In the 1890s, when Yamada Saburō was arguing about the equal treatment of migrants of all races, negative reactions to immigration had already begun to be observed in various parts of the world. As early as at the end of the 19th century, countries had started to implement anti-foreign policies, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States and the mass expulsion of Polish and Jewish residents from Prussia. Japan was no exception in this regard. As stated in the first chapter, the exclusionist spirit of the days clearly marked Japan’s immigration control system, which was implemented in 1899 to prevent the admission of Chinese workers. Soon after Japan introduced this anti-Chinese legislation, Japanese nationals also started to experience discriminatory treatment overseas. In 1906 the city of San Francisco ordered Asian children including Japanese to attend a racially segregated school, and in 1913 the state of California prohibited Japanese immigrants from possessing land in the state. There is no doubt that anti-foreign sentiment had prevailed around the world at the beginning of the 20th century, but, still, it was not until the outbreak of the First World War that trends against international movement of people became manifest. Passport control was reintroduced in Europe at the beginning of the war and would never be abolished even after the armistice. The catastrophe of the war changed the social, political and intellectual landscape irreversibly. A great number of people started to cast serious doubts on the typically 19th-century liberal assumption that the free movement of capital, goods and people would bring peace to the world.

To many Japanese, the rejection of the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference was a watershed event that revealed how strongly Western countries were opposed to accepting Japan as an equal member of international society. They reacted angrily to the event, thinking that the newly established international organization gave assent to the discriminatory treatment of Japanese immigrants in the United States. The denial of the racial equality proposal also made Yamada reconsider his views on international migration. Before the war, he had taught in his university lectures that, according to standard international practice, a country could
reject nationals of treaty countries in peacetime if they were criminals, criminal suspects, the poor and people with contagious diseases.¹ But after the war he added two footnotes to the above explanation of the rejection of foreigners:

(1) The Japanese are experiencing severe discrimination in the state of California. Although this does not directly violate international law, it cannot be denied that this is an act against internationally accepted practice. The League of Nations, whose establishment is now being called for, is based on the assumption that all nations are created equal. If the equality of nations is not guaranteed and still a country agrees to join the League, the country must expect to face discrimination against itself. (2) The British Empire has also implemented an immigration restriction law in Australia.²

Although these sentences are too short to understand exactly what he meant, they indicate that he was concerned about the anti-foreign policies in the United States and the British Dominions. He thought that the equality principle was being undermined and the deletion of the equality clause from the Covenant of the League of Nations would have serious consequences for Japan.

Interestingly, however, the Great War did not only bring an end to the era of relatively free borders. It also stimulated the formation of new international cooperation, which aimed at restoring international intercourse and securing perpetual peace. Yamada was one of those who participated in this post-war international cooperation. In 1919 he visited battlefields such as Ypres and Verdun during his official trip to Europe.³ The calamities of war he witnessed—high towers destroyed to rubble, a hill whose shape had been completely changed by bombardment and a ten-kilometre square area where the lives of five hundred thousand people had been lost—had left a lasting impression on him. He recalled, “Seeing such a horrible spectacle, everybody will feel that wars are the gravest crime [...]. It is, therefore, quite natural that the former enemies and allies, afraid of incurring such war damage once again in the future, began to deeply desire measures to prevent war and secure peace.”⁴ The sight of the ruined

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¹ Yamada Saburō, *Kokusaishihō* [Private international law], a transcript of a lecture held at Tōkyō Imperial University for the academic year 1913, 155–156.
² Yamada Saburō, *Kokusaishihō* [Private international law], a transcript of a lecture held at Tōkyō Imperial University for the academic year 1922, 216–217.
⁴ Ibid., 20.
battlefield might have shaken his belief in progress through the expansion and intensification of international intercourse. But, rather than becoming pessimistic, he became more convinced of the necessity of international cooperation than ever before.

Established in the aftermath of the First World War, the International Federation of League of Nations Societies became one of the most important actors in post-WWI international cooperation. The Federation created a place where academics, businessmen and politicians from all around the world met to discuss various problems of international politics and formulate international principles which all states were supposed to adhere to. Yamada was one of the first Japanese citizens who attended the assembly of the IFLNS in 1919 and helped establish the League of Nations Association of Japan in 1920. The second part of this book aims at analysing the initial period of international cooperation immediately after the First World War, particularly focusing on the IFLNS and the LNAJ.

The following chapters regard the discrimination against Japanese immigrants in the United States as one of the key factors behind the establishment of the LNAJ, and emphasize the Japanese government’s proposal of racial equality and its final rejection at the Paris Peace Conference as a catalytic event that led to the rise in Japanese international cooperation in the early 1920s. As is well known, when the Japanese government proposed inserting a racial equality clause into the Covenant of the League of Nations, it only intended to secure its status as one of the major powers. But the proposal gained an unintended meaning soon after it was made public; in the minds of many Japanese it began to be connected with the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States and the British Dominions. As a result, the rejection of racial equality sparked strong reactions from Japan, and the racial issue became one of the most important issues Japanese semi-governmental international organizations like

5 Shimazu Naoko, *Japan, Race and Equality: the Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). Shimazu analysed the intentions of the Japanese, American and English delegations to the Paris conference. According to her, the Japanese delegation's intention of proposing racial equality can be explained by three factors, namely, domestic politics, immigration issues and its position as a major power. Among them, she emphasized the last factor. It is true that the Japanese government intended to gain domestic support or to solve the immigration problems in the United States and the British Dominions, but its most important goal was to secure its position as the only non-white major power in the League. See also, Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations*, 80–86.
the LNAJ had to tackle. Unlike the Japanese government, which became increasingly unwilling to talk about racial issues after the failure at Versailles, the LNAJ continued to demand racial equality. The Association proposed to take up the problem at the assemblies of the IFLNS and attempted to awaken world opinion to the issue of equal treatment of all races. As this second chapter will show, this organized effort resulted in a unique draft resolution which advocated the principle of racial equality with regard to the admission of foreigners into a country.

Previous studies of the Paris Peace Conference have overlooked the link between the racial equality proposal at Versailles and the LNAJ’s international cooperation in the early 1920s with the result that the LNAJ’s demands for racial equality have largely remained unstudied despite the amount of attention given to the problem of racial equality.Ōnuma Yasuaki’s famous article on the racial equality proposal also does not touch upon the LNAJ, but it is worth mentioning because it offers an analysis which is also useful for the discussion here.

He examines the proposal to test the validity of his claim that there were some characteristic patterns in the modern Japanese “attitude towards international legal order (Kokusaihō-chitsujo-kan: 国際法秩序観)”. What he considers the merkmal of this attitude is a lack of active commitment and an absence of universalistic orientation. According to Ōnuma, Japan’s commitment to universal principles was usually superficial and its support for the gradual and peaceful change of international legal order was for the most part fragile. As a result, throughout its modern history the country has oscillated

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6 See Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: white men’s countries and the international challenge of racial equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: the Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*, trans. Ōkura Yūnosuke (Tōkyō: TBS Britannica, 1995). In contrast to Shimazu, Lauren emphasized the positive effects the racial equality proposal had on the establishment of international human rights. He regarded Japan’s racial equality proposal as a part of a global movement against racism which included the American Civil Rights Movement, decolonization and the anti-Apartheid movement.


8 Ibid., 429.
between two extremes: its passive adaptation to the Eurocentric international legal order at one end of the scale and its total rejection of the order by force at the other. Although, at first glance, the racial equality proposal seems an unusual case in which the Japanese government actively attempted to establish a universal principle, Ōnuma argues that one can also find the same patterns in this attempt. By closely investigating official documents and published sources at the time, he shows how dubious the Japanese government’s approach to the racial issue was. What he emphasizes is the fact that while the government demanded racial equality, it did not have the slightest intention of abolishing its own discriminatory treatment towards Chinese and Korean people. This shows that Japan proposed racial equality not for the purpose of promoting universal racial equality but to acquire an equal status with Western countries. Interestingly, Ōnuma found little difference between the Japanese government and its critics in terms of their attitude towards international legal order. Certainly, he admires intellectuals like Ishibashi Tanzan, Yoshino Sakuzō and Kanbe Masao for having criticized the hypocrisy of the government’s proposal by pointing out the existence of discrimination towards the Chinese and the Koreans in Japan. Their attitude was much better than that of the government leaders and anti-foreign nationalists who only denounced racial discrimination in the United States and remained silent about discrimination in their own country. But Ōnuma blames even these dissident intellectuals for not having acted on their own initiatives to eliminate racial discrimination at home and abroad. They only criticized the government and did nothing to make international society acknowledge racial equality as a universal principle. This lack of active commitment is what he regards as the typical shortcomings of the Japanese attitude towards the international legal order.

The second part of this book does not directly challenge Ōnuma’s analysis of the racial equality proposal, since its focus is not on the Paris Peace Conference but rather on the repercussions the Conference had on the succeeding events. It suggests, however, that the post-war development of international cooperation is an interesting and necessary subject of study even from Ōnuma’s perspective, because, contrary to what he would expect, the members of the LNAJ actively attempted to make international

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9 Ibid., 431–432.
10 Ibid., 477.
society recognize racial equality as a universal principle. Although they were only able to work within the framework of semi-governmental international cooperation, they did strive to change international order peacefully by mobilizing international opinion in favour of racial equality.

The following discussion tries to offer an elaborate analysis of the post-WWI development of international cooperation, which has not been provided by previous studies. It does not maintain that the LNAJ overcame the shortcomings of what Ōnuma calls the modern Japanese attitude towards international legal order. As the second chapter will show, the LNAJ’s active commitment to racial equality did not last long and failed to establish it as an international principle. In 1925, when it became clear that the British and American League of Nations associations would not subscribe to racial equality, the LNAJ ceased to propagate the idea of racial equality, just as the Japanese government had done after the Paris conference. The semi-governmental organization could not behave in a morally coherent enough manner to make its demand for racial equality credible to international audiences. But this second part also argues that the LNAJ did not simply go back to where it had come from but continued its agenda-setting activities while shifting its focus from international migration to international trade and investment. In contrast to the second chapter, which emphasizes the limits of the activities of the LNAJ, the third chapter indicates the possibility of the development of Japanese international cooperation in the late 1920s. It shows that the way and degree in which Japanese international cooperation addressed the issue of international migration changed gradually in the interwar years. The LNAJ began to formulate a new policy agenda after it realized the strength of opposition to dealing with the issue at international forums. It started to place more weight on the liberty of trading and the expansion of international investment than on racial equality and international migration in general.

In the following, the second chapter examines in detail the development of the LNAJ and the IFLNS in their initial period between 1919 and 1925, mainly focusing on the most important issue addressed by the LNAJ, the equal treatment of all races in the matter of international migration. Then, the third chapter analyses the change of direction in Japanese international cooperation brought about by the failure of the LNAJ’s demands for racial equality, especially paying attention to the discussion about the 1927 Geneva World Economy Conference.
On January 26, 1919, a meeting was held in Paris by representatives of eight societies that had been established independently in France, England, the United States, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Romania and China. These societies were non-governmental organizations which supported Woodrow Wilson’s post-war vision of international order, and their purpose of having the meeting was to encourage the development of the League of Nations, which the Allied powers had agreed to establish the previous day. Unfortunately, little is known about what was discussed at the meeting, but the fact that the societies held the next meeting just two months later was a sign that the first meeting had ended successfully. In fact, the relationship among the societies developed rapidly thereafter. The circle of the societies expanded to include other societies with a similar purpose, with the result that the third meeting, held in Brussels in December of the same year, witnessed representatives of 16 societies from different countries—France, England, Italy, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Poland, Russia, Yugoslavia, China and Japan. It was at this meeting that the representatives decided to set up a federation of the societies called the International Federation of League of Nations Societies (the French official name was l’Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations), whose declared goal was to improve and foster the application of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Those who attended the third meeting—which was later to be called the third ‘Plenary Congress’ of the IFLNS—thought that the establishment of a federative organization would foster communication among member societies. In their plan the federation would offer a place for discussion among member societies, form a consensus of opinion among them, and check government actions by expressing their consensus, while each society was to function as a ‘transmitter’ which would communicate the IFLNS’s opinion to its national public and educate domestic opinion through propaganda. In other words, the IFLNS and its member societies were expected to become an organ for expressing support for the League’s

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ideas worldwide. One author summarized the function of the IFLNS in three points: “[C]réer, dans chaque pays, par l’éducation des peuples, une opinion favorable à la Société des nations. Unifier l'opinion des diverses nations jusqu’à en faire une base solide pour la Société. Exprimer cette opinion, pour mettre la Société des nations face à face avec la volonté des peuples.”

Those who participated in the third meeting thought that an organization like the IFLNS, whose mission was to mobilize international public opinion in favour of the League of Nations, was urgently needed to assist the League. Since it did not have its own means of sanction, the League had to rely largely on the moral power of world opinion in order to maintain peace. Of course, it was quite uncertain how far the opinion expressed by the IFLNS could actually influence international politics. To say the least, it was highly doubtful that a non-governmental international organization like the IFLNS could contribute greatly to solving international conflicts. Documents adopted by the Federation at its Plenary Congress, most of which expressed recommendations and resolutions concerning the League’s work, had no binding force. They were only handed to the president of the Assembly of the League and subsequently printed in the League’s Official Journal. The overwhelmingly long process which had to be undergone until a lay member’s idea might have an influence on international politics is illustrated by the following passages published in an official journal of one of the most influential member societies of the IFLNS, the British League of Nations Union.

For actual member [sic] of the Union, the International Federation is the “back entrance” to the League. Through our Parliament and by constitutional methods we have one means of access. But through our own organization we have another. A member has an idea. It is adopted by his branch committee and sent to Headquarters. It comes before the Executive. If it is of inter-

2 In this regard, the IFLNS somewhat resembled the IDI, which claimed to be the “legal conscience of the civilized world”. But it should also be noted that the IFLNS was not an organization specializing in legal science like the IDI. The IFLNS was an organization composed of various groups of people—politicians, businessmen, scholars etc.—and its field of activity was broader than the IDI. On the other hand, the founding members of the IDI defined the Institut as a purely scientific organization and differentiated it from organizations aimed at exerting political influence on international society. See Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 40–41.

national importance it becomes part and parcel of the policy of the British delegation to the next Congress [of the IFLNS] and goes upon the agenda. Should it be accepted by the full meeting, it is later presented to the President of the Assembly or of the International Labour Conference. Deputations from the Federation wait upon both, and the resolutions are printed in the Journal of the Assembly and so brought to the notice of the delegates themselves.\textsuperscript{4}

Needless to say, official delegations from various countries must have been too busy to read resolutions adopted by a merely private organization.

However, despite the obvious defect that the IFLNS was a weak, non-governmental organization whose decisions had no binding force on governments around the world, people hurried to establish a League of Nations society in their own country and joined the IFLNS willingly. This enthusiasm was based on the widely held belief that, even if the IFLNS could have no direct influence on international politics, its decisions would have an indirect influence on international politics, since its members included highly renowned people in various countries. “Of course, the delegates at these Conferences of voluntary societies do not bind, or even represent, their Governments. Nevertheless, they are mostly men of importance in their own countries, many of whom have held high posts”, said an active member of the British Union, Lady Gladstone, the spouse of Herbert Gladstone, in her report on an assembly of the IFLNS.\textsuperscript{5} In fact, the Union’s members included distinguished leaders of the British peace movement, like Philip Baker and David Davies.\textsuperscript{6} It was upon the influence of these prominent figures that IFLNS enthusiasts placed much hope. They thought that, although the IFLNS would be powerless in the world of official diplomacy, it could at least function as an agenda setter. They believed that the Federation was capable of proposing an issue which was of international importance but had not been taken up by the League of Nations, and of encouraging the League to officially deal with the issue. Therefore, the author who described the IFLNS as a “back entrance” to the


\textsuperscript{5} Lady Gladstone, “League Societies in Conference”, \textit{Headway} 5 no. 8 (1923): 386.

\textsuperscript{6} In this regard, the British association was an organization of those people who were later criticized by E. H. Carr as “utopianist”. On his criticism, see E. H. Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations}, ed. Michael Cox (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
League also called the IFLNS’s Plenary Congress a “dress rehearsal” for the Assembly of the League. He wrote:

Owing to their unofficial character it is often possible to broach matters that are as yet unripe for official intervention. Therefore it is possible to see what difficulties and dangers are likely to arise. It is possible to see, too, how they may be circumscribed. And this is what happens. Little by little public opinion in every country is mobilized on that particular point till such time as every government knows that it has well-informed public opinion behind it in its efforts for international co-operation […].

These understandings of the IFLNS were little different from those held by the founder members of the League of Nations Association of Japan. Yamada Saburō, one of those Japanese members of the LNAJ who first attended the third Plenary Congress of the IFLNS, regarded the unofficial character of the IFLNS as its merit. He even thought that the official League of Nations was “less important as a place for discussion than the IFLNS, where people can freely argue what they think.” He expected every international problem of great importance to be first discussed at the assembly of the IFLNS and then be the subject of the official discussion at the League. The earliest government documents on the IFLNS also stated an opinion similar to the British view of the IFLNS. They recorded a comment by a Japanese participant at the third Congress that “although the IFLNS is an unofficial undertaking, its member societies attract renowned politicians and academics of various countries. Its resolutions, therefore, will influence public opinion in those countries and their governments will eventually have to take the resolutions into account.”

With these understandings of the IFLNS, Japanese supporters of the League established the LNAJ on April 23, 1920. Representatives from various circles—bureaucrats, officers, members of the Diet, academics, religious leaders, journalists and businessmen—were invited to an inaugural meeting held on that day. Those who attended the meeting agreed to define the aim of the Association as “achieving the ideal of the League of Nations” and to perform various missions such as “research on the League
of Nations, organization of lecture meetings, publications, communication with other organizations with a similar aim, and participation in the activities of the IFLNS”. Among these missions, the founding members of the LNAJ regarded participation in the Plenary Congress of the IFLNS as an important task of the LNAJ along with educational activities aimed at fostering support for the League. In contrast to the latter activities, whose nature was basically propaganda, the former aimed at agenda-setting.

Table 2.1 is a list of those who attended the IFLNS Plenary Congress as delegates from the LNAJ. The Association sent 1 to 10 delegates to (at least) 18 congresses held between 1919 and 1937. The list is impressive not only because it shows a large number of well-known names, but also for the variety of their backgrounds. It includes notable academics, both then and later, such as the leading constitutional lawyers Minobe Tatsukichi and Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, a pioneer in the study of public administration, Rōyama Masamichi, or the man who introduced Kelsen’s theory of international law into Japan, Yokota Kisaburō. On the other hand, the list also contains diplomats, both active and retired, and bureaucrats of other ministries like the Justice Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. Among them, diplomat Sugimura Yōtarō, who became an Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations in 1927, attended more than one congress. A few people are difficult to categorize either as an academic or bureaucrat, such as Ōsawa Akira, who served at the Home Ministry but later held the chair of international law at Kyūshū Imperial University. There are also a few influential people in political and financial circles, such as Inoue Junnosuke, who served as the Finance Minister and the Governor of the Bank of Japan, and Shidachi Tetsujirō, the former Governor of the Industrial Bank of Japan. The person who has the best attendance record is probably one of those who are the least known, Inagaki Morikatsu, who lived in Europe as a staff member of the LNAJ and attended almost all congresses of the IFLNS from 1925 to 1937.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Place, Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brussels, December 1–3, 1919</td>
<td>Akizuki Satsuo (retired diplomat), Horiuchi Kensuke (diplomat), Maeda Masana (member of the House of Peers), Onozuka Kihéiji (political scientist), Suehiro Izutaró (legal scholar), Yamada Saburó (legal scholar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Milan, October 12–16, 1920</td>
<td>Kanõ Jigorõ (educator), Tanakadate Aikitsu (geophysicist), Miura Yagorō (retired diplomat), Hotta Masatsune (member of the House of Peers), Miyake Masatarō (bureaucrat of the Justice Ministry), Hotta Masaaki (diplomat), Kuriyama Shigeru (diplomat), Koshida Saichirō (diplomat), Kurosawa Jirō (diplomat), Ōsawa Akira (international lawyer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Geneva, June 6–9, 1921</td>
<td>Oka Minoru (bureaucrat of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce), Dazai Semon (scholar of French literature), Satake Sango (bureaucrat of the Railways Ministry), Oritake Tamou (linguist), Ojima Kikue (unknown), Ichihashi Yamato (scholar of Japanese history)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Prague, June 4–7, 1922</td>
<td>Minobe Tatsukichi (legal scholar), Hatoyama Hideo (legal scholar), Kamikawa Hikomatsu (scholar of international politics), Dazai Semon (scholar of French literature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Vienna, June 22–27, 1923</td>
<td>Tachi Sakutarō (international lawyer), Sugimura Yōtarō (diplomat), Inui Kiyosue (English teacher), Takagi Yasaka (political scientist), Fujisawa Chikao (official of the League of Nations), Akamatsu Shûkei (religious scholar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lyons, June 27–July 2, 1924</td>
<td>Inoue Junnosuke (former Governor of the Bank of Japan), Takayanagi Kenzō (legal scholar), Shiozawa Masasada (economist), Sugimura Yōtarō (diplomat), Usami Uzuhiko (diplomat), Wakatsuki Fukujirō (diplomat), Kusama Shikō (diplomat), Suzuki Tadakatsu (diplomat), Furukaki Tetsurō (diplomat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr.</td>
<td>Place, Date</td>
<td>Participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Warsaw, July 3–8, 1925</td>
<td>Suzuki Bunji (trade unionist), Tanahashi Gentarō (museologist), Sugimura Yōtarō (diplomat), Usami Uzuhiko (diplomat), Furukaki Tetsurō (diplomat), Ishizaki Masatarō (unknown), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aberystwyth, June 29 – July 3, 1926</td>
<td>Makino Eiichi (legal scholar), Nogami Toshio (psychologist), Horiuchi Kensuke (diplomat), Tsuchida Seiichi (Shintoist educator), Haji Morisada (colonial bureaucrat), Rōyama Masamichi (political scientist), Yokota Kisaburō (international lawyer), Fukushima Hantarō (art critic), Furukaki Tetsurō (diplomat), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Berlin, May 26–31, 1927</td>
<td>Shidachi Tetsujirō (Governor of the Industrial Bank of Japan), Inui Kiyosue (English teacher), Furukaki Tetsurō (diplomat), Fukushima Hantarō (art critic), Nagai Alexander (diplomat), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Hague, July 2–7, 1928</td>
<td>Taoka Ryōichi (legal scholar), Narahashi Wataru (lawyer), Fukushima Hanntarō (art critic), Yasuma Norikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Madrid, May 18–24, 1929</td>
<td>Yamada Saburō (legal scholar), Fukushima Hantarō (art critic), Nakamura Yoshinosuke (scholar of economic geography), Kikuzawa Suemaro (bureaucrat of the Education Ministry), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Geneva, June 5–9, 1930</td>
<td>Tanakadate Aikitsu (geophysicist), Hijikata Seibi (economist), Miyazawa Toshiyoshi (legal scholar), Mutō Toshio (legal scholar), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Budapest, May 24–28, 1931</td>
<td>Miyajima Mikinosuke (zoologist), Kawahara Jikichirō (political scientist), Satō Junzō (diplomat), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Paris, July 4–9, 1932</td>
<td>Tsurumi Yūsuke (politician), Yamauchi Shirō (unknown), Satō Junzō (diplomat), Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr.</td>
<td>Place, Date</td>
<td>Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Montreux, June 3–8, 1933</td>
<td>Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Folkestone, May 19–24, 1934</td>
<td>Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bruxelles, June 9–13, 1935</td>
<td>Non-attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Glasgow, June 1–4, 1936</td>
<td>Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ), Kitaoka Juitsu (bureaucrat of the Home Ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Bratislava, June 28 – July 3, 1937</td>
<td>Inagaki Morikatsu (staff member of the LNAJ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The annual bulletin of the LNAJ.

Note: When the bulletin contained no information on members of the delegation to the IFLNS, the author used reports wired from the delegation to the Foreign Ministry of Japan and official programs of the Congress. In cases where there were discrepancies between the bulletin, reports and official programmes, the author relied on reports, since they were provided by delegates themselves immediately after the Congress and deemed most credible. The same rule was applied to the year 1925, in which the bulletin is missing.

Although the list is quite informative, it can only provide a rough idea of what the LNAJ’s delegation to the IFLNS’s Congress in each year was like. It cannot show the degree of contribution each delegate made to the discussion held at the Congress. To know the exact nature of the LNAJ’s agenda-setting activities, therefore, it is necessary to make clear (1) who was at the centre of the LNAJ and what was their motivation in participating in the LNAJ and, in more detail, (2) what the LNAJ argued at the IFLNS’s Congress and who articulated the LNAJ’s policies. In so doing, it is also indispensable to examine (3) how other international actors—other member societies of the IFLNS and other international organizations—approached the LNAJ, because it can be assumed that not only did internal factors within the LNAJ affect the course taken by the Association, but so did external ones.
Table 2.2 Governing body of the LNAJ at the time of its establishment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Tokugawa Iesato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Shibusawa Eiichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-chairman</td>
<td>Sakatani Yoshirō, Soeda Juichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Inoue Junnosuke, Hayashi Kiroku, Hozumi Shigetō, Oka Minoru, Yoshii Közō, Tagawa Daikichirō, Takahashi Sakue, Yamakawa Tadao, Matsuda Michikazu, Akizuki Satsuo, Anesaki Masaharu, Miyaoka Tsunejirō</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The LNAJ and its relations with business and financial circles

The first question is rather easy to answer: there were two main groups among those who ran the LNAJ. One group was influential people in business and financial circles and the other was diplomats.

The LNAJ’s governing body consisted of a chairman, two vice-chairmen and twelve directors (see Table 2.2). Although Tokugawa Iesato, the 16th head of the Tokugawa clan, was the President of the Association, the post was honorary. The founding chairman was Shibusawa Eiichi and the vice-chairmen were Sakatani Yoshirō and Soeda Juichi. These three were in charge of the LNAJ’s various activities for almost a decade until Soeda passed away in 1929. Sakatani lived until 1941, but he held only an honorary position after Shibusawa’s death in 1931.

Although the three were more or less involved in the business world, it is misleading to describe them straightforwardly as businessmen. All of them were typical examples of the elite in the Meiji era, when the boundaries between the state, business and civil society were still nebulous. Shibusawa was a truly successful businessman who established or managed more than 500 companies in his lifetime. But at the time of the foundation of the LNAJ, he had already retired from the business world and devoted himself to social philanthropy. He was a member of many non-profit organizations including: Hakuai sha (the Philanthropic Society), Nichi-In Kyōkai (the Japan-India Association), Nichi-Futsu Kyōkai (the Japan-France Association), Chūō Jizen Kyōkai (the Central Charity Asso-
Shibusawa’s son-in-law Sakatani was also involved in a great number of profit and non-profit organizations, but unlike Shibusawa, who served at the Ministry of Finance only for a short period from 1868 to 1873, Sakatani spent most of his career as a state official and a politician rather than a businessman. He entered the Ministry of Finance after he graduated from the University of Tōkyō in 1884 and served as the Finance Minister from 1906 to 1908. Later, he became the mayor of Tōkyō in 1912 and a member of the House of Peers in 1917. Soeda’s career was similar to Sakatani’s: he entered the Ministry of Finance in the same year as Sakatani, served as its vice-minister, and became a member of the House of Peers in his later years. But Soeda was more multifaceted than Sakatani. After he left the Ministry of Finance in 1898, he taught economics and public finance at several universities, and then took charge of the establishment of several government-managed financial institutions, such as the Bank of Formosa and the Industrial Bank of Japan. He also served as the president of newspaper companies like Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpō and Hōchi and wrote chief editorials for these papers.

What characterized these three people was that they all had the experience of government finance at the Ministry of Finance and built strong connections with both the business world and the government. Shibusawa especially was known as Zaikai sewanin (財界世話人), a mediator who utilized his personal network to reconcile different interests among businessmen as well as between the business sector and the government. Sewanin helped merge small companies in the same industry into a larger corporation and communicated requests from the business community to the government in order to promote the overall interests of the business world. It was thanks to this network bridging between the business community and the government that the three held important positions in many semi-governmental organizations including the LNAJ. There was a mutual

12 Although the network of sewanin was spontaneous and informal in the beginning, it was later institutionalized as Nihon keizai renmei kai (the Japan Economic Federation), the largest business organization in the pre-war years which was established by a group of leading industrialists in 1922. The Federation was mainly administered by one of the directors of the LNAJ, Inoue Junnosuke, until 1928. For Zaikai sewanin, see Matsuura Masataka, Zaikai no seiji keizai shi: Inoue Junnosuke, Gō Seinosuke, Ikeda Shigeaki no jidai [Political and economic history of Zaikai: the age of Inoue Junnosuke, Gō Seinosuke and Ikeda Shigeaki] (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppan kai, 2002).
ally beneficial relationship between the three and the government. On the one hand, the government could rely on them to attract donations from the business sector. It could also ask them to do what the government could not do officially. On the other hand, they could use their positions in semi-governmental organizations when they needed to urge the government to take account of the special interests of the business community. The role they played in the LNAJ must also be seen in the light of this symbiotic relationship.

Shibusawa’s involvement in international cooperation dated back to the pre-WWI era, and it was related to the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States. The situation surrounding Japanese immigrants on the west coast of the United States began worsening in the early 1900s, and the city of San Francisco passed a regulation in 1906 which required Japanese children to attend a racially segregated school. The United States and Japan negotiated from 1907 to 1908 to solve the problem and reached the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement, whereby the Japanese government agreed to stop issuing passports to Japanese nationals who wished to migrate to, and work in, the United States. But this did not stop the escalation of anti-Japanese sentiment on the west coast. In 1913 the so-called alien land bill was introduced in the state of California. The bill, if passed, would prohibit Japanese immigrants from possessing land in the state. Concerned about the effect the bill would have on the Japanese-US relationship in general, Shibusawa started to make various attempts to ease the conflict between the two countries. Together with two politicians, Nakano Buei and Shimada Saburō, he organized an association called Nichi-Bei dōshi kai in April 1913. The association sent Soeda Juichi and Kamiya Tadao to the United States from May to August in the same year, and made them examine the prevailing conditions in California. It also held a lecture meeting at a clubhouse of the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce in May, inviting Yamada Saburō as a guest speaker. 13

Although the bill was passed in May and the California Alien Land Law came into force in August 1913, this made Shibusawa only more active. A pacifist organization, the Japan Peace Society, and its international network played a major role in the development of his further

Established on May 18, 1906, a memorial day of the First Hague Peace Conference, the Society was originally an organization of Japanese Christians who had a connection with an American missionary organization, the American Peace Society of Japan. But after Sakatani became a member of the Society in 1911, its membership was extended on his initiative to include influential politicians and businessmen like Shibusawa. Utilizing the Society’s connection with American pacifists, Shibusawa held a meeting in February 1915, inviting Japanese and American citizens who were concerned about the relationship between the two countries. Among those present were Shibusawa, Sakatani, Soeda, Nakano, Kaneko Kentarō and two missionaries, Gilbert Bowles and Sidney Gulick. The meeting developed into the Japanese-American Relations Committee (Nichi-Bei kankei iinkai), an organization dedicated to the betterment of the US-Japanese relationship. In the interwar years, Shibusawa devoted much of his time to the activities of the Committee and the LNAJ.

What is important is that most of the Japanese mentioned above were more or less deeply connected with the migration industry. Kamiya was an executive of the Brazilian Colonization Company, which was established in 1913 to build a Japanese colony in the Iguape region. Shibusawa and Nakano helped the establishment of this company and remained involved with it as advisors. Although the company operated only in Brazil, it could not remain indifferent to the problem in the United States, because anti-Japanese sentiment could also spread in Brazil. No doubt Shibusawa and his fellows acted out of sympathy for their compatriots, but presumably patriotism was not the only factor that prompted their actions. It is highly probable that their efforts were closely related to their business interests, at least in the beginning. This becomes all the clearer if one reads two letters of request which Shibusawa, Nakano and Soeda submitted to the

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Japanese government in October 1913. These letters clearly show where their real interests lay.

In one of the two letters entitled *Keihatsu undō ni kansuru ken* (On the campaign for education), the three asked the government to establish an association whose ultimate objective was to “achieve harmony between Eastern and Western civilizations as well as among all races”.\(^\text{16}\) Although the term ‘international cooperation’ did not appear in this document, Shibusawa and the others seem to have already cherished an idea similar to international cooperation. The association to be established would develop a close relationship between Japan and foreign countries by “encouraging international exchange of ideas, feelings and information”.\(^\text{17}\) It would dispel misunderstanding about Japan and the Japanese by sending distinguished scholars from Japan to foreign countries and inviting foreign collaborators to write articles about Japan for internationally influential newspapers; that means the three planned the campaign would become a mixture of intellectual exchange and propaganda. Although its obvious target was the United States, the campaign would not be confined to the North American area. Soeda stated clearly in a published article that the campaign’s aim was to guide the public of “not only Japan and the United States but also the world at large in the right direction”.\(^\text{18}\)

But why did Shibusawa and his fellows think such an international campaign was necessary? In the letter, they insisted that the campaign was indispensable in fostering Japan’s *kaigai hatten* (overseas development). Although the term could signify various things, in the early 20th century context it unmistakably meant the expansion of economic activity through colonization and emigration.\(^\text{19}\) The ambition for Japanese economic expansion through international migration was more clearly expressed in the other letter entitled, *Imin hōshin ni kansuru ken* (On emigration policy). In the document, Shibusawa, Nakano and Soeda urged the government to support the migration industry in Japan, arguing that a large emigration company which would invest in foreign countries and send emi-


\(^\text{17}\) Ibid., 131.

\(^\text{18}\) Soeda Juichi, “Konpon kaiketsu no yōten [How to solve the problem completely]”, Taiyō 20 no. 10 (1914): 153.

grants to those countries was needed to solve Japan’s overpopulation problem. They requested that the government should either help merge four existing emigration companies, or financially assist the most promising one. In their plan, the company would cooperate with the association to be established for the education campaign in order to foster the steady growth of Japanese migration overseas.

What is remarkable about the letter is that the three justified encouraging foreign migration with a pressing need to solve the overpopulation problem in their country. Although the impression that Japan was a small and mountainous country with limited arable land and few natural resources was widespread throughout the country, it is difficult to specify exactly when the fear of overpopulation took hold of the nation. It is at least clear that the major motivation for overseas expansion came from considerations about how to feed a population growing by about half a million to one million per year. According to one author, both colonization and emigration were already believed to be a drastic solution to the overpopulation problem as early as 1887. At the time when the Shibusawa group was writing the request, the sense of crisis was heightened more than before because the United States and the British Dominions had begun to restrict the admission and residence of Japanese immigrants.

Both plans developed by Shibusawa and his fellows, one on education and the other on emigration policy, became a reality, although they assumed a slightly different form than their original ideas. The plan on education was realized by the government as Tai-bei keihatsu undō (The campaign for educating public opinion in the United States). The campaign targeted the United States only and was not carried out globally, as had been envisaged by Soeda. The plan on emigration policy, on the other hand, materialized in February 1914 as the Japan Emigration Association (Nihon Imin Kyōkai). The association was organized by those who were interested in matters related to international migration, and Soeda served as president of the association. As had been proposed in Imin hōshin ni kansuru ken, the association held lectures designed to provide would-be

migrants with practical knowledge and know-how about migration.\textsuperscript{22} The merger of emigration companies was also achieved in December 1917 through the establishment of the Overseas Development Company (\textit{Kaigai kōgyō kabushiki kaisha}). The government sponsored enterprise, which merged all the emigration companies existing at that time, sent Japanese immigrants to Brazil, the largest destination country for Japan in the interwar years.\textsuperscript{23}

The close connection a few central figures of the LNAJ had with the migration industry should not be overlooked in assessing the nature of the Association’s interwar activities. But it should also not be forgotten that the migration business was just one of those numerous businesses Shibusawa had to take care of, and he had already retired as a businessman at the time of the establishment of the LNAJ. The existence of a connection between a few leaders of the LNAJ and the migration industry does not mean that the Association was an organization which solely represented the interests of emigration companies. What can be safely said is only that they were attracted to the migration business to such an extent as to develop a somewhat detailed plan for fostering overseas migration.

The two letters of request shed light not only on Shibusawa and his fellows’ connection with the migration industry but also on their strong rela-


\textsuperscript{23} In January 1917, Kamiya Tadao submitted a proposal for organizing a large emigration company to the Foreign Ministry and, on the establishment of the Overseas Development Company, he became one of its founders. On Kamiya and the establishment of the Overseas Development Company, see Takeuchi Konmei, “Senkan ki no imin seisaku: Ōkura Gaimu Naimu sanshō ni wataru imin seisaku no tenkai katei [The emigration policy in the interwar years: the development of the policy in the Finance, Foreign and Home Ministries]”, \textit{Kanazawa daigaku daigakuin shigaku ronshū} 37 (2007): 90–91.
tionship with the Japanese government. Surprisingly, the process in which the two letters were written and submitted to the government indicates that it was not the Shibusawa group but the government that first conceived the idea of conducting a large propaganda campaign. Although shortly after the passage of the alien land bill in May the government came up with the idea of launching propaganda against the law, it nonetheless asked Soeda to develop a plan on a propaganda campaign and submit it to the government.\(^{24}\) The Japanese government took this seemingly redundant step, thinking that if the government ran the campaign, it might draw criticism from the American people as interference in their internal affairs. Therefore, the government decided to conceal the fact that the plan originated from the government and pretend the government was only assisting the private sector initiative. The government’s request was transmitted to Soeda around August 1913 while he was staying in the United States, and the letters on the education campaign and on emigration policy were submitted about two months later. The symbiotic relationship between Shibusawa et al. and the government was reflected in the content of the letters: The proposed association for the education campaign was going to be a semi-governmental organization, rather than a purely private one, and the proposed emigration company would become a government sponsored enterprise.

The LNAJ and its relationship with the Japanese government

While one of the two major forces within the LNAJ was Shibusawa and the people around him who had strong connections with both the business world and the government due to their experience working in the Ministry of Finance, the other was diplomats. The Foreign Ministry was involved in the formation of the LNAJ as deeply as in the propaganda campaign against the California Alien Land Law. It arranged the Japanese delegates’ first participation in the IFLNS and continued to play an important role even after the official establishment of the LNAJ. The Association pro-

fessed to be a non-governmental organization, and, as a matter of fact, non-government members were in charge of its administration. But it was under the shadow of the Foreign Ministry from the very beginning.

There were two diplomats who played a decisive role in the establishment of the LNAJ: Adachi Mineichirō and Matsui Keishirō. These two professional diplomats, who were resident in Europe, one in Belgium and the other in France, were keeping a close eye on the activities of League of Nations societies around the world and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to have a counterpart organization in Japan. What they found to be the most worrying development was the emergence of the Chinese association, which was established earlier than the Japanese association and was planning to raise the Shandong problem at the third congress of the IFLNS. The question about the disposition of German interests in Shandong province in China was the most serious controversy that existed between Japan and China at that time. The Japanese government wanted to avoid drawing international attention to the problem, whereas the Chinese association aimed at mobilizing international opinion in favour of China by discussing the problem at international forums. It was in order to defeat this Chinese association’s plan that Adachi and Matsui encouraged Japanese League supporters to join the IFLNS.

Although it is clear from several sources that the two helped Japan to first participate in the IFLNS conference behind the scenes, there remains uncertainty about how far they orchestrated the event. It has been said that a group of people who wished to establish a Japanese association for the League of Nations had had a meeting in Paris earlier in 1919. A letter from Sakatani to Shibusawa dated July 10 of that year shows that Sakatani, Soeda and several others discussed a plan to establish a Japanese League of Nations society. The letter also notes that Soeda was temporarily acting as chairman and that Akizuki Satsumo, Anesaki Masaharu, Date Gen’ichirō, Hayashi Kiroku and Oka Minoru were elected to a committee on developing a concrete plan.25 Although somewhat inconsistent with Sakatani’s letter, Yamakawa Tadao also testifies in his memoir that he held a meeting with Anesaki, Akizuki, Soeda and a few others at accommoda-

Jürgen Neumann (ed.), C relatively close to the banks of the Seine. Judging from all these pieces of information, there must have been some meeting among the Japanese in Paris in 1919, but it is not known how concrete a plan they had. More importantly, it is not in the least clear whether they had had contact with Adachi and Matsui before the meeting or whether they had gained information about the Chinese association’s plan to raise the Shandong question at the IFLNS meeting.

By the time six Japanese delegates—Akizuki Satsuo, Horiuchi Kensuke, Maeda Masana, Onozuka Kiheiji, Suehiro Izutarō and Yamada Saburō—attended the third meeting of the IFLNS, they had already learned about the Chinese association’s plan. Yamada admitted later that the very aim of attending the meeting was to undermine the plan. At preparatory meetings held on November 31 and December 1, a Chinese delegate, Wellington Koo, proposed that the IFLNS should discuss the question of the disposal of Shandong more than once. But his proposal met with strong opposition from Akizuki and finally had to be withdrawn. It was Adachi Mineichirō who made this withdrawal possible by introducing Yamada Saburō to Baron Edouard Descamps. Descamps was the president of the Belgian League of Nations Association, which hosted the third meeting of the IFLNS, and it was thanks to the good offices of Descamps and another Belgian, Eugène Baie, who acted as secretary for the meeting, that Yamada and the other Japanese were allowed to attend the meeting even before the Japanese association was officially established. A report Matsui Keishirō submitted to the Japanese government

26 Yamakawa Tadao, “Nihon kokusai kyōkai no nijūnen [Twenty years of the Japan International Association]”, Kokusai chishiki 20 no. 7 (1940): 78.
27 A report on the assembly submitted to Japan’s foreign ministry and Yamada’s talk made after he came back to Japan tell that such was the case. “Daisankai kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō sōkai kaigi [The third assembly of the IFLNS]”, JACAR: B04013930300, 36–38; Yamada, “Kokusai renmei ni tsuite”, 28. In his talk, however, Yamada also said that he had no knowledge about the Chinese proposal until he met Baron Edouard Descamps on November 15. It is unclear whether this was true or not.
28 “Daisankai kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō sōkai kaigi”, 37.
after the conference also indicated that the Chinese proposal was withdrawn not only because Akizuki had strongly opposed it but because Adachi had held talks about the proposal with Descamps before the meeting.\textsuperscript{30}

In his report, Matsui not only provided details of the meeting, but also asked the Japanese government to facilitate the establishment of a League of Nations association in Japan. Arguing that central members of the League of Nations societies in European countries were renowned scholars and politicians who could strongly influence public opinion in those countries, he requested that Japan should have a close relationship with the IFLNS to “see what other countries were planning [to discuss at the League of Nations] as well as to show Japan’s eagerness to contribute to world peace.”\textsuperscript{31} In response to the request, the Foreign Ministry held a meeting in an office room in the Treaty Bureau of the Ministry on March 4, 1920.\textsuperscript{32} Those present were the chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry Matsuda Michikazu, the diplomats Sawada Setsuzō and Sugimura Yōtarō, a councillor of the Navy Ministry Yamakawa Tadao, the international lawyer Tachi Sakutarō, and the journalist Date Gen’ichirō. Although Yamakawa was working at the Navy Ministry at the time of the meeting, he was transferred to the Foreign Ministry soon after the meeting as a successor to Matsuda. The participants in the meeting had no objection to Matsui’s idea of establishing a Japanese association for the League of Nations with the result that the Treaty Bureau assumed the task of developing a concrete proposal including a draft constitution for the association.\textsuperscript{33} After writing the proposal under the leadership of Matsuda, the Bureau circulated it to higher officers, and then it was decided that the chief of the Bureau should supervise the establishment of the association. With this decision, the association took on a semi-official character.\textsuperscript{34} The chief of the Treaty Bureau—first Matsuda and later Yamakawa—continued to supervise the association even after its establishment, and young

\textsuperscript{30} Matsui to Uchida, December 10, 1919, JACAR: B06150911600, 9.

\textsuperscript{31} “Kokusai renmei kyōkai ni kansuru Matsui taishi no iken [Ambassador Matsui’s opinion about the League of Nations societies]”, JACAR: B04013930300, 42.

\textsuperscript{32} “Kokusai renmei kyōkai no setsuritsu oyobi kansei ni kansuru sōdankai no keika yōryō [Proceedings of the preparatory meetings for the establishment of the League of Nations Society]”, JACAR: B04013930300, 80–81.

\textsuperscript{33} Yamakawa Tadao, “Nihon kokusaikyōkai no nijūnen”, 79.

\textsuperscript{34} “Nihon kokusairenmei kyōkai setsuritsu junbi ni kansuru keika [Proceedings on the preparations for the establishment of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B04013930800, 4.
diplomats such as Sugimura and Sawada did all the necessary secretarial work until the association started to employ its own staff members.

The Bureau held two further preparatory meetings on March 10 and 22, inviting those who had been in Paris during the Peace Conference and representatives of private organizations which had a similar plan of establishing a League of Nations association. Those organizations invited were the Society of International Law, the Japan Peace Society, the Association Concordia and the Japan International Society. It is unclear how concrete the plans were that these private organizations had developed before the Foreign Ministry made contact with them. All that is known is that the Japan Peace Society had learned about the League of Nations societies and its Federation through Theodore Marburg. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Organization of the American League to Enforce Peace had informed the Japan Peace Society of the League of Nations movement developing in Western countries.\(^\text{35}\)

Those who were invited to the two meetings—the scholar of religious studies Anesaki, the politician Hayashi and the businessman Soeda to the first one, and the legal scholars Terao Tōru, Nomura Junji, Miyaoka Tsunejirō, the moral philosopher Tomoeda Takahiko and the journalist Tagawa Daikichirō to the second—approved of the Foreign Ministry’s plan to establish a Japanese League of Nations association.\(^\text{36}\) These meetings were important because many of the participants later assumed important positions in the association: Soeda became its vice-chairman, and Anesaki, Hayashi, Miyaoka and Tagawa became its directors. Although the future chairman of the association Shibusawa had been informed of the meeting held by Soeda and others in Paris, it was not until a meeting held on April 5 that his name appeared in a set of minutes. At the meeting it was decided that the two diplomats Matsuda and Date were to visit Shibusawa with a recommendation letter written by Makino Nobuaki, the former ambassador plenipotentiary on the Peace Conference, and ask him to become the chairman of the association.\(^\text{37}\) Since the inaugural meeting of the LNAJ was held on April 23, it can be presumed that the Bureau made contact with Shibusawa in the middle of April.

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\(^\text{36}\) “Kokusai renmei kyōkai no setsuritsu oyobi kansei ni kansuru sōdankai no keika yōryō”, 81–82.

\(^\text{37}\) “Kokusai renmei kyōkai dainikai tokubetsu iinkai [the second meeting of the special committee of the League of Nations Society]”, JACAR: B04013930300, 95.
### Table 2.3 List of people who declined to be the founding members of the LNAJ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State officials and army and navy officers</td>
<td>Inoue Katsunosuke, Tsuzuki Keiroku, Yamanashi Hanzō, Matsumoto Shigetake, Suematsu Kenchō, Suzuki Kisaburō, Takeshita Isamu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the House of Peers</td>
<td>Tokugawa Yoshihisa, Maeda Masana, Maeda Toshisada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>Kaneko Umaji, Kawakami Hajime, Takano Iwasaburō, Tajiri Inajirō, Miura Kinnosuke, Shimizu Tōru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>Ishikawa Mikiaki, Ōyama Ikuo, Wakamiya Yūnosuke, Tsushima Kennosuke, Motoyama Hikoichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellanies</td>
<td>Yanagita Kunio, Mutsu Hirokichi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The LNAJ, “Hokkinin taru koto o hitei seru mono [Those who refused to be a founding member]”, JACAR: B04013930400, 42.

Note: The classification of occupation was that used by the LNAJ.

In order to better understand the character of the association, it is worthwhile to see a list of people who were invited to the inaugural meeting of the LNAJ but declined to join the Association (see Table 2.3). Nothing is known about the reasons for their refusal: they might have been against the Association’s cause or just unwilling to pay a membership fee, or they might have been willing to pay the fee but unwilling to assume other membership obligations. Those who were on the list were a miscellaneous group of people with few commonalities in terms of vocation and political orientation. On the one hand, it included members of major zaibatsu, family-owned industrial and financial conglomerates in pre-war Japan which continued to assume monopolistic or oligopolistic positions in different businesses until they were dissolved by GHQ after the Second
World War. Those included were Masuda Takashi (Mitsui zaibatsu), Toyokawa Ryōhei and Gō Seinosuke (Mitsubishi zaibatsu), Nakajima Kumakichi (Furukawa zaibatsu), Yasuda Zenjirō (Yasuda zaibatsu), Asano Sōichirō (Asano zaibatsu) and Kuhara Fusanosuke (Kuhara zaibatsu). Although these people did not personally join the LNAJ, some of the financial conglomerates mentioned here provided economic support for the Association. The list, on the other hand, included scholars and journalists who had been keenly interested in social problems at that time, such as the economist Kawakami Hajime, the journalist Ōyama Ikuo and the statistician Takano Iwasaburō. Yoshino Sakuzō, who joined the LNAJ but did not become its active member, was a slightly different case. The political scientist who laid the theoretical foundations for democratization in the Taishō period was an ardent admirer of president Wilson and probably the most powerful supporter of the League in Japan. But it seems he did not find the LNAJ attractive enough to spare the time for its activities. While zaibatsu constituted the Establishment in pre-war Japan, these intellectuals were progressive reformers, some of whom would become socialists in later years. The disregard these critical intellectuals showed for the LNAJ might indicate the conservative character of the Association.

Although the role played by the Foreign Ministry in the establishment of the LNAJ already shows that the association was a semi-governmental, or, at best, a government-affiliated organization, nothing indicates the close relationship between the government and the LNAJ more clearly than the fact that the Association was dependent not only on financial support from the private sector but on government funding (see Table 2.4 and 2.5). The record shows that the Association received 20,000 to 100,000 yen each year from 1923 to 1930. It should also be added that the ‘private sector’ here included government-supported enterprises which were created by national policy, such as the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Japan Mail Shipping Line, and the South Manchuria Railway Company.

As a matter of fact, there were members of the LNAJ who felt uneasy about the dependency of the association on the government. At the first meeting of the Board of Directors of the LNAJ on April 29, 1920, Soeda proposed seeking financial assistance from the government—the amount of support he proposed was fifty thousand yen for the budget of the first year and one million yen for the LNAJ’s fund. But other members expressed the concern that receiving such assistance would compromise the LNAJ’s independence. Even Shibusawa, who had a close relationship with the government, stated that although government assistance would
facilitate the LNAJ’s activities, it was unadvisable to develop too close a relationship with the government. He said, “if, for instance, the Japanese government adopted militaristic policies, the LNAJ’s dependence on the government would drive the Association into a difficult situation.”

Note: There is no report available for 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1931. But some sources indicate that the government provided 20,000 yen in each year from 1920 to 1922. In the same period, the private sector also donated more than 164,080 yen in total. See Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 36, 577; The LNAJ, “Daihachikai rijkai giji yōroku [The protocol of the eighth council meeting]”, JACAR: B04013930500, 22. For the years 1924 and 1925, only the sums of the government endowment and the private sector donations is available.

Table 2.4 Government endowment and private sector donations to the LNAJ: 1920–1932 (yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>50,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>49,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>56,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>65,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>40,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>40,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>40,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>35,980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on the LNAJ’s annual accounting report.

For the years 1924 and 1925, only the sums of the government endowment and the private sector donations is available.

facilitate the LNAJ’s activities, it was unadvisable to develop too close a relationship with the government. He said, “if, for instance, the Japanese government adopted militaristic policies, the LNAJ’s dependence on the government would drive the Association into a difficult situation.”

Although it is unclear how seriously he took the possibility that the government would take military action in the future, his fear was understandable. He had in mind a situation where Japan would go to war and the LNAJ would be pressed to choose whether it would keep adhering to its

38 “Kokusai renmei kyōkai daiikkai riji kai [the first session of the council of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B04013930400, 28.
pacifist cause or compromise its moral integrity by supporting the war. In contrast to Shibusawa, however, a retired bureaucrat at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Oka Minoru, and a member of the House of Peers, Yoshii Kōzō, strongly defended Soeda’s proposal, insisting that the LNAJ should receive government assistance but “should never allow government interference in its opinion and actions, nor should it compromise its independence.”

In the end, the majority of directors subscribed to the opinion of the two. The board agreed on the principle that the LNAJ would receive financial assistance from the government but would not accept any interference in its activities.

Table 2.5 Large contributors who donated more than 10,000 yen from 1921 to 1931 (yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iwasaki Koyata</td>
<td>61,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsui Hachirōemon</td>
<td>61,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama Specie Bank</td>
<td>32,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasuda Zenjirō</td>
<td>31,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Mail Shipping Line</td>
<td>29,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Manchuria Railway Company</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shibusawa Eiichi</td>
<td>25,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furukawa Toranosuke</td>
<td>25,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōkura Kihachirō</td>
<td>21,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor of the Bank of Japan</td>
<td>18,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan</td>
<td>12,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daiichi Bank</td>
<td>12,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Korea</td>
<td>12,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor of Nippon Kangyo Bank</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamashita Kamesaburō</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The LNAJ, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai kihusha oyobi sono kingaku [Contributors to the LNAJ and the amount of their donations]”, JACAR: B05014052300, 22.

39 Ibid., 28.
The LNAJ and its racial equality proposal

Although the immediate objective of the Japanese who attended the third Congress of the IFLNS was to block the Chinese association’s plan to raise the Shandong question, there was another motivation behind the LNAJ’s participation in the IFLNS. The Association aimed at creating the opinion in the world which was sympathetic to Japan concerning the problem of Japanese immigrants in the United States. The Association attempted to achieve this objective by advocating two principles: the abolition of racial discrimination and the equitable treatment of commerce.

The LNAJ embarked on a campaign for racial equality in 1921 after finishing all the miscellaneous work for the establishment of the Association. On February 25 of the same year, it held a Board of Directors’ meeting to discuss what the Association should propose at the fifth Congress of the IFLNS. Those present were Sakatani, Soeda, Tagawa, Yamakawa, Oka, Hozumi, Date, Sawada, Sugimura and two clerks, Ōkuma and Ojima. At the meeting, the board agreed to propose racial issues and later officially notified the Office of the IFLNS of its proposal to institute three commissions within the Federation, i.e. “commissions on the abolition of racial discrimination, the protection of religious freedom and the equitable treatment of commerce”.

The LNAJ attached little importance to the protection of religious freedom with the result that it soon disappeared from the agenda of the Association. The board included the item in the agenda only because the Japanese government submitted its racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference as an amendment to an article in the Covenant concerning religious freedom. However, the fact that the LNAJ proposed the abolition of racial discrimination together with the protection of religious freedom indicated that the LNAJ was quite conscious of maintaining the continuity between the government’s argument at Versailles and its own. In fact, the Association ordered its delegation to the fifth Congress of the IFLNS to use “the text of the speech given by the ambassador plenipotentiary Makino Nobuaki at the Peace conference” for reference as well as

40 “Tokubetsu iinkai gijiroku [The protocol of the special committee]”, JACAR: B04013930500, 30. The document shows only the surnames of the participants. Ōkuma is probably Ōkuma Makoto, who worked as a secretary for the LNAJ. Ojima may be Ojima Kikue, who participated in the fifth Congress of the IFLNS.
41 Uchida to Adachi, March 26, JACAR: B06150912100, 9.
Problems of the international free movement of people, a report the Japanese government had given to the Japanese delegation to the Peace conference in order to provide the basic information about the problem of Japanese immigrants in foreign countries as well as the treatment of foreigners in Japan.\(^{42}\) This shows clearly that the LNAJ’s advocacy of racial equality was a follow-up to the Japanese government’s racial equality proposal at Versailles.

Leaders of the League of Nations associations in other countries who read the proposal by the LNAJ might think that the Japanese association was eager to act as a government mouthpiece, as a spokesman for its government. But the relationship between the LNAJ and the Japanese government was not so simple. The government’s attitude toward the problem of racial equality changed in the period from 1919 to 1921. The Japanese delegation at the Paris conference declared that Japan would propose racial equality at every opportunity, but in reality the country never loudly demanded racial equality at subsequent international conferences.\(^{43}\) The Washington conference in 1921 was probably the last chance for Japan to intervene in the construction of post-war international order, but at that conference Japan did not raise racial issues. In its official instructions given to the delegates to the conference, the Japanese government stated that, circumstances permitting, the government wished to discuss “the problem of natural resources and that of the treatment of foreigners in connection with the problem of the open-door policy, the solution to which is deemed essential to the existence of the Empire and is also justifiable in terms of humanity”.\(^{44}\) But the government chose not to discuss these problems at the conference but to use them only as a bargaining chip to “establish Japan’s presence in the world and to make other powers accept her demands”.\(^{45}\) Thus, the government ordered the delegation not to “go deeply into these problems but to use them only when doing so will facili-

\(^{42}\) Uchida to Ishii, June 4, 1921, JACAR: B06150912100, 28–29.


\(^{44}\) Uchida to Hara, October 13, 1921, in Nohon gaikō bunsho: Washinton kaigi [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: Washington conference], vol. 1, ed. Gaimushō (Tōkyō: Gaimushō, 1977), 188.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 188.
These instructions show that the government had lost the will to advocate racial equality after Versailles. Of course, the unwillingness of the government to address racial issues did not necessarily mean that the government had abandoned its hope of resolving these issues in the future, nor did it mean that the LNAJ’s advocacy of racial equality went against the government’s policy. On the contrary, it might be the case that the government found the LNAJ’s campaign for racial equality worth supporting in the long run, thinking that the semi-governmental international organization could do what the Foreign Ministry could not do. At least the fact that the government did not stop the Association but allowed it to propagate the idea of racial equality shows that the campaign was not what the government found obstructive to its official policy. The government did not advocate racial equality on its own initiative but it did not prevent the LNAJ from doing so either. It is only in this limited sense that one can say that the LNAJ acted as a government mouthpiece.

When the Japanese government proposed racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference, the objective of the government was to establish Japan’s international position as a major power and to maintain its equality with the other permanent members of the League Council. The instructions prepared for the Washington conference also showed that this particularistic attitude of the government paying little attention to matters other than its own national interests did not change much after the Paris conference. However, the attitude of the LNAJ was somewhat different. Certainly, there were a few members of the LNAJ who held a view different from the government’s. The Association’s official organ, Kokusai chishiki (International understanding), published an unsigned article entitled Appealing to all people of the world before the Washington conference and offered the reader fresh insights into racial equality. The article, while criticizing the racial discrimination practiced by England, the United States and France, directed its criticism at Japan itself in the following way:

The Japanese! You have bravely fought wars against China and Russia for the purpose of self-defence, and won the wars. But have you treated the Chinese as equal human beings since the wars? Have you not done whatever you wanted to do in China on the pretext of protecting your right to live? Can you claim that there has been no fault in what you did in China, Korea, Formosa or the South Pacific islands? You demand that the United States adopt an

46 Ibid., 188.
open-door policy. You may well do so. But have you never forced Americans
to do so in an unpleasant way?\textsuperscript{47}

The anonymous author proceeded to mention Japan’s interests in China
and said, “We do not simply tell you to renounce your national interests.
We just advise you to acquire something larger. Japan has not yet fully
enjoyed what the world has to offer, namely, the fruits of equal opportuni-
ties and an open-door policy. If what you do to protect your lesser interests
ruins your international reputation and prevents you from pursuing your
greater interests, renounce the lesser ones. You must not lose the confi-
dence of the world.”\textsuperscript{48}

Comparing the opinion expressed by the anonymous author with the
opinion of dissident intellectuals will help understand the position the
LNAJ was located in the political spectrum in interwar Japan. Ishibashi
Tanzan, who had criticized Japan’s racial equality proposal as hypocrisy,
serves as a good reference point. The editor of the \textit{Tōyō keizai shinpō} was
not a member of the LNAJ, although he joined the Association much later
in the 1930s. He is best known for his Small Japan policy (\textit{shō Nihon
shugi}; \小日本主義), which he advocated immediately before the Wash-
ington conference. One of the basic tenets of his Small Japan Policy was
the abandonment of all its foreign colonies. He said, “Determine to aban-
don Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin. Not to mention that Japan should stop
intervening in China and Siberia.”\textsuperscript{49} He organized a research group in his
newspaper company before the Washington conference to study problems
that would be placed on the agenda at the conference. The research group,
which included one of the LNAJ’s directors, Tagawa Daikichirō, pub-
lished its research results which urged the Japanese government to adopt a
disarmament policy and recognize the Chinese people’s right to self-
determination.\textsuperscript{50} The Ishibashi group was much more radical than \textit{Kokusai

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Ishibashi1921}
\bibitem{Tagawa1984}
\end{thebibliography}
chishiki’s unnamed writer in that the former clearly recommended the abandonment of Japan’s colonies, whereas the latter’s postion on the colonial problem was never clear-cut. But the intentions of the two were not far apart. Both suggested renouncing Japan’s interests in China. Ishibashi opposed Shōyoku (小欲), profit in the short run, in this case, the interests in China, and advocated Taiyoku (大欲), profit in the long run which would be gained from free trade. Likewise, the Kokusai chishiki’s article opposed the lesser interests while advocating the greater interests. To prove the closeness of the positions of the LNAJ and Ishibashi, another article in Kokusai chishiki favourably reviewed the Ishibashi group’s study, saying, “Although there might be an allegation that the group offered only an impractical, visionary scheme, we should respect its courage to have issued an uncompromised statement for the sake of perpetual peace of the world.”

While the Kokusai chishiki’s unnamed writer was sympathetic towards the Ishibashi group, most of the LNAJ members were not. At the meeting of the Board of Directors held on February 25, the Association divided topics to be discussed by the IFLNS into “those relating to Japan’s special position” and “those relating to the interests of the world as a whole” and classified the abolition of racial equality as part of the former category of topics. The classification appeared only once in the documents of the Association but this indicated that the prevailing feeling among the majority of members of the LNAJ was one that regarded racial equality as a problem which solely related to Japan’s particular interests, not as a universally relevant one. The behaviour of the LNAJ towards the Chinese association also bore testimony to its particularistic attitude. The Japanese representatives prevented the Chinese association from bringing up the Shandong question at the fourth and fifth Congresses of the IFLNS, arguing that the IFLNS should not deal with such a political matter.

51 “Saikin Nihon no heiwa undō [The recent peace movement in Japan]”, Kokusai chishiki 1 no. 7 (1921), 62.
52 “Tokubetsu iinkai gijiroku”, 31.
53 Ishii to Uchida, October 21, 1920, JACAR: B06150911700, 60–62; Mushanokōji to Uchida, April 23, 1921, JACAR: B06150912000, 8.
should not, “as a matter of principle”, decline to discuss such topics, nor was it “fair to kill a Chinese proposal each time it is submitted”.\textsuperscript{54} Likewise, the diplomat Adachi Mineichirō argued in his telegram sent to the Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai that “Continuing to avoid discussing political problems and killing other nations’ proposals will make the other associations suspicious of our intentions. In order to express our opinion and to find an echo in the political and academic circles of the world, we had better enter into discussion as far as possible no matter how political the subject of the discussion is.”\textsuperscript{55} But neither Anesaki and Tagawa nor Adachi expressed opposition to killing the Chinese proposal with stronger words than these.

Although a few minority members of the LNAJ found it somewhat questionable to avoid discussing sensitive issues concerning Japan’s interests in China, no one showed even a modicum of reluctance to stop Koreans from bringing up issues of Japan’s colonial rule to the IFLNS. Accompanying the Chinese association, two Koreans, Yi Kwan-yong (李灌镕) and Yun Hae (尹海), attended the fourth Congress of the IFLNS and handed the president of the Congress a draft resolution that asked the League of Nations to intervene in the colonial affairs of Japan.\textsuperscript{56} The Japanese delegation to the Congress immediately protested against this unpredicted action. Also at the fifth Congress, the Chinese association proposed investigating Japan’s colonial rule in Korea, but again the Japanese delegation raised an objection and the proposal was rejected.\textsuperscript{57} The members of the LNAJ did not utter a word or criticize these moves made by the Japanese delegation. Their silence showed the LNAJ’s timid stance towards Japan’s colonial rule in Korea more clearly than anything else.

It can be concluded from all the above information that most of the LNAJ’s members did not have any intention of applying the principle of racial equality universally, and that they tended to consider race issues as a problem concerning Japan’s international position as a major power. It is true that some members expressed sympathy with Ishibashi’s view of a Small Japan Policy, which proposed to build an equal relationship with

\begin{footnotes}
\item[54] “Daiyonkai rijikai [The fourth sessions of the council]”, JACAR: B04013930400, 93.
\item[56] “Chōsen mondai [Korean problems]”, JACAR: B06150911700, 75–80.
\item[57] Matsuda to Uchida, June 24, 1921, JACAR: B06150912100, 31.
\end{footnotes}
Asian nations, and others showed a readiness to discuss the Shandong question with the Chinese association. But even these minority members did not advocate the complete abandonment of Japan’s colonies, nor did they question the LNAJ’s hostile attitude towards the Korean people and its blunt refusal to talk about colonial issues at the IFLNS meetings. Certainly, this was the prevailing attitude among the LNAJ members who advocated racial equality in the early 1920s.

Discussion of racial equality at the IFLNS

When the LNAJ proposed establishing three commissions on the abolition of racial discrimination, the protection of religious freedom and the equitable treatment of commerce to the IFLNS, it was unclear what tasks the Association expected each commission to perform. This was not surprising given the unpreparedness of the Association, which had not developed its own policy on these topics in detail. The agenda to be pursued by these commissions and the position of the LNAJ were gradually articulated in the subsequent course of discussion at the IFLNS.

The first commission the IFLNS established in response to the Japanese proposal was that on racial equality. At a meeting of the General Council of the IFLNS held on April 21, 1921, the Japanese diplomat Mushanokōji Kintomo insisted that the Federation, which had already had a commission on minority problems, must also have a commission on racial equality. The Council agreed to propose establishing the commission at the next Congress of the IFLNS, and the proposal was approved without opposition at the fifth Congress held in Geneva from June 6 to 9 of the same year.

In October, the General Council of the IFLNS organized the commission on racial equality by selecting its members from the associations of China, England, France, Hungary, Japan and Switzerland and by inviting a representative of the Secretariat of the League of Nations as an observer. The commission member selected from the LNAJ was legal scholar Hatoyama Hideo, who was known as an authority on civil law in Japan. The Chinese representative was journalist Scie Ton-fa (謝東發), and the

58 Mushanokōji to Uchida, April 23, 1921, JACAR: B06150912000, 7.
59 Honda to Uchida, October 20, 1921, JACAR: B06150912200, 3.
French representative was sociologist Célestin Bouglé. Bouglé also acted as a chair of the commission. The Council later added Blaise Diagne, a member of the Chamber of Deputies of France representing Senegal, to the commission as a representative of black people.

The commission held two meetings in Paris on January 22 and March 25 in 1922 for the purpose of selecting its research topics. The commission first decided to exclude Jewish and other minority problems in Europe, which the minority commission of the IFLNS had been in charge of, and then distinguished between “domestic racial problems” and “international racial problems”. Bouglé proposed postponing the study of the latter problems, arguing that concentrating on fewer topics would increase the possibility that the Congress would adopt resolutions drafted by the commission. But this proposal was rejected due to Hatoyama’s strong opposition. The commission eventually selected four topics—the problems of indigenous peoples, Afro-Americans, the Chinese and the Japanese—and appointed Swiss representative René Claparède, Afro-American historian Rayford Logan, Scie and Hatoyama as the rapporteur on each problem respectively. The General Secretary of the IFLNS and French historian of philosophy, Théodore Ruyssen, accepted the task of drafting the final report.

Hatoyama’s report was the first document which articulated the LNAJ’s view on racial equality. In this document, Hatoyama provided basic information on Japanese migration such as laws concerning the admission and residence of Japanese people in the United States and the British dominions, and statistics on Japanese migrant populations by country and occupation. These were informative but easily accessible data which added nothing new to the migration debate. What is noteworthy is the two principles Hatoyama proposed in the conclusion of the document:

1. Chaque Etat peut, à raison de sa souveraineté, imposer à l’immigration quelles restrictions raisonnables. Mais la justice commande l’équité envers toutes les nations;
2. Priver certaine étrangers, autorisés à résider sur le territoire d’un Etat déterminé, de leur base d’existence, de la faculté d’exercer tel métier ou telle profession, du droit d’acquérir des propriétés ou de conclure des

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Hatoyama distinguished racial discrimination concerning the admission of immigrants from that concerning the residence of foreigners already admitted into a country. Although the Tōkyō Imperial University professor admitted that a state was allowed to impose restrictions on the admission of immigrants, he expressed opposition to their discriminatory treatment in both their admission and residence. Ruyssen accepted these principles and incorporated them into his final report as two of six general principles —“Tout Etat peut, en vertu de sa souveraineté, imposer des bornes à l’immigration; mais la justice commande un traitement égal à l’égard de toutes les races, et la réciprocité d’Etat à Etat” and “Tout immigré une rois admis sur un territoire doit pouvoir jouir de droits égaux à ceux de tout autre immigré.”

The observation of these principles, he said, “would greatly contribute to reducing the present grave inequality among races.”

While Hatoyama was writing his report in France, Yamada Saburō was drafting another document at the request of the LNAJ to draw up instructions to the Japanese delegation to the sixth Congress of the IFLNS to be held in June 1922. The document exhibited a slight difference between Hatoyama and Yamada in their approach to racial issues. Interestingly, at the beginning of his instructions Yamada showed some reluctance to discuss the problem of racial equality, saying that “The proposal to deal with racial issues seems somewhat premature. But now that we have submitted it to the IFLNS, we must take on the responsibility of studying the issues.” This reluctance seemed to stem from his perception that the issues were highly contentious. He thought that the LNAJ needed to act with great care and therefore advised the Association to develop “a long-term strategy and begin with matters on which countries are able to agree more easily.” Although, like Hatoyama, Yamada divided racial issues into “the problem of admission” and “the problem of treatment after admission”, Yamada proposed that the LNAJ tackle the latter, less con-

61 Hatoyama Hideo, _SITUATION DES JAPONAIS RÉSIDANT A L’ETRANGER_, JACAR: B06150912400, 37.
62 Théodore Ruyssen, _L’Immigration des Jaunes.—La situation des Noirs aux Etats-Unis_, JACAR: B06150912400, 150.
63 Ibid., 150.
65 Ibid. 5.
tentious problem first. Furthermore, he divided the problem of foreigners’ treatment after admission into “matters concerning their treatment in terms of public law” such as political rights and the right of naturalization and “those concerning their treatment in terms of private law”, and then suggested that at the sixth Congress of the IFLNS the LNAJ propose equal treatment in terms of private law between nationals and foreigners as well as among foreigners. In this way, Yamada proposed solving racial issues gradually, from matters concerning immigrants’ treatment in terms of private law to those concerning their treatment in terms of public law and to the problem of admission.

Yamada’s approach was also different from Hatoyama’s in that the former emphasized the necessity of scientific study on racial issues. He insisted that the issues must be studied from not only “legal” but also “anthropological, ethical and economic” viewpoints. In particular, he argued that “a close examination of the economic condition of various countries” was needed to solve the problem of admitting foreigners into a country. This emphasis on examination (chōsa) was not unexpected, given his opinion that the limits of free movement of people should be determined by taking account of the necessity of international community life. As has been pointed out in the first chapter, Yamada had referred to economic literature like Leroy Beaulieu’s in his discussion about international migration. The call for broader research on racial issues expressed in the instructions only made explicit his long-lasting interest in scientific study, which had already existed in his early writings.

The LNAJ adopted Yamada’s instructions and sent them to the Japanese delegation to the sixth Congress of the IFLNS on May 11, 1922. However, his scientific research-based, piecemeal approach to racial issues seems to have had little effect on the action taken by the Japanese delegation comprised of Hatoyama Hideo, Kamikawa Hikomatsu and Minobe Tatsukichi. Because one of the two principles Hatoyama advocated in his report had dealt with the problem of admission, it was obviously against Yamada’s instructions to submit Hatoyama’s report without modification. But the delegation seems to have done nothing in this regard, and Hatoyama’s report was incorporated into the commission’s final report, which was presented to the Congress.

66 Ibid., 5–6.
67 Ibid., 6.
Because of the lack of primary sources, it is impossible to explain why the LNAJ did not follow Yamada’s instructions by, for example, proposing the withdrawal of the principle of equal treatment of all races with regard to immigration. Nor can it be clarified why the other League of Nations societies—25 associations in total participated in the Congress—did not strongly object to the commission’s report, which advocated the principle of racial equality, the highly explosive idea that had complicated the Paris Peace Conference enormously. The Congress held from June 4 to 7 passed the final report without much trouble. It is true that the English and Dutch associations abstained from voting, but even these associations did not vote against it. Participants in the Congress might not have understood the implications of the report because of its abstract wording, or the absence of the American association might help explain the lack of objections raised at the Congress. Either way, however, it is difficult to understand what made the adoption of the report so easy.

It is no wonder that Kokusai chishiki reported the results of the sixth Congress with delight: “Three years have passed since the Japanese ambassador plenipotentiary proposed the abolition of racial discrimination at the Paris Peace Conference in the spring of 1919. It is our great pleasure that international public opinion has begun to recognize the justice of the proposal. As a result of the sixth Congress, several hundred million coloured races in the world have begun to be recognized as human beings.” But contrary to what Kokusai chishiki insisted, the LNAJ’s proposal of racial equality seems to have done little to foster international public opinion, as evidenced by the fact that most of the major Western media did not even cover the Congress. Although six principles adopted by the Congress were later transferred to the International Conference of Emigration and Immigration held in Rome in 1924, they also drew little attention at the conference.

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68 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, Compte rendu des travaux, JACAR: B06150912400, 98.
69 “Kokusai seiji jihyō [Editorial comments on current international politics]”, Kokusai chishiki 2 no. 7 (1922): 51.
The LNAJ did not consider that its goal had been achieved by the adoption of the racial equality principle at the sixth Congress. It continued its campaign for racial equality by proceeding to draft resolutions on the equitable treatment of commerce, which were meant to spell out the idea of racial equality more concretely. The draft resolutions were presented at a meeting of the economic commission held in Basel in March 1923, and the commission agreed to submit them to the seventh Congress of the IFLNS.  

The drafter of the resolutions was Inui Kiyosue, who worked as a staff member of the LNAJ in the middle of the 1920s and continued to be involved in its activities until the 1930s. He was undoubtedly one of the key figures who played an important role in the discussion on racial equality, but it is somewhat difficult to explain what he was because of his unusual career path. He was neither a businessman like Shibusawa nor a scholar like Yamada. Having migrated to the United States in 1902, Inui studied at the University of Michigan and distinguished himself as an orator in English. He won the Northern Oratorical League Contest in 1906, and in 1911 participated in the International Peace Congress in Edinburgh and the First Universal Races Congress in London as an American delegate from the Great Lakes International Arbitration Society. Such was his ability to use English that in 1914 the acting consul in San Francisco Numano Yasutarō employed him in the Japanese government’s aforementioned propaganda campaign, Tai-bei keihatsu undō. In the campaign, Inui went on a lecture tour in the West and the Midwest of the United States to create public sentiment favourable to Japan. He continued such public relations work until at least 1920, when the Japanese government conducted a propaganda campaign against the new Californian Alien Land Law, which prohibited the state’s Japanese residents from leasing land.

72 In August 1923, Matsuda Michikazu, the chief of the Japan Office of the League of Nations in Paris, recommended Inui as an office staff member of the LNAJ. See Matsuda to Yamakawa, August 25, 1923, JACAR: B06150759400, 59–61. Inui’s name is on the staff list of the LNAJ in the year of 1928. “Kokusai renmei kyōkai shokuin roku [the staff list of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B04013931700, 51.
Even after the campaign had ended, the Foreign Ministry occasionally employed him in some way or other, for example, as a translator at international conferences. Although he taught Japanese culture and history at several American universities and English in a Japanese college, his background shows that he was not so much an academic as a public relations man employed by Japan’s Foreign Ministry.

In his draft resolutions on the equitable treatment of commerce, Inui included the following three provisions concerning the treatment of foreign nationals, persons, firms, corporations, etc:

Resolution 8: Without involving the immigration question, the requirements for admission of the classes of people who fall within the mercantile or commercial group shall be treated equally.

Resolution 9: In the establishment and conducting of usual business, trade, occupation or profession abroad, foreign nationals, persons, firms or corporations shall not be placed under less favourable position than the native nationals.

Resolution 10: The foreigners shall enjoy the equal protection of law and the juridical and tribunal machineries shall be as equally open to them as to the native population.74

Inui elaborated two principles proposed by Hatoyama and made them more concrete and specific. However, these provisions were less radical than Hatoyama’s in that the former did not explicitly use phrases such as racial equality. In this regard, Inui’s resolutions seemed to follow the course of action suggested by Yamada. Inui also focused solely on civil, or more correctly, commercial matters and did not touch on sensitive political matters, which Yamada had recommended avoiding. However, what Inui proposed was different from Yamada’s recommendations in some important respects. Although the resolutions made it clear that the LNAJ had no intention of discussing the topic of labour migration—as was clearly expressed in the above quotation by the words “Without involving the immigration question”—they still mentioned the issue of the admission of merchants, which Yamada had thought too early to deal with. Furthermore, the resolutions, written up in a short period, were hardly based on scientific studies about racial issues.

However, Inui’s draft resolutions were shelved at the seventh Congress of the IFLNS. Immediately before the Congress held in Vienna, the LNAJ

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requested the Federation to postpone discussing the texts to the next Congress. This was not because the Association finally followed Yamada’s instructions and decided to revise the resolutions but because it became clear that the resolutions were going to be discussed at a commission, to which the Chinese association would present its own draft resolutions. In the resolutions, the Chinese association proposed urging the League of Nations to take the necessary steps in order to solve the problem existing between China and Japan and insisted on the return of the Kwantung leased territory and the denunciation of the 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties, the treaties imposed on China as a result of twenty-one demands. The Japanese delegation composed of international lawyer Tachi Sakutarō and Inui Kiyosue proposed postponing the discussion of its own resolutions since they found it disadvantageous for the resolutions to be discussed together with the Chinese ones.75 The delegation also requested diplomat Sugimura Yōtarō, an eloquent speaker in French who did his doctoral degree at the University of Lyons, to participate in the Congress and to negotiate with the Chinese association. It was mainly due to Sugimura’s persistent negotiations with the Chinese representative Huang Rong-liang (黄栄良), the Chinese envoy to Austria, that the Chinese association withdrew its resolutions before the opening of the Congress.76 Sugimura participated in the subsequent IFLNS Congresses and was to become a key figure in the discussion about racial equality.

The ILO intervention

Up to the seventh Congress held in Vienna, it was the LNAJ that led the discussion at the IFLNS. Things might have developed differently if it had not been for an intervention by the International Labour Office (ILO).77

76 Matsuda to Uchida, June 13, 1923, JACAR: B06150912900, 49; “Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ]”, JACAR: B06150912900, 80–86.
77 The abbreviations of the International Labour Organization and its secretariat, the International Labour Office, are notoriously confusing in English. Hereafter, this paper refers to the former as “the International Labour Organization” and the latter as “the ILO”.

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1921, on which occasion the ILO invited delegates from League of Nations societies around the world to its bureau. The ILO kept sending its representatives to the Congress of the IFLNS from then on, but it was not until the Vienna Congress in 1923 that the Office decided to actively engage in the activities of the IFLNS. At the Congress, the Office’s representative, William Martin, held a conversation with the General Secretary of the IFLNS, Théodore Ruyssen, and discussed how the interests of the IFLNS’s member societies in the ILO could be effectively aroused. Martin had the impression that the member societies were directing their attention only to the League of Nations and were ignoring the International Labour Organization. Ruyssen also thought that it was “incontestable que nos Associations s’intéressent plus vivement aux questions d’ordre politique qui relèvent principalement de la S.D.N. elle-même, qu’aux questions qui touchent le B.I.T.” The two agreed that a prospective way forward was to add a question closely related to the ILO to the agenda of the IFLNS and organize a special commission for dealing with the question.

The IFLNS and the ILO had coincident interests, which made the agreement possible; while the Federation wished to intensify its relationship with official international organizations so as to increase its influence over international politics, the propaganda function of the IFLNS was highly attractive to the ILO, which had to take public opinion in nations around the world seriously in order to achieve its ultimate aim of fostering the ratification and implementation of international labour conventions. “In the end their success or failure must depend on the extent to which they are supported by public opinion, and public opinion can only be formed when the intelligent understanding of the people has been aroused. That is the direction in which we look for help from the League of Nations Union in each country”, said Harold Butler, the Deputy Director of the Office, to the delegates of the League of Nations societies who were invited to the Office in 1921. The ILO induced the IFLNS to pay more attention to its work in order to make the efforts it was making in the fields of labour and social welfare known to the world.

After the conversation with Martin, Ruyssen chose three questions—1) emigration, 2) treatment of foreign workers and 3) labour treaties—and

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78 Martin to Thomas, June 24, 1923, the International Labour Organization Archives (hereafter, ILOA): D 600/431/5.
79 Ruyssen to Thomas, July 10, 1923, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
80 ILOA: D 600/431/1.
suggested to the French historian and member of the *Association française pour la Société des Nations*, Jules Prudhommeaux, that the French association bring one of the three topics up for discussion at the IFLNS Congress. At the same time, Ruyssen also asked Albert Thomas, the Director General of the Office, to propose alternative questions, if any. Responding to Ruyssen’s suggestion, the French association decided to submit the question of emigration to the next IFLNS Congress and Thomas too approved of this choice. In response to the decision, Ruyssen arranged a plan to constitute a special commission for studying the problem of emigration in connection with the problem of the equitable treatment of commerce, which had been addressed by the LNAJ, and his plan soon became reality. At a meeting held in the Hague in October 1923, the General Council of the IFLNS organized the special commission for discussing several proposals, including Japanese and French ones.

The coordinated intervention made by Ruyssen, the French association and the ILO affected the later course of discussion about the Japanese proposal. Although the LNAJ had begun to restrict the subject of its proposal to the admission of the “mercantile or commercial group” and to avoid dealing with the matter of labour migration, the member societies of the IFLNS began to frame the discussion in terms of migration in general.

The Secretariat of the IFLNS was not particularly interested in migration issues. Although Ruyssen presented three conditions about a question

81 Ruyssen to Thomas, July 10, 1923, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
83 Ruyssen to Thomas, August 11, 1923, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
84 Documents in 1923 and 1924 seem to be missing because of the confusion after the Kantō earthquake on September 1, 1923. Later in this month the LNAJ asked Matsuda Michikazu to select a delegate for the meeting of the IFLNS’s general council. It also asked him to draft a proposal submitted to the council from the association. This was probably because the association could not afford to draw up a proposal immediately after the earthquake. Before the meeting of the special commission held in Paris in 1924, the LNAJ prepared a proposal on its own. This proposal was presented to the meeting as an alternative to a proposal called “Miki proposal”. Probably, the Miki proposal, whose details are unknown, was the one the Japan Office of the League of Nations drafted on the request of the LNAJ in 1923. See Yamamoto to the Plenipotentiary delegation of the Empire of Japan to the Assembly of the League of Nations, September 12, 1923, JACAR: B04013931700, 108; Sugimura to Matsui, April 2, 1924, JACAR: B06150913400, 2–3.
to be chosen by the Frence association, these conditions were quite broad and general: “1) cette question doit être importante, et d’un intérêt général, même pour des milieux qui ne se recrutent pas parmi les ouvrieres ou les industriels: 2) cette question doit être relativement complexe, pour justifier la création d’une commission spéciale: 3) cette question ne doit pas être trop litigieuse pour ne pas exposer l’Union des Associations à un échec.”

The task assigned to the Secretary was to facilitate communication among the member societies of the IFLNS as well as between the IFLNS and outside organizations, and Ruyssen was careful enough to refrain from doing anything but his duty. All he wished to do was to establish a closer relationship with the ILO and he used the emigration problem only for that purpose.

In contrast to the Secretariat of the IFLNS, the ILO was genuinely interested in migration issues. Having instituted the Migration Service within its organization, the Office wished to develop its activity in the field of international migration. What was important in this regard was that Italy under Mussonili’s rule was trying to seize the initiative on the matter of international migration by convening an international conference on migration in Rome in 1924. The Italian government was discontent with the inactive Emigration Commission of the ILO, which had been established mainly at the request of Italy but had been inactive because of opposition among emigration and immigration countries. The Office, deeply worried about the Italian action, intervened in the Rome conference in the final stage of its preparations, hoping to keep international public opinion on the side of the ILO. That was why Thomas strongly complained about the IFLNS’s having sent the text of its resolution on racial equality to the Rome conference. In a letter from April 24, 1924, the Office’s Chief of the Migration Service, Louis Varlez, communicated Thomas’ request to Ruyssen that the Secretariat of the IFLNS should consider the following points: Italy was holding the Rome conference, ignoring the International Labour Office and the League of Nations, and the latter organizations had adopted the international viewpoint, which was quite different from the national aspect the former was interested in; the two organizations had to win over resolutions satisfying their international position and for that purpose they needed the support of their friend asso-

85 Fleury to Martin, July 20, 1923, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
Thus, Varlez asked that “votre union insistât un peu sur notre rôle international et signalât nos initiatives déjà nombreuses en même temps qu’elle s’intéressait à la conférence de Rome.”

The ILO was not only interested in migration *per se* but also in establishing a connection with the LNAJ. The ILO Branch Office, which had been established in Tōkyō in November 1923, had a plan to organize a national commission on labour issues within the LNAJ, which would work together with the aforementioned special commission to be instituted by the IFLNS. On May 1, 1924, Asari Junshirō, the Director of the ILO’s Tōkyō Branch Office, visited Takano Iwasaburō and asked him for advice. The statistician known for his study on household expenditure among working-class families in an industrial district in Tōkyō was one of key figures in the interwar labour movement in Japan. Considering the character of the LNAJ as an organization established by businessmen and bureaucrats, the creation of a national commission on labour issues might have changed the shape of the Association by increasing the participation of those who were involved in the labour movement, but no such thing happened. According to an entry in Takano’s diary from May 1, 1924, he opposed Asari’s plan to establish a national commission within the LNAJ, and instead proposed to organize a new association separately from the LNAJ. Takano worried that the autonomy of the commission might be compromised if it were instituted as a subcommission of the LNAJ.

Takano’s concern was understandable in the light of his stance towards the labour movement. The chief of a non-governmental research institute, the Ōhara Institute for Social Research, was wary of government interven-

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86 Thomas to Varlez, April 9, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6. Varlez was a Belgian specialist on social problems, known for his initiative in introducing unemployment insurance in Ghent. He was also one of the social reformers who had been engaged in international activities before the First World War. Sacriste and Vauchez regard Varlez as a typical example of international legal experts who emerged in the 1920s. See Guillaume Sacriste and Vauchez, “The Force of International Law: Lawyers’ Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s”, 92. For l’association internationale pour la lutte contre le chômage, the international organization founded by Varlez, see Rainer Gregarek, “Le mirage de l’Europe sociale. Associations internationales de politique sociale au tournant du 20e siècle”, *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire* 48 (1995): 109.

87 Varlez to Ruyssen, April 24, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6.

88 *Takano Iwasaburō Nikki* [The diary of Takano Iwasaburō], May 1, 1924, at the Digital Archives of the Ōhara Institute for Social Research at Hōsei University.
tion in the labour movement. For instance, he was opposed to a government plan of establishing a semi-governmental, labour-management cooperation organization called Kyōchō kai. In his opinion, such an organization would pre-empt the natural development of trade unionism in Japan. It should be noted that the president of Kyōchō kai, which was established in 1919, was Tokugawa Iesato and one of its vice-presidents was Shibusawa Eiichi, exactly the same personnel as in the LNAJ. Takano might have seen the LNAJ in the same way as he saw Kyōchō kai. Takano had also had the bitter experience of being embroiled in a dispute between the government and the labour unions over the selection of a workers’ representative to the first International Labour Conference. The problem was that the Japanese government appointed a committee to elect a workers’ delegate to the Conference, instead of allowing trade unions to select the delegate by themselves. It was Takano who was chosen to be the delegate and he decided to accept the request, thinking that to do so was the best thing he could do. The largest independent trade union Yūai kai, however, severely criticized the government’s intervention in the selection, although the union itself felt no animosity towards Takano. In the face of the opposition from the labour side, Takano eventually declined to go to the Conference. He also took responsibility for his behaviour and resigned his professorship at Tōkyō Imperial University.

There is no doubt that Takano’s decision had an effect on the relationship between the ILO and the LNAJ in an important way. However, even if Takano had endorsed Asari’s plan, there must have been many problems to be solved before establishing a commission within the LNAJ, because the LNAJ was very unwilling to tackle labour issues. At a Board of Directors’ meeting of the Association on April 11, Hozumi Shigetō proposed revising the statutes of the Association and institute a commission which would deal with issues relating to the International Labour Organization. But the Board rejected his proposal. This indicates that the LNAJ was, to say the least, uninterested in strengthening its partnership with the ILO.

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89 Ōshima Kiyoshi, Takano Iwasaburō den [Biography of Takano Iwasaburō] (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1968), 120.
90 Ibid., 145–165.
91 The LNAJ, “Kaimu hōkoku, dai 21 shū [The bulletin, no. 21]”, in Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 36, 576. Although Hozumi’s idea of creating a commission on labour issues was quite similar to Asari’s plan, it is unknown whether there was any communication between the two.
A letter from Thomas to Asari on June 25 shows that the latter had given up his attempt to institute a national commission within the LNAJ and was now planning to organize a totally new association. Thomas was disappointed that the Tōkyō Office abandoned the original plan, but left the final decision to the Tōkyō Office. He also agreed that the highest priority should be given to gaining autonomy: “Si l’Association [the LNAJ] est, comme vous nous le laisses entendre, une Association solide et efficace, peut-être y a-t-il lieu de ne pas créer en face d’elle une autre Association. Mais elle devrait vraiment comprendre que l’autonomie est nécessaire. La Société des Nations elle-même reconnaît l’autonomie du Bureau. Dans les Associations privées, il serait souhaitable que le même principe fût adopté.”

Asari established *Kokusai rōdō kyōkai* (the International Labour Association, hereafter, ILA) in March 1925. As could be expected from the above episode, the ILA became an organization completely independent from, or even in conflict with, the LNAJ to such extent that the directorate of the LNAJ rejected Asari’s request to donate 500 to 1,000 yen for the establishment of the ILA.

The central figures of the LNAJ probably did not know that the Secretariat of the IFLNS, the French association and the ILO had cooperated in establishing a special commission within the Federation. The directorate of the LNAJ held a meeting on March 1, 1924, to prepare for a session of the special commission scheduled at the end of the same month. Those who participated in the meeting—Shibusawa Eiichi, Sakatani Yoshirō, Yamakawa Tadao, Hayashi Kiroku, Yamada Saburō, Tachi Sakutarō, Inui Kiyosue, Takagi Yasaka and the two diplomats Kawashima Shintarō and Matsushima Shikao—made minor revisions to the Association’s previous draft resolutions. The new resolutions were as follows:

**Resolution 1** “Without involving the immigration question, a member nation of the League of nations *[sic]* shall apply the same requirements for admittance to and departure from that country, to the classes of people of other member nations, who fall within the commercial or mercantile group, irrespective of their origin or nativity.”

**Resolution 2** “In the establishment of business, trade, occupation, profession or commercial, industrial, insurance or banking enterprises, foreign nationals, persons, firms and corporations, shall enjoy the equal treatment as the native nationals or establishments of like kind, it being understood that where excep-

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92 Thomas to Asari, June 25, 1924, ILOA: C 1402.
93 Aoki Setsuichi to Shiraishi Kitarō, May 2, 1925, Shibusawa archives [hereafter, SA]: 135/04/184.
tions are made by reason of public order or security, they are to be applicable to all foreigners alike.

Resolution 3 “Likewise in conducting or engaging in business, trade, etc same as resolution 2 [sic].”

The Association deleted Resolution No. 10 on the equal treatment of nationals and foreigners under the law, which had been included in the original document. It also divided Resolution No. 9 into two resolutions on starting a business (Resolution 2) and that on conducting business (Resolution 3). The reason for the division was to gain the approval of the IFLNS Congress, at least for the latter provision on conducting business. Another seemingly minor but significant change was that the Association limited the application of the new resolutions to the member countries of the League of Nations, excluding, among others, the United States. This made the resolutions look more moderate than the original ones.

The meeting of the special commission was held in Paris on March 25, attended by familiar members like Célestin Bouglé and Seic Ton-fa as well as new members such as the French politician Bertrand Nogaro and the Greek diplomat and international lawyer Nicolas Politis. The Japanese member of the commission was the diplomat Usami Uzuhiko. At the meeting Politis and Nogaro raised an objection to Resolution 1, arguing that certain countries which were rich but whose populations were small would be afraid of opening their territory to foreigners.

Thus, although the commission adopted Resolutions 2 and 3, it was decided that Resolution 1 would be further examined at the eighth Congress, which was to be held in Lyons from June 27 to July 2 in 1924.

The atmosphere of the Congress, however, became unprecedentedly tense because of the 1924 Immigration Act in the United States. The 1924 Act, which effectively barred immigration from Japan to America, provoked the Japanese public. The LNAJ decided at its general meeting on April 23 to send a statement to the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association and the American League of Nations Union and requested these...
organizations do their best to prevent the enactment of the Act. The LNAJ also ordered delegates to the eighth Congress—the former Governor of the Bank of Japan, Inoue Junnosuke, the legal scholar Takayanagi Kenzō, the economist Shiozawa Masasada and several diplomats including Sugimura Yōtarō—to explain to the Congress’s audience “the cause of the Japanese exclusion, the history leading up to the Act, the feelings of the peace-loving Japanese people who patiently endure this humiliation, and the Association’s ceaseless effort to calm down the agitated public opinion.” What made the Congress more conflict-laden than ever was the decision of the American League of Nations Non-Partisan Association to send its representative across the Atlantic to the Congress. The associations of Japan and the United States, which were in an explosive situation, faced each other in Lyons.

The Japanese delegation submitted its resolutions to the final commission meetings held immediately before the Plenary Congress on June 27 and 28. The ILO representative Louis Varlez, who attended the meetings, agreed to the resolutions. He also proposed studying ways of applying the principles formulated by the resolutions, and expressing the hope that the League of Nations and the ILO would examine those ways and that the Secretariat of the IFLNS would enquire into the difficulties present in various countries as well as the conditions in which those principles could be realized. Varlez’s proposals clearly showed that the ILO wished to develop its relationship with the IFLNS. The commission unanimously adopted the Japanese resolutions and Varlez’s proposals. It also decided at the meetings to deal with the problem of immigration in general, as had been planned by the Secretariat of the IFLNS, the French association and the ILO. The Japanese association, which had restricted the subject of its resolutions to the migration of the commercial or mercantile group, might

97 “Shadanhōjin kokusai renmei kyōkai dai 4 kai tsūjō sōkai gijiroku [The protocol of the fourth annual assembly of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B04013932000, 69–72.
98 Shidehara to Wakatsuki, June 27, 1924, JACAR: B05014049000, 67–68. Someone added a few sentences in the telegram, “But openly bringing up the matter of Japanese exclusion is not allowed either, because such an act will have a negative effect on the problem of the twenty-one demands on China. It is, therefore, requested to find appropriate measures to achieve our purpose.” The LNAJ was worried that touching on a political problem might provoke the Chinese association, since the Japanese association had prevented the Chinese association from bringing up its political problems with Japan.
99 Varlez to Thomas, June 30, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6.
be surprised by this unexpected turn of events, but it also agreed to the decision, seeing the willingness of the commission to discuss the problem of immigration.

Although the commission members were generally supportive of the LNAJ, the Congress was not. At the session of the Congress held on July 1, the American representative and historian Clyde Duniway strongly opposed the commission’s draft resolutions. He insisted on referring the resolutions back to the commission, arguing that the majority of his fellow citizens did not support the principle of racial equality. The resolutions, he said, entailed “the disadvantage of involving the League of Nations in a question which lay within the exclusive province of the sovereignty of States.”

Sugimura and Bouglé objected to Duniway’s proposal. Sugimura vigorously insisted on the adoption of the resolutions at the Congress, and Bouglé maintained that the American argument was “aimed at preventing all questions affecting the sovereignty of States from being examined by the Congress.” The Congress, unable to settle the differences of opinion, decided to entrust the task of finding a solution to a committee composed of Bouglé, Duniway, Inoue Junnosuke and a representative of the Swiss association, Albert Picot.

The committee modified the commission’s resolutions and the Congress eventually adopted this modified version of the resolutions. The new texts approved almost all the original provisions in the Japanese resolutions and Varlez’s proposals, and further stated that the Congress reaffirmed its principles on the equitable treatment of races, which had been adopted at the sixth Congress. But the resolutions included the sentence that “The Congress understands that the above resolutions do not involve the question of immigration.”

The adopted resolutions were clearly the results of compromise between the Japanese and American associations, and the compromise was mutually satisfactory. While the American association was pleased

100 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, HUITIÈME ASSEMBLÉE et SESSION DU CONSEIL GÉNÉRAL, JACAR: B05014049500, 53.
101 Ibid., 54.
102 Ibid., 79.
that it could prevent the problem of immigration from being discussed at
the eighth Congress, the Japanese association was happy that the Congress
decided to continue the discussion on this matter. The Congress asked the
Federation to institute an enquiry into “the difficulties to be encountered in
the application of these principles [on the equitable treatment of foreign-
ers] and into the conditions under which the said principles can be
applied”.\footnote{Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, \textit{HUITIÈME ASSEMBLÉE et SESSION DU CONSEIL GÉNÉRAL}, JACAR: B05014049500, 79.}

The Japanese delegation was encouraged by the fact that most of the member societies, apart from the American association, were sympa-
thetic to the Japanese position. Sugimura said, “While the speech given
by the American representative caused disappointment and opposition
among the audience in spite of his unusual eloquence, the same audience
loudly applauded my speech. This, I believe, shows the trend of world
opinion about the problem between Japan and the United States.”\footnote{Sugimura Yōtarō, “Lyon no kokusai renmei kyōkai rengōkai [The assembly of
the IFLNS in Lyons]”, JACAR: B05014049200, 8.}

To Sugimura, the eighth Congress was a success in another respect. At this
Congress, the Chinese association finally abandoned its attempt to bring
up the problem between China and Japan with the IFLNS. Although the
Japanese association had expected that the Chinese association would
present a new proposal on Chinese-Japanese relations, the Chinese associ-
ation refrained from doing so. Sugimura welcomed this decision, thinking
that this was the expression of the Chinese association’s will to develop a
friendship with the Japanese association.\footnote{Ibid., 8–9.}

Probably, the only party which was disappointed with the results was
the ILO. Thomas thought the debate by the IFLNS was not thorough and
disregarded it as “assez médiocre”.\footnote{Thomas to Valrez, July 9, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6.}

Varlez was also convinced that much more research was needed before the controversy between Japan and the United States was finally resolved. He must have realized the extent of the discord between the two countries. In a letter from February 23, 1925, he told Thomas that “pour eux [Japonais] l’heure des grandes résolutions en matière d’égalité de races et d’émigration n’est pas encore venue. On n’en est encore qu’aux travaux de recherches: voyez les propo-
French proposal on the admission of foreigners into a country

The General Council of the IFLNS decided at a meeting held in London on October 14, 1924, to entrust the French association with the task of organizing a commission composed of the associations concerned with the problem of immigration. This decision was meant to transfer the initiative for drafting reports and resolutions from Japan to France, but the Japanese association did not object to the decision. Rather, the Japanese association welcomed it because the Japanese association had the impression that the French association was sympathetic to the Japanese position.

The French association selected Célestin Bouglé, Bertrand Nogaro, the trade unionist Hyacinthe Dubreuil and the legal scholar William Oualid as commission members, and appointed the historian Alphonse Aulard as chairman of the commission. Those who participated in the meetings of the commission, held four times from December 23, 1924, to January 27, 1925, were representatives from Armenia, China, Czechoslovakia, England, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania and Russia. The Japanese representative was Shiozawa Masasada, professor of economics at Waseda University.

The Paris commission selected four topics for discussion—the rights and duties of immigrants, the conditions of admission of foreigners to a country of immigration, the problem of assimilation and the international protection of emigrants—and appointed Dubreuil, Oualid and Bouglé as rapporteurs on each topic respectively (Bouglé took charge of the last two topics). Most of the commission members, including Shiozawa, paid the greatest attention to the report on the conditions of admission of foreigners prepared by Oualid, a professor at the Paris Law Faculty who was known as a specialist on migration issues. According to a letter from Ruyssen to

109 Hayashi to Shidehara, October 17, 1924, JACAR: B06150913500, 6.
Thomas, the French association had already asked Oualid to study the topic in April 1924.\textsuperscript{111}

Oualid’s report included the most detailed analysis the IFLNS made in the interwar period about the problem of immigration. The report’s preamble was as follows:

Considérant que le droit d’admission et d’établissement de l’immigrant dans un pays étranger a, comme limite, le droit souverain de l’État d’immigration de déterminer les conditions d’accès de son territoire aux éléments étrangers; Considérant, toutefois, que ce droit souverain doit s’exercer dans des conditions d’objectivité, de publicité, de régularité respectueuses de l’égalité entre Etats et exclusives de tout arbitraire, sous peine de dégénérer en abus et de méconnaître le principe de l’égalité des nations, base de toute vie juridique internationale et garantie du bon fonctionnement et de l’essor de la Société des Nations;

Considérant, en conséquence, que les limitations légales ou réglementaires reconnues nécessaires au droit d’accès du territoire, ne sauraient s’appliquer en principe aux Etats ou aux races, comme tels, mais doivent viser exclusivement les individus;

Qu’en ce qui tache ces dernier, ces limitations ne doivent être motivées que par des considérations de sauvegarde et de sécurité physique et économique ou morale et intellectuelle de la nation et qu’elles doivent être mises en vigueur, quand elles sont édictées, avec les délais et les notifications, la modération et l’humanité requis pour en atténuer les conséquences dommageables;

Considérant aussi que les principes énoncés ci-dessus supposent la mise en vigueur de principes correspondants de la part des pays d’émigration, qui ne sauraient restreindre la liberté de sortie de leurs nationaux ou leur acheminement vers la destination de leur choix qu’en raison de considérations de même ordre et formulées dans les mêmes conditions d’objectivité et de publicité […]\textsuperscript{112}

The line of argument was not unique. The report started by recognizing that immigrants’ right of admission to and residence in a foreign country was limited by the sovereign right of states to determine the conditions of foreigners’ access to their territory, and then argued that the right of foreigners to enter the territory of a country must not be limited on the grounds of their nationality or race, because even in exercising the

\textsuperscript{111} Ruyssen to Thomas, April 5, 1924, ILOA: D 600/431/6. On Oualid and immigration studies in France in the early 20th century, see Benoît Larbiou, “Organiser l’immigration. Sociogenèse d’une politique publique (1910–1930)

\textsuperscript{112} Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, BULLETIN Nr 2: Les Réunions de Bruxelles et de Paris, JACAR: B05014050100, 92.
sovereign right to determine the conditions of admission states had to respect the principle of the equality of nations, which the report said formed the basis of all “international juridical life”. This was not much different from the argumentation of von Bar examined in the first chapter. The uniqueness of the report rather lay in its specification of the conditions of admission of foreigners. Oualid contended that limiting the admission of foreigners must exclusively refer to individuals, not to states or races, and be motivated only by considerations about the “physical and economic” or “moral and intellectual” protection and security of the immigration country, and concluded that states must select immigrants only according to objective criteria, such as their age, state of health, economic value, educational background or criminal record, and not on the basis of their nationality or race. The detail of the conditions of admission Oualid endorsed was as follows:

Que le droit d’admission en pays étranger, corollaire de la liberté individuelle de déplacement, ne puisse être limité que par application de principes scientifiques et objectifs, tenant compte :
de l’âge et de la santé des immigrants ;
de leur valeur économique et de leur degré d’instruction ;
de leur moralité, objectivement attestée par la production d’un extrait de casier judiciaire, ou une caution émanant de nationaux honorables de pays d’immigration ;
Que ces conditions d’admission, ainsi que toute modification dont elles feraient l’objet, soient notifiées, en temps utile, aux nationaux ou associations intéressés [...].

The report incorporated the Japanese point of view by supporting the principle of racial equality, whereas the idea of using the attributes of individual immigrants as criteria for selection was new and foreign to the Japanese association. The French association, founded in the largest immigration country in Europe, had shown a positive attitude towards establishing some sort of international principle on international migration since long before the creation of the Paris commission. As has been mentioned, it was the French association that chose the problem of emigration from among three alternatives suggested by Ruyssen.

The internal documents of the French association have been dispersed with the result that it is impossible to reconstruct what was discussed among the members of the French association. However, the records of

113 Ibid., 92.
one of its constituent organizations, la Ligue des droit de l’homme, are still available. The Ligue was a civil liberties organization established in the middle of the Dreyfus affair, whose objective was to defend the rights of man. Importantly, the two central members of the Paris commission, Oualid and Bouglé, were members of the Ligue and they discussed the problem of immigration within the Ligue around the same time as the Paris commission.114 Several articles published in Cahiers des droits de l’homme, the official organ of the Ligue, show that the two had two motives for dealing with the problem of immigration: the protection of foreigners’ human rights and the regulation of labour supply in France.115

In his article contributed to Cahiers in January 1925, Oualid stated that France would become “le refuge des «indésirables» du monde entier” if it abandoned the right of expulsion in the age when in both America and Europe barriers to foreigners being admitted were being erected.116 But he did not think that his country should renounce its faith in the individual liberty proclaimed by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen as well as in its own tradition of hospitality.117 Rather, he believed that an equitable balance should be achieved between humanitarian treatment of individuals on French territory and the protection of French national labour. It was from these considerations that he developed the idea of using individual attributes as criteria for selecting immigrants. In so doing, however, he seems to have given a relatively higher priority to the labour market regulation. At a meeting of the Ligue held on February 16, Oualid concurred with Henri Guernut’s remark that “on se montre prudent pour l’admission, mais il faut être juste dans l’expulsion”, and proposed making the conditions for the admission of foreigners severer instead of misusing the right of expulsion.118 Here he advocated essentially the same criteria as he had advocated at the Paris commission:

117 Ibid., 34.
Il faudrait exiger, que les étrangers admis à séjourner en France remplissent certaines conditions physiques, morales et économiques. Conditions physiques: qu'ils ne soient pas tarés ou atteints d'affections contagieuses; conditions morales: qu'ils aient de bons antécédents et ne viennent pas grossir les rangs des maltaiteurs; conditions économiques: qu'ils soient capables d'exercer un métier [...].

Bouglé, who was present at the same meeting, was much more outspoken. He insisted on introducing a quota system for immigrants, saying that the system was necessary for the national interests of France, especially for the purpose of protecting national labour. “C’est évidemment un droit de l’homme d’aller où il veut, de faire ce qui lui plaît. Néanmoins, des conversations avec des ouvriers et avec des étrangers m’ont convaincu qu’il fallait une réglementation, surtout pour le contingentement à l’entrée. Et cette réglementation doit être inspirée par un souci d’intérêt national. Les voeux des organisations ouvrières sont conformes à cet intérêt. Elles aussi demandent le contingentement, et le refoulement.”

These remarks clearly show that both Oualid and Bouglé, while acknowledging the importance of protecting foreigners’ human rights, approved of selecting immigrants or limiting their number in order to regulate labour supply in France.

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119 Ibid., 158.
120 Ibid., 158.
Most of the LNAJ members welcomed the Oualid report as a great step forward. For example, Yamada Saburō showed a positive reaction to the report and informed the Japan committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations of its content. The Japan committee of the IPR was a newly established international cooperation organization, whose membership largely overlapped with that of the LNAJ (see Table 2.6) and whose council members included all of the council members of the Japanese-American Relations Committee.\(^{121}\) At a meeting of the Japan committee of the IPR on April 29, 1925, Yamada, who acted as rapporteur on the immigration problem, talked about the Paris commission’s proposals. In the margin of a document delivered at the meeting, someone wrote a fragmentary line which read, “the League of Nations associations; resolutions; the limitation of admission should be based not on races or religions but on merit”.\(^{122}\)

A legal scholar and member of the Japan committee, Takayanagi Kenzō, might have utilized the information provided by Yamada when he wrote a paper submitted to the first conference of the IPR held in Hawaii. Takayanagi’s paper, which is said to have “attracted the audience’s attention as one of the most scientific and important papers presented at the Hawaii conference”, made substantially the same propositions as those in the Oualid report.\(^{123}\)

With regard to the conditions on which the admission of immigration should be based, I submit the following:

1. The conditions or standards of admission should be objective and open.
2. They should not disregard the principle of equality of states.
3. They should be administered not arbitrarily, but according to rules.
4. They should not make any discrimination on the grounds of race or nationality.
5. They should be based on personal merit, such as age, health, education, moral and pecuniary conditions of the immigrant.\(^{124}\)

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\(^{121}\) Ogata, “Kokusaishugi dantai no yakuwari”, 313–314.

\(^{122}\) “Dai 2 kai dai 1 bukai (imin/jinshu) [The second meeting of the first section on immigration and race]”, Takagi Yasaka Papers (hereafter, TYP): 1/1/196.

\(^{123}\) Katagiri Nobuo, Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai no kenkyū [A Study on the Institute of Pacific Relations] (Tōkyō, Keiō daigaku shuppan kai, 2003), 65.

\(^{124}\) Takayanagi Kenzō, “A suggestion for more enlightened immigration and emigration policies”, in Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session, June 30–July 14, 1925: History, Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses (Honolulu, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925), 111. See also Takayanagi Kenzō,
The international lawyer Tachi Sakutarō also mentioned the Oualid report in his study on the meaning of domestic questions. He conducted the study as part of the project for the codification of international law, the largest enterprise undertaken by the Society of International Law in the interwar years. The aim of the project was to develop international law by drawing up its draft code. Tachi was in charge of the topic of domestic questions, whose scope was often disputed in discussions on immigration problems. In his report, the professor of international law at Tōkyō Imperial University referred to the French association’s proposals and, in a somewhat reserved manner, described them as pointing to the theoretical possibility of applying the notion of “the abuse of rights” to international law.

The Japanese media also reported the details of the discussion at the Paris commission. Shigenori Raisuke, a correspondent for the Ōsaka asahi newspaper in Paris, wrote the most enthusiastic article. “As Ōsaka asahi’s editorial has insisted, the immigration problem in the United States has not been solved yet. And now an ally has appeared who supports us”, said Shigenori in his long article. He praised the Paris commission reports as important documents drafted by an “impartial organization”, and argued, “Although the resolutions, if passed, will not become a binding international treaty [...] they will be regarded as the expression of world opinion and, therefore, give us moral and spiritual support.”

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125 On the project, see Banzai Hiroyuki, “Kokusaihō no hōtenka to kokuren kokusaihō iinkai [The codification of international law and the UN commission on international law]”, Waseda hōgaku 78 no. 4 (2002): 261–263.

126 Tachi Sakutarō, “Kokunai-teki mondai no igi [The meaning of the domestic question]”, JACAR: B07080300300, 74. But he was somewhat pessimistic about the theoretical possibility and even thought that using such a vague notion as the abuse of rights was dangerous. When he published this study in French, he deleted the reference to the French proposals. Sakutaro Tachi, La Souveraineté et l’Indépendence de l’État et les Questions intérieures en Droit International (Paris: Les éditions internationales, 1930), 100.

127 Shigenori Raisuke, “Imin mondai no kōseina kaiketsu saku [A fair plan for resolving the immigration issue]”, Ōsaka asahi shinbun, April 11, 12, 29, 1925.

128 Ibid.
A defeat at the ninth Congress of the IFLNS

To prepare a final report to be submitted to the IFLNS Congress, the Paris commission held two meetings on February 7 and 8, inviting member societies which had not participated in the previous meetings. At the meetings, Shiozawa proposed deleting a sentence in the Oualid report that described the quota system as an acceptable method of limiting the admission of immigrants, and the commission approved his proposal. Obviously, he had the immigration control system in the United States in mind. But apart from this minor revision, Shiozawa was greatly in favour of the commission’s work and paid the highest compliment to Oualid.

By contrast, the American representative William H. Buckler opposed the commission making a final report, arguing that the General Council meeting in London had only entitled the commission to conduct a preparatory study on immigration. The member societies, he said, should be able to conduct a study on the same topic before the commission drew up a final report.129 The delegate from the British association, Walter Napier, agreed to Buckler’s observation and stated that if the commission wished to keep the question of immigration on its agenda, the British association would submit a counter-proposal. Responding to the American and British opposition, the commission checked the protocols of the Lyons Congress as well as the London meeting and confirmed that the commission was authorized to deal with the question of the conditions of admission of foreigners. But the commission agreed that the General Secretariat of the Federation would send the commission’s report to the member societies before the next Congress so that they would be able to examine its content and raise their objections, if any, to it.

Following this agreement, Ruyssen circulated the Paris commission’s documents among the member societies and, in response to them, the British association officially submitted a counter-proposal on June 9, 1925, in which the British association insisted on the postponement of the discussion on the commission’s report. The LNAJ, believing that the intention of the British association was to kill the ideal proposal formulated by the Paris commission, determined to do its best to have the pro-

129 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, BULLETIN Nr 2: Les Réunions de Bruxelles et de Paris, JACAR: B05014050100, 63

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proposal passed at the ninth Congress scheduled to be held in Warsaw from July 3 to 8.\footnote{Usami Uzuhiko, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai dai 9 kai sōkai ni kansuru hōkoku imin mondai [Report on the ninth assembly of the League of Nations Societies: immigration problems]”, JACAR: B05014050500, 58.}

However, immediately before the Warsaw Congress it turned out that the rules of procedure in the IFLNS were disadvantageous to the Japanese association. They prescribed that a counter-proposal must be examined prior to an original proposal. Following this procedure, the commission on political questions held on July 5 discussed the British proposal presented by Lady Gladstone instead of the commission’s report. Here, she argued that adopting the commission’s proposal was difficult in the present circumstances in which South Africa, for instance, was restricting the immigration of Indians. A Japanese delegate, Sugimura Yōtarō, quickly replied to her argument. He stated that the commission’s resolutions were aimed at establishing general principles and that detailed rules concerning the application of those principles could be laid down through negotiations among the authorities of the governments around the world. Sugimura argued that “Our task is to educate world opinion and to establish impartial principles according to our conscience.”\footnote{Ibid., 59.} Notwithstanding his vehement opposition, however, the commission adopted the British proposal with only two dissenting votes from the Chinese and Japanese associations with the result that the discussion on the commission’s proposal was postponed to the next Congress.

Immediately after the meeting ended in Japan’s defeat, Sugimura asked Alphonse Aulard for help. Although the French historian had served as the chairman of the Paris commission, he was absent from the meeting of the commission on political questions because he had to chair a different commission held at the same time. He accepted Sugimura’s request and attended the next meeting of the commission on political questions. At this meeting, Aulard demanded to have the British proposal re-examined, complaining that the vote had taken place when he was unable to participate in it. The commission accepted his request and allowed the societies of Britain, France and Japan to discuss among themselves and submit a new proposal during the sessions of the Congress.

Until the very end of the Congress, Sugimura continued to negotiate with member societies to find a solution. The British association, however,
showed little willingness to compromise. The Association proposed a compromise text which deleted only the phrase that circumstances did not permit the adoption of a final resolution. Sugimura, on the other hand, requested the British delegation to approve the principles incorporated into the commission’s reports. But the British side rejected his request, insisting that racial distinction was necessary. After the first round of negotiations with the British association had failed, Sugimura held talks with Aulard and drew up a new proposal which maintained that recognizing the principles formulated by the Paris commission, especially the principle of racial equality, was essential to solving immigration problems and suggested adopting all the resolutions that could be adopted at the present Congress and postponing discussion of the rest to the next year.

With the new proposal in hand, Sugimura conducted the second round of negotiations with the British delegation. On July 7 he met with the British scholar Alfred Zimmern, who was known for his contribution to the development of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, the predecessor of UNESCO. But the renowned internationalist rejected Sugimura’s proposal, saying that the British association could by no means accept the principle of racial equality. On the same day, Sugimura also met with an American representative and pacifist activist, Theodore Marburg, suspecting that the American association was cooperating with the British behind the scenes. Marburg was one of the founding members of the American League to Enforce Peace who had urged the Japanese to participate in the League of Nations movement before the end of the First World War. But there was no chance of gaining support from him, who argued against Sugimura from the viewpoint of eugenics.

Now, it was obvious to all that the word “race” in the commission’s proposals aroused such strong opposition among the British and American delegates. On July 8, therefore, Aulard and the British association drew up a compromise resolution, carefully avoiding the use of the word. The Japanese delegation had no alternative but to agree to the compromise plan, which stated only vaguely that the original proposals formulated by the Paris commission were in accord with the ideal of the League of
Nations. “Now that the British association’s intransigent attitude had become clear, it was futile to insist on changing the wording”, said one of the Japanese delegates named Inagaki Morikatsu in his report on the Congress.\textsuperscript{134} The Congress decided to adopt only a minor resolution that had been incorporated into the commission’s report and postponed the discussion on the rest of it to the next year.\textsuperscript{135}

This decision was a decisive defeat to the LNAJ, an event which was so devastating that after the ninth Congress the LNAJ members began to withdraw from the attempt to propagate the idea of racial equality one after another. Diplomats were the first to lose their motivation. A telegram sent from the LNAJ to Matsuda Michikazu, then chief of the Japan Office of the League of Nations in Paris, on October 21, 1925, requested Sugimura to attend the meeting of the next General Council of the IFLNS and do his best to pass the rest of the proposals formulated by the Paris commission as early as possible.\textsuperscript{136} Shibusawa, the chairman of the LNAJ, himself had given his assent to the request.\textsuperscript{137} But Sugimura refused to be the LNAJ’s delegate to the Council meeting. Considering the confrontation caused by the discussion in Warsaw, he said, it was clear that the situation was not ripe for fulfilling the request: “If our hasty action only provokes the American and British associations, it will in the long run be counterproductive to the solution of immigration problems.”\textsuperscript{138} Adachi Mineichirō was of the same opinion. In a telegram sent to Shibusawa, he stated that nobody wished to raise the same question once again. “No matter how hard we try,” he complained, “we will be unable to make a small difference. On the contrary, our efforts may provoke the nations concerned and aggravate the conflict with them.”\textsuperscript{139} He concluded his telegram with a definite sentence that there was “no other way but to shelve the problem [of immigration] for a while.”\textsuperscript{140} In response to Sugimura and Adachi, the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134} Inagaki, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai rengōkai dai 9 kai sōkai ni kansuru hōkoku imin mondai ni kansuru uramen no keika”, JACAR: B05014050500, 89.
\item \textsuperscript{135} English newspapers scarcely reported the postponement of the discussion on immigration problems. “League of Nations Union: Warsaw Congress Concluded”, \textit{The Times}, July 10, 1925.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Shidehara to Matsuda, October 21, 1925, JACAR: B05014050500, 96.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Shibusawa jimusho [Shibusawa office] to Ōkuma Makoto, October 21, 1925, SA: 135/04/135.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Sugimura to Shidehara, October 22, 1925, JACAR: B06150914000, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Adachi to Shidehara, October 23, 1925, JACAR: B06150914000, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 4.
\end{itemize}
LNAJ toned down its request. The Association still asked Sugimura to attend the Council meeting but allowed him to act as he thought proper.\textsuperscript{141} This time Sugimura accepted the request and attended the meeting held in October. But he was no longer enthusiastic about the LNAJ’s activities. He declined to attend further meetings, saying that it was “unpleasant for a diplomat to attend the meeting of the IFLNS, whose objective was to criticize the governments around the world.”\textsuperscript{142} This was Sugimura’s farewell message to the IFLNS.

In the face of the opposition from diplomats who were afraid of jeopardizing the relationship with Western countries, the other non-diplomat members of the LNAJ also began to change their opinion. Although every member society of the IFLNS was free to submit a new proposal to the tenth Congress scheduled from June 29 to July 3, 1926, the Japanese association did nothing. It was only the British association that presented a proposal.

Interestingly enough, the British association announced its intention to deal with the matters of admitting foreigners into a state and the treatment of foreigners in that state after their admission in its proposal. It declared that “the time has arrived when the States which have signed the Peace Treaties or adhered to the Covenant of the League must carefully consider the principles which ought to govern international relations in these matters.”\textsuperscript{143} Although, the proposal admitted, British jurists in pre-war times had regarded both matters as those within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, continental jurists had allowed a wider field for the operation of international law, as could be seen from the 1892 resolutions of the IDI. Considerable changes had taken place since the war and “all matters likely to give rise to war” had been brought into the “international arena”.\textsuperscript{144} In marked contrast to its former attitude, the British association showed its readiness to cooperate with other associations to discuss basic principles concerning international migration.

In relation to the first matter of admitting foreigners into a state, the British association suggested the following four principles:

\textsuperscript{141} Shidehara to Sugimura, October 24, 1925, JACAR: B05014050500, 122.
\textsuperscript{142} Adachi to Shidehara, February 28, 1926, JACAR: B05014050700, 39.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 7.
(1) That any limitations placed on freedom of immigration should be framed so as not to act unfairly as between different States but so as to have due regard to the equality of States, which forms the foundation of all international juridical life.

(2) That such limitations should be objective, specific and clearly defined, and should be published as widely as possible and should not be brought into operation without reasonable notice.

(3) That such limitations should be enforced equally, openly, regularly, without caprice, and with such moderation and humanity as may be required for mitigating prejudicial consequences.

(4) That the States which are members of the League of Nations should cooperate by means of the machinery of the League for securing that any limitations placed on freedom of immigration shall be in accordance with the above principles, and for minimising the risk that injustice or international fraction may arise through the methods adopted for regulating immigration.\textsuperscript{145}

The British proposal derived many phrases from the Oualid report, such as “international juridical life” (“vie juridique internationale”), “equally, openly, regularly” (“dans des conditions d’objectivité, de publicité, de régularité”), or “moderation and humanity” (“la modération et l’humanité”). But there were various differences between the two documents. The largest one was that while the Oualid report used the word “race”, the British proposal stated only that limiting the admission of foreigners should pay due regard to the equality of “States”. Furthermore, the stipulation that limiting the admission of foreigners into a state must exclusively refer to individuals and take the specific conditions of admitting foreigners into consideration disappeared completely. As regards the second matter of the treatment of foreigners within a state after their admission to it, the British association was more protective than the Paris commission. It is true that the British document maintained that “all nations should accord to foreigners living within their territories equal legal and economic rights with their own nationals” in the same way as the Paris document, and even stated that “no distinction should be made, on grounds of difference in race or nationality, in the treatment of foreigners after admission.”\textsuperscript{146} But it added an important qualifying clause to the stipulation: “except when the avoidance of such distinction is incompatible with the political, economic and social security of the State.”\textsuperscript{147} This

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 5.
was obviously intended to allow states to make exceptions and, if necessary, introduce racially discriminatory policies.

The LNAJ noticed these crucial differences between the British and Paris documents. Inagaki Morikatsu, who in 1926 was appointed to the resident representative of the LNAJ in Europe,\textsuperscript{148} presented a report to the LNAJ, in which he compared the two texts and correctly pointed out that the British one did not necessarily follow the principles of racial equality and the equitable treatment of foreigners.\textsuperscript{149} But at the Congress held in Aberystwyth in Wales from June 29 to July 3, 1926, the LNAJ did not raise any strong objections to the British proposal. A Japanese delegate, Rōyama Masamichi, only opposed the stipulation which allowed states to make exceptions on the treatment of foreigners after admission.\textsuperscript{150} Surprisingly, the LNAJ did not propose deleting the qualifying clause (“except when the avoidance of such distinction is incompatible with the political, economic and social security of the State”) but instead proposed removing the phrase “on grounds of difference in race or nationality”. The sentence the LNAJ proposed (“No distinction should be made in the treatment of foreigners after admission except when the avoidance of such distinction is incompatible with the political, economic and social security of the State”) neither explicitly advocated the principle of racial equality nor expressly approved of making exceptions on the grounds of race or nationality. In other words, the Japanese association chose to obfuscate the point and leave racial issues untouched. The commission supported the Japanese opinion and, quite ironically, erased the term “race” at the request of the Japanese association.

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\textsuperscript{148} The LNAJ, “Dai 60 kai rijkai [The 60th council meeting]”, *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*, vol. 37, ed. Shibusawa seien zaidan ryūmon sha (Tōkyō: Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō kankō kai, 1961), 38.

\textsuperscript{149} Inagaki Morikatsu, “Imin mondai to kokusai renmei kyōkai rengōkai [Immigration problems and the IFLNS]”, JACAR: B05014050800, 75–76.

\textsuperscript{150} Rōyama Masamichi, “Keizai oyobi Shakai rippō mondai [Problems in the economy and social legislation]”, in *Aberisutouisu no taikai* [The Aberystwyth Congress], ed. Kokussai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ] (Tōkyō: Kokussai renmei kyōkai, 1926), 55–60. Inagaki’s account is somewhat different from Rōyama’s. According to Inagaki, it was the Polish delegate Alfred Halban who at the Aberystwyth Congress insisted on deleting the qualifying clause included in the British proposal. Inagaki Morikatsu, “Dai 10 kai kokusai renmei kyōkai rengō taikai ni shusseki shite [On attending the 10th Congress of the IFLNS]”, *Kokusai chishiki* 6 no. 11 (1926): 90–94. On Halban, see the next chapter of this book.
The principle of racial equality the LNAJ had long advocated was not incorporated into the IFLNS’s document, and the LNAJ’s campaign for racial equality ended without having developed into a truly global movement. The resolution at the tenth Congress had little impact on world opinion. There was one newspaper article which suspected that the Aberystwyth resolution was one of the motivations behind Lord Cecil’s proposal at the seventh Assembly of the League of Nations to limit the scope of the League’s activities.\footnote{“Seek to Restrict Sphere of League”, \textit{The New York Times}, September 21, 1926.} \textit{La Réglementation des Migrations: Les traités et les conventions internationals}, a compilation of documents concerning international migration published by the ILO, also briefly mentioned the resolution as one of the texts regarding international migration adopted by private international organizations.\footnote{Bureau International du Travail, \textit{La Réglementation des Migrations: Les traités et les conventions internationals}, vol. 3, (Gèneve: Bureau International du Travail, 1929), 21.} But there were no major publications other than these that mentioned the resolution.

The aftermath of the defeat

The discussion about race and immigration which has been examined in this chapter reveals the nature of the LNAJ’s activities in the early 1920s. Although those who made an effort to formulate the LNAJ’s policy were, apart from Inui, academics such as Hatoyama, Yamada or Shiozawa, those who actually defended the LNAJ’s proposals at the IFLNS’s Plenary Congress were diplomats, such as Sugimura especially. This demonstrates more clearly than anything that the nature of the discussion at the IFLNS was political rather than scientific. The main aim of the discussion was not to improve and share knowledge about international problems but to construct a collective will by drafting and adopting resolutions. But it was quite often the case that an attempt at collective formation of will only produced quarrels among member associations. Shiozawa thought that what he saw at the Lyons Congress was only the dominance of “national interests” over the sense of “international justice”. Describing the confrontation with the American association as a “farce”, he complained that all the allegations made at the IFLNS conference, whose aim was to estab-
lish international peace, were, in fact, “purely nationalistic”. Yamada’s advice that the LNAJ should scientifically study racial issues had little influence on the Association’s course of action. On the contrary, the direction and pace of its activities kept being determined by external international political events, like the conflict with China over Shandong or the dispute with the United States over the 1924 Immigration Act.

The presence of diplomats who saw the discussion at the IFLNS only as diplomatic bargaining of minor importance seems to have made the LNAJ’s arguments for racial equality less persuasive than they could have been. Several statements made by Sugimura at the IFLNS meetings were shocking enough to cast serious doubt on his moral sensibility. At a session of the commission on minority problems held in March 1924, for example, he replied to a question about the massacre of Koreans in the aftermath of the Kantō earthquake by saying that it was “rather praiseworthy” that the massacre had not escalated further in emergent situations at that time. Also, when Zimmern stated at the ninth Congress that Japan excluded the Chinese and the Russians, Sugimura argued that Japan had no law which excluded foreigners from entering the country and that “the number of expelled Chinese people was negligible.” But these were obvious lies. Furthermore, he told Marburg at the same Congress that it was “unpleasant for the Japanese to be compared with the black race.”

These statements clearly show that the very man who demanded racial equality entertained racist thoughts.

This chapter has also made clear that the International Labour Office intervened in the discussion about the LNAJ’s proposal of racial equality with the aim of establishing a close relationship with the Federation. A special commission for examining the question of emigration was organized according to the plan formulated by the Secretariat of the IFLNS, the ILO and the French association, and the coordination among the three helped the commission develop rapidly and smoothly. At the ninth Congress, the commission was renamed as “the International Labour Office and social legislation commission” and the Office continued to

155 Inagaki, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai rengōkai dai 9 kai sōkai ni kansuru hōkoku imin mondai ni kansuru uramen no keika”, JACAR: B05014050500, 86.
156 Ibid., 88.
strengthen its involvement in the IFLNS. The Office also attempted to establish a connection with the LNAJ, but the attempt did not succeed. The ILO’s Tókyō Branch Office planned to organize a national commission on labour issues within the LNAJ which would cooperate with the special commission of the IFLNS. But those who were involved in the labour movement in Japan preferred to gain autonomy and decided to establish a new organization outside the LNAJ. This decision, although founded on reasonable grounds, hindered the development of the relationship between the ILO and the LNAJ.

All in all, the organizational character of the LNAJ as an association chiefly managed by diplomats and people in business and financial circles continued to condition its activities in relation to the IFLNS. Since the Association was an elitist organization run by a small group of people, it could not only conceal details of the discussion about racial equality within the IFLNS from outsiders but also from rank-and-file members of the Association. By doing so, it deprived its own members of an opportunity to learn from experiencing failure. The 1925 annual report of the LNAJ only mentioned in passing that there was severe opposition to the Paris commission proposals from the American and British associations. And the report of the next year stated that the IFLNS “to a large extent” adopted the principle of the equal treatment of immigrants, which the Japanese association had long advocated. The LNAJ also published a special pamphlet about the Aberystwyth Congress, which included a chapter telling the history of the LNAJ’s campaign for racial equality up to the tenth Congress. But the chapter written by Inagaki did not mention all the details about the discord with the American and British associations at the Warsaw Congress. Sometimes the insiders of the Association not only concealed the fact that they had lost their battle for racial equality but fabricated stories. In an article published in the organ of the Society of International Law, Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi, for instance, Sugimura described the atmosphere at the ninth Congress as if it were favourable to the Japanese position. “Although the American association sent a prominent person like Marburg to the Warsaw Congress and made him repeat the same opinion that the American association had expressed...

157 The LNAJ, “Taishō 14 nendo kaimu hōkoku [The 1925 annual report of the LNAJ]”, SA: 235/16/0097, 35.
158 The LNAJ, “Taishō 15 nendo kaimu hōkoku [The 1926 annual report of the LNAJ]”, JACAR: B05014051100, 75.
on immigration problems,” he said, “all the representatives of the member societies of the IFLNS showed no sympathy for the American opinion. Far from that, they dismissed it with a laugh.”159 But as the above examination has made clear, this was not the case. A rational discussion about racial issues in public was made impossible by such concealment and falsification, and even historians in later years have experienced difficulties in reconstructing and recognizing the significance of the events that took place within the IFLNS in the early 1920s.

159 Sugimura Yōtarō, “Kokusaihō yori bankokuhō e [From international law to cosmopolitan law]”, Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi 25 no. 10 (1926): 20.
Chapter 3: The Geneva World Economy Conference and the LNAJ: 1925–1927

After the ninth Plenary Congress of the IFLNS, where the draft resolution on the conditions of the admission of foreigners to a country encountered strong opposition from the British association, the LNAJ began to see the problem of international migration from a different perspective and started to assess the relative importance of international migration in the development of the national and international economy as compared to other factors such as international trade and investment. This shift in the LNAJ’s perspective occurred in the process of developing its policy for the World Economy Conference held in Geneva in 1927. The idea of convening an international conference on the economy was first suggested by Léon Jouhaux, then secretary general of the French General Confederation of Labour (CGT), and then officially proposed by a French representative to the League of Nations, Louis Loucheur, at the sixth Assembly of the League on September 24, 1925. From the announcement of the Conference in 1925 to its opening in 1927, the LNAJ attempted to influence the outcome of the conference in a variety of ways: by proposing items to be placed on the agenda of the conference, compiling reports on international economic problems viewed from the Japanese perspective, and passing resolutions on the tasks the conference should achieve. The preparation of these documents provided the Association with an opportune moment to discuss economic problems and re-examine its policy on international migration.

Using the same approach and materials as the previous chapter, this chapter investigates the attempt the LNAJ made to exert influence on the direction of the World Economy Conference. By closely examining the course of events up to the opening of the World Economy Conference, this chapter identifies key figures in the Japanese association, illuminates their relationship with other international actors, and makes clear what they argued about the Conference. In so doing, this chapter tries to understand

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how the policy agenda of the Association was reformulated after the defeat at the ninth Congress of the IFLNS.

The second chapter followed the activities of the LNAJ from its foundation in 1919 to the failure of its advocacy for racial equality in 1925 and showed that the LNAJ was an organization mainly run by two groups of people, namely, influential people in business and financial circles like Shibusawa, on the one hand, and diplomats, on the other hand, who tried to utilize the semi-governmental international organization to create a world opinion sympathetic to Japan. Although renowned academics were members of the LNAJ, most of them participated in the LNAJ’s activities only sporadically and superficially. The examination of the IFLNS Congresses in the period mentioned has also made clear that the International Labour Office successfully intervened in the discussion about the LNAJ’s proposals on racial equality and the equitable treatment of commerce, and enhanced its relationship with the IFLNS, while the Office’s attempt to establish a connection with the LNAJ failed principally because of the unwillingness of the Japanese sympathizers of the ILO to participate in the government-dependent LNAJ.

The following examination will show that the involvement of diplomats in the LNAJ’s activities was not so frequently observed during the period from 1925 to 1927 as in the preceding years. But this does not necessarily imply that the degree of contribution other members made to the formulation of the LNAJ’s policy markedly increased in the same period, nor does it mean that the LNAJ began to devote more energy to scientific research than to political advocacy. As this chapter shows, it was rather a miscellaneous group of people—businessmen, journalists, academics etc.—who participated in the LNAJ’s discussion about the World Economy Conference. And they reached no consensus on which type of activity—scientific or political—the LNAJ should pursue. Likewise, this chapter will also make clear that the LNAJ’s relationship with other international actors did not significantly change from previous years. Although the International Labour Office gradually increased its involvement in the IFLNS, the connection between the LNAJ and the Office did not develop in a similar manner.

Seen against the background of the impasse in the discussion about international migration at the IFLNS, the crucial importance of the World Economy Conference becomes clear, because what was at issue in the LNAJ’s internal discussion about the World Economy Conference was not only the success of the conference but also the future policy direction of
the Association. The following analysis of the discussion among the LNAJ’s members will make clear that there were three different positions about the policy direction of the Association. This chapter calls the three positions labourist, free-tradist and developmentalist and distinguishes them according to the degree of importance each position attached to the problem of international migration: the labourist attached the highest importance to international migration and the free-tradist the lowest. Although almost all the members of the LNAJ believed that Japan was suffering from ‘overpopulation’ and that the only solution to the problem was to foster Japan’s industrialization, they were different in their assumption about the speed and degree of the future integration of the world economy. Labourists who expected the strongest integration to be realized in the near future placed emphasis on the necessity of improving working conditions and the establishment of the freedom of international migration, whereas developmentalists, although foreseeing integration that was as strong as the labourists predicted and advocating free international migration, assigned more importance to international investment than to international migration. By contrast, free-tradists who made the weakest assumption about the tendency towards international economic integration emphasized the necessity of establishing free international trade and, therefore, opposed proposing the matter of international migration at the Conference. As the following examination will show, the official policy the LNAJ finally endorsed was a mixture of the developmentalist and free-tradist positions.

The LNAJ’s discussion about the World Economy Conference

At the General Council meeting held in October, 1925, the IFLNS decided to express its opinion about and exert influence on the World Economy Conference, and to discuss matters relating to the Conference at its newly established International Labour Office and Social Legislation commission. Following the Council’s decision, the IFLNS requested seven member societies—America, Austria, England, France, Germany, Italy and Japan—to submit a proposal about the Conference. In response to the

2 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kaimu hōkoku dai 34 shū [The bulletin, no. 34]”, JACAR: B05014050700, 22.
request, the LNAJ sent a questionnaire to “appropriate persons and research organizations” in Japan in order to formulate its proposal.\(^3\) The questionnaire was composed of three questions: “1) Is it necessary to hold an international conference [on the economy]?; 2) if necessary, how broad should the scope of the agenda be and what topics should be included in it?; and 3) what attitude and policy should Japan adopt towards the agenda?”\(^4\)

There are no materials which help identify who received and replied to the questionnaire. The only document available is a draft proposal the LNAJ drew up based on the answers given to the questionnaire.

1. On the problem of immigration: Although there will be various approaches to the problem, the best way to begin is probably to investigate the possibility of controlling the overall supply of labour in the world from a purely economic viewpoint.
2. On the problem of raw materials: We recognize that, in order to build a world economy, improve overall industrial productivity and ensure the co-existence and co-prosperity of all humans beings, it is necessary to divorce the utilization of natural resources as much as possible from territorial considerations. Facilitating free trade of raw materials and providing equal treatment to all countries is especially urgently needed.
3. On achieving an international agreement for the abolition of differential tariffs: Tariff barriers hinder the free movement of goods and capital, disturb the balance of supply and demand, and exert a bad effect on the life and economic development of nations. Not only do differential tariffs contradict the idea of equity, but they also quite often cause tariff wars and exert adverse effects on each of the countries concerned. Although we wish all countries would agree on not imposing tariffs higher than a fixed ad valorem tariff limit, this is presumably impracticable for various reasons. We, therefore, propose that all countries of the world agree that they will abolish the multiple tariff system and that, if they establish a tariff convention, they will apply the conventional tariff to every country. These proposals should also be applied to colonies.
4. On the problem of exchange and currency: The instability of international exchange is becoming a major impediment to international commerce and trade. To achieve greater stability, countries of the world need to cooperate with each other. Those countries suffering from the fall in the exchange rate especially need to improve their domestic conditions by immediately achieving a balanced budget and by disposing of inconvertible paper currency.\(^5\)

\(^3\) Ibid., 22.
\(^4\) Ibid., 24.
\(^5\) Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 37, 7.
Apart from the above four suggestions, the draft also contained proposals to place those matters on the conference agenda which had been studied by technical committees of the League of Nations and to invite the United States and Russia to the conference.

In order to better represent the opinions of its members, the LNAJ held a special meeting on January 20, 1926, about six months after that disastrous Warsaw Congress. It was rare for the Association to convene such a special meeting open to its rank-and-file members except for its annual assembly. Shibusawa presided over the meeting, which was attended by a large number of people—one source reported that there were more than 50 people, but another described that the number exceeded 70. Inoue Junnosuke gave an opening lecture on the objective of the World Economic Conference, the scope of topics which were going to be discussed and the expected effects the Conference would have on international politics. Although he was one of the LNAJ’s directors, at the meeting he acted as a representative of the Japan Economic Federation, which, as a business organization, was especially interested in the Conference. Supplementing Inoue’s lecture, Soeda Juichi explained the purpose and content of the Association’s draft proposal to the audience. According to the vice-chairman of the LNAJ, the proposal was designed to address the “fundamental economic problems of Japan”, by which he meant a variety of problems:

[...] we have incorporated an item on the problem of immigration into the draft because we think a complete and ideal solution to this problem will be impossible without mobilizing world opinion in favour of Japan. Furthermore, we have mentioned the problem of raw materials as the second item of the draft proposal. In a resource-scarce country like Japan, manufacturing industries will not develop unless it can obtain raw materials from all over the world. Lastly, we have found that the problem of tariffs is extremely important from the point of view of how to sell manufactured goods abroad. Even if we can satisfactorily solve problems other than tariffs, we will be unable to achieve our final goal as long as tariff barriers prevent us from exporting manufactured goods.

The deep causes of these problems were clear to Soeda. Japan had to address these problems because of its fast-growing population and its stagnant export industries. He said, “the root of Japan’s economic problems

6 Ibid., 7.
7 Ibid., 8–12.
8 Ibid., 13.
lies in the fact that we must devote all our energies to solving the problem of overpopulation and increasing exports in manufacturing industries.”

Soeda emphasized the need to propose the first three items of the draft, namely, the problems of immigration, raw materials and tariffs, but the discussion that took place following his explanation revealed differences of opinion among the LNAJ members. The heated debate mainly centred on three questions: (1) should the content of the proposal be revised and, if so, how?; (2) should the conference aim at arranging an immediately practicable plan or should it be an academic conference whose objective is to develop an ideal, though unrealistic, plan?; and (3) is the population problem really a major economic problem of Japan?

The first person who made a remark on the content of the draft proposal was Asari Junshirō. The Director of the ILO’s Tōkyō Branch Office was generally in favour of the draft. He especially endorsed the suggestion about investigating immigration problems, saying, “this, I suppose, is an issue that we, Japanese, must take the initiative in raising at the coming conference.” But he thought it necessary to bring up not only the matter of immigration but also that of working conditions. “It is impossible”, he said, “to solve problems of tariffs and immigration independently of another fundamental problem lying underneath, namely, the problem of labour protection. It will be impractical to solve these problems unless workers around the world are treated equally and unless they work under similar conditions.” In his recognition, the problems of immigration, tariffs and working conditions were internally related issues which could not be dealt with in isolation from each other.

In a similar but somewhat different vein, Takahashi Kamekichi argued in favour of proposing the matter of working conditions. Takahashi was an economist who worked at Ishibashi Tanzan’s Tōyōkeizai shinpō. Like Asari, Takahashi thought that the problems of immigration, raw materials and tariffs were interrelated with the labour problem, but he emphasized the former set of problems rather than the latter. He said that in order to achieve the equal treatment of workers around the world, “nations must be treated equally in matters of raw materials, population and tariffs”, and then maintained that, “since the League of Nations has already adopted a resolution that workers around the world be treated equally, nations must

9 Ibid., 13.
10 Ibid., 14.
11 Ibid., 15.
also be treated equally in matters of immigration, raw materials and markets for goods.”

Although he did not specify what the resolution was, he probably meant Article 23 (a) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which proclaimed “to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend.”

In contrast to Asari and Takahashi, who wished to broaden the scope of the conference’s agenda, Shidachi Tetsujirō proposed to restrict it. The former Governor of the Industrial Bank of Japan agreed to raise the questions of raw materials and tariffs at the Conference, but he said he was unwilling to bring up “delicate questions” such as immigration.

Shidachi was known for his intransigent position on the issue of Japanese migration. He had raised an objection to Japan’s sending migrants abroad in a magazine article and faced harsh criticism from those who wanted to promote the migration business.

In his comment at the LNAJ’s special meeting, too, he emphasized the importance of free trade instead of migration: “My opinion is that Japan will profit most by advocating free tradism. Japan is a resource-scarce country which will gain from adopting a liberal policy towards resource-abundant countries [...] Our country will gain the greatest profit by adhering to the League’s ideal and the spirit of the Covenant, namely, by endorsing liberalism and the freedom of commerce and trade.”

In saying this, he probably had in mind such texts as Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which advocated “[t]he removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations”, and Article 23 (e) of the Covenant, which stipulated the “equitable treatment for the commerce of all the Members of the League”.

A debate over these different views on the conference’s agenda, however, did not develop further because of Satakani Yoshirō’s interruption. Instead of talking about the content of the draft proposal, the vice-chairman of the LNAJ questioned the underlying assumption the document made about the nature of the conference. He stated that what topics should be proposed depended upon the nature of the conference, and

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12 Ibid., 17.
13 Ibid., 17.
14 Kawasaki Tōichirō, “Shidachi Tetsujirō shi ni atari [To Mr. Shidachi Tetsujirō]”, Shokumin 3 no. 7 (1924): 14–19.
15 Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 37, 16.
asked whether the conference would be of an “academic” or “practical” character. To him, the draft proposal was nothing but scholarly plans for an academic conference, but he preferred to have a practical conference which discussed workable plans. He thought it most important that Japan should propose a feasible policy that the country itself could adopt, but the proposals formulated in the LNAJ’s document, either on immigration or on tariffs, appeared to him to be an impractical policy that the Japanese government could not accept.

Those who were satisfied with the draft proposal were stirred up by Sakatani’s critical remarks, which were tantamount to denying the value of the document. Tanaka Mitsugu, a professor of commercial science at Meiji University, defended the original text and proposed submitting it as it was. No wonder Yamada Saburō also suggested ignoring the question of practicability for the meanwhile and concentrating on formulating an ideal proposal based on a study of international economy. As has been seen in the preceding chapters, he had insisted on the necessity of scientific studies and recommended that the LNAJ examine the economic condition of various countries for the purpose of solving the problem of the admission of foreigners. His remark at the special meeting was the logical consequence of this long-held opinion. Although he admitted that an international lawyer like him could not say what the best economic policy for Japan was, he thought that:

> It is necessary for us to determine what measures Japan should adopt as its national policy on international economy. And once we determine the measures, we must make the government implement them, even if it is difficult to do so right now. Sooner or later, the government will have to undertake the measures—it might have already implemented some of them—because they are fundamentally important for Japan’s future. We must not give up even if it takes twenty or thirty years. What we must do now is study and formulate an ideal policy which can be implemented gradually in the future.

A recurrent idea in Yamada’s works appeared here—the piecemeal implementation of an ideal policy based on scientific research. This idealistic proposal, however, received a mixed reaction: While the eminent mathematician Fujisawa Rikitarō agreed with the necessity of conducting research and formulating an idealistic plan, the central figure of the Ōsaka

16 Ibid., 18–20.
17 Ibid., 20.
18 Ibid., 21.
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Takayanagi Matsuichirō, objected to it. Takayanagi insisted on submitting the original draft as it was, and said that it was not necessary to wait for research results or to determine what the best policy for Japan was.19

The debate revolved around the question of whether the conference should be an academic one or a practicable one until Sakatani’s second interruption. This time, he questioned the other basic assumption underlying the draft proposal that overpopulation was the fundamental economic problem facing Japan. “All of you misunderstand the immigration problem, don’t you?” he asked again in a rather provocative manner.20 “The population is increasing in Japan because the country has the power to grow larger. The more the productivity of the increased population rises as a result of education, the wealthier the country becomes. All difficulties pertaining to population increase will be overcome thanks to the industriousness of the population.”21 From a pro-natalist viewpoint, he maintained that there were no grounds for neo-Malthusian fears of overpopulation. He criticized Soeda, saying, “you say overpopulation is a problem but you miss the point. The population of a country will increase as long as it can sustain the growing population. If not, the population will decrease. Please understand this relation correctly.”22

The meeting finished without an agreement about the LNAJ’s proposal being reached because of Sakatani’s remarks, which might well sound like provocation for provocation’s sake. A note written by someone in a margin of the official minutes of the meeting said, “[the original draft] faced much criticism. Some disapproved of it vehemently. Others said that it shifted the blame onto other countries without criticizing Japan.”23 This comment showed that the discussion was held in a rather tense atmosphere at the meeting. A politician, Uehara Etsujirō, closed the meeting by saying that the difference of opinion between Satakani and the other participants was not as great as it looked, but the very act of saying so demonstrated that many perceived the difference between the two.

20 Ibid., 23.
21 Ibid., 24.
22 Ibid., 25.
23 Ibid., 8. The document, in which the note was written, is held in the Shibusawa archives. SA :135/04/126.
Three positions

Although less marked than the opposition between Sakatani and the other participants, the meeting also revealed a significant difference of opinion among the LNAJ’s members about the desirable economic policy for Japan. All of them apart from Sakatani agreed that overpopulation was the major economic problem facing the country. They also admitted that industrialization was an ultimate solution to the problem and, for that purpose, an increase in both imports of raw materials and exports of manufactured goods would be required. But they disagreed about what should be prioritized in order to achieve industrialization.

Obviously, the ardent supporter of the ILO, Asari Junshirō, placed the greatest emphasis on the improvement of working conditions.

By achieving humane labour conditions, industry will develop on a sound footing. The industrial world will establish itself on a solid and lasting foundation by improving cooperative organization and technology, not by continuing to abuse cheap labour. Humane labour conditions will also raise the living standards of the working classes and provide a reasonable solution to the problems of overpopulation and chronic unemployment.24

Writing in an article published in *Kokusai chishiki* in May 1924, he described the improvement of working conditions as if it were a magical solution to every imaginable problem. But, in reality, this enthusiast for the International Labour Organization thought that the improvement of working conditions by itself was not enough to raise the living standards in a resource-scarce country like Japan. He said:

Countries are different in their population densities and natural resources. Accordingly, even if formal equality among nations in terms of labour conditions is achieved by such measures as the regulation of working hours or a ban on night work, the actual life of workers in a densely populated and resource-scarce country will have to remain miserable, as compared to that of workers in a sparsely populated and resource-abundant country.25

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He went further and stated that “if the establishment of international labour conventions brings to light the existence of international inequality resulting from factors other than labour conditions, this will be a cogent reason for the necessity of nations’ cooperating in such matters as the regulation of population density or the redistribution of natural resources.”26 This statement makes clear that Asari did not believe that the improvement of working conditions would automatically solve the ‘over-population’ problem in Japan. Rather, he believed that in order to solve the problem, Japan needed to gain freedom of international migration:

As it is the most reasonable attitude for proletariats to reject violence, abandon their class egoism and support moderate socialism, it is the most rational policy for a poor country like Japan to abandon imperialism or expansionism and openly advocate the ideal of international social justice as a national policy. On the one hand, Japan should take the initiative in introducing progressive policies whose implementation needs international cooperation, such as the improvement of labour conditions or the betterment of public hygiene. On the other hand, it should make every effort to achieve social justice by criticizing Western-centric policies on such matters as racial equality, free migration or free access to raw materials.27

The improvement of working conditions and the liberalization of international migration must be fulfilled simultaneously. This was the opinion that characterized the labourist position.

Around the time of the publication of Asari’s article, many of those who were concerned about labour issues adopted the labourist position. For instance, the scholar of labour law Suehiro Izutarō—one of those six members of the LNAJ who first attended the third Congress of the IFLNS—had repeatedly expressed a similar view in the early 1920s. Writing in a letter to Yoshizaka Shunzō, a member of the Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, on February 2, 1919, Suehiro indicated that “the problem of international distribution of labour” was one of the most important world issues after the war.28 In this letter, he criticized the United States for developing “seclusionist policies” and called “for the establishment of some scheme for internationally distributing the labour force” as well as “the removal of barriers to international movement of labour”. The Tōkyō Imperial University professor expressed the same

26 Ibid., 13.
opinion publicly later in 1922 in his article entitled “The ideal of perpetual peace in the world and the International Labour Conference”. This article shed light on an underlying contradiction between two international organizations established after the First World War: the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization. According to Suehiro, the twin organizations had the same goal of establishing peace in the world. But while the former aimed at establishing international peace, the aim of the latter was to establish internal peace, namely, to prevent social disturbance caused by class wars. This difference posed the question of whether the two organizations could achieve their goals without coming into conflict with each other. Suehiro’s answer was negative: “I must say that trying to establish perpetual peace through the League, on the one hand, and organizing the ILO as if it were an instrument of the League, on the other, contains a great, fundamental contradiction.” To him, the contradiction was most manifested in the ILO’s attempt at establishing equal treatment of workers around the world, because this ambitious goal, if achieved, would provoke an international race for territory. But why would the establishment of equal treatment trigger territorial expansion? Presuming that the cost of production depended on the cost of raw materials and labour as well as on organizational efficiency and technological level, Suehiro argued that if working conditions were equalized worldwide, “as a matter of course, resource-abundant countries would become the winners and resource-scarce ones the losers.” It was, therefore, almost inevitable that the potential losers would avoid ratifying international labour conventions or, if it was impossible to do so, attempt to expand their territory in search of raw materials.

What Suehiro advocated in order to resolve the contradiction was a radical, thoroughgoing approach. The young scholar insisted that, in order to establish perpetual peace, not only did the equal treatment of workers around the world have to be achieved, but so did the “freedom of international migration” and the “equality of access to natural resources”:

30 Ibid., 28.
31 Ibid., 27.
The demands for the freedom of international migration and the free exchange of raw materials and goods are exactly the opposite of—or, at least, an attempt to restrict—economic imperialism. It is quite unlikely that those countries which possess vast territory and rich natural resources will agree to the request. But in the present day, when the necessity of the International Labour Conference is being advocated in the name of justice and humanity and promoted for the sake of perpetual peace in the world, I believe it right for our country to advocate the freedom of international migration and the free exchange of raw materials and goods.\(^\text{32}\)

In his analysis, Suehiro did not take into consideration the possibility of improvement in organizational efficiency as well as that of technological innovation. This was simply because he was quite pessimistic about both possibilities: “It is extremely naive to expect that a backward country like Japan could outstrip other countries in the future. Furthermore, there is little hope of establishing industrial supremacy only by improving organizational efficiency or by encouraging technological innovation because organizational and technological know-how is universal knowledge which will sooner or later be discovered by other countries too.”\(^\text{33}\)

It is rather surprising to see the notorious haves-and-have-nots argument used by a scholar like Suehiro, who was known for his progressive stance on labour issues. But it is undoubtably the man adhered to the idea of free international migration. Probably, the idea came from a proposal made by an Italian delegate at the Paris Peace Conference. At the conference, Italy proposed inserting a set of clauses into the Covenant which stipulated, among other things, “Liberty of migration controlled by agreement between the Governments and the trade and labour unions of the countries directly interested [sic]”.\(^\text{34}\) It is unclear when Suehiro learned about the proposal. He might have read it in Paris as he was helping the Japanese delegation at the conference. The Japanese delegates lacked knowledge of labour law and relied on the advice of the young student, who was studying in France.\(^\text{35}\) Whether he read the Italian proposal in Paris or not, he was convinced of the rightness of the Italian claim to the

\(^{\text{32}}\) Ibid., 35.  
\(^{\text{33}}\) Ibid., 33.  
extent that he mentioned it at a session of the Imperial Economic Council on May 5, 1924, the advisory council held by the Japanese government for the purpose of establishing the country’s economic policy. Referring to the Italian proposal, Suehiro advanced his pet theory that if working conditions around the world were equalized, resource-scarce countries would necessarily be deprived, and then he proposed that the Japanese government arrange an international conference on international migration in order to establish “the right to international migration”.36 His proposal, which was voted against by the majority of the Council, was quite similar to the idea of the International Conference of Emigration and Immigration held by Italy in the same month.

Asari shared the assumption with Suehiro that the freedom of international migration was essential for the improvement of working conditions around the world. But there was also a clear difference between the two; Asari was less pessimistic than Suehiro, who emphasized adverse effects Japan might suffer as a consequence of improved working conditions. This difference resulted from their attitude towards the ILO. In contrast to Asari, who put his hope in the development of international labour conventions, Suehiro firmly believed that the ILO was an instrument devised by developed countries for the purpose of maintaining their economic supremacy by imposing high labour standards on developing countries. Although the ILO and the Italian government were in opposition on the matter of international migration, Suehiro was closer to Italy than to the ILO. This can be seen from the fact that he declined Asari’s request to join in the ILA, the organization Asari organized to intensify the relationship between Japan and the ILO. When asked to be a member of the association, Suehiro expressed “his doubt regarding the motives from which the International Labour Organization was created.” 37 He said that he “received a very bad impression at the time of the Peace conference”, especially from one of the ILO’s architects, George Nicoll Barnes, and


therefore “I cannot help feeling that the International Labour Organization was created for the benefit of the advanced industrial countries in the name of humanity and justice and before this doubt is cleared up, I cannot become enthusiastic in supporting the work of the ILO.” Such was his distrust of the ILO that he did not expect that the Organization would do much for the establishment of the freedom of immigration.

The second position expressed at the special meeting of the LNAJ was that of the free-tradists. At the meeting, Shidachi Tetsujirō represented this position by stressing the importance of free trade while showing reluctance to discuss the topic of international migration. This line of argument was closely related to a revival of liberalism led by the academic economist Ueda Teijirō. The professor at the Tōkyō College of Commerce advocated what he called Shin jiyūshugi (新自由主義 new liberalism) publicly by launching a journal named Kigyō to Shakai (Business and Society) in April 1926. He was also a member of the LNAJ from its establishment, although not a particularly active one. A close relationship and a similarity in thinking between Ueda and Shidachi is shown by the fact that, in the second issue of Kigyō to Shakai, Ueda reviewed a policy proposal issued by Keizai kōkyū kai (経済考究会), a think-tank-like organization established by Shidachi with the aim of making policy proposals on the Japanese economy, quite favourably. Shidachi recalled afterwards that it was thanks to Ueda’s review article that he found what the two men believed in was “one and the same”.

Ueda summarized the main point of his new liberalism concisely in the following sentences:

The spirit of the present days no longer allows an expansion of national territory or sphere of influence [...] To continue its economic development, there-
fore, a small country like Japan, whose population size is increasing at high speed, must make it a national policy to import foreign raw materials, to process them by utilizing technology and labour in the country, and to profit by exporting manufactured goods.\(^{41}\)

As clearly shown in these words, Ueda, like most of the LNAJ’s members, regarded overpopulation as an urgent problem facing his country and thought that “How to feed the population which increases by about seven hundred thousand a year is a vital question for Japan.”\(^{42}\) Yet to him, “to think as if overseas migration were the only solution to the overpopulation problem” was a sheer fallacy because “however large the population will become, it will pose no problem as long as there are enough jobs to feed the increased population.”\(^{43}\) Such a number of jobs, he believed, could be created by expanding the importation of raw materials and the exportation of manufactured goods.

Although, therefore, Ueda did not put much weight on international migration, he did not underrate the importance of international factors in modern life. On the contrary, his new liberalism developed from his considerations on the expansion and intensification of the international intercourse he was witnessing. In his first monograph *Gaikoku bōeki genron* (The principles of foreign trade) published in 1903, he described human history, in a way similar to Yamada Saburō, as the expansion process of community life.\(^{44}\) Ueda believed that the core of a state was a community and it had gradually developed and expanded its circle from kinship group to horde to tribe to nation:

A state apparatus and its constitution are a result of a nation’s historical development. Behind the legal institutions of a state is a naturally developed society of a nation. Members of the national society have similar physical traits, speak the same language, engage in the same manners and customs and share

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41 Ueda Teijirō, “Shin jiyūshugi no hitsuyō [The necessity of new liberalism]”, in vol. 7 of *Ueda Teijirō zenshū*, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 19.
42 Ueda Teijirō, “Shin jiyūshugi to waga kuni no kanzei seisaku [New liberalism and Japan’s trade policy]”, in vol. 7 of *Ueda Teijirō zenshū*, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 90.
43 Ibid., 90.
44 Ueda Teijirō, “Gaikoku bōeki genron [The principles of foreign trade]”, in vol. 5 of *Ueda Teijirō zenshū*, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1975), 7–90.
the same ideas and feelings. These commonalities have developed from a long experience of living a community life under the same climate.\textsuperscript{45} Ueda thought that if international intercourse continued to expand its horizons, it might even eliminate differences among nations in the future: “Thanks to the advancement of transportation as well as the development of humanity, civilizations in the world can now imitate each other and they are coming closer and closer to forming a single civilization.”\textsuperscript{46} To Ueda, accordingly, differences among nations were not rigidly fixed. They were just a result of a low degree of development of international commerce and communication. But he thought that there were still considerable differences among nations in his days: “The move towards a single civilization has just begun, so each nation still has its own civilization with distinct features.”\textsuperscript{47} This is why he believed that international movement of workers and capital had only a limited significance in the world of his time. Of course, capital could move more freely than workers, but even in the case of capital movement, its freedom was still severely curtailed because of different financial systems adopted by countries around the world. Ueda maintained that the classical doctrine which distinguished domestic from international trade on the basis of the existence of free movement of capital and workers still held true. In this regard, he adopted the definition of nation formulated by Walter Bagehot as “an aggregate of producers among which capital and workers freely circulate”.\textsuperscript{48} Certainly, “the classical doctrine has recently been called into question by some scholars who have seen the development of transportation and financial industries promoting the increase in foreign investment and the growth of the emigration business since the early 19th century.”\textsuperscript{49} But, according to Ueda, their criticism was off the point, because the domestic-international distinction based on the existence of free movement of capital and workers was only “a matter of degree”.\textsuperscript{50} Although he admitted that there were exceptional cases in which international relations could be treated in the same way as domestic relations, he maintained that in most cases it was still reasonable to follow the classical doctrine. Notwithstanding the global

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 27.
expansion of a community life, he thought the amount of international migration remained relatively small and its influence remained negligible.

Ueda believed that Japan lagged far behind the Western countries in economic development. During his studies in Europe and the United States from 1905 to 1909, he found that transportation infrastructures, such as harbours and railways, were much less developed in Japan than in Western countries. He also learned from the experience of travelling in his own country that there were still various types of handicraft manufacturing in rural areas which had been isolated by natural barriers until recently. The fact that pre-modern handicraft products had not been driven out of the market seemed to him to indicate that domestic, not to mention international, markets were still highly segmented.

Like Asari, Ueda was in favour of international labour conventions. He thought that the world was moving in the direction of making a concerted effort to improve working conditions and that if Japan rejected international labour conventions, foreign countries would impose economic sanctions by either levying customs tariffs on imports from or banning the export of raw materials to Japan. These sanctions had to be avoided, because if enacted, they would completely destroy industries in Japan. Ueda also considered it inadmissible to exploit Japanese workers under bad working conditions just for the sake of winning international economic competition, and insisted that such a short-sighted policy would ruin the “future productivity of the Japanese nation”. But, unlike Suehiro, he did not express the fear that global equalization of working conditions would make the liberalization of international migration inevitable. This might be because he estimated that the speed of the equalization would be so slow that there was little need to worry about it, or because he thought

51 Ueda Teijirō, “Ōbei manyū shokan [My impressions of travel around the Western countries]”, in vol. 7 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 538. It should be noted that Ueda witnessed the 1906 United Kingdom general election, where the Liberals, espousing the doctrine of free trade, won a historic victory against the Conservatives, who were split over Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for Tariff Reform. On free trade culture in Edwardian Britain, see Frank Trentmann, Free Trade Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

52 Ueda Teijirō, “Nihon rōdō mondai no tokushitsu [The characteristic features of Japan’s labour problems]”, in vol. 7 of Ueda Teijirō zenshū, ed. Itani Zen’ichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1976), 577–580.

53 Ibid., 584.
that the equalization would cause no harm as long as free international trade was sustained.

Interestingly, Ueda was as sympathetic towards Italy as Suehiro was in spite of their different attitudes towards international migration. Ueda was an advisor of the Japanese delegation to the first International Labour Conference, where the Italian workers’ representative, Gino Baldesi, proposed that the ILO conduct a study on a method for redistributing raw materials.\(^{54}\) Writing in his report on the conference, Ueda favourably referred to the proposal and maintained that the matter of raw materials was “a grave problem underlying not only the International Labour Conference but also the League of Nations”.\(^{55}\) However, unlike Suehiro, Ueda did not regard international migration as a desirable means with which to regulate the balance between population and raw materials. Baldesi must also have had other means in mind when he asked at the conference, “Should this abundant labour be forced to emigrate to those countries where the raw materials are to be found? Or would it not be more just and more humane to make such raw materials available in those countries where labour abounds?”\(^{56}\) What Ueda sympathized with was probably this plea to find a method of making raw materials available in labour-abundant countries without sending migrants abroad.\(^{57}\)

If it is appropriate to call the position of Asari ‘labourist’ and that of Shidachi and Ueda ‘free-tradist’, the third and last position can be called ‘developmentalist’. Although this position was less distinctly articulated than the first two, the difference between this and the other two positions was clear. It emphasized the necessity of encouraging investment in foreign territories and developing natural resources there. The person who advocated the developmentalist position was Tanaka Mitsugu, the scholar who defended the original draft at the special meeting of the LNAJ. As an


\(^{55}\) Ueda Teijirō, “Dai I kai kokusai rōdō kaigi no tenmatsu [What happened at the first International Labour Conference]”, in vol. 4 of *Ueda Teijirō zenshū*, ed. Itani Zenōichi et al. (Tōkyō: Ueda Teijirō zenshū kankō kai, 1975), 207.


\(^{57}\) Baldesi’s proposal was rejected at the Conference “on the grounds that the subject raised was impracticable, dangerous and not within the competence of the ILO”. See Antony Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organization* (New York: Octagon books, 1971), 45.
academic, Tanaka was much less known than Suehiro and Ueda. This was partly because he studied and taught at a small private university on the periphery of Japanese academia and partly because he later moved from academia to the world of politics.\(^{58}\) However, some of his books, especially *Kōgyō seisaku* (industrial policy) published in 1925, offer interesting insights into Japan’s economic problems.\(^{59}\)

Just like most of the LNAJ’s members, Tanaka was concerned about the overpopulation problem in his country and thought that industrialization was the only way out of the problem: “From an agricultural to an industrial country: This is a natural course of development in national economies. In order to support its surplus population, an overpopulated country like Japan especially must concentrate its efforts on developing industries which rely less on land.”\(^{60}\) He emphasized that Japan needed to obtain capital and raw materials as well as improve the quality of its labour force.\(^{61}\) This line of argumentation was not much different from that of Asari or Shidachi, who also regarded industrialization as the only solution to the population problem. What made up the distinctive character of Tanaka’s position was his attention to overseas investment and foreign natural resources. The sentence included in the LNAJ’s draft proposal that “it is necessary to divorce the utilization of natural resources as much as possible from territorial considerations” was probably the most important part to him.

In *Kōgyō seisaku*, Tanaka maintained that the advancement of international division of labour depended on whether each national economy could fully utilize its characteristic features, which were “not a given but something to be created”.\(^{62}\) While these characteristic features were, therefore, primarily “unforeseeable”, raw materials and their uneven distribution among countries were a “given reality that cannot be changed by human efforts”.\(^{63}\) Tanaka found a source of international inequality in this gap between the possibility of developing national characteristics and the reality of resource constraints, and contended that it was quite unfair to let countries compete with each other, while leaving the situation of raw

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59 Tanaka Mitsugu, *Kōgyō seisaku* [Industrial policy] (Tōkyō: Kurita shoten, 1925).
60 Ibid., 1.
61 Ibid., 2.
62 Ibid., 247–248.
63 Ibid., 248.
materials as it was. Just as a hereditary system within a country must be dismantled by redistributive measures, so must natural inequality among countries:

In a perfect world where national economies are fully integrated into one world economy, profits must be fairly distributed on the basis of each country’s ability and efforts, and each country must be able to fully develop its characteristic features. For that purpose, resource-abundant countries must allow resource-scarce countries access to raw materials and let them enjoy the materials under fair conditions.\(^6^4\)

This argument might sound similar to that of Suehiro, who insisted on the need for free international migration and free exchange of raw materials and goods. But Tanaka was different from Suehiro in that he advocated the “freedom of international movement of production factors”, which included not only the movement of workers but also that of capital:

Free international movement of capital and workers should be established so that each production factor can move freely to profitable countries and to productive industries. If each country fully develops its characteristic features under such conditions, international cooperation in consumption will be realized. Only then will international co-existence and co-prosperity (Kyōzon kyōei: 共存共栄) be truly achieved.\(^6^5\)

Tanaka argued that free international movement of capital and workers was necessary for the purpose of fully utilizing natural resources that were undeveloped or underdeveloped in the present situation because of a lack of capital or labour force. Obviously, his argument with its focus on the development of natural resources in foreign territories was aimed at justifying Japan’s economic expansion in China, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

It should be noted that Tanaka gave a higher priority to foreign investment than to international migration. He demanded as much freedom of international movement of production factors as necessary to develop natural resources. This meant that international migration would be unnecessary if Japan could develop enough resources by investing capital only. Furthermore, since he was not strongly committed to the improvement of working conditions, he did not feel the necessity for free international migration as keenly as Asari or Suehiro. Tanaka regarded it justifiable to deny access to migrant workers who came from a country with low living

\(^6^4\) Ibid., 248.

\(^6^5\) Ibid., 248–249.
standards, and approved of a series of exclusionary measures the United States had taken against Chinese immigrants.\footnote{Tanaka Mitsugu, *Shakai seisaku* [Social policy] (Tōkyō: Meiji daigaku shuppan bu, 1923), 352.} He even thought that industries in Japan had advanced so rapidly since the First World War and labour demand had increased so sharply that it was no longer necessary for Japan to send migrants abroad or to control its population.\footnote{Tanaka, *Kōgyō seisaku*, 116–117.} He called for the freedom of international movement of capital and workers but placed emphasis on the former.

Tanaka’s position was also dissimilar to Ueda’s in that the former attached less importance to free trade and approved of adopting protective trade policies for infant industries. Tanaka admitted that protective measures were undesirable, considering the necessity of avoiding retaliatory tariffs. But he believed that industries whose development was necessary for states should be given preferential treatment.\footnote{Tanaka, *Shakai seisaku*, 351.} Accordingly, he insisted that states could protect prospective industries by subsidizing them or by temporarily exempting them from observing social policy regulations. His stance on protective measures stood in sharp contrast to that of Ueda, who thought the protection of infant industries should be a very rare exception.

The three positions summarized here—labourist, free-tradist and developmentalist—had a few assumptions in common. All positions assumed that overpopulation was the gravest problem Japan was facing and that industrialization was the only solution to it. A major difference among them lay in their assumptions regarding the speed of the equalization of working conditions. While the labourists thought that the equalization of working conditions all over the world would progress on the initiative of the ILO and, therefore, maintained that the equalization of working conditions must go hand in hand with the liberalization of international migration, the free-tradists and the developmentalists thought differently. The three positions were also not homogeneous in their assumptions about the way to secure access to cheap raw materials. While the labourists and the free-tradists hoped to procure raw materials through free trade, the developmentalists stressed the need for exploiting undeveloped or underdeveloped natural resources in foreign territories through overseas investment.

\footnote{Tanaka, *Shakai seisaku*, 351.}
Although the degree of their commitment to the LNAJ varied widely, all of those who were mentioned above were members of the Association. This means that there was a realistic possibility of the Association adopting their opinion. The rest of the chapter examines this possibility by documenting the process of the LNAJ’s preparation for the World Economy Conference and making clear how these different strands of thinking were incorporated, or not, into the LNAJ’s policy recommendations for the Conference.

Discussion at the IFLNS

The directorate of the LNAJ revised its draft proposal at a session held on February 12, 1926. Those present at the session—Sakatani Yoshirō, Soeda Juichi, Hayashi Kiroku, Yamada Saburō, Zumoto Motosada, Miyaoka Tsunejirō and Katō Sotomatsu—decided to bring up the following three issues at the IFLNS meeting: “(1) Freedom of export and import especially of raw materials, fuels and other natural produce, (2) General reduction of custom tariffs and (3) Admission of foreign vessels to coasting.

Table 3.1 Three positions proposed for the Geneva World Economy Conference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Main Objective</th>
<th>Expectations about Future Integration</th>
<th>Attitudes Towards International Migration</th>
<th>Proponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labourist</td>
<td>The improvement of working conditions</td>
<td>Strong international integration</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Asari Junshirō, Suehiro Izutarō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetradist</td>
<td>The promotion of free trade</td>
<td>Weak international integration</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Shidachi Tetsujirō, Ueda Teijirō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmentalist</td>
<td>The development of natural resources through international investment</td>
<td>Strong regional integration</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
<td>Tanaka Mitsugu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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At the same session, the directors decided not to propose to tackle the issue of immigration, which had been formulated in the original draft as the issue of “investigating the possibility of controlling the overall supply of labour in the world from a purely economic viewpoint”. Although the reason for their decision was unclear, they agreed that the LNAJ “should do nothing more than call the other associations’ attention to the existence of the issue.” As a result, the final text of the proposal came closer to what free-tradists like Shidachi desired.

The Japanese proposal was submitted to the International Labour Office and Social Legislation commission together with French and Italian proposals. At the first commission meeting held in the building of the ILO on March 6, the British representative George Nicoll Barnes raised the objection that the commission was not entitled to discuss these proposals because they were not directly related to the work of the ILO. But a Polish representative, François Sokal, and the Director of the Office, Albert Thomas, argued against this objection. The latter maintained that the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization held the opinion that the Organization had a part to play in the Conference. He also pointed out the fact that the ILO was officially invited by the League of Nations to participate in the preparatory commission of the Conference. The passionate international civil servant emphasized that the IFLNS could play a crucial role as a non-governmental international organization. Unlike the governments around the world, which could only represent national interests, the Federation could study matters from an international point of view: “[...] pour l’intérêt du monde, l’intérêt de l’opinion publique, il faut que les questions urgentes dont la menace pèse sur le monde soient discutées par vous.” As a result of this strong counterargument, it was decided that the commission would organize a subcommission which would discuss member societies’ proposals concerning the World Economy Conference.

69 “Dai 58 kai rijikai gijiroku [The minutes of the 58th session of the council]”, JACAR: B05014050700, 42; the IFLNS, Resolution proposed by the Japanese League of Nations Societies, ILOA: D 600/431/9.
70 “Dai 58 kai rijikai gijiroku”, 42.
72 Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, Commission pour le Bureau international du Travail et la législations sociale, 2ème séance—6 mars 1926 (après-midi), ILOA: D 600/431/9, 43.
The ILO was obviously trying to guide the direction of discussion at the commission to the effect that the IFLNS would support the ILO’s viewpoint. At a subcommission meeting on March 9, where the representative of the ILO was absent, the representative of the Polish association and professor at Lviv University Alfred Halban suggested four research topics on behalf of the Office.\textsuperscript{73} They were: “1) l’accélération de la ratification des conventions protégeant le travail; 2) l’appui qu’il faudrait prêter aux grandes industries menacées par les crises économique; 3) chômage et des moyens pour écarter toutes les difficultés qui en résultent; 4) la réglementation universelle des problèmes d’émigration et d’immigration”.\textsuperscript{74} The subcommission agreed to include all the topics suggested by the Office in its agenda and appointed a rapporteur to each. It was Halban who became the rapporteur on the “universal regulation of emigration”.\textsuperscript{75}

The Polish legal historian knew that the Japanese association had been interested in immigration problems. Therefore, he approached the Japanese representative and diplomat Kawai Hiroyuki after the session ended, and proposed submitting a joint report to the next session. However, the LNAJ did not accept his proposal. All it did was to send two documents to the Polish association: the Oualid report on the admission of foreigners and Takayanagi Kenzō’s paper presented at the first IPR conference. The LNAJ stated in its message to the Polish association that these texts would provide a “rough idea of what the Japanese association stands for”.\textsuperscript{76}

In Brussels on April 9, 1926, the resident representative of the LNAJ in Europe, Inagaki Morikatsu, met with Halban and the Swiss representative Aloys Hentsch, who was in charge of drafting a final report for the subcommission.\textsuperscript{77} They held the meeting in order to reconcile differences of opinion among them before the second session of the subcommission started, which was scheduled to be held on the next day. At the meeting Halban expressed his agreement with the LNAJ’s claim for racial equality.

\textsuperscript{73} Kawai Hiroyuki, “Kokusai renmei kyōkai Geneva ni okeru syo kaigō [Meetings of the IFLNS held in Geneva]”, JACAR: B05014050700, 95.
\textsuperscript{74} Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations, \textit{Sous-Commission économique, Séance du 9 mars 1926 (matin)}, ILOA: D 600/431/9, 5.
\textsuperscript{76} Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, vol. 37, 49.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 49
He understood the gist of the two documents sent from the Japanese association correctly and said that the limits imposed on the admission of foreigners must not be based on their nationalities or races but on the personal attributes of individual immigrants. Yet what he proposed was to make the ILO produce international statistics on the demand and supply of labour force. This showed clearly where his main interest lay. It was not in racial equality but in the control of labour supply.

Halban held a view quite close to the labourist position. He used the same logic as Asari’s in his report submitted to the subcommission, Recommendations on the universal regulation of emigration, in which he stated that “the equalization of labour conditions is impossible unless free movement of individual migrants is guaranteed by international instruments.”78 The recommendations suggested that the emigration committee of the ILO build an international statistics system on the labour markets of all countries around the world and devise measures to achieve a global equilibrium of demand and supply for labour and to prevent unemployment by effectively allocating unemployed workers to jobs. The recommendations also proposed that the measures only take the demand in the labour market into account and be enforced without worsening work conditions, wages and social security, and without discriminating between native and foreign workers.79

Inagaki might have found it difficult to accept Halban’s proposal since the LNAJ had decided not to address the issue of international migration. But he did not oppose submitting the proposal, nor did he reject the final report written by Hentsch, which clearly stated that “national barriers to people and goods should be eliminated” and “due consideration should be given to the demand in the labour market.”80 In his report sent to the LNAJ after the session of the subcommission, Inagaki explained his decision to support both documents by saying that “showing hesitation in accepting these ideal texts would be disadvantageous to the Japanese association, which has called for racial equality and the equitable treatment of commerce.”81

At the session of the subcommission, Inagaki said,

78 Ibid., 50.
79 Ibid., 51.
80 Ibid., 47.
81 Ibid., 48.
Even though the Japanese government remains silent, the Japanese people have never forgotten the problem [of immigration] [...]. If the IFLNS deals with the problem from the viewpoint of the labour force, it must not dismiss the importance of the equal treatment of all nations. In particular, it should be recognized that the selection of immigrants must not be based on their nationalities or races but on the personal attributes of each individual immigrant.82

The subcommission adopted the Hentch report without any significant modification. The ease with which the subcommission passed the report might seem surprising, considering the fact that the report, although in an indirect manner, advocated the equal treatment of national and foreign workers, the idea the IFLNS had stubbornly refused to endorse. This might be explained by the fact that the British representative, one of the potentially strongest opponents, served as the chair of the session and had to behave neutrally. The absence of opposition might also be due to the limited importance attached to the subcommission. Inagaki reported that the participants “lacked enthusiasm” because influential societies, such as the French and Italian ones, did not attend the session.83

In his report submitted to the LNAJ, Inagaki maintained that the Japanese association should not adopt the Polish approach, which emphasized the necessity of correcting the global imbalance between the demand for and supply of labour. “Rather than focusing on the problem of unemployment,” he wrote, “we should insist on the necessity of achieving a right balance between densely and sparsely populated regions, which is indispensable for fostering economic development around the world.”84 Inagaki argued in a way similar to Tanaka that international migration would promote the development of natural resources: “Even if we talk about labour demand, we should argue that population increase [through immigration] will make it possible to exploit unknown or undeveloped natural resources, as a result of which both the world economy and the overall demand for labour will simultaneously grow.”85 Notwithstanding his opposition to the Polish approach, however, Inagaki acknowledged the importance of studying immigration problems from the perspective of labour demand and supply. He had the impression from the session of the subcommission that the discussion on immigration problems would

82 Ibid., 51.
83 Ibid., 53.
84 Ibid., 51.
85 Ibid., 51.
“become more and more connected with that of labour problems”, and concluded that, in the future, the LNAJ would also need to examine matters relating to the labour force, working conditions and unemployment, and study immigration problems not only from the viewpoint of population and race but from a more systematic and comprehensive perspective.\textsuperscript{86}

The Japanese government’s attitude towards the Conference

Although Inagaki had no choice but to accept the subcommission’s final report and Halban’s proposal about international regulation of international migration, the LNAJ was no longer willing to discuss the topic of international migration at international forums. This reluctance was also shared by the Japanese government.

When the government set out to develop its plan for the World Economy Conference, it also considered the possibility of bringing matters related to international migration up at the Conference. The list of potential agenda items Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō presented to Sugimura Yōtarō, one of the Japanese representatives at the first meeting of the preparatory commission for the Conference, included a section on “the treatment of peoples” and the first item in the section was “the admission to a country”. In this section, the Foreign Minister proposed “investigating the geographical distribution of the world’s population and seeking a solution to population problems”.\textsuperscript{87} However, the official instructions attached to the document also stated that “Because it is disadvantageous to express what we wish to achieve from the outset, it would be wise to set a broad agenda in the beginning and add more detailed items later so that we can be sure to bring up those matters that we really wish to discuss at the Conference.”\textsuperscript{88} This meant that the government had no intention of pushing through its proposals against the opposition of major powers. It preferred taking a wait-and-see attitude to running the risk of provoking other countries at the preparatory commission of the Conference. Sugimura, who had had a bitter experience at the Warsaw Congress, also showed his unwillingness to broach the subject of international migration, although in

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{87} Shidehara to Sugimura, March 22, 1926, JACAR: B06150626100, 31.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 18.
a quite indirect manner. In his reply to Shidehara, Sugimura stated that immigration problems would be excluded from the agenda because France, the proponent of the Conference, had already stated that it did not want to discuss the problems.89

At the preparatory commission meetings held from April 26 to May 1, 1926, the Japanese representatives remained deliberately vague as instructed. Sugimura chose his words carefully and did not use words such as ‘immigration’ or ‘admission of foreigners’. He only stated in a general way that nations “should adhere to the principle of equality” and that “equal treatment [...] should be given to ships, goods and people.”90

At the meetings, however, Italian representatives insisted on discussing the topic of international migration repeatedly. Alberto de Stefani emphasized the necessity of securing free movement of people as well as goods. Another Italian representative, Ernst Belloni, maintained that the Conference must not overlook the problem of overpopulation. Belloni, who had been a member of the 1924 International Conference on Emigration and Immigration in Rome,91 even insisted that the most important task to be tackled at the Conference was to find a solution to the problem of free movement of workers.92 Responding to these demands by the Italian representatives, the preparatory commission decided to collect information on the following points by the next meeting:

1. Natural movement of population: births, deaths, marriages, during the periods 1900–13, 1924–26.
2. Artificial movements of population; emigration in its various forms, permanent and temporary.

89 Sugimura to Shidehara, April 6, 1926, JACAR: B06150626100, 51.
90 “Kokusai keizai kaigi junbi iinkai dai 1 kai kaigi ni kansuru hōkoku [A report on the first meetings of the preparatory committee for the World Economy Conference]”, JACAR: B06150626300, 29. This general statement met with different reactions. A newspaper reported that Japan wanted to “get the question of emigration in through the side door”, while another wrote that “Japan will not touch the immigration question, because it does not want complications with the United States and because the subject was left off of the agenda by the Council and Assembly.” “Proposed Farm Issue to League”, Boston Daily Globe, April 28, 1926; “Japan to Avoid Immigration at League Meeting”, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1926.
91 Ibid., 21.
92 Ibid., 28.
(3) Enquiry on uniform method, and with the aid of one or more experts, into fluctuations of population arising out of the world war, and fluctuations in potential labour forces during the next two decades.
(4) Population density in relation to cultivable areas, natural resources on the surface and underground.
(5) Data concerning economic development and the standard of life.
(6) Legislation on the movements of labour.
(7) Legislation affecting international migration in general.93

Japan could have taken sides with Italy and submitted its own proposal on the admission of foreigners. But to do so would have entailed the serious risk of causing international disputes. Georges Theunis, the former Prime Minister of Belgium who presided over the preparatory commission, told Adachi Mineichirō that the problems Italy wished to discuss were “very dangerous”.94 By communicating this remark to Shidehara, Adachi indirectly warned him of unpleasant reactions that might occur if Japan supported Italy. Shidehara took Adachi’s warnings and chose to stay on the safe side. Although the Japanese government did not delete the section on “the treatment of peoples” when it drew up the final version of the list of potential agenda items, it did not propose discussing problems of immigration or population at the second preparatory commission meetings held from November 15 to 20, 1926.

It was decided at the meetings that the Conference would not organize a committee devoted to the “population problem” and that it would deal with the problems of population and immigration only in relation to other subjects.95 Interestingly, it was not Italian representatives but delegates from other countries such as England, Switzerland and Germany that proposed discussing the population problem at the Conference. They argued that the population problem was related to other important problems, such as unemployment and the minimum living standard, and insisted that it was necessary to discuss the population problem in order to make clear where the heart of these problems lay. By contrast, Italian representative Ernst Belloni insisted that the preparatory commission should do nothing but submit collected information to the Conference, saying that to bring up highly political issues like population would only complicate the discus-

94 Adachi to Shidehara, October 21, 1926, JACAR: B06150627500, 14.
sion at the Conference. The Japanese representative Satō Naotake concurred with Belloni, thinking that some members’ attempts to connect the population problem with other sensitive issues like unemployment was, against their declared intentions, aimed at creating an impasse by proposing an impossible task. He thought it would be better to agree to the Italian proposal in order to “allow for the possibility of discussing the population problem at the Conference”. In the end, the majority of members agreed with Belloni. The commission adopted his proposal and decided not to institute a committee on the population problem.

A middle-ground position

As the World Economy Conference approached, the LNAJ began its efforts to clarify what the Association expected from the Conference. To organize a research commission for that purpose, the LNAJ held a preparatory meeting on December 16, 1926. More than 30 people were present at the meeting, including those who had attended the special meeting in January, such as Asari Junshirō, Inoue Junnosuke, Tanaka Mitsugu and Takahashi Kamekichi.

Before the preparatory meeting the Association drafted a research agenda for the Conference. The agenda was composed of three items—“transport and tariffs”, “raw materials and markets” and “population and migration”—and the last item was further divided into the following three subtopics:

1. Population problems in Japan and the solutions which have already been implemented.
2. The ratio of population and land area in the world and the demand for and supply of labour.

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97 There are two slightly different versions of the list of the meeting’s participants. “Kokusai keizai kaigi chōsakai goshusseki hōmei [The list of those who attended the meeting of the research commission for the World Economy Conference]”, JACAR: A08072606400, 1; “Kokusai keizai kaigi chōsakai giji yōroku [The minutes of the meeting of the research commission for the World Economy Conference]”, JACAR: B06150627700, 20.
3. Difficulties pertaining to the problems of population and migration and the solutions which the Association should propose.98

Inoue Masaji, the president of the Overseas Development Company, started the discussion. The company was the government sponsored emigration company established in 1917 for the purpose of sending Japanese migrants to Brazil. Interestingly, Inoue, the man who played the most important role in Japan’s migration businesses, opposed the agenda, which included the subtopics of population and migration. He said, “I don’t think it appropriate to bring up population problems for discussion at the Conference, although I find it necessary that the commission conduct research on the problems.”99 The remark was not surprising, however, considering the fact that he always described himself as a man of deeds, not of words (hugen jikkō). Although he attended several international conferences in his life, he believed that mere discussions at international conferences would lead nowhere. In spite of his business interests in Brazil, therefore, he found little importance in discussing population problems at international conferences. Following Inoue, staff member of the LNAJ, Okuyama Seiji, also made a negative comment on discussing population problems at the forthcoming Conference. He said, “Japan will have to accept immigrants if it insists on the equal treatment of all immigrants.”100 Responding to Okuyama’s comment, Takahashi Kamekichi maintained that “we can solve the problem which was just pointed out [by Okuyama] by establishing a minimum wage system in all countries around the world.”101 Although it is not clear what he meant by this remark, he probably thought that the minimum wage would lead to restricting the entry of ‘undesirable’ immigrants into Japan. The economist was in favour of discussing the problems of population and immigration in connection with matters relating to working conditions: “Problems which will be discussed at the Conference such as raw materials, wages and working hours are connected to problems of population and immigration. It is therefore necessary to consider the latter problems in order to find a solution to the former.”102

100 Ibid., 21.
101 Ibid., 21.
102 Ibid., 21.
But it was only Takahashi who still insisted on raising matters relating to population and immigration at the Conference. Inoue Junnosuke argued that now that population problems were excluded from the Conference agenda, the research commission, whose aim was to examine what the Japanese delegation should propose at the Conference, did not need to study the problems. But he also added that the problems would be discussed at the next conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to be held in Hawaii in July of the next year. “At the IPR conference”, said the Chief director of the Japanese committee of the IPR, “we will maintain that if a country cannot produce enough food for its people, the country should be allowed to procure food from foreign countries or to send migrants overseas. By arguing in this way, we can also justify our not accepting immigrants.”

In fact, at the meeting of the Japanese Council of the IPR held on October 1, 1926, Inoue had proposed discussing problems of population and food at the Hawaii conference and the committee had agreed to his proposal.

Although most of the members of the research commission did not think that population problems should be discussed at the World Economy Conference, they also recognized the necessity of studying the problems. Therefore, the research commission, while agreeing that the purpose of its activity was to formulate the Japanese policy for the Conference, did not exclude the possibility of studying population problems. At the end of the meeting, the commission appointed seven members—Enchi Yoshimatsu, Morita Yoshio, Nasu Shiroshi, Obama Toshie, Takahashi Kamekichi, and others.

103 Ibid., 22.
104 Although Inoue seems to be willing to discuss the issue of international migration at international conferences, it is not clear if this was the case. It is said that he stated at the meeting of the Japanese committee of the IPR that it was better not to propose discussing immigration problems because it was “unpleasant to keep complaining about the matter”. Given this statement, he might have no longer been willing to draw international attention to immigration problems. It is also important to remember that it was Inoue who experienced the eighth Congress of the IFLNS in Lyons, where the LNAJ’s resolution on international migration met with fierce opposition from the American association. This experience might have made him more cautious about discussing immigration problems in the international arena. In fact, in a newspaper interview conducted in 1929, he clearly said, “Not emigration but industrialization will take care of our population problem.” “Industry held most pressing need of Japan”, Vancouver Star, June 12, 1929.
Takashima Seiichi and Tanaka Mitsugu—to a special committee on conducting necessary research.  

At the first meeting of the special committee held on December 21, it was decided that the committee should examine the problem of international migration in relation to the first part of the agenda which had been formulated by the preparatory commission for the Conference. The first part entitled “the world economic position” was divided into three sections: i) “principal features and problems as seen from the point of view of different countries”, ii) “analysis of economic causes of the present commercial and industrial dis-equilibrium” and iii) “economic tendencies which affect peace in the world”. The committee appointed Tanaka, Obama and Inui as the rapporteurs of each section respectively.

As regards the second part of the agenda, Takashima Seiichi wrote a report on “Import and export prohibitions and restrictions”, Inui on “Economic treatment of nationals and companies of one country duly admitted to the territory of another”, Komatsu Kashichi on “Indirect methods of protecting national commerce and shipping” and Nasu Shiroshi and Takahashi Kamekichi on “Agriculture”. The committee did not take up matters relating to working conditions, so the subject disappeared from the committee’s report.

The introductory part of the special committee report advanced an interesting argument for the freedom of movement of capital and people. Although the introduction was written under the joint names of Inui, Obama and Tanaka, its main author was probably Tanaka, judging from the fact that several sentences used in his Kōgyō seisaku were found interspersed in the text.

In the introduction, the authors used the term employed by Yamada Saburō and stated that states must live an “international community life” (Kokusai kyōdō seikatsu). According to the authors, nations in the present world were not allowed to adopt a policy of seclusion at their free
will. It is true that they had the negative freedom to do what they wished as long as they did not infringe on the freedom of other nations, but they also had rights and duties as members of the international community. That was why they had agreed to institutionalize various organizations whose goals were to improve community life. Among others they had established the Permanent Court of International Justice in the legal field and the League of Nations in the political field. But there had been little cooperation in the more important field, that is, the field of the economy. According to the authors, it was the lack of greater cooperation in this field that constituted a menace to world peace. Under the present circumstances countries around the world were tempted to achieve autarky. But in order to maintain world peace, it was necessary to establish international division of labour and enable each country to fully utilize its characteristic features. What was important in this regard was that the characteristic features of a country could not be discovered unless capital and people were allowed to move freely. Therefore,

Access to resources in the world must be given to each and every country. Nations which can make the best use of resources should be allowed to use them. Capital and the labour force should be allowed to move to and concentrate on the most profitable industries in the optimum countries so that each country can fully develop its abilities.

Although the authors thought it unjust for a resource-abundant country to deny other countries access to its resources, they also admitted that it was equally unjust for a resource-scarce country to invade other countries on the pretext of its right to live there. Therefore, they insisted that a resource-abundant country should be allowed to develop its resources first, but if it turned out that the resource-abundant country did not have the ability to develop its resources by itself, it should give resource-scarce countries equal access to its resources by allowing them to invest capital or send surplus labour force to its territory. Here the authors did not forget to add that although the resource-abundant country had the right to select immigrants, it must not use race as a criterion for selection.

At the end of the introduction, the authors proposed that Japan should engage in joint efforts with the other population-abundant countries and

111 Ibid., 1–2.
112 Ibid., 2.
113 Ibid., 3.
114 Ibid., 3–4.
advocate “the principle of free movement of workers” at the coming Conference. In so far as human beings live a community life, the authors concluded, “all human beings should be guaranteed their living and be given freedom to improve their living standards by developing their own characteristic features.”

While the introduction of the special committee report insisted on developing natural resources through international investment and migration in a manner quite similar to the developmentalist argument, the part written by Takashima Seiichi, one of the central figures of the Japan Economic Federation, advocated a policy which was close to the free-tradist position, namely, the reduction of trade barriers. He proposed: (1) “making explicit the conditions under which import and export prohibitions and restrictions are allowed”, (2) “establishing the principle that import and export prohibitions and restrictions should not be imposed on important industrial raw materials” and (3) “organizing a permanent international committee to discuss the above two points”. He further mentioned in his report that two suggestions had been made on the special committee, which were (1) “to impose a duty on all countries to report to the League of Nations on the reasons for and possible effects of import and export restrictions when they introduce new ones”, and (2) “to regard those regions among the British Dominions which have the vote at the League as independent countries”.

The special committee drafted resolutions based on its report and submitted them to the seventh annual assembly of the LNAJ held on May 11, 1927. The committee divided the draft resolutions into two parts: the part on “the open door policy for natural resources” and the part on “the freedom of international workers”. Surprisingly, the committee ignored its own decision not to propose the topic of international migration and included in its draft resolutions a set of proposals on the freedom of inter-

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115 Ibid., 4.
116 Ibid., 4. Such a line of argumentation was not used frequently but was not uncommon either in the mid-1920s. Director member of the LNAJ, Hozumi Shigetō, also justified the freedom of immigration by using the same concept “kokusai kyōdō seikatsu”. See Hozumi Shigetō, Kyōdō seikatsu kannen no kakuritsu [Encouraging the idea of community life] (Tōkyō: Kyōka dantai rengōkai, 1924), 33–37.
118 Ibid., 20.
national migration. On the open door policy for natural resources, the committee proposed:

1. recognizing the conditions of exception enumerated by Article 4 of the draft Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, which was prepared by the League of Nations economic committee, and to specify the conditions and narrow the scope of their application as much as possible.
2. establishing a principle that import and export prohibitions and restrictions should not be imposed at least on important industrial raw materials.
3. reporting to the League of Nations on the reasons for and possible effects of import and export restrictions.

And on the freedom of international movement of workers, it proposed:

1. gathering accurate and reliable news and produce statistics on the labour market in each country.
2. giving priority to overpopulated countries or countries with unemployed workers in controlling the demand for and supply of labour.
3. precluding discriminatory treatment on the supply of labour. 

The draft resolutions contained radical proposals for the abolition of discriminatory treatment with regard to labour migration, but the assembly revised the text substantially. The resolutions the Association finally adopted were as follows:

1. The principle should be established that import and export prohibitions and restrictions should not be imposed on food and important industrial raw materials.
2. Each country (including the League members of the British Empire) should treat the other countries as equals in economic terms.
3. As regards the above two points, when a country introduces import and export restrictions or discriminatory measures, it should report to the League of Nations on their reasons for and possible effects of the restrictions or measures.
4. As regards land use and capital investment by foreigners, each country should not impose taxes, charges and other conditions and restrictions on foreign nationals which are different from those imposed on its own nationals.

The main point in the introduction of the special committee report, namely, free movement of capital for the purpose of developing natural

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119 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kokusai keizai kaigi ni tai suru kibō [Requests on the World Economy Conference]”, SA: 135/05/135.
120 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kokusai keizai kaigi ni taisuru ketsugi [Resolution on the World Economy Conference]”, JACAR: B05014051100, 89.
resources, was included in the last resolution and Takashima’s proposals were incorporated into the first and third resolutions, while the final resolutions completely excluded the topic of international migration and deleted all the proposals on the freedom of international movement of workers. This was probably because the resolutions were intended to propose only an immediately practicable plan. As the opening sentences of the resolutions stated, “The World Economy Conference does not aim to create a system for the world economy overnight. It does not ignore the fact that each country has different national interests. The aim of the conference is, rather, to cooperatively establish an economic organization to the extent that is possible.”121 Thus, the emphasis of the resolutions was put on the reduction of trade barriers and the freedom of movement of capital, instead of the freedom of international migration.

The final resolutions show clearly that it was the mixture of developmentalist and free-tradist opinions that constituted the main policy adopted by the LNAJ. The Association did not take the labourist standpoint, which emphasized the improvement of working conditions, nor did it propose discussing the problem of international migration at the Conference. This cautious attitude resulted in the resolutions which combined the opinions of free-tradists and developmentalists. The resolutions did not purely reflect either of the two standpoints but were the results of a compromise between the two. For instance, the LNAJ only advocated the reduction of export duties which foreign countries imposed on food or raw materials, but if the Association really adhered to the doctrine of free trade, it should have also proposed the reduction of import duties which Japan placed on manufactured goods. This proposal, however, would have been fiercely opposed by domestic manufacturing industries. Likewise, the Association did not fully endorse the opinion of developmentalists in that they did not advocate free movement of labour force for the purpose of developing natural resources. The resolutions finally adopted by the LNAJ were a compromise which those who wished to establish free trade and those who wished to have access to natural resources in foreign territories could agree on, but this was a precarious position based on the shared but unfounded fear of overpopulation.

121 Ibid., 89.
The World Economy Conference and its results

There is no evidence that the LNAJ’s advocacy activities for the World Economy Conference influenced the Japanese government’s attitude toward the Conference, but there seems to have been a link between the two. The government chose some delegates for the Conference from the members of the LNAJ. It appointed free-tradist Shidachi Tetsujirō as chief delegate and Ueda Teijirō as one of five members of the delegation. It also selected members of the LNAJ’s special committee, such as Inui Kiyosue and Takashima Seiichi, as attendants to the delegation. By doing so, the government gave them the opportunity to make their opinions known to an international audience. The members of the Conference were mainly selected from private citizens. This was because the preparatory commission for the Conference had recommended that Conference members “should be chosen for their personal qualification”. The appointment of Shidachi and Ueda might indicate the government’s tacit support for their free tradism. But there are few documents left which mention the reason for this appointment. According to an entry in Ueda’s diary, he was chosen as a member of the Conference because his “opinion became known to Shidachi Tetsujirō and to the officials of the Foreign Ministry (particularly vice-minister Debuchi [Katsuji])” after he started to advocate new liberalism. Shidachi also recollected that when the government appointed him as chief delegate and informally asked him to select attendants, he recommended Ueda as a member. If this was true, it was Shidachi who played an important role in making the government support the free-tradist opinion.

The government, to a certain extent, allowed Shidachi to express his own opinion at the Conference. For instance, the government entrusted him with the task of writing the official observation on the first part of the Conference agenda, which was entitled as “The World Economic Position: Principal features and problems as seen from the point of view of different

122 The other members were a diplomat Satō Naotake, a scholar of engineering Shiba Chūzaburō and an agriculturalist Satō Kanji.
123 Preparatory committee for the International Economic Conference, Report to the Council, JACAR: B04122078400, 12.
125 Shidachi, “Ueda Teijirō kun no tsuioku”, 2.
countries”. Writing in his observation, Shidachi stated that the Japanese members of the Conference saw “the impelling necessity of the firm establishment of international cooperation and coordination based upon the solid foundation of world economy”, and pointed out the seriousness of overpopulation in Japan, which was not only “one of the most thickly populated countries in the world” but also was “scantily blessed with natural resources.”

The solution to the overpopulation problem was to establish “a universal regime of freedom of communication and transit and equitable treatment of commerce between the members of the family of nations in strict obedience to the spirit of the League of Nations.”

To achieve this end, Shidachi suggested the following six points:

1. The reduction of fiscal burdens of the people of several countries.
2. The removal or reduction of customs barriers, discriminatory tariffs and other differential treatment in persons or goods.
3. The development of natural resources through freedom of economic enterprises; and [sic]
4. The equitable distribution of food stuffs and raw materials.
5. The abolition of discriminatory treatment in transportation and navigation and the opening of coastwise trade to the commerce of the world.
6. The stabilization of foreign exchange.

These suggestions were for the most part in line with what the LNAJ had already discussed. Although they included topics which the Association had not discussed such as the first and sixth points, the rest of them covered familiar topics. Like the Association’s resolutions, Shidachi did not mention the issue of international migration in an explicit way, the problem he had considered so delicate that he was unwilling to propose at the Conference.

Although Shidachi was commissioned to formulate the official observation on the first part of the Conference agenda, he did not have a free hand to express his opinion on all items on the agenda. The government authorities held meetings from January 27 to March 30, 1927 to discuss detailed matters mentioned in the second part of the Conference agenda.

126 The Observation of the Japanese Members of the Economic Conference, JACAR: B04122076500, 11.
127 Ibid., 11.
128 Ibid., 11.
129 Gaimushō, Kokusai keizai kaigi no kaku gidai ni kansuru hōshin [Policies on each agenda item of the World Economy Conference], JACAR: B05014193500, 54.
invited the Conference members to the meetings, and handed the documents of the meetings to them. Although the preparatory committee for the Conference recommended that Conference members should not be “spokesmen of official policy”\textsuperscript{130} and the Japanese government did not give orders to the Conference members, the document of the meetings handed to the Conference members was virtually official instructions from the government.

It is not clear how much the Japanese members acted on their own free will at the World Economy Conference held in Geneva from May 4 to 23, 1927. But what Shidachi said at the Conference was not significantly different from the opinion he had expressed before. In the speech he delivered at the third session on May 5, he maintained that overpopulation and resource scarcity were “a few predominant and salient economic facts” which characterized his country.\textsuperscript{131} He described the predicament of his country in detail as follows: “Its area is very limited and its natural resources are extremely meagre. It is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, having 157 people to the square kilometre. Moreover, the arable land that can be advantageously utilised in Japan proper is no more than 20 per cent of the total.” The main point of his speech was:

Such being the characteristics of our country, it is an absolute necessity for her to keep up her national life by the importation of foodstuffs and raw materials, the payment for which is met by converting them into articles that can be advantageously produced. As a natural consequence, we must of necessity make it our national policy to remove Customs [sic] barriers and to establish freedom of communication and commerce, as far as possible in cooperation with other nations. At the same time, I wish to state that it is our ardent aspiration to develop industries which can be beneficially conduced in our country. To this end, we welcome the friendly assistance and concurrence of other nations.\textsuperscript{132}

He emphasized that Japan had no alternative but to rely on the import of food and raw materials, on the one hand, and the export of manufactured goods, on the other. It was therefore necessary to reduce tariff barriers and foster industrialization. He criticized “the post-war protective policies of

\textsuperscript{130} Preparatory committee for the International Economic Conference, \textit{Report to the Council}, 12.


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 80.
different nations, the monopolistic control of raw materials and natural resources, and the inequitable distribution of population” as three “outstanding and unfortunate tendencies of the world to-day [sic]” and stressed the necessity of studying these tendencies to find their solutions.\textsuperscript{133}

Although like other members of the LNAJ Shidachi was afraid of overpopulation, he did not think that sending migrants abroad was a realistic solution to the overpopulation problem. He held another speech on the last day of the Conference and stated that “freedom of movement of capital, freedom not only of the movement of merchandise but also of persons; freedom not only of overland trade but also of all-oceanic traffic” were problems which should be resolved in the future.\textsuperscript{134} This passing remark couched in vague wording was the only mention he made about international movement of people. In respect to international migration, the behaviour of the other Japanese members of the Conference was more or less the same. They remained silent about the topic, and even when they touched on the topic, they used only general and unprovocative words.

The moderate attitude of the Japanese delegation made a striking contrast to conference members from southern and eastern European countries, who discussed the problem of international migration unhesitatingly. A Greece member, Jean Tournakis, explicitly criticized the quota system in the United States. He said that “The effects of overpopulation, which in certain States used to be obviated by means of emigration, are now becoming apparent”\textsuperscript{135} and maintained that overpopulated countries had to raise tariffs and protect domestic industries to absorb the surplus working population. What he proposed to solve the overpopulation problem was establishing an “International Labour Exchange”, an information centre with the aim of gathering and providing information about the demand for and supply of labour in each region of the world. An Italian member, Angelo di Nola, also insisted on mentioning the problem of population in a final Conference report. It was as a result of his insistent demand that a sentence was added to the final report: “the problem of population has induced certain countries which have a surplus of labour to base their Cus-

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\item 133 Ibid., 81.
\item 134 Ibid., 161–162.
\item 135 Ibid., 163.
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toms protection on this argument.” 136 The main thrust of the Greek and Italian arguments was clear. As di Nola stated, they thought that both “the reduction of Customs [sic] tariffs of all countries and [...] the elimination or attenuation of the restrictions imposed on immigration” should be promoted simultaneously. 137 In other words, they demanded the liberalization of international migration in exchange for the reduction of tariff barriers. This was an idea entirely foreign to Shidachi and Ueda. Although the free-tradists also advocated the reduction of tariff barriers, they had no intention of using it as a bargaining instrument with which to achieve the freedom of international migration.

Change and persistence in the LNAJ’s activities

The organizational character of the LNAJ had changed partially during the period of preparation for the World Economy Conference. As has been seen above, those who actively participated in the Association’s meetings were mostly private citizens, not bureaucrats. Furthermore, the LNAJ did not need to rely much on diplomats since it could now appoint its resident representative in Europe, Inagaki Morikatsu, as a delegate to the IFLNS meetings. However, the status of academics within the LNAJ’s activities seems to have undergone little change. Those who expressed their opinions at the Association’s meetings were a miscellaneous group of people including not only academics but also businessmen and journalists. Scholars like Tanaka Mitsugu attended these meetings regularly and contributed to the compilation of the special commission report greatly. Yet he was apparently an exceptional case. Sakatani Yoshirō’s questioning of the value of an academic conference was symbolic in this regard. Although Yamada Saburō reacted against him and emphasized the necessity of studying the international economy as well as the merits of an academic conference, the event revealed that there was little consensus of opinion among the LNAJ’s members regarding the value of scientific study in international cooperation.

137 Ibid., 69.
The World Economy Conference offered the LNAJ an opportunity to address an issue the Association had not directly dealt with, the problem of the international economy. To use the concept introduced in the first chapter, the association began to examine a question about how much the globalization of civil society must be fostered in order to sustain international community life. The Association members offered different answers to this question. Labourists argued that the improvement of working conditions which was being promoted by the ILO would make the freedom of movement of workers inevitable. Free-tradists, in contrast, did not attach great importance to the freedom of international migration and maintained that free trade was sufficient for sustaining international community life. The third and last group, which this chapter has called developmentalists, emphasized the necessity of developing natural resources through foreign investment and, to a lesser extent, international migration. These three positions were based on different assumptions about the future development of international interdependence. While labourists made the strongest assumption that globalization would be deepened to the extent that working conditions were equalized throughout the world, free tradists expected that such equalization would only occur in the distant future, if at all.

The report and resolutions the LNAJ adopted were predicated on the free-tradist and developmentalist arguments, whereas the labourist opinion had never been incorporated into the official policy of the Association. The Association located itself in the middle ground between the free-tradist and the developmentalist policies formulated by, among others, Shidachi and Tanaka. It insisted on the reduction of trade barriers and an increase in overseas investment for the purpose of developing natural resources but not on the freedom of international migration.

That the LNAJ did not adopt the labourist position advocated mainly by Asari was partly a natural consequence of his decision not to organize a subcommission within the LNAJ which would act in cooperation with the International Labour Office. He chose to establish an independent organization, the International Labour Association, and most of those who were concerned about labour issues also opted to stay out of the LNAJ. This prevented them from making their voice heard within the Association. The decision, although trivial in itself, made a significant difference in the Association’s course of action. It created a condition in which the Association developed in a direction away from the ILO and the IFLNS’s International Labour Office and Social Legislation commission.
Although the ILA was successfully organized in March 1925, it remained a weak international organization compared to the LNAJ. There were several factors that hindered the development of the newly born organization. Firstly, there was a problem regarding the relationship with the state. While key officers at the Bureau of Social Affairs of the Home Ministry, Nagaoka Ryūichirō and Moriya Eihu, sent Asari their congratulations when the ILA was established, the Foreign Ministry complained to Asari about the establishment of the ILA.Ý This was probably because the Bureau of Social Affairs, which was in charge of labour administration, had often conflicted with the Foreign Ministry over the jurisdiction of several matters including international migration.Ý This uneasy relationship between the two authorities prevented the growth of the ILA as an international organization, since it could not count on the Foreign Ministry for help in developing diplomatic relations with other international organizations. The second factor was Kyōchō kai. According to Asari, how to handle the government-sponsored, labour-management cooperation organization was a very delicate problem, since its relationship with the ILA was competitive.Ý “If the proposed Association [the ILA] becomes one of the authorities in the sphere of social and labour legislation for which the Kyōchō Kai was established, and in which the Kyōchō Kai failed, it will lose its raison d’être.”Ý Although Asari succeeded in persuading two directors of Kyōchō kai, Soeda Keiichirō and Nagai Tōru, to become members of the ILA, he did not expect that they would give their full support to the ILA. The third factor was the difficulty of obtaining support from the labour movement. Since the ILA was an organization closely related to the International Labour Office, it could not publicly support a particular political party. This neutral attitude dissatisfied the trade unionists, who were divided into different camps, with the leftist group increasingly being drawn to revolutionary socialism. Although

141 Ibid.
Asari contemplated joining the centre-left *Shakai minshū-tō* (Social Democratic Party), Thomas persuaded him not to join the party even as an individual.\(^{142}\) What made the ILA’s task of securing support from the labour movement even more difficult was the deep distrust towards the ILO in Japan. As has been mentioned, Suehiro, the authority on labour law, thought that the Organization was an instrument devised by industrialized countries to suppress the unindustrialized ones. This opinion was shared among the Japanese labour activists so widely that Asari needed to devote considerable efforts to dispelling mistrust towards the ILO. The last factor was the establishment of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Act in 1925. The ILA members had sought to utilize the ILO in order to put pressure on the Japanese government to tackle labour problems, but the Act made it unnecessary to rely on such a roundabout course of action by providing them with a direct route to achieving their objective. The renaming of the ILA in 1929, one year after the first election under the Act, was a symbolic event in this regard.\(^{143}\) In this year, the organization changed its name to *Shakai rippō kyōkai* (the Association for Social Legislation) at the suggestion of Maeda Tamon, the Japanese government representative for the Governing Body of the ILO. By doing so, it deleted the term “international” from its name. This was an expression of the will to attach greater importance to domestic politics than to international relations.\(^{144}\) In fact, soon after its renaming, the Association created a committee on Parliamentary Relations composed of the Diet members of the Association and attempted to lobby for social and labour legislation.\(^{145}\)

It should be noted that the rupture in relations between the supporters of the League of Nations and the ILO was not a problem unique to Japan. A member of the Secretariat of the IFLNA, Lothian Small, who had worked hard to establish the connection between the Federation and the Office, thought that apart from England, where the British section of the Inter-

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\(^{142}\) Thomas to Asari, December 31, 1926, ILOA: C 1402.

\(^{143}\) Asari to Thomas, March 2, 1927, ILOA: C 1402.

\(^{144}\) *Shakai rippō kyōkai*, *Shakai rippō kyōkai nenpō* [The annual report of the Association for Social Legislation] (Tōkyō: *Shakai rippō kyōkai*, 1933), 1–2. The association did not totally abandon its mission to build relationships with international organizations. In the 1930s, the association joined the International Association for Social Progress and started to participate in its meetings. But the association did not succeed in building as close a relationship with the International Association for Social Progress as the LNAJ did with the IFLNS.

\(^{145}\) Asari to Thomas, October 23, 1929, ILOA: C 1402.
national Association for Social Progress and the British League of Nations Union worked closely, “the division between the two movements does not hold out much hope of being bridged at present”. The labour movement around the world was apt to be radicalized and gravitate away from the League. According to Small, “some of our societies may even have a nationalistic tinge and be well on the political right whereas the Social Policy groups tend as definitely to the left and can see no useful purpose in collaboration with the League of Nations.”

In contrast to the organizational character of the LNAJ, which changed only partially, the framework of the LNAJ’s discussion about international migration underwent a few significant changes before and after the World Economy Conference. Firstly, international migration began to be considered less as a problem of equality of races or nations than a problem of quantity and distribution of population. The focus of the discussion moved gradually, although not completely, from establishing formal equality among races or nations to achieving substantive equality in the distribution of population. At the same time, international migration began to be regarded more as a policy instrument than as an act of individual free will. A sign of this change can be seen in the fact that, while members of the LNAJ still used phrases such as ‘free migration’ or ‘freedom of movement’, they also started to use an expression like the ‘control of the supply of labour’. This meant that people began to regard international migration as a potential tool to be used by states or international actors to achieve their purpose.

Another important change was that the discussion about international migration began to cover a larger problem than that of the Japanese migrants in the United States. Although the conflict with the United States over the 1924 Immigration Act remained an important problem, people began to focus upon other countries and regions. China was especially important in this regard. The authors of the introduction to the LNAJ’s report on the World Economy Conference had China in mind when they talked about the potential existence of undeveloped natural resources. They said, “it is an urgent task to improve the situation of countries and regions that supply resources, in particular China and Siberia, so that it becomes possible to freely bring industrial raw materials from there.”

146 Small to Kose, January 27, 1926, ILOA: D 600/431/9.
147 Ibid.
148 “Kokusai keizai kaigi gidai”, 12.
Shidachi also regarded China as a potential supplier of resources, although he differed with the authors of the introduction about the necessity of promoting international migration. He said at the Conference that, “The economic unrest, together with the incessant internal strife in China, is a source of grave concern to all nations, particularly to Japan, whose relations and interests are so closely interwoven with those of that country. It is hoped that peace and order will soon prevail there, that her vast resources will actually be opened to the world.”

Quite interestingly, not long after the World Economy Conference, one of the authors of the introduction, Tanaka Mitsugu, urged the creation of a regional organization for promoting economic integration in Asia, which he called “the economic United States of Asia”. In his article published in 1928 in *Gaikō jihō*, a leading journal on foreign policy, he insisted on the liberalization of international movement of capital and workers, using exactly the same sentences he used in the introduction. He stated that it was advantageous for Japan to transfer not only heavy industries which needed to cover transport costs of raw materials to neighbouring countries, but also a part of agricultural and raw material industries, and this would also benefit China, India and the other East and South Asian countries. Of course, economic integration would not be achieved easily. However desirable it would be to “build a strong world economy and to form a single economic unit”, it would be impossible in the near future to achieve economic integration in the world at large. Therefore, he insisted that the East and South Asian countries should first engage in regional economic integration. This would be easier to achieve than global integration because they were close to each other and had common economic interests. What he emphasized in this regard was the importance of China. In the LNAJ’s report, he had stated that it was resource-abundant countries that should be allowed to develop their resources first, and that if it turned out that they could not do so by themselves, resource-scarce countries should be entitled to develop the resources. In the *Gaikō jihō* article, he mentioned China as an example of such resource-abundant countries. “A key to China’s recovery should be sought in the development of a raw

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151 Ibid., 27–28.
materials industry. The country should strive for resource development first and, if necessary, introduce foreign capital and technologies. But if it cannot achieve the development of its resources, then it should allow foreigners to bring capital and labour for the purpose of developing natural resources.”  

This statement made clear that what Tanaka assumed to be a potential immigration country for Japan was not the United States but China.

Taken as a whole, the changes in the framework of the discussion about international migration seem to suggest a growing trend within the LNAJ towards the formation of the vision of ‘the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, the vision of a regional order which Japan attempted to construct violently in the Second World War. But at least in the late 1920s no one in the LNAJ had the slightest intention of breaking down the international order based on the League of Nations. This can be ascertained by looking at the Association’s reaction to a Pan-European tendency within the IFLNS. At the eleventh Congress held in Berlin from May 26 to 31, 1927, the IFLNS discussed two questions: “Can regional or continental bases be incorporated within the League of Nations?”, and “Is the United States of Europe one such basis?” The Japanese Association answered the first question negatively, saying that regionalization would “create racial and economic barriers”. As regards the second question, the Association admitted that the proposed United States of Europe might be possible, but emphasized that its formation must not conflict with Article 23 of the Covenant of the League. Even Tanaka did not envisage the formation of a regional economic bloc. He regarded the United States of Asia only as a step towards world economic integration. Although, therefore, it is interesting that some elements of regionalism were found in the discussion among those who were involved in the Western-oriented international cooperation in the middle of the 1920s, it should also be remembered that they did not have a concrete plan for constructing ‘the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’.

152 Ibid., 24.
153 Shibusawa to Shidehara, March 31, 1927, JACAR: B05014050900, 72.
154 Kokusai renmei kyōkai [The LNAJ], “Kokusai renmei chihō teki bunkenko mondai ni kansuru ketsugi [Resolution on the question of regional reorganization of the League of Nations]”, JACAR: B05014051100, 87.
155 Ibid., 87.
The next chapter investigates the development of the LNAJ’s activities after the 1927 World Economy Conference. During their stay in Europe, the Japanese members and attendants at the Conference took the opportunity to attend other international conferences. Shidachi and Inui went to the Berlin Congress of the IFLNS. And the former also attended the fourth Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm from June 27 to July 2, while the latter visited the first World Population Conference in Geneva from August 29 to September 3. The experience of these international conferences brought new impetus to non-governmental international cooperation activities in Japan. As will be examined in the next chapter, it stimulated the formation of a free-tradist organization, Jiyū tsūshō kyōkai (the Association for Liberty of Trading), on the one hand, and the establishment of a research institute for studying population problems, on the other.