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Kinga Anna Gajda, Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity in:

Adam Bence Balazs, Christina Griessler (Ed.)

The Visegrad Four and the Western Balkans, page 63 - 82

Framing Regional Identities

1. Edition 2020, ISBN print: 978-3-8487-5999-6, ISBN online: 978-3-7489-0113-6, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901136-63

Series: Andrássy Studien zur Europaforschung, vol. 25

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Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity Kinga Anna Gajda, Institute of European Studies at the Jagiellonian University Abstract: The aim of the paper is to show how Orientalism might impact identity-building in Eastern Europe. Based on the concept of oppressive performative identity, and through an exposé of the different theories on how and why Europe is divided between East and West, we will focus on the way Orientalism, a critical framework originally aimed at understanding Western imperialist mechanisms, needs to be adapted to grasp identitarian issues in Eastern Europe. Keywords: Eastern Europe, Balkans, Orientalisation, Easternalisation, oppressive/ascriptive performative identity Orient– An Exhibition In 2018, an exhibition travelling across the Old Continent proposed a collection of works expressing the contemporary identity of the Eastern European area. The artists, coming from Eastern European countries, focused on the “suppressed inferiority complex” of the European East as a possible cause of the recent outbreak of nationalism and of anti-democratic trends. This means that certain frustrations internalised by Eastern European identity could act as a cause of contemporary political defects. Instead of highlighting scientific cause and consequence relations between bittersweet self-mockery and the political degradation of Eastern Europe, Orient offered a subjective journey inside the region’s identitarian pathologies. The curator, Michal Novotný, and the artists were guided by the conviction that, despite pathos, irony and subsequent contradictions, the exhibition would help “Europe’s recalcitrant children” to finally find their way back to their European home and accept this residence as more “joyful” than complacent and conceive of their Western neighbourhood as more “fraternal” than “condescending.” Orient did not consider defining Eastern Europe’s exact borders as important. As Novotný pointed out, the exhibition’s main goal was “inclusion”: it was not a “mapping, nor a survey,” but a set of intimate immer- 63 sions into the Eastern European homeland, a “celebration” of regional belonging.1 The contributing artists did not address the conceptual framework of identity; rather, the stress was on the way the notion of identity is commonly used. They highlighted the most stereotypical occurrences of the notion in a diverse and heterogeneous region that suffers from arbitrary divisions between East and West, given that such dichotomies tend to exclude the East from a West perceived as civilised, progressive and democratic. The exhibition’s title was deliberately provocative: Orient suggests that Eastern Europe is one of the West’s constructed others. This approach puts the spotlight on the idea that the victims of Western Orientalism are not only to be found in faraway lands outside Europe but might very well also exist in an “Orient” that lies inside the Old Continent’s approximate borders. In the scholarly literature dealing with Eastern European identities, one can easily find approaches that echo the insights of the exhibition: blurred boundaries, harsh stereotypes and constructed otherness within Europe are recurring topics. Larry Wolff reminds us that “as late as the eve of World War I, French scholarship still alternated between two seemingly similar terms, l’Europe orientale (Eastern Europe) and l’Orient européen (the European Orient).”2 Such terminological hesitations only underline how labelling aims to exclude the capriciously named regions: labelling Eastern Europe as an “Orient” means shutting it out of Europe. Geographically, this makes no sense, for such an exclusion would move the region to Asia and no scientific cartography could possibly support this conception. Lexical indecisions have played a decisive role in the emergence of Eastern Europe as we know it, i.e. a region balanced between exclusion and inclusion, reluctantly accepted as European yet fixed in an imagined and constructed otherness. For stereotypes and the effects of constructed otherness, there is a more technical expression based on existing literature: oppressive performative identity.3 This expression extends the common meaning of stereotype because it underlines how identities forced into a label react to the very pro- 1 Bunkier sztuki: Orient, http://bunkier.art.pl/?wystawy=orient&lang=en (accessed April 17, 2019). 2 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 6. 3 Performativity is a concept used in Gender Studies, introduced by Judith Butler to put a name on the socially constructed differenciations within gender relations. See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990). Kinga Anna Gajda 64 cess of identity constructions imposed from the outside. At the crossroads of art and scholarship, blurred geographical boundaries, identity-labelling and reactions to nonchalant stereotypes beg the following questions: how does the very practice of oppressive performative identity affect Europe’s wishful unity? How has it contributed to the rise of hostile attitudes towards the European ideal and the West in Eastern Europe? Can we assume that reactions to constructed labels are a mere matter of self-mockery in a region used to disdain itself in the direct yet distinct neighbourhood of the West? Does not self-mockery rather translate into an inability to get out of the trap of inflicted constructions of identity and otherness? The aim of this article is to offer a theoretical overview of the literature around the concept of oppressive performative identity and to show its specific relevance to the Eastern European case. Given that the blurred boundaries of this European East are inherent to identity-labelling and otherness-constructions, the contours of the Visegrad Group (V4) and the Western Balkans (WB) will be left somewhat vague throughout the overview. However, following the aforementioned exhibition’s main message of inclusion, spelling out the theoretical framework with all its inconsistencies should lead us to a constructive standpoint where the side effects of arbitrary labelling can be overcome. First, we will define the concept of oppressive performative identity, highlight the potency of labelling as an instrument of exclusion and underscore how it turns into a trap for the ones forced into an identity imposed by others. Second, we will frame its significance in the V4 and the WB as parts of the constructed European East. Third, we will show that this construction is an orientalist one. In other words, Orientalism has made unexpected victims within Europe, and not only in the “Orient,” traditionally conceived as extra-European. Oppressive Performative Identity The invention, construction and far-reaching effects of stereotypes call for an elaborate theoretical framework. Oppressive performative identity is a comprehensive concept that gathers and orders the wide-ranging aspects of stereotypical structures and thinking. First, oppressive performative identity follows the basic outlines of identity-building. As Wolfgang Welsch puts it, the basis of all identity is Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 65 the experience of difference.4 The contrast of otherness highly contributes to creating a sense of belonging to a given group, and this process involves labelling other groups. Identity is not formed on the basis of rational motives. The us-and-them agenda is often a practical way to articulate projects and experiences, to frame a story for the given group. In fact, the construction of identity takes places through narrativity: boundaries, images, community, social roles are articulated around a plot, i.e. a linguistic object, as we will see below. Such plots and frameworks tend to be unstable and fragmented. In fact, identity-building is much more about practical application than about theoretical structures. Fred Dallmayr notes that a process of interlacing construction – between identity and difference, inside and outside, familiarity and strangeness – has been operating since the dawn of civilisation.5 The need to construct an image of the self in contrast with others’ perceived sense of belonging is the most basic structure of identity-building. Theoretical frameworks as such result from a reflection on identity-building in action throughout history. As stated by Walter D. Connor, the conception, for instance, of an East-West cultural/historical divide within Europe “has been a part of most historians’ intellectual equipment. It has come under attack in more recent times, mainly in an academic sphere where ‘critical theory’ and postmodern language have their home, and has been pushed in some cases toward the edge of political incorrectness.”6 In other words, theoretical frameworks have their own history, not to be confused with identity-building as a historical process. Oppressive performative identity is one framework among others, based on the outlines of identity-building as an ongoing historical process that relentlessly mobilises the categories of the self and the other to reinforce a group’s sense of belonging. Second, oppressive performative identity highlights the inherent power of naming groups, the ingroup as well as the outgroups. Indeed, the very 4 Wolfgang Welsch, “Stając się sobą” [Becoming Yourself], in Problemy ponowoczesnej pluralizacji kultury. Wokół koncepcji Wolfganga Welscha [Problems of Post-Modern Pluralisation of Culture. Around the Concept of Wolfgang Welsch], ed. Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora, 1998). 5 Fred Dallmayr, “The Ambivalence of Europe. Western Culture and its ‘Other,’” in Dialogue Among Civilizations. Some Exemplary Voices, ed. Fred Dallmayr (New York, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 65. 6 Walter D. Connor, “Europe West and East: Thoughts on History, Culture, and Kosovo,” in Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk, ed. Zvi Y. Gitelman and Roman Szporluk (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2000), 75. Kinga Anna Gajda 66 act of naming oneself and the others plays a decisive role in identitybuilding. Labelling is the scaffold of identity; naming is a practice that gives meaning to a group’s integrity, which is always, to a certain extent, a construction based on a verbal practice. However, naming is not a mere linguistic device. Yi-Fu Tuan underlines the role of language and naming in characterising places built by humans, including regions as constructed entities. He claims that there are places created by the casting of a linguistic net,7 and continues: “The telling itself […] has the power to endow a site with vibrant meaning.”8 The sense of belonging hence depends on the power of a given name. As an example, Yi-Fu Tuan underlines how “modern Western people felt the need for a collective name to designate their own society and culture.”9 “Europe” used to be a proper noun well before the Old Continent started to conceive of itself as a geographically united area. Moreover, naming supposes collective and public experiences. Identity is constructed through interaction: individuals belonging to a given group find out who they are in the public forum. They receive a name to which they must respond. Performative identity is the product of an endless repetition, of quoting a particular model, which is created not only by the subject itself, but by the whole group, that is to say by a social structure. To put it differently, the “others” are first of all the other members of the ingroup, constructing the self through reflection. However, the issue of individual identity in such a process becomes secondary. The determination of “I” takes place on the principle of “I according to the others.” By performance, we thus mean the interactive aspect of identity-building: the self reacts to the way it is addressed and perceived by the other members of her group. The social or performative identity of the group is sometimes played subconsciously. It is a project, a game, but also an illusion. Between the self and the others, i.e. in the space where the group’s identity takes shape, fiction does have its share. The tool for identity’s elaboration is repetitive verbal expression, language as a relentlessly reused tool. The act of naming can, to paraphrase John Langshaw Austin, be called actions with 7 Yi-Fu Tuan, “Language and the Making of Place: A Narrative-Descriptive Approach,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 81, no. 4 (December 1991): 686. 8 Tuan, “Language,” 687. 9 Ibid., 689. Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 67 words.10 Words have the power to make given elements stand out and transform what is incomprehensible into something that is meaningful. By speaking and naming the group, its members determine who they are, their place in the world, and they make manifest the features that determine the belonging to a given communitas. Hence, identity is a collective matter, in other words a political one. If words are actions, identitybuilding joins Hannah Arendt’s conception of politics based on human plurality and publicity rather than the private and the individual sphere.11 Last but not least, oppressive performative identity puts a name on how the very victims of stereotypical structures react to the imposed label. This is the oppressive component of our concept. Labelling is an instrument not only for systematising and confirming divisions that are objectively required for understanding a given group’s situation in the world, but also for valuing the essence of its members. Naming hence results in the establishment of hierarchies, within the ingroup as well as between the ingroup and outgroups. To the social ladder of dependence structuring the ingroup corresponds a vertical conception of its place in the world, the ingroup conceiving of itself as superior to others. That is the shift from sound social structuring to the domination of others through the use of naming, from performance to oppressive stereotypes within the group or in power relation to others. The use of the social scaffold of names turns into the construction of stereotypes. Naming and the narratives in which it is practiced frame a powerful tool of oppression. To define another group as “different,” “inferior” or “backward” establishes a relation that justifies the domination of the coercively labelled group. Orientalism, as Edward W. Said explained, is about an “Orient” invented by the West in order to keep vast and heterogeneous lands under control. Said showed how a priori innocent narratives such as novels and other literary works have contributed to the West’s imperialist ideology without having been produced on the explicit order of this ideology. Their narrative power has been absorbed by the imperialist framework, often without any consent from the authors.12 Stereotypes are artificially fixed narratives or narrative fragments used to control those who are forced into them. As a result, we see how exclusion 10 John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, New York: Harvard University Press, 1975). 11 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 12 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). Kinga Anna Gajda 68 from an ingroup actually results in dependence from it. But there is more to this well-known agenda in the way the victims of oppressive performative identity incorporate their stereotype and build their identity in reaction to it. Stereotypes, especially in postcolonial contexts, become the very tool of emancipation: the oppressed group seizes hold of the imposed narrative and turns it against the oppressor. In this case, we can talk about a form of “auto-stereotype.” The fine line between the imposed stereotype and its performative use to turn the tables remains one of the main issues of postcolonial studies. Our Eastern European context is of course different and requires a careful shift from the orientalist background to the intra-European setting. Before mapping out Eastern Europe’s historical situation, let us sum up the definition of oppressive performative identity, as it is the conceptual tool we will use to grasp the specificities of our context. Oppressive performative identity is a process of identity-building based on the traditional selfand-the-other structure that mobilises naming not only to put order within a group but also to label others as stereotypes. Oppression, however, does not end with control. Stereotypes remain active and harmful in the very process of emancipation in the form of auto-stereotypes, leaving the emancipated group in uncertainty: if the group seized the very tool of oppression to free itself, is it not still under the yoke, given the analysed power of words and labels? Eastern Europe: Itinerant Names, Wandering Borders Now that we have the appropriate conceptual tool to show how akin Eastern Europe’s situation is to orientalised areas outside Europe, we still need to give an approximate frame to the region we are dealing with. As mentioned above, the V4 and the WB countries may be somewhat lost within Eastern Europe but, in a sense, that is our very point: not only is there an ongoing debate on exact boundaries within these regions but, what is more, labels and distinctions have been blurred on the long term. Let us see how and why, keeping in mind that these two questions are almost interchangeable when it comes to the geopolitics of Eastern Europe. The concept of Central and Eastern Europe referred formerly to the territories between Germany and Russia, and between the Baltic and the Adriatic. The region’s diverse populations were considered as living in the transitional in-between formed by this “isthmus.” The concept of Central Europe included Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, i.e. Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 69 the countries known today as the V4. The concept of Central and Eastern Europe is clearly more recent than other concepts such as “Eastern Europe” or “Central Europe.” In the interwar period, stakes increased in Central Europe in view of the “geopolitical revolution” after World War I and the end of Central Europe as an empire, i.e. the erasing of a clear geopolitical entity. The concept of “Central Europe” defended, among others, by Milan Kundera13 and popularised in the West by the Czech, Polish and Hungarian intelligentsia of the 1980s, was meant to be an identitarian remedy for a region lost inside the Eastern Bloc. Although “Central Europe” is now an accepted term in political and scientific discourse, it was, forty years ago, a reinvented concept aimed at denouncing the purported homogeneity of the Bloc under Soviet control. “Eastern” and “Central” are thus labels depending on and triggered by geopolitical conjectures. The division of Europe between the East and the West is not the only possible one. There was an attempt to divide the continent between the North and the South,14 as well as in four parts (West, North, East/Orient and South), as discussed by Larry Wolff.15 However, the East-West division proved to be permanent. Walter D. Connor notes that this division is more historically and culturally fixed: according to him, the West has the Latin alphabet, Roman Catholicism, has been through the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and is in command of the dynamic development of culture and science, politics and economy; the East, on the other hand, uses the Greek and Cyrillic alphabets, is based on Byzantine culture, the Orthodox church, and is characterised by stagnation and a poor economic system.16 A significant part of Eastern Europe, the East-Central region, does not confirm this dichotomy in terms of culture and religion, calling for yet an- 13 Milan Kundera, “A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows Out,” Granta, March 1, 1984, https://granta.com/a-kidnapped-west-or-culture-bows-out/ (accessed October 4, 2019). 14 See Ezequiel Adamovsky, “Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern Europe in France, 1810-1880,” The Journal of Modern History 77, no. 3 (September 2005). 15 Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. 16 See Adrian Smith, “Imaging Geographies of the ‘New Europe’: Geo-economic Power and the New European Architecture of Integration,” Political Geography 21, no. 5 (2000): 647-670; John Lukacs, “The ‘Other’ Europe At Century’s End,” The Wilson Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Autumn 1991), http://archive.wilsonquarterly.com/site s/default/files/articles/WQ_VOL15_A_1991_Article_04_2.pdf (accessed October 4, 2019). Kinga Anna Gajda 70 other division. Besides, we see how geographical divisions tend to be metaphors of normative statements on development. Attila Melegh states that Eastern Europe has “never been fully integrated into the first modernizationist ‘transition’ discourse. [This region has] been relegated to an intermediate category of ‘almost developed.’”17 Eastern would be a synonym of “almost.” Connor adds that the East-West dimension is nothing new, pinpointing that historians tend to insist “on the difference between Eastern and Central Europe, careful to stake out the latter turf as theirs, or to use the term East-Central Europe – sometimes without real specification of what West-Central Europe might be.”18 Naming is confusing indeed, but the value judgement is clear. Van de Kaa even wrote about Europa Major (including the non-Muslim Soviet territories), Europa Minor (including the European Union and Central Europe in a large sense), and Europa Unita (including the European Union and the Central European states soon to be members of it).19 The use of Latin does not dissimulate judgements behind geographical terms. East and West also translate into Centre and Periphery. According to Tomasz Zarycki, the Centre-Periphery relation on the European level is primarily associated with the capital of culture, ideas, knowledge, skills and objects with cultural value that people must possess in order to be active and efficient in social life.20 Cultural capital is a differentiating factor. Once again, the division generates in-betweenness: Central and Eastern Europe turn out to have the cultural capital but lack political and economic development. Zarycki sees it as a key dimension of inequality in the region, where culture is “a kind of substitute for deficit economic capital.”21 The idea of a cultural capital tries to mask economic and political shortcomings compared to the West. The conviction of high cultural resources 17 Attila Melegh, On the East-West Slope. Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Central and Eastern Europe (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2006), 69. 18 Walter D. Connor, “Europe West and East: Thoughts on History, Culture, and Kosovo,” 71-72. 19 Dirk van de Kaa, “Europe and its Population: the Long View,” in European Populations. Unity in Diversity, ed. Dirk van de Kaa, Henri Leridon, Giuseppe Gesano and Marek Okólski (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999). 20 Tomasz Zarycki, “Peryferie. Nowe ujęcia symbolicznych zależności centro-peryferyjnych” [Periphery. New Approaches to Symbolic Center-Peripheral Relationships] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2009). 21 Tomasz Zarycki, “Socjologia krytyczna na peryferiach” [Critical Sociology in the Periphery], Kultura i Społeczeństwo [Culture and Society] 80, no. 1 (2009): 109. Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 71 conceived as bearing moral significance is meant to compensate for the lower economic status of the Eastern part of Europe. There are several different ways to divide the East from the West, but there are three recurring elements: 1) a moral dimension is projected on the geographical notions; 2) divisions create in-betweenness, as there is no clear-cut line between two supposedly hermetic ensembles; 3) divisions depend on the geopolitical context. The fact is that “Eastern Europe,” whatever its precise contours are supposed to be, is a name meant to divide Europe in a vertical way. Coming back to the power of words as actions, to designate the East means to assign to it an inferior status compared to the West. In short, it is a label for the European other, constructed as such and fuelled with the stereotypes of underdevelopment. Its Western borders are first of all the Eastern borders of the West, i.e. the more or less extended boundaries the West consents to have, following the actual geopolitical conjecture and the spatial limits of Western performative identity. Eastern Europe as an Orientalist Construction In the previous part, we mapped Eastern Europe as an uncertain in-between, a region so to speak “easternalised” by political aims and geopolitical contexts. It is important to note that only a weak and exposed region can become prey to such a process. It involves a strong player, namely the West, and a power relation between it and the “easternalised” area. Although Eastern Europe cannot be compared to the West’s former overseas colonies, the procedure is quite similar: the other is constructed by the (Western) self to reinforce its superiority, a stereotypical identity is assigned and, eventually, the other seizes the stereotypical construction to define its own sense of belonging and character. In a word, Eastern Europe is nowadays an example of oppressive performative identity. Eastern Europe can therefore be understood as an otherness constructed by the West. Bo Stråth writes that historically, the idea of European civilisation had three specific “Others”: the Orient, America and Eastern Europe.22 In this sense, and according to Joshua Hagen, the East can be understood as “a product of Western imagination.”23 22 Bo Stråth, “A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept,” European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 4 (2002): 391, http://www.lib.csu.ru/ER/ER_Philoso phy/fulltexts/StrethBo.pdf (accessed December 23, 2019). 23 Joshua Hagen, “Redrawing the Imagined Map of Europe: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Center,’” Political Geography 22, no. 5 (2003), 489-490. Kinga Anna Gajda 72 A particular need exists to separate what is European and not European, what is more and/or less European. Eastern Europe is certainly not “different” in the way the Orient is: the principal object of Orientalism stands in a high civilisational contrast with the West, while the Eastern side of Europe swings on the mental map as a more or less European area. Nevertheless, if its function as an Other is not comparable to the Orient, Eastern Europe does bear symptoms of Orientalism: “It had no independent reality,” writes Tuan; “and yet in the course of time, people who lived in this European creation began to accept it and to exploit the name.”24 In other words, Eastern Europe shares some identitarian aspects with former colonies. The geopolitical history being substantially different, it is in the naming practice, the construction of stereotypes and the phenomenon of auto-stereotyping that we can grasp how orientalised Eastern Europe is: identity is the key here, much more than geopolitics. It is in the European, i.e. continental context that Joshua Hagen highlights the importance of naming in discussions about identity.25 Ezequiel Adamovsky also addresses an intra-European case: the construction of the “Slavic other” on the borders of Europe. Similarly to Tuan, albeit in the European context, he points out that “[t]he counterpart of the liberal-bourgeois narrative of Western civilization is the narrative of its ‘others.’” Adamovsky then explains that “in every binary construction of identity the excluded ‘other’ and the self that gained consistency by means of that exclusion depend on each other.”26 Though Eastern Europe does not depend on the West in the way the former overseas colonies do, the structure of mutual dependency is comparable and deserves further comparative research. The framework is orientalist, given that the narrative is not based on the observation of those Slavic populations, but rather on an idea of European civilisation from which they are excluded. When it comes to the Balkans, a similar stereotype is at work: the region is often described as uniform, as is the supposed identity of the homo balkanicus. This is only, as outlined by Pavlos Hatzopoulos, a “frozen image,” which tries to determine collective identity on the exclusive basis of geographical location.27 As Dusan Bjelic emphasises, the aim of “the European nation-states’ hegemony of cultural 24 Tuan, “Language,” 689. 25 Joshua Hagen, “Redrawing the Imagined Map of Europe: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Center,’” 489-490. 26 Adamovsky, “Euro-Orientalism,” 591. 27 Pavlos Hatzopoulos, The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity. International Relations and Ideology (London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2008), 3. Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 73 representation, has constructed the Balkans as its dangerous exterior, as the dark side of the collective Europe.”28 Labelling serves a certain ideal of European civilisation, but in the close Eastern neighbourhood instead of the Orient. The East-West division within Europe is not about the Eastern populations’ sense of belonging. It is an invention that seems more and more “real” through the repeated act of labelling. Derek Gregory defines this type of construction as “discursive formations” that build “constellations of power, knowledge and spatiality.”29 Naming has the ability to increase power, transforming what is on the Eastern side of Europe into an imaginary land. As Tuan notes, “naming is power – the creative power to call something into being, to render the invisible visible, to impart a certain character to things.”30 Hagen also claims that the discourse of naming “reflects social and political relations of power and knowledge, in addition to territorial control.”31 Further research on the Eastern European case should combine geopolitical perspectives and cultural production: if Eastern Europe is indeed an orientalist product within Europe, then this process not only has straightforward political aspects, but might also be strengthened by culture. Eastern Europe as an orientalist construction sets “ways of perceiving spaces and places, and the relationship between them.”32 It imposes a perception of the area as a uniform mass, as “complex sets of cultural and political practices and ideas defined spatially”33 but in an even way. Thus, it moves away from the analysis and classification of individual countries. The division of Europe into East and West, although increasingly presented as politically incorrect, used to highlight hegemony, privileging certain attitudes or perspectives, though Eastern Europe was never colonised by the West, unlike the Middle East. Nevertheless, as Connor points out, dependency is based on “the superiority of Western-style democracy and 28 Dusan Bjelic, “The Balkans' Imaginary and the Paradox of European Borders,” Eurozine, December 15, 2003, 3, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298302 979_The_Balkans'_Imaginary_and_the_Paradox_of_European_Borders (accessed April 11, 2019). 29 Derek Gregory, “Between the Book and the Lamp: Imaginative Geographies of Egypt, 1849-50,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 20 no. 1 (1995): 29, https://s3.amazonaws.com/arena-attachments/293170/45ea329ecb 01c57008b0b2b3c6942663.pdf (accessed April 4, 2019). 30 Tuan, “Language,” 688. 31 Hagen, “Redrawing the Imagined Map,” 491. 32 Ibid., 490. 33 Ibid. Kinga Anna Gajda 74 Western-style capitalist markets,” the specificity of Eastern Europe being the direct proximity of the model. The use of fiction is inherent to the orientalist framework. “East” does not refer objectively to the geographical location of Eastern Europe, its cultural entities, language, or history. It is an idea, a form of thought and a creation with almost no matching reality. Said writes that “the structure of Orientalism is nothing more than a structure of lies or of myths which, were the truth about them to be told, would simply blow away.”34 How does this translate into the Western political discourse on Eastern Europe? Larry Wolff shows that the discourse on Eastern Europe and the Balkans is constructed to cover the immaturity, aggressivity, insecurity, underdevelopment and inconsistencies of the common European social, political, cultural and economic standards and to justify Western colonialism.35 In other words, it is the Western model’s own shortcomings that are projected on the Eastern part of the continent in order to be dissimulated. How powerful are words when it comes to labelling stereotypes? Within Europe, the Balkans offer an unfortunate example for naming practices and their devastating effects. After World War I, a conflict that symbolically started in Sarajevo, Central and Eastern Europe was said to have become “balkanised,” as the contemporary French notion of l'Europe balcanisée indicates. Concerning the Balkans themselves, Maria Todorova states that Balkanism is a notion modelled on Edward Said's Orientalism.36 “Balkans” is a name for a confused land of transience and its menacing diversity of cultures, religions and nationalities not found in other parts of Europe. The name expresses the idea of a transition between East and West, between Europe and Asia. It is also another name for underdevelopment, used as a synonym for semi-developed, semi-colonial, semi-civilised, semioriental. On the borders of Europe and Asia, the “Balkans” mean “stuck halfway.” Balkanism and Balkanisation (for instance in “a balkanised country”) are used as convenient substitutes that cleanse the West of accusations of racism, colonialism and Eurocentrism. The widespread use of “Balkanisation” shows how Orientalism37 can concern regions and populations 34 Said, Orientalism, 5. 35 Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. 36 Said, Orientalism. Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 37 As Gerard Delanty notes, “the Balkans were caught in a double bind. On the one hand they were divided between Islam and Christianity and on the other hand there was an abiding division between Roman Catholicism and Christian Ortho- Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 75 within Europe, even such Eurocentric ones as, for instance, Central Europe as redefined in the 1980s. The constructed East is based on the stereotypes and prejudices traditionally used to describe the Orient. Adamovsky calls it “Euro-Orientalism.” He states that “Euro-Orientalism not only provides a style of talking about Eastern Europe but also performs a normative function – that is, it endeavours to establish norms for a good society and to punish deviations from those norms.”38 Edward W. Said writes that “the Orient was almost a European invention” and considers the Orient and the Other as synonyms. This points to the naming and orientalising of the East as a politically reflected process. For Said, “to speak of Orientalism […] is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such disparate realms as the imagination itself.”39 The intra-European application of the orientalist framework adds a new layer of understanding to Said’s critical legacy. The key difference between the European East and the North-African or Middle Eastern Orient is, for Zarycki, the ambiguous position of Central and Eastern Europe regarding the very idea of Europe. Culture might be European or even Eurocentric, but political and economic shortcomings make this inner East dependent and exposed to stereotypes. Europe’s Eastern borderland could not be orientalised as overseas territories were, given the direct geographical continuity between the Western centre and its Eastern periphery. The borderland is not “fixed” in stereotypes like geographically distant and separated lands. doxy. These fissures, in the form of marcher regions, were the price that had to be paid for a European identity.” As Maria Todorova writes, Balkanism is “one of the most abused mythologemes in journalistic and, generally, in popular discourse.” Milan Ristovic underlines that “the term ‘Balkans’ had the negative connotations associated with the Oriental past, disorganization, and the generally rickety character of the government.” Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (London: Macmillan, 1995), 52. Maria Todorova, “What Is or Is There a Balkan Culture, and Do or Should the Balkans Have a Regional Identity?” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 4, no. 1 (2004): 180, https://www.academia.e du/21150023/What_is_or_is_there_a_Balkan_culture_and_do_or_should_the_Bal kans_have_a_regional_identity?auto=download (accessed April 11, 2019). Milan Ristovic, “‘The Birth of Southeastern Europe’ and the ‘Death of the Balkans.’ Essay on German views on SE Europe during the 1930s and 1940s,” Thethis. Mannheimer Beiträge zur Klassischen Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns 2 (1995): 4, https://www.academia.edu/31064657/The_Birth_of_Southeastern_Eur ope_and_the_Death_of_the_Balkans.DOC (accessed April 4, 2019). 38 Adamovsky, “Euro-Orientalism,” 613. 39 Said, Orientalism, 12. Kinga Anna Gajda 76 Despite the differences in terms of location, cultural proximity, and the active sense of belonging to Europe that could not possibly concern the realities behind the constructed Orient, we are dealing in Eastern Europe with an Orientalist set of cases. “Easternalisation” is the intra-European practice of Orientalisation. The geopolitical and historical basis of the orientalist construction deserves further elaboration if it is to be criticised with objectivity, but we can already highlight the dramatic repercussions of the framework on Eastern European identities. Attila Melegh proposes a comprehensive summary of the way in which Orientalism was translated into the context of Eastern Europe. First, he reminds us of the potency of words and narratives: “Narratives are texts that create temporality. They are devices through which we, individually, are able to ‘weave’ our lives into discursive structures which are the materialization and reproduction of power arrangements.” We pinpointed, with Hannah Arendt, the collective aspect of identity-building. Melegh emphasises the power relations this type of collective performativity easily shifts to. He stresses the performative aspect of identity-building by claiming that “nonetheless, narratives are not constructed by us but are social constructs which belong to the ‘relational’ field of social life. From a given stock of narrative patterns we create our stories with regard to the social context in which we find ourselves.” Performance is indeed about designing stories through reflexion on given social constructions. Melegh then comes to the East-West construction in the European context: “Thus at an institutional or collective level the East–West dichotomy and the East– West slope not only offer patterns for identifying East–West differences (rational versus irrational etc.), but also prescribe our position on an East– West slope and thereby set the ways we utilize East–West discourses.” The “slope” indicates the hierarchical aspect of naming. Melegh puts our selfand-other pattern in the “easternalised” context of Eastern Europe before calling it explicitly an Orientalist framework: “The Orientalism of Western actors will be different from the downward perspective of Central or Eastern Europeans because they themselves are considered to be ‘Eastern’ or to be at a lower point of the East–West civilizational slope, which in itself leads to some kind of frustrated Orientalism.”40 Melegh defines the oppressive component of our identity-building pattern as a “kind of frustrated” internalisation of the stereotypes assigned to the East by the West. In fact, what is oppressive in the case of the colonised and reinvented Orient in Said’s theory becomes a frustration in the case of 40 Melegh, On the East-West Slope, 127-128. Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 77 Eastern Europe: the European East cannot reject its own geographical location like the constructed Orient has to in order to emancipate herself from the Western yoke. Eastern Europe is part of Europe and, in a sense, does not have the choice but to make a story out of the “East” – while the “Orient” might very well rid itself of its constructed location in relation to the West and reposition itself as a centre of the global stage. There is so to speak “no escape” in Eastern Europe from the oppressive/ frustrated performative identity assigned by the West. The price to pay to belong to Europe is to internalise this constructed identity and to seek to neutralise its stereotypes, thereby emancipating the East as it is, i.e. the East of the Europe. On the theoretical level, we might consider replacing the oppressive/frustrated component with a more neutral term: ascriptive performative identity should be more accurate from now on to analyse the intra-European Orientalist phenomenon as distinct from Said’s context, yet in the continuation of his legacy. As we saw, the key difference between the “Orient” as a set of oppressive performative identity cases and the “East” as an ascriptive one is the geographical and cultural proximity of the latter and of the West to which it craves to belong. The Eastern borderlands tend to “duplicate” the ascriptive performative identity imposed by the West when they project it on their Eastern neighbours. As Milan Ristovic colloquially put it, “‘Balkans’ is a word of contempt; for Vienna, the Balkans begin in Hungary, for Hungary they begin in Belgrade and Bucharest; Greece considers that the Balkans refer to her Bulgarian neighbour.”41 Sven Milekic confirms that “no one wants to be part of the Balkans – for Croatians, the Balkans begin in Bosnia; in Bosnia, the Balkans begin in Serbia; and in Serbia, they begin in Romania.”42 We know how a similar slippery slope characterises the “East,” especially in the way “Central” Europe projects on its Eastern neighbours the very same stereotype the West assigns to it. Such repercussions are not solutions and passing on the stereotypes will not help overcoming them. Reversing the ascriptive performative pattern and turning it against the West will not dissimulate frustrations either: the West becoming the “Other” might justify nationalist and anti-democratic movements in Eastern Europe under the banner of Euroscepticism. However, that would not be called emancipation, given that it is still built on 41 Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snalpostem, Malmo, September 28, 1942, quoted in Ristovic, “The Birth of South-eastern Europe.” 42 Sven Milekic, “Croatian Pupils Voice Mixed Views on ‘Balkan’ Identity,” Balkan Insight, January 11, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/01/11/croatian-pupils-sp lit-between-europe-and-balkans-01-11-2018/ (accessed April 4, 2019). Kinga Anna Gajda 78 the very same stereotypes and actually pushes the East of Europe more to the East, closer to the “Orient,” as some kind of ironic “self-orientalisation” of countries frustrated by their very proximity to the West and seeking relief by creating more “distance” – within the Orientalist construction. Verbal repetition is required for the shaping of identities; repeating the stereotypes by projecting them on others is destructive. Conclusion Based on the fundamentals of identity-building, we have shown that the swinging dichotomies between East and West in Europe constitute an intra-European case of Orientalism. These dichotomies depend on the actual geopolitical context, are coercively constructed, and always generate a residue, for there could be no clear-cut division line between the East and the West. The intra-European case is a context Edward Said did not consider. However, thanks to our oppressive performative identity concept, we were able to grasp the orientalist machinery in action, given the identitarian symptoms the East of Europe shares with the constructed Orient. In the continuation of Said’s now classic framework, we thus had to adapt the orientalist pattern to suit the Eastern European setting. Ascriptive performative identity is not something Eastern Europe can evade or should simply reproduce by projecting the very same stereotypes on its Eastern neighbours, because this results in an enlargement of the stereotypes. What to do then? As Zarycki notes, Eastern Europe is at the same time a victim and a producer of orientalist discourse.43 There is no sound way to evade a certain degree of Orientalism in our region, and we can only try to get a better understanding of its mechanisms. As we saw, identity-building is an everlasting process, theoretical frameworks are only established through reflection on it. Theories hence have a history in the same way identity-building has. Geographical divisions are required to understand our place in the world, and there is nothing intrinsically wrong with naming the East and the West within Europe. The Old Continent’s identity is constantly created and recreated by people and this involves constructions, discursive artefacts, constellations of selves and others. Nevertheless, naming and labelling have considerable power on structuring societies, their inner hier- 43 Tomasz Zarycki, Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe (London‒New York: Routledge, 2014), 1. Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 79 archies as well as their relation to other societies. It is by remaining aware of this potency of words that we can prevent constructions from falling into stereotypes, geographical divisions from shifting to moral and value judgements dissimulated behind geographical terms such as the cardinal points. The specific case of Eastern Europe calls for further research. The cultural and geopolitical characteristics of a borderland need to be examined to give a more accurate picture of the case and dismantle the counterproductive mechanisms of intra-European Orientalism. Within Europe, dependency can be turned into complementarity. Further European integration requires the neutralisation of a power discourse that produces stereotypes and a more attentive focus on the very scales of identity-building: the selfand-the-other pattern is constructive on the microlevel, but a mere patchwork of such microlevels does not shape the identity of the macro, European scale. Self-images have the ability to construct, while stereotypes tend to disintegrate identities. Bibliography Adamovsky, Ezequiel. “Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern Europe in France, 1810-1880.” The Journal of Modern History 77, no. 3 (September 2005): 591-628. Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York: Penguin Classics, 2006. Austin, John Langshaw. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford, New York: Harvard University Press, 1975. Bjelic, Dusan. “The Balkans' Imaginary and the Paradox of European Borders.” Eurozine, December 15, 2003. Bunkier sztuki. Orient, http://bunkier.art.pl/?wystawy=orient&lang=en (accessed April 17, 2019). Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 1990. Connor, Walter D. “Europe West and East: Thoughts on History, Culture, and Kosovo.” In Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk, edited by Zvi Y. Gitelman and Roman Szporluk. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2000. Dallmayr, Fred. “The Ambivalence of Europe. Western Culture and its ‘Other.’” In Dialogue Among Civilizations. Some Exemplary Voices, edited by Fred Dallmayr, 49-65. New York, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Kinga Anna Gajda 80 Delanty, Gerard. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. London: Macmillan, 1995. Gregory, Derek. “Between the Book and the Lamp: Imaginative Geographies of Egypt, 1849-50.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 20, no. 1 (1995): 29-57. Gutmann, Amy. Identity in Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Hagen, Joshua. “Redrawing the Imagined Map of Europe: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Center.’” Political Geography 22, no. 5 (2003): 489-517. Hajnal, John. “Two Kinds of Preindustrial Household Formation.” In Family Forms in Historic Europe, edited by Richard Wall, Jean Robin, and Peter Laslett, 65– 104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Hatzopoulos, Pavlos. The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity. International Relations and Ideology. London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2008. Kundera, Milan. “A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows Out.” Granta, March 1, 1984. https://granta.com/a-kidnapped-west-or-culture-bows-out/ (accessed October 4, 2019). Lukacs, John. “The ‘Other’ Europe At Century’s End.” The Wilson Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Autumn 1991): 116-122. Melegh, Attila. On The East-West Slope. Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2006. Milekic, Sven. “Croatian Pupils Voice Mixed Views on ‘Balkan’ Identity.” Balkan Insight, January 11, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/01/11/croatian-pupilssplit-between-europe-and-balkans-01-11-2018/ (accessed April 4, 2019). Ristovic, Milan. “‘The Birth of Southeastern Europe’ and the ‘Death of the Balkans.’ Essay on German views on SE Europe during the 1930s and 1940s.” Thethis. Mannheimer Beiträge zur Klassischen Archeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns 2 (1995): 169-176. Said, Edward W. Orientalism. London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Schmemann, Serge. “The World: Storm Front; A New Collision Of East And West.” The New York Times, April 4, 1999. Smith, Adrian. “Imaging Geographies of the ‘New Europe’: Geo-economic Power and the New European Architecture of Integration.” Political Geography 21, no. 5 (2000): 647-670. Stråth, Bo. “A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept.” European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 4 (2002): 387-401. Todorova, Maria. Imagining the Balkans. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Todorova, Maria. “What Is or Is There a Balkan Culture and Do or Should the Balkans Have a Regional Identity?” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 4, no. 1 (2004): 175-185. Eastern Europe’s Orientalised Identity 81 Van de Kaa, Dirk. “Europe and its Population: the Long View.” In European Populations. Unity in Diversity, edited by Dirk van de Kaa, Henri Leridon, Giuseppe Gesano and Marek Okólski, 1-50. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. Welsch, Wolfgang. “Stając się sobą” [Becoming Yourself]. In Problemy ponowoczesnej pluralizacji kultury. Wokół koncepcji Wolfganga Welscha [Problems of Post- Modern Pluralisation of Culture. Around the Concept of Wolfgang Welsch], edited by Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora, 1998. Wolff, Larry. Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Yi-Fu, Tuan. “Language and the Making of Place: A Narrative-Descriptive Approach.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 81, no. 4 (December 1991): 684-696. Zarycki, Tomasz. “Socjologia krytyczna na peryferiach” [Critical Sociology in the Periphery]. Kultura i Społeczeństwo [Culture and Society] 80, no. 1 (2009): 105-212. Zarycki, Tomasz. Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe. London-New York: Routledge, 2014. Zarycki, Tomasz. Peryferie. Nowe ujęcia symbolicznych zależności centro-peryferyjnych [Periphery. New Approaches to Symbolic Center-Peripheral Relationships]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2009. Kinga Anna Gajda 82

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References
Adamovsky, Ezequiel. “Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern Europe in France, 1810-1880.” The Journal of Modern History 77, no. 3 (September 2005): 591-628.
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York: Penguin Classics, 2006.
Austin, John Langshaw. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford, New York: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Bjelic, Dusan. “The Balkans' Imaginary and the Paradox of European Borders.” Eurozine, December 15, 2003.
Bunkier sztuki. Orient, http://bunkier.art.pl/?wystawy=orient&lang=en (accessed April 17, 2019).
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Connor, Walter D. “Europe West and East: Thoughts on History, Culture, and Kosovo.” In Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk, edited by Zvi Y. Gitelman and Roman Szporluk. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2000.
Dallmayr, Fred. “The Ambivalence of Europe. Western Culture and its ‘Other.’” In Dialogue Among Civilizations. Some Exemplary Voices, edited by Fred Dallmayr, 49-65. New York, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Delanty, Gerard. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. London: Macmillan, 1995.
Gregory, Derek. “Between the Book and the Lamp: Imaginative Geographies of Egypt, 1849-50.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 20, no. 1 (1995): 29-57.
Gutmann, Amy. Identity in Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Hagen, Joshua. “Redrawing the Imagined Map of Europe: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Center.’” Political Geography 22, no. 5 (2003): 489-517.
Hajnal, John. “Two Kinds of Preindustrial Household Formation.” In Family Forms in Historic Europe, edited by Richard Wall, Jean Robin, and Peter Laslett, 65-104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Hatzopoulos, Pavlos. The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity. International Relations and Ideology. London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2008.
Kundera, Milan. “A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows Out.” Granta, March 1, 1984. https://granta.com/a-kidnapped-west-or-culture-bows-out/ (accessed October 4, 2019).
Lukacs, John. “The ‘Other’ Europe At Century’s End.” The Wilson Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Autumn 1991): 116-122.
Melegh, Attila. On The East-West Slope. Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2006.
Milekic, Sven. “Croatian Pupils Voice Mixed Views on ‘Balkan’ Identity.” Balkan Insight, January 11, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/01/11/croatian-pupils-split-between-europe-and-balkans-01-11-2018/ (accessed April 4, 2019).
Ristovic, Milan. “‘The Birth of Southeastern Europe’ and the ‘Death of the Balkans.’ Essay on German views on SE Europe during the 1930s and 1940s.” Thethis. Mannheimer Beiträge zur Klassischen Archeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns 2 (1995): 169-176.
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.
Schmemann, Serge. “The World: Storm Front; A New Collision Of East And West.” The New York Times, April 4, 1999.
Smith, Adrian. “Imaging Geographies of the ‘New Europe’: Geo-economic Power and the New European Architecture of Integration.” Political Geography 21, no. 5 (2000): 647-670.
Stråth, Bo. “A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept.” European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 4 (2002): 387-401.
Todorova, Maria. Imagining the Balkans. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Todorova, Maria. “What Is or Is There a Balkan Culture and Do or Should the Balkans Have a Regional Identity?” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 4, no. 1 (2004): 175-185.
Van de Kaa, Dirk. “Europe and its Population: the Long View.” In European Populations. Unity in Diversity, edited by Dirk van de Kaa, Henri Leridon, Giuseppe Gesano and Marek Okólski, 1-50. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
Welsch, Wolfgang. “Stając się sobą” [Becoming Yourself]. In Problemy ponowoczesnej pluralizacji kultury. Wokół koncepcji Wolfganga Welscha [Problems of Post-Modern Pluralisation of Culture. Around the Concept of Wolfgang Welsch], edited by Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora, 1998.
Wolff, Larry. Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Yi-Fu, Tuan. “Language and the Making of Place: A Narrative-Descriptive Approach.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 81, no. 4 (December 1991): 684-696.
Zarycki, Tomasz. “Socjologia krytyczna na peryferiach” [Critical Sociology in the Periphery]. Kultura i Społeczeństwo [Culture and Society] 80, no. 1 (2009): 105-212.
Zarycki, Tomasz. Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe. London-New York: Routledge, 2014.
Zarycki, Tomasz. Peryferie. Nowe ujęcia symbolicznych zależności centro-peryferyjnych [Periphery. New Approaches to Symbolic Center-Peripheral Relationships]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2009.

Abstract

The Western Balkans and the Visegrad Group are two macro-regions within the larger Eastern European area. Geographically and historically close, both regions share comparable characteristics on a macro-regional level as well as among the region's individual countries on a national level. However, when it comes to identities, the national level seems unavoidable: politically speaking, identity means national identity first and foremost. The authors of this book, who come from both regions, examine the ways in which the very sense of regional belonging might—or might not—override the shortcomings of and the obstacles erected by national identity. The varied case studies in the book focus on aspects of identity and their political (mis)use by actors in the regions under study. With contributions by Adam Bence Balazs, Adam Balcer, Ladislav Cabada, Ondřej Daniel, Kinga Anna Gajda, Kamil Glinka, Christina Griessler, Adis Maksic, Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc, Ešref Kenan Rašidagić, Andrea Schmidt, Tamara Trošt, Robert Wiszniowski, Nikola Zečević.

Zusammenfassung

Der Westbalkan und die Visegrad-Gruppe sind zwei Makroregionen innerhalb eines größeren osteuropäischen Raums. Geografisch und historisch nahe beieinander weisen beide Regionen sowohl auf makroregionaler als auch auf nationaler Ebene vergleichbare Merkmale auf. Kommt man zur Frage der Identität, scheint die nationale Ebene jedoch unumstößlich: Politisch gesehen bedeutet Identität zuallererst nationale Identität. Die aus den Regionen stammenden AutorenInnen untersuchen, auf welche Weise das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu einer Region die Unzulänglichkeiten und Blockaden der nationalen Identität überwinden könnte - oder auch nicht. Die Vielfalt der Fallstudien konzentriert sich auf Identitätsaspekte und deren politischen (Missbrauch) durch Akteure in den untersuchten Regionen. Mit Beiträgen von Adam Bence Balazs, Adam Balcer, Ladislav Cabada, Ondřej Daniel, Kinga Anna Gajda, Kamil Glinka, Christina Griessler, Adis Maksic, Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc, Ešref Kenan Rašidagić, Andrea Schmidt, Tamara Trošt, Robert Wiszniowski, Nikola Zečević.