Part I

A Conceptual Debate on Security
Human Security: The Evolution of a Concept and its Doctrinal as well as Institutional Manifestations

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**Introduction**

The very meaning of the term security is to a large extent insecure. What constitutes security is obviously dependent upon contextual factors that change with different historical eras, social norms, and individual perspectives. On the international and global level, the ambiguity of “security” intensifies. This chapter aims at a clarification on the meaning of security in international relations. The first step will be an outline of the changing conceptions of security (I). This is followed by a closer look at the fundamental conceptual shift in recent years from state security to human security (II). These observations will then lead to a survey of doctrinal and institutional manifestations of new understandings of security on the global level (III). A brief survey of the global level will include the United Nations, the G8/G20 as well as diverse global alliances. The conclusion (IV) will sum up the findings of the chapter.

1. Changing Conceptions of Security

Security is often tied to the perception of specific threats, and in that sense it is as much about concrete facts as about the assessment of those facts. An often-cited definition from peace and conflict studies equates “threat” with a combination of capabilities and intent of an adversary power. Though it implies that threats can be measured and weighed, this formula inevitably brings in the uncertainty as to who is the potential adversary power, how its capabilities can be detected, and how its intentions can be interpreted. This uncertainty is especially pervasive in the realm of international relations where the focus traditionally lies with the security between states and nations. Walter Lippmann, political analyst and presidential advisor on American foreign policy, coined a short definition of

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2  Singer 1967, for the following also cf. Fröhlich 2010.
security in 1943, not only valid for the Second World War, but also for much of the ensuing Cold War: “A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.” Such a definition clearly emphasizes military “capabilities” and ultimately points to the instrument of war as a means for survival and self-assertion in a hostile environment. In the absence of effective rules for the use of force and established procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the realist paradigm portrays the world as essentially anarchical with unavoidable power rivalries and security dilemmas where only nation states are deemed fit for defensive as well as offensive action. It is, however, interesting to see that Lippmann’s definition also makes a strong reference to the core values that lie at the heart of security concerns in international affairs. The international arena, therefore, is not only a place of military power struggles but is also structured by norms and ideas, a concept that in the past years has been highlighted by the constructivist approach to international affairs. Military means and material values are not the only things that constitute international interactions: Values such as individual liberty or self-determination are also taken into consideration. Security is therefore not only referring to simple survival. It is also connected to the preservation of certain values.

Political science has tried to capture the dimensions and elements of security in various conceptual efforts (see Table 1). A first starting point would be the theoretical diagnosis of the classic 1977 “Power and Interdependence” by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The study was published against the background of the oil crisis that had had consequences for the largely unprepared community of industrialized nations, and had only intensified a looming debate on American decline. Keohane and Nye argued for a reassessment of the very understanding of international politics. In their view, “complex interdependence” was the constitutive feature of international relations that expressed the cumulative effect of three fundamental changes in world politics: First, states were no longer perceived to be the sole and unquestioned actors of international politics – other actors such as private businesses or international organizations also appeared on an increasingly crowded international stage. Second, the power of pure military force could not be easily translated into bargaining power and the control over negotiation outcomes – military power was not always and not absolutely the

3 Lippmann 1943, p. 51.
5 Ibid., pp. 161-77.
prime power resource. Third, the somewhat artificial dividing line between so-called high and low politics could not be maintained any longer – various areas from technology to culture influenced the global interaction. This diagnosis had obvious consequences for the notion of security and the ways in which states tried to preserve it. The study by Keohane and Nye did in fact aim at a better preparation of U.S. foreign policy to perceive and deal with new threats to security beyond the military realm and among other things advised Washington to intensify international cooperation.\footnote{A topic that found further expression in Keohane’s focus on regime-building in international relations, Keohane 1984.}

The heightened awareness of economic structures and interdependencies was not the only enlargement of the notion of security. Once again referring to a concrete challenge from the international experience, Jessica Tuchman Matthews in an article from 1989 reacted to dramatic events that (also in the shadow of the Chernobyl catastrophe) brought more and more evidence in support of the thesis that ecological questions do have a bearing on security at the global level: “Ignorance of the biological underpinning of human society blocks a clear view of where the long-term threats to global security lie.”\footnote{Mathews 1989, p. 173.} Echoing the conclusion of Keohane and Nye, Mathews also argued for increased multilateral cooperation – with special emphasis on safeguarding the world’s resources and dealing with the depletion of the ozone layer.

The 1998 book by Buzan et al. in a way prolonged and intensified the impulse of Keohane/Nye and Mathews: The authors now conceptualized security with a view to the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sector. Once again, a concrete experience from international politics, namely the war and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, highlighted the importance of social identity for security on a national and international level. Buzan et al. did, however, also provide a theoretical framework to understand the changes of the term security from “narrow” military security to “broad” multidimensional security. Their concept of “securitization”\footnote{Buzan et al. 1998, pp. 23-25.} directly addresses the question of how relevant actors perceive and define threats (and by that also their security). Securitization is a communicative and social-political procedure by which an issue “is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”\footnote{Ibid.} The content of security, therefore, clearly stands out as being alterable.

\footnote{https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845229386-19}
Table 1: Broadening of the Security Concept

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<th>Event</th>
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<th>Authors</th>
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<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Oil Crisis</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Robert Keohane &amp; Joseph Nye</td>
<td>Power and Interdependence (1977)</td>
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These stages in the broadening of the concept are at the same time connected to debates about “extending”\(^\text{11}\) the concept. Here the question is not only about enlarging the amount of dimensions and sectors of security-related issues but rather about enlarging the scope of actors involved in and affected by security-related issues. This aspect has been reinforced by various trends in recent years. The landscape of international conflict has changed markedly from inter-state wars to intra-state wars, as the Uppsala conflict data demonstrates.\(^\text{12}\) Although the development over the decades has not been altogether negative as the Human Security Report (2005) shows, new forms of violence, war economies in civil conflicts, global inequalities as well as international organized crime and terrorism not only challenge traditional concepts of security but also traditional ways to tackle these threats. The sovereign state, formerly the source of national and international order, also has the capacity to become a source of national and international disorder by creating instability within and beyond its borders, when, for example, a national government engages in the ethnic cleansing of its own population. While the state’s “offensive” potential for chaos and suffering may have increased, its “defensive” potential to effectively protect itself and its population against threats to its security have decreased. As Mathews argued in 1997:

“The security threat to states from other states is on a downward course. Non-traditional threats, however, are rising – terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, and the combination of rapid population growth, environmental instability, and, some-

\(^{11}\) Caldwell/Williams 2006, pp. 12-14.
\(^{12}\) Cf. the data at http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/.
times, state collapse. [...] These trends have fed a growing sense that individuals’ security may not in fact reliably derive from their nation’s security.\textsuperscript{13}

Interstate security becomes secondary in a situation where hundreds of thousands of people are affected by human trafficking, thousands of children die every day from hunger and malnutrition and the effects of climate change threaten whole territories and populations. Resolving violent conflict remains a crucial issue, but war-related deaths more and more have to be placed into the context of connected, indirect death tolls, e.g., through dire living conditions or severe health crises. Global pandemics like HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis each cause millions of deaths a year. These global linkages are complex in a variety of ways and require new ways of global action.

A broader concept of security therefore is also accompanied by a change in its point of reference: the nation state has lost its dominant position with respect to security. The theoretical diagnosis of “denationalization”\textsuperscript{14} further intensifies the complex interdependence of Keohane and Nye. Referring to a concept developed by Jürgen Habermas, Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn\textsuperscript{15} discuss the transformation from the national to the post-national constellation, addressing governance and legitimacy as well as problems and resources (see Table 2).

Table 2: National versus Post-National Constellation

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<th>National Constellation</th>
<th>Post-National Constellation</th>
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<td>Problems</td>
<td>National</td>
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<td>Governance</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Supranational</td>
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<td>Resources</td>
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<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>National</td>
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Whereas the former constellation was organized by national problems, dealt with by national governments whose national resources were used on the basis of national processes of legitimacy, the latter model is characterized by the transnationalization of problems, the supranationalization of governance, and by changing modes of generating legitimacy in world politics. Only resources remain relatively tied to the national sphere. While this assessment clearly represents a

\textsuperscript{13} Mathews 1997, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{14} Zürn 1998.
\textsuperscript{15} Zangl/Zürn 2003.
diagnosis that can be challenged,\textsuperscript{16} the trend is certainly discernible: The state is no longer the sole point of reference in defining, measuring and safeguarding security. Other political entities, and most notably the individual, move into the centre of debates. New actors do not only come into the picture as originators of new demands and needs in safeguarding security, they also have to be taken into account when defining and implementing political steps to achieve security – a process that has recently been coined “security governance”:

“Security governance suggests that security is provided not only by state institutions like the armed forces or state police, but by a broader range of non-state actors which may include voluntary groups, community-based associations, citizens’ forums, commercial or corporate entities, militias, rebel groups, regional and international organizations. Thus the security environment is diverse and disparate; the state is one actor (albeit a very important one) among various actors at multiple levels – local, state, regional, transnational – who supplement, augment, replace or enrich the state’s provision of security.”\textsuperscript{17}

Both the broadening and extending of security have led to the establishment of “human security” as a new focal point of the debate.

2. From State Security to Human Security

The notion of human security prominently surfaced in the 1994 Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Following the trend outlined above to widen the scope of security, the report distinguished seven dimensions of security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. The report, developed under the aegis of former Pakistani finance minister Mahbub ul Haq, argued for a very broad understanding of what could constitute a threat to people. The text opens with an explicit call for a re-orientation of international affairs:

“The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them – with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms. More generally, it will not be possible for the community of nations to achieve any of its major goals – not peace, not environmental

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. e.g. Daase/Engert 2008.
\textsuperscript{17} Caparini 2006, p. 269.
protection, not human rights or democratization, not fertility reduction, not social integration – except in the context of sustainable development that leads to human security. It is time for humanity to restore its perspective and redesign its agenda.\(^\text{18}\)

The link between security and social as well as economic development is particularly apparent here since the 1994 Report preceded the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen that is in itself another manifestation of the re-orientation of global politics.\(^\text{19}\) The idea itself is not that new and can be traced through past centuries and projects on the global level.\(^\text{20}\) It integrated at least four elements of thinking about security: (1) an emphasis on the individual, (2) the inclusion and acknowledgment of the needs of formerly marginalized social groups, (3) the broadening of possible threats to security, and (4) a “gradual reconceptualization of development that moved the focus away from macroeconomic aggregates and towards the lives, fortunes, and possibilities of individual human beings, particularly the economically vulnerable.”\(^\text{21}\)

Against the background of such a broad agenda it should not surprise that several readings of human security, i.e. different emphasis on specific ingredients of what constitutes human security have emerged.\(^\text{22}\) MacFarlane and Khong distinguish a development dimension of human security from a protection dimension. As these dimensions can also be connected to the policies of specific advocates of these approaches, this distinction (although it is clearly a pointed comparison) shall serve as a way to briefly illustrate the conceptual shift in thinking about security (see also Table 3).

The first concept is associated with the policies and actions of the Canadian government. It is closely linked to the person and program of former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy. Canada focused on a number of challenges in humanitarian law, from the protection of civilians in armed conflict to the successful ban on land mines realized through the so-called Ottawa process.\(^\text{23}\) Borrowing from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1941 “Four Freedoms Speech,” the Canadian conception of security emphasizes “freedom from fear,” meaning the absence of violence and threats to the physical security of individuals. The challenges of humanitarian intervention epitomized by intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo acted as a kind of catalyst for

\(^{19}\) Schechter 2005, Fröhlich/Höne 2008.  
\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 264.  
\(^{22}\) Fröhlich 2007b.  
the Canadian approach. The most prominent manifestation of this approach is the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P), the result of the Axworthy-led International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).\textsuperscript{24} This meticulously researched report aimed to deliver policy-relevant recommendations based on their argument that “sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”\textsuperscript{25} The R2P doctrine, however, does not only address military intervention, but also imposes responsibilities to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict, and to rebuild communities after conflict. It can be understood as an explicit consequence of the transformation of the state and its capacity to provide security for its citizens. Against the background of state failure and state-induced catastrophe, a static concept of state sovereignty can no longer be upheld as a shield against intervention even in the case of genocide. Instead, a new understanding is gaining primacy, one that in 1999 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called “individual sovereignty” which qualifies the claim and exercise of sovereign rights in international affairs.\textsuperscript{26} National security, according to the Canadian approach, is a meaningful concept only insofar it serves to uphold human security within and beyond state borders.

The second concept is connected to Japanese policies and initiatives and adds another emphasis. It goes back to the work of Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi, and is articulated in an expert report on human security called “Human Security Now.”\textsuperscript{27} Led by former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, this report defined human security as the effort “to protect the vital core of all human lives that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.”\textsuperscript{28} The report captures human security in broad terms:

> “It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{24} ICISS 2001, Fröhlich 2006.  
\textsuperscript{25} ICISS 2001.  
\textsuperscript{26} Annan 1999, Fröhlich 2007a.  
\textsuperscript{27} Commission on Human Security 2003.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 4.  
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
Although there is reference to “freedom from fear,” there is a strong emphasis on “freedom from want” based on economic and social conditions. Just as the Kosovo crisis can be considered the catalyst for the Canadian concept, the Asian financial crisis can be seen as the impetus behind the Japanese approach to human security.

Table 3: Readings of Human Security

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<th>Concept</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Protagonist</th>
<th>Background Experience</th>
<th>Commissions</th>
<th>Policy Documents</th>
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There are a number of critical questions that emerge from these conceptions. The Canadian concept has been called a thinly veiled camouflage for military intervention without Security Council approval, and the Japanese concept was criticized for trying to turn every problem in social and individual life – all the “bad things that can happen” into “security problems.” Both approaches have, however, also led to positive action. The Canadian doctrine influenced the Ottawa Process, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, and a number of Security Council resolutions explicitly dealing with the “protection of civilians in armed conflict.” Canada is an active part of the Human Security Network, an informal group of 14 states ranging from Austria to Thailand that pursues a common agenda, including enhancing the role of women in post-conflict peace building and thinking about new ways to fight the spread of global pandemics

like HIV/AIDS. Japan, although very close to that agenda, is not a member of the Human Security Network, but has also initiated a number of efforts to further the aims of its own human security agenda. The most notable innovation in that context is the creation of a Human Security Trust Fund, used to finance local projects that will enhance human security in various regions of the world.

The concept of Human Security as defined in these broad and arguably abstract ways leaves ample room for criticism of its conceptual soundness, its empirical applicability, and its potential for political realization. It is very difficult to measure human security and to find a comprehensive strategy to address the inter-connected threats and dimensions of such a concept. For the critics, conceptual vagueness is inextricably linked to a lack of concrete strategies, procedures, or institutions that could effectively provide human security. And yet, the notion of human security has resulted in various doctrinal and institutional manifestations that shaped the current security debate and its shift away from state-centered policies. This “shift” does not imply an end to state-centered policies or the notion of state security. What we can see, however, is a transformation of concerns and patterns of interaction that do not render the state superfluous but seem to call for an adapted way of defining and fostering state security through human security. International cooperation and organization thus emerges as the modus operandi for safeguarding security on the global level. As Mathews wrote in 1997:

“International organizations, given a longer rein by governments and connected to the grassroots by deepening ties with NGOs, could, with adequate funding, take on larger roles in global housekeeping (transportation, communications, environment, health), security (controlling weapons of mass destruction, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping), human rights, and emergency relief.”

To illustrate this point, some recent developments within the UN system, the G8/G20 and so-called global alliances will be discussed below. Although the last two of these structures would not strictly count as being international organizations they nonetheless illustrate the effort to organize the international and even global realm.

32 Cf. the homepage of the network at http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org.
34 Mathews 1997, pp. 63-64.
3. Doctrinal and Institutional Manifestations of Human Security

3.1 The United Nations

The UN has already been identified as one of the most prominent fora for the promotion of a changed notion of sovereignty. It is interesting to note that these efforts have come about as a consequence of a double crisis that shaped the tenure of its seventh Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The first crisis of the UN’s system of collective security can be connected to the Iraq war of 2003 that led to an intense discussion about the nature and value of the established system of collective security under the UN charter. Annan had tasked a “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change” to chart new ways to reconcile current global challenges with the constant values enshrined in the Charter text. The Panel delivered a report that identified the spectrum of threats that have to be addressed on a global level: (1) economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation, (2) inter-state conflict, (3) internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities, (4) nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, (5) terrorism, and (6) transnational organized crime. This clearly parallels the thinking about broadening the security concept described above. The report’s many recommendations on conflict prevention, the authority to use force and the need to find new structures for peace building efforts after conflict situations can not be dealt with in detail here. For the purposes of this chapter, it is, however, interesting to note that the report combines state security and the security of individuals and populations thus paying tribute to the fact that state capacity can and should not be disregarded in a system of collective security in the 21st century: “Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security.”

This statement also echoes the second experience of crisis that the Panel had to deal with: The question on how to address ethnic cleansing or even genocide within states. In this respect, the Canadian initiatives tie in with several attempts by the UN Secretariat. Against the background of the UN experience with Rwanda and Kosovo, Annan advocated for a new understanding of sovereignty:

36 Ibid.
“State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined not least by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”38

This plea pointed towards a number of initiatives around the already mentioned concept of responsibility to protect that was also integrated into the High-level Panel report and Annan’s own reform report “In larger freedom. Towards development, security and human rights for all.”39 After lively debates, the heads of state and governments adopted the principle in the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit:

“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”40

Far from being uncontroversial, this heavily restricted application of the original Canadian term has nonetheless given rise to a number of further debates and concrete initiatives in the UN. It has been discussed in the Security Council and wording of the concept has been integrated into a number of resolutions on UN peace operations. Further to that it was also used as a frame of reference for the peacemaking initiatives of (now former) UN Secretary-General Annan after the violence in Kenya thus stressing the preventive aspect of that concept.41 Annan’s successor Ban Ki-moon has tried to operationalize the responsibility to protect in a number of speeches and reports,42 i.e. installing Edward Luck as the special adviser for that issue who has taken the initiative to further discuss and develop the concept in a number of different regional meetings and gatherings that could help to fulfill the mandate of the outcome document. These developments do not account for an instant realization of the responsibility to protect. The ongoing crisis in Darfur, the disputed applicability of the concept during the natural catas-

40 UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005, §135.
trophe induced by the 2008 cyclone Nargis in Myanmar or the “use” of the term by Russia to legitimize its intervention in Georgia the same year show that the concept remains controversial but also has established itself as one point of reference in thinking about global and individual security.

The 2005 outcome document also contained a paragraph on human security that (although on a declaratory level) promoted the conceptual debates outlined above to an agenda-item of international diplomacy:

“We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, particularly vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.”

In order to prepare that effort, Ban Ki-moon issued a report on human security that underlined the fact that the notion is not alien but rather compatible with the UN’s approach to work for international peace and security. Once again echoing the fundamental observations from the 1994 UNDP report and other documents, Ban understands the notion of human security as a call for “comprehensive, integrated and people-centered approaches.”

Much the same as with his follow-up report to the responsibility to protect, the Secretary-General carefully avoids the impression that human security could be understood as something that takes away from state security. Raising the awareness for human security, in his view, can also lead to “enhance the sovereignty of states” which under the Charter holds “equal weight […] to the livelihood of people everywhere.” In that context Ban underlines the concrete efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals relating to the fight against poverty or diseases by 2015 which can also be seen as one concrete way to deal with human security issues. He notes a number of improvements in the actual life situation of individual human beings and illustrates the UN effort also by pointing to recent projects on food security coordinated by the Food and Agricultural Organizations in the UN system: With more than 1 billion people living with hunger, 17,000 children dying of hunger each day and political unrest in 30 countries because of food insecurity in 2008

43 UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, October 21, 2005, §143.
44 UN Doc. A/64/701, March 8, 2010.
46 Ibid., §22.
47 Ibid., §21.
and 2009, the UN developed a “Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis” that addressed various strategies to improve the situation at the local and global level. Ban also traces the increasing momentum for human security concerns in mirroring not only the work of the Human Security Network but several initiatives in different regions of the world that all pay tribute to the fact that human security has become something of a mainstream approach to deal with insecurities worldwide. The UN Trust Fund for Human Security has allocated a notable but still relatively modest amount of roughly USD 325 million to over 180 projects in 60 countries worldwide – from community recovery after conflict to raising health awareness. In his report Ban also notes that the UN can and should not aim to take on human security issues on its own. In his conclusion he argues for the promotion of “multi-stakeholder responses that enable the protection and empowerment of people and communities.” This leads us to looking at two more types of actors engaged in the global security framework.

3.2 The G8/G20

Originally conceived as a series of primarily economic summits and deliberations, the G8 always had an important, although indirect, relevance for global security. From the beginning, the G8 was also an actor in the political wrangling between the East and West, and the group made frequent comments on crisis situations and power rivalries. At the 1983 Williamsburg Summit, the leaders issued a separate political declaration, focusing on the question of security:

“As leaders of our seven countries, it is our first duty to defend the freedom and justice on which our democracies are based. To this end, we shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat, and to ensure the peace. Our arms will never be used except in response to aggression.”

The call to protect the security of their countries with a reduced military capacity was a common feature of summit documents, particularly during the 1980s. This link between the G8 and domestic security policy does not, however, fully represent the larger role of the G8 within the global security debate.

50 Ibid., §69.
52 Statement at Williamsburg (Declaration on Security) 1983.
This wider role can be traced by analyzing the references to the term “security” in relevant G8 documents. Although the term appears in both summit declarations and communiqués and the scope and length of these documents vary considerably over time, the overall trend is obvious: As far as summit communiqués are concerned, the word “security” appears five times in all the documents of the first G7/8 cycle (1975-1981). The second cycle (1982-1988) had 10 references, followed by 14 references for the third cycle (1989 and 1996). In this count, the added “eighth” summit on nuclear safety and security in Moscow alone had six references to security. The fourth cycle (1996-2002) offers 32 references to security. Finally, the fifth cycle (2003-2010) has a total of 173 counts and— notwithstanding the differences in the format and lengths of the texts—amply illustrates the increased awareness and importance of security matters in the G8 agenda.

This quantitative impression, superficial as it may be, is reinforced by the various issue-related declarations and statements. Some are entirely devoted to security issues, and others are replete with references to security. The 2007 Heiligendamm summit statement on Counter Terrorism begins with a section called “Security in the Era of Globalization.” The Heiligendamm Chair’s summary also contains a clear expression of a security concept that goes beyond a military focus: “We affirmed that military solutions alone cannot secure peace in the long term. Instead, the political, economic and social conditions needed for promoting human security and stability would have to be aimed for” (section II). The spectrum of security references, in the communiqués and the more specific

53 Cf. the official document at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/index.htm. The authors would like to thank Dorothea Toepfer for her assistance in researching the occurrence of security-related matters in G8 documents. While “insecurity” was counted as a reference to security, mentioning of the UN Security Council etc. was not included.

54 In this cycle, the nature of the communiqué texts changes. So far the analysis concentrated on the summit communiqué that is also referred to as the economic communiqué. Parallel to that there have been political declarations that also hold references to security but the fact that they are often subdivided into several single declarations that cannot be compared easily, is an argument for the focus on “the” summit communiqué. The Denver summit combined the political and economic declaration and this led to a high count of 18 references to “security” in that document alone. Another change has to be noted for 2002: Here the count is problematic as there are a number of specific declarations but no comprehensive communiqué as in the years before. In lieu of that single document, the Chair’s statement was included into the count. The 3 counts attributed to that seem to be compatible with the results of the other summits in that cycle (with Denver being the exception). Without overlooking the differences between the Chair’s statement and the communiqué, this rule was also applied in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. The Heiligendamm summit 2007 reintroduced the format of one comprehensive summit declaration.
issue-related summit statements, covers nearly all of the above mentioned sectors and dimensions of a broadened concept of security: It is interesting to note that the very first mentioning of security in the 1980 Venice communiqué, fully in line with the economic focus, dealt with the security of the international banking system. Over time, several other dimensions were dealt with including military security (e.g. non-proliferation), political (e.g. human rights), economic (e.g. monetary stability), environmental (e.g. climate change) and societal (e.g. refugees) security. In addition to that one can also find a number of security concerns specific to the G8 in various references to the security of travel, transport or supply as well as the introduction of biosecurity in the G8 Global Partnership Annual Report at the 2004 Sea Island Summit. Some of the issues that were mentioned in the innovative and holistic 1994 UNDP report were already prominent on the G8 agenda for some time: food security (Declaration of the Ottawa summit, 1981, and then emphasized in the final communiqué at Genoa 2001); energy security (Declaration of the Versailles Summit in 1982 and in various documents at Petersburg in 2006) and the relevance of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS to the security of the global community (Communiqué of the 1997 Denver summit and then prominently in Okinawa 2000, Genoa 2001 and Kananaskis 2002). The summit communiqués also underline the interconnectedness of the various dimensions of security. In the 1999 Cologne Summit Document, the group pledged to “ensure that our security, economic, environmental and development policies are properly coordinated and are conducive to the prevention of violent conflict” (§40). This preventive aspect of the G8 security policy constitutes the link between what could be described as a rather arbitrary laundry list of security concerns. The issue of security is not confined to the specialized statements formerly termed “non-economic” or “political” declarations but is present in all of the G8 documents.

In that regard, the G8 can be seen as an agent of securitization: The term “securitization” comes from the study by Buzan et al. It describes a process of attributing special attention and resources to a particular problem: “securitization on the international level (although often not on the domestic one) means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.” This general definition can be applied to the G8. Its summits have done their part in securitizing several issues that had not been dealt with in an urgent and existential way before. In doing that, the G8

56 Buzan et al. 1998, p. 29.
agenda also parallels the broadening and extending of the term security as outlined above. The Chair’s Statement from the 1996 Lyon Summit establishes the connection between global, regional, national, and human security: “We also concurred that enduring security and stability is possible only when it is founded on the basic requirements of respect for human rights, establishment of democratic institutions and individual citizen’s security, and realization of sustainable development and economic prosperity.”

Considering the broad definition of human security discussed above, it should come as no surprise that especially the 2000 Okinawa and 2008 Hokkaido Summits as well as the 2002 Kananaskis and 2010 Muskoka Summits, propagate an extended security concept. The formative influences of the Japanese and Canadian approaches to security are evident within the G8 process. Okinawa introduced the Miyazaki principles, a framework for conflict prevention that calls for a comprehensive strategy to address a range of issues from small arms to child soldiers (G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention). At the Kananaskis Summit, the G8 Africa Action Plan was built upon the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its “pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate democracy and sound economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development” (§3).

On the other hand, the Chair’s Summary of the 2003 Summit in Evian includes only a short paragraph stating that the group “took note of the report of the Commission on Human Security submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.” This small paragraph was included in the section on “development,” while the “security section” was focused on more traditional concepts of security like nuclear non-proliferation or the fight against terrorism. This may be a result of the competing definitions of human security. The “Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Plan” presented at Evian highlights the respective approaches:

> “Human security, in particular in war-affected areas is a common concern of the G8 partners. Japan intends to give greater priority to Africa in initiatives supported by the Trust Fund for Human Security […] Canada’s five foreign policy program priorities for advancing human security — support for public safety, protection of civilians, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and peace support operations also retain a significant focus on Africa.” (§ 15)

57 The same Lyon summary gives another illustration of the special concern that the language and concept of security has for the G8 in that it speaks of efforts to “secure security” in the international system.

58 Kirton 2000.
Meanwhile, the European Union, including four of the G8 countries, developed a “Human Security Doctrine” of its own in the Barcelona Report.\textsuperscript{59} There are considerable differences between these various manifestations of the concept of security; the contrast with some aspects of the 2002 national security strategy of the United States is a case in point.\textsuperscript{60} Nonetheless, the common ground on the issue of human security within the G8 has grown in recent years, and the G8 has been both a driving force and a reflection of a new understanding of security.

The Chair’s Statement from the 1996 Lyon Summit stresses that the pursuit of human security is directly linked to the institutional setting of the United Nations: “We continue to regard the United Nations as the cornerstone of an international system whose success or failure is increasingly significant for human security, including development within countries and partnership among countries” (section I, 1). The G8 contribution to human security, however, is not limited to the support of and coordinated efforts within the UN. G8 countries have at various times taken their own initiative in order to supplement, strengthen, and also fill gaps in the UN’s framework and actions. The 1994 Naples communiqué articulates an overarching motivation for these types of efforts: “How can we adapt existing institutions and build new institutions to ensure the future prosperity and security of our people?” (§3) There are four patterns that the G8 has followed with respect to supplementing and encouraging UN actions in the realm of security:

(1) The creation of specific issue-related committees and initiatives. Examples include the Transport Initiative, the Renewable Energy Task Force or the Nuclear Safety and Security Group. Each group devotes itself to one pressing concern of the member states in areas where their cooperation could make a difference.

(2) The infusion of coordinated G8 efforts into other organizational settings. Apart from the established coordination procedures in the context of the UN

\textsuperscript{59} A Human Security Doctrine for Europe 2004, cf. also Kaldor et al. 2007. The Barcelona Report strongly endorses both preventive engagement and effective multilateralism. It calls for a new legal framework for intervention but also for the establishment of a Human Security Response Force. Its approach is grounded on “[a] set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that apply to both ends and means.” The principles that the report addresses are: “the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force.” (p. 5.) For a recent evaluation of the EU experience with human security cf. Martin/Owen 2010.

General Assembly, the G8 action to resolve the Kosovo crisis by means of an unconventional move that resulted in Security Council resolution 1244 is a prime example of this pattern.\textsuperscript{61} The Cologne summit, judged to be a “‘big bang’ beginning of the G8’s concentrated, comprehensive, coherent work on conflict prevention,” clearly marks a more visible role in security affairs.\textsuperscript{62}

(3) The adaptation of the G8 agenda and its membership. One case in point could be the decision to include Russia in the G8: “In one respect, the original G7 members regarded the inclusion of Russia partly as a security issue in an attempt to encourage a peaceful transition to free-market economics and democratic principles.”\textsuperscript{63} In yet another perspective, the development of the G20 can also be related to this pattern although it remains to be seen whether its work and that of the G8 will be complementary or competitive with a view to security issues other than financial and economic problems.

Although established over a decade ago in 1999, it was the financial crisis of 2007 that stimulated the establishment of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, better known as the G20. In response to the financial crisis of 1997 the G7 finance ministers proposed annual meetings of the finance ministers and central bank governors of 19 major economies, the European Union as well as representatives of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Formally created at the 1999 meeting of the G7 finance ministers, the G20 was intended to be

“a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically significant economies and promote cooperation to achieve stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits all.”\textsuperscript{64}

At its first ministerial meeting in Berlin in December 1999, the G7 finance ministers invited “counterparts from a number of systemically important countries from regions around the world,”\textsuperscript{65} as well as the EU Presidency, the European Central Bank and representatives from the IMF and World Bank.

\textsuperscript{61} Pentillae 2003, pp. 44-51.
\textsuperscript{62} Kirton/Stefanova 2004, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{63} Dobson 2007, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{64} G7 1999, §19.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., §19.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007 it became clear that a group of seven industrialized nations and Russia did no longer relate to the allocation of economic power in a globalized world. To coordinate a global response in which emerging markets like Brazil, India and China would have a significant role; President George W. Bush announced that he would invite the leaders of the G20 countries to Washington on November 14-15, 2008. This first G20 summit was followed by the April 2009 summit in London and the September summit in Pittsburgh hosted by U.S. president Barack Obama in the same year. The Pittsburgh Summit G20 Leaders Statement speaks of the “G20 to be the premier forum for our international economic cooperation” (Preamble). Thus the leaders recognized a fundamental crisis and, i.e., pledged cooperation “to improve access to food, fuel, and finance for the poor” (§38). Apart from various references to food, climate and energy security that relate to the UN’s work and efforts briefly outlined above, the Pittsburg document also speaks of the need (also for the international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund) to “focus on human development and security in the poorest and most challenging environments” (§24). Representing two-thirds of the world’s population, almost 90 percent of global GNP and 80 percent of world trade, the G20 has become a more comprehensive forum for economic matters than the G8. Although it has taken on the extended and broadened concept of security of the G8 it remains to be seen how it will integrate its efforts in such a broader approach. Much the same as with the UN, human security initiatives obviously can not be attributed and limited to one set of actors only. The already mentioned practice of the G8 to create specific issue-related structures to deal with concrete problems thus leads to a closer look at so-called multi-stakeholder initiatives that can be understood to be global coalitions in pursuit of a human security agenda.

3.3 Global Coalitions

Global Coalitions to address specific issues are working on a network-logic integrating different actors with their respective strengths to further a common cause. In his Millennium Report Kofi Annan defined these networks:

“They are non-hierarchical and give voice to civil society. They help to set global policy agendas, frame debates and raise public consciousness. They develop and disseminate knowledge, making extensive use of the Internet. They make it easier to reach consensus
and negotiate agreements on new global standards, as well as to create new kinds of mechanisms for implementing and monitoring those agreements.°

Two such networks shall be illustrated here: The Kimberley Process and the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

Focus point of the Kimberley Process are conflict diamonds or “blood diamonds.” These are rough diamonds sold illegally at the world market by rebels, terrorists or simply outlaws in order to fund their operations in often weak or failed states. This funding source is primarily used, because there is almost no way to trace the revenues to an individual or a group, unlike for example in the case of bank transfers. The duration and intensity of the civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia or Congo cannot be explained without resorting to the crucial role played by the trade of conflict diamonds. NGOs like Partnership Africa-Canada, Global Witness or medico led the way in raising the awareness of this new transnational threat to state and individual security. In the second half of the 1990s, the Security Council began to order immediate sanctions against the traffic of conflict diamonds. Any regulation without inclusion of the private sector did, however, prove to be futile: Affected states were interested in the abolition of this hard-to-control but very profitable funding source and NGOs were interested in exposing and combating these structures of conflict finance, but the international diamond trade, regulated by discreet rules and controlled by only a few trading companies, had no particular interest in stopping the trade of illegal conflict diamonds. The revenues resulting from the sale of these diamonds suggested that the diamond industry in western states hugely profited from this phenomenon. Estimations connected about 20 percent of the world market of rough diamonds to illegal sources. Between 1994 and 1999, there was a discrepancy of USD 660 million between the officially declared exports of diamonds by western Africa to Belgium and the declaration of actually imported diamonds in Belgium alone. Large quantities of diamonds were exported by African states which did not even have any resources of diamonds. This unsettling account of the official diamond trade was exposed and documented by a number of NGOs. A number of drastic information campaigns brought about a change of attitude in the diamond industry. The association of diamonds with bloody conflict threatened to

67 Grant/Taylor 2004.
69 Berdal/Malone 2000.
hurt the industry in a very vulnerable spot: the image of diamonds as symbols of love and purity. This development resulted in the growing interest of the World Diamond Council and its member companies to regulate the problem of illegal diamond trafficking.

In 1999, outside of the UN system but supported by a number of resolutions from the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Kimberley Process was initiated in the eponymous South African city to contain the trade of conflict diamonds.\textsuperscript{72} Central to this effort is the implementation of an internationally standardized “Certificate of Origin” of rough diamonds. This rather simple idea was realized by the “Interlaken Declaration on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds” and its adaptation of standardized certifications of “conflict-free” diamonds. Private sector, NGOs and states are monitoring – sometimes with difficulties – this process. In addition to sanctions by the Security Council the Kimberley Process declared trade embargos against Congo and Côte d’Ivoire. The Kimberley Process is therefore a global coalition which consists of a trilateral structure combining, governmental, civil society and business actors.

A similar example of such a global coalition is the Global Fund to Fight HIV/Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Here, the G8 played a kind of midwife to a new global structure. Health had already been an important topic on the agenda for several years, and in 2001 at the Genoa summit, the G8 laid the groundwork for an innovative and unprecedented financing mechanism to combat the spread of these three pandemics. The G8 was also responding to a call for action by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and made their partnership with the UN explicit:

“At Okinawa last year, we pledged to make a quantum leap in the fight against infectious diseases and to break the vicious cycle between disease and poverty. To meet that commitment and to respond to the appeal of the UN General Assembly, we have launched with the UN Secretary-General a new Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. We are determined to make the Fund operational before the end of the year. We have committed $1.3 billion. The Fund will be a public-private partnership and we call on other countries, the private sector, foundations, and academic institutions to join with their own contributions –financially, in kind and through shared expertise.”\textsuperscript{73}

The G8 created a new institution, linked to existing structures such as the UN and its UNAIDS program, but independent from them. By 2010 the Fund had

\textsuperscript{72} For the most accurate and up to date information, cf. Kimberley Process. From conflict diamonds to prosperity diamonds, at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com.

\textsuperscript{73} G8 2001, §15.
generated roughly USD 16 billion for 572 projects in 144 countries, i.e. providing medication for 2.8 million people with HIV/AIDS and distributing 120 million bed nets.\textsuperscript{74} Its added value – although still not matching the enormous challenge of the deadly diseases – is beyond doubt even if such a new structure raises new question of efficiency and legitimacy. Looking at the role of the G8 in promoting human security there is another innovative feature that has to be underlined. The G8, a group of states, created an institution whose decision-making structure pays tribute to the “post-national constellation” in which the issue of health security is embedded, and which offers a contribution to a new form of “global security governance.”\textsuperscript{75} The Global Fund’s international board is made up of 20 voting members and six non-voting members. There are eight regionally allocated representatives of donors and seven representatives of recipient country-regions as designated by the World Health Organization, plus an additional representative from Africa. Along with these more traditional state actors, there are a further five representatives from civil society and the private sector: two NGO representatives, one from a developed country and one from a developing country, one representative of the private sector, one representative of a private foundation, and one representative of an NGO who is a person living with HIV/AIDS.\textsuperscript{76} The inclusion of expert NGOs in the state-dominated international settings is no longer that remarkable, but it is noteworthy nonetheless. The direct involvement of private sector actors, however, is more unusual.\textsuperscript{77} The inclusion of one member from a charity foundation and the other from a business company is a clear indication that they play an important role in the fight against global diseases. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, currently represented on the Board, has USD 60 billion at its disposal, far more than any country could devote to global health. Additionally, the fight against these diseases would be ineffective without the pharmaceutical companies that develop and deliver the medical treatment. Finally, the inclusion of a representative of those people actually affected by HIV/AIDS is an important recognition of the kind of bottom-up approach that runs in contra-distinction to the state-centric governance structures.

The composition of the Global Fund’s board is an innovative answer to the challenge of governance in the post-national constellation. It is an effective or-

\textsuperscript{74} For the most accurate and up to date information, cf. The Global Fund, at http://www.theglobalfund.org.
\textsuperscript{75} Kirton 2005a.
\textsuperscript{77} Bayne 2000, pp. 213-16.
ganizational setting which acts “as global fundraiser”\textsuperscript{78} to muster the necessary resources, while recognizing the changing requirements of political legitimation. This, once again, can be linked to various development efforts in the context of the Millennium Development Goals (see also the 2005 Gleneagles Summit and its focus on debt, trade and development in Africa) where the UN, the G8 and global coalitions join efforts.

4. Conclusion

This brief survey should not give the impression that both the concept and the implementation of changed agendas in global and human security are without contradiction and problems. Neither the UN nor the G8 or global coalitions represent a panacea to deal with global and human security threats worldwide.\textsuperscript{79} The trend, however, seems not only remarkable but firmly established: Both in the academic literature and in the doctrinal as well as institutional work of several international organizations and fora, the broadening and extending of the term security cannot be denied. Human security, vague and ambiguous as it may be, has established itself as a central point of reference in thinking about and working for security on the individual, national, international and global level. A comprehensive and demanding concept such as human security does not come without problems of its own – including the creation of too divergent or too high expectations as well as the chance of evading crucial questions with regard to the cause and effect behind threats to individual lives. First evaluations of the evolution of human security already call for the need to reassess the concept and think about a “second generation” of human security that more soberly addresses some of the problems and experiences with human security so far.\textsuperscript{80} This kind of criticism notwithstanding, the term has clearly left its mark in global politics and continues to do so. The changing policies of global security are accompanied by changing politics of global governance sometimes resulting in new political structures. In that context, it must be stressed that the process of securitization and norm creation\textsuperscript{81} does not only consist of the rhetorical move (or speech act) of a securitizing actor\textsuperscript{82} but needs the approval and realization of a broader audience in order to be successful. The quest for global security, therefore, is not

\begin{thebibliography}{82}
\bibitem{78} Dobson 2007, p. 67.
\bibitem{79} For a critical discussion of the G8 cf. Melber 2007.
\bibitem{80} Cf. Martin/Owen 2010, MacArthur 2008.
\bibitem{81} Malone 2004.
\bibitem{82} Buzan et al. 1998, p. 40.
\end{thebibliography}
only a quest for resources but also a quest to identify, agree and address what should be common concerns of a diverse community of actors that constitute today’s world – a quest that will bring about further transformations of global politics.

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The Concept of Human Security Revisited: Theoretical and Empirical Problems of a Post-Cold War Security Approach

Christoph Schuck

Introduction

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the changed architecture of global security resulted in both socio-political changes and a new orientation of the academic security debate. In 1993, Robert O. Keohane pointed out that the debate on international relations was caught in a “double dialectic,” since on the one hand, historical developments had overtaken the academic discussion, while on the other hand the gap between theoretical and practical aspects had grown.

Keohane’s “double dialectic” is inseparably linked to the historical changes in the concept of security, which in a general sense can be defined as replacing a negative definition of peace with a positive one. While “negative peace” is minimalistically defined as “the absence of physical violence,” particularly in the sense of an absence of wars between nations, “positive peace” concentrates on avoiding not only physical, but also, and especially, structural violence. Although the idea of a positive or structural peace was discussed before the Cold War ended, it was the peace dividend which followed the end of the bipolar confrontation between the East and West Blocs in 1990 that made a discussion of normatively more complex peace- and security concepts possible. One stream, known as Critical Security Studies (CSS), aimed at “unpacking the traditional conception of security” and expanding the role of the individual from the “neo-realist reduction [...] to instrumentally rational actors, embedded in a contractual theory of sovereignty [to...] right-bearing persons, [...] citizens or members of society, or as members of a transcendent global community.”

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2 Keohane 1993, pp. 296-97.
3 Kaldor 2007, p. 183.
5 It is not an objective of this article to provide a detailed introduction the field of CSS. For comprehensive works cf. Krause/Williams 1997, Jones 1999, Booth 2005.
6 Krause/Williams 1997b, p. 36, pp. 42-44.