

# Introduction

## I.

“The term Europeanization,” one can read in a 1937 article of the “*Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*,” “is intended to express the effects on Asiatic, American and African cultures and civilizations of permeation by the peculiar social system set up in modern Europe as a consequence of the classical renaissance, the Protestant Reformation and the industrial revolution. Europeanization may be expressed politically by imposing the idea of democracy, in the sense of parliamentary and party government, or of sovereignty, in the sense of suppression or subordination of all governmental organs to the semireligious solidarity in support of that sovereignty. It may be expressed economically by imposing ideas of individualistic capitalism, competition and control on communities enjoying more elaborate and equitable, but less productive and progressive, collectivist or communal civilizations; or industrially by substituting the factory and the foundry for the hand loom and home craft. It may be expressed in terms of education by convincing other continents of the advisability of acquiring attainments in European science to their material or even moral advantage, or by exposing the discipline of tribal tradition and training to the dissipation by the gospel of the missionary, the goods of the trader and the good intentions of the administrator.”<sup>1</sup> If it were not for the rather rusty and politically incorrect language, eight decades later such an article – by and large – could have appeared in an *Encyclopedia* discussing the term “Americanization.”

Even in its critique, America and Europe remain tied together to this day as each other’s mirror. While in 1937, the US was critical about Europe’s global colonialism, in the first decade of the twenty-first century Europe tended to criticize the global projection of American power and values. Will a 2037 *Encyclopedia* publish a balanced article on the link between “Europeanization” and “Americanization” in the age of globalization? Will it recognize that the American and European societies are complimentary expressions of an Atlantic civilization, each of them having dominated the other one at times? Will it finally recognize that in the end, both partners of the Atlantic civilization found a new balance, synchronizing values and interests and bringing their joint resources to the best possible use of managing global matters while yet living with inevitable differences and, at times, even conflicts?

Both partners of the Atlantic civilization have lately been forgetful of the bonds that hold. Instead they have engaged each other during the last decade of the twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-first century in endless rows over their

---

1 Young, George, “Europeanization,” *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 5, New York: Macmillan, 1937: 623.

differences and the inevitable divorce that ought to follow – first strategic, then cultural. None of this has happened and will unlikely happen in the years ahead. Yet it remains an open question as to how transatlantic relations will relate to other coordinates that constitute world order-building in the twenty-first century.

The 1937 article mentioned that China “as a whole could not be Europeanized from outside. It could only Europeanize itself if and when it chose, and the early attitude of China toward Europeanization was as antagonistic and anti-European as anywhere.”<sup>2</sup> In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a self-assured and strong China had become an indispensable partner for balancing and managing the world order of this century, no matter whether or not China will be called “Europeanized,” “Americanized” or simply “globalized.” The 1937 article spoke about the voluntary “sudden and sensational Europeanization of the Japanese” as an expression of its authentic nationalism during the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup> The important role of Japan as a provider of global stability prevails, added by the economic contributions of South Korea that has gone through its own remarkable, sudden and sensational modernization during the last decades of the twentieth century. The 1937 article analyzed the “intellectual Europeanization” of the Indian elite. In the early twenty-first century, for the first time an Indian middle-class had emerged in this extremely diverse and fascinating country that has atomic bombs and the biggest number of impoverished people side by side. For the 1937 author, the Eurasian Empire Russia had been “Europeanized forcibly” by Peter the Great. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Russia is still struggling with its identity amid aggravating poverty downgrading the former super-power to Third World levels of development while its political neo-authoritarianism is disconnecting Russia from becoming fully “European.”<sup>4</sup> In 1937, an emerging Latin America was seen as a promising continent in which Europeanization “is producing new life from seed.”<sup>5</sup> During the first decade of the twenty-first century, in spite of its cultural cohesion Latin America is still not recognizable as a global force although its biggest country, Brazil, is rallying support to play this role. The 1937 social science analysis concluded that the Arab region was “wholly recalcitrant to Europeanization whether imperialist, nationalist or socialist” and it mentioned the “artificial Europeanization of Iraq.”<sup>6</sup> During the first decade of the twenty-first century and in spite of the military defeat of the terrible regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraq did not turn into an uncontested model for democracy in the Broader Middle East. The hope for modernization and more pluralism in Arab countries remained torn between reasonable

---

2 Ibid: 633.

3 Ibid: 625.

4 The GDP of Russia’s 144 million people amounts to 347 billion US dollars (2005), much less than Mexico’s GDP of 699 billion US dollars with 100 million people, less than the 399 billion US dollars GDP of Australia with 19 million people and less than Korea’s GDP of 476 billion US dollars with its 47 million people.

5 Young, George, “Europeanization,” op.cit.: 629.

6 Ibid: 631-632.

progress and the drawbacks of Islamic fundamentalism. Building sustainable peace between the Palestinians and Israel has remained the most pressing geopolitical issue for more than half a century. As in 1937, also in the early twenty-first century, Africa tends to be forgotten. This should not prevail for too long, for reasons of enlightened self-interest of both its Western and Arab neighbors and for reasons of historical justice to the whole continent.

Between 1937 and the first decade of the twenty-first century, imperialist Europeanization had been replaced by American-dominated globalization.<sup>7</sup> Whether or not Europe has been “provincializing” with the end of its colonialism, as an Indian author was suggesting,<sup>8</sup> both the US and Europe tended to forget that their own internal history has been one of colonization, empire-building and the language of power ever since their beginnings – since the Roman Empire in Europe and since the first colonial settlements on both sides of the North American coasts.<sup>9</sup> The issue in the twenty-first century is not any more one of colonization and hegemonic dominance; it is one of world order-building. Thus it is inherently a multidimensional and multipolar challenge. In shaping the world order, the US and Europe are indispensable partners.

The Europe engaged in this partnership is of an altogether different nature than the Europe characterized in 1937 as imperial initiator of “Europeanization” elsewhere.<sup>10</sup> It is an anti-colonial and anti-imperial, largely multilateral Europe that has enormously increased the level of its integration under the roof of the European Union. It is a Europe that has finally transformed its cultural diversity into its advantage. It is a Europe in which different nations and diverse, also non-overlapping interests prevail and yet democratic stability and peaceful affluence have reached levels unheard of in earlier periods of European history. Nevertheless, Europe is not free from conflicts. Populist nationalism and the challenge of integrating migrants, particularly of Muslim faith, are distant echoes of the colonial and imposed Europeanization of past centuries: Today, non-Europeans claim citizen rights in a continent which, in the past, has dominated many of their home countries. Although they could be “normal” citizens

---

7 On the imperial legacy of Europe see Raudzens, George, *Empires: Europe and Globalization, 1492-1788*, Stroud: Sutton, 1999; Chamberlain, Muriel Evelyn, *The Longman Companion to European Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, London/New York: Longman, 1998; Waites, Bernard, *Europe and the Third World: From Colonization to Decolonization, 1500-1998*, New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1999; Springhall, John, *Decolonization since 1945: the Collapse of European Overseas Empires*, New York: Palgrave, 2001.

8 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

9 See for some instructive reading Armitage, David (ed.), *Theories of Empire, 1450-1800*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998: passim.

10 For some traditional characteristics and contemporary dilemmas of Europe see Scales, Len, and Oliver Zimmer (eds.), *Power and the Nation in European History*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Gerrits, André W. M., and Dirk Jan Wolffram (eds.), *Political Democracy and Ethnic Diversity in Modern European History*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005; Majone, Giandomenico, *Dilemmas of European Integrations: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

there, surprisingly many people from distant lands voluntarily prefer to live in Europe, despite problems of integration, legal status and fear (if not xenophobia) among the indigenous European population they are confronted with.

America, on the other hand, is experiencing the curse and paradox of an Empire, which Europeans know only too well from their own nineteenth or early twentieth century dominance. Global leadership is coupled with a global fascination for the American way of life and yet it breeds mistrust, rejection, and even hatred toward America in many places around the globe.<sup>11</sup> Internally, America is as much confronted with issues of national identity as the European Union and its constituent parts are.<sup>12</sup> For the remainder of the twenty-first century, the defining question posed to the US and to the EU will not be what they are, but who they are, not how they operate, but what they intend to achieve, not how democratic they are, but what the purpose of their democracy and their power will be.

The European Union's homepage introduces its overview of EU relations with the United States under the headline: "The World's two greatest powers."<sup>13</sup> Whatever that means and implies, the European Union is today's Europe. Over the past five decades, Americans have used the term "Europeans" much more liberally than many Europeans do. Europeans still have mixed feelings about it as they divide their identity between their "European-ness" and their adherence to one of Europe's many nations, old or new, big or small. Yet, today the European Union signifies "political Europe" across the continent and around the world. The European Union comprises 0.86 percent of the globe (4.324.782 square kilometers) and roughly seven percent of the global population (491 million). Even with Turkey as an EU member, these figures would increase only insignificantly to 1.01 percent of global space and nine percent of global population. All in all, the European Union is, and will remain, the smallest of all continents. But, at last, it has achieved a level of unity unprecedented in its long and colorful history.

This has been easy so long as the EU was in its embryonic stage, still labeled the EEC (European Economic Community) and later the EC (European Community). The US had served as Europe's pacifier and federator after World War II. European integration was in the US's interest as it was largely dependent upon America's strategic goodwill and protection. As much as America has been the product of emancipation from Europe, after the end of the Cold War many in Europe claimed some sort of emancipation from the US. No matter how these phenomena are assessed, they are inevitable by-products of the reversion of the global role between Europe and America during the past four centuries. They do not imply divorce and the drifting apart

---

11 On the inevitability for the US to operate as an empire, on its merits and price see Ferguson, Niall, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*, New York: Penguin Press, 2004.

12 See Schlesinger jr., Arthur M., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998; Huntington, Samuel R., *Who are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

13 See European Union, European Commission, *The EU's Relation With the United States – Overview*, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/us/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/intro/index.htm).

of the Atlantic partners. Their self-interest is too strong to allow for this under any rational circumstances. These disputes echo rather temporary collisions among close partners, having to find a new balance among them and a new organizing principle to define their partnership and the purpose of their underlying civilization.

Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a “European dream.” Europe has been created, but Europeans are still missing. A genuine European interest is only growing slowly, but steadily. And no matter how hard proponents try, it is difficult to decipher what “the European model” truly will mean as opposed to “American conditions,” which is a favorite stereotype in Europe to blame America for its deficits without giving justice to all the positive dimensions of that great country. More realism and rational analysis would often be helpful to understand each other, including each other’s differences and complementary strengths. Part of this necessary reevaluation of transatlantic realities on the side of Europeans is the need to stop caricaturing the US. And part of this necessary reevaluation of transatlantic realities on the side of the US is the need to take the European Union more seriously.

Since the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957, European states have transformed dramatically. No European state of the early twenty-first century was defined only ethnically. Compared with the long and often ideologically-obsessed period between the eighteenth and the twentieth century, other functions of the modern state prevail in contemporary Europe. The states in Europe are still the most important source for providing the social framework for Europe’s economic development. But European citizens, by and large, have become market citizens, primarily interested in their economic well-being, in social security, safe jobs, and the delivery of social provisions by the state. Function and effect of the European state have turned primarily into that of an economic agency, sharing authority and power with the European Union. Yet, cultural integration prevails as aspiration and problem both on the national and on the European level. Unlike in the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the status of European citizens as cultural citizens is not defined against any of their neighbors in Europe. At times, it is however defined against close-by immigrants or far-away Americans. European patriotism might and, I believe, should grow step by step. But it should be based on values and constitutional principles, never on anti-American or any other anti-type of Euro-Gaullism. The emergence of some sort of a dangerous European nationalism is not an artificial worry for a continent in which “myth and nationhood” often went hand in hand.<sup>14</sup> Timothy Garton Ash has put this concern into clear words: “The whole of the new, enlarged Europe is engaged in a great argument between the forces of Euro-Gaullism and Euroatlanticism. This is the argument of the decade. On its outcome will depend the future of the West.”<sup>15</sup> It is exactly because of this concern that

---

14 See Hosking, Geoffrey, and George Schöpflin (eds.), *Myths and Nationhood*, London: Hurst, 1997.

15 Garton Ash, Timothy, *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time*, London: Allen Lane, 2004: 58; for an early study on the Atlantic civilization see Deutsch, Karl W.,

I suggest to reconcile a strong Atlantic partnership of the European Union with the internal evolution of a European constitutional patriotism.

Wherever states cannot deliver sufficient economic benefits for their citizens – or wherever political systems do not have to do this anymore in the very basic sense of the word – the state will inevitably change its character and meaning. The idea of cultural identification was never sufficient to integrate a state over a critically long period of time. Nation-building and state-building outside the Western world give ample proof to this experience. Yet economic impulses for integrating a large population are also insufficient if not embedded in a political purpose and perspective. This is what the European Union continuously looks for: Political purpose and popular approval for a successful economic integration amid cultural diversity in unity. This can only work as a permanent learning process and it requires the recognition of local and regional identities as enshrined in the concept of “subsidiarity,” one of the linguistic monsters of Euro-speak (and one of the original structural principles of Catholic social doctrine since its development in the nineteenth century). Subsidiarity is not just an intelligent concept to protect political autonomy in an ever globalizing and homogenizing world, it is also the recognition of the cultural seed in which Europe grew and will continue to be fertile.

Despite the constitutional roller coaster ride of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the EU lives its symbols, among them the European flag, the European anthem (Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy”) and “Europe Day” on May 9. “United in diversity” is not simply a fine and appropriate motto for Europe. It is the very summary of the evolution of the European population since time immemorial. Demographically, Europe has always been a continent of emigration and immigration, of voluntary and enforced migrants.<sup>16</sup> Among European high-nobility, cross-national marriages have always been the norm and are well studied even as an instrument of power-formation. It would also be worth studying the degree of cross-national marriages among ordinary European citizens over all recorded periods: United in diversity is the demographic bond that has held Europe together ever since. Today, it constitutes the most successful post-national integration project in human history.

The formula “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,” used already in the Treaties of Rome in March 1957, is a distant echo, of course, of the “more perfect union” invoked in the US Constitution of 1787. This is another indication of the mutually reinforcing character of the political processes on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The US Constitution was an early realization of European constitutional

---

et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. For the current situation see Rien, Serges T., *Cultural Constructions of Europe: European Identity in the twenty-first Century*, Frankfurt/New York: Peter Lang, 2004.

16 See van de Kaa, Dirk, et al. (eds.), *European Populations: Unity in Diversity*, Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.

evolution at that time, albeit on the national level only. In the early twenty-first century, the European Union, with its flag and anthem, currency and parliament, Europe Day and treaty-based rule of law, is a genuine contribution to the global development of political form and theory. Most of all, the European Union is a form in action, a vision turned practice. It is a process and not a static construction. The enlargement of the European Union by twelve new member states during the first decade of the twenty-first century – ten of them post-communist countries and the other two making the EU a neighbor of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Lebanon and Israel – was significant not only for the degree of complexity and regional asymmetries it created inside the EU; it was also very emotional, because in reality it meant the reunification of Europe under conditions of cooperative peace and parliamentary democracy. The enlargement marathon of the early years of the twenty-first century went hand in hand with a deep crisis of confidence, orientation and leadership. Nowhere was it more evident than in the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty and its subsequent repair work, the Treaty of Lisbon, across the EU. In the end, this double fiasco was a crisis of adaptation: adaptation to a new set of member states, to a new rationale of integration in the globalized world, and to a new form of legitimacy, no longer rooting the EU solely in elite discourses but requiring a fresh and substantial connection with the feelings, aspirations and concerns of Union citizens. For the political leaders of the European Union, the result of the constitution-building crisis came with their signature under the Treaty of Lisbon on December 13, 2007. They called it metaphorically “Reform Treaty.” For the citizens of the European Union, the EU’s constitution-building process between 2001 and 2008 was a sequence of rifts between their growing recognition of the importance of European solutions to common challenges and their increasing skepticism about political leadership and backdoor politics in the European Union. The constitution-building process was the most intensive reform process of the EU so far, and yet it rather enhanced people’s distance from the EU and its institutions. To complete the paradox of this decade, the majority of EU citizens were ahead of their leaders, still favoring a genuine European Constitution while their leaders were helplessly absorbed in the repair work of what they initially had claimed to achieve. This confusing first decade of the twenty-first century was a turning point in European integration rationale. Over time, consensus will grow in our understanding that this decade of confusion, euphoria, backlash, a new, cautious beginning and, again, backlash was the painful birth of a new European consensus between Europe’s institutions and Europe’s people. It was a decade equivalent to a Second Founding of the European Union.

European integration is the single most important event in European history in modern times, no matter the still pending cases of integration in South Eastern Europe and a long list of unfinished business as far as the implementation of EU policies is concerned.

The political, legal and economic development of Europe has always been accompanied by “the cultural gradient.”<sup>17</sup> Ideas were transferred from their original place of construction into a new context and into social norms. Gradually they amalgamated into political form – or vanished into the big archives of Europe. The idea of European unity finally has been transformed into Europe’s reality – with all the idiosyncrasies and disputes that will continue amid the diversity in united Europe. Limits of European-ness prevail, to be sure.<sup>18</sup> The term “Europeanization” is no longer used to delineate colonial empires and their cultural development. The term “Europeanization” has come home and refers to the often daunting process of applying EU legal norms in the member states of the European Union. European integration, to paraphrase the 1937 “Encyclopedia of Social Sciences” article, is permeating the nation states in Europe and the complex web of world order-building. At the end of a long journey, Europe is Europeanizing itself.

The guiding principle of the quest for European unity has been and remains the maintenance of peace. The search for peaceful solutions, for conflict-prevention and conflict resolution, if necessary also with the use of military might, has turned into the EU’s central creed. Promoting the strategy of reconciliation is no longer necessary among Europeans, but it remains in short supply amid the many regional conflicts of the world. The European Union will stay committed to supporting peaceful order-building in the world, if necessary also with military means. The European Union would not want to become a superpower. But it would want to be respected as a power for peace and stability, freedom and prosperity in partnership with the world. Although its link with the US might remain contested, or at least uncertain for some time ahead, this is the new political identity of most Europeans, as Timothy Garton Ash has eloquently defined it: “We hope to become a superpower, fellow Europeans, in vain. Let us make ourselves, rather, comrades in a community of free people, working to build a free world.”<sup>19</sup>

## II.

This book introduces the first five decades of European unity and analyzes the European Union at a crossroads. It describes the changes and transformations during the first decade of the twenty-first century as the Second Founding of the EU. Following five decades of turbulent, often daunting, yet highly successful integration, the

---

17 See Evtuhov, Catherine, and Stephen Kotkin (eds.), *The Cultural Gradient: the Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789-1991*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003 (this book however is mainly dealing with Eastern European intellectual history).

18 See Ferguson, Niall, *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire*, op.cit.: 251–257.

19 Garton Ash, Timothy, *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time*, op.cit.: 223.



European Union unintentionally yet with lasting effect began a process of refounding, symbolized in the enormous eastward enlargement, contested in the search for the constitutional parameters of European integration and visible in the all-pervasive effects of European integration on public life and politics across EU member states. European integration has become a matter of domestic politics everywhere in the EU while at the same time the EU is exponentially broadening its global role. This study puts the European Union and its evolution in the global context as defined by transatlantic relations, the impact of globalization on the rationale of European integration, and the global proliferation of regional integration schemes. It discusses the theoretical and normative issues related to the rise of the European Union and its challenges ahead. The book ends with an outlook on the prospects of a genuine European constitutional patriotism and the increased global role of the European Union.

This book offers a history-based political analysis with sensitivity for the cultural dimensions in which European integration is embedded. The first five decades of the quest for European unity have seen remarkable developments, and also failures, new beginnings and lasting success. The idea of reconciliation among former European foes has been the driving motivation at the beginning stages of European integration. After losing its global power as defined in the age of colonialism, Europe got a second chance with US support for its integration. Throughout this path, the ongoing division of Europe and the absence of freedom under totalitarian communism saddened the image of post-war Europe. Following its first successful peaceful and democratic revolution, symbolized in the fall of the Berlin Wall, and bringing the Cold War to its end, Europe's unity strengthened the European Union as the ever increasing embodiment of the political identity of a continent, whose cultural diversity will surely prevail as one of its charming advantages and sources of identity. It also confronted the European Union with its biggest ever adaptation crisis and the need to restore legitimacy to European integration as a project rooted in its citizens' identity and loyalty. A common political identity under the roof of the European Union is only gradually emerging. Yet it adds already a new dimension to the various cultural identities in Europe. One might even say that this new and gradually uniting political identity – as incomplete as it still is – protects the diverse cultural identities of Europe, not the least among its many small nations and for all of their languages.

European political identity has been shaped, challenged and advanced in the course of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Parallel with an unprecedented enlargement of the European Union, the need for deeper integration was confronted with the usual disputes between advocates and skeptics of integration. The search for constitution-building led the EU to its, so far, finest hour in institutional reform, but also into the deepest crisis ever. EU leaders signed a European Constitution all but in name. However, they were unable to manage the ratification process in a convincing way for many of their citizens. After the Constitutional Treaty came to a halt, the first ever

constitutional debate in EU history followed. Its result was a repair treaty, relying on the traditional means of an inter-state bargain, and a citizenry in favor of a genuine European Constitution. The reform treaty was rejected in the only public referendum at hand. Those who said “no” insisted to be good Europeans, wanting a better EU than the one offered by their political leaders. This paradoxical result of incremental and deliberative constitution-building will be discussed in Chapter I: Emerging European constitutionalism without a European Constitution is the result of almost a decade of adaptation crises. In its effects, it has opened the door for a new rationale of European integration. Since it has also added new dimensions to a renewed contract between citizens and political elites, it is no exaggeration to frame this period as the Second Founding of European integration. In Chapter II, I will analyze the European Constitutional Treaty of 2004, compare it with the so-called Reform Treaty of 2007 and assess the experiences of a unique reform period in European integration in which both treaties were rejected by European citizens in the name of a better EU. In three subsequent chapters (Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V) that combine historical narrative and political science-based structural analysis, I will discuss the key turning points of this development as an interplay of “challenge and response,” thereby recalling the famous argument of the great historian Arnold Toynbee about the dialectical sources of progress. In my understanding, the main turning points of European integration were a permanent interplay of “challenge and response,” often requiring an external, and even more often an internal, crisis to advance to the next level of deepened integration. The debate about a possible alternative between the deepening of European integration and permanent widening of the process through four distinct series of enlargement turns out to be artificial. In the end, all enlargements served the purpose to strengthen European unity and hence the European Union as it is today. Deepening its structures and policies was, at the end, in the interest of all partners.

The internal evolution of the European Union never followed a blueprint. The goals of integration evolved step by step, and with them the very name for the project. From European Economic Community to European Community to European Union – that also marks the development of an often idiosyncratic yet stabilizing process of integration policies. From customs union to political solidarity, from the direct election of a European Parliament to a common currency, from qualified majority voting as contested principle of decision-making in very limited policy areas to an almost generalized joint EU legislation of the Council of the European Union (in the following: “Council”) and the European Parliament, from heavily contested first steps in political cooperation to the doorsteps of introducing a European Foreign Minister in all but the name – at no point in European integration did it meet its finality. In fact, one might wonder about the very meaning of this term if one believes in political freedom and non-deterministic paths of life. Indeed, the debates about political finality in European integration have always been more of a wake-up call for prioritizing new stages of

European integration than a serious effort to delineate the ultimate boundaries of integration.

The imminent results of European integration were mostly supported, and at times were even made possible, by the European policies of the United States. Without Marshall Plan aid and protection under the Truman Doctrine, Western Europe would have found it extremely difficult after 1945 to reestablish viable democracies, to generate unprecedented affluence and to overcome centuries of mistrust, hatred and nationalism. Moreover, Western Europe would have had difficulties in organizing “the West” alone as a magnetic attraction for countries and people in Central and Eastern Europe forced to live under communist totalitarian rule. The integration process followed an idiosyncratic mechanism of “challenge and response,” as I argue in the three historical chapters. Often, a crisis was followed by unintended consequences ultimately strengthening the integration process. Sometimes it seemed as if Europe needed a crisis – internal or external – in order to get its act together and reach the next goal of integration. Without a permanent US commitment to this process, it might have been impossible. At least it would have been extremely difficult, given the Soviet threat that was military and ideological at the same time. This argument is developed in Chapter VI. The US was Europe’s federator and this immediate post war-experience prevailed in South East Europe amid the Wars of Yugoslavian Succession and their aftermath. This does not mean that relations in the Atlantic Alliance were always smooth. Far from it, their history could be written as one of permanent crisis and controversy. Yet, in the end, the Atlantic Alliance prevailed as an embodiment of Atlantic civilization and as the most successful military alliance ever. With the end of the Cold War, it has turned into transatlantic relations covering a much larger ground than before, being economically more interdependent than ever, but also encountering fundamental disputes, clashing moralities and interests on key issues relevant for the management of global affairs. The dispute over the usefulness of the war against Iraq in 2002/2003 escalated into an internal Cold War of the West. Yet, I argue, it was the culmination of a transformation of transatlantic relations and their link to a rapidly growing European integration. One experience prevailed from the ashes of this bitter dispute: Whenever transatlantic relations are not in good shape, European integration tends to suffer, too.

Over the course of the twenty-first century, the United States and the European Union will remain each other’s most indispensable partner for economic, but likewise for political and cultural reasons. In the age of economic globalization, the US and the EU are destined to cooperate in the evolution of a common global agenda as part of an increasingly multipolar world order. In doing so, the European Union will continue its politically driven integration. Unlike market-driven globalization, I argue in Chapter VII, European integration remains a process led by the primacy of politics, defined by a community of law and a supranational parliamentary democracy. Globalization has

changed the rationale for European integration. It has moved the process beyond internal European reconciliation toward an external projection of European interests and ambitions. European integration has also generated genuine and unique contributions to our understanding of key terminologies of political theory and philosophy: The notion of sovereignty has been expanded, and it now includes the notion of a supranationally pooled and shared sovereignty. The concept of governance has been broadened, and it now includes the category of multilevel governance as exercised among the various levels of rule in Europe, both horizontally and vertically. And the notion of democracy has been expanded, encompassing also multinational democracy without the ambition of becoming a state in the nineteenth century meaning of the word.

European integration has also found global resonance and raised the question of its applicability in other regions of the world. The EU has made it its explicit strategy to promote regional cooperation and integration elsewhere. An overview of regional integration schemes indicates an impressive array of related efforts in other parts of the world. The global proliferation of regional integration schemes is a new element in world order-building. Its success depends on criteria of regime cohesion and shared interests, to name just the two most evident. In Chapter VIII, I present an overview of non-European regional integration schemes, assess their flaws and potentials and express my concern about the fact that the geopolitically most troublesome regions, Northeast Asia and the Broader Middle East, are the least affected by integration ideas or realities so far. In fact, only in these parts of the world are both virtually absent to this day.

The global proliferation of regional integration raises a lot of questions for further research. One of them refers to the deficit of integration: Why does it not work and did not achieve the results the initiators had hoped for? This very question is also pertinent with regard to Europe's past. For two thousand years the European continent has been a cradle of continuous cultural developments, and yet it has never achieved peaceful and voluntary, law-based political integration. The failures of the past are related to the inability of Europeans to turn cultural experiences of commonality into the political will to work together and thus transform the political culture of their continent. This is all the more sad as European statesmen and intellectuals have contributed a good number of concepts favoring European unity. Instead of becoming reality, these concepts moved into archives and libraries, where they constitute the archaeology of European integration. For all too long, I argue in Chapter IX, hegemonic aspirations and nationalistic rivalries have prevented European unity from taking place in freedom and peace. All reasonable integration concepts of past centuries were lacking political sense and will as far as the necessary drive for their implementation was concerned. This remains the genius of the Founding Fathers of European unity to this day: They have turned European unity from a fine idea into a workable political process.

On the basis of this exceptional change in the political culture of Europe many problems were resolved. However numerous pragmatic conflicts and unresolved debates on principles prevail. Some of them, I argue in Chapter X, will advance European constitutionalism (and eventually, I am convinced, European patriotism in the best original meaning of this old Roman term), while others constantly activate the ever-present potential for slowing down European integration for a considerable period of time. Re-nationalization of European politics remains an unfortunate option, although in the end only to please parochial populists across the EU and to reduce the perspectives for the vast majority of EU citizens. The real issue is no longer the survival of the European Union; the real issue in this debate is the degree of relevance Europe can play in the world of the twenty-first century. The strongest argument against any parochialism in the European Union must grow from within Europe. It must be nurtured by the experience of EU citizens that European integration adds value to their lives and that of their societies. The most convincing argument against the often-invoked fear of failure lies in the experience of successful integration. Rightly so, politicians have lately formulated the concept of a Europe that works. A growing degree of shared memories reinforces the importance of defining common goals. The biggest challenge ahead of Europe might not be the organizing of the continent's unity, but the purposeful use of its rule of law-based democracy. European leaders need to continuously define Europe from its potential and not only from its limits.

Academic reflection has accompanied the European integration process ever since the beginning. Different schools of thought have contributed to a vast theoretical body of literature, some of which is more an exercise in logic than a reflection on European realities. Other theoretical contributions wavered between their descriptive and prescriptive character, while the best ones in the field have been able to inspire both colleagues and policy-makers as they were capable of feeling the true pulse of integration as it evolved. The fact that the academic penetration of European integration has attracted so many bright minds in the social sciences adds to its liveliness and underlines the all-permeable relevance of European integration. I discuss the evolution of academic theories in Chapter XI and argue – which might not please some of its proponents – that ultimately they can all be considered variations of a federal theory of European integration.

A critical assessment of academic exercises on European integration brings the circle of my study to a close. In the final chapters I discuss the preconditions and limits of European patriotism and the emerging global strategic role of Europe. It is my firm conviction that European patriotism – in the Ciceronian sense of the word – is not directed against anyone, any other country or region, culture or religion. Instead, European patriotism is rooted in the treaty-based constitution of European governance, in a community of recollections and driven by the desire to jointly approach the future as a matter of common destiny. At best, I dare to dream, European patriotism will one

day have a European Constitution as its point of political reference. In Chapter XII, I discuss the potential and the limits of a genuine European constitutional patriotism. I conclude my argument with several concrete practical proposals for how to advance the European sense of ownership even in the absence of a European Constitution that would truly deserve its name. Finally, in Chapter XIII, I outline the trajectory of the European Union into the role of a global political and strategic actor. The stronger the sense of European political identity will become, the more coherent one might expect Europe's foreign and security policy to be. Together with the US, the EU is the main player in the management of global affairs, both economical and political. It must therefore be in the continuing interest of the US to see the European Union flourish. There is no need to fear this and little reason to look at it with lack of understanding or even to look down on it with cynicism as the process of European unity enters the second half of its first century.

Although one cannot compare the two processes of federation-building, it is worth recalling the long and winding road the US has followed from independence through constitution-building – its Second Founding – to a common currency, a solidified and saturated territory, and to a global role. History does not repeat itself. Sometimes, it never reaches its goals and ends. Sometimes, it takes astonishing detours and unexpected jumps. And sometimes, it is faster, steadier and happier than most professional skeptics allow themselves to recognize. All in all, it will be exciting for the living to observe the next decades of European integration. I hope that it will remain a good story to be told one day to those who were just born (or not even born yet) as European unity turned fifty in 2007. All in all, it is a story whose characteristics shifted from fragile integration to multilevel governance, from market-building to security strategies, from internal reconciliation to global positioning, from institution-building to constitutional patriotism. It is the unique story of the European Union as the embodiment of the political identity of Europe.

### *III.*

This book reflects the EU's journey through its fascinating success since 1957 and its deep crises of adaptation in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The preparation of this book suffered with the detours and impasses of European integration, and it echoes its joy, self-doubt and potential. It has accompanied much of my work as Director at Bonn University's Center for European Integration Studies, and it has benefited enormously from the many dimensions of this gratifying work. This book owes a lot to my experiences across Europe as they have helped me to look at Europe through the specific perspective of many of its peoples with their own hopes, fears and worries, as well as with their diverse interpretations of European history and their own

ideas for Europe's future. This book also owes a lot to my experiences outside Europe as these experiences helped me to understand the worldwide perception of Europe. In the most diverse of places, policy makers, religious and other community leaders, as well as academic colleagues, have shaped my knowledge of the world and of Europe's place in its midst. Reading about European integration over the past decade, its internal dynamics and its external impact, has been a constant source of fresh knowledge that helped to clarify my own judgment. Working in different environments outside Germany during the years of incubation of this book has helped me to broaden my perspectives and test my hypotheses. The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington D.C. was my host during extremely stimulating initial research months in 2002, which led to the publication of a book that can be considered a small prelude to this present study.<sup>20</sup> Walking around the Wilson Center, one can reach not only the White House within a few moments, but also a plaque at one of the corner's of the Willard Hotel, recalling the sojourn of Jean Monnet in Washington during the dark years of World War II. Looking at this sign reinforced my firm conviction that the Atlantic civilization exists and that Europeans and Americans can be proud of it while they also remain responsible to maintain it for the sake of others. The format and outline of this book grew from an idea basically conceived at Stanford University in 2004, where I had the pleasure to teach an exceptionally diverse and bright group of students from all over the world. Advising Seoul National University in 2004/2005 about the establishment of a Korean Center for European Studies reinforced my impression that European integration often finds more enthusiasm outside Europe than within the EU. At Oxford University's St. Antony's College I was privileged to organize a lecture series on the effects of crises in European integration during Hilary Term 2006. The Oxford debates have further sharpened my understanding of European integration, its opportunities and its limits.

At Bonn University's Center for European Integration Studies, Ingrid Maldonado and Simone Schmidt went through the development of this book with patience and commitment, for which I am grateful indeed. As grateful as I am for the insights of many of my academic colleagues – from the ones I personally know to personally unknown authors of fine works on the topic quoted in this book – I especially appreciate the intellectual input of my students on several occasions during the past decade at different universities. Students in America, Asia, Africa and across Europe have helped me to better understand my own questions through the lenses of their good answers and even more so with their own succinct new questions. This unending interplay of question and answer is the spirit in which European unity may well flow, in diversity and for many generations to come.

---

20 Kühnhardt, Ludger, *Constituting Europe: Identity, Institution-building and the Search for a Global Role*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003.

Inspired by this hope, *European Union – The Second Founding* is dedicated to my son Stephan Maximilian, born in 2000, whose century this is.

Bonn, August 2008

Ludger Kühnhardt



## The Second Founding

