Explaining Patterns in IO Openness: Governance Problems, Policy Approaches, and Institutional Design

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1. Introduction

International organizations (IOs) have undergone a profound institutional transformation over past decades, dramatically expanding the opportunities for transnational actors (TNAs) to participate in global policy-making. Today, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational companies, philanthropic foundations, scientific communities, and other forms of TNAs, enjoy levels of access to IOs that were unimaginable only 25 years ago. This is a development that spans all areas of global governance. At the same time, significant differences remain, as TNA involvement continues to vary in distinct and durable ways. Notably, it is a recurring finding in existing, comparative research that IOs in general are most open when engaged in human rights, development, and social affairs, and most closed in the areas of finance and security (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2013). A prominent explanatory factor is the varying functional benefits of involving TNAs in IO policy-making. While some issue areas are characterized by governance problems that generate a strong demand for TNA resources and services, others are associated with problems where TNAs have less to contribute.

Yet, at a closer look, there are important exceptions to this stable pattern of variation across issue areas. Some IOs engaged in multiple issue areas display very limited variation in openness where we would have expected extensive differences across policy fields. For instance, the United Nations (UN) appears to offer relatively extensive access to TNAs across the board, while the Commonwealth and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are homogeneously closed to TNAs. In some other IOs, we witness significant developments in TNA access over time, despite issue areas and governance problems remaining the same. For instance, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has opened up considerably over the past two decades, as has the Asian Development Bank (ADB), even with limited change in policy problems (Tallberg et al. 2013). These anomalies present a puzzle and demand explanation.

In this article, we argue that a neglected source of patterns in openness is the policy approach an IO adopts to the problem at hand. We understand policy approaches as organizational styles of problem-solving, involving a choice between centralized and decentralized policy instruments. Policy approaches matter because one and the same governance problem may be tackled in multiple ways. For instance, IOs may address world poverty either through state-centered or so-

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1 We use the terms issue area, policy field, and policy domain interchangeably in this article.
ciety-oriented development initiatives. While both aim to solve the same underly-
ing governance problem, the choice of policy approach has extensive consequenc-
es for IO design in terms of openness. Making sense of patterns in TNA access therefore requires an understanding not only of governance problems, but also of how IOs work to address those problems. While a centralized approach to prob-
lem-solving reduces the demand for TNA involvement, a decentralized approach strengthens the demand for this design solution, all other things constant.

Our article suggests a need to broaden the repertoire of explanations in use to account for patterns in TNA access in global governance. Existing literature tends to locate explanations of openness at three levels. Some explanations privilege characteristics of member states, such as their level of democracy (Grigorescu 2007; Tallberg et al. 2014), their relative power (Drezner 2007), and the proximity of their preferences to TNA interests (Tallberg 2010; Vabulas 2011). Other expla-
nations highlight characteristics of issue areas, such as the nature of governance problems (Raustiala 1997; Steffek 2010), the level of sovereignty costs (Bradley/ Kelley 2008; Tallberg et al. 2014), and issue-specific organizational models (Rei-
mann 2006; Dingwerth/Pattberg 2009). Yet other explanations focus on factors located in the external environment, such as societal awareness and contestation of IOs (Zürn 2014), civil-society pressure for involvement (Scholte 2011; Pallas/ Uhlin 2014), and participatory norms (Brühl/Rosert 2009; Saurugger 2010).

Our argument privileges an alternative locus of explanation – the organization. Conceptualizing policy approaches as an organizational characteristic, we ex-
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2. Determinants of Institutional Design: Governance Problems and Policy Approaches

This article subscribes to a rational functionalist understanding of the design of international organizations. The analytical bedrock of this approach is the general proposition that institutions are created and designed to address shortcomings in the market or the political system as a means of producing collectively desirable outcomes (Williamson 1975; Keohane 1984; Weingast/Marshall 1988). When developed as an approach to the study of international institutional design, it suggests that patterns in the design of international agreements and organizations reflect actors’ deliberate attempts to deal with the varying governance or cooperation problems they confront. International agreements and organizations are created to address different underlying problems, and this fundamentally shapes the way they are designed, by giving rise to varying functional demands for specific institutional features.

When applied to the context of transnational actors in global governance, this approach generates a distinct interpretation of the relationship between states, IOs, and TNAs. It suggests that states and IO bureaucracies constitute rational actors who make deliberate choices about TNA access, based on assessments of the functional benefits that TNAs may bring, given the governance problems that IOs seek to address. TNA access, in this sense, is not different from other dimensions of institutional design. As Barbara Koremenos (2008, p. 155) concludes in a summary of rational design theory: “Rational Design suggests that states would choose to delegate functions to NGOs – instead of to an internal body or an IGO – only if there is some explicit advantage to such delegation.”

We find extensive theoretical and empirical merit to this argument. In our analysis, governance problems are central to the design of IOs in terms of openness toward TNAs (Tallberg et al. 2013, 2014). In this article, however, we go one step further than the conventional logic. We suggest that governance problems do not automatically translate into functional demands for specific institutional features, but are mediated by the policy approach of an IO to a given problem. Policy approaches thus function as an intervening variable, shaping the effect of underlying governance problems on the functional demand for particular design solutions. In the following, we outline our argument in two steps. First, we explain why governance problems should shape the design of IOs and generate patterns of variation across issue areas. Second, we introduce policy approaches as an intervening factor, conditioning the effect of governance problems on functional demand and institutional design. We conclude by identifying observable implications of our argument.

2.1 Governance problems and International Institutional Design

While early work on international cooperation tended to model interstate relations generally as a prisoners’ dilemma situation, the diversity of governance problems in world politics has now been a cornerstone of rational institutionalist work on international cooperation for some time. In a first wave of research,
scholars sought to understand the prospects for international cooperation with reference to the nature of the problems that states confronted. In this vein, Arthur Stein (1983) introduced an influential distinction between collaboration and coordination situations, and explained why cooperation should be more difficult to achieve in the former compared to the latter. Developing this approach further, Lisa Martin (1992) and Michael Zürn (1992) identified additional varieties in the underlying situation structure (assurance and suasion), with implications for the prospects for international cooperation.

When scholars in a second wave of research turned to the design of international institutions, they built on these insights (see, especially, Koremenos et al. 2001a). The extensive variation worldwide in the design of international agreements and organizations was the central puzzle to be addressed, and attention to governance problems the principal mode of explanation. Only by understanding the underlying cooperation problems that states confront, can we understand why states design international agreements and organizations in varying ways, was the central message. In the special issue of *International Organization* that has become synonymous with the launch of this research agenda, Barbara Koremenos and colleagues (2001b) differentiated between cooperation problems based on four central variables – distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty – and hypothesized their relationship to five dimensions of international institutional design. Over the past decade, the rational analysis of international institutional design has developed into a rich body of research, with cooperation problems as a central explanatory factor (e.g., Goldstein et al. 2000; Smith 2000; Hawkins et al. 2006; Johnson/Urpelainen 2012; Baccini et al. 2013; Jupille et al. 2013).

Research on governance problems and institutional design directs our attention to issue areas as a central analytical category. Issue areas are assumed to vary in the propensity of different cooperation problems. Designing institutions that help to mitigate cooperation problems therefore requires different solutions in different issue areas. The notion that issue areas matter featured prominently in early work on the prospects of international cooperation, which suggested that security, economics, and human rights were governed by different logics (e.g., Efinger/Zürn 1990), but it also informs recent work on the design of international institutions. In this vein, Koremenos (2013) identifies patterns in the prevalence of twelve different cooperation problems across four central issue areas. Simplifying slightly, she finds that the issue area of economics often features commitment problems, and environmental agreements normally deal with problems of negative externalities, while the area of human rights is characterized by distribution problems, and security agreements typically seek to manage different forms of uncertainty.

Building on this generic logic, we expect the governance problems IOs confront to influence their design with regard to TNA involvement and to generate variation in IO openness across issue areas. For our purposes, governance problems vary on three central parameters, shaping the functional demand for TNA access to IOs: technical complexity, level of implementation, and non-compliance incentives.

First, IOs may be designed to include TNAs because of the policy expertise these actors can contribute. While some problems in global governance are quite
straightforward, others are characterized by significant uncertainty, both as regards the policy options available and the effects of alternative policy choices. Engaging TNAs that specialize in gathering, analyzing, and offering policy expertise may in these cases be an attractive option, especially since this information is generally provided for free, allowing states and IO bureaucracies to move research costs off-budget (Raustiala 1997; Betsill/Corell 2008).

Second, IOs may be designed to involve TNAs because of the assistance these actors can provide in implementing IO programs. While some forms of international cooperation, such as the adoption of regulatory standards, entail no or limited IO involvement in implementation, other forms of cooperation, such as programmatic activities in the field, require implementation on the ground for which IOs may not be optimally adapted or equipped. Outsourcing implementation to TNAs, with local knowledge and capacity to reach the target population, may in these cases hold the promise of greater policy and resource efficiency (Reimann 2006; Steffek 2010).

Third, IOs may be designed with access for TNAs because of the help these actors can offer in monitoring and enforcing compliance. While some IOs are active in policy areas characterized by coordination problems with limited defection incentives, many international agreements require costly domestic adjustments that present states with non-compliance incentives. In these cases, relying on TNAs as ‘fire alarms’ that monitor compliance from below may constitute an effective and cost-efficient alternative to oversight from above by IOs themselves (Dai 2002; Raustiala 2004; Tallberg forthcoming).

2.2 Policy Approaches as an Intervening Factor

The rational functionalist logic assumes that the nature of governance problems generates a functional demand for specific institutional design solutions, which in turn translates into variation in the design of international agreements and organizations. When this logic has been challenged from within the rationalist paradigm, the criticism has typically targeted the link from functional demand to institutional design, which has been accused of neglecting the politics involved in designing international institutions (Knight 1992; Stone 2011). We bracket that issue and instead direct our attention to the preceding step in the logic, linking governance problems and functional demands. Our central theoretical argument is that policy approaches of IOs mediate the effect of governance problems on the functional demand for specific design solutions.

By policy approach, we mean an IO’s approach to problem-solving in a particular area. Our conceptualization assumes that policy approaches are an organizational feature and involve an element of durability. This conceptualization has analytical affinities with the notion of policy styles introduced by Richardson et al. (1982), where policy styles are seen as a government’s approach to problem solving (see also van Waarden 1995). Other related concepts are administrative styles (Howlett 2003), regulatory styles (Vogel 1986), and policy instruments (Howlett 1991). These concepts have been used extensively in the study of public administration to account for patterns in policy-making across countries and sec-
tors, but received less attention in the study of IOs. Research related to this theme in IR includes work on the organizational culture of IOs (Barnett/Finnemore 2004; Nielson et al. 2006; Liese 2010; Vetterlein this special issue), the administrative styles of IOs (Hooghe 2001; Grohs/Knill 2013), metagovernance norms in IOs (Holzscheiter this special issue), and IOs as bureaucracies (Biermann/Siebenhüner 2009; Trondal et al. 2010).

In our analysis, the policy approaches of IOs may strengthen or weaken the functional demand for TNA access, given a particular governance problem. In this context, the central dimension on which policy approaches vary is the extent to which policy is centralized or decentralized in its orientation. Centralized policy initiatives are directed at the state level, and involve the regulation of state activities, programs directed at state actors, and information distributed to and gathered from state institutions. Decentralized policy initiatives, by contrast, are directed at sub-state actors, and involve the regulation of societal actors, programs directed at societal actors, and information distributed to and gathered from societal actors.

It is important to note that a decentralized policy approach is analytically separate from an IO’s involvement of TNAs, just as a centralized approach is analytically distinct from non-involvement of TNAs. Development IOs, for instance, may pursue a decentralized policy approach by directing programs at societal actors, but then face a separate choice as to the means of implementation: deploy IO officials, engage member state officials, or enlist TNAs to drill wells, distribute vaccines, and promote female entrepreneurship? The centralized-decentralized dimension is most usefully conceived as a spectrum, where IOs’ policy approaches in a given issue area are positioned more or less toward the one or the other end in terms of regulatory activities, programmatic activities, and information activities.

Our main expectation is that a centralized approach to problem solving will reduce the functional demand for TNA involvement, while a decentralized approach will amplify functional pressures for this design solution, all other things constant. Where IOs pursue a centralized approach, they are less likely to turn to TNAs for policy expertise, implementation services, and compliance information. Conversely, where IOs pursue a decentralized approach, they are more likely to seek the involvement of TNAs in policy formulation, implementation, and enforcement.

This logic generates four observable implications. The first pertains to the general importance of governance problems, and the subsequent three to the mediating effect of policy approaches. First, if governance problems matter for institutional design, then we should see distinct and durable patterns in IO openness across issue areas. Second, if policy approaches matter, then we should observe that IOs organize relations with TNAs in similar ways even in issue areas dominated by different underlying governance problems. Third, if policy approaches matter, then we would expect that IO arrangements for TNA involvement remain stable over time, even when underlying governance problems shift. Fourth, if policy approaches matter, then we would expect that shifts over time in these approaches translate into changing arrangements for TNA access, even if underlying governance problems remain the same.
3. IO Openness Across and Within Issue Areas

In this section, we describe patterns of TNA access across and within issue areas over the time period 1950 to 2010. The purpose is to explore whether TNA access varies distinctly across policy domains, as the notion of governance problems would suggest, and whether we can identify additional variation within issue areas, unaccounted for by governance problems and suggestive of an explanatory role for policy approaches.

The patterns we present are based on a new dataset on formal TNA access to 298 bodies of 50 IOs (for an in-depth description, see Tallberg et al. 2013, ch. 3). The selected IOs comprise a stratified random sample. This sample was drawn from a list of 182 IOs that were identified by applying a set of five criteria to the Correlates of War IGO Dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2004). To be included an organization must: (1) be intergovernmental; (2) be independent from other IOs as regards budget, decision-making, and reporting requirements; (3) have at least three members; (4) have at least one organizational body that operates on a permanent basis; and (5) be active in 2010. To ensure that the sample represents the breadth of the IGO population, we applied stratified random sampling. The 182 IOs were categorized into ten issue areas and five world regions. Then, a random sample was drawn from each category, leading to a final set of 50 IOs. As a result, our sample includes both major, well-known IOs, such as the UN and the WTO, and lesser known regional or specialized organizations, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the International Coffee Organization.

We operate with IO bodies, such as ministerial councils, committees, and secretariats, as the unit of analysis in the dataset. IOs are not monolithic entities and TNA access varies within as well as across IOs. A focus on IO bodies thus permits a more fine-grained analysis of variation in TNA access in global governance. The dataset exclusively captures formal access to IO bodies, as laid down in treaty provisions, rules of procedure, ministerial decisions, policy guidelines, or equivalent. The data have been collected on the basis of documents from archives, databases, and direct data requests to the relevant IOs.

We conceive of TNA access as a dimension of the institutional design of IOs, similar to dimensions such as policy remit, geographical scope, and the autonomy of IO bodies (Koremenos et al. 2001; Koremenos 2013). Access is distinct from participation, even if the two often go together. While access consists of the institutional mechanisms whereby TNAs may take part in the policy process of an IO, participation denotes TNAs’ presence in these institutional venues. In this article, we focus exclusively on institutional access. We define TNAs as private non-profit or for-profit actors that operate in relation to IOs (cf. Tallberg/ Jönsson 2010; Risse 2012). We treat them as one category because we have no strong theoretical reason to restrict the empirical scope to only a sub-set of private actors.

We measure TNA access with a composite index that contains four dimensions of access. First, the depth of access captures the level of involvement offered to TNAs through institutional rules, and covers a continuum from active and direct involvement, sometimes mirroring that of member states, to passive and indirect involvement, such as observing negotiations. Second, the range of access captures the breadth of TNAs entitled to participate, and includes a spectrum from all-inclusive to more selective access.
interested TNAs to only those that fulfill a very restrictive set of selection criteria. Table A.1 summarizes the coding along these two primary dimensions of access, which are each measured on a five-point scale. In addition, the index contains two secondary dimensions. The *permanence of access* captures the extent to which institutional rules grant a permanent right for TNAs to be involved, or whether such privileges are ad hoc or by invitation. The *codification of access* captures how access is legally regulated, and thus its revocability, by distinguishing between regulation through treaties, secondary legislation, or bureaucratic decisions. The scores on each of these four dimensions are aggregated into a composite index.  

Using this index, Figure 1 displays the openness of IO bodies in ten different issue areas from 1950 to 2010. The figure motivates three conclusions. To begin with, the data corroborate the existence of a profound shift in the design of IOs over time. Figure 1 reveals an increase in the formal openness of IOs over these sixty years, especially since 1990. Temporary decreases in access scores are mainly the result of the establishment of new, less accessible IO bodies within the issue areas in question – not a decline in formal access within existing IO bodies – and marginal in scope compared to the overall trend.

**Figure 1. TNA Access: Variation Across and Within Issue Areas, 1950-2010**

![Graph showing variation in TNA access across different issue areas](https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516-375)

*Source: Own calculation.*

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2 Depth and range form the additive component of the index, since they are constitutive of access, defining what rights are granted to whom, while permanence and codification function as weighting factors, because they shape the regularity and revocability of the depth and range of access. Since many IO bodies offer more than one type of access, the composite index is defined by the sum of all arrangements for each body, divided by the number of arrangements per body.
In addition, the figure demonstrates that TNA access varies considerably across issue areas. In 2010, IO bodies in the field of human rights were by far the most open. Multi-issue bodies were the second most open category, followed by development and trade. The lowest levels of openness could be found in finance and security. All issue areas have followed the same clear trend of an increase in openness over time, most notably after 1990. At a closer look, three additional patterns can be observed. First, IO bodies in human rights and development, as well as multi-issue bodies, have been pioneers of TNA access. Second, early differences in access have proven highly resilient over time, as IO bodies in some fields consistently have been the most open (human rights) or the most closed (finance). Third, unlike the overall trend of a steep increase from 1990 onwards, access in some fields, such as environmental politics and commodity regulation, grew more linearly. Other issue areas, such as trade and security, became more accessible later and abruptly.

Finally, Figure 1 shows how TNA access, despite the overall upward trend and the distinct patterns of variation across issue areas, varies extensively within each issue area as well. While the bold line in each sub-figure depicts the general trend in the issue area, the horizontal spread of asterisks at any given point in time captures the degree of intra-issue area variation. Again, three observations are in order. First, the figure shows that all issue areas contain significant internal variation in TNA access. Second, there appears to be a relationship between the level of access and the level of variance; the issue area with the highest level of access is also the area with the greatest internal variance (human rights), while the issue area with the lowest level of access also is the area with least variance (finance). Third, across the board, the intra-issue area variation in TNA access has increased over time. We do not observe the convergence on a specific model of openness in IOs, even within single issue areas.

Table 1 takes us further in terms of disaggregation. It reveals that there is extensive variation in TNA access even across IO bodies involved in the very same policy function in the very same issue area. We identify the policy functions of IO bodies by the stage of the policy cycle in which they are active. An emphasis on functional benefits from TNA involvement yields the expectation that IO bodies involved in the same policy function in the same issue, characterized by the same governance problem, would display relatively homogenous access arrangements. By reporting the standard deviations for each combination of issue area and policy function, the table enables us to compare the levels of internal variation. Again, it is notable that the highest variance is recorded for the area of human rights; while more open than any other issue area in the aggregate, human rights also displays the most extensive internal variation.
Table 1. TNA Access by Issue Area and Policy Function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy function</th>
<th>Policy formulation</th>
<th>Decision-making</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Monitoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Issue</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodities</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculation.

Taken together, these data merit two general conclusions. First, TNA access varies extensively across issue areas. This pattern is consistent with the rational functionalist expectation of distinct and durable differences in institutional design across policy domains, because of variation in underlying governance problems. Second, TNA access varies considerably within issue areas as well, even when controlling for the policy function of IO bodies. This pattern suggests that governance problems, while important, do not tell the full story about variation in TNA access.

In the next two sections, we will show how attention to the policy approaches of IOs can help us understand such patterns in TNA access. We will focus on two cases: the ADB and the Commonwealth. The first is best categorized as a development IO and the latter as a multi-issue IO. The cases were selected in order to have variation in policy approaches – our privileged explanatory variable. Moreover, each case speaks to one of the observable implications. In the case of the ADB, we demonstrate how a shift in the IO’s policy approach generated far-reaching changes in TNA access over time, despite the governance problem remaining the same. In the case of the Commonwealth, we show how the IO organizes its relations to TNAs in an almost identical way in issue areas that vary extensively in the underlying governance problems, because of an organization-wide policy approach. Each case study proceeds in three steps, where we first map the present level of TNA access, then highlight one puzzling pattern that we believe is attributable to the choice of policy approach, and finally trace the historical process through which this choice made its mark on institutional design. As opposed to the dataset, which exclusively focused on formal access, the case studies capture both formal access and informal access, developed through customs and practices.
4. TNA Access in the ADB

The ADB is a multilateral institution that focuses on development within Asia and the Pacific. Established in 1966, the ADB today includes 67 member states. Similar to other development banks, the member states jointly own the ADB as shareholders. The core aim of the Bank is to foster economic growth within Asia and accelerate the economic development of developing member states (ADB 1966). The ADB’s primary means to achieve this aim is to invest in developing member states with loans, grants, and technical assistance. In 2009, these investments totaled $16.1 billion (ADB 2010, p. 6). To improve development, the Bank invests both in the public sector and private sector. In addition, the ADB cooperates with TNAs to achieve greater development in the developing member states in the region (for a general overview on the ADB, see Wesley 2003).

TNA access to the ADB today extends to a broad range of actors, including service delivery NGOs, advocacy NGOs, persons affected by ADB projects, as well as persons or organizations with expert information. Table 2 summarizes the depth and range of access to the ADB’s core organizational bodies. It shows that TNA access extends to all aspects of the ADB’s activities, even if it varies across the phases of the policy cycle. Opportunities for TNA involvement are greatest in policy implementation, where it first developed in the organization, and extensive in policy formulation and monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, access to decision-making bodies is significantly lower.

**Table 2. Formal and Informal TNA Access to the ADB**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth of access</th>
<th>Range of access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Board of Governors Decision-making</strong></td>
<td>Observe Annual meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in parallel NGO program at Annual Meeting, includes informal interactions with officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Board of Directors Decision-making</strong></td>
<td>Participate in parallel NGO program at Annual Meeting, includes informal interactions with officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal meeting during group visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management Policy formulation and implementation</strong></td>
<td>Access to NGO Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in consultations on country-programming and Bank-wide policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consult or assist in project design, implementation or evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formal partnerships for collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consult on assessment of projects’ environmental and social impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informally meet and communicate with staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability Mechanism</td>
<td>Depth of access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submit complaint for review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and enforcement</td>
<td>Participate during review process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Act as consultant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Own calculation.*

The present level of TNA access in the ADB stands in marked contrast to the IO’s degree of openness during its first two decades of operation. Prior to the late 1980s, the institutional provisions for TNA involvement were very restrictive and TNA involvement in development projects a rare exception. For example, in 1990, only seven percent of loans involved NGOs in project execution, in contrast to 81 percent in 2010 (ADB 2012). How can this transformation of the organization’s approach to TNA access be explained?

Our analysis shows that a central part of the explanation rests with the reorientation of the ADB’s policy approach in the late 1980s, from state-led to society-centered development (for an in-depth account, see Tallberg et al., Ch. 6). While prior to this shift the ADB had had few reasons to engage TNAs, the benefits of TNA involvement became clear when the Bank began to understand its governance problem in terms of social development. For this new approach to development, the ADB required significant local and expert capacities and resources, which the Bank itself initially lacked and TNAs possessed. This move toward greater TNA involvement began in policy implementation, where the benefits were greatest, and subsequently spread to other areas of the ADB’s work, following processes of organizational learning. In policy formulation, TNAs could provide valuable input on the priorities required to make the Bank’s loans effective and sustainable. Similarly, the ADB would benefit from opening up decision-making to TNAs because access could serve as a channel for spreading information about the work of the Bank, educating the public about development in general, and facilitating participation. Last, in monitoring and enforcement, TNAs offered information on whether project benefits were realized in line with the ADB’s policies, and promised improved oversight of the Bank’s activities. In the following, we focus on the shift in policy approach in the late 1980s and show how it transformed the ADB’s involvement of TNAs in the implementation of development projects.

TNA access to the ADB began in the early 1980s, when NGOs occasionally assisted the ADB in the execution of specific projects. From its founding in 1966 until 1990, only 17 Bank-approved projects involved NGOs (ADB 1997). The ADB only codified formal access to policy implementation when it adopted the 1987 policy on “The Bank’s Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations.” This policy explicitly drew upon the Bank’s prior, yet limited, experience with NGOs, as well as an analysis of the policies and experiences of other bilateral and multilateral aid organizations (ADB 1987, pp. 20-24). The 1987 policy envisioned NGOs as a necessary supplement to the Bank’s capacities to alleviate poverty in the region. More specifically, the policy explained that NGOs have
“valuable experience and expertise on local conditions and realistic perception of constraints and prospects” (ADB 1987, para. 14) and thus can have a comparative advantage for addressing development. Accordingly, “[t]he Bank could enhance the effectiveness of its operations by utilizing the special expertise and experience of NGOs” (ADB 1987, para. 15). The policy expected NGOs to act as: (1) sources of information, (2) consultants or contractors, (3) executing or cooperating agencies, and (4) co-financers (ADB 1987).

The expansion of TNA access began as the Bank was undergoing a shift in its perspective on development. In 1987, the Bank’s Board of Governors commissioned an external study on the ADB’s coming role in the 1990s. The 1989 report issued by this external evaluation recommended that the ADB complement the objective of economic growth with new priorities to invest in social infrastructure (for example, public health and education), improve living conditions for the poorest groups, and protect the environment (ADB 1989). The Bank adopted this approach in the early 1990s through its strategic frameworks, which identified environmental protection, population planning, economic growth and women in development among the Bank’s primary goals (e.g., ADB 1995b). In addition, the ADB established a Social Dimensions Unit in 1992 and adopted “Guidelines for the Incorporation of Social Dimensions in the ADB’s Operations” in 1993. According to these Guidelines, the reorientation toward a social perspective on development called for greater cooperation with NGOs. At the same time, NGO involvement became more common with projects in social infrastructure, which includes education, health and population, urban development and housing, and water supply and sanitation. For example, in the period of 1990-1992, 19 percent of loans involving NGOs went toward social infrastructure, as compared to 47 percent in the period of 1993-1996 (ADB 1996a). As one interviewee confirmed, when the Bank shifted its attention toward social sectors, there was a need to engage with NGOs (interview, anonymous ADB Independent Evaluations official, 14 November 2011). The reorientation toward the social dimensions of development increased the demand for decentralized resources and information, for which TNAs were especially well-equipped.

As the TNA involvement became more common in loans and projects, the ADB’s evaluations revealed that TNA inclusion not only offered valuable resources, but that it also enhanced the quality of Bank projects and ensured their sustainability. For example, a key finding of an internal evaluation report – the 1994 “Report of the Task Force on Improving Project Quality” – was that project quality and sustainability are attributed in part to the inclusion of project beneficiaries, and the report recommended steps be taken to enhance the donor countries’ and beneficiaries’ “ownership” in ADB projects (ADB 1994b). The ADB’s project-evaluation process also found that project success depended upon the inclusion of beneficiaries in the design and implementation of projects. For example, in the 1994 post-evaluation of projects, one of the lessons learned was that “beneficiaries should be involved in the design and implementation of projects to encourage greater ownership” (ABD 1994a, p. 119).

The ADB sought to further enhance beneficiary ownership for purposes of improving project quality and sustainability through its policies on ‘good govern-
ance’ and ‘participatory development’. Adopted in 1995, the ADB Governance Policy highlighted participation as a basic element of good governance. The Governance Policy, which drew upon a similar policy of the World Bank (ADB 1995a, p. vii), stated: “The principle of participation derives from an acceptance that people are at the heart of development. They are not only the ultimate beneficiaries of development, but are also the agents of development” (ADB 1995a, p. 9). This policy called on the ADB to improve participation by increasing cooperation with NGOs, arguing that the benefits of participatory approaches include “improved performance and sustainability of policies, programs, and projects, as well as enhanced capacity and skills of stakeholders,” and that NGOs “can be helpful in identifying people’s interests, mobilizing public opinion in support of these interests, and organizing action accordingly” (ADB 1995a, pp. 10-11).

The ADB’s commitment to participation was further strengthened by the adoption of the 1996 “Framework for Mainstreaming Participatory Development Processes into Bank Operations.” This Framework described how ‘participatory development’ – or the process by which stakeholders, such as directly affected communities, NGOs, private firms or experts, influence and share control over development – would be introduced into the Bank’s operations (ADB 1996b). The participatory approach to development was adopted by the Bank with the understanding that there was a net benefit to such an approach. As the “Framework for Mainstreaming Participatory Development” states:

“Evidence from several sources shows clearly that the benefits of participation outweigh the costs. The benefits are principally in the form of speedier project implementation and more effective use of resources or services provided through the project. There is also evidence that not adopting participatory approaches also has costs. These costs include a lack of ownership and support, which can impede the use of project services, reduce the sustainability of intended benefits, and limit the recovery of project costs; indifference and dependency on the state by citizens who see that they have little or no say in development; and resentment and willful obstruction when policies and programs are imposed. In general, nonparticipatory approaches, which rely primarily on interventions by outside experts, limit the learning of new possibilities on the part of in-country stakeholders.” (ADB 1996b, para. 12)

In all, the shift over time from a centralized policy approach (state-centered development) to a decentralized policy approach (society-centered development) had far-reaching implications for the ADB’s openness vis-à-vis TNAs. While the underlying governance problem remained constant, the change in policy approach generated a strong incentive for the ADB to involve TNAs in the implementation of development projects, in view of their local expertise and outreach. The ADB developed its policies on TNA access based upon the understanding that inclusion was central to its new, decentralized approach, which it found from its own experience and by drawing upon the work of the World Bank, which also had adopted a decentralized approach of participatory development.
5. TNA Access in the Commonwealth

The Commonwealth was first established in 1949 and presently has 54 member states. The Commonwealth’s core principles include developing just and honest government, protection of human rights, universal access to education, poverty reduction, free and fair trade, sustainable development, promotion of small states, and working toward international agreement on economic, political and social issues (CHOGM 1991). The Commonwealth is perhaps most known for its activities on the promotion of democratic values, such as its election monitoring program. In addition, the Commonwealth has played a role in putting forward the concerns of small and developing states on the international agenda. For example, the Commonwealth has been instrumental to IMF and World Bank policies of debt relief to heavily indebted poor states.

For many years, TNA access to the Commonwealth was shaped by the existence of the Commonwealth Foundation, which was established in 1965 to foster the development of TNAs (especially professional associations) within and across member states. The Commonwealth essentially ‘offloaded’ TNAs to the Foundation, leaving it the task of interacting with societal actors (Bourne 2004). Yet, over the past two decades, the relationship between TNAs, the Foundation and the Commonwealth has developed. Today, TNAs have moderate access to the various Commonwealth bodies, as summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Formal and Informal TNA Access to the Commonwealth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Depth of access</th>
<th>Range of access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHOGM</strong></td>
<td><strong>Decision-making</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submit statements</td>
<td>Commonwealth accredited groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in parallel events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal interactions during events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consult with Committee of the Whole</td>
<td>Invited groups only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministerial</strong></td>
<td><strong>Meetings</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-making</strong></td>
<td><strong>General:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in consultations</td>
<td>Commonwealth accredited groups, may have additional criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in parallel events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make oral or written submissions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal interactions during breaks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finance</strong></td>
<td>Participate in consultation, joint statement presented</td>
<td>Commonwealth accredited groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informally interact during breaks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presentation and private sector statement</td>
<td>Commonwealth Business Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Give report</td>
<td>Invited experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td>Member of CACH</td>
<td>Selected representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observe meeting</td>
<td>Accredited groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informally interact during breaks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Give a presentation and/or submit a paper for the meeting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Invited group(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secretariat</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policy formulation and implementation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in CSO consultations</td>
<td>Commonwealth accredited groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal contact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ad hoc meetings</td>
<td>By invitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collaborate on programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CMAG</strong></td>
<td><strong>Monitoring</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On occasion CMAG agrees to accept written and/or oral statements</td>
<td>Interested TNAs with local knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informally appeal to national delegates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or other Commonwealth bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculation.

A particularly puzzling aspect of TNA access in the Commonwealth is its limited variation across issue areas. While IOs generally offer TNAs highly varying levels of access depending on the policy domain, as illustrated by Figure 1, the Commonwealth displays unexpected similarities. The primary Commonwealth bodies for issue-specific policy are the ministerial meetings, which play an important role in shaping the Commonwealth’s policy in education, environment, finance, foreign affairs, health, law, sports, tourism, women’s affairs and youth affairs. Yet, despite extensive differences across these issue areas in the expected benefits of TNA involvement, there is generally little variation in the openness of the various
ministerial meetings. With few exceptions, TNA access tends to be shallow in the depth of involvement and narrow in the range of actors included. This homogeneity cannot be explained by overarching rules on TNA participation, since each ministerial configuration is free to establish its own procedures.

What can account for this pattern of cross-issue similarities in TNA access? We have chosen to focus on two issue areas where we would least expect to find homogeneity – finance and health – to explore this question. While, among IOs in general, finance is the issue area with the lowest level of TNA access to decision-making of all, health belongs to the area of social affairs, which boasts the highest level of access (see Table 1). In the Commonwealth, however, the differences in access are negligible.

Our analysis suggests that this surprising pattern is a product of the Commonwealth’s general policy approach, or the way in which it seeks to address governance problems (for an in-depth account, see Tallberg et al. Ch. 5). The Commonwealth relies mostly on centralized policy initiatives, such as programs to distribute information to member states’ public sectors (for instance, training sessions, workshops, technical assistance and policy research and publications), to advocate for small and poor states and to coordinate member states’ activities in other multilateral forums (Commonwealth 2011). Decentralized policy initiatives, like local, programmatic activities for which TNAs are better equipped, are much less common for the Commonwealth. As the main policy approach of the Commonwealth is to use centralized policy initiatives, the demand for TNA resources is less than expected at first glance. We show that TNA access to the ministerial meetings on finance and health historically was restricted to a very narrow range of TNAs that were granted deep access. Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, opportunities for TNA involvement in both finance and health policy have expanded. Yet this expansion of access in the past decade has not been sweeping, and generally access is still moderate.

In finance, the Commonwealth’s initiatives include advocating for reforms of multilateral institutions, assisting member states in their trade policy, drawing attention to small states’ concerns, assisting states to manage their debt, and supporting the development of business and private investment. For example, the Commonwealth maintains a database of small state development indicators and provides advisory services to states on debt management, export strategy development, and regulatory frameworks to encourage investment.

Historically, access to the Finance Ministers’ Meeting (FMM) was very low. For a long time, the only form of TNA involvement existed in the Commonwealth’s expert groups, which provided access to a very narrow set of actors. The first expert group was formed at the request of the 1975 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Jamaica, when the Commonwealth began to turn its attention to the wide disparities in economic development between the global north and south. This expert group was comprised of ten experts from across the Commonwealth who served in their individual capacity and were selected because of their expertise to propose a plan for promoting economic development and reducing global inequalities.

The use of expert groups then became normal business for the Commonwealth in the area of economic and financial affairs. For example, throughout the 1970s
and 1980s thirteen expert groups were established (Commonwealth 1990). Beyond the opportunity for access afforded to the narrow set of experts who were invited to participate in an expert group, the only other means of access to the FMM was for a TNA to “masquerade as media” and seek media accreditation (interview, David Kalete, 24 November 2011).

A major step toward opening the FMM came when the first Commonwealth Business Forum was held prior to the 1997 Commonwealth summit. The British government hosted the summit and decided to hold a parallel Commonwealth Business Forum in the days prior to the meeting, for the purpose of bringing together business and political leaders. The summit ended with the adoption of the Edinburgh Economic Declaration, which among other things stated that the Commonwealth would establish a Commonwealth Business Council and that a Commonwealth Business Forum would be held every two years (CHOGM 1997).

Consequently, when Canada hosted the FMM in 1998, the second Commonwealth Business Forum was held by the newly established Commonwealth Business Council – an umbrella organization with a corporate membership. The Commonwealth Business Forum gave private sector actors informal access to the FMM, as a number of ministers attended the forum and engaged with business leaders. The following year, the finance ministers invited the Commonwealth Business Council to prepare principles of best practice on the relationship between companies and governments, thereby initiating a practice of inviting the Business Council to offer input to the FMM (Commonwealth 1999, para. 38).

The FMM subsequently opened up to TNAs in 2002, shortly after the UN International Conference on Financing for Development adopted the Monterrey Consensus in March 2002. The Monterrey Consensus established a new approach to development, highlighting the responsibility of developing states alongside the support of developed states. In addition, the Monterrey Consensus articulated a commitment “to promoting national and global economic systems based on the principles of justice, equity, democracy, participation, transparency, accountability and inclusion” (UN 2003: para. 9). Similarly, it expressed a commitment to engaging with civil society organizations and stakeholders in the international coordination to finance development (UN 2003: para. 69-72).

In the lead-up to the 2002 FMM, the incoming chair of the FMM requested the Commonwealth Foundation to hold a series of regional civil-society consultations on the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus (Commonwealth 2002b: para. 4). A result of this consultation process was that the FMM called on the Secretariat to continue building on its “cooperation with the Commonwealth Foundation and engagement with civil society begun in the recent consultations on ‘delivering the Monterrey consensus’” (Commonwealth 2002b: para. 10). The FMM in its 2002 communiqué also:

“noted that the Commonwealth Action Plan has benefited from a process of consultation and partnership with civil society in Commonwealth countries generally, coordinated by the Commonwealth Foundation. Ministers agreed to build on and strengthen this partnership, and establish the process of civil society engagement as a routine element of preparations for future meetings of Finance Ministers.” (Commonwealth 2002a)
From that point on, the FMM allowed a civil society consultation in the lead-up to the annual meeting of the FMM and a presentation during the FMM.

In all, TNA access to the Commonwealth in the area of finance was early on restricted to expert groups, who could assist the finance ministers to develop strategies and policy initiatives given their knowledge and experiences. The expansion of access to a broader range of TNAs did not occur until the late 1990s and early 2000s, when private sector actors were first given access followed by non-profit civil society actors a few years later.

In the area of health, the Commonwealth’s main priorities include e-health, health worker migration, HIV/AIDS, maternal and child health, and non-communicable diseases. The Commonwealth tackles these priorities by working with states to develop their policies, conducting research on health policy, and using advocacy and information initiatives.

Like the FMM, TNA access to the Health Ministers’ Meetings (HMM) can be traced back to the 1970s, when access was granted on the basis of particular benefits TNAs could provide. In 1971, the Commonwealth Medical Association and the International Federation of Planned Parenthood were invited to attend the third meeting of the health ministers (Commonwealth 1971).

When the Commonwealth Nurses Federation (CNF) requested observer status to the 1974 HMM, the Secretariat was asked to draft guidelines on observer status. The Secretariat concluded that only those organizations that have a “proven utility in promoting international co-operation in the health field” and can “contribute to the substance of discussion” should be allowed to observe (Commonwealth 1974: para. 10). In all, the Secretariat proposed three criteria, namely that the organization: “(1) must fulfill an important role in international or Commonwealth-wide cooperation in some aspect of health, (2) it should be the sole or at least the most relevant organization of its type, and (3) it should be capable of contributing to Commonwealth Medical Conferences as well as learning from them” (Commonwealth 1974: para. 8). Ministers carefully assessed applications for observer status and maintained the authority to make decisions for or against. Not all applications were accepted. In practice, access to the HMM was reserved for TNAs that could be particularly instrumental to the implementation of the Commonwealth’s health policies and in conveying the ministers’ messages in the national context.

The generally restrictive access to the HMMs remained in place, despite the ministers’ growing recognition that TNAs played a vital role in health care. In principle, the HMMs placed emphasis on ‘community participation’ and ‘collaboration with NGOs’ in their policy. However, the HMM focused primarily on promoting health through interaction with national governments, where TNA involvement only had limited benefits.

TNA access to the HMM began to change in the early 2000s. At the meeting in 2001, hosted by New Zealand, TNAs were granted increased access. First, during the HMM the Secretariat hosted a parallel symposium (Commonwealth 2001: para. 1). In addition, an NGO Forum was held prior to the meeting, during which the participants developed a report that was submitted to the ministers.
during the official meeting (2001: para. 1). It then became standard practice to allow a representative of the CSO community to give a presentation at the HMM.

Shortly thereafter, in 2003, the new Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Health (CACH) was established. This was an important step toward greater access for TNAs as two seats on the committee were reserved for TNA representatives. The CACH’s responsibilities include assisting the Health Section to develop and provide advice on its work program, reviewing the agenda for the HMMs, advising Ministers on World Health Assembly (WHA) agenda items, and assessing the performance of the Commonwealth Secretariat’s health division (Commonwealth 2003). Moreover, in 2003, the HMM began to hold its regular meetings immediately prior to the World Health Organization’s annual WHA, which opened up for a parallel event involving ministers and partner health organizations (Commonwealth 2003). Since then, TNAs regularly host a similar event at each HMM, often in collaboration with the Secretariat or the Commonwealth Foundation (interview, Jill Iliffe, 25 November 2011).

Overall, TNA access to the HMM has been more limited than expected, given the focus on health policy. While health policy in many other IOs is associated with extensive TNA access, the Commonwealth’s approach of working primarily with national governments has limited its demand for TNA involvement. Historically, TNA access has been structured to ensure that only TNAs who would be essential to spreading Commonwealth health policy decisions, and who could provide knowledge to the HMM, would be granted access. This range of access slowly expanded over the years to include more TNAs. Increased depth came in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when parallel events were incorporated into the meetings and the CACH was created.

In conclusion, the general policy approach of the Commonwealth has contributed to the extensive similarities in the level of TNA access across finance and health. Even though the Commonwealth is a poorly resourced IO with a broad mandate, its approach to solving governance problems minimizes the functional benefits from TNA inclusion. The Commonwealth’s policies entail state-led actions and centralized policy initiatives, for which TNAs have less useful resources. Nonetheless, TNAs with expertise valuable to the Commonwealth’s policy orientation have increasingly been granted access because of the distinct benefits they can provide.

6. Conclusion

While IOs in general display strong and durable patterns in openness across issue areas, typically attributed to variation in governance problems, important deviations from this picture suggest that other factors are at work as well. Some multi-issue IOs display homogeneously high or low levels of access across policy fields normally associated with extensive variation in access. Other IOs have undergone significant developments in openness over time, despite an absence of changes in the underlying governance problems.

In this article, we have argued that the policy approaches of IOs merit greater attention as a factor capable of explaining such anomalies. We have conceptualized...
policy approaches as an intervening factor, conditioning the effect of governance problems on the demand for TNA involvement, and introduced a distinction between centralized and decentralized policy approaches. In addition, we have demonstrated the promise of this explanation through two case studies, illustrating the varying impact of policy approaches on IO openness. Our central take-home message is that policy approaches matter: one and the same governance problem can be addressed in multiple ways, and how IOs choose to address their respective governance problems has distinct implications for the relationship to TNAs.

We conclude by highlighting two implications of the article for research on global governance. First, the article suggests a need to broaden the range of explanations normally used to explain variation in the openness of IOs. While existing explanatory factors typically are located at the level of member states, issue-areas, or the external environment, our emphasis on policy approaches suggests an alternative locus of explanation: the organization. This article thereby joins recent efforts to explain patterns in global governance with reference to IOs as organizations, and supplements these efforts by offering an account based in rational functionalism, rather than organizational theory. This focus on IOs as organizations should not be mistaken as a move toward contextual explanations; rather, it is about identifying generic features of organizations and their systematic effects on political outcomes.

Second, this article speaks to the general rational functionalist literature on international institutional design. Based on our findings, we have reason to suspect that IOs’ policy approaches may mediate the impact of governance problems on other dimensions of institutional design as well. On the dimension of IO autonomy, for instance, it is notable that some IOs tend to possess homogeneously high levels across policy fields (e.g., the EU), while other IOs generally possess low levels of autonomy, irrespective of issue area (e.g., ASEAN). Exploring such patterns in the institutional design of IOs with greater attention to the explanatory potential of policy approaches is likely to be a promising avenue of research.

**Literatur**


Interorganisationale Beziehungen


Interorganisationale Beziehungen


**Appendix**

**Table A.1. Measuring TNA Access: Indicators for Depth and Range**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth of access</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Range of access</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right to vote; right to lodge legal complaint</td>
<td>Full and autonomous involvement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Full access</td>
<td>No selection</td>
<td>All interested TNAs; public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present statement at meeting; cooperate in project implementation</td>
<td>Active and direct involvement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>High access</td>
<td>Formal selection criteria</td>
<td>TNAs from member states; international NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special meetings with NGOs; TNAs official members of state delegations; consult on project implementation</td>
<td>Active and indirect involvement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium access</td>
<td>Comprehensive selection criteria</td>
<td>Conform to IO goals, transparent financing, democratic structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to gallery; TNA briefing</td>
<td>Passive involvement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Low access</td>
<td>Demanding selection criteria</td>
<td>Experts and professionals; named TNAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No access</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>