The term globalisation has become a buzzword in political and academic discourses since the nineties. It functions as a label for different aspects such as the implementation of free market policies in the world economy, processes of political and cultural Westernisation or the spread of new information technologies. The continuous boom of the term originates from social and economic sciences, with the effect that in public debates globalisation is often limited to its economic aspects and to contemporary globalisation since the 1990s.\footnote{Jürgen Osterhammel, “Globalizations”, in: \textit{The Oxford Handbook of World History}, ed. by Jerry H. Bentley, New York: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 89-104. Jürgen Osterhammel/ Niels P. Petersson, \textit{Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen}, München: C.H. Beck, 2003.} From a historical point of view, globalisation is not a unique characteristic of contemporary history but a phenomenon that can be studied in 19th and 20th century history as well as in the history of Early Modern times. Some authors have described processes of globalisation as normal and deeply rooted in all history\footnote{Madeleine Herren, \textit{Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung}, Darmstadt: WBG, 2009, p. 4.}, others are questioning this perspective of \textit{longue durée} and cast doubt on the transferability of the term on earlier epochs and pre-modern times, questioning the benefit of an excessive use of the word.\footnote{So does Osterhammel, “Globalizations”, p. 97.}

Broadly speaking and according to well received views, globalisation means a process of increasing connectivity that goes across geographical and political boundaries and that creates an interdependence between nation states and regions forming a “global community”.\footnote{Akira Iriye, \textit{Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World}, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.} In this way the world is said to have become a smaller place. Innovations in communication and information technology, mass transport systems or the overall palpable effects of the world as one global market place are having the effect of a compression of time and space which is held as one pivotal characteristic of
globalisation. What was the initial point of those forms of globalisation that have still and that will further have an impact on our lives today? Historical research has often put the focus on the 1970s as the origin of recent globalisation. According to that, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, the breakdown of the post-war Bretton Woods economic and monetary system marked a decisive shift in international history that gave the 1970s the character of a decade of transformation in both the economic and political realm as well as in social life and mental dispositions. French author Jean Fourastier diagnosed the end of the “trente glorieuses”, the golden ages of an incomensurable economic boom that had shaped the character of post war Europe.5 German historians have written about history “after the boom”6, the American Niall Fergusson debates a “shock of the global” which has been triggered by the crises of the 1970s.7 Others claimed this decade a “saddle period of globalization”8 that was not just a period of disruption but also launched the beginnings of our modernity, particularly with regard to fashion, music, culture, mentalities, values and norms or technological innovations.9

Strictly speaking, it was already the post-war boom that incited globalisation. The Bretton Woods system with World Bank, IMF and GATT created international institutions that aimed at solving economic problems multilaterally. However, in the light of the Cold War bipolar world order this was only a “semi-globalisation”10. What indeed made a difference in the 1970s was the commencing political erosion of the Eastern bloc in the wake of the CSCE process. Unlike the 50s or 60s, this marked the beginning of a multilateralisation that went beyond the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, issues of interdependence became increasingly important as environmental problems or human rights, and the 1970s were a decade of remarkable growth of nongovernmental international organisations. At the same time the nation

10 Osterhammel/ Petersson, p. 86.
state in its function as a regulatory interventional state slipped into crisis. Reagonomics and Thatcherism are the key words for a paradigm shift from Keynesianism to an economic policy inspired by Milton Friedman’s supply-oriented monetarism which was the consequence of globalisation as well as the reason for another boost in globalisation.

Historical research more and more questions the topos of crisis for the 1970s and instead discerns the dismantling of a certain economic model to a credit of another, more free market oriented model. The perception of crisis was more a characteristic of contemporary discourses. With the oil crises as “the birth pains of interdependence” (Henry Kissinger), even high level politicians increasingly perceived themselves as part of a game that they could less and less influence. German Chancellor Willy Brandt, for instance, explained the German case during the oil crisis: “We are a dependent state, as almost every state one way or another. That means for us, as for others: the number of factors that have an impact on us which we cannot or little influence will even increase in the future.” Actually, globalisation can be described as a multi-faceted phenomenon and process in which the classic nation state has lost ground with regard to its autarky on the economic and foreign policy realm and where it had to face the appearance of new challenges that affected all of humanity and for which traditional solutions and forms of conflict resolution were proving to be insufficient.

What has that got to do with the history of European integration? Surprisingly, scholars of the history of the European Community have not used the category of globalisation consistently yet. Although the use of the term in all its variants is increasing, most EC-studies do not use the word globalisation or global at all. Assuming that the 1970s are at the basis of a new impetus in globalisation, a probable effect on the regional integration in Western Europe is to be expected. Historical research on European integration has demonstrated a mounting interest in this decade that for a long time

was considered to be the ‘dark ages’\textsuperscript{14} of the Community, marked by a decline labelled as ‘eurosclerosis’. This perspective seems to be overcome, instead the seventies until the mid-eighties are perceived as a period of remarkable dynamics. Under the auspices of the European relaunch that was initiated by the Hague Summit Conference of December 1969 this period is now regarded as the starting point of a “second generation Europe”\textsuperscript{15} and a decade that plays an important role as a “hinge” in the process of European integration. Whereas the Community of the sixties was just in an early stage of development and far from being really confirmed, it was now setting the course in manifold respects and started formative initiatives that enabled the EC to face the challenges of globalisation. To mention first of all the enlargement of the EC, then the implementation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), then the deepening in the form of a common monetary policy, regional or social policy, finally institutional reforms as the creation of the European Council or the direct ballot for the European Parliament. Beyond that, European identity and citizenship became a point of reference. On the whole, the EC underwent a boost that raises the question whether this was part of a strategy of regionalisation in response to globalisation.

Recent research on international history has stressed the interconnectedness of the first globalisation in the 19th century with the process of nation building and has come to the conclusion that globalisation did not automatically mean the end of the nation state, indeed it was quite the opposite.\textsuperscript{16} A similar observation may be phrased in stating that globalisation in the twentieth century did not automatically lead to a loss of influence of Europe and the European Community but on the contrary had even strengthened European integration. Self-assertiveness in a global context was and still is one of the latest driving forces that are said to underlie the European construction after World War II.\textsuperscript{17} Even though the Community was an international actor right from the beginning in the field of foreign trade and as an


observer or participant in international organisations\(^1\)\(^8\), it is after all apparently entering the international arena in the 1970s.\(^1\)\(^9\) The Hague summit marked the turning point, as for the first time the EC explicitly expressed its aspirations henceforth to have a say in world politics and to play an adequate role on the international stage. For this the decisions on completion, deepening and enlargement played a decisive role in shaping the institutional structure of the EC and preparing it for coming years.

Current research on European integration history is now on the way to overcome its somewhat inward looking approach in favour of a contextualisation of EC history within the discussions of international history.\(^2\)\(^0\) In this regard the present book is shaped as a contribution to this debate and aims at bringing forth the historical research on the correlation of European integration and globalisation. Against the background of a transforming international and global order it aims at working out the influence of globalisation processes on regional orders such as the EC. By the timeframe of 1970 to 1985 it conceptualises itself along the long 1970s, a decade that begins with the above mentioned Hague Summit conference and ends with the decision to implement the Single European Act (SEA) in the mid-eighties. In these years covered by the book the Community is searching for more inner cohesion and empowering to effectively fulfil its new role as international actor in a different world. The Community thereby acted Janus-faced. On the one hand it implemented stronger interventionism and regionalism, with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy, for instance.\(^2\)\(^1\) On the other hand it was part of the above mentioned neoliberal transformation of Western societies. François Mitterrand’s course of more state intervention and nationalisation only turned out to be a short episode that ended in an adaption of European...
austerity policy. All this provides evidence for regarding the period from 1970 to 1985 as a distinct one which was then brought to an end by the Single European Act. All those newly established policy fields and institutional reforms were incorporated into the SEA which was thus the result of preceding developments since 1970. Furthermore, inward liberalisation was crowned by framing the European Single Market. The EC was made stable for globalisation by adapting to the global transformation processes. In this regard, the 1970s and early 80s are rather a history of empowerment than of stagnation or decline. And it even makes clear that the 1992 Maastricht Treaty is more a result of the Community’s long-term development than of short-term events like the fall of the Iron Curtain or German reunification. The 1970 to 1985 period takes shape as the prehistory of present-day European Union.

How was, in concrete terms, a European policy of globalisation performed? Which role did the respective political actors play: was it the supra-national institutions of the Community or state or non-state actors? “Managing globalisation” is one of those wordings that has been transferred from the political discourse into research vocabulary and may serve as a useful term, albeit the question remains whether this is more a rhetoric concept or indeed real politics. According to latest social-science research, managing globalisation would describe the mechanisms that were supposed to canalise or even steer the process of globalisation, with the goal to secure European interests and to cushion negative globalisation effects.

With regard to contemporary EU politics, characteristic features such as “expanding policy scope, exercising regulatory influence, empowering international institutions, enlarging the territorial sphere of EU influence, and redistributing the costs of globalization” can be identified. Some of those characteristics seem to be adaptable to the period in question here. We can observe global political and economic challenges that come to be Community tasks incorporated into EC policy. This strategy of managing globalisation...
sation can be ascertained with regard to European détente policy during CSCE negotiations which took place under the umbrella of EPC. This might serve as a sound example of expanding the policy scope in the foreign policy realm to include the community into multilateral structures. Another example would be the common European economic and monetary policy, environmental or social policy. Furthermore, participation in international institutions was one significant means of exercising influence. When global rules were defined through international organisations, it would be crucial to be part of them to influence those rules. Finally, the enlargement of the territorial sphere of the EC can be stated on varying degrees of intensity from dialogue to cooperation, agreements, treaties of association and at last offering full membership. Relations with the ACP-states and Asian states, the Mediterranean policy and enlargement would serve as examples of this assumption.

The present volume is the outcome of an international conference held on March 22-23, 2012 at the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut in Essen, supported by the Erasmus Academic Network LISBOAN and convened by Wilfried Loth and Claudia Hiepel. The book is about European responses to global challenges in the political, security, economic and societal realms and is composed into four parts, dealing with the EC’s détente policy, North-South relations, Asia as a new global actor and new forms of action as response to global challenges. In the first chapter Angela Romano deals with pan-European cooperation in the 1970’s, when the Soviet Union put out her feelers to install a dialogue with the Community. In 1972 and 73 a series of secret meetings between the EEC Commission and representatives of the USSR took place, followed by some further Breshnev initiatives. Romano puts a focus on the hitherto disregarded economic relations in the détente context. Whereas the Community developed a long term strategy that implied the transformation of the East and the creation of a new European peace howsoever in concrete terms that should be, the Soviet Union clang to the Cold War rationale, so that these meetings came to nothing and did not survive the second Cold War that started with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, as Romano argues, these contacts were not useless. She shows that economic developments and interdependences did not

26 We would like to thank at this point Jost Dülffer (Cologne), Christoph Marx (Duisburg-Essen), Wolfram Kaiser (Portsmouth), Antonio Varsori (Padua), Sylvain Schirmann (Strasbourg) and Kiran Klaus Patel (Maastricht) for chairing the sessions and for their helpful comments.
make halt at the Iron Curtain. Not only had the existence of the Community to be accepted, but the flows of trade between EC-states and Eastern European states increased de facto. In doing so, the Iron Curtain was incrementally perforated.

The European détente approach even survived the second Cold War, as Sara Tavani points out in her chapter. Using the example of a common Polish foreign policy within the EPC, she analyses a genuine European détente policy that demonstrates a remarkable degree of independence from US-policy. The Europeans denied the envisaged imposition of hard sanctions against Poland for her implementation of martial law and instead argued for any forms of de-escalation. Not least, it was the increasing economic interdependences that conflicted with US security policy in this case. The EC remained firm and united in their Polish policy, and in doing so they did not only succeed in keeping détente over the worsening situation during the 1980s but they also strengthened EPC and set the course for a deeper European integration.

The EPC initiatives did not prevent nation state actors from pursuing their own interests, as shown by the chapters of Veronika Heyde and Wilfried Loth, something which was typical for the hybridisation of the Community’s policy. Common institutions worked alongside with and in addition to national initiatives. The sensitive nature of détente affected each European member state to a different extent, and the conclusions drawn from it could indeed differ. For French foreign and security policy, still under the influence of Gaullist traditions, the necessity of multilateral action clashed with the notion of nation state sovereignty. Occasionally, France was a wayward European partner in East-West relations with a certain reticence against Community initiatives. This only came to an end under the pressure of the détente crisis. The turn to common action was not least due to Franco-German bilateralism. Whereas Loth puts the focus more on the leadership of the heads of state and governments, Heyde takes a look at the French diplomatic apparatus. “Embedded bilateralism”27 gained ground and became manifest by the Europeanisation of national interests. The collapse of the Soviet Union was henceforth a result of globalising effects which were already at work in the 1970s. In this context it was the earnings of the EC’s multilateral pan-European policy since the 1970s that survived another decade of Cold War

and laid the ground for the post-communist European order. All four contributions make clear that all kinds of economic, trade and political contacts did contribute to cross the “physical interaction barrier”\textsuperscript{28} of the Iron Curtain.

The second part of the book has a focus on the relations to global South, which can be seen either through the angle of an asymmetric Third World perspective or, in a broader sense, as North-South relation with the repercussion of developments in the South to Europe. First of all, the colonial past of some member states – France and, after the first enlargement, Great Britain in particular – brought the relation to the former colonies on the Community’s agenda. The diverging interests between EC members are subject of Lili Reyels chapter that gives a survey on France’s and Germany’s concepts and their impact on development policy of the Community on the whole. To her, the EC’s development policy is an example of the rapprochement of different policies within the Community which served as catalyst of European integration.

This is a point that also Guia Migani makes. In addition to it, she describes a development policy that in the self-perception of EC persons was responsible for a kind of social policy on a global level. Migani deals with the three Lomé Conventions from 1975 to 1984 which go beyond classic development policy and discover the states of the South as part of a developing new world order in which Europe required to have a say. Migani outlines the complex structure of the Lomé regulations on trade preferences and compensations which have something of redistribution of globalisation costs, whereby the Community’s interests were not only economic or financial but also political and social and not the least strategic in a developing world order. Here too, the EC enlarged its policy scope and increasingly acted as a global player.

Giuliano Garavini deals with an aspect that includes a change of perspective in the relationship between Europe and the global South which was not only a one-way-process. Speaking of global South means widening the perspective on developing countries, not only in a postcolonial context but in a wider frame as of the group of 77, for instance, who were trying to build an active part of the New International Order coming up in the Seventies. Their policy, particularly with regard to the oil producing countries, had repercussions on Europe and the “West” on the whole. From their standpoint, 1973 was much less of a caesura than it was for the industrial developed

\textsuperscript{28} Fäßler, p. 41.
countries, as the decision to increase the oil price had been taken before as part of the radicalisation and nationalisation strategies of Third World countries and the search for more independence and increasing importance. They tried to gain more control of the distribution and prices of this important crude material. The repercussions on the West were on the one hand psychological, in demonstrating the uncertainty of wealth and the vulnerability of their economy. They were political on the other hand, whilst they led to a new European stance and policy towards the Arab world. And not at least the advancing oil prices had the long-term effect of inflation and unemployment that shaped the economic policy of the eighties.

The Mediterranean policy of the EC can be subsumed under the North-South dialogue as well, and it attracted more attention at the same time as the Lomé Conventions were negotiated and the EC was looking for a new relationship to the South. Was it sub-regionalism and hence more a contradiction to globalisation or was it part of the globalisation process since the 1970s? As Elena Calandri explains in her contribution, the Mediterranean region was not only highly heterogeneous as such, but each EC member state had its own interest (or disinterest), and the aims oscillated between trade, economy and foreign policy within a Cold War context. After first attempts at a common strategy, the EC Mediterranean policy was in the final analysis a failure, due to numerous inconsistencies. Indeed, it can serve as one more example of widening the policy scope with regard to geopolitics and geo-economy, but the EC did not succeed with making a name as a global actor in this region of the world. The fall of the authoritarian regimes in Portugal, Spain and Greek and their democratisation process detached these countries from a Mediterranean policy towards accession to the Community as full members. This admittedly strengthened the EC, but the other Mediterranean countries had to notice that this was not at all an option for them. Insofar, EC policy lacked a clear strategy towards their neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean South.

Bernd Rother, on the other hand, makes us aware of the role of non-state actors for the Southern enlargement of the EC. He examines the attitude of the socialist parties in France, Germany and Great Britain towards the democratic transformation of Southern Europe and towards their membership aspirations. He shows that the German SPD’s concept of full membership prevailed against the Euro-sceptic French Socialist party and the idea of a Mediterranean Union. The German Social Democrats’ support for the pro-European forces was coupled with the idea of a transfer of the German welfare state concept, based on the assumption that the nation state alone could
not secure prosperity any more. This can be characterised as Europeanisation by transfer of ideas and concepts for strengthening the EC, thus enabling it to make a stand in times of increasing globalisation. Whereas the tentative pervasion by détente can be judged as a success of Western European policy, the North-South dialogue leaves an ambivalent impression. EC policy was not fully consistent, and the development policy did not prevent the developing countries from being left behind. By and large, the global economic interconnectedness disregarded the African continent.

Instead, globalisation in the economic realm proceeded very much as an interlacing between North-America, EC and East Asia, forming the so called “triad”.\textsuperscript{29} The Asian states and their regional organisations increasingly appeared as serious global actors. Japan underwent a swift economic modernisation, and since 1975 it was a member of the G7-group of industrialised countries. However, as a consequence of her aggressive export policy Japan was increasingly perceived as a threat for European interests. Hitoshi Suzuki shows that Europe belatedly discovered Asia as a potential economic power. It was just in the 1970s that the Commission was concerned with the trade deficit in relation to Japan and tried to find a strategy against this imbalance. The result of the negotiations was a trade agreement that Suzuki describes as a regulated free trade mechanism that could not profoundly solve the problem.

Beside Japan, the EC’s focus shifted towards other East Asian countries. Whereas in the Japanese case the Community negotiated trade and economy issues with a country that could be unequivocally allocated within the Western democratic world, the interregional contacts between EC and the ASEAN states was also determined by the Cold War rationale and détente. As Tomoya Kuroda proves, since 1975 the EPC was responsible for negotiations with the aim to stabilise this regional model of non-communist states in a sensible region. The Community itself should serve as a role model, and it was German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in particular who engaged himself in promoting a liberal development policy that should foster prosperity to bring Western democracy in its wake. In the long run this was to prove a success in at least economic terms, as some of those ASEAN states rank among the so-called Asian “tiger economies”. EC policy of this decade oscillated between political and economic motives and development policy

aims, which in 1978 led to the very first cooperation agreement with a regional group that nevertheless remained below the ASEAN states’ demands to support their economic development.

Since it proved to be difficult to draw a clear line between economic and foreign policy, the European Community increasingly developed a multi-level-polity to react adequately to the growing complexity of the world order. The supranational institutions, such as the Commission and the intergovernmental mechanism of EPC, acted partly competitively and partly complementarily. Marie Julie Chenard exemplifies this by the establishment of relations to the People’s Republic of China. First of all, an EPC’s Asian Group was founded in 1975 to prepare a Sino-European dialogue before the involvement of the Commission. As a first result, China was the second communist country sending an ambassador to Brussels. Finally in 1978 a first EC-PRC trade agreement was concluded. In terms of trade, this might not be of high importance. Chenard’s chapter rather serves as a valuable contribution to a revaluation of EPC, by examining the less prominent example of China. Instead of recognising crisis rhetoric, she gives proof of an active and fruitful EPC policy as part of the developing multi-level governance during the late 1970s. The European Community on the one hand acted as a bulwark against globalisation, as it tried to control the rise of potential economic competitors such as the Asian states. On the other hand it established relationships that served to strengthening the Asian region and to helping these countries with bringing on their development.

The fourth part of the volume takes a look at certain global challenges of the long 1970s and the actors of that time. The increasing importance of markets and economy had an effect upon political decisions and decision-makers. Guido Thiemeyer in his chapter considers the question of why since the 1970s monetary integration becomes a topic for the EC institutions as well as for the European heads of state and government. He identifies three entangled driving forces: the international markets, the German question and world politics that were responsible for promoting the process of monetary integration. As long as the Dollar functioned as the key currency, there was less need for European monetary integration. Only the Dollar weakness and the rise of the German Mark to become the leading European currency furthered the discussion, since a strong Mark was politically not desired. Monetary independence from the United States, self-assertiveness as well as considerations about the prospective role of Europe in a global world order between the superpowers and a rising Asia stimulated the implementation of the European Monetary System EMS. This was hence a response to glo-
balisation on the financial markets and a further example of the expanding
of policy scope in a realm that was not integrated so far.

A likewise innovative policy field arose with environmental policy. Thorsten Schulz-Walden in his part shows as how urgent since 1970 the European Commission perceived it as a cross-border common European assignment. In fact, environment was already a global issue which the EC discovered belatedly. Furthermore, EC institutions and national governments quarreled about the question of in how far it should generally be in Community responsibility. The ambitious ideas of the Commission were supported primarily by the German government who saw environmental policy as an interface policy for the supranational EC institutions in which different policy fields were overlapping. In this context, environmental policy should be embedded into a wider concept of the improvement of living conditions, whereas others insisted on the intergovernmental character of environmental policy. These divergences weakened the European stance during the Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, when the EC got down in the net of national, global and multilateral politics, albeit on the whole Stockholm gave environmental policy a new impetus.

There was one crucial actor within the Commission of this time who felt responsible for a policy change in environmental policy, interim-President Sicco Mansholt. Johann van Merriënboer presents a detail from the somewhat colourful biography of Mansholt who, under the impression of the Club of Rome report on the *Limits to growth*, underwent a metamorphosis from the architect of the EC Common Agricultural Policy to a “green prophet”. On the one hand this alienated him from old companions, and on the other hand he did not prove himself able to transform his newly obtained convictions into concrete and effective policy initiatives. Van Merriënboer tells a history of conversion that is more than a footnote of history, as it shows how much influence global challenges and their perception could have on individual actors and what in turn they could have on global discourses. Mansholt’s importance lies in affecting the reception of the Club of Rome’s report. It was due to him, who knew the contents of the report before it was published, that it was mainly perceived as an alarmist doom and gloom scenario fostered by an international public discourse on global problems that were, first time in the history of mankind, broadcasted via new communication media around the world.

Mansholt was of course not the only one who agonised on how to solve global problems. Another famous example is that of Klaus Schwab, who was the man behind the European Management Forum (EMF) in Davos since
1971, later on better known as World Economic Forum. In her chapter Claudia Hiepel puts the focus on this international non-governmental organisation that was one of a rapidly increasing number of INGOs since the 1970s. However, the EMF is different from them, as it cannot be characterised as a pure civil society non-profit organisation such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International. Right from the starting point it considered itself as an elite forum and network that invited prominent politicians from nation states, high-ranking EC officials, scientists and managerial elites to a discourse on the state of European economic position and policy in a globalising world. Initially, one motive was the perceived threat by the US and the rising economic actors in Asia from the 1970s onwards. For that, Schwab formed a hybrid organisation that increasingly influenced the discourse on global challenges. The so called “Davos people” formed an epistemic community whose ideas and practices were influential in the course of globalisation and the way in which Europe adapted to it. If Davos meetings and networks were a product of globalisation or an active accelerator remains still controversial. From the beginning, the Commission was intimately involved in the proceedings and actively participated in the meetings and their follow-ups. This gives evidence to the assumption that the EC tried to exert influence by empowering international institutions.

In the last chapter Henning Türk deals with the often mentioned oil crisis and its repercussions on Europe. For him the oil crisis marks a deep caesura in global history, as for the Western industrialised nations it was a decisive challenge to which they turned out to be insufficiently prepared. Until then the EC had omitted developing a common energy policy. And under the auspices of the oil crisis they were not to succeed with doing so. The Community showed weak and defensive, discordant and with less sense of solidarity. The dialogue with the Arab oil producing countries was the seed of a conflict with the USA which could only be settled at the price of French isolation. This paved the way for the implementation of the International Energy Agency IEA as one of the most important and lasting repercussions on the oil crisis which for Türk represents a modern multilateral solution of global problems on energy questions. By the Commission’s status of an active observer the EC was involved into this international institution which allowed to co-write the rules of globalisation. On the other hand, the IEA example shows the repercussions of international institutions on EC policy. The International Energy Agency retarded the development of a Common Energy Policy, since it developed a more efficient mechanism.
As the volume shows, much historical research based on multinational archival studies is still required until we can assess with even more precision how the interaction between globalisation and European integration worked. It is safe to state that there is a correlation between strong institutional regionalism and globalisation. The institutional and political development of the European Community in the long 1970s must be seen in the light of globalisation effects that were perceived as a challenge on which nation state and EC actors had to react. Dealing with growing interdependence was a learning process, since the concomitant problems Europe had to face were numerous and at the same time partly unprecedented. The increasing complexity of policy issues and mechanisms was perceived as a challenge by contemporaries, making it an attractive issue of future research and debate among historians of European integration and international history alike.
Part I:
Eastern Europe and the Process of Détente