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Åse Berit Grødeland, Culture, Corruption, and Anti-Corruption Strategies in Post-Communist Europe in:

Diana Schmidt-Pfister, Sebastian Wolf (Ed.)

International Anti-Corruption Regimes in Europe, page 137 - 158

Between Corruption, Integration, and Culture

1. Edition 2010, ISBN print: 978-3-8329-5846-6, ISBN online: 978-3-8452-2573-9, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845225739-137

Series: Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V., vol. 70

Bibliographic information
137 Culture, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies in Post-Communist Europe Åse Berit Grødeland 1. Introduction Since the collapse of communism corruption has been a bone of contention in postcommunist states in East Central Europe (ECE), South East Europe (SEE) and the West Balkans (WB). In recent years, fairly extensive anti-corruption programmes have been introduced in most of them. Such programmes have drawn heavily on anti-corruption strategies developed by international donors. Their strategies tend to be vague, all-inclusive and fairly non-sensitive to the national environments into which they are introduced. Besides, they are rarely accompanied by proper mechanisms to ensure their implementation (Michael, quoted in Rucinschi 2007: 5). This chapter investigates whether national culture (i) is conducive to corrupt behaviour and (ii) obstructs anti-corruption reform. Our purpose, in other words, is to investigate the root causes of corruption. These tend to be overlooked by ‘conventional’ corruption studies and are rarely addressed by anti-corruption programmes. Yet they are of crucial importance for reform.1 The link between national culture and corruption is investigated by examining elite perceptions of (i) national culture and informal practice; (ii) national culture and law; and (iii) how best to do away with culturally ‘informed’ informal behaviour, in seven post-communist states in ECE (Czech Republic, Slovenia), SEE (Bulgaria, Romania) and WB (Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina – below referred to as BiH). 2. Culture and Informal Practice Hofstede and Bond define culture as ‘the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one category of people from those of another.’2 ‘Culture is composed of certain values, which shape behaviour as well as one’s perception of the world.’ Perceptions of the world shared by citizens of a national state may 1 In order to be truly successful, anti-corruption efforts must target not only the manifestations of corruption but also the factors causing them in the first place. Reducing the impact of the former requires a different time span and also a set of different measures than those traditionally employed. What is more, they are sensitive from both a political and cultural point of view and therefore less ‘responsive’ to externally imported anti-corruption initiatives. 2 National culture, then, distinguishes the citizens of one state from those of another. 138 be referred to as national mentality and effectively as an expression of national culture. While cultural patterns may change as a result of external influences, social norms ‘informing’ people’s behaviour rarely change through the direct adaptation of outside values (Hofstede, Bond and Adler, in Kwok/Tadesse 2006: 227-247). Though used as a coping-mechanism during transition, informal practice3 in postcommunist states is rooted in social norms, shaped by national culture (Grødeland/Aasland 2007; Grødeland 2008).4 What is more, such practice appears to be (i) most common in post-communist states that have experienced prolonged periods of foreign rule and big distance between rulers and the ruled, and (ii) stronger in states that used to be under Ottoman rule than in those that were not (Grødeland/Aasland 2007).5 Citizens residing in such states have traditionally had to ‘try harder’ to obtain their rights or to achieve other outcomes requiring some kind of interaction with the state.6 Informal practice provided them with a means by which to compensate for their perceived or real disadvantage. The countries in WB were all under Ottoman rule in the past. Unlike the countries in SEE they have also been negatively affected by prolonged political conflict and/or war. Further, they have not undertaken as extensive legal and institutional reform as the post-communist member states of the European Union (EU). We therefore assume that informal practice – as an expression of national culture – is more wide- 3 For our purposes, informal practice is understood as the use of contacts and informal networks. For definitions, see Grødeland (2007: 221). 4 Dahrendorf suggests that ‘it will take six months to reform the political systems (in postcommunist states), six years to change the economic systems and sixty years to effect a revolution in the people’s hearts and minds’(Pedersen/Johannsen 2005: 19). This observation is in line with our previous findings from focus groups in Ukraine, conducted in the late 1990s, in which participants suggested that it would take anything from one to three or four generations to combat corruption. 5 The Ottoman Empire was organised by religion rather than ethnicity and religious communities were organised in ‘millets’. The millets were – at least in theory – given equal rights. Still, non-Muslims were in some ways disadvantaged compared to Muslims, and especially those whose ethnic and religious identities overlapped. While there are some indications that the state administration during the zenith of Ottoman rule was well-functioning and noncorrupt, later territorial expansion was accompanied by massive centralisation to strengthen control over the new-won territories. As a result, the old administrative structure eventually weakened and collapsed, causing extensive corruption, disadvantaging the periphery and fuelling national sentiments amongst ethnic communities. Ingrao (1996: 4) suggests that ’the sultans were the archetypal oriental despots: In theory they claimed to have absolute power over everyone and everything; in practice, they cared less about how their empire was run, so long as each of their dominions provided them with a steady supply of revenue and recruits for the army. This diffidence helped incubate traditions of public ignorance, technological backwardness, local corruption, social injustice, lawlessness, and violence that are still evident in the Balkans today.’ While ethnic minorities in the Austro-Hungarian were also at a disadvantage, corruption appears to have been less extensive there. For a more thorough analysis of corruption in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, see Grødeland and Aasland (2007). 6 Our ‘try harder’ hypothesis also applies to ethnic minorities in post-communist states, with the exception of Gypsies who simply appear to have ‘given up’ (Miller/Grødeland/Koshechkina 2001: 169-204). 139 spread in WB than in SEE and more widespread in SEE than in ECE, given that Bulgaria and Romania were previously under Ottoman rule while the Czech Republic and Slovenia were ruled by the Habsburgs.7 Finally, we assume that informal practice is conducive to corrupt behaviour – and more so in WB than in SEE and ECE.8 3. Methodology Data referred to in this chapter was collected in ECE, SEE and WB, respectively, as part of two international research projects funded by the Research Council of Norway.9 Between 2003/4 and 2007/8 we conducted a total of 774 structured, openended in-depth interviews (IDIs) amongst nine different categories of elites.10 The interviews covered several dimensions of informal practice and allowed us to test questions that were later used for seven quota-based national quantitative surveys (N= 600 x 7), carried out amongst the same categories of elites.11 Surveying elites is generally more complicated than surveying members of the general public, in that refusal rates tend to be higher. Organising interviews is difficult from a logistical point of view due to time constraints on the part of the respondents. On top of this, the topic of our survey – informal practice and corruption – is rather sensitive. In all countries except BiH, Bulgaria and Macedonia, refusal rates were therefore high.12 However, given the rather large number of respondents interviewed in each country as well as the geographical spread of our national samples, we consider our survey design to be sufficiently robust for the views expressed by 7 Other factors such as type of communism and aspects of transition are of course also at play, but in this paper the focus is on culture only. For an account of how the communist past and transition affect informal practice in post-communist Europe, see Grødeland/Aasland (2007). 8 BiH has been both under Ottoman and Habsburg rule. However, Habsburg rule was shorter than Ottoman rule and also less stable (Kann 1977). The impact of the former should therefore be more pronounced than that of the latter. 9 Where appropriate, references are also made to partial data collected for a third project, funded by the same Council. Projects no 156856/V10 (2003-2006), 174856/S30 (2006-2009) and 182628 (2007-2011). 10 Face-to-face interviews were conducted with (i) elected representatives; (ii) political party representatives; (iii) judges & prosecutors; (iv) representatives of local business; (v) representatives of foreign business; (vi) representatives of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs); (vii) media representatives; (viii) public procurement officials; and (ix) government officials in charge of anti-corruption efforts/EU representatives & Council of Europe representatives (ECE and SEE)/foreign donor representatives (WB). 11 We also conducted a limited number of pilot interviews in each country covered by our projects to test our survey questionnaire. The quantitative survey combines questions from the IDIs with a range of other questions – all close-ended. 12 The average refusal rate for all categories of respondents in Slovenia was 71 per cent, in the Czech Republic and Serbia 59 per cent, in Romania 55 per cent, in BiH 23 per cent, in Bulgaria 17 per cent and in Macedonia 15 per cent. 140 the respondents to be reasonably representative of the types of elites they represent as such.13 This chapter presents partial findings from our seven national quantitative surveys. These are presented in table form and illustrated by representative quotations from our qualitative surveys (IDIs). Where appropriate, qualitative and quantitative findings from ECE, SEE and WB are contrasted with qualitative findings from Ukraine.14 4. Formal vs. Informal Society To gain a better understanding of how deeply affected post-communist societies are by informal practice, we asked our respondents to choose between four statements. The first statement ‘(COUNTRY) is a well-functioning society defined by the rule of law’ captures the essence of liberal democracy. We therefore did not expect many respondents to choose this option. The second statement, ‘(COUNTRY) is a society formally defined by the rule of law but in which the rule of law is not functioning properly’ is more applicable to post-communist transitional societies. As reform takes hold, these societies are likely to move in the direction of liberal democracy (i.e. the type of society described in the first statement). The third statement, ‘(COUNTRY) is a society formally defined by the rule of law, but in which people prefer to do things informally’, on the other hand, suggests a fairly informal society, 13 We cannot rule out the possibility of systematic failure to answer questions honestly on the part of certain categories of respondents. In BiH and in Slovenia, official permission had to be obtained in order to interview judges. Similar permission had to be obtained in order to interview public procurement officials in Slovenia. This might have affected the responses provided by the relevant respondents. At the time of interviewing Bulgaria and Romania were under considerable pressure from the EU to reduce corruption to qualify for EU membership. As a result, the local media provided extensive coverage of corruption-related incidents. Anticorruption campaigns – official as well as civil society-based – were launched in both countries. These circumstances may either have made people more willing to speak up about corruption as a result of the awareness they caused, or more reluctant to do so for fear that such statements might complicate their country’s path to EU membership. Our previous research in post-communist states – including some of those covered in this chapter – suggests that although corruption is a sensitive issue it is not sufficiently sensitive for people to refrain from voicing their opinions about it. We therefore have no reason to believe that the anti-corruption campaigns in Bulgaria and Romania affected data collection in these countries negatively. However, it is possible that respondents who took part in our quantitative survey in the Czech Republic may have exaggerated the extent of corruption in their country somewhat as a result of a corruption scandal which involved the Prime Minister at the time and which received extensive coverage in the national media. Such coverage might have generated a degree of cynicism amongst respondents. 14 In Ukraine we conducted a total of 84 structured, open-ended elite IDIs with six different categories of respondents at national and capital level (Kyiv), in Lviv and in Donetsk in early 2008. As findings for Ukraine have already been published (Grødeland 2009), brief references to these findings are inserted in the text or in footnotes, where appropriate. 141 in which there is no real incentive for people to revert to formal behaviour. They may even actively oppose change. The last statement, ‘(COUNTRY) is a disorganised society, defined by contradicting laws that people largely ignore” suggests the absence of the rule of law. People residing in such societies are forced to apply informal strategies to survive. Not surprisingly, most respondents (more than, or close to, half of the respondents in all countries) opted for the second statement. Roughly between one fifth and one third thought their countries are societies formally defined by the rule of law but in which people have a preference for informal decision making. A fairly large number of respondents in BiH, Romania and Bulgaria described their countries as disorganised (table 1). Table 1: Whether (COUNTRY) is… (in per cent) Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. a well-functioning society defined by the rule of law 8 9 4 3 2 11 2 a society formally defined by the rule of law but in which the rule of law is not functioning properly 62 71 41 45 43 49 48 a society formally defined by the rule of law, but in which people prefer to do things informally 19 18 32 22 28 28 34 a disorganised society, defined by contradicting laws that people largely ignore 7 2 19 24 27 9 13 mix/depends/DK 4 1 4 6 0 4 3 N= 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. Our IDIs shed some light on the scenarios presented in table 1. As regards the second scenario, a fairly sizeable group of respondents perceived state institutions in their respective countries as ‘unstable’ or ‘inadequate’ – implying that post-communist states are still in the grips of transition. Respondents suggested that transition facilitates the same type of informal practice that occurred during communism – and that institutional short-comings are to blame. During communism state institutions were characterised by red tape and inefficiency. This is the case also at present. Respondents in all countries – and particularly in WB – thought state institutions are suffering from unnecessarily complicated procedures. Consequently, people either choose to, or feel that, they are left with no choice but to seek informal solutions to their problems. Such solutions tend to be faster and produce better results than formal ones. Respondents throughout post-communist Europe – though more so in SEE and WB than in ECE – made it clear that the use of contacts is widespread and 142 that they are very much a part of the national mentality. Consequently, their use is not likely to disappear in the near future: it is easier to reach your goal…if you have connections than if you go through institutions… (Do-7-Se15); no matter what you need to do, if you want to do it quickly, efficiently, you must do it in an informal way (Do-10-FED-Bo); this is the country that functions on the ‘we know each other!’ and ‘you owe me’ basis.’ (PP-5-conf-Se); for the time being, a great part of the population still lives in the rural and patriarchal culture in which the influence of the family is greater than the influence of the institutions (NGO-3-Ma). As regards the third scenario – i.e. societies characterised by a preference for informal over formal decision-making – a clear difference is observed between ECE, on the one hand, and SEE/WB, on the other.16 Historically, citizens in the region are used to cheating the state. This practice has been reinforced by transition in general, and by widespread distrust in state institutions, in particular: ever since the Ottoman Empire, (giving bribes) has been a permanent characteristic of Bulgarian society... (PP-9-Bu); ‘centuries’-old habits exist for doing things informally…this may be part of our tradition and our mentality (ER-6-Se); this is not a state: they (i.e. people) behave like they did in the Ottoman period or in the Austro-Hungarian Empire; it is important to trick the state, work for your own benefit’ (PP-5-ST-Bo); the institutions here are not strong enough and we still have a culture of behaviour that does not trust the institutions, but trusts the political party contacts, family contacts or neighbour contacts (NGO-2-Ma). Some respondents in Europe’s post-communist states suggest that their states are formal in the sense of being independent states, possessing all the necessary attributes of statehood, including a Constitution, legislation and state institutions. However, formalism – i.e. form without content – is a real problem, particularly in WB. Respondents in BiH and Serbia even suggested that their countries are not states in the ‘real’ sense, but rather formal structures aspiring to ‘real’ statehood. State institutions tend to be ‘provisional’ and they are not functioning properly (scenario 4).17 A minority thought the international community was to blame – in Serbia, because of the blockade it organised of their country during the Balkan wars, in BiH because it 15 Quotes from the IDIs are referred to as follows: PP indicates that the respondent is a political party representative, ER refers to elected representative, Le refers to judges and prosecutors, LB refers to local business, FB refers to foreign business, Me refers to the media, NGO refers to NGOs, Pr refers to public procurement, GO refers to government official working in the area of anti-corruption, EU refers to EU staff, CoE refers to Council of Europe staff and Do refers to foreign donors. The number after the respondent category indicates the number of the interview. CzR refers to the Czech Republic, Sl refers to Slovenia, Bu refers to Bulgaria, Ro refers to Romania, Se refers to Serbia, Bo refers to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ma refers to Macedonia. Interviews conducted in areas badly affected by conflict in the West Balkans are identified by co, which appears after the interview number. For interviews conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina the following codes are also used: ST (state level), FED (The Federation – entity level) and RS (Republika Srpska – entity level). Do-7-Se indicates the following: foreign donor representative, interview number seven, Serbia. 16 Respondents in Romania considered their country to be informal to a lesser extent than respondents in other parts of the Balkans. 17 Scenario 4 could also be referred to as state capture – see Hellman/Jones/Kaufmann (2000). 143 created an artificial state that is not functioning properly, and in Macedonia because the country is controlled by foreigners: form dominates…there is form without content… (ER-1-Se); forms exist only to meet the expectations of the international community… (Do-3-conf-Se); formally, we have a state… (Pr- 5-FED-Bo); all three ethnic groups are ruled by well-organised oligarchies of informal groups, grey eminences (who are) behind everything that is happening (PP-3-ST-Bo); the rest of the world made us behave this way…you live informally and don’t observe the rules because the most important thing for you is to survive… (Me-4-Se); B&H society practically does not exist...it is totally informal… (INGO-3-FED-Bo); we are under the influence of foreign countries, it seems to me that we are subordinate to them and their requests (NGO-2-conf-Ma). 4.1 Culture and Informal Practice Respondents distinguished between three distinct types of ‘culture’.18 ‘informal culture’ (all countries except the Czech Republic and Slovenia), ‘legal culture’ (all countries except the Czech Republic) and ‘political culture’19 (Bulgaria, Romania and BiH). These cultures are relevant to corruption. Two of them – ‘informal culture’ and ‘legal culture’ – will be addressed in more detail below. When referring to ‘informal culture’, respondents had in mind informal behaviour ‘informed’ by national culture. In their view national culture is informal because it (i) relies heavily on the use of contacts (SEE, WB) and/or informal networks (Bulgaria and Macedonia), (ii) emphasises ‘our’, as opposed to ‘other’, people – and the need to help the former at the expense of the latter (Serbia, BiH); and (iii) endorses the use of bribes (Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia). The majority of the statements referred to above suggest that informal behaviour is deeply embedded in the national mentality of people residing in post-communist states. Still, it is possible to solve problems formally in all these states (table 2). To the extent people seek informal outcomes, they do so because (i) it has become a habit, (ii) it is easier to secure a favourable outcome this way, or (iii) problems may be solved much faster. While (i) suggests the existence of an informal culture, (ii) and (iii) indicate that there is an element of opportunism in people’s informal coping strategies. 18 Our questions on informal practice in post-communist states provided more detailed insight into how these cultures manifest themselves. 19 These include informal relations – but also monetary exchanges (bribes) – between political actors in a wide sense, and powerful civil servants. Apart from these, respondents highlighted the ‘big gap between the mentality of the political establishment and the general public’ (Romania) and the ‘disentanglement from reality on the part of the politicians’ (Bulgaria). Respondents in other countries, such as Serbia, spoke about a problematic relationship between rulers and ruled – partly conditioned by fear on the part of the latter (Serbia). 144 Table 2: Main reason for solving problems in (COUNTRY) informally (in per cent) Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. impossible to solve them formally 10 7 7 3 14 9 8 easier to secure a favourable outcome 28 29 28 25 29 25 22 it has become a habit 27 19 27 37 36 44 38 it is quicker to solve them informally 15 32 18 19 15 12 18 a combination of these 11 8 14 12 2 5 11 none/depends/DK 10 6 5 6 3 6 4 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. Habit-based, or culturally ‘informed’, informal practice is most common in Romania and WB. In the Czech Republic and Bulgaria habit-based informal behaviour and informal strategies producing favourable outcomes, appear to be equally widespread. Slovenes differ in that they think people primarily solve problems informally as this is quicker or as it is easier to secure favourable outcomes this way. Habitbased informal behaviour matters less. If it is possible to solve problems formally, then why do people still seek informal solutions to their problems? Table 3 indicates that citizens in post-communist states either do not believe that formal solutions may be found to their problems. Or that engaging in informal problem-solving has become a habit. Informal coping mechanisms that produced successful outcomes in the past are simply repeated during transition.20 This is even the case in the Czech Republic, where informal behaviour appears to be less widespread than in Romania and WB. In other words, even though society changes at the formal level, people’s behaviour does not necessarily follow suit. There are several reasons for this, such as (i) ignorance, (ii) a preference for the tried and tested, or (iii) a lack of faith in other people changing their behaviour – which provides people with no incentive to change their behaviour. 20 Ordinary citizens engaged in lobbying politicians, for instance, to quite some extent apply the same strategies as they did when lobbying elected representatives during communism. To some extent they do this because they prefer to stick with the ‘tried and tested’, to some extent as a result of ignorance: not all citizens are aware of how the role of politicians has changed following the collapse of communism, nor of what is, or is not, acceptable behaviour on the part of the lobbying public (Grødeland 2009b). Lack of trust in state institutions probably also has quite a lot to do with it. 145 Table 3: Main reason for solving problems in (COUNTRY) informally, when it is possible to solve them formally (in per cent) Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. easier to secure a favourable outcome 18 14 15 14 21 17 15 it has become a habit 18 11 15 31 31 34 26 it is quicker 22 31 23 23 18 15 20 people don’t believe that problems can be solved formally 26 29 31 17 26 26 29 a combination of all 9 9 12 11 2 5 6 none/depends/DK 8 4 4 4 2 4 3 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. We have chosen to study informal practice in post-communist Europe by investigating the use of contacts and informal networks.21 These may, or may not, facilitate corruption – though our data suggest that they do (Grødeland 2007: 249). The use of contacts is predominantly viewed as an expression of national culture in all countries except the Czech Republic and Romania. In the latter two countries, national culture and the socialist past are blamed roughly in equal measure (table 4). This is understandable to the extent contacts are perceived as something negative. Due to the events of 1968 and the harsh rule of Ceausescu, people in the Czech Republic and Romania are more negative to the socialist past than people in the other post-communist states. A fairly large share of respondents in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Bosnia thought the use of contacts is a result of a several factors – and only to a limited extent caused by conflict or war. Though widespread in the Balkans, some respondents felt rather uncomfortable about the use of contacts, associating contacts with ‘rural mentality’ (Bulgaria), ‘small town mentality’ or ‘village mentality’ (Serbia): you have to seek contacts for everything…if we do not start to eradicate this rural mentality…nothing will happen (ER-9-Bu); we still have this small town mentality: connections with relatives…the cultural model hasn’t changed… (ER-7-Se); the historically inherited concept of using connections to…achieve something…is in people’s mentality, it was not imposed by Milosevic and Broz. In the past, village people knew when they went to the doctors that they should bring them something. They also knew that they had to give something to the priests. This is embedded in the mentality of the people… (NB-5-Se). Informal networks, for their part, are primarily perceived as an expression of national culture and partly as a feature of transition. Respondents in the Czech Republic and Romania blamed informal networks – just as they blamed contacts – on their 21 See footnote 3. 146 countries’ socialist past to a greater extent than respondents elsewhere.22 A fairly large share of the respondents in all countries, especially in Bulgaria, Serbia and the Czech Republic, attributed informal networks to a mix of factors. Table 4: The use of contacts in (COUNTRY) is a result of… (in per cent) Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. (COUNTRY’s) culture 24 30 28 28 36 38 36 (COUNTRY’s) socialist past 22 12 13 29 14 21 18 the transition to the market 13 27 16 18 29 22 9 (CONFLICT) 9 1 5 a combination of all 25 15 31 18 11 13 26 neither/DK 15 16 12 7 2 5 7 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Informal networks in (COUNTRY) are a result of … (in per cent) (COUNTRY’s) culture 22 28 22 22 31 31 32 (COUNTRY’s) socialist past 21 10 12 27 11 18 16 the transition to the market 18 30 20 23 34 32 12 (CONFLICT) 11 1 5 a combination of all 24 15 31 18 10 13 26 neither/DK 15 17 14 12 2 6 8 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. (CONFLICT) as an option was only included in the questionnaire used in WB. 4.2 Culture and the Law Proverbs in several post-communist states suggest a rather laid back attitude to the law. Bulgarians, for instance, have a saying to the effect that ‘the law is like a door in an open field’. Consequently, there is no need to go through the door. Ukrainians have ‘to grease the wheels in order to drive’. Our quantitative data largely confirm the attitudes towards the law contained in these proverbs. When asked whether people obey the law only when it suits them, a large majority in all countries suggested that this is indeed the case – though Romanians are somewhat less inclined to break the law, possibly as a result of fear, ‘left over’ from the communist period.23 22 It should be noted that respondents talk about ‘old-style’ networks that have existed since socialism, and ‘contemporary-style’ networks that did not exist in the past. 23 Former employees of the Securitate, Ceaucescu’s dreaded secret police force, still exert considerable influence on Romanian society (Gallagher 2005: 108). 147 Table 5: ‘People in (COUNTRY) only obey the law when it suits them’ (in per cent) Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. (strongly) agree 65 65 67 56 73 73 74 (strongly) disagree 30 35 31 43 27 26 26 neither/depends/DK 5 2 1 1 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. Respondents used the term ‘legal culture’ synonymously with ‘law-breaking’ and ‘disregard’ for the law. The stories told by our respondents shed some light on why people break the law (SEE and WB). In their view, European post-communist states are characterised by ‘the absence of the rule of law’, ‘disrespect for the law’ (Bulgaria), citizens ‘ignoring’, ‘avoiding’ or ‘evading’ the law (SEE & WB – except BiH), viewing the law as ‘unimportant’, as a ‘guide, rather than a must’ (Romania), or as something that it is acceptable to break, provided that there is ‘no risk of being sanctioned’ (BiH).24 However, in WB widespread disregard for the law goes hand in hand with the ‘culture of fear’ – not only of the system and the authorities, but also of the law itself25: the legal culture here is underdeveloped… (IB-10-CzR); Bulgarians…follow their own sense of justice…the legal culture of the population is not very high. (Ju-3-Bu); there is this mentality in Romania: whenever a law is adopted, the first concern is to see how it can be avoided… (ER-9-Ro); Being a man of faith, I abide by God’s laws. (I) don’t need a single written law.’ (PP-4-Se); that is our mentality…everyone wants to avoid the law, which is very negative (ID- 2-Ma); our mentality only knows punishment…as long as something can ‘be gotten away (with) unpunished’ nobody respects the law (Pr-4-Bo). In the Czech Republic and Slovenia law-evasion is perceived as a ‘national sport’, a ‘heritage from the past’ or a ‘result of history’. During communism it was considered acceptable to steal from the state. Respondents in Slovenia suggested that such behaviour is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, then ‘people do not change overnight’. While Czechs have very little tolerance for those who break social norms, tolerance is considerably greater for law-breakers. The law is usually broken for personal benefit, due to excessive red tape or unintentionally, because citizens are simply not familiar with it. Bulgarian elites primarily blame law-breaking on the laws themselves, describing them as ‘imperfect’, ‘frequently changing’, ‘unhelpful’ or ‘disrespectful of people’. In contrast, elites in Romania focused less on the laws as such. To the extent they did, they argued that laws do not reflect the needs of society in that they are not 24 A small minority of the respondents suggested that their national cultures are characterised by ‘regard for the law’ – though with limits. Politicians are considered to be less law-abiding than the general public. Serbs either respect or have mixed attitudes to the law. People in Bosnia and Herzegovina are generally respectful of the law and consequently law-abiding. 25 In Ukraine absence of fear that seems to explain why people break the law (Grødeland 2009: 82). 148 ‘clear cut’ and also ‘frequently changing’. Consequently, people have no faith in the law and prefer to live by ‘other rules’ – i.e. according to ‘common sense’ – i.e. according to social norms. National culture causes people in SEE to ignore the law. Not surprisingly, therefore, law-breaking is considered to be part of Romanian ‘customs and mentality’, a ‘tradition’ that has ‘historical roots’. During communism, for instance, people got used to thinking that it was acceptable to break the law, provided that they had connections (‘pile’). Bulgarians, for their part, have a ‘tradition of not obeying the law’. This tradition has effectively become a ‘social norm’, a part of the ‘national psychology’. Added to this, law-breaking is considered low-risk as law enforcement is weak. Added to this, people’s knowledge of the law throughout post-communist Europe is poor. Consequently, it is difficult for them to consciously avoid breaking the law: there is a tradition to…ignore (the law) (IB-7-Bu); for historical reasons…we oppose everything above us, even God (NB-4-Bu); people from Romania are not used to obeying the law…during…the communist regime they were inoculated with the idea that you can break the law and nothing happens if you have ‘pile’ (contacts) and connections (PP-9-Ro); our imagination regarding law breaking has no boundaries and rich traditions (Pr-6-Ro). Culture and social norms also explain law-breaking in WB. In Serbia, for instance, law-breaking is primarily blamed on ‘tradition’, ‘national mentality’ or on ‘unwritten moral codes’. It is ‘not in the nature of people’, or ‘not a custom’ to respect the law: ‘people are simply not used to’ doing so. A major reason for this is that the ‘value system’ in Serbia has been ‘disturbed’. Citizens pay lip-service to the law, but they ‘don’t understand it’, ‘don’t know it’, ‘don’t respect it’, or even worse, ‘don’t believe in’, or ‘don’t trust it’. Macedonian citizens, for their part, largely fail to obey the law due to an ‘inherited set of beliefs’ and due to (national) ‘culture’. The quality – or rather the absence of quality – in current legislation is also being blamed. Laws in WB are considered to be very poor. Serb laws, for instance, are not laws for ‘a democratic state’ and there is no ‘rule of law’. Laws passed as part of the adjustment process to the EU, such as the law on lustration, are not enacted and exist on paper only. Besides, government officials in Serbia generally do not respect the law, thus setting a bad example for ordinary citizens. Bosnian and Macedonian laws are predominantly ‘declarative’, ‘poor’ or ‘non-harmonised’. The Macedonian legal system is ‘too complicated’ and its employees ‘unqualified’. Courts in Serbia are perceived as ‘incapable’. Respondents in BiH and Macedonia claimed that current conditions in their countries are not conducive to the rule of law. In their view, the latter requires a wellfunctioning and strong state. While BiH is characterised by ‘legal anarchy’, Macedonia is considered to be a ‘political state’ with an ‘unstable society’, characterised by ‘no rule of law’. Political leaders in both countries allegedly live by one set of rules whereas ordinary citizens are expected to live by another. Consequently, people distrust institutions and do not believe in the law: there is…a culture that ridicules law obedience (Do-7-FED-Bo); Bosnia and Herzegovina has never functioned as a state governed by law. It has always been a political state where politics rule over law…people do not respect state institutions or legislative bodies. We have inherited beliefs, on the one side, and negative experiences, on the other. (Me-1-FED-Bo); one of our 149 greatest virtues is the disrespect of everything (Pr-10-Ma); in Serbia there is no rule of law.(ID- 1-Se); corruption rules and courts don’t function (ID-5-Se). Still, respondents in all countries except BiH thought laws exist to be observed – including those that come across as very unreasonable or unjust (table 6): Table 6: If people think a law is very unreasonable or unjust, they should… (in per cent) Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. obey it 73 75 70 65 27 75 78 ignore/avoid it 15 19 20 19 70 20 14 depends/DK 13 6 10 15 2 5 9 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. Though widespread, legal culture – in the meaning of law-breaking – is to some extent counteracted by fear and/or passive acceptance. Respondents in all countries suggested that both are historically motivated, but that they are not as strong as people’s preference for informal problem solving. Citizens in the Czech Republic and Slovenia are generally considered to be fairly law-abiding and said to have a deepseated respect for the law. Our data suggest that they are primarily abiding by the law ‘for fear of sanctions’. Unlike citizens of other post-communist states, they are not afraid to voice their discontent with the current legislation and they do look for loopholes. Bulgarian citizens abide by laws ‘for fear of penalties’ or ‘repression’ – though like the Czechs and Slovenes they look for ways to evade them. Negative historical experiences have facilitated a rather servile approach to the state amongst Romanians. As a result, people try to comply with laws – even those that are unreasonable or unjust. Their law-abiding is, to a considerable extent, conditioned by fear: people here still have fear, which they carry with them from communism; they respect the law… (EU-2-CzR); Slovenes have the mentality that they must obey the law (GO-4-Sl); we all keep silent and obey them (i.e. the laws) (LB-8-Bu); unfortunately, people from Romania respected all the regimes, no matter how bad they were (PP-10-Ro). Servility towards the state and state legislation is particularly strong in BiH. Citizens have developed ‘high tolerance’ for unpleasant conditions. They are not ‘revolutionary minded’, preferring to ‘talk but do nothing’. As in ECE and SEE, there is also an element of fear in their decision to abide by unreasonable or unjust laws. Serb citizens appear to be even more willing to obey such laws for fear of sanctions or punishment than people in BiH. Macedonians are generally accepting of state decisions. Their mentality makes them less prone to protest and civil disobedience is rare. On the one hand, Macedonians fear sanctions if they fail to abide by the law. On the other hand, they are generally uninformed about the law: people are obedient here, like servants (Me-4-Se); it is more about fear than acceptance (Me-9- Se); the tolerance level of our people is very high…all of us just talk in private and complain… 150 (Do-3-FED-Bo); we have such a character and (such a) mentality, we abide by the laws (ER-4- Ma). Despite widespread disregard for the law, there appears to have been a net increase in law-abidingness throughout much of post-communist Europe since the collapse of communism. BiH represent the exception to the rule: law-abidingness has decreased considerably as a result of war (table 7). While this increase has been very modest in ECE, it has been more marked in Macedonia, Romania and Serbia, and considerable in Bulgaria. Bulgaria and Romania have undertaken extensive judicial reform as part of their preparations for EU membership. Judicial reform has also been introduced in Macedonia and Serbia – much as a result of external pressure. Still, roughly one third of the respondents in all countries except Bulgaria and BiH thought people are less law-abiding now than they were during socialism.26 While people in many post-communist states are perceived to be more law-abiding now than they were during socialism, a reverse trend has been observed in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania in the last five years.27 However, in BiH the percentage of people who are more law-abiding now exceeds that of those who are less lawabiding. People in Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia are more or less law-abiding now than five years ago in almost equal measure.28 26 Our recently collected data amongst Ukrainian elites, on the other hand, suggest that people were more law-abiding before the collapse of the USSR and also, that they were more lawabiding before than after the Orange Revolution. This is understandable. Corruption levels soared during the rule of President Kuchma. The Orange Revolution appears to have produced a very brief period of reduced corruption. However, given the ensuing difficult relations between president, government and parliament, Ukraine this trend was quickly reversed (Grødeland 2009). 27 The collapse of communism not only facilitated increased law-abidingness throughout much of post-communist Europe. Fix and Randazzo (2008) conclude that ‘increased confidence in the judiciary (in the Former Soviet Union) significantly influenced democratic transition’ and that ‘levels of democracy significantly affect public confidence in the judiciary’ – ‘but only in the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.’ Similarly, corruption levels in Ukraine dropped somewhat in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, only to increase after a while (cf. note 24). It thus appears that sharp political and economic change, which enjoys widespread public support, produce immediate improvements in some areas of society. However, once the difficult path of reform starts and disillusion sets in, positive trends stagnate or are even reversed. 28 Macedonia’s government at the time of interviewing was considered to be fairly clean and uncorrupted. BiH is still in the process of recovering from the aftermath of war, whereas Slovenia, unlike some of the other post-communist EU member states, has handled EU integration really well. These circumstances help explain our findings. 151 Table 7: People in (COUNTRY) are generally more or less law-abiding now than they were… (in per cent) During socialism? Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. more law-abiding now 40 37 77 51 29 53 47 no difference 22 27 10 12 15 14 17 less law-abiding now 36 34 10 35 54 28 31 DK 2 3 4 2 2 5 5 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Five years ago? more law-abiding now 27 32 21 29 41 37 35 no difference 28 35 26 25 24 26 29 (much) less law-abiding now 43 32 51 45 34 36 33 DK 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. As shown above, informal practice and poor law enforcement are major reasons why people fail to abide by the law in Europe’s post-communist states. Not surprisingly, therefore, a large majority of our respondents – though less so in ECE than in SEE and WB – suggested that people in their countries are in need of more order and discipline (table 8): Table 8: People in (COUNTRY)… (in per cent) Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. need more order and discipline 57 53 84 81 89 76 91 need more freedom from control 26 37 10 15 9 19 5 depends/DK 18 10 7 4 2 4 5 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. Exactly how such order and discipline should come about, however, is less clear. Respondents in all countries covered by our projects made it clear that a strong leader vested with widespread powers would be dangerous for their countries. It therefore seems more likely that they have in mind more law and order. However, institutions in charge of law enforcement, such as the public prosecutor’s office, na- 152 tional courts and the police, are perceived as highly corrupt throughout Eastern Europe.29 An improvement is therefore not likely to occur in the short term. 5. How To Do Away With Culturally ‘Informed’ Informal Behaviour Four of the countries covered by our research – the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania – became EU members in 2004 and 2007, respectively. The other three – BiH, Serbia and Macedonia – aspire to EU membership. The European expansion eastward has been referred to not only as a political and economic, but also as a culture and value-based project. Mihai (2005: 8) notes that ‘although the Europeanization is visible in post-communist Europe as far as structures are concerned, the essence, i.e. the process of adopting European values and standards, is more cumbersome.’ Contemporary Polish writer Andrej Stasiuk (quoted in Roth 2007: 12- 13) perceives traditional social relations as being preferable to Western-style social relations for East Europeans. Roth (2007: 13), for his part, is convinced that Balkan people ‘want to become Europeans without really becoming “Europeans”, i.e. they want to become members of the EU without giving up their social logic and – purportedly – losing their cultural identity.’ However, he still thinks that informal social relations so typical of Balkan society are likely to gradually wither away as the postcommunist states are properly integrated in the EU and forced to abide by EU rules.30 Both our quantitative and qualitative data indicate that informal practice, rooted in national culture, will not automatically decrease due to EU membership – despite the specific anti-corruption requirements made by the EU as a pre-condition for such membership. The large majority of the respondents in EU member states Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania suggested that EU membership would not affect corruption.31 In contrast, most of the respondents in WB thought corruption levels would decrease if their countries were to join the EU (table 9). Their reason for making such an assumption may be wishful thinking. However, it might also re- 29 Close to or more than, half of the respondents in all countries except the Czech Republic and Slovenia suggest that courts are usually dishonest and corrupted. What is more, a majority of the respondents in Bulgaria, almost half of the respondents in Macedonia and Serbia, and a fairly large share of the respondents in the other countries thought courts are easy to influence. 30 This view is also held by our respondents in WB. When asked whether they thought EU membership would increase or decrease informal behaviour – i.e. the use of contacts and informal networks – in their countries, 70 per cent of the respondents in BiH, 63 per cent of the respondents in Serbia and 49 per cent of the respondents in Macedonia answered in the affirmative. However, it should be remembered that elites tend to be more pro-European than the general public. Consequently, their opinions may not reflect those of the population at large (see for instance Checkel/Katzenstein 2009). 31 The quantitative surveys in ECE and SEE were conducted in 2005 – i.e. a year after the former had joined the EU and two years before the latter followed suit. 153 flect the fact that WB still has a long way to go before formally qualifying for EU membership – including in the field of anti-corruption. Table 9: If (COUNTRY) joined the EU, the level of corruption in (COUNTRY) would… (in per cent) Cz.R Slov. Bulg. Rom. Bos. Mac. Serb. increase 10 6 5 10 2 2 2 remain unchanged 60 73 60 50 16 23 19 decrease 15 16 22 34 82 73 73 depends/DK 15 6 13 6 1 3 7 N= (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) (600) Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. Respondents in all countries agreed that the use of contacts and informal networks cause corruption32 and that this is a negative aspect of network society. When specifically asked what measure that would be most effective in terms of reducing the negative impact of informal networks33 they preferred to (i) strengthen the rule of law or (ii) change people’s mentality through education. Introducing new and better laws or improving law-enforcement also gained some support, as efforts to strengthen public trust in the state. Traditional anti-corruption measures were far less popular.34 32 Only 18 per cent of the respondents in the Czech Republic, 20 per cent of the respondents in Slovenia, 24 per cent of the respondents in Bulgaria, 15 per cent of the respondents in Romania, 17 per cent of the respondents in BiH, 19 per cent of the respondents in Macedonia and 14 per cent of the respondents in Serbia held the view that informal networks do not cause corruption. 33 Questions about informal networks in the IDI guide and survey questionnaire were valueneutral. The interviewers who conducted the IDIs made it clear to respondents that they were interested in hearing their views on informal networks – positive as well as negative. The survey questionnaire contained one question listing several statements – some positive, some negative – about informal networks. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement. The large majority of respondents who took part in the IDIs and quantitative survey (all countries) were negative to informal networks. 34 Common anti-corruption measures such as good governance (i.e. transparent decision-making, accountability and codes of ethics), measures aimed at regulating political party funding, lobbying and public procurement, the introduction and strengthening of specific anti-corruption bodies, and exposure of corrupt behaviour in the media, gained much less support than might be expected. 154 Table 10: Most efficient measure for limiting the negative impact of informal networks (in per cent) CzR Slov Bulg Rom Bos Mac Serb change people’s mentality through education 11 19 24 34 24 24 27 strengthen the rule of law 21 28 23 20 30 27 30 strengthen law-enforcement 14 4 11 10 8 13 8 introduce new & better legislation 12 6 8 6 6 4 5 strengthen public trust in the state 8 14 12 4 7 8 9 expose negative aspects of informal networks in the media 3 5 2 1 3 2 3 regulate political party funding 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 regulate lobbying 3 2 1 2 2 1 0 Improve regulation of public procurement 3 2 --- 0 1 1 0 make state adm. more open & transparent 6 5 4 3 3 4 4 strengthen the accountability of politicians & officials 6 4 1 3 4 6 3 enhance the efficiency & independence of the judiciary 3 3 3 5 4 5 3 strengthen anti-corruption bodies & policies 4 4 3 6 5 1 3 introduce codes of ethics/professional codes 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 introduce lustration --- --- 1 1 1 0 0 comply with EU conditionality requirements --- --- 2 3 prepare for EU membership 2 2 2 DK 1 2 N= 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 Note: N weighted down to 600 per country. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. The respondents’ preferences are in line with our hypothesis that informal practice – caused by widespread disregard for the law – is to a considerable extent ‘informed’ by national culture. Besides, poor law-enforcement does not encourage law-abidingness. As for changing mentality through education, some respondents favoured changing people’s attitudes and behaviour more generally. In their view, ‘a new morality’ and ‘a new set of values’ are called for. Values are an inherent part of national culture and they are not easily changed. Other respondents emphasised the need to educate citizens about the law as such, about their legal rights and about how to abide by the law: we should become different people…this is a question of upbringing, of culture, things that are hardly amenable to regulation (Le-7-Bu); what children learn at home is very important (Le-8- FED-Bo); (it) should start…in the primary schools... (Do-4-Ma); we will have to teach our people that the laws are…to be followed... (CoE-2-Sl); We have to educate the people. We have a lot of laws. We have to respect them, all of us. (ER-1-Ro); people should be educated to 155 respect laws... (NB-1-conf-Se); (people) must be educated about their rights and about the laws that exist for them (Do-9-FED-Bo). All respondents emphasised the time-dimension required for changing people’s mentality by means of upbringing and education. Elites in Ukraine are not very optimistic about the future. In their view it will at least take one generation for people’s mentality to change, but most likely even longer (Grødeland 2009: 96). Elites in other post-communist states are somewhat more optimistic. Though the process as such would no doubt be difficult and challenging, it is in their view not impossible. Michael (quoted in Rucinschi 2007: 7) claims that introducing better laws is not likely to reduce the level of corruption in countries in transition. However, elites in post-communist Europe think there is still much to be desired in terms of the quality of law. In the Balkans, in particular, laws are frequently vague and/or contradictory and thus easy to manipulate. Some respondents, particularly those in Macedonia, held the view that there is nothing wrong with the legislation in their countries as such. The problem is rather that law-enforcement is not given priority. Those in charge of enforcing the laws are neither of high enough quality nor adequately equipped for the task.35 The risk of getting caught for breaking the law is small and sanctions are modest and easily avoided. Consequently, respondents have no real incentive to comply with the law: (we should) improve law enforcement… (Me-10-CzR); you may establish clear rules but if there is nobody to check whether they are observed…then what is the benefit of such rules... (Le-9-Bu); Law-making is quite good. Law-enforcement is not that good. We need better police, better prosecutors, inspectors must control law-enforcement (Me-3-CF-Bo); judges should not be elected for life and those judges who are found to abuse their office should be fired (NGO-1-conf-Se). 6. Conclusions Informal practice in post-communist Europe is widespread – and it facilitates corruption. Disregard for the law is also common. Even though ECE is doing somewhat better than SEE and WB36, the impact of culturally ‘informed’ behaviour should not be underestimated there either. Anti-corruption efforts are conducted against this backdrop and they are affected by it. 35 Qualitative and quantitative data from Ukraine suggest that the courts represent the most corrupt institution in the country (Grødeland 2009). Judges and courts, as well as the police and prosecution, have a poor reputation also in SEE and WB. 36 Above we hypothesised that SEE is generally doing better than WB in terms of informal practice and also in terms of corruption, facilitated by informal practice. Our data suggest that the difference between the two regions is not all that significant. However, our findings support our hypothesis that corruption, facilitated by informal practice, is more spread in postcommunist states that used to belong to the Ottoman Empire than in those that used to be under Habsburg rule. 156 Yasin and Snegovaya (2009: 104-111) suggest that cultural factors provide a barrier to democracy in Russia. Based on the above, it is possible to conclude that such factors also pose a considerable obstacle to effective anti-corruption policies in postcommunist Europe. Though used in response to problems caused by transition, informal practice is deeply rooted in social norms shaped by national culture. Behaviour informed by social norms is fairly resistant to change. As informal behaviour in general and the use of contacts and informal networks in particular, facilitate corruption, anti-corruption programmes must address not only the corrupt acts as such, but also the mentality facilitating them in the first place. The importance of culturallyinformed behaviour has not yet been properly recognised by those designing mainstream anti-corruption policies.37 However, it is crucial for the success of anti-corruption reform. Bibliography Checkel, J. T./Katzenstein, P. J. (eds.) (2009) European Identity, Cambridge. Fix, M. P./Randazzo, K. A. (2008) Public Trust in Courts as a Facilitating Mechanism in Democratization, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/1/2/p266129_ind ex.html. Gallagher, T. (2005) Theft of a Nation. Romania since Communism, London. Grødeland, Å. B. (2009) Cultural Constants, Corruption and the Orange Revolution, in Besters- Dilger, J. (ed.) Ukraine on its Way to Europe. Interim Results of the Orange Revolution, Frankfurt am Main, 79-102. Grødeland, Å. B. (2009b) Political Lobbying in Post-Communist Europe. Article submitted to Slavic Review (special issue on post-collectivism). Grødeland, Å. B. (2008) Informal Practice, Cultural Capital and Politics in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, in Pickles, J. (ed.) State and Society in Post-Socialist Economies, Basingstoke/New York, 229-252. Grødeland, Å. B. (2007) “Red Mobs”, “Yuppies” and “Lamb Heads”: Informal Networks and Politics in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, Europe-Asia Studies 59, 217-252. Grødeland, Å. B./Aasland, A. A. (2007) Informality and Informal Practices in East Central and South East Europe, CERC Working Paper Series 3, Melbourne. Hellman, J./Jones, G./Kaufmann, D. (2000) Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition Economies, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2444. 37 Notions of what does, or does not, constitute corrupt behaviour varies across cultural borders. To give an example, when asked to define corruption very few Ukrainian respondents mentioned nepotism. Instead, they focused on bribery. Traditional anti-corruption efforts give less emphasis to education and long-term measures aimed at strengthening the rule of law – possibly as these are likely to yield results in the long- rather than short-term. Attempting to modify culturally-informed behaviour is a politically and culturally sensitive matter and one which is less likely to be successful if initiated from the ‘outside’ than from ‘within’. 157 Ingrao, C. (1996) Ten Untaught Lessons about Central Europe: A Historical Perspective, Habsburg Occasional Papers No 1. Kann, R. A. (1977) A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London. Kwok, C. C./Tadesse, S. (2006) National Culture and Financial Systems, Journal of International Business Studies 37, 227-247. Mihai, A. (2005) Romanian Central Public Administration and the Challenges of Europeanization, Berlin. Miller, W. L./Grødeland, Å. B./Koshechkina, T. Y. (2001) A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post-Communist Europe, Budapest. Pedersen, K. H./Johannsen, L. (2005) Corruption: Commonality, Causes & Consequences. Comparing 15 Ex-Communist Countries, Paper prepared for the 13th NISPAcee Annual Conference, 19-21 May 2005, Moscow, Russia. Roth, K. (2007) Soziale Netzwerke und soziales Vertauen in den Transformationsländern, Wien/ Zürich. Rucinschi, D. (2007) The Flourishing Anti-Corruption Industry (Originally in Romanian in Jurnalul National as ‘Industria anti-corupŃie’, 28 June 2007), http://www.docstoc.com/docs/3726871/government-consulting-companies. Yasin, E./Snegovaya, M. (2009) Tectonic Shifts in the World Economy, Moscow.

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Zusammenfassung

In dieser aktuellen und interdisziplinären Analyse der internationalen Antikorruptionsregime werden mit Schwerpunkt Europa ausgewählte staatenübergreifende Bemühungen der letzten Jahre zur Eindämmung der Korruption einer kritischen Bestandsaufnahme unterzogen. Die Beiträge stammen aus der Politikwissenschaft, Rechtswissenschaft, Soziologie, Wirtschaftswissenschaft und von PraktikerInnen.

Der Band vereinigt sowohl qualitative als auch quantitative Analysen und berücksichtigt darüber hinaus kulturwissenschaftliche Fragestellungen im Rahmen seiner vier Teile: „The European Dimension“, „Political and Legal Instruments“, „Culture, Perceptions, and Experiences” sowie „Practitioners’ Perspectives”.

Mit Beiträgen von: Tanja A. Börzel, Donald Bowser, Ben Elers, Angelos Giannakopoulos, Åse B. Grødeland, Leslie Holmes, Georg Huber-Grabenwarter, Anja P. Jakobi, Anne Lugon-Moulin, Bryane Michael, Holger Moroff, Yasemin Pamuk, Diana Schmidt-Pfister, Gefion Schuler, Andreas Stahn, Dirk Tänzler, Michael H. Wiehen und Sebastian Wolf.