Nonlegal Sanctioning in Private Legal Systems

Limits in US Antitrust Law and EU Competition Law
Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftspolitik

edited by
Prof. Dr. Florian Bien
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Schwalbe
Prof. Dr. Heike Schweitzer

founded by
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker

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Jos van Doormaal

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Nomos
Preface

This work was accepted as a doctoral dissertation by the law faculty of the University of Bremen. The literature and case law are current to January 2020.

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Bremen, February 2021

Jos van Doormaal
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<td>Commission</td>
<td>Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>General Court (constituent court of the EU which allows parties to the proceedings to lodge a complaint against a Commission decision; formerly known as the CFI before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009)</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice (constituent court of the EU which handles second level appeals by reviewing a GC judgment; before 2009 it was the appellate body to uphold, modify or reverse the findings of a CFI judgment; for reasons of clarity, court judgments before 1989 are also mentioned as coming from the ECJ in this research)</td>
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<td>CJEU</td>
<td>The Court of Justice of the European Union (the collective term for the judicial arm of the EU, consisting of the GC and the ECJ despite this definition dating from 2009, for the purpose of elucidation the CFI and the ECJ combined are mentioned as the CJEU in this research)</td>
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<td>CFI</td>
<td>Court of First Instance of the European Communities (precursor of the GC before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009)</td>
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<td>PLSs</td>
<td>Private Legal Systems</td>
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