. The former Governor of the Industrial Bank of Japan agreed to raise the questions of raw materials and tariffs at the Conference, but he said he was unwilling to bring up “delicate questions” such as immigration. Shidachi was known for his intransigent position on the issue of Japanese migration. He had raised an objection to Japan’s sending migrants abroad in a magazine article and faced harsh criticism from those who wanted to promote the migration business. In his comment at the LNAJ’s special meeting, too, he emphasized the importance of free trade instead of migration: “My opinion is that Japan will profit most by advocating free tradism. Japan is a resource-scarce country which will gain from adopting a liberal policy towards resource-abundant countries […]. Our country will gain the greatest profit by adhering to the League’s ideal and the spirit of the Covenant, namely, by endorsing liberalism and the freedom of commerce and trade.” In saying this, he probably had in mind such texts as Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which advocated “[t]he removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations”, and Article 23 (e) of the Covenant, which stipulated the “equitable treatment for the commerce of all the Members of the League”.

A debate over these different views on the conference’s agenda, however, did not develop further because of Satakani Yoshirō’s interruption. Instead of talking about the content of the draft proposal, the vice-chairman of the LNAJ questioned the underlying assumption the document made about the nature of the conference. He stated that what topics should be proposed depended upon the nature of the conference, and

12 Ibid., 17.
13 Ibid., 17.
14 Kawasaki Tōichirō, “Shidachi Tetsujirō shi ni atau [To Mr. Shidachi Tetsujirō]”, Shokumin 3 no. 7 (1924): 14–19.
15 Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 37, 16.
asked whether the conference would be of an “academic” or “practical” character.\textsuperscript{16} To him, the draft proposal was nothing but scholarly plans for an academic conference, but he preferred to have a practical conference which discussed workable plans. He thought it most important that Japan should propose a feasible policy that the country itself could adopt, but the proposals formulated in the LNAJ’s document, either on immigration or on tariffs, appeared to him to be an impractical policy that the Japanese government could not accept.

Those who were satisfied with the draft proposal were stirred up by Sakatani’s critical remarks, which were tantamount to denying the value of the document. Tanaka Mitsugu, a professor of commercial science at Meiji University, defended the original text and proposed submitting it as it was.\textsuperscript{17} No wonder Yamada Saburō also suggested ignoring the question of practicability for the meanwhile and concentrating on formulating an ideal proposal based on a study of international economy. As has been seen in the preceding chapters, he had insisted on the necessity of scientific studies and recommended that the LNAJ examine the economic condition of various countries for the purpose of solving the problem of the admission of foreigners. His remark at the special meeting was the logical consequence of this long-held opinion. Although he admitted that an international lawyer like him could not say what the best economic policy for Japan was, he thought that:

\begin{quote}
It is necessary for us to determine what measures Japan should adopt as its national policy on international economy. And once we determine the measures, we must make the government implement them, even if it is difficult to do so right now. Sooner or later, the government will have to undertake the measures—it might have already implemented some of them—because they are fundamentally important for Japan’s future. We must not give up even if it takes twenty or thirty years. What we must do now is study and formulate an ideal policy which can be implemented gradually in the future.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

A recurrent idea in Yamada’s works appeared here—the piecemeal implementation of an ideal policy based on scientific research. This idealistic proposal, however, received a mixed reaction: While the eminent mathematician Fujisawa Rikitarō agreed with the necessity of conducting research and formulating an idealistic plan, the central figure of the Ōsaka

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 18–20.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 21.
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Takayanagi Matsuichirō, objected to it. Takayanagi insisted on submitting the original draft as it was, and said that it was not necessary to wait for research results or to determine what the best policy for Japan was.\textsuperscript{19}

The debate revolved around the question of whether the conference should be an academic one or a practicable one until Sakatani’s second interruption. This time, he questioned the other basic assumption underlying the draft proposal that overpopulation was the fundamental economic problem facing Japan. “All of you misunderstand the immigration problem, don’t you?” he asked again in a rather provocative manner.\textsuperscript{20} “The population is increasing in Japan because the country has the power to grow larger. The more the productivity of the increased population rises as a result of education, the wealthier the country becomes. All difficulties pertaining to population increase will be overcome thanks to the industriousness of the population.”\textsuperscript{21} From a pro-natalist viewpoint, he maintained that there were no grounds for neo-Malthusian fears of overpopulation. He criticized Soeda, saying, “you say overpopulation is a problem but you miss the point. The population of a country will increase as long as it can sustain the growing population. If not, the population will decrease. Please understand this relation correctly.”\textsuperscript{22}

The meeting finished without an agreement about the LNAJ’s proposal being reached because of Sakatani’s remarks, which might well sound like provocation for provocation’s sake. A note written by someone in a margin of the official minutes of the meeting said, “[the original draft] faced much criticism. Some disapproved of it vehemently. Others said that it shifted the blame onto other countries without criticizing Japan.”\textsuperscript{23} This comment showed that the discussion was held in a rather tense atmosphere at the meeting. A politician, Uehara Etsujirō, closed the meeting by saying that the difference of opinion between Satakani and the other participants was not as great as it looked, but the very act of saying so demonstrated that many perceived the difference between the two.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 25–26.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 8. The document, in which the note was written, is held in the Shibusawa archives. SA :135/04/126.
Three positions

Although less marked than the opposition between Sakatani and the other participants, the meeting also revealed a significant difference of opinion among the LNAJ’s members about the desirable economic policy for Japan. All of them apart from Sakatani agreed that overpopulation was the major economic problem facing the country. They also admitted that industrialization was an ultimate solution to the problem and, for that purpose, an increase in both imports of raw materials and exports of manufactured goods would be required. But they disagreed about what should be prioritized in order to achieve industrialization.

Obviously, the ardent supporter of the ILO, Asari Junshirō, placed the greatest emphasis on the improvement of working conditions.

By achieving humane labour conditions, industry will develop on a sound footing. The industrial world will establish itself on a solid and lasting foundation by improving cooperative organization and technology, not by continuing to abuse cheap labour. Humane labour conditions will also raise the living standards of the working classes and provide a reasonable solution to the problems of overpopulation and chronic unemployment.²⁴

Writing in an article published in Kokusai chishiki in May 1924, he described the improvement of working conditions as if it were a magical solution to every imaginable problem. But, in reality, this enthusiast for the International Labour Organization thought that the improvement of working conditions by itself was not enough to raise the living standards in a resource-scarce country like Japan. He said:

Countries are different in their population densities and natural resources. Accordingly, even if formal equality among nations in terms of labour conditions is achieved by such measures as the regulation of working hours or a ban on night work, the actual life of workers in a densely populated and resource-scarce country will have to remain miserable, as compared to that of workers in a sparsely populated and resource-abundant country.²⁵

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He went further and stated that “if the establishment of international labour conventions brings to light the existence of international inequality resulting from factors other than labour conditions, this will be a cogent reason for the necessity of nations’ cooperating in such matters as the regulation of population density or the redistribution of natural resources.”26 This statement makes clear that Asari did not believe that the improvement of working conditions would automatically solve the ‘over-population’ problem in Japan. Rather, he believed that in order to solve the problem, Japan needed to gain freedom of international migration:

As it is the most reasonable attitude for proletariats to reject violence, abandon their class egoism and support moderate socialism, it is the most rational policy for a poor country like Japan to abandon imperialism or expansionism and openly advocate the ideal of international social justice as a national policy. On the one hand, Japan should take the initiative in introducing progressive policies whose implementation needs international cooperation, such as the improvement of labour conditions or the betterment of public hygiene. On the other hand, it should make every effort to achieve social justice by criticizing Western-centric policies on such matters as racial equality, free migration or free access to raw materials.27

The improvement of working conditions and the liberalization of international migration must be fulfilled simultaneously. This was the opinion that characterized the labourist position.

Around the time of the publication of Asari’s article, many of those who were concerned about labour issues adopted the labourist position. For instance, the scholar of labour law Suehiro Izutarō—one of those six members of the LNAJ who first attended the third Congress of the IFLNS—had repeatedly expressed a similar view in the early 1920s. Writing in a letter to Yoshizaka Shunzō, a member of the Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, on February 2, 1919, Suehiro indicated that “the problem of international distribution of labour” was one of the most important world issues after the war.28 In this letter, he criticized the United States for developing “seclusionist policies” and called “for the establishment of some scheme for internationally distributing the labour force” as well as “the removal of barriers to international movement of labour”. The Tōkyō Imperial University professor expressed the same

26 Ibid., 13.
opinion publicly later in 1922 in his article entitled “The ideal of perpetual peace in the world and the International Labour Conference”. This article shed light on an underlying contradiction between two international organizations established after the First World War: the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization.\(^29\) According to Suehiro, the twin organizations had the same goal of establishing peace in the world. But while the former aimed at establishing international peace, the aim of the latter was to establish internal peace, namely, to prevent social disturbance caused by class wars. This difference posed the question of whether the two organizations could achieve their goals without coming into conflict with each other. Suehiro’s answer was negative: “I must say that trying to establish perpetual peace through the League, on the one hand, and organizing the ILO as if it were an instrument of the League, on the other, contains a great, fundamental contradiction.”\(^30\) To him, the contradiction was most manifested in the ILO’s attempt at establishing equal treatment of workers around the world, because this ambitious goal, if achieved, would provoke an international race for territory. But why would the establishment of equal treatment trigger territorial expansion? Presuming that the cost of production depended on the cost of raw materials and labour as well as on organizational efficiency and technological level, Suehiro argued that if working conditions were equalized worldwide, “as a matter of course, resource-abundant countries would become the winners and resource-scarce ones the losers.”\(^31\) It was, therefore, almost inevitable that the potential losers would avoid ratifying international labour conventions or, if it was impossible to do so, attempt to expand their territory in search of raw materials.

What Suehiro advocated in order to resolve the contradiction was a radical, thoroughgoing approach. The young scholar insisted that, in order to establish perpetual peace, not only did the equal treatment of workers around the world have to be achieved, but so did the “freedom of international migration” and the “equality of access to natural resources”:


\(^{30}\) Ibid., 28.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 27.
The demands for the freedom of international migration and the free exchange of raw materials and goods are exactly the opposite of—or, at least, an attempt to restrict—economic imperialism. It is quite unlikely that those countries which possess vast territory and rich natural resources will agree to the request. But in the present day, when the necessity of the International Labour Conference is being advocated in the name of justice and humanity and promoted for the sake of perpetual peace in the world, I believe it right for our country to advocate the freedom of international migration and the free exchange of raw materials and goods.\(^\text{32}\)

In his analysis, Suehiro did not take into consideration the possibility of improvement in organizational efficiency as well as that of technological innovation. This was simply because he was quite pessimistic about both possibilities: “It is extremely naive to expect that a backward country like Japan could outstrip other countries in the future. Furthermore, there is little hope of establishing industrial supremacy only by improving organizational efficiency or by encouraging technological innovation because organizational and technological know-how is universal knowledge which will sooner or later be discovered by other countries too.”\(^\text{33}\)

It is rather surprising to see the notorious haves-and-have-nots argument used by a scholar like Suehiro, who was known for his progressive stance on labour issues. But it is undoubttable that the man adhered to the idea of free international migration. Probably, the idea came from a proposal made by an Italian delegate at the Paris Peace Conference. At the conference, Italy proposed inserting a set of clauses into the Covenant which stipulated, among other things, “Liberty of migration controlled by agreement between the Governments and the trade and labour unions of the countries directly interested [sic]”.\(^\text{34}\) It is unclear when Suehiro learned about the proposal. He might have read it in Paris as he was helping the Japanese delegation at the conference. The Japanese delegates lacked knowledge of labour law and relied on the advice of the young student, who was studying in France.\(^\text{35}\) Whether he read the Italian proposal in Paris or not, he was convinced of the rightness of the Italian claim to the

\(^{\text{32}}\) Ibid., 35.

\(^{\text{33}}\) Ibid., 33.


extent that he mentioned it at a session of the Imperial Economic Council on May 5, 1924, the advisory council held by the Japanese government for the purpose of establishing the country’s economic policy. Referring to the Italian proposal, Suehiro advanced his pet theory that if working conditions around the world were equalized, resource-scarce countries would necessarily be deprived, and then he proposed that the Japanese government arrange an international conference on international migration in order to establish “the right to international migration”.  

His proposal, which was voted against by the majority of the Council, was quite similar to the idea of the International Conference of Emigration and Immigration held by Italy in the same month.

Asari shared the assumption with Suehiro that the freedom of international migration was essential for the improvement of working conditions around the world. But there was also a clear difference between the two; Asari was less pessimistic than Suehiro, who emphasized adverse effects Japan might suffer as a consequence of improved working conditions. This difference resulted from their attitude towards the ILO. In contrast to Asari, who put his hope in the development of international labour conventions, Suehiro firmly believed that the ILO was an instrument devised by developed countries for the purpose of maintaining their economic supremacy by imposing high labour standards on developing countries. Although the ILO and the Italian government were in opposition on the matter of international migration, Suehiro was closer to Italy than to the ILO. This can be seen from the fact that he declined Asari’s request to join in the ILA, the organization Asari organized to intensify the relationship between Japan and the ILO. When asked to be a member of the association, Suehiro expressed “his doubt regarding the motives from which the International Labour Organization was created.”

He said that he “received a very bad impression at the time of the Peace conference”, especially from one of the ILO’s architects, George Nicoll Barnes, and


therefore “I cannot help feeling that the International Labour Organization was created for the benefit of the advanced industrial countries in the name of humanity and justice and before this doubt is cleared up, I cannot become enthusiastic in supporting the work of the ILO.” Such was his distrust of the ILO that he did not expect that the Organization would do much for the establishment of the freedom of immigration.

The second position expressed at the special meeting of the LNAJ was that of the free-tradists. At the meeting, Shidachi Tetsujirō represented this position by stressing the importance of free trade while showing reluctance to discuss the topic of international migration. This line of argument was closely related to a revival of liberalism led by the academic economist Ueda Teijirō. The professor at the Tōkyō College of Commerce advocated what he called Shin jiyūshugi (new liberalism) publicly by launching a journal named Kigyō to Shakai (Business and Society) in April 1926. He was also a member of the LNAJ from its establishment, although not a particularly active one. A close relationship and a similarity in thinking between Ueda and Shidachi is shown by the fact that, in the second issue of Kigyō to Shakai, Ueda reviewed a policy proposal issued by Keizai kōkyū kai (経済考究会), a think-tank-like organization established by Shidachi with the aim of making policy proposals on the Japanese economy, quite favourably. Shidachi recalled afterwards that it was thanks to Ueda’s review article that he found what the two men believed in was “one and the same”.

Ueda summarized the main point of his new liberalism concisely in the following sentences:

The spirit of the present days no longer allows an expansion of national territory or sphere of influence [...] To continue its economic development, there-

38 Ibid.
39 Ueda Teijirō, “Keizai kōkyū kai no ‘Bōeki oyobi sangyō shinkō saku’ o yomu [Reading ‘the plan of promoting trade and industry’ proposed by the economy research association]”, in vol. 7 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū [The complete works of Ueda Teijirō], ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 629–634. Ueda referred to the plan in another article. See Ueda Teijirō, “Taigai keizai teki kokusaku juritsu no kyūmu [The urgent task of establishing a national policy on the international economy]”, Gaikō jihō 43 no. 9 (1926): 5. For Keizai kōkyū kai, see Shimojū Naoki, “Keizai kōkyū kai oboegaki [A note on the economy research association]”, Shikyō 58 (2009): 105–120.
fore, a small country like Japan, whose population size is increasing at high speed, must make it a national policy to import foreign raw materials, to process them by utilizing technology and labour in the country, and to profit by exporting manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{41}

As clearly shown in these words, Ueda, like most of the LNAJ’s members, regarded overpopulation as an urgent problem facing his country and thought that “How to feed the population which increases by about seven hundred thousand a year is a vital question for Japan.”\textsuperscript{42} Yet to him, “to think as if overseas migration were the only solution to the overpopulation problem” was a sheer fallacy because “however large the population will become, it will pose no problem as long as there are enough jobs to feed the increased population.”\textsuperscript{43} Such a number of jobs, he believed, could be created by expanding the importation of raw materials and the exportation of manufactured goods.

Although, therefore, Ueda did not put much weight on international migration, he did not underrate the importance of international factors in modern life. On the contrary, his new liberalism developed from his considerations on the expansion and intensification of the international intercourse he was witnessing. In his first monograph \textit{Gaikoku bōeki genron} (The principles of foreign trade) published in 1903, he described human history, in a way similar to Yamada Saburō, as the expansion process of community life.\textsuperscript{44} Ueda believed that the core of a state was a community and it had gradually developed and expanded its circle from kinship group to horde to tribe to nation:

A state apparatus and its constitution are a result of a nation’s historical development. Behind the legal institutions of a state is a naturally developed society of a nation. Members of the national society have similar physical traits, speak the same language, engage in the same manners and customs and share

\textsuperscript{41} Ueda Teijirō, “Shin jiyūshugi no hitsuyō [The necessity of new liberalism]”, in vol. 7 of \textit{Ueda Teijirō zenshū}, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 19.

\textsuperscript{42} Ueda Teijirō, “Shin jiyūshugi to waga kuni no kanzei seisaku [New liberalism and Japan's trade policy]”, in vol. 7 of \textit{Ueda Teijirō zenshū}, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 90.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 90.

\textsuperscript{44} Ueda Teijirō, “Gaikoku bōeki genron [The principles of foreign trade]”, in vol. 5 of \textit{Ueda Teijirō zenshū}, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1975), 7–90.
the same ideas and feelings. These commonalities have developed from a long experience of living a community life under the same climate.\textsuperscript{45}

Ueda thought that if international intercourse continued to expand its horizons, it might even eliminate differences among nations in the future: “Thanks to the advancement of transportation as well as the development of humanity, civilizations in the world can now imitate each other and they are coming closer and closer to forming a single civilization.”\textsuperscript{46} To Ueda, accordingly, differences among nations were not rigidly fixed. They were just a result of a low degree of development of international commerce and communication. But he thought that there were still considerable differences among nations in his days: “The move towards a single civilization has just begun, so each nation still has its own civilization with distinct features.”\textsuperscript{47} This is why he believed that international movement of workers and capital had only a limited significance in the world of his time. Of course, capital could move more freely than workers, but even in the case of capital movement, its freedom was still severely curtailed because of different financial systems adopted by countries around the world. Ueda maintained that the classical doctrine which distinguished domestic from international trade on the basis of the existence of free movement of capital and workers still held true. In this regard, he adopted the definition of nation formulated by Walter Bagehot as “an aggregate of producers among which capital and workers freely circulate”.\textsuperscript{48} Certainly, “the classical doctrine has recently been called into question by some scholars who have seen the development of transportation and financial industries promoting the increase in foreign investment and the growth of the emigration business since the early 19th century.”\textsuperscript{49} But, according to Ueda, their criticism was off the point, because the domestic-international distinction based on the existence of free movement of capital and workers was only “a matter of degree”.\textsuperscript{50} Although he admitted that there were exceptional cases in which international relations could be treated in the same way as domestic relations, he maintained that in most cases it was still reasonable to follow the classical doctrine. Notwithstanding the global

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item[45] Ibid., 28.
  \item[46] Ibid., 28.
  \item[47] Ibid., 28.
  \item[48] Ibid., 26.
  \item[49] Ibid., 26.
  \item[50] Ibid., 27.
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expansion of a community life, he thought the amount of international migration remained relatively small and its influence remained negligible. Ueda believed that Japan lagged far behind the Western countries in economic development. During his studies in Europe and the United States from 1905 to 1909, he found that transportation infrastructures, such as harbours and railways, were much less developed in Japan than in Western countries. He also learned from the experience of travelling in his own country that there were still various types of handicraft manufacturing in rural areas which had been isolated by natural barriers until recently. The fact that pre-modern handicraft products had not been driven out of the market seemed to him to indicate that domestic, not to mention international, markets were still highly segmented.

Like Asari, Ueda was in favour of international labour conventions. He thought that the world was moving in the direction of making a concerted effort to improve working conditions and that if Japan rejected international labour conventions, foreign countries would impose economic sanctions by either levying customs tariffs on imports from or banning the export of raw materials to Japan. These sanctions had to be avoided, because if enacted, they would completely destroy industries in Japan. Ueda also considered it inadmissible to exploit Japanese workers under bad working conditions just for the sake of winning international economic competition, and insisted that such a short-sighted policy would ruin the “future productivity of the Japanese nation”. But, unlike Suehiro, he did not express the fear that global equalization of working conditions would make the liberalization of international migration inevitable. This might be because he estimated that the speed of the equalization would be so slow that there was little need to worry about it, or because he thought

51 Ueda Teijirō, “Ōbei manyū shokan [My impressions of travel around the Western countries]”, in vol. 7 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 538. It should be noted that Ueda witnessed the 1906 United Kingdom general election, where the Liberals, espousing the doctrine of free trade, won a historic victory against the Conservatives, who were split over Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for Tariff Reform. On free trade culture in Edwardian Britain, see Frank Trentmann, Free Trade Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

52 Ueda Teijirō, “Nihon rōdō mondai no tokushitsu [The characteristic features of Japan’s labour problems]”, in vol. 7 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 577–580.

53 Ibid., 584.
that the equalization would cause no harm as long as free international trade was sustained.

Interestingly, Ueda was as sympathetic towards Italy as Suehiro was in spite of their different attitudes towards international migration. Ueda was an advisor of the Japanese delegation to the first International Labour Conference, where the Italian workers’ representative, Gino Baldesi, proposed that the ILO conduct a study on a method for redistributing raw materials.\(^{54}\) Writing in his report on the conference, Ueda favourably referred to the proposal and maintained that the matter of raw materials was “a grave problem underlying not only the International Labour Conference but also the League of Nations”.\(^{55}\) However, unlike Suehiro, Ueda did not regard international migration as a desirable means with which to regulate the balance between population and raw materials. Baldesi must also have had other means in mind when he asked at the conference, “Should this abundant labour be forced to emigrate to those countries where the raw materials are to be found? Or would it not be more just and more humane to make such raw materials available in those countries where labour abounds?”\(^{56}\) What Ueda sympathized with was probably this plea to find a method of making raw materials available in labour-abundant countries without sending migrants abroad.\(^{57}\)

If it is appropriate to call the position of Asari ‘labourist’ and that of Shidachi and Ueda ‘free-tradist’, the third and last position can be called ‘developmentalist’. Although this position was less distinctly articulated than the first two, the difference between this and the other two positions was clear. It emphasized the necessity of encouraging investment in foreign territories and developing natural resources there. The person who advocated the developmentalist position was Tanaka Mitsugu, the scholar who defended the original draft at the special meeting of the LNAJ. As an

\(^{54}\) Gaimushō, *Dai 1 kai kokusai rōdō kaigi hōkokusho* [The report of the first International Labour Conference], JACAR: B06150613100, 87–88.

\(^{55}\) Ueda Teijirō, “Dai 1 kai kokusai rōdō kaigi no tennatsu [What happened at the first International Labour Conference]”, in vol. 4 of *Ueda Teijirō zenshū*, ed. Itani Zen'ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1975), 207.


\(^{57}\) Baldesi’s proposal was rejected at the Conference “on the grounds that the subject raised was impracticable, dangerous and not within the competence of the ILO”. See Antony Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organization* (New York: Octagon books, 1971), 45.
academic, Tanaka was much less known than Suehiro and Ueda. This was partly because he studied and taught at a small private university on the periphery of Japanese academia and partly because he later moved from academia to the world of politics. However, some of his books, especially *Kōgyō seisaku* (industrial policy) published in 1925, offer interesting insights into Japan’s economic problems.

Just like most of the LNAJ’s members, Tanaka was concerned about the overpopulation problem in his country and thought that industrialization was the only way out of the problem: “From an agricultural to an industrial country: This is a natural course of development in national economies. In order to support its surplus population, an overpopulated country like Japan especially must concentrate its efforts on developing industries which rely less on land.” He emphasized that Japan needed to obtain capital and raw materials as well as improve the quality of its labour force. This line of argumentation was not much different from that of Asari or Shidachi, who also regarded industrialization as the only solution to the population problem. What made up the distinctive character of Tanaka’s position was his attention to overseas investment and foreign natural resources. The sentence included in the LNAJ’s draft proposal that “it is necessary to divorce the utilization of natural resources as much as possible from territorial considerations” was probably the most important part to him.

In *Kōgyō seisaku*, Tanaka maintained that the advancement of international division of labour depended on whether each national economy could fully utilize its characteristic features, which were “not a given but something to be created”. While these characteristic features were, therefore, primarily “unforeseeable”, raw materials and their uneven distribution among countries were a “given reality that cannot be changed by human efforts”. Tanaka found a source of international inequality in this gap between the possibility of developing national characteristics and the reality of resource constraints, and contended that it was quite unfair to let countries compete with each other, while leaving the situation of raw

59 Tanaka Mitsugu, *Kōgyō seisaku* [Industrial policy] (Tōkyō: Kurita shoten, 1925).
60 Ibid., 1.
61 Ibid., 2.
62 Ibid., 247–248.
63 Ibid., 248.
materials as it was. Just as a hereditary system within a country must be dismantled by redistributive measures, so must natural inequality among countries:

In a perfect world where national economies are fully integrated into one world economy, profits must be fairly distributed on the basis of each country’s ability and efforts, and each country must be able to fully develop its characteristic features. For that purpose, resource-abundant countries must allow resource-scarce countries access to raw materials and let them enjoy the materials under fair conditions.\(^{64}\)

This argument might sound similar to that of Suehiro, who insisted on the need for free international migration and free exchange of raw materials and goods. But Tanaka was different from Suehiro in that he advocated the “freedom of international movement of production factors”, which included not only the movement of workers but also that of capital:

Free international movement of capital and workers should be established so that each production factor can move freely to profitable countries and to productive industries. If each country fully develops its characteristic features under such conditions, international cooperation in consumption will be realized. Only then will international co-existence and co-prosperity (Kyōzon kyōei: 共存共栄) be truly achieved.\(^{65}\)

Tanaka argued that free international movement of capital and workers was necessary for the purpose of fully utilizing natural resources that were undeveloped or underdeveloped in the present situation because of a lack of capital or labour force. Obviously, his argument with its focus on the development of natural resources in foreign territories was aimed at justifying Japan’s economic expansion in China, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

It should be noted that Tanaka gave a higher priority to foreign investment than to international migration. He demanded as much freedom of international movement of production factors as necessary to develop natural resources. This meant that international migration would be unnecessary if Japan could develop enough resources by investing capital only. Furthermore, since he was not strongly committed to the improvement of working conditions, he did not feel the necessity for free international migration as keenly as Asari or Suehiro. Tanaka regarded it justifiable to deny access to migrant workers who came from a country with low living

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64 Ibid., 248.
65 Ibid., 248–249.
standards, and approved of a series of exclusionary measures the United States had taken against Chinese immigrants.\footnote{Tanaka Mitsugu, \textit{Shakai seisaku} [Social policy] (Tōkyō: Meiji daigaku shuppan bu, 1923), 352.} He even thought that industries in Japan had advanced so rapidly since the First World War and labour demand had increased so sharply that it was no longer necessary for Japan to send migrants abroad or to control its population.\footnote{Tanaka, \textit{Kōgyō seisaku}, 116–117.} He called for the freedom of international movement of capital and workers but placed emphasis on the former.

Tanaka’s position was also dissimilar to Ueda’s in that the former attached less importance to free trade and approved of adopting protective trade policies for infant industries. Tanaka admitted that protective measures were undesirable, considering the necessity of avoiding retaliatory tariffs. But he believed that industries whose development was necessary for states should be given preferential treatment.\footnote{Tanaka, \textit{Shakai seisaku}, 351.} Accordingly, he insisted that states could protect prospective industries by subsidizing them or by temporarily exempting them from observing social policy regulations. His stance on protective measures stood in sharp contrast to that of Ueda, who thought the protection of infant industries should be a very rare exception.

The three positions summarized here—labourist, free-tradist and developmentalist—had a few assumptions in common. All positions assumed that overpopulation was the gravest problem Japan was facing and that industrialization was the only solution to it. A major difference among them lay in their assumptions regarding the speed of the equalization of working conditions. While the labourists thought that the equalization of working conditions all over the world would progress on the initiative of the ILO and, therefore, maintained that the equalization of working conditions must go hand in hand with the liberalization of international migration, the free-tradists and the developmentalists thought differently. The three positions were also not homogeneous in their assumptions about the way to secure access to cheap raw materials. While the labourists and the free-tradists hoped to procure raw materials through free trade, the developmentalists stressed the need for exploiting undeveloped or underdeveloped natural resources in foreign territories through overseas investment.

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68 Tanaka, \textit{Shakai seisaku}, 351.
Although the degree of their commitment to the LNAJ varied widely, all of those who were mentioned above were members of the Association. This means that there was a realistic possibility of the Association adopting their opinion. The rest of the chapter examines this possibility by documenting the process of the LNAJ’s preparation for the World Economy Conference and making clear how these different strands of thinking were incorporated, or not, into the LNAJ’s policy recommendations for the Conference.

Discussion at the IFLNS

The directorate of the LNAJ revised its draft proposal at a session held on February 12, 1926. Those present at the session—Sakatani Yoshirō, Soeda Juichi, Hayashi Kiroku, Yamada Saburō, Zumoto Motosada, Miyaoka Tsunejirō and Katō Sotomatsu—decided to bring up the following three issues at the IFLNS meeting: “(1) Freedom of export and import especially of raw materials, fuels and other natural produce, (2) General reduction of custom tariffs and (3) Admission of foreign vessels to coasting

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<th>Three positions proposed for the Geneva World Economy Conference</th>
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<td><strong>main objective</strong></td>
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<td>labourist the improvement of working conditions</td>
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<td>developmentalist the development of natural resources through international investment</td>
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Table 3.1

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At the same session, the directors decided not to propose to tackle the issue of immigration, which had been formulated in the original draft as the issue of “investigating the possibility of controlling the overall supply of labour in the world from a purely economic viewpoint”. Although the reason for their decision was unclear, they agreed that the LNAJ “should do nothing more than call the other associations’ attention to the existence of the issue.” As a result, the final text of the proposal came closer to what free-tradists like Shidachi desired.

The Japanese proposal was submitted to the International Labour Office and Social Legislation commission together with French and Italian proposals. At the first commission meeting held in the building of the ILO on March 6, the British representative George Nicoll Barnes raised the objection that the commission was not entitled to discuss these proposals because they were not directly related to the work of the ILO. But a Polish representative, François Sokal, and the Director of the Office, Albert Thomas, argued against this objection. The latter maintained that the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization held the opinion that the Organization had a part to play in the Conference. He also pointed out the fact that the ILO was officially invited by the League of Nations to participate in the preparatory commission of the Conference. The passionate international civil servant emphasized that the IFLNS could play a crucial role as a non-governmental international organization. Unlike the governments around the world, which could only represent national interests, the Federation could study matters from an international point of view: “[...] pour l’intérêt du monde, l’intérêt de l’opinion publique, il faut que les questions urgentes dont la menace pèse sur le monde soient discutées par vous.” As a result of this strong counterargument, it was decided that the commission would organize a subcommission which would discuss member societies’ proposals concerning the World Economy Conference.

69 “Dai 58 kai rijikai gijiroku [The minutes of the 58th session of the council]”, JACAR: B05014050700, 42; the IFLNS, Resolution proposed by the Japanese League of Nations Societies, ILOA: D 600/431/9.
70 “Dai 58 kai rijikai gijiroku”, 42.
72 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, Commission pour le Bureau international du Travail et la législations sociale, 2ème séance—6 mars 1926 (après-midi), ILOA: D 600/431/9, 43.
The ILO was obviously trying to guide the direction of discussion at the commission to the effect that the IFLNS would support the ILO’s viewpoint. At a subcommission meeting on March 9, where the representative of the ILO was absent, the representative of the Polish association and professor at Lviv University Alfred Halban suggested four research topics on behalf of the Office.73 They were: “1) l’accélération de la ratification des conventions protégeant le travail; 2) l’appui qu’il faudrait prêter aux grandes industries menacées par les crises économiques; 3) chômage et des moyens pour écartter toutes les difficultés qui en résultent; 4) la réglementation universelle des problèmes d’émigration et d’immigration”.74 The subcommission agreed to include all the topics suggested by the Office in its agenda and appointed a rapporteur to each. It was Halban who became the rapporteur on the “universal regulation of emigration”.75

The Polish legal historian knew that the Japanese association had been interested in immigration problems. Therefore, he approached the Japanese representative and diplomat Kawai Hiroyuki after the session ended, and proposed submitting a joint report to the next session. However, the LNAJ did not accept his proposal. All it did was to send two documents to the Polish association: the Oualid report on the admission of foreigners and Takayanagi Kenzō’s paper presented at the first IPR conference. The LNAJ stated in its message to the Polish association that these texts would provide a “rough idea of what the Japanese association stands for”.76

In Brussels on April 9, 1926, the resident representative of the LNAJ in Europe, Inagaki Morikatsu, met with Halban and the Swiss representative Aloys Hentsch, who was in charge of drafting a final report for the subcommission.77 They held the meeting in order to reconcile differences of opinion among them before the second session of the subcommission started, which was scheduled to be held on the next day. At the meeting Halban expressed his agreement with the LNAJ’s claim for racial equality.

73 Kawai Hiroyuki, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai Geneva ni okeru syo kaigō [Meetings of the IFLNS held in Geneva]”, JACAR: B05014050700, 95.
76 Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 37, 49.
77 Ibid., 49
He understood the gist of the two documents sent from the Japanese association correctly and said that the limits imposed on the admission of foreigners must not be based on their nationalities or races but on the personal attributes of individual immigrants. Yet what he proposed was to make the ILO produce international statistics on the demand and supply of labour force. This showed clearly where his main interest lay. It was not in racial equality but in the control of labour supply.

Halban held a view quite close to the labourist position. He used the same logic as Asari’s in his report submitted to the subcommission, *Recommendations on the universal regulation of emigration*, in which he stated that “the equalization of labour conditions is impossible unless free movement of individual migrants is guaranteed by international instruments.” The recommendations suggested that the emigration committee of the ILO build an international statistics system on the labour markets of all countries around the world and devise measures to achieve a global equilibrium of demand and supply for labour and to prevent unemployment by effectively allocating unemployed workers to jobs. The recommendations also proposed that the measures only take the demand in the labour market into account and be enforced without worsening work conditions, wages and social security, and without discriminating between native and foreign workers.

Inagaki might have found it difficult to accept Halban’s proposal since the LNAJ had decided not to address the issue of international migration. But he did not oppose submitting the proposal, nor did he reject the final report written by Hentsch, which clearly stated that “national barriers to people and goods should be eliminated” and “due consideration should be given to the demand in the labour market.” In his report sent to the LNAJ after the session of the subcommission, Inagaki explained his decision to support both documents by saying that “showing hesitation in accepting these ideal texts would be disadvantageous to the Japanese association, which has called for racial equality and the equitable treatment of commerce.”

At the session of the subcommission, Inagaki said,

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78 Ibid., 50.
79 Ibid., 51.
80 Ibid., 47.
81 Ibid., 48.
Even though the Japanese government remains silent, the Japanese people have never forgotten the problem [of immigration] [...]. If the IFLNS deals with the problem from the viewpoint of the labour force, it must not dismiss the importance of the equal treatment of all nations. In particular, it should be recognized that the selection of immigrants must not be based on their nationalities or races but on the personal attributes of each individual immigrant. 82

The subcommission adopted the Hentch report without any significant modification. The ease with which the subcommission passed the report might seem surprising, considering the fact that the report, although in an indirect manner, advocated the equal treatment of national and foreign workers, the idea the IFLNS had stubbornly refused to endorse. This might be explained by the fact that the British representative, one of the potentially strongest opponents, served as the chair of the session and had to behave neutrally. The absence of opposition might also be due to the limited importance attached to the subcommission. Inagaki reported that the participants “lacked enthusiasm” because influential societies, such as the French and Italian ones, did not attend the session. 83

In his report submitted to the LNAJ, Inagaki maintained that the Japanese association should not adopt the Polish approach, which emphasized the necessity of correcting the global imbalance between the demand for and supply of labour. “Rather than focusing on the problem of unemployment,” he wrote, “we should insist on the necessity of achieving a right balance between densely and sparsely populated regions, which is indispensable for fostering economic development around the world.” 84

Inagaki argued in a way similar to Tanaka that international migration would promote the development of natural resources: “Even if we talk about labour demand, we should argue that population increase [through immigration] will make it possible to exploit unknown or undeveloped natural resources, as a result of which both the world economy and the overall demand for labour will simultaneously grow.” 85 Notwithstanding his opposition to the Polish approach, however, Inagaki acknowledged the importance of studying immigration problems from the perspective of labour demand and supply. He had the impression from the session of the subcommission that the discussion on immigration problems would

82 Ibid., 51.
83 Ibid., 53.
84 Ibid., 51.
85 Ibid., 51.
“become more and more connected with that of labour problems”, and concluded that, in the future, the LNAJ would also need to examine matters relating to the labour force, working conditions and unemployment, and study immigration problems not only from the viewpoint of population and race but from a more systematic and comprehensive perspective.°6

The Japanese government’s attitude towards the Conference

Although Inagaki had no choice but to accept the subcommission’s final report and Halban’s proposal about international regulation of international migration, the LNAJ was no longer willing to discuss the topic of international migration at international forums. This reluctance was also shared by the Japanese government.

When the government set out to develop its plan for the World Economy Conference, it also considered the possibility of bringing matters related to international migration up at the Conference. The list of potential agenda items Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō presented to Sugimura Yōtarō, one of the Japanese representatives at the first meeting of the preparatory commission for the Conference, included a section on “the treatment of peoples” and the first item in the section was “the admission to a country”. In this section, the Foreign Minister proposed “investigating the geographical distribution of the world’s population and seeking a solution to population problems”.°7 However, the official instructions attached to the document also stated that “Because it is disadvantageous to express what we wish to achieve from the outset, it would be wise to set a broad agenda in the beginning and add more detailed items later so that we can be sure to bring up those matters that we really wish to discuss at the Conference.”°8 This meant that the government had no intention of pushing through its proposals against the opposition of major powers. It preferred taking a wait-and-see attitude to running the risk of provoking other countries at the preparatory commission of the Conference. Sugimura, who had had a bitter experience at the Warsaw Congress, also showed his unwillingness to broach the subject of international migration, although in

86 Ibid., 54.
87 Shidehara to Sugimura, March 22, 1926, JACAR: B06150626100, 31.
88 Ibid., 18.
a quite indirect manner. In his reply to Shidehara, Sugimura stated that immigration problems would be excluded from the agenda because France, the proponent of the Conference, had already stated that it did not want to discuss the problems. 89

At the preparatory commission meetings held from April 26 to May 1, 1926, the Japanese representatives remained deliberately vague as instructed. Sugimura chose his words carefully and did not use words such as ‘immigration’ or ‘admission of foreigners’. He only stated in a general way that nations “should adhere to the principle of equality” and that “equal treatment [...] should be given to ships, goods and people.” 90

At the meetings, however, Italian representatives insisted on discussing the topic of international migration repeatedly. Alberto de Stefani emphasized the necessity of securing free movement of people as well as goods. Another Italian representative, Ernst Belloni, maintained that the Conference must not overlook the problem of overpopulation. Belloni, who had been a member of the 1924 International Conference on Emigration and Immigration in Rome, 91 even insisted that the most important task to be tackled at the Conference was to find a solution to the problem of free movement of workers. 92 Responding to these demands by the Italian representatives, the preparatory commission decided to collect information on the following points by the next meeting:

(1) Natural movement of population: births, deaths, marriages, during the periods 1900–13, 1924–26.
(2) Artificial movements of population; emigration in its various forms, permanent and temporary.

89 Sugimura to Shidehara, April 6, 1926, JACAR: B06150626100, 51.
90 “Kokusai keizai kaigi junbi iinkai dai 1 kai kaigi ni kansuru hōkoku [A report on the first meetings of the preparatory committee for the World Economy Conference]”, JACAR: B06150626300, 29. This general statement met with different reactions. A newspaper reported that Japan wanted to “get the question of emigration in through the side door”, while another wrote that “Japan will not touch the immigration question, because it does not want complications with the United States and because the subject was left off of the agenda by the Council and Assembly.” “Proposed Farm Issue to League”, Boston Daily Globe, April 28, 1926; “Japan to Avoid Immigration at League Meeting”, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1926.
91 “Kokusai keizai kaigi junbi iinkai dai 1 kai kaigi ni kansuru hōkoku”, 21.
92 Ibid., 28.
(3) Enquiry on uniform method, and with the aid of one or more experts, into fluctuations of population arising out of the world war, and fluctuations in potential labour forces during the next two decades.
(4) Population density in relation to cultivable areas, natural resources on the surface and underground.
(5) Data concerning economic development and the standard of life.
(6) Legislation on the movements of labour.
(7) Legislation affecting international migration in general.\textsuperscript{93}

Japan could have taken sides with Italy and submitted its own proposal on the admission of foreigners. But to do so would have entailed the serious risk of causing international disputes. Georges Theunis, the former Prime Minister of Belgium who presided over the preparatory commission, told Adachi Mineichirō that the problems Italy wished to discuss were “very dangerous”.\textsuperscript{94} By communicating this remark to Shidehara, Adachi indirectly warned him of unpleasant reactions that might occur if Japan supported Italy. Shidehara took Adachi’s warnings and chose to stay on the safe side. Although the Japanese government did not delete the section on “the treatment of peoples” when it drew up the final version of the list of potential agenda items, it did not propose discussing problems of immigration or population at the second preparatory commission meetings held from November 15 to 20, 1926.

It was decided at the meetings that the Conference would not organize a committee devoted to the “population problem” and that it would deal with the problems of population and immigration only in relation to other subjects.\textsuperscript{95} Interestingly, it was not Italian representatives but delegates from other countries such as England, Switzerland and Germany that proposed discussing the population problem at the Conference. They argued that the population problem was related to other important problems, such as unemployment and the minimum living standard, and insisted that it was necessary to discuss the population problem in order to make clear where the heart of these problems lay. By contrast, Italian representative Ernst Belloni insisted that the preparatory commission should do nothing but submit collected information to the Conference, saying that to bring up highly political issues like population would only complicate the discus-

\textsuperscript{94} Adachi to Shidehara, October 21, 1926, JACAR: B06150627500, 14.
sion at the Conference. The Japanese representative Satō Naotake concurred with Belloni, thinking that some members’ attempts to connect the population problem with other sensitive issues like unemployment was, against their declared intentions, aimed at creating an impasse by proposing an impossible task. He thought it would be better to agree to the Italian proposal in order to “allow for the possibility of discussing the population problem at the Conference”. In the end, the majority of members agreed with Belloni. The commission adopted his proposal and decided not to institute a committee on the population problem.

A middle-ground position

As the World Economy Conference approached, the LNAJ began its efforts to clarify what the Association expected from the Conference. To organize a research commission for that purpose, the LNAJ held a preparatory meeting on December 16, 1926. More than 30 people were present at the meeting, including those who had attended the special meeting in January, such as Asari Junshirō, Inoue Junnosuke, Tanaka Mitsugu and Takahashi Kamekichi. Before the preparatory meeting the Association drafted a research agenda for the Conference. The agenda was composed of three items—“transport and tariffs”, “raw materials and markets” and “population and migration”—and the last item was further divided into the following three subtopics:

1. Population problems in Japan and the solutions which have already been implemented.
2. The ratio of population and land area in the world and the demand for and supply of labour.

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97 There are two slightly different versions of the list of the meeting’s participants. “Kokusai keizai keika chōsakai goshusseki hōmei [The list of those who attended the meeting of the research commission for the World Economy Conference]”, JACAR: A08072606400, 1; “Kokusai keizai keika chōsakai giji yōroku [The minutes of the meeting of the research commission for the World Economy Conference]”, JACAR: B06150627700, 20.
3. Difficulties pertaining to the problems of population and migration and the solutions which the Association should propose.

Inoue Masaji, the president of the Overseas Development Company, started the discussion. The company was the government sponsored emigration company established in 1917 for the purpose of sending Japanese migrants to Brazil. Interestingly, Inoue, the man who played the most important role in Japan’s migration businesses, opposed the agenda, which included the subtopics of population and migration. He said, “I don’t think it appropriate to bring up population problems for discussion at the Conference, although I find it necessary that the commission conduct research on the problems.”

The remark was not surprising, however, considering the fact that he always described himself as a man of deeds, not of words (hugen jikkō). Although he attended several international conferences in his life, he believed that mere discussions at international conferences would lead nowhere. In spite of his business interests in Brazil, therefore, he found little importance in discussing population problems at international conferences. Following Inoue, staff member of the LNAJ, Okuyama Seiji, also made a negative comment on discussing population problems at the forthcoming Conference. He said, “Japan will have to accept immigrants if it insists on the equal treatment of all immigrants.”

Responding to Okuyama’s comment, Takahashi Kamekichi maintained that “we can solve the problem which was just pointed out [by Okuyama] by establishing a minimum wage system in all countries around the world.” Although it is not clear what he meant by this remark, he probably thought that the minimum wage would lead to restricting the entry of ‘undesirable’ immigrants into Japan. The economist was in favour of discussing the problems of population and immigration in connection with matters relating to working conditions: “Problems which will be discussed at the Conference such as raw materials, wages and working hours are connected to problems of population and immigration. It is therefore necessary to consider the latter problems in order to find a solution to the former.”

100 Ibid., 21.
101 Ibid., 21.
102 Ibid., 21.
But it was only Takahashi who still insisted on raising matters relating to population and immigration at the Conference. Inoue Junnosuke argued that now that population problems were excluded from the Conference agenda, the research commission, whose aim was to examine what the Japanese delegation should propose at the Conference, did not need to study the problems. But he also added that the problems would be discussed at the next conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to be held in Hawaii in July of the next year. “At the IPR conference”, said the Chief director of the Japanese committee of the IPR, “we will maintain that if a country cannot produce enough food for its people, the country should be allowed to procure food from foreign countries or to send migrants overseas. By arguing in this way, we can also justify our not accepting immigrants.”

In fact, at the meeting of the Japanese Council of the IPR held on October 1, 1926, Inoue had proposed discussing problems of population and food at the Hawaii conference and the committee had agreed to his proposal.

Although most of the members of the research commission did not think that population problems should be discussed at the World Economy Conference, they also recognized the necessity of studying the problems. Therefore, the research commission, while agreeing that the purpose of its activity was to formulate the Japanese policy for the Conference, did not exclude the possibility of studying population problems. At the end of the meeting, the commission appointed seven members—Enchi Yoshimatsu, Morita Yoshio, Nasu Shiroshi, Obama Toshie, Takahashi Kamekichi, (103) Ibid., 22.

Although Inoue seems to be willing to discuss the issue of international migration at international conferences, it is not clear if this was the case. It is said that he stated at the meeting of the Japanese committee of the IPR that it was better not to propose discussing immigration problems because it was “unpleasant to keep complaining about the matter”. Given this statement, he might have no longer been willing to draw international attention to immigration problems. It is also important to remember that it was Inoue who experienced the eighth Congress of the IFLNS in Lyons, where the LNAJ’s resolution on international migration met with fierce opposition from the American association. This experience might have made him more cautious about discussing immigration problems in the international arena. In fact, in a newspaper interview conducted in 1929, he clearly said, “Not emigration but industrialization will take care of our population problem.” “Industry held most pressing need of Japan”, Vancouver Star, June 12, 1929.

(104) Although Inoue seems to be willing to discuss the issue of international migration at international conferences, it is not clear if this was the case. It is said that he stated at the meeting of the Japanese committee of the IPR that it was better not to propose discussing immigration problems because it was “unpleasant to keep complaining about the matter”. Given this statement, he might have no longer been willing to draw international attention to immigration problems. It is also important to remember that it was Inoue who experienced the eighth Congress of the IFLNS in Lyons, where the LNAJ’s resolution on international migration met with fierce opposition from the American association. This experience might have made him more cautious about discussing immigration problems in the international arena. In fact, in a newspaper interview conducted in 1929, he clearly said, “Not emigration but industrialization will take care of our population problem.” “Industry held most pressing need of Japan”, Vancouver Star, June 12, 1929.
Takashima Seiichi and Tanaka Mitsugu—to a special committee on conducting necessary research.105

At the first meeting of the special committee held on December 21, it was decided that the committee should examine the problem of international migration in relation to the first part of the agenda which had been formulated by the preparatory commission for the Conference. The first part entitled “the world economic position” was divided into three sections: i) “principal features and problems as seen from the point of view of different countries”, ii) “analysis of economic causes of the present commercial and industrial dis-equilibrium” and iii) “economic tendencies which affect peace in the world”.106 The committee appointed Tanaka, Obama and Inui as the rapporteurs of each section respectively.107 As regards the second part of the agenda, Takashima Seiichi wrote a report on “Import and export prohibitions and restrictions”, Inui on “Economic treatment of nationals and companies of one country duly admitted to the territory of another”, Komatsu Kashichi on “Indirect methods of protecting national commerce and shipping” and Nasu Shiroshi and Takahashi Kamekichi on “Agriculture”.108 The committee did not take up matters relating to working conditions, so the subject disappeared from the committee’s report.

The introductory part of the special committee report advanced an interesting argument for the freedom of movement of capital and people.109 Although the introduction was written under the joint names of Inui, Obama and Tanaka, its main author was probably Tanaka, judging from the fact that several sentences used in his Kōgyō seisaku were found interspersed in the text.

In the introduction, the authors used the term employed by Yamada Saburō and stated that states must live an “international community life” (Kokusai kyōdō seikatsu).110 According to the authors, nations in the present world were not allowed to adopt a policy of seclusion at their free

105 “Kokusai keizai kaigi chōsakai giji yōroku”, 22.
106 For the agenda of the conference, see “Draft Agenda”, JACAR: B04122078400, 11.
107 “Dai 1 kai tokubetsu iinkai [The first special committee]”, JACAR: B06150627700, 21–25.
109 Ibid., 1–14.
110 Ibid., 1.
will. It is true that they had the negative freedom to do what they wished as long as they did not infringe on the freedom of other nations, but they also had rights and duties as members of the international community. That was why they had agreed to institutionalize various organizations whose goals were to improve community life. Among others they had established the Permanent Court of International Justice in the legal field and the League of Nations in the political field. But there had been little cooperation in the more important field, that is, the field of the economy.\textsuperscript{111} According to the authors, it was the lack of greater cooperation in this field that constituted a menace to world peace. Under the present circumstances countries around the world were tempted to achieve autarky. But in order to maintain world peace, it was necessary to establish international division of labour and enable each country to fully utilize its characteristic features. What was important in this regard was that the characteristic features of a country could not be discovered unless capital and people were allowed to move freely. Therefore,

> Access to resources in the world must be given to each and every country. Nations which can make the best use of resources should be allowed to use them. Capital and the labour force should be allowed to move to and concentrate on the most profitable industries in the optimum countries so that each country can fully develop its abilities.\textsuperscript{112}

Although the authors thought it unjust for a resource-abundant country to deny other countries access to its resources, they also admitted that it was equally unjust for a resource-scarce country to invade other countries on the pretext of its right to live there. Therefore, they insisted that a resource-abundant country should be allowed to develop its resources first, but if it turned out that the resource-abundant country did not have the ability to develop its resources by itself, it should give resource-scarce countries equal access to its resources by allowing them to invest capital or send surplus labour force to its territory.\textsuperscript{113} Here the authors did not forget to add that although the resource-abundant country had the right to select immigrants, it must not use race as a criterion for selection.\textsuperscript{114}

At the end of the introduction, the authors proposed that Japan should engage in joint efforts with the other population-abundant countries and

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 1–2.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 3–4.
advocate “the principle of free movement of workers” at the coming Conference.\footnote{Ibid., 4.} In so far as human beings live a community life, the authors concluded, “all human beings should be guaranteed their living and be given freedom to improve their living standards by developing their own characteristic features.”\footnote{Ibid., 4.}

While the introduction of the special committee report insisted on developing natural resources through international investment and migration in a manner quite similar to the developmentalist argument, the part written by Takashima Seiichi, one of the central figures of the Japan Economic Federation, advocated a policy which was close to the free-tradist position, namely, the reduction of trade barriers. He proposed: (1) “making explicit the conditions under which import and export prohibitions and restrictions are allowed”, (2) “establishing the principle that import and export prohibitions and restrictions should not be imposed on important industrial raw materials” and (3) “organizing a permanent international committee to discuss the above two points”.\footnote{“Kokusai keizai kaigi gidai”, 20.} He further mentioned in his report that two suggestions had been made on the special committee, which were (1) “to impose a duty on all countries to report to the League of Nations on the reasons for and possible effects of import and export restrictions when they introduce new ones”, and (2) “to regard those regions among the British Dominions which have the vote at the League as independent countries”.\footnote{Ibid., 20.}

The special committee drafted resolutions based on its report and submitted them to the seventh annual assembly of the LNAJ held on May 11, 1927. The committee divided the draft resolutions into two parts: the part on “the open door policy for natural resources” and the part on “the freedom of international workers”. Surprisingly, the committee ignored its own decision not to propose the topic of international migration and included in its draft resolutions a set of proposals on the freedom of inter-

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{115} Ibid., 4.
\bibitem{116} Ibid., 4. Such a line of argumentation was not used frequently but was not uncommon either in the mid-1920s. Director member of the LNAJ, Hozumi Shigetō, also justified the freedom of immigration by using the same concept “kokusai kyōdō seikatsu”. See Hozumi Shigetō, \textit{Kyōdō seikatsu kannen no kakuritsu} [Encouraging the idea of community life] (Tōkyō: Kyōka dantai rengōkai, 1924), 33–37.
\bibitem{117} “Kokusai keizai kaigi gidai”, 20.
\bibitem{118} Ibid., 20.
\end{thebibliography}
national migration. On the open door policy for natural resources, the committee proposed:

1. recognizing the conditions of exception enumerated by Article 4 of the draft Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, which was prepared by the League of Nations economic committee, and to specify the conditions and narrow the scope of their application as much as possible.
2. establishing a principle that import and export prohibitions and restrictions should not be imposed at least on important industrial raw materials.
3. reporting to the League of Nations on the reasons for and possible effects of import and export restrictions.

And on the freedom of international movement of workers, it proposed:

1. gathering accurate and reliable news and produce statistics on the labour market in each country.
2. giving priority to overpopulated countries or countries with unemployed workers in controlling the demand for and supply of labour.
3. precluding discriminatory treatment on the supply of labour. ¹¹⁹

The draft resolutions contained radical proposals for the abolition of discriminatory treatment with regard to labour migration, but the assembly revised the text substantially. The resolutions the Association finally adopted were as follows:

1. The principle should be established that import and export prohibitions and restrictions should not be imposed on food and important industrial raw materials.
2. Each country (including the League members of the British Empire) should treat the other countries as equals in economic terms.
3. As regards the above two points, when a country introduces import and export restrictions or discriminatory measures, it should report to the League of Nations on their reasons for and possible effects of the restrictions or measures.
4. As regards land use and capital investment by foreigners, each country should not impose taxes, charges and other conditions and restrictions on foreign nationals which are different from those imposed on its own nationals. ¹²⁰

The main point in the introduction of the special committee report, namely, free movement of capital for the purpose of developing natural

¹¹⁹ Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kokusai keizai kaigi ni tai suru kibō [Requests on the World Economy Conference]”, SA: 135/05/135.
¹²⁰ Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kokusai keizai kaigi ni taisuru ketsugi [Resolution on the World Economy Conference]”, JACAR: B05014051100, 89.
resources, was included in the last resolution and Takashima’s proposals were incorporated into the first and third resolutions, while the final resolutions completely excluded the topic of international migration and deleted all the proposals on the freedom of international movement of workers. This was probably because the resolutions were intended to propose only an immediately practicable plan. As the opening sentences of the resolutions stated, “The World Economy Conference does not aim to create a system for the world economy overnight. It does not ignore the fact that each country has different national interests. The aim of the conference is, rather, to cooperatively establish an economic organization to the extent that is possible.”

Thus, the emphasis of the resolutions was put on the reduction of trade barriers and the freedom of movement of capital, instead of the freedom of international migration.

The final resolutions show clearly that it was the mixture of developmentalist and free-tradist opinions that constituted the main policy adopted by the LNAJ. The Association did not take the labourist standpoint, which emphasized the improvement of working conditions, nor did it propose discussing the problem of international migration at the Conference. This cautious attitude resulted in the resolutions which combined the opinions of free-tradists and developmentalists. The resolutions did not purely reflect either of the two standpoints but were the results of a compromise between the two. For instance, the LNAJ only advocated the reduction of export duties which foreign countries imposed on food or raw materials, but if the Association really adhered to the doctrine of free trade, it should have also proposed the reduction of import duties which Japan placed on manufactured goods. This proposal, however, would have been fiercely opposed by domestic manufacturing industries. Likewise, the Association did not fully endorse the opinion of developmentalists in that they did not advocate free movement of labour force for the purpose of developing natural resources. The resolutions finally adopted by the LNAJ were a compromise which those who wished to establish free trade and those who wished to have access to natural resources in foreign territories could agree on, but this was a precarious position based on the shared but unfounded fear of overpopulation.

121 Ibid., 89.
The World Economy Conference and its results

There is no evidence that the LNAJ’s advocacy activities for the World Economy Conference influenced the Japanese government’s attitude toward the Conference, but there seems to have been a link between the two. The government chose some delegates for the Conference from the members of the LNAJ. It appointed free-tradist Shidachi Tetsujirō as chief delegate and Ueda Teijirō as one of five members of the delegation. It also selected members of the LNAJ’s special committee, such as Inui Kiyosue and Takashima Seiichi, as attendants to the delegation. By doing so, the government gave them the opportunity to make their opinions known to an international audience. The members of the Conference were mainly selected from private citizens. This was because the preparatory commission for the Conference had recommended that Conference members “should be chosen for their personal qualification”. The appointment of Shidachi and Ueda might indicate the government’s tacit support for their free tradism. But there are few documents left which mention the reason for this appointment. According to an entry in Ueda’s diary, he was chosen as a member of the Conference because his “opinion became known to Shidachi Tetsujirō and to the officials of the Foreign Ministry (particularly vice-minister Debuchi [Katsuji])” after he started to advocate new liberalism. Shidachi also recollected that when the government appointed him as chief delegate and informally asked him to select attendants, he recommended Ueda as a member. If this was true, it was Shidachi who played an important role in making the government support the free-tradist opinion.

The government, to a certain extent, allowed Shidachi to express his own opinion at the Conference. For instance, the government entrusted him with the task of writing the official observation on the first part of the Conference agenda, which was entitled as “The World Economic Position: Principal features and problems as seen from the point of view of different

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122 The other members were a diplomat Satō Naotake, a scholar of engineering Shiba Chūzaburō and an agriculturalist Satō Kanji.
125 Shidachi, “Ueda Teijirō kun no tsuîoku”, 2.
countries”. Writing in his observation, Shidachi stated that the Japanese members of the Conference saw “the impelling necessity of the firm establishment of international cooperation and coordination based upon the solid foundation of world economy”, and pointed out the seriousness of overpopulation in Japan, which was not only “one of the most thickly populated countries in the world” but also was “scantily blessed with natural resources.”

The solution to the overpopulation problem was to establish “a universal regime of freedom of communication and transit and equitable treatment of commerce between the members of the family of nations in strict obedience to the spirit of the League of Nations.” To achieve this end, Shidachi suggested the following six points:

1. The reduction of fiscal burdens of the people of several countries.
2. The removal or reduction of customs barriers, discriminatory tariffs and other differential treatment in persons or goods.
3. The development of natural resources through freedom of economic enterprises; and [sic]
4. The equitable distribution of food stuffs and raw materials.
5. The abolition of discriminatory treatment in transportation and navigation and the opening of coastwise trade to the commerce of the world.
6. The stabilization of foreign exchange.

These suggestions were for the most part in line with what the LNAJ had already discussed. Although they included topics which the Association had not discussed such as the first and sixth points, the rest of them covered familiar topics. Like the Association’s resolutions, Shidachi did not mention the issue of international migration in an explicit way, the problem he had considered so delicate that he was unwilling to propose at the Conference.

Although Shidachi was commissioned to formulate the official observation on the first part of the Conference agenda, he did not have a free hand to express his opinion on all items on the agenda. The government authorities held meetings from January 27 to March 30, 1927 to discuss detailed matters mentioned in the second part of the Conference agenda. They

126 The Observation of the Japanese Members of the Economic Conference, JACAR: B04122076500, 11.
127 Ibid., 11.
128 Ibid., 11.
129 Gaimushō, Kokusai keizai kaigi no kaku gidai ni kansuru hōshin [Policies on each agenda item of the World Economy Conference], JACAR: B05014193500, 54.
invited the Conference members to the meetings, and handed the documents of the meetings to them. Although the preparatory committee for the Conference recommended that Conference members should not be “spokesmen of official policy”\textsuperscript{130} and the Japanese government did not give orders to the Conference members, the document of the meetings handed to the Conference members was virtually official instructions from the government.

It is not clear how much the Japanese members acted on their own free will at the World Economy Conference held in Geneva from May 4 to 23, 1927. But what Shidachi said at the Conference was not significantly different from the opinion he had expressed before. In the speech he delivered at the third session on May 5, he maintained that overpopulation and resource scarcity were “a few predominant and salient economic facts” which characterized his country.\textsuperscript{131} He described the predicament of his country in detail as follows: “Its area is very limited and its natural resources are extremely meagre. It is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, having 157 people to the square kilometre. Moreover, the arable land that can be advantageously utilised in Japan proper is no more than 20 per cent of the total.” The main point of his speech was:

Such being the characteristics of our country, it is an absolute necessity for her to keep up her national life by the importation of foodstuffs and raw materials, the payment for which is met by converting them into articles that can be advantageously produced. As a natural consequence, we must of necessity make it our national policy to remove Customs [sic] barriers and to establish freedom of communication and commerce, as far as possible in cooperation with other nations. At the same time, I wish to state that it is our ardent aspiration to develop industries which can be beneficially conducted in our country. To this end, we welcome the friendly assistance and concurrence of other nations.\textsuperscript{132}

He emphasized that Japan had no alternative but to rely on the import of food and raw materials, on the one hand, and the export of manufactured goods, on the other. It was therefore necessary to reduce tariff barriers and foster industrialization. He criticized “the post-war protective policies of

\textsuperscript{130} Preparatory committee for the International Economic Conference, \textit{Report to the Council}, 12.


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 80.
different nations, the monopolistic control of raw materials and natural resources, and the inequitable distribution of population” as three “outstanding and unfortunate tendencies of the world to-day [sic]” and stressed the necessity of studying these tendencies to find their solutions.\textsuperscript{133}

Although like other members of the LNAJ Shidachi was afraid of overpopulation, he did not think that sending migrants abroad was a realistic solution to the overpopulation problem. He held another speech on the last day of the Conference and stated that “freedom of movement of capital, freedom not only of the movement of merchandise but also of persons; freedom not only of overland trade but also of all-oceanic traffic” were problems which should be resolved in the future.\textsuperscript{134} This passing remark couched in vague wording was the only mention he made about international movement of people. In respect to international migration, the behaviour of the other Japanese members of the Conference was more or less the same. They remained silent about the topic, and even when they touched on the topic, they used only general and unprovocative words.

The moderate attitude of the Japanese delegation made a striking contrast to conference members from southern and eastern European countries, who discussed the problem of international migration unhesitatingly. A Greece member, Jean Tournakis, explicitly criticized the quota system in the United States. He said that “The effects of overpopulation, which in certain States used to be obviated by means of emigration, are now becoming apparent”\textsuperscript{135} and maintained that overpopulated countries had to raise tariffs and protect domestic industries to absorb the surplus working population. What he proposed to solve the overpopulation problem was establishing an “International Labour Exchange”, an information centre with the aim of gathering and providing information about the demand for and supply of labour in each region of the world. An Italian member, Angelo di Nola, also insisted on mentioning the problem of population in a final Conference report. It was as a result of his insistent demand that a sentence was added to the final report: “the problem of population has induced certain countries which have a surplus of labour to base their Cus-

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 161–162.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 163.
toms protection on this argument.\textsuperscript{136} The main thrust of the Greek and Italian arguments was clear. As di Nola stated, they thought that both “the reduction of Customs [sic] tariffs of all countries and [...] the elimination or attenuation of the restrictions imposed on immigration” should be promoted simultaneously.\textsuperscript{137} In other words, they demanded the liberalization of international migration in exchange for the reduction of tariff barriers. This was an idea entirely foreign to Shidachi and Ueda. Although the free-tradists also advocated the reduction of tariff barriers, they had no intention of using it as a bargaining instrument with which to achieve the freedom of international migration.

Change and persistence in the LNAJ’s activities

The organizational character of the LNAJ had changed partially during the period of preparation for the World Economy Conference. As has been seen above, those who actively participated in the Association’s meetings were mostly private citizens, not bureaucrats. Furthermore, the LNAJ did not need to rely much on diplomats since it could now appoint its resident representative in Europe, Inagaki Morikatsu, as a delegate to the IFLNS meetings. However, the status of academics within the LNAJ’s activities seems to have undergone little change. Those who expressed their opinions at the Association’s meetings were a miscellaneous group of people including not only academics but also businessmen and journalists. Scholars like Tanaka Mitsugu attended these meetings regularly and contributed to the compilation of the special commission report greatly. Yet he was apparently an exceptional case. Sakatani Yoshirō’s questioning of the value of an academic conference was symbolic in this regard. Although Yamada Saburō reacted against him and emphasized the necessity of studying the international economy as well as the merits of an academic conference, the event revealed that there was little consensus of opinion among the LNAJ’s members regarding the value of scientific study in international cooperation.


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 69.
The World Economy Conference offered the LNAJ an opportunity to address an issue the Association had not directly dealt with, the problem of the international economy. To use the concept introduced in the first chapter, the association began to examine a question about how much the globalization of civil society must be fostered in order to sustain international community life. The Association members offered different answers to this question. Labourists argued that the improvement of working conditions which was being promoted by the ILO would make the freedom of movement of workers inevitable. Free-tradists, in contrast, did not attach great importance to the freedom of international migration and maintained that free trade was sufficient for sustaining international community life. The third and last group, which this chapter has called developmentalists, emphasized the necessity of developing natural resources through foreign investment and, to a lesser extent, international migration. These three positions were based on different assumptions about the future development of international interdependence. While labourists made the strongest assumption that globalization would be deepened to the extent that working conditions were equalized throughout the world, free tradists expected that such equalization would only occur in the distant future, if at all.

The report and resolutions the LNAJ adopted were predicated on the free-tradist and developmentalist arguments, whereas the labourist opinion had never been incorporated into the official policy of the Association. The Association located itself in the middle ground between the free-tradist and the developmentalist policies formulated by, among others, Shidachi and Tanaka. It insisted on the reduction of trade barriers and an increase in overseas investment for the purpose of developing natural resources but not on the freedom of international migration.

That the LNAJ did not adopt the labourist position advocated mainly by Asari was partly a natural consequence of his decision not to organize a subcommission within the LNAJ which would act in cooperation with the International Labour Office. He chose to establish an independent organization, the International Labour Association, and most of those who were concerned about labour issues also opted to stay out of the LNAJ. This prevented them from making their voice heard within the Association. The decision, although trivial in itself, made a significant difference in the Association’s course of action. It created a condition in which the Association developed in a direction away from the ILO and the IFLNS’s International Labour Office and Social Legislation commission.
Although the ILA was successfully organized in March 1925, it remained a weak international organization compared to the LNAJ. There were several factors that hindered the development of the newly born organization. Firstly, there was a problem regarding the relationship with the state. While key officers at the Bureau of Social Affairs of the Home Ministry, Nagaoka Ryūichirō and Moriya Eihu, sent Asari their congratulations when the ILA was established, the Foreign Ministry complained to Asari about the establishment of the ILA.138 This was probably because the Bureau of Social Affairs, which was in charge of labour administration, had often conflicted with the Foreign Ministry over the jurisdiction of several matters including international migration.139 This uneasy relationship between the two authorities prevented the growth of the ILA as an international organization, since it could not count on the Foreign Ministry for help in developing diplomatic relations with other international organizations. The second factor was 

Kyōchō kai. According to Asari, how to handle the government-sponsored, labour-management cooperation organization was a very delicate problem, since its relationship with the ILA was competitive.140 “If the proposed Association [the ILA] becomes one of the authorities in the sphere of social and labour legislation for which the Kyōchō Kai was established, and in which the Kyōchō Kai failed, it will lose its raison d’être.”141 Although Asari succeeded in persuading two directors of Kyōchō kai, Soeda Keiichirō and Nagai Tōru, to become members of the ILA, he did not expect that they would give their full support to the ILA. The third factor was the difficulty of obtaining support from the labour movement. Since the ILA was an organization closely related to the International Labour Office, it could not publicly support a particular political party. This neutral attitude dissatisfied the trade unionists, who were divided into different camps, with the leftist group increasingly being drawn to revolutionary socialism. Although

141 Ibid.
Asari contemplated joining the centre-left *Shakai minshū-tō* (Social Democratic Party), Thomas persuaded him not to join the party even as an individual.\(^{142}\) What made the ILA’s task of securing support from the labour movement even more difficult was the deep distrust towards the ILO in Japan. As has been mentioned, Suehiro, the authority on labour law, thought that the Organization was an instrument devised by industrialized countries to suppress the unindustrialized ones. This opinion was shared among the Japanese labour activists so widely that Asari needed to devote considerable efforts to dispelling mistrust towards the ILO. The last factor was the establishment of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Act in 1925. The ILA members had sought to utilize the ILO in order to put pressure on the Japanese government to tackle labour problems, but the Act made it unnecessary to rely on such a roundabout course of action by providing them with a direct route to achieving their objective. The renaming of the ILA in 1929, one year after the first election under the Act, was a symbolic event in this regard.\(^{143}\) In this year, the organization changed its name to *Shakai rippō kyōkai* (the Association for Social Legislation) at the suggestion of Maeda Tamon, the Japanese government representative for the Governing Body of the ILO. By doing so, it deleted the term “international” from its name. This was an expression of the will to attach greater importance to domestic politics than to international relations.\(^{144}\) In fact, soon after its renaming, the Association created a committee on Parliamentary Relations composed of the Diet members of the Association and attempted to lobby for social and labour legislation.\(^{145}\)

It should be noted that the rupture in relations between the supporters of the League of Nations and the ILO was not a problem unique to Japan. A member of the Secretariat of the IFLNA, Lothian Small, who had worked hard to establish the connection between the Federation and the Office, thought that apart from England, where the British section of the Inter-

\(^{142}\) Thomas to Asari, December 31, 1926, ILOA: C 1402.

\(^{143}\) Asari to Thomas, March 2, 1927, ILOA: C 1402.

\(^{144}\) *Shakai rippō kyōkai*, *Shakai rippō kyōkai nenpō* [The annual report of the Association for Social Legislation] (Tōkyō: *Shakai rippō kyōkai*, 1933), 1–2. The association did not totally abandon its mission to build relationships with international organizations. In the 1930s, the association joined the International Association for Social Progress and started to participate in its meetings. But the association did not succeed in building as close a relationship with the International Association for Social Progress as the LNAJ did with the IFLNS.

\(^{145}\) Asari to Thomas, October 23, 1929, ILOA: C 1402.
national Association for Social Progress and the British League of Nations Union worked closely, “the division between the two movements does not hold out much hope of being bridged at present”. The labour movement around the world was apt to be radicalized and gravitate away from the League. According to Small, “some of our societies may even have a nationalistic tinge and be well on the political right whereas the Social Policy groups tend as definitely to the left and can see no useful purpose in collaboration with the League of Nations.”

In contrast to the organizational character of the LNAJ, which changed only partially, the framework of the LNAJ’s discussion about international migration underwent a few significant changes before and after the World Economy Conference. Firstly, international migration began to be considered less as a problem of equality of races or nations than a problem of quantity and distribution of population. The focus of the discussion moved gradually, although not completely, from establishing formal equality among races or nations to achieving substantive equality in the distribution of population. At the same time, international migration began to be regarded more as a policy instrument than as an act of individual free will. A sign of this change can be seen in the fact that, while members of the LNAJ still used phrases such as ‘free migration’ or ‘freedom of movement’, they also started to use an expression like the ‘control of the supply of labour’. This meant that people began to regard international migration as a potential tool to be used by states or international actors to achieve their purpose.

Another important change was that the discussion about international migration began to cover a larger problem than that of the Japanese migrants in the United States. Although the conflict with the United States over the 1924 Immigration Act remained an important problem, people began to focus upon other countries and regions. China was especially important in this regard. The authors of the introduction to the LNAJ’s report on the World Economy Conference had China in mind when they talked about the potential existence of undeveloped natural resources. They said, “it is an urgent task to improve the situation of countries and regions that supply resources, in particular China and Siberia, so that it becomes possible to freely bring industrial raw materials from there.”

146 Small to Kose, January 27, 1926, ILOA: D 600/431/9.
147 Ibid.
148 “Kokusai keizai kaigi gidai”, 12.
Shidachi also regarded China as a potential supplier of resources, although he differed with the authors of the introduction about the necessity of promoting international migration. He said at the Conference that, “The economic unrest, together with the incessant internal strife in China, is a source of grave concern to all nations, particularly to Japan, whose relations and interests are so closely interwoven with those of that country. It is hoped that peace and order will soon prevail there, that her vast resources will actually be opened to the world.”

Quite interestingly, not long after the World Economy Conference, one of the authors of the introduction, Tanaka Mitsugu, urged the creation of a regional organization for promoting economic integration in Asia, which he called “the economic United States of Asia”. In his article published in 1928 in *Gaikō jihō*, a leading journal on foreign policy, he insisted on the liberalization of international movement of capital and workers, using exactly the same sentences he used in the introduction. He stated that it was advantageous for Japan to transfer not only heavy industries which needed to cover transport costs of raw materials to neighbouring countries, but also a part of agricultural and raw material industries, and this would also benefit China, India and the other East and South Asian countries. Of course, economic integration would not be achieved easily. However desirable it would be to “build a strong world economy and to form a single economic unit”, it would be impossible in the near future to achieve economic integration in the world at large. Therefore, he insisted that the East and South Asian countries should first engage in regional economic integration. This would be easier to achieve than global integration because they were close to each other and had common economic interests. What he emphasized in this regard was the importance of China. In the LNAJ’s report, he had stated that it was resource-abundant countries that should be allowed to develop their resources first, and that if it turned out that they could not do so by themselves, resource-scarce countries should be entitled to develop the resources. In the *Gaikō jihō* article, he mentioned China as an example of such resource-abundant countries. “A key to China’s recovery should be sought in the development of a raw


151 Ibid., 27–28.
materials industry. The country should strive for resource development first and, if necessary, introduce foreign capital and technologies. But if it cannot achieve the development of its resources, then it should allow foreigners to bring capital and labour for the purpose of developing natural resources.”

This statement made clear that what Tanaka assumed to be a potential immigration country for Japan was not the United States but China.

Taken as a whole, the changes in the framework of the discussion about international migration seem to suggest a growing trend within the LNAJ towards the formation of the vision of ‘the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, the vision of a regional order which Japan attempted to construct violently in the Second World War. But at least in the late 1920s no one in the LNAJ had the slightest intention of breaking down the international order based on the League of Nations. This can be ascertained by looking at the Association’s reaction to a Pan-European tendency within the IFLNS. At the eleventh Congress held in Berlin from May 26 to 31, 1927, the IFLNS discussed two questions: “Can regional or continental bases be incorporated within the League of Nations?”, and “Is the United States of Europe one such basis?” The Japanese Association answered the first question negatively, saying that regionalization would “create racial and economic barriers”. As regards the second question, the Association admitted that the proposed United States of Europe might be possible, but emphasized that its formation must not conflict with Article 23 of the Covenant of the League. Even Tanaka did not envisage the formation of a regional economic bloc. He regarded the United States of Asia only as a step towards world economic integration. Although, therefore, it is interesting that some elements of regionalism were found in the discussion among those who were involved in the Western-oriented international cooperation in the middle of the 1920s, it should also be remembered that they did not have a concrete plan for constructing ‘the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’.

152 Ibid., 24.
153 Shibusawa to Shidehara, March 31, 1927, JACAR: B05014050900, 72.
154 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kokusai renmei chihō teki bunkenka mondai ni kansuru ketsugi [Resolution on the question of regional reorganization of the League of Nations]”, JACAR: B05014051100, 87.
155 Ibid., 87.
The next chapter investigates the development of the LNAJ’s activities after the 1927 World Economy Conference. During their stay in Europe, the Japanese members and attendants at the Conference took the opportunity to attend other international conferences. Shidachi and Inui went to the Berlin Congress of the IFLNS. And the former also attended the fourth Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm from June 27 to July 2, while the latter visited the first World Population Conference in Geneva from August 29 to September 3. The experience of these international conferences brought new impetus to non-governmental international cooperation activities in Japan. As will be examined in the next chapter, it stimulated the formation of a free-tradist organization, Jiyū tsūshō kyōkai (the Association for Liberty of Trading), on the one hand, and the establishment of a research institute for studying population problems, on the other.
Part III: International cooperation at a crossroads

Chapter 4: The birth of international scientific cooperation: 
Ueda Teijirō’s population study and its historical significance, 1927–1938

The IFLNS and the LNAJ continued discussing the matter of the international economy after the 1927 World Economy Conference. Inspired by the Geneva conference, the IFLNS convened its own International Economy Conference in Prague in 1928, and the LNAJ established a standing economic commission in 1929, whose members included Japanese delegates to the Geneva conference.

The delegates to the Geneva conference returned from Europe with varied impressions. Shidachi Tetsujirō and Ueda Teijirō, the two apostles of free trade, gained confidence from a liberal mood prevailing among the members of the Geneva conference. On their way back from Europe, the two agreed to launch a nationwide movement in the cause of free tradism and, immediately after arriving in Japan, established an organization called the Association for Liberty of Trading (ALT), whose goal was to reduce tariff barriers around the world. Inui Kiyosue, who attended the World Population Conference during his stay in Europe, came back to Japan with a different mission. He was one of many who were inspired by the speech given by Albert Thomas at the conference. The Director General of the International Labour Office suggested establishing an international organization for the study of population problems in his speech, arguing that the problems were at the very root of many international conflicts and that an international organization solely dedicated to studying demographic issues was needed to resolve the conflicts. Thomas’ proposal, described by Inui as “extremely ambitious” in a newspaper article, were echoed by the Japanese public, and influential figures, such as Nitobe Inazō and bureaucrats at the Bureau of Social Affairs of the Home Ministry, started a campaign to found a national institute for population

1 Inui Kiyosue, “Jinkō chōsetsu no kokusai kikan teishō [A proposal to establish an international organization to control population]”, Chūgai shōgyō shinpō, October 6, 1927.
studies which would work in cooperation with the international organization to be established.

The third part of this book investigates the development of Japanese international cooperation in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, which revolved mainly around issues of trade and population. Like the preceding two chapters, this chapter elucidates the characteristics of Japanese international cooperation by identifying key figures and analysing their writings intended for both national and international audiences. By doing so, this chapter reveals two important changes Japanese international cooperation underwent after the Geneva conference. One is a growing tendency observed among the members of the LNAJ to avoid the provocative topic of international migration. The free-tradist perspective introduced by Shidachi and Ueda shifted the focus of the LNAJ’s policy agenda away from international migration to international trade. The other change was an increased emphasis put on scientific research. Not only did academics begin to appreciate the importance of science, believing that it had the potential to provide a neutral standpoint for solving international conflicts, but so did bureaucrats.

Ueda’s population study was one of the results produced by these changes of attitude towards international cooperation. He undertook a collective research project on population after the Manchurian Incident and published a number of influential articles with his fellow researchers. This research project had much to do with his vision of international order and the fast-changing international environment in the 1930s, even though they might appear unrelated at first glance. Ueda thought that in order to defend his free-tradist position against an increasing tendency towards a bloc economy, it was necessary to develop a scientific study of the population that could present a reasonable solution to what he believed to be the root cause of the Incident—the problem of overpopulation. In pursuit of a solution to this problem, Ueda’s study developed from the estimation of Japan’s future population growth to an attempt to measure the standards of living in Japan, and its results were presented at various international conferences such as the sixth conference of the IPR in Yosemite in 1936 and the International Studies Conference in Paris in 1937.

This chapter argues that the development of scientific research in the 1930s altered the nature of Japanese international cooperation in an important way. However, it does not underrate the significance of the fact that this turn towards international scientific cooperation happened in the age of crisis caused by the Manchurian Incident. The course taken by Japanese
international cooperation was largely determined by international circumstances and its development was severely restricted by the reality of international politics. This chapter indicates that most of those who pursued international cooperation in these critical years accepted international conditions after the Incident as an unchangeable reality. They did not criticize the Japanese government and focused on empirical issues, instead of normative ones, as if to avoid questioning the legitimacy of ‘Manchukuo’. As this chapter will argue, they hoped in vain that international society would someday recognize the puppet state.

Two campaigns that emerged after the World Economy Conference

In the early autumn of 1927, a group of businessmen, excited by the endorsement of economic liberalism at the World Economy Conference, held a meeting in Osaka and discussed a plan to set up an organization for studying Japanese trade policy. They contacted Shidachi and Ueda immediately after the two came back from Europe. On their way back to Japan, the two missionaries of economic liberalism had also developed a plan to launch a movement for the reduction of trade barriers. On January 14, 1928, the two groups decided to work together and created the Association for Liberty of Trading in Tōkyō and Osaka. “The movement for liberty of trading”, as they called it, soon became a nationwide movement and was followed by the establishment of other local associations in cities such as Kōbe, Kyōto, Nagoya, Aomori, Kanmon and Dalian. The national organization of these local associations, the Japan Association for Liberty of Trading.
Trading (Nihon jiyū tsūshō kyōkai), was also formed on March 14 of the same year.\(^5\)

Unlike the LNAJ, the ALT did not depend on the government, nor did it receive financial support from Zaibatsu, except for the funds provided by Mitsui Zaibatsu’s Yasukawa Yūnosuke to publish the association’s English organ Liberty of Trading Bulletin from 1933 onwards.\(^6\) Although the ALT consisted of people of various occupations, including academics like Ueda Teijiṃō and Takano Iwasaburō and journalists like the Ōsaka asahi’s Wada Nobuo and the Ōsaka mainichi’s Shimoda Masami, most of its members were businessmen. Its leading members included people like Hirao Hachisaburō, who ran private schools in Kōbe, Murata Shōzō, a manager of the shipping company Ōsaka shōsen, and Taguchi Hachirō, a manager of the trading company Kishimoto shōten. Most of these businessmen, who came from the Kansai region, had direct commercial interests in foreign trade. That is why, according to Ueda, “people in Osaka say that the movement ‘smells of iron’ and people in Kobe regard it as an agent of shipping companies.”\(^7\) These core members of the association were not among the most powerful in the trading business. Although the leading export industry at that time was textiles, managers in the textile industry only took part in the promoters’ council of the Tōkyō association and did not become active members of the association.

The ALT was not an organization that acted only within the country. It built a relationship with Chambers of Commerce in major cities around the world as well as like-minded organizations in foreign countries. In the 1930s, the number of foreign organizations to which the ALT regularly donated its organ, Jiyū tsūshō, amounted to 25.\(^8\) Among them, the ALT attached the highest importance to the Cobden Club in England, an association founded in 1866 following the death of Richard Cobden in the previous year, by those who espoused his free trade doctrine. Although the ALT did not attend or hold international conferences, it delivered English mem-

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5 “Zaikai ikizumari dakai ni jiyū tsūshō renmei naru [The Association for Liberty of Trading was formed to resolve the economic impasse]”, Chūgai shōgyō shinpō, January 16, 1928, and “Jiyū tsūshō kyōkai Nihon renmei naru [The establishment of the Japan Association for Liberty of Trading]”, Ōsaka asahi shinbun, March 15, 1928.

6 Ueda, Ueda Teijiṃō nikkī, 97.

7 Ibid., 124. Ueda also wrote that there were members from an association of timber traders and a trade association of leather merchants.

oranda on several occasions, such as those of the International Chamber of Commerce or the Institute of Pacific Relations in order to make its activities known to foreigners. The association also distributed an English letter in Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, and urged that a similar organization for the liberty of trading be established in those regions, saying:

we notice everywhere throughout the world the rise and growing influence of various international fraternal organizations such as the League of Nations Association, or the Rotary Club—the great international forces all making for the promotion of international peace, understanding and co-operation. In view of these facts, it is most earnestly to be hoped that a strong sentiment for Liberty of Trading should be raised all over the world, so that the noble ideal it upholds may be speedily realized among nations of the world for the increased well-being of mankind.\(^9\)

The ALT’s main activity was to pronounce its opinion on matters relating to tariffs by adopting resolutions and sending them to various interested parties—both foreign and domestic. Soon after its establishment in January 1928, for instance, the Ōsaka association voiced its objection to the Japanese government’s attempt to increase import tariffs on steel by delivering a protest statement to the government, members of both houses of the Diet, newspapers, news agencies and local chambers of commerce in Japan.\(^10\) The Ōsaka association was the most active among local associations. In March the same year, the association sent a telegram to the London Chamber of Commerce, the Cobden Club and Matsuyama Shin’ichirō, the commercial councillor of the Japanese Embassy in England, and expressed its objection to the imposition of import tariffs on knitted fabric, which the British government was planning at that time.\(^11\) Such activities continued unabated from the late 1920s into the early 1930s and covered various goods including steel, pig iron, timber, cotton, silk, chemical fertilizers and dyes. The ALT also conducted research on international trade. But compared to its lobbying activities, the effort it put into its research projects was rather sporadic. Under the chairmanship of Takano Iwasaburō, the Ōsaka association established a research commis-


\(^11\) “Eikoku no kōritsu meriyasu kanzei shinka wo soshi seyo [Stop the imposition of new and high import tariffs on knitted fabric]”, *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, March 18, 1928.
sion on industry, and investigated the level of tariffs levied on various goods and their effects on commodity prices and the living conditions of the nation at large. The results of the investigation were published as a series of booklets from 1929 to 1931. Those who were in charge of editing the series were Takano’s student and economist Ōuchi Hyōe and Ueda Teijirō’s student Yamanaka Atsutarō.

As the movement for the liberty of trading was developing rapidly, another movement was under way whose objective was to establish an institute for population studies. This was a result of the World Population Conference, the international conference proposed by the famous birth control activist Margaret Sanger.12

Although the Conference, held in Geneva from August 29 to September 3, 1927, was a non-diplomatic, scientific conference where natural and social scientists such as Alexander Carr-Saunders, Henry Fairchild, Corrado Gini, Raymond Pearl and Warren Thompson presented their research on population problems, it was not the papers given by these scientists but the speech delivered by the Director General of the International Labour Office, Albert Thomas, that attracted the greatest international attention. Thomas stated in his speech that the conflict between immigration countries and overpopulated countries would necessarily raise “a query as to whether a people has a natural right to reproduction beyond the limits of its own economic resources and to overflow into foreign countries and whether, on the other hand, a people has a natural right to maintaining a hold on territory which it does not exploit and from which it is incapable of extracting the maximum yield.”13 He did not think that the conflict could be solved immediately. Rather, he believed that in order to solve the problem, it was necessary to find a guiding principle based on an accurate knowledge of population and immigration. Concluding his speech, the visionary international civil servant proposed establishing “an international scientific centre or institute” on population studies and suggested that the future institute explore the following seven research topics:

The part to be played by national and international regulation, the manner in which such regulation should be applied and the restrictions to which it should be subject;

The relationship between the supposed over- or under-population of a given country and the theoretically ideal density of population (necessitating research concerning the optimum density of population in a given country and its distribution in the world as a whole);

The effects of contact and intermixture between different races and civilizations;

The effects of the population situation in a particular group on its tendency to emigrate (and the possibility of prognostication in this respect);

The form, rate and recurrent fluctuations of migration movements: their historical progress, cyclic fluctuation (or crisis) and seasonal variations;

The existing migration crisis, its causes and effects;

Effects of emigration and immigration on the state of the labour market.14

Inui Kiyosue was listening to the speech at the World Population Conference. Sanger had read his book on the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States, *The Unresolved Problem of the Pacific*, and invited him to the Conference.15 Inui gave a speech after Thomas and presented his

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15 The Foreign Ministry was not in favour of Inui’s attending the World Population Conference. Diplomat Wakasugi Kaname wrote a note in the margin of the Ministry’s document on the Conference. In the note Wakasugi insisted that it was uncertain what opinion Inui would express at the Conference and that his opinion might be “misunderstood as the official opinion” and its record might be “remained for a long time and distributed widely”. In the same document, the diplomat Ishii Itarō also left a note saying that it would do “no good to bring up the issue of immigration at such a conference”. In general, the Foreign Ministry was not interested in the Conference. Although after the Conference its organizer sent some letters to Inui through the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry did not pay much attention to these letters. See Satō to Tanaka, May 25, JACAR: B04122496000, 28.
assent to the proposal of establishing an international institute on population studies by saying, “I am in hearty accord with the program as outlined [by Thomas].”\textsuperscript{16} In an article he contributed to a newspaper after the Conference, Inui reported Thomas’ speech in detail and stated that the Conference ended “with great success”.\textsuperscript{17}

But, in fact, Thomas himself thought the Conference proved to be a failure. Thomas had wished to establish an international organization which could promote solutions to population problems, but the other key participants did not endorse such an ambitious plan. The American biologist, Raymond Pearl, who had provided Sanger with conference funds through the National Research Council, was of the opinion that the organization should be an international union of population scientists. Pearl and his American and British colleagues were, therefore, satisfied when they organized the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems (IUSIPP). The IUSIPP “would merely be a federation of national committees and would have no formal connection with any international organizations, further reducing the possibility that it would spur an international movement, or even an international spirit” as expected by Thomas.\textsuperscript{18}

The Japanese public did not know the inside story of the Conference and the IUSIPP. The media reported the establishment of the Union favourably as the first step towards realizing Thomas’ vision. The \textit{Kokumin shinbun} praised the Conference for opening the way for the formation of an international organization for population studies. “The fact that nations have begun to discuss population problems publicly is recognized as a step forward in international relations. We, the Japanese, who worry about the population growth of our country, must pay due attention to the future development of the established organization”, wrote a reporter.\textsuperscript{19} Likewise, the \textit{Ōsaka asahi}’s Shimomura Hiroshi mentioned Thomas’ speech more than once in his newspaper articles and books intended for the general public, emphasizing the need for the scientific

\textsuperscript{17} Inui, “Jinkō chōsetsu no kokusai kikan teishō”.
\textsuperscript{19} “Kokusai-teki jinkō mondai kaiketsu [The solution of international population problems]”, \textit{Kokumin shinbun}, September 7, 1927.
study of population problems. The businessman was an active member of international cooperation organizations such as the LNAJ and the ILA, and his writings about population problems—most of them contained eugenic ideas—were widely read in Japan in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Given these favourable reactions, it was not surprising that a welcoming atmosphere prevailed in Japan when Nitobe Inazō proposed establishing a national institute which would act in concert with the IUSIPP. The former Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations had served as adviser to the World Population Conference. In July 1927, just after he returned from Geneva to Japan, he submitted a “proposal for the establishment of a scientific institute for population studies” to Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsa kai, the government’s advisory council on population and food problems. His proposal underscored the necessity of a permanent institute for population studies, arguing that the problem of population would persist as long as society existed. “Because an ultimate solution to the problem cannot be discovered in a short time, a research institute for the problem must be a permanent organization and a study on the problem must be conducted continuously”, said Nitobe.

There are no minutes that recorded the council members’ reaction to his proposal. But there remain two reports prepared by the council about the


21 There are two letters from Ōkuma Makoto, a staff member of the LNAJ, to Shimomura, in which Ōkuma provided Shimomura with a list of book titles on population problems held at the LNAJ’s library. It is presumed that Shimomura asked the LNAJ to offer materials useful for his writings. Ōkuma Makoto to Shimomura Hiroshi, January 8 and 10, Shimomura Hiroshi Kankei Monjo [Shimomura Hiroshi Papers] at the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room of the National Diet Library, 162.

22 Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsa kai [The advisory council on population and food problems], Jinkō bu tokubetu iinkai gijiroku [The protocol of the special committee on population], JACAR: A05021095900, 127–128. Nitobe’s proposal is inserted between minutes of the meetings on February 4 and April 18, 1928. According to a booklet of the Society for the Study of Population Problems published later in 1934, the submission of the proposal was at the twelfth meeting on February 4. See Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai yōran [The handbook of the Society for the Study of Population Problems], JACAR: C01006571600, 6.

23 Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsa kai, Jinkō bu tokubetsu iinkai gijiroku, 127.
World Population Conference: One was *Reference materials on the 1927 World Population Conference*, which contained Inui’s paper presented at the World Population Conference, and the other was *The establishment of the IUSIPP and the position of our country*, which analysed the background to the establishment of the IUSIPP and the statutes of the organization.\(^\text{24}\) The latter report remarked that although the Union would not engage in political discussion, it would be an “important international organization which will influence immigration policy around the world and provide solutions to conflicts over immigration”.\(^\text{25}\)

At first glance, the two campaigns that emerged in the late 1920s appear to have nothing in common. But the two were derived from the same assumption that population problems were at the root of international conflicts. As seen in the previous chapter, free tradists had been interested in population problems from before the World Economy Conference. In fact, overpopulation was the sole reason for their advocating the doctrine of free trade. The statement the ALT published on the occasion of its establishment stated clearly that “the scarcity of natural resources and the density of population” were the reason why Japan needed to pursue free trade.\(^\text{26}\) This statement may appear odd to modern readers, but in the interwar years issues of trade and population, far from being distinct from one another, were interrelated and interwoven with each other.

Two campaigns and the LNAJ

After the World Economy Conference, Shidachi and Ueda participated in meetings of the LNAJ more actively than before in order to implant their economic liberalism in the Association. Ueda succeeded in representing

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\(^{24}\) Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsa kai, *1927 nen sekai jinkō kaigi shiryō: Nihon hikōshiki daihyō Inui Kiyosue si enzetu kōgai sono ta* [Reference materials on the 1927 World Population Conference: the speech given by Inui Kiyosue, the non-official representative of Japan, and other miscellaneous documents], possessed by the Library of Economics, the University of Tōkyō; Masuda Shigeki, *Jinkō mondai kokusai kyōgikai no seiritu to wagakuni no chii* [The establishment of the IUSIPP and the position of our country], JACAR: A05021095900, 239–258.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 243.

\(^{26}\) Takiguchi, “Minseitō naikaku to Ōsaka zaikai: Inoue Junnosuke zōshō to keizai-teki jiyūshugi”, 597–598.
the Japanese association at the International Economic Conference, which
the IFLNS, inspired by the Geneva World Economy Conference, held in
Prague from October 4–6, 1928. According to Ueda, those who planned
the Prague conference were members of the International Committee to
Promote Universal Free Trade—the organization of free trade supporters
established by the leaders of the Cobden Club such as Hugh Bell, Henry
Bell and George Paish. They approached the IFLNS to infuse their free
tradism into the League of Nations societies.

The aim of the Prague conference was to provide “the occasion for an
effective expression of public opinion so as to make the work of the
Geneva Conference more widely known and to study the difficulties
which in various countries stand in the way of the adoption of the mea-

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sures recommended.” Every member association of the IFLNS was
requested to submit a report on “a) what results have already been
obtained in the direction of adopting the Geneva Recommendations and b)
the difficulties, especially in the form of administrative protectionism,
which stand in the way of the more complete national adoption of these
Recommendations”. In responding to these requests, the Japanese asso-
ciation submitted a memorandum which was, in general, in accord with
the policy of the ALT. It mentioned the formation of the ALT as the most
important outcome of the Geneva Conference and the existence of subsi-
dies as an example of administrative protectionism in Japan. The docu-
ment also showed the closeness between the economic liberalism endorsed
by the LNAJ and demographic concerns. It maintained that studies about
the question of population initiated by the preparatory commission of the
Geneva Conference should be pursued, and expressed the hope that the
Prague Conference would recognize the usefulness of formulating recom-
mendations on this subject. Ueda said in his speech at the Prague confer-
ence that in Japan the Association for Liberty of Trading was “carrying on
an active popular campaign throughout the country for freer trade policy”

27 Ueda, Ueda Teijirō nikki, 127.
28 Ueda Teijirō, “Ueda daihyō hōkoku [Report by delegate Ueda]”, SA: 135/05/19.
29 The IFLNS, International Economic Conference: Prague 4th, 5th, 6th October,
1928, ILOA: D 600/431/11.
30 Ibid.
31 l’Union Internationale des Association pour la Société des Nations, Conférence
Economique Internationale: à Prague, 4–6 Octobre 1928: Rapports Nationaux sur
Tchécoslovaque pour la S. D. N., 1928), 56.
and expected that “such institutions would be formed in those countries where they are not yet existing [sic] and [...] cooperate with us in the work of building economic peace throughout the world.”

The Prague conference adopted four resolutions on “application of the recommendations of the Geneva economic conference”, “customs barriers”, “principles of a political economy favourable to peace” and “continuation of the work of the Prague economic conference”. The main objective of these resolutions was to create an auxiliary international economic committee and national economic liaison commissions, which would draw up an international economic protocol “in order to carry the Geneva work to its proper conclusions”. Responding to these resolutions, the LNAJ appointed the standing economic commission under the chairmanship of Yamakawa Tadao on March 27, 1929. The commission was composed of those who had participated in the LNAJ’s preparation work for the World Economy Conference, such as Inoue Masaji, Asari Junshirō, Obama Toshie, Tanaka Mitsugu and Nasu Shiroshi as well as Shidachi and Ueda. The commission worked energetically in that year: It held ten general meetings and more than 20 sessions of its subcommissions until the end of October and adopted 20 resolutions. How often Ueda participated in these meetings is unclear, but Shidachi attended the commission regularly and was deeply involved in its work. On October 25, the commission adopted a resolution proposed by Shidachi, which urged the Japanese government to take part in the so-called Tariff Truce Conference. In December he succeeded to the chairmanship of the commission after Yamakawa, who left Japan to attend the London Naval Conference.

The standing economic commission discussed matters relating to international trade in great detail. The discussion, however, revealed that the idea of liberty of trading could not readily permeate to the members of the

35 Kokusai renmei kyōkai, Kaimu hōkoku shōwa 3 nendo, 67–68.
36 Ueda wrote in his diary only that there were many meetings until the end of the year. Ueda, Ueda Teijirō nikki, 133.
37 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 73 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 73]”, October 25, 1929, JACAR: B05014051900, 32.
commission. Although the commission adopted some resolutions that incorporated the free-tradist position, such as a draft convention banning countries around the world from raising tariffs for two years or a resolution on a model tariff system designed to keep tariffs low, the support for the position was not solid.\(^{38}\) The strongest opposition came from diplomat Wakamatsu Torao. He raised an objection to the commission’s draft resolution, which urged countries around the world to insert a general and unconditional most-favoured-nation provision into their commercial treaty. The exceptions the draft resolutions proposed to the provision were the following:

1. Tariff exemption for the benefit of border-area residents.
2. Preference for customs unions.
3. Special treatment for products of colonies (apart from the dominion members of the League of Nations) and mandates.
4. Duties imposed on subsidized or dumped goods.
5. Special treatment of goods imported overland from regions under special geographical, economic, or technical conditions.
6. Exceptions for national fishing industries and their equivalents.\(^{39}\)

At the commission session on September 13, 1929, Wakamatsu insisted on deleting the words “dumped goods” from the fourth provision. The diplomat maintained that it was not only “infeasible to follow the provision” but that also there were “fears that foreign countries might abuse it to oppress Japan".\(^{40}\) On the same day, the commission also deleted the fifth exception on overland trade on the grounds that the proposed text could not be used to “justify tariff preferences for Manchuria”.\(^{41}\) What was at issue was the reduction of tariffs for overland trade between Manchuria

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\(^{38}\) On the list of resolutions adopted by the commission, see Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 76 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 76]”, November 8, 1929, JACAR: B05014051900, 16–26.

\(^{39}\) Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 44 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 44]”, July 10, 1929, JACAR: B05014051900, 102.

\(^{40}\) Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 57 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 57]”, September 13, 1929, JACAR: B05014051900, 59. Those who were present at the session were Asari Junshirō, Kitaoka Jitsu, Obama Toshie, Shidachi Tetsujirō, Wakamatsu Torao, Tamaki Yoshio, Shibasawa Shinichi, Nagasawa Ryūsaku, Hishinuma Isamu, Satō Shōshirō, Atsumi Ikurō, Shimizu Yasuharu, Yamakawa Tadao, Okuyama Seiji, Yasuma Norikatsu and Makiuchi Masao.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 60.
and Korea by one-third, which Japan had practiced since 1913. It had been agreed at the Washington Conference in 1922 that the participant countries would abolish tariff reductions for overland trade in the near future, but Japan had continued the tariff reduction after the Conference. As a result, its abolition had become one of many diplomatic issues between Japan and China. Japan had implemented the reduction on the pretext of protecting the interests of Korean residents in border areas, but its true purpose was to foster Japan’s economic expansion into Manchuria, the expansion which was promoted under the slogan Sen-Man ittai (the integration of Korea and Manchuria) until the Japanese government finally recognized the abolition in 1930.

Interestingly enough, it was another diplomat member of the commission, Kawashima Shintarō, who attempted to attenuate the protectionist colour Wakamatsu added to the draft resolution. After the ninth session of the commission on October 25, 1929, Kawashima proposed two revisions to the document. Referring to Article 7 of the Statute on the International Régime of Maritime Ports—the international treaty which had come into force in 1926—he proposed that, in special cases stipulated by the treaty, a state be allowed to levy lower customs duties on goods imported across its customs frontiers than those imported through maritime ports in order to protect the interests of border area residents. This was a revision aimed


43 The LNAJ, “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 72 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 72]”, October 30, 1929, JACAR: B05014051900, 35. Article 7 of the Statute on the International Régime of Maritime Ports is as follows: “Unless there are special reasons justifying an exception, such as those based upon special geographical, economic, or technical conditions, the Customs duties levied in any maritime port situated under the sovereignty or authority of a Contracting State may not exceed the duties levied on the other Customs frontiers of the said State on goods of the same kind, source or destination. If, for special reasons as set out above, a Contracting State grants special Customs facilities on other routes for the importation or exportation of goods, it shall not use these facilities as a means of discrimination unfairly against importation or exportation through the maritime ports situated under its sovereignty or authority.”
at sustaining tariff reduction for overland trade between Manchuria and Korea, but the scheme proposed by Kawashima was different from the then existing tariff preferences in that under his scheme tariff reduction would also be applied to goods produced outside Manchuria, which means his scheme was not a preferential tariff reduction favouring only Manchurian products. Kawashima also submitted a revised provision on anti-dumping duties. He maintained that if there was no international convention banning anti-dumping duties, a state might take appropriate countermeasures to prevent dumping.\textsuperscript{44} The commission accepted these revisions and adopted a final resolution which recognized exceptions on overland trade and anti-dumping duties.

Although Kawashima was clearly opposed to protectionism, he was not against economic expansionism. The diplomat, who was well versed in commercial policy, had no intention of obstructing Japan’s economic expansion into Manchuria. On the contrary, his proposal on overland trade (and in this regard the provision in the original draft too) was designed to enable Japan to adopt favourable measures for that purpose. The difference between Kawashima and Wakamatsu lay in that the former clearly intended to promote Japanese economic expansion within the limits permitted by international law, while the latter intended to do the same in a more unilateralist way.

Kawashima’s intervention made the final resolution less protectionist in its outlook, but the commission members did not go further to endorse the doctrine of free tradism by advocating a universal, non-preferential reduction of tariffs. At a session on September 13, the commission modified the third item in the list of the exceptions in order to exclude India from the application of special treatment, because the British colony was a serious rival to Japan in the market for cotton and pig iron. The modified provision, therefore, only acknowledged “special treatment for products of colonies (apart from the dominion members of the League of Nations and India) and mandates”.\textsuperscript{45} This amendment, whose obvious purpose was to defend Japanese particularistic interests, was retained in the final resolution.

Free tradism promoted by Shidachi and Ueda met with stronger opposition than they had expected. At the same session on September 13,

\textsuperscript{44} Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 72 gō”, 38.
\textsuperscript{45} Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 57 gō”, 59.
Shidachi revealed that there was a man who had argued against his plan to establish the ALT. He said, “A certain person told me that America behaved selfishly and England protected its interests by preferential tariffs. The man went on to say that a movement was developing in Europe for the establishment of the United States of Europe, and then he insisted that Japan be the leader of the Orient by establishing an Asian League.”

It was unclear who the person was but there were many who did not like the idea of free trade. The Tōkyō Association had entrusted its administrative tasks to the Japan Economic Federation for a while after its establishment, but it soon moved its office to a room in the offices of Nihon bōeki kyōkai (the Japan Trade Association), because there were “protectionists such as Ōhashi [Shintarō] and Ōkawa [Heizaburō] among the members of the Japan Economic Federation”.

Because of the existence of strong opposition to free tradism, Shidachi and Ueda had to compromise in various ways. The Japanese name of the association itself was a result of such compromise. The association did not adopt an alternative name, Jiyū bōeki kyōkai (the Free Trade Association), because they worried that many people might not agree to use the word Jiyū bōeki (自由貿易), the word which meant ‘free trade’ more explicitly than Jiyū tsūshō (自由通商) in Japanese. The association also had to take a somewhat non-committal attitude towards the iron industry, which constituted a major obstacle to free trade. Although heavy industries started to develop rapidly during the boom of the First World War, most of the iron-manufacturing companies became unprofitable after the war and came to form a strong pressure group for protective tariffs. While Ueda was in favour of keeping the tariff on iron products unchanged, he did not express a strong objection to the protection of the iron industry. This attitude might have appeared to be indecisive to an impartial observer. It

46 Ibid., 58.
47 Ueda, Ueda Teijirō nikki, 123. Ōhashi was a businessman who ran a publishing company, Hakubun kan, and other firms. Ōkawa was an owner of several paper manufacturing companies.
48 Ibid., 123.
49 Ueda Teijirō, “Seitetsu gōdō to kanzei [The amalgamation of iron manufacturing companies and tariffs]”, in vol. 7 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 668–674; Ueda Teijirō, “Tetsukanzei hikiage mondai [The problem of raising the iron tariff]”, in vol. 7 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 675–683.
might have appeared to be too inconsistent to trust the earnestness of the ALT’s attempt to achieve peace through free trade, given the fact that the Japanese government protected the iron industry partly because it was essential when waging war.

In the end, the movement for liberty of trading gathered strength only in Osaka and did not develop much in other regions. Although journalist Ishibashi Tanzan was sympathetic to the movement and referred to Shidachi and Ueda as the “Cobden and Bright” of Japan, even he had to admit that there was no social class which would support the movement in Japan.50

In contrast to the doctrine of the liberty of trading, the plan to establish a research institute for population studies obtained the assent of the members of the LNAJ quite easily. At the second session held on April 6, 1929, the standing economic commission of the LNAJ decided to study problems of population and immigration and asked Kawanishi Jitsuzō, Inoue Masaji and Inui Kiyosue to conduct the study.51 Soon after, the plan became the topic of discussion.52 Kawanishi, a bureaucrat at the Bureau of Social Affairs of the Home Ministry, suggested at the fifth session that the commission make a recommendation to the government on the establishment of an institute for population studies. At the request of the commission, he wrote a draft recommendation and submitted it to the next session held on July 11. In his draft recommendation, he emphasized the need for establishing a standing and scientific institute for population studies, and maintained that the institute be a national institute or a public corporation.

50 Ishibashi Tanzan, “Ika ni shite jishu dokuritsu no seishin o sakkō suru ka [How to cultivate the independent spirit]”, Tōyō keizai shinpō, January 28, 1928.
51 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Dai 2 kai jōsetsu keizai iinkai giji taiyō [The minutes of the second session of the standing economic commission]”, JACAR: B05014051700, 52. The LNAJ’s annual bulletin reported that the commission appointed special committees for the research of population and immigration at the fourth session on June 10, 1929. It is not clear whether the committees were the same as the three asked to study the problem of population and immigration. See Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], Kaimu hōkoku shōwa 4 nendo [The Annual Bulletin of the LNAJ: April 1929 to March 1930] (Tōkyō: Kokusai renmei kyōkai, 1930), 20.
assisted by the government.\textsuperscript{53} In writing the recommendation, Kawanishi might make contact with Nitobe, because Kawanishi, who studied at Dai-ichi High School when the school’s headteacher was Nitobe, was his ardent follower. In fact, the recommendation submitted to the LNAJ used the same argument as used in Nitobe’s proposal that population problems were of a permanent nature and, therefore, research on the problems must also be conducted continuously.\textsuperscript{54}

The commission adopted Kawanishi’s recommendation with a slight modification, and the LNAJ presented it to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and the Colonial Minister on July 18.\textsuperscript{55} Inoue Masaji, who participated in both the economic commission of the LNAJ and the government’s advisory council on population and food problems, mentioned the recommendation at a session of the advisory council on December 14 and asked the government to give consideration to it. The government did not immediately endorse the LNAJ’s recommendation, but another council member Nagai Tōru drafted a new proposal based on Nitobe’s and Kawanishi’s documents, and the plenary session of the advisory council again adopted this proposal on March 27, 1930. This time, the government accepted the proposal and included the cost of establishing a research institute in the budget for the 1931 fiscal year. The content of Nagai’s proposal was the same as in the previous documents. Although his proposal did not mention the name of the IUSIPP, it emphasized the necessity of studying population problems from an international viewpoint and facilitating better coordination with an international organization.\textsuperscript{56} The government won the consent of the Imperial Diet, but the institute did not immediately materialize because of a cabinet change. It was on October 27, 1933, more than five years after Nitobe’s proposal, that the Society for

\textsuperscript{53} Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 41 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 41]”, July 6, 1929, JACAR: B05014051900, 106.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 106.

\textsuperscript{55} Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], Kaimu hōkoku shōwa 4 nendo, 5–6; “Jinkō mondai kenkyū jōsetsu kikan setti ni kan suru kengisho [Proposal on the establishment of a permanent organization for the study of population problems]”, JACAR: A05021095900, 344–346.

\textsuperscript{56} Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsa kai [The government’s advisory council on population and food problems], Jinkō mondai ni kan suru jōsetsu chōsa kikan setti ni kan suru ken [On the establishment of a research institute on population problems], JACAR: A05021098900, 31.
the Study of Population Problems (Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, hereafter, SSPP) was founded with the financial support of the government and donations from major Zaibatsu such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Kōnoike.\[57\]

Those who played a central role in the establishment of the SSPP were bureaucrats at the Bureau of Social Affairs of the Home Ministry, although the Society also included high officials at the Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (see Table 4.1). Ueda wrote in his diary that the Bureau was preparing the establishment of the Society in 1933. Even the official handbook of the SSPP admitted that it was the Bureau that had drafted a budget bill for the Society and organized a promoters’ council.\[58\]

The SSPP pursued its aim of building relationships with similar foreign organizations. On August 30, 1933, immediately before its official foundation, the SSPP notified foreign individuals and organizations of its establishment and received replies from the World Population Conference, several research institutes for population studies in foreign countries such as Britain, Italy and the United States, and notable researchers such as Harold


\[58\] Ueda, Ueda Teijirō nikki, 184; Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai yōran, JACAR: C01006571600, 7. See also “Jinkō mondai kaiketsu no jōsetsu kikan setti [The establishment of a standing institute for solving population problems]”, Ōsaka jiji shinpō, November 22, 1932.

Table 4.1 Governing body of the SSPP in 1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Yanagisawa Yasutoshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Niwa Shichirō, Inoue Masaji, Nagai Tōru, Shimomura Hiroshi, Nasu Hiroshi, Yamakawa Tadao, Yoshida Shigeru, Horikiri Zenjirō, Hasegawa Takeo, Kawada Isao, Tomita Aijirō</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, Shōwa 9 nen 1 gatsu jinkō mondai kenkyū kai yōran [The handbook of the SSPP, January 1934], JACAR: C01006571600, 18–19.
Part III: International cooperation at a crossroads

Cox and Henry P. Fairchild.\textsuperscript{59} The Society also granted geographer Odauchi Michitoshi a subsidy for attending the 1934 International Geographical Congress in Warsaw, which was planning to conduct a study on overpopulation in relation to geographical and regional conditions.\textsuperscript{60} Odauchi, who had worked for the government’s advisory council on population and food problems, was one of four researchers employed by the SSPP. The other three were Masuda Shigeyoshi, Sōda Takeo and Tachi Minoru.\textsuperscript{61}

A cautious approach towards immigration problems

As the discussion at the standing economic commission shows, the organizational character of the LNAJ did not change much after the World Economy Conference. Although businessmen and academics participated in the discussion within the LNAJ, bureaucrats continued to play a significant role in formulating the Association’s policies. The number of the LNAJ’s members drastically increased in 1928 from around 2,700 to more than 10,000 due to the newly instituted student membership, but the core constituency of the Association remained the same (see Table 4.2).

However, there were some changes in Japanese international cooperation after the Conference. One important change was that Japanese international cooperation began to focus its attention on topics relating to international trade and population and stopped dealing with matters relating to international migration as directly and actively as before. As mentioned above, the LNAJ commissioned Kawanishi, Inoue and Inui to study problems of population and immigration, but the three did not accomplish the task for unclear reasons.\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, although there were several chances to discuss international migration at international conferences, the LNAJ

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{59} Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, “Shōwa 8 nendo jigyō jōkyō [Activities in the 1933 fiscal year]”, HUNSC: N0045-010.

\textsuperscript{60} Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, “Kokusai chirigaku kaigi kajōjinkō iinkai keikaku an [The International Geographical Congress’ plan for a commission on overpopulation]”, HUNSC: N0045-009; Jinkō mondai kenkyūkai, “Shōwa 9 nendo jigyō jōkyō [The project plan for the 1934 fiscal year]”, HUNSC: N0045-010.

\textsuperscript{61} Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, Shōwa 9 nen 1 gatsu jinkō mondai kenkyū kai yōran, JACAR: C01006571600, 21–22.

\textsuperscript{62} Kawanishi wrote a book on immigration problems. This might be related to his study commissioned by the LNAJ. In this book, Kawanishi mentioned the resolu-
\end{flushleft}
Table 4.2 The membership of the LNAJ: 1922–1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>membership category</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>full member</td>
<td>special member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1,698</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>full member</td>
<td>special member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1,674</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1,886</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-class member</td>
<td>special member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,689</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-class member</td>
<td>special member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on the annual bulletin of the LNAJ.

Note: The membership rule of the LNAJ was revised several times. The major revision was made in 1927, in which the student membership was instituted and the regular subscriber to the magazine Sekai to warera was upgraded to B-class member, whose number was not included in the total number of members from 1925 to 1927. This extension of the LNAJ’s membership explains the sudden increase in membership in 1928. The distinction among the life, special, A-class and B-class members was based on the amount of the membership fee. Foreign members belonged to the section of foreigners and female members to that of women.

did not seize these opportunities. The IFLNS discussed the issue of international migration at the eleventh Congress in Berlin and the thirteenth
Congress in Madrid, but the Association paid little attention to the discussion. At the Berlin Congress, the International Labour Office, Economic and Social Questions commission—‘Economic’ was added to the name of the commission after the World Economy Conference—resolved to “study immigration problems thoroughly and to urge the activities of the League of Nations and the ILO” on these problems and decided to hold a special meeting on international migration. But, as mentioned in the third chapter, it was only on the question of the regional reorganization of the League of Nations that the LNAJ declared its position at the Berlin Congress. After the Congress, Inui Kiyosue telegraphed the LNAJ’s staff member Okuyama Seiji, requesting the Association’s official permission to attend the IFLNS’s special meeting on international migration. However, Okuyama ordered him to submit a written report only and immediately return from Europe. At the Madrid Congress held from May 18 to 24, 1929, too, the IFLNS adopted resolutions which demanded the ILO to thoroughly study the problem of migrant workers from economic, social and political viewpoints and to complete the already existing statistics on immigration. The resolutions further proposed that the ILO investigate the system of the protection of the national labour market and expressed its wish that the League of Nations hold an international conference to abolish unjustifiable measures against labour migration. Yet again, the LNAJ did nothing to pass these resolutions.

There were only few members who attempted to bring up the issue of international migration within the LNAJ. At a session of the standing economic commission held on October 31, 1929, the Association discussed a draft resolution submitted by Kawashima Shintarō on the admission of foreigners to a country and their treatment after admission. The aim of the resolution was to influence the outcome of the International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners scheduled to be held in Paris from Novem-

63 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kokusai renmei kyōkai dai 11 kai rengō kai [The 11th assembly of the IFLNS]”, JACAR: B05014051200, 25.
64 Tanaka to Satō, July 25, 1927, JACAR: B05014051200, 19. The written report which is supposed to have been submitted to the meeting is reprinted in 1927 nen sekai jinkō kaigi shiryō: Nihon hi-kōshiki daihyō Inui Kiyosue si enzetu kōgai sono ta.
ber 5 to December 5 of the same year. The draft resolution formulated by Kawashima was as follows:

1. The admission of foreigners into a country should be as free as possible, except if restrictions or prohibitions on the entry of foreigners are needed to maintain public order and hygiene or to protect national labour. Even in such cases, however, restrictions or prohibitions should be imposed on all foreigners equally and equitably.

2. A country should provide national treatment to foreigners after admission on a reciprocal basis, except if there is special concern about hygiene, public order (including national security) or national labour. But such exceptions to national treatment should be applied to all foreigners equally.

3. A country is not prevented from appropriately restricting the application of the above two principles to countries and nations whose social and legal systems have still not developed to the level of civilized nations.

4. As for the licensing and operation of foreign companies, a country should apply the above three principles *mutatis mutandis*, unless special circumstances make the application unsuitable.66

These resolutions, which proposed to adopt the principle of reciprocity on the treatment of foreigners after admission and make exceptions for “uncivilized” nations, were clearly less progressive and demanding than earlier documents the LNAJ had endorsed on this topic. But the reason why the Association did not adopt these resolutions is rather unclear. According to the minutes of the meeting, the participants in the meeting “approved the gist of the draft resolutions but postponed making a decision, because the resolutions related to other issues such as population and immigration and required further studies in relation to these issues.”67

A similar unwillingness to discuss topics relating to international migration prevailed at the second conference of the IPR held in Honolulu from July 15 to 29, 1927. As mentioned earlier, the IPR had decided to discuss the issue of international migration as a part of population and food problems. Nasu Shiroshi, who submitted a paper on the problems of population and food to the conference, had regarded international migration as a solution to the overpopulation problem in Japan. Like many others who were concerned about the problem in Japan, the agriculturalist

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66 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 71 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 71]”, October 30, 1929, JACAR: B05014051900, 34.

67 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 75 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 75]”, October 31, 1929, JACAR: B05014051900, 28.
had been pessimistic about the prospect of the country expanding the area of arable land and increasing crop yields. The professor at Tōkyō Imperial University stated in his paper that it was difficult to develop export industries in Japan because of high wage levels, low labour productivity and the scarcity of natural resources. He said that the movement of surplus population gains momentum “under the circumstances where a country cannot check its population increase nor provide enough jobs to its surplus population”, and demanded that Japan be provided with full support for the solution of population problems.\(^{68}\) Obviously, he regarded international migration as an important solution to the population problem. But even this agriculturalist had to admit that the majority opinion at the conference did not support his idea. The participants preferred international trade to international migration as a solution to the overpopulation problem. “What the Japanese members felt during the discussion at the conference was that a free-tradist argument was dominant over all the others. This was quite a natural reaction. The free movement of goods and capital was called for to compensate for the restriction on the free movement of people”, said Nasu after returning from the conference.\(^{69}\) The Japanese delegation declared at the conference that “Japan does not criticize the US immigration law for the purpose of solving the population and food problems of Japan.”\(^{70}\) This was another sign of unwillingness on the Japanese side to discuss the issue of international migration. The declaration made it clear that the Japanese Council of the IPR had no intention of discussing the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States in connection with the problems of population and food in Japan.

In the late 1920s both the LNAJ and the IPR dealt with the issue of international migration only indirectly. One example was a resolution on the progressive codification of international law which the LNAJ submitted to the Madrid Congress of the IFLNS. Yamada Saburō proposed the resolution and attended the Madrid Congress to explain the reason for the

\(^{68}\) Nasu Shiroshi, “Jinkō shokuryō mondai no kokusai-teki kenkyū [International study of the problem of food and population]”, Tōkyo asahi shinbun, September 20, 1927.

\(^{69}\) Nasu Shiroshi, “Jinkō shokuryō mondai no kokusai-teki kenkyū”, Tōkyo asahi shinbun, September 21, 1927.

Association submitting the document. The resolution was designed to help and support the first International Conference for the Codification of International Law, which the eighth Assembly of the League of Nations had decided to hold in order to foster the development of international law. The resolution proposed that the members of the IFLNS recommend their respective governments to intensify the collaboration with the committee of the Conference and that the member associations of the Federation request organizations and experts in their own countries to study the matter of international law and to express their opinion on the topics selected for the agenda for the Conference. The Congress adopted the text with only a few modifications.

At first glance, the resolution seems totally unconnected with the issue of international migration and, in fact, it was not directly related to that issue. What is important is rather that the three topics the League of Nations had selected for the Conference included the question of nationality—the other two topics were “territorial waters” and “responsibility of states for damage done in their territory to the person or property of foreigners”. Yamada had urged the Japanese government to advocate the principle of racial equality in connection with the question of nationality. He had been selected as a member of the government commission for the preliminary study on the codification of international law and had attended commission meetings from its first session on May 25, 1928. The task of the commission was to write an answer to questionnaires sent from the Preparatory Committee for the International Law Codification Confer-

71 Arai to Tanaka, May 27, 1929, JACAR: B05014051700, 65. Yamada was in Europe in order to attend an assembly of the International Union of Academies in Brussels in May of the same year. See Okada, “Tokuni shin’nin kan no taigū o tamau”, JACAR: A03023479500, 6. According to Yamada’s memoires, he seems to have got a bad impression of the IFLNS’s Congress. “To see that the meeting started from 2 p.m. and the banquet from 11 p.m., I realized how decadent the meeting was”, although he did not mention the name of the IFLNS and said only that the meeting was that of “an academic society” held in Madrid. Yamada, Kaikoroku, 153.


73 There is a letter from Yamada to Debuchi from April 8, 1928, communicating Yamada’s will to accept the request to become the member of the commission. See JACAR: B04014070300, 48. See also “Kokusai hōten hensan chōsa junbi iinkai dai 1 kai kaigi [The first meeting of the commission for the preliminary study on the codification of international law]”, JACAR: B04014070600, 2.
ence, and Yamada was in charge of drafting an answer to a questionnaire about nationality. At the eighth session of the commission held on July 11, 1928, which discussed Yamada’s draft, he suggested that the government make proposals on two topics which had not been included in the questionnaire: One was about the conflict between the principles of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* and the other was naturalization. He insisted that the Japanese government advocate the principle of racial equality in connection with the latter question of naturalization:

> With regard to naturalization and other modes of the acquisition and loss of nationality, it is essential to establish the principle that states shall not make any discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality or religion (such as made by the Naturalization Act of the United States). Although the questionnaire does not cover the topic [of racial equality], the government should prepare to make proposals on the topic (see article 6 of the draft rules on nationality prepared by *Kokusaihō gakkai*).

His suggestion was aimed at facilitating the solution of the problems of Japanese immigrants in the United States. Because the Californian Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920 had banned “aliens ineligible for citizenship” from owning and leasing agricultural land, enabling and fostering the naturalization of Japanese immigrants in the United States would have been effective in solving the problems.

Interestingly, Yamada’s proposals had been incorporated into the draft of the official instructions for the Conference until immediately before the

74 For the questionnaire, see the League of Nations, “First Codification Conference: Schedules of Points drawn up by the Preparatory Committee for Submission to the Governments”, JACAR: B04014070300, 51–62; “Kokusai hōten hensan chōsa junbi iinkai dai 1 kai kaigi”, JACAR: B04014070600, 3.

75 “Kokusai hōten hensan chōsa junbi iinkai dai 8 kai kaigi [The eighth meeting of the commission for the preliminary study on the codification of international law]”, JACAR: B04014070600, 30.

76 Yamada Saburō, “Kokuseki mondai ni kan suru kaitōan junbi shorui [Preparatory documents for the answer to the questionnaire about nationality]”, JACAR: B04014070600, 77. Article 6 of the draft rules on nationality prepared by the SIL was as follows: “A State shall not make any discrimination between individuals on the ground of race, nationality or religion, in the matter of naturalization or other mode of the acquisition of nationality.” See “The Law of Nationality”, *The American Journal of International Law* 23 no. 2 supplement: Codification of International Law: 123.
opening of the Conference in March 1930. But the ambassador to Germany, Nagaoka Harukazu, who was appointed to be a delegate to the Conference, opposed proposing the principle of racial equality. He maintained that the Conference was unlikely to approve the proposal, given the fact that there were some international treaties which made discriminations on the grounds of race, nationality or religion, such as Article 7 of the League of Nation’s Palestine Mandate of 1922, which stipulated that the Palestine nationality law should facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews, or the 1923 Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, which used religion to identify Greek and Turkish inhabitants in order to exchange them between the two countries.

Nagaoka fiercely opposed the draft, saying that, “If the proposal leads to a defeat, it will also have bad effects on the solution of other similar issues.” As a result of his objection, the government deleted the proposal on racial equality from the final instructions issued on February 15, 1930.

Yamada’s attempt to incorporate the principle of racial equality into international law on nationality did not succeed. But even after the Codification Conference, he continued to address issues indirectly related to international migration. He submitted a paper about the treatment of foreigners after admission to the fourth conference of the IPR held in Shanghai in 1931, which was later published in English as “The Legal Status of Aliens in Japan”.

A reader of the article would be struck by a surprising continuity in his argument, which placed great emphasis on the equal treatment of nationals and foreigners. The failure at the Codification Conference does not seem to have brought about a change in his stance on this issue. He wrote, “no one can dispute that it is necessary for the promotion of international harmony and the maintenance of world peace, to establish

77 “Kokusai hōten hensan kaigi kokuseki mondai kunrei an [The draft instruction on the question of nationality for the Codification Conference]”, JACAR: B04014072700, 14.

78 Nagaoka to Shidehara, February 8, 1930, JACAR: B04014072900, 16.

79 Ibid., 16.

80 “Kokusai hōten hensan kaigi ni okeru teikoku daihyōsha daihyōsha ni taisuru kunrei [The official instruction to the imperial delegation to the Codification Conference]”, JACAR: B04014072900, 32.

the principle of national or equal treatment for lawfully admitted aliens, so far as enjoyment of private rights and pursuance of various advocations and carrying on commerce and industry are concerned." He thought that the development in the late 1920s showed a growing readiness among the international community to tackle issues that had been regarded as solely domestic:

In an age [...], in which the international community is advancing from a state of anarchy to that of an organized body—e.g. the League of Nations—each component member of which is fully awake to the fact of interdependence and the necessity of promoting world peace through international cooperation, it is only natural that many problems which have so far been regarded as outside the sphere of international law should become subjects of international negotiation and legislation.

Even after repeated failures of Japanese international cooperation, Yamada seems to have believed in the gradual progress of humanity. After the Madrid Congress of the IFLSN, he attended the conference of the IDI held in New York in October 1929 and was selected as an associate member of the IDI, the institute he had long respected for its efforts to express the “legal conscience of the civilized world”. At the conference he witnessed the adoption of the Déclaration des droits internationaux de l’homme, which had been prepared by the international law scholar André Mandelstam. Yamada welcomed the declaration, which was the result of long and strenuous efforts made by the Russian émigré. What Yamada paid most attention to was the first article of the declaration, which said:

Il est du devoir de tout Etat de reconnaître à tout individu le droit égal à la vie, à la liberté, et à la propriété, et d’accorder à tous, sur son territoire, pleine et

82 Ibid., 191.
83 Ibid., 190.
entière protection de ce droit, sans distinction de nationalité, de sexe, de race, de langue ou de religion.\textsuperscript{85}

In a journal article he wrote in order to introduce the declaration to the Japanese public, Yamada described it as “far more comprehensive and universal than the racial equality proposal which the ambassador plenipotentiary Makino Nobuaki had tried to push through at the Paris peace conference but failed to insert into the Covenant of the League of Nations.”\textsuperscript{86}

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An upsurge in interests in international scientific cooperation

Another important change which happened in the late 1920s was that those who participated in Japanese international cooperation, not only academics but also bureaucrats, began to recognize the role of science in international cooperation.

Many members of the LNAJ thought that the institute for population problems must be a scientific or academic one. They believed that the problem of population was at the root of international conflicts and that scientific research was necessary for resolving the conflicts. After returning from the World Population Conference, Inui said:

The people of overpopulated country A regard the closed-door policy of country B as an inhuman act and believe that it is their natural right to immigrate to country B. On the other hand, the people of country B advise the destitute people of country A to control their population growth, even though the resource-abundant, thinly populated country B is suffering from the under-development of agricultural and manufacturing industries. The problem is that both countries express their views while having little evidence to support them. Is it necessary for both to conduct more systematic research on the excess and deficiency of the population of each country?\textsuperscript{87}

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\textsuperscript{86} Yamada Saburō, “Kokusai-teki jinken no sengen ni tsuite [On the declaration of international human rights]”, Kokka gakkai zasshi 44 no. 1 (1930): 16. It should be noted that Mandelstam’s purpose in drafting the declaration was to protect religious minorities like Jews and that he did not attach much importance to the idea of racial equality, as proposed by the Japanese delegation to the Paris peace conference.

\textsuperscript{87} Inui Kiyosue, “Kokusai mondai to shite no tekido jinkō [Optimum population as an international problem]”, Gaikō jihō 47 no. 560 (1928): 116–117.
Likewise, Nitobe and Kawanishi emphasized the necessity and desirability of a scientific approach to population problems. As has been seen above, Nitobe suggested establishing a scientific organization for population studies. Kawanishi, too, believed that population problems must be approached scientifically. In the recommendation he wrote for the standing economic commission of the LNAJ, the bureaucrat underlined the possibility of science providing a neutral ground on which to resolve political issues:

Because population problems tend to provoke anger and arouse prejudice, they are likely to cause unnecessary conflicts in human society. It is therefore vitally important in establishing world peace to investigate the problems dispassionately and objectively and to inform the public about the facts. This is especially so in our country. We have argued many times both at home and abroad that population problems are the most important national issue in our country. But quite regrettably, we have lacked scientific evidence to base our argument upon. This is the reason why the League of Nations Association of Japan requests that the organization for population studies be a standing and scientific organization.88

His proposal clearly expressed a technocratic idea that scientific expertise was required to resolve international disputes, although it also exhibited a bit of wishful thinking that the results of scientific investigation would be advantageous to Japan.

Needless to say, academics who had already been preoccupied with the study of population problems welcomed the trend towards international scientific cooperation. Nasu Shiroshi, who had participated in the discussion about population and food problems at the second conference of the IPR, had strongly felt that a satisfactory settlement of population problems depended on “research using a dispassionate, scientific approach, on the one hand, and sincere international cooperation, on the other”.89 It was quite natural that he praised Albert Thomas’ speech. The agriculturalist was proud that the IPR had taken the lead over the World Population Conference in studying population problems. He said, “The point [of Thomas’
speech] is fine but such a research project [as proposed by Thomas] has already been launched [by the IPR] among the Pacific countries to a certain extent."

Another member of the Japan Council of the IPR and scholar of colonial studies, Yanaihara Tadao, was also much in favour of the scientific study of population problems. Writing in his 1928 book Jinkō mondai [population problems], he maintained that any policies on population problems could only be effective if they were based on scientific knowledge.

One of the academics who embodied this scientific turn in international cooperation in the late 1920s was Rōyama Masamichi. In his first book, Seijigaku no ninmu to taishō (The aim and object of political science) published in 1925, the political scientist attempted to provide a theoretical basis for the scientific study of politics. The discipline, which had originated in German Staatslehre and was introduced to Japan by state authorities for the practical purpose of building a Westernized state, had difficulty in separating itself from a state-centred viewpoint. In this book, Rōyama took the international conflict over migration between Japan and the United States as an example of political issues which would be used as a litmus test of political science’s ability to make an objective judgment. He also devoted most of its last two chapters to examining the development of international governance after the First World War.

Rōyama’s thirst for scientificity and his interest in international relations became more evident in Kokusai seiji to kokusai gyōsei (International politics and international governance) published in 1928 after he returned from studying in Europe and the United States. Although the book is known as the first academic work written in Japanese in the field of international governance, the fact that his experience of the conferences of the LNAJ and the IPR was pivotal in the establishment of the pioneer-

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90 Nasu Shiroshi, “Taiheiyō kaigi to imin mondai [The IPR conference and immigration problems]”, Chūō kōron 42 no. 10 (1927): 59.
91 Yanaihara Tadao, “Jinkō mondai [population problems]”, in vol. 2 of Yanaihara Tadao zenshū (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1963), 175.
93 Rōyama Masamichi, Seijigaku no ninmu to taishō [The aim and object of political science] (Tōkyō: Ganshōdō shoten, 1925), 6–10.
As mentioned in the second chapter, Rōyama had participated in the discussion about the admission of foreigners into a country at the tenth Congress of the IFLNS. After that he had also attended the second conference of the IPR in Honolulu, the conference that Nasu claimed to have been a pioneering attempt at conducting scientific research on population problems. The experience of these international conferences made the earnest young scholar reflect on how he should behave as an academic at international conferences and what he could do to facilitate international cooperation. “When I attended a few non-governmental international conferences almost by chance during my studies in Europe and the United States, I had to deliberate and decide on what attitude I should take as a scholar and a citizen and how I should approach the discussion at the conferences”, wrote Rōyama in the introduction to his *Kokusai seiji to kokusai gyōsei*.

What urged him to think carefully about his behaviour was the reality of international cooperation strongly influenced and constrained by international politics:

> Because I had an objection to most of the foreign policies the Japanese government adopted in the past and present, I had to reflect, on the occasion of the conferences, on how to decide when to take a different stand from the official policy of the government and when to defend it. How can a person who adopts a pacifist-internationalist position give an unqualified approval of the past and present government policies and indiscreetly represent them to foreigners? Although everyone has an indirect moral responsibility for the policies taken by his government, he must not serve as a spokesman of his government who expresses an official statement as his own opinion.

Rōyama regarded Japanese international cooperation organizations as a mere mouthpiece of the government. Yet he was not a rootless cosmopolitan who could completely ignore his emotional ties with his nation. What Rōyama thought necessary was not to distance himself from international

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94 Political scientist Imamura Tsunao points out that Rōyama happened to attend the conference of the IPR on his way back from his study in Europe and the United States to Japan, and argues that this was a pivotal experience which drew Rōyama’s attention to international governance. However, Imamura does not mention that before the IPR conference Rōyama had attended the conference of the IFLNS, which was presumably no less important than the IPR in Rōyama’s starting to study international issues. See Imamura Tsunao, *Gabanansu no tankyū: [Quest for governance]* (Tōkyō: Keisō shobō, 2009), 22.


96 Ibid., 4.
cooperation but to reform it from within. “Not to simply negate government policies nor to be dishonest about my longing for the welfare and happiness of my fellow citizens but to develop alternative, new views and policies which would replace the government policies” was the task he set himself.97 And in order to accomplish this task, he thought, it was necessary to do scientific research on the existing problems of international politics.98

In 1930 Rōyama established the Tōkyō seiji keizai kenkyūjo, a research institute of politics and economics, and started to tackle the task in earnest. He organized the institute together with a group of young scholars—including Yamanaka Atsutarō—who had already worked with him to produce a magazine named Shakai shisō (Social thought).99 The institute, which was, according to Rōyama, the first of its kind, carried out extensive research on questions of political and economic development in Japan and the world after the First World War and published its research results in a thick Political and Economic Yearbook.100 The analysis the yearbook gave of the shortcomings of Japanese diplomacy was similar to that of Rōyama. An article in the yearbook—its author is unclear—asserted that public opinion in Japan could not perform a primary function in diplomacy as long as there were no institutional means of democratically controlling diplomacy.101 The article referred to the LNAJ and the IPR along with other international organizations and commented that these private organizations had not played a prominent role in guiding and shaping public opinion on diplomacy. Although, the article admitted, a few major newspapers had made a significant contribution to the critical examination of the government’s foreign policy, even these newspapers had not based their allegations on systematic and scientific research on foreign policy.

97 Ibid., 4.
98 Kokusai renmei kyōkai, Aberisutouisu no taikai, 46–47.
99 Yoshida Kenji, “Tōkyō seiji keizai kenkyūjo no seturitsu to jigyō [On the establishment and works of the Tōkyō Research Institute of Politics and the Economy]”, Ōhara shakai mondai kenkyūjo zasshi 479 (1998): 26–29. Like Imamura, Yoshida emphasizes the importance of the experience Rōyama had at the IPR conference for the establishment of the Tōkyō seiji keizai kenkyūjo but did not mention his attendance at the IFLNS conference.
101 Ibid. 197.
Rōyama’s article, published in 1931 and entitled “The lack of a peace-maintaining organization in the Pacific”, clearly expressed the hope that scientific research could serve the purpose of promoting international cooperation and settling international disputes. In the article, he developed an ambitious plan for the regional integration of the Pacific. There was no regional collective security organization in this area because of the non-participation of the United States and Soviet Russia in the League of Nations. In order to overcome this deficiency, Rōyama maintained that a piecemeal, bottom-up approach was needed. He suggested creating a network connecting the existing private international organizations, the office of the League of Nations, and the technical organizations of the League, establishing a permanent organization composed of those private international organizations, inviting influential people in the USA and the Soviet Union to become members of the permanent organization, and gradually developing the network into an official collective security organization in the Pacific Rim. What he had in mind as examples of such private international organizations were, among others, the LNAJ and the IPR. In his plan, the permanent organization including these private organizations would conduct research on important problems in the Pacific, and its research results would be made public at international conferences so as to shape public opinion in the Pacific countries and guide their governments. This road map provided by Rōyama resembles, in an essential way, the functionalist or neo-functionalist approach in international relations theory developed by scholars like David Mitrany or Ernst Haas after the Second World War. Like these functionalists, Rōyama expected that the organization would first conduct research on non-political, technical topics and then proceed to the investigation of highly sensitive political issues:

The improvement of international relations in economic and industrial fields is a precondition for the establishment of better cooperation among the Pacific countries. Probably, the first step for the formation of a permanent organization composed of private international organizations will be to hold an economic conference. The organization will at first develop as an econo-

103 Sakai Tetsuya, Kindai Nihon no kokusai chitsujo ron [The political discourse of international order in modern Japan] (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2007), 125–130.
mic organization, not as a political one, and focus its research on mainly eco-
nomic issues such as currency, foreign exchange, capital, finance, commodi-
ties, raw materials, transportation facilities, labour, or immigration. A thor-
ough investigation must be pursued on these topics. It is only after the investi-
gation on these topics has been accomplished that political questions will be
added to the research agenda.104

The article fully expressed the expectations held by Rōyama with respect
to the future development of non-governmental international cooperation,
the hope entertained not only by the political scientist alone but by many
Japanese academics who were concerned about international issues. They
believed that scientific research conducted by non-governmental inter-
national organizations would foster the formation of rational international
opinion and promote international cooperation among countries around
the world.

Ueda Teijirō’s population studies

Two changes seen in Japanese international cooperation in the late 1920s
—the inclination to avoid issues directly relating to international migration
and the tendency away from political agitation or propaganda and towards
science-oriented international cooperation—might indicate the maturity of
Japanese international cooperation. But Japanese international cooperation
did not develop straightforwardly throughout the next decade due to the
Manchurian Incident, which was experienced by the members of the
LNAJ as a genuinely exogenous shock.

The Incident had a massive impact on Japanese international coopera-
tion. The LNAJ, which had functioned as the centre for Japan’s inter-
national cooperation, was put on the defensive both at home and abroad.
At home, right-wing extremists threatened the Association, regarding it as
a pro-Western organization.105 In the face of rising anti-League sentiment
in the aftermath of Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in
1933, the Association had to review its organizational policy and relin-
quish the League’s ideal. At the annual assembly on May 12, 1933, the
LNAJ changed its name to Nihon kokusai kyōkai (the International Asso-

104 Rōyama, “Taiheiyō ni okeru heiwa kikan no hubi”, 535.
105 Fujinuma Shōhei, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai no kinkyō ni kansuru ken [The recent
situation of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B05014052600, 2.
ciation of Japan, hereafter, IAJ), thus deleting the word ‘League of Nations’. It also revised article I of its statutes, which stated that the Association aimed to achieve the ideal of the League of Nations. The new article stipulated that the Association aimed to “foster friendly relationships and cooperation with other countries, establish international justice and maintain international peace”. Although the new Association did not completely abandon the idea of international cooperation, it was no longer an organization dedicated to the League’s development. Nobody seems to have remembered Shibusawa’s concern about the course of action the LNAJ should adopt in the event of a war. The chairman passed away in 1931 and a retired diplomat, Ishii Kikujirō, succeeded him as chairman. The loss of the most important non-bureaucrat member made the Association more subordinate to the Foreign Ministry than was previously the case. On the international front, the actions taken by Japan and the LNAJ after the Manchurian Incident provoked fierce criticism. The IFLNS adopted resolutions condemning Japan four times at its Council meeting in February 1933, the seventeenth Congress in July of the same year, the Council meeting in September 1937 and a meeting in London in February 1938, which was held simultaneously with the World Conference for the Boycott of Japan and Aid to China sponsored by the International Peace Campaign. Although apart from the Brussels Congress in 1935 the IAJ continued to send Inagaki Morikatsu to the IFLNS’s Congress until its withdrawal from the Federation in 1938, what the Association did at the IFLNS’s meetings was only to defend the action of the Japanese Army. The Association did not submit a proposal of major significance and the Congress of the IFLNS turned into a place for mere political agitation.

The situation in which the IPR was located was slightly different from that of the IFLNS. The organization, which had no official connection with the League of Nations and whose basic objective was to hold scientific discussions, was able to maintain its activities even in a politically charged situation after the Incident. The IAJ, which was losing its footing within the IFLNS but still wished to continue its activities in order to resolve the international crisis after the Incident, found the IPR better

suited to its aim. Importantly, the IPR had the United States as its member, with which Japan wished to improve its relationship. In 1935, therefore, the IAJ absorbed the Japanese Council of the IPR and reorganized it as a section of the Association.\textsuperscript{108} The centre of Japanese international cooperation thus moved from the IFLNS to the IPR.

The Manchurian Incident affected Japanese international cooperation in two ways. On the one hand, the Incident fostered research-oriented international cooperation in an unexpected way. The urgent necessity of easing the international tensions caused by the Incident in the Pacific region impelled academics who were concerned about international relations to put their energy into an investigation of the cause and effects of the Incident. On the other hand, the Incident determined the framework of their investigation in a decisive way. They concentrated their attention on the Japanese population problem, which they believed to be the underlying cause of the incident. They assumed that the pressure to find an outlet for overpopulation in Japan had caused the Incident.

The academic who most actively participated in international cooperation in the age of crisis after the Incident was the free-tradist economist Ueda Teijirō.\textsuperscript{109} He wrote in his diary in 1932:

\begin{quote}
From before the World Economy Conference, I have thought that Japan should adopt free tradism as a national policy. A country like Japan, which is rich in population but poor in resources cannot be economically self-sufficient. The country should utilize its advantage as an island and become a commercial and industrial country. But until recently I have not undertaken a detailed study on the Japanese population nor on the possibility of developing its export industries. The Manchurian Incident changed my view and I have begun to regard these tasks as more important than ever.\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

In an article published in the same year, he stated clearly that the goal of his study was to avoid war:

\begin{quote}
A war has not begun yet. What we are witnessing now is just a crisis in diplomatic relations with other countries. The prevention of war is a task politi-
cians at home and abroad must take on themselves. More than that, it is a task imposed on all nations of the world. That is why I decided to investigate the population problem in Japan, the problem that I presume to be the fundamental cause of the crisis. ⑪

Although, as has been stated above, free tradism formulated by Ueda and Shidachi depended on the sense of crisis that Japan was facing an overpopulation problem, there was no significant interplay between population scientists and free-tradists before the Manchurian Incident. Shidachi had even questioned the necessity and desirability of studying population problems at international conferences. At a session of the standing economic commission of the LNAJ held on February 28, 1930, Shidachi heard Nasu Shiroshi’s lecture entitled “Population Problems and International Relations”. ⑫ The lecture was a report about a symposium held at the University of Chicago in June 1929, where Nasu was invited to deliver a speech about the population problem in Japan in front of around 40 attendees including Margaret Sanger and Raymond Pearl (the other speakers were Corrado Gini, Oliver E. Baker and Robert R. Kuczynski). According to Nasu, demographer Warren Thompson insisted at the symposium that population problems could not be solved without concluding an international convention on international migration. Thompson suggested to Nasu that Japan should collect extensive data to demonstrate the necessity of an international convention, and hold an international conference to promote the convention. ⑬ After hearing Nasu’s lecture, Shidachi expressed opposition to the idea of holding an international conference. He said, “One must take utmost care in dealing with population problems

⑪ Ueda Teijirō, “Wagakuni genka no sitsugyō to jinkō mondai [The present unemployment in our country and population problems]”, Shakaiseisaku jihō 146 (1932): 64.
⑫ Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 89 gō [Papers relating to the economic commission, No. 89]”, February 28, 1930, JACAR: B08061569300, 5–8.
⑬ In his Danger Spots in World Population published in 1929, Thompson emphasized the seriousness of Japan’s overpopulation and proposed sending Japanese immigrants to Australia. His argument was quite useful for those who advocated the freedom of migration and was, therefore, quite often mentioned in demographic literature written in Japanese in the late 1920s and early 1930s. He visited Japan after the Second World War and insisted on the implementation of birth control. See Bashford, “Nation, Empire, Globe: The Spaces of Population Debate in the Interwar Years”, 190; Ogino Miho, Kazoku keikaku e no michi [The road to family planning] (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2008), 146.
at an international venue. The problems were apt to provoke foreign countries or to be used by imperialists at home as a pretext for their actions.”

He was concerned that the Japanese imperialists would use the discourse of overpopulation to justify the search for an outlet for the surplus population overseas.

Shidachi’s cautious, tempered attitude towards the problem of population did not change even after the Manchurian Incident. By contrast, Ueda focused on the problem by choosing it as the research subject of a collective study group named *Nihon keizai kenkyū kai* (the Study Group on Japanese Economy). The group was a private study circle mainly composed of Ueda’s former students at the Tōkyō College of Commerce; its regular members in 1932 were Itani Zen’ichi, Yamanaka Atsutarō, Minoguchi Tokijirō, Odahashi Teiju, Iguchi Tōsuke and Ogura Shōhei; in 1933 Yamanaka left and Ikeno Yūji, Inoma Kiichi, Sugimoto Eiichi, Morita Yūzō and Sōda Takeo joined the group. Ueda also began to be actively involved in the activities of the IPR in about 1931. He proposed discussing the topic of population at the fifth conference of the IPR scheduled for August 1933 in Banff, and the Japanese Council of the IPR accepted his proposal, appointing Ueda and Nasu as rapporteurs on population problems.

Ueda’s research activity soon merged with the campaign for the establishment of a research institute for population studies. On October 23, 1932, he attended the *Shakai seisaku kaigi* (the Social Policy Conference) organized by the Association for Social Legislation and at the session on “the methods of population control” he reported the interim findings of his research at the *Nihon keizai kenkyū kai*. During the discussion at the session, Inoue Teizō proposed that the conference establish a permanent research organization on population problems. Another participant suggested requesting the government to create an institute for population studies. Shimomura Hiroshi, who presided over the session, agreed to submit the plan to the general meeting of the conference for deliberation.

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114 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Keizai iinkai shorui dai 89 gō”, JACAR: B08061569300, 8.
115 Ueda, *Ueda Teijirō nikki*, 175, 191.
117 “Shakai rippō kyōkai shusai shakaiseisaku kaigi [The Social Policy Conference organized by the Association for Social Legislation], *Shakaiseisaku jiho* 148 (1933): 21. According to the protocol of the meeting, the name of the participant
But the general meeting held after the session could not decide on whether to accept the plan.

It is unknown whether the discussion at the Social Policy Conference had some effect on the government. In a diary entry presumably written at the beginning of 1933, Ueda wrote, “the government decided to establish a research institute for population problems after the Social Policy Conference of last October and the Social Bureau is said to be preparing to establish the institute.”118 Ueda was not involved in the work of the Social Bureau at the time of the diary entry. It was before and after the Banff conference of the IPR in 1933 that he was officially asked to help establish the institute. “The Social Bureau asked for my help in the establishment of the Society for the Study of Population Problems. Dr. Nitobe already talked about this matter on the ship to the IPR conference. After I returned to Japan the director of the Social Bureau, Niwa Shirō, officially asked for help and I gave my consent to his request”, wrote Ueda.119

Ueda attended the first Council of the SSPP on November 27, 1933, and then on December 23 discussed the matter of who would conduct research on which topic with Nasu Shiroshi and Nagai Tōru.120 Ueda took charge of the research on “1) matters relating to the change in population composition, especially in age structure, 2) matters relating to population projections, 3) matters relating to the relations between population on the one hand and industry, trade and the economy in general, on the other, and 4) matters relating to the absorbing capacity of industry, especially those relating to commercial and industrial development”.121 The SSPP decided to grant 2900 yen to Ueda’s *Nihon keizai kenkyū kai*.122 He also managed who proposed requesting the government to establish a research institute was Osanai (小山内), but this might be a misprint of Odauchi (小田内) because there is no person named Osanai in the list of participants.

118 Ueda, *Ueda Teijirō nikki*, 184. Probably Ueda had in mind a promoter’s council held by the initiative of the Social Bureau on 21 November, 1932. See also “Jinkō mondai kaiketsu no jōsetsu kikan [The establishment of a permanent organization for the resolution of population problems]”, *Ōsaka jiji shinpō*, November 22, 1932; Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, *Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai yōran*, JACAR: C01006571600, 7.

119 Ueda, *Ueda Teijirō nikki*, 191.

120 Ibid., 199, 204–205.

121 Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, “Shōwa 9 nendo jigyō keikaku gaiyō [The project plan for the 1934 fiscal year]”, HUNSC: N0045-001.

122 Ueda, *Ueda Teijirō nikki*, 212.
to obtain a research grant of 2,000 to 3,000 yen for three years from 1933 to 1935 from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, the non-profit foundation established in 1932 for the purpose of advancing scientific research in Japan.123

During the 1930s Ueda conducted a series of pioneering studies on population problems, motivated by his determination to address the most pressing question of his time. The first task he undertook was to estimate how much the Japanese population would increase over the next 20 years, the question which he thought necessary to be answered in order to clarify how many jobs would be needed to fully absorb the increase in population. In an article published after the Social Policy Conference, Ueda examined an estimation method of future population numbers developed by statistician Arthur L. Bowley, and proposed using the birth rate among women of childbearing age, not the birth rate among the overall population, to estimate those figures.124 Ueda discovered that the rate was dropping in Japan. This meant that if the trend continued, the population growth rate would also start to fall in the near future, although the overall population would continue to increase for a while because of the existing large number of children in the population.

When he was writing the article, Ueda did not have the data necessary to apply the method examined in the article to Japan, because the results of the 1930 national census had not been published yet. His estimation of the population increase in Japan in the next 20 years was made public in May 1933, after the results of the 1930 national census became available.125 This was presumably the first estimation made in Japan, whose approach was basically the same as the so-called cohort-component method, a standard population projection method used even today.126

What was striking in Ueda’s estimation was that he did not only try to offer an accurate estimation as far as possible but also attempted to clarify its limits and shortcomings. For instance, he tried to estimate the number

123 Ibid., 185, 227.
124 Ueda Teijirō, “Wagakuni genka no sitsuyō to jinkō mondai”, 72–73.
of births in the next 20 years by multiplying the number of women of childbearing age by their pregnancy rate. But he could not find a reasonable way to estimate how the rate would change in the same period. Thus, he decided to work on the assumption that the number of births would remain about 2,100,000 because the number had stayed stable at around two million in the previous 12 years. This was tantamount to assuming that the pregnancy rate would decline, since the overall number of women of childbearing age would increase as the already existing child population grew older. Therefore, he admitted that there was a possibility that the real number of births would be larger than he assumed. Likewise, Ueda made an assumption that the survival rate of children from birth to age 4 would remain constant during the period in question. But again there was a realistic possibility that the rate would decline in the same period, since the rate had been improving drastically during the most recent period from 1921 to 1930. He, therefore, admitted that his estimation might also become smaller than the real number of the population growth due to the assumption about the survival rate. By making these assumptions explicit to the readers, he attempted to increase the reliability of his estimation.

His conclusion was that the Japanese population would increase by 14,288,000 during the next 20 years from 1930 to 1950. He drew readers’ attention especially to the prediction that the working-age population between the ages of 15 to 59 years would increase by about 210,000 to 290,000 per year in the said period. With these results in hand, Ueda attended the fifth conference of the IPR held in Banff from August 14 to 28, 1933. His message to the English audience was clear: Japan must annually provide employment for more than 200,000 people in the following twenty years and thus needed international cooperation for that purpose. In his understanding, the most promising measures were fostering international trade and industrialization.

Ueda’s estimation was far more reliable than similar attempts made in the past. Nasu Shiroshi’s paper submitted to the second conference of the IPR in 1927, for example, relied on an estimation produced by the agriculturalist Inagaki Otohei. The estimation was based on the assumption that there was a correlation between the increase in population and the growth rate of the population, a law which had not been tested at all. The numbers presented by Ueda and Inagaki differed little in the short term. While

127 Ueda, “Chikaki shōrai ni okeru Nihon jinkō no yosoku”, 18–19.
Inagaki predicted that the population in 1948 would become 75,000,000, Ueda estimated that the population in 1950 would be 78,350,000. But Inagaki’s estimation covered a much longer period than Ueda’s and this had made his estimation far less reliable than Ueda’s. Inagaki insisted that the Japanese population would continue to grow and exceed one hundred million in 2201. Ueda was fully aware of the danger that such a long-term projection was likely to become pure speculation. Although he stated that the total population of Japan would not grow larger than 80,000,000 and would reach its peak in around 1960–1970, he made it clear that these numbers were nothing but an extremely rough estimate.128

From the population projection to the measurement of living standards

The next task Ueda undertook was to measure living standards in Japan. At the Banff conference, the IPR decided to offer a two-year research grant for the study of living standards in the Pacific countries. Ueda, again together with Nasu, received this grant and tackled the task.129 The change in Ueda’s research interests, namely, the development from the projection of the future population to the measurement of living standards, did not occur in a haphazard way. There was a good reason for him to follow this path, because even if one can accurately estimate future population growth, the estimation itself will not reveal whether the growth is too large or not, whether a country is overpopulated or not. The Marxist economist Kawakami Hajime raised this point in 1926. In his criticism levelled at sociologist Takada Yasuma, Kawakami explained the problem of the term ‘overpopulation’, which was commonly used at that time but was notoriously imprecise:

Why do people regard the population growth rate of, let’s say, seven hundred thousand per year as ‘high’ and not a hundred thousand per year? Why do they regard the population density of, say, a thousand per square kilometres as ‘dense’ and not a hundred? If one uses the word ‘high (or low) temperature’

128 Ibid., 29.
at a lecture on the use of thermometers without defining the meaning of the term, one will be unable to provide the audience any knowledge. He must first say how one can find the freezing and boiling points of water and then explain how these points are determined by various laws of nature, not by the preference of the seller or producer of the thermometer. No one can go beyond the commonplace as long as he has no doubt about colloquial words like ‘high’ or ‘low’ and believes that these terms have a clear meaning.\(^\text{130}\)

Kawakami insisted on the necessity of defining a standard by which to determine whether a given size of population exceeded the number of the population a country could feed. He was not alone in pointing out the necessity. The same question was discussed internationally under the rubric of optimal population. The “optimum density of population” appeared in the list of research subjects proposed by Albert Thomas at the 1927 World Population Conference, and at the same Conference Henry P. Fairchild devoted his paper entirely to the topic.\(^\text{131}\)

But how can one define the concept of optimum population? Ueda had paid little attention to the issue at the beginning of his study on population problems. He had simply assumed that overpopulation was an imbalance between the number of jobs and the working-age population, and that the surplus population would almost automatically manifest itself as an increase in unemployment. But these assumptions were completely erroneous, because overpopulation (whatever it might mean) did not necessarily lead to unemployment. Agricultural or self-employed workers would not become unemployed but suffer from a fall in their income. Ueda became aware of this possibility by reading an article written by his former student and member of his Nihon keizai kenkyū kai, Minoguchi Tokijirō. In his article, Minoguchi defined latent unemployment (\textit{senzai-teki shitsugyō}: 潜在的失業) as the type of overpopulation which resulted not in unemployment but in a deterioration of living conditions and sug-
gested that a study about overpopulation should focus on the decline of living standards instead of the increase in unemployment.132

In the years from 1935 to 1936, Ueda addressed theoretical issues on the definition of overpopulation. After presenting a preliminary paper at the third study meeting of the SSPP on July 6, 1935, he published a seminal article titled “Theoretical aspects of population problems in Japan” in 1936. In this article, he reviewed Edwin Cannan’s definition of optimum population and William Beveridge’s criticism on the definition. According to Cannan, a size of population was optimum if it generated the maximum return to industry as a whole. Ueda rejected this as an unworkable definition. Because conditions of industrial production, such as the amount of available resources and capital or the level of technology and organizational efficiency changed constantly, it was “effectively impossible” to compute the optimum population in Cannan’s sense. Instead, Ueda accepted the opinion of Beveridge who advocated focusing on “how actual return is moving”, and not on the maximum return.133 “What interests us here is not whether our living standard has reached a theoretically attainable peak but whether the standard is rising or not”, said Ueda.134 In the conclusion, he proposed judging the degree of overpopulation of a country by whether the industry of the country was growing in parallel with the increase in population. This does not seem radically different from his original understanding of overpopulation. But he no longer defined the growth of industry based on the total numbers of employment provided by industry but on the rise in living standards, which was mainly understood as the increase in the real income of workers:

If the increase in the population of a country goes hand in hand with the industrial development of the country, people can sustain the same level of living. If not, the level has to fall. The deterioration of the living standard of wage workers manifests itself as a cut in their wages or as the loss of their jobs. Small farmers and businessmen experience the same thing as a decline in profits. What is at issue in both cases is the increase and decrease in

134 Ueda Teijirō, “Nihon jinkō mondai no riron teki igi [Theoretical aspects of population problems in Japan]”, in vol. 6 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976) , 42.
income, namely, the rise and fall of the living standard. It is the movement of
industry that determines in which way and to what degree the living standard
shifts. After all, the problem of population comes down to the question of
whether industry can be developed so as to secure at least the same standard
of living for the increasing population as today.\textsuperscript{135}

He was quite content with the conclusion. Reporting on his research
results at a council meeting of the SSPP on September 27, 1935, he said
that his theoretical position was the same as that adopted by many Western
researchers.\textsuperscript{136}

The understanding of overpopulation as the decline in living standards
was by no means original to Ueda. This definition had already gained
widespread acceptance among those who were interested in population
problems. Nasu Shiroshi, for instance, had stated at the aforementioned
symposium at the University of Chicago in 1929 that “The standard of liv-
ing is the pivot on which the population problem rotates. What is called
‘overpopulation’ or ‘underpopulation’ is quite meaningless without refer-
ence to the standard of living, because the capacity of a certain society to
support a certain number of people is entirely dependent upon the standard
of living which its members maintain.”\textsuperscript{137} What was unique about Ueda
was, rather, his attempt to measure the change in the standard of living in
Japan. Unlike Nasu, who insisted without any statistical evidence that
Japan was suffering from overpopulation, Ueda thought it essential to
empirically examine whether the country was really overpopulated.\textsuperscript{138} In
his study of living standards in Japan, Ueda collaborated with Iguchi

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 44–45.
\textsuperscript{136} Jinkō mondai kenkyū kai, “Shōwa 9 nendo jigyō jōkyō [Activities in 1934]”,
HUNSC: N0045-011.
\textsuperscript{137} Nasu Shiroshi, “Population and the Food Supply”, in Population by Corrado Gini
et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), 143. Ishibashi Tanzan also
showed a similar understanding of overpopulation before Ueda. In a 1927 article
on the government’s advisory council on population and food problems, he had
argued that the problem of population was equal to that of living standards, and
that the decline in the standards could be caused by an imbalance between the
degree of industrial development and the supply of labour, on the one hand, and
by a business cycle, on the other. Ishibashi Tanzan, “Seifū no jinkō shokuryō
mondai akka an [The government plan will aggravate the problems of population
and food]”, Tōyō keizai shinpō, October 1, 1927.
\textsuperscript{138} Nasu Shiroshi, “The problem of population and food supply in Japan”, in Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of
Tōsuke, a member of Nihon keizai kenkyū kai. It was probably Iguchi who did the data collection and processing work necessary for the study. He presented a preliminary paper at the meeting of Nihon keizai kenkyū kai held on January 22, 1935 and, based on this paper, Ueda gave a presentation at the Interim Research Conference of the IPR held in Tōkyō from April 16 to 24 of the same year. The final version of the paper entitled Cost of Living and Real Wages in Japan, 1914–1936 was submitted to the sixth conference of the IPR in Yosemite in 1936.

Ueda and Iguchi defined the standard of living as “the sum total of goods and services which people think essential for their accustomed way of living” and advocated using real wages as an indicator of the living standard. What they examined was the real wages of industrial workers during the 20-year period from 1914 to 1933. Although they wished to calculate the real wages by dividing the cost of living index by wage index, they were unable to obtain a reliable cost of living index covering this period. Therefore, they had to begin by collecting data on the cost of living and then construct the index. The data they were able to gather were insufficient in many regards. It was particularly impossible to attain comprehensive data on house rent paid by industrial workers. But in the end they succeeded in drawing a rather sophisticated picture of the movement of the living standard, which had not been measured objectively before.

According to Ueda and Iguchi, the real wages of industrial workers declined during the three years after the beginning of the First World War and then started to increase rapidly and considerably. But after the War ended there was no significant progress in real wages. Even worse, after the gold embargo in 1931 they started to decline and fell to the level of 1924 in 1933. The authors went further to gather data on real wages in

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139 Ueda Teijirō, “Study of standards of living in medium and small Japanese industries where products are entering into international competition”, TYP: 82/293–296.
141 Uyeda, “Cost of Living and Real Wages in Japan”, 289.
142 Ibid., 303.
the previous three years according to sex and industry, and discovered that the fall in real wages was particularly severe among female unskilled workers. It was only skilled workers in heavy industry who had benefited from the economic recovery since the gold embargo. In conclusion, the authors came back to the initial purpose of their research and suggested that the recent increase in the working age population might be a factor that was blocking the rise in real wages among female unskilled workers.

Undoubtedly, Ueda and Iguchi made a significant contribution to the progress of population studies by defining the concept of the standard of living explicitly and expressing it numerically. This was clearly a great step forward, considering the fact that Inui Kiyosue’s paper submitted to the 1927 World Population Conference, which was the first attempt of this kind in Japanese international cooperation, was content to present various statistics, such as family expenses, price index and wage index in an unorganized manner. Nasu had also realized the importance of the concept of living standards in population studies but had not conducted any sophisticated empirical study of it.

Although Ueda continued his research after *Cost of Living and Real Wages in Japan*, the article was the tidemark of his population studies. Because of his death in 1940, the initial objectives of his living standard studies were not achieved. He envisaged measuring the living standards not only of Japan but of other countries and comparing living standards around the world. He also entertained the idea of developing a theory about the effects of international trade and migration on the standards of living around the world. These plans, if accomplished, would have made it possible to see how differently nations developed and how much impact international intercourse had on the living standards of each nation. In short, the studies would have made it possible to quantitatively describe the present state of international community life:

However minutely and accurately we may become able to state and compare the standard of living in different countries, that will not answer the question [sic] whether the welfare of people in one country is disadvantageously affected by the existence of [sic] low standard of living in other countries. To ascertain the difference in standards of living in other countries is one thing. To see if such difference will affect some countries’ welfare advantageously or disadvantageously is quite another thing theoretically. We must have another set of complicated theoretical thinking before coming to a conclusion on the latter point. Does the existence of a low standard of living in one country really enable her to beat other countries in international trade competition? If it does so, under what conditions? Is it possible to maintain the high stan-
dard of living in one country by means of tariffs or migration restrictions? If it is possible, under what conditions? Is it beneficial for the whole working classes to stop such trade?143

These questions remained unanswered. In 1939 the Nihon keizai kenkyū kai, which had served as the centre of his research activities, was merged into a newly established research institute of the Tōkyō College of Commerce and thereafter gradually ceased to function as an independent research circle.

The SSPP grew steadily and succeeded in joining the IUSIPP as originally planned. By that time, however, the IUSIPP had become an organization totally different from its founders’ plan. Raymond Pearl’s influence over the IUSIPP decreased soon after its establishment because he failed to secure grants from the National Research Council of the United States. The grants were blocked by the president of the Social Science Research Council, Edwin B. Wilson, who was opposed to birth control.144 As a result, neither Thomas nor Pearl took on the leadership of the newly founded organization. It was the Fascist supporter Corrado Gini and his pro-natalist view that came to dominate the organization.

On the initiative of Shimojō Yasumaro, the SSPP and the Tōkyō Statistical Association cooperatively organized the National Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems of Japan and sent Inoue Masaji to the conference of the IUSIPP held in Paris in 1937.145 The SSPP planned to hold the IUSIPP conference in Japan in 1940.146 It aimed at drawing international attention to the issue of overpopulation in Japan by convening an international conference.147 However, like several other international events planned in the late 1930s, such as the conference of the ICC or the Tōkyō Olympic Games, the IUSIPP conference did not

143 Ueda, “Study of standards of living in medium and small Japanese industries where products are entering into international competition”, TYP 82/294.
144 Connelly, Fatal Misconceptions, 73–74.
146 Hasegawa Takeo to Tōgō Shigenori, December 8, 1936, JACAR: B04122496100, 30.
147 The SSPP had planned to add “Japan’s population problem” to the agenda of the conference. See “1940 nen Tōkyō kokusai jinkō mondai kenkyū kaigi yōmoku [The principal items of the IUSIPP conference in Tōkyō, 1940]”, JACAR: B04122496100, 56.
materialize because of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and the relationship between the SSPP and the IUSIPP did not develop further. The SSPP was reorganized in 1939 into the National Institute of Population Research (Kokuritsu jinkō mondai kenkyūjo, hereafter, NIPR), the still-existing national centre of demographic research in Japan. The NIPR realized the dream cherished by those who wished to establish a national centre of population studies, but it was no longer an organization whose main objective was to maintain peace. It was rather an organization established for waging total war.

International cooperation in the age of crisis

Ueda’s attempt to estimate Japan’s future population and measure the living standards of the country was motivated by his belief that international cooperation must be based on objective knowledge about factors relating to international conflicts, the belief that Japanese academics and bureaucrats who were concerned about international politics began to hold in the late 1920s.

However, an aspiration for scientific objectivity does not necessarily ensure that the results of a study are unbiased. In fact, Ueda tended to underestimate, consciously or unconsciously, the increase in Japan’s future population. When he needed to make assumptions about key factors affecting population growth, such as the number of births or the survival rate, he always used assumptions that were likely to lower the estimates on future population. This choice might have arisen from his desire to lessen the sense of demographic crisis felt by many, both at home and abroad, at that time. He wished to make people believe that, if appropriate measures were taken, the social and economic effects of short-term population growth would be kept within manageable limits.

While he tended to underestimate the growth of the Japanese population, he hardly doubted that the major economic problem facing his country was that of overpopulation. He interpreted the stagnation of the standard of living after the gold embargo as primarily caused by the increase in the working age population, not by any other factors, although he admitted that there might be “other influences of at least equal strength at
However, one could also find an alternative and even more reasonable explanation for the phenomenon. This explanation attributes the stagnation of living standards to the expansion of heavy industries for military use and the resultant increase in the import of natural resources. The economic historian, Yasuba Yasukichi, maintained that, “the absorption of huge public resources for military use, the shortage of natural resources, and the channelling of resources from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries tended to reduce the welfare of the general public.”

According to his estimation, an average annual increase in real GNP from 1929 to 1940 was 4.7 percent, but 1.6 percent of the increase was used for military expenditure, 1.2 percent was offset by population growth, and 1.1 percent was reduced by the deterioration in the terms of trade. And even the rest of the increase in GNP did not contribute to the improvement of living standards greatly because the industrial structure changed from labour-intensive light industries to capital and resource-intensive heavy industries mainly due to military expansion.

Taken as a whole, one cannot deny that there was a clear tendency for Ueda to estimate the figures on future population growth conservatively but, nonetheless, to find the main cause of Japan’s economic problem in overpopulation. To him, overpopulation in his country could not be too serious to be tamed but at the same time it had to be severe enough to be used to emphasize the necessity of free trade as a solution to the overpopulation problem.

The significance of the fact that the development of international scientific cooperation in the early 1930s happened against the background of Japan’s expansion into Manchuria cannot be overemphasized. Surpris-

148 Uyeda, “Cost of Living and Real Wages in Japan”, 308.
150 Ibid., 555–556.
151 The motivation behind Ueda’s population studies is one thing. How people understood his research results is another. English newspapers, while accurately reporting his estimates on the future population, carried headlines like “Prof. Uyeda Asserts Nation Is Packed With Those Living Now, Needing New Room” or “The Need of More Outlets”. Given these ways of reporting research results, the Western people might interpret his research one-sidedly as intended to emphasize the seriousness of Japan’s overpopulation only. See “Says Birth Curbs Cannot Aid Japan”, New York Times, August 19, 1933; “Crowded Japan: The Need of More Outlets: A Ten-Year Testing Period”, Times, December 8, 1933.
ingly, the Manchurian Incident and the resultant international tension in Northeast Asia fostered the active participation of Japanese scientists in international cooperation. Although those who participated in international cooperation recognized the necessity of scientific research much before the Manchurian Incident, it was only after the Incident that an academic like Ueda began to take the necessity seriously.

Most of the scientists who participated in international cooperation in this age of crisis accepted the establishment of Manchukuo as a *fait accompli* and this affected their perception of the crisis. They became more or less actively involved in the construction of the puppet state. Nasu, for instance, strongly promoted the migration of Japanese farmers to Manchuria, even describing the establishment of Manchukuo as a “ray of light breaking through the darkness”\(^\text{152}\). The Kwantung Army, which plotted the Manchurian Incident, also found him quite useful and invited him to high-level meetings on migration and farming in Manchukuo\(^\text{153}\).

Compared to Nasu, Ueda was much less enthusiastic about the Incident and indeed very cautious about committing himself to a militaristic expansionist policy. Although in 1932 the Kwantung Army asked if they could consult his opinion, he declined their invitation, thinking that the aim of the Army was to make him endorse a pre-arranged plan\(^\text{154}\). His view about the insignificance of international migration in the international economy changed little after the Incident. In an article published in 1932, he compared three approaches to the problem of overpopulation—birth control, emigration and industrialization—and concluded that industrialization was the most promising one. According to him, birth control had no effect on the short-term growth in the working age population, since those who would be of working age in the next 20–30 years were already born. Likewise, emigration would be ineffective in offsetting the increase in population unless the government could send a large number, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of people overseas. Ueda stated clearly that “I am not of the opinion that Japan should plan to give a subsidy of some hundred million


\(^2\) Asada Kyōji, “Kantōgun no Manshū nōgyō imin keikaku (siken imin ki) (1) [The Kwantung Army’s plan for agricultural migration: the pilot migration years, part 1]”, *Komazawa daigaku keizaigaku ronshū* 5 no. 2 (1973): 61.

\(^3\) Ueda, *Ueda Teijirō nikki*, 167.

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yen to send several hundred thousand people to Manchuria.” An attentive reader might find some ambiguous remarks even in this article. Ueda did not eliminate the long-term possibility that sending migrants to Manchuria would reduce unemployment, and admitted that “a pilot project will be needed.” He did not deny the promotion of emigration and stated that the promotion of emigration and that of industrialization “were compatible and should be tried simultaneously”. But a remark that affirmed sending migrants to Manchuria more strongly than these is not found in his writings before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. He wrote in his diary that “considering the past record [of Japanese migration], Manchuria will not be a destination country for the Japanese.” In a text published in 1934, too, he still emphasized the importance of free trade and stated that he had long placed his hope in the development of the export industry rather than on emigration. Although in 1935 the SSPP adopted resolutions for the promotion of emigration from Japan to Manchukuo, it was not Ueda but Inoue Masaji who took the initiative in passing the resolutions.

However, in spite of his cautious approach to the promotion of migration, Ueda was not different from Nasu in getting involved in Japan’s expansion into China. Their difference lay only in the difference of approaches they adopted to the development of Manchukuo. In 1932 Ueda accepted a request from the Kwantung Bureau to examine the tariff policy of the newly founded state. In a report written in response to the request, he criticized those who advocated forming a Japanese-Manchurian economic bloc, calling them “childish rightists (uyoku shōnibyō: 右翼小児病)”. What he proposed was not to build a bloc economy but to reduce the tariff of Manchukuo as fast and to as low a level as possible. He believed that his policy would not only develop Manchuria as a source of food supply and an export market for Japan but also help improve the rela-

155 Ueda, “Wagakuni genka no sitsugyō to jinkō mondai”, 77.
156 Ibid., 77.
157 Ibid., 81.
158 Ueda, Ueda Teijirō nikki, 167.
159 Ueda, “Nihon jinkō mondai kenkyū dainishū jobun”, 318.
161 Ueda, “Manshūkoku no kanzei seisaku [The tariff policy of Manchukuo]”, in vol. 7 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 699.
tionship between China and Japan by increasing foreign trade between China and Manchukuo and mitigating the negative effects the establishment of Manchukuo had had on Chinese exports. Furthermore, despite the fact that he was against sending Japanese migrants to the region, Ueda did not oppose accepting Chinese and Korean migrants to Manchuria. He wrote in his diary in 1933 that “The key to economic construction [in Manchukuo] is nothing but a railway enterprise. And the development of agriculture, forestry, or mining is prerequisite for making the enterprise profitable. In order to achieve this, it is essential to accept Chinese immigrants, welcome Japanese businessmen and, if possible, attract foreign capital from the United States and other countries.”

Most of those who participated in international cooperation after the Manchurian Incident, including Ueda, thought that the only way to restore international confidence in Japan was to restore public order and foster economic growth in Manchukuo. At the Social Policy Conference on October 23, 1932, Shimomura Hiroshi said, “Now that that major incident has happened, we must make every effort to achieve brilliant results.” This was a view widely shared by Japanese elites after the Incident. They believed that they could secure international recognition for Manchukuo by building a modern state apparatus and creating the necessary infrastructure for the development of industries there, completely ignoring the illegitimate, violent foundation of the state. While describing the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese army as “a gross violation of international law”, Ueda also wrote in his diary that “since we cannot go back to the time before the Incident, the only thing we can do is to establish peace in the region and introduce necessary reforms to make Manchukuo a model country for the modernization of China. This is also the only way to restore international confidence in Japan.”

Ueda thus harboured two attitudes: one which emphasized a scientific approach to international cooperation and another which ignored the founding violence in Manchukuo.

The last attempt at international cooperation before the war in China was the tenth International Studies Conference held in Paris from June 28 to July 3, 1937. Besides the two bureaucrats, Satō Junzō and Yoshizaka Shunzō, Japan sent Yamada Saburō to the conference and submitted two

162 Ueda, *Ueda Teijirō nikki*, 187.
163 “Shakai rippō kyōkai shusai shakaiseisaku kaigai”, 20.
164 Ueda, *Ueda Teijirō nikki*, 217.
memoranda written by Ueda Teijirō and Inui Kiyosue about the present conditions of the Japanese population and Japan’s trade problems. However, nothing significant was achieved by the conference. What Yamada said at the conference was only a refashioning of the Japanese argument maintained repeatedly at previous international conferences: the necessity of free access to natural resources and markets as well as free movement of labour. The only new proposal he made was a blatantly imperialist agenda, a fair redistribution of colonies.  

What happened during wartime is not the main subject of this book, which focuses on Japanese international cooperation in the interwar years. But it should be mentioned how the legacy of the interwar period—personnel, institutions and knowledge—was mobilized and used for the war effort. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the IAJ intensified its pro-government attitude. It became a habitual practice at annual assemblies of the IAJ after 1939 to bow deeply to the Imperial Court and pray for the Japanese Army’s success in war. The Japan Council of the IPR, the only remaining section of the IAJ that had kept in contact with foreign organizations, also ceased to cooperate with the IPR in 1939.

The Pacific War was just another shock to the IAJ. The Association changed its name again to Nihon gaisei kyōkai (Japan Foreign Policy Association).


166 Ibid., 394, 398. See also Yoshizaka’s report on the conference: Yoshizaka Shunzō, *Sekai no jinkō to genjō dakai undō [The world population and the movement for peaceful change]*, JACAR: B06050095000, 1–14. Although the phrase ‘genjō dakai’ was used in the 1930s to translate ‘peaceful change’, the meaning of the English and Japanese phrases is entirely different. The literal meaning of ‘genjō dakai’ is to “break with the status quo” and lacks the meaning of peace.

167 Nihon kokusai kyōkai [The IAJ], “Kaimu hōkoku: shōwa 14 nendo [The 1939 annual bulletin of the IAJ]”, (Tōkyō: Nihon kokusai kyōkai, 1940), 5.

It was no longer possible to use the word *Kokusai* (international), which appeared to many Japanese to imply anti-war ideas and attitudes. Furthermore, it was no longer necessary for the Association to profess to be a private organization. The Association made clear that it was, and had been, an extra-governmental organization.\(^{169}\)

Academics who had participated in international cooperation used their knowledge and techniques for the development of a wartime mobilization plan. Ueda examined the plan of a state-controlled economy in an article written after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Referring to the phrase of Horatio Kitchner, the British Secretary of State for War during the First World War, that men, money and materials were immediate necessities, Ueda argued that the wartime economy in Japan was far better prepared than in Europe during the First World War apart from the control of manpower. “The point of manpower control”, he wrote, “was to distribute the right people to the right places on the largest scale. It came down to the issue of striking a right balance between the number of soldiers and workers for the munitions industry.”\(^{170}\)

To determine the soldier-worker ratio and distribute workers to various war industries was indeed the most important task in the mobilization of labour during wartime. Although Ueda, who died in 1940, did not engage in this task, statistical techniques developed by the *Nihon keizai kenkyū kai* and its detailed data on population according to region and occupation were applied to the development of the mobilization plan. Disciples of Ueda themselves acknowledged this. Yamanaka Atsutarō argued:

> Needless to say, labour mobilization is one of the most important problems in the national economic planning for Japan, which has since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War started to build a regime that can endure a protracted war. It was made possible by Professor Ueda’s population studies to estimate the quality and quantity of labour to be mobilized and to formulate a plan for labour supply. Indeed, techniques being employed to determine Japan’s national policy are the extension and reproduction of his works.\(^{171}\)

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\(^{169}\) Nihon gaisei kyōkai [The Japan Foreign Policy Association], *Kaimu hōkoku: shōwa 17 nendo* [The 1942 annual report of the Japan Foreign Policy Association] (Tōkyō: Nihon gaisei kyōkai, 1943), 1.


\(^{171}\) Yamanaka Atsutarō, “Ueda Teijirō sensei no gakuseki [The works of Professor Ueda Teijirō]”, *Jiyū tsūshō* 13 no. 7 (1940): 10.
Another disciple, Odahashi Teiju, expressed almost the same opinion in a written memorial for Ueda. The man whom Yamanaka and Odahashi had in mind in talking about Ueda’s influence on the wartime labour mobilization plan must have been Minoguchi Tokijirō, a member of Nihon keizai kenkyū kai, who worked at the Cabinet Planning Board and developed the nationwide labour mobilization plan during wartime.

With the enactment of the National Mobilization Law in 1938 and the National Service Draft Ordinance in 1939, the government was authorized to draft civilian workers into the war industries, and it was the Cabinet Planning Board that took charge of designing the mobilization plan.

The boundary of the region to which the labour mobilization plan was applied expanded greatly to the extent that the Programme for National Land Planning adopted by the Cabinet in September 1940 included the distribution of the population in China. Minoguchi, together with Tachi Minoru at the National Institute of Population Research, wrote the population section of the National Land Plan. The expansion culminated in the 1941 Programme for the Establishment of Population Policies, one of whose goals was to determine the right distribution of the population for the purpose of achieving Japan’s leadership among East Asian nations. The National Institute of Population Research, reorganized in November 1942 as a section of the research institute of the Welfare Ministry (the former Bureau of Social Affairs of the Home Ministry), adopted the study on the plan for the redistribution of the population as its research topic, and in July of the following year compiled the notorious report entitled An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus, which estimated the number of Japanese people to be distributed across the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’.

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172 Odahashi Teiju, “Ueda sensei to Nihon jinkō mondai [Professor Ueda and Japanese population problems]”, Hitotsubashi ronsō 7 no. 1 (1941): 98.
Conclusion

This book has analysed Japanese international cooperation in pre-war years, focusing on its main actor, the League of Nations Association of Japan. It has argued that Japanese international cooperation was characterized by the basic assumption that, in the modern world, the life of one nation increasingly depended upon the lives of other nations and, therefore, solving vital problems for one nation was becoming more and more difficult in the absence of international cooperation with others. One of the founding members of the LNAJ, Yamada Saburō, described this tendency towards increasing international interdependence as a road to kokusai kyōdō seizon (international community life). As the first chapter demonstrated, this vision of international community life was crystallized in the late 1890s, when the Japanese government was preparing to open its borders to Western countries in a large-scale legal reform project called shin jōyaku jisshi junbi. Japanese society was going to be integrated with Western societies and the Japanese were to gain access to foreign markets on an equal footing with Western nations. A typically 19th century notion of laissez-faire liberalism was still prevalent at that time, and many took it for granted that to build and maintain artificial barriers against the international movement of people, goods and capital was a counterproductive attempt to reverse a universal trend towards the establishment of international community life. International cooperation, as it emerged in the 1910s and 1920s, aimed at removing these barriers by promoting mutual understanding and shared knowledge of international life among nations and civilizations. Importantly, however, this does not mean that those who participated in the undertakings of the LNAJ pursued this goal in a universalistic way. In reality, as has been illustrated throughout this book, many of them tried to eliminate only those barriers that were detrimental to Japan’s interests and retain those that were deemed advantageous to the country. This discrepancy between words and deeds became most manifest with regard to Japan’s relationship with Asian countries and colonies. The LNAJ demanded equal treatment on the admission of Japanese people into Western countries while remaining silent about its own country’s discrimination against Koreans and Chinese. Although previous studies have...
already pointed out the double standards of Japan’s foreign policy, its unjustness cannot be emphasized too much.

In interwar Japan, the necessity of international cooperation was emphasized particularly with regard to the problem of overpopulation, the problem that was widely believed to be the underlying cause of Japan’s economic predicament after the First World War. Those who joined the LNAJ thought that a primal goal of international cooperation was to solve the overpopulation problem, although they disagreed substantially about how to approach the problem. One popular solution that continued to attract many for a long time was fostering international migration, that is, expanding the international movement of people by removing legal obstacles to entry to and residence in countries around the world. Key members of the LNAJ were strongly concerned about the growing restrictions placed upon Japanese immigration to the United States. As early as in the early 1910s, Shibusawa Eiichi and Soeda Juichi had a plan for conducting an international campaign against anti-Japanese policies in the US. In the next decade, these two influential figures in business and financial circles became actively involved in the LNAJ and attempted to propagate the idea of racial equality with regard to international migration. They tried to persuade member societies of the IFLNS to pass resolutions for racial equality, hoping that the establishment of an international consensus on normatively desirable immigration policies would help to solve the problem of Japanese migrants in the US. As this book has indicated, they did not act only out of sheer altruism or patriotism. Shibusawa, who was the leading figure in the business world, not only had an interest in keeping good economic relations between Japan and the US, but also had a connection with a migration company operating in Brazil. Although for the industrial giant the migration business was just one of many businesses that had to be taken care of, he had good reason to work hard to alleviate the situation in the US and stop the spread of anti-Japanese sentiment from there to Brazil.

It cannot be denied that one of the goals for the Japanese who participated in international cooperation was to facilitate international migration. However, the strength of their efforts to achieve this goal declined gradually and had nearly been diminished by the end of the 1920s. This book has revealed that the change was caused by a stalemate which the discussion about racial equality at the IFLNS ran into in the mid-1920s. The IFLNS Congress in Warsaw 1925, where a racial equality clause included in a draft resolution on the conditions of admission of foreigners to countries written by William Oualid aroused heated discussion among member
societies of the IFLNS, marked a watershed in Japanese international cooperation. Because of the strong opposition from the American and British associations at the Congress, the Japanese association had to abandon its claims for racial equality against its will. Although even after the Warsaw Congress there were several occasions when international migration became the subject of discussion within the IFLNS, the LNAJ did not try to seize its opportunities any longer for fear that their efforts might only aggravate the conflict with the US.

This book has indicated that the LNAJ could have cooperated with the International Labour Office at this critical juncture. The ILO, which was trying to extend its authority to all aspects of labour, also attempted to assume international leadership with respect to the problem of international migration. It especially tried to discourage emigration countries from concurring with Italy, which convened the International Conference of Emigration and Immigration in 1924 to seize the initiative in this field. The Office was interested in the capacity of the IFLNS to shape international opinion and attempted to intensify its relationship with the IFLNS and the LNAJ by instituting a commission specialized in labour issues within both organizations. Although it succeeded in having the International Labour Office and social legislation commission established within the IFLNS, its attempt to build a relationship with the LNAJ turned into a failure mainly because the Japanese association, never radical about social problems, disliked connecting the problem of international migration with that of working conditions and avoided cooperating with the ILO. Japanese members of and sympathizers with the labour movement, on the other hand, did not wish to join the Association, which they deemed a conservative, state controlled organization. Although the International Labour Association was established on the initiative of the Director of the ILO’s Tōkyō Branch Office, Asari Junshirō, this organization did not develop as much as the LNAJ for various reasons, and soon after its establishment it started to shift its emphasis from international cooperation to domestic politics.

Rather than focusing on problems of international migration, those who intervened in the activities of the LNAJ in the late 1920s, such as Shidachi Tetsujirō and Ueda Teijirō, stressed the importance of international trade. Shidachi and Ueda became actively involved in international cooperation after the World Economy Conference in 1927, in which they participated as official delegates from Japan. Like their forerunners, they believed that the lives of nations around the world were becoming interdependent and a
problem of one nation could no longer be solved without international cooperation. They also shared the fear that Japan was suffering from overpopulation with other members of the LNAJ. But in their view, the overpopulation problem could be overcome not by the promotion of emigration, as many believed, but by free trade—by developing Japan’s export industries and creating enough jobs to absorb the rapidly growing working age population. Shidachi and Ueda, mainly backed by managers of export-related companies in the Kansai region, organized the Association for Liberty of Trading and propagated free trade policies both at home and abroad. They also tried to indoctrinate their free tradism into the LNAJ through its standing economic commission established after the IFLNS’s International Economy Conference in 1928. Although their involvement in the LNAJ did not completely alter the leadership within the Association, it did bring a new voice to Japanese international cooperation. Under the influence of the two apostles of free tradism, the LNAJ began to take a moderate line, focusing on trade issues and avoiding such provocative topics as international migration.

The late 1920s witnessed another change in Japanese international cooperation: it not only shifted its focus from international migration to international trade but also started to adopt a scientific, rather than a political, approach to international cooperation. It continued to propose resolutions to be passed by international organizations, aiming at opinion and will formation, but it started to devote more efforts to scientific research on international problems. It is true that there were academics and state officials who had emphasized the necessity of scientific research in the early 1920s, such as the legal scholar Yamada Saburō, who suggested that the LNAJ had better not tackle the problem of admitting foreigners into a country until it had studied various aspects of racial issues. His advice was not accepted, however. It was only after the dismal failure of the Association to advocate racial equality at the IFLNS that the necessity was recognized more widely than before.

A scientific approach developed in the 1930s, especially in the field of population problems where international cooperation grew rapidly after the World Population Conference in 1927. The National Institute of Population Research, which was established in 1939 to join the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population, was an institutional legacy of international scientific cooperation in this period, and Ueda Teijirō’s population studies were its academic outcome. In his research, Ueda attempted to estimate Japan’s future population growth and measure the
effects that population growth had on the standards of living in his country. Although these topics might seem hardly relevant to international cooperation at first glance, this was an attempt to critically examine the concept of overpopulation and assess the present status of Japan in terms of the seriousness of its overpopulation, the problem many believed at that time to be the most important problem with international consequences.

This book has identified various factors that determined the course actually followed by Japanese international cooperation in the interwar years. At the root of the change from a migration-centred approach to the population problem to a more moderate, trade-centred approach was a profound antagonism between Japan, on the one hand, and the United States and Britain on the other. The opposition was so strong that diplomats such as Adachi Mineichirō and Sugimura Yōtarō, who represented the LNAJ at international meetings, had to forgo talking about race and immigration in order to maintain a good relationship with these countries. The undemocratic regime of Japan, which suppressed the growth of labour movement at home, also prevented the LNAJ from taking a labourist approach to international migration and cooperating with the ILO on this matter. It is hardly surprising that the LNAJ did not deviate greatly from the official lines laid down by the Japanese government, considering the fact that it was a semi-governmental organization that relied heavily on the government for financial support and included state officials as its members.

The hard reality of politics at home and abroad and the semi-governmental character of the LNAJ continued to condition the nature of decisions made by the Association to the end. But if there was a single factor that determined the fate of Japanese international cooperation most, it must be the Manchurian Incident. The impact the Incident had on international cooperation was twofold. On the one hand, the Incident and the resultant withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations hindered the development of international cooperation by undermining international confidence in Japan and fostered anti-League sentiment in Japan. However, on the other hand, the Incident also gave birth to international scientific cooperation in a quite surprising way. Japanese supporters of international cooperation clung to the hope that science might provide a neutral standpoint from which to adjudicate the international dispute over the ‘Manchukuo’ issue, that it could offer scientific truths that nobody could disagree about. Yet, it should be mentioned that the international scientific cooperation that developed in the years of crisis was not immune from biases. As the last chapter argued, Ueda’s demographic study tended to
focus on population increase as a cause of the economic turmoil in the 1930s and to ignore other possible factors such as the undue expansion of the war industry and the resultant increase in the import of natural resources.

The history of Japanese international cooperation should be deemed as a history of failure since it could not achieve its original goal—the prevention of war and the construction of lasting peace. It should be stressed, however, that the path from interwar international cooperation to the Pacific War was not predetermined. It was a series of numerous decisions, combined with a number of accidents and coincidences, that finally led to the catastrophe of the Second World War. Although the idea of building a regional organization in Asia was entertained by one of the LNAJ’s members, Takana Mitsugu, as early as in 1928, there was no evidence that suggested a connection between his idea of ‘the economic United States of Asia’ and ‘the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, which Japan sought to construct with military force during wartime. Likewise, scientists who were trained in the interwar years were later mobilized for war, such as Ueda’s disciple Minoguchi Tokijirō, who developed the nationwide labour mobilization plan, but it was not the case that international scientific cooperation was predestined to fail and its knowledge to be diverted to war purposes. Researchers from the Welfare Ministry in the 1940s even formulated a plan for the redistribution of the population across the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, but no one had even a faint idea of developing such a plan before the Manchurian Incident. Even after the Incident, people made strenuous efforts to prevent war, as this book has argued by examining the case of Ueda. This means that the process to the eventual failure of Japanese international cooperation was not straightforward. International cooperation gradually went off track after the Incident and started to serve the exact opposite purpose, namely, for the purpose of justifying the military expansion. This also means that internationally minded individuals would have had many chances to attempt to correct the course of international cooperation and, therefore, were responsible for having not succeeded in doing so.

The mindset that continued to guide Japanese international cooperation throughout the period examined in this book was surprisingly the same. It was the assumption that Japan could not develop economically because of the paucity of natural resources available in its territory and, therefore, had to foster international movement of people, goods and capital to sustain its existence. Considering the fact that many resource-scarce countries have
experienced rapid economic development up to the present time in contrast to resource-abundant countries, which tend to fall under the so-called resource curse, this assumption appears unfounded. However, the fear of resource restrictions continued to affect Japan’s international cooperation like a chronic disease. Quite ironically, those who were drawn to international cooperation were more apt to emphasize international factors as causes of Japan’s economic predicament, and those who emphasized the importance of domestic factors in economic growth such as land ownership, working conditions and redistribution tended to disregard international cooperation and stayed away from it. This bias among internationally minded people hindered them from critically assessing the effect of both domestic and international factors upon the life of the nation and made them susceptible to an impractical idea of solving the overpopulation problem through international migration.
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