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Eltion Meka, Stefano Bianchini (Ed.)

The Challenges of Democratization and Reconciliation in the Post-Yugoslav Space

1. Edition 2020, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-6904-9, ISBN online: 978-3-7489-2151-6, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748921516

Series: Southeast European Integration Perspectives, vol. 13

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The Challenges of Democratization and Reconciliation in the Post-Yugoslav Space Eltion Meka | Stefano Bianchini [eds.] Southeast European Integration Perspectives | 13 Southeast European Integration Perspectives Edited by Wolfgang Petritsch, former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Special Envoy of the EU for Kosovo Christophe Solioz, Secretary-General of the Multiplex Approach (MAP) Nomad Think Thank Eltion Meka | Stefano Bianchini (eds.) The Challenges of Democratization and Reconciliation in the Post-Yugoslav Space Nomos Acknowledgment: This book is part of a deliverable from a Jean Monnet Networks project (found under Reference #: 587516-EPP-1-2017-1-AL-EPPJMO-NETWORK). The project was funded and made possible with the support of the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union. Moreover, we would like to thank our respective institutions for the implementation of this project: the University of New York Tirana (as project leader), the European Movement in Serbia, the Institute of East-Central Europe in Forlì, the University of Dubrovnik, and Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de ISBN 978-3-8487-6904-9 (Print) 978-3-7489-2151-6 (ePDF) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-3-8487-6904-9 (Print) 978-3-7489-2151-6 (ePDF) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meka, Eltion / Bianchini, Stefano The Challenges of Democratization and Reconciliation in the Post-Yugoslav Space Eltion Meka / Stefano Bianchini (eds.) 295 pp. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 978-3-8487-6904-9 (Print) 978-3-7489-2151-6 (ePDF) 1st Edition 2020 © Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2020. Overall responsibility for manufacturing (printing and production) lies with Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. This work is subject to copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to “Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort”, Munich. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Nomos or the editors. Onlineversion Nomos eLibrary Table of Contents List of abbreviations 7 Introduction 9 Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini Section 1: Understanding the dilemmas of the post-Yugoslav Space Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity: Nation- and State- Building in the Western Balkans 37 Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 59 Pero Maldini Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy in Promoting Reconciliation 81 Goran Patrick Filic Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 103 Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 127 Stefano Bianchini Section 2: Achieving Democracy and Reconciliation: Controversial paths? Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism in the Western Balkans 153 Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 5 Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation: Some Experiences from the ICTY and South Africa 169 Johan J du Toit Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 189 Maja Pulić Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 207 Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 225 Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility: “intra”, “extra”, and “crossing” flows in the region and the democratization process 247 Marco Zoppi Afterword 269 Stefano Bianchini and Eltion Meka List of authors 279 Index 285 Table of Contents 6 List of abbreviations AEBR Association of European Border Regions ASK Kosovo Agency of Statistics BHAS Agency for Statistics of the Bosnia and Herzegovina CEE Central and Eastern Europe CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries CEFTA Central European Free Trade Area CEI Central European Initiative DPS Democratic Party of Socialists EC European Community ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEC European Economic Community EU European Union EUSAIR EU strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region EUSDR EU strategy for the Danube Region FBIH Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GDP Gross Domestic Product HDZ Croatian Democratic Union ICTR The International Criminal Court for Rwanda ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IEBL Inter Entity Boundary Line IIP International Institute for Peace INSTAT Albanian Institute of Statistics JNA Yugoslav People’s Army (originally: Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija) KFOR Kosovo Force LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual LGBTIQ Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Intersexual Queer MAKStat State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia 7 MONStat Statistical Office of Montenegro NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization NDH Independent State of Croatia OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe RAE Roma, Ashkalis and Egyptians RCC Regional Cooperation Council RECOM Regional Commission RS Republic of Srpska RZS Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia SEE South-East Europe SSECP South East European Cooperation Project SNS Serbian Progressive Party (Serbian: Srpska Napredna Stranka) SAP Stabilization and Association Process SASA Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (English: KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army) UN United Nations UNHCR United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo US United States JNA Yugoslav People’s Army WB Western Balkans WBC Western Balkan Countries WWI First World War or Great War WWII Second World War List of abbreviations 8 Introduction Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini Abstract: The democratization and reconciliation of post-Yugoslavia has received a substantial amount of attention from the academic and policy communities. From the academic perspective, the Western Balkans has been an important testing ground for theories of various disciplines. The post-socialist and post-communist transformations of the region has received the attention of scholars from democratic theory, nationalism, transitional justice, minority studies, European integration, and international humanitarian intervention, just to name a few. From the policy community, the region has been the recipient of major sources of aid and has even been a testing ground for a number of newly devised tools for change. Yet, despite its academic and policy relevance, students studying the region do not have a single source of reading material where to learn about the various challenges facing the region and the various alternative policies devised by local policy-makers and the international community. This textbook aims to serve a wide array of college students and become a go-to source in the study contemporary socio-political challenges facing the region. Key terms: Yugoslavia, post-Yugoslavia, democratization, reconciliation, European integration. Introduction The terms, South East Europe, Western Balkans, and post-Yugoslavia are often used interchangeably. Although the differences between them can be rather small, they do illustrate a very turbulent and fluctuating geopolitical landscape. South East Europe refers to a geographical region comprising of the Balkans Peninsula which enumerates every country within this geographical area. The Western Balkans on the other hand is a geopolitical term referring to South East European countries that are yet to become members of the European Union (EU). As such, once a country has joined the EU, it falls out of this category. Croatia being one such country which has left the Western Balkans category and has joind the EU. The post-Yu- 9 goslav space on the other hand refers to those countries which at one point were republics or territories of the former Yugoslavia. Box I: The Yugoslav socialist federation was composed by eight political subjects, that is six republics and two autonomous regions. The republics were: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia. The regions were: Vojvodina and Kosovo, both formally part of Serbia. The federal system was established in 1943 during the second world war, and implemented as soon as the conflict was over since 1946. A further republican and regional decentralization was granted by the Constitution of 1974. Before WWII, instead, Yugoslavia was a mostly centralized kingdom, which emerged from the ashes of the Austria-Hungarian Empire in November 1918. Suggested readings: Lampe, J. (1996). Yugoslavia as History, New York: Cambridge University Press. Allcock, J.B. (2000). Explaining Yugoslavia, New York: Columbia University Press. In this book we are primarily concerned with the post-Yugoslav space, although we will often utilize the other terms as well whenever we are referring to the geographical region of South East Europe (SEE) or the geopolitical landscape of the Western Balkans (WB). What about the post-Yugoslav space and what is this book all about? Why study this region and what does it tell us about democratization and reconciliation? What is the relevance of international actors such as the European Union, NATO, and other actors in studying the region? What are you expected to learn after reading this book? And, why continue reading this book any further? Despite the political importance of post-Yugoslavia to the study of postcommunism, democratization, reconciliation, and European integration, there is surprisingly no college-level textbook for students to go to when searching for a comprehensive analysis of the region. Moreover, the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in conjunction with the collapse of communism set in motion a simultaneous set of processes such as democratization, transition to a market economy, state building, and ethnic reconciliation. As such, students of the region are forced to develop their understanding of post-Yugoslavia in bits and pieces by drawing from the literature of vastly different disciplines. In this textbook we overcome these challenges by putting forward an edited collection of 11 substantive chapters, written by 16 authors from different disciplines. Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 10 This textbook is chiefly focused on the challenges of democratization and reconciliation in post-Yugoslav space, and the ways in which the process of European integration has impacted these two processes. As such, the different chapters of this book revolve around these two themes by providing different disciplinary approaches to analyzing and understanding the challenges facing the region. The depth of coverage dedicated to these two processes will hopefully serve as a go to source for students interested in studying the region. A crucial background: why post-socialist transition was replaced by State partition in the Yugoslav federation? Before entering into details about the challenges posed by democratization and reconciliation, particularly between – and within – the Yugoslav successor states, an overview of the circumstances that generated a series of uncompromising conflicts among the parties is needed. The wars that affected the territory of the former federation, between 1991 and 2001, provoked an unprecedented military conflict for the post-WWII Europe, with a remarkable suffering among civilians. Inevitably, the phase of post-socialist transition, which marked the political choices of other countries as, for example, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and, to a certain extent, Slovenia (if our focus remains restricted to South East Europe), had to be postponed. Given these peculiarities, the Yugoslav collapse became a specific geopolitical matter for policy makers, diplomats, military officers, scholars, and lawyers, who treated the argument with different lenses and under dissimilar approaches. Therefore, the issue has been reconstructed, and extensively debated by a wide international and local literature, including, memoirs, legal assessments of the International Tribunal for the Crimes Committed in Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the publications of a huge number of documents, classified reports, memoranda, records of conversations, and minutes. However, and despite the massive – and to a large extent public – availability of sources, the understandings of these events and, often, even the chain of their effects, are still highly controversial. The variety of viewpoints is large. As a result, a first-hand approach to the topic requires that students and readers make a great effort to consult disparate books and articles in order to grasp at least the essence of so troubled and still unsettled contexts. Introduction 11 Box II. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1992 by the UN Security Council to provide an international court for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Western Balkans wars of the 1990s. The wartime presidents of Croatia (Franjo Tuđman) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegović) initiated the creation of the Tribunal, wishing for it to function as an international body that would solely hold the wartime leaders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnian Serbs and rebel Croatian Serbs accountable for war-related crimes. However, the Tribunal – whose mandate terminated in 2017 - put on trial many prominent civilian and military leaders from all involved countries, pursuing war crimes, crimes against humanities, and genocide. The main aim of the Tribunal was to establish justice by prosecuting criminal acts, while giving a voice to victims and witnesses of crimes. Nevertheless, in each of the countries, the dominant official narrative has interpreted the work of the ICTY as biased and prone to “equalization of guilt” for the events of the 1990s. Suggested readings: Calvo-Goller, K N. (2006). The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court: ICTY and ICTR Precedents. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. King K. L., Meernik J. D. (2017). The Witness Experience: Testimony at the ICTY and Its Impact, New York: Cambridge University Press. Steinberg R. H. (Ed.). (2011). Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY. Leiden: Brill. As the focus of this textbook is the nexus between democratization and reconciliation, mostly in the post-Yugoslav framework, it is not our aim to offer a history of the Yugoslav collapse in these pages. This would require not only a broader work, but also a careful scrutiny of opposite interpretations, which are – however – an active part of the current debate on reconciliation, as reported in the chapters that follow. Rather, we think it is important for our students and readers to enlist here a series of undisputable facts, that can help frame the post-war challenges of democratization and reconciliation in the area of our concern. Admittedly, the list of facts that we are going to mention here is not exhaustive, but we do hope that it will be useful to better understand the questions raised in this textbook and the intrinsic potential of their resolution. Having said that, the key facts that should be borne in mind are the following: 1. Yugoslavia was affected by a deep and long economic crisis, immediately after the Tito’s death in 1980. The government had to pay huge Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 12 loans to international financial institutions, introducing restricted measures of austerities, which scaled back the standard of life of a large part of the population. Furthermore, the crisis expanded social gaps, aggravating the existing unequal development among republics and regions. This affected particularly Kosovo and, in fact, Albanians publicly manifested their dissatisfaction in 1981. 2. The governance of the federation proved soon to be ineffective. For example, ethno-national warranty measures, like the right of veto of the eight units of the federation, postponed the decision-making process indefinitely. Similarly, the rotation of the institutional positions at all levels, which was introduced in order to assure the visible representation of the eight ethno-nations and obstruct any individual predominance, produced a chaotic change of officials, lack of responsibility and accountability. 3. Both the economic crisis and the governance fragility undermined the role of self-management as the ideology of the country. In order to protect their political legitimacy, local leaders increasingly protected the territorial interests of their constituency, diluting the domestic market and common interests. 4. The Serbian intellectuals of the Academy of Science issued a Memorandum published in 1988. It emphasized the discrimination of Serbs in the federation and demanded a new adjustment of domestic relations to the benefit of “their integration”. The Memorandum was sharply criticized in the other units of the country and by the President of Serbia Ivan Stambolić, but inflamed the Serbian protests in Kosovo, because of perceived discrimination. 5. Mass protests of Serbian militants expanded, with the support of the Secretary of the Serbian communists Slobodan Milošević, and overthrew the governments of Vojvodina and Montenegro. Furthermore, in 1989 Milošević was able to obtain a revision of the Serbian constitution by the other republics in order to reduce the autonomy of Kosovo. His uncompromised approach sparked tensions and high concerns over the whole country about Serbian politics. When Slovenia did not allow a similar Serbian mass demonstration in Ljubljana, Milošević reacted by imposing the cancellation of all contracts between Serbian and Slovenian companies. The first secessionist act affected, therefore, the unity of the Yugoslav market. It was December 1989. 6. Meanwhile, a new government led by Ante Marković introduced a radical economic reform on 1st January 1990. His success was unexpectedly quick and impressive. Inflation disappeared, foreign exchange reserves grew up, and the currency stabilized. Introduction 13 7. The Yugoslav League of the Communists collapsed at its 14th congress on 22 January 1990. The fragmentation occurred on the basis of the territorial principle (i.e. by republics) with the withdrawal of the Slovenian delegation, and not on the basis of divergent political thoughts as it was suggested during the debate by a group of delegates who proposed to establish a Socialist Party of Yugoslavia. Therefore, the federal system of the country suffered a decisive blow. 8. Multiparty elections took place in all Yugoslav republics during 1990. The results varied according to the context. An anti-communist coalition prevailed in Slovenia, but the communist Milan Kučan was confirmed as a President of the Republic. In Croatia, an anti-communist party got the absolute majority and elected a former dissident partisan, Franjo Tuđman, as President. In Serbia Slobodan Milošević and his allies in Montenegro confirmed their popularity and got full control of these republics (including Vojvodina and Kosovo, whose autonomy had ceased meanwhile to exist). In Bosnia-Herzegovina the three “constituent nations” (that is, the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslim/Bosniacs) dominated the ballot, while only in Macedonia the newly established party of the prime minister Ante Marković recorded a good outcome, but failed to achieve majority. Subsequently, federal multiparty elections should have been held, but the leaders of the most relevant republics showed no interest, neither were they demanded by the international community. 9. The Federal Presidency, at this point, was deeply polarized. Milošević controlled four out of eight members: paradoxically, in fact, the representatives of Kosovo and Vojvodina were never suppressed, even though their autonomy no longer existed. Under these circumstances an institutional mutual deadlock began to assert. 10. The Army (JNA – Yugoslav People’s Army) started to play its own role. Constitutionally, it was acting on the authority of the Federal Presidency. Its high military commander had still a federal composition, but the majority of the officers were Serbs, while the troops were made up of young conscripts from all over the country. Moreover, the republics had jurisdiction over the civil defense system, established in 1968 as a protective shield against a potential invasion of Soviet Union after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Under these circumstances, the new governments (particularly in Slovenia and Croatia) began to transform the civil defense into a local army and sought to buy weapons from the Warsaw Pact in disarray. This process alarmed the Yugoslav high commander, who was still believing that its constitutional task was to defend the socialist order and the territorial integrity Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 14 of the country. Furthermore, the majority of the officers, either because of Serbian nationality, or because they truly believed that Milošević wanted to preserve the Yugoslav socialism and its unity, unambiguously supported him, but failed to obtain the endorsement of the federal Presidency when general Veljko Kadijević proposed a military coup in January 1991. He suggested again a state-of-emergency plan in March, but once again he failed to get a majority vote. Consequently, the Serbian President of the Presidency, Borisav Jović resigned, together with the representatives of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The Presidency dismembered and a power-vacuum occurred. Milošević publicly announced the end of Yugoslavia. 11. Meanwhile, on 24 January 1991 the Slovenian delegation with its President met its Serbian counterpart. The meeting achieved a quick agreement. The Slovenes wanted to leave Yugoslavia peacefully. Milošević accepted, but requested from Kučan a recognition that the Serbs have the right to leave in one country, like the Slovens. Kučan made such a statement when back to Ljubljana. The reaction in Zagreb was furious: Tuđman accused Slovenia of stabbing Croatia in the back. Subsequently, he decided to meet Milošević at Karađorđevo in March. They discussed how to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina and established a team of experts from both sides to study the maps accordingly. They met recurrently at least until the end of 1991, but never achieved an agreement despite the common interest to change borders. 12. The more the Yugoslav crisis deepened, the more international players began to actively follow the developments, even trying to control the evolution of events with the aim of determining their own sphere of influence. Initially, the public opinion in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy manifested a growing sympathy to the right of self-determination, particularly of Slovenia and Croatia. In this respect, the year 1990 marked a turning point. On the one hand, the socialist collapse in Central Europe and the unification of Germany created a new atmosphere, by rooting the belief that liberal democracy and freedom of peoples were facing new prospects of peace. On the other hand, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, the subsequent UN sanctions, and the US military intervention, placed the Yugoslav government in great economic difficulty, despite the recent success of its reforms. As a founding State of the UN, Yugoslavia adopted the sanctions and suspended contracts with Bagdad. But the price paid, in terms of energy availability and money spent, had devastating effects. Meanwhile, the Vatican, whose influence in Croatia was raising since the beginning of the 1980s, reacted positively to the diplomatic pressures of Tuđman. Introduction 15 Furthermore, the anticommunist emigrant components (mostly Croatian, but later also from other areas of Yugoslavia) campaigned in support of the independence of their republics of origins. The USA, instead, adopted a more cautious approach, at least initially, while high officers of the Yugoslav Army visited Moscow to investigate the support of Soviet Union to the preservation of the Yugoslav unity. They met personalities that few weeks later attempted to oust Gorbačëv, condemning instead the Soviet Union to the final collapse. As a result, the new Russia was too weak to play a role in the Balkans in the decades to come. Meanwhile, the European Community promoted some mediation efforts as soon as the war began in Slovenia, when a “trojka” of diplomats was sent to Belgrade. However, no substantial results were achieved. Subsequently, the European Community established an arbitrary commission (led by the French lawyer Robert Badinter), whose task was to identify “objective criteria” able to provide a shared mechanism for managing the Yugoslav dissolution. Still, on 23 December 1991, Germany decided unilaterally to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Two weeks later the Vatican followed. In January 1992, the Badinter Commission suggested the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Macedonia, but the European council decided differently, by supporting the applications of Slovenia and Croatia, and rejecting that of Macedonia, because of the Greek veto over the name dispute. Later, the London Conference was held to find (in vain) a peace solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Basically, the most active negotiators underestimated the territorial interests and the aspiration of border changes between republics that animated the war plans of the contenders. In the end, the military intervention of NATO, under the leadership of the Clinton Administration, plaid a decisive role to put an end to war. 13. The most relevant phases that marked the violent dissolution of the Yugoslav federation can be summarized as follows: a. When Slovenia and Croatia declared their “dissociation” from the Yugoslav federation on 25 June 1991, the federal government issued a decree in order to protect the international border-crossing, which had been quickly controlled by Ljubljana. The Yugoslav army (JNA), instead, decided to cross Slovenia, as a demonstration of power, meeting, however, an unexpected military resistance. The war lasted 10 days only. b. In the last meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency on 18 July, following a Slovenian-Serbian pact, the JNA was ordered to leave Slovenia and withdraw to Croatia. Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 16 c. The war, therefore, moved southward, mostly in Slavonia, Krajina (where a Serbian state was declared), in part of Dalmatia and around Dubrovnik. At the end of the year, prime minister Ante Marković resigned and the federal government dissolved. Yugoslavia no longer existed. The military conflict increasingly became a Serbo-Croatian confrontation. During this period the city of Vukovar was destroyed by the JNA (now increasingly a Serbian army) while Dubrovnik suffered from a siege and destructions provoked by Serbian and Montenegrin soldiers. d. At the beginning of April 1992, the war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was, essentially, a war of everyone against everyone. Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and two factions of Bosniacs fought each other for years. A Serb republic of Bosnia and a Croat republic in Herzegovina were declared. The city of Sarajevo suffered the longest siege in modern warfare (3 years and 11 months) by the Serbian army. Ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, genocides (the most relevant one committed in Srebrenica), rapes, and other forms of brutality were committed mostly by regular and irregular Serb forces. However, their contenders also perpetrated atrocities, while Serb and Croat leaders of Bosnia were unsuccessfully negotiating an agreement to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina. e. The Clinton Administration imposed the Washington Agreement on 18 March 1994 which put an end to the war between Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats with Tuđman’s approval. Subsequently, NA- TO blasted Serbian targets around Sarajevo and in Bosnia. Meanwhile, an UN-US mediation was able to impose an international administration in Eastern Slavonia before reintegrating it into Croatia. Furthermore, with the support of US military instructors, Zagreb succeeded in retaking control of Krajina in August 1995 and together with the Bosniac army to deeply penetrate into Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the military operations were suspended, following the decision of the parts to convey in Dayton, Ohio, for a peace negotiation, which was positively achieved on 1st November, and officially signed in Paris the 14 December 1995. f. In Kosovo the peaceful resistance led by Ibrahim Rugova to the discriminations imposed to the Albanian population by the Serbian government became more contested. Younger generations believed that the international community would only intervene following a military conflict. Therefore, a new liberation army of Kosovo (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or UÇK) started to attack police forces and stations. The confrontation escalated quickly. The Introduction 17 brutality of Serbian retaliation inflamed public opinion in the West. The failure of an US negotiation at Rambouillet in France in March 1999 between the Serbian and Albanian representatives led to a NATO bombing of Serbia and Montenegro. The new war was justified with the need to guarantee the protection of human rights that Belgrade was systematically violating in Kosovo. However, this argument did not meet the support of the UN Security Council and created worldwide concerned, despite the great mass of Albanian refugees that moved to Albania and Macedonia. Quickly, military operations were suspended, following an agreement achieved on 9 June 1999 by a Russian-Finnish mediation. The Albanian population could come back home, while the Serbian troops withdrew from Kosovo. They were replaced by NATO and subsequently by an international civil and military presence under the aegis of the UN (Resolution 1244). g. At the end of 2000, an Albanian military movement from Macedonia, unsatisfied by the status of the Albanians in this country, drew inspiration from the operations promoted by the UÇK in Kosovo in the years 1997-1998. Consequently, it began to take peaceful control over villages on the North-West areas of the country, mostly along the borders with Kosovo. In February 2001, they attacked Macedonian police forces, thus starting a new military conflict. Potentially, this situation might have been able to destabilize the region, with destructive effects in the neighborhood. The alarm grew fast in NATO headquarter deployed in Kosovo, which began a strict surveillance of the borders in order to prevent the infiltration of Albanian insurgents from Kosovo into Macedonia. Violence, however, remained circumscribed between Tetovo and Kumanovo. The number of victims was also limited. Meanwhile, while international diplomacy took place, the ceasefire achieved in July was soon violated. New negotiations, with EU and US diplomatic teams, were needed. On 13 August 2001 a peace agreement was sign in the town of Ohrid, but tensions persisted until January 2002, when the parts settled the most relevant aspects of the dispute. Since then, peace in the territories of the Yugoslav successor states was basically respected. According to estimations of international NGOs and Humanitarian centers between 130.000 and 140.000 people died, mostly civilians. The war also resulted in 2.4 million refugees and 2 million displaced persons approximately. Still, even after 2001 violence occasionally erupted, Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 18 as for example in Kosovska Mitrovica in 2004 and Smederevo in 2015. Sport hooliganism, vandalism against cars with the license plate of a neighboring State, damages of monuments, even sometimes extremely politicized music events and few murders contributed to maintain an atmosphere of intolerance and intimidation over time in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo. Religious services and political ceremonies, for example in Bleiburg, Kočevski rog, in the Sarajevo cathedral, are still reproducing divisive interpretations of the past, in which a Nazi-fascist revisionism takes shape, sometimes ambiguously, sometimes undisputedly. Similarly, attempts to downsize responsibilities for the Shoah and the extermination camp in Jasenovac are often aimed to obscure WWII atrocities. Instead, such a selection of memories is intended to focus only, or primarily, on the legacies of the communist dictatorships, its crimes, and/or the collective responsibility of an ethno-nation for the bloody events that followed the Yugoslav dismemberment. As a result, resentments are reproduced, while guilts are forgotten, if not rejected. Such a complexity of feelings and controversial relations with the past are still influencing the present of the Western Balkans, affecting the fragile peace so far achieved. Why Democratization and Reconciliation? As a result of this condensed summary, the first question that you may be wondering has to do precisely with the thematic area of the book. Why, in fact, democratization and reconciliation? This is indeed a very good question to ask, and one which should be answered in the very early parts of this book. Let us first say that other processes which were undertaken after the breakup of Yugoslavia also provide important insights into the politics of the region. For example, the economic transition from communism to a market-based economy provides important insights into the development of political dynamics that shaped economic institutions and political competition. Yet, such approaches cannot be properly analyzed without considering the larger political transition from authoritarianism to democracy which followed the end of communism. The processes of democratization and reconciliation epitomize the challenges and political choices that post- Yugoslav societies were faced with. As such, a focus on democratization and reconciliation allow us to cast a larger net, so to speak, in order to develop a more comprehensive account of the challenges facing the region. Introduction 19 Box III: Democratization refers to the process of becoming a democracy. The term is used in the context of regime change in which a non-democratic regime transitions to democracy, or a newly established democracy has yet to consolidate itself. In this respect, democratization refers to a process of change toward democracy. Reconciliation refers to a process in which adversarial groups overcome their disputes and reconcile their differences by establishing friendly relations with one another. Often reconciliation becomes a necessity after a violent conflict or regime change in which human rights were grossly violated by the proceeding regime. Suggested readings: Whitehead, L. (2002). Democratization: Theory and experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T. & Huyse, L. (Eds.) (2003). Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook. Stockholm: International Idea. Moreover, democratization became the leitmotif of post-communism and served as the guiding framework for societal, economic, and legal decisions made in the immediate years. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama (1989) famously stated that the post-Cold War era marked the end of mankind’s ideological evolution and the triumph of democracy. In this respect, even military alliances such as NATO reinvented themselves by making democracy promotion a key objective under the argument that security and democracy go hand-in-hand. Perhaps the biggest international driver of democracy in the region became the EU with its emphasis on democracy, rule of law, and human rights as primary conditions for membership in the organization. Democratization, therefore, became the be-all and endall of the regions political transition. However, unlike most of post-communist Europe, post-Yugoslav societies faced the simultaneous process of state building, or what political sociologist Claus Offe (1991, p. 507) has called the “triple transformation affecting all three levels of nationhood, constitution making, as well as the "normal politics" of allocation.” This process became all the more challenging due to the region’s inexperience with democracy, weak institutions, and perhaps most importantly, as a result of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia which resulted in the death of over 140,000 people and the displacement of over 4 million (ICTJ 2009). The violent nature of the breakup which resulted in the commitment of heinous crimes such as mass rape, crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide served to divide post-Yugoslav societies to the point of irreconcil- Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 20 ability. Hence, the need to focus on ethnic reconciliation is paramount and the juxtaposition between democratization and reconciliation will provide readers with important insights in the interplay between these two processes. Moreover, while the process of democratization is chiefly a domain of political science, reconciliation is interdisciplinary in nature. As such, students can expect to be exposed to a variety of disciplinary approaches which serve to complement one another and help create a more comprehensive picture of the region. In this respect, students can expect chapters written from a historian’s point of view, chapters on international relations, nationalism, legal perspectives and justice, and sociology. In the following section we turn to the theoretical underpinnings of the book by justifying and highlighting the assumptions and questions to be explored by the substantive chapters later on. Theoretical Underpinnings What is the interplay between democratization and reconciliation, and how are these processes effected by the process of European integration? Essentially, these are the two key questions which are explored in detail throughout this book. We begin first by exploring the concept of democracy, then subsequently its relation and compatibility with reconciliation, and lastly, we look at how these two ideals are influenced by the process of European integration. In our modern conception of democracy, we are almost exclusively referring to representative democracy. That is, a political system in which citizens elect their representatives in government, the latter of which are then held accountable by the very people who elected them. The principle idea behind democracy lies in the argument that the people should govern themselves. In more practical terms, decision-making in democracies are made through majorities. In other words, governments and policies are created by the majority. Reconciliation on the other hand which we defined as the amelioration of inter-group conflict or animosities, is a necessary process following an armed conflict such as in the former Yugoslavia. In the context of reconciliation, the groups that we refer to may be ethnic, religious, linguistic, or national groups. Under such conditions, citizens living under a common territorial unit, often a state, must reconcile if their society is to move forward. As you may imagine, this is likely to be a very political and often intractable process. Reconciliation is likely to be even more challenging Introduction 21 when other processes are developing simultaneously, such as democratization and state building. The link between democracy and reconciliation is a very intimate one, and one which raises important questions with respect to sequence. Should societies first establish the pillars of democracy, and only subsequently deal with matters of reconciliation? Or, is the other way around more likely to lead to a successful outcome? Can the two processes develop simultaneously, and if so, under what conditions? The post-Yugoslav context adds even more difficulty to these questions as a result of the state building process of the seven new states which emerged after its breakup. Thus, the objectives of democracy, reconciliation, and state building are likely to appear conflictual, and under certain conditions, one can argue, even mutually exclusive. It is these questions which this book grapples with and the subsequent chapters provide a comprehensive account of what has transpired in the post-Yugoslav space, and the challenges still facing the region. Lastly, we address the process of European integration and how this process has impacted both, democracy and reconciliation. You may be wondering as to why European integration and not integration in other Western-led organizations such as NATO, the OSCE, or the Council of Europe. We focus on European integration for the reason that unlike membership in the other aforementioned organizations, membership in the EU is conditional on the satisfaction of a stringent set of criteria which deal directly with democracy and reconciliation. Thus, only democratic states are eligible for EU membership, while in the context of the Western Balkans, the restoration of friendly relations between states serves as an additional criterion which dictates the politics of EU accession. In this respect, the institutions of the EU have established a strong presence in the region which seeks to influence the development of democratic institutions and the establishment of friendly relations between states. Box IV: European integration is a term used to refer to the multifaceted process of integration into the structures of the EU. These processes can include political, economic, legal, social, and cultural changes. The term can, however, mean slightly different things depending on the context. When used in the context of exiting members, it often refers to the politics of the EU, such as the deepening or widening of existing policies, or the introduction of new policies. In the context of non-member states, such as the context in which is being used in this book, integration refers to the process of adopting EU policies, values and norms in an effort to join and become a full member of the union. Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 22 Suggested readings: Dedman, M. (2009). The Origins & Development of the European Union 1945-2008: A History of European Integration. London: Routledge. Cini, M., & Borragán, N. P. S. (Eds.). (2016). European Union Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). The Politics of the European Union. New York: Cambridge University Press. In this book, we integrate these three research areas into a unified approach in order to understand the challenges of democratization and reconciliation in the post-Yugoslav space. As such, we are dealing with the questions of how European integration effects these two processes and their compatibility with one another as well as with integration itself. Does the process of EU accession have a positive effect on democracy and reconciliation? Are these effects mutually reinforcing? Does the process of integration promote contradicting objectives, and what are the implications of such contradictions? And perhaps the biggest question of all, does EU membership serve as a cure to the ills of post-Yugoslavia? Lastly, we tackle the themes of these book from a variety of disciplinary approaches. Democratization and reconciliation are not unrelated to other development in the region such as the search for statehood and nationalism. As a matter of fact, statehood and nationalism run at the core of reconciliation in post-Yugoslavia, while statehood is thought as an absolute necessity for the establishment of democracy. The search for justice and the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia play an essential role in laying blame for wrongdoings and delivering justice. The concept of borders and the changing nature of borders in the contemporary world help define and separate peoples. The reproduction and recreation of memory shapes views toward the past and the present. And the reactionary decisions taken by publics following years of government failure lead many to migrate, thus reshaping political landscapes in ways that effect democratization and reconciliation for better and worse. In the following section, we explore these approaches in more detail, while simultaneously outlining the structure of this book and summarizing the book’s substantive chapters. Introduction 23 Structure of the Book This book is divided in two sections. The first section is titled Understanding the dilemmas of the post-Yugoslav Space, and deals primarily with laying the groundwork for understanding democracy, reconciliation, state building, and European integration in the context of post-Yugoslavia. The section is composed of five chapters and allows students without any background in politics of post-Yugoslavia to develop a sufficient understanding of the challenges facing the region. This first section is primarily focused on the themes of democratization and reconciliation in the context of European integration. Students who are already familiar with these themes, will have the opportunity to think about these areas of study in relation to one another. Section 1 We begin Section 1 with what is arguably the groundwork for any further analysis of post-Yugoslavia. Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos dedicate Chapter 1 to the issues of nation- and state-building. The authors use the collapse of communism as their point of departure under the argument that questions of statehood have dominated the period from 1989 to present. Utilizing historical institutionalism for the analysis of state-building, and critical historiography, cultural, and memory studies for the analysis of nation-building, Pauković and Raos illustrate how modern nations and nation-states are social constructs, with specific patterns of legitimization, consolidation, and reproduction. Under this framework, the authors show how the collapse of communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia provided an opportunity for either maintaining or expanding existing institutional frameworks through interpretations and reinterpretations of the past. In their analysis of seven Western Balkans states, the authors show how nation- and state-building efforts in the region are largely explained by these considerations. Moreover, Chapter 1 also considers the implications of state-building efforts on the concept of citizenship and the establishment of political communities within the state. This is a rather important implication to consider, as statehood has long been thought as an absolute pre-condition for democracy. Thus, as political scientist Dankwart Rustow (1970, p. 350) as argued, “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 24 to.” In other words, without an established and uncontested state, the chances of democratic maturity or democratic survival are rather slim. The discussion on statehood serves as an appropriate transition into Chapter 2 in which Pero Maldini explores our modern conception and understanding of democracy. Maldini starts with a historical overview of democracy by exploring the ancient Athenian practice of direct democracy then exploring our modern practice of representative democracy. By defining democracy as a political order that establishes the rule of the people, the chapter explores different conceptions of democracy and its preconditions. In this respect, the chapter distinguishes from minimal conceptions, otherwise also known as electoral democracy in which the people have a choice in who they elect as their democratic representatives, and more comprehensive or maximalist definitions of democracy, otherwise known as liberal democracy. In the latter conception, democracy allows the people to practice their civil and political rights such that it protects individual autonomy from abuses of power from those elected by the people. It is in fact this latter conception which preoccupies much of the research on democracy. From the minimalist conception, every post-Yugoslav state or Western Balkans state can be classified as a democracy. However, the failures of such regimes to protect civil and political rights, the failure of such regimes to deliver public goods to its citizens, and the lack of accountability, transparency, and responsiveness on part of elected officials raises important questions as to the extent to which such incomplete democracies, or sometimes also referred to as hybrid democracies, can address matters of reconciliation. Often times, as we will see in the Balkans context, democracy functions well for the majority, but easily violates the rights of minorities. Thus, can reconciliation take place under political systems in which civil and political rights are not protected, or when the majority violates the rights of the very minorities with whom it needs to reconcile? In Chapter 3, Goran Filic explores the relationship between democracy and reconciliation. In this chapter, Filic focuses on two particular models of democracy, deliberative and participatory democracy. Filic defines reconciliation as “as the process of reconciling between ethnic, religious or national groups often in the aftermath of the armed conflict.” Under this understanding of reconciliation, the chapter identifies deliberative and participatory democracy as the most appropriate models of democracy for dealing with matters of reconciliation. In this respect, deliberative democracy is conceptualized as a model of democracy in which decisions are achieved through public reasoning and discussion, while participatory democracy is conceptualized as a model which maximizes citizen participa- Introduction 25 tion, and policies which help develop the social and political capacities of its citizens. After defining these concepts, the chapter seeks to answer the question of whether efforts to build democracy should proceed the process of reconciliation or vice-versa. After exploring these alternatives, Filic adopts the perspective that democracy must proceed reconciliation. In support of this perspective, the argument is made that for reconciliation to be successful certain democratic values must be present in society. As such, in post-conflict environments where political values are inherited from the previous system, reconciliation has little hope of succeeding if the people have not been habituated into accepting universal human rights and democratic practices. Under this framework, the chapter concludes by exploring how political structures interact with the process of reconciliation, and the ways in which these interactions help explain the success or failure of reconciliation in post-Yugoslavia. In Chapter 4, Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić introduce the international dimension of political change in the Western Balkans. While the Western Balkans has been a major recipient of international aid, and has been under the influence of numerous international actors, none has been as involved as the EU. The process of European integration for the Western Balkans has been all-encompassing, including political, economic, and legislative changes. In this respect, the chapter focuses particularly on the EU’s attempts to influence democratic reforms and reconciliation processes. The chapter adopts the argument that the EU has adopted a simultaneous promotion strategy, under the assumption that democratization and reconciliation can develop side-by-side. The chapter, however, adopts a somewhat critical view of the EU‘s approach, arguing that the simultaneous pursuit of democratization and reconciliation can at times lead to contradictory objective. Moreover, fear of potential ethnic flareups has led the EU to focus its efforts in promoting regional stability rather than democracy or reconciliation. Additionally, political reforms which ultimately reshape ethnic relations are not necessarily acceptable to all. As a result, European integration becomes politicized along ethnic lines, thus the very process of EU accession may be pushing divided societies further apart rather then pulling them together. In concluding their chapter, Meka and Savić-Bojanić argue that the process of reconciliation is incompatible with the EU’s existing toolbox, thus reconciliation must come from within rather than from outside. In the last chapter (5) of Section 1, Stefano Bianchini explores the fragility of imported democracy without reconciliation. Bianchini adopts the argument that democratization and reconciliation are two sides of the Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 26 same coin in the Western Balkans, but equally important, they are both transnational issues and domestic ones. The argument put forward argues that after the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Western Balkans societies developed narratives of the past which have been heavily influenced by war legacies. Nationalist rhetoric and self-victimization thus became the mechanisms through which such societies decided to deal with the past. Consequently, such rhetoric nurtured intolerance toward the ‘others’, thus making democratization and reconciliation transnational issues when the ‘other’ was a neighboring state, and a domestic issue when such issues polarized societies internally. Because of these developments, democratization and reconciliation were fragile from the very beginning, and ‘imported’ solutions emerged as the only way forward. The EU’s influence, however, was only partially accepted by local actors. International efforts to create the right conditions for progress have never prevailed over domestic rhetoric. Meanwhile some positive progress has been apparent in the sphere of economics, as inter-regional cooperation has intensified. Yet even this positive development has been interpreted through nationalist perspectives, with some likening this new development to a ‘Yugosphere’, thus effectively undermining regional efforts to intensify cooperation further. In concluding his chapter, Bianchini argues that the process of European integration and its efforts to promote democracy and reconciliation are at odds with nationalist rhetoric. Yet while, this conclusion may appear pessimistic, the absence of the EU from the region is likely to lead to more frightening developments. Section 2 Section 2 is titled Achieving Democracy and Reconciliation: Controversial paths?. This section provides readers with a number of case study approaches which explore the ways in which other processes of change have affected democratization and reconciliation. The six chapters deal with the issues of nationalism, justice, borders, memory and intellectuals, minorities, and migration. In combination, we hope that readers are able to develop a comprehensive picture of the main political dynamics in the post-Yugoslav space, and the ways in which such dynamics shape democratization and reconciliation efforts. In Chapter 6, Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi explore the issue of nationalism and how this has served as a source of continuous ethno-religious conflict in South East Europe. Kalemaj and Lleshi begin their chapter by referencing the popular euphemism that the Balkans is considered as the Introduction 27 ‘world’s powder keg’. Using a long-term perspective, with a focus on institutional and structural factors, the authors illustrate the emergence of nationalism in the South East Europe in the 19th century and its evolution during the interwar period, the communist period, and after the breakup of Yugoslavia. The authors show how the turbulent interwar period led to the emergence of ethno-religious nationalism, the effects of which shaped the difficulties of establishing a Yugoslav identity during communism. Suppressed nationalist forces eventually came to the fore once again with the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. After the breakup, nationalist sentiment and ideology came to be more influential in affecting the political decisions that followed. It is also possible, that nationalism has undermined modernization in the region. Such developments, have subsequently led to the involvement of external actors in the process of nation-state building. This, however, poses difficulties for the process of European integration, as the EU is unwilling to extend membership to those who have not settled territorial disputes with their neighbors. Consequently, the EU is often forced to intervene in the region as its savior, rather than a partner, with nationalism serving as an insurmountable obstacle. In conclusion, readers are provided with a short discussion on the prospect of European integration as affected by issues of nationalism. In Chapter 7, Johan du Toit explores the relationship between justice and reconciliation. Drawing from the challenges in delivering justice through the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the chapter explores how mechanisms of justice affect the process of reconciliation. Moreover, du Toit utilizes examples from South Africa and the role played by the Goldstone Commission in investigating cases of public violence between 1991 and 1994 which ended the apartheid regime, and the relevance of the Goldstone Commission for the country’s first democratic elections in 1994. Du Toit shows that transitional justice under an international mandate is a formidable task due to limited resources and uncooperating states. More importantly, however, while justice and reconciliation are complementary to one another, they are not the same thing. Courts play an important role in establishing facts and accountability, yet facts and accountability alone do not result in reconciliation. Nor is it the responsibility of courts to achieve reconciliation. Nevertheless, court proceedings such as the telling of stories or the admission of guilt can lead to a transformative effect on perpetrators and communities as a whole. In drawing lessons from the South African experience, du Toit concludes that there is no universal rule in dealing with past atrocities. Yet as a starting point, former en- Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 28 emies must be willing to sit across each other and reconcile their differences. In Chapter 8, Maja Pulić delves into the concept of borders and boundaries as a prism through which to analyze the process of reconciliation. Pulić argues that borders play an increasingly important role in the daily lives of citizens. This includes, both traditional territorial Westphalia borders, otherwise known as hard borders, as well as mental borders, otherwise known as soft borders. While the former seems to be losing some of its relevance due to the forces of globalization, it remains an important factor in keeping people separated in the post-Yugoslav space. The emergence of new states after the breakup of Yugoslavia, has led to the rise of nationalism and the importance of territorial boundaries. Interestingly, however, in the former Yugoslavia, boundaries serve to divide not only states, but also ethnic groups within the same state. These soft forms of borders are increasingly dividing people in the region along ethnic, religious, and class lines by transcending the simple inside/outside divide of state borders. The process of border-making plays an important role in reconciliation by reconceptualizing border and boundaries in ways that either aid or hamper the prospect of bringing people together. The author highlights the role of European integration in breaking down borders by allowing for the free movement of peoples within its borders, yet this change does not necessarily mean that we are moving toward a borderless world. European integration has set in motion various mechanisms for breaking down physical barriers in the Western Balkans, yet the emergence of soft barriers raises important questions as to whether European integration can deliver other mechanisms of achieving reconciliation. Even the EU experiment with a borderless Europe has come into question in recent times, following the migrant crisis of 2014-16 and the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020. In Chapter 9, Gazela Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović develop an interesting approach in exploring the role of intellectuals in promoting reconciliation or radicalization. Draško and Pavlović stress that in societies dominated by nationalist ideologies, intellectuals have tremendous influence in redefining memories and promoting nationalism. While anti-nationalist intellectuals are also able to influence public opinion, the post-Yugoslav experience has shown that nationalist intellectuals outnumber anti-nationalists, thus having a greater influence in public opinion. Utilizing this framework, the authors illustrate how intellectuals have either aided reconciliation or promoted radicalization. The chapter traces the genesis of nationalist intellectuals in the former Yugoslavia to the early 1960s, during which period national demands first started appearing within the socialist framework. Consequently, due to the Introduction 29 economic crisis of the 1980s, nationalist intellectuals become more influential, and demands for national independence became stronger. The 1990s also saw the emergence of anti-nationalist intellectuals and anti-war groupings. However, their voices ran against the mainstream and could not find their way to the general public. Even after the end of the Yugoslav wars, such nationalist intellectuals survived and have been able to maintain nationalist rhetoric alive to this day. In Chapter 10, Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić explore reconciliation from the perspective of minority rights. Mameli and Kajinić argue that minority protection is essential and potentially transformative for reconciliation. The common approach to protecting minority rights is through institutional means, such as those deriving from the consociational model of democracy which establishes power-sharing mechanisms for deeply divided societies. This model, however, institutionalizes ethnicities, thus potentially leading to the worsening of conditions for minorities. Consociationalism, however, is successful as long as those is power are willing to cooperate across ethnic lines. When such conditions are not met, consociationalism will not lead to either democratic stability nor reconciliation or inter-group dialogue. Interestingly, the institutional and legal mechanisms to dealing with minorities in post-Yugoslavia have perpetuated separation, and the situation of minorities has worsened over the years. The alternative approach suggested by the authors argues that bottomup approaches are more likely to create the appropriate conditions for reconciliation. In support of this claim, the concept of deliberative democracy is utilized to show how processes of deliberation that focus on reasoning and persuasion can foster democratic qualities consistent with the needs of reconciliation. However, even this approach appears to have been counterproductive and misused in the region. School systems have often separated children across ethnic lines. This is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Daytona Accords of 1995, in North Macedonia following the Ohrid Agreement of 2001, and in Kosovo following the various constitutional mechanisms adopted after independence in 2008. In each of these cases, segregation was a result of institutional mechanisms intended to protect and preserve minority rights. In conclusion, the authors stress the difficult choices that such societies face in light of competing ideals. In the final chapter (11) of Section 2, Marco Zoppi explores the link between migration and democratization and reconciliation. Zoppi begins his chapter by exploring the wider phenomena of migration, then subsequently exploring the ways in which migration generally may affect democratization and reconciliation. In this respect, because modern technologies have made it so that immigrants can maintain close contact with their Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 30 home countries, leaving home does not mean ending one’s engagement with the political community. Thus, do immigrants maintain or change their party loyalties abroad; are their views changed and shaped by the political culture in the immigrating country; how are political remittances transmitted to the political community of the home country; and what are the implications of these interactions? Moreover, because immigration is no longer a definitive act performed once and for all, many such immigrants choose to return back home at some point, thus making such questions even more appealing. The author hypothesizes that (e)migration is likely to affect both democracy and reconciliation. Because the very act of relocating within the country or to another country reflects existing threats or new opportunities, such relocations reshape the political environment in distinct ways. In other words, relocation can be interpreted to mean an act of voting with ‘one’s own feet’, by revealing tensions and contradictions within society. As a region characterized by high rates of (e)migration, the Western Balkans represent an ideal ground for testing such questions. In conclusion, the chapter argues that migration should be explored not simply as a consequence of problems at home, but equally as a solution to such problems. Conclusion We don’t purport to provide all the answers to the questions highlighted above, nor seek to simplify the complex process of democratization and reconciliation in the post-Yugoslav space. We hope, however, that the analytical depth provided in this book will lead students to not only understand the post-Yugoslav context, but provide explanations for historical and ongoing developments. Moreover, the post-Yugoslav context is not irrelevant to the development democracy and reconciliation beyond the region. As a matter of fact, the study of democracy and its relationships with nationalism has come under increasingly scrutiny following the recent wave of populism throughout the world. Renowned political scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have recently published a very interesting book titled Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, exploring precisely how the rise of nationalist rhetoric is affecting even some of the world’s oldest and most established democracies. Student are encouraged to consult this source found under the recommended readings list below. While the Western Balkans provides a vastly different political landscape from Western Europe for direct comparability with respect to how Introduction 31 rising nationalism effects democracy, it is noteworthy nonetheless that when nationalist rhetoric is on the rise, often democracy suffers as a result. Students are therefore encouraged to think about the applicability of this textbook beyond the Western Balkans. The same goes for the study of reconciliation. While post-Yugoslavia is certainly one of the most studies regions with respect to reconciliation, comparative studies with postapartheid South Africa, post-civil war Spain, and Latin America are plentiful. In this respect, post-Yugoslav reconciliation has important lessons to provide to the rest of the worlds, as well as vice-versa. We hope students enjoy this book and are able to take full advantage of the substantive chapters that follow. Questions for students: What are the conceptual differences between the different terminologies used to refer to the Balkans Peninsula, and what do these differences mean? Why study the post-Yugoslav space, and how does this region help us understand democratization and reconciliation? In what ways in European integration relevant to democratization and reconciliation in the post-Yugoslav space? References Daskalov, R. D., Mishkova, D., Marinov, T., & Vezenkov, A. (2017). Entangled Histories of the Balkans-Volume Four: Concepts, Approaches, and (Self-) Representations. Leiden: Brill. Diamond, L., Fukuyama, F., Horowitz, D. L., & Plattner, M. F. (2014). Reconsidering the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 25 (1), 86-100. Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history?. The National Interest, 16 (Summer), 3-18. Gallagher, T., & Geoffrey P. (Eds.) (2012). Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans. London: Routledge. Helbling, M. (2013). Nationalism and democracy: Competing or complementary logics?. Living Reviews in Democracy, 4, 1-14. ICTY. (2009). Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia. Published 1/1/2009. Accessed on June 5, 2020, . Eltion Meka and Stefano Bianchini 32 Keil, S., & Arkan, Z. (Eds.). (2014). The EU and member state building: European foreign policy in the Western Balkans. London: Routledge. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Offe, C. (1991). Capitalism by democratic design? Democratic theory facing the triple transition in East Central Europe. Social Research, 71 (3), 865-892. Plattner, M. F., Diamond, L., Walker, C. (Eds.) (2016). Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model. Comparative Politics, 2 (3), 337-363. Introduction 33 Section 1: Understanding the dilemmas of the post-Yugoslav Space Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity: Nation- and State- Building in the Western Balkans Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos Abstract: After the collapse of one-party communist rule and the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the region of Western Balkans has experienced an intensive period of collective soul-searching, with institutional and symbolic innovation and reinterpretation taking place. The new political and societal elites reinterpreted socialist institutions, the existing constitutional order, and identity frameworks to fit the new, nationalist narrative. State-building was in many cases accompanied by armed conflict, ranging from small-scale skirmishes to open war, as secessionist movements in parts of the newly established states refused to accept the results of independence referenda. Nation-building encompassed changes in official language policy, definitions of the titular nation and ethnic minorities, citizenship regimes, as well as symbolic shifts regarding the official flag, national anthem, currency, and even the very name of a given country. Religious institutions became vehicles of national consolidation, as well as contested grounds for opposing factions in the struggle for identity and meaning. Holding of referenda and census taking became tools of choice for the establishment and consolidation of nation and state. Competing statehood conceptions and narratives about nationhood created deep societal fault lines, which undermined or slowed down democratic consolidation. In some cases, political elites traded rigid nationalist narratives for free passage towards NATO and EU membership, proving responsive to EU conditionality. They accepted more inclusive notions of statehood and nationhood and accommodated concerns of minorities and neighboring states as a token of good will and proof of Europeanization. Key Terms: nation-building, state-building, Yugoslavia, post-conflict society, peace-building 37 Introduction This chapter deals with the processes of nation-building and state-building in the Western Balkans after the collapse of one-party communist rule (1989-1990) and the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation (1991-1992). The political, social, and cultural dynamics of post-Yugoslav countries of the Western Balkans region (as defined and understood by both the European Union and the wider academic community in Europe) have been dominantly shaped by questions of statehood and nationhood in the 1989-2019 period. This chapter analyzes state-building from the lens of historical institutionalism, within the discipline of comparative politics, while it deals with nation-building in terms of critical historiography, cultural, and memory studies. The chapter follows the tradition of authors such as Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, Rogers Brubaker, Eric Hobsbawm, and Ernest Gellner, that view nations and nation-states as historically developed social constructs, with specific patterns of legitimization, consolidation, and reproduction. Box 1.1. Nation-building and State-building. Although these concepts are closely related, one should draw a distinction between them. State-building is focused on the institutional, legal, and constitutional framework which includes all practical features needed for a functioning state. Nation-building is a more fluid concept, which deals with softer issues of national identity or identity consolidation, such as symbols, memory, language, or different cultural traditions, commemorative practices, and rituals. The main goal of nation-building is to achieve a certain degree of national unity among a given population. Suggested readings: Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Tsang, R., & Woods, E. T. (Eds.). (2013). The Cultural Politics of Nationalism and Nation-Building: Ritual and performance in the forging of nations. London, New York: Routledge. Wimmer, A. (2018). Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. The chapter encompasses all Western Balkans states, notwithstanding their different status according to international recognition by other states and Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 38 international organizations. Thus, the cases analyzed in this study include Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Albania. After an introduction outlining the post-communist and post-conflict context and offering explanations of the concepts of state-building and nation-building, the chapter will analyze each of the seven included cases. For each case, state-building will be assessed through institutional building and development, citizenship regimes, and the constitutional framework. Nation-building will be evaluated with an emphasis on symbolic identitybuilding, the usage of state holidays, flags, anthems, coats of arms, language policy, and commemorative practices as vehicles of creation and proliferation of notions of nationhood. In addition, the role of religion in the shaping and reshaping of nations will be examined. Conceptual Framework Literature on state-building in the last decades has often placed emphasis on the role that international actors and organizations have played and still do in post-conflict institutional building and re-building, i.e. state-building. In this regard, analyses have differentiated between successful and unsuccessful state-building and the overcoming of situations of failed states (Hehir & Robinson, 2007). However, here we want to look at state-building as undertaken by domestic political elites and portray their practices of institutional and constitutional engineering and usage of citizenship regimes. The latter was a key mechanism for shaping political communities according to an ethnonationalist blueprint (Štiks, 2015). As Brubaker has noted, “(…) questions of citizenship and nationhood (…) are among the core aspects of statehood”, because they inquiry about belonging to a specific political community, i.e. the relationship between people and the state (Brubaker, 1996, p. 43). The institutional shaping and reshaping after 1989, which characterized state-building in this region, demonstrated a tension between maintenance and expansion of the existing institutional and constitutional framework inherited from the socialist period and attempts at recreating an imagined, glorious past, either from the interwar period, or from the premodern era. In doing so, state-building and nation-building entrepreneurs and narrative-makers will often resort to creation or entrenchment of myths of collective heroism and victimhood, as well as historic (in)justice. The community is rallied behind the same banner through a collective acceptance of notions of common destiny (Anderson, 1991). Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 39 State-building in Western Balkans is inextricably linked to nation-building and the notion of the state as an ethnic homeland of the titular ethnic group. Therefore, when studying constitutional changes and adoption of entirely new constitutions, one should pay close attention to the identity markers enshrined in these texts. Preambles, with their lofty appeals to ancient and more recent history, serve as reminders of national pride and ethos, reinforcing nations as symbolic communities. Nation-building in the post-communist context of the Western Balkans starkly differs from similar processes in Western Europe as it was timecompressed, and was not connected to wider societal transformation through modernization and industrialization (Kolstø, 2014a, pp. 3-4). In addition, both state- and nation-building in this region went hand-in-hand with armed conflict, which has, in some form, affected all of the analyzed cases, be it armed rebellion, civil war, international intervention, neighbor invasion, armed civic unrest, or a combination of all of the above. In this chapter, we offer a brief, yet condensed overview of the main challenges faced by the state- and nation-building projects and efforts in the Western Balkans after the fall of communism and analyze the most important practices and policies used. In addition, we outline the main processes, actors, and events shaping the contemporary states and nations in this region. Croatia Croatian statehood is rooted in the tradition of its parliament (Sabor), which has, albeit irregularly and in different forms, convened since the 13th century. However, the modern concept of a Croatian nation was not clearly defined until the 1848 Spring of Nations (Zakošek & Maršić, 2010, p. 773) and the subsequent period of Croatian National Revival, which saw the standardization of its literary language and the establishment of key cultural and educational institutions. During that time, Croatia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while its nation-building process oscillated between ideas of an independent Croatian state to the idea of Yugoslavism, a cultural and political concept which sought to unite speakers of Southern Slavic languages. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Croatian lands became part of the short-lived and unrecognized State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which united with Serbia and Montenegro into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918), later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929), also known as the First Yugoslavia (1918-1941). During the Second World Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 40 War, Axis powers created a puppet state, the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) which disappeared with Hitler’s defeat in May 1945. The native communist-led antifascist movement emerged victorious from the Second World War and founded a new federal, real socialist state, the Second Yugoslavia. Croatia was the second largest republic and Croats were the second largest nationality of communist Yugoslavia (1945-1991). The crisis of the communist regime in the 1980s led to an unprecedented wave of liberalization, which primarily opened the question of nationand state-related issues between different nations and republics in Yugoslavia. A Croatian national movement emerged in the midst of dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fall of the communist regime. Nation- and statebuilding were based on the narrative of a “thousand-year old dream” about an independent state. In that context, the notion of a historical right of the Croatian people to an independent state played an important role. For that purpose, the Croatian constitution begins with section on “historical foundations”, listing events of independent decision-making in Croatia that are meant to support the argument of statehood continuity. The national movement was led by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the winner of the first multi-party election and its leader and first Croatian post-communist president, Franjo Tuđman. The War for Independence or “the Homeland War” (1991-1995) became a central point of symbolic nation-building. In the Croatian society, there is a considerable level of consensus about the nature of this war – it is predominantly seen as a justified, legal, and defensive war of liberation against Greater Serbian aggression. A field survey conducted in 2011 has shown that the majority of people in Croatia consider holidays and commemorative events related to the Homeland War as the most important memorial days (Pavlaković, 2014, p. 39). The narrative of establishment of an independent state and achievement of full sovereignty defined the 1990s period. Government change in 2000 and the departure of HDZ from power after a decade-long rule represented a discursive shift towards EU and NATO integration as main national goals (Pauković, 2015, pp. 54-55). We can conclude that the nation-building process in Croatia was successful in comparison to other analyzed countries. The leaders of the Croatian national project achieved their officially proclaimed goals: they won the war and created an independent state; it became a member of NATO and the EU; and there is huge support for the dominant state-building myth connected to the Homeland War. One should also mention that a significant part of the society is still reluctant towards dealing with the darker side of the Homeland War and crimes committed by the Croatian Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 41 side. Regardless, there is still a wide-ranging debate about the constituting contents of Croatian national identity. This is largely linked to the debate about the communist/socialist period and the nature of Second Yugoslavia. From the actors’ perspective, this debate gains intensity as one moves more to the left or right side of the political spectrum (Pauković, 2019, str. 114). Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina did not exist as a sovereign state before the breakup of Yugoslavia (Richter & Gavrić, 2010, p. 837). In one short period there was a medieval Bosnian kingdom, but the greatest influence on Bosnia and Herzegovina was exercised by the Ottoman rule, which lasted from the 15th to the end of the 19th century, during which a significant part of the Christian population was converted to Islam. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina came under Austro-Hungarian rule, and in 1918 it became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, or First Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the collaborationist Independent State of Croatia (Bieber, 2006, pp. 5-10). Many key battles fought by the communist-led antifascist resistance against Axis powers and their native allies took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the Second World War, Bosnia and Herzegovina gained the status of a republic, mostly within the previous Austro-Hungarian borders. With its mixed population, it represented small Yugoslavia. The republic was defined as a state of three “constituent peoples” (konstitutivni narodi) Bosniaks (Muslim), Serbs (Orthodox) and Croats (Catholic). Ethnic and national mobilization led to wars in the 1990s, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ethnic settlement patterns were mostly intertwined, the bloodiest war (1992-1995) in former Yugoslavia took place. The consequences of the war were devastating, with almost 100,000 documented casualties (Tokača, 2013). The country was left extremely polarized across ethnic lines. Numerous citizens had to leave their homes to which they never managed to return, as the post-conflict population largely grouped following ethnic divisions. The US-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 ended the war and reinforced Bosnia and Herzegovina as a dual, or divided country. The main political cleavage exists between the Serb-dominated Republic of Srpska federal entity (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosniaks hold the demographic and political majority. The Federation is further divided by mutual mistrust and different visions of the state Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 42 between Bosniaks, who seek a more unitary state and Croats, who wish for a looser federation. As a result, there is no horizontal loyalty at the state level, and there are two parallel nation-building processes, one in the RS and the other in the Federation. The Dayton Peace Agreement also established international presence (United Nations, later the European Union) represented by The Office of the High Representative. The role of the High Representative is implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. According to the only study that measured success of nation-building in Western Balkans, conducted in 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina scored the worst (Dević, 2014, pp. 54-57). Loyalty to the state is particularly low among Serbs and Croats, who link their loyalty to their native countries, Croatia and Serbia, and Serbs also to their Republic of Srpska entity. Distinct ethnic polarization on a symbolic level is also visible in the language, where the vast majority of Serbs and Croats consider their native language to be Serbian or Croatian, respectively. A very important cleavage that accompanies the ethnic division, which was not so pronounced in Yugoslavia, relates to the religious identification of ethnic groups. The difference in relation to the period of Yugoslavia is especially visible among Bosniaks and Serbs (Dević, 2014, pp. 78-79). Bosnia and Herzegovina remains an unfinished and divided state burdened with the legacy of war and vastly different interpretations of events of the 1990s. The reasons for the unsuccessful nation-building project lie in the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multinational community in which there were practically three separate national movements that ultimately led to war. The peace established through international intervention in 1995 did not resolve key issues, but contributed to the formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on an ethno-national principle. The current leader of Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, has for years publicly emphasized that the long-term goal of the entity is unification with Serbia. It is practically a state within a state and there is no chance to establish a functional state with such a constitutional solution. The second problem is within the Federation, where the Bosniak majority is implementing a project of centralization of the state on the majority principle, according to which the Bosniaks would gain control and ultimately extend it to the entire state. Such a policy is opposed to the stated goals of Bosnian Serbs, who do not agree to reduce their Dayton autonomy. In addition to this constant conflict, there is also a problem between Bosniaks and Croats. Bosniaks use the mechanisms provided by the electoral system according to which Bosniaks can elect a Croatian representative in the collective presidency of the state (Richter & Gavrić, 2010, p. 866). Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 43 Serbia Serbia emerged as an independent nation state taking advantage of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Its modern statehood has roots in the 1878 Congress of Berlin, when its independence was internationally recognized (Ristić, 2010, p. 897). The Ottoman period left a stark impact on the Serbian society as a whole and on the development of its political culture. Serbia emerged victorious from the Balkan Wars and the First World War and led the unification of the South Slavs under the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty in 1918. The First Yugoslav state or the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was marked by the domination of Belgrade and the Serbian political elite close to the royal court. The country collapsed following the Axis Powers invasion in April 1941 and was restored with the victory of the communist-led Partisans during the Second World War. Serbia was the largest republic and Serbs were the largest nation of communist Yugoslavia. Only Serbia had autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Unrest in Kosovo in the early 1980s, combined with the looming general crisis of the communist regime, gave rise to the Serbian national movement that would gain momentum in the second half of the 1980s. When Slobodan Milošević took over as leader of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1987, Serbian nationalism gradually became the main driving force of the communist leadership in that country. Populism, nationalism, and mythomania were rooted in the attempt to prove that Serbia and Serbs were the biggest victims of communist Yugoslavia, what ultimately became the main reason for the initiation of Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. Events in Serbia had a decisive impact on political transition and nation-building programs in other Yugoslav republics. The main national myth is related to the medieval Serbian state and the struggle against the Ottomans, symbolized by the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Field. National identity in Serbia after the disintegration of Yugoslavia was shaped between “ethnic, confession-based Serbdom” and “civil, atheismbased Yugoslavdom (Jovanović, 2014, p. 89). This has created a problem, as it was not entirely clear whether modern Serbia was a new state or a successor to Yugoslavia. A study conducted in 2011, has shown a very high degree of Yugonostalgia in Serbia (Kolstø, 2014b, p. 767). A very important element of the national narrative is the victimization of Serbs, which is also evident among other ethnic groups/nations of the former Yugoslavia, especially those involved in the 1990s wars. The national movement in Serbia and the state-building program thwarted democratization until the end of the Milošević regime in 2000 (Zakošek, 2008). The new government in Serbia carried out significant de- Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 44 mocratization reforms and also tried to establish better relations with the countries that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia. Therefore, a serious step was made in dealing with Serbia's responsibility for the wars of the 1990s. The road to catharsis and positive change in the national narrative was stopped in 2012 when the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came to power. With the rise of SNS, the narrative related to the wars of the 1990s changed significantly, whereby the main focus again was on Serbia and Serbs as victims. In the years to come, the SNS leader, Aleksandar Vučić, took full control of the state and built a semi-authoritarian regime in which the opposition, among other difficulties, faces major obstacles in its access to the public and media space. Thus, SNS achieved overwhelming electoral victories and systematically undermined the quality of the democratic regime. Numerous issues faced by contemporary Serbia stem from the unfinished process of state-building. First, the national borders are not clearly defined, as there is no societal consensus which territories belong to Serbia. This is primarily related to the Kosovo question, which all leading politicians declare to be an integral part of Serbia. In addition, there is also the issue of the Republic of Srpska (RS), whose leader has for years publicly emphasized that the long-term goal of RS is to merge with Serbia. The government in Serbia does not oppose this idea and develops “special” relations with RS. The official policy towards Montenegro’s statehood and independence also remains ambivalent. Second, the political elite is very confused in determining where Serbia should go and where it should belong. On the one hand, the government is conducting negotiations on EU accession, and on the other hand, it claims Russia as its main friend and ally. This is evident in both fluctuating and relatively low support for the country's EU accession. Accordingly, Serbia declared itself to be militarily neutral, with a markedly negative attitude towards NATO, as a result of the 1999 NATO intervention. In conclusion, the state- and nation-building process in Serbia remains largely unfinished. Montenegro Before the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, Montenegro was a sovereign principality and since 1910, a kingdom. The identarian and cultural split of the Montenegrin society over the character of its nation and state, which represents the strongest social cleavage in that country, goes back to the time after 1918, when the Kingdom of Montenegro was integrated in the new Yugoslav state. The split between the Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 45 “Whites” (bjelaši) who supported attachment to Serbia (and Yugoslavia) during the 1920s and the “Greens” (zelenaši), who favored an independent monarchy, is reflected in the contemporary antagonism between pro-independence and pro-Serbian forces, but also in the official demographic shift that occurred after 1991. Montenegro represents a peculiar case because it has experienced disintegration of its titular ethnonational identity after the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Instead of pursuing independence in the early 1990s, the Socialist Republic of Montenegro voted in 1992 to form a new union with Serbia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, only to reverse this in the 2006 referendum, held under scrutiny of EU observers, when slightly over 55 percent of its inhabitants chose to form a separate state (Bieber, 2010, p. 941). During the early 1990s, Montenegro was dominated by the post-communist Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). Under its leader Momir Bulatović, it pursued a policy of close cooperation with Serbia, yet without the wish for full incorporation of both the country and identity with Serbia (Bieber, 2010, p. 942). However, in 1997, the DPS party split, and its larger wing was taken over by Milo Đukanović who initiated a change in course and a reorientation towards more autonomy and self-determination for Montenegro. The new leadership introduced the German mark as a parallel currency to the Yugoslav dinar. In 2000 it became the only currency, as was later transformed to the euro. In the wake of the Kosovo war (1998-1999), the federal government in Belgrade tried to centralize power. The Montenegrin government parties responded with an electoral boycott in 2000. After the fall of Milošević, relations between the two constituent republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia improved, yet Đukanović continued to work towards more autonomy, and, eventually, independence for Montenegro. The Montenegrin leadership received support for its pro-independence policy from the ethnic minorities, Albanians, Bosniaks, and Croats. Minority representatives in parliament became a ready supply of votes needed for maintaining a government majority. Under international pressure, in 2002 the federation was transformed into a loose confederation, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which the Montenegrin leadership only accepted if it could be followed by an independence referendum (Bieber, 2010, p. 943). The European Union conditioned the validity of the referendum with more than 50 percent turnout and at least 55 percent in favor of independence. In 2006, just 55.5 percent voted for a sovereign Montenegrin state. In the years preceding the referendum, as well as in the new state, the political polarization over the statehood issue (independence vs. union with Serbia) has become linked with ethnic identification (Montenegrin Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 46 vs. Serb) (Džankić, 2014, p. 116). Whereas before the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia in 1991, almost 60 percent of the population identified with the titular ethnic group of Montenegrins, subsequent census data shows that less than one half of the population declares its attachment to Montenegrin ethnic identity, while almost a third identify as Serbs. The new Montenegrin state has employed policies that combine an ethnic and a civic concept of the nation. According to its constitution, it is officially a civic state, with no titular ethnonational group (Džankić, 2015, p. 18), yet it gives the Montenegrin language official status and links the state with monarchist heritage by listing the Old Royal Capital of Cetinje along with the capital city of Podgorica. The Montenegrin language was only standardized in 2010 and is accepted by fewer citizens as their own (see Box 1. 2.). The Orthodox Church has also experienced a division along this statehood/identity fault line. In 1993, a group of priests and monks split from the Serbian Orthodox Church to establish the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. This church lacks autocephaly and recognition by fellow churches, yet it bases claims on evidence about its previous (before 1920) independent status. The Montenegrin Church has since laid claim on all church property in the country, which is a source of significant income. This has provoked renewed protests from pro-Serbian forces, reigniting the deep chasm between the two main political factions with radically different visions of the Montenegrin state and nation. Finally, Montenegro’s acceptance into NATO membership in 2017 has also laid bare the deep divisions in society, the pro-independence forces seeking rapprochement with Western powers and an independent, autocephalous church, while pro- Serb forces see Russia as a natural ally and support the sole jurisprudence of the Serb Orthodox Church in the country. Box 1.2. Demographic shifts in Montenegro, evident from census data, reflect the contested nature of the Montenegrin state and nation, with a split between proponents of an independent state and those that wish a union of Montenegro and Serbia. This split is reflected in the ethnic and linguistic identification of citizens, as documented by census surveys. Ethnicity 1991 2003 2011 Montenegrin 61.9 43.2 45.0 Serb 9.3 32.0 28.7 Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 47 Mother tongue 2011 Montenegrin 37.0 Serbian 43.0 Kosovo Since Kosovo is the only case in this analysis that does not enjoy universal international recognition, its state-building process is particularly interesting. Formerly an autonomous province within the Socialist Republic of Serbia that was part of the Yugoslav federation, it saw its status revoked in 1989 by the Serbian leadership under Slobodan Milošević. Ever since the death of Tito in 1980, Kosovar Albanians were protesting what they perceived as a second-grade status and demanded a Kosovo Republic, equal in status to other republics in socialist Yugoslavia. In fact, already in 1968, only five years after gaining autonomy, Kosovar Albanian elites proclaimed unity of nation and language with Albania and demanded a republic within Yugoslavia (Kamusella, 2016, p. 226). Prior to the autonomy achieved in 1963, the Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade actively tried to separate Kosovar Albanians from Albania due to strained bilateral geopolitical relations. This also involved a specific language policy, which used the fact that Kosovar Albanians originally wrote in a Gheg-based idiom in order to develop a notion of a separate Kosovar language (called šćiptarski), just like the Greek authorities do not acknowledge Albanian speakers on its territory but rather call them Arvanites (Kamusella, 2016, pp. 229-230). After the abolition of autonomy and suppression of language rights, Kosovar Albanians, led by Ibrahim Rugova, embarked on a creation of an underground state called “Republic of Kosova”, with parallel institutions, especially the education system. This was part of their strategy of peaceful resistance to the Milošević regime, but also an attempt to build a state of their own. Over time, peaceful resistance gave in to armed insurrection, which gained momentum after an influx of illegal firearms following the 1997 rebellion in Albania. The 1998-1999 Kosovo War between the Yugoslav army and Kosovar Albanian rebels ended with the NATO military intervention. Subsequently, according to the Security Council 1244 Resolution, an interim UN peace-building mission (UNMIK), and a NATO-led peace-keeping mission (KFOR) were created. What followed was a case of state-building supervised by international peace-keeping forces. International forces created the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, including the Assembly of Kosovo, with re- Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 48 served seats for Serbs, but also for smaller ethnic minorities, such as Bosniaks, Roma, Ashkali, and others. Both Albanian and Serbian were afforded equal status, with additional protection for minority languages. Parallel to such internationally-sponsored state-building, the United Nations fostered a long process of negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina about the future status of Kosovo (Ahtisaari Plan). However, after Montenegro became independent in 2006, the new Republic of Serbia enshrined in its constitution an official position that Kosovo is to remain an integral part of the state. In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed independence. After the declaration of independence, Kosovo Serbs adopted two strategies of coping with the new situation. The ones living in the enclaves in the southern and eastern parts of the country chose to partake in elections to the Assembly and even participate in government as junior partners, while those in the northernmost part opted for a boycott and development of parallel institutions. In the 2011-2013 period, this led to an insurgency in North Kosovo. This ended with the Brussels Agreement, mediated between Belgrade and Prishtina, where the Serb government put pressure on local Serbs to dismantle parallel institutions, in exchange for guarantees of establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities. The Agreement was also envisaged as a precondition for further advancement of Serbia’s EU accession, as well as a means of ensuring that Serbia might not block Kosovo’s EU membership in the future. Yet, due to different opinions on the actual scope of self-rule powers accorded to this entity, the Community of Serb Municipalities still remains to be realized in practice. The Ahtisaari Plan, an UN-mandated plan of supervised independence that became the basis of the contemporary Republic of Kosovo, introduced civic notions of statehood and nationhood, with a new flag, coat of arms and other state symbols which do not pertain to any specific ethnic group (Krasniqi, 2014, pp. 147-148). Nevertheless, the non-ethnic nature of the state and the civic nation-building mandated by international forces remain contested among the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, which often gives more weight to attachment to Albania and its symbols than to the deliberately catch-all character of the Kosovo state. In addition, one of the three biggest political parties in Kosovo, Self-Determination (Vetëvendosje), advocates a union of Kosovo and Albania in a single state. Kosovo, thusly, remains challenged by external deniers of its statehood, and internally because of a dissonance between the internationally mandated civic character and the strong attachment of ethnic Albanians to the idea of a shared polity with Albania. Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 49 Box 1.3. Partial international recognition remains one of the biggest challenges to the statehood of the Republic of Kosovo. Both Belgrade and Prishtina have invested a lot of time and resources into diplomatic efforts at either thwarting or enabling recognition by sovereign states around the world, as well as acceptance of Kosovo into international organizations. Some of the countries which do not recognize Kosovo include Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, China, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, and the Ukraine. Suggested readings: Ejdus, F. (2020). Crisis and Ontological Insecurity: Serbia’s Anxiety over Kosovo's Secession. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kostovicova, D. (2005). Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space. London/New York: Routledge. North Macedonia The Republic of North Macedonia is a successor of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, formed in 1944 as part of socialist Yugoslavia. The foundation of its statehood was laid by socialist Yugoslavia. Further, North Macedonia is a good example of socialist state and nation-building, i.e. the process of establishment of key national institutions (parliament, cultural, and educational institutions) under the conditions of socialist modernization. Thus, the standard Macedonian language was codified only in 1945. The development of other key national institutions, such as the academy of arts and sciences and universities, also go back to the socialist era. Both socialist and modern-day North Macedonia see a precursor of its statehood the Kruševo Republic, a short-lived revolutionary entity following the anti-Ottoman Ilinden Uprising in 1903. The old communist elites, led by President Kiro Gligorov, reluctantly embarked on a path towards independence. They organized a referendum which included a possibility of renewed association with other Yugoslav polities in a union of independent states in September 1991, yet only left Yugoslav federal institutions in January 1992 and introduced a new national currency in May 1992 (Willemsen, 2010, pp. 967-968). The new state inherited socialist institutions, but also symbols. Together with Belarus, it is the only post-communist state in Europe that still uses a socialist emblem (albeit without the red star which was removed in 2009). However, it did adopt a new flag, which featured the Vergina Star, a solar symbol from an- Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 50 cient Hellenic Macedonia. This was part of a general policy of antiquization, a nation-building project meant to project Macedonian identity into the far past and claim heritage of Ancient Macedonia, including Alexander the Great. Such a nation-building policy was vehemently opposed by Greece. Through international lobbying and pressure, Greek diplomacy managed to force the government in Skopje to amend the flag so that it does not display the Vergina Star but a stylized sun, and achieved the adoption of the moniker FYROM (“Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”) as the officially used name in international discourse until a bilateral settlement would determine the final verdict on the issue of the name of the state (Risteski & Kodra Hysa, 2014, p. 167). Macedonian statehood received another challenge in 1992, when a group of ethnic Albanians organized an unofficial referendum in Albanian-majority municipalities in the western and northwestern parts of the country and proclaimed an autonomous province of Ilirida. This internal challenge to the state came about as the new authorities amended the constitutional status of the country’s different groups (and languages), which particularly meant reduced possibilities for official usage of the Albanian language in municipalities where its speakers were in majority or substantial plurality (Willemsen, 2010, p. 971). Thus, the external challenge to the nation-building project, posed by Greece, affected Skopje’s ambitions towards international recognition and European and Atlantic integration, while the internal challenge posed by ethnic Albanians created structural instability for the young state. Finally, the national church, an institution understood by the new post-communist authorities as a key element of national unification around an ethnic Macedonian identity, faced challenges as well. Namely, the Serbian Orthodox Church, from which the Macedonian Orthodox Church – Ohrid Archbishopric seceded in 1967, sought to exert its authority and prevent the achievement of autocephaly. In 2005, the Serbian Orthodox Church established a separate, autonomous, yet subordinate Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric (Risteski & Kodra Hysa, 2014, p. 195). The discontent of ethnic Albanians over their status escalated when insurgency spilled over from Kosovo and finally resulted in a short, yet impactful armed uprising in 2001. Under international mediation, a post-conflict power-sharing mechanism was brokered with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The country became a consociational democracy, with mandatory inclusion of Albanian parties in the national government and provisions for official bilingualism in parts of the country with substantial Albanian population. However, as the power-sharing mechanism linked language rights to census-confirmed percentages (at least 20% on Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 51 municipal level to make it co-official) of minority ethnolinguistic groups, census results became particularly contested in the struggle between ethnic Macedonians wishing to preserve the character of the state as pertaining to the Macedonian nation and Albanians seeking to promote a binational, highly decentralized or even federal state. Census data was also linked to the citizenship regime and its role in national homogenization. After a census in 1994 and another one in 2002, the 2012 was started and then suspended, amid controversy and mutual accusations of false representation of ethnic demography. The renewed census was to be held in 2020, yet again failed to manifest due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2018, the bilateral Prespa Lake Agreement was signed, paving the way for the normalization of relations between the governments in Skopje and Athens. The authorities in Skopje agreed to change the name of the country to North Macedonia, giving in to years of Greek objections. In addition, the Agreement proclaimed mutual understanding that the term “Macedonian” carries an entirely different and separate historical and cultural meaning for both countries, but also made the North Macedonian side renounce its policy of nation-building rooted in Ancient Macedonia of Alexander the Great (Rohdewald, 2018, pp. 578-579). Thus, Skopje accepted the exclusive policy of history and identity promoted by Athens, which, in return, revoked its veto against North Macedonia joining NATO in 2020. Box 1.4. The Macedonian question refers to the multifaceted political, cultural, and sectarian struggle to integrate and dominate the Slavic Macedonian population in the late 19th century. With the weakening power of the Ottoman Empire, the nascent Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek states all vied for influence over this population, by building their own schools and sending out priests to expand their national church presence in the region, in an attempt to attract local inhabitants to its own nation- and state-building projects. The period spanning from the Congress of Berlin (1878) to the Second Balkan War (1913) involved a bitter conflict for the hearts and souls of Slavic Macedonians and laid the ground for contemporary contested polity and identity in North Macedonia. Suggested readings: Karakasidou, A. N. (1997). Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 52 Yosmaoğlu, İ. K. (2013). Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Albania Albania is the only analyzed case which was already an independent state before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of one-party communist regimes in South Eastern Europe. The modern Albanian state was created in 1912. Its establishment was externally supported by geopolitical concerns of the Austro-Hungarian empire which wanted to create a buffer zone and prevent Serbian expansion towards the sea. At time of its birth, the state encompassed roughly half of areas where ethnic Albanians were the majority or a large plurality. The question whether the borders of Albania should be maintained or whether an integration of all Albanian-settled areas in the Balkans should be sought, became one of the key elements in the civil war that developed between Yugoslav-backed communist partisans and partially collaborationist National Front (Balli Kombëtar) during the Second World War and the resistance to Fascist Italian and later (from September 1943) Nazi German occupation (Schmidt-Neke, 2010, pp. 1007-1008). Communist Albania was dominated by speakers of the southern dialect, Tosks (traditionally Orthodox and Bektashi). As the old, pre-war nationalist elites were suppressed, so was the pre-war standard language, based on the intermediate Elbasani dialect, supplanted by the southern, Tosk idiom (Kamusella, 2016, pp. 223-225). This has alienated speakers of the northern dialect (also spoken in Kosovo), Ghegs (traditionally Roman Catholic and Sunni), who had constituted the majority of pre-war elites. Albanian nation-building in late 19th century revolved around the idea of overcoming religious and sectarian differences as unimportant and stressing the notion of “Albanianism” as a meta-religion, superseding previous attachments (Endresen, 2014, p. 201). Such an approach was further emphasized by communist authorities which promoted radical secularization and official atheism. In 1990, the communist leader Ramiz Alia enacted reforms introducing the market economy, freedom of religion and multiparty elections without changing the constitution (Schmidt-Neke, 2010, p. 1009). Thus, post-communist Albania did not enact a radical break with the existing institutional framework, but rather just adapted it to new circumstances. However, af- Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 53 ter decades of isolation, many Albanians had little patience for gradual steps towards Western-style liberal democracy. In 1991, almost 30,000 irregularly migrated over the Adriatic Sea to Italy. This ultimately led to Operation Pelican, a humanitarian mission of the Italian Army, providing food and other aid in Albania (Tripodi, 1999, p. 109). In 1997, a chain bankruptcy of Ponzi scheme investment undertakings led to massive protests and the collapse of the state, with family and local loyalties superseding the state. This was a sign that the new post-communist regime could not consolidate and manage a crisis, but was torn between post-communist and nationalist forces trying to shape the state according to its own image. Order was restored by an Italian-led multinational protection force called Operation Alba, approved by the Security Council Resolution 1101(Tripodi, 1999, p. 114). After the unrest, the new 1998 constitution emphasized the unitary character of the country, contrary to notions of a potential federalization between the Gheg north and a Tosk south (Schmidt-Neke, 2010, pp. 1010-1011). Post-communist Albania is an ethnically homogenous country, with almost 98 percent of the population being of Albanian ethnicity. The new elites have started emphasizing the Christian character of the country’s past and its heroes, be it Mother Teresa or Skanderbeg, as an attempt to bring Albania closer to Western Europe (Endresen, 2014, pp. 206-207). However, survey data from 2014 offer a complex picture. Albanians are not as atheist as the communist regime tried to make them and are more attached to their religious and sectarian identities than the hundred years of secularist nation-building wished, yet they remain largely unobservant and view religious tolerance as part of Albania’s civic culture and national characteristic (Endresen, 2014, pp. 223-224). Instead of building new institutions, the Albanian state just adapted existing, communist ones, while official atheism was replaced by secular civic nationalism where religion is largely confined to the private sphere and cannot and does not have to serve as a unifying factor for the nation. During the 1990s, the state was very fragile, with police and military unable to maintain monopoly on violence, which ultimately resulted in state collapse, in 1991 and 1997 respectively, resolved by international intervention. Conclusion During the last thirty years, the dual processes of nation- and state-building have played a central role in Western Balkans societies. In contrast to other Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 54 post-communist societies, Yugoslav successor countries faced several parallel processes: collapse of communism, state dissolution, war, and transition. In addition, a nation-building process characterized by pronounced ethnocentrism took place. Institutionally, the new states embraced the institutional framework that they inherited from federal Yugoslavia, which had, since the 1974 constitution, become confederal in nature. Symbolic nation-building, especially in those countries that were involved in war and armed conflict, was characterized by victimization of the own nation, whereby the “Others” were proclaimed to be enemies. Such a strategy has left a deep mark in all post-conflict societies of the Western Balkans, which find it very difficult to deal with own responsibility for the events of wars and armed conflicts in the 1990s. This reluctance to deal with the past prevents substantial reconciliation and manifests itself in a plethora of ways, from the discourse on cooperation with the ICTY and commemorative practices to official political rhetoric and history and language textbooks in elementary and secondary schools. Questions for students: What are the main external and internal challenges to the state of North Macedonia? What is the role of the Orthodox Church in contestations over statehood and nationhood after the fall of communism? What competing narratives about the nature of the state can we find in Bosnia and Herzegovina? How does Montenegro stand out from other discussed Western Balkans cases? References Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Bieber, F. (2006). Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bieber, F. (2010). Das politische System Montenegros. In W. Ismayr (Ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (3rd ed., pp. 941-966). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 55 Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Dević, A. (2014). Jaws of the Nation and Weak Embraces of the State: The Lines of Division, Indifference and Loyalty in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In P. Kolstø (Ed.), Strategies of symbolic nation-building in South Eastern Europe (pp. 51-86). Farnham: Ashgate. Dobbins, J. (2008). Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo. Santa Monica, CA, Arlington, VA, Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation. Džankić, J. (2014). When Two Hands Rock the Cradle: Symbolic Dimensions of the Divide Over Statehood and Identity in Montenegro. In P. Kolstø (Ed.), Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe (pp. 115-138). Farnham: Ashgate. Džankić, J. (2015). Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro: Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges. Farnham: Ashgate. Endresen, C. (2014). Status Report Albania 100 Years: Symbolic Nation-Building Completed? In P. Kolstø (Ed.), Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe (pp. 201-226). Farnham: Ashgate. Hayden, R. M. (2013). From Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans: Studies of a European Disunion, 1991-2011. Leiden: Brill. Hehir, A., & Robinson, N. (Eds.). (2007). State Building: Theory and Practice. London, New York: Routledge. Jovanović, V. (2014). Serbia and the Symbolic (Re)Construction of the Nation. In P. Kolstø (Ed.), Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe (pp. 87-114). Farnham: Ashgate. Kamusella, T. (2016). The idea of a Kosovan language in Yugoslavia’s language politics. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 242(1), pp. 217-237. Kolstø, P. (2014a). Introduction. In P. Kolstø (Ed.), Strategies of Symbolic Nationbuilding in South Eastern Europe (pp. 1-18). Farnham: Ashgate. Kolstø, P. (2014b). Identifying with the old or the new state: nation-building vs. Yugonostalgia in the Yugoslav successor states. Nations and Nationalism, 20(4), pp. 760-781. Krasniqi, V. (2014). Kosovo: Topography of the Construction of the Nation. In P. Kolstø (Ed.), Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South-Eastern Europe (pp. 139-164). Farnham: Ashgate. Pauković, D. (2015). The Discourse on Europe: From the Return to Europe and the Escape from the Balkans to the European Union as a Solution of all National Problems. In P. Maldini, & D. Pauković (Eds.), Croatia and the European Union: Changes and Development (pp. 53-68). Farnham: Ashgate. Pauković, D. (2019). Framing the Narrative About Communist Crimes in Croatia: Bleiburg and Jazovka. In V. Pavlaković, & D. Pauković (Eds.), Framing the Nation and Collective Identities: Political Rituals and Cultural Memory of the Twentieth-Century Traumas in Croatia (pp. 99-118). Abingdon: Routledge. Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos 56 Pavlaković, V. (2014). Fulfilling the Thousand-Year-Old Dream: Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in Croatia. In P. Kolstø (Ed.), Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe (pp. 19-49). Farnham: Ashgate. Richter, S., & Gavrić, S. (2010). Das politische System Bosnien und Herzegovinas. In W. Ismayr (Ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (3rd ed., pp. 837-895). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Risteski, L. S., & Kodra Hysa, A. (2014). Strategies for Creating the Macedonian State and Nation and Rival Projects Between 1991 and 2012. In P. Kolstø (Ed.), Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe (pp. 165-200). Farnham: Ashgate. Ristić, I. (2010). Das politische System Serbiens. In W. Ismayr (Ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (3rd ed., pp. 897-940). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Rohdewald, S. (2018). Citizenship, Ethnicity, History, Nation, Region, and the Prespa Agreement of June 2018 between Macedonia and Greece. Südosteuropa, 66(4), pp. 577-593. Schmidt-Neke, M. (2010). Das politische System Albaniens. In W. Ismayr (Ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (3rd ed., pp. 1007-1052). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Štiks, I. (2015). Nations and Citizens in Yugoslavia and the Post-Yugoslav States: One Hundred Years of Citizenship. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Tokača, M. (2013). Bosnian Book of the Dead. Sarajevo, Belgrade: Research and Documentation Center, Humanitarian Law Center. Tripodi, P. (1999). The Collapse of Albania and a Different Type of Warlord: Criminal Gangs. In P. B. Rich (Ed.), Warlords in International Relations (pp. 103-119). Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Willemsen, H. (2010). Das politische System Makedoniens. In W. Ismayr (Ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (3rd ed., pp. 967-1005). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Zakošek, N. (2008). Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia. Democratization, 15(3), pp. 588-610. Zakošek, N., & Maršić, T. (2010). Das politische System Kroatiens. In W. Ismayr (Ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (3rd ed., pp. 773-835). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Chapter 1: The Search for Meaning and Identity 57 Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy Pero Maldini Abstract: This chapter analyzes the concept and meaning of democracy from the aspect of normative determining (value, ideological and political basis of democracy), and from the aspect of the basic features of contemporary liberal democracy (normative-institutional establishment of a democratic political order and functioning of a democratic political system). Democracy is a political order that establishes the rule of the people through institutional and procedural mechanisms. Its purpose is to realize the freedom, equality, dignity, human and civil rights, and social justice and well-being for each individual. For the sake of better understanding, the historical, philosophical, and political origins of modern democracy are first considered in a historical and political perspective from Athenian democracy, through the development of early modern political thought to bourgeois revolutions and shaping of modern liberal democracy. The chapter then analyzes the dimensions, scope, and criteria of democracy and the distinction between minimal (political) and maximal (substantive) democracy. This is particularly important in the context of the democratic transition of post-authoritarian societies and the consolidation of democracy within them. The chapter pays particular attention to the political participation just as to the prerequisites for substantive democracy (institutional-political, socioeconomic, socio-structural and socio-cultural) as the preconditions for the functioning, viability, and development of democracy. Key terms: democracy, freedom, equality, civil rights, values of democracy, institutions, procedures, participation Introduction Democracy is a term, which – despite its widespread popularity and seemingly self-explanatory – cannot yet be determined unambiguously. It is commonly understood as a political order marked by the rule of the peo- 59 ple; at the same time, democracy is a value per se, since it tends to realize freedom, dignity, and the protection of human rights. Democracy also signifies a desirable form of organizing social and political relations in a society; it can be understood as a political ideology; it denotes a political system as a normative-institutional establishment of a democratic order. For a clear picture of the meanings and structure of these interpretations, we need to clarify the relevant concepts and relations involved. We use the word democracy for both the ideal, and the reality, which tries to achieve it (cf. Dahl, 2005, 187). Therefore, the discussion on democracy must involve not only theory on possible forms of government by the people, but also consideration of what it should be, i.e. of the best forms of governing and understanding the practical experiences with the ways in which power should be organized in different societies at different times (cf. Sørensen, 1998, 4). The democratic system is thus set up as a result of deontological pressure. What democracy is, cannot be separated from what democracy should be. Democracy exists only if its ideals and values exist (Sartori, 1962, 4; Sartori, 1987, 58-59). Box 2.1. At its core, democracy is a way of making collective decisions and establishing rules and policies through the citizen's decision-making process. It is a form of government that lets citizens supervise the political government, and act in their own interest. A democratic citizenship implies that citizens are involved in political processes (of making collectively binding decisions), so the essential function of political institutions is to translate citizens' preferences into policies, i.e. to bring them to life. Suggested readings: Dahl, R. A. (1998). On democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. At the same time, democracy is, or should be, a process, which creates freedom of action for the individual. To ensure as much liberty for all citizens – as much as concrete social circumstances will permit – is a constant requirement that democracy has to meet. Namely, freedom is not absolute, but limited by regard to others' freedom; it denotes certain concrete liberties, including the free choice of one's way of life, worldview, opinions, religion, and profession; the free usage and inviolability of one's property. The purpose of these liberties is to protect the dignity of each individual, not as something granted by the ruler's mercy, but as the original and inalienable right of a human and a citizen, that the government (state) must safeguard and guarantee equally to all its citizens. Therefore, a truly democratic society will have to enable and stimulate all citizens, as individuals Pero Maldini 60 or groups, to choose their life path in a way that recognizes that others have a right to this, too. In this vein, the following discussion suggests that democracy should be understood not only as a democratic political order (normative-institutional establishment and functioning of a democratic political system and democratic procedures), but also as a process of introducing, constant broadening and protecting civil rights and liberties, and constantly deepening democratic practice. Historical, philosophical, and political origins of modern democracy Ancient Greek polis, a city-state, denotes a community of citizens as its equal members. Since man is a political being by his nature, he lives in a community. Therefore, such a community, or state, is the natural form of his life. A polis is set up to maintain life, and its basic determinant is justice. Politics, in turn, denotes political (public) actions of citizens in order to regulate common life (cf. Aristotel, 1984). Citizens of ancient Athens were all free and full members of Athenian society (indigenous, adult, and male) constituting the political people, or demos, as the political community of equals. Other people (women, slaves, foreigners) were not citizens, and had no right to participate in political decision-making. Athenian democracy was based on equality before the law, freedom of speech, and free access to public services. Citizens would assemble to decide on laws and public issues of the community. From their ranks, officials were elected to public service, for a period, with possibility of recall. This kind of democracy is direct – all citizens participate in decisionmaking. In the (physical and political) center of Athens is the agora; this is a gathering place where all important issues of the community are publicly discussed, and decisions are made by majority vote. The citizens are both the government and the court; they assess and judge propositions, decide which propositions are good for the community, and who is to govern and implement the decisions and how. Free speech (as a right) and rhetorical skill (as a means of persuading the audience) are key characteristics of Athenian democracy. Likewise, a rationalization of political decision-making appears, stemming from awareness of the common good. This is a huge departure from the primitive forms of government and decision-making of tyrannies based on force, which were a common and widespread form of government at the time. Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 61 From a modern perspective, Athenian democracy was seriously limited; it was not inclusive (like modern representative democracies), but exclusive, toward its own social structure as well as outsiders. In addition, freedom and civil rights did not apply to everyone, but only to full members of its own community (cf. Zamarovský, 1978, 142-174; Dahl, 1989, 13-23). However, despite all its limitations, it achieved something remarkable: turning a passive subject (with no rights, ruler-dependent) into an active citizen (free and equal). It secured a high level of participation in political decision-making, which was not seen again until modern times. Athenian democracy gave birth to the values and ideals on which not only modern liberal democracy, but also the cultural identity of Western civilization is based. After the period of (Hellenistic and Roman) antiquity came the longlasting Middle Ages; social thought was immersed in theological and scholastic frameworks; monarchies and feudal estate order marked the social and political structures. In the Renaissance period, social thought slowly became more humanist, anthropocentric, and scientific; thinkers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Moore, and Erasmus of Rotterdam, made significant contributions by reflecting on the social relations of their times. In the 17th and 18th century, growth of production and economy resulted in great social changes: strengthening of citizens, liberation from the old feudal and religious restrictions, and more complex forms of sociality. This was a time of growth for science and social thought alike, in particular the ideas of rationalism and Enlightenment, which put forth the question of a rationally based political order and the idea of individual freedom. The opposition of the state of nature and the political state, natural law, social contract, distinction between state and society, separation of powers, and rule of law – these were the new concepts on which new political thought was based (cf. Hobbes, 2004, 90-113, 122-125; Rousseau, 1978, 94-110; Locke, 1952, 4-14; Strauss, 1992, 1-29; Prpić, Puhovski and Uzelac, 1990, 217-219; Tadić, 1988, 35-40). Box 2.2. Political society exists, where every member of society gives up his natural authority, and delegates it to the community, to gain protection of the laws it establishes. The origin and basis of political society is the consent of free individuals to unite and incorporate such a society. Only this can justify a legal government. A political society is created as a voluntary alliance of free men, based on an agreement, and freely choosing their rulers. The political order is based on the state of equality (political and before the law), and freedom limited with respect to others and their freedom. The state is established by the will of its citizens (implying na- Pero Maldini 62 tional sovereignty, which opposes any form of absolutism) and serves to guarantee freedom, equality, and private property to its citizens. A ruler is a ruler only by the citizens will and consent. Due to this, citizens have the constitutional and legal right to oppose the unconstitutional actions of the ruler, and replace him with another. The principle of secularity, i.e. separation of Church and state, universal religious tolerance, and freedom of thought, are all promoted (Locke, 1952, 44-72, 96-98; Montesquieu, 2003; Voltaire, 1977). Suggested readings: Locke, J. (1952) [1690]. The second treatise of government, (ed. and introduction by Thomas S. Peardon). New York. The Liberal Arts Press. Montesquieu, C. L. S. (2003) [1748]. O duhu zakona. Zagreb: Demetra. Rousseau, J. J. (1978). Društveni ugovor. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. Voltaire, (1997) [1763]. Rasprava o toleranciji. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska. All citizens are equal in their rights, because every individual joins of his own free will, and for the common good and common interest. Society is thus constituted as an association of free and independent citizens, connected by the market and integrated by the state (sovereign political authority and a unified legal order) which is the result of the general will of the citizens, and which by its instruments guarantees freedom and equality before the law. In this way, the sovereignty of the people (demos) is founded. The government of the state stems from the people and belongs to the people; national sovereignty is indivisible and inalienable. A democratic republic becomes the ideal state (Rousseau, 1978, 107-112, 126, 146). Besides this "unifying" characteristic, the social contract also has a "subjugating" characteristic, which includes the obligation of every member of society to submit to its laws. The state is set up as a legal creation, based on laws. It is a mechanism for carrying out and protecting the general will with laws and regulations. The ideal of a rational state and the social contract theory had enormous influence and significance on the further development of civic thought in 18th and 19th century, as well as on social (bourgeois, democratic) revolutions. Social revolutions, especially the American (1775–1783) and the French (1789–1795) ones, marked the end of old feudal regimes (l'ancien régime) and started great social changes leading to the establishment of new political orders – republics and liberal democracies. General suffrage, rule of law, a constitutional state, political liberties, political competition, tolerance, and responsibility of the political authorities – these concepts spawned by social revolutions became the constituents of civic thought Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 63 and political life of the period. They are of great importance, because they became the foundation for modern democracy. Mid-19th century social revolutions were marked by processes of creation of modern nations and nation-states, but also by social problems of early industrial capitalist societies, and struggle for labour rights and social justice. Two great political ideologies of modern times – liberalism and socialism, shaped the political development of modern democracies with their values, but also their shortcomings and crises. While liberalism determined democracy as a society of liberty, equality, and political rights, social democracy extended it with standards of social protection, security, and social solidarity. The different role (and scope) of the state in liberal and socialist traditions significantly contributed to the present shape of democratic orders of the Western world. The concept and meaning of democracy In the widest sense, democracy means the rule of the people. However, this is a fairly imprecise definition. The term demos kratein, as we saw, denoted classic, direct democracy of the ancient Greek polis, the agora where public issues were discussed and directly decided on by all its full citizens. Although, in contemporary comparisons, Athenian democracy has to be taken conditionally, the original sense of democracy, embodied in the possibility for every full citizen (with rights equal to others' rights) to participate in deciding on the community's public issues – still remains the ideal which modern liberal democracies aim towards. In modern times – because of the large number of members of political communities – direct democracy is not possible, so modern democracy is established as a representative democracy. The people rule through elected representatives which, in the name of the people and under their supervision (in regular elections and through institutions of government control), perform political duties and carry out the general will of the people who elected them. This kind of rule is a way of deciding on collectively binding rules and policies by which citizens organize their relations and supervise the government (Beetham, 1992, 40). Thus, in a democracy the government stems from the people, is implemented by the people, and for the interests of the people. The system of democratic rule entails a set of procedures, which determine the methods and forms of activity of political actors in their approach to government, strategies that they can use to implement their approach, and rules they follow when creating and enforcing collectively Pero Maldini 64 binding decisions. In periods between elections, citizens can influence public policies through a range of other intermediaries (interest groups, social movements, civil associations). Modern democracy thus enables a diversity of competitive processes and channels for expression of interests and value orientations, not only political, but also territorial, collective, and individual. All these components are part of democratic practice. However, a problem can appear when a properly set up and stable majority regularly makes decisions to the detriment of the minority. In these conditions, successful democracies define basic principles of the majority in a way that protects the rights of the minority. In a democracy, there has to be agreement that those who obtain greater electoral support or political influence will not take advantage of temporary power to prevent the losing side from taking office or gaining influence in the future. The reverse also holds: to maintain competition, the losers have to respect the right of the winner to make collectively binding decisions. For democracy to progress, it's necessary to follow procedural norms and respect civil rights. Any policy, which fails to define such limitations for itself, fails to achieve rule of law. Besides, this kind of limiting enables equal and legitimate expression of different interests in public. For this reason, cooperation is a necessary and central characteristic of democracy. Actors have to voluntarily make collective decisions based on public good. They have to cooperate to be able to compete. They must be capable of collective action through parties, civil groups, and movements, to elect candidates, articulate their interests and demands, and policies of influence (Karl and Schimtter, 1991, 76-82). Box 2.3. Compromise and consensus are thus key mechanisms for mediation between different, mutually opposed social interests. This process of mediation requires such mechanisms as to peacefully, without pressure or force, solve the problems of social relations, and organize them in a way that maximally satisfies all interests, within the limits of a given situation. Negotiations involving compromise lead to a consensus-based agreement, making political decisions legitimate and collectively binding for members of the political community. In addition, it is a necessary condition for legitimacy of the government's decisions that the whole process is based on a democratic procedure. A formal democratic procedure is a set of rules and procedures, which are the basis for activities of institutions of a democratic system. Consistent compliance with the democratic procedure ensures the lawfulness of the institutions' actions; it acts to redistribute power; it is a mechanism for controlling power, and preventing its abuse. Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 65 Suggested readings: Diamond, L. (2009). Three Paradoxes of Democracy. In Diamond, L. and Plattner, M., (Eds.), Democracy: A Reader. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (p.p. 73-85). Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven CN/London: Yale University Press. Tocqueville, A. (2001). Democracy in America. New York: Penguin Putnam Inc. There are three main dimensions to political democracy that the political system must include to be democratic: a) The first dimension comprises a level of civil and political liberties (freedom of expression and association) which must ensure the dignity of political competition and the right of political contestation (opposition). b) The second dimension comprises a well-established, widespread competition between individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all positions in the political authority, regularly recurring, and without the use of force. c) The third dimension comprises high inclusivity (general suffrage) in electing political leaders and policies, through regularly occurring and fair elections so that no social group is left out (Dahl, 1971, 2005; Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997; Sørensen, 1998; Karl and Schmitter, 1991). Box 2.4. However, democracy is much more than merely free elections of political representatives and the struggle to be (re)elected among political competitors. It is, above all, a political system which enables the realization and protection of human and civil rights including freedom (of thought, expression, religion, association, movement, labor), equality before the law, political pluralism, right of private ownership, privacy, social justice, and security. These rights are inalienable, guaranteed by the constitution, and protected by laws. Suggested readings: Dahl, R. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven; London: Yale University Press. Karl, T. L. and Schmitter, P. (1991). What Democracy Is… and Is Not, Journal of Democracy, (2) 3: 75-88. Pero Maldini 66 Hence, modern understanding of democracy usually implies liberal democracy. Liberalism laid the foundations for modern democracy with two achievements. The first achievement is founding civil society as a place where social relations – including private affairs, NGOs, family, and personal life – can develop without interference from the state. Gradually, liberalism became a doctrine according to which individuals ought to be free to pursue their interests in economic, religious and political affairs; basically, in all that affects everyday life. An important element here is the support for a capitalist market economy based on respect for private property. A free market is a necessary precondition for a democratic order. It is a mechanism for allocating social resources (goods, labour, and capital); it is a system in which participants (as private owners of their labour or commodity producers) match supply to demand while pursuing their goals and interests. To its participants, the market economy provides the possibility of benefit, under conditions of competition and responsibility for their own actions. The second achievement of early liberalism is the claim that the state and its government are not grounded in natural nor supernatural law, but in the will of a sovereign people. The tradition that became liberal democracy was liberal first (to limit state power in relation to civil society), and democratic later (given the creation of structures that secure the mandates of holders of state power) (cf. Sørensen, 1998, 5-9). Liberal democracy, through a system of representation, becomes the aggregate of individual preferences. Translating liberal traditions into democracy shows that the goals of democracy are best accomplished by protecting individual autonomy. Liberalism attempts to justify, but also limit, state sovereignty. The role of the state is to safeguard rights and autonomy of the individual. Box 2.5. With all this, liberal democracy also includes constitutional liberalism. It entails a constitution and laws which limit the power of the government, guarantee freedom, equality, civil rights and freedoms, protection of individuals and minorities against the majority, right of ownership and privacy, education which instructs citizens in their rights and duties, a developed civil society, diverse forms of political participation, a clear separation of powers, and a way for citizens to supervise the government. This is the substance of a modern democracy; this is its democratic essence. Suggested readings: Dahl, R. A. (1998). On democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 67 Plattner, M. (2009). From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy. In Diamond, L. and Plattner, M., (Eds.), Democracy: A Reader. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (pp. 58-70). Scope and criteria of a democracy The criteria according to which we call certain societies (political systems) democratic are not unambiguous. This is especially noticeable when attempting to classify new democracies, i.e., societies in transition from autocratic rule to democracy. One could say that the dual meaning behind the notion of "rule of the people" lies primarily in different views of the scope in which the idea of democracy was recreated (Parry and Moran, 1994, 3). Tocqueville also warned that democracy originally had two meanings: one is a political order defined by the rule of people, with institutional and procedural mechanisms; the other is a characteristic of society marked by emphasis on equality and civil rights and widespread political participation and autonomous citizen activity as a form of bridging hierarchical mediations in regulating relations in society (Tocqueville, 2001). The latter meaning implies the existence of a societal precondition of democracy, and suggests that democracy cannot be reduced to just its formal, institutional aspect. Because of this, democracy is substantially defined by its effectiveness, which is seen primarily in the scope of citizens' political participation, the potential for effective control over the government, and the degree of realization of fundamental democratic values. One could say that effective democracy exists where general consensus exists, along with wide participation, a reliable praxis of respecting rights, tolerance, and pluralism. State institutions are therefore very important, but they are not there to dominate; quite the opposite, they are there to serve citizens, as a resource that enables and guarantees all those things mentioned. Following this, we distinguish between formal and substantive democracy. Formal democracy is a set of rules, procedures, and institutions, which make up the normative-institutional constitution of a democratic order. It is the minimal, absolutely required precondition; a framework which enables the democratic order to function. A substantive democracy, on the other hand, is a process which needs to be continuously reproduced; a way of regulating power relations so as to maximize the individual's abilities and his influence on the conditions of his own life – to let him take part in discussions and influence what is being decided, including the Pero Maldini 68 most important decisions which influence a society. The distinction between formal and substantive democracy is useful for analytical purposes, separating institutional and procedural aspects from the way they are applied and practiced in the real conditions of concrete societies (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997, 62-63). This distinction can also be considered as a continuum, ranging from minimal (political) to maximal (participative) democracy. Thus, minimal democracy means a minimum of preconditions, primarily institutional and procedural ones, which a society needs to be able to be democratic; maximal democracy is all this, but with wide political participation and effective mechanisms of government oversight in addition (Maldini, 2008, 30-35). A minimal level of democracy could be determined based on two basic requirements. The first requirement is presence of political competition; this is the case if there exist institutions and a democratic procedure through which citizens can freely express their preferences (with multiple choices!), and if there is an institutional protection to prevent the government from reaching for these freedoms. The second requirements of a minimal democracy is inclusivity (general suffrage) for all citizens, independent of their secondary (national, religious, socioeconomic, etc.) characteristics. The basic minimalist definition understands democracy as regularly recurring elections and introduction of the basic norms making them possible (lack of coercion, competition between political parties, and general suffrage). However, this by itself does not guarantee the existence of freedom, equality (before the law) and respect of civil liberties. In addition, the main issue here is the substantive task of democracy as a mean of realizing the interests of the individual and the people in general. In other words, it corresponds to the third part of the famous Lincoln statement: "Of the people, by the people, for the people." Narrow, minimalist concept of democracy, which focuses on its fundamental characteristics as a political order, is useful for distinguishing it from other (primarily undemocratic) political orders. However, as democracy is not just a political system, but also a complex economic and social system, it is necessary to define it broader. The maximalist interpretation additionally assumes a much wider inclusions of citizens in political processes, the introduction and protection of individual rights and liberties, and the dependence of political authorities on the voters. According to Dahl, such wide democracy (or polyarchy, as he calls it) requires: elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship; all this, at minimum, to be called a democ- Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 69 racy. Unlike a formal democracy, this is a democracy based on civil rights. The question is therefore not whether a state has the right political institutions and formal rights, but whether (and in what scope) they have a real meaning for the citizens (Dahl, 1971, 2-3; Dahl, 2005, 188-191). In line with Dahl, Huntington defines democracy as a political system that satisfies three demands: competition, inclusiveness, and civil liberties (Huntington, 1991, 7). The importance of this definition grows with the increasing number of societies with general suffrage and free competition, but without a developed system of civil liberties. These societies emphasize the fact that the civil liberties dimension can be completely independent from the dimensions of competition and inclusiveness. Because of this, the criteria of the minimalist interpretation are not sufficient to determine the level of democratization of a society, and a need arises for further criteria. These, in turn, we could classify as: a) real criteria (quality of human experience and social relations), b) constitutional criteria (legal procedures, such as elections and referenda), c) political-process criteria (interactions between politically constituted actors). So, we can consider a political order to be democratic if it sustains: a broad citizenship, civic equality, civic participation, a significant level of respect and acceptance for citizens' opinions by the political authorities, alongside the acceptance of their legitimate decisions by citizens as collectively binding, and protection of citizens from state meddling in their affairs. The institutions of democratic government and state can be effective when they have the citizens' support, i.e. when they are legitimate representatives of the political community. For this reason, it is hard to separate a democratic government from the concept of citizenship. Namely, citizenship refers to the practice of opposing power, on conflicting actions around power, i.e. on the struggle around who gets to determine the common problems and the ways to solve them through a democratic political system, which mediates and resolves these power struggles. One could say that citizenship exists where there is general consensus, general participation, responsibility, practice of civil rights, tolerance and pluralism. Democratization is therefore every step towards a citizenship, expanding the level of civil participation, equality, acceptance, and articulation of citizens' opinions, and their protection (Tilly, 1999, 4-9; Dalton, 2006, 35-60; Grugel, 2001, 7; Held, 1996, 263-271). Many countries today aim for a polyarchic level of democracy, but the challenge for citizens of old democracies is to discover how they might Pero Maldini 70 achieve a level of democratization beyond polyarchal democracy (Dahl, 2005, 197). The process of democratization, understood as the process of continuously improving democracy, can therefore manifest itself through advancements in competitive elections, general citizenship, and respecting civil rights. This definition shows that democracy is a movement towards implementing institutions and procedures (elections), but also towards achieving greater effectiveness (civil rights, economic and political rights) (Przeworski, 1991; Mainwaring, 1992). Importance of political participation Political participation, in the wideset sense, denotes participation of citizens in political decision-making. It is a result of the need to make political decisions at the lowest level possible, and for the number of included citizens to be as large as possible. By allowing for the widest participation possibility, it brings democracy closer to its ideal: real rule of the people. On the other hand, it allows citizens to supervise elected representatives, control their actions and performance in office. In modern democracies, political participation takes place in this manner: citizens, with their organized and legal activities, influence decision-making (collectively binding) outside the institutions of the political system through various forms of influence on this process and on the functioning of government. Basic forms of civic activity include political inclusion (voting), active political engagement (in parties and political campaigns), organizing, and engagement within the network of non-governmental organizations which make up the structure of civil society (civil movements, local associations, religious groups, sports, ecology, and professional organizations, art groups, unions). In a functional sense, civic activity implies shaping a critical general public as a control mechanism and a corrective for the government. . All these forms of civil activism mostly attempt to influence political decision-making. Political participation cannot substitute the functions of the institutions of representative democracy (since most decisions cannot be brought by direct decision-making), but it is still not merely an addition to them. Participative forms of decision-making and influencing processes of political decision-making exist side by side with the representative institutions. They are a complementary part of the democratic decision-making process, and a mechanism of supervision and constraint over the political government. The best indicator of developed civil participation is a developed and vital civil society. When it is organized and active, and when there is a Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 71 diversity of forms of political participation, the civil society is autonomous with respect to the political government, as a center of power beyond the state. It is an actor that guarantees the separation of state and society, and acts against any interference by the state (political government) with the autonomy of citizens (Maldini, 2008, 36-40; Maldini, 2011, 286-287). Preconditions of substantive democracy To function stably and effectively, a democratic political order needs certain conditions to be satisfied. Old democracies created them over a long period; today, these are the factors which make them stable and effective. New democracies – by and large, societies recently emerged from authoritarian rule – have yet to achieve most of these conditions, even though they have already established a formal normative-institutional democratic order. These conditions are necessary to sustain democracy after its initial establishment; even more important, they are necessary for this formal democracy to come to life as a real, substantive democracy. Therefore, the issue of preconditions for democracy is more relevant today than ever before. Even though they are hard to view in isolation, due to them being intertwined and usually co-occurring, the basic preconditions of an effective democracy could be characterized as institutional-political conditions, socioeconomic conditions, and sociocultural conditions (Maldini, 2008, 41-51). Institutional-political preconditions The basic precondition for the establishment of any political order, including democracy, is the existence of a nation-state as a political community of its citizens. A state means territorial integrity and (internationally recognized) national sovereignty, and a system of institutions with the legal right (in a democracy, it also has to be legitimate) to use force in enforcing laws and decisions by the government. A democratic state also includes: rule of law, existence of multiple centers of power (separation of powers, autonomy of civil society), commitment to social justice (social state), and a freely elected political authorities (who represents the political will of the citizens and which is subjected to their control), and public administration institutions. a) Pero Maldini 72 Institutional-political preconditions of a democratic order are included by minimal or formal (political) democracy. They refer primarily to the institutional constitution of democracy, i.e. setting up norms, procedures, and institutions, which make up the foundation of a democratic political system. Without that framework as the fundamental institutional precondition, a democratic order is not possible. To avoid the danger of violent conflict resolution, a democratic system requires a procedural consensus. Rule of law guarantees rights to individuals and groups to challenge the political authorities and refute their policies and the influence of those policies on social structures. Legal state is thus one of the fundamental institutional preconditions of democracy. The state is ruled by law, not the ruler. Legal state presumes respect for laws and equal rights, equally so for citizens and the political government. Its purpose is to ensure freedom and rights to the citizen, equality and justice, participation in political decision making, and safety. In other words, its function is to protect the autonomy of the individual in relation to the state (government); it is expressed through protection of freedom (of thought, expression, and association), equality (legal and political), and rights (to private ownership, human, political, and civil ones). This protection is reflected in both formal and real separation of civil society and the state. It manifests itself in securing the autonomy of civil society and preventing the state and the political authorities from reaching into the free space of civil society and the public. Separation of powers and legal state are inseparable from each other. Legal state legalizes and establishes separation (tripartition) of powers as one of the fundamental precepts of democracy. In this framework, the legislature makes laws, and since it is an institution of political representation, those laws reflect the general will of the people. The executive branch acts according to laws, which prescribe its actions, constrain it, and allow for supervision. The judiciary, which is independent from the first two, acts to protect justice and lawfulness. The three branches of the government are separate, but mutually dependent, so each branch oversees and constrains the others (principle of checks and balances). This enables a rule of law and avoids arbitrary use of power. Legal state necessarily includes democratic procedure. Compliance with procedures is necessary to ensure that institutions of the political system act legally, and therefore legitimately. All state activities must be connected with the constitution as the basic legal act of a democratic state. The power of the state comes from the constitution and the laws that constrain it and prescribe its usage. Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 73 Despite the formal, political equality of citizens that a democracy enables, conditions of life – especially socioeconomic ones, such as a distribution of economic resources and opportunities, which are essential to structuring social relations – cause real inequality of people. This inequality is reflected in economic and social differences, poverty, vulnerability, and insecurity of particular groups of citizens within society, which substantially limits their freedom, their rights and possibilities to participate in political life. Freedom and equality are therefore established and sustained by state intervention, with the aim of realizing social equality and a dignified life for all citizens (Nohlen, 2001, 343; Grugel, 2002, 5). This intervention is reflected primarily in the state's social functions; this is a set of public policies and measures of social care and protection, carried out by the state, e.g. stimulating economic growth, employment, social solidarity, social security, healthcare, education. Their purpose is to reduce the risks and consequences of uncertainty of a market economy, and soften the real inequalities that arise due to socioeconomic differences and unequal opportunities for participation in social and political life. In other words, it is an attempt to overcome the real constraints created by liberal democracy and effect equality and social justice by equalizing socioeconomic conditions and setting up a system of solidarity and social care to help the weak and the poor, and to lessen the social disparities. Box 2.6. A social state establishes appropriate social rights of citizens, which are inseparable from formal political rights, because the former cannot be fully exercised unless supported by the latter. It has been shown that a developed social state has a positive influence on the development of democracy, especially in the framework of a welfare state, the use of which has substantially affected the development of some of the most developed democratic societies. Suggested readings: Maldini, P. (2008). Demokracija i demokratizacija. Dubrovnik: Sveučilište u Dubrovniku. Grugel, J. (2002). Democratization: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. To summarize: a democratic political system, in addition to being free and having citizens participate in the process of decision making, needs to be socially just. Pero Maldini 74 Socioeconomic and sociostructural preconditions Socioeconomic preconditions include the economic development and availability of material resources of a society to its members. The importance of these socioeconomic factors is reflected in the fact that economic development stimulates democratic development, and vice versa. However, this influence is indirect, through changes in social structure caused by economic development, which benefits the development of democracy. Namely, to establish and sustain itself, a democracy requires certain sociostructural preconditions. This claim is essentially the basic claim of modernization theory: it says that societies which are economically more developed will be more successful in sustaining democracy, since a high level of economic development reduces poverty and creates a middle class, that refrains from radical methods of solving problems and is more inclined to cooperate, which is conducive to the development of democracy. Ensuring a state of welfare for a larger number of citizens of a society acts to reduce tensions, lessens inequality and class disparities, and enables easier resolution of conflicts. On an individual level, it enables a higher economic standard and better quality of life, a higher degree of independence, and, on average, a higher degree of education. Education greatly contributes to higher levels of political competence and awareness of mutual dependence of all people upon others, which in turn contributes to greater tolerance and willingness to compromise in order to achieve consensus – the fundamental mechanisms on which democracy and democratic activity rests. Developed political competence also influences higher levels of political participation. On a social level, welfare affects urbanization, professional diversification, creation of a complex social structure (whose main characteristic is not vertical social stratification, but horizontal diversity), and on development of mass media and the public sphere. All these are factors that foster democracy (cf. Lipset, 1959). It is easy to see that the most developed modern democracies are at the same time both economically highly developed societies with a relatively large percentage of well-off people (the middle class is the largest social group) and relatively small social disparities. At the same time, most economically underdeveloped countries are not democracies or are having serious issues with building a democracy (for example, numerous transition countries). b) Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 75 Sociocultural preconditions In order to establish a substantive democracy, an appropriate political culture is necessary. A political culture includes beliefs, feelings, and opinions of citizens about political objects and political processes in their society. It reflects how citizens understand and perceive the political system, its components, its functioning, and their own role in it. Political culture of a democracy can be defined on two levels. The first level consists of the structurally relevant values codified by social norms (laws). The second level is the belief of society that such values should be applied in practice. Common to both levels is a commitment for these values, i.e. the level of their acceptance among the citizens, which is central to the conception of political culture. In terms of content, it's crucial for the establishment and effective functioning of a democracy that its fundamental values (liberty, equality, human and civil rights) and sociocultural characteristics (tolerance, compromise and restraint as a basis for consensus, respect for others, pluralism, civil activism) to be intrinsic, internalized values of most citizens. The broader their acceptance, the more stable the democracy. Conversely, if dominant social values do not correspond to fundamental values of democracy, the chances that a democratic order will be successfully sustained are weak. This is precisely where the connection between political culture and (democratic) political structure manifests itself. In the classic analysis of forms of political culture corresponding to democracy, the civic culture is held to be the most suitable one (Almond and Verba, 2000, 349-370; Vujčić, 2001, 122-130). Civic culture is not determined merely by its content (because it is assembled from elements of various cultural types), but mostly by its ability to sustain and balance different elements, which constitute it: different roles (parochial, subject, and participant) and opposing orientations (cognitive, affective, and evaluative). Since democracy is a system of mediation between different and opposed social interests through institutions and procedure, it is the ability of civic culture to balance those differences that puts it into the role of maintaining the stability and the functioning of a democratic system. On its own, democratic procedure would only reflect legality and formality if it were not in the function of realizing democratic values. Namely, when citizens are convinced that the values of democracy are the values that allow their individual freedom, equality, realization and protection of rights, social justice, and security – they adopt those values as their own. Without this conviction, a democratic order would be impossible. To accept democracy means to believe in its values. Legitimacy of a democratic c) Pero Maldini 76 order is thus equally based on respect for democratic procedure and on the values of democracy. Political authorities will have democratic legitimacy if they comply with the procedural aspects of the constitution, and if it realizes proclaimed democratic values. Legitimacy of the political system is precisely proportional to the citizens' trust in it, i.e. the degree to which the functioning of the system enables the social (political, economic and social) needs of citizens to be met. Box 2.7. Accepting democracy as an order and the trust of citizens in the institutions of a democratic system are essential sociocultural preconditions for sustaining and functioning democratic political system. Suggested readings: Diamond, L. (1993). Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy. In: Diamond, L. (Ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, London, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-28. Conclusion Speaking of democracy, one notices that it is not a system of social harmony, but a system marked by diverse particular (individual and group) and mutually opposing interests, goals, and ideas. These interests, however, are not repressed, nor are conflicts suppressed; quite the opposite, they are freely expressed in all their diversity and breadth, and organized within the pluralist public political space. One of the fundamental characteristics that makes democracy stand out from all other political orders is precisely the recognition of equal rights to express and organize different and mutually opposed social interests. Establishment of a democracy does not automatically bring all the benefits associated with it. Democracy does not guarantee success; it provides opportunities. A democratic political system is a framework in which expressing demands, organizing interests, and struggle for economic development and human rights have much better opportunities than in the framework of any autocratic system. However, democracy is not a state of affairs, and it does not work by itself. It is a continuous process; it demands engagement of citizens in issues of common interest. It is a powerful mechanism, if citizens use it; this would require their attachment to democratic values, political competence, and a will to actively participate in political processes. Without that, one cannot expect the development of democracy and realization of its ideals – liberty, equality, and civil rights. Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 77 Questions for students: How conflicted interests are mediated in a democracy? What is legitimacy and why does it matter? Which are the structural and which are the cultural preconditions for sustaining and developing democracy? What are the core values of democracy, and why do they matter? What does it mean for democracy to be liberal, and why it is important? Why is political participation essential to democracy? References Almond, G. and Verba, S. (2000). Civilna kultura: politički stavovi i demokracija u pet zemalja. Zagreb: Politička kultura. Aristotel, (1988). Politika. Zagreb: Globus i Sveučilišna naklada Liber. Beetham, D. (1992). Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization, Political Studies, 40 (1), 40-53. Dahl, R. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven; London: Yale University Press. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Heaven/London: Yale University Press. Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven CT: Yale University Press. Dahl, R. (2005). What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require? Political Science Quaterly, 120 (2), 187-197. Dalton, R. J. (2006). Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Diamond, L. (2009). Three Paradoxes of Democracy. In Diamond, L. and Plattner, M., (Eds.), Democracy: A Reader. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (pp. 73-85). Diamond, L. (1993). Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy. In: Diamond, L. (Ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Boulder / London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. (pp. 1-28). Grugel, J. (2002). Democratization: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Held, D. (1996). Models of Democracy. Stanford, CA.: Polity Press, Cambridge and Stanford University Press. Hobbes, T. (2004) [1651]. Levijatan ili građa, oblik i moć crkvene i građanske države. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk. Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wawe. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press. Pero Maldini 78 Kaldor, M. and Vejvoda, I. (1997). Democratization in Central and East European Countries. International Affairs, 73 (1), 59-82. Karl, T. L. and Schmitter, P. C. (1991). What Democracy Is… and Is Not, Journal of Democracy, 2 (3), 75-88. Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven CN/London: Yale University Press. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, American Political Science Review, 53 (1), 69-105. Locke, J. (1952) [1690]. The second treatise of government, (ed. and introduction by Thomas S. Peardon). New York: The Liberal Arts Press. Mainwaring, S. (1992). Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues, in Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. and Valenzuela, S. J. (Eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 294-392. Maldini, P. (2008). Demokracija i demokratizacija. Dubrovnik: Sveučilište u Dubrovniku. Maldini, P. (2011). Politička kultura i demokratska tranzicija u Hrvatskoj. Dubrovnik: Sveučilište u Dubrovniku. Montesquieu, C. L. S. (2003) [1748]. O duhu zakona. Zagreb: Demetra. Nohlen, D. ed., (2001). Politološki rječnik: Država i politika. Osijek, Zagreb and Split: Pan Liber. Parry, G. and Moran, M. (1994). Introduction: problems of democracy and democratization. In Parry, G. and Moran, M. (Eds.), Democracy and Democratization. London and New York: Routledge (pp. 1-17). Plattner, M. (2009). From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy. In Diamond, L. and Plattner, M., (Eds.), Democracy: A Reader. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (pp. 58-70). Prpić, I., Puhovski, Ž. and Uzelac, M., eds. (1990). Leksikon temeljnih pojmova politike. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, R. (1994). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Rousseau, J. J. (1978). Društveni ugovor. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. Sartori, G. (1962). Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Sartori, G. (1987). Theory of Democracy Revisited. New Jersey: Chatham House. Sørensen, G. (1998). Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press. Strauss, L. (1992). The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Tadić, Lj. (1988). Nauka o politici. Beograd: Rad. Chapter 2: Understanding Democracy 79 Tilly, C. (1999). Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization. Sociological Theory 18, (1), 1-16. Tocqueville, A. (2001) [1835]. Democracy in America. New York: Penguin Putnam Inc. Voltaire, (1997) [1763]. Rasprava o toleranciji. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska. Vujčić, V. (2001). Politička kultura demokracije. Osijek, Zagreb and Split: Pan Liber. Zamarovský, V. (1978). Grčko čudo. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. Pero Maldini 80 Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy in Promoting Reconciliation Goran Patrick Filic Abstract: In order to better grasp the underlying issues of failed reconciliation in former Yugoslavia and the Western Balkans we will turn to a discussion on deliberative and participatory democratic models. Relying both on theoretical and empirical scholarship we will try to gain a nuanced understanding of why the decades of pungent ethnic politics led by the hardened ethnic political party elites did not bring about positive results in terms of reconciliation. We will be going over some of the key scholars of democratic theory and how they see [you], the accountable citizen, as part of the potential remedy. For the theoretical part of the chapter we will discuss Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Joseph Schumpeter arguments on participatory and deliberative democracy. In few words, Schumpeter’s argument posits that the citizen is not essential to democracy and should be limited to only voting for their leaders or representatives. As such, public officials should take the lead in the political and decision-making process. Today we understand that Schumpeter’s view on political participation is seen as undesirable if not damaging. However, given that most of the world democracies are representative democracies and in many ways citizens have been alienated from the decisions stemming from the top. Hence, in contrast, Rousseau’s account is essentially the foundation for theories on the role of participation and deliberation of modern democracies whereby he sketched a political system in which the citizens decide to be free by making the laws that rule them. According to Rousseau, political participation by ordinary citizens is considered to have an instrumental function in the official political process which may lead to a change of political leadership and policy programs. The chapter synthesizes the above concepts in post-conflict ethnic reconciliation of former Yugoslavia with empirical examples and recent scholarly works, concluding that reconciliation would be much easier to achieve only after a certain level of democratic capital is attained in society and among ordinary citizens. 81 Key terms: Yugoslavia, Deliberative and Participatory Democracy, Reconciliation, Democratic Capital Introduction The fall of former communist East Bloc led not just to proliferation of newly independent states, but also to a resurgence of ethnicity and ethnic identity as a political energy among groups of people looking for a sense of social cohesion and national belonging. In some cases, that resurgence had benign effects, as in the separation of Czechoslovakia, conversely in the unification of West and East Germany. However, in some other cases, it had much more destructive consequences. In particular, many of the states that had made up the Yugoslav federation descended into vicious warfare, as ethnic groups fought to protect their identity, assert its dominance and gain control over land and other valuable resources including the state itself (O’Flynn, 2006). Needless to say, the end of the Cold War had significant consequences for divided societies in Eastern Europe in particular former Yugoslavia, however it also gave wind to scholars to focus on the challenges of ameliorating potential conflicts as well as deepening democracy in such societies. In lieu of this, scholars have produced an impressive body of empirical research that has immensely contributed to our understanding how ethnically divided societies could be managed democratically where they have not been able to achieve reconciliation. This chapter will address some of the obstacles in the slow progress of reconciliation where the sustained ideological separation based on ethnic belonging and lack of trust among different ethnic groups and in institutions tend to be compartmentalized by ethnic and ideological belonging. We will also learn how the process of transitioning into democratic society in former Yugoslavia and WB on the level of the ordinary citizens, impacts reconciliation and whether the process of democratization via democratic deliberation and participation can lead to sustainable reconciliation. We will also look into some of the problematic issues in regards to why the process of reconciliation in WB has not been successful thus far and why democratization has faltered or at least the kind of democratization where various regional ethnic groups are willing to come together to deliberate and participate for the purpose of constructive reconciliation. As we start this chapter it is important to differentiate the willingness to work towards reconciliation and the actual need or necessity to do so. Cur- Goran Patrick Filic 82 rently, the necessity for reconciliation in Western Balkans appears to be inconsequential, that is to say, that most ethnic groups are relatively safe and comfortable by currently occupying their homogeneous divided territories and generally staying out of each other way, be it Albanians in Kosovo, Croats in Herzegovina and Croatia, Bosnian Muslims in Federation BiH, Serbs in Republika Srpska, and Serbia. However this pacified living arrangement is not a guarantee for a genuine reconciliation particularly when it comes to two groups: the younger generation (which most of the readers of this book will fall into) born after the war yet at the same time having been impacted profoundly by the kind of pungent and divisive ethnic politics that have marked the former Yugoslav republics in the last three decades and second, the former war veterans and their families. Many of the war veterans have suffered greatly during the conflict and have in large part by now sometimes directly and often indirectly became policy drivers in the region by either joining their respective war veteran organizations, which yield electorate influence (Obradović & Filic 2019) or by joining ethnic political parties which by large have divided up the administration of the country. Expectedly, the war veterans and their associations, bring with them the hardened war scars of the vicious ethnic fighting and thus their ethnic biases inevitably manifest themselves in policy deliberation whether it be on municipal, regional or national level. Instinctively, this process essentially is not allowing for the rooted reconciliation to take place because of the kind of policies reflected from the people and the entrenched ethnic political parties which have never let go of the past. The political elites have not let go of the war narratives not because they are not able to do so, but because it would not be in their electoral interest. Hence, manifestation of the supposed ethnic tensions among the Yugoslav ethnic groups (even though tensions may not be always present) is what keeps the political elites in office. So what does this type of ‘democracy’ have to do with reconciliation in former Yugoslavia and how if at all these two concepts are connected? This is something we will discuss in this chapter. In order to start addressing the status quo in terms of reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia, we have to first try to better understand the underlying issues of the conundrum mentioned above by engaging into discussions of deliberative and participatory democratic models. In order to offset the decades of pungent ethnic politics in the region led by the economic and political “ethnic businessmen” we will discuss how some of the major theorists of democratic theory see you, the accountable citizen, as part of the potential remedy. This chapter should also help you better understand the accountability on your part towards the process of reconcilia- Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 83 tion but also the accountability of those deliberating policies and whether you should hold them accountable and importantly how to hold them accountable. As the chapter will show, the major democratic theorists and the proponents of deliberative and participatory democracies understand reconciliation as the outcome of the democratic society and the democratic capital. In other words, the chapter concludes that without democratic citizenship and substantial democratic capital among the ordinary citizens, sustainable reconciliation in Western Balkans and former Yugoslavia is not possible. Deliberative and Participatory Models To start things off, let us define the terms mentioned above, specifically deliberative and participatory democracies, democratization and reconciliation. Second, we will explore the relationships between the mentioned models, as well as concepts of democratization and reconciliation. It is also important to mention the representative model of democracy, however, this model has been criticized in regards to Southeastern Europe, specifically for yielding to clientelistic and ethnic based politics and being unable to grapple with the reconciliation process. For some time now, the overreliance on elected officials became tantamount to citizens being disconnected from governance. Therefore, empowering citizens to participate and guide representatives has gained some steam with scholars of deliberative and participatory approaches. Hence, we will focus on the two other models which may be more appropriate approaches in dealing with reconciliation in Western Balkans. Deliberative democracy refers to the model of democracy in which collective decisions are achieved through public reasoning and discussion. More specifically, deliberative democracy is the idea that a decision-making procedure is defined deliberative in so far that is founded on the notion of exchange of reasons and arguments and democratic in so far as it is inclusive (i.e. involves all those who are affected by a public issue and have a say in it (Elster 1998). On the other hand, participatory democracy according to Pateman (1970) is a model of democracy where maximum input (participation) is required and where output includes not only policies but also the development of the social and political capacities of each individual. Both models require citizens to come-together (participate) and decide (deliberate) on various issues. However, the two models of democracy, or rather two adjectives ‘participatory’ and ‘deliberative’ are frequently used in an overlapping manner allowing for some confusion. One of the Goran Patrick Filic 84 goals of the chapter is to discuss how reconciliation can be achieved through one or both of these models by discussing the basic differences between the two. To distinguish the difference between the two it is easiest to think of what ideas the models represent. For example, participatory model of democracy is founded on the idea of direct action of citizens who decide to exercise some power and therefore decide on issues affecting their lives or their community and so on. On the other hand, deliberative democracy is founded on the notion of argumentative exchanges, reciprocal reasoning, and public debates which precede decisions. Deliberative democracy sees deliberation as a step or a phase of a dialogue and discursive process for arriving at decisions, which legitimate democratic institutions can take. To deliberate in the most classical sense means to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of a possible solution to a collective problem but also to amend social and political beliefs, attitudes, judgments etc. that may not always be based on factual or objective evidence. In this case that would be assumptions, judgments, fears, distrust held by one ethnic group against the other. Which brings us to the concept of reconciliation. Reconciliation is referred to as the process of reconciling between ethnic, religious or national groups often in the aftermath of the armed conflict. Reconciliation naturally requires great deal of dialogue, deliberation and participation of all sides involved. Notice that deliberation and participation are one of the key attributes for a successful reconciliation. Sometimes reconciliation may require mediators to help move the process smoothly without any of the sides feeling they have been cut short. Finally, the term democratization. As we learned from Chapter 1, democratization is defined as a transition to a more democratic political regime, including fundamental political changes gearing towards increasingly more democratic principles and universal values. Democratization levels and progress, however, depend on many factors including historical trajectory, economic development and civil society. Indeed, democratization in one sense is characterized as the process defined by active citizenship working towards making demands on elected officials. This also includes building effective public institutions that are transparent and accountable to voters. For new democracies, the development of the democratically conscientious citizen goes a long way, which is amalgam with the development of democratic capital. Democratic capital is a wider studied concept, but on the most normative level it is defined as “accumulation of a stock of civic and social assets … empirically, democratic capital accumulation occurs through a country’s learning from its own historical experience or its neighboring countries” (Persson, Tabellini 2009). Democratic capital thus Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 85 is seen as a mechanism that should lift citizen’s democratic participation, helping to maintain a transparent and accountable system of government. Hence, without accountable strong civil society, which has the power to elect and remove public officials, the process of transitioning to a democratic society and building up democratic capital fumbles. Scholars agree that building the democratic capital in former Yugoslavia has been and is currently dominated by the elite-driven and sometimes with authoritarian incumbents for the purpose of retaining power and access to economic and financial resources (Dolenc 2016). Given the above, building democratic capital is seen as a crucial factor in countering the politicization and elite-based status quo maintenance of the reconciliation process. Scholars also agree on the two types of models on how sustainable peace in post-conflict societies can be achieved. The first school professes the argument that democratization has to occur first and only then can sustainable reconciliation take place. We will explore both sides of the argument, but as this chapter will show, the strong democratic society builds sustainable reconciliation more so than the other way around, that is to say, in order for groups to reconcile, first certain democratic values, should be embedded into the wider society. A quote from (Hoglund, Jarstad & Soderberg (2009), demonstrates the notion: Strong theoretical arguments exist for the positive impact democracy can have on peace: First, through conflict moderation by transforming the manner in which conflict is processed; and, second, through conflict alleviation by reducing sources of conflict. A democratic system provides peaceful, transparent and open mechanisms for succession and distribution of power, enabling diverse social groups to gain access to the government, to participate. The second group believes that reconciliation should be realized before democratic society and democratic values are established. In other words, prior to society’s intrinsic acceptance of the essential democratic tenants, first inherent peace among the conflicted sides should be established. A quote from (Bloomfield 2003) shows this side of the argument: As a backward-looking operation, reconciliation brings about the personal healing of survivors, the reparation of past injustices, the building or rebuilding of non-violent relationships between individuals and communities, and the acceptance by the former parties to a conflict of a common vision and understanding of the past. In its forward-looking dimension, reconciliation means enabling victims and perpetrators to get on with life and, at the level of society, the establishment of a civilized political dialogue and an adequate sharing of power. Goran Patrick Filic 86 When societies, in particular those transitioning from the conflict, obtain democratic capital, other democratic values such as: accountability, transparency, democratic deliberation and participation etc., become second nature. Indeed, without the proper attributes embedded in the citizens’ democratic attitudes and behaviors, the reconciliation process is curbed. Hence, building democratic capital should essentially lead to sustained and full reconciliation among different ethnic groups. Societies that become cognizant of democratic values and intrinsically build their democratic capital would want to reconcile because tolerance and other merit-based principles are one of the basic principles of democracy and universal human rights. To reconcile means to be democratic or in peace and if one is not democratic not only can they not reconcile with others, but essentially, they do not respect universal human rights or democratic principles. In this sense, democratization or democratic capital is a precursor to sustainable reconciliation especially in post-conflict transitioning governments (Mross 2019). Box 3.1. Deliberative Democracy is a model of democracy in which collective decisions are achieved through public reasoning and discussion. More specifically, deliberative democracy is the idea that a decision-making procedure is defined deliberative in so far that is founded on the notion of exchange of reasons and arguments and democratic in so far as it is inclusive (i.e. involves all those who are affected by a public issue and have a say in it. While, participatory democracy is a model of democracy where maximum input (participation) is required and where output includes not only policies but also the development of the social and political capacities of each individual. Suggested readings: Elster, J. (1998). Deliberative Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press. Reconciliation and the Citizen Now that we understand the relationship between democratic society and reconciliation in so far that the democratic society should set in place before reconciliation, let us explore the concept of reconciliation. Generally speaking, there are multiple definitions for the concept of reconciliation. Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 87 The complexity starts with the multidimensional nature of the notion, that is to say, one may study reconciliation from many fields of study and theoretical approaches: socio-psychology, economics, international relations, political science, peace studies or even from an anthropological perspective. Reconciliation has three fundamental points: it induces a psychological process, so that it is transitional, therefore, it changes; there is a relationship taking place between at least two parties (usually a victim and a perpetrator); and there is a perspective for a common future among them. By attempting to make the concept more operational, some scholars conceived the definition from two different lenses. The first one, referred to reconciliation as an output, in so far as it is a result of a process through which the parties change their relationship (Bar-tal and Bennink, 2004). When discussing reconciliation in the Western Balkans we refer to the wars of the 1990s. The peculiarity of the Yugoslav wars (Gagnon 2004; Nikolić 2020; Pavlović 2014) is the shared history and life Yugoslav citizens had before the violence broke out but also the fact that all sides involved in the conflict were sometimes perpetrators and sometimes victims and sometimes both. To add to complexity of the wars, an ethnic group in one part of the country was a victim, but in another part of the country was a perpetrator. Thus, sorting out who did what and where and to what extent is difficult and takes long time, which protracts reconciliation even further. Because each ethnic group was perpetrator and the victim or both at some point, each group tends to see itself only as a “victim” and the others as “perpetrators”. If we take the example of Croats as victims, the narrative is that the Serbian hegemony started the war and that Croats were only defending their lands etc. Yet, the politics in Zagreb which was equally responsible for the military and political leadership in Bosnia tends to marginalize events such as Mostar, Ahmići, Stupni Do, Dretelj, Lora etc. (Melander 2007, Shrader 2003, Markovina 2014) where the crimes were committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs civilians. Equally important is the expulsion of hundred of thousands of Croatian Serb civilians from Krajina region (Jović 2008) or initiating the population exchange of Bosnian Croats from Central Bosnian cities and their surroundings likes of: Vareš, Kakanj, Kraljeva Sutjeska and Travnik (Shrader 2003, Melander 2007) for the non-Croat population in Herzegovina (Gagnon 2004). On the other hand, if we take the example of Serbs as victims under the assumption that the Bosnian Muslims and Croats wanted to see the end of the Serbian nation. latching on the past Ustaša crimes during WW II and even going back five hundred years to the Ottoman rule of Serbia and Serbian nation, we can refer to the events and cities such as siege of Sarajevo, Dubrovnik, Vukovar, Srebreni- Goran Patrick Filic 88 ca, Manjača, Ovčara, Morinj etc. (Shrader, 2003, Gagnon 2004, Nikolić, 2020) and expulsion of hundred of thousands of Albanian, Croatian and Bosnian civilians from Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia respectively. Last, but not least, let us take an example of the Bosnian Muslims in being the victims but should we not mention the atrocities committed by the 3rd Zenica Corps of Army BiH and the foreign Islamist fighters against the ethnic Croats and Serbs in the cities of Kakanj, Vareš, Travnik and Zenica expelling and cleansing central Bosnia of ethnic Serbs and Croats (Gagnon 2004, Melander 2007). There are also incidents such as Miletići, Kopijari, Borovica, Trusina where the Muslim forces committed crimes against the ethnic Croatian civilians, but also Orahovac, Klečka, Gnjilane and many others in Kosovo where the KLA the ethnic Albanian Kosovo military committed atrocities against the Serb, Janjevci, Gorani and other non-Albanian population in Kosovo. Can we say that ‘only one’ side is a victim in the Yugoslav secession wars? The victims and perpetrators are on all three sides. Consequentially, if only one ethnic group attempts to claim the victimhood, while treating other groups as perpetrators or aggressors — there will be no reconciliation — nor should there be reconciliation if that is the case, because that type of reconciliation would not be authentic one. Let us take a moment and pose an important question ‘did only one group commit the crimes’ in former Yugoslavia? Literature on Yugoslav wars and various international indictments should tell you that all groups perpetrated crimes. If we want to see the region reconciled in the near future and not wait another three decades, one of the essential steps is that all sides need to accept the truth that they were victims but equally important that they were also perpetrators, without any exceptions. This is not only so that the region can achieve the reconciliation, it is rather because that is the only truth to the wars of the 1990s. So, the question of reconciliation becomes asking how many of former Yugoslav citizens are willing to say regardless of one’s ethnic background that her ethnic group is both victim and a perpetuator. Additionally, one should ask what kind of attributes and values and individual has to hold to be able to make a statement like that and how does she attain them? So, how do we remedy then the three versions of the so called truth? The paradox is not easy, however. One of the remedies is the creation of democratic capital which at the most basic level entails that ordinary citizens should want to come together and have a dialogue. The last three decades of unsuccessful reconciliation should be the sign that reconciliation stemming from outside either by EU or US will not bear to fruition. Given that almost three decades have passed and the ethnic groups in for- Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 89 mer Yugoslavia have not reconciled but rather only “pacified” (Bieber 2008), it is a good time to start thinking in terms of building democratic capital. Embracing democratic capital would place civic duties and responsibilities ahead of ethnic identities. Embracing strong civil duties and responsibilities essentially builds strong civil societies and in return strong civil societies utilize methods of participatory and deliberating democracy. Once democratic values are utilized and intrinsically accepted by the larger population it is inevitable that ethnic communities should engage in building tolerant societies. Democratically conscientious citizens are the ingredients for the tolerant societies, on the other hand reconciled groups are not necessarily an ingredient to build democratic societies. If we take an example of few former Yugoslav cities which were once striving in their multi-ethnic and tolerant way of life, the likes of Mostar, Split, Banja Luka and Titova Mitrovica (now Kosovska Mitrovica), we can easily list a number of recent incidents of ethnic hostility. This is mostly due to decades of pungent divisive ethnic party politics which yield tens political environments where ordinary citizens who do not hold any biases are being held hostage by the larger ethnic hardline narrative and attitudes, hence continual manifestation of hatred and ethnic intolerance. On the other hand, another group of once vibrant multiethnic cities such as Tuzla, Brčko, Vareš and Ulcinj have established a very opposite reality. Their multiethnic fiber prior to the conflict and their ability to maintain somewhat democratic societies during and post conflict period sets this group apart. In the former group ordinary citizens are trapped because of the wider ethnic politics and intolerant political narratives while in the latter the shear opposite. One could easily make an argument that ‘democracy’ in the first group is suffocated. Many ordinary citizens who sum up the courage to step out of the hardened defined ethnic lines, essentially get mobbed either verbally and sometimes also physically sending a message to all others who might consider doing the same.1 This kind of mob system acts as a mechanism in maintaining the status quo of ethnically divisive narratives. In some of these incidents, democratic practices such speaking out against injustices gets easily stifled by the larger ethnically hardened group. This kind of 1 See incident in Split, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/10/croatian-police-arrest-t wo-after-attack-on-serbs/ website retrieved on March 2nd 2020. Also see incident in Mitrovica, https://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes.php?yyyy=2018&mm=07&dd=05 &nav_id=104558 website retrieved on February 10th 2020. Goran Patrick Filic 90 mechanism maintains the low levels of democratic capital by never actually allowing for reconciliation to take place A more specific example of strong democratic values from the latter group in the above’s example is the city of Tuzla where in contrast to city of Mostar, Tuzla’s citizens come together and protect the cultural heritage Yugoslav World War II monuments. Both cities have large WW II monuments in the memory of the Yugoslav Partisans fighting against Nazi and Fascist occupations. However, the one in Mostar is continually being defaced (Markovina, 2014) while the one in city of Tuzla is protected and well maintained. This is because democracy in city of Tuzla has been protected from the start and during the war in Yugoslavia via Tuzla’s non-ethnic party leadership, building the kind of society based on the civic values and multi-ethnic tolerance (Filic, 2018). Conversely, city of Mostar has been embedded into an ethnic conflict from the start of the war where the hardened ethnic political parties came to build ethnically divided communities where democratic capital and the civic values were set aside for the purpose of controlling the ethnically homogeneous municipal territories with clear ethnic lines. Democratic capital in terms of one’s attitudes and behaviors does not only pertain to having a good attitude and behavior toward his/her own ethnic group. Rather it means to have all-encompassing universal democratic principles regardless of who is on the other side. Attacks on other ethnic groups, defacing monuments, hardened ethnic divisive politics and narratives do not constitute the kind of democratic values that engages the divided communities towards sustainable reconciliation (Petsinis, 2019). Keeping in mind some of the examples above, let us now see how the reconciliation works from the theoretical perspective. In this sense, reconciliation can be seen as an output where one expects some benefit in the end: mutual recognition and acceptance (among parties), invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relationships, mutual trust or sensitivity for the other's party needs and interests. On the other hand, reconciliation can also be seen or described as a process. Here we pay attention to how reconciliation unfolds in regards to motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, initiatives and emotions. Hence, we can also define reconciliation as the process through which all those impacted by the conflict transform the nature of their relationship aiming to build a peaceful common future. Scholars generally agree in defining the reconciliation as a process along the following lines: “reconciliation is sustainable, for individuals if individual’s socioeconomic status and fear of violence or persecution, trust from manipulation by political elites and nationalist parties, freedom of trade and commerce, freedom of movement and communication across both local and Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 91 international boundary lines is no worse, prior to the conflict” (Bar-Simantov 2004; Kaldor 1999). While one may assert that what matters most are both the victim and the perpetrator, principal scholars in the field have been arguing that it is the relationship among the groups or citizens involved, that takes place during the process of reconciliation. In this sense, reconciliation becomes the process of reconstruction of a new relationship among the parties (Lederach 1997). Reconciliation does not have to necessarily start at the time of the peace agreement, and often can start before the conflict ends or when the conflict is in the last stages. The principle tenet of reconciliation is derived from the premise that if people previously confronted are not properly reconciled, the conflict is merely concealed. Ethnic tensions, distrust and fear persevere, the peace is fragile and in the moments of recurrence of even minuscule flares may it be social, economic, political even accidental incidents will antagonize old memories, feelings and violence is likely to manifest itself again. Democracy and the Citizen One can make an argument that the systems of governance in most former Yugoslav republics closely resemble(s) John Stuart Mill’s idea of a successful democracy, where he argued that the democracies cannot succeed unless their citizens share a common national identity: Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart … Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationality. Among a people without fellow-feeling especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist (Mill 1871 [1991]). While Mill’s assumption is imprecise in many ways because it does not take much to think of many contemporary examples of successful democratic states containing more than one nation, ethnicity or national community, it is however crucial to understand why Eastern European countries in practice reflect Mill’s definition of democracy, namely Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. Let us further break down the relationship between the citizens and democracy in hopes to reveal some of the duties and responsibilities on the part of each citizen. As discussed in previous chapters democracy is contin- Goran Patrick Filic 92 ually evolving which makes it an open and continual rather than closed and static system. Democracies changed over time beginning with Classical Direct Democracy (Ancient Greece, Athens 5th century BCE), onto Democratic Elitism (Joseph Schumpeter, James Madison - where citizen’s only duty is to elect the representatives, and not get involved otherwise) and Participatory Democracy (20th century John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas - high levels of participation, beyond just voting). Basic Merriam-Webster definition of democracy is defined as: “government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections”. However, some political philosophers will take a look at the second part of this definition and note that “indirect system of representation” would actually mean that the government is republic and not a direct democracy where representative people make the decision on the behalf of the people and in someways not technically what is classically understood as democracy. Indeed if we look into the epistemology of the Latin word “res publica” we can see that: “res” has a meaning of ‘entity or concern’ and “publicus” has a meaning “of the people, public”, all together form the idea “res” to be “entity, concern” plus publicus to be “of the people” in other words, an English word ‘republic’ (which stems from the French word “république”) actually means “concerns of the people”. So, whether it is direct or indirect, democracy entails ‘concerns of the people’, more commonly U.S. President Abraham Lincoln referred to democracy during his infamous Gettysburg Address speech delivered during the American Civil War, as “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. The idea “government of the people” means that people are essentially the ones that comprise the government. The notion “government by the people” means that the people themselves construct, create and implement the government. And the notion “for the people” means that the government needs to serve in the peoples interests and not the other way around. The Western Balkan regimes have yet to reach the threshold of consolidation as measured by Freedom House2. Given that free and fair elections are the essential condition of liberal democracy, the right to vote should not be understood as the only or central attribute of a democratic society. In Du Contrat Social (1762) Jean-Jacques Rousseau explained that the individual participation of each citizen is essential in the political decision- 2 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018 Report, https://freedomhouse.org/report/n ations-transit/nations-transit-2015#.ViJQzH4zfDc (accessed January 20th, 2020). Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 93 making process. In his view, each citizen would become a public citizen only through the deliberation and participation in the democratic processes. Furthermore, political authority flows from the people to the polity (or the state) — not from the state to people. The participation of each citizen in the political process is of vital consequence to the functioning of his or her society. This mutual understanding between the citizens and the public officials elected is understood as social contract. Under the principles of the social contract, citizens refrain from their own personal preferences and instead settle to work together to produce policies and rules based not on ethnic grouping but rather based on the civic moral values. On this principle every citizen is essentially equally affected by the social contract, and it should spur citizens to behave in a fair way in public, as well as in private. Let us take Bosnian ethnic relations for our next example. In today’s Bosnia, we can say that ethnic Bosnian Muslims residing in the city of Banja Luka will in many ways feel as an outsider and will not find themselves in a better situation than their countryman, an ethnic Serb in Mostar or the ethnic Bosnian Croat in Zenica, when looking purely from the ethnic group perspective. We can also take an example of an ethnic Albanian in the northern part of Mitrovica and an ethnic Serb in southern part of Mitrovica, the examples are numerous. That is why each citizen should understand that he or she has to take more into account than just their own private interests when it comes to reconciliation in the region. All have to come together in building accountability and responsibility around public interests. To put it more simply, reconciliation in former Yugoslavia will continue stagnate as long as ethnic Croats in Zenica, and ethnic Serbs in southern part of Mitrovica or ethnic Bosnian Muslims in Banja Luka feel as second-class citizens. Without each citizen contributing to the public interests, democracy cannot function properly and ultimately as we have discussed earlier in the chapter, reconciliation will not succeed. As we have already mentioned, the remedy for reconciliation is deliberative and participatory democracy which place discussion and communication at the center of politics. However, the type of communication in deliberative democracy is of a particular sort. Ideally it is respectful, it is very important that the parties reach and understand those who start from a very different point of view. For someone who has been indoctrinated for twenty or thirty years that their ethnic group is a victim while all other ethnic groups are perpetrators, it is going to be exceptionally difficult to come to terms with the claim that their particular view may not be the correct one. Rational argumentation is certainly part of the deliberative model but it is not confined to arguing. The point is that argumentation should be respectful and constructive. Goran Patrick Filic 94 A deliberative process involves having members of society justify their arguments. In this way, everyone is allowed to be an advocate. However, keep in mind, while assuming the position of an advocate, individuals should engage in a manner of the dialogue that is constructive and engaging of the people on the other side of the table. An example of the city of Mostar3 where all three ethnic groups have in the end paid the ultimate price, and it would highly be impractical to apply the win-loss principle for the purposes of reconciliation as all three sides have suffered losses. Instead, deliberative democracy can be a much more effective remedy by bringing different ethnic groups in a non-accusatory, non-binding deliberation on matters pertaining to their own reconciliation. This way members of the community would be taking matters of sustained peace and reconciliation in their own hands rather than waiting for the top-down elite prescribed process. The city of Vareš4 in central Bosnia is a prime example of a success story where all three sides for the most part rebuilt their pre-war relationships allowing for long term peace, a common future and sustainable reconciliation to take place. Finally, reconciliation requires communication, more specifically the constructive, non-accusatory kind of communication. As we have seen from the above discussion deliberative democracy is in large part about engaging in a constructive and respectful kind of dialogue. Therefore. we can say that by deliberating on issues concerning reconciliation, citizens are also engaging in a participatory kind of democracy. To truly reconcile means first and foremost to be democratic. Remember from the beginning of the chapter democracy is inherently tied to the maxim ‘concern of the people’, so to reconcile one has to first abide by democratic values first. Rights, Privileges and Duties In 1949, George Hartmann, used an individual free association test with ten boys and ten girls from each of the twelve grades of a small public school in upstate New York. Each youngster was asked, "What is the first thing you think about when you hear the word ‘democracy'?" Not until the ninth grade was every student able to supply some significant response. As 3 For details on city of Mostar during the Yugoslav wars please refer to: Charles R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat civil war in Central Bosnia” : A military history, 1992-1994. College Station : Texas A&M University Press, 2003. 4 U Varešu našli i zlato i suživot: http://ba.n1info.com/Vijesti/a358812/N1-u-Varesu-N asli-i-zlato-i-suzivot.html. Accessed January 18th 2020. Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 95 was found in Putnam's study of fifth-grade students, rights and privileges are emphasized; however, duties and responsibilities are normally incorporated in the concept only after teacher intervention. Fifty men and fifty women from the same community were tested in the same way. The most frequent response terms for pupils and adults combined appear in this descending order: freedom, government, free, United States, America, president, peace, people, vote, liberty, war, equality, religion (or church), selfgovernment (Hartmann 1949). Hence, the general idea is that democracy is a social system with a certain minimum of conventional personal freedoms, and that political structure and functioning are the main components, but sense of accountability for the duties and responsibilities embedded in the concept of democracy is more important. It is true that certain rights and privileges tend to be firstly associated with democracy, however, importantly duties and responsibilities on part of citizens and their communities become equally if not more important. Democratization therefore becomes an engagement or individual responsibility for each citizen and their community rather than simply an acceptance of democratic rights. For many scholars of participatory democracy, participation is much more than voting in elections and participation and should not be limited to the political arena, but should also encompass such areas as the workplace, inter-community roles etc. We can say that democratization in part is a process of individual accountability on part of each citizen. Citizen participation in the democratic processes is regarded as a value in itself and is not exclusive to electing public officials (Michels 2006, De La Cruz 2012). Substantial participation carries a sense of personal ownership and personal accountability towards the community and as such should be desired by each citizen. For every citizen in a democratic society, substantial participation is a way of expressing belonging. The emphasis is not on individual interests but on the collective interest. As such, participatory theorists of democracy such as Rousseau, view democracy first and foremost as the people’s business. There are three functions of participations that we can identify. The first is the educative function. This means that participation in democratic processes contributes to personal growth by making each citizen accountable to the collective interests, essentially making him or her more of a public citizen rather than a private citizen when it comes to building and maintaining democratic societies. John Stuart Mill (1861), like Rousseau focused on the role of participation in democracy in such a way that it helped transform private citizens into public oriented citizens. As such, Mill also thought that the best place to learn about democracy participation is through engagement in the democratic processes at the local level. Goran Patrick Filic 96 The first step of raising citizen awareness on participatory democracy according to Mill and Rousseau is starting from one’s own surrounding, that is to say, getting involved in running one’s own community. Second function of participatory democracy is known as the integrative function. The integrative function is identified as a contribution to each citizen’s feeling that he or she belongs to the community. In other words, when citizens avoid participation for certain period of time, it is inevitable that feelings of worthiness and essentially demobilization arise within each citizen. This process is not exclusive only to an individual but can also impact entire communities, regions even entire nations. Third function of participatory democracy is known as the good government function. For Rousseau, participation by each citizen marks an important role in creating and implementing rules and laws acceptable to the collective. Moreover, participating in various areas of the political life, places citizens in a position where they are be able to make better political decisions and understand them on the local, regional and national level. So, what are some of these responsibilities and duties? One of the overall responsibilities and duties in democratic societies are maintaining high ethical and moral standards towards public goods and one’s own community which essentially allows for the creation and development of the high culture in society. If there is to be successful reconciliation in post-conflict societies, it should to a good extent reflect the levels of citizen democratic culture that resemble citizen participatory societies of Japan, Australia, US and Western European countries, as well as correcting its moral and ethical values that may have been misplaced and disregarded during the times of the conflict such as war profiteering, nepotism, corruption etc. Thus, the foundations of societies that have built large democratic capital rest first and foremost on good elementary and secondary education at school, but also at home (Feu and Canimas 2017). For example, respect for common goods, services and public places as if they were private. Indicators such as corruption, nepotism, theft and other criminal and unethical activities by all members of the society should be by all means on the margins. Every member of such society should aspire to a higher culture and treat their own surroundings as their own property. In addition to the well-rounded education and good upbringing at home, the development of an accountable society starts with individual moral standards and the well-rounded relationship with the community. In this process, active citizenship and caring for one’s community should also be nurtured. Contribution to the betterment of one’s community is an indication of the initial stages of democratic capital (Hadley 2018). Eventually, if the process con- Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 97 tinues and is supported by majority of members, then active citizenship towards one’s community will emerge. This means, that every citizen should participate and engage with their own community matters, essentially demanding accountability and transparency from elected public officials. Active citizenship is manifested via multiple methods, one of the most prominent being town hall meetings or some type of community gatherings. This is the time when town ‘folks’ hear from their representatives but they all have equal say. This is not direct democracy, this is not everyone having a vote on everything but this is the people having a clear say through discussion on what their leaders are going to do. Through such actions, citizens engage their representatives by demanding accountability and transparency. Managing one’s own community through fair and transparent means of policy making is the key to building democratic capital, which in turn enables communities to come to terms with their past grievances. Conclusion Scholars of democratic theory have been advocating for deliberative and participatory models of democracy in order to give back the power of decision-making to ordinary citizens. From the beginning of the realization of an idea of social contract, obligations such as accountability and transparency, underline the notion of democratic rule on the part of the elected public officials, but equally important it places those same obligations on the part of the citizens electing the public officials. Trust between members of society emerges as one of the important factors to successfully reconciling torn societies. Without the social trust, which in return is grown and polished by participatory democracy, reconciliation falters. Participatory democracy carries within its fiber not only the traits of responsible, accountable, transparent citizens, but also the ability to engage others often with different point of view in a constructive, problem solving discussions, all attributes and skills needed for reconciliation to succeed. Therefore, we can say that sustainable reconciliation is achieved by deliberation, i.e., holding and organizing constructive town hall-like meetings between “demos” i.e., the people, who have at some point been involved in a violent conflict. As such, reconciliation requires first and foremost democratic consciousness. It is nearly inescapable that in order for reconciliation to materialize, first and foremost citizens must achieve a democratic capital on some level to be able to apply it onto their communities and societies. Having democratic consciousness or democratic capi- Goran Patrick Filic 98 tal, citizens are much more cognizant, peaceful and tolerant. Democracy implies a certain level of economic prosperity enticing people to trade or do business, share culture and goods and unless reconciled, the former is not possible. Without a strong democratic society, reconciliation in post conflict transitional countries like the former Yugoslavia is not possible, and without reconciliation social and economic prosperity falters. Questions for students: Explain deliberative model in practice and provide an example. Why is reconciliation sometimes considered both, a process and output? Explain how the win-win approach is key to the success of reconciliation vs. the zero-sum approach. Why is reconciliation in former Yugoslavia still ongoing? According to Hartman’s study, most citizens associated democracy with personal freedoms rather than personal accountability, why is this so? According to Mill and Rousseau what did they think should be the first step in raising citizen awareness on participatory democracy and why did they see value in this? References Bar-Tal, D. & Bennink, G.H. (2004). The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process. New York: Oxford University Press. Bar-Siman-tov Y. (2004) From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation. New York: Oxford University Press. Dolenec, D. (2016). Democratization in the Balkans: The Limits of Elite-Driven Reform. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 12 (1), 125-144. De La Cruz, N. (2012). Mobilising for Democracy: Citizen Action and the Politics of Public Participation. Development in Practice, 22 (2), 273-274. Elster, J. (1998). Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Filic, G. (2018). Rejection of Radical Nationalism in former Yugoslavia. The Case of Tuzla. Journal of Peace building and Development. 13 (3), 55-69. Feu, J., Serra, C., Canimas, J. et al. (2017). 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Promoting Peace and Democracy in the Aftermath of the Balkan Wars: Comparative Assessment of the Democratization and Institution- Building Processes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Former Yugoslavia. World Affairs, 162 (1), 3-10. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2009). "Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1 (2), 88-126. Chapter 3: The Role of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy 101 Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans1 Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić Abstract: A large body of literature has shown that internationally-assisted transitions to democracy tend to be more successful. Yet despite the great international attention and resources dedicated to the Western Balkans, international efforts have not been particularly successful. Democratization is at a standstill or regressing, ethnic reconciliation has either failed or has not reached up to expected levels, and the stalled process of European enlargement has all but diminished any chance of substantial change. Despite high levels of public support for European integration, and the alignment of party programs with the accession criteria, the region’s progress is below expectations. This chapter, therefore, takes stock of the European integration literature with a reference to the Western Balkans in order to show how the European Union is involved in the democratization and reconciliation processes of the region. Key terms: Public support, European integration, party politics, reconciliation, democracy promotion Introduction The Western Balkans (WB) is arguably the world’s biggest case-study of internationally-led democratization. Following the end of communism, the WB became the focus of international aid much like the rest of post-communist Europe. Unlike the rest of Eastern Europe, however, the Yugoslav Wars raised a series of new challenges for the region. The breakup of Yugoslavia lead to the formation of new nation-states, ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing, wars of independence, a NATO intervention, and an interna- 1 Parts of this chapter have appeared in a previous local publication in Albania. See Meka, E. (2020). Reigniting European Integration in the Western Balkans: What can we expect?. Tirana Observatory. 103 tional criminal tribunal, to highlight but a few major headlines from the 1990s. Yet, despite this turbulent period, part of the region has made surprising progress. Two former Yugoslav Republics—Slovenia and Croatia— are now member states of the European Union (EU), while the rest are waiting in the membership queue. Nevertheless, despite the progress made by some states, the rest of the region is stagnating. Democratization as either stalled or regressed (Bieber 2020), while ethnic reconciliation seems to have never gotten off the ground (Fischer 2011). Moreover, the process of European integration seems to have come at a standstill, thus diminishing any hope of real change. This chapter is focused primarily on the role of European integration in the region and the ways in which the EU has effected change with respect to democratization and reconciliation. The role of international actors in shaping transitional politics is perhaps one of the most widely researched topics in political science and international relations literature. The focus in what is referred to as the international dimension of democratization has fascinated scholars in the wider field of political science since the collapse of communism. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama even famously stated that the post-Cold War era marked the end of mankind’s ideological evolution and the triumph of democracy (Fukuyama 1989). Thus, in a certain light, democracy promotion became an integral mission of international organizations such as the EU and NATO. It is in this respect, that the EU has been labelled the prime benefactor of new democracies in Europe (Pridham 2005). Box 4.1. The international dimension of democratization refers to the wider phenomena of foreign-assisted transitions to and consolidations of democracy. More specifically, when international actors such as the EU or NATO, or individual states such as the USA, provide different forms of assistance to transitioning societies, these acts fall under the international dimension of democratization. Such acts can include financial assistance, technical assistance with holding elections and writing legislation, as well as more normative support for the newly emerging democratic regime. Suggested readings: Whitehead, L. (Ed.). (2001). The international dimensions of democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Burnell, P. (Ed.). (2013). Democracy assistance: international co-operation for democratization. London: Routledge. Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 104 The WB, however, seems to have resisted the effects of European integration. Despite the offer of a credible membership perspective, apart from Croatia which became the latest EU member state in 2013, the region has stagnated and is failing to deliver either democracy or reconciliation. Although the countries of the WB are characterized by the absence of authoritarianism since the 1990s, the region is generally not categorized as fully democratic. The Freedom House continues to classify these states as “partly free”. And indeed, the basic premises of democracy are missing across the region—from rule of law to political participation and equality of groups. In fact, it can be said that de-democratization is taking place, as citizens do not have equal access to politics, especially in states such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which exacerbates popular support for democratic institutions and representation. On the other hand, ethno-nationalism has created an almost clientelistic approach to political representation, but also economic well-being. This is evident through the presence of strong party regimes which overwhelmingly dominate politics in the region. Thus, it can be said that democracy in the Western Balkans portrays characteristics of a non-linear and non-steady process. Rather, it fluctuates and tends to revert in conjunction with issues of nationalism and statehood. In this respect, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains emblematic of a state with significant challenges in overcoming its ethnic divisions; Kosovo remains a contested state; North Macedonia has only recently been able to overcome its longstanding name dispute with Greece; Serbia has yet to come to terms with its recent past; Albania continues to suffer from endemic corruption and a weak state; meanwhile Montenegro which had been the region’s frontrunner is now showing signs of religious divisions between its two largest groups, Montenegrin and Serbian orthodox. While each of these cases are fraught with peculiar challenges of their own, they have all been and continue to remain under the EU’s influence as dictated by their drive toward EU membership. This is a noteworthy factor to bear in mind as the literature has given important weight to the role of international actors in promoting democracy. There is already substantial evidence in support of the claim that international actors help move democracy forward, be it the post-communist world, Latin America, or the global south more generally (Whitehead 1996). A more important consideration here is the distinction between the varieties of democracy promotion. These approaches range from incentivized ones where a recipient state receives an initial reward with the hope that it will implement democratic reforms in order to continue receiving aid, to conditional approaches where the recipient state has to undertake reforms before receiving the reward. The literature, however, is conclusive Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 105 on this distinction and has consistently shown the superiority of conditional approaches (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Ethier 2003). The EU’s enlargement policy which requires applicant candidate states to undertake reforms before moving closer to eventual full membership is a prime example of the conditional approach. Yet, as this chapter will show, even this approach has its limitations, particularly when democracy promotion is confronted with simultaneous domestic challenges that may not necessarily require the same strategies and instruments. This is the case in the WB where democratization and reconciliation are evolving side by side, but may not necessarily be complimentary with one another. In the remainder of the chapter, we will first develop a theoretical linkage between democratization and reconciliation in order to understand their (in)compatibility with one-another. Second, we will provide a definition of democracy promotion and ethnic reconciliation. Third, we will provide an overview of the EU’s presence in the region by highlighting some of its achievements and failures. Last, the chapter will conclude by emphasizing the major takeaways as well as highlighting some expectations for the near future. Linking Democracy and Reconciliation We have already discussed the concepts of democracy and reconciliation extensively in chapters 2 and 3 of this book. We will not dwell much on definitions here. Consequently, we want to reiterate briefly that by democracy we refer to a system of government of the people, for the people, and by the people. It is this underlying logic depicts the basis of representative democracy. The people elect their representatives who are then held accountable to the people. Whenever ‘the people’ are not clearly defined or are explicitly excluded from democratic politics, as through disenfranchisement laws, democracy is thought to be suffering from serious qualities. By extension, when society is divided and the system is unrepresentative because certain groups have either been disenfranchised or do not have viable means to political representation, the democratic system has yet to reach the normative standards that we associate with modern democracy. In this respect, reconciliation, which is defined as the process or outcome of having restored friendly relations between grieving groups, appears to be closely associated with democracy and the two appear compatible with one-another (for a more detailed discussion on the link between democracy and reconciliation consult Chapter 3). Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 106 Yet, when we think in more specific terms, it appears that the relationship is more tenuous. Generally speaking, every modern democracy has a starting point, a birthday if you may, which in new democracies often represents the country’s first democratic elections. This defining moment does not imply that a full liberal democracy has been established. As a matter of fact, this is generally not the case, as different societal groups may be intentionally disenfranchised in the early days of democracy. Nevertheless, at this point, the pillars of representative democracy are institutionalized into the new democracy’s body of laws. These pillars, first and foremost, refer to political rights and civil liberties such as the right to vote, the freedom of expression, the right to assembly and so on. However, the institutionalization of these rights, in the legal sense of the word, does not necessarily secure the new democracy’s future. As the authoritarian and populist trend of post-2008 has shown us, institutionalization is not sufficient in securing democracy. The rise of populism in Europe, the election of Donald Trump to the White House, and the democratic backsliding in some of the EU’s newest member states provide a clear illustration to the limits of institutional arguments. Thus, democracies become consolidated and endure not only when “governmental and nongovernmental forces alike…become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process,” but when such institutional changes are associated with behavioral and attitudinal shifts, as two prominent scholars in the field of democracy have suggested (Linz and Stepan 1996, 14-15). It is the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of democracy which in today’s world have taken center stage in the study of democracy. Thus, questions such as who supports populist parties, who supports anti-immigration policies, who voted for Donald Trump or Brexit, and how do political parties respond to such changes have become of increasing importance (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Yet when we think of ethnic reconciliation, while the institutional aspect is certainly important and has its role to play, we can never speak of reconciliation without corresponding attitudinal and behavioral shifts, which in democracies cannot be legislated or are challenging to legislate. In this respect, reconciliation is compatible with democracy, but only with an advance type of democracy that has moved beyond the initial phase of instituting democracy. Moreover, reconciliation constitutes a different process from that of democratization. It is a process of dealing with the past in order to move forward to a common future. This is an entirely different process from democratization. Yet, the more interesting question is not the compatibility of the two, but whether one can proceed without the other. The conven- Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 107 tional wisdom, and one which is often promulgated by the transitional justice paradigm, is that without first dealing with the past, there is no hope for democracy. Dealing with the past helps establish accountability, fights prejudice and intolerance, strengthens institutional legitimacy, and protects human rights. Without these developments, democracy has little hope of surviving. And there is evidence in support of this claim ranging from post-apartheid South Africa to post-communist Europe. However, there are equally compelling arguments against confronting the past, with Spain representing perhaps the prime example of a new democracy which did not confront its past well after the new regime was consolidated (Encarnación 2008). The issue that we want to address in this chapter is the challenge of the simultaneous promoting of these two ideas. The WB are ideal testing grounds for such issues for the simple reason that the region has been a major recipient of the EU’s democracy promotion and efforts to restore friendly relations within states and between them. For example, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which serves as the framework for the region’s European aspirations, requires that each state first stabilize its relations with neighboring states prior to accession. Box 4.2. The Stabilization and Association Process was initiated in 1999 as a new framework whose main goal was to strategically support the EU integration process of Western Balkan countries. The process finds its basis in an array of different formats, from financial assistance to political dialogue. It also includes favorable trade relations and focuses on regional cooperation. Contractual relations represent a form of stabilization and association agreements (SAAs). Each SAA is signed individually (with each state) and serves as a permanent cooperation agreement. The implementation of the agreements is overseen by The Stabilization and Association Council. This Council meets annually at the ministerial level. Lastly, a Stabilization and Association Parliamentary Committee (SAPC) serves to ensure close cooperation between WB countries’ parliaments and the European Parliament. SAA has been in force for all WB countries since 2016. Suggested readings: Gordon, C. (2009). The stabilization and association process in the Western Balkans: an effective instrument of post-conflict management?. Ethnopolitics, 8 (3-4), 325-340. Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 108 Kaminski, B., & Rocha, M. (2003). Stabilization and association process in the Balkans: integration options and their assessment. The World Bank Research Working Papers. It is under this framework that both democracy and reconciliation are promoted. Nevertheless, while North Macedonia was the first WB state to sign an SAP in 2001, only Croatia has gone the full way with the country’s accession into the EU in 2013. Nevertheless, we should not conflate EU membership with the resolution of inter-state disputes. As the Croatian case has demonstrated, inter-state disputes (such as territorial disputes or matters of reconciliation between itself and Serbia) may remain frozen or fall out of the political agenda unless addressed prior to EU accession. Meanwhile, the failure of the rest is indicative of the region’s inability to address reconciliation, although matters of democracy and economy comprise other challenges the region must address before eventual accession. In the remainder of the chapter we provide an overview of the EU’s presence in the region and how it has been able to shape political developments. Moreover, we also provide some evidence to illustrate either the success or failure of the Union in pushing democracy and reconciliation forward. Promoting Democracy and Democratic Values While this chapter is focused on the role of the European integration, sometimes we will also rely on and refer to other ways the EU has been present in the region, even though its actions may not have been directly related to the process of integration. It is necessary, therefore, that we start with a definition of democracy promotion and what the literature has shown us in this respect. As with any other concept in the social sciences, scholars often disagree when it comes to definitions. Democracy promotion is no exception. According to Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki (2012, 3) democracy promotion is understood to mean “the processes by which an external actor intervenes to install or assist in the institution of democratic government in a target state.” Yet even this seemingly straightforward definition is open to debate as not all democracy promotion is the same. As we learned in Chapter 2, democracy is not a monolithic term. Different societies, with different historical backgrounds and socio-economic conditions have instituted different models of democracy. Most researchers, however, would agree that Western actors promote a liberal ver- Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 109 sion of democracy, consisting of a set of partial regimes, that is, free and fair elections, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effective representation (Wetzel et al. 2015). In the last decade, democratic governance has also received substantial attention. Democratic governance, however, should not be conflated with democracy itself. As one prominent scholar of the field has pointed out, while democratic governance in not incompatible with liberal democracy, “the promotion of democratic governance does not target the core institutions of the democratic state - the electoral regime, individual rights, and the checks and balances of legislative, executive, and judicial organs. Rather, it focuses on the institutions of sectoral governance” such as transparency, accountability, and participation (Schimmelfennig 2011, 730). Democratic governance in this respect is thought to represent a more technocratic approach to democracy promotion. Some research has even suggested that the EU has shifted its priorities from the promotion of democracy to the promotion of democratic governance (Wetzel and Orbie 2011; Schmidt 2015). As we will show below, this trend is worrisome for the WB where the EU’s focus on democratic governance and stability is of particular relevance. Democracy Promotion Through Enlargement Democracy promotion scholar Richard Youngs (2010, 1) has famously stated that the Eastern enlargement of the EU was the most successful case ever of democracy promotion. Beyond the EU’s strict enlargement policies based on the Copenhagen Criteria for membership, what gives EU membership power is the union’s normative appeal (Manners 2002). Box 4.3. The Copenhagen Criteria represent the rules which define whether a country is eligible to join the EU. These rules were laid down in Copenhagen in June 1993 and they specifically require that the country is a democracy and hence respects the rule of law, human rights, minority rights and is a functioning market economy. Each country must also accept the obligations of the EU. The Copenhagen criteria is divided into three main areas: 1. Political criteria – includes democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities; 2. Economic criteria – a country must have a functioning market economy and its producers must be able to compete on the European market; Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 110 3. Legislative criteria – technically outside the Copenhagen criteria, but focuses on enacting the EU legislation and bringing national legislation in line with EU law. This is known as the “acquis communautaire”. To commence the EU accession process, a country must satisfy the first criteria. Suggested readings: Hillion, C. (2014). “The Copenhagen criteria and their progeny.” In Hobson, C (Ed.) EU enlargement: a legal approach. Hart Publishing. Marktler, T. (2006). The power of the Copenhagen criteria. Croatian yearbook of European law & policy, 2(2.), 343-363. New democracies want to join the organization not only for its economic benefits, but also because accession represents a certain status—of having escaped a country’s communist past and moving toward a European future. With respect to the Eastern enlargement, it is without a doubt that the promotion of democracy, free markets and peace influenced the democratic transitions of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Perhaps a quote from Romanian scholar Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2005, 15-16), best illustrates this argument: There is no doubt that EU enlargement has been a remarkable success…Not only did the prospect of the EU membership precipitate the reforms that were indispensable for the transformation of CEE states, but since it enjoyed large popular support it also enticed post-communist parties into becoming genuinely pro-EU parties…[and as a result], transitions with an EU prospect seem to be the best: they lead to democracy and prosperity earlier and with fewer uncertainties and risks than any other types of transitions. It was the conditional nature of EU accession, however, that provided the Eastern enlargement with its success. CEE states were expected to oblige to a pre-set EU agenda in order to secure membership. In other words, reforms came first, rewards came later. Yet, this approach is not without its limitations. Expected to oblige to a pre-set agenda of rules to which an applicant states had no say in formulating in the first place raises questions about the sustainability of reforms once membership is secured. Interestingly, research has shown that while post-accession compliance with EU rules—rules which have a basis in the acquis (EU body of laws)—has been relatively stable, compliance with non-rule base norms has lagged far behind (Epstein and Sedlemeier 2008; Cianetti et al. 2018). The explanation for this observation is equally interesting. While the EU has a strong infringement procedure for incompliance with the acquis, the Union’s tools Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 111 are more limited when it comes to preventing or punishing democratic breaches. Box 4.4. The Acquis Communautaire or the Community Acquis is a French term which means “acquired” or “obtained”, while communautaire pertains to the “community. The Acquis represents all the legislation, legal acts and decisions of the EU. In short, it is the European Union law. Suggested readings: Grabbe, H. (2002). European Union conditionality and the acquis communautaire. International Political Science Review, 23(3), 249-268. Hille, P., & Knill, C. (2006). ‘It’s the Bureaucracy, Stupid’ The Implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in EU Candidate Countries, 1999-2003. European Union Politics, 7(4), 531-552. Beyond the activation of Article 7 of the EU Treaty which suspends a country’s voting rights in EU institutions, there is very little else at the EU’s disposal. Moreover, because the conditional nature of EU accession process forced applicant states to compete over the implementation of a pre-set agenda rather than alternative policies it did not encourage the development of democratic pluralism. In other words, because the pre-accession process prioritized the efficiency of policy adoptions over the legitimacy of such policies, the EU, paradoxically, while acting as a beacon of legitimacy in driving applicant states toward democracy, at the same time, it undermined the development of democratic practices. Box 4.5. Article 7 of the EU Treaty 1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure. The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination was made continue to apply. 2. The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a se- Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 112 rious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the Member State in question to submit its observations. 3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons. The obligations of the Member State in question under this Treaty shall in any case continue to be binding on that State. 4. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary or revoke measures taken under paragraph 3 in response to changes in the situation which led to their being imposed. 5. The voting arrangements applying to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council for the purposes of this Article are laid down in Article 354 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Explaining post-accession democratic performance becomes even more interesting when we consider the literature from party politics. There is broad consensus in the literature that European integration had a profound effect on CEE party systems. Not only did the accession process shape political competition, but it also provided the framework through which parties built their political programs. As Milada Vachudova (2008, 862), has argued, “in almost all cases, major political parties respond to EU leverage by adopting agendas that [were] consistent with EU requirements in the run-up to negotiations for membership.” In this respect, former communist, illiberal, and authoritarian parties reformed their ideological profiles to appear more supportive of integration. However, once accession was secured, these parties then appear to have reverted to their original ideologies, which in many cases had nationalist and authoritarian roots. The theoretical argument here is that the drive toward EU membership helped stabilize political competition and suppressed political tensions, although, once membership was secured, political tensions came to the fore, and political competition was reshaped once more. This is just another indicator that institutional transformations do not automatically lead to democratic consolidation unless societies are able to adopt the behavioral and attitudi- Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 113 nal aspects of democracy. Yet, these two latter aspects, have remained outside the EU’s purview. Milada Vachudova (2014) who is one of the prominent scholars of this field has recently argued that the process of EU accession is shaping political competition in the WB in a very similar pattern. Former authoritarian and nationalist parties, such as the Socialist Party of Serbia (Slobodan Milošević’s former party) or the Serbian Progressive Party (a breakaway faction of the nationalist Radical Party) have adopted agendas consistent with the accession criteria. A similar trend is apparent in Montenegro where all major political parties support EU accession. Meanwhhile, the effects of the accession process have only recently reemerged in North Macedonia, after the country settled its longstanding name dispute with Greece. Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other hand faces significant internal problems for EU conditionality to have any substantial and consistent effect. Yet, whatever the effects of pre-accession, we now know that post-accession is a different story. As Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2007, 16) argues: When conditionality has faded, the influence of the EU vanishes like a shortterm anesthetic. The political problems in these countries, especially the political elite’s hectic behavior and the voters’ distrust of parties, are completely unrelated to EU accession. They were there to start with, though they were hidden or pushed aside because of the collective concentration on reaching the accession target…Now that countries in the region have acceded to the EU, we see Central and Eastern Europe as it really is—a region that has come far but still has a way to go. The above quote may provide us with insights into why the EU finds it difficult to promote democratic values such as those related to ethnic reconciliation. There is now broad consensus in the scholarly community that the EU’s promotion strategies are ‘shallow’. The argument here rests on the claim that reforms are more likely to become sustainable when they are accompanied by social learning. However, it appears that the EU’s topdown and technocratic manner of administering the accession process left little room for social learning, and as a result, what we are now witnessing in post-accession CEE is a prime case of ‘shallow Europeanization’. Thus, to what extent can we expect the EU’s influence in the WB to have a lasting and deep effect on values and norms that we associate with a reconciled society? Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 114 The EU in the WB The very idea of European integration, taking note from Franco-German reconciliation, is built on the argument that ties between states overcome bilateral disputes, or at the very least, effectively eliminates the likelihood of war between adversarial sides. This same idea is the driving force behind the integration of the WB. However, unlike the Franco-German reconciliation, or the transformative power of integration for CEE, in the WB the EU faces a more daunting task. The process of European integration and democratization are taking place simultaneously with the process of state building. This third factor is beyond the EU’s capacities to address, and it is this factor which largely explains the challenges facing the region today. This section will therefore provide an overview of European integration in the region, but not necessarily provide a detail analysis of every case. It will, however, provide supportive evidence where necessary. Any analysis of the process of integration must take as a starting point the supply and demand for integration. By supply, we mean a credible perspective for integration on behalf of the EU. Meanwhile, by demand, we mean a desire for membership on behalf of the applicant states. There are a variety of ways through which these factors can be analyzed. For example, official documents and government speeches from member and non-member states can tell us the seriousness to which EU enlargement is being considered. We can also analyze party profiles and determine the extent to which political parties are placing an emphasis on pro or anti-enlargement policies. From a different angle, we can analyze popular views from the perspective of EU citizens or applicant states in order to determine popular desire for enlargement. There is a general consensus among the academic and policy communities that after the 2008 global financial crisis the EU entered a phase of enlargement fatigue. This argument suggests that due to a number of internal challenges such as the Eurozone crisis, Brexit, and rising populism, an enlargement perspective became unrealistic in the short term. Indeed, current French President, Emmanuel Macron, has pointed out persistently that there will be no enlargement until the EU decision-making procedures have undergone deep reforms. There is an important distinction in the European integration literature that should be pointed out here. That is, the different between vertical and horizontal integration. Whereas the former refers to the process of deepening integration by addressing internal concerns, the latter refers to widening integration by expanding membership. Theoretically, the two can proceed simultaneously. However, due to limitations in resources and the veto power held by member states, the Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 115 two processes often proceed in turn. Thus, when internal reforms are on top of the agenda, the enlargement process slows down. This is an important consideration to bear in mind, as research has shown that when enlargement loses its credibility, reforms stall in candidate states (O’Brennan 2014). This is precisely the reason why WB elites are not willing to undertake the necessary reforms—the ultimate reward of membership is simply too far down the line. Much of the literature on the effects of membership relies on rational choice arguments, in that elites are willing to undertake reforms as long as there is some immediate reward associated with the reform. When reforms, however, are too costly, and the reward of membership is far down the line, politicians are unwilling to bend under EU pressure. Precisely for this reason, research has also been able to show that democracy promotion which offers an enlargement perspective is more effective compared to other forms of promotion (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). Turning our attention back to the supply and demand argument, utilizing survey data from the Eurobarometer survey we see that support for enlargement among existing member states has steadily declined over the last decade (European Commission 2018). Support from EU citizens has declined from 53% in 2004 to 44% in 2018. More importantly, those standing against enlargement have increased from 35 % to 46% for the same time period. In other words, more EU citizens stand against enlargement than those supporting it, albeit these trends vary from country to country. On the other hand, support for enlargement from the perspective of WB has also declined, albeit data available for this group of countries is a bit more sporadic. In any case, if we compare levels of support in 2014 versus 2018, we see a small decline of 3%, while those standing against have increased by 5%. These are not large fluctuations, but when we look at these trends for North Macedonia for which time-series data goes farther back, support has declined from 90% in 2007 to 74% in 2018. North Macedonia has also become the emblematic case in illustrating the effects of enlargement fatigue. Up till 2005 North Macedonia was the posterchild for the region. The country had overcome the potential for large-scale violence between the majority Macedonian population and the Albanian communities through the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, ethnic reconciliation was arguably heading in the right direction, and in 2005 the European Commission granted the country candidate status, thus paving the way for eventual accession. Yet three years later, when Greece vetoed the country’s bid for NATO membership due to the name dispute between the two, the Nikola Gruevski government at the time used the rejection to playing into Macedonian claims of historical grievances (Meka 2016). Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 116 From 2008 until Gruevski’s government was forced to step down in 2016 following a series of scandals, inter-ethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians had gotten sour and democracy had steadily deteriorated until the country’s levels of democracy were one of the lowest in the region. There are now hopes that democracy will get a kick-start after the 2018 Prespa Agreement which settled the country’s name dispute with Greece. What North Macedonia’s experience shows, however, is that without a credibile perspective for EU membership, the region is prone to authoritarian reversals. Box 4.6. The Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001) was the peace agreement signed by the government of North Macedonia (then FYROM) and ethnic Albanian representatives. The agreement was signed after international mediators pressured for its ratification and implementation. The agreement established the basic principles of a civic state and ended the armed conflict between the two sides. The Agreement also includes a provision by which any language that is spoken by more than 20% of the population must be proclaimed as an official language. Hence, Albanian language also became official at the municipal level. The Prespa Agreement (2018) derives its name from the lake by which it was signed. It is an agreement between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia under the UN auspices which resolved a dispute over Macedonia’s name. The agreement entered into force on February 12, 2019. The agreement changed the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia to North Macedonia. Suggested readings: Marolov, D. (2013). Understanding the Ohrid framework agreement. In Sabrina P.R., Listhaug, O. and Simkus, A. (Eds.) Civic and Uncivic Values in Macedonia (pp. 134-154). Palgrave Macmillan. Rohdewald, S. (2018). Citizenship, Ethnicity, History, Nation, Region, and the Prespa Agreement of June 2018 between Macedonia and Greece. Südosteuropa, 66(4), 577-593. Despite the positive role played by the EU in the region, there are also claims to the contrary. One of such arguments suggests that the EU has done little to promote democracy. Rather, what it has promoted is stabilitocracy. That is, promoting regimes that provide political stability at the expense of democracy (Kmezić and Bieber 2017). While there is nothing novel in the argument that Western powers promote stability at the expense of democracy, with the Cold War period providing numerous examples were Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 117 the US helped stabilize authoritarian regimes in exchange for their alignment with the West, promoting such policies in the WB is rather counterintuitive considering the region’s drive toward EU membership. Nevertheless, the stabilitocracy argument does force us to ask questions of the integration process and whether it can promote democracy and reconciliation in a place like the WB. Another way through which we can analyze the effects of integration is by understanding the tools the EU utilizes as part of the enlargement process. In this way, we can develop a better understanding of theoretical linkages and expected outcomes. The framework through which the accession process is judged and measured is based on the Copenhagen Criteria. This list of accession criteria emerged in the early 1990s after several CEE states expressed the desire to join the Union. The list effectively consists of three categories: political, economic, and legal. In the political camp reside the necessity for institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities; the economic camp consists of the need to establish a functioning market economy capable of competing with market forces; and the legal camp consisting of the institutional and administrative capacity to implement the acquis. While this list of criteria may at first sight appear specific enough, it is in fact vaguely broad. For instance, by what measure do we evaluate institutions of democracy, human and minority rights? When are we certain that an economic system has developed the capacity to compete within the common market? And how do we evaluate administrative capacity? The vagueness of the criteria has led to criticism against the EU under the accusation of ‘moving the goal post’. That is, candidate countries fulfill a certain benchmark, only to be told that there is more work to be done, hence the EU moving the goal post further down the line. It is this very dynamic, however, which gives the EU the leverage to induce reforms. As part of this framework, the EU produces an Annual Report which outlines the progress each candidate has made in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. For candidate states the report serves as an objective measure of political progress in the country, which governing and opposition parties utilize to their advantage. Thus, when the report highlights positive progress, governing parties pull out these positives to highlight their successful reforms in getting the country closer toward full membership. Meanwhile, opposition parties pull out the negatives and blame government for their failure. Bearing in mind the popular support for integration in the WB, the reports therefore become a powerful tool in forcing governments to address the shortcomings of their reforms. Overall, however, the integration process is an executive focused process. There is little room for mass participa- Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 118 tion beyond the role of civil society in bringing forward government abuses, while the opposition and parliament are largely removed from the process as it is the government which negotiates directly with the EU. For this reason, the process is criticized for being elite focused, and questions are raised as to whether such a process can lead to the necessary attitudinal shift within the masses that we associate with a consolidated democracy and a reconciled society. Moreover, reforms are often initiated by outside actors, with little understanding of the real importance or meaning from the local actors. As such, the integration process and its benefits remain largely outside the reach of citizens and the public. Citizens are stuck as observers or, even worse, completely alienated, thus acting mainly as recipients of political decisions. What results is political alienation and distance from EU policies and practices. Indeed, the accession criteria constitute of institutional measures of democracy, thus leaving aside the other two components of a consolidated system—the behavioral and attitudinal aspects. The EU, however, has learned from its mistakes and has refined the enlargement process. Following Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession, the EU realized that rule of law and democratic standards in the two countries did not follow the trajectory that was expected from their membership in the Union. As a result, the EU redesigned its pre-accession process, with new candidates (beginning with Croatia) required to first engage with Chapters 23 and 24 of the Annual (or Regular) Reports which deal with ‘Judiciary and fundamental rights’ and ‘Justice, freedom and security’ respectively. The idea behind this change was to encourage behavioral compliance with rule of law very early on in the process, thus ensuring long-term compliance with qualities of democracy. Yet, even this innovative change is not fully compatible with ensuring measures that promote reconciliation. Indeed, beyond the criteria for ensuring human rights and minority right, there is very little direct focus on reconciliation within the enlargement framework. Box 4.7. Negotiating Chapters are a list of legislative areas that each candidate must reform before EU accession. The chapters are outlined in the Annual Report of each candidate country, which the EU prepares in order to document their progress. At the moment of writing, there are 34 chapters in total, covering areas such as agriculture, taxation, energy, the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital, and many others. A candidate state is extended membership only after all 34 chapters have been negotiated. While some chapters are easier to negotiate, others are controversial and often take years to negotiate. The chapters are not ne- Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 119 gotiated in any particular order, the final decision of which is often determined by political considerations. List of Chapters: 1: Free movement of goods 13: Fisheries 25: Science and research 2: Freedom of movement for workers 14: Transport policy 26: Education and culture 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 15: Energy 27: Environment 4: Free movement of capital 16: Taxation 28: Consumer and health protection 5: Public procurement 17: Economic and monetary policy 29: Customs union 6: Company law 18: Statistics 30: External relations 7: Intellectual property law 19: Social policy and employment 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 8: Competition policy 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 32: Financial control 9: Financial services 21: Trans-European networks 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 10: Information society and media 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments 34 - Institutions 11: Agriculture and rural development 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 35 - Other issues 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 24: Justice, freedom and security While the EU has maintained a strong stance against separatism in the WB, a position which theoretically supports multiculturalism and reconciliation, in and of itself such a position does not guarantee reconciliation. Without complementary mechanisms which support bottom-up approaches that explain the benefits of reconciliation, the existing process is unlikely to be successful. In fact, failing to legitimize compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is thought to have Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 120 intensified ethnic tensions, thus placing a higher cost on reformist parties (Petričušić and Blondel 2012). Thus, even good intentions at promoting reconciliation can have the opposite effect by separating societies further. An interesting study in this respect, shows how police reform driven under EU pressure in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia has unintentionally led to the ethnicization of the issue (Koneska 2019). That is, to the defining of political issues in terms of their impact on ethnic groups. In these two cases, the EU promoted police reform in non-ethnic terms, as a necessity for good governance. Yet, the practical implications of the reforms raised uncertainties within ethnic groups who then begin judging the integration process along ethnic lines. Thus, similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, the overall effect that we are now witnessing in the region is ethnic separation instead of reconciliation. This perhaps should not be surprising. Even within its own boundaries the EU has failed to promote multiculturalism as demonstrated by the wave of populism that has swept across the continent since the 2008 economic crisis. This does not suggest that either multiculturalism in Europe or reconciliation in the WB have been complete failures. Rather, reconciliation is not compatible with the EU’s existing toolbox, and by extension, we should not place a heavy emphasis on the role of the EU in delivering such outcomes. Ultimately, it is the locals who must deliver—the EU can only support. Conclusion In recent years the WB has gained the attention of scholars and international media once more. There are claims that Russia is meddling into domestic affairs by reigniting ethnic divisions with the intention of derailing the region’s progress toward Western-led institutions. Enlargement fatigue is raising questions as to whether the region’s democratic reversal is due to the membership perspective losing credibility. Kosovo and Serbia are entertaining the idea of territorial swaps. And the term reconciliation has even become taboo in certain communities. Yet as this chapter has highlighted, these factors are closely related. Enlargement fatigue has provided an opening for outside powers such as Russia. In that sense, the EU’s own tools for promoting democracy and reconciliation appear either limited or ill-suited for the dynamics of the WB. And under certain conditions, such policies have even undermined the reconciliation process. As we highlighted in this chapter, democratization and reconciliation are theoretically compatible with one another. However, in practice they Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 121 may also end up undermining each other, particularly when their interaction is further complicated by an influence of an external actor. In this respect, while the EU has set itself a clear objective in the Western Balkans, its policies are ethnicizing political issues across ethnic lines. Thus, when one of these processes is undermined, it may also undermine the other. This leads us to the question of whether reconciliation should proceed before, after or along the process of democratization. While success stories can be found from each of these perspectives, it appears that the simultaneous approach has not had much success in the WB. Beyond the issue of reconciliation, this chapter has also analyzed the enlargement process. Interestingly, even in this regard the WB have shown to be a stubborn case. Despite the offer of EU membership, progress has been relatively slow, and in recent years democratization has taken steps back. Even the newly designed process which commences accession negotiations with the Chapters 23 and 24 is unlikely to led to significant changes in outcomes. Democracy is built much more on the belief of people that it is the best system possible, rather than smart institutional designs which prevent corrupt politicians from using public office for personal gains. It is precisely for this reason why the current enlargement process is unlikely to substantially aid reconciliation in the WB. It remains to be seen as to what the European future of the WB holds. While the enlargement perspective is still ongoing, as the recent history of CEE has shown us, membership is not a panacea to every problem facing society. Deeper societal problems are unlikely to find recourse through European integration, with reconciliation perhaps being a prime example. While the European future of most WB states is unquestionable at the moment, a stagnated enlargement process could slow reforms even further. Nevertheless, regardless of the EU’s unquestionably important role in the region, progress has to come from within the states themselves, especially initiatives which deal with reconciliation. Perhaps it is even unrealistic to expect European integration to address such matters. Perhaps it is more realistic to leave such matters to domestic actors, while the EU serving as the guarantor of fundamental rights without which no form of reconciliation is possible. Questions for students: How does the EU promote democracy and reconciliation in the Western Balkans? Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 122 What does the democracy promotion literature say about the EU’s capacity to influence democratic developments in its surrounding regions? To what extent is the enlargement framework effective in delivering ethnic reconciliation? References Bieber, F. (2020). The rise of authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Cianetti, L., Dawson, J., & Hanley, S. (2018). Rethinking “democratic backsliding” in Central and Eastern Europe–looking beyond Hungary and Poland. East European Politics, 34 (3), 243-256. Elbasani, A., & Šabić, S. Š. (2018). Rule of law, corruption and democratic accountability in the course of EU enlargement. Journal of European Public Policy, 25 (9), 1317-1335. Encarnación, O.G. (2008). Reconciliation after Democratization: Coping with the past in Spain. Political Science Quarterly, 123 (3), pp. 435-459. Epstein, R. A., & Sedelmeier, U. (2008). Beyond conditionality: international institutions in postcommunist Europe after enlargement. Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (6), 795-805. Ethier, D. (2003). Is democracy promotion effective? Comparing conditionality and incentives. Democratization, 10 (1), 99-120. European Commission. Standard Eurobarometer 90, December 2018. https://ec.eur opa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm, Accessed April 19, 2020. Fischer, M. (2011). “Struggling for Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in the Western Balkans” in Susanne Buckley-Zistel and Thomas Kater (Ed.) Nach Krieg, Gewalt und Repression Vom schwierigen: Umgang mit der Vergangenheit [After war, violence and repression: The difficult handling of the past]. Nomos. (pp. 59-80). Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history?. The national interest, 16, 3-18. Grabbe, H. (2001). How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity. Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), 1013-1031. Hobson, C., and Kurki, M. (2012). “Introduction The conceptual politics of democracy promotion.” In Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki (Ed.) The conceptual politics of democracy promotion. London: Routledge. International Crisis Group. (2011) Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict. Europe Report 212 (11). Kmezić, M. and Bieber, F. (2017). The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans: An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion. BiEPAG Policy Study. Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 123 Koneska, C. (2019). “Ethnicisation vs. Europeanisation: Promoting Good Governance in Divided States.” In, Jelena Džankić, Soeren Keil and Marko Kmezić (Eds.), The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. London: Routledge. Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. C. (1996). Toward consolidated democracies. Journal of Democracy, 7 (2), 14-33. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2), 235-258. Meka, E. (2016). Minority Protection and Democratic Consolidation: The role of European Integration in the Republic of Macedonia. Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, 10 (2), 23-37. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2005). "EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress" in Michael Emerson (Ed.) Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood. CEPS Paperback Series. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2007). Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? EU Accession Is No" End of History". Journal of Democracy, 18 (4), 8-16. Norris, P. and Ronald I. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. New York: Cambridge University Press. O'Brennan, J. (2014). On the Slow Train to Nowhere-the European Union, Enlargement Fatigue and the Western Balkans. European Foreign Affairs Review, 19 (221). Petricusic, A., & Blondel, C. (2012). Reconciliation in the Western Balkans: New perspectives and proposals. JEMIE, 11, (4) 1-6. Pridham, G. (2005). Designing democracy: EU enlargement and regime change in postcommunist Europe. New York: Springer. Reka, A. (2008). The Ohrid Agreement: The travails of inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. Human Rights Review, 9 (1), 55-69. Richter, S., & Wunsch, N. (2020). Money, power, glory: the linkages between EU conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 27 (1), 41-62. Schimmelfennig, F. (2011). How Substantial is Substance-Concluding Reflections on the Study of Substance in EU Democracy Promotion. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16 (727). Schimmelfennig, F., & Scholtz, H. (2008). EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood: political conditionality, economic development and transnational exchange. European Union Politics, 9 (2), 187-215. Schmidt, J. (2015). Constructing new environments versus attitude adjustment: contrasting the substance of democracy in UN and EU democracy promotion discourses. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28 (1), 35-54. Vachudova, M. A. (2008). Tempered by the EU? Political parties and party systems before and after accession. Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (6), 861-879. Vachudova, M. A. (2014). EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52 (1), 122-138. Eltion Meka and Maja Savić-Bojanić 124 Wetzel, A., & Orbie, J. (2011). With map and compass on narrow paths and through shallow waters: discovering the substance of EU democracy promotion. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16, 705-725. Wetzel, A., Orbie, J., & Bossuyt, F. (2015). One of what kind? Comparative perspectives on the substance of EU democracy promotion. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 28 (1), 21-34. Whitehead, L. (Ed.). (2001). The international dimensions of democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Youngs, R. (Ed.). (2010). The European Union and democracy promotion: a critical global assessment. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Chapter 4: The role of European integration in the Western Balkans 125 Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation Stefano Bianchini Abstract: This chapter raises a crucial challenge, that is why and to what extent the Western Balkans can emulate the EU pattern. In order to find an articulated answer to such a complicated issue, the chapter explain how reconciliation – in the case of the Western Balkans – has not only an international (regional) dimension, but also a domestic one. In fact, the level of stability of the area still depends on the persuasive role of a number of international organizations, despite the military confrontations ended in 2001. Therefore, the prospect of stability is still suffering from the social, political and cultural inability of respecting diversities, syncretism, and heterogeneity, which deeply mark the reality of the WB countries. As a result, sovranist and illiberal models manifest a significant degree of attractiveness in the region. Furthermore, the chapter explains how the persistent divisions in the geopolitical assessment of the Western Balkans may increasingly match with the growing divisions among the EU member-states and their reluctance to respect the pledge of inclusiveness made in Thessaloniki in 2003. Consequently, the chapter argues that local Western Balkans political attitudes may remain trapped in war legacies, institutional weaknesses, and confrontations, by affecting the whole process of democratization under way. A prospect, this one, that should not be underestimated and should require special efforts to support the interaction of democratization and reconciliation, if the EU pattern may play an influential role. Key terms: Imported Democracy, European Union, Emulated pattern, Domestic Reluctances, International Organizations. 127 The Background: Communist decline and democratic challenges at the end of the 20th century The Yugoslav federation violently collapsed in 1991. However, the transition from the communist dictatorship had actually, albeit timidly, started already in the 1980s. The process of changes began after the death of Tito (4 May 1980). To a large extent, it was due to the growing economic crisis, which affected the whole decade. During this period, the need of reforms encouraged the members of the League of the Communists to gradually consider a set of variants, related either to the economic performance and the role of the market, or to the broadening participation of the people in the political system, beyond the constraints that affected the self-management organization of the society. Box 5.1. Self-management was the basis of the economic and social system of Yugoslavia since 1950, after the break-up with Stalin in 1948. Originally established in the factories, self-management was gradually expanded to the whole society. It involved workers and citizens in a wide range of assemblies and meetings, under the leadership of the League of the Communists. Self-management facilitated also the administrative decentralization, which empowered in particular republics and regions. However, despite the extensive popular participation, its implementation suffered of many shortcomings, such as excess bureaucracy, confusion, uncertainties, and lack of expertise, while the interests of the eight political subjects increasingly diverged. Suggested readings: Rusinow D. (1977). The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Drulović M. (1978). Self-Management on Trial. Nottingham: Spokesman Books. Unkovski-Korica V. (2016). The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito’s Yugoslavia. London-New York: Tauris. In particular, the implementation of a political pluralism might have implied the acceptance of free competing ideas and a multiparty system. However, they were in conflict with one key aspect of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, that is the “dictatorship of the proletariat”. Therefore, the leaders of the eight federal units considered multilateral dialogue, bargaining, and diversities of republics and autonomous regions the “only form of compatible pluralism” for their country. At the same time, alerted by the experi- Stefano Bianchini 128 ence of the Yugoslav kingdom between the two world wars, they frightened that a multiparty system would have intensified the nationalist polarization among the federal units. Trapped among these fears, they lacked courage to face the reality, postponing relevant reforms until the moment when impatient leaders tried to impose changes by force, as occurred initially in Serbia, with subsequent devastating consequences for the whole country. It is not our task to enter into the details of the chain of events that led to the bloody fragmentation of the federation. Instead, the recall of few, but key dynamics that affected the process of reforms during the 1980s explains why an inner democratic transition failed in Yugoslavia when the League of Communist collapsed on the basis of the territorial principle in January 1990. One year later, the federation fragmented according to the same principle, war erupted and lasted ten years (1991-2001). Actually, the leaders of the country were uninterested in transforming the State into a democratic federation. They did not believe that this option was feasible. Therefore, they concentrated their efforts on the potential of their restricted territorial units (de facto, their electoral constituencies), with mainly unfortunate results. Subsequently, when the war occurred, several international attempts of mediations, particularly from the UN, the EU and the US were promoted in vain. NATO military operations were also carried out before the US and the EU succeeded to impose a series of contentious peace treaties between 1994 and 2001. Differently from Yugoslavia, the Albanian experience did not suffer from war, but from a harsher dictatorship than Titoism, and a lack of attempts to outline important reforms as soon as the Albanian “strong man”, Enver Hoxha, died in 1985 (Blendi, 2016; Mëhilli, 2017). Consequently, the State quickly precipitated in such a deep social and economic isolation and downfall that thousands of Albanians decided to flee to the neighboring Italy by boats, while the political tensions within the country reached their pick, encouraging Italy, with the UN and OSCE authorization, to lead two multinational interventions between 1991 and 1997. Called “Pellicano” and “Alba”, these operations were aimed to preserve a minimum level of institutional stability. Both these short narratives help highlighting why the post-socialist transition to democracy in the Western Balkans1 was, since the beginning, in- 1 Western Balkans: this is the terminology invented in the 1990s by the officials of the international organizations to refer to the territories of the Yugoslav successor states, without Slovenia, but with Albania. Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 129 stitutionally “fragile” and subject to “imported” solutions, stemming from international interventions, as the title of this chapter suggests. Furthermore, because (1) the war legacies are still vivid in the local (opposite) memories, (2) the domestic polarizations are not yet restrained under democratic institutional frameworks, and (3) the “triangle” of relations “Serbia-Kosovo-Albania” together with the domestic situation of Bosnia- Herzegovina remain unsettled, the issue of reconciliation is a crucially open challenge, that keeps Western Balkan democracies fragile. The EU and the Western Balkans The prolonged Western Balkan destabilization in the 1990s had an additional effect in Europe, because – paradoxically – it contributed to giving a sense of value to EU enlargement eastwards. This aspect has been rarely touched by EU policy makers, but the minister of foreign affairs of Germany, Joschka Fischer, was adamant in this regard during a speech at the Humboldt University in 2000. In that occasion, he explicitly stressed: Following the collapse of the Soviet empire, the EU had to open up to the east, otherwise the very idea of European integration would have undermined itself and eventually self-destructed. Why? A glance at the former Yugoslavia shows us the consequences, even if they would not always and everywhere have been so extreme. An EU restricted to Western Europe would forever have had to deal with a divided system in Europe: in Western Europe integration, in Eastern Europe the old system of balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations. A divided system of states in Europe without an overarching order would, in the long term, make Europe a continent of uncertainty, and, in the medium term, these traditional lines of conflict would shift from Eastern Europe into the EU again. If that happened, Germany, in particular, would be the big loser. The geo-political reality after 1989 left no serious alternative to the eastward enlargement of the European institutions, and this has never been truer than now, in the age of globalization.2 2 Joschka Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration, Speech delivered at the Humboldt University in Berlin, the 12 May 2000, https://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do?docId=192161&cardId=192161. Stefano Bianchini 130 This speech can be better understood in the light of the events that particularly occurred in 1992, when the risk of a Europewide extension of nationalist wars seemed to be real. In fact, in 1992 the Yugoslav war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the same year, Moldavia and the secessionist Transnistria entered into a military conflict as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan contended the Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the Prime Minister of Hungary, József Antall, threatened to ask for the revision of the Trianon peace treaty if Romania and Moldavia would merge according to a demand which was popular at that time in those countries. Box 5.2. Trianon peace treaty: this peace treaty was imposed to a defeated Hungary in 1920 by the winners of the Great War. As a consequence, Hungary began a landlocked state, which lost 72% of the territory and 64% of the population of its pre-war kingdom. Given the radical changes of the State, Trianon has represented such a deep psychologically political, economic, social, and cultural trauma, that the country is still recovering from. Suggested readings: Romsics I., Király B. K. (1999), Geopolitics in the Danubian Region. Hungarian Reconciliation Efforts 1848-1998, Budapest: CEU Press. Romsics I. (2002). Dismantling of Historic Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon 1920. New York: Columbia University Press. Deeply concerned about the devastating potential of these events, the prime minister of France, Édouard Balladur, suggested a “Stability pact” based on bilateral and multilateral treaties bounding EU potential candidate countries among themselves and between them and the EU in order to guarantee the protection of minorities and the rejection of violence in case of borders revisions. This issue was included in 1993 in the Copenhagen criteria. Subsequently, 92 separate agreements were signed in Paris in April 1995 between pairs of CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) and their neighbors (Bianchini, 2017, pp. 154, 217). Consistently, the “virus of nationalism” was isolated within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, while the EU enlargement was pursued mostly with the aim of guaranteeing stability and peace in the former Soviet camp. This goal was achieved between 1999, when negotiations were simultaneously opened with 10 post-socialist countries, and 2007 when Romania and Bulgaria finally joined the bloc. As for the Western Balkans, it was only at the EU summit in Thessaloniki, in June 2003, that the commitment to prospectively include the region Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 131 was declared, despite hesitations and reluctances of some member states. The promise occurred, not accidentally, after the death of the Croatian and the Bosnian Presidents, Franjo Tuđman (1999) and Alija Izetbegović (2003) respectively, while the former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević had been extradited to the ICTY in the Hague for charges of war crimes (2001). In other words, the U-turn of the EU from the position of negotiator among belligerents to the attractive framework able to guarantee the consolidation of democracy and the development of market economy in the Western Balkans took place only when the three most important war lords of the Yugoslav successor states were no longer in office. Under these circumstances, the EU institutions came to the conclusion that the new regional situation was offering unexpected opportunities for strengthening democratization and reconciliation, gradually overcoming the turbulent and problematic legacies of the area. In this perspective, the negotiations for the inclusion of the Western Balkans encompassed, in addition to the Copenhagen criteria, both the full cooperation with the ICTY and the development of the regional economic cooperation. The latter two aspects were considered important prerequisites for a comprehensive approach to reconciliation and integration. Box 5.3. The EU institutions: basically, they have two different profiles: one is communitarian and the other is intergovernmental. The most relevant communitarian institutions are the European Parliament (elected by EU citizens every 5 years), the European Commission (appointed by codecision of the Parliament and the Council), the European Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. The European Central Bank belongs to this institutional profile but limited to the eurozone countries. The most influential intergovernmental institutions are the European Council, composed by the 27 Head of States or Prime ministers of the memberstates, and the Council of the European Union, which is composed by 10 different configurations of Ministers. The latter shares with the Parliament the legislative role before the proposals of the Commission. In addition, the Eurogroup operates with the participation of the ministers of Finances of the 19 countries, which have adopted the common currency. Suggested readings: Peterson J., Shackleton M. (Eds). (2012). The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Consequently, democracy building efforts either stemming from the postwar contexts (for former Yugoslavia) or from the deep institutional crisis Stefano Bianchini 132 that repeatedly affected Albania during the 1990s, were entrusted to an intense interaction of domestic dynamics and outside conditionalities. Consistently, the external players– and in particular the EU – acquired a growing influential role that was only partially accepted by the local authorities. In fact, one of the main challenges of democracy building comprised the respect of diversities that, conversely, the socialist experience, the war rationale, and the post socialist transition have substantially denied, although in different ways and for different reasons. Admittedly, radical transformations were affecting democratic societies. Yet few decades earlier, the famous sociologist Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) elaborated a distinction between a minimalist and maximalist idea of democracy building (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 381). Later, other famous scholars, like Philippe Schmitter or Larry Diamond, wrote further on this issue (Schmitter and Lynn Carl, 1991, p. 78; Diamond, 2003, p. 36). In substance, the minimalist approach to democracy was limited to the “free and fair elections”, with institutions able to guarantee a control from below to leadership behaviors and political program implementation. Such a restricted vision could make sense immediately after WWI, when a large part of the population was still illiterate, women were beginning to demand recognition, and the European societies were just about to enter a new world. Eighty years later, the world was totally different. Democratic procedures were more sophisticated and broader, well beyond the electoral dimension. Active participation, effective demands to carry out civil, social, and economic rights, human and minority rights, respect of diversities outlined societal complexities that only mature and maximalist democracy building approaches could have met and satisfied. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, interdependence, globalization, and inclusiveness were becoming increasingly key words for developed societies. Box 5.4. The Berlin Wall was built by the German Democratic Republic authorities in 1961. This barrier, with guard towers, divided sharply the former German capital, unravelling the West side of the city, under the Western allies’ strict control, from the East zone and isolating it from the East Germany, occupied by the Soviet Army. The main reason of the construction was stemming from the will of the East German authorities to put an end to the migration flow of ordinary people and particularly scientists, experts, and intellectuals (brain drain) to the West. Under the new atmosphere of changes that occurred in 1989, the East German authorities announced on November 9 that visits to the Western side of Berlin were possible. In few hours thousands of people crossed the wall Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 133 and chipped away parts of it as souvenir. Then demolition of the wall began and was completed in November 1991. Suggested readings: Engel J. A. (Ed.) (2009). The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sarotte M. E. (2014). The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall, New York: Basic Books. Bozo F. (2009). Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification. New York: Berghahn Books. Therefore, with the new millennium, the post-socialist and post-traumatic societies of the Western Balkans were expected to cope with these changes as well. Under these circumstances, however, the process of democratization depended, and still depends, to a large extent, on the role played by the EU and its commitment to enlarge into South-East Europe. Its attractiveness in the Western Balkans is undeniable, due to the fact that these societies need great financial support and huge investments in order to establish solid conditions for social wealth, economic growth, and effective infrastructures. On the other hand, however, the rationale of this potential inclusion is based on an integrative political culture that, to a large extent, is incompatible with the dynamics triggered by either the Yugoslav violent dismemberment or the broader Albanian national question, as well as by their weak institutions and the poor performance of the local governance. As a result, war traumas, ethno-national political cultures, as well as the experience of a mid-century of almost total isolation (in case of Albania) do represent, although for different reasons, an arduous obstacle to the reconstructions of regional ties and domestic institutional trust. The prospect of integration: can the EU pattern be emulated? Regardless of its undeniable socio-economic appeal, the EU is – admittedly – a pattern difficult to emulate, at least for the Western Balkans. What does this sentence mean? The answer to this question lays on reconciliation. Reconciliation is, in fact, a crucial prerequisite for meeting the key values of the European integration processes. When such a project took shape in the 1950s, the main concern was to establish an economic and political framework able to avoid future wars in Europe. The reconciliation between France and Ger- Stefano Bianchini 134 many, after centuries of military confrontations, was identified as the most relevant agent for a stable peace. Box 5.5. EU “founding fathers”: Jean Monnet (1888-1979) was a French diplomat and political economist. He was the president of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, that is the first institution that anticipated the European Common Market and, later, the EU. Robert Schuman (1886-1963) was twice a Prime Minister of France and then the President of the European Parliament. He also led the European Movement in the 1950s supporting human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a supranational Union for Europe to put an end to war risks forever. Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986) had a leading role in establishing a European Federalist Movement. He was one of the authors of the Ventotene Manifesto. Entitled “For a Free and United Europe”, the document that called for a united and federal Europe in 1941 had a relevant influence on the antifascist movements. Later, he became a member of the European Commission and the European Parliament. His ideas paved the way to the negotiations, which led to the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) was the first Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany after the end of the second world war. Together with De Gaulle he promoted the reconciliation with France and supported convincingly the foundation of the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome, 1957). This was the key suggestion of the EU “founding-fathers” (like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Altiero Spinelli, and Konrad Adenauer), who took advantage of the French-German and Irish experiences, by outlining a project of integration, which paves the way for further potential developments, far beyond the nation-state theory and practice. Box 5.6. Nation-State: this is a very controversial term, which basically refers to a form of State based on nation. Historically, it originated mainly during the French revolution, when the legitimization of powers shifted from God to the people, essentially identified with the nation. Later, the nation was a goal to be achieved under territorial unification policies, as occurred in the cases of Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and other countries. However, the nation has been also Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 135 based on policies of divergence, which marked, for example, the self-perceptions of statehood among the Croats, Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians and others. Admittedly, scholars and policy-makers have elaborated or, respectively, implemented quite different, and sometimes opposite interpretations about what a nation means. Alternatively, in fact, the nation might be identified with a homogenized group of people who speak the same (standardized) language, share a common past, a common religion as well as a destiny, is generated by ancestors, or is the expression of a common will, or has been constructed mostly by the needs of modern mechanics and the industrial revolution. Recently, its homogenization structure has been the focus of critiques of women and feminist movements. Additional aspects have been also discussed. For example, a “civic nation” is considered an inclusive notion, encompassing all the inhabitants of a State. By contrast, the “ethnic nation” reflects on an exclusive notion, which restricts the sense of belonging to those sharing such politically pre-determined categories as language, religion, memory, ancestors, literature, and arts. The most radical approach to it includes also racism, race superiority, xenophobia, and prejudices against the others. Suggested readings: Gellner E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Breuilly J. (1993). Nationalism and the State. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hutkinson J., Smith A. (Eds.). (1994). Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. In the Western Balkans, on the contrary, such a prospect is still divisive for a variety of reasons that originated from the unlike (alternative) visions of nation/state building. Partially, they consolidated during the Yugoslav succession wars. Partially, they were advocated by local authorities through ethnic claims, and partially implemented by the atrocities and crimes committed in different areas and different times. Although Albania is a peculiar case, the trauma of the partition of 1912-13 is still alive in part of the political discourses of Albanian leaders and among Albanians outside the country. As a result, historical memories, social trauma, and victimization are seriously impacting the self-perceptions of individuals and leaders, by reproducing opposite narratives and mutually incompatible geopolitical desires (Dimou, 2009; Donskis and Dabasinskiene, 2010). Furthermore, the difficulty of emulating the EU pattern is also the result of the wrong assessment of the European Community in the late Stefano Bianchini 136 1980s, when its member-states interpreted the Yugoslav State exclusively as a communist creation, rather than a federation whose democratic evolution after 1989 might have followed liberal patterns, drawing inspirations, for example, from the experiences of Switzerland, India or Brazil. And, in fact, the liberal-democratic West, which pretended free and fair elections as a first step towards democratization in all post-socialist countries, never raised such a requirement for federal elections in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, it was satisfied with the elections in its republics, whose leaders – in turn – were not interested in giving popular legitimacy to the Federal Assembly. In truth, if these elections were indeed held, they would have had to discuss the future of the country under this institutional common framework. And republican leaders categorically disliked this outcome. Moreover, the blindness of the Western European countries was to a large extent stemming from their ideological approach to reality. As is known, the French-German reconciliation paved the way for a potential European integration after the atrocities of WWII. Similarly, however, the federal solution designed by the communists and their allies in 1943 for Yugoslavia was, in substance, a cultural and political mediation aimed to offer a shared peaceful project to peoples that were also experiencing mutual brutalities and murders. Nonetheless, this aspect was never recognized by the Western countries. Furthermore, and not incidentally, the previous, generous effort of reconciliation in Europe was made by two Nobel Peace Prizes, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Gustav Stresemann and his French counterpart and Prime Minister Aristide Briand in the midst of the 1920s. They aimed to create a true partnership between their countries, therefore consolidating the peace in Central Europe. However, their attempt, in the end, failed to overcome the resentments that the Great War had installed into important social components of the two States. Similarly, again, the peace solutions adopted to put an end of the Yugoslav violent fragmentation of the 1990s failed to pave the way for the rebuilding of mutual trust, functional governance, and a new economic take-off in the region. In addition, they were imposed to the warring parts by the US and the EU and never prevailed over the resentments generated by the war traumas. As a result, these resentments are still smoldering under the ashes of the unsettled regional conflicts. Admittedly, the endurance of regional fragility in democracy building and reconciliation in the Western Balkans is the product of a variety of sources, partially generated by local dynamics and events, but partially also by the inadequacy of external players, and particularly the European Union in convincingly promoting its model of inclusiveness. This failure Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 137 was initially transmitted to the region by the contradictory indications of the peace treaties. Their architecture was (and still is) fluid, if not inconsistent, under many respects. Box 5.7. Peace Treaties: The Yugoslav succession wars ended once a series of peace treaties were ratified. The most relevant treaties were (a) the Dayton Accords (1995), when Bosnia and Herzegovina was structured in two autonomous entities (the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and the Republika Srpska), with a common, feeble, government; (b) The Kumanovo Accords (1999), when the NATO bombing over Serbia and Montenegro was suspended, the Serbian military forces withdraw from Kosovo, and the region was placed under the UN administration, pending a decision about its future status; (c) The Ohrid agreement (2001) was the peace deal achieved between the Macedonian government (today North Macedonian) and the Albanian representatives after a short conflict. In this case, the unity of the State was preserved, but a large autonomy was granted to municipalities; (d) the Belgrade agreement (2003) provided a framework for the Serbian-Montenegrin Union, while envisaging the possibility of a referendum for the independence of Montenegro, which was actually hold in 2006 and 55,5% of voters supported the independent option. Suggested readings: Woodward S. (1995). Balkan Tragedy, Washinton D.C.: Brookings Institutions. Caplan R. (2005). Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia. New York: Cambridge University Press. Biserko S. (2012). Yugoslavia’s Implosion. The Fatal Attraction of Serbian Nationalism. Oslo: The Norwegian Helsinki Committee. Hayden R. (2013). From Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans. Studies of a European Disunion 1991-2011. Leiden: Brill. Their main provisions have been (and still are) interpreted by local authorities as the first legal step for further territorial and ethnic separations (as, for example, in the cases of the Dayton and Kumanovo Accords, concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo respectively), or as the result of an international consensus that the first step for a prospective integration has been started (this is the case of the Ohrid and Belgrade agreements, where Stefano Bianchini 138 the unity of the State was formally preserved).3 Consequently, after the war traumas, peace traumas were generated, rather than security and stability. Later, this comprehensive institutional, economic, and socio-psychological weakness was reinforced by divisions inside the EU, the decline of its conditionality, and “enlargement fatigue”. That is, the EU began to face a series of domestic difficulties connected to the management of the wide enlargement of 2004, the failure of the constitutional treaty in 2005, the sovereign debt crisis of 2008-2009, and the migrations flows after the Arab uprisings in 2011. Consequently, the EU has not been able to exercise the vital attraction of the previous decade. On the contrary, its reluctant behaviors were perceived as a manifestation of powerlessness. Under these circumstances, the post-war Western Balkan countries, still affected by their ghosts, continue to suffer from the manipulation of the past, the persistence of border contestations, the weakness of functional and trustful institutions. Initially, however, the EU made honest efforts to encourage the perspective of integration, as a viable option for stabilizing the region. For example, the Stability pact for SEE was launched in 1999 by EU member states immediately after the end of the NATO bombing over Serbia and Montenegro because of human rights violations in Kosovo4 (Musliu and Banjac 2005; Janjić and Hisa 2011). Subsequently, the EU promised to accomplish the enlargement to SEE at the Thessaloniki summit (2003). Later, the Stability Pact was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council, whose headquarters were established in Sarajevo in 2008, while a free trade area was initiated under the CEFTA (Central European Free Trade agreement) umbrella in 2007, despite reluctances of the involved governments, which feared some sort of regeneration of Yugoslavia (van Meurs, 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005; Rupnik, 2011, Petrović, 2014).5 Not surprisingly, this still lacerated area is currently hosting a high concentration of international organizations. In addition to those mentioned above, NATO, the OSCE, the CEI, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, EUSAIR and EUSDR (the EU strategies respectively for the Adriatic-Ionian and Danube macroregion), the SSECP (South East European Cooperation 3 A useful comparative analysis of the main peace treaties is in Bianchini S. et al. (Eds). (2007). Regional Cooperation, Peace Enforcement, and the Role of the Treaties in the Balkans. Ravenna: Longo. 4 This was the US formal explanation of the military operations. 5 On the EU policies in the Western Balkans the literature is really wide. We have above suggested some authors for a first account. Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 139 Project), the Adriatic-Ionian Euroregion and others are actively operating in the Western Balkans. By contrast, the unsettled question of Kosovo, the growing tensions between the entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina and among the three “constituent nations” of this country (that is the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosniacs), together with the persistence of border contestations (from Slovenia to Serbia) are affecting attempts aimed to re-establish solid networks of cooperation and a gradual shared policy of convergence, consistent with the integrative values of the EU. Within this context, nationalism determines the setting of the school system, the educational structure and, to a large extent, also the behavior of the media. Powerfully channeled by public statements of intellectual circles, political parties and movements, sport clubs, selective TV broadcast and social networks, nationalism helps propagate stereotypes about neighbors and/or the “others” in general terms. Furthermore, opposite interpretations of key historical events mark the governmental selection of textbooks in an effort of instilling in young generations and ordinary people a national sense of belonging based on the victimization of the nation and its glorious redemption against the atrocities and oppression systematically perpetuated by the neighbors. This trend is still powerfully enshrined in regional dynamics and is reinforced by the segregation cases of “two schools under one roof” in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This happens despite the efforts of numerous NGOs, civil society organizations, scholars and teachers who speak out against segregation, the manipulation of history, the manipulations of sufferance, and the distortion of memories. Box 5.8. “Two schools under one roof” is the terms used for the segregate school system of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pupils from different ethnic groups attend their lectures in the same building but entering from opposite sides, following different curricula, and remaining physically separated from each other. Suggested readings: “Two Schools Under One Roof”. The Most Visible Example of Discrimination in Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE Mission of Bosnia-Herzegovina, November 2018, https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-her zegovina/404990?download=true. Suffice here to remember the six textbooks on the Balkan history, jointly written between 2009 and 2016 by a pool of Balkan scholars, who implemented an important project led by Christina Koulouri and promoted by Stefano Bianchini 140 the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in SEE based in Thessaloniki. Available for free in Internet, they were never included in the list of the adopted school texts. A similar fate occurred to the addendum to the Croatian history textbooks, written by Snježana Koren, Magdalena Najbar- Agičić, and Tvrtko Jakovina in 2005. Originally commissioned by the center-right government, it was in the end rejected because of the vehement reactions of nationalist academics. Still, a number of scholars and NGOs, mostly from young generations, concentrated their efforts in contrasting historical revisionism in their own countries. Others, like Svetlana Broz, highlighted the relevance of civil courage, by publishing interviews with ordinary citizens who survived the conflict due to the support and solidarity of unknown people from different ethnic groups who did not hesitate to put their life at risk. Moreover, socio-linguistic experts, like Snježana Kordić, raised the issue of language segregation. She promoted a wide transnational movement who supported a “Declaration of a common language” with a polycentric character in 2017. Activists, like Nataša Kandić, Vojin Dimitrijević and others focused on human rights violations and spent their energies to preserve the memories of all the victims of the war of Kosovo (Koulouri et al., 2005/2016; Korostelina and Lässig, 2013; Schwandner-Sievers and Klinkner, 2019; Koren et al. 2007; Kandić, 2011). The main challenges for reconciliation in the Western Balkans These are just but a few examples of the broader resistance to the culture of ethnic partitions that the legacy of the war continues to reproduce within the societies, despite the efforts of the ICTY to help the region in transitional justice. Albania as well, although it was not involved in the Yugoslav succession wars, has remained often entangled in the cobweb of the “Albanian cultural world” across the borders, when ambivalent public statements, occasional political meetings or infrastructural constructions have raised suspicions among its neighbors about the real geopolitical intentions of the Albanian leaders. This is the case not only in Albania, but also in North Macedonia, Kosovo, Southern Serbia, and Montenegro (Murati, 2012; Biberaj, 1998; Schwandner-Sievers and Fischer, 2002; Woods, 1918; Duham, 2004). Other scholars noticed that regional economic cooperation, despite everything, has intensified. Tim Judah published a seminal study in 2009 under the provocative title of “Yugosphere”, which raised fierce criticisms among nationalists. In essence, he suggested that “an unappreciated dynamic was at work on the ground” and described the intense network of Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 141 contacts, trade, investments, as well as the flow of cultural, music, and artistic ties that were bounding the region transnationally. In particular, he emphasized the role of the RCC, NATO, the EU and other international fora. Mirroring a situation under development, he highlighted that a sort of a parallel world of economic, cultural and social interests did exist and grow, but also collided with the political mainstream (Judah, 2009). Admittedly, this mainstream is still unable to settle its account with the past. However, it is not only a question of scarce (even lack of) elaboration of the atrocities and crimes suffered during the war, which still affect the attitude of politics in the Yugoslav successor states. Yet, this is, mostly, the endurance of the psychological obsession that some “sort of Yugoslavia” might be re-established, either within the EU umbrella, or – even worst, for them – as an EU “waiting room”, where the candidate countries of the Western Balkans will be left indefinitely. This psychological approach explains to a large extent, but not completely, why the EU integrative model is difficult to emulate in the Western Balkans (which also includes, in our view, Slovenia and Croatia, although both are EU member-states). Truly, practical cooperation – starting from economy – represents the main lever of the functionalist method that was suggested by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman in order to create the basic conditions for reconciliation between France and Germany. In reality, they did not mention this word in the famous “Schuman Declaration” of 1950, although they firmly believed that a strategy initially focused on the convergence of economic interests, able to carry out a long-lasting peace, would produce key prerequisites for reconciliation and a political evolution of the integration. Box 5.9. The Schuman Declaration: with this declaration, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested on 9 May 1950 the foundation of the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC). France, Western Germany, the Benelux (a Belgian-Luxembourg-Netherlands’ association) and Italy joined the proposal, which was ratified in Paris in 1951. Actually, coal and steel were considered two key raw materials for war needs. Therefore, Schuman believed that a common market of these natural resources, under a supranational authority, would have neutralized competition and made war impossible. This approach was also considered the basis of the functionalist method. This method, in fact, assumed that a sector to sector economic cooperation will strengthen gradually the interdependence among member-states, narrowing the role of nation-states, and paving the way for a political union. This was the origin of the itinerary that progressively led to the EU. Stefano Bianchini 142 Suggested readings: Declaration of 9th May 1950 delivered by Robert Schuman. In European Issue. 204, 10th May 2011.https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questio ns-d-europe/qe-204-en.pdf. Similarly, the simultaneous inclusion of Ireland and the United Kingdom with the European Economic Market in 1973, the cross-border cooperation, the financial support to Northern Ireland from Brussels, and the free market implementation, were all factors that paved the way to the Irish peace agreement of the “Good Friday” of 1998. Box 5.10. The “Good Friday Agreement” or “Belfast Agreement” refers to the peace treaty signed between the United Kingdom, Ireland and the most relevant political parties of Northern Ireland to end the long years conflict in the North of the island. It was signed on 10 April 1998 and was achieved with the mediation of the Clinton administration. Suggested readings: Fenton S. (2018). The Good Friday Agreement. London: Biteback Publ. However, twenty years after the end of wars in the Western Balkans it seems that such a methodology, powerfully applied in terms of financial support and political assistance, does not work so successfully as expected. In effect, the German ministry of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer was one of the rare EU policy makers who noticed, in 2000, that the functionalist approach has serious limitations. In his famous speech at Humboldt University he suggested that it was finally time to go beyond it and lay the foundation of a political unit. It did not happen. On the contrary, the power of the member-states consolidated to the detriment of the communitarian institutions. Meanwhile, in the Western Balkans, the “Yugoslav Phantom” is still one of the basic reasons, which explain the reluctance of the regional authorities to develop regional cooperation. An additional factor is determined by a specificity of the war legacy. In fact, none of the parties in conflict feels itself as vanquished. On the contrary, even if some claims to be the winner, all parties feel themselves as victims. Victimization is therefore a crucial mental aspect that marks the behavior of regional policies. Reproduced mostly by policy makers, media, extreme-right movements, ultras sport groups, the victimization feeling nurtures intolerance against the “others”. It depicted diversities as national threats and a source of perpetrating unjust behaviors, crimes, genocides, atrocities. These “antagonist Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 143 others” can be another ethnic or religious group, but also women organizations, the LGBT community, disabled people, Roma, Jews etc. Basically, the “self-identified victims” perceived themselves as “historically discriminated communities”. Therefore, they consider themselves authorized, even in time of peace, to exert violence against goods and individuals, often claiming manliness superiority, mixed with suprematism, ethnic leadership, racism, anti-Semitism. Their aspiration is to take revenge against (real or allegedly) wrongs whatever suffered in the recent past, during the 1990s, under Communism, during WWII, under the Kingdom, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, gradually retreating chronologically to ancient times. This attitude is, in essence, based on the belief that they have been recurrently and collectively persecuted. Such a sentiment is politically popular everywhere in the Western Balkans. It is regularly nurtured by local authorities and a plethora of intellectuals of humanities, with a wide spectrum of arguments whose manipulation is basically a rule. Victimization, at the end of the day, is an expression of a sense of inferiority. Nevertheless, it is also used by policy-makers when they reject responsibilities in the delays of the negotiations for EU membership. In this case, discrimination, underestimation, and marginalization of the region and their peoples are evoked to express the disappointment for the lack of progresses in the relations with the EU. Since almost all the countries of the region (with the exception of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) are NA- TO members, or close to became members, the governments of the candidate countries often remark how the NATO integration moves at the faster pace compared to European integration. And this gap has some effect on both hopes and behaviors of the Western Balkan countries. In effect, the EU perception is increasingly affected by its internal divisions (due to disagreements either on migration or budgetary policies, on currency strategies, sovranist and illiberal perspectives or prospects of higher integration levels). Box 5.11. Sovranist and illiberal perspectives: reference is here to the notions of “sovranism” and “illiberal democracy”. Sovranism is a terminology used particularly by Europhobic parties and individual leaders who claim the “return to sovereignty” of the member states against the role played by the EU institutions. Actually, it is a reaction against globalization, but also a way to recycle the idea of nationalism, whose attractiveness severely suffered from the impact of the two world wars and the Yugoslav succession wars. The “Illiberal democracy” is, instead, a notion that rejects liberalism and most of the civic rights. It preserves, however, the formality of the democratic institutions (elections, the parliament, a Stefano Bianchini 144 multiparty system…), but harshly erodes the division of powers, extends the controls on media and justice, while strengthening the authoritarian role of the State leader. The policy-maker who explicitly advocates the “illiberal democracy” is the prime minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán. Suggested readings: Grigrich A., Banks M. (Eds.). (2006). Neo-Nationalism in Europe and Beyond. New York: Berghahn Books. Lendvai P. (2017). Orbán. Europe’s New Strongman, London: Hurst. Tóth Cs. (2014). Full text of Viktor Orbán’s speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014. IN The Budapest Beacon, 29 July 2014, https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusn ad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/. They are also reinforced by the EU citizens’ gripes due to “enlargement fatigue” and the limited “absorption capacity”. Under these conditions, EU officials in Brussels have postponed the opening of the negotiations or, simply, deferred their implementation path, by recording an equally slow implementation of the reforms by candidate countries. At the same time, no clear dates for membership were publicly estimated. As a result, a set of dynamics are triggering negative consequences on the expectations of SEE citizens and demotivating leaders in making reforms. On the other hand, EU conditionality, which stimulated important social and economic changes in East-Central Europe, is losing its effectiveness due to the failure of the deepening of its institutions. Such a consistent decline of the EU attractiveness is becoming a discouraging factor. Its potential aggregative role is affected, with negative impacts on a still severely divided region. Consequently, a vicious circle has been created and the room for affirming a maximalist democracy, based on regional cooperation, prospective reconciliation, and inclusiveness within the EU framework is stagnating, while mutual animosities are still in place. Subsequently, in order to give a new impetus to the process of integration, a new initiative was launched in 2014 by Germany in agreement with few other EU member-states and intended for all the Western Balkan societies. Although unable to involve the EU as a whole, the “Berlin process” (the name given to the initiative) tried to reinvigorate dialogue and cooperation mainly by stimulating civil society (especially youth organizations). In particular, strong support was given to the reconciliation process promoted by the coalition for RECOM, and the development of infrastructures. Six international meetings, an action plan, and a new enlargement Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 145 strategy were carried out with the involvement of the EU Commission since then. Box 5.12. RECOM is an official international commission established by the governments of the Yugoslav successor states. Its acronym stands for the “Regional Commission Tasked with Establishing the Facts about All Victims of War Crimes and Other Serious Human Rights Violations Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2001”. The Coalition for RECOM is a regional network of civil society organizations established in 2008 with the aim to contribute the accurate reconstruction of the events that occurred at the end of the 20th century and support a remembrance of the past, potentially shared by the peoples affected. For more information visit the website https://www.recom.link/. However, these efforts did not achieve visible results. Definitely, the main reason of such a failure lays on the aforementioned political and cultural obstacles that still mark the SEE context. However, this also happened because Western Balkan societies rely on weak functional institutions with equally weak popular trust. Regular public demonstrations in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Albania confirm the persistence of severe divisions within these societies (and not only between them). Deep domestic polarizations affect Croatia and North Macedonia as well. Dissatisfaction and resignation are widespread in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In some cases, even the post-Yugoslav sources of statehood are questioned. Especially in Croatia and Serbia, the confrontation between Ustaša and Četnik, their domestic rehabilitation vs the Communist legacy, are still permeating public discourses and narratives, with detrimental impact on minorities and their status. In other words, reconciliation is also a domestic issue, and not only a transnational need. Under these regional circumstances, the growing reaction of the citizens is to leave their countries as soon as an opportunity arises. Persistent ethnic cleansing, economic migrations, depopulation and low birth rates contribute to make the Western Balkans increasingly “an empty box”, with wide abandoned territories, a high level of brain drain, a law quality educational systems, a low degree of European integration despite the available pre-accession programs and financial instruments and, at the end of the day, with deleterious consequences for social and territorial cohesion (Bianchini, 2014; Bianchini and Zoppi, 2018). Still, regardless of these negative aspects, the aspiration for EU integration is still alive, even if some- Stefano Bianchini 146 times (and ironically) it is carried out by the people’s mobility across, and outside the region. This sentiment, however, remains at home as well. Therefore, the EU attractiveness is still the most powerful lever for encouraging democratization and reconciliation. Conclusion To conclude, it seems that the concentration of a set of weaknesses is producing a context which is unable to overcome the legacies of disruptive post-socialist transitions, even if the origins of these weaknesses are different in nature and by content. Nevertheless, the decline of EU conditionality, together with unsettled post-war legacies, contested institutional roles, the lack of respect for diversity, and opposite political-cultural narratives stemming from conflicting memories are contributing to make the effort to emulate the EU model at least fluid, if not erratic and uncertain (Perchoc and Lilyanova, 2019). Crucially, democracy and reconciliation in the Western Balkans are two sides of the same coin. They present not only a transnational dimension, but also a domestic one, within each political component of the area. Under many respects, SEE stability suffers from the persistent influence of social movements and parties, which aggressively reject respect for diversities, cultural syncretism, and societal heterogeneity. The illiberal suggestions and the sovranist argument elaborated by governments or political organizations within the EU are factors which reinforces the belief that homogeneity is the key issue able to guarantee democracy, development, national identity, and security (Schöpflin, 2000). This conviction is, in reality, a pure illusion. Following the words of the prominent sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017), the European continent has demonstrated, across the centuries, to be the most powerful example of thaw and fusion, with its ability of adaptation and regeneration of the plurality of inputs, received from all over the world. Its identity is the product of the ancient classic civilization, as well as of the Arab, Turkish, Armenian, Jews, Russian, Persian contributions (Bauman and Donskis, 2013). The Balkan peninsula is not an exception in this regard and boast a similar wealth of stimuli. In other words, a high level of heterogeneity marks the reality of this European region. In this context, pursuing nation-state homogeneity is not only inadequate to new international frameworks, but it is also a form of institutional violence on regional and local identities. As a result, the prospect of the European integration and desires of neo-nationalist closures are mutually confronting, both in the Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 147 EU and in the Western Balkans. This situation creates a state of tension which, under the specific conditions of regional democratic fragility, aggravates the vulnerability of SEE. Consistently, the persistent geopolitical divisions perpetrated in the Western Balkans may increasingly match with the growing divisions among the EU member-states and their reluctance to respect the pledge of inclusiveness made in Thessaloniki in 2003. Under these circumstances, local political attitudes may remain trapped into war legacies, EU hesitancies, local institutional weaknesses, and tenacious confrontations by affecting the ongoing process of democratization, the consolidation of institutions, the respect and implementation of human rights, inclusiveness, and civil efforts spent at reconciling traumas and memories. Therefore, even if the emulation of the EU model appears to be problematic, the alternative might be even more frightening. Drawing inspiration from the Joschka Fischer suggestions in his speech at Humboldt, the enlarged EU cannot afford a divided system, with the Western Balkans, in this case, under the “permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations”. As a result, the geo-political reality of the 21st century – just to follow again Fischer’s argument – requires a solid progress of transnational democracy and reconciliation. In order to achieve this goal, the EU needs to relaunch the successful pattern, followed in the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium. This means a simultaneous development of the EU’s “widening” towards SEE, and the EU’s “deepening” of the degree of integration of the member-states. Reconciliation, in this context, is a must for the Balkans, as well as for Europe. Questions for students: Which have been the main reasons of the EU to offer the membership to the Western Balkans? Can you compare the main reasons for reconciliation as perceived within the European Union and in the Western Balkans? Can you formulate some examples of resistance to ethnic confrontation? To what extent, in your view, the recent past is a factor of inclusion or exclusion in the perspective of EU integration? Is reconciliation irrelevant for the economic development of the Western Balkans? Stefano Bianchini 148 References Bauman Z., Donskis L. (2013), Moral Blindness. The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bianchini S., Marko J., Nation C., Uvalic M. (Eds.). (2007). Regional Cooperation, Peace Enforcement and the Role of the Treaties in the Balkans. Ravenna: Longo. Bianchini S. (2014). Re-examining international development assistance to Southeast Europe: time for a post-functionalist approach? IN Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 14 (3), 347-365. Bianchini S. (2017). Liquid Nationalism and State Partitions in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Bianchini S., Zoppi M. (Eds.) (2018). MIGRATUP: Territorial and Urban Potentials Connected to Migrations and Refugee Flows, ESPON, https://www.espon.eu/migrat ion. Biberaj E. (1998). Albania in transition. The Rocky Road to Democracy. Boulder: Westview Press. Cerovic B., Uvalic M. (Eds.). (2010). Western Balkans’ Accession to the European Union. Belgrade: Faculty of Economics. DiamondL. (2003). Defining and Developing Democracy. In Dahl R. A., Shapiro I., Cheibub J.A. (Eds.). (2003). The Democracy Sourcebook. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Dimou A. (Ed.). (2009). Transition and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe. Göttingen: V&R Unipress. Donskis L. and Dabasinskiene I. (2010). European Memory. A Blessing or a Curse?. Ravenna: Longo. Durham E. (Ed. by Bejtullah Destani). (2004). Albania and the Albanians: Selected Articles and Letters 1903-1944. London/New York: Tauris. Fevziu B. (2016). Enver Hoxha. The Iron Fist of Albania. London/New York: Tauris. Fischer J. (2000), From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration. IN Poole P. A. (2003). The EU’s Eastern Enlargement, Santa Barbara: Praeger (191-201). Isak H. (Ed.). (2007). A European Perspective for the Western Balkans. Vienna: Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag. Janjić D., Hysa Y. (Eds.). (2011). Kosovo: Independence, Status, Perspectives. Adjusting Regional Policies of Ethnicity and Borders. Ravenna: Longo. Judah T. (2009). Yugoslavia is Dead Long Live Yugosphere. London: LSEE Papers on South Eastern Europe. Kandić N. (2011). The Kosovo Memory Book 1998-2000. Let People Remember People, Belgrade/Prishtina: Humanitarian Law Center Belgrade-Humanitarian Law Center Kosovo. Chapter 5: Imported Democracy And Its Fragility Without Reconciliation 149 Koren S., Najbar- Agičić M., Jakovina T. (2007). 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New York: Harper. Schwandner-Sievers S., Fischer B. J. (Eds). (2002). Albanian Identities. Myth and History. London: Hurst. Schwandner-Sievers S., Klinkner M. (2019). Longing for Lost Normalcy: Social Memory, Transitional Justice and the ‘House Museum’ to Missing Persons in Kosovo. IN Nationalities Papers, 47(2), 1-17. Vickers M. and Pettifer J. (1997). Albania. From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity. London: Hurst. Woods Ch. (1918). Albania and the Albanians. In The Geographical Review, 5 (4), 257-273. Title History 1916-2013, Abingdon: Francis and Taylor. Stefano Bianchini 150 Section 2: Achieving Democracy and Reconciliation: Controversial paths? Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism in the Western Balkans Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi Abstract: Processes of nation-building are usually a historical consequence of social and political modernization. The Western Balkans, being at the semi-periphery of Europe, have had an ambiguous experience with modernization, trying on the one hand, to emulate the European civilization’s model of social and political transformation, and on the other hand, being torn by ethno-nationalist sentiments and movements. Contrary to the transformation of the initial ethno-nationalist mobilizations into cohesive imagined communities of citizens seceding from Empires, which have dominated for centuries the region of Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans region has had a recurring pattern of ethno-religious nationalist mobilization and ideology long after the formation of the Balkan nation-states in the nineteenth century. This chapter provides an overview of the debate in the literature regarding the sources of ethno-religious nationalism in the Western Balkans arguing in favor of structural and institutional explanations. Key terms: nationalism; ethno-nationalism; secessionist nationalism; modernization; Europeanization Introduction The present chapter takes into consideration the fact that based on the number of scholarly articles, empirical analysis, policy papers or journalistic accounts, nationalism and the Western Balkans often seem synonymous to each other. A random search in Google shows 3.5 million pages on the connection between these two terms only. The present chapter seeks to reveal the complexity of this nexus over time in the Western Balkans. The Balkan’s euphemism as the world’s “powder keg,” has as the starting point the volatility of the region and the propensity for ferocious nationalism whose effect can go well beyond the region’s borders. Not only is the region a top priority for the EU but often policy choices can cause repercus- 153 sions and political upheavals that need an intervention from Brussels more often than not (Ziabari & Mujanovic, 2019). The processes of nation-formation and national mobilization in this area of South East Europe has been portrayed and analyzed in the nationalist studies literature as following a different path when compared to the processes of nation-building not only in Western Europe but also in Central Europe. The persistent re-emergence of nationalist ideology and instrumentalization of nationalist agitation (see Hroch, 2000) in countries such as Serbia, Romania, Croatia or Bulgaria long after the 19th century period of nation-building in the region shows the peculiarity of nationalism in the Western Balkans. This chapter aims at providing an institutional and structural explanation to the reemergence of nationalist ideology and mobilization in the region in the recent past and presently. We use a longterm perspective to highlight the continuities in nationalist mobilizations in the Western Balkans. One could argue that in the Western Balkans we witness the involvement of external actors in the processes of nation-building, which Breuilly (1993) calls the externality function of legitimation of a local nationalist movement. This process took place particularly in the late 19th century when the political systems of the Habsburgs and Ottoman empires, respectively, affected the newborn ethnic nationalism of the Serbian, Bulgarian, or Albanian, and to some extent Greek nationalism. This particular historical moment foreshadowed the complex relation between home-grown nationalist movements and ideological borrowings from civilizational centers that led to further hybridization locally and stopped modernization processes. Box 6.1. Modernization is a long-term process of transformation of rural, parochial and underdeveloped societies into urban and industrialized societies. Such a historical process is accompanied by the rise of the middleclasses, economic growth and social mobility. Moreover, processes of modernization are argued to be conducive to nation-building. Suggested readings: Huntington, S. (1968). Political order in changing societies. Yale: Yale University Press. Inglehart, R., & Welzel, Ch. (2005). Modernization, cultural change, and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The path to the establishment of a nation-state through a process of modernization and industrialization, as Ernest Gellner argued, has been hin- Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 154 dered in the Western Balkans. The industrial revolution either started late or did not start at all in the region. On the other hand, much nation-building has been founded upon myths. Such are for example, the practices of glorifying an historical past unreflectively. The outgoing President of the Republic of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, praised the interwar period of the rump state of Croatia in official public commemorations. Another instance of instrumentalizing nationalism and ideological irredentism in particular is the use of the notion of Albanophobia by the current and former prime ministers of Albania, while pledging to catch up with the EU. On the other hand, the European Union aims to achieve a process of intraregional cooperation in the post-Yugoslav space by providing external legitimacy to economic and political development along the EU model. However, the fact that the EU sees the region as problematic and more often than not intervenes to rescue it from intra and inter-state conflict rather than as a credible partner tell us a lot about the current state of affairs and how nationalism often becomes an insurmountable obstacle. The path to membership is at least unclear for almost all present Western Balkans countries and among the usual problems such as organized crime, corruption, inefficient administrations and property right problems, we also see that these countries have unresolved problems with neighbors, some of whom are already EU member states. Ethno-religious nationalism in general is mostly understood, strictly speaking, as a concept tied to the Western Balkans. This is both an important as well as ill-fated link in the existing literature of nationalism and ethnic conflict. The type of ethno-religious nationalism and its irredentist offspring is especially the most powerful driver for political mobilization, as Bardos (2013) has convincingly argued. Or as another author commenting on the Balkan conflicts that erupted after the disintegration of Yugoslavia says, nationalist sentiment and ideology have been more influential than communist ideology, democratic ideals or religious beliefs (Packer, 2019). On the other hand, one can trace the origin of the ethno-religious nationalism, or the fusion between ethnic and religious identity in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. As Grandits et al. (2011) argue, there existed different competing forms of social integration and loyalties in the Balkans. Religious loyalties were quite present and, to some extent overwhelming, compared to regional or kinship loyalties. The religious affiliation to the millet system was challenged by the attempts of “political activists to advocate the ‘nationalization’ of what had been multi-religious regions” (Grandits et al 2011, p. 6). The Orthodox religious community that was expected to show loyalty to the Patriarchate in Constantinople was fragmentized and nationalized or ethnicized by the Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism 155 Bulgarians, Macedonians and Serbians establishing their own Orthodox Exarchate. The main agents of the 19th century process of nation-formation were the intellectuals. Box 6.2. Millet system: an established practice in the Ottoman Empire that recognized non-Muslim religious communities and provided them autonomy to regulate their own affairs. Prior to the rise of nationalist movements and processes of nation-building in the Balkans, religious identifications prevailed over ethnic identifications. Suggested readings: Aviv, E. (2016). Millet system in the Ottoman empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grandits, H., Clayer, N., & Picher, R. (Eds.) (2011). Conflicting loyalties in the Balkans: The great powers, Ottoman empire and nation-building. London: I.B. Taurus. Meanwhile in Central Europe the subordinate nationalities in the Habsburg Empire highlighted linguistic nationalism and claimed ‘historical rights’, which were in contradiction with the dynastic rule of the dominant nationality. On the other hand, the nation-building process of Czechs, Poles and Hungarians was based on existing institutions and what Hroch terms a ‘full social structure’, which is linked with an existing local bourgeoisie or nobility. Whereas, in the Balkans, during the 19th century and under the Ottoman Empire it was not quite possible to base “national claims on old rights or agreements” (Hroch, 2013). Stalled processes of modernization and the legacy of 19th century nation-building process has influenced the resurgence of nationalism in the late 1990s. Scholars have termed that what has happened in the 1990s with the disintegration of Yugoslavia as ‘nesting orientalisms’ (Grandits et al. 2011). The nationalism in the Western Balkans remains linked to ethno-spaces and borders. This fits with a global trend in the re-emergence of the nation-states, where not only are borders failing to disappear as optimist cosmopolitans would argue, but are actually getting hardened. The Western Balkans continues to be a region where borders take a powerful symbolic meaning and determine most of the political life and activity (Kalemaj, 2014). Hence, ethno-nationalism is often imbrued with powerful symbolic politics (Kaufman, 2014). Ethnic civil wars are not the cause of ethno-nationalism. On the contrary, as Dyrstad (2012) has argued, ethnic wars are a derivative or a consequence of ethno-nationalism. Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 156 Moreover, nationalism in Balkans has taken disproportionate forms. An observer has captured that argument neatly when he writes that in Balkans “they had encountered the enemy, and in the first two days several thousand” (Glenny, 2012). The quote shows how the real or invented enemy multiplies and becomes a real threat to mobilize the masses in new great adventures. Glenny’s overall criticism of Western literature on Balkan nationalism comes to the “conclusion that the Balkans are only reported to the outside world in times of terror and trouble and otherwise ignored” (Glenny, 2012). The Balkans in general seem to “produce more history than it consumes” Winston Churchill once said. And its recent history as “you might attest, has been written in blood. Afterall, it was the breakup of Yugoslavia that gave humanity the term “ethnic cleansing” (Lynch, 2013). If the region can escape the 19th century romantic nationalism trap that is ethnically exclusive, it can well develop from the backwaters into a bridge that connects Eastern and Western Europe and contribute much to the future of European Union. Balkans between two world wars It is not a historical secret that both world wars of the 20th century either emanated from the Balkans or they were the powder keg that gave them scope and strength. Such notable instance was the killing of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the streets of Sarajevo by a young Serbian man called Gavrilo Princip of the nationalist organization “Black Hand”. Another example is the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization of Macedonia (IMRO), one of the first nationalist movements or terrorist organizations depending on whose perspective on adopts, whose vocal act was the killing of then Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Stambolyiski. These acts consistently and historically show that nationalism has been persistent and the cause of much upheaval in the region, then and now. Serbian Nationalism The process of the establishment of the Serbian nation during the 19th century is a good example of how nation-building in the Balkans unfolded through different stages. Initially, the reinvention of tradition and cultural nationalism emerged within the Serbian community in the territory of Vojvodina under the Habsburg Empire. The political system of the Habsburg Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism 157 and the Ottoman empires, which incorporated different territories of the Serbian ethnic community, influenced the process of Serbian nation formation. Mišković (2013) explains that initially the first phase of the Serbian cultural nationalism (from 1800 to 1839) demanded more autonomy. The emerging Serbian local elite imitated, initially, the imperial lifestyle of the Ottoman Empire trying to integrate itself within the Muslims. The version of separatist nationalism (Breuilly, 1993; Hroch, 2000) came only in the last stage, which emerged at full force by the end of the Russo-Turkish war until WWI. The aim of separatist nationalism was to “create a homogeneous Serbian nation” (Mišković, 2013). As a consequence, turning against the empires and shedding the cultural nationalism of the early stage, the ethno-nationalism of the local Serbian elites emphasized a different Serbian identity. Box 6.3. Nation: a Weberian definition of nation defines it as a community of shared memories and common political destiny aiming to form a common state. Suggested readings: Smith, A., D. (1979). Nationalism in the twentieth century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities. New York: Verso. Box 6.4. Ethnic community: a community sharing a common name, a set of myths of common origin and descent, culture or religion and an assumed association with a common historic territory. What it differentiates it with a nation is the concept of political consciousness and mobilization that is a key feature of the nation-building and nationalism processes. The mythologized historical narratives of a continuous if not ever-lasting struggle for national independence overlook what Sabine Rutar calls a process and a context-dependent event. As Miroslav Hroch (2000) argues, the secessionist ethno-nationalism of the Balkans was not followed by a process of an emerging cohesive ruling class of a bourgeois stock. That would imply a process of social formation that is supportive of modernization and a political nationalism that emphasizes the national liberal ideology of the 19th century. Indeed, there were attempts in what became the Serbian territory after independence to adopt the European ways of doing and highlight the process of state-formation and political community as the end result of nation-building. Paradoxically, modernizing liberal intellec- Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 158 tuals of the 19th century instrumentalized local traditions such as that of the skupština (an assembly of notables), which according to them represented popular sovereignty, and constitutional rule. Vladimir Jovanović, a leading intellectual and member of the Association of the Serbian Youth presented the skupština as “an ancient national institution” (Vujačić, 2015) favorable to the self-governing aim of the Serbian community. Another instrumentalization of the local institutions relates to the Serbian peasant institution of zadruga that was based on equality and order. This peasant institution was used to legitimize the reign of Prince Milos Obrenović as reflecting the family order (Mišković, 2013). As Diana Mishkova (2014) mentions, liberal intellectuals who were inspired by the European tradition of state-building criticized absolutist rule and supported a Rechtsstaat based on popular legitimation and rule of law. Nonetheless, even the liberals could not avoid the use of mythologized historical narratives of ancient self-governing local institutions. Still, the state institutions of the rising nation-states in the Balkans were rather weak as attested by the Serbian case. The political elite were fragmented and the national liberal version of nationalism failed and was replaced slowly by ethno-religious nationalism of the National Conservatives and the Radicals. The Serbian nationalist movement hesitated between a process of modernization and imitation of European traditions and a process of the return to the local national traditions. The liberal faction of the Serbian nationalist movement was fused with the romantic populist tradition of the National Conservatives and the Radicals. The lack of success in achieving the internal and external freedom for the Serbian community and the ambivalent attitude of the liberals towards popular sovereignty facilitated the fusion of the liberals with the romantic populist tradition (Vujačić, 2015). Instead, other existing institutions and actors of the Serbian society became more dominant as agents of nationalist agitation. The Serbian Orthodox Church functioned as a replacement of the state institutions. On the other hand, Serbian intellectuals, as most of the other intellectuals in the region, embarked on a process of “inventing tradition”. Academics dedicated their research primarily on Serbian history, folklore and language (Mišković, 2013). A central claim of the Serbian nationalist movement since the first Serbian Uprising has been the unification of the Serbs that were separated in Ottoman lands and Habsburg lands. The nationalist ideology in Serbia could not be based on evocation of the “state right”, which was an exception in the region, as in the case of Croatian nationalism. In fact, even those forms of nationalism that were initially based on the ‘state right’ were influenced by and manifested features of ethnoreligious nationalism. Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism 159 The establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, apart from introducing the “unitarist” doctrine of the South Slavs, foreshadowed the divisions between these nationalities, in particular between the Croats and the Serbs, in the understanding of the first Yugoslav ethno-federation. For the Croats, the foundation of the Yugoslav kingdom implied the suppression of the Croat’s nation-building project based on the Croatian state right. While in the Serbian case the nation-building project was focused on centralization and agreements between ethnicity and national unity. The institutions of the Yugoslav kingdom such as the king and the army belonged to the Serbian “tribe” as the dominant tribe of the federation (Vujačić, 2015). The kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929 following the inauguration of the personal rule of King Aleksandar, who attempted to create an official Yugoslav state nationalism (Vujačić, 2015). The supranational Yugoslav identity of the Titoist Yugoslavia can be considered as functionally similar to the official state nationalism when compared to the personal rule of King Aleksandar. The Croats perceived centralization as contrary to their political aims and pushed for a reconfiguration of the Yugoslav kingdom. The historical recollections of struggles for an autonomous Croatian state within the Habsburg Empire made the Croats proponents of a federalization of Yugoslavia. The agreement between the Yugoslav Prime Minister Cvetković and the leading Croatian politician Vladko Maček in 1939, known as Sporazum, legitimized the federalization of Yugoslavia. The Croatian unit gained more political and cultural rights within the Yugoslav federation. Nonetheless, the federalization of the first Yugoslavia was actually a short-lived political experience followed by the Yugoslav civil war after the defeat of the Yugoslav Royal Army by the Nazi occupiers. However, the dilemma between a centralized or decentralized Yugoslavia, as a supra-national political community, persisted even in the post-World War II with the foundation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The interwar experience witnessed a renewal of nationalist agitation and mobilization on the part of the Croats with the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia by the collaborationist government of the extreme nationalist movement of Ustasha, with the support of the Nazis. The Independent State of Croatia incorporated more than 1.8 million Serbs and around 750,000 Bosnian Muslims. The Croats revived the antemurale christianitatis (Bulwark of Christendom) myth of their historical tradition to highlight their ‘Western’ identity in contrast with the Orthodox and ‘Eastern’ identity of the Serbs. Bosnians were considered by the extreme nationalists in power in the Croatian rump state as of Croatian stock, al- Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 160 beit converters to Islam. The massacre of non-Croats in the concentration camp of Jasenovać, the majority of which were around 80,000 Serbs, alienated the Serbs with the Croats and increased the rift between these two communities. The Jasenovac massacre became key to the anti-fascist myth of the postwar Yugoslavia. This experience was transformed, during the legitimacy crisis of Socialist Yugoslavia in the 1980s, into an ideological and discursive resource for the refashioning of the Serbian historical memory and nationalist ideology. The counter-reaction to the Ustasha was the Serbian chetnik nationalists ruled by a general of the Yugoslav Royal Army, which focused on resurrecting Yugoslavia based on the leading role of the Serbian nation (Vujačić, 2015, p. 219). According to Chetniks, the main goal was to unify the territories in which Serbian ethnic community was situated. The other key player in the Yugoslav civil war was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which organized and led the anti-fascist partisan resistance. To the Yugoslav Communist Party, the atrocities committed by the Ustasha and the Chetniks were both equally reprehensible. The partisan war and the social revolution constituted the emerging foundational myth of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, this foundational myth of the Socialist Yugoslavia dissipated into thin air in the last decade of the second federalist Yugoslav experiment. It was substituted by ethno-religious nationalism. The modernizing project and social structures of the Socialist Yugoslavia were not resilient enough to nationalism. Albanian Nationalism From early on the idea of Albanian nationhood, as Clayer (2007) has argued, has been carried by a multitude of various actors such as “emigres (diaspora), students abroad, beylers (landlords), religious elites among the Catholic and Orthodox clergy, Bektashi networks (Albanian Muslim Shiite)” and so on. In one of the best examples of the effects of WWI, historian Mark Mazower (2002) gives a sweeping account of the ravaging effects in the Balkans and how Balkan nationalism interplayed with Great Power interests. He writes inter alia: In the First Balkan War of 1912-13 Ottoman power in Europe vanished in a matter of weeks. Serbia and Greece were the main victors, both acquiring huge new territories. Bulgaria won much less, and was soon even worse off after she declared war on her former allies in the Second Balkan War and was defeated by them. An independent Albania was recognized by the Pow- Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism 161 ers, and defended against its hungry neighbors. The biggest loser in many ways — apart from the Ottoman Empire — was Austria-Hungary, which now faced a successful and expansionist Serbia. Austria tried to build up Albania as a counter-weight but could not prevent Kosovo and neighboring lands being assigned to Serbia and Montenegro. The shifts continued well in the interwar period, where the crystallization of the new Balkan nation-states was taking place. As this excerpt from Britannica testifies: Once established, the new Balkan states, both before and after World War I, attempted to build political and economic structures based upon those that had evolved in the West. However, their endeavor was hampered by their own histories, which had produced societies and psyches much different from those to the west. Population shifts—which inside western Europe had ceased in the 10th century—continued in the Balkans into the 20th century. Population exchanges produced more problems than they resolved. Turks were deported from Greece and vice-versa based on population exchange agreements such as the Lausanne Agreement if 1923. Albanians deported from Kosovo and other areas outside the state of Albania to Turkey or Albania, losing property and citizenship in the process, are only some of the dislocations and ruptures that were produced in the process of nationbuilding and state consolidation that followed the Great War. Overall, as an author recently puts it, demographic engineering was a “deliberate state intervention in population figures’ for political, ideological, strategic and economic reasons” (Seker, 2013). In the absence of historical state rights and institutional continuity secessionist nationalism in the Balkans pursued an ethno-religious nationalism with the intention to expand territorially.1 What can be considered as a legacy of this type of nationalism and process of nation-formation is the consistency of the nationalist doctrine, the use of myths instead of historic rights, and the ethnicization of religious cleavages and identities. Nonetheless, it could be mentioned that external factors, namely the conflicting interests of the Habsburg and Russian empires played a role in the trajectory of nationalist processes. On the other hand, the attempt to modernize the emerging nation-states and imitate the European tradition faltered. In the Balkans as Vjekoslav Perica (2005) argues, “religious differences reinforce ethnic ones and strengthen the construction of distinct national identities” 1 Secessionist nationalism is a type of nationalist movement that usually emerged out of subordinate nationalities to secede from an existing Empire. Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 162 Communism and Nationalism Marxism—in essence an internationalist ideology—and communism were generally enforced in Central and Eastern Europe through the Soviet Red Army. There is a shared assumption, albeit legitimate to a certain degree, that communist ideology is incompatible with nationalist ideology. However, the communist regimes in Southeastern Europe, particularly, Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, experienced a shift from the internationalist ideology to a national communist one. The abstract notions of class struggle, alienation and ending the exploitation of the working-class by the capitalist, as part of the Marxist -Leninist dogma, were rather remote and inexplicable to the people. Thus, the construction of socialism had to be appealing to the population (see Malešević, 2002). The weakening and the crisis of the Marxist- Leninist ideology, among other reasons, led the communist rulers to use nationalist ideology. Yugoslavia and Albania, whose own Communist Parties were formed under the guidance of Yugoslav emissaries were the exception to the rule. The Red Army did not have to march through the capitals of Belgrade or Tirana but they nonetheless voluntarily joined the East camp during the Cold War. The difference between the two was that while Tito had an early rupture with Stalin and the Yugoslavian Communist Party was expelled from the Moscow led Comintern, Hoxha continued to be a convinced Stalinist even when Stalin was gone. Later, after Kruschev denounced Stalin’s crimes, Yugoslavia improved its relations with Kremlin while Tirana diverged and forged a new alliance with China. Tito used the Soviet concept of nations and nationalities and carefully constructed a solid federal architecture that allowed ethnically mixed states and regions to carefully co-exist, while restricting foreign intervention and maintaining the delicate political equilibrium at home. In comparison with the historical experience of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, whose institutions were mostly dominated by the Serbian “tribe”, the 1953 constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gave more power to the federative units of the republic. As Siniša Malešević (2002) mentions, ethnic identities were de-emphasized in order to highlight the so-called Yugoslav state nationalism. Yet, Yugoslav state nationalism could not become a focal point of a common national identity of the South Slavic ethnic communities. Hence, the so-called supranational Yugoslav identity, which was partly based on the notion of socialist patriotism and on the anti-fascist Yugoslav liberation war, started to weaken. The constitutional amendments of 1968-1971 gave equal status and representation to the constituent republics and veto power in federal institu- Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism 163 tions. A process of decentralization slowly gave priority to the titular nations (constituent republics) of Yugoslavia. This particular institutional change in Yugoslavia strengthened the interest of the party and administrative elites of the constituent republics. Some scholars argue that the disintegration of Yugoslavia is explained by the interests of the local political elite of the titular nations that constituted Yugoslavia and aided by the nationalist cultural revival of the 1970s. That is not to say that the Serbian option of centralization was a solution to keeping Yugoslavia together. Again, as in the interwar period or even during the 19th century, multi-religious political communities could not succeed in finding a proper and sustainable legitimation formula. An example of this is the creation of the state of Macedonia in 1945 by combining Slav and Albanian populations, as well as Roma, Turks, Vlachs etc., which served as a mean to fend off Greek and Bulgarian territorial ambitions while increasing national cohesiveness back home. This practice of constitutional engineering to forge a new official Yugoslav identity which included the granting of full autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina with 1974 Constitution, was dependent on the charismatic authority of Tito rather than on political institutions. His death in 1980s, left a power vacuum at the center which could not be simply replaced with the rotation presidency. The collective leadership and institutions that would maintain the stability of Yugoslavia, after the death of Tito, proved to be ineffective. The trajectory of nation-building and national identities followed the different political trajectories of these neighboring but rather different communist political regimes. For example, the Albanian national identity developed in line with self-forced isolationism in communist Albania in order to silence dissidence. Whereas, in Kosovo and Macedonia it developed in contrast to Serb and Macedonian identity (Clayer 2007). Thus, beyond the same communist cover, two different political realities with long-standing consequences were to emerge. Dismemberment of Yugoslavia By far, one of the bitter legacies of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and probably the one closer to a tragedy, was the violent dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the secessionist and irredentist wars that it produced. The aftermath of communism proved to be an escape from isolation and autarchy for some countries, such as neighboring Albania. On the other hand, they proved to be a nightmare for most people in former Yugoslavia, which ended up in one or the other side of an elite instigated-con- Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 164 flict that used radical positions, arbitrary drawn borders and little regard for international law to pursue their parochial interests, all while committing some of the biggest atrocities in Europe since the days of WWII. While nationalism and ancient hatred were initially seen as the cause of ethnic conflict that suddenly erupted in the aftermath of communism (Kaplan, 2005), others have offered a more nuanced view that focused on elites and how they made use of ethnic fervor that would demobilize the masses who sought radical change in the aftermath of communism (Gagnon, 2006). Yet others, such as Sabrina Ramet (1999) push even further when she argues that Tito’s Yugoslavia was never a legitimate state in the first place and lasted for as long as was economically viable and ended with the rapid economic decline in the last years of Communism. Other scholars such as Valerie Bunce, argue that the ethnofederalist structures of Yugoslavia made it possible for the elites to rely on existing institutional framework in order to mobilize ethnic communities along nationalist ideology (quoted in Vujačić, 2015). Also, another keen observer of (former) Yugoslavia seems to agree on the "motivating causes of the disintegration in economic circumstance and its ferocious pressures" (Woodward, 1995). Thus, it is the structural factors that help us understand the metamorphosis of this once-successful federation into mayhem. Simplistic accounts usually attribute the disintegration of Yugoslavia either to ancient hatred and inter-ethnic past grievances or exclusively focusing on the role of nationalist leaders such as Milošević or Tuđman. Despite the prevailing presence of nationalist leaders in the Yugoslav Wars and their role in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the authors argue that the real causes of the process are primarily structural and institutional. The process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia through ethnic wars and violence brought to the fore the continuous role or instrumentalization of nationalist ideology. Thus, a resurgent nationalist ideology combined with the institutional framework of this polity as a legacy of the communist past, contributed to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. What’s interesting is that the political dynamics of the ethnic conflict and the establishment of the separate ‘ethnic’ were built on the legacy of ethno-religious nationalism that is peculiar to the nation-building processes of this region. Conclusion This chapter provided a historical overview of the processes of nationbuilding in the Western Balkan region. The focus of the chapter has been Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism 165 to highlight the unifying pattern of processes of nation-state formation in this area compared to other regions. On the other hand, what appears peculiar to the Balkans is the ambiguous relation to modernization, as a semi-periphery of Europe. Yet, nation-building has hardly been accompanied with a process of modernization. Contrary to the common sense of understanding of nationalism as ancient hatred, or as instrumentalized by political elites, we claim that a longterm perspective is useful in assessing and explaining continuity or change regarding nationalism. What this chapter underlines are the structural and institutional causes of the persistence of ethno-nationalist or ethno-religious sentiment in the Balkans. The emergence of the nation-state is usually assumed as a derivate of modernization followed by the establishment of a full social structure, namely a rising local bourgeoisie. Instead, cultural intelligentsia rather than the economic bourgeoisie appear to have spearheaded the process of nation-building in South East Europe. The attempt to catch up with the West and the cultural borrowings from civilizational centers was actually accompanied by a stalled process of modernization, secessionist nationalism, and the resurgence of nested orientalism. Ethno-religious nationalism seems to be the dominant type of nationalist mobilization in the Western Balkans. For this reason, nation formation processes in the Balkans tend to be different from the ones in Central Europe. The experience of communism in the Balkans did not succeed in forging a new stable identity of the citizens, which could efface or replace the ethno-religious identification of the communities. In fact, a marking feature of the communist legacy has been the use of nationalist ideology as a basis for regime legitimation. On the other hand, in countries such as Yugoslavia, cultural mobilizations of nationalism were influential in producing ethno-nationalist claims to centralized power as well as emphasizing the boundaries between the ethnic communities of the federation. In turn, the hardening of the ethnic and institutional borders among former republics of the Yugoslav federation and the consecutive ethnic conflict that erupted, greatly slowed the process of democratization and the functionality of rule of law. Coupled with a slow and problematic transitional justice system and enforceable mechanisms, it produced a difficult, though not impossible, reconciliation process. As a result, the region has lost a few good decades by getting caught in various ethnic clashes and nationalist conflicts that have prevented the consolidation of democracy and the achieving its full economic potential. Although there are some promising signs like the improvement of inter-ethnic relations in Northern Macedonia, some problems still remain like the dysfunctionality of Bosnia- Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 166 Herzegovina and the ongoing Serbia-Kosovo negotiations mediated by the European Union. Questions for students: What are the main features of ethno-religious nationalism in the Western Balkans? What distinguishes the nation-formation process in the Balkans to the one in Central Europe? How would you support the claim that nationalist movement in the Balkans did not lead to modernization? Was communist ideology incompatible with nationalism? What are the causes of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia? How does the legacy of nationalism affect the post-Yugoslav space? What is a recurrent feature of nationalism in the Western Balkans? References Bardos, G., N. (2013). Ethnoconfessional Nationalism in the Balkans: Analysis, Manifestations and Management. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. New York: Columbia University Press. Breuilly, J. (2013). The Oxford handbook of the history of nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clayer, N. (2007). La naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe. Paris : Éditions Karthala. Daskalov. R., & Mishkova, D. (Ed.). (2014). Entangled histories of the Balkans: Transfers of political ideologies and institutions. Leiden: Brill. Dyrstad, K. (2012). After ethnic civil war: Ethno-nationalism in the Western Balkans. Journal of Peace Research, 49(6), 817-831. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433124 39202 Gagnon, V., P. (2006). The myth of ethnic war: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans, 1804-2012: Nationalism, war and the great powers. London: Granta Books. Grandits, H., Clayer, N., & Pichler, R. (Ed.). (2011). Conflicting loyalties in the Balkans: The great powers, the Ottoman empire and nation-Building. New York: I.B. Taurus. Chapter 6: Sources and Continuities of Ethno-religious Nationalism 167 Hroch, M. (2000). Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: A comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations. New York: Columbia University Press. Kalemaj, I.(2014). Contested borders: Territorialization of national identity and shifts of “imagined geographies” in Albania. Oxford: Peter Lang Ltd.. Kaplan, R., J. (2005). Balkan ghosts: A journey through history. Basingstoke: Picador. Kaufman, Stuart J. (2014, November 14-16). A Symbolic politics theory of war. [Conference Presentation] ISAC-ISSS Conference. Austin, TEX, United States. Lynch, L. (2013, August 28). How to Write about the Balkans. OpenDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/how-to-write-about-balk ans/. Malešević, S. (2002). Ideology, legitimacy and the new state: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia. London: Routledge. Mazower, M. (2002). The Balkans: A short history. New York: Modern Library. Mišković, N. (2011). Mission, power and violence: Serbia’s national turn. In H. Grandits, C. Nathalie, & R. Pichler. (Eds.) Conflicting loyalties in the Balkans: The Great powers, the Ottoman empire and nation-building (pp. 205-224). New York: I.B. Taurus. Packer, G. (2019). The End of the American Century,” The Atlantic, May Issue. Ramet, S., P. (1999). Balkan Babel: The disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the war for Kosovo. Boulder: Westview Press. Seker, N. (2013). Forced population movements in the Ottoman empire and the early Turkish republic: An attempt at reassessment through demographic engineering. European Journal of Turkish Studies, 16. https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.4396. Vujačić, V. (2015). Nationalism, myth, and the state in Russia and Serbia: Antecedents of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Woodward, S. (1995). Balkan tragedy: Chaos and dissolution after the Cold War. Washinton D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Ziabari, Kourosh & Jasmin Mujanovic. 2019. Nationalism in the Balkans Predates Brexit and Trump. January 30. Downloaded from: https://www.fairobserver.com /region/europe/balkans-bosnia-herzegovina-serbia-croatia-balkan-states-european -news-today-23902/. Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi 168 Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation: Some Experiences from the ICTY and South Africa Johan J du Toit1 Abstract: This Chapter will discuss the practical steps and the issues that were present during the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Chapter will further explore the issues that were grappled with in dealing with justice and reconciliation in the Western Balkans since the establishment of the ICTY. Moreover, the position in South Africa from 1991 to 1994 with respect to justice and reconciliation and the relevance of this for the first democratic elections in 1994 will be also compared. The concepts of democratization and reconciliation will be discussed as overlapping concepts during these crucial years, including the role played at the Goldstone Commission that investigated the causes of public violence in South Africa from 1991 to 1994 and also later the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In conclusion, the chapter will highlight the lessons learned from South Africa and the ICTY. Key terms: Justice, Nuremberg Trials, Reconciliation, South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Introduction In November 1994, I was among the handful of persons who were responsible for setting up the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Netherlands (ICTY) - the first International Criminal Tribunal since the Nuremberg trials after WWII. It was not an easy task. Much had been written, at that stage, about international humanitari- 1 B-IUR LLB (1979). Advocate of the High Court of South Africa. Retired Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions at the National Prosecution Authority, Johannesburg. Former evidence leader at the Goldstone Commission, South Africa and team leader and trial attorney at the ICTY. The views expressed are my own and do not reflect the views of the ICTY/United Nations. 169 an law, but it was the first attempt to set up such a court in practice. The ICTY basically followed common law procedural principles which made it even more challenging as countries within the former Yugoslavia followed a more civil law approach. Box 7.1. Common law and civil law legal systems follow different ways in getting to the truth in a criminal case. Common law is more adversarial in nature and civil law inquisitorial. What follows is a general overview of what the procedure is in the two main legal systems from personal experiences. There may be slight differences, especially in countries that have a more hybrid legal system comprising elements of both common law and civil law. In the common law system, there is a prosecution and defense case and the accused can also be a witness in his/her own defense/case. The Judge is not presented with the docket/dossier of the evidence before the trial commences. The trial commences with the accused pleading guilty or not guilty to the charges. If a plea of guilty is offered, the accused can be found guilty based on a document agreed to by the prosecution and defense without any evidence being given. In some cases, the prosecution and defense can also agree on the appropriate sentence subject to the final approval of the Judge. The process is thus mainly driven by the parties in court – the prosecution and the defense. The Judge is more neutral and must listen to the presentation of all the evidence. After closure of the prosecution case the accused can apply for the case to be dismissed against him/her. The test is normally that there was no evidence on which a reasonable court could convict. If refused, the accused can also decide to close its case and present no evidence. If that is not so decided, evidence can be presented and normally the accused must be the first witness in his/her case. After final arguments, the Judge must then rule if the prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt. If convicted, a separate stage of the trial commences, and further evidence can be led as to what an appropriate sentence will be. The Judge will finally rule on sentence, subject later to any applications for leave to appeal by the prosecution and/or defense. In the civil law system, there is no prosecution or defense case and no plea of guilty or not guilty. The Judge is presented with the docket/ dossier before the case commences. He/she will then provide an indication as to which witnesses, he/she elects to hear in person or not during the trial. The prosecution and defense will also be given an opportunity to assist in that process of selection of witnesses, but it is the Judge's final call. The accused cannot be a witness during the trial. The Judge ques- Johan J du Toit 170 tions the witnesses first and then allows the parties to ask additional questions. It is to a certain extent a free available evaluation of the evidence by the Judge. The evidence to be considered will be that of the witnesses testifying in person and the remaining evidence in the docket/ dossier. The Judge will then rule on whether the person is guilty or not. If guilty, the Judge will pronounce the sentence at the same time. The accused were, in the beginning, mainly defended by lawyers from civil law systems who, inter alia, were also familiar with the languages spoken in the former Yugoslavia. However, the Registrar later appointed lawyers from common law systems to assist. It was a good decision as the combination of lawyers from both systems ensured fairness. Even within the Prosecutor's Office we had lawyers from different legal systems and it took some time and sometimes heated debates, to get consensus as to how we were going to operate during the investigation, pretrial and trial processes. To name a few – in many civil law systems there is no such thing as a guilty plea or that an accused can testify under oath in his/her defense. Civil law systems do not have a prosecution and defense case, the Judges lead in questioning the witnesses and only after that questioning, allow the prosecution and defense to ask questions. No leading questions are allowed and even consulting with a witness before testifying was not allowed (also true of some common law systems). I was appointed as the leader of the strategy team that was responsible, inter alia, for the investigation strategy to be followed; to assist the teams with preparing requests to governments for mutual legal assistance; and to begin investigating the leadership cases. The strategy team had two subteams - the leadership research team and the military analysis team. Both teams had leaders and consisted of highly experienced and dedicated analysts who were essential for assisting the investigators and lawyers at the ICTY. It was also a requirement for the leadership research team to be able to be fluent in the languages of the former Yugoslavia. It was invaluable to the ICTY as we had to review and analyze thousands of documents over the years. Some analysts became our expert witnesses in court – it was not an ideal situation to be an expert at the same time as working for the prosecutor’s office: but over the years they proved to be independent and of great assistance to the Trial Chambers in telling the “story” of the documentation and the evidentiary link to top leadership suspects. The analysts spent months in the witness box and had to endure days of cross examination in court. The broader strategy team later disbanded but the leadership Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 171 and military teams remained a key component within the prosecutor’s office. I then commenced working on other investigations and trials. Justice and Reconciliation in the Western Balkans Creation of the ICTY One of the basic principles in international law is that each country’s right to sovereignty must be respected. This means, amongst others, that every country has the rights to investigate and prosecute its own citizens without foreign interference. Only in extremely exceptional circumstances, will another Court be appointed from outside. Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were two exceptions to the rule – the existing legal systems in those countries could not handle the many crimes that were allegedly committed and the International Community, through the United Nations (UN) Security Council, decided to establish both Courts in 1993/4. Staff for the courts, including the Judges were appointed by the UN. A trial court consisted of three Judges with no jury. The Court of Appeal consisted of five Judges. Meanwhile, the statute that gave jurisdiction to the court was compiled and approved by The Security Council. What is justice? Justice can take different forms – it can for example be provided by a court of law, by a commission or other forum, where persons/victims are given a public opportunity to tell their part of the story. The truth is also a form of justice and can lead to reconciliation. If you do not provide the opportunity to persons/victims to tell their part of what happened, it can form the basis for justifying the commission of injustices against other persons. It is a sort of cancer that develops and if it is not cured/removed it can cause devastating effects and even death. This is what injustice can do if there is no justice. We had to listen many times to the events during the 1389 Battle of Kosovo many years ago, what happened during the Second World War which ended in many cases with the witness observing the following: how do you expect me to grant justice if so many of my people were not given justice before. Johan J du Toit 172 I will elaborate on this more later on as it is incredibly important in dealing with justice and reconciliation. Investigation strategy at the ICTY Against this background, let us examine first how the prosecutor’s office worked in identifying the cases they had to deal with in providing some justice to so many persons/victims affected by the violence in the former Yugoslavia. The prosecutor’s office had the benefit of having the services of highly professional staff, that were appointed or seconded mainly due to their skills in investigating and prosecuting organized crime and human right abuses within their respective countries. The biggest challenge in those early days was how to start with our investigations. We operated from The Hague, far away from where many crimes had allegedly been committed. It was therefore difficult to collect evidence, as the war was still going on and we had no control of the territory as was the case during the Nuremberg trials. The Prosecutor had to work, after obtaining the necessary legal authorization by the Tribunal’s Judges, through international structures and the UN to obtain permission to visit a country to search institutions. It is very different from working within one’s own country where you can apply for a search and arrest warrant and utilize the services of local law enforcement services to execute them. Internationally it is more complex, and you need time and patience to execute them. We struggled to determine what the investigation strategy should be during those early years considering the huge number of crimes that had been committed by various parties to the conflict. Many of us, including myself, had previous experience in investigating organized crime and it was clear from the outset that one must be guided by that experience. Investigating serious human rights abuses is just another form of organized crime. I want to share a few short comments on our experiences during those years in trying to provide justice to many persons affected by the violence. During August 1995, the office of the Prosecutor had an in-house discussion on our investigation and prosecution strategies. In October 1995, the Deputy Prosecutor set out the criteria we had to follow for investigations and prosecutions. It was an internal document, but it mainly concentrated on the following criteria to be considered – the position of the perpetrator, the seriousness of the violation and then relevant policy, practical and other considerations. Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 173 It was decided to prosecute those most responsible for international human rights abuses, including identifying some notorious offenders. It may sound good in theory but in practice it was not so easy. Especially during the early years, I must concede that the strategy was to a great extent influenced by the fact that an accused was in custody and that the Judges wanted a trial. One of the first accused, Duško Tadić, may be regarded as a “small fish” in isolation, but the Government of Germany made him available to the ICTY after some convincing. Germany wanted to be seen as conducting the first prosecution, especially after what had occurred at Nuremberg. We had to start somewhere, and it was an appropriate case to commence with for all involved. Remember, we were all new to this, including the Judges and defense counsel. Later, the prosecutor’s office mainly followed a top-down bottom-up investigation strategy. Our aim was to prosecute those in high leadership positions, but the reality was that our evidence base did not warrant that type of prosecutions at such an early stage. The further aim was to identify the "tools" that the leadership used, as they normally did not commit any crimes personally but through such “tools”. We identified persons as part of the lower and mid-level hierarchy that fulfilled that requirement—they were allegedly responsible for implementing a policy/plan on the ground. Our leadership and military analysis teams were also in the process of preparing expert reports on the links to leadership figures, but it was not in the interest of justice to disclose publicly our full hand at that stage. The name of any suspect being investigated cannot be made public and should only be disclosed after an indictment has been confirmed by the Judges. Box 7.2. Public announcement of that fact that someone is being investigated. The fact that someone is being investigated is normally kept confidential in many legal systems. The reasons are many, but the following is of key importance, especially in an international environment. A person is normally treated as a suspect only in an investigation. It is important that this is kept confidential as the case must still be investigated and presented to a Judge, as the case was at the ICTY, to consider whether or not there is a case against him/her on which a reasonable court may convict. If so, a warrant is issued and only then a person becomes an accused. In some cases, the Prosecutor applied for the warrant to be kept under seal as it would assist in apprehending the accused, especially if the latter is in another country. If known of the arrest warrant, he/she may go into hiding or disappear. It is also not fair that any person Johan J du Toit 174 e.g. reads in a newspaper that he/she is being investigated – investigations are not trials by media. I can remember on many occasions being asked “when will the Prosecutor’s office prosecute X or Y?” I could not comment due to operational and fairness reasons—well knowing we were at an advanced stage of the investigation against a specific person or that the indictment/warrant had been issued already but kept under seal/confidential until the person(s) had been arrested. It also became clear in prosecuting the "tools" that we had created the necessary solid evidential foundations to target the highest leadership positions. More witnesses came forward willing to provide the evidential link between the physical perpetrators and those far away from where the crimes had been committed, normally sitting in their offices pulling the strings. One must also remember that any organization must first earn the trust for what it is doing before witnesses will risk their lives to come forward and testify. As already stated, we did not have the benefit of the Nuremberg prosecutors where the Allied Forces took possession of huge volumes of documentation and were privy to many insider witnesses. If we had that caliber of evidence at an earlier stage of our existence, we could indeed have proceeded more quickly to prosecute the top leadership/most responsible. Box 7.3. The Nuremberg Trials. After the second World War, it was decided to prosecute Hermann Göring and others, for crimes against humanity and other counts, at Nuremberg, Germany. The Prosecutor was Robert Jackson, an American. He was assisted by a group of lawyers from the USA, United Kingdom, Russia and France. They divided the prosecution case into sections and each country was responsible for prosecuting a part of the case. When the Allied Forces took control of the territory, they collected and confiscated a huge amount of documentation that was left behind by the German Forces (e.g. at concentration camps). The Allied Forces were also in a position to locate key German witnesses that worked at the camps. The Forces also arrested the top leadership that were allegedly responsible for the huge amount of crimes that had allegedly been committed. On 1 October 1946, Hermann Göring and 18 other accused were convicted. Twelve accused were sentenced to death and seven accused to prison sentences. Three accused were acquitted. Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 175 It took the dedicated commitment of many investigators/lawyers/analysts over many years to collect and analyze the required evidence base one needs to prosecute those at the top leadership—key documents were moved from archives/places before our searches could take place, but through the dedicated efforts of many we found many of them later in other archives/places. You can be the best lawyer/investigator in the world but at the end of the day it is the quality of the evidence and witnesses that’s crucial. Care must also be given not to prosecute the top leadership too soon if you do not have a sound and solid evidence base—even if you are under pressure from interested parties to do so. We also investigated socalled notorious offenders e.g. Arkan and Šešelj. They may be that they did not fit clearly into the "tool category" but on their own they warranted prosecution. Box 7.4. Cases against Željko Ražnjatović (Arkan) and Vojislav Šešelj. In Arkan’s case, he was prosecuted for crimes against humanity and other counts in an indictment dated 21 September 1997. The indictment and warrant were kept under seal. In March 1999, the seal was partially lifted to reveal that Arkan was under indictment by the Tribunal. He died in January 2000 before being arrested to stand trial before the ICTY. In Šešelj’s case, he was also prosecuted for crimes against humanity and other counts. The Trial Court found him, by majority, not guilty on all counts. The prosecution appealed. In April 2018, the Appeal Court reversed the decision and found him guilty on some counts and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment. Who is most responsible? Who determines who is most responsible? The views of the victims are also important in answering that question. I was interviewing a witness in Sarajevo and observed he was terribly upset before I commenced with the interview. I sat him down, gave him coffee and asked him what was wrong? He told me that on this way to our office he recognized a guard of a prison camp he was imprisoned in for many years. He remembered many times requesting of the guard to stop the various assaults, rapes etc. in the camp. The guard did not personally commit any of the crimes personally, but he had the authority to stop it. The witness told me: I do not care about Karadžić and Mladić. I had to face that guard and his inaction for many years and for me he is most responsible. Johan J du Toit 176 Another example was a witness who just came back from reburying his father. A mass grave was discovered and the remains of about 40 persons from the village were discovered. He told me while he was reburying his father, a few police officers stood close by and witnessed it. He knew that they were responsible for the killings and then said the following to me: You know, the Tribunal (ICTY) is useless – why can’t you arrest the (physical) perpetrators and prosecute them at the Hague. It was a reasonable question and an outcry for justice. But I could not tell him: You know at the Tribunal this case is not serious enough, we only prosecute those most responsible at the top and for much more deaths. It would have been an insult to him and his family. I had to take the criticism on the chin but assured him that we will take his evidence into account in prosecuting the top leadership cases. Checks and balances The investigation plan had to be executed by experienced persons which walked the mills of life before investigating and prosecuting persons in their home jurisdictions. It was essential to ensure that we built the required checks and balances into our investigations to ensure a professional product. One of the biggest contributions to the successful execution of our mandate was the introduction of an indictment review process by the lawyers working in the prosecution’s office. It kept us on our toes. It basically worked as follows. Teams had to present their draft indictment and evidence to a group of lawyers not part of the team and selected by the legal coordinator. The legal coordinator was not an official UN position, but the person was appointed due to his/her skills by the Prosecutor. The indictment and evidence would be presented to the panel of reviewers who acted as a type of “jury”. Critical questions were asked, and suggestions were made to improve the investigation. Minutes were taken and at the end of each session, and the team were given a list of aspects on which they had to follow-up before the next review. In an international environment you may be working on a specific project/investigation but also have experience in working in that area which is now the subject of the investigation. The review process also served as a training session as many of us would obtain valuable experience as to how to present our case when time came. In some cases, we had many reviews solely on the facts, before we Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 177 really dealt with the law. Many of us also believed in the old Roman Dutch principle—take care of the facts and the law will take care of itself or the facts will lead you to the law. Most of the lawyers attended the reviews, either as presenters, reviewers or just to observe. I also attended all the reviews, and during those meetings it became clear who would be the next leadership suspect to be implicated by the evidence. We had highly efficient and very competent legal coordinators who had previously prosecuted big cases and who guided us all in our work for many years at the ICTY. In addition, we also had a legal advisers’ meetings (LAM) every Friday for one hour, chaired by the legal coordinator. It was a forum where we discussed legal developments before our colleagues and listened to the feedback from various teams that had just finalized a prosecution or appeal. I was always impressed with the honest and open way lawyers provided feedback. They were also very forthcoming as to what worked and what one should be careful of in future. Our legal interns, who were also invited to attend the reviews and LAM meetings, played a major role in our success. Criticism of the investigation strategy Sometimes we were criticized for prosecuting “small fish or mid-level perpetrators.” In isolation, that criticism may have been justified, but it did not take into account the bigger picture, the top-down approach that we had been engaged in from the outset, but needed more time/resources/ evidence. Critics may also argue that we took too long in our preparation but many of us knew that if you had to prosecute the leaders at the top, you had to have a case that was 120% certain. The impression was also gained in the beginning of our work that, although many countries talked about the importance of investigating and prosecuting human rights abuses, indirectly some did not want the ICTY to succeed. I am convinced that if the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were failures, there would not have been an International Criminal Court (ICC). The creation of the ICTY and the ICTR were to a great extent an experiment in international criminal justice and we knew it. Box 7.5. The International Criminal Court (ICC). Many countries came together in Rome in 1998 to establish the International Criminal Court. The Statute establishing the Court was a multilateral treaty and came into operation on 17 July 1998. The court entered into force on 1 July 2002 Johan J du Toit 178 after the required minimum number of ratifications by member countries. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, it is not a Court of first instance. Before the ICC’s jurisdiction could kick in, parties had to show that a specific country was unwilling or unable to do anything. The Security Council could also refer a case for investigation to the ICC, e.g. in South Sudan and Libya. The Prosecutor can also initiate an investigation itself. As of November 2019, 123 Countries have ratified the Statute of the Court, with exception of e.g. USA, Russia, China, India, and many other countries. These countries do not accept the jurisdiction of the Court. Some countries that ratified the Statute also incorporated the crimes in the ICC Statute within their own local legal systems. The International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR). The court was founded in November 1994 and had its Headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania .It indicted 93 individuals—62 were sentenced, 14 were acquitted, 10 referred to other jurisdictions, 3 referred to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism) that took over the work of ICTR and ICTY as of 22 December 2010; 2 deceased prior to judgment and 2 indictments withdrawn. We had to commence without much legal guidance, unlike the ICC. If we had lost some of our cases at the beginning it would have been devastating —in a sense it was good that Karadžić and Mladić were tried towards the end of the ICTY’s lifespan. It was not that we did not have a prima facie case against them at the beginning, but the indictments had to be amended many times to consider further evidence that had been obtained. Summary of cases finalized at the ICTY Soon after the first indictments were issued, many comprising multiple accused, it became clear that it would be difficult to prosecute those multiaccused cases in one trial. There was no control of the territory where the accused resided, and it took concerted efforts on many of the Prosecutors to get persons arrested. Practice showed us that countries selectively handed over accused and other accused moved under the radar screen to prevent them from being arrested. It took a lot of money, resources, and time to prosecute cases under the crimes recognized by the Statute. We would have been much more efficient if we had the opportunity to prosecute more than one accused during the same trial. Much time would have been saved if persons in top leadership positions could have been tried together. Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 179 To name a few, Kordić and Blaskić, Karadžić and Mladić and the many accused who had to be prosecuted, individually, and jointly, because of the Srebrenica crimes. Another factor that assisted in prosecutions is that more procedural elements of the civil system were bought into our court proceedings. It was soon realized that for many of us trained in the common law system, the trials took too long and rules had to be put in place, especially from the civil law systems, to shorten the trial but still afford the accused a fair trial. Certain rules were included by the Judges into the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, such as: • a crime base can be agreed upon or evidence introduced without the witness testifying in person. • the court can take notice of certain judicial facts from other similar cases. • witnesses do not necessarily have to give their full evidence in court— the key parts can be highlighted in a short examination by prosecution counsel, followed by the admission of the complete statement of the witness. Box 7.6. Possible joint trials Tihomir Blaskić was prosecuted for crimes against humanity and other counts. His first appearance was on 3 April 1996. He was convicted on 3 March 2000 sentenced to 45 years imprisonment. On appeal some of his convictions were set aside and he was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment. Dario Kordić was also prosecuted for crimes against humanity and other counts. His first appearance was on 8 October 1997. He was convicted and on 26 February 2001 sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and affirmed on appeal. Radovan Karadžić was prosecuted for genocide and other counts. His first appearance was during July 2008 and he was later convicted and on 24 March 2016 sentenced to 40 years imprisonment. On appeal it was increased to life imprisonment. Ratko Mladić was also prosecuted for genocide and other counts. His first appearance was during July 2011 and he was later convicted and on 22 November 2017 sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal has not been heard as of July 2020. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić were also prosecuted individually and convicted for genocide as to what happened within Srebrenica. Ten other Johan J du Toit 180 accused were also convicted and sentenced in three separate trials, for mainly genocide and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The imposition of a document management system during the court proceedings made the proceedings even more efficient. It reduced drastically the number of photocopies that had to be provided to all parties in the court, including the three Judges. Documents that any party wanted to use in court were uploaded on the system in advance and given a unique number. To cater for the needs of the accused, documents were also split on the computer screens in English and Serbo-Croatian versions, in order to allow the accused to follow the proceedings in his/her mother tongue. Despite all the above, the Office of the Prosecutor indicted 161 persons: • 90 were convicted and sentenced. • 18 were acquitted. • 13 cases were transferred to other jurisdictions. • 37 cases were terminated prior to trial – 20 cases were withdrawn and 17 died before or after transfer to the Tribunal. • 3 cases are ongoing before the Mechanism. Those who were prosecuted included Presidents, Prime Ministers, Generals and other senior Military Officers, Police Commanders and other senior Police Officials and persons in other leadership positions. What about Reconciliation? The ICTY did its best to establish the truth as to what happened. Almost all cases went on appeal and at the end the ICTY created a solid evidential foundation as to what had happened in certain parts of the former Yugoslavia. The Courts played an important role, but it is not the end of the matter. It cannot be argued that the various prosecutions conducted at the ICTY achieved reconciliation. It is not the sole responsibility of the courts, both at the ICTY and locally, to achieve reconciliation. Perceptions, rightly or wrongly, as to what happened are also important. Even today certain persons have not accepted that a genocide took place during WW II. While in some countries it is a crime if the Holocaust is denied. The challenges to reconciliation are therefore many. It does not follow that the truth, in whatever way it is determined, including through the courts, will necessarily lead to reconciliation. Charles Villa-Vicencia, from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, argued that rec- Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 181 onciliation involves hard work in an article entitled “Don’t blame me, I just lived here”. In summary, he indicated that reconciliation: • Does not come easy—it necessitates persistence. • Does not wipe away the memories of the past. Indeed, it is motivated by a form of memory that stresses the need to redress the past. • Does not necessarily involve forgiveness. It does involve a minimum willingness to coexist and work for the resolution of differences. This involves listening to and eventually understanding the other person, even where disagreement continues. • Involves translation of the quest for understanding and political renewal into economic renewal and material distribution. • Takes time and that coexistence precedes reconciliation. • Involves a different kind of justice—a form of restorative justice which does not seek revenge, but neither does it seek impunity. This kind of justice allows for both the capacity for evil as well as good that resides within humanity. It accepts moral and political responsibility for redressing the needs of victims as well as the need to ensure that perpetrators become responsible members of society. An attempt was made to achieve reconciliation during the trial of Biljana Plavšić, Case IT-00-39&40-S. She pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity and during her sentencing hearing some evidence was provided in this respect. Dr. Alex Boraine, Vice Chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was invited by the defense and prosecution to testify during the sentence proceedings of Mrs. Plavšić who acknowledged her crimes and accepted responsibility. During the sentence proceedings on 17 December 2002, Dr. Boraine was asked by Judge Robinson as to how one measure the effect of reconciliation, to which he stated: Your Honour, I think that some people have mistakenly talked about the South African model as political negotiations and then a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. My own view is that reconciliation started when former enemies [who had been] killing each other sat around a table and started negotiating a new constitution. For me, that’s a kind of litmus test, that it was not merely words but people who actually hated each other, people who were trying to kill each other, sat around a table, as I said, and negotiated a new constitution. And it was extremely difficult…and I think that some countries that were in transition themselves thought they may be able to learn something from our own experiences and duplicate it, which of course you cannot. Johan J du Toit 182 Judge Robinson also explored the role that accountability generally plays in the process of reconciliation to which Dr. Boraine answered as follows: …if accountability was not present, then the reconciliation would be a contradiction in terms. I think systems of criminal justice exist not simply to determine guilt or innocence, but also to contribute to a safe and peaceful society…in my experience accepting responsibility for terrible crimes can have a transformative and traumatic experience impact on the perpetrator, but also on the victims and the wider community. Such acceptance, whether by a guilty plea in a criminal case or in some other forum, can, I believe, be a significant factor in promoting reconciliation and creating what I call space for new attitudes and new behavior. It has that potential; I am not saying it is always realized…Genuine reconciliation, in my view, in the former Yugoslavia will remain elusive until responsibility is accepted by those who through defiant declarations or silent indifference explicitly or implicitly endorse these atrocities. Mrs. Biljana Plavsic has taken this crucial first step, so different from so many other leaders from that part of the world. Plavšić was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment and was released after serving two thirds of her sentence in a Swedish prison. Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa Goldstone Commission Before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established, the Goldstone Commission was established to investigate accusations of public violence during the four years prior to the first democratic elections in April 1994. It was a bloody part of the history of South Africa and the Commission under the chairmanship of Judge Goldstone acted like a type of fire brigade to try to prevent the outbreak of violence during this crucial period. I was counsel to the Commission and led the evidence before various commission hearings where all relevant parties were given an opportunity to present their case as to what happened during an incident that the Commission had to investigate. The Commission would then make its ruling and recommended what should be done to prevent further violence. There were many examples of doing so, but one that stands out is the hearing on mass demonstrations. At that time, the majority of South Africans did not have the right to vote and wanted to protest against the policies of the government at the time. In a normal democracy one would have the opportunity to vote a government out of office. At that stage, it was not Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 183 possible to do so. The Commission decided to have a formal enquiry about the right to demonstrate. Unfortunately, many deaths occurred during these demonstrations, mainly at the hands of the police. Something urgent had to be done to prevent further bloodshed prior to the elections in April 1994. On 9 July 1992, a Committee of the Commission under Judge Goldstone's chairmanship met in Cape Town. A unique procedure was followed. From 6 to 8 July 1992 a panel of experts in the field of protests from around the world and South Africa were chaired by Prof. Philip Heymann from Harvard University. On 9 July 1992 they handed their report to the Commission. It included provisional legislation as well as a recommendation that all the parties involved must first agree to before it becomes effective. Judge Goldstone discussed the agreement with legal representatives of various political and other parties that attended the hearings: the African National Congress (ANC), COSATO (Trade Union), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the South African Police and the Defence Force. They all agreed to the recommendations and signed on behalf of their groups. The recommendations did not have legal power but was a bona fide attempt to establish interim regulations and prescriptions that would prevent future bloodshed, especially in the run up towards the elections in 1994. As an interim measure, it was successful. The broader proposals of the Commission were subsequently incorporated in legislation with the implementation of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 205 of 1993. The Commission finalized its work in 1994 and during that time negotiations took place between all relevant parties to create a new Constitution for a democratic South Africa. One of the key sticking points was what to do with the past atrocities under apartheid. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission South Africa followed a different route in dealing with the past as was the case within the former Yugoslavia. Persons from all sides were prepared to sit round a negotiation table to sort the issues out. It was indeed not easy but there was a determination to make it work, despite huge differences. It remains a miracle what had happened and that all South Africans went peacefully to the polls in April 1994 to elect a democratic government under President Mandela. On 18 September 1997, Dr. Boraine, made a presentation at Siracusa, Italy. He spoke about “reigning in impunity for International crimes and seri- Johan J du Toit 184 ous violations of fundamental human rights”. He described how the negotiation process dealt with human rights abuses during the apartheid era. Three options were considered at the negotiation table: • A Blanket or general amnesty – it was rejected. • Trial and Prosecutions – it was also rejected. • A Truth Commission – it was the third option and gained the majority support. Justice Richard Goldstone (the first Prosecutor at the ICTY) put it this way: The decision to opt for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was an important compromise. If the ANC had insisted on Nuremberg-style trials for the leaders of the former apartheid government, there would have been no peaceful transition to democracy, and if the former Government had insisted on a blanket amnesty then, similarly, the negotiations would have broken down. A bloody revolution sooner rather than later would have been inevitable. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is therefore a bridge from the old to the new. The Constitutional Court also ruled that the victims of politically motivated crimes had to be afforded a hearing before the President could exercise his powers to pardon prisoners who had been found guilty of committing these crimes, and who had not sought amnesty from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. On 23 February 2010, the Court delivered its judgment in Albutt vs Center for Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the President of the Republic of South Africa. It sets clear guidelines on how matters should be dealt with and makes the important observation that the idea of a participatory democracy is also an African-one. The Court further stated: Victim participation was the norm in the decision of the proper "punishment" for perpetrators in the traditional African society. This was the expression of the participating democracy practiced in those societies. This is my understanding of African tradition. The main judgment therefore finds support in the African legacy of participation of citizens in affairs of society, not as direct authority for his specific application on the facts of this matter, but as further legalization that has its compliance with a tradition that runs deeply in the lives of many people in this country. It is indeed difficult to escape that this remarkable tradition of participation and capacity for forgiveness in the African society is also placed on a deeper level, the amnesty process, in a very other way. Without it, the amnesty process would have Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 185 been impossible, or at least it would have been unmeasurable harder than it was. The same can be said for the continued duty to promote national unity. The promotion of national unity is an ongoing process in terms of the Constitution. Although it may be necessary for this process of national unity "not to punish those who have properly violated the law" it should be remembered that these flies in the face of what is conventionally associated with the supremacy of the law. In this regard, the presidential justification may, in relation to offences that have an impact on the national unit, have properties similar to the amnesty process, where individual participation of victims was the only rational way to try to achieve that goal. Was Reconciliation achieved? Even though great progress had been made and persons were given a voice to present their views during the various Commission sessions, it cannot be said that reconciliation had been achieved. The challenges facing South Africa are also different than those in the former Yugoslavia. It will also require time, patience, perseverance, and good leadership from all in South Africa to continue this long road to reconciliation. Certain iniquities came to the forefront again during the Covid-19 pandemic. Much needs to be done here in South Africa to achieve reconciliation. Lessons Learnt from the ICTY and South Africa There is no universal rule or solution in dealing with past atrocities. It depends on various factors, including the willingness of the parties to sit round a negotiation table to sort out differences, the seriousness of the crimes allegedly committed and the quality of the leadership that will be responsible for dealing with the past. It may be in the interest of justice, to have trials and/or truth commission’s first, to establish the facts. It can then be followed by other forums to deal with the broader and more difficult issue of reconciliation. It takes time, patience, perseverance, and good leadership to achieve and it is a long road to walk. A truth commission should not be contradictory, but complementary, to the criminal justice systems. The members of the truth commission should be citizens of the relevant country itself—one of the successes in South Africa was the leadership and qualities of Archbishop Desmond Tutu who chaired the Commission. Forums should be established to provide Johan J du Toit 186 victims the opportunity to tell their part of the story even after the completion of criminal trials (internationally or local) and/or truth commissions. At the end of the day it is essential to provide justice to all victims of human rights abuses. This can be done in a variety of ways but the crucial aspect is that an opportunity should be given to witnesses to tell that story in whatever appropriate forum. Questions for students: What innovative ways are still available to provide justice and reconciliation to victims in the Western Balkans, excluding trials and truth commissions? How should one deal with guilt, especially if you are part of a generation that took no part in what occurred in the former Yugoslavia? To provide justice to victims of serious human right abuses, should it be a prerequisite that some prosecutions must first take place? Can reconciliation be achieved on its own without establishing the truth first? Can an international prosecution proceed at the same time as a domestic truth and reconciliation commission? What if there is an overlap in the investigations? References Hazan, P. (2004). Justice in a time of war: The true story behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. ICTY Communication Service, Statements of guilt from ICTY cases. In https://www.ic ty.org/en/features/statements-guilt. ICTY Communication service, Voice of Victims in https://www.icty.org/en/features/v oice-of-the-victims. International Centre for Transitional Justice and the Kofi Annan Foundation (2014), Challenging the Conventual, Can Truth Commissions Strengthen the Peace Processes in https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_TruthCommPeace_Engli sh_2016.pdf. Krog, A. (2007). Country of my skull: Guilt, sorrow, and the limits of forgiveness in the new South Africa. Portland: Broadway Books. Chapter 7: Justice and Reconciliation 187 Mallinder, L., & Hadden, T. (2013). The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability, with Explanatory Guidance. Newtownabbey: the University of Belfast in https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BelfastGuidelines_TJI2 014.pdf.pdf. South African Embassy (1998). Essays on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Information Series, (4) April. Tusa, A., & Tusa, J. (2010). The Nuremberg Trial. New York: Skyhorse Publishing Inc.. Johan J du Toit 188 Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation Maja Pulić Abstract: Borders and boundaries are increasingly becoming a contemporary topic of conversation. In the midst of the electoral campaign, today’s president of the United States of America announced he is going to build the wall between the US and Mexico, thus erecting a physical border that would separate two countries. Today - twenty years into the twenty-first century we live in the world of growing nationalism, xenophobia and racism while at the same time we are seemingly in the borderless world. This is not strange as borders are nowhere to be found when looking at the Earth from the outer-space. Indeed, Earth is naturally borderless, yet territorial lines divide our social, economic, political and every-day lives. Our lives have been ordered by nested lines of territorial borders, be that neighbourhood in which we live, city through which we walk or neighbouring state which we visit for the summer holidays. Contemporary patterns of borderlines make our social lives very complex resulting in the fact that we need to navigate more and more spatial and mental borders. Therefore, it is not surprising that the studies of borders have become an increasing interest to scholars across disciplines. This chapter follows the multidisciplinary approach to studying borders and boundaries which institutes a prism through which it is possible to examine broader processes of reconciliation. In this sense, this chapter presents and offers different ways to examine and analyse borders and boundaries and helps students to understand complexities behind them. The focus is on exploring similarities and differences between borders and boundaries while investigating the real and symbolic consequences of their materiality in the processes of reconciliation. In this sense, the boundary line in Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented as a division line that carries powerful symbolic meanings, coupled with historical overview of spatial politics in Yugoslavia and cross-border cooperation initiatives seen in the context of Western Balkans. Key terms: territory, boundaries, social constructionism, cross-border cooperation, reconciliation. 189 Historical Overview Borders, boundaries, frontiers and borderlands are human creations. In the ancient times borders were erected as a result of conquest. The most striking example of such borders could be found in the Roman Empire which consisted of large territorial holdings throughout Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Beyond those psychical holdings, boundaries organized the Roman Empire according to a hierarchy of spaces (territories) of diverse dimensions and functions, which included settlements, cities, provinces and regions (Anderson, 2003). Box 8.1. Border and Boundaries. Borders are defined as clearly delineated entities established by legal agreement. Boundaries can be natural and artificial. They carry symbolic, representational and functional meanings that go beyond their materiality or physicality. In contemporary literature, borders are seen as entities that represent more than lines and fixtures, which makes them difficult to separate from boundaries. Formation of modern political order required international recognition by other states. This meant formal recognition of the borders of sovereign and territorially demarcated states (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). An illustration of this can be found in the Spanish-Dutch Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. The Treaty established borders for the territorial possessions of England, Dutch-land, France, the German princedoms, Poland, Muscovy, Turkey, Sweden and Spain. The Treaty, alongside boundary-marking, marked the beginning of the era of nation-state (Brunet-Jailly, 2012, p. 635). In fact, it specified the principles of inviolability of borders and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. This system became known in the literature as Westphalian sovereignty. With the formation of modern nation states the notion of the border as an imagined line increasingly took root while the establishment of the border (as a line) first of all occurred as a signal of domination (Doll & Gelberg, 2015). After the First World War and in the subsequent decades, geographers and statesmen were preoccupied with describing the changing political situation in Europe and in the world. In the period of 1920-1960s one of the better-known typology of borders and boundaries would be elaborated by American geographer Richard Hartshorne. He described the process of border demarcation and developed four typologies of borders. These were: Maja Pulić 190 ‘antecedent’, ‘subsequent’, ‘superimposed’ and ‘natural’ borders (Newman, 2006). These typologies, although seemingly diverse, should not exclude each other: 1. Antecedent borders were those that existed already before the settlement of the area in question in what was perceived as constituting unsettled land. 2. Subsequent boundaries were those which were demarcated according to the existing settlement patterns and difference, supposedly reflecting the ethno-territorial patterns of the region. 3. Superimposed borders were those which were imposed by an outside (normally colonial) power on a region under their control. Usually this was done without regards to the existing tribal and ethnic settlement patterns which resulted in increased division of those settlements between more than one state, or the inclusion of various ethnic groups in a single territory. On the maps these borders can be recognized easily. They are those straight geometric lines running through African, Asian and parts of Latin American continents. 4. Natural borders describe the existence of physical features of the landscape, such as rivers, mountain ridges, oceans, deserts and other recognizable features (Newman, 2006, p. 174). These four descriptions reflect traditional views of borders and boundaries. Indeed, already during 1980s it was possible to hear traces of borders being ‘social constructions’ which allows for the recognition of boundaries as meaningful construction that go beyond the material separation of land. Social constructionism as s philosophical understanding (theory of knowledge) assumes that people construct their understanding of the world and their meaning, and in contemporary literature it is becoming one of the most often used lenses through which it is possible to examine, understand and deconstruct borders and boundaries within their context and setting, while avoiding looking at them in isolation. Therefore, looking at borders and boundaries as mere lines and fixtures, as something static that does not depend of any political, economic or social processes and consequently cannot be changed, was soon to be left behind. Furthermore, the Westphalian ‘territorial compartmentalisation’, raised questions of validity after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the territorial reordering of Central and Eastern Europe (Newman, 1998). After the fall of socialist block and the events of early 1990s in the Balkans, it was not surprising that renewed interest arose in borders and border studies in general. Overnight old states ceased to exist while others were clinging to the last remaining strings of socialist ideas. This re-emergence of nation Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 191 states and re-drawing of borders just indicated the ever-lasting power of territory and territoriality, which Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates in this chapter. With growing impact of globalization and supra-national processes (European Union for example) it was possible to argue and discuss the changing nature of borders and boundaries. An illustration of such phenomenon can be seen in the Schengen Area. The Schengen is an area comprising twenty-six European states that have officially abolished all passport and all other types of border control at their mutual borders. Thus, countries belonging to the zone exercise only external border control. Although rather a successful project, irregular migration and internal security threats kept increasing, resulting in issues that were difficult to handle within the limits of the initial network mechanism. This resulted in the decision of the Council to adopt the Commission's proposal to reinforce the European Border and Coast Guard (European Commission, November 2019). Nevertheless, as scholars elaborate, the changing function of borders and boundaries does not mean a ‘borderless world’ (Newman, 1998, pp. 6-7). It can only mean that in contemporary world we can discuss borders and boundaries beyond realist and international relations sphere and enter into valuable post-modern discussions that render not only the physical recognition of borders but also their general meaning for the social world in which they exist. This argument fits the philosophical observation of social constructionism mentioned at the beginning of this chapter but also provides a valuable lens for further theoretical investigation of borders and boundaries in the contemporary world. However, contemporary and realist debates do not need to exclude each other. if reconciled, they can provide insightful explanations of behaviours, theories and policies. Contemporary view of Border and Boundaries Today, state and state-related borders are the most common borders that exist. These are geographic boundaries of political entities or legal jurisdictions, such as states, governments, entities, federal entities or subnational entities. They are usually established by legal agreement by those entities that control them. Nevertheless, they may be imposed by other parties, inherited or never formally recognized. Borders can also be defacto military lines. In the past, most borders were not clearly marked – there were no border lines. Instead those were areas of warning that were claimed or fought by the other side. An illustration of this can be found in a medieval Maja Pulić 192 depiction of the Oecumene in 1482 by engraver Johannes Schnitzer.1 In modern world however, borders are clearly defined and demarcated in maps and denote territory. Territory and territoriality are complex concepts and cannot be theoretically explored separately. Territory is bounded space that carries meanings of complex social phenomena that carries power. This meaning can be derived from treaties, constitutions, international agreements and other legal and political acts. This view is often found and interpreted in theories of international relations. Territoriality is implicated in creation, circulation and interpretation of meaning (Delaney, 2005). Territory is almost always historically situated and any investigation of territoriality requires historical and contextual specification. Since territory always represents a bounded entity, borders and boundaries are their intrinsic parts. With the increase in the number of territorial states, state borders became an illustration of borders that affect people’s lives. Nevertheless, state borders should not be the archetypal illustration of borders nor they should be understood as the sum of all other borders and boundaries, as the most important boundaries that exist. Indeed, religious, class, gender are just some examples that “transcend the simplistic inside/outside divide that state borders have established: they predate even the earliest state borders in antiquity, and they never fit the territorial matrix of modern state borders” (Popescu, 2011, p. 8). Therefore, border studies have come a long way from studying hard, static territorial lines and now include the process of bordering as well, through which territories and peoples get included or excluded within a system. According to John Agnew (2008), borders are always problematic because they undermine human dignity. His perspective implies looking at border studies and reframing borders as to include basic ethical questions. In other words, rather than being trapped into national questions, border studies should open up to the real effects on human lives and recognize that their existence always limits movement of people, things, but also limit the exercise of intellect, imagination and political will (Agnew, 2008, p. 176). Borders and boundaries can be conceptualizing in many different ways and across various disciplines. In theories of international relations borders and boundaries are very complex and they are investigated as part of terri- 1 If interested in ancient cartography with a twist (world not as it ever existed but as it thought to be), see Brooke-Hitching, Edward (2016) The Phantom Atlas: The Greatest Myths, Lies and Blunders on Maps, Simon and Schuster UK, London. Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 193 tory in which they were formed. Simply said, they are not static nor simple and should be investigated in the broader context of both space and time: Instead, they appear inherently contradictory, problematical, and multifaceted. They are at once gateways and barriers to the ‘‘outside world,’’ protective and imprisoning, areas of opportunity and/or insecurity, zones of contact and/or conflict, of co-operation and/or competition, of ambivalent identities and/or aggressive assertion of difference. These apparent dichotomies may alternate with time and place, but – more interestingly – they can coexist simultaneously in the same people, some of whom have to regularly deal not with one state but two. (Anderson & O’Dowd 1999, pp. 595– 596) The next part of the chapter presents some of the most common conceptual debates on borders and boundaries in contemporary literature. These include borders as territorial constructions , which help us understand the ways how we can examine borders and boundaries, analyse and understand them. Secondly, borders as identity demarcations show us how identity and other social issues cannot be separated from borders and boundaries. Indeed, in any subsequent analysis they should not exclude each other. rather, they should be looked at in their specificities and examined within their context, which could ultimately result in analysis reconciling post-modern and realist schools of thought. Finally, borders and boundaries represent power and their institutionalization should not be avoided in interpretation. Borders as Territorial Constructions Territory is a concept derived from political theory and it is often strongly connected with other political concepts such as sovereignty, power, property, identity and jurisdiction. Territory is strongly related to the notion of land and the control over borders of which it has a jurisdiction on. ‘Territory’ has its roots in the Latin word ‘territorium’, meaning the land that surrounds a town. In contemporary world however, territory carries many meanings and may come in many forms. For example, one way to define territory is to look at it as spatially bounded field of forces in which access, purposes, and meanings are shaped and controlled by individuals, groups or institutions (Sack, 1986). Territory is social because people inhabit it collectively, and it is political because groups struggle to establish, maintain and at times enlarge or change their space (Mabel, 2003). Territory is also cultural because it en- Maja Pulić 194 folds collective memories, and it is cognitive since it has a capacity to capture political, cultural and social borders and place itself at the core of both public and private identity projects (Mabel, 2003, pp. 1-30). Borders and boundaries can be observed as dimensions and attributes through which territory can be observed. Every territory exists as a bounded entity. In fact, it is widely accepted that boundaries are a constitutive prerequisite of territory. Consequently, territory and boundaries should be framed as two aspects of the same phenomenon (Brighenti, 2010). Borders as Identity Demarcations Borders do not only separate locations and divide people; they also define and make specific markings of their purpose. Demarcation does not only mean the cartographic drawing of lines and coordination. Rather, demarcation implies the overall making of rules and regulations as well as general processes of border creation. On the most perceptive level we can describe it as assigning of signs and symbols that identify and demark two or more opposed sides. By doing so, borders reflect politics and represent the system in which they arose. They represent both symbolic and realist politics. Therefore, borders are not only politics of delimitation/classification but also politics of representation and identity (Paasi, 1998). However, the demarcation is not seen only in specific signs made for that purpose, it is seen in every-day life and every-day business and social life people deal with. In this sense, it is useful to talk about flags, signs, posts, and even colours, which all signify something political. Border narratives can be found in literature, language, education and culture, while at the same time they are open to contestation at the government level and in everyday life of their residents. People relate to bounded territory through territoriality which is the process through which individuals or groups claim and control the territory. According to Sack, territoriality is “a spatial strategy to affect, influence, and control resources and people, by controlling area.” The control is asserted by putting boundaries and borders around that territory. As boundary constructions become more significant and territorial space emerges, differentiation, separation and division become tools by which boundary elements are set in the ground (Löw &Weidenhaus, 2017). Ultimately, they may become an element of people’s belonging to their group. Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 195 Box 8.2. Karrholm (2007, p. 439) lays out some of the most important definitions of territoriality: • The act of laying claim to and defending a territory is termed territoriality. (Hall, 1959, p. 187) • Territorial behaviour is a self-other boundary regulation mechanism that involves personalization of or marking of a place or object and communication that it is “owned” by a person or a group. (Altman, 1975, p. 107) • Territory is a meaningful aspect of social life, whereby individuals define their scope of their obligations and the identity of themselves and others. (Shils, 1975, p. 26) • Human territoriality can be viewed as a set of behaviour and cognitions a person or group exhibits, based on perceived ownership of physical space. (Bell et al., 1996, p. 304) • Territory is a portion of geographical space that coincides with the spatial extent of a government’s jurisdiction. (Gottman, 1975, p. 29) • Territoriality can be defined as the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. This area is called territory. (Sack, 1986, p. 19) Suggested reading: Kärrholm, M. (2007). The materiality of territorial production: A conceptual discussion of territoriality, materiality, and the everyday life of public space. Space and Culture, 10 (4), 437–453. Feathersone D., and Painer J. (2013). Spatial Politics. Hoboken NJ: Wiley Blackwell. Borders as Institutions Part of the transformation of border studies in contemporary world is a recognition by many scholars that borders are institutions. This conceptualization goes parallel with theory of social constructionism. Social constructionists view the knowledge as socially constructed. The origins of social constructionism can be traced in part to an interpretivist approach to thinking by which meanings are created, negotiated, sustained and modified. Following those lines, borders and boundaries are understood as more than fixed lines drawn in the land. They are historical constructions and they always change in space and in time. borders as institutions are Maja Pulić 196 also part of the discussion on the role of elites and governments in preserving divisions. Indeed, people erect borders as a way to differentiate between here and there, between us and them. The essence of borders is to create ‘otherness’, while usually functioning as the barrier of protection. Box 8.3. In contemporary sociology, human geography, political science and other disciplines, borders and boundaries are seen as practices, processes, discourses, symbols, institutions or networks Suggested reading: Jessop, B., Brenner, N., & Jones, M. S. (2008). Theorizing sociospatial relations. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26 (3), 389–401. Paasi, A. (2008). Is the world more complex than our theories of it? TPSN and the perpetual challenge of conceptualization. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26 (3), 405–410. Brunet-Jailly, E. (2005). Theorizing borders: An interdisciplinary perspective. Geopolitics, 10 (4), 633–649. Massey, D. (2005). For Space. Thousand Oaks CA: SAGE Publications. Deleuze G., and Guattari F. (1987). A Thousand Plateaus. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Towards Regional and Cross-Border Cooperation: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Western Balkans It is not strange for (predominately) Western decision-makers to transform the administrative borders into international ones when state partition occurs. Initially, this approach was adopted with the colonies. In order to avoid conflicts among countries, the colonial empires connected the recognition of independence to their colonies with the preservation of the existing administrative borders, now recognized internationally. This strategy was reinforced after the Indian war in 1948 and during the process of decolonization in African continent (Bianchini, 2017). Similarly, the EU and US decided when the socialist system collapsed in Europe. They connected the recognition of the newly independent states within the administrative borders established by the Communists. This was also connected to the borders ‘recognition established by the Helsinki accords of 1975, whose impacts were significantly relevant for the two German States, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, this decision was considered in relation to the Yugoslav collapse in 1991. Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 197 Territorial questions were part of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, commonly known as Badinter Arbitration Committee. Set during the month of August of 1991 by the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community, the Badinter Committee was an arbitration body commissioned to provide the Conference on Yugoslavia with legal advice. The Yugoslavian federation consisted of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. The opinion issued by the Commission clearly separate the notion of territoriality and self-determination from the ethnic identity (Navari, 2014). Box 8.4. Self-determination. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 1: 1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resporces without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Self-determination appears firmly entrenched in the international law in only three areas: as an anti-colonialist standard, as a ban on foreign military occupation, and as a requirement that all racial groups be given full access to government (Cassese, 2005, p. 61). Suggested reading: Cassese A. (2005). International Law (2nd ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Schutter, O. (2010) International Human Rights Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Commission first addressed the question of dissolution of Yugoslavia and declaration of independence of the republics forming the federal states Maja Pulić 198 through the international recognition of the internal borders of the republics. To this question the Commission answered that the republics have a right to international recognition upon the fulfilment of a number of conditions among which the respect of the rights of minorities stands out for its political implication and for its logical connection to the second question posed to the Commission. The Serb delegation asked the Commission whether the Serbs living in in republics other than Serbia would have a right to self-determination in the form of territorial independence from the rest of the territory of the republic. In this regards the Commission stated that the right of self-determination cannot be realized through the creation of new borders. As Pellet (1992, p. 180) explains, the Arbitration Committee provided considerable emphasis to the principle of respect for borders existing at the time of independence in order to pin that ‘the right to self-determination must not involve change to existing frontiers.’ On the other hand, the right to self-determination of Serbs living in those republics shall be realized through the recognition of their identity and the connected rights recognized to minority groups. The Opinion of the Commission tries to strike a balance between ensuring the principle of territorial integrity of sovereign states and the objective unwillingness of territorial units composing a Federal State of Yugoslavia to continue being members of the federal entity. This balancing act, although reasonable, did not prevent the start of armed conflicts in the former republics of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1992-1995 Bosnian War was the most violent and destructive of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession that accompanied the breakup of the federal socialist state of Yugoslavia into its constituent republics after the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and what became known as the Greater Serbia project (Ramet, 2010; Silber and Little, 1996). Wars of Yugoslav Succession represented the violent culmination of the political conflict within Yugoslavia of the late 1980s and early 1990s caused by the rise of nationalism, particularly within Yugoslavia’s Socialist Republic of Serbia; the weakening of the Yugoslav communist regime; the seizure of power by Slobodan Milošević in the Socialist Republic of Serbia in 1987; and his consequent attempt to overturn the Yugoslav constitutional order. The bloodiest and most prolonged phase of the conflict occurred in nationally heterogeneous Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 (Hoare, 2010). The end of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to internal division of the country into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (majority Muslim-Croat) and Republic of Srpska (majority Serb), where Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) is covering 51% of Bosnian territory while Republic of Srpska (RS) covering 49%. The construction of Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 199 the new political system that followed after the end of war brought further administrative divisions of both entities which resulted in complex and severely complicated political climate in the whole state. Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) drawn by digital technology during the Dayton Negotiations is primarily an administrative border that marks territorial division between these two entities. However, the border also marks and denotes the ethnic division, territorially more or less separating two ethnic groups.2 Despite the establishment of entities, the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not happen, and most European countries today reject the idea of an exchange of territories (for example between Serbia and Kosovo. Indeed, partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina would sanction or approve the fact that the state is created as a product of a conflict in which serious war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide were committed. The boundary in this country today represents an administrative division which was created after the war. Therefore, its creation bares no parallel with the recognition of administrative borders in the process of independence of former colonies. When it comes to possible exchange of territories between Serbia and Kosovo, the reasons why this is rejected by most of the European countries is clear. That would destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina as the principle of transformation of administrative borders created in awake of the conflict into an international border would be affirmed. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates that the territorialisation reflects both symbolic and material divisions of the society in general. In the context of the Western Balkans however, free movement and cooperation between countries seems as a positive move towards less territorialisation and borderless region. Cross-border cooperation is a very powerful tool of reconciliation, especially in contexts where territories have emerged as a result of conflict or wars. It primarily serves as a tool of overcoming territorial divisions in form of borders. The main objective of cross-border cooperation is to ensure the long-term development of countries and communities. It is a precise, policy-driven project which implies concrete participation of (both) sides. Freedom of movement and going further away from the territoriality and border-making, was represented in such an initiative in the Western 2 According to the census held on 2013, majority of Serb population lives in Republic of Srpska 81.51%. There are 13.99% of Bosniaks and 2.41% of Croats living in RS. In Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina live majority of Bosniaks, 70.40%. There are 2.55% of Serbs and 22.44% of Croats living in this entity (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016). Maja Pulić 200 Balkans. At the end of 2019, the Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama and Prime Minister of North Macedonia Zoran Zaev, together with President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić met in Novi Sad and discussed the possibility of creating a so-called ‘mini-Schengen’. The second meeting, joined by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina Denis Zvizdić and Minister of Economy of Montenegro Dragica Sekulić, was held in November in Ohrid, and resulted in a set of proposals with the goal of achieving “four freedoms” (Muminovic, 2019). As a result, the leaders agreed that the initiative would include mutual recognition of professional qualifications, incentives for the exchange of students, joint research and development projects, border cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism and help in an emergency situation. In a broader sense, the initiative meant unrestricted flow of goods, people and service, and travelling between countries using only identification card. Nevertheless, the initiative was quickly forgotten with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina never acknowledging their own official stance regarding the matter, while Kosovo officially refusing the deal due to unrecognition of its status. Even though the initiative was a good and positive plan, especially in terms of economic opening and development, it suffered from usual political clashes. As Böhm and Drápela (2017) found, cross-border cooperation helps establishing functional relationships but application of policies become problematic, especially in terms of interpreting history. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Western Balkans, cross-border cooperation brings better relationships with the European Union as well. In European politics cross-border cooperation is one of the incentives of enlargement policy. The EU policy makers institutionalized this form of cooperation in what is now called ‘Euroregions’. Euroregions were intended as territorial framework where East Europe countries would prepare for the EU membership (Böhm and Drápela, 2017, p. 102) following the Association of European Border Regions criteria. Box 8.5. Association of European Border Regions (AEBR). In line with its statutes, the AEBR works on behalf of the European border and crossborder regions with the aim to: • highlight their special problems, opportunities, responsibilities and activities; • represent their common interests vis-à-vis national and international parliaments, bodies, authorities and institutions; Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 201 • initiate, support and coordinate cooperation between the regions throughout Europe; • promote exchanges of experience and information with a view to identifying and coordinating common interests among the diverse range of cross-border problems and opportunities, and to propose possible solutions. The activities of AEBR involve: • implementing programmes and projects, to apply for funds and to receive and to dispose of them; • to organise events that deal with cross-border problems; • to help to solve cross-border problems and to support special activities; • to prepare and implement common campaigns within the networks; • to inform European political bodies and the public about cross-border issues (AEBR, 2020). In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the Western Balkans, cross-border cooperation initiative should work to attain common goals such as: a. Transformation of territorial divisions into communication tools between societies and countries b. Overcoming divisions and achieving common goals in terms of economic and social development c. Strengthening of democratic development d. Overcoming administrative obstacles e. Utilize institutionalization of EU enlargement policy in terms of crossborder cooperation: practicing multi-level governance, cooperatively solving border issues. Conclusion Scholars are increasingly inviting us to recognize the importance of considering the place of borders and ‘on the ground’ experiences in border studies. This means that we need to look for evidence of bordering practices and what are the impacts in specific contexts. In fact, they underline the importance of looking at unconventional borders that stretch into different dimensions and over different periods of time (Johnson, et al., 2011). Since borders are enacted in different ways, i.e. borders today may carry, Maja Pulić 202 mean and represent different characteristics, finding their place is important. This leads to the process of interpretation of territoriality, both in symbolic and material way. Indeed, theorization of borders and boundaries and their application in international relations, can be reunited. On the one hand, we were able to see that people relate to borders and boundaries through territoriality. On the other, people – individuals or groups – can claim and control, influence and strategize the territory. Hence, exploring different elements that transcend disciplines and engage into more interdisciplinary analysis, can explain complex phenomenon in their contextual frameworks. Through the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of its own internal division and as part of Western Balkans in the broader sense, it is possible to observe attainable goals which would work together towards processes of reconciliation. Opening borders for economic and social cooperation works for positive steps in this sense, both in micro and macro environment. Thus, cross-border cooperation brings concrete and precise goals which can serve interests on all sides. Questions for students: Discuss how bordering and borders are open to contestation at the government level and in everyday life of their residents. Using an example discuss the difference between border and boundary. Critically discuss whether public spaces carry a degree of political responsibility. How can cross-border cooperation imitative help in reconciliation process? Discuss using specific countries in the Western Balkans. Discuss the relationship between cross-border cooperation and EU policies. How might such initiatives benefit in the accession process? References Agnew, J. (2008). Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking. Ethics & Global Politics, 1 (4), 175–191. Altman, I. (1975). The environment and social behavior. Pacific Grove CA: Brooks/ Cole. Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 203 Anderson, J., & Dowd, L. O. (1999). Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance. Regional Studies, 33 (7), 593– 604. Bell, P. A., Greene, T. C., Fisher, J. D., & Baum, A. (1996). Environmental psychology. (4th ed.). San Diego: Harcourt Brace. Berezin, M. (2003). Territory, emotion, and identity: spatial recalibration in a New Europe. In M. Berezin and M. Schain (Eds.). Europe without borders: remapping territory, citizenship, and identity in a transnational age (pp. 1-30). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bianchini, S. (2017). Liquid Nationalism and State Partitions in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Böhm H. & Drápela E. (2017). Cross-border cooperation as a reconciliation tool: Example from the East Czech-Polish borders. Regional & Federal Studies, 27 (3), 305-319. Brighenti, A. M. (2010). On Territorology: Towards a General Science of Territory. Theory, Culture & Society, 27 (1), 52–72. Brunet-Jailly, E. (2005). Theorizing borders: An interdisciplinary perspective. Geopolitics, 10 (4), 633–649. Cassese A. (2005). International Law (2nd ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Delaney, D. (2005). Territory: A Short Introduction. In Territory: A Short Introduction. De Schutter, O. (2010) International Human Rights Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Doll, M., & Gelberg, J. (2015). Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Borders, Spaces and Identities. In Wille, Christian et al., (Eds.), Spaces and Identities in Border Regions, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, European Commission (2019) EU delivers on stronger European Border and Coast Guard to support Member States. In https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ detail/en/statement_19_6237. Gottmann, J. (1975). The evolution of the concept of territory. Social Science Information, 14 (3), 29–47. Hall, E. (1959). The silent language. New York: Anchor Books. Hoare, M.A. (2010). The War of Yugoslav Succession. In Ramet, S. P. (Ed.), Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989 (pp. 111-136). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jessop, B., Brenner, N., & Jones, M. S. (2008). Theorizing sociospatial relations. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26 (3), 389–401. Johnson, C., Jones, R., Paasi, A., Amoore, L., Mountz, A., Salter, M., & Rumford, C. (2011). Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies. Political Geography, 30 (2), 61–69. Kärrholm, M. (2007). The materiality of territorial production: A conceptual discussion of territoriality, materiality, and the everyday life of public space. Space and Culture, 10 (4), 437–453. Maja Pulić 204 Löw, M., & Weidenhaus, G. (2017). Borders that relate: Conceptualizing boundaries in relational space. Current Sociology, 65 (4), 553–570. Löw, M., & Weidenhaus, G. (2017). Borders that relate: Conceptualizing boundaries in relational space. Current Sociology, 65 (4), 553–570. Muminović, E. (2019, November 22). Mini-Schengen: Hand in hand with the EU integration process, or its replacement? European Western Balkans. https://europe anwesternbalkans.com/2019/11/22/mini-schengen-hand-in-hand-with-the-eu-inte gration-process-or-its-replacement/. Navari, C. (2014). Territoriality, self-determination and Crimea after Badinter. International Affairs, 90 (6), 1299-1318. Newman, D. (1998). Geopolitics Renaissant: Territory, sovereignty and the world political map. Geopolitics, 3 (1), 1–16. Newman, D. (2006). Borders and bordering: Towards an interdisciplinary dialogue. European Journal of Social Theory, 9 (2), 171–186. Paasi, A. (1998). Boundaries as social processes: Territoriality in the world of flows. Geopolitics, 3 (1), 69–88. Paasi, A. (2008). Is the world more complex than our theories of it? TPSN and the perpetual challenge of conceptualization. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26 (3), 405–410. Paasi, A. (2009) Regions and Regional Dynamics. In Rumford, C. (Eds.), Handbook of European Studies (pp. 464-484). London: Sage. Pellet, A. (1992). The Opinions of the Badinter Abritration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples. European Journal of International Law, 3 (1), 178-185. Popescu, G. (2011). Bordering and Ordering in the 21st century: Understanding Borders. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Ramet, P. S. (2010). Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sack, R.D. (1986). Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History. (7) Cambridge Studies in Historica. CUP Archive. Shils, E. (1975). Center and periphery. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Silber L. and Little A. (1995). Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. London: Penguin Books. Chapter 8: Borders and Boundaries as Obstacles to Reconciliation 205 Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović Abstract: According to cultural definitions, intellectuals can be defined as social actors who have developed public authority based on cultural achievements and/or positions. Intellectuals are key participants in the creation, specification, articulation and dissemination of any form of social ideas. Their relevance can be particularly prominent in societies dominated by nationalism, because they have the ability to sift through a particular national/ethnic tradition, selecting specific moments and elements from the collective memory and thus strengthening a given national ideology. In the Westerns Balkans, intellectual elites mostly positioned themselves as bearers of national programs, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. This, almost exclusively male, group was awarded disproportionately large space in the media. Smaller groups of a(nti)nationally oriented intellectuals never gained such dominance in public discourse, but continuously used their opportunities of influencing public opinion to express the necessity of repudiation of extremism and breaking with the ideology that hampers the normalization of socio-political life in the region. We analyze here the role of intellectuals to both radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans, focusing especially on the former Yugoslavia. Starting with the 1987 Memorandum of the SASA, widely regarded as the ultimate intellectual fuel to the deepening the conflict, we end with the most recent case of Declaration on the Common Language (2017), which opted for the unification of the now separated Western Balkan languages into a joint one. Key terms: Intellectuals, Belgrade Circle, Circle 99, Dialogue of Historians, Declaration on the Common Language. Introduction: Who are intellectuals? The term “intellectual” was firstly used in 1898 to describe a group of writers and professors who spoke out publicly in the case of the Dreyfus Affair, 207 when a French officer of Jewish origin Alfred Dreyfus got accused and sentenced for treason under suspicious circumstances. A group of prominent public figures, led by an influential writer Émile Zola, publicly accused high government and army officials in the press and, eventually, managed to revoke the sentence and free Dreyfus. Georges Clemenceau, a politician and publicist, soon called this protest a “protest of intellectuals”. Owing to this event, a paradigm was created about the authority of intellectuals in matters of public importance (Piereson, 2006: 52). Box 9.1. Intellectuals are understood here as actors who have developed intellectual authority based on education and/or achievements in the cultural field and use that authority to act in public regardless of the issue at hand. Intellectuals are irreplaceable actors in the functioning of the social system and represent a group in society that produces attitudes and beliefs, or values, which then spread to other strata of society. In that sense, intellectuals are generators of ideologies and initiators of its acceptance on the social scene. This view is shared by many theorists who have dealt with the connection between nationalism and intellectuals (Breully, Smith, Anderson, Nairn, Kedourie). Suggested readings: Gramsci, A. (1971). “The Intellectuals”, in Gramsci, A. Selection from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International Publisher. Collini, S. (2002). “Every Fruit-juice Drinker, Nudist, Sandal-wearer...: Intellectuals as Other People”, in Small, H. (ed), The Public Intellectual, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. There has always been a blistering controversy about the engagement of intellectuals in social life and their attachment to certain social groups and politics. Many theorists advocate a position that intellectuals must be critical of existing society. Various determinants are attributed to them, such as: “the moral ideal of authenticity versus conformism (Sloterdijk); steering against any authority and demystifying the image of man as a consumer (C. B. Macpherson); demystifying liberal society as a society of segregation (A. Touraine); working for progress in freedom for all by overcoming purely legally defined freedom (Chronique); acting to liberate subjectivity, the struggle against totalitarianism”(Golubović, 2005). In this sense, the independent intellectual stands against ketman intellectuals (Milosz 1953). Milosz described the ketman as an individual who is silent about his beliefs and conforms to the demands of his time, rational- Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović 208 izing it by the impossibility of controlling the existing circumstances, that is, as a conformist who advocates desirable views and accepts self-censorship, rejecting value reasoning. Wright Mills (2000), on the other hand, views the independent intellectual as an actor who seeks to demystify political lies and find the truth, while the pseudo-intellectual supports the myths of the ruling ideology through falsifying historiography and abusing the mass media. Julien Benda (2014) also wrote about the role of intellectuals in society, introducing the term “betrayal of intellectuals”. This term describes the contribution of intellectuals to political and national desires, which marked the twentieth century as the century of intellectual organization of political hatred. Such a phenomenon stems from the renunciation of universal values and the acceptance of special, national commandments, which satisfy narrow, selfish interests to which justice, truth, and freedom are usually external. “And indeed never were there so many political works among those which ought to be the mirror of the disinterested intelligence” (Benda, 2014: 55). Benda strongly condemns intellectuals who act in the service of political desires and submits that they should strive for value-neutral sociology or social science. He especially emphasizes the important role of one category of intellectuals, who should refrain from bias more than anyone else – the historians. Their “derogation from the disinterested activity of the mind is far more shocking” for they are “’clerks’ whose influence on the laymen is much more profound by reason of the prestige attached to their functions.” (ibid, 57). Benda reminds that intellectuals have played and undeniably still play a very important role in creating and maintaining the ideology of nationalism. He, thus, dismisses them as being not historians, but as historians at the service of the spirit of party or of national passion. Theorists who advocate the necessity of a critical attitude of intellectuals claim that “the public is an authentic field of intellectual activity of those who understand that it is not enough to discover only the truth and articulate it theoretically, but to shed light on the existing state of society and point out possible changes” (Golubović, 2005). According to this view, intellectuals must play an emancipatory role on the social scene by engaging through the media, social protests and movements, and not be mere observers or “silentologists”. Such engagement differs significantly from party and narrowly political engagement that is related to the interests and goals of a particular party or power elite in order to gain or maintain power. In this regard, critical intellectuals clearly distance themselves from political, party engagement. Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 209 The “critical direction” qualifies the so-called pseudo-intellectuals as “immoral” and “poltronic” actors who put themselves in the service of the dominant political ideology, thus shifting the controversy to the field of ethics. By demanding that the intellectual is guided by his/her own beliefs and sense of morality, it gives a “critical point” to many extreme intellectuals, who probably perceive their views as the only correct, true and moral ones. This certainly applies to the so-called “apologetic” intellectuals and in general to all intellectuals who are directly and practically engaged. Engagement itself, by the nature of things, puts the engaged in a position that cannot be called “all-critical”, which should be the basic characteristic of an intellectual. On the other hand, certain intellectuals can be conformists, not prone to open polemics or tolerating different ideologies on the social scene, and are inclined to occupy or be close to positions of power. It is in the nature of every ideology to strive to attract and retain as many supporters as possible, in order to survive and reproduce for as long as possible. In line with this aspiration is the appropriation of a monopoly over channels of dissemination of ideas and knowledge, which in modern times means the control of the mass media, thus trying to marginalize non-dominant ideologies. Intellectuals in the Service of National Conflicts Earlier, we mentioned Benda’s position on the “betrayal of intellectuals”, which directly refers to the role of intellectuals in creating and maintaining the ideology of nationalism. Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined Communities” ascribe to intellectuals a key role in creating nationalism: journalists, novelists, architects, philologists, folklorists and artists are actors who portray the national community and give it meaning shared by members of the nation. They create the memory cultures of groups and nations. Box 9.2. There is a mass of evidence for the primary role of intellectuals, both in generating cultural nationalism and in providing the ideology, if not the early leadership, of political nationalism. Wherever one turns in Europe, their seminal position in generating and analyzing the concepts, myths, symbols and ideology of nationalism is apparent. (Smith, 1991: 94) Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović 210 Suggested readings: Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Smith, A.D. (1991). National identity. London: Penguin books. Anthony Smith also highlights the crucial role of intellectuals as generators of ideology and leaders of the nationalist movement in its early stages. John Breuilly (1994), who defined the notion of nationalism as a political movement that seeks or possesses state power and justifies such actions with nationalist arguments, also gave intellectuals the role of key actors in constructing the ideology of nationalism. This attitude is in the line with historical testimony that nation states, such as Germany, Italy, Serbia or Slovakia, first emerged in intellectual programs and only then in political practice. Thus, it was Croatian intellectuals such as Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905), Franjo Rački (1828-1894) and their Serbian colleagues Đuro Daničić (1825-1882) or Jovan Skerlić (1877-1914) that advanced the idea of South Slavs being merely different “tribes” of the same Yugoslav nation and opting for their unification. According to Andrew Wachtel, South Slav intellectuals played a crucial role in creating the ideology of Yugoslav nationalism at the turn of the 20th century (as well as in breaking the country at the end of it). Especially prominent ideologues of Yugoslavism were Ivo Andrić and Ivan Meštrović as reputable and award-winning intellectuals of Yugoslavia. Similarly, Croatian intellectuals promoting the breakup of Yugoslavia found their role-models among the 19th century ethno-national minded Croatian intellectuals like Ante Starčević (1823-1896) or Eugen Kvaternik (1825-1871). British theorist Elie Kedourie (2000) sees nationalism as a contagion that has occurred in the West and spread to other parts of the world. Western intellectuals are responsible, according to Kedouri, for generating a multitude of doctrines based on the assumption that nations are the obvious and natural division of the human race. Kedouri claims that intellectuals were marginalized in politics under the influence of Enlightenment rationalism, and the consequence of that is turning to romanticism and generating nationalism as an ideology that can give them a more significant role in society. He instrumentalizes the masses in the eyes of intellectuals as a means to achieve their own goals. The assumption that the masses are passive and disoriented explains propaganda and control over education as the only possible way to mobilize the masses for the spread of nationalism. In this way, nationalism gives intellectuals the opportunity to gain power in society and maintain an alienated position, but this time not as a Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 211 marginalized one, but as a position of parts and privileges. “The new nationalist intelligence of the middle class had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation letter had to be written in a language they understood” (Guibernau, 2003: 8). All aforementioned theorists emphasize the power of culture, language, symbols, and ceremonies as key elements of nationalism. Intellectuals are the actors who create and use these elements drawing on cultures of memory. They act as creators of nationalist ideology and movement, providing cultural, historical, political and economic arguments for maintaining the distinctive character of the nation and thus giving legitimacy to its will to decide its political destiny. However, Guibernau points out that intellectuals are subversive and create a discourse that undermines the legitimacy of the current order, when pursuing for special status of one’s own nation. Intellectuals do not only create a nationalist ideology, but also mobilize the national movements, often putting themselves at the forefront. Guibernau dealt with nationalism in nations without a state, and her position is interesting to study, given that nationalism in the former Yugoslavia developed in nations that did not have their own “nation state”. She also emphasizes the importance of emotional factors, which act together with the rational and cannot be eliminated from the analysis of nationalism and the role of intellectuals in its creation and expansion. Rationality is related to the objective reasons that nationalists use when defending their ideology. Emotions arise when a nation presents itself as a community that transcends the limited lives of individuals by providing them with a collective sense of identity. Belonging to a nation, which is real in the minds of its members, provides a sense of continuity based on a sense of belonging to a group that presents itself as an extended family. The use of a common, yet specific language reinforces the sense of belonging to a community that shares a common history and a common set of values, which intellectuals emphasize in their engagement. The nation is seen as an organic community in the sense of an extended family, and membership in the nation requires a certain solidarity, in this case, with its compatriots. Invoking solidarity in the image of the family creates a sense of victimhood and a sense of attachment that becomes stronger when the group is threatened. Victimhood is a very strong factor and indicator of social integration. Through symbols and ceremonies, individuals can feel emotions of unusual intensity that stem from their identification with an entity that transcends them. Appeals to these emotions are an unavoidable item in popularizing the ideology of nationalism. Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović 212 Guibernau rightly points out that the emergence of a nationalist movement in a nation without a state requires the existence of some intellectuals willing to build a nationalist discourse of a different form and often opposed to the state. Relations between national intellectual elites and state authorities in multinational states occur in a large number of ways. Crucial to the development of nationalism in stateless nations is the position held by intellectuals representing a potential national elite. The potential elite includes individuals who feel dissatisfied with the state treatment of their community, which could be seen among members of the Serb, Slovene and Croat nations in the former Yugoslavia. In such cases, individuals are unable to work within state circles of power and influence, and must limit their activities to the region. The reaction of Albanian circles within Serbia, as well as Serbian circles within Yugoslavia, in certain periods can be observed in a similar way. Finally, potential elite includes individuals who choose to be more concerned with loyalty to a nation without a state than to strive to integrate into the state’s official elite. In this way, they emphasize their commitment to advancing higher national goals versus state ones, which often means their automatic exclusion from the state’s chosen elite. However, exclusion does not have to be a consequence of such aspirations, as evidenced by the example of the Slovenian and Croatian elites, who identified the progress of national goals with their progress. Conflictual action of intellectuals in Yugoslavia In his study of Yugoslavia, Dejan Jović testifies that there was a whole theoretical current that explains the disintegration of Yugoslavia by the influence of intellectual elites. This cultural argument gives a specific weight to intellectuals in the creation, and later in the dissolution of the Yugoslav nation, which led to the disintegration of the state (Jović, 2003: 59 – 60). Wachtel, 1998) as mentioned, also analyzes the importance of intellectual circles for the creation and disintegration of Yugoslavia. When taking a closer look at the situation in Yugoslavia, it can be concluded that nationalism was covertly woven into its very foundations. The impossibility of reconciling the ethnocultural and territorial-political model led to conflicts and decentralization, which further inflamed nationalist demands. Yugoslavia began to be viewed quite early as a community of nations, and former life-long Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito accordingly pointed out that he was “a Croat first, then a Yugoslav second”. National affiliation, that is nationality, was legitimately recognized as a means of ex- Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 213 pression, which is proved by the presence of such a declaration on the census, but the ideological advantage was given to class affiliation in socialist society. However, national demands, within the framework of the socialist ideological discourse, appeared as early as the beginning of the 1960s. An early example is the controversy between Dobrica Ćosić and Dušan Pirjevec in 1961/1962 in the literary journals Act [Delo] and Our Modernity [Naša sodobnost]. This polemics brought to light the different understandings of the nation and the role of the nation by two recognized intellectuals of the former Yugoslavia. Similar to later statements, after he withdrew from the League of Communists, Ćosić advocated the stance that the nation was only a transitional path to a higher level of integration. However, Pirjevec (2005: 190) on the other hand “considered real integration possible only if all these organisms and all these units experience such confirmation of themselves to exhaust to the end all those healthy energies which today necessarily exist as separate, as independent organisms, as special, as independent units.” According to Pirjevec, the existence of national republics should not have been questioned, which Ćosić sharply criticized. One of the first attempts to introduce the nation into this field is the speech of Dobrica Ćosić in 1968. Already a prominent writer and intellectual, but also an official of the League of Communists, he spoke from the position of Marxist internationalism on the problems of underestimating the national question in the Republic of Serbia in the 1960s, Albanian nationalism and irredentism. Contrary to attempts to formalize national selfdetermination through self-government, Ćosić stands out for the second time “as we know the way of creating an internationalist community on the foundations of real socialist self-government and association of all equal and free individuals, united on the basis of common class, economic, cultural and social goals and interests, regardless of nationality and borders” (Ćosić, 2004: 21). The speech gives a very precise analysis of what was happening at the national level at that time. It is easy to see the elements that later became so characteristic of every, even Serbian ideology of nationalism – Serbs as victims of other nations, but perhaps even more as own victims. However, the political climate of the late 1960s did not allow anyone to discuss national problems openly, especially those related to the sensitive issue of Kosovo. This speech was strongly condemned and Ćosić withdrew from the League of Communists. There was a kind of confusion since the liberalization of the market with the reform of 1965 was expected to correspond to the liberalization of other social areas. In 1967, many Croatian intellectuals signed a declaration on the Croatian literary language, to which many Serbian intellectuals Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović 214 responded with their “Proposal for Thinking”. In November 1968, nationalist demonstrations broke out in Kosovo, which were suppressed by police force and the threat of military use. In the early 1970s, the Croatian leadership faced a wave of nationalism that it failed to resist, which eventually had to be removed from the centers of power at the Yugoslav level. After that, the Constitution was adopted in 1974, transferring additional competencies to the republics of Yugoslavia. The federal state still had a charismatic leader, controlled foreign policy and the army remained under the jurisdiction of the federation. The federation lost significant power as the republics were “nationalized” so that the sovereignty within the republic belonged to the nation – more precisely, this applied to those ethnicities in the former Yugoslavia that were considered as “constituent nations” – Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims (later Bosniaks), Macedonians and Montenegrins. Other ethnic groups were considered national minorities. The largest of those were Albanians and Hungarians, and they enjoyed significant autonomy within autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which were formally part of Serbia. In this way, all issues were linked to the national issue. The constitution also introduced the definition of a nation, nationality and ethnic group. The Memorandum of SASA and the Slovenian Memorandum In the 1980s, society fell into a political-economic crisis, which contributed to the strengthening of nationalisms in Yugoslavia. Investigating why Serbian intellectuals turned to nationalism, Jasna Dragović-Soso (2002) pays special attention to the crisis in society and the strengthening of differences between elites in different republics after Tito’s death, as well as the mutual relations between the Serbian and Slovenian critical intelligentsia. In her book, the author discusses the role of the Kosovo problem after the Albanian demonstrations in 1981, and its use within the national ideology. The study provides a complex overview of the development and/or change in the understanding of intellectuals from the 1960s onwards and attempts to explain the support that intellectuals gave to national ideology and ultimately to Milošević. During this pre-war period, a document appeared in Serbia which was later used as the crucial evidence of the connection between nationalism and intellectuals. Since its appearance then, and until today, the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA Memorandum) does not cease to provoke controversy about its character and intentions. Mostly, this unfinished product of intellectuals within the SASA is assessed Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 215 as a moment when Yugoslavia clearly noticed nationalistic tendencies among Serbian intellectuals. Although the Memorandum was an official document of SASA, the academics did not deny their authorship, nor did they distance themselves from its content. According to the authors of the Memorandum, the economic crisis, which worsened during the 1980s, was the result of poor economic planning. This crisis subsequently contributed to the strengthening of the republican and provincial bureaucracy, and was reflected in the suppression of any opinion that seemed against their interests. They considered Serbia a victim of Yugoslav policy, which they understood as the policy of other republics, primarily Croatia and Slovenia, which deprived Serbia of parts of its territory – Kosovo and Vojvodina. This idea of Serbs as victims, which appeared in Ćosić’s speech 18 years earlier, became a cornerstone of the demands of both nationalists and communists in the late 1980s. In the Memorandum, Albanians were negatively characterized as an anti-democratic force, aimed at achieving the goals proclaimed in the programs and actions of the Prizren League 1878-81. Albanians were perceived as a serious threat to the state and the Serbian nation due to the lack of timely action by the authorities. In order for Serbia to become an integral component of socialist Yugoslavia, they believed that the country needed democratization, constitutional reform and the elimination of national discrimination, in order for the Serbian people to enjoy the same rights. The authors point out that shortly after the end of the WWII “nationalism began its rise, so that every constitutional change complements the institutional preconditions for its flourishing”, and that “the basic cause of the multidimensional crisis lies in the ideological defeat inflicted on socialism by nationalism” (SASA Memorandum, p. 31). On the other hand, despite certain contradictions, the basic vision for the organization of Yugoslav society in the SASA Memorandum is related to the period before 1966. A few weeks after the SASA Memorandum, the Contributions to the Slovenian National Program – also called the Slovenian Memorandum – were published in the New Review [Nova Revija] in Ljubljana. This document had a similar tone of resentment towards a common state in which its own nation is threatened with extinction. Serbian and Slovenian intellectuals had an understanding for each other so much so that the Belgrade Literary Newspaper [Književne novine] published the Slovenian memorandum, giving full support to efforts to articulate the national question. This document clearly positioned the Slovenian nation as exploited and subordinated in Yugoslavia, especially in terms of language. However, it did not try to offer any solutions for a common state, unlike the Serbian version, Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović 216 but limited itself to issues of exclusive importance for the Slovenian nation (see Dragović Soso, 2002). After this first widespread appearance of intellectuals within the national discourse, Slovenian and Serbian intellectual elite as well as elites from other republics, largely supported the dominant political ideology of the political leadership in their respective republics/autonomous province, which introduced nationalism as its inseparable element. Subsequent developments further weakened the support of intellectuals to the dominant communist ideology. The general socio-economic crisis has contributed to the engagement of many intellectuals in politics. However, during the 1990s, intellectuals who were thought to not belong to the “mainstream” did not find their way to the general public. Following the October 5th, 2000 overthrow of Slobodan Milošević’s and subsequent democratic changes in Serbia, the elimination of the former dominant discourse in which nationalism found its place did not go as smoothly as had been assumed. The value structure of this discourse has survived the changes and found its place on the social scene, regardless of the calls for liberation from the ballast of the past. That there is a deep division among intellectuals over the ideology of nationalism is evidenced by the results of research among intellectuals after 2000 (Pudar Draško, 2016). Anti-Nationalist Action of Intellectuals Bearing in mind the series of studies that thematized the views and efforts of intellectuals in the direction of supporting national conflicts, it is important to point out continuous attempts to end such nationalistic program in Yugoslavia. Former Praksis members such as Nebojša Popov and Miladin Životić strongly opposed the ideology of nationalism. They started several initiatives, such as the one opting for a peaceful solution in late 1991, before the full outbreak of the war in former Yugoslavia, signed by 18 academics. In it, the signatories requested the resignation of Milošević, which SASA did not adopt at its regular session on June 4th, 1992, but the document was nevertheless signed by 65 academics. Three anti-nationalist initiatives that were of a more permanent character in the former Yugoslavia are The Belgrade Circle and the Circle 99, The Dialogue of Historians and The Languages and Nationalisms initiative which gave rise to the Declaration on a Common Language. Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 217 The Belgrade Circle and the Circle 99 The Belgrade Circle arose from a spontaneous gathering of Serbian intellectuals united against the war that was just beginning. It brought together about 400 independent intellectuals who, in the midst of nationalist euphoria, gathered to promote the knowledge of a democratic, civil, pluralistic society. This “loose community of anti-regime intellectuals” (Cvejić et al, 2019: 39), which grew into an organization, is the originator of the idea of the Second Serbia as an anti-war, anti-nationalist and civil Serbia. The first presidents of the Belgrade Circle were Miladin Životić and Radomir Konstatinović. The sessions of the Belgrade Circle, which gathered the critical intellectuals of the time, were held in the Student Cultural Center, and then in the Youth Center. The group was eventaully expelled from both places due to political intolerance and pressure. Through these sessions, the Belgrade Circle produced two important works - the book volumes “Second Serbia” and “Intellectuals and War”, which were subsequently translated into several languages. Box 9.3. The Belgrade Circle gathered a number of prominent intellectuals with which the Second Serbia – i.e. anti-war and anti-Milošević activists – was identified. One of the founders, Borka Pavićević, described it as follows: “one book, one association, was formed as an opposition to the policy of memorandum Serbia, as a rebellion, as a creative rebellion against nationalism, evil, crime, destruction and self-destruction. In oral, written, propaganda and executive form. I am of the opinion that the Belgrade Circle with which the Second Serbia was identified, and between which there is not always a sign of equality, was basically Yugoslav and therefore necessarily anti-nationalist” (Borka Pavićević, 2017). Suggested readings: Cvejić, I. Nikolić, O. Sladeček, M. (2019). Građenje jedne kontra-institucije: istorija Instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju. Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju. Russel Omaljev, A. (2016). Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in “First” and “Other” Serbia, Hannover: Ibidem-Verlag. In the early months of the Bosnian war in late 1992, in ethically mixed and diverse Sarajevo, an informal network of intellectuals began to operate around the independent and popular local radio station Studio 99. The Circle 99 [Krug 99], as this association was later named, gathered a group of intellectuals who inherited the values of the Bosnian way of life. In the fol- Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović 218 lowing period, this group appeared publicly with the aim of offering a different future and openly resisting aggression and nationalism. The Circle 99 launched the Declaration on a Free and United Sarajevo in early 1994, which was signed by 185,000 citizens of besieged Sarajevo and almost a million citizens from around the world. The Circle 99 cooperated closely with the Belgrade Circle and together they organized a meeting in Sarajevo during the siege, calling once again for an end to the conflict and coexistence of all citizens. Unlike the Belgrade Circle, this association still exists and operates today. Box 9.4. The multinational composition of the Circle 99 [Krug 99] and the free expression of national, religious and political feelings of its members practically proves the possibility of living together, tolerance and mutual respect... All members are united and bound by the vision of a free, democratic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, complete freedom and equality of its citizens and peace as their highest ideal. Nationalism, chauvinism, political and religious fanaticism, social injustice, any form of discrimination against individuals and groups, as well as any, especially cultural isolationism, are incompatible with the principles of human rights and freedoms, and that means they are incompatible with the principles of the Circle 99. Mutual personal respect, regardless of differences of opinion on certain topics, is the highest value of Circle 99, and openness to different political or ideological orientations is the principle of action with a call for dialogue. The Dialogue of Historians The Dialogue of Historians is an initiative that created an important output of ten books, collections of plenary presentations and statements submitted at these gatherings. The German Liberal Foundation organized nine meetings from 1998 to 2004, insisting to have present at the meetings pronationalistic intellectuals as well. The Dialogue of Historians formally began in 1998 in the Hungarian city of Pécs without the presence of the public, in order to secure neutral ground without pressure. Three more gatherings on this topic were held in Pécs. Only after the fourth gathering, were such activities organized on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (Herceg Novi, Zagreb, Belgrade, Zadar, Vršac and Osijek). Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 219 Box 9.5. The Dialogue of Croatian and Serbian Historians is a collective name for international scientific gatherings of historians, primarily from Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), later Serbia and Montenegro. It soon proved, despite the previous unscientific approach, and even gloating expectations, that the democratic and pluralistic dialogue did not present a set-back, but an opportunity for mutual enrichment and opening of new prospects and insights. It showed that an intellectual and liberal discussion in a society and among societies, which strive for democracy, pluralism and tolerance, cannot be part of the problem itself, but only part of its solution (Fleck, 2005: 37, in Graovac, 2005). Suggested readings: Graovac, I. (2005). Čemu dijalog povjesničara - istoričara? Brussels: Fridrich Naumann Stiftung, Dijalog. Declaration on the Common Language With the support of German foundations, the project “Languages and Nationalisms” was launched in 2016, the intention of which was to problematize the issue of “political” languages in the four countries that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia through an open dialogue between linguists and other experts. It was taken as a starting point that the languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia have a common basis in the Štokavian dialect, and it was pointed out that linguistics has been intersecting with identity politics for years. As part of the project, four regional conferences were held in Podgorica, Split, Belgrade and Sarajevo. The core of the working group consisted of prominent experts in the field of language: Snježana Kordić from Croatia, Hanka Vajzović from BiH, Ranko Bugarski from Serbia and Božena Jelušić from Montenegro. In 2017, these linguists jointly issued a Declaration on the Common Language [Deklaracija o zajedničkom jeziku] which was subsequently signed by a number of prominent intellectuals and public figures throughout the region. Box 9.6. The Declaration on the Common Language contains a number of postulates that emphasize the common features of the politically separated languages that originated after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, such as: Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović 220 The answer to the question whether a common language is used in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia is affirmative. This is a common standard language of the polycentric type – one spoken by several nations in several states, with recognizable variants, such as German, English, Arabic, French, Spanish, Portuguese and many others. This fact is corroborated by Štokavian as the common dialectal basis of the standard language, the ratio of same versus different in the language, and the consequent mutual comprehensibility. The use of four names for the standard variants – Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian – does not imply that these are four different languages. Insisting on the small number of existing differences and on the forceful separation of the four standard variants causes numerous negative social, cultural and political phenomena. These include using language as an argument justifying the segregation of schoolchildren in some multiethnic environments, unnecessary “translation” in administration or the media, inventing differences where they do not exist, bureaucratic coercion, as well as censorship (and necessarily also self-censorship), where linguistic expression is imposed as a criterion of ethnonational affiliation and a means of affirming political loyalty. Suggested readings: Text of the Declaration on the Common Language, available at: http://www. krokodil.rs/eng/text-of-the-declaration-on-common-language-in-english/ (page accessed on 1.7.2020) Conclusion Modern history testifies that intellectuals have engaged massively in creating the contextual terrain for conflicts based on the ethnic and national grounds. Nations are collective communities, and are peculiar and elusive concepts prone to be interpreted as “being both ̒banal’ and infinitely complex; primordial and modern; imagined and real; they also have a great role in the politics of enmity” (Pavlović et al, 2018: 7). The Yugoslav and the generally Balkan context has shown that intellectuals were not only ideologues but also implementors of the ideology of nationalism. For such reasons, it was important to show that they also wholeheartedly engaged in anti-conflictual thinking and contributed to anti-conflictual actions. State building in Balkans has to move a step away from nation building. Finding a consensual peace is the only sustainable perspective for the region which suffered tremendously from ‘othering’ and attempts to expel those ‘others’ from one’s own communities. Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 221 Questions for students: Should intellectuals be defined formally– as a strata with the highest education within a society, or functionally – as those who voice their views publicly and influence public opinion? Do intellectuals have ethical and/or legal responsibility for their public statements and engagement? What are the specific characteristics of intellectuals and their public role in the Western Balkans, especially during and after the 1990s? What were and/or are the main challenges and activities of the Western Balkan intellectuals during and after the 1990s, and how did the violent conflict in the region affected their work? What are your views of the most important recent reconciliation efforts and initiatives instigated by the Western Balkan intellectuals? References Anderson, A. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Benda, J. (2014). The Treason of the Intellectuals. Piscataway NJ: Transaction Publisher. Breuilly, J. (1994). Nationalism and the State. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Collini, S. (2002). „Every Fruit-juice Drinker, Nudist, Sandal-wearer...: Intellectuals as Other People“, in Small, H. (ed), The Public Intellectual, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Cvejić, I. Nikolić, O. Sladeček, M. (2019). Građenje jedne kontra-institucije: istorija Instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju [Building a Contra-institution: History of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory]. Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju. Ćosić, D. (2004). Kosovo. Beograd: Novosti. Dragović-Soso, J. (2002). Saviours of the Nation?: Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism, London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. Golubović, Z. (2005). „Intelektualci u epohi pomerenih vrednosti“. Republika 350-351. Gramsci, A. (1971). „The Intellectuals“, in Gramsci, A. Selection from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International Publisher. Graovac, I. (2005). Čemu dijalog povjesničara - istoričara? [Why Dialogue of Historians?]. Brussels: Fridrich Naumann Stiftung, Dijalog. Gazela Pudar Draško and Aleksandar Pavlović 222 Guibernau, M. (2003). Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nation without State: The Catalan Case. Barcelona: Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials. Jović, D. (2003). Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla: Uspon, kriza i pad četvrte Jugoslavije [Yugoslavia - A State that Withered Away: Rise, Crisis and a Fall of the 4th Yugoslavia]. Beograd: Samizdat B92. Kedourie, E. (2000). Nationalism. London: Hutchinson University Library. Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (1986), https://www.helsinki.o rg.rs/serbian/doc/memorandum%20sanu.pdf, approached on 1 July, 2020. Milosz, C. (1990). The Captive Mind. New York: Vintage International. Pavlović, A. Pudar Draško, G. Meka, E. (2018). Politics of Enmity. Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory. Piereson, J. (2006). The rise & fall of the intellectual. The New Criterion. 25 (1). Pudar Draško, G. (2016). Društveno-politički uticajni intelektualci i njihovo shvatanje nacionalnog u Srbiji nakon 2000. Godine [Socio-Politically Influential Intellectuals and Their Understanding of the National in Serbia After 2000.]. PhD Dissertation. Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet. Russel Omaljev, A. (2016). Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in “First” and “Other” Serbia. Hannover: Ibidem-Verlag. Smith, A. D. (1991). National identity. London: Penguin books Wright Mils, C. (2000). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wachtel, A. (1998). Making a Nation: Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Chapter 9: Intellectuals between radicalization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 223 Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić Abstract: Deeply divided societies, especially those facing the aftermaths of civil wars, but also experimenting troubled transformation to multi-ethnic societies, are generally prone to political instability, and easy to opt for political extremism, with minorities often discriminated and emarginated. This chapter gives an overview of status of inter-group relations in the Western Balkans, with a special focus on minorities, on conflicting identities and strategies of post-war reconciliation aimed at correcting the misfunctioning of pure power sharing frameworks. Starting from identifying minorities in the region, the topic of inter-group dialogue is analyzed, with a special focus on cultural rights of minorities in the Western Balkans. Special attention is paid to the question of minority linguistic rights as well as the use of minority languages in education in this region. The challenges in educational systems of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia are discussed, as well as some encouraging cases of dialogue and integration in these contexts. Among alternative strategies for inter-group dialogue and political participation of minorities, the deliberative approach to inter-group reconciliation in divided societies, as well as its philosophical and empirical background, is illustrated. The chapter ends with some suggestions for possible future directions of study and research that can shed light on the importance of minority rights for the reconciliation and inter-group dialogue in the Western Balkans but also for understanding other divided societies. Key terms: minorities, Western Balkans; deliberation; inter-group reconciliation; cultural rights. Minorities, cultural rights, and intergroup relations in the Western Balkans This chapter, in dialogue with the overarching dilemma of the textbook, engages in assessing the dynamics of democratization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans. Regarding minorities in this region and in particular 225 their cultural rights, the focus is on current inter-group relations and specifically asking about the challenges to reconciliation and peaceful coexistence but also about cases of positive intercultural practices. Taking into account extreme historical changes in the status of minorities in different national contexts; long and conflicted histories of discrimination of minorities, and recent additional fragmentation of identities resulting in new minorities and minority languages, the key underlining question remains whether minorities are a key to reconciliation or an obstruction to it. Historically, the question of the loyalty of minorities to the new state would arise with each conflict and transition process. Instead, together with many other authors (in this volume and more broadly), this chapter would suggest to approach the field of minority cultural rights and intergroup relations in the Western Balkans as potentially transformative, rich resources for intercultural dialogue that can contribute to further democratization and reconciliation in the region. In the Western Balkans, the legal and institutional mechanisms guarantying minority rights are not sufficient for reducing social distance and reconciliation (Blondel and Petričušić 2012, p. 1). In the post-conflict period, the situation of all minorities has worsened due to increased ethnic homogenization of the majority group, though each minority was impacted in different ways. Currently, the general ethnic landscape of the Western Balkans reflects the historical changes towards national homogenization of the post-conflict period: the biggest ethnicities are Serbs and Albanians, then the Croats, Bosniaks, Macedonians, with the smallest group with the state being the Montenegrins (Végh 2012). Most contemporary Western Balkans states have a considerable number of minorities, while the biggest ethnic groups having no state of their own are Roma and Vlahs. Box 10.1. The legal and institutional mechanisms protecting minority rights have developed starting from the minority treaties after the WWI and the engagement of the League of Nations. They were included in the Paris peace treaty, but their implementation has remained a challange since 1919. Since then, several crucially important minority rights and human rights mechanisms have developed, starting with the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Especially after the 1989 changes in Europe, minority protection became an even more central issue in international politics. Indeed, in 1992, the role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was established. In that same period, other important international instruments were founded: the UN Working Group on Minorities in 1995, and the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on Minorities in 1997. The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 226 National Minorities, approved in 1998, has had an important impact on minority laws in Western Balkan countries. Important for cultural rights of minorities are also the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages since 1992 as well as the OSCE Oslo Recommendations for Linguistic Rights of National Minorities from 1998 and its Lund Recommendations from 1999. Suggested reading: Letschert, R. M. (2005). The impact of minority rights mechanisms. The Hague: TMC Asser Press. Wolff, S., Van Houten, P., Anghelea, A. M., & Djuric, I. (2008). Minority rights in the Western Balkans. Brussels: European Parliament. In the literature on the rights of minorities, the national and ethnic minorities have been differentiated from the so-called social or cultural minorities (Kymlicka 2011). Another often discussed distinction is between the so-called historical/old and the new minorities, where the new minorities refer to migrants, refugees, and other persons without citizenship (Medda-Windischer and Carlà, 2015). The term “new minorities” in the European context used to refer to post-WWII immigration as well as to third-country nationals living in the EU (Turnšek, Hinge, and Karakatsani, 2009). However, social or cultural minorities, such as sexual minorities or disabled persons, increasingly organized into social movements, can also be perceived as included in the category of new minorities, and have increasingly been discussed as such in the context of the changing societies of the Western Balkans. The novelty of these “new” minorities in contemporary Western Balkans could be said to concern their recently increased visibility rather than their presence in society, especially when it comes to the rights of LGBTIQ persons. The expansion of the human rights paradigm to include the rights of sexual minorities has in the countries of Western Balkans been linked not only to social movement but also to the processes of EU enlargement and the conditionality around sexual minority rights (Gould and Moe, 2015). While homosexuality was decriminalized early in Bulgaria (1968) and in some republics of Socialist Yugoslavia (for instance, in 1977 in Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia), the decriminalization process happened much later on in the remaining countries of the region – in 1994 (Serbia and Kosovo, as part of rump Yugoslavia – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia formed in 1992), in 1995 (Albania) and in 1996 (North Macedonia). Decriminalization in different parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina was accomplished in between 1996 and 2003 (for the Federation in 1996, Republika Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 227 Srpska in 1998, and Brčko in 2003). While the changes to criminal laws have often happened in a top-down way and were not a result of lobbying by sexual minorities, other legislative changes together with increasingly important social visibility and organizing of LGBTIQ persons have influenced the slow transformation of public attitude to sexual minorities in these countries. One important indicator of the status of (in)tolerance in the region and an occasion of new visibility of sexual minorities is the annual Pride Parade, which in Western Balkans often turns into a highly politicized, securitized event, but remains important for non-heterosexuals and the articulation of their rights. Although major legal and political advances have been achieved in many Western Balkan countries, the persons belonging to LGBTIQ minorities still face discrimination in most of these societies. So, as an effective backlash to legal and societal advances of queer rights, several countries have added to their constitutions clauses on the exclusive heterosexuality of the institution of marriage. Such a ban was added to the Bulgarian constitution in 1991, but subsequently also to the constitutions of Serbia in 2006, Montenegro in 2007, and Croatia in 2013. While the provision of registered same-sex partnership exists since 2006 in Slovenia and since 2014 in Croatia, there is no recognition of partnerships for queer couples in the Western Balkans (with the proposal refuted in Montenegro). In contrast to this, all countries of Western Balkans have adopted anti-discrimination laws or provisions prohibiting discrimination based on person’s sexuality. In addition, more attention has recently been given in literature to the so-called “hidden minorities” in the Balkans: ethnic and linguistic minority groups that have for various historical and political reasons not been accorded the status of national minorities. Beside the “passing” (as a majority group) or assimilated ethnic or linguistic minorities, sexual minorities have been discussed as “hidden minorities” (Pachankis and Bränström, 2019). Furthermore, in the Western Balkans, especially the Roma have been the focus of research as one of the ethnic minorities that is often situated between visibility as a group and self-preservation for the individual (Tamas 2001). Box 10.2. Hidden minorities are defined as those minority ethnic groups with unclear legal status that are not represented in the public space, do not have a strong intellectual elite vocal on their behalf, but do share a memory of their specific group culture/language, that sometimes hide their identities for reasons of safety or are in turn ignored by the state (Promitzer et al. 2009, p. 12). In the Balkans, the historical reasons for many instances of multicultural fluidity of identities but also of practices Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 228 of hiding minority identities are suggested to be tied to the complex legacies of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The examples of “hidden” minorities in the Balkans mostly refer to small ethnic communities such as the Serbs in the region of Bela Krajina in Slovenia; Montenegrins and Albanians in coastal Croatia, as well as the Catholic Serbs in Dalmatia (Ibid, p. 15). To sum up, the post-conflict solutions especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo are engaged in institutionalizing ethnicity as the primary category of political life, which raises enormous problems both for inhabitants of these countries and the countries themselves internationally. However, most alternative proposals are not viable since the abandonment of power-sharing and of the focus on group representation would have adverse effects in this context due to the paradox that most of the cases of discrimination to which the minorities are exposed happen not on formal level but “through informal means of exclusion“ (Bieber 2003, p. 98). The adoption of an institutional design should be aware of the fragmentation of that society along ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious lines, in order to avoid exacerbating centrifugal trends. However, without a political culture marked by a “spirit of accommodation” (Lijphart, 1968), institutions alone (grand-coalition executives; veto power for minorities; proportional representation system; segmental autonomy) do not grant democratic stability nor favor reconciliation and inter-group dialogue. This chapter offers an alternative perspective on the potential for cooperation and inter-group dialogue (majorities/minorities); through suggesting deliberative approach from the other, it offers guidance in studying cultural rights of minorities in the Western Balkans. The interdisciplinary approach taken here encompasses the recent long-overdue attention to linguistic rights in political theory (Kymlicka and Patten 2003) but also historical, sociolinguistic and anthropological debates as applied to cultural minority rights in this region. Granting stability in deeply (ethnically) divided societies: is power sharing the answer? Political science approaches to conflict management in divided societies have their traditional roots in Arendt Lijphart’s work on consociationalism and power sharing formulas for granting stability in deeply divided societies (Lijphart, 1968; Lijphart, 2001). Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 229 Box 10.3. Arend Lijphart is a political scientist specialized in comparative politics, elections and voting systems, democratic institutions, and ethnicity and politics. In the 1960’s Lijphart used the case of Netherlands to develop his theory of power sharing. At the time, the Netherlands was segmented into three pillars of Calvinists, Catholics and seculars, and Lijphart argued that it was thanks to power sharing institutional designs that despite its segmentation the country was politically stable. Traditional institutional arrangements of power sharing are: • Proportionality for parliamentary elections • Grand coalitions in cabinet formation • Federalism • Strong Veto Points in the system. According to the consociational theory, culturally fragmented political systems need power sharing arrangements to increase democratic stability and to settle centrifugal tendencies. Such mechanisms are basically institutional: grand-coalition executives; veto power for minorities; proportional representation system; segmental autonomy. Beside the institutional elements, power sharing requires “a spirit of accommodation” among political leaders, willing to compromise to avoid centrifugal tendencies. Lijphart’s theories and practical implementations have played a key role in establishing enduring peace settlements worldwide. Suggested readings: Lijphart A. (1968). The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lijphart A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale: Yale University Press. Jakala M., Kuzu D., Qvortrup M. (Eds.). (2018) (Eds.). Consociationalism and Power-Sharing in Europe. Arend Lijphart’s Theory of Political Accommodation. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. However, mere institutional designs alone are not sufficient for settling conflict; indeed, segmental autonomy might rather contribute to entrench divisions where political leaders representing opposing groups might be more inclined to perpetuate separation, which give them power, instead of finding compromises and allegiances with enemy groups. In this sense the consociational model is an elitist model, since its success depends almost completely on the willingness of leaders to cooperate. It requires an extremely mature political class, open-minded, awareness of the dangerous tendencies of the system to centrifugal fragmentation, deeply rational in its Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 230 choices, and mindful of power struggles among elites which normally nourish ethnic conflicts.1 Where political elites are immature, therefore, we should expect poor functioning of consociational arrangements. Political fragmentation that characterizes deeply divided societies tends to produce and maintain divided educational systems along ethnic/religious lines. Separated school systems are set up in such way that in turn replicate intergroup conflict based on ethnicity and function as a bastion of the status-quo. The attitudes of leaders are crucial to accommodate conflicting interests. For this reason, the consociational model, in its original formulation, assumed an additional element, which is non-institutional but important to grant democratic stability in divided societies. Namely, a “political culture” inclined to accommodate divergences is necessary for avoiding centrifugal tendencies potentially detrimental to the country (Steiner J., Bächtiger A., Spörndli M, Steenbergen M. S. 2004). According to Lijphart, political culture plays a crucial role in settling conflicts. This element, termed the “spirit of accommodation” by Lijphart, is high when politicians are willing to bridge mutual differences to settle serious disputes in non-consensual environments (Steiner J., Bächtiger A., Spörndli M, Steenbergen M. S. 2004). When leaders lack the will to accommodate minority rights, institutions alone might turn out to be ineffective for granting stability to the system. This appears to be especially true where power sharing models are imposed by external forces, without a genuine consensus shared by local leaders and societies, as the international community did in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995. 1 A relevant criticism against Lijphart’s model may be found in Horowitz D. (2000). Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, California University Press. pp. 573-574. Horowitz states that “(…) what is needed is a theory of timing and incentives for elite cooperation”. He argues that an integrative approach to power sharing could better work than Lijphart’s model in stabilizing divided societies. The integrative approach favours the creation of institutions and the adoption of practices aimed at stimulating the creation of inter-ethnic pre-electoral coalitions, or, even better, of inter-ethnic electoral parties. Horowitz’s model aims at stimulating more intra-group than inter-group cooperation for better reducing the likelihood of violent conflicts. Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 231 Cultural rights: Use of minority languages in education In divided societies such as those of the Western Balkans, entire educational systems have been divided, and at times segregated, on ethnic and religious terms (Bianchini, this volume; Emkić 2018). As the Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights of the UNHCR (UNHCR 2014b) pointed out, the post-war fragmentation of society in Bosnia and Herzegovina has resulted in the misinterpreting of cultural and linguistic rights, while “culture and education are hijacked by the rhetoric of difference…with an immense, detrimental impact on artistic, cultural, scientific and academic life“. Only some 6% of Bosnian pupils attend the so-called “two-schools-under-oneroof”– currently there are still 56 such segregated schools in the country (OSCE 2018). The option of segregated schools was formulated as a temporary solution by the OSCE in 2000; instead it continues as the most visible example of segregated education in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tolomelli 2015). However, this is only a part of a problem since the vast majority of the students in both Republika Srpska and the Federation attend monoethnic schools (UNHCR 2014a). Especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the division of the country along ethno-national lines is clear. With the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 that approved the division of the country and the tacit approval of the international community, the education system was divided into three separate systems (OSCE 2018). The division into three separate curricula is especially visible in subjects such as literature, history and geography that reflect unresolved charged issues for each community. Box 10.4. The Dayton Peace Agreement is the peace treaty accepted by the then presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia on November 21st, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, USA. The Accords ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina but solidified the ethnic divisions of that historical moment into an institutional set-up that continues to exacerbate the fragility of the country as well as impede its progress towards the EU and NATO membership. The Agreement divided the country into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska (while the small District of Brčko obtained an autonomous status in 2000). The Agreement and its heritage remain disputed: acknowledged for terminating the war but becoming a stumbling block to reforms in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. Suggested reading: Cousens, E. M., & Cater, C. K. (2001). Toward peace in Bosnia: implementing the Dayton accords. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 232 Dayton Accords. (1995). Retrieved: US Department of State: https:// 2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/index.htm The paradox of how the question of minority linguistic rights has been misused in Bosnia and Herzegovina to further emphasize the small linguistic differences that differentiate the three constituent groups from each other has had major consequences on the education system. The 2014 UN- HCR report (2014a) clearly states that the misinterpretation of the provision that guarantees the right to education in one's native language has led to segregated schools. Box 10.5. The United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is an agency of the United Nations founded in the aftermath of the Second World War with the mandate to protect refugees and displaced persons. The role of the UNHCR is intended not as political but humanitarian. However, in the Yugoslav wars, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, it was cast into a confusing political context where its efficiency was often compromised. At the beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community had hoped that the crimes against civilians could be stopped through its UNHCR presence and the UNPROFOR. Yet, such protection did not prove successful. UNHCR continues to be active in the post-Yugoslav region, especially in the long process of the return of refugees and displaced persons, and more recently, in helping the “new” migrants of the Balkans route. Suggested reading: Cunliffe, S. A., & Pugh, M. (1997). The politicization of UNHCR in the former Yugoslavia. Journal of Refugee Studies, 10 (2), 134-153. Mooney, E. D. (1995). Presence, ergo protection? UNPROFOR, UNHCR and the ICRC in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. International Journal of Refugee Law, 7 (3), 407-435. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/bosnia-and-herzegovina.html In terms of efforts to bridge such impasse, initiatives such as the much discussed 2017 Declaration on the Common Language, as reported in Chapter 9, signed by numerous intellectuals including many linguists, have asked for abolishing language segregation in education across the post-Yugoslav space (Declaration 2017). On the other hand, the positive examples of so-called “integrated schools” concern the Gymnasiums of Sarajevo and Mostar; the desegregated secondary schools in Stolac and Čapljina; the successful student protests that contributed to keeping the secondary schools Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 233 integrated in Jajce, and the truly integrative system applied in the Brčko district. However, anthropological studies of actual inter-group contact, done at the Mostar Gymnasium, warn against top-down approaches to integrating school management while simultaneously preserving the actual separation of instruction into two different national curricula and restricting spatial and social possibilities of contact between students of different ethnicities (Hromadžić 2011). A somewhat similar situation to that of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been reported for Kosovo, as in Baldwin's early warning of the need to reverse these “patterns of segregation” (Baldwin 2006, 3). Currently while legal international standards of minority rights protection are included in the constitution, the major drawback is their implementation (Beha 2014, 85), the lack of attention to smaller ethnic minorities (Cocozzelli 2008) and the effective segregation of the school system. The challenges to equality and inclusion of minorities in the field of education are also reflected in the textbooks used in schools. In ethnically divided societies, textbooks insist on ethnic instead on civic identities. For instance, in the case of North Macedonia the majoritarian Macedonian identity is promoted in textbooks together with curriculum based on ethno-nationalistic values, implicitly excluding other minoritarian identities as well as a more multicultural view of national identity (Kavaja 2017, 487). Concerning Kosovo, it is important to look beyond the two most discussed ethnic groups at the expense of often disregarded smaller ethnic minorities – Muslim Slavs, Turks, and RAE (Roma, Ashkalis and Egyptians). Taking into account the broader picture of ethnicities in Kosovo, it is clear that while there are educational programs in the Serbian language, the lack of curricula and textbooks for Bosniak, Turkish, and Roma in minority languages has also been reported (Beha 2014, 85). In North Macedonia, the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 provided for language rights: the language spoken in an area by over 20% of population was rendered official on a local level. However, the post-Ohrid Agreement educational context has been criticized as segregated between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, and in need of concrete policies and practices of desegregation (Kavaja 2017). The parallel educational system was partially a response to potential security concerns and lack of trust in ethnically mixed classrooms, and (similarly to Bosnia) was at first thought as a temporary solution. The Macedonian segregated educational system resembles those of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – with majority of primary schools being monoethnic, while secondary education is also mostly mono-ethnic but with some examples of two-schools-under-one-roof, and in some cases, mixed schools with separate classes in minority languages. Ethnic tensions are of- Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 234 ten made visible through the language issue as in the case of protesting against minority language courses in mixed schools or in reactions to renaming of schools. Recent improvements have been reported specifically with extending rights to education in minority languages and university quotas for ethnic minority students (OECD 2019). Approaches to ethnic conflict transformation in deeply divided societies: overcoming consociational limits through deliberative practices As recalled before, education represents a powerful tool that in divided societies can serve to replicate ethnic division. Wherever, when a political culture aimed at accommodating conflicting quests among political leaders and across society in general does not exist, institutions alone will not solve divisions. On the contrary, they may freeze or even worsen intergroup separation (O’Flynn 2006). Hence, if the spirit of accommodation is poor, the logical consequence may be inefficiency of institutional designs. In Bosnia-Herzegovina power sharing mechanism were simply imposed by external forces, as they have not emerged genuinely from mature reasoning among political elites. The political game within this deeply divided society has rewarded the same ethno-national leaders (Bieber, 2005; Bianchini, 2005). And since political elites seem to be interested in inflaming the conflict further because of electoral success, they rationally appear to be uninterested in compromise, by worsening the conflict and polarizing society further (Goati, 1997; Bieber, 2005; Bianchini, 2005). Strong power sharing mechanisms and particularly mutual veto powers for ethnopolitical representatives became a tool for consolidating ethnic belonging and contrapositions, entrapping society and individuals in rigidly defined ethnic categories (O’Flynn, 2006; Bieber, 2006). All in all, imposing consociational institutions without a spirit of accommodation may lead to a freezing of ethnic boundaries and general stagnation. This may be one of the most challenging hazards of applying rigid institutional models to deeply divided societies, which argues that segmental autonomy could further stimulate the already existent divisions among people, replicating and perpetuating the lack of dialogue, therefore, hindering rather than favoring dialogical processes and conflict settlement (Dryzek, 2005). It should be considered, however, that in the aftermath of a conflict the very society expressively requires inter-group division, since conflicting groups demand to recover from experienced traumas by elaborating them under the shelter of in-group solidarity. In other words, in these contexts, Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 235 group isolation is first a need than a choice, and the institutional design might only reflect already existing divisions. It is difficult to find an alternative to consociationalism, since fostering integrationist institutional designs (“majoritarian” options) could be interpreted by groups as an attempt to be forcefully assimilated by their enemy counterparts (O’Flynn, 2006; Goati, 1997). Box 10.6. Social identity theory, one of the corner stones of Social Psychology, conceptualizes the group as the place of origin of social identity: human beings are social animals, tending spontaneously to live in group and to feel part of it, and at the same time to distinguish one's own group (in-group) from those of non-belonging (out-group), activating non-conscious mechanisms of cognitive bias and favoritism in support of the in-group. Suggested reading: Tajfel H. (2010). Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor D. M., Moghaddam F. M. (1994), Theories of Intergroup Relations: International Social Psychological Perspectives, Westport: Praeger Pub Text. Therefore, even if the consociational model might turn out to be ineffective for settling the conflict, because it might favor the crystallization of divisions both at the political level (where ethno-leaders may find it more interesting to maintain radical position) and at the social fabric level (since it does not provide opportunities for inter-group exchange and communication), no alternative model seems available for divided societies (O’Flynn, 2006). Ethnic groups need to recover from traumas, and to focus on intragroup solidarity and cohesion, with culture and education playing a crucial role in consolidating and perpetuating ethnic divisions. Even if power sharing formulas are necessary, corrective mechanisms to adjust their inefficiencies should be considered. Otherwise, like a dog biting its tail, ethnonationalist leaders will keep on promoting divisions, inter-group dialogue will continue to be ignored, and negative prejudices against the out-group will be strengthened among people, who in turn will keep on voting ethno-national leaders. Whenever political classes are immature and prone to conflict, consociational systems prove ineffective in overcoming ethno-national division among common people. In other words, the consociational approach to ethnic conflict lacks a complementary strategy aimed at changing the po- Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 236 litical culture and promoting a “spirit of accommodation” not just at the political level, but at the level of the common people’s as well. Deliberation and Ethnic Conflict Management Deliberative democracy theories, grounding their roots in ancient Greek thought, emphasize the dialogical aspect of the decision-making procedure and essentially postulate that high levels of deliberation are good for democracy. Particularly, deliberative democrats argue that the deliberative procedure could modify initial preferences of actors, through persuasion rising from reasoning and the inclination “to yield to the force of the better argument.”. The outcome of a deliberative decision-making process should be, in other words, a more consensual policy, namely more responsive to participant’s interests and, therefore, a more rational and sustainable one (Steiner et al. 2004). The deliberative democracy literature, mostly developed within the philosophical field, assigns great importance to citizen participation in the political process and to their dialogical expressions of preference. The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, crucial for the concept of deliberation, developed a procedural conception of democracy, which emphasizes the role of citizens who organize themselves through informal associations where to voice their opinions (Habermas, 1997). The decisionmaking process, to be legitimate, must take into due account their expressions. According to Habermas, in pluralistic and complex contemporary societies the legitimacy of the decision-making process depends on the presence of a robust civil society and a vibrant public sphere of participation. However, the deliberative model has to be understood in ideal terms: “(e)ven under favourable conditions, no complex society could ever correspond to the model of purely communicative social relations”, namely a pure and perfect deliberation (Habermas, 1997). Some deliberative theorists argued that deliberative practice may also help in managing intractable ethnic conflicts (Dryzek 1990; Dryzek 2001; Dryzek 2006; O’Flynn 2006; Kanra 2005). The premises lay on the assumption that through deliberative processes individual cultural identities could gradually change and multi-cultural conflict might find settlement through deliberative interaction among subjects in the public sphere (O’Flynn 2006; Kaufman S. J. 2001). Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 237 Box 10.7. The formulation of the concept of deliberation is based on the work of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. According to the philosopher, ideal deliberative politics should fulfill some basic requirements: • all citizens have to freely and equally participate to an open and public political process. • participants have to honestly express their sincere opinions. • arguments have to be logically justified. • the value of justification has to be stated in terms of “common good” and be intended as promoting the improvement of the poorest, and not in utilitarian terms. • participants have to be willing to listen to their counterpart’s argumentations, and they have to respect them. • participants have to be prone to yield to the force of the better argument, and to modify their initial preferences in the light of recent learning. Deliberation presumes dialogical interaction, and it does not necessarily have to lead to consensus. Deliberation can take place both at the level of politicians and the level of ordinary citizens. Suggested reading: Habermas J. (1997). Between Facts and Norms. Oxford: Polity Press. Steiner J. (2012). The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy: Empirical Research and Normative Implications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moreover, participation in deliberative practice may create a sense of common ground, helping to create a sense of belonging to a single community (O’Flynn 2006) as well as premises for renewing contact and removing prejudices (Allport G. W. 1954). This approach basically states that in order to settle inter-group conflicts, it is necessary to foster inter-group contact under the right conditions so as to promote inter-group dialogue. The deliberative democracy scholar Ian O’Flynn (2006) underlined, citing John Stuart Mill, that a democracy cannot survive if citizens do not share any sense of common belonging to the state. This feeling of belonging, like “civic nationalism”, has been said to be essential for granting the stability of the state in two senses. First, in democracy, the authority to exercise political power lies on people. If they are divided, namely if they do not perceive to be part of a single demos, the political authority will be weakened and divided as well. Secondly, if citizens do not perceive to be working to- Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 238 gether for a common enterprise, and therefore do not feel a sense of common allegiance toward state institutions, they are not provided with an incentive to fulfil obligations and duties stemming from living in a self-governing society. Box 10.8. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was a leading figure in the nineteenth-century intellectual life. He contributed to the fields of logic, economics, ethics, and social and political philosophy. Today, he is best known for his related defenses of utilitarianism and liberalism. Common people ideally represent the foundation of democracy, and if they are divided and unwilling to settle ethnic conflict, the higher political sphere cannot but mirror those feelings (O’ Flynn 2006). Here we come back to the question of “political culture”, and how a “spirit of accommodation” can be fostered both at the grass root level of a deeply divided society and, as a result, at the higher political sphere level. A political-institutional design aimed at backing the creation of transversal deliberative arenas and the development of a lively and active civil society might take advantage of adopting the deliberative model of decision-making and confrontation, in this sense. According to O’ Flynn (2006), participating at the decision-making process to deliberate on the attainment of a common superordinate goal, even if not concerning fundamental values, can incentivize the creation of a common sense of belonging among participants, since it might induce citizens to feel as part of the decisional process, irrespective of the final decisional outcome. Indeed, the deliberative decision-making process is expected to produce an outcome which cannot be reduced to a “zero sum” game, since it always implies positive payoffs for each participant. The possibility to freely express opinions and the aptitude for listening and for yielding to the force of a better argument could provide for everybody’s position to be treated with respect, stimulating the building of consensus on the procedure as such. In turn, this consensus will act as an incentive to foster future involvement, participation, and respect for rules, contributing, in the long run, to create a sense of civic belonging. Deliberative practices may also help a social-psychological approach to ethnic conflict. Indeed, meeting individuals belonging to the hostile group, dialoguing with them about non-polarized issues, listening to their argumentations and discussing together without pressures due to urgent decisions or to the fear to give way on fundamental values, could also stimulate the process of removal of prejudices, according to social psychologi- Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 239 cal approach of “contact hypothesis”, already tested in several experiments (Allport 1954). When conflict mitigation may be fostered at the societal level, citizens are intuitively expected to replicate their new attitudes in their electoral behavior, fostering political change and the selection of more tolerant leaders for governing the country.2 Civil society participation in decision-making processes may also be promoted. For instance, within deliberative micro-arenas – forums for dialogue and confrontation which might enable citizens to express their opinion and to listen to others’ views (Dryzek 2005). At the beginning, dialogue should be focused on non-polarizing issues in order not to exacerbate tensions, and precisely on the attainment of super-ordinate goals: common objectives, solutions to common problems, public good which everybody needs but that is not achievable without inter-group cooperation (Allport 1954). A super-ordinate goal might be the efficiency of the waste disposal service in a multi-ethnic village where conflicting groups live, or sports infrastructures for young people to be built in common spaces; but also higher level issues, such as the perspective of facilitations and benefits stemming from a quicker approach toward the European Union. Within the social-psychological literature, the effects of inter-group cooperation in order to gain super-ordinate goals have been variously tested, demonstrating that cooperation might reduce, across time, inter-group hostility, while favoring the development of a common sense of belonging to those institutions within which the same decision-making process has been developed (Smith & Mackie 2007). Samuel Gaertner underlined, within his social-psychological research, how the perception to be a part of a common super-ordinate group – with respect to conflicting group identities – might reciprocally foster tolerance and remove negative prejudices against the formerly perceived out-group. The efficacy of re-categorization in de-escalating inter-group conflicts has been empirically investigated by Gaertner with several experimental studies realized in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Gaertner et al. 1989). Since individuals tend to attribute positive qualities to the group they belong to in order to maintain a positive self-image, the identification of a common super-ordinate group can induce people to reduce aggressive attitudes against individuals previously categorized as not belonging to their own group. 2 Vladimir Goati described instead the inverse process, characterizing the spreading of nationalist attitudes in Former Yugoslav Republics during the 1990s and the effects on electoral preferences (Goati V. 1997). Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 240 Re-categorization of individuals might also concern a decision-making process. In this sense deliberative practices applied to local forums, where citizens may discuss super-ordinate goals, might help to generate a common super-ordinate “feeling of belonging” among citizens living in a given area. This outcome can come about through sharing common problems in their everyday life, and so the ethnic identity might not stand out. The adoption of deliberative practices at local level might foster intergroup conflict transformation stimulating the individuation of a super-ordinate community of belonging across groups. Besides the feeling of being part of a shared decision-making process, deliberation fosters loyalty towards institutions and contact among groups, which under favorable conditions might help the removal of negative prejudices against the members of the perceived out-group, therefore helping conflict settlement and reconciliation. Deliberative processes promote the empowerment of citizens at local level and their involvement and participation in decision-making processes, to revert the negative spiral of conflict nurtured by educational segregation and political polarization. As such, deliberative practices should be promoted at school level, by supporting “bottom up” change in educational systems and preventing segregation and inter-group conflict from being perpetuated across time. Conclusion Within multi-national states where society appears to be divided across ethno-national cleavages and where the legitimization of political leaderships derives from the mobilization of the same ethnic fractures, political science suggests the adoption of power sharing models in order to avoid centrifugal trends and grant stability to the system. By ensuring to each of the relevant segments of society fair access to the political power and ensuring that the philosophy of “sharing” would be supported and recognized as legitimate by each segment, power sharing arrangements can have a potentially transformative effect. However, the application of power sharing systems upon deeply divided societies cannot be implemented without risks. One of the most common criticisms against power sharing models refers to its detrimental potential which crystallizes inter-group divisions through segmental autonomy. Power sharing systems, applied with no correctives, may easily result in educational and cultural segregation, at their turn consolidating inter-group conflict. Notwithstanding criticism, post-conflict institutional designs cannot but adopt power sharing formulas in order to avoid centrifugal tendencies Chapter 10: Minorities and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 241 and new violence among groups formerly involved in conflict. Moreover, power sharing formulas serve to grant each group the possibility to recover and find security within their own community, in a context of reciprocal distrust and diffidence deriving from the traumatic war experience. Therefore, while institutional designs applied to deeply divided environments should be aware of the fragmentation of the society in order to avoid exacerbating centrifugal trends, they should pay attention to the quality of the local political culture, which should be marked by a “spirit of accommodation.” If this spirit of accommodation does not exist, its creation (or recovering) should not be left to the monopoly of political leaderships, in the perspective of a top-down process which, because of incentives for nationalist groups to stay in power, might risk crystallization of ethnic division. On the contrary, the process should include at the same time the empowerment of civil society and its participation in local decision making, in the perspective of generating bottom-up dynamics for social transformation. Deliberative forums aimed at discussing and solving common ordinary problems, like super-ordinate goals, might help people create a political culture turned towards dialogue by involving social-psychological dynamics and posing the right premises in order to re-categorize individuals’ belongings and to develop a feeling of being part of a shared and legitimized decision-making process. The sense of belonging to this process might change into a feeling of trust towards common institutions, granting stability to fragile democracy by promoting, in the long run, a sense of civic nationalism in support of the state. Across time, significant shifts in electoral preferences might also emerge, moderating the political spectrum by excluding the more radical and nationalist forces hindering inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation processes. Educational and cultural segregation may be countered with a stronger involvement of citizens in local decisionmaking processes. In addition to discussing deliberative approach to intergroup dialogue, this chapter followed a double approach to understanding cultural rights of minorities in the Western Balkans. On the one hand, it discussed the historical shifting map in the ethnic composition of this region, paying special attention to the status of languages of the historical minorities. On the other, it engaged the contemporary debates on the importance of minority rights, including cultural rights, for the stability, democratization, and effectiveness of reconciliation in the Balkans. In conclusion, we aimed to provide a number of suggestions to students for possible future directions of study and research, suggesting the crucial Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 242 role of minority rights for the reconciliation and inter-group dialogue in the Western Balkans but also for understanding of other divided societies. 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Accessed September 25th 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Page s/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14370&LangID=E. Végh, A. (2012). Minorities, mother countries, majority on the western Balkans. Historia Actual Online, 27 (1), 83-101. Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić 246 Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility: “intra”, “extra”, and “crossing” flows in the region and the democratization process Marco Zoppi Abstract: Thousands of migrants are moving within and outside the Western Balkans every year in search of better opportunities. Migration brings important long-term consequences, especially in terms of demographic and socio-economic effects, yet comparatively less is known about its relation with the processes of democratization and reconciliation. In fact, the departure of the younger cohorts of the population implies a crucial loss of skills and knowledge for the origin country, and accentuates territorial inequality between urban and rural areas. Moreover, emigration may prevent national institutions from regenerating their internal human capital. At the same time, globalization offers Western Balkan diasporas many opportunities to interact with the homeland at all levels of the political, economic and social sphere, and to influence the path to democratization and reconciliation at home. In this chapter we explore the multidimensional connections between migration and political dynamics at both theoretical and empirical level, in order to understand their impact on the processes of democratization and reconciliation. To achieve this aim, the chapter relies on a theoretical framework connecting migration with democratic equality and reconciliation as a political value, as well as on statistical data to assess the diverse mobility trajectories within, across and outside the region. Key terms: migration, diaspora, transnationalism, depopulation, Western Balkans Introduction The globalization of the world economy has greatly facilitated the movement of people, goods and capital across states and continents. Think about instant money transfers, ethnic food markets, Skype interviews, web- 247 based degrees, relocation of industrial production to third countries: these are all diverse but tangible components of the global condition that has come to inform our common daily experiences. Moreover, the mechanisms of the global market have enhanced the possibility to forge and maintain connections of different kinds between the homeland and the new countries of residence. In fact, the advances of technology have multiplied the available communication channels, contributing to create new transnational labor, educational, network opportunities and impacting on those and other fields with both positive and negative effects. What most of the innovative technological instruments at our disposal have in common is the ability to obviate, or at least to complement, the physical distance in a range of collaborative activities with the provision of digital spaces of interaction. In many ways, migration can be considered a great facilitator of the ongoing global dynamics: what we may call the “globalization of migration” has been in fact instrumental for the transfer of knowledge, knowhow, skills, norms, values, market preferences, codes of behaviors. All those elements move together with human beings wherever they go. By the same token, through words, decisions, and actions human beings convey back the meaning of what they have experienced and learned abroad in their interactions with the homeland. This framework of mutual exchanges via migration characterizes the Western Balkans, as the entire region appears part of global economic trends (Kóczán, 2017). However, in order to properly assess the effects of such exchanges, it is important to consider the context within which dynamics of both globalization and migration are occurring in the area. In fact, it should be noted that the Western Balkans’ economic development and competitiveness on world markets are seriously undermined by longterm vulnerabilities: Western Balkan Countries (WBCs) are said to display still “weak democratic institutions that sometimes resemble empty facades, a lack of rule of law, huge deficits in terms of fundamental rights and values such as media freedom, elections dominated by dominant party centers, a passive and fairly obedient citizenry” (Džihić & Draško, 2018: 4). In its 2018 report, Freedom House has expressly referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia as “hybrid regimes”, and to Montenegro and Serbia as “semi-consolidated democracies”. In the 2020 report update, all regional countries are denoted as hybrid regimes in what represents a worsening democratic scenario. The need to reform the public sector and to fight corruption as well as organized crime have been called up in the oft-quoted European Commission’s communication on enlargement of February 6, 2018. These points of concern confirm that the path of WBC’s Marco Zoppi 248 democratization presents a number of remarkable challenges (World Bank, 2019a). Box 11.1. Freedom House is a Washington-based non-governmental organization that publishes an annual global report on political rights and civil liberties. Through a methodology based on various indicators (e.g. rule of law, freedom of expression) it classifies countries according to five categories: consolidated democracies, semi-consolidated democracies, transitional governments andhybrid regimes, semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes, and consolidated authoritarian regimes. Suggested readings: Freedom House (2020). Nations in Transit 2020: dropping the democratic façade. Washington: Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/na tions-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade. In the light of this brief overview, we understand that the developments of the new millennium have not eased the challenges faced by the WB. Global competition has exposed even more evidently the evils of incomplete democratic transition, reflected in the scarce political will to reform; the lack of transparency; and the inadequacy of administrative capacities (Čeperković & Gaub, 2018). As evidence of the failure to meet democratic expectations, we shall recall the public protests that have spread across the region in the last years leading some observers to talk about a Balkan Spring in the making. Yet, the analysis of migration dynamics in the region provides an even more compelling case to evaluate the relation between globalization and the shortcomings of the democratization and reconciliation processes. In fact, it is often said that people vote “with their feet” to show their disapproval for a situation they don’t like or when they are pressured to leave by circumstances. Beyond personal motivations, migration reveals thus tensions and contradictions nurtured at the societal level. Hence, by focusing on migration we can reach two important aims: on the one hand, through the analysis of mobility in, out and across the region we can learn more about the effects of the incomplete democratization and reconciliation processes. On the other hand, we can examine how the diaspora—via transnational engagement—influences political initiatives in the WBC. In other words, migration contributes to explaining what are the opportunities and threats that achieve political stability: it is thus relevant to address such a topic and its relation with democratization and reconciliation. Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility 249 Box 11.2. The Balkan Spring is an expression used in some media outlets to refer to the series of street protests that have concerned all Western Balkan countries in the last five years. Starting from Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2014, and continuing in North Macedonia (2015), Serbia (2017), Albania (2018) and Montenegro (2019), citizens faced tear gas, water cannons and batons to voice disapproval against corruption and violence in their country’s politics. The motivations behind the social malaise were similar, and the protests demonstrate the crucial contribution of civil society organizations for the democratization of the region. The expression is borrowed from the Arab Spring, which denoted the wave of protest and anti-regime revolts taking place in many North African and Middle East countries, notably Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. Suggested readings: Bieber Florian, & Brentin, Dario (Eds.) (2019), Social movements in the Balkans: rebellion and protest from Maribor to Taksim. New York: Routledge. The relation between migration and democratization: theoretical reflections Let us now explore in more detail some theoretical reflections concerning the relationship between migration and democratization. First of all, migration—and emigration abroad especially—does not mark the end of political engagement on the part of migrants, nor does it mark the end of national political parties’ attempt to reach potential dislocated supporters. However, one cannot take for granted the individuals’ political trajectory in the diaspora: do they maintain/develop partisan loyalties abroad? How does the new social and political environment shape their political views? What about the interaction between newcomers and the established diaspora communities in the host states? These are all questions that we need to ask when approaching whatsoever diasporic context. In fact, if it is true that migration reduces the possibility to maintain social relations in the homeland, it also enhances fresh opportunities for new socio-political regrouping in the diaspora. Through their research, scholars focusing on the transnational engagement of diasporas have underlined that involvement in political issues is sought on both sides, with-in and with-out the homeland. For example, Koinova (2018) has conceptualized three forms of diaspora outreach strategies by parties, which she named “state-endorsing”, “state-challenging”, and “party-building”. The classifications are in accordance to where parties stand in the political spectrum (respectively: in gov- Marco Zoppi 250 ernment, in opposition, or if it represents a new formation). Hence, the first point we need to establish is that engagement continues at distance, even across national borders. The idea of transnationalism refuses old notions contending that migrants would either completely amalgamate in the receiving country or coming back after a period abroad as temporary sojourners. Transnationalism explores everyday practices of migrants that operate across borders and connect territorial and social spaces one with the other, or that even create brand new spaces of interaction, as a permanent condition of globalization. Box 11.3. Transnationalism refers to a group of theories focusing on the migrants’ durable ties across distant spaces. It is utilized as a concept to capture the sum of activities of individuals, communities and other social formations. Besides tangible activities (e.g. remittances), transnationalism may also entail the study of practices of collective identity (re)formation in the country of relocation, as well as a dialectic with the receiving societies on issues of belonging, loyalty and multiple identities. Suggested readings: Hockenos, Paul. (2003). Homeland Calling, Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Sullivan, Stacy. (2004). Be not Afraid for you have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the US into the Kosovo War. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Bauböck, Rainer, & Faist, Thomas (Eds.) (2010). Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. A logical consequence of what was explained above is the need to understand how such engagements manifest themselves: each migrant gets exposed to new ideas in the host country, whether through daily life, work, education or else, in ways that can transform his/her own political view based on experiences in the homeland. If persuaded to do so, the same person may send political remittances back home, that is, norms and views regarding democratic institutions and their supposed functioning. Therefore, the way in which migration influences the circulation of ideas about what the ideal society should be, and what should be the practical instruments to achieve it, will also affect the processes of democratization and reconciliation. In fact—from the individual to the collective level—we observe that migration flows involve the constant reshaping of non-financial practices and forms of “social capital”, that is, those structures and “rela- Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility 251 tions among persons that facilitate action” (according to the influential definition given by Coleman (1988: 100) some thirty years ago). Migration thus changes the network of available human relations and with it, it influences the chances to mobilize people around an ideal. For this reason, one can argue that migration directly affects the opportunities to promote reconciliation. Even more so, mobility continues to be a defining feature of the WB, and according to projections it is likely to remain so in the next decades (IIP, 2018). Box 11.4. Political remittances are the variety of political values, beliefs and preferences that individuals in the diaspora “send” back to the homeland, whether through transnational vote, discussions with home-based individuals, or decisions/actions that can have political, social and economic consequences (e.g. private donation to a political party or association; signing of a petition and so on). Suggested readings: Rapoport, H. (2016). A Democratic Dividend from Emigration? Policy Brief. Florence: European University Institute. Krawatzek F., & Müller-Funk, L. (2020). Two centuries of flows between ‘here’ and ‘there’: political remittances and their transformative potential. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46 (6), 1003–1024. Another aspect of the migration-democratization nexus is that a large part of migration flows in the WB are generated by local and regional economic inequalities. Inequality leads individuals to look for better economic opportunities elsewhere, and their emigration generates in turn more inequality in the origin region/country because of the ensuing lack of human capital. In his classic work on democratization, Tilly (2000) has stressed that inequality is indeed a realm of social relations that influence democratization, since the latter is only achieved when all citizens can exert rightful claims on government resources and move beyond existing models of organization in order to achieve equal assets. This passage in Tilly’s work underlines how valuable the incorporation of migration can be for this kind of analyses. In other words, ongoing forms of mobility says a lot about inequality and democratization in the home countries. Against this backdrop, in this chapter we will disentangle migration in the framework of the democratization process with the aim of revealing connections and interrelations between the two topics. For this purpose, it will be relevant to explore first the human mobility trajectories that characterize present Western Balkan countries, since the variety of destinations possibly corre- Marco Zoppi 252 spond to the different ideas and values transferred or imported back in the homeland. A region defined by mobility Contemporary mobility flows in the Western Balkans are best described as intense and multidirectional (Migratup, 2018). This is not a novelty for the region, since at the time of Former Yugoslavia mobility was allowed and many workers left for other countries, in central and northern Europe especially. As for Albania, the same would hold true in the 1990s, when its international isolation ended and the country began its transition to a market-based economy. We can distinguish the great diversity of migration flows in the WB through the macro-categories of non-labor, labor and return migration. (Krasteva, 2015: 7). The first category contains forced migrants, those displaced by ethnic tensions, refugees, as well as victims of illicit traffics and retired individuals. The most recent UNHCR (2019) data indicate that in 2019 in the whole Balkan region there were still more than 80.000 people “of concern”, or with “refugee” and “refugee-like” status, in consequence of the conflicts and wars of the 1990s. Evidently, one could question the use of such labels decades after the tragic events they refer to; and yet—as we will see from family reunification statistics of BiH—return mobility connected to conflicts is ongoing and helps explain why reconciliation lags behind in the region. Labor migration, the second category, incorporates the variety of regular and irregular mobility connecting the region internally, and externally with neighbor areas. Seasonal, temporary work, circular migration are the most common examples1. The final category embraces return migration— the act of coming back to the place of origin. Return migration can be, for example, that of previous forced and displaced individuals and refugees, as explained above. Return can be also voluntary, based on a pure personal decision spurred not least by signs of economic improvements in the homeland(s). Or it may be prompted by changed conditions in the country of relocation: an example of the latter is the return migration provoked by the global financial crisis of 2007-8, which forced many WB citizens to 1 Circular migration is the repetitive movement of a migrant that moves back and forth between the homeland and a host country, typically for the purpose of employment. It is thus not a permanent movement, and remains strictly connected to labor opportunities (Cf. Triandafyllidou, 2015; Vermeulen et al., 2015). Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility 253 leave Southern EU countries (Gëdeshi & King, 2018: 14). In respect to all its forms, mobility in the region is less and less a definitive act, something done once and for all. In reality, people engage in forms of migration connoted by different purposes whose aim—intendedly – may not be permanent re-settlement elsewhere. As rightly argued by Bobić and Janković (2017: xiv): Not only are migrations’ typologies blurred when it comes to directions (immigration vs. emigration) but also their geographies, temporalities, purposes and goals are very hard to unequivocally classify and dismantle. While they are more and more recurring, circular, re-turn, seasonal, temporary, long stay, residential, tourist, transnational, etc., geographies of new mobilities are also altered and therefore some traditional sending countries like Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, have become destination ones. In the last decade, the migration context in the region has received yet another layer of complexity: since late 2014 the Western Balkans have been concerned by the inflow of asylum seekers and economic migrants originating from Syria, the Middle East and Central Asia, which “created a completely new situation”, triggering security-centered narratives and altering the traditional view of the WB as an emigration source (Šelo Šabić, 2017: 53). In fact, even though most asylum seekers and economic migrants only crossed the area to reach better-off countries in the European Union, several thousands have eventually applied for asylum, or have become stranded in one of the Western Balkan countries, contributing to that multidirectionality of migration patterns that one can retrieve from the region. In order to achieve a better understanding of migration, it is thus important to divide between its different typologies. Let us start from internal migration. Internal mobility Internal mobility (or migration) is defined as the sum of citizens that have changed their place of usual residence to another one still located within national boundaries. In order to collect this type of statistics, one condition needs to be satisfied: the change of residence has to be reported to public authorities. In other words, those citizens moving from one place to another have to inform the previous and new municipalities about their new address. Currently, this does not represent a compulsory act in all WB Marco Zoppi 254 countries, and therefore we are confronted with partial data that do not provide an accurate picture of the phenomenon.2 Yet, even considering data at our disposal only, we can conclude that internal mobility concerns many thousand WB citizens every year: if we take statistics for year 2017 as an example, we see that as many as 220.000 WB citizens have reported a change of residence to their respective authorities from a total WB regional population of estimated 18.000.000. Interesting observations are possible also on a more long-term basis: Serbia is the WB country displaying the most marked internal migration flows: one of every 57 Serbian citizens has on average changed residence in the period 2014-2018 (internal migrants have ranged between 120.000 and 125.000 in each of the concerned years). North Macedonia faces the opposite migratory situation: only one of every 320 citizens has officially moved the residence in the same 5-year period, while the remaining countries are placed somewhere between the two ranges. The most important aspect emerges when we apply a territorial perspective on the data: in fact, we find out that internal mobility is not at all a homogeneous phenomenon, but it instead affects territories disproportionally. More specifically, all WB countries are concerned with a noticeable urbanization trend: capital cities and larger urban centers are growing in population over the years, while rural areas are experiencing high depopulation. Accordingly, data from national statistical offices reveals that during the last five years in Albania only the counties of Tiranë and Durrës have been capable of attracting new residents, while the other ten counties are all facing loss of resident population. In North Macedonia, Skopje and surroundings represent the only area gaining population in the same period of time (around one thousand new residents each year), while all other regions are depopulating.3 The same is true for Montenegro, where capital Podgorica is by far the most attracting pole, followed by the mid-sized cities of Budva and Bar, the only two other urban centers with remarkable positive growth trend. In Serbia as well, around 40% of all internal migrants have targeted the Belgrade region alone. Together with Vojvodine, 2 This section is based on the elaboration of the most recent data on internal migration collected at the national statistical offices of the WBCs, which are abbreviated as: INSTAT for Albania; BHAS for Bosnia; ASK for Kosovo; MONStatfor Montenegro; MAKStatfor North Macedonia; RZS for Serbia. 3 Note also what MAKStat specifies: “Rural-urban migration at the regional level was highest in the East Region at 46.2%, while the Polog Region is characterised by inter-rural migration, making up 58.7% of the total migration in the region”. See: http://www.stat.gov.mk/PrikaziSoopstenie_en.aspx?id=6&rbr=2684. Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility 255 they represent the two sole regions with positive migration balance in the surveyed years, while in terms of municipalities, approximately 2/3 of the total show worrying negative trends. In Kosovo, only the capital Prishtinë has grown its resident population substantially, while several cities are considerably shrinking. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of detailed and reliable data does not allow for a precise calculation, yet the Federation of BiH appears to be in a steady depopulation trend. Republika Srpska and Brčko district are reported in the Statistics Agency as having a slightly positive migration net outlook. As a result of this process, at least 20% of WB’s overall population currently lives in the region’s capital cities. How should we interpret these data? The urbanization dynamic provides certainly an indication that economic opportunities, services, and good life prospects are centering around few areas, contributing to the growing inequality within countries. Capital cities increasingly account for most part of total population (e.g. in Skopje lives the 29.9% of total national population of North Macedonia); for most of national GDP (e.g. Podgorica generates 50.4% of national Montenegrin GDP); for most of total active enterprises (the 45.9% of Serbian enterprises are in the area of Beograd); and for most of total working age population (in Albania, 23.3% of this population segment lives in Tiranë (World Bank 2019b, 8). At the other end of the spectrum, rural areas are instead suffering from depopulation, lack of services and abandonment of economic activities. Regional mobility The analysis of patterns of regional mobility, that is, from one WB country to another in the same area, suffers from major data gaps and lack of comparable data (cf. Migratup, 2018). Two appear to be the most compelling issues in this regard: state authorities do not always put in place efficient databases of this kind; in second lieu, not all regional migrants report the change of address to the authorities, not least because these may not be permanent moves but temporal, circular, connected to seasonal or occasional job opportunities. Consequently, we are far from observing an exhaustive picture. Due to the scarce data, we will provide only selected examples that will allow nevertheless to note a couple of crucial aspects. A first example regards North Macedonia, where the data provided by the national statistical office reveal rather scarce regional mobility flows: just 34 North Macedonia citizens emigrated to WB countries in 2014 vs. 752 im- Marco Zoppi 256 migrated citizens from the other WB countries in the same year; 58 vs. 1.237 in 2015; 27 vs. 908 in 2016; 2 vs. 711 in 2017; and 6 vs. 879 in 2018.4 Another example, although based on temporary and permanent residence permits comes from Bosnia-Herzegovina: in the period 2014-2018, the authorities have granted some 57.300 temporary residence permits on grounds of family reunification (most common), education, employment, humanitarian reasons (the latter representing around 1% of all cases) and other justified reasons in the period 2014-2018 (BHAS, 2016, 2017, BiH Ministry of Security, 2019).5 Top beneficiaries have been citizens of Turkey, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, thus with a visible regional representation in statistics. As for permanent residence permits, cases in the period 2014-2018 have been limited (3.935), with slightly less representation of WB citizens: surprisingly, Chinese citizens are those who have received more permanent permits (591), followed by Croatians (530), Montenegrin (473), North Macedonians (354) and Turkish (338). If we turn to look at how many BiH citizens have cancelled their residence in the same reference period, the total amount is 19.710: mostly moved to Croatia, Germany, Serbia and Austria. What is interesting to note about regional flows is that despite the geographical proximity and the interconnected history, the number of those reporting moving in the area is rather little. One of every 18 emigrants in North Macedonia has resettled in a neighbor country in the last five years. External mobility Western Balkan countries are believed to have an overall diasporic population ranging between six and ten million, meaning that those living abroad today may represent even more than 50% of the total regional population. Many regional citizens are attracted by the possibility to emigrate abroad, regularly or not, with the main reason being work. In the period 2014-2018, at least 199.000 Albanians have emigrated abroad regularly. More than 3.200 have been reported emigrating from North Macedonia in the same period. More than 90.000 Kosovars did so as well between 2015 4 The dataset is: International migration: Immigrated and Emigrated Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia foreigners and net migration, by country, annually. It is accessible on MakStat website. 5 Family reunification, employment and education are in this order the three most common reasons granting temporary permits to WB citizens. As for Turkey, more than 70% of permits are connect to education purposes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility 257 and 2018.6 However, regular migration is not the only means WB citizens resort to. Recently, a notable emigration push has been visible also in the form of asylum applications to EU countries. This is the case of the mid-2010s mass migration to Europe along the Balkan Route, which involved citizens from the WB: in fact, more than 320.000 out of the total 3.7 million asylum applications recorded in EU countries between 2015 and 2018 were lodged by citizens of the WB. The eventual rejection of most of these applications suggests however that the emigration flows from WBCs were not triggered by serious humanitarian concerns, as seen for many of those transiting along the Balkan Route. Instead, such mobility seems to take place in continuity with other relevant, well-established emigration dynamics, including that of regular workers who have left WBCs in the last two for Central and Northern Europe. At present conditions, there is thus still a widespread sentiment in WBCs about looking outside the region for better life opportunities, especially among the youth. In classic Hirschmanian terms (1970), this could be taken as indication that reforms and institutional steps towards democratization and reconciliation enjoy low trust among the exiting population, and therefore they represent to a great extent fragile and unfinished tasks. Still, the classification of flows presented above is not meant to depict regional mobility as dysfunctional or, worse, in terms that pathologize it. Mobility across regional or international borders, due to environmental, economic, and political instability, or simply to accept a new job or to commute seasonally is becoming more and more common across the globe (Nail, 2015). In the WB too, mobility reflects the dynamism of the region and the richness of networks spread around the world. At the same time, it also shows that the legacy of the recent past is still impacting the region, as mobility between neighbors is comparatively lower. Mobility is thus a complex and multi-layered phenomenon to explore, bearing relevant insights on the prospects for democratization and reconciliation. Box. 11.5. German economist Albert O. Hirschman theorized that individuals react in two possible ways against a deteriorating polity or organization: a first option is to “exit” (i.e. withdraw from the relationship); or they can “voice” (lament deficiencies openly and propose change as well as improvements). In both regards, “loyalty” affects the individual deci- 6 Again, these are author’s elaborations on data available on national statistical offices websites. Marco Zoppi 258 sion and can be instrumental for the organization/polity to address and mold its members’ concerns. Third-country mobility crossing the region As anticipated, in the last few years the Western Balkans have also experienced the external flow of refugees and economic migrants from thirdcountries transiting through the region. The expression “Balkan Route” has quickly become popular in media and political discourses since 2014 to refer to the path of migrants making their way from the Middle East and Central Asia: first through the sea strip between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria, then to central and northern Europe via the Balkan countries. It is useful noting that the Balkan Route, both as the migration pattern in itself and as common usage expression, is not new, nor was it coined in correspondence with the recent mass flows (Zoppi, 2019a). It has been a preferred route for smuggling and other illicit activities for years and was as such already known to governments in the region. Yet, it is only since late 2014 that the term has penetrated the colloquiality of European debates. To assess the magnitude of this flow, we may refer to UNHCR data on asylum applications in the WB for the period 2014-2018. In those five years, there have been 41.300 new applications, lodged mostly in Serbia and Kosovo (45,5%), Montenegro (19,8%) and Albania (18,9%): small percentages compared to the national population, and certainly fewer numbers than the total internal migrants in the same years. Still, the recent external flows trigger some important questions that are partly connected to the issues of democratization in the region. First of all, the few asylum applications received by the regional countries suggest that this area is not perceived as attractive by transiting migrants, whether for labor, security, or other reasons. Secondly, it has been noted that the regional countries lack adequate policies and are overall unprepared to integrate migrants and asylum seekers (Kogovsek Salamon, 2016). Against this backdrop, more analyses will be needed to assess the potential effects of asylum seekers on domestic politics of the WB countries, as well as on their impact on the political systems of the receiving WBC. Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility 259 Mobility and democratization The previous section has provided an overview of the migration dynamics interweaving the WBC. Now, we explore the relations between such mobility forms and the establishment of democratic institutions and practices in the region. In such way, we attempt to understand if migration has a beneficial impact or not (and to what extent) for the advancement of democratization. A first element to consider is the relationship between migration and socio-economic inequality. Let us come back to what has been labeled earlier as internal migration: the fact that flows are unidirectional towards capital and large cities is an indicator of high socio-economic inequality engulfing the Western Balkans. Economic opportunities, and chances of higher income are concentrating in capital and large cities. As a matter of fact, the levels of income inequality in Southeast Europe “tend to be among the highest in Europe”, with “serious repercussions” that also include decline in opportunities as well as “social conflict” (Jusić, 2018: 2). Vasiljević et al. (2019) have analyzed the case of the municipality of Kuršumlija, Southern Serbia, which in many ways could be said to typify the situation of dozens of depopulating cities across the region. As they report with the help of census data, the municipality has approximately halved its population since 1948, and the share of the rural population in the settlements included within the municipality has dramatically dropped. If at the end of World War II almost 34.500 people lived in settlements classified as rural (that is, nearly everyone), today only 6.000 do so— 30% of present municipality inhabitants. Going deeper in the vicissitudes of Kuršumlija via field interviews and surveys, Vasiljević et al. (2019: 54) bring to light that local inhabitants are unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the current economic situation, while only two residents report excellent economic conditions. Hence, the declining economic conditions, the underdevelopment of the area, the extinction of old industrial branches without replacement have led many people of working-age to emigrate, leaving behind a territory filled with frustration, dissatisfaction and ultimately the impression that the desired change is slow or not happening at all (cf. also Živković, 2018). The same dynamic of emigration and subsequent depopulation is found elsewhere in southern Serbia (Mastilovic & Zoppi, forthcoming) and appeared to be a general trend affecting many rural or peripheral areas across the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region, from southern Italy to Greece (Zoppi, 2019b). Emigration then is at least fostered by perceived notions that certain territories are privileged to the detriment of others. And in the shadow of rising urbanization, peripheral territories become increasingly de- Marco Zoppi 260 populated and inhabited by elder people, as internal and regional migrants are prevalently young (Migratup, 2018: 17). Typical circumstances that the literature has associated with depopulation are the lack of services (post and bank offices; schools; social care), infrastructure gaps, and the decrease of economic production as well as attractiveness, which contributes further to augment inequality. Moreover, the sensible reduction of workforce in peripheral areas leads to the underutilization of resources that could help alleviating inequality vis-à-vis urban centers, such as agriculture, wood, or the development of tourism reception infrastructures (Vasiljević et al., 2019). In truth, this situation is characterizing more and more areas of Europe and is driving a wave of discontent threatening the citizens’ trust in the possibilities of liberal democracies in the 21st century. Things are possibly made even worse by the fact that agglomeration and density, under current urbanization trends in Europe and the WB, are not necessarily associated with growth, especially where inequality hits the hardest.7 Therefore, inequality plays a key role in fostering emigration, which in turn is a factor challenging the pace of democratization: inequality pushes resident citizens away, especially the youth, thus depriving the territory of social capital and of the immediate community networks that facilitate and organize concerted (political) action. At the same time, inequality and subsequent emigration empty out—literally—territories from expectations of democracy, inhibiting social innovations against outdated models of organization and production. Emigration also contributes dramatically to brain drain8. These considerations are crucial for a thorough understanding of threats and opportunities awaiting democratic reforms. There is another critical reason to consider fragmentation and emigration determined by inequality as a severe challenge for democratization efforts: even after the wars in the 1990s, politics in WBC has been dominated by parties with marked ethno-national agendas, which strengthened ideas and practices of patrimonial, authoritarian and ethno-based states (Mujanović, 2018: 17; and chapters 5 and 6 in this book). Areas like the Preševo Valley, Republika Srpska, and Sandžak are powerful reminders of the ethnic heterogeneity in the area and of the legacy of history. The surge of asylum seekers and economic migrants from the Middle East and Cen- 7 Cf: https://www.centreforcities.org/blog/five-reflections-revenge-places-dont-matter /. 8 Brain drain is an expression commonly in use to describe the outflow of skilled individuals from a less developed area to a more developed area. The main consequences are that the sending country loses its most talented and educated workers to the benefits of the receiving countries (Cf. Vračić, 2018; Rolandi and Elia, 2019). Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility 261 tral Asia (prevalently Muslims) in the last five years has indeed provided fresh grounds for ethno-religious tensions, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by showing how migration impinges on the fragile reconciliation process (McLaughlin, 2018). In this scenario, territorial inequalities may exacerbate existing political divisions, creating areas of ethnic resentment towards local and national institutions. Going back to Tilly again (2000: 10), “Inequality can coexist with democracy just so long as it remains outside the sphere of public politics (…). Deep material inequality with respect to gender, race, lineage, or age usually translates into political inequality and thereby hinders democratization.” It appears evident that if migration flows, whether of labor migrants or asylum seekers, are interpreted through the lens of ethnicity or are rhetorically matched with the raise of inequality, they can end up fueling reactionary nationalistic narratives. And nationalistic political forces are less likely to propagate among their audience the need of implementing democratic institutions (including equal rights to all) as a solution to political issues and to reconciliation. Quite the opposite, nationalism can prosper out of popular resentment, emphasizing exact differences and inequality while adducing ethno-based explanations, if not solutions (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). This is yet another threat to consider. Another crucial point where migration helps shedding light on democratization and reconciliation is that of political narratives specifically involving the diaspora. As a matter of fact, existing research has underlined the instrumental role of diasporas in dealing positively with political issues and reconciliation initiatives in post-war and divided countries, whether in Africa (Young & Park, 2009), Asia (Duthie, 2011), or the Caribbean (Hoogenboom & Quinn, 2011). This is not always the case. During the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, tensions were also reproduced among diaspora communities worldwide, and ethnic lobbies attempted at influencing the foreign policy of the host lands, thus reinforcing divisions (Carter, 2005). Political leaders in the Balkans sought to mobilize the diaspora, and the latter in many cases engaged in public relations and media campaigns in a partisan way (Blitz, 1996; Hockenos, 2003). In a globalized world, conflicting legacies and political disputes do not remain confined to the local level but are appropriated, reproduced and participated by diasporas. In their participation, diasporas are influenced by the hosting political environment they are exposed to, resorting to principles, values and practices that they wish to see applied in the homeland. This has been called a “diffusion” mechanism (Levitt, 1998). Therefore, aspirations to democratization and reconciliation are also dependent on diasporas, and their ability to influence events at home. For this reason, diaspora engagement with the Marco Zoppi 262 homeland may eventually prove “ambivalent” in regards to its effects (Remiddi et al., 2019). Let us now explore this further with few examples. Karabegović (2014) has brought to attention the case of Bosnian diasporas in Sweden and the US and their mobilization for cultural events and for the Srebrenica genocide remembrance. Importantly, she contends that diasporas can have certain degrees of autonomy from the homeland, and for this reason they can act as moderators and can go beyond ethnonationalist lines of political divisions. In other words, diasporas can also promote unifying and inclusive practices to counter separate commemorations, narratives, initiatives in the respective homelands. The case of the iron ore mine in the town of Omarska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is interesting as well. At the beginning of 1992, a Bosnian Serb-run concentration camp was created in the town: after the acquisition of the mining site by steel multinational ArcelorMittal in the early 2000s, several diaspora groups mobilized, eventually without success (at least at the time of writing) to stop extraction activities in the same area where mass graves had been discovered. During the mobilization phase, Republika Srpska was reported to have undermined the initiative, while political differences also emerged within the diaspora groups involved. Such cases reveal, on the one hand, that the diaspora can actively engage in transnational initiatives and, on the other hand, that memories which are still widely contested prevent unitarian action (Sivac-Bryant, 2014; Koinova & Karabegovic, 2016). What we learn from these examples is that the diaspora can participate and influence the processes of democratization and reconciliation in the WB at distance (transnationally). They may reproduce the same conflict pattern; or, their engagement can be (more) free from political constraints and promote the transformation of state-civil society relations in ways that are less plausible at home. In this latter sense, diaspora actions and discourses display the potential to depart from the usual rhetoric based on division lines and can even have a different approach to the question of national and cultural identity, currently so central in the politics of the region. Results and achievements obtained abroad, however, can be undermined by local and national actors in the homeland, as needs, aspirations and values can vary between these actors. Still, it is the mobilization beyond usual categories that can lead to the dissolution of narrow or local-based coalitions and promote change, as Tilly has suggested. Nevertheless, mobilization beyond usual categories of social and political action, that in the WB are still heavily based on clientelism, corruption and dispossession, also takes place internally (Mujanović, 2018). An example of this kind has been the previously mentioned Balkan Spring (Santora, 2019). The diaspora too has to play a role: politics in Chapter 11: Variety and effects of human mobility 263 countries with large diasporas are increasingly transforming in the direction of a transnational arena. The latter opens up for new political alliances between those who have (temporarily) migrated and those who are homeland-based. This is indeed a promising field of research for investigating the processes of democratization and possibly reconciliation in the WB. Conclusion This chapter was preoccupied with surveying both obvious and less obvious links between migration and the democratization and reconciliation processes in the Western Balkans. The analysis of mobility reveals that the region is characterized by multiple migration patterns that require efforts to disentangle the resulting complexity. Such effort allows us to distinguish among causes of migration and potential implications for facilitating the establishment or the reform of democratic institutions. As it emerges, inequality and territorial disparities besides the legacy of the past are crucial in explaining migration dynamics, and represent an issue for democratization in a highly divisive political context such as that of the WB. At the same time, emigration and engagement by the diaspora provide potential channels for the transmission of ideas that are conducive for democratization and reconciliation. This depends on the extent to which such networks allow for the creation of new and broader consensus around those notions and are not subjected to manipulation and to dynamics of conflict reproduction. In conclusion, we should look at migration not just as a mere consequence of failed reconciliation or democratization, but possibly as part of the strategy to achieve them. Questions for students: What are the main challenges and opportunities for the WBCs in the socalled globalized era? What types and patterns of human mobility concerns the WBCs? 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Zoppi, M. (2019b). A flow within the flow: dynamics of 2015 and post-2015 migration from the Western Balkans to EU Countries. Southeastern Europe 43 (1), 50-74. Marco Zoppi 268 Afterword Stefano Bianchini and Eltion Meka Abstract: Drawing concluding remarks on issues related to democratization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans raises more questions than answers. This sentence may sound paradoxical, since so many articulated considerations have been elaborated by the authors of this textbook. However, the complexity of regional dynamics, the impact of controversial interpretations of the past, the persisting conflictual memories, and the declining attractiveness of external patterns are still having their effects on the (in)stability of the local political and economic systems as well as their international status. Furthermore, the Western Balkans are also an area with a great cultural potential, a shared past, a strategic geopolitical location, and a similar psychological configuration. All these factors contribute to maintain this European area under stress. Put another way, they are on the crossroad between a modernity yet to be accomplished, and a global postmodernity that meets some of its benchmarks, although in an unprepared context. This “state of tension” raises a set of issues, whose implications are, honestly, very difficult to forecast. The hope is that the posed questions either in the chapters or in the present afterword will encourage readers to critically think and elaborate their individual responses. Key words: Western Balkans, diversity management, justice, respect of otherness Drawing concluding remarks on issues related to democratization and reconciliation in the Western Balkans raises more questions than answers. This sentence may sound paradoxical, since so many articulated considerations have been elaborated by the authors of this textbook. However, the complexity of regional dynamics, the impact of controversial interpretations of the past, the persisting conflictual memories, and the declining attractiveness of external patterns are still having their effects on the (in)stability of the local political and economic systems as well as their international status. On the other hand, the Western Balkans are also an area with a great cultural potential, a shared past, a strategic geopolitical location, a 269 similar psychological configuration, and mental borders that multilaterally cross the geopolitical lines of demarcation. As a result, they are a crucial European core under stress. Differently said, they are on the crossroad between a modernity yet to be accomplished, and a global postmodernity that meets some of its benchmarks, although in an unprepared context. This “state of tension” explains why unanswered questions are still dominating the regional dynamics. Let’s elucidate what such a “pattern of unstable change” means for the Western Balkans. We can, for example, reconsider some of the main aspects, which have been scrutinized in the textbook’s chapters, in particular the role of democracy, borders, European integration and the nation-state, the potential and the limits of dialogue, and the cultural consequences of people’s mobility. In fact, contending interpretations are still marking their perception and their pragmatic implementation. If the focus goes on democracy, relevant challenges are affecting the post-war contexts (in the Yugoslav successor states) but also the post-socialist transition (in the Albanian case). As Pero Maldini elucidates in his contribution, there are two main concepts of democracy, the minimal and maximal interpretation. Admittedly, the former one is basically functioning in the whole region, since a multiparty system, regular elections (despite contestations), a parliamentary opposition, and a formal division of powers are essentially working. Nevertheless, the question here concerns the quality of democracy, in consideration of the high level of diversities that mark the Western Balkan societies, regardless of wars, ethnic cleansing, individual or collective animosities and religious rivalries. This is, actually, a key issue, since it implies an in-depth and comprehensive role of multilevel institutions, civil society organizations, educational systems, and deliberative mechanisms of decision-making able to articulate and manage reality with respect of otherness. As a consequence, it should be questioned whether the minimal concept of democracy is sufficient to represent and mediate the heterogeneity of the Western Balkan societies. Or said differently, is this minimal concept of democracy inappropriate for the needs of the contemporary life, because – for example – it is too much reminiscent of, and restricted to the liberal context of the 19th century, to be really effective in the 21st century? By contrast, if the maximalist interpretation is to be pursued, another set of questions comes to focus. On the one hand, the great syncretism and heterogeneity of the Balkan societies sound, in principle, compatible, and consistent with a democratic approach that accepts to face the challenges of post-modern pluralism. However, this implies new forms of governance. For example, the growing diversities require the implementation of Stefano Bianchini and Eltion Meka 270 appropriate institutional mechanisms and cultural creativity, able to jointly guarantee higher participation of citizens, respect for human rights, and an adequate satisfaction of new civil rights demands. On the other hand, this approach needs an innovative multilevel cooperation from local administrations to macro-regional configurations. European integration and globalization are part of this perspective. However, other contexts may also contribute to increase both the institutional framework and the active participation of a plurality of subjects, either entrepreneurial associations, universities, territorial units or NGOs. Under these circumstances, an effective policy of minority protection is also expected to be accomplished. In this case, minorities do not necessarily coincide with ethnic groups, but they embrace the management of social diversities based on gender, alternative family planning and lifestyles, LGBT community demands, religious beliefs with specific dietary habits, the respect of secularized behaviors and new individual rights, including different motherhood models, adoption requirements, end-of-life choice. This comprehensive approach to minorities might exceed the need to focus on the relation between democratization and (ethno-national) reconciliation. Nonetheless, plurality is increasingly marking our societies, including those of the Western Balkans, far behind the original pretended homogeneity of the Nation-state. Therefore, can reconciliation occur under a democratization process that underestimates the relevance of diversities, tolerance, and the growing social articulation of the population? Could it be possible to settle the ethnic majority/minority relations within societies that do not recognize the value of diversities and “otherness”? Inevitably, and to be more specific, is the current societal organization of the Western Balkans able to face such an everyday reality under persistent transformation? Or, put another way: how far can individual and collective discriminations be avoided, in order to guarantee social consensus, territorial cohesion, and a reasonable representation in the political system? On the opposite, it should be questioned how far patriarchism, traditionalism, and conservativism are still alive in these Southeast European societies and to what extent do they represent a serious obstacle to the maximalist implementation of democracy. Furthermore, this crucial question is narrowly connected to additional terminological combinations that have been investigated in the chapters of this textbook. Simona Mameli and Sanja Kajinić, for example, has mentioned the dichotomy represented by the consociational versus the majoritarian model of democracy, promoted in a seminal book by Arend Lijphart. To a large extent, this study originally analyzed different characteristics of the electoral systems and the balance of powers in contemporary Afterword 271 democracies. However, his suggestions have been also considered in the light of the transition to democracy and the Western Balkan reality during the 1990s by both local policy-makers and international diplomats actively involved in the negotiations with regional governments. Under these circumstances, the majoritarian model has been often interpreted by local leaders as a system structurally hierarchical and poorly inclusive of minority parties, especially when their participation in the governments has become a key topic in political agendas. As a consequence, the model was advocated or rejected, depending on the ethno-demographic strength political parties could count on. Differently, the consociational system has been acknowledged as a horizontal mechanism, able to give equal voice to the most relevant ethnic components of a society in the legislative, executive and judicial powers, regardless of their demographic weight. In practice, the current power-sharing political systems of Bosnia- Herzegovina (but not its entities) and North Macedonia can be considered examples of the consociational model, while Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania have adopted the majoritarian pattern. In principle, both can assure the free expression of societal diversities if legislations offer an effective room for participation. Nonetheless, the majoritarian model or simply the making of decisions with a majoritarian system can be vigorously contested by one “constituent nation” or a demographically relevant minority, for the aforementioned reasons. Minority groups, therefore, preferably support a consociational decision-making process, which often is identified with the use of the “right of veto”. As a result, the quality of democracy, in a diversified and complex society, is not only (and merely) an issue of which pattern is to be applied, but also a request of both co-decision guarantees and effectiveness of governance. However, these two trends are not necessarily compatible. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly illustrates the difficulty of harmonizing ethnocollective autonomous rights, power-sharing, and governance effectiveness. Admittedly, many reasons explain such a controversial approach in the Western Balkans. Lack of mutual confidence and the preference to secure stable votes with ethno-national roots are among the most relevant legacies of the events that led to the Yugoslav collapse. Alleged ongoing talk (at the time of writing) about an exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia in accordance to the principle of ethno-territorial demographic concentration is also a manifestation of such a political and institutional distrust on ethnic relations within these two political frameworks. Consistent with this approach, an additional dichotomy is playing a crucial role in the region. This dichotomy concerns the relation between homogeneity and heterogeneity. Their discrepancy is determined, in particular, by the gap that Stefano Bianchini and Eltion Meka 272 separates the political aspiration to social homogeneity from the actual heterogeneity of the societies. This gap has been generated, to a large extent, by the historical development of the concept of the nation-state and the subsequent dynamics that have marked its implementation from the 19th century to nowadays. At the same time, the persistence of this gap contributes to prospectively make the nexus of democratization and reconciliation a hard job. The process of standardization of language, culture, history and memory, state ideology promoted since the beginning of the industrial and French revolutions by different political regimes for a variety of reasons and in different chronological periods, has nurtured an idea of homogeneity which is gendered-based ((masculine), as Sanja Kajinić unveiled in her chapter with Simona Mameli. Furthermore, this homogeneity is justified by security reasons (both domestic and international), and strengthened by the belief that a strong identification between the rulers and the ruled is also necessary. This approach, however, is in deep contrast with the coexistence of a variety of vernaculars, religions, cultural heritages and habits (including food, dance, and music), which represent a wealth for the Balkans as a whole. Nonetheless, the persistence of diversity is still considered by nationalists as an impediment to the establishment of a “modern nationstate”. Therefore, is the exchange of territory justified, as a principle, by the will of determining an ethnic homogenous society? This operation is certainly less brutal than ethnic cleansing during a war. But can human society become homogenous? Albania, for example, is apparently homogenous, given the diversities of religious beliefs, described in their chapter by Ilir Kalemaj and Sokol Lleshi. As a result, religion never became a lever for building an Albanian national feeling. By contrast, the large majority of the people in Montenegro share the same religion. However, the territorial organization of orthodox christianity is a dividing factor of national beliefs. As a result, the polarization between the Serbian Patriarchate and the Montenegrin church in Montenegro is affecting the ethnic conviction of believers both in Belgrade and Podgorica (a similar situation is occurring in Ukraine: in this case, the schism of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine from the Moscow Patriarchate is going to have an impact on the national beliefs both in Russia and Ukraine by deepening the controversial perception of identities in the populations). So, to what extent do territories matter in socially complex societies? And should borders be established in order to pave the way for re-building cooperation and trust? Are borders really a factor of stabilization in the contexts of the 21st century? Maja Pulić in her chapter offers a variety of Afterword 273 considerations about the powerful role of hard borders and boundaries in encouraging reconciliation. Admittedly, they are not only territorial constructions, but also a factor of identity demarcation, which might reinforce state homogenization while entering into conflict with the social and cultural variety of the inhabitants. Particularly the Yugoslav succession wars have reinforced this identification of borders and (national) identity in the former South Slav federation. However, the violent and often brutal efforts made to achieve this goal have also redesigned the mental borders of people, refugees, and emigrants. It has constructed visible and invisible boundaries. It has affected their functions, limited their porosity, and strengthened their hard demarcation. The “desperate” will to stop migration flows from Middle East and the reaction against the Covid-19 pandemic have contributed to increase this awareness. Nevertheless, and despite governmental resistances, can borders be crossed easily? Undeniably, IT innovations and new technologies have dramatically changed the perception of space and time. The mass use of computers, tablets, and smart phones have extended transnational attitudes and mindsets. The speed of communication and the potential of unlimited contacts have established a new, although virtual, environment, able to erase territorial borders, be they soft or hard. Paradoxically, the recent Covid-19 pandemic has contributed to such a trend, by strengthening either the need of a transnational health policy or global individual and group contacts through smart working and a number of platforms, in contrast with the imposed physical isolation of people in their flats, towns, regions, and states. Similar effects have been generated by the persistence of migration flows from Central Asia, Middle East and Northern Africa, in addition to the pre-existent and still alive local, regional and macro-regional mobility that Marco Zoppi has described in his chapter. Their determination has scaled back the political efforts to build physical barriers and fences in order to protect, often in vain, territorial borders. Crucially, in this contradictory and uncertain framework, the concepts of nation and nation-state have been recurrently mentioned. In particular, the intensity of social changes that are marking our time encourage us to look at these notions under new lenses. In fact, the global (including transnational mobility) has unpredictable effects on the local, including the form of the State. Such dynamics affect the homogeneous role of the nation-state, whose understanding and implementation in the Western Balkans have proved to be highly controversial. Globally speaking, scholars, policy-makers, social and cultural élites have associated the concept of nation-state with different interpretations, Stefano Bianchini and Eltion Meka 274 either under the leverage of the passage of time or depending on the geopolitical reality of their milieu. However, it is increasingly contentious whether and to what extent this concept is still valid and meets the trends of political societies of our time. Many needs suggest such a critical approach: in particular, those of international markets, transnational corporations, global health, climate change, medicine, people’s mobility, educational systems, environmental protection, and citizens’ security against organized crime and terrorism. They are just a few, but crucially relevant demands, whose satisfaction requires facilitated border crossing and a more effective global governance. Furthermore, if we narrow the target to the EU, then the common currency, Schengen, the implementation of the four liberties, and the Erasmus program are paving the way for more intense political and financial integration, despite reluctances from some member-states and political parties. Under these circumstances, the Western Balkans, together with all their domestic and regional unsettled questions, aim – anyhow – to join the European Union. Moreover, they are narrowly depending on the economic aid and the active mediation of the EU, even though a certain range of skepticism is alive among member-states about further enlargement. Then, if we further narrow the target to the Western Balkans, without losing the broader picture of the global changes under way, the implications of the democratization/reconciliation nexus appear to take a specific mark in the whole macroregion. In particular, new, open questions multiply, because the requirements of maximal democracy and consociational models are connected not only with tolerance, respect and accommodation of diversities, but also with the recognition of responsibilities for crimes (as Johan J. Du Toit stressed in his chapter) or intellectual ethnoaggressive mobilization (as in the case of the role played by the Serbian Academy Memorandum commented by Gazela Pudar and Aleksandar Pavlović). All these aspects are important and need to be democratically articulated and managed. But is the nation-state and the political and institutional framework able to face these challenges? Can the goals relevant to these challenges be achieved to the benefit of reconciliation and democratization by a form of State whose predominant voices are in support of homogeneity? To what extent is such a pretended homogeneity consistent with social diversity? And what is the degree of its compatibility with the process of EU integration? Admittedly, identifying a proper solution to these questions is not a challenge just for one Balkan country, neither for the Western Balkan as a whole, but this is a crucial European test. The EU dynamics, stemming si- Afterword 275 multaneously from the deepening of its communitarian institutions and the widening of its geopolitical inclusiveness, are a determinant that can help the process of democratization and reconciliation in the candidate, or potential candidate countries of South-East Europe. Nonetheless, it is also true that the EU conditionality has lost part of its effectiveness, mainly due to internal divisions, ineffective governance and solidarity. Still, the public declarations of Western Balkans leaders periodically emphasize their EU aspirations. Apparently, therefore, this attitude is a confirmation that a shared path exists. Meanwhile, these leaders have to cope with the consistency of the form of the State. In particular, it remains to understand how unsettled war legacies, old prejudices, lack of mutual knowledge, and the idea of homogenous nation-states can be matched with a process of reconciliation. Admittedly, the demand of homogeneity is often justified by the desire to guarantee state security. In this perspective, the awareness of a shared identity is viewed as a fundamental prerequisite for domestic stability. At the same time, however, the territorial fragmentation carried out since the beginning of the 20th century has created a series of kin states with their ethnic compatriots abroad, as minorities in neighboring countries. This process has divided families, friendships, and human relations. Historically, in the Balkans, state partitions happened brutally and in war times. Its consequences became vivid and still burn in the memory of victims as well as in the politics of remembrance, which are promoted by official institutions. Accordingly, it seems difficult to emulate the EU pattern even though personalities who promoted state partitions now demand an inclusive pathway. In fact, a multilateral strong political will is required by all former conflicting parts to emotionally accept (and not only rationally) the idea of coming back together again, although under a “different umbrella”. However, it is doubtful how this goal can be achieved without honestly facing the deeply controversial issue of responsibilities. An issue, this one, which might have unpredictable implications on power legitimation and security feelings. Shortly said, the knot is really intricate. The efforts to loosen it will require time, comprehensive approaches, but also innovative institutional perspectives. For example, the French-German reconciliation laid its foundations in sharing the management of the raw materials needed to fight. This was the first step aimed to establish mutual trust. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was therefore created in 1951 with this goal. Since then, European integration has evolved and currently (2020) the Commission has suggested key steps for establishing the basis of a fiscal and financial communitarian approach. Truly, we cannot predict whether Stefano Bianchini and Eltion Meka 276 and to what extent this proposal will be accepted by the intergovernmental institutions of the EU. However, this process raises a new question: is, in fact, this trajectory – despite all its stop and go policies – an inspiring factor for the Western Balkans, whose countries are still reluctant even to cooperate economically under the rules of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)? Additionally, the variety of cultures, habits, traditions, religions, vernaculars/languages, lifestyles, historical heritage, entrepreneurship, economic interests and commodities should also be examined. Can the management of these differences benefit of the whole region? Can this opportunity be considered crucially relevant to make the Western Balkans a pilot area for managing diversities, rather than a backwarded, quarrelsome, trouble-making area of Europe? The challenge of reconciliation, in fact, is not only a prerequisite for implementing a project, dominated – at least in words – by the prospect of the EU integration. It may become a crucial strategy for enhancing all unexpressed skills, whose potential wealth risks being frustrated by the efforts to impose homogeneity in territories where syncretism dominates. In the end, one can also inquire whether the attempt to establish nationstates is the outcome of a mindset approach that gives priority to a “traditional notion” of security in the Western Balkans. Accordingly, the idea of security is entrusted to group loyalty and identity, a domestic wellequipped military force, and a military alliance (in this case NATO). By contrast, the integration and cooperation with neighbors, which is the fundamental cornerstone of the EU, is less perceived as a key factor of stability and security. Rather, it is considered just a tool for attracting funds and increasing economic growth and welfare. In this sense, the leaderships of the Western Balkans are looking preferably at the past, rather than at the future. The Balkans are known for the famous sentence of Winston Churchill who contended that “the Balkans produce more history than they can consume”. In a way, this belief points out the extent to which politics, in the Balkans, suffers from a past that is described as a product of a long-lasting injustice both in textbooks and in public ceremonies or speeches. According to this view, in fact, the historical reproduction of injustice has affected the “natural right of the nation” to rely on an independent and sovereign State. This has been the result of the substantial enmities of neighbors who threaten the security of the “small nations” for centuries. Therefore, historical injustice still requires redemption, if not revenge. As a result, a non stop chain has virtually nurtured. How to remove this attitude constitutes a decisive challenge to allow reconciliation to find Afterword 277 a positive ground to establish the awareness of the population and in the political will. Taking into consideration the currently uncertain developments of the socio-political dynamics described in this textbook, it is regretfully difficult to say which direction the events will take. There are both chances that democratization and reconciliation will prevail with the support of the EU, or resentments will be further nurtured by politics, poisoning the future of the region with their instrumental use of the past. We have raised in this afterword a set of issues, whose implications are very difficult to forecast. We hope that the questions we have posed will encourage readers to critically think and elaborate their individual responses. At the same time, we cannot exclude that the regional variety of inputs produced over the centuries will help the Western Balkans to identify appropriate institutional frameworks and generate a shared confidence for a future common good. In this perspective, the “state of tensions” that we have mentioned at the beginning of these pages, might be positively – although prospectively – settled. Further readings: Atherton J. (1965), Michelet: Three Conceptions of Historical Becoming, in “Studies in Romanticism”, 4 (4), 220-239. Clewing K., The Presence of the Recent Past in Southeastern Europe Today, Goethe Institute, no date, available at http://www.goethe.de/ins/gr/lp/prj/eri/ein/en123185 69.htm#:~:text=The%20Presence%20of%20the%20Recent,history%20than%20th ey%20can%20consume.%E2%80%9D. Harvey D. (1990). The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reynolds A. (2002) (Ed.). The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford university Press. Warf B. (2008). Time-Space Compression. Historical Geographies. Abingdon: Routledge. Zapata-Barrero R. and Triandafyllidou A. (2012) (Eds.), Addressing Tolerance and Diversity Discourse in Europe, Barcelona: Cidob-University of Pompeu Fabra. Stefano Bianchini and Eltion Meka 278 List of authors Aleksandar Pavlović is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade with a PhD in Southeast European Studies from the University of Nottingham. He has extensive project experience and is currently engaged as principal investigator for Serbia on a Jean Monnet project Democratization and Reconciliation in the Western Balkans and as an MC member at the COST action ENTAN. He recently published Imaginarni Albanac (IFDT: Belgrade, 2019) and co-edited Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations: Figuring out the Enemy (New York: Routledge 2019). His main research interests include cultural history of the Balkans, Serbian and Balkan oral and written tradition, Serbian-Albanian relations and traditional Balkan society. Davor Pauković, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Mass Communication at the University of Dubrovnik, Croatia. He received his PhD in Contemporary History in 2010 from the University of Zagreb. He teaches courses in contemporary Croatian and world history. He has published on political transition in Croatia, dealing with the past and memory studies, dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Serb minority in Croatia and Serbo- Croatian relations. He is currently editor in chief of the international journal Contemporary Issues. His recent publications include Framing the Nation and Collective Identities: Political Rituals and Cultural Memory of the Twentieth-Century Traumas in Croatia (Routledge, 2019). Eltion Meka, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor at the College of Security and Global Studies, American University in the Emirates (Dubai, UAE) and a Researcher at the University of New York Tirana (Albania) and. He researches democracy promotion and EU enlargement and has been the recipient of three Erasmus+ projects on EU democracy promotion. He is the project leader of the Jean Monnet Network on “Democratization and Reconciliation in the Western Balkans”. His most recent publications have appeared in the Journal of European Integration and Europe-Asia Studies. 279 Gazela Pudar Draško is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade. She received her PhD at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, working on the themes of nationalism and intellectual engagement. Gazela has recently authored books O čemu govorimo kada govorimo o intelektualcu: ideje i iluzije [What do we talk when we talk on intellectual: ideas and illusions] and Mapiranje političkih orijentacija građana Srbije: kartografija nemoći [Mapping political orientations of citizens of Serbia: Cartography of impotence]. Her main interests lie within the fields of social engagement and democratization. Goran Patrick Filic, Ph.D., earned his bachelor in Finance and Economics from Southern Methodist University in Dallas, and the Master in International Affairs from Columbia University in New York City. He studied at University of Milan, where he earned his Ph.D. in Political Science. His most recent work is published in the Journal of Peace and Development and his research concerns questions in political theory, political economy and international relations. Maja Pulić is a doctoral candidate at University of Birmingham Business School (UK) and a Lecturer at the University Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. Interested in consumer culture and critical marketing, her interdisciplinary research explores post-conflict places and territories with particular emphasis on consumption of borders and boundaries in post-conflict cities. She is involved in the development and application of qualitative research methodologies with particular focus on grounded theory, visual methods as well as working with vulnerable groups of people in conflict and post-conflict areas. List of authors 280 Maja Savić-Bojanić received her Ph.D. from the University of Buckingham, and is currently teaching in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology (SSST). She holds an honorary professorship at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. Her research and publications focus on national minority groups and group identity issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Her other interests include: migrant and diaspora identities, autochthon minorities, identities and religion in fragmented states, and minority political participation. Ilir Kalemaj, Ph.D., is Chair of Social Sciences Department at the University of New York Tirana (Albania). He has published three books/monographs and more than twenty peer review journal articles and book chapters. His most recent monographs are Contested Borders: Territorialization of National Identity and Shifts of Imagined Geographies in Albania (Bern: Peter Lang); as well as Gracka e Votuesit: Mes Alkimisë Elektorale dhe Demokracisë Hibride [English translation: Voter’s Trap: Between Electoral Alchemy and Hybrid Democracy], co-written with Eltion Meka (UET Press, 2018). Johan J. du Toit, Adv., was a career Prosecutor and Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and Coordinator for Extraditions and Requests for Mutual Legal Assistance at the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court of South Africa in Johannesburg until his retirement in November 2019. He was also the lead counsel and evidence leader at the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry that investigated the causes of public violence in South Africa during 1991 to 1994. He later joined the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Netherlands (‘ICTY”) as a team leader and trial attorney, where he, inter alia, was responsible with others in setting up the first International Criminal Court since WW II. At that court he also worked on the investigation and trial phases of many cases of persons most responsible for serious human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia. List of authors 281 Marco Zoppi works as Research Assistant at the Department of Political and Social Science of the University of Bologna (Italy). His research interests span from Euro-African relations to migration and integration issues, especially in Europe and across the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region. His latest articles were published on Southeastern Europe and The International Spectator. Pero Maldini, Ph.D., is a Professor of Political Science and the Head of Department of Mass Communication at University of Dubrovnik. He has published four books and a number of papers in the field of comparative politics, democratic theory, political culture, media and politics, and political education. He is a member of the Executive Board of the Croatian Political Science Association and a member of the two journal editorial boards. Sanja Kajinić, Ph.D., is an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political and Social Science at the University of Bologna, Forli campus (Italy). She researches the history of social movements and politics of memory in Southeastern Europe. Her recent publications appeared in the journals Southeastern Europe and the Anthropology of East Europe Review. Simona Mameli has worked as project manager and international consultants on several projects in Italy and Western Balkans, dealing with deliberative approach to decision making and divided societies. She received her PhD in Political Science from the University of Bern, Switzerland. Her research has been recently published in the framework of a coauthored book, Deliberation across Deeply Divided Societies: Transformative Moments, published by Cambridge University Press (2017). List of authors 282 Sokol Lleshi, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of New York Tirana (Albania). He researches political projects of breaking with the past in post-socialist Eastern Europe, processes of institutional emergence, and sociology of intellectuals. His most recent publications have appeared in State of Affairs: Social Theory East Central Europe issued by Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, and Sage Research Methods Cases. Stefano Bianchini is Professor of East European Politics and History at the University of Bologna, Forlì Campus and Rector's delegate for East European relations. As an expert of Balkan issues, he published and co-edited 36 books and more than 150 articles in Italian, French, English and other languages. He was an adviser of the ICTY, in the Hague. He is the Executive Editor of «Southeastern Europe», Brill, Leiden. His last books are "Liquid Nationalism and State Partitions in Europe" (Edward Elgar, 2017) and “Rekindling the Strong State in Russia and China” (co-edited with Antonio Fiori, Brill, 2020). Višeslav Raos, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. He received his Mag. phil. in Political Science from the University of Vienna and his PhD in Comparative Politics from the University of Zagreb. He teaches courses on comparative politics, electoral system, party competition in the EU, and party democracy in Europe. He is particularly interested in the intersection of territory, identity, and politics, as well as European party competition and party mobilization of identities. List of authors 283 Index A Abraham Lincoln, 93, 96 Accountability, 81, 87, 94, 96, 97, 98, 108, 183 Acquis Communautaire, 111, 112, 118 AEBR (Association of European Border Regions), 201 Adenauer Konrad, 135 Adriatic-Ionian Euroregion, 140 Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, 139 Adriatic-Ionian Macroregion, 139, 260 Adriatic Sea, 53 Ahmići, 88 Ahtisaari Plan, 48-49 Albania, 11, 18, 39, 48-9, 52-4, 56-7, 103, 105, 129-30, 133-4, 136, 141, 146, 149-50, 155, 161-4, 168, 201, 227, 250, 253, 255-6, 259, 265, 270, 272-3 Albanians, 46, 48-49, 51, 53-54, 83, 89 Albanian Nationalism, 161 – and the Albanian national question, 134 – the “Albanian cultural world”, 141 – the trauma of the partition of 1912-13, 136 Alexander the Great, 50, 52 Alia Ramiz, 53 Almond Gabriel, 76 America, 93, 96 Anderson Benedict, 38 Annual Report, 118, 119 Antall József, 131 Antifascist movement, 41, 42, 135 – Myth, 161 – Resistance, 42, 161 – Yugoslav liberation war, 163 Anti-Semitism, 144 Arab uprisings, 139 Arcelor Mittal, 263 Armenia, 131, 147 Aristotel, 61 Arkan (Željko Ražnatović), 176 Ashkali, 48, 234 Athens, 52, 61, 93 Australia, 97 Austro-Hungarian Empire, 40, 53 Authoritarianism, 14, 31, 33, 45, 72, 86, 105, 107,114, 117, 123, 188, 144, 249 Axis Powers, 41-42, 44 Azerbaijan, 131 B Badinter Arbitration Committee, 16, 198 Banja Luka, 90, 94 Battle of Kosovo Field, 44, 172 Balkan Spring, 249-250, 263 Balkan Wars, 44 Balladur Édouard, 131 Bauman Zygmunt, 147 Beetham David, 64 Belarus, 50 Belfast Agreement, (see Good Friday), 143 Belgrade, 44, 46, 48-49 – Belgrade Circle, 207, 217-9 Benelux, 142 Berlin, 42, 52 – process, 145 – wall, 52, 133-4, – and the East zone, 143 – and the West side, 133 Blaškić Tihomir, 180 Borders, 15, 18, 23, 27, 29, 42, 45, 53, 131, 141, 149, 153, 156, 165-6, 168, 189-97, 199-200, 202-5, 214, 251, 258, 270, 273-4 (see also State Borders) – Antecedent borders, 191 Border demarcation, 191 – Contestations, 139-40 285 – Cross-border cooperation, 143, 189, 197, 200-204 – Natural borders, 191 – Superimposed borders, 191 – Revisions, 131 Borovica, 89 Boraine Alex, 182, 183, 184 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10, 14-7, 19, 39, 49, 55, 88, 89, 92 100, 131, 138, 140, 144, 146, 168, 198, 229, 235, 250, 257, 262, 272 – Entities, 138, 140, 190, 192, 199-200, 232, 272 Bosniaks, 42-43, 46, 48 Bosnian Croats, 88, 89, 94 Bosnian Muslims, 83, 88, 89, 94 Bosnian Serbs, 88, 89 Boundaries, 190-191 – Subsequent boundaries, 191 Brazil, 49, 137 Brčko, 90, 227, 256, 232-234 Breuilly, 154, 158, 211 Briand Aristide, 137 Broz Svetlana, 141 Broz Tito, see Tito Brubaker Rogers, 38-39 Brussels, 49, 143, 145, 154, 220, 222, 227, 267 – Brussels Agreement, 49 Bulatović Momir, 46 Bulgaria, 11, 119, 131, 154, 157, 161, 163, 227, 259 C Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 111, 113,114, 131, 163, 164, 191 Central Bosnia, 88, 89, 95 Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), 139, 277 Central European Initiative (CEI), 139, Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Central Europe, 15, 33, 137, 145, 154, 156, 166-7, 245 Četnik, 146 Cetinje, 47 Citizen, 24, 60, 62, 64, 68, 73 – Public citizen, 94, 96 Civil law, 170, 171, 180 Civil rights, 59, 61, 62, 65-68, 70, 71, 76, 77, 110, 271 Civil society, 67, 71, 72, 73, 85, 86, 119, 140, 145, 237, 240 Civic duties, 90 Civil courage, 141 Clientelism, 263 Clinton administration, 16, 17, 143 Cold War, 82, 117, 163 – Post-Cold War, 20, 104 Collapse of communism, 10, 24, 54, 104 Common law, 170, 171, 180 Communism, 19, 28, 40, 54, 103, 144, 163, 164,165,166 Communist partisans, 53 Community of Serb Municipalities, 49 Competition, 63, 65-67, 69, 70, 113, 114, 194, 249, 283, Compromise, 65, 75, 76, 185, 230, 233, 235 Congress of Berlin, 42, 44, 52 Consensus, 65, 66, 68, 70, 73, 75, 76, 138, 171, 231, 238, 239, 264 Consociationalism, 30, 229, 230, 236 – Consociational democracy, 271, 272, 275 Copenhagen criteria, 110, 111, 118, 131-2 Confederation, 46 Corruption, 97, 105, 155, 248, 250, 263 Ćosić Dobrica, 214, 216 Cross-border cooperation, (see Borders) Croatia, 9-10, 12, 14-7, 19, 39, 41-3, 56-7, 83, 89, 100-101, 104-5, 109, 119, 142, 146, 154-5. 160, 167-8, 198-9, 216, 220-21, 227-9, 232-3, 257, 267, 272 Croats, 40-43, 45-46, 83, 88, 89, 94 Croatian Serbs, 88 Cultural heritage, 91, 273 Cultural nationalism, 157, 158, 210 Index 286 Cultural rights, 160, 198, 226, 227, 229, 232, 242, Czechoslovakia, 14, 82, 135, 197 D Dahl Robert, 69, 70 Dayton Accords (1995), 138, 232-3 – Peace agreement, 42-3, 232 – Negotiations, 200 De Gaulle Charles,135 Declaration on the Common language, 141, 207, 217, 220-1, 233 Democratic Party of Socialists, 46 Demarcation, 190, 194, 195, 270, 274 Democracy, 21, 25, 32, 62-6, 68, 70-2, 75, 78-9, 81, 84-5, 92-3, 104, 107, 111, 124, 130, 248-9, 261-72 – Democracy building, 132-33, 137 – and a minimalist and maximalist idea of, 133 – Democracy promotion, 105, 106, 109 – Democratic capital, 81, 85, 87, 90, 91, 97, 98, 100 – Democratic deliberation, 82, 85, 87, 94, 98, 237, 238, 241 – Democratic governance, 110 – Democratic society, 82, 99 – Democratic participation, 86, 97 – Democratic values, 86, 87, 90, 91 – Democratic theory, 81, 87, 98 – Democratization, 20, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 96, 99 Depopulation, 146, 247, 255-6, 260-1 Development, 13, 15, 19, 22-3. 27-8, 31, 39, 44, 49-50, 56, 59, 63-4, 74-5, 77, 79, 84-5, 87, 97, 99-100, 108-9, 112, 120, 123-4, 132, 135, 142, 145, 147-9, 155, 178, 198, 200-2, 213, 215, 217, 239-40, 248-9, 260-1, 273, 278 Deliberative democracies, 25, 30, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 89, 94, 95, 237, 238, Diamond Larry, 77-9, 133, 149 Dictatorship of the proletariat, 128 Dialogue of Historians, 207, 217, 219 Diaspora, 249-250, 252, 262-264 Dimitrijević Vojin, 141 Disabled People, 144, 227 Discrimination, 13, 17, 140, 144, 216, 219, 226, 228-9, 245, 271 Disintegration, 46, 155-6, 164-5, 213, 220 Diversity, 65, 72, 75, 77, 147, 253, 273, 275 Divided societies, 30, 82, 325, 229, 231, 234, 235, 241 Diversities, 127-8, 133, 143, 147, 270-3, 275, 277 Dretelj, 88 Dubrovnik, 88 Đukanović Milo, 46 Duties, 64, 67, 90, 92, 95, 96, 97 E East Bloc, 82 Eastern enlargement, 110, 111 Eastern Europe, 82, 84, 92, 103, 111, 114, 130, 150, 153, 163-4, 191 East Germany, 82, 133 Education, 48, 67, 74-5, 97, 99, 120, 140, 149-50, 195, 208, 211, 222, 225, 232-6, 244-5; 251, 257 Empire, 157 – Colonial empires, 197, Equality, 59, 61-64, 66-70, 73-77, 219, 234, 252 Ethnic community, 158, 161 Ethnic conflict, 91, 103, 155, 165-6, 231, 235-7, 239 Ethnic cleansing, 20, 89, 100, 103, 146, 157, 270, 273 Ethnic group, 29, 40, 43, 44, 47, 49, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 94, 95, 121, 140, 141, 191, 200, 215, 226, 228, 234, 236, 271 Ethnic identity, 47, 82, 198, 241 Ethnic intolerance, 90 Ethno-nationalism, 105, 156, 158 Ethnicization, 121, 162 Europe, 38, 40, 50, 53-54, 82, 84, 89, 92, 97, 100 Euroregions, 201 European integration, 10, 11, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 103, 104, 105, Index 287 109, 113, 115, 122, 130, 134, 137, 144, 146, 147, 270, 271, 277 European Union, 9-10, 23, 38, 43, 46, 56, 103-4, 112-3, 124-5, 127, 132, 137, 148-9, 155, 157, 167, 192, 201, 240, 254, 265, 275 – and absorption capacity, 145 – and enlargement eastward, 130 – and the “founding fathers”, 135 – and the Maastricht Treaty (1992) – Candidate countries, 106, 112, 116, 118-9, 131, 142, 144-5, 276 – Conditionality, 37, 112, 114, 123-4, 139, 145, 147, 227, 276 – Constitutional treaty in 2005, 139 – Deepening, 22, 61, 82, 115, 145, 148, 207, 273, 276 – Enlargement fatigue, 115-6, 121, 124, 139, 145 – European Economic Community, 135, 198 – European Economic Market, 143 – European Federalist Movement, 135 – Institutions, 130 – Integrative values, 140 – Member-states, 22, 104, 107, 112, 115-6, 132, 139, 144, 155, 204 – Single European Act (1986), 135 – Sovereign debt crisis of 2008-2009, 139 – Treaty of Rome (1957), 135 – Widening, 22, 115, 148, 176 EUSAIR, 139 EUSDR, 139 F Fascist Italian occupation, 53, 91 Federation, 10-11, 13, 16, 38, 42-3, 46, 48, 82-3, 128-30, 137-8, 149, 160, 165-6, 198-200, 215, 227, 232, 243, 256, 274 – Federation BiH, 83 Feminist movements, 136 Fischer Joschka, 104, 123, 130, 141, 143, 148 France, 18, 131, 134-5, 142, 175, 190 Freedom, 15, 53, 59-63, 66, 67, 69, 73, 74, 76, 91, 96, 107, 119, 208, 209, 219, 248 Freedom House, 93, 105, 248, 249 Frontiers, 190, 199 Fukuyama Francis, 20, 104 Functionalist method, 142-3, 149 G Gellner Ernest, 38, 154, German Democratic Republic, 133 Germany, 15, 16, 82, 130, 133, 135, 142, 145, 174, 175, 211, 257 Ghegs, 53 Gligorov Kiro, 50 Gnjilane, 89 Goldstone Commission, 28, 169, 183, 281 Goldstone, Justice Richard, 183-5 Gorani, 89 Goring Hermann, 175 Good Friday, 143 Great War, 131, 137, 162 (see also World War I) Greece, 50, 51, 105, 114, 116, 117, 161, 162, 254, 259 Greens, 46 Grugel Jean, 70, 74 H Habermas Jurgen, 93, 237, 238, Habsburg Empire, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 229 Hellenic Macedonia, 50 Hegemony, 88 Heterogeneity, 127, 147, 261, 270, 273 Heymann Philip, 184 Hidden minorities, 228 Hirschman Albert O., 258 Hobsbawm Eric, 38 Homeland War, 41 Homogeneity, 147, 271, 273, 275-6, 277 – Homogeneous territories, 83 Hoxha Enver, 129, 163 Hroch Miroslav, 154, 156,158 Human Rights, 20, 26, 77, 87, 108, 110, 118-9, 124, 135, 139, 141, 146, Index 288 148, 150, 173-4, 178, 185, 187, 198, 204, 219, 226-7, 244, 246, 267, 271 – and Protection of human rights, 18, 60, 66 Humboldt University, 130, 143, 148 Hungary, 123, 131, 145, 162 Huntington Samuel. 70 I ICC, 178, 179 ICTR, 178, 179 ICTY, 11-12, 55, 132, 141, 169-74, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176-81, 185 Identity demarcations, 194, 195 Ideology, 28, 60, 128, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 161, 163, 165, 166, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 221, 273 Ideology of nationalism, 209-12, 214, 217, 221 Ilinden Uprising, 50 Illiberal democracy, 144-45 Inclusiveness, 70, 127, 133, 137, 145, 148, 276 Independent State of Croatia, 41-42, 160, India, 49, 137, 179 – Indian war, 197 Integration, 9-11, 13, 21-4, 26-9, 32, 41, 51, 53, 103-5, 108-9, 113, 115, 118-9, 121-2, 124, 130, 132, 134-5, 137-9, 142, 144-49, 155, 205, 212, 214, 225, 270-1, 275, 277 Intellectuals, 13, 27, 29, 30, 133, 144, 156, 159, 207-221 – anti-nationalism of intellectuals, 217-8 Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), 199-200 Intergroup dialogue, 242 International dimension of democratization, 104 International relations, 88, 104, 192, 193, 203, 280, 281 International Residual Mechanism, 179, 181 Intolerance, 19, 27, 90, 108, 143, 218 Ireland, 143, 254 – and Northern Ireland, 143 – Irish peace, 135, 143 Italy, 15, 53, 79, 129, 135, 142, 184, 211, 254, 260, 282 Izetbegović Alija, 12, 132 J Jackson Robert, 175 Jakovina Tvrtko, 141 Janjevci, 89 Japan, 97 Jews, 144, 147 Judah Tim, 141 K Kakanj, 88, 89 Kandić Nataša, 141 Karađorđević dynasty, 44 Karadžić, Radovan, 176, 179, 180 Kingdom of Montenegro, 45 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 40, 42, 45, 160 Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 40, 44, 160, 163 KFOR, 48 Klečka, 89 Kopijari, 89 Kordić, Dario, 140, 180, 220 Kordić Snježana, 141, 149, 220 Koren Snježana, 141 Kosovo, 10, 13-5, 17-9, 30, 39, 44-5, 48-51, 53, 56, 83, 89, 92, 105, 121, 130, 138-41, 146, 149-50, 162, 164, 167-8, 172, 200-1, 214-6, 222, 225, 227, 229, 234, 243, 248, 251, 255-6, 259, 267, 272 – Kosovar Albanians, 48 – Kosovo Liberation Army, 17, 89 – Kosovska Mitrovica 90, 94 – Kosovo War, 46, 48 Koulouri Christina, 140 Kumanovo Accords (1999), 18, 138 Kraljeva Sutjeska, 88 Kruševo Republic, 50 L League of the Communists, 14, 128, Legacy, 12, 43, 134, 141, 143, 156, 162, 165, 167, 185, 258, 264 Index 289 – Communist, 146, 166 – Historical, 261 Legitimacy, 65, 76, 77, 108, 112, 137, 155, 161, 212, 237 LGBTIQ, 227, 228 LGBT community, 144, 271 Liberal-democracy, 15, 25, 53, 59, 62, 67-8, 74, 93, 107, 110 Liberalism, 64, 67, 68, 144, 239 Lijphart Arend, 79, 229-231, 271 Linguistic rights, 225, 229, 232, 233 Lora (Yugoslav Navy HQ), 88 Low birth rates, 146 M Macedonian Orthodox Church, 51 Macedonia, 10, 14, 16, 18, 50-2, 57, 117, 123-4, 157, 164, 198, 229, 244, 257 – North Macedonia, 30, 39, 50, 52, 55, 92, 105, 109, 114, 116-7, 121, 138, 141, 146, 166, 201, 225, 227, 234, 245, 248, 250, 255-7, 272 – Macedonians, 51-52 Madison James, 93 Mainwaring Scott, 71, 79 Majoritarian democracy, 66, 79, 271-2 Maldini Pero, 69, 72, 74, 79 Mandela Nelson, President, 184 Manjača, 89 Marginalization, 144 Marxist-Leninist ideology, 128 Media, 27, 45, 75, 120-1, 140, 143. 145, 175, 207, 209-10, 221, 248, 250, 259, 262 Memorandum of the SASA, 13, 207, 215-6, 218, 223 Memories, 19, 29, 92, 130, 136, 140-1, 147-8, 158, 182, 195, 263, 269 Migration, 27, 30-1, 133, 139, 144, 146, 149, 192, 245, 247-62, 264-68, 274 Miletići, 89 Milošević Slobodan, 13-5, 44, 46, 48, 114, 132, 165, 199, 215, 217-8 Minorities, 25, 27, 37, 46, 48, 67, 131, 146, 199, 215, 225-30, 234, 242-6, 271, 276 – Minority rights, 30, 110, 118, 133, 225-7, 229, 231,234, 242-3 – New minorities, 226, 227 – Protection of minorities, 110, 118, 131 Mishkova Diana, 32, 159, 167 Modernization, 28, 40, 50, 75, 153-4, 156, 158-9, 166-7 Moldavia, 131 Monnet Jean, 135, 142 Montenegro, 10, 12-14, 18, 39-40, 45-8, 55-6, 105, 114, 138-9, 141, 146, 162, 198, 201, 220-1, 227-8, 248, 250, 255, 257, 259, 267, 272-3 Montenegrin Orthodox Church, 47 Montesquieu Charles-Louis de Secondat, 63, 79 Monuments, 19, 91 Moran Michael, 68, 79 Morinj, 89 Mostar, 88, 90-1, 94-5, 100, 233-4 Mother Teresa, 54 Multiethnic cities, 90 – Environment, 221 – Fiber, 90 Multinational intervention, 129 – and Alba, 54, 129 – and Pellicano, 53, 129 N Nagorno-Karabakh,131 Najbar-Agičić Magdalena, 141, 149 Nation, 24, 28, 37-41, 43-5, 47-57, 64, 72, 88, 92-3, 97, 103, 117, 135-6, 140, 142, 147, 150, 153-4, 156-8, 160-8, 190-1, 205, 210-7, 221-3, 226, 249, 265, 267, 270-1, 273-7 – Civic nation, 49, 54, 136, 238, 242 – Constituent nations, 14, 140, 215, 272 Ethnic nation, 136, 154 – and its theory and practice, 56, 135 Nation-state, 24, 28, 38, 64, 72, 103, 135, 142, 147, 153-4, 156, 159, 162, 166, 190, 270-1, 273-7 Nationalism, 9, 21, 23, 27-9, 31-2, 38, 44, 54-6, 99, 103, 131, 136, 138, 140, 144-5, 149, 153-63, 165-8, 189, 199, 204, 207-23, 238, 242, 244, 262, 266 Index 290 – Ethnonational identity, 46 – Ethno-nationalism, 105, 153, 156, 158, 167, 243 – National Identity, 38, 42, 44, 92, 147, 163-4, 168, 211, 223, 234 – Nationalist wars, 131 – Separatist nationalism, 158 NATO, 10, 16-8, 20, 22, 37, 41, 45, 47-8, 52, 103-4, 116, 129, 138-9, 142, 144, 232, 277 – Bombing over Serbia and Montenegro, 138 Nazi occupation, 53, 91, 160 – Nazi-fascist revisionism, 19 Negotiations, 17-8, 45, 48, 65, 113, 122, 131-2, 135, 145, 167, 182, 184-6, 200, 272 – for EU membership, 144 Neighbors, 28, 131, 140-1, 155, 162, 258, 277 Nepotism, 97 NGOs, 18, 67, 140-1, 271 Nesting orientalisms, 156 New York, 95 Nobel Peace Prizes, 137 Nohlen Dieter, 74, 79 Nuremberg Trials, 169, 173-5, 185, 188 O Ohrid Agreement, 18, 30, 51, 116, 117, 138, 234, Operation Alba, see Multinational intervention Operation Pelican, see Multinational intervention Ottoman Empire, 44, 52, 88, 144, 154-6, 158, 162, 168, 229 – Ottoman lands, 159, 267 – Ottoman Macedonia, 52 – Ottoman power; 161 – Ottoman rule, 42, 88 Orahovac, 89 Orbán Victor, 145 Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric, 51 OSCE, 22, 129, 139-40, 226-7, 232, 245 Ovčara, 89 P Paris, 17, 131, 142, 150, 167, 226, 265 Parry Geraint, 68, 79 Participation, 59, 62, 67-75, 78, 81-2, 84-7, 93-4, 96-7, 99-100, 105, 110, 128, 132-3, 185-6, 200, 225, 237-42, 262, 271-2, 281 Participatory democracies, 25, 81-5, 87, 90, 93-9, 185 Partition, 11, 15, 17, 73, 136, 141, 149, 197, 200, 204, 276 Peace, 15-9, 43, 86-7, 92, 95-6, 99, 101, 111, 117, 135, 137, 142, 144, 149, 167, 187-8, 219, 221, 230, 244, 266 – Paris Peace treaty, 226 – Peace-building, 48 – Peace keeping, 48, 100 – Peace studies, 88, 100 – Peace treaties, 129, 131, 138-9, 143, 226, 232, – (see also Dayton Peace Agreement, Trianon Peace Treaty) Perpetrator(s), 28, 86, 88-9, 92, 94, 173, 175, 177-8, 182-3, 185 Plattner Marc, 32-3, 66, 68, 78-9 Plavšić Biljana, 182, 183 Poland, 123, 135, 190, 197 Political culture, 31, 44, 76-8, 134, 229, 231, 235, 239, 242 Political representation, 73, 105-6, 243 Political system, 21, 25, 59-61, 66, 68-71, 73-4, 76-7, 81, 128, 154, 157, 200, 230, 259, 271-2 Post-communism, 20, 244 – Post-communist Albania, 53-4 – Post-communist authorities, 51 – Post-communist Europe, 20, 103, 108 – Post-communist context, 39-40 – Post-communist Democratic Party of Socialists, 46 – Post-communist parties, 111 – Post-communist President, 41 – Post-communist regime, 53 – Post-communist societies, 54 – Post-communist state, 50 – Post-communist world, 105 Index 291 Post-conflict societies, 54, 86, 97 Post-socialist transformation, 9 – Post-socialist countries, 131, 137 – Post-socialist societies, 134 – Post-socialist transition, 11, 119, 270 Post-Yugoslav space, 10-1, 22-4, 27, 29, 31-2, 155, 167, 233 Prejudice, 108, 136, 198, 236, 238-41, 243, 276 Prespa Agreement, 52, 57, 117 Prishtina, 48-9, 149 Privileges, 95-6, 212 Procedures, 59, 61, 64-5, 68, 70-1, 73, 107, 115, 133 Prpić Ivan, 62, 79 Przeworsky Adam, 71, 79 Public services, 61, – Public administration, 72 – Public citizen, 94, 96 – Public commemorations, 155, 277 – Public institutions, 85 – Public interest, 94 – Public officials, 81, 86, 94, 96, 98 – Public opinion, 15, 18, 29, 78, 92, 207, 222 – Public political space, 77, 203-4, 228 – Public politics, 65, 74 – Public procurement, 120 – Public school, 95 – Public sphere, 75, 237 Puhovski Žarko, 62, 79 Putnam Robert, 66, 79 R Racism, 136, 144, 189 Rawls John, 93, 101 Recom, 145-6 Reconciliation, 9-12, 19-32, 55, 81-9, 91-2, 94-5, 97-100, 103-7, 109, 114-6, 118-24, 127, 130-2, 134-5, 137, 141-2, 145-8, 150, 166, 169, 172-3, 181-9, 203-4, 207, 222, 225-6, 229, 241-5, 247, 249, 251, 252-3, 258, 262-4, 269, 271, 273-8 – the French-German reconciliation 137, 276 Regional Cooperation, 27, 108, 139, 143, 145, 149, 155 – Regional Cooperation Council, 139 Religious groups, 71 Remittances, 31, 251-252, 266 Republic of Srpska or Republika Srpska, 42-43, 45, 83, 138, 199-200, 227, 232, 256, 261, 263 Responsibilities, 19, 90, 92, 96-7, 144, 201, 275-6 Revisionism, 19, 141 Rights (see also Human Rights and Minority Rights), 25, 48, 51, 59, 61-71, 73-4, 76-7, 87, 95-6,107, 110, 112, 113, 119-20, 122. 124, 133, 144, 156, 160, 162, 172, 198-99, 216, 225-9, 232, 234-5, 242-4; 246, 248-9, 267, 271-2 – Civil, social, and economic rights, 133 – Human and minority rights, 133 Robinson Patrick, 182-3 Roma, 48, 144, 164, 226, 228, 234 Romania, 11, 50, 119, 131, 135, 154, 163 Rousseau Jean-Jacques, 62, 63, 79, 81, 93, 96, 97, 99 Rugova Ibrahim, 17, 48 Rule of law, 20, 62-3, 65, 72-3, 100, 105, 110, 118-9, 123, 159, 166, 248-9 – Authoritarian rule, 72 (see also authoritarianism) – Of the people, 25, 59, 64, 68, 71 – Ruler(s), 60, 62-3, 71, 163, 273 Russia, 16, 18, 45, 47, 50, 168, 175, 179, 273 – Russian Empire, 162 Rutar Sabine, 158 S Sarajevo, 17, 19, 57, 88, 100, 139, 157, 176, 218-20, 233, 245, 265-6 Sartori Giovanni, 60, 79 Schmitter Philippe, 66, 79, 133, 150 School system, 27, 30, 140, 231, 234 – and “two schools in one roof”, 140, 245, Schuman Declaration, 142 Schuman Robert, 135, 142 Schumpeter Joseph, 81, 93 Index 292 Security, 20, 64, 66, 74, 76, 119-20, 139, 147, 192, 234, 242, 254, 247, 259, 265-7, 273, 275-7 – UN Security Council, 12, 18, 48, 54, 172, 179 Self-determination, 15, 46, 49, 198-9, 205 Self-management, 12, 128 Serbia, 10, 12-9, 39-41, 43-8, 51, 56-7, 83, 88, 100-1, 105, 109, 114, 121, 129-30, 138-41, 144, 146, 150, 154, 159, 161-4, 167-8, 198-201, 211, 213-8, 220-3, 227-8, 232, 244, 248, 250, 255-7, 259-60, 265, 267, 272 – Serbian Orthodox Church, 47, 51 – Serbian Nationalism, 157 – Serbian Progressive Party, 45, 114 – Serbs, 40, 42-45, 47-49, 83, 88, 89, 94 Serbian-Montenegrin Union, 138 Šešelj Vojislav, 176 Shoah, 19 Skanderbeg, 54 Skopje, 50-2, 255-6 Slovenia, 10-11, 13-6, 104, 129, 140, 142, 198, 216, 227-9 – Slovenian Memorandum, 215-6 Smith Anthony, 38, 136, 158, 208, 210-1, 223, 240, 245 Social cohesion, 82 Social constructionism, 191 Socialist Party of Serbia, 114 Socialist Party of Yugoslavia, 14 Socialist Republic of Macedonia, 50 Socialist Republic of Montenegro, 46 Sørensen Georg, 60, 66-7, 79 South Africa, 28-9, 32, 50, 108, 169, 183-8 South-East Europe, 134, 276 – South East Europe, 9, 10-1, 28, 154, 166 – Southeast Europe, 149, 260, 266, Southeastern Europe, 84, 150, 163, 266, 268, 278 South Slavs, 44, 160, 163, 211, 274 Soviet camp, 131 Soviet empire, 130 Sovranism, 144 Spinelli Altiero, 135 Split (city), 90, 100, 220 Srebrenica, 17, 88-9, 180, 263, 266 SSECP, 139 Stability pact, 131 Stability pact for SEE, 139 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), 108-9 Stabilitocracy, 117-8, 123 Stalin, 150 State, 60-64, 67, 68, 70, 72-75, 77 – State borders, 192 – State-building 37-41, 44-45, 48, 52, 54 – State dissolution, 54 State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, 40 State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 46 Strauss Leo, 62, 79 Stresemann Gustav, 137 Stuart Mill John, 92, 96, 97, 99, 238, 239 Superiority, 106, 136, 144 Suprematism, 144 Stupni Do, 88 Switzerland, 15, 137 Syncretism, 127, 147, 270, 277 T Tadić Duško, 174 Tadić Ljubomir. 62, 79 Territory, 193 - 194 – Territorial principle, 14, 129 – Territoriality, 193, 196 Textbooks, 55, 140-1, 149, 234, 277 The Hague, 12, 132, 169, 173, 177, 227 The manipulation of the past, 139 Thessaloniki, 127, 131, 139, 141, 148 Tilly Charles, 70, 80 Tito (Josip Broz), 12, 48, 128, 163-5, 168, 213, 215 – Titoism, 129, – Titoist Yugoslavia, 160 Titova Mitrovica, 90 Tosks, 53 Tocqueville Alexis de, 66, 68, 80 Index 293 Transition, 10-11, 19, 20, 25, 32-3, 44, 54, 59, 68, 75, 79, 85, 103-4, 111, 128-9, 133, 147, 149, 182, 185, 226, 249, 253, 270, 272, 279 – Transitional justice, 9, 28, 33, 108, 141, 150, 166, 187, 265-7 Transnationalism, 247, 251, 265 Transnistria, 131 Transparency, 25, 87, 98, 110, 249 Trauma, 56, 131, 136, 148, 235-6, 279 – Social trauma, 131 – War trauma, 134, 137, 139 Travnik, 88, 89 Trianon peace treaty, 131 Trust, 77, 82, 91, 98, 134, 137, 146, 175, 198, 234, 242, 258, 261, 274, 276 Trusina, 89 Truth and Reconciliation Commission - South Africa, 169, 181-5, 187, 188 Tuđman Franjo, 12, 14-5, 17, 41, 132, 165 Tutu Desmond, 186 Tuzla, 90, 91, 99 Two-schools-under-one-roof, 140, 232, 234, 245 U Ulcinj, 90 Underestimation, 144 UNMIK, 48 United Kingdom, 143, 175 United Nations, 43, 48, 169, 172, 198, 233, 267 United States or USA, 16, 96, 100, 104 168, 175, 179, 189, 232 Ustaša, 88, 146 Uzelac Maja, 62, 79 V Values, 59, 60, 62, 64, 68, 76, 77 Vareš, 88-90, 95 Vejvoda Ivan, 66, 69, 79 Ventotene Manifesto, 135 Verba Sidney, 76, 78 Vergina Star, 50 Veterans (war) 83 Victimization, 27, 44, 54, 136, 140, 143-4 – Victim, 88, 89 – Victimhood 89 Villa-Vicencio Charles, 181 Violence, 18, 28, 52, 54, 88, 91-2, 100, 116, 123, 131, 144, 147, 165, 168-9, 173, 183, 185, 242, 250, 281 Vojvodina, 10, 13-5, 44, 157, 164, 215-6 Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), 63, 80 Vučić Aleksandar, 45, 201 Vujačić Veljko, 159-61, 165 Vujčić Vladimir, 76, 80 Vukovar, 17, 88, 100 W Western allies, 133 Western Balkans, 9-10, 12, 19,22, 24-7, 29, 31-3, 37-8, 40, 43, 54-6, 81, 83-4, 88, 100, 103, 105, 108, 122-5,127, 129-32, 134, 136-44, 146-50, 153-6, 166-7, 169, 172, 187, 189, 197, 200-3, 205, 207, 222, 225-29, 232, 242-3, 245-8, 253-4, 259-60, 264-72, 274-78 – and the EU, 150 – Destabilization, 130 – the post-socialist and post-traumatic societies of, 134 – Serbia-Kosovo-Albania triangle, 130 Western Europe, 32, 40, 54, 97, 130, 137, 154, 157, 162 Western Germany, 142 Whites, 45 World War I (WWI), 44, 133, 158, 161, 165 226 (see also Great War) World War II (WWII), 10-1, 19, 41-42, 44, 53, 88, 91, 137, 144, 165, 169, 172, 181, 216, 227 X Xenophobia, 136, 189 Y Yugoslav federation, 11, 16, 38, 46, 48, 82, 128, 160, 166 Index 294 – and former Yugoslavia, 10-12, 21, 23, 27-30, 33, 42, 44, 81-4, 86, 89, 94, 99, 101, 120, 130-2, 146, 164, 169-73, 181, 183-4, 186-7, 207, 212-5, 217, 219-20, 233, 243, 253, 267 – and the “Yugosphere”, 27, 141, 150 – Federal Assembly, 137 – the “Yugoslav Phantom”, 143 – the Yugoslav violent fragmentation, 137 – Yugoslav Partisans, 91 – Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), 14 – Yugoslav succession wars, 88, 136, 138, 141, 144, 274 Z Zagreb, 15, 17, 63, 88, 219 Zamarovský Vojtech, 62, 80 Zenica, 89, 94 – Zenica 3rd Corps, 89 Index 295

Abstract

This book explores the challenges of democratization and reconciliation in the context of European integration in the post-Yugoslav region. Despite its academic and policy relevance, students and academics studying the region do not have a single source of reading material where they can learn about the challenges facing the region. This book aims to serve an array of college students and become a go-to source in studying the region. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the book provides readers with a comprehensive account of the various challenges inhibiting democratization and reconciliation. The chapters are written by authors from different disciplines, thus allowing readers to analyze the region from different perspectives.

Zusammenfassung

Die Beiträge in diesem Buch analysieren die Herausforderungen in Post-Jugoslawien bezüglich Demokratisierung, Anerkennung und Versöhnung im Rahmen der europäischen Integration. Sie verfolgen einen interdisziplinären Ansatz, indem sie Probleme und Herausforderungen aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln betrachten, und führen diese erstmals gezielt in einem einzigen Werk zu dieser Region zusammen. Das Buch richtet sich dabei sowohl an Studierende als auch an Wissenschaftler und Forscher, die einen fundierten Zugang zu Post-Jugoslawien erhalten möchten.

References

Abstract

This book explores the challenges of democratization and reconciliation in the context of European integration in the post-Yugoslav region. Despite its academic and policy relevance, students and academics studying the region do not have a single source of reading material where they can learn about the challenges facing the region. This book aims to serve an array of college students and become a go-to source in studying the region. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the book provides readers with a comprehensive account of the various challenges inhibiting democratization and reconciliation. The chapters are written by authors from different disciplines, thus allowing readers to analyze the region from different perspectives.

Zusammenfassung

Die Beiträge in diesem Buch analysieren die Herausforderungen in Post-Jugoslawien bezüglich Demokratisierung, Anerkennung und Versöhnung im Rahmen der europäischen Integration. Sie verfolgen einen interdisziplinären Ansatz, indem sie Probleme und Herausforderungen aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln betrachten, und führen diese erstmals gezielt in einem einzigen Werk zu dieser Region zusammen. Das Buch richtet sich dabei sowohl an Studierende als auch an Wissenschaftler und Forscher, die einen fundierten Zugang zu Post-Jugoslawien erhalten möchten.