International Climate Change Policy: Where do we Stand?

The article begins with a definition of what is meant by climate change, from the perspective of an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publication. The second section identifies the major legal instruments of international climate change policy adopted before 2012, followed by an analysis of the post-2012 international legal framework in the third section. The next three sections investigate what policy instruments and methods individual countries use to tackle global warming. Two industrialised societies are looked at in detail, namely the European Union, which is a Kyoto Protocol Annex I party, and the United States, the second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), but not a party to the Kyoto Protocol. The investigation then directs its attention to a member of the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) of newly industrialised countries, namely China, as a Kyoto Non-Annex I party and the highest current emitter of GHGs. In the last section, the discussion turns to the developing world, with a special focus on least-developed countries.


Introduction
Very few scientists today doubt that climate change is taking place and that human activities are contributing to this trend. 1  • … to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. (IPCC TAR, 2001 a) • … to a statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer). Climate change may be due to natural processes or external forcing, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land-use. (IPCC TAR, 2001 b) • [to a] change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is [,] in addition to natural climate variability [,] observed over comparable time periods. (UNFCCC, Article 1) • [t]he climate of a place or region [changing] if over an extended period (typically decades or longer) there is a statistically significant change in measurements of either the mean state or variability of the climate for that place or region. (Changes in climate may be due to natural processes or to persistent anthropogenic changes in atmosphere or in land use. Note that the definition of climate change used in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is more restricted, as it includes only those changes which are attributable directly or indirectly to human activity). (UN/ ISDR, 2004) Major Legal Documents of International Climate Change Policy Adopted Before 2012 From its inception, international climate change policy and legislation was firmly rooted in the United Nations (UN) system. During the mid-to late 1980s, for the first time ever, research was able to demonstrate that manmade global warming was indeed happening. Against this background, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) set up an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 to gather the scientific evidence for (or against) human-induced global warming. The IPCC's first Assessment Report, which appeared in 1990, presented scientific evidence that global warming was a reality, triggering worldwide concern: B.

Nadia von Bassewitz
The Report identified as main factors affecting climate (i) atmospheric gases, so-called greenhouse gases, some of which occur naturally (e.g. water vapour, ozone, carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) methane (CH 4 ), nitrous oxide (N 2 O) and some of which are man-made (e.g. chlorofluorocarbons, CFC) as well as (ii) aerosols which are tiny particles within the atmosphere. 3 The Report presented evidence that, for a thousand years prior to the industrial revolution, the concentration of GHG was relatively constant and that however since the beginning of the industrialisation in the 18th century the concentration of several GHG, in particular CO 2 , methane, N 2 O and CFCs, have been increasing markedly primarily due to man's activities. 4 As a result of the enhanced greenhouse effect, the Earth's surface and atmosphere are warming up. The IPCC Report warned that in a Business-as-Usual scenario (i.e. few or no steps are taken to limit GHG emissions) future humanmade emissions will result in a likely increase in global mean temperature of about 1°C above the present value (about 2°C above that in the pre-industrial period) by 2025 and 3°C above today's (about 4°C above pre-industrial) before the end of the 21st century. 5

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992
Based on the findings of the 1990 IPCC Assessment Report, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed during the Rio Earth Summit in June 1992, and entered into force on 21 March 1994. The major accomplishment of the UNFCCC was that it recognised, for the first time, that there was indeed a man-made problem of climate change at a moment when there was still considerable doubt regarding the causes of global warming, its extent and impact. 6 The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations "at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate". 7 The stabilisation level is not quantified in the UNFCCC. The latest climate analysis has identified a stabilisation range of 450 to 500 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. According to the UNFCCC, this level should be reached within a time frame which allows ecosystems to adapt naturally to global warming, I. 3 IPCC (1990:13-14). 4 (ibid.:15-16). 5 (ibid.:22). 6 Bothe (2003:240). 7 UNFCCC (2012a:1). while making sure that food production is not at risk and that development occurs in a sustainable manner.
The UNFCCC is a framework document which introduces two main policy approaches which are intrinsically linked in order to address global warming, namely mitigation and adaptation. While mitigation tackles the very cause of climate change, adaptation deals with the unavoidable effects of global warming. The less mitigation takes place, the more adaptation is required, and vice versa: • Climate mitigation refers to any action taken to eliminate or decrease the long-term impact of global warming on human life or property. 8 According to the UNFCCC Glossary, mitigation is understood as "human intervention to decrease the sources of GHG or enhance their reabsorption". 9 • Climate adaptation involves initiatives or measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals, groups and natural systems to the negative effects of climate change. 10 According to the UNFCCC Glossary, the term involves the adaption of natural or human systems in response to climatic stimuli or their impact, which moderates damages or exploits beneficial opportunities. 11 Any country can become a party to the UNFCCC, 12 thus making it a global instrument. Within this framework of global participation, however, states parties' obligations vary substantially between developed and developing countries. The UNFCCC notes that - • the largest share of accumulated GHG emissions has originated in developed countries, as opposed to developing countries, and • per capita GHG emissions in developed countries are much higher than in developing countries.
As a consequence, the UNFCCC introduces the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" or CBDR principle for its member states. 13 The CBDR principle is based on the general principles of equity of international law and includes two elements: while all states together have a common responsibility for the protection of the environment, there are nonetheless differences between the states in terms of their historical contribution to global warming and their ability to fight it, which is why states need to bear different responsibilities. 14 In view of this, the UNFCCC foresees asymmetrical obligations and places the heaviest burden on the wealthier industrialised states. 15 At the same time, the UN-FCCC recognises that developing nations, especially least-developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDSs) are more vulnerable to climate change, in part because of their greater exposure to climate trends and in part because of their low adaptation skills. 16 In line with the CBDR principle, the UNFCCC divides states parties as follows: • Annex I parties include the 41 industrialised countries, covering members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1990 and the former Soviet Bloc (economies in transition, or EITs), 17 and • Non-Annex I parties, which are mostly developing countries.
However, it is important to understand that the CBDR principle is not deemed absolute under the UNFCCC and that the UNFCCC provides, to a certain degree, for a transition from the Non-Annex I group to the Annex I group.
Based on the CBDR principle, the UNFCCC imposes voluntary mitigation targets for Annex I parties, according to which they were supposed to reduce their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. As economic development is vital for the world's poorest countries, the UNFCCC accepts that GHG emissions originating in those countries would grow in the near future, as a result of which Non-Annex I parties were not subject to mitigation targets. The UNFCC aims at helping the developing countries limit emissions in ways that will not restrict their development.
14 CISDL (2002:1-2). 15 Boisson de Chazourne (2008:2). 16 Preamble, UNFCCC. 17 There is a sub-category of so-called Annex II parties, which consist of the OECD members of Annex I but not the EITs. Only these Annex II states parties are obliged to make funding available for Non-Annex I parties.
The UNFCCC obliges OECD members (the Annex II states parties) to support developing countries in the elaboration of national adaptation plans. 18 Moreover, industrialised members agreed to share adaptive knowhow and technology to offer urgently needed capacity-building for Non-Annex 1 states parties. 19 The UNFCCC's institutions and procedures are drawn from the UN system, with a Conference of the Parties (COP) being the highest decisionmaking organ. 20 Decisions are adopted by way of negotiation within the COP, which convenes once a year to review the UNFCCC's implementation. 21 Procedures are governed by the rules included in the UNFCCC itself, as well as the Draft Rules on Procedure -even though the latter have never been formally adopted. This is why most of the decisions of the COP can only be taken by consensus. 22 The Kyoto Protocol, 1997 The publication of the Second IPCC Assessment Report in 1995 23 showed that the measures taken up to that point under the UNFCCC to fight global warming were insufficient. As a consequence, on 11 December 1997, the UNFCCC parties signed the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 24 which only came into operation on 16 February 2005. At the time, more than 55 countries had ratified Kyoto, accounting for more than 55% of global carbon dioxide emission in 1990. This included all OECD countries, but with the important omission of the United States of America (USA/US): the biggest emitter in 1990, the US signed but has never ratified the Protocol. As at the time of writing, 190 countries and the European Union (EU) have ratified Kyoto, while Canada withdrew in December 2011.

II.
In brief, the Protocol operationalises the UNFCCC: 25 • It shares the objectives, instruments and the institutions of the UNFCCC.
Even more importantly, Kyoto replicates the CBDR doctrine formulated in the UNFCCC. However, as opposed to the UNFCCC, Kyoto excludes a transition from the Non-Annex I category to the Annex I category, hence introducing a so-called firewall between these two groups of countries. • The major distinction between the UNFCCC and Kyoto is that, for the first time ever, a UN instrument imposes legally binding mitigation targets as opposed to the non-binding goals under the UNFCCC. In line with the CBDR principle, only Annex I parties take on binding mitigation objectives, while the Non-Annex I parties are expected to carry out voluntary mitigation actions.

Mitigation
Kyoto introduces binding quantified emission reduction targets for the industrialised countries. Under the Protocol, 41 industrialised countries -including EITs and the EU -are obliged to reduce their GHG emissions by 5.2% compared with 1990 levels over the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. 26 The individual national targets include, from the 1990 base year, an 8% decrease for the EU, 27 6% each for Canada and Japan, no decrease for Russia, and an 8% increase for Australia. 28 The Kyoto Protocol allows for more flexibility as to how to meet binding GHG emission reduction targets by designing three innovative instruments. Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), countries with Kyoto targets may implement an emission reduction project in developing countries, based on which they obtain certified emission reduction (CER) units, which count towards fulfilling their Kyoto obligations. 29 A CDM project is obliged to confer measurable and verifiable emission reductions that are additional to what would otherwise have occurred without the CDM. 30 Join implementation is a mechanism similar to the CDM, but the emission reduction project has to be implemented in industrialised countries. 31 CDM and joint implementation are the first global investment tools of their kind, stimulating foreign investment and knowledge transfer in the host country, while offering industrialised countries flexible and cost-effective ways of meeting a part of their Kyoto obligations. 32 Emissions trading is based on the idea that the mitigation targets under Kyoto are formulated as levels of permitted GHG emissions over the 2008-2012 commitment period. As laid down in Article 17 of Kyoto, emissions trading permits countries with CER units to spare to trade such units with other countries that have exceeded their CER allowance. 33 Under Kyoto, states parties are obliged to monitor their GHG emissions and to keep a national register of trades carried out under Kyoto. 34 The UN-FCCC Secretariat keeps an independent transaction log to verify that operations are consistent with the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, a compliance mechanism has been established to verify the implementation of the Protocol by its members.

Adaptation
Under the adaptation objective, the Kyoto Protocol, like the UNFCCC, is designed to support developing countries, especially LDCs and SIDSs, in adapting to the inevitable impacts of climate change and in facilitating the development of know-how and technologies that could help increase resilience to climate change impacts. 35 A range of funds have been created through the UNFCCC which are managed by the Global Environment Facility (see the discussion under Section D below). 30 Hepburn (2009:412). 31 Article 6, Kyoto Protocol. 32 UNFCCC (2012g). 33 UNFCCC (2012f.). 34 UNFCCC (2012e). 35 The IPCC defines resilience as the ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change.

2.
The Post-2012 International Legal Framework -Which Way Forward?

Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol
When evaluating Kyoto toward the end of its first commitment period in 2012, we have to recall the logic behind the agreement. Kyoto was always deemed an initial step towards a low-carbon future, 36 introducing humble reduction targets of 5% for industrialised countries over a short period of five years only, until 2012. After 2012, Kyoto was to be followed by a chain of other agreements to impose ever wider and deeper reductions for Annex I parties. Developing countries were expected to follow suit in time, so that at last, all countries would have binding GHG emission reduction goals. However, the results of Kyoto are mixed, to say the least. Economists agree that the Protocol imposes relatively high costs and generates negligible benefits, while failing to provide a real solution. 37 Additionally, most climate researchers warn that the Protocol has failed to decrease GHG emissions to the extent necessary. 38 Progress towards the mitigation targets under Kyoto has also not been satisfying. According to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (NEAA), industrialised countries will, as a group, probably meet the GHG emission reduction goals imposed under Kyoto. 39 When extrapolating the trend of the years 2000-2007 to the period 2008-2012, NEAA forecasts an average emission reduction of almost 16% for this group of countries in the first Kyoto commitment period. 40 However, the NEAA also indicates that the expected decrease of 16% is mainly attributable to large GHG emission reductions of about 40% in Germany and the EITs after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 41 The World Bank reports that there are significant differences in performance across individual countries. 42 If one looks at the individual state level, the compliance gap for many of them is quite noteworthy. 43 C.

I.
36 UNFCCC (2012e). 37 Olmstead & Stavins (2006:1). 38 Helm (2009b:16). 39 NEAA (2012). 40 (ibid.). 41 (ibid.). 42 World Bank (2008:6). 43 Barrett (2009:62). Various factors have contributed to this underachievement. Some are linked to the Kyoto Protocol itself, others go beyond the scope of Kyoto, as follows: • An important deficiency of the Kyoto regime itself is the lack of broad participation, i.e. the number of countries willing to take real action via obligatory mitigation objectives has always been quite small. 44 The world's largest GHG emitter at the time, the US, has never ratified Kyoto. Canada, an Annex 1 state party, left Kyoto in December 2011. Moreover, the largest increase in GHG emissions today originates from six newly industrialised countries (NICs), i.e. including the BASIC group made up of Brazil, China, India and South Africa, as well as Indonesia and Mexico. These six countries ratified Kyoto as Non-Annex I parties. As a consequence, nowadays, Kyoto addresses only 30% of GHG emissions in the world. 45 • Another great -if not the greatest -weakness of Kyoto is its inflexible partition of countries into two groups in line with the CBDR dogma, building the so-called firewall between Annex I and Non-Annex I members, which has reinforced the existing ideological North-South divide. 46 Kyoto has no graduation process by which to verify whether some of the NICs such as the BASIC group are ready to join the Annex 1 group. 47 This split between richer and poorer nations under Kyoto is clearly outdated and inaccurate, with 50 Non-Annex I countries now having a larger per capita income than some of the Annex I countries. 48 But, more importantly, the partition means that today's biggest GHG emitter, China, remains unconstrained in its emissions output, implying that half of all worldwide emissions will in the near future be generated in a country without binding mitigation targets. 49 • Some observers indicate that the very methodology of Kyoto is flawed in that it takes a geographical approach to GHG emission responsibilities, i.e. the so-called production basis methodology, as opposed to the consumption methodology. 50 Emissions are attributed to states on the basis 44 (ibid.:61). 45 Gao (2007:7). 46 Gosh & Woods (2009:454). 47 Depledge & Yamin (2009:443). 48 Olmstead & Stavins (2010:2). 49 (ibid.). 50 Helm (2009b:20). of territory. 51 All emissions produced within a state account for its emissions total. Hence, Kyoto places the burden of GHG emission reduction on those states which produce emission-intensive goods, rather than those which import and finally consume such goods. The weakness of this methodology is that industrialised countries, which are subject to binding emission reduction targets, can relocate carbon-dioxide-intensive production abroad to developing countries (with no such goals) in order to meet their Kyoto targets. 52 • Another important shortcoming of Kyoto relates to the lack of compliance incentives and enforcement mechanisms to deter non-participation and non-compliance. 53 The UNFCCC, like Kyoto, includes rules for monitoring compliance, in particular for the GHG emission reduction targets of Annex I countries. But monitoring is still inadequate, both in terms of linking it to effective implementation and including issues of importance for developing countries. 54 In defence of Kyoto, however, it must be said that the problem of global warming does not easily lend itself to a binding international agreement. To name but a few issues, the allocation of responsibility for the existing level of GHGs is complex; the measurement of emissions is at best weak; GHG emissions per capita are low in those nations most rapidly increasing their overall emissions; and the impact of global warming varies between countries. 55 Additionally, the complexity of global warming is increasing all the time and is having a severe impact on international negotiations, 56 which is why each negotiation round becomes more demanding. 51 Pan et al. (2009:145). 52 A country such as the United Kingdom (UK) could produce low-GHG-intensive goods, i.e. services instead of manufacture, and import high-GHG-intensive goods such as aluminium and steel from abroad. By transferring energy-intensive production to China, India or other developing countries, the UK could meet its Kyoto obligations without making any noticeable difference to climate change. 53 Barrett (2009:63); Aldy & Stavins (2009:8). 54 Gosh & Woods (2009:463). 55 Helm (2009b:19). 56 Depledge & Yamin (2009:446).

COP12, Montreal, Canada, 2005
Recognising that Kyoto on its own was insufficient to fight global warming, the COP in Montreal adopted a set of decisions which laid the foundation for an innovative dual-track climate negotiation process: 57 The first track, the so-called Kyoto track, is about negotiating obligatory emission reduction targets for Annex I parties for a second commitment period (CP2) beyond 2012. This negotiation path is only open for Annex I parties. The negotiation track is supervised by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP).
The second track, the so-called UNFCCC track, involves the negotiation of emission reduction goals for industrialised countries that have not ratified Kyoto, first and foremost the US. This track also covers negotiations for nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) to be undertaken by developing countries. This track is open to all UNFCCC states parties. The negotiation path is overseen by the Ad Hoc Working Group for Long-term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC (AWG-LCA), which was set up at COP13 in Bali in 2007.
This two-track negotiation and decision-making process aims at broadening the participation and improving the effectiveness of the international climate regime. COP13, Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia, 2007 In 2007 the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report substantially increased the pressure on the international community to urgently address global warming: The IPCC Report indicates that the warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level. 58 The Report confirms the findings of earlier Assessment Report that atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 , methane (CH 4 ) and nitrous oxide (N 2 O) have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed preindustrial values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands of II.

III.
years. 59 The Report notes that most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations. 60 The Report projects an increase of global average temperature of about (i) 0.2°C per decade for the next two decades for all four GHG emissions scenarios and (ii) 1.8°C to 4°C by the year 2100 depending on the GHG emissions scenario. 61 Outcome COP13 in Bali in 2007 decided to uphold the dual negotiations path under both the UNFCCC and Kyoto, with the expectation that the two tracks should be unified in Copenhagen in 2009.
The COP adopted the Bali Road Map, which is an overarching term to include all the decisions made in Bali, identifying the challenges under the two negotiation streams. 62 The main objective of the Road Map was to achieve a legally binding, inclusive climate agreement in Denmark 2009, which was to replace Kyoto after 2012 and would ideally include all major GHG emitters.
The Bali Road Map includes the Bali Action Plan (BAP) which lays down the mandate of the AWG-LCA to supervise the UNFCCC negotiation track. 63 The BAP is built on five pillars, i.e. a shared long-term vision and enhanced action on mitigation, adaptation, technology and funding, which has determined the agenda of any COP to come. Some of the BAP's highlights are as follows: • The BAP calls for a "shared vision of long-term action" on global warming recognises the need for an overall long-term mitigation objective beyond 2012. 64 1. both -would be adopted in the working group. The objectives to be achieved under the BAP are not quantified, especially with respect to -• the long-term mitigation objective under the UNFCCC, and • the funding by industrial countries of the adaptation and mitigation efforts by developing countries. • Even more significantly, COP13 was unable to reach an understanding on a question which has dominated the international climate negotiations since then, i.e. the terms of a post-Kyoto climate agreement after the expiry of the first commitment period in 2012.

COP15, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2009
The COP15 in Denmark in 2009 was meant to finalise two years of intense negotiations which had been launched with the 2007 Bali Road Map and, more importantly, consolidate the two negotiation tracks under the UNFC-CC and Kyoto.

Expectations
Expectations before the start of the COP15 were running high. It was hoped that the Copenhagen meeting could streamline the two negotiation tracks and produce a new, legally binding global climate agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol after 2012: one that would involve all the major GHG emitters -or at least a strong commitment by all states parties to work toward this goal. 70 Furthermore, under the UNFCCC track, COP15 was expected to recognise the imperative of limiting global warming to 2°C. 71 The meeting was also meant to decide on new instruments to generate sustainable funds to bolster mitigation and adaptation efforts by developing countries. 72 In terms of mitigation, it was hoped that the industrialised states parties could agree to a quantified long-term mitigation objective such as a 50% reduction by 2050 ('50 by 50') goal formulated by the G8. 73 The largest developing states,

IV.
1. such as Brazil, China, India and Mexico, were to take on a wider range of quantifiable, policy-based mitigation commitments, e.g. sectoral GHG emission reduction targets and intensity goals. 74 The agreement was also intended to establish the terms for reporting on and verifying states parties' mitigation actions.

Outcome
With the negotiations on the verge of breaking down and after an all-night final session, all the COP15 managed to deliver was the informal Copenhagen Accord, 75 a three-page document with two empty annexes addressing the following: • Under the UNFCCC negotiation track, the Accord recognises the scientific view as outlined in the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report that global warming has to be limited to 2°C in order to prevent the most damaging impacts. 76 Copenhagen introduced a new instrument in the form of "national pledges", which every UNFCCC member had to submit by the end of January 2010. 77 The Accord is labelled a portfolio of national commitments, under which each state commits and enrols to observe its domestic GHG mitigation targets, whether those are in the form of laws, regulations or multi-year action plans. 78 The Accord also highlights the need for scaled-up and predictable funding to developing countries. It called for US$30 billion over a three-year period from 2010 to 2012, to be split equally between mitigation and adaption, and identified a "goal" of US$100 billion per year as from 2020. 79 • Copenhagen endorsed the maintenance of the two negotiating tracks by prolonging the Kyoto as well as the AWG-LCA. While some states parties had hoped these negotiating forums could be used to operationalise the new Accord, no formal link between the working groups and the Accord was established.

Assessment
The gathering in Copenhagen drew a level of political attention well beyond expectations in that an unprecedented number of heads of state and government -almost 120 -decided to meet to provide the final input for a new global climate regime. Did this strategy pay off? Initially, most observers showed profound frustration, because for them the three-page Copenhagen Accord represented all that was wrong with international climate negotiations: 80 • It was felt that the COP had covered no ground whatsoever towards a binding post-2012 climate agreement, as neither of the two working groups, i.e. the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA, had been able to reach a formal decision. Instead, the Copenhagen Accord is a non-binding informal decision, which was not even supported by all UNFCCC members. Due to opposition by a handful of states at the 11th hour, the COP only "took note" of the decision. 81 • The Accord does not impose a long-term binding mitigation goal on all industrialised countries; nor does it foresee mitigation commitments for the NICs. Instead, the Accord introduces an "open enrolment" framework under which states can register their voluntary domestic mitigation pledges. 82 From the onset, experts have been wary about the quality of the voluntary mitigation pledges. Indeed, today, experts are unanimously of the view that the pledges do not suffice to keep global warming at 2°C below pre-industrial level; instead, the pledges would reflect a target of approximately 3°C. 83 Highlighting the gap between the pledged and the necessary GHG emission reductions (the so-called ambition gap), experts since have called for increased reduction targets. Moreover, most of the pledges that are deemed insufficient are listed with conditions. 84 • What is more, like no other COP before it, Copenhagen revealed the dividing lines on the terms of a post-2012 climate agreement. These were as follows: 3. 80 Falkner et al. (2010:252). 81 Anderson (2009:2). 82 Cao (2010:3). 83 UBA (2010:5). 84 Diringer (2010a:1).
• While the developing world insists that the CBDR principle be continued as formulated in Kyoto, i.e. excluding mitigation targets -be they voluntary or otherwise -for developing countries, 85 industrial countries argue that the CBDR principle needs to be revised, given that emissions levels are increasing quickly in some developing countries. 86 • Annex I parties are unwilling to go any further without noteworthy commitments from the US and the large developing countries. 87  However, observers soon realised that, with the Copenhagen Accord, a total breakdown of the climate negotiations had been prevented. 90 By the end of 2010, the Accord had become the first-ever vehicle to include explicit, albeit not unconditional, mitigation pledges from all the world's major economies, including China, India and other large developing states. 91 Experts now believe that the Accord is a compromise of what was realistically possible, given the political impasse. 92 Other observers go as far as implying that Denmark could have seen the emergence of a new climate architecturemoving away from the top-down model of Kyoto with its internationally agreed obligatory emission limits and designated instruments, towards a bottom-up model relying on voluntary national pledges and using flexible instruments. 93

Beyond Copenhagen
Undoubtedly, the weak outcome in Denmark raised important questions about the future of the international climate negotiations. The first question was how to incorporate Copenhagen, which is an informal political decision reached outside the UNFCCC process, into the UN legal framework. 94 After Copenhagen, three possible scenarios were discussed: • Using Copenhagen as an alternative negotiation path -a route favoured by the US • Ignoring Copenhagen and moving on with the UNFCCC/Kyoto tracks only, and • Integrating successful elements of Copenhagen into the UNFCCC/Kyoto tracks, which was the EU view. 95 For most observers, this third option appeared to be the most realistic for COP18 in Cancun, Mexico, in 2010.
An even more important question concerned the form of a post-2012 climate treaty and how best to reach it. In view of the weak COP outcome in Copenhagen, quite a few observers argued that the EU's "global climate deal" strategy 96 was obsolete, and that a new approach to formulating a climate treaty was necessary. 97 Indeed, Denmark had exposed major hurdles on the way to a new legally binding global climate agreement: 98 • Of the major GHG emitters that account for two thirds of carbon dioxide emissions (China, the EU, India, Russia and the US), only the EU unequivocally supports the idea of a new global legally binding treaty • The EU was, however, unable to exercise leadership at Copenhagen, and • Instead, the negotiations were overshadowed by the political impasse between the US and China: Washington made its ratification of a new 4. 94 Diringer (2010b:2). 95 (ibid.). 96 A global climate deal strategy entails deriving a package deal with legally binding quantified targets on all the key issues -mitigation, adaptation and funding -and is universal in its application; see Falkner et al. (2010:256 • issue-specific agreements • agreements which target specific industries or specific policies, or • agreements involving only a few like-minded countries. 105 Specifically, considering the logjam between the US and China, there is a growing number of experts who recommend that a 'coalition of the willing' including the EU, Japan and Russia and progressive developing countries such as Indonesia, Korea and Mexico should continue with Kyoto beyond 2012. 106 The last major question that needed to be looked at after Denmark involved the obvious weaknesses of the UN negotiation framework. Observers agreed that there was an urgent need for more effective decision-making rules, which simultaneously guaranteed participation and inclusiveness. 107 After Copenhagen, various options were discussed. Under the first main option, negotiations would continue under the UN umbrella, but the decision-making procedure would be overhauled by -• introducing majority rule, or • keeping voting rules as they were, but using more exclusive negotiation groups. 108 Other experts looked beyond the UN as a negotiation platform and suggested using other forums. 109  Observers hoped that the COP in Mexico would consolidate the various discussions and negotiation streams which existed: the two formal negotiation streams, supervised by the Kyoto and AWG-LCA, and the more informal Copenhagen Accord. 113 The key issue to resolve in this regard was how to integrate the non-binding Copenhagen Accord into the wider UNFCCC framework. Under the UNFCCC track, COP16 was expected to at least decide on the basic parameters of new or improved mechanisms in those areas where negotiations had reached a certain level, e.g. the REDD+ initiative by UN-REDD and others in respect of deforestation, or initiatives regarding finance or technology. 114

Outcome
The Cancun Agreements did extremely well to integrate the key elements of the Copenhagen Accord into the UNFCCC. For example, -• Cancun includes, for the first time in an official UN document, the objective to limit the temperature increase below 2°C. Unlike the year be-V. In the run-up to the COP17, experts discussed various possible negotiation options for Durban, ranging from a worst-case scenario to a very ambitious one: • At worst, states parties would be unable to agree on prolonging Kyoto beyond 2012, not even informally. Many experts thought this was the most likely option going into the negotiations in light of the unresolved gridlock, described earlier. Even those Kyoto states parties that had supported its formal extension were no longer inclined to do so without reciprocal commitments by other nations. 127 For example, the EU, which was generally willing to sign up to CP2 of Kyoto, would only do so if negotiations for a new binding climate deal including China and the US were to be launched. 128 Then again, the US would only agree to negotiate such a new deal if it included GHG emission reduction goals of the "same legal force" for all of the major emitters -including China and Indiaalthough these obligations could be differentiated. 129 China, on the other hand, seemingly kept on opposing any binding targets, no matter how differentiated they were. • In the very ambitious scenario, industrialised countries would agree in Durban to a formal extension of Kyoto. For the reasons explained above, most observers viewed this option as highly improbable. Moreover, with Canada, Japan and Russia's declaration to oppose a CP2 of Kyoto -a position which these countries declared just before Durban -a prolonged Kyoto would cover even less GHG emission reduction than the original Kyoto. 130 • Viewed by most observers as the best-case scenario, states parties would reach an informal agreement launching a CP2 of Kyoto in which GHG emission reduction goals would be political rather than legally binding obligations. 131 Due to the political nature of the new targets, their endorsement would not require a formal amendment of Kyoto, but only a simple decision. 127 Bodansky (2011:5

Outcome
In spite of the doom and gloom at COP17's opening, the states parties adopted the Durban Agreements on a range of issues that may lead to a historic breakthrough in international climate negotiations. What was sure was that COP17 kept the discussion of global climate efforts from breaking down and instead moved it in the right direction. 132 Thirty hours after the scheduled end of the Durban COP, on the Kyoto track, the states parties agreed to a prolongation of Kyoto beginning in 2013. However, the details of the new reduction targets including the length of the new commitment period would be established at COP18. The BASIC group (and other NICs) remained Non-Annex I parties without binding targets. 133 States parties to CP2 of Kyoto would have to submit their quantified reduction targets by May 2012. However, Canada, Japan and Russia indicated that they would not participate in CP2 of Kyoto. 134 The extension of Kyoto beyond 2012 was combined with the launch of new road map for the negotiation of a post-2020 climate agreement by way of "a protocol, another legal instrument or an outcome with legal force". 135 Negotiations are supervised by a newly formed Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), and are to finish no later than 2015. 136 The new climate deal is to come into effect only from 2. 2020 onwards. Negotiations within the AWG-LCA stream were to continue for at least another year, until the COP in Doha. 137 On the UNFCCC track, the COP took various significant steps to further the implementation of the Cancun Agreements: • A major outcome was the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund to serve as a key vehicle for climate funding. 138 For years, funding has been an issue of ongoing conflict between developing countries and their more industrialised counterparts. Though the UNFCCC includes funding mechanisms, it has a very weak role, and sums pledged to the three financing tools -the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, and the Adaptation Fund -are notoriously low. 139 However, while states parties were able to decide on the institutional structure of the Green Climate Fund, the decision does not indicate where the money for the Fund will actually come from beyond 2012. 140 • Importantly, in order to further improve monitoring under the UNFCCC, Durban's COP17 introduced -141 • a voluntary international assessment and review mechanism for developed countries, and • a non-binding international consultation instrument for developing countries. • Finally, states parties agreed on various other operational actions including, for example, -142 • the upcoming inauguration of the new technology instrument in 2012, and • funding and technical aspects of the REDD+ initiative.

Assessment
Observers believe that Durban kept the international climate negotiations intact and moving in the right direction, thus increasing the likelihood of 3. meaningful long-term climate action. 143 South Africa reopened the door to legally binding GHG reduction targets for all major emitters -a door which seemed to have been closed after Denmark. 144 For China, India and the US to even consider an inclusive and robust legal agreement beyond 2012 was certainly an important move. 145 Durban was a step forward in more than one respect: • The key importance of the innovative ADP was not so much that a further negotiation stream had been launched: it would have been sufficient to prolong the UNFCCC track beyond 2012. It was more that, for the first time, Durban offered states parties the option of a more symmetrical future climate agreement. 146  • What is also significant is the fact that old alliances were crumbling. In the past, developing countries used to negotiate as one G77 bloc, but were often hijacked by the larger developing countries. In Durban, for example, the LDCs and SIDSs formed a coalition with the EU. 153 Similarly, the BASIC group fractured in Durban: first South Africa and then, later, Brazil insisted on a road map for a new universal treaty, while China indicated its willingness to ponder adopting binding goals after 2020. 154 Yet again, observers raised various concerns. For one, great ambiguity remains over the legal nature of the post-2020 climate deal, particularly the binding force of the targets. The agreement to launch the ADP, the new negotiation platform, undertakes "to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC." However, apart from the question of what is meant by an "agreed outcome with legal force" -which is a novel term in international law -even a legally binding agreement need not contain legally binding commitments. 155 The Durban forum may well have provided for a legally binding agreement by referring to an "agreed outcome with legal force", but nowhere does it state that this new agreement is to include legally binding mitigation targets. It can be expected that the US and others will continue to fight tooth and nail against having quantified binding goals in a 2020 agreement. 156 Observers also warned that the new emission reduction targets under a CP2 of Kyoto would be much weaker than the ones under the first commitment period (CP1) of Kyoto because, for many countries, they would consist of voluntary national pledges which are not linked to an overall emission reduction objective. 157 The large developing countries are still without binding targets, Russia and Japan will not participate in CP2 of Kyoto, and Canada withdrew from Kyoto for good just after COP17 in Durban in 2011.

COP18, Doha, Qatar, 2012 Expectations
In terms of public and media interest, Doha was expected to be a lower-key meeting than its predecessors in Cancun, Mexico, in 2010, andin Durban, South Africa, in 2011. 158 After three years of rather 'big moment' COPs, i.e. in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2010, and those in Mexico and South Africa, the COP in Doha, Qatar, in 2012 was more about giving operational momentum to the agreements reached in Durban. 159 The progress required in Doha was deemed quite modest, so it was important that expectations were not too high in order to avoid it being labelled "another failure". 160 Although no new initiatives or processes were expected to be launched, much remained at stake. COP18 in Doha came at a particularly important time, namely the end of CP1 of the Kyoto Protocol on 31 December 2012. Hence, Doha would be vital in ensuring a seamless continuation of the Protocol as of 1 January 2013 and, thus, the maintenance of the only international legally binding instrument that existed in respect of tackling global warming. 161  Furthermore, COP18 was expected to conclude the work on the UNFCCC track inaugurated in Bali in 2007 and supervised by the AWG-LCA since then. 167 The three key issues under negotiation in Doha, therefore, included mitigation (for both developed and developing countries), funding, and MRV -although, in the run-up to Doha, states parties were sharply divided over what issues needed finalisation at the COP18. 168 As regards funding, the vital question was whether developed countries would make new commitments for the 2013-2020 period to bridge the gap between the 'start finance' period, which was to end in 2012, and the US$100 billion commitment made in Copenhagen, which begins in 2020. 169 The task in Doha was either to formally conclude work on each of these areas or move them to the two UNFCCC subsidiary bodies or to the ADP itself.
Finally, under the ADP, much needed to be concretised, e.g. starting to define the details regulating the negotiations expected to set up the new "protocol, another legal instrument or a legal outcome under the [UNFC-CC]" applicable to all states parties by 2015. 170 As a negotiation track, the objective in Doha was to consolidate the understanding among countries on the negotiation issues for the next three years under both so-called workstreams: 171 • Under Workstream 1, which focused on the post-2020 treaty, countries were to discuss how the UNFCCC's existing framework would apply to the new 2020 treaty; for example, developing countries were insisting on upholding the CBDR rule and the so-called firewall between Annex I and Non-Annex I parties, and • Under Workstream 2, countries were to look at how to improve the level of existing pledges for the 2013-2020 period.

Outcome
The Doha Climate Gateway successfully managed to end two long-standing negotiation streams, i.e. Kyoto and the UNFCCC track, and to progress to a unified track -the ADP -with the objective of an inclusive legal climate agreement by 2015.
First and foremost, the COP agreed on the revision of the Kyoto Protocol to formally establish the CP2. 172 Having been launched in 2005, the AWG-KP thus terminated its work in Doha. States parties also decided that CP2 would run for eight years, i.e. from 2013 through 2020. 173 In addition, the extended Kyoto features an ambition trigger, requiring that states parties verify and increase their emission reduction targets by 2014 in line with the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report. 174 In the face of strong Russian objections, as the main benefactor of hot air targets under KP1, states parties decided to restrict the use of the surplus emission allowance gained under KP1. 175 For Non-CP2 parties such as Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia, COP18 agreed to restrict their eligibility to marketbased instruments, including the CDM and emissions trading. 176 Furthermore, the states parties agreed to terminate the Convention track under the AWG-LCA. As expected, the COP simply took note of the pledges already listed under Copenhagen, while launching a one-year work programme to verify those pledges. Efforts to improve the accounting rules for the MRV were unsuccessful.
A major outcome of the UNFCCC track was the agreement to look towards establishing some kind of 'loss and damage' mechanism in favour of the most vulnerable countries at COP19 in 2013. 177 On the other hand, industrial countries refused any new funding commitment, and only agreed to maintain through 2015 the average finance levels provided during 2010- 2012 -roughly US$10 billion a year. 178 At least a few European countries, i.e. Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK, pledged to somewhat augment their funding post-2012.
Under the ADP track, China, India and other developing countries again tried to introduce the CBDR principle explicitly into the ADP framing, which the US and others had objected to include in the mandate. 179 The COP decided to establish a one-year work programme to think through the application of the UNFCCC principles. 180 The COP also stated that the ADP should consider "elements for a draft text" for the new agreement no later than COP20, "with a view to making available a negotiating text before May 2015". 181 For the rest, the ADP decision was mainly of a procedural nature.

Assessment
This round of international climate change talks was a modest step forward. We always knew they would be very tough after the breakthrough at the same conference in Durban last year. 182 The success in agreeing a second Kyoto commitment period, although important politically, is also something of a Pyrrhic victory for its supporters. 183

Despite the devastation wrought by Hurricane Sandy and President Barack
Obama's re-election, the US was once again less than helpful in moving ahead, declining any proposal to increase their emission reduction targets or to commit to new funding. 184 The EU is similarly to blame for a lack of progress on this score, since the traditional frontrunner arrived at Doha with a reduction objective it had basically already met, with no joint funding commitment, and with divergent positions among the EU member states on various issues. 185 With the industrialised world unwilling to increase their targets or to improve on funding, there was no incentive for the likes of China or India to better their voluntary emission reduction goals. 186 • Observers warn that the outcome of COP18 was even more modest than would have been necessary. CP2 will be a far cry from CP1 in terms to emission reductions: under the original Kyoto, all industrialised countries (39 at the time) -representing more than 55% of all global emissionscommitted to reducing those emissions. With Canada having withdrawn from the treaty entirely, and Japan and Russia declining to sign up to CP2, this left the EU27, plus Australia (subject to conditions), Belarus, Iceland, Kazakhstan, New Zealand (possibly), Norway, and the Ukraine as members 187 -representing only around 15% of global emissions. Also noteworthy is that, at the time of writing, the 2020 target of the largest party (the EU) had almost already been met. 188 Moreover, the overall emission reduction to be achieved under CP2 will be approximately 18% by 2020 from 1990 levels and, hence, significantly less than the 25-40% range recommended by the IPCC. 189 The net result is that Doha left the world firmly on track to 4°C or more of warming by 2100. 190 • In terms of the UNFCCC track, mitigation ambitions remained low. As expected, funding proved to be the most difficult issue to resolve in Doha. There was no joint commitment by Annex I parties in terms of mid-term funding from 2013 to 2020. The relevant decision simply "urges", "invites" and "encourages". Annex I parties to increase their funding, but when their "financial circumstance permit ". 191 Yet again, Doha also produced some positive results, as follows: • Its main objective was to streamline the complex, multi-track negotiating process. The achievement in reducing the overall negotiations down to one unique track from 2013 onwards should not be underestimated: 192 it allows states parties to concentrate on the discussions at hand, and frees up time and resources for states parties to the UNFCCC. 193 • As for the level-of-ambition discussion, there remains hope. Workstream 2 under the ADP, which was instituted to increase pre-2020 ambitions of the states parties, and the review of the CP2 states parties' targets envisaged between 2013 and 2015, provide the tools for jump-starting mitigation efforts. 194 • The idea of setting up a kind of 'loss and damage' instrument at COP19 in 2013 is a major achievement for LDCs, particularly for those most vulnerable to the long-term impacts of global warming. 195 Where mitigation and adaptation fail, people may suffer damages to their assets and health due to global warming. Yet, industrialised countries, notably the US, remain extremely wary of such a legal mechanism, fearing that, as traditionally high emitters, they may be held liable for damages of potentially unlimited economic value whose attribution to global warming may still be unclear. 196 However, following Doha, the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy pointed out the following: 197 The decisions required in 2015 will be momentous: to raise collective global ambition for 2020-30 to meet the 2°C pathway; to agree a new, legally binding framework; to identify the sources of finance that can meet the goal of providing US$100 billion in climate assistance to the poorest countries by 2020; and to agree a new international collaboration on the development, demonstration and deployment of low-carbon technologies.
With just three years to go, there is no time to lose. The next three sections therefore investigate what policy instruments and methods individual countries use to tackle global warming. Two industrialised societies are looked at in detail, namely the EU, which is a CP1 and CP2 Kyoto Annex I party; and the US, the second largest GHG emitter, but not a party to Kyoto. The discussion then turns to the developing world, with a special focus on LDCs.

Climate Change and Industrialised Countries The European Union
The EU, representing 27 member states, with a combined output of 4,050 Mt of carbon dioxide in 2010, is the world's third largest GHG emitter after China and the US, accounting for 12.3% of global carbon dioxide emissions, and having shown an increase of 3% from 2009 (and a decrease of 5% from 1990). 200 The EU27's emission intensity of 0.26 kg carbon dioxide per unit of GDP 201 in 2010 is about a third lower than the US's (0.41 kg) and China's (0.77 kg), and has decreased by 37. 2% from 1990. 202 Per capita carbon dioxide emissions in the EU27 totalled 7.29 t of carbon dioxide in 2010 (compared with 17.3 t for the US and 5.4 t for China), which signifies a reduction of 17.3% for the EU27 from 1990. 203 The EU has long been at the vanguard of international efforts to address global warming, and has been a state party to the UNFCCC since 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol since 2002. Unlike the US, the EU follows mainly a 'stick' climate policy approach, i.e. a permit and tax system, combined with direct regulations such as fuel efficiency standards. This top-down approach is complemented by financial incentives to stimulate innovation and market-based instruments. The European Climate Change Programme (hereinafter ECCP I) of 2000, replaced in D.
I. 200 NEAA (2011:11, 14 2005 by the ECCPII, serves as the main EU climate policy document, which is an example for a 'front door' approach.

Binding Mitigation Targets?
Under Kyoto, the 15 older EU member states (EU-15) took on the obligation of reducing their collective GHG emissions by 8% on average in the first commitment period until 2012, compared with its 1990 base-year emissions. 204 While the EU's Fifth National Communication under the UNFCCC in 2009 projected that the EU-15 would overshoot their Kyoto target by 5.8% in 2010, 205 individual members had varied results in achieving their targets. Though some member states, like France, Greece and the United Kingdom, have reduced domestic GHG emissions beyond their Kyoto targets, others like Austria, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain are lagging in compliance. 206 Regarding the 2013-2020 follow-up, in March 2007 the EU took the unilateral decision to reduce its GHG emissions by at least 20% by 2020 compared with its 1990 levels. In order to implement this obligation, in June 2009 the EU adopted a Climate and Energy Package, 207 in which it reiterated the overall target of a 20% GHG emission reduction, with an additional commitment to push this up to 30% if a satisfactory international agreement involving all big GHG emitters is reached. Apart from these new mitigation targets, the package obliged EU members to generate 20% of their energy from renewables by 2020. In a communication of May 2010 208 and a Staff Work Document of February 2012, 209 the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) investigated various options for moving towards a 30% GHG emission reduction, underlining that the 20% target was well within reach, given a much quicker GHG emission decrease than originally anticipated due to high oil prices as well as the ongoing global financial crisis.
Yet, due to opposition from some EU members, the EU was unable to push its emission reduction target to 30% at COP18 in Doha, while observers indicated that the 20% target had already been met.
With regard to the long-term ambition of keeping the global temperature increase to below 2°C, the Climate and Energy Package contains an EU objective of reducing domestic GHG emissions by 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050, which was reconfirmed by the European Council (hereinafter Council) in February 2011. In March 2011, the Commission adopted a Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050 210 outlining scenarios on how to achieve this target.

Policy Instruments
In order to achieve the binding mitigation goals, the EU uses various regulatory instruments, central to which is the trade in GHG emission permits, i.e. the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) launched in 2005, which now in its third phase, running till 2020. 211 The 2005 Directive introduced a mandatory 'cap and trade' regime. According to this regime, a GHG emission limit for the whole ETS is fixed, and for each year a certain quantity (a 'cap') of GHG emission allowances is granted to EU members, who in turn distribute ('trade') these via public sale to the 10,800 installations throughout the bloc participating in the scheme. 212 If an installation emits more than the allowances it has obtained, it has to buy unused allowances from other installations under the ETS. 213 In 2009, a revised ETS directive was adopted 214 to further improve the EU scheme for a third phase running from 2013 to 2020. Moreover, the Commission wants to promote the creation of a robust OECD-wide carbon market by 2015, to be further extended to the larger developing countries by 2020. Up until 2012, the EU ETS only involved carbon dioxide emissions in the power-and heat-generating sector as well as a few other emissions-intensive industries (oil, iron and steel) across the 27 EU members plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. While overall ETS guidelines are set at EU level, allocation rules and GHG emissions caps are determined at national level. The firms in question obtain allowances to emit a certain tonnage of GHG each year, 215 but the overall emissions level is reduced over time. It is currently some 6.5% below the 2005 level, and by 2020 will be 21% lower. In 2008, 3 billion t of carbon dioxide were traded at a market value of US$92 million. 216 While the EU ETS is generally acknowledged for its pioneering role, observers outline a number of flaws: at the beginning, it was unclear whether it was indeed more effective than carbon taxes in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 217 In Phase II, the ETS only covered 40% of all EU GHG emissions, notably excluding the transport sector, which was an important omission. 218 Other weaknesses included the lack of harmonised rules on allocation within the EU, the lack of strict enforcement tools, and the missing linkage between the EU ETS and other ETSs in third countries. 219 In the revised EU ETS Directive of 2009, coverage of the ETS was broadened for Phase III in order to include carbon dioxide emissions from the chemical industry and the aviation sector as well as certain other GHGs such as nitrous oxide. Moreover, caps are to be set at EU level and allocation rules harmonised across the EU. In spite of these structural reforms the ETS has been facing its most important challenge to date over the past months: the growing surplus of allowances due the economic crisis risks undermining the orderly functioning of the regime.
As to the other main regulatory instrument usually discussed by observers, namely carbon taxes, notably, quite a few EU members have introduced some form of eco-taxation; 220 however, there is no EU-wide carbon tax as 215 For an overview, see Massai (2007:18). 216 CCES (2009a:3). 217 Helm (2009a:229). 218 Farnsworth (2007:29). 219 Massai (2007:21). yet. However, proposals for a carbon taxation dispensation have been floated since 1999, prompting the Commission in 2010 to propose the amendment of the Energy Taxation Directive of 2003 which lays down common rules for the taxation of energy products. 221 The proposal aimed to introduce a carbon tax mainly for those sectors not yet included in the ETS. 222 However, the proposal has yet to reach a majority in the Council due to considerable lobbying by industry. These regulatory instruments are accompanied by incentive-based mechanisms which promote the transition to a low-carbon society. The Energy Review of 2008, which stress that the EU's climate goals for 2020 will necessitate an overhaul of EU energy arrangements, looks at the challenges facing the bloc between 2020 and 2050 and formulates an EU Strategic Energy Plan. 223 This Plan tries to speed up the development of innovative, inexpensive, low-carbon technologies, and is built on a wide-ranging research and development scheme. 224 The initiative is complemented by the European Energy Programme for Recovery, which allocated €1 billion for carbon capture and storage installations and €50 million for offshore wind installations. 225 In 2011, the Commission proposed its Roadmap for 2050, which is based on the view that innovative ideas are needed to scale up investments in energy, transport, industry and information technologies and that more focus is necessary to combat energy inefficiency. 226 Together with the Energy Efficiency Plan of 2011 and the White Paper on Transport of 2011, the Roadmap for 2050 is a key deliverable to achieve the EU's longterm objective of reducing GHG emissions up to 95% by 2050. 227

Funding for Developing Countries
As an Annex I party under the UNFCCC, the EU is obliged to assist developing countries to tackle global warming, both in respect of reducing GHG emissions and in adapting to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. Before COP15 in Denmark in 2009, the Commission adopted a communication Stepping Up International Climate Finance: A European Blueprint for the Copenhagen deal, recognising that supporting developing countries was vital to reaching an ambitious outcome at COP15. The blueprint identified that, by 2020, developing countries would incur yearly costs of €100 billion to finance their mitigation and adaption activities, and proposed that industrialised nations and larger developing countries grant them funding to the tune of some €22-50 billion a year, with the remaining €50 billion coming from national sources and expanded international carbon dioxide markets. 228 At COP15 in Denmark in 2009 and COP16 in Mexico in 2010, the EU and other industrialised countries pledged to jointly grant nearly US$30 billion from 2010 to 2012 to kick-start the scheme, and offered to mobilise US $100 billion a year by 2020. Despite budgetary constraints, the EU did, in fact, manage to award €2.34 billion in 2010 as well as in 2011, bringing its contribution to €4.68 billion, or 65% of the overall pledge for 2010-2012, most of which was deployed through existing instruments. 229 With the assistance of the EU, COP17 in Durban in 2011 launched the Green Climate Fund, the new funding instrument intended to serve as the key long-term financing vehicle. However, states parties were unable to reach consensus on where the money for the Fund would come from, in either the medium (beyond the fast-start resources) or long term. 230 In recent years, three funding mechanisms have been set up by the Commission, i.e. the Global Climate Change Alliance, the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, and the Climate Change Windows, pooling more than €1.5 billion in grants from the EU budget and EU members' national budgets. These tools are estimated to leverage around €14 billion in climate finance by 2013. 231

The United States of America
The US, with its output of 5,250 Mt of carbon dioxide in 2010 alone, is the world's second largest GHG emitter after China and ahead of the EU in third II. 228 EC (2009a:244). 229 EC (2012d). 230 Boyle (2011:2). 231 EC (2012d). position. The US accounts for 15.9% of global carbon dioxide emissions, showing an increase of 4% from 2009 (and an increase of 5% from 1990). 232 The US's emissions intensity of 0.41 kg carbon dioxide per unit of GDP is almost half as low as China's (0.77 kg) and about a 40% higher than the EU27's (0.26 kg), and has decreased by 30.6% from its 1990 levels. 233 Per capita emissions in the US totalled 17.3 t of carbon dioxide in 2010, which is more than double the value of the EU27's 7.29 t and more than three times the value of China's 5.4 t; for the US, this signifies a reduction of 11.0% since 1990. 234 While the US became a state party to the UNFCCC in 1992, it declined to ratify Kyoto in 2003, making it the only major industrialised countryand the world's largest GHG emitter at the time -to do so. Unlike the EU, against the background of voluntary mitigation goals, the US pursues a 'carrot' climate policy approach with various incentive-driven instruments rewarding energy innovation, such as its Climate Change Technology Program, while favouring market solutions. This bottom-up approach is -albeit only recently -complemented by direct regulations, i.e. energy standards and mandates. Unlike the EU, the US lacks an explicit climate policy and strives to attain reduction of GHG emissions by indirect means such as air quality and energy efficiency policies.

Mitigation Policy
Binding Mitigation Targets?
Since the US has never ratified Kyoto, it has, to date, never signed up to binding mitigation targets at international level. Following COP15 in Denmark in 2009, the US signed up to the Copenhagen Accord and took on the voluntary goal of reducing its GHG emissions by 17% below 2005 levels. With regard to the long-term vision of keeping global warming at 2°C, at COP15 the US Government stated that it sought to voluntarily reduce its GHG emissions by 85% by 2050, compared with its 2005 levels.
Neither has the US, at federal level, adopted an explicit climate policy ('front door' approach). In order to reach the voluntary goal agreed at COP15, the Obama Administration made an all-inclusive obligatory Climate Bill one of its legislative priorities. The so-called American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) Bill was passed by the House of Representatives in June 2009, 235 but was defeated in the Senate in June 2010. 236 The ACES Bill would have established a nationwide cap-and-trade scheme covering 85% of US GHG emissions, with the long-term goal of achieving an 80% reduction in GHG emissions relative to 2005 levels by 2050. 237 Emissions limits would have been placed on power generation, oil refining, natural gas supply, and other energy-intensive industries, such as iron and steel, cement and paper, covering approximately 85% of US GHG emissions by 2016. 238 Since the failure of the ACES Bill, the Clean Air Act (CAA) has become vital for developing a federal climate policy ('back door' approach). 239 The CAA formulates the broad authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop regulations to mitigate harm from air pollution. In 2011, the EPA succeeded in implementing regulations imposing mandatory fuel standards for vehicles, thus introducing, for the first time, obligatory emission reduction targets at national level via the 'back door' of the CAA. 240 For lack of binding mitigation targets at federal level, individual states have, over the years, introduced obligatory emission objectives. Since November 2009, 23 of the 50 states had adopted a state GHG emission reduction target, although these vary in stringency, timing, and enforceability. 241 As for carbon dioxide trading systems, the most important is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative involving 10 north-east US states, which was launched in 2009 as the first-ever obligatory cap-and-trade programme. 242 Emissions from large power generators in 10 north-east and mid-Atlantic states are capped at 2009 levels, and the cap will be reduced by 2.5% in each of the four years from 2015 through 2018, for a total reduction of 10% below 2009 levels. 243 235 CCES (2009c). 236 Zusman et al. (2012:3). 237 (ibid.). 238 (ibid.). 239 Burtraw (2011:1). 240 US (2010. 241 (ibid.:62). 242 Burtraw (2011:1). 243 US (2010 this instrument has applied to about 900 construction projects per year at sites that emit large quantities of GHGs, and • The third and most important tool concerns performance standards that apply to the operation of new GHG-emitting sources in various categories.

Funding for Developing Countries
As with the EU, the US is committed to helping developing countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts. For years, China, together with India, followed a rather inflexible policy at the climate negotiations, rejecting each attempt to commit it to setting (binding) GHG emission reduction goals, emphasising the historical liability of the industrialised nations and its own development needs. 260 While this line was reiterated once more at the G8 Summit in Germany in 2007, where President Hu Jintao argued that climate-related policy was essentially development policy, after the COP13 in Bali in 2007 there were indications that China was willing to take on a more proactive role in climate negotiations. 261 In November 2009, China stated its intention to reduce the intensity of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% by 2020, compared with 2005 levels. 262 According to China, this is a "domestic voluntary action" which will be included as a compulsory indicator in its medium-and long-term planning for economic development. 263 In January 2010, China followed up on its statement and voluntarily pledged to reduce its GHG emissions intensity by up to 45% by 2020, a target which was reiterated at COP16 in Mexico in December 2010.
In Mexico 2010, China -at least officially -continued to put forward its view that any legally binding climate change mitigation objectives were unacceptable unless the US accepted them as well. 264 However, at COP17 in Durban in 2011, for the first time, China stated its willingness to participate in a legally binding international climate treaty, depending on the outcome of negotiations. 265 Accordingly, China would be willing to take on legally binding commitments matched with its economic development and in line with the CBDR principle under the UNFCCC, 266 but the country set out five specific preconditions: 267 • Parties must extend Kyoto through a second commitment period; • Developed countries must meet their funding obligations under the Green Climate Fund; • The consensus reached in Durban on funding, technology, REDD+, adaptation, and MRV measures must be institutionalised; 260 Gupta (2007:167). 261 Oberheitmann & Sternfeld (2009:141). 262 Xinhuanet (2009). 263 (ibid.). 264 Gupta (2007:177). 265 Hsu (2011:2). 266 Xinhuanet (2011). 267 Hsu (2011:2).
• The obligation to review the adequacy of long-term goals scheduled to take place between 2013 and 2015 must be completed, and • A framework for a post-2020 agreement must be defined that upholds the CBDR, respective capacities, and environmental integrity.

Policy Instruments
With  273 In order to meet these goals, the intention is to broaden the 'Top 1,000 Enterprises' scheme to include 10,000 large energy-intensive enterprises, thus covering the entire national industrial complex. 274 Even more importantly, China announced it would undertake measures to gradually introduce provincial and regional voluntary carbon-trading schemes until 2015, by drawing on the experiences of international carbon-trading markets. 275 • As to renewables, the FYP12 provides for increasing the share of nonfossil energy to 11.4% of overall primary energy consumption by 2015 through optimising the energy mix and the development of clean energy. 276 Measures to achieve this goal involve the installation of an additional 70 GW of wind power and an additional 30 GW of solar power by 2015. As regards nuclear power, the object is to install an additional 40 GW by 2015, which would mean China could have the world's largest installed capacity of nuclear energy by 2020. 277 However, the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in March 2011 may somewhat limit China's appetite for nuclear expansion. 278 Other measures include the development and accelerated use of clean coal technology and unconventional gas-oil resources such as coal-bed gas and shale gas.
In order to implement the targets set out in FYP12, in July 2011 the Chinese Government issued a work plan under which the two national reduction targets were broken down by assigning obligatory overall energy and specific carbon dioxide reduction targets to the 28 Chinese provinces, with reductions ranging from 10% to 18%. 279 It is important to note that the work plan underscores China's intention to launch carbon-trading pilot projects, although only on a voluntary basis. 280 In July 2011, the Chinese Government announced that it would launch pilot project trading schemes in six provinces by 2013.
Besides piloting carbon-trading schemes, the Chinese Government is also reportedly considering implementing a nationwide carbon tax, according to Chinese media in January 2012. 281 While plans have yet to be finalised, the proposed tax could become operational before 2015 and could start with a rather low amount of US$1.50 per t of carbon dioxide emitted by large industrial installations, with the tax amount to be increased quickly thereafter. 282 Discussions about introducing a carbon tax have been around since the release of the FYP12 while a national natural resource tax was introduced on crude oil and gas late in 2011. In addition to these regulatory instruments, China also uses public finance incentives, tax breaks and financial support schemes to reach its mitigation objectives.

Least-developed Countries
Although global warming potentially threatens all countries, observers and experts concur that developing states, in particular the LDCs and the SIDSs, will be most affected. 283 Poor nations are more affected than the rich ones because of their greater vulnerability to climate shocks, and their lower adaptive capacities. 284 The biggest vulnerability is that rising temperatures affect developing countries' most important sources of national incomefarming and tourism. 285 The World Bank forecasts that a 2°C warming above pre-industrial temperatures, which is the minimum to expect, could result in a permanent loss in GDP of 4-5% in Africa and South Asia, as opposed to minimal losses in high-income countries, and a 1% loss in world average GDP. 286 World farming production could fall by 16% by 2080, but by as much as 21% in developing countries. 287 Increasing temperature will have severe effects on health, particularly in developing countries, where people will be exposed to life-threatening illnesses such as malaria even more than they are at present. 288 Lastly, whereas for other regions the impacts of global F.
warming will only unfold in the future, in developing countries, especially those in Africa, many of the negative effects are already visible. 289 Compounding this vulnerability to global warming is the fact that developing countries lack the institutional capacity, financial resources and technical expertise necessary to address the ever-increasing impacts of climate change. Recognising this, based on the CBDR principle, the UNFCCC obliges industrialised nations to support the developing world with finance and access to innovative technology in order to increase such vulnerable countries' adaptive capacities. It is important to keep in mind that developing countries' higher vulnerability to global warming is ironically accompanied by a much lower responsibility for GHG emissions. 290 The present carbon footprint of developing nations is extremely low. 291 The carbon dioxide per capita of a low-or middle-income country is 1.3 t to 4.5 t of carbon dioxide, respectively, compared with 15.3 t for high-income countries. 292

Adaptation
Whereas the key concern for industrialised states is mitigating their GHG emissions, for developing nations, due to their higher vulnerability, the overriding concern is adaptation to the inevitable impacts of global warming. The UNFCCC urges all states parties to formulate and implement national adaptation measures as well as to cooperate internationally on adaptation issues. Article 4.9 of the UNFCCC recognises the specific needs of LDCs, in that they do not have the necessary capacities to deal with adaptation to global warming.
In 2001, at COP7 in Morocco, in order to implement Article 4.9, states parties established a working plan for LDCs in particular, including what were termed National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), with the objective of communicating LDCs' urgent and immediate adaptation needs. 293 The main content of NAPAs constitutes a list of ranked adaptation measures aimed at facilitating the development of projects to implement the I. 289 For an overview of regional impacts of climate change, see World . 290 Collier et al. (2009:125 NAPAs. 294 Once a NAPA has been submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat, the country concerned becomes eligible to apply for financial support for NAPA projects under the LDC Fund. 295 By January 2012, the UNFCCC Secretariat had received 47 NAPAs.
At COP12 in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2005, the UNFCCC Secretariat launched the Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation. The Nairobi Work Programme is an international framework that initially operated from 2005 to 2010. It was extended in Mexico at COP16 in 2010 to assist developing countries in particular to better understand adaptation and to make informed decisions on practical adaptation options. 296 In Bali 2007, the Bali Action Plan identified adaptation as one of the cornerstones of the sustained implementation of the UNFCCC. 297 Since Bali, the Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action has mainly dealt with adaptation issues.
Also in Mexico in 2010, states parties established the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF). Its objective was to intensify cooperation on adaptation issues under the UNFCCC while confirming that adaption is obliged to enjoy the same priority as mitigation. 298 The CAF is meant to enable LDCs to formulate and implement national adaptation plans in order to identify their intermediate and long-term adaption needs, and to develop strategies to tackle those needs, building on their experience with the NAPAs. 299 However, as opposed to NAPAs, national adaptation plans can also be submitted by developing countries other than LDCs. As part of the CAF, the COP established a programme to investigate mechanisms and systems such as climate risk insurance to address potential damage caused by global warming. 300 In order to further the implementation of the CAF, at COP18 in Durban 2011, states parties agreed on the procedure, the work modalities, and the institutional structure of a new Adaptation Committee, as well as on guidelines for the aforementioned national adaptation plans.

Funding
Funding is vital in order for most developing countries, in particular for LDCs and SIDSs, to implement adaptation and mitigation initiatives.

Adaptation Funding
Estimates for funding for adaptation initiatives vary considerably. In 2010, the World Bank projected that it would cost US$70-100 billion each year (at 2005 prices) to adapt to global warming. 301 The UNFCCC predicted that adaptation would require supplementary investments of US$60-182 billion a year. Of these funds, developing countries would need US$28-67 billion annually. 302 There has been a significant increase in adaptation funding, from US$587 million (8% of total climate funding) in 2010, to US$957 million (21% of total funding) by 2011. 303 There are presently five multilateral funds that support adaptation in developing countries, including the following three: • The Global Environmental Facility, the independently run funding institution established in 1991, with the World Bank serving as its Trustee, operates two climate funds, both established in 2001: • The Least-developed Countries Fund is tasked with funding the preparation and implementation of NAPAs. As of December 2011, this Fund had approved some US$217 million for short-term NAPA projects and mobilised millions more in co-financing arrangements. A total of 52 projects had been funded as at that date. 304 • The Special Climate Change Fund was established to fund long-term adaptation measures and access to innovative technology. This Fund has approved some US$150 million for 39 projects, of which US$80 million has been disbursed. 305 The Fund has also leveraged about US II. Apart from multilateral funding vehicles, climate funding in general -including those for adaptation -are increasingly received through bilateral instruments or national trust funds. 312

Mitigation Funding
Estimates of the costs of climate change mitigation initiatives vary considerably. The UNFCCC projected in 2007 that US$176 billion would be required by 2030 to fund mitigation activities. Between 2004 and 2011, US $2.97 billion was approved for mitigation initiatives, of which US$1.17 billion has been disbursed. 313 Today, mitigation represents about 66% of total climate funding, much of which has been directed at India and China, where emissions are growing rapidly. 314 The CDM, which was established under the Kyoto Protocol and has been operational since 2008, provides an incentive-based mechanism linking mit-

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306 GEF (2012a). 307 (ibid.). 308 AF (2012a). 309 AF (2012b). 310 Nakhooda et al. (2011a:3). 311 (ibid.). 312 For more information, see Nakhooda et al. (2011b). 313 Nakhooda et al. (2011c:2). 314 (ibid.). igation to financing for sustainable development. 315 The CDM has already registered more than 3,497 projects in 72 countries and has issued CERs of almost 750 Mt. Transactions involving CERs were valued at approximately US$20 billion in 2010. 316 However, a major difficulty of this instrument today is that the price of one CER has fallen below €1 due to a vast oversupply on the carbon market. Unfortunately, CDM ventures are mainly located in a few of the larger developing countries of the BASIC group, especially in China (46%), India (21%) and Brazil (6%), while LDCs have generally been bypassed: Africa, for example, represents less than 2% of CDM projects. 317 The scope of CDM, which is currently very restrictive, has to be broadened not only to include the power-generating industry (hydropower), but also to exclude deforestation, thus opening up new opportunities -especially for Africa. 318 A number of additional multilateral funds to support mitigation efforts in developing countries have emerged since 2008, including the Clean Technology Fund and the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, both of which operate under the World Bank's Climate Investment Funds. 319

Funding Gap
However, on the whole, the funding that is presently offered under the UN-FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is minimal compared with the scale of the adaptation and mitigation costs identified. In 2007, the UNFCCC estimated that the annual funds needed in 2030 are likely to be around US$28-67 billion for adaptation, and US$176 billion for mitigation. At present, there is a vast funding gap that needs to be closed. For instance, funding for adaptation and mitigation efforts in developing nations -as per the commitments made by wealthier nations -amounts to less than 5% of what may be needed annually by 2030.
In light of this funding gap, at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, industrialised countries pledged to grant new and additional resources of US$30 billion, to be operational almost immediately, from 2010 to 2012, and to

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315 UNFCCC (2012o). 316 CDM Executive Board (2011:4-5). 317 Nakhooda et al. (2011d:1). 318 Collier et al. (2009:138). 319 Nakhooda et al. (2011c:2). mobilise long-term funding together with developing countries of US$100 billion a year by 2020. The informal pledge was incorporated into the final decisions of COP16 in Mexico in 2010, and the states parties reaffirmed that funding for climate change adaptation would be prioritised for the most vulnerable developing countries, namely LDCs, SIDSs and Africa. While COP17 in Durban in 2011 saw the launch of the Green Climate Fund, the question of medium-and long-term funding remains unresolved and needs urgent attention. As outlined before, states parties in Qatar at COP18 in 2012 were unable to make any headway whatsoever, especially with a view to committing to the mid-term funding between 2013 and 2020.

Concluding Remarks
Regardless of having created a new window of opportunity, the success of the Doha Gateway is far from certain, given the existing differences between the major GHG emitters -the BASIC group, the EU, and the US. Hence, some observers argue that the issue is not the format of the international negotiations process -the top-down Kyoto approach or the bottom-up Copenhagen model -but the lack of national political will in some countries to tackle global warming and climate change. 320 Canada, Russia and the US are bringing nothing constructive to the table at the moment, and the only intention of Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporting countries is to block any further progress on mitigation measures that impact on their sales. 321 In addition, what unfortunately has become clear over time is that the voluntary climate change mitigation targets and NAMAs pledged by states parties and integrated into the Cancun Agreements are not enough to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C or 2°C over the course of the 21st Century and urgently need to be intensified. According to most climate scientists, global GHG emissions need to peak by 2015 at the very latest in order for there to be a meaningful chance of limiting the global temperature rise to 2°C. Instead, GHG emissions actually rose by 6% in 2010. 322 G. 320 Sterk et al. (2011b:35). 321 (ibid.). 322 Bodanksy (2012:1).