German-Turkish Relations Revisited

The European Dimension, Domestic and Foreign Politics and Transnational Dynamics

Ebru Turhan [ed.]
EU-Turkey relations have a long historic trajectory. Turkey is in future likely to remain, despite political tensions, an important country for the EU in economic, political and geostrategic terms. On the one hand, recent developments affecting the EU have motivated the Heads of State or Government to rediscover Turkey's relevance as 'key strategic partner'. On the other hand, prospects of Turkey's accession to the EU have reached an all-time low in the light of Turkey distancing itself from the political accession criterion as well as the multiple internal crises the EU has been confronted with. This renders EU-Turkey relations a highly topical issue for academic research.

The Centre for Turkey and European Union Studies (CETEUS) aims at providing a framework for publications dealing with Turkey, the European Union as well as EU/German-Turkish relations regarding multiple thematic dimensions as well as geographic contexts including the neighbourhood and the global scene.

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**edited by**

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Wolfgang Wessels

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations 7

INTRODUCTION 9
German-Turkish Relations – Intermestic, Interdependent, Intricate 11
Ebru Turhan

PART 1 The European Dimension of German-Turkish Relations 29
Institutional Triangle EU-Turkey-Germany: Change and Continuity 31
Mirja Schröder, Funda Tekin
With or Without Turkey? The Many Determinants of the Official German Position on Turkey’s EU Accession Process 59
Ebru Turhan
Reluctant Multilateralists? How Brexit Can Affect German-Turkish Relations 91
Thomas Krumm

PART 2 German-Turkish Dialogue in consideration of Foreign and Domestic Politics 111
Shaping Geopolitical Destiny and Coping with Global Complexity: Germany and Turkey as Central Powers in International Politics 113
Ludwig Schulz
Germany’s Domesticated European Policy: Implications for the EU and Turkey 143
Ebru Turhan
# Table of Contents

German-Turkish Relations at Continuous Crossroads – Political and Structural Factors

*Yaşar Aydın*  

165

---

**PART 3 German-Turkish Transnational Space**

Turkish Electoral Campaigns in Germany and the Wider Western Europe as Transnational Practices

*Deniz Kuru*  

187

Creatively Displaced? The Impact of Neoliberal Urban Policies on Immigrants from Turkey in Berlin

*Defne Kadoğlu Polat*  

207

Educational Inequalities within the context of the Turkish Community in Germany: Family Background, Institutional Settings and Ethnic Boundaries

*Çetin Çelik*  

225

Germany has “been there, done that”: Remembering the Engagement of Media in German Integration Strategies towards Turkish Immigrants and Beyond

*Elif Posos Devrani*  

243

---

**CONCLUSIONS**

Untangling German-Turkish Relations: Thinking Ahead

*Funda Tekin, Wolfgang Wessels*  

269

Acknowledgements

281

Notes on Contributors

283

Series Editors

285

Index

287
List of Abbreviations

AfD Alternative für Deutschland
AKP Justice and Development Party
BAMF German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BDI Federation of German Industries
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries
CoE Council of Europe
CRDU Croatian Democratic Union
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CSU Christian Social Union
CU Customs Union
DITIB Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği
EC European Commission
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EP European Parliament
EPP European People’s Party
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
FCC Federal Constitutional Court
FDI Foreign Direct Investments
FDP Free Democratic Party
FETÖ Gülenist Terror Organisation
FPÖ Freedom Party of Austria
FT Financial Times
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDR German Democratic Republic
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IR International Relations
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MENA Middle East and North Africa
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPAA</td>
<td>National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>Austrian People’s Party</td>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party</td>
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<td>PEGIDA</td>
<td>Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West</td>
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<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<td>PISA</td>
<td>Programme for International Student Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
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<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td>TANAP</td>
<td>Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline</td>
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<td>TAP</td>
<td>Trans Adriatic Pipeline</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>TUSIAD</td>
<td>Turkish Industry and Business Association</td>
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<td>UETD</td>
<td>Union of European Turkish Democrats</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WEAG</td>
<td>Western European Armament Group</td>
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<td>WEAO</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
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INTRODUCTION
German-Turkish Relations – Intermestic, Interdependent, Intricate

Ebru Turhan

1. Introduction

In recent years the German-Turkish dialogue has been increasingly becoming subject to German, Turkish and European political, academic, public and media debates. The bilateral relationship has been in fact attracting attention for many decades taking into consideration the multidimensional complex interdependence between both countries and a vicious cycle of ebbs and flows that has dominated German-Turkish relations. The overarching evolution of the bilateral dialogue between Germany and Turkey has been a journey with numerous crossroads as throughout the contemporary history moments of conflict between both countries were followed by an era of rapprochement and intensified interest-oriented collaboration which was yet again succeeded by another period of disagreement and estrangement based on diverging preferences and interests. Whereas various phases of conflict, convergence or standstill could also be observed in the overarching relationship between Turkey and the European Union (EU)\(^1\), the German-Turkish dialogue has experienced sharper, more clear-cut U-turns and transitions.

Sharp and rapid adjustments in the key parameters and scope of the relations between Germany and Turkey has more recently taken place, above all,

a) in December 1999, when the Helsinki European Council granted Turkey candidate country status with the strong support provided by the Gerhard Schröder government\(^2\) and when the German-Turkish bilateral di-

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alogue took a positive turn in economic and political terms by means of Turkey’s enhanced European perspective;

b) *in early 2013* with Germany’s adoption of a more positive attitude towards the acceleration of Turkey’s EU accession process, the realization of regular official visits to Turkey by the representatives of German federal and state governments and the launch of the German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue Mechanism taking into account the negative externalities arising from the Eurozone crisis and the Arab Spring;

c) *in early June 2013* following the Gezi Park incidents and Germany’s subsequent official criticism of their handling by Ankara accompanied by the German decision to veto the opening of a new negotiation chapter in Turkey’s accession talks with the EU;

d) *in late 2015*, when a sudden yet temporary rapprochement took place between Germany and Turkey, and when German Chancellor Angela Merkel unanticipatedly supported the revitalization of Turkish accession process in exchange for Ankara’s enhanced cooperation with the EU on the management of irregular migration flows and

e) *in mid-2016*, when an extensive period of conflict and magnified estrangement between both countries kicked off as a result of various incidents including the adoption of a resolution by the German Bundestag (federal parliament) recognizing the mass death of Armenians in 1915 as a “genocide”, Ankara’s consequent ban on German parliamentary delegation’s visit to the Incirlik military base that hosted roughly 250 German troops as part of the anti-IS Coalition and Berlin’s palpable criticism of post-coup developments in Turkey.

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The cyclical trends in German-Turkish relationship appear to continue – with one difference: Lately, phases of conflict have started to last longer and include magnified levels of estrangement and mutual distrust, whereas periods of rapprochement and consistent collaboration free of conflict have been appearing to last shorter. The most recent period of proper rapprochement and intensified intergovernmental collaboration was predominantly interest-driven and took place between September 2015 and May 2016 throughout the efforts to finalize as well as implement the “EU-Turkey Statement”\(^7\) on dealing with the refugee crisis, which had transformed from a crisis of the Middle East to a European/German one mid-2015. The EU-Turkey Statement, also to be known as the EU-Turkey refugee “deal”, aimed - alongside the management of irregular migration flows - at the intensification and further institutionalization of the relations between the EU and Turkey with the launch of talks in new chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU, the acceleration of the visa liberalisation process, the kick-off of talks on the upgrading of the Customs Union (CU) and the carrying out of bilateral summits on a regular basis. Nevertheless, the EU/German-Turkish relationship has since June 2016 been largely in a state of turmoil.

Many developments and incidents contributed to the escalation of bilateral disputes and estrangement between Ankara and Berlin as a result of diverging preferences and interests accompanied by the emergence of negative externalities for one party on account of the strategic policy choices made by the other. The Armenian bill and the subsequent Incirlik decision of the Turkish government; German withdrawal from the base; Germany’s “politics of balance”\(^8\) with regard to the armed terrorist organization the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its delivery of military aid to the Kurdish Peshmerga throughout the turmoil in Syria, which then appeared to be delivered to the PKK-annexed Democratic Union Party (PYD)\(^9\); German television comedian Jan Böhmermann’s crude satirical poem about Turk-


ish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan\textsuperscript{10}; clear diverging views of both governments on political and societal developments in Turkey post-coup attempt\textsuperscript{11}; the leaked 2016 report of the German Ministry of Interior that claimed the “Islamization” of Ankara’s domestic and foreign policies and Turkey’s transition to a central platform for the activities of Middle Eastern terrorist groups\textsuperscript{12}; the prohibition of Turkish election rallies in Germany ahead of the April 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum and Ankara’s subsequent comparison of the German ban with “Nazi practices”\textsuperscript{13}; the imprisonment of German journalist Deniz Yücel by Turkish authorities who was then released after more than one year of pre-trial detention; other German citizens who remain imprisoned in Turkey, and Germany’s veto on the launch of talks on the update of the CU between Turkey and the EU\textsuperscript{14} have been some of the many issues of heightened contention between Germany and Turkey in the last 2.5 years.

2. From an “almost” train crash to a quick full recovery?

The relations between both countries have been recently showing some early signs of normalization. Following a phase of heightened estrangement and conflict that lasted for about two years some steps towards reconciliation have been taken by both countries since late-summer 2018 in consideration of mutual strategic interests and converging preferences in both economic and political terms. Indeed, German-Turkish efforts for rapprochement coincided with several developments including the emergence of a severe economic turmoil in Turkey following the authorization of


\textsuperscript{11} Turhan. The Struggle for the German-Turkish Partnership: Preventing the ‘Train Crash.’


trade sanctions against Turkey by US President Donald Trump in early August 2018, Berlin’s succeeding statement about Germany’s strategic interest in the maintenance of an “economically prosperous Turkey”\textsuperscript{15}, which indicated possible negative externalities of a Turkish economic crisis for the German economy and companies operating in Turkey, increasing frictions in the transatlantic alliance in view of controversy over many issues including the Paris Agreement on climate change and Trump’s withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, and the likelihood of a new Syrian refugee wave as a result of increasing violence experienced in the Syrian province of Idlib. These incidents led to the realization of reciprocal official visits by key representatives of German and Turkish governments in the second half of 2018, some of which were accompanied by high-level business delegations.\textsuperscript{16} 

A quick and complete recovery from turmoil however appears to be very unlikely as a result of already done severe damage resulting in mutual distrust between Ankara and Berlin and the ongoing preference divergence with regard to various policy areas. For instance, as far as Turkey’s EU accession process and the overarching relationship between Turkey and the EU are concerned, it should be underlined that Germany has emerged as a visible, self-confident and assertive veto player in recent years. For many decades, Germany has in fact been a key actor in the formulation of the dialogue between Turkey and the EU, in general, and the progression of Turkish accession process, in particular. This has been an unavoidable outcome of Germany’s overall structural capabilities which “provide the country with a greater leeway for power politics”\textsuperscript{17} in the interstate negotiations concerning agenda-shaping and decision-making processes in the two intergovernmental EU institutions most relevant for the making of EU enlargement politics: the European Council and Council of Ministers.\textsuperscript{18} That being said, until very recently Germany had been tending to shape the EU-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Turkey visit of German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (05-06.09.2018); Turkish Minister of Finance Berat Albayrak’s Germany visit (21.09.2018); Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Germany (27-29.09.2018); German Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Peter Altmaier’s visit to Turkey (25-26.10.2018).
\item \textsuperscript{17} Turhan. Europe’s Crises, Germany’s Leadership and Turkey’s EU Accession Process.
\end{itemize}
Turkish relationship behind closed doors by means of intergovernmental negotiations rather than through unilateral statements in front of microphones and cameras.

3. Changing dynamics of German-Turkish relations

A combination of different dynamics including the emergence of a fresh narrative in German foreign policy making in 2014 founded on Germany’s stepping up to greater responsibilities and pursuing a more active foreign policy both Europe-wide and globally, a remarkably Turkey-sceptic German public opinion and rising populist/Eurosceptic attitudes in Germany contributed to the appearance of a more assertive German policy making with regard to EU-Turkey dialogue. A more resolute and visible German foreign policy making vis-à-vis EU-Turkey relations has been above all reflected in the German coalition agreement which highlighted Berlin’s resistance to the opening of any new chapter in Turkey’s accession talks with the EU, while also noting Germany’s clear scepticism about the fulfilment of Turkey’s visa liberalization process and the launch of negotiations on the updating of the EU-Turkey CU. For the very first time, the German federal government openly and somehow bindingly integrated its prospective veto on possible developments with re-

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gard to EU-Turkey relations into the coalition agreement which lays down the guiding principles of the government.

Alongside Germany’s emergence as a visible and influential veto player in the formation of EU-Turkey dialogue there are various other areas of contention which hinder the progression of German-Turkish relations without a hitch and disruption. Turkey’s scope of involvement in the management of the violence and turmoil in Syria has been an issue of dispute between both parties for some time. In a scientific report prepared by the German Bundestag and published in December 2018, Turkey’s military presence in Northern Syria was described as an “occupying force” and as a violation of the international law. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas had already emphasized in March 2018 that Turkey’s permanent stay in Syria was not going to be in accordance with the international law hinting at Germany’s discomfort from a strong Turkish presence in Northern Syria. In view of the possibility of the US military’s withdrawal from Syria and the prospective shift in the balance of power in the region, German-Turkish preferences are likely to diverge, even more.

Another important point of contention between both countries has been reciprocal discomfort from some judicial processes. While the Turkish government has repeatedly raised its concerns about Germany’s processing of asylum applications made by possible members of the Gülenist Terror Organisation (FETÖ), which was responsible for the implementation of the 2016 coup attempt and has been classified as a terrorist organization by Ankara, Berlin has expressed its discomfort from the detention of various German citizens by Turkish authorities on terrorism charges. Diverging preferences and tensions between Germany and Turkey also exist in other areas including Turkey’s diaspora policies, on the one hand, and

22 Deutsche Welle. Alman meclisi raporu: Türkiye Suriye’de işgalci güç, 26 December 2018, https://www.dw.com/tr/alman-meclisi-raporu-t%C3%BCrkije-suriyede-i %C5%9Fgalci-g%C3%BC%C3%A7/a-46866011 [02.01.2019].
the “clash of models” between two countries as regards Turkish immigrant community’s integration into Germany, on the other,\textsuperscript{25} and the situation of rule of law and human rights in Turkey.\textsuperscript{26} Both countries’ differing preferences and interests in these policy areas accompanied by continuing partial mutual distrust as a result of the use of harsh rhetoric against each other hinder a quick and complete restoration of the intergovernmental dialogue between Berlin and Ankara. This has also been reflected in both parties’ inability to convene already established high-level intergovernmental dialogue instruments such as German-Turkish intergovernmental consultations and the German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue Mechanism.

4. Germany and Turkey: intermestic affairs and conflictual cooperation as a result of complex interdependence

Despite the endurance of various contentious issues in the German-Turkish relationship and the continuing existence of severe differences as regards ideological attitudes and the normative attributions of freedom and security both countries refrain from causing an apparent “train crash” in the bilateral dialogue and tend to maintain cooperative working relationships in manifold policy areas. In this vein, German-Turkish dialogue seems to be above all based on the principle of “conflictual cooperation,” according to which “cooperation in some areas coexist with instances of disagreement and even conflict in others.”\textsuperscript{27} Accordingly, the bilateral relationship between both countries bears a resemblance to a rollercoaster ride, “with the


\textsuperscript{26} See for example, Die Bundesregierung. Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem türkischen Ministerpräsidenten Binali Yıldırım im Bundeskanzleramt, 15 February 2018, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenzen/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-und-dem-tuerkische-n-ministerpraesidenten-binali-y%C4%B1ld%C4%B1r%C4%B1m-849330 [10.11.2018].

\textsuperscript{27} Ergun, Doruk/ Dessi, Andrea/ Lindgaard, Jakob/ Ala’Aldeen, Dlawer/ Palani, Kamaran. The Role of the Middle East in the EU-Turkey Security Relationship: Key Drivers and Future Scenarios. FEUTURE Online Paper No. 20, May 2018, p. 2.
display of dramatic tensions followed by signs of rapprochement in view of common interests and preferences.”

The conflictual cooperative working relationship between Germany and Turkey is most of all the result of a unique “complex interdependence” between the two countries. While neoliberalism defines interdependence as a situation “characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries”, it utilizes the concept of “complex interdependence” to define an international system model that would contradict the realist ideal type of international system and demonstrate a clear and visible linkage between interdependence and regional integration/cooperation through the presupposition of the existence of multi-dimensional and multi-level interdependence between states, in the highest possible degree. In such an international system, societies are connected by manifold informal and formal ties at interstate, transgovernmental and transnational levels. The absence of hierarchy among different policy areas and issues culminates in the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign politics and in the emergence of different levels of interstate cooperation as well as conflict. While security and military power still remain relevant to interstate dialogue in an international system dominated by complex interdependence, issues of low politics such as economy, environment or social affairs increasingly become significant, too. Under complex interdependence, states’ national sovereignty is profoundly constrained and cooperation among them becomes necessary.

The concept of complex interdependence also features two important characteristics that need to be taken into account throughout its application to various situations of interstate dialogue and collaboration: 1) The concept has been predominantly formulated to study the relations between states that embrace pluralist democratic principles. This accompanied by its representation of an extreme end of the spectrum dealing with various modes of international system hinders its applicability to all kinds of relations between states. 2) As a result of the curvilinear relationship be-

28 Turhan. The Struggle for the German-Turkish Partnership: Preventing the ‘Train Crash’.
tween interdependence, cooperation and conflict\textsuperscript{33}, interstate interdependence may bring about both conflict and cooperation depending on its degree and the related policy area.

Despite the limited applicability of the concept of complex interdependence to the bilateral and multilateral dialogues between all states, the overarching evolution of the bilateral dialogue between Germany and Turkey based on the principle of conflictual cooperation features a particularly high degree of interconnectedness, and pushes the relationship as close as possible to the extreme condition of complex interdependence. Indeed, in accordance with the key premises of neoliberalism, German and Turkish societies have been linked for many decades with various formal channels including regular intergovernmental meetings between key representatives of German and Turkish governments, collaboration and exchange of ideas within the context of various international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Group of Twenty (G20) and Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), and more recently, with emerging intergovernmental mechanisms including German-Turkish intergovernmental consultations and German-Turkish Energy Forum although the utilization of these dialogue tools have lately been hindered by the escalating diplomatic row between both countries. Informal links between German and Turkish governmental elites have been established for many decades particularly through the realization of bilateral/minilateral meetings, calls and talks outside the framework of official intergovernmental meetings based on personal relationships, particularly, at times of distinct bilateral tensions. The informal talk between former German Foreign Affairs Minister Sigmar Gabriel and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in December 2017 in Antalya following severe intergovernmental clashes between both countries\textsuperscript{34} sets a good example for the employment of informal political channels between Berlin and Ankara.

Similar strong informal ties have also been relevant for the relationship between both countries’ governments and multinational German and Turkish companies which play a leading role in the maintenance and enhancement of the bilateral trade and investment partnership, and conse-


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quently, serve as key domestic actors for national preference formation processes. Above all, the presence of more than 7000 companies with German capital in Turkey and their utilization of Turkey as a regional business hub for their operations in the wider neighbourhood point to the triangular relationship between domestic, foreign and regional economic activities. This sphere of transnational economic activities is accompanied by a distinct German-Turkish transnational space resulting from Turkish immigrants and their descendants residing in Germany, who establish extensive channels of communication with Turkey culminating in intensive “border-crossing cultural reproduction, capital accumulation, political engagement, citizenship attainment, hyphenated identities and cultures in fluidity.”

The complex interconnectedness between German and Turkish societies via multiple formal and informal channels brings along the absence of a clear hierarchy as regards the overarching agenda of German-Turkish dialogue and minimizes the separation between foreign and domestic politics, in accordance with the main assumptions of neoliberalist thought. Indeed, the agenda of German-Turkish dialogue is extremely volatile and based on the absence of a clearly prevailing issue. One day, the governments of the two countries may be occupied with Turkey’s EU accession process and shifts in official German position, while the next day issues such as the activities of PKK members and supporters in Germany, election campaigns of Turkish government representatives and politicians in German cities, bilateral cooperation in the field of energy or the implications of the economic turmoil in Turkey for German companies operating in Turkey and German foreign direct investments (FDI) may dominate the agenda.

These examples also indicate the “intermestic” nature of the German-Turkish relationship which triggers the overlapping of internal and external issues and increases the level of complexity in as well as the necessity for policy coordination and cooperation between both countries. As a result of this intermestic feature of German-Turkish bilateral relations, one country’s foreign policy making typically has various domestic politics related consequences for the other party, while domestic developments in one country is frequently leading to a recalibration of foreign policy making vis-à-vis the other country. In a similar vein, in such a relationship, foreign policy making may have domestic drivers and domestic policies may

36 Szabo. Germany and Turkey: The Unavoidable Partnership, p.2.
frequently be influenced by foreign affairs. That the intermestic character of the bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey has lately become particularly visible is also reflected in the recent establishment of a new department at the German Federal Foreign Office which only deals with the domestic political aspects of German-Turkish relations.

5. Revisiting the German-Turkish affairs: three dimensions

Against this background and taking into account the intermestic and exceptionally interdependent nature of German-Turkish relations, this edited volume revisits the German-Turkish dialogue by focusing on three important aspects of the affairs which particularly involve conflictual cooperative working arrangements between Germany and Turkey:

The European dimension: German-Turkish dialogue on European issues contains manifold aspects which foster the creation of multiple venues for the appearance of conflictual cooperation between both countries due to the existence of sometimes converging, sometimes diverging interests, on the one hand, and the negative externalities that arise for one party as a result of the other’s policy preferences, on the other. Issues such as the official position of the German federal government on Turkey’s EU accession process and the conflicting personal views of top political figures in German political landscape; the implications of Turkey’s partial distancing itself with Europe in manifold aspects, what came to be known as “De-Europeanisation”, for German-Turkish relations; German-Turkish cooperation in the management of irregular migration flows to Europe and the potential implications of a Turkish withdrawal from the refugee “deal” for Germany and Europe undoubtedly relate to the European dimension of German-Turkish relations. As far as the official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process is concerned, Mirja Schröder and Funda 5.

38 A potential withdrawal was indicated many times by top Turkish political figures at times of crisis with Europe/Germany, and particularly throughout the post-coup attempt era. See for instance, Eleftheriou-Smith, Loulla-Mae. Turkey says it will abandon deal stemming flow of refugees if it doesn’t get EU visa freedom in October. In: The Independent, 15 August 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-abandon-deal-stem-flow-refugees-no-eu-visa-freedom-october-a7191921.htmlleds [03.09.2019].
Tekin point to Germany’s increasing visibility in the formation of EU-Turkey dialogue arguing, “If the UK exits the EU, one of the strongest promoters of Turkish accession will have left. With German-Turkish relations in disarray an additional and strong veto player might enter the picture.” That Brexit is likely to foster Germany’s leadership in the EU and, consequently, in the evolution of Turkey’s institutional dialogue with the EU is also emphasized by Thomas Krumm: “After Brexit, a shift of the EU’s political centre towards the South is a most likely consequence, giving Germany a more central role in finding and negotiating compromises concerning European policy making between the different regions and member states. […] Germany’s increasing influence in the EU is likely to further decrease Turkey’s already rapidly declining chances of entering the EU.” While Germany’s influence in EU-Turkey dialogue has been gradually growing, the key drivers of this influence, Germany’s policy preferences, are determined by various factors. Whereas Ebru Turhan’s study highlights “the primacy of Germany’s security and welfare related interests over normative considerations as far as the construction of Berlin’s policies concerning Turkey’s accession to the EU are concerned”, it also points to the “increasing importance of non-utilitarian, normative factors” as regards the construction of German-Turkish relations, in general, and German attitude toward Turkish accession process, in particular.

Domestic and foreign politics: The intermestic nature of German-Turkish relations and the complex interdependence between both countries are particularly felt in the makings of domestic and foreign policy by both countries. That foreign policy preferences of one country could typically have significant domestic implications for the other country has been undoubtedly reflected in the German federal parliament’s 2016 Armenian resolution and its domestic repercussions within Turkish political, media and public spheres as well as in German companies’ concerns about their operations in Turkey following the US launch of trade sanctions against Turkey. Likewise, the implications of Germany’s/Turkey’s domestic policy actions for German-Turkish bilateral relations were for instance felt in Turkey’s imprisonment of various German citizens on terrorism charges in the post-coup attempt era and Berlin’s consequent strong criticism of Turkey in front of cameras and microphones, which also culminated in


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various German foreign policy actions such as German veto on the launch of CU reform talks between Turkey and the EU, and in Germany’s call to cut the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) provided to Turkey within the context of its EU accession process, which was accepted by the other member states.

As far as the linkage between domestic and foreign policy related factors are concerned, Yaşar Aydın stresses that the existence of Turkey-sceptic public opinion in Germany also serves as an important domestic driver for the maintenance of turmoil in the German-Turkish bilateral dialogue: “According to a survey, 56 percent of the Germans do not approve the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU, and 68 percent of Germans are against a Turkish accession to the EU. The Turkey-sceptic public opinion undoubtedly constrains the policy options of German federal government.” In a similar vein, Ebru Turhan studies the gradual domestication of Germany’s European policy and notes that the formation of Germany’s European policy “has become increasingly domesticated with the progression of the European integration process and, consequently, with competence transfer from the national to the EU level and increased policy coordination at the supranational level.” According to Turhan the domestication trend was particularly visible during the crisis eras when key societal actors defined their preferences and interests more precisely, which was also reflected in Germany’s foreign policy making towards Turkey throughout the Eurozone and refugee crises. While the blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign politics acts as an important driver in the formulation of German-Turkish relations, Ludwig Schulz points to the substantial differences as regards the use of the concept of “central power” developed by Hans-Peter Schwarz in German and Turkish foreign policy making, which is likely to nurture bilateral disagreements between both countries: “The analysis of the evolution of the concept of ‘central power’ in the cases of German and Turkish foreign policy demonstrates first and foremost that the concept, although being widely ignored so far, may have implicitly or even explicitly been playing a key role in the making and practice of foreign policy in both countries since the mid-1990s. However, simply put, the notion of ‘central power’ also is what governments make of it.”

Transnational Dynamics: German-Turkish transnational space could be regarded as the most complex, sensitive and volatile dimension of the bilateral dialogue between Germany and Turkey. This dimension is being constantly reshaped by many drivers including Turkey’s diaspora politics, Germany’s integration policies, the citizenship regimes of both countries, the overarching economic, political and cultural interaction between Germany and Turkey at the intergovernmental level and its impact on the “German-
Turkish community, this community’s continuously evolving perception of the host and home countries, and the status of anti-immigrant and far-right discourse in Germany. In accordance with the emergence of Turkish foreign policy activism after 2007 “to actively pursue the goal of assuming a leading regional and, ideally, global role” Ankaralately sought to pursue a more active and institutionalized diaspora policy since it regarded the Turkish diaspora as a “potential source of soft power and influence.” The utilization of Turkish diaspora as a source of power in domestic politics was reflected in the introduction of voting from abroad with the 2014 presidential elections which brought along transnational electoral campaigns in Western Europe and, above all, in Germany. Deniz Kuru notes in his study that Germany’s visible and negative reaction to the making of Turkish electoral campaigns on German soil was the result of the methodological differences between the two countries’ electoral practices: “In comparison to German political parties and political leaders’ small-scale open-air activities, the AKP strategy of organizing huge rallies in sports or entertainment facilities was something so different that this transnationally-run Turkish electoral campaign could not but attract the attention of the German media.”

Elif Posos Devrani turns her attention to the role of the German media in the continuous reproduction of the German-Turkish transnational space focusing particularly on the evolution of the instrumentalization of the German media as a tool for German integration policies. According to Posos Devrani, in the first years following the arrival of Turkish immigrants in Germany “no coverage in media about the Turkish workers and their new lives in Germany existed, which was a consequence of the lack of the attempts to create an integration policy.” However, she also notes that with the adoption of the 2007 German National Integration Plan, German federal government started to effectively utilize various German media outlets as an apparatus for integration, for instance, by calling for co-operation with Turkish-language media, creating awareness about violence against women and recruiting journalists and media professionals of immigrant descent. Another vital factor contributing to the definition of the main parameters and meanings of transnational spaces has been the educational

opportunities provided to the immigrant communities and the educational credentials the immigrants, and later, their descendants acquire.Çetin Çelik focuses in this edited volume on socioeconomic and institutional challenges facing second generation Turkish immigrants in Germany on the path to integration and concludes: “Broad ethnic boundaries such as negative public discourses, mono-ethnic citizenship regime, de-industrialization of economy, and rigid school-type tracking are the major realities in the context of reception that second generation Turkish immigrants interact with on daily basis.” Just like educational opportunities, conditions of and limitations to immigrants’ access to housing play an important role in immigrants’ constant reformulation of transnational ties and practices and their perception of the host community. Departing from the recent utilization of neoliberal urban policies in Berlin Defne Kadioğlu Polat shows how “districts that were prior constructed as Turkish or Muslim ghettos, such as Neukölln, have increasingly found their way into tourist guides and are celebrated as exciting hubs to witness the emergence of a new and diverse metropolis” and, consequently, how low-income Turkish immigrants experience negative consequences.

6. The structure of the edited volume

This edited volume consists of three main parts in accordance with the above-mentioned focus on the a priori selected dimensions of the German-Turkish dialogue. In the first part, which deals with the “European dimension” of the affairs, Mirja Schröder and Funda Tekin study the path dependencies in the triangular relationship between Germany, Turkey and the EU applying an institutionalist approach, while Ebru Turhan examines the main drivers of the official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process drawing on the key premises of rationalism and constructivism. Taking the British, German and Turkish approaches to uni-, bi- and multilateralism into account, Thomas Krumm elaborates the possible implications of Brexit for the relationship between Germany/the United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey.

In the second part of the edited volume, contributions deal with the role of domestic and foreign politics in the making of German-Turkish re-

lations and the linkages between internal and external affairs. Departing from the concept of “central power”, Ludwig Schulz looks at the similarities and differences between German and Turkish foreign policy identities. Ebru Turhan examines the gradual “domestication” of Germany’s European policy and its implications for EU/German-Turkish relations throughout the Eurozone and refugee crises. Yaşar Aydın’s chapter maps both the long-term and short-term conflicts between Germany and Turkey and analyses the domestic, external and structural factors contributing to the emergence and maintenance of diplomatic tensions between both countries.

The third part of the edited volume focuses on German-Turkish transnational space and interactions. Deniz Kuru examines Turkish electoral campaigns in Germany and in wider Western Europe and their perception by the host communities in a comparative perspective. Defne Kadioğlu Polat’s chapter deals with the implications of the gentrification of Berlin’s working class neighbourhoods for Turkish immigrants’ livelihoods, while Çetin Çelik studies the constraining effects of socioeconomic factors and institutional settings on the educational performance of second generation Turkish immigrants. Elif Posos Devrani examines in a chronological order the utilization of the German media as an integration apparatus within the context of the integration policies of successive German governments towards Turkish immigrants.

Following these three main sections, Funda Tekin and Wolfgang Wessels summarize the main findings of this edited volume and provide some projections about the future of the German-Turkish dialogue drawing on various aspects of these findings.
PART 1
The European Dimension of German-Turkish Relations
Institutional Triangle EU- Turkey-Germany: Change and Continuity

Mirja Schröder, Funda Tekin

1. Introduction

EU-Turkey relations have a long history and there is little doubt that Turkey is in future likely to remain an important country for the European Union (EU) in economic, political and geostrategic terms. Turkey has been associated to the EU since 1963 through the so-called Ankara Agreement with the aim to establish a Customs Union (CU), which was achieved in 1996. Turkey, however, aspires full membership in the Union and submitted its application as early as 1987. While rejecting this application the Commission emphasized the Communities’ “fundamental interest in intensifying its relations with Turkey helping it to complete as soon as possible its process of political and economic modernization.” In 1999, the EU finally granted Turkey accession candidate status and opened negotiations in 2005. However, ambiguity in the relationship remains high. In spite of the official prospect of EU membership, alternative forms of cooperation or integration such as ‘privileged partnership’ or ‘associate membership’ feature in the academic and political debates alike.

In 2015, EU-Turkey relations gained new momentum after almost a decade of stagnating accession negotiations. In that year alone more than

1 This study was conducted within the framework of the project ‘TRIANGLE – Blickwechsel in EU/German-Turkish Relations Beyond Conflict: Towards a Unique Partnership for a Contemporary Turkey?’, which is part of the programme “Blickwechsel: Contemporary Turkey Studies”, funded by Stiftung Mercator.
1.3 million asylum seekers registered in the EU and Turkey received special political attention from the EU as “key strategic partner”\(^4\) in this so-called refugee crisis. The proclaimed aim of the enhanced bilateral dialogue between both parties in view of the refugee crisis was to revitalise the accession negotiations. Yet, on the contrary, both external as well as domestic factors have complicated Turkey’s accession to the EU ever since. Turkey moved away from the EU’s political criteria\(^5\), reaching new rock bottom after the failed military coup attempt on 15 July 2016. The relationship worsened after a series of contested measures taken under the state of emergency in Turkey and lack of mutual understanding including massive criticism on both sides increased. The European Parliament (EP) voted, although non-binding, on 24 November 2016 to suspend the accession negotiations and repeated its demand after the Constitutional referendum in Turkey in April 2017.\(^6\) The Commission evaluated Turkey’s progress towards compliance with the political accession criteria also negatively\(^7\). The conclusion, however, differs from the EP’s opinion by emphasizing the necessity of continuing to maintain a dialogue. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini summarized in April 2017 that “the accession process continues, it is not suspended, nor ended but as you might know, we are currently not working on opening any new negotiation chapter.”\(^8\)

Prospects for EU-Turkey relations, if conflict can be avoided, therefore, range from EU membership to some sort of close association with the EU to cooperation with a key strategic partner. This study applies an institutionalist approach to assessing these different pathways. Building on histor-

\(^7\) European Commission. Turkey 2016 Report.
The research aims at analysing whether path-dependencies in EU-Turkey relations exist or whether ad hoc institutional constellations can be identified.

The first section of this paper sets the conceptual frame. This includes the elaboration of path-dependencies in light of historical institutionalism and the exceptionally close bilateral ties between Germany and Turkey. We include the question of how German-Turkish relations shape the institutional frame of the EU-Turkey relationship in our considerations, because we identify the German government as one of the key drivers in possible changes in institutional EU-Turkey relations.

In a second part the paper takes stock of the institutional frame of the accession procedure and additional forms of institutional cooperation between the EU and Turkey with the aim to map the main path of the relationship in view of Germany’s role.

Finally, the paper gives an overview about the state of play in EU-German-Turkish relationship examining what path seems to be the most promising.

2. Conceptual considerations

2.1 A historical institutionalist account of EU-Turkey relations

A very cursory assessment of the EU-Turkey relationship building on key arguments of historical institutionalism could jump to the conclusion that there is no future scenario but Turkey’s EU membership. The main argument would be that “institutional choices taken in the past persist, or become ‘locked in’, thereby shaping and constraining actors later in time.” This would imply that the decisions to grant Turkey accession candidate
status in 1999 and to open accession negotiations in 2004 are “sticky” and therefore resistant to change. This creates a path-dependence that motivates policy-makers to stick to the inherited decision from the past even though this might represent an inefficient outcome. There are various explanations for path-dependent processes. One key argument for Turkey’s accession process with the EU can be found in Scharpf’s “joint decision-trap.” Institutional arrangements characterized by intergovernmentalism, a voting rule of unanimity and default condition in which a policy or institution would persist in the event of no agreement are the most favourable framework for generating such traps. The decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey requires unanimous decision in the European Council. In 2004, there was a window of opportunity for finding such an approval among the EU member states. The German Social Democrats/Greens coalition government was a strong promoter of Turkish accession to the Union. The French President Jacques Chirac had only slight concerns regarding the timing of opening accession negotiations. He wanted to avoid any conflict with the French referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005. Greece also did not have any major objections and the strongest veto point, Cyprus, was temporarily dissolved by an Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement that foresaw to extend the CU between the EU and Turkey to all countries that had joined the EU in 2004 – including Cyprus.

This favourable constellation had already changed when accession negotiations were opened on 3 October 2005, because Angela Merkel from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was elected German Chancellor, public support for Turkish EU membership across member states had started to gradually decrease and Turkey had unilaterally excluded Cyprus from the Additional Protocol to the Ankara agreement. However, both transaction costs and institutional thresholds for cancelling the accession procedure are high. The political damage caused to the EU’s relationship with

12 See Pierson. The path to European integration; Pierson. Increasing returns, path dependency, and the study of politics.
14 Ibid.
15 For a detailed overview on the roles of the different EU member states in this decision see Turhan, Ebru. Turkey’s EU accession process: do member states matter? In: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2016, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 463-477.
16 Pollack, New Institutionalisms and European Integration, p. 3.
a key strategic partner that has been promised full membership would be significant. Furthermore, the decision to cancel the accession process with Turkey would require a unanimous vote of all member states.

These lock-in effects create a dilemma in EU-Turkey relationship because the accession process with Turkey created a path-dependence towards an outcome that both sides, neither Turkey nor the EU, have full confidence in ever achieving. Building on Greif and Laitin one can hence question whether the accession process is a “self-reinforcing” or “self-undermining” institution.\footnote{17 Greif, Avner/ Laitin, David D. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. In: American Political Studies Review, 2004, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 633-652.}

2.2 Germany-Turkey relations – reinforcing or undermining the EU-Turkey relationship?

In the run-up to the elections to the German Bundestag in 2017 the candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Martin Schulz, openly promised to “end talks with Turkey about joining the EU because of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian policies.”\footnote{18 Connolly, Kate. Merkel clashes with Schulz in TV debate as her rival hopes to claw back support. In: The Guardian, 04.11.2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/03/merkel-schulz-tv-debate-last-ditch-bid-to-save-campaign [16.11.2017].} Although German governments had always diverging views on Turkey’s prospect for EU accession which had been generally linked – sometimes more explicitly, sometimes less outspokenly – to reforms and developments inside Turkey, this clear-cut promise of ending the accession procedure represents a precedent in Germany’s official government positions.\footnote{19 Hauge, Hanna-Lisa. Germany, EU 28 Country Reports, FEUTURE, 2017, www.feuture.eu [16.11.2017].} Governments have always tried to avoid clearly positioning themselves against Turkey’s accession aspiration as they have generally been tied down by the close longstanding bilateral relations that are particularly visible in the societal, political and economic dimension.

A recruitment programme for Turkish workers of the early 1960s, family reunification schemes and the asylum track strongly influence the societal dimension today. Almost 2.9 million inhabitants of Germany have a Turkish migration background and more than half of them have also ob-
tained German citizenship. Germany is thus home to the largest total number and greatest share of the estimated 5.5 million people with Turkish roots living in Western European countries. Strong cultural links to Turkey that prevail even among the third-generation influence the political dimension of the German-Turkish relationship. Concepts of integration, Turkey’s diaspora politics, the provision of religious services, extra-territorial voting and election campaigning are critical questions of the bilateral political agenda. Finally, the exceptional connection between Germany and Turkey also finds expression in economic terms. As the destination country for 9.8 per cent of Turkey’s total exports in 2016, Germany received almost 20 per cent of Turkey’s total exports to the EU and is hence the country’s leading trading partner. Turkey in turn accounts for 1.7 per cent of Germany’s total trade. Moreover, Germany is the second largest foreign direct investor in Turkey. An estimated 7,100 German companies and Turkish companies with German capital participation are engaged in the Turkish economy, while almost 100,000 business women and men of


Turkish origin generate an annual turnover of 50 billion Euro in Germany.\textsuperscript{23}

Against this backdrop, traditionally, the coalition governments of the SPD and Alliance90/The Greens have been more supportive of Turkey’s EU membership than the Christian Democrats’ (CDU/CSU) coalition governments with the liberal Free Democratic Party of Germany (FDP) – irrespective of the statement by Martin Schulz cited above. The change of the government in 1998 when Gerhard Schröder became Chancellor is said to represent a “catalyst of Turkish accession to the EU”?\textsuperscript{24} During his term, the EU granted Turkey accession candidate status and took the decision to open accession negotiations. When Merkel (CDU) became Chancellor in 2005 she continued this enlargement policy towards Turkey only in the spirit of pacta sunt servanda and in light of the close bilateral relationship – but was not an open promoter of Turkey’s accession bid. Instead, the Christian Democrats re-energised the debate on alternative formats for the EU-Turkey relationship by (unofficially) coining the concept of “privileged partnership” in 2004.\textsuperscript{25}

Since 2015, however, a series of incidents at EU-level and in the bilateral relationship between Germany and Turkey have affected Germany’s Turkey policies. The refugee crisis in 2015, generated a new momentum that motivated Germany to become more active in EU-Turkey relations.\textsuperscript{26} Yet the bilateral relationship started deteriorating in spring 2016 due to increasing political conflicts over several issues: freedom of speech of artists in Germany, the so-called Boehmermann affair, or more fundamentally the resolution of the German Bundestag on the Armenian genocide and a leaked document of the German Federal Ministry of Interior on Turkish terrorist support structures as well as finally the frictions resulting from the bans on Turkish government officials that wanted to campaign in Germany for the Turkish constitutional reforms and the increased number of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Turhan. Turkey’s accession process: do member states matter? p. 466.
\end{itemize}
German citizens getting arrested in Turkey for political reasons. The announcement of then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, in July 2017 that it was time for Germany to change its policy towards Turkey by reviewing Hermes bonds, intensifying travel alerts for German citizens and considering to request the reduction of the EU’s IPA-funds for Turkey marked a low and turning point in the bilateral relationship.

This turned a traditionally modest to strong promoter of Turkey’s accession to the EU into an openly sceptic member state, which increases the number of potential veto-points and players in the EU decisions on Turkish membership.

3. Institutional relations with an accession candidate and a key strategic partner

Turkey remains geo-strategically and economically a “key partner” and a “strategic partner” for the EU. In 2016, Turkey was the EU’s fifth largest trade partner representing 4.2 per cent share of EU’s total trade. With regard to energy security Turkey is in a favourable position of being the bridge between energy rich and energy thirsty countries in Western Europe. The refugee crisis enhanced Turkey’s geo-political relevance for the EU being the gateway into the EU for refugees particularly from Syria. For geographical reasons Turkey has always been perceived either as buffer zone or bridge to the Middle East and Russia.

The development of the institutional relations between the EU and Turkey acknowledge this versatile relevance and is rather complex – particularly so because Turkey is also a candidate for accession to the EU. The


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following subchapters will highlight the main institutional threads ranging from the association framework and the accession process to EU-Turkey summits and high level dialogues.

3.1 The association framework – a relict of past times?

In 1963, the European Communities signed the Association Agreement with Turkey, the so-called Ankara Agreement. The aim was to “promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions of the Turkish people.”\(^{33}\) To this end, a CU was to be progressively established, which was achieved in 1996.

In order to guarantee effective implementation of Turkey’s association with the EU, government officials of both parties shall meet regularly within the framework of the Association Council\(^{34}\). Over the years, the mandate of this institutional body has been extended to deal with “a range of issues” in addition to trade relations, including refugees, counter-terrorism measures and domestic issues like political reforms as well as the peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue in Turkey.\(^{35}\)

A number of committees and commissions support the work of the Association Council.\(^{36}\) The Association Committee meets in various formations of subcommittees dealing with agriculture and fisheries, trade, industry and European Cole and Steel Community products, economic and monetary issues, capital movements and statistics, innovation, transport, environment and energy, regional development, employment and social policy, customs, taxation, drug trafficking and money laundering. The Joint Parliamentary Commission facilitates cooperation and communication between the EP, the Economic and Social Committee, on the one hand, and the Turkish parliament, on the other. Supported by the Joint


\(^{34}\) European Communities. Association Agreement, Article 6 and 23.


\(^{36}\) European Communities. Association Agreement, Article 24 and 27.
Consultation Committee, its main task is to examine the annual activity reports prepared by the Association Council, exchange views on the issues regarding the association relations and present its recommendations to the Association Council. Finally, the Customs Cooperation Committee monitors the implementation of the provisions of the Ankara Agreement within biannual meetings. The Customs Union Joint Committee contributes to this task.

The framework of Turkey’s association to the EU is, hence, highly institutionalized with regular meetings of its different bodies. By 2015, the Association Council had met annually 53 times and there had been 123 meetings of the Association Committee. Although, afterwards the Association Committee also convened in 2016, there has been no meeting of the Association Council. One explanation for this prompt cessation might relate to other dialogue formats that were established or energized in 2015 in reaction to the refugee crisis (see 3.3 Striking the Balance between Accession and Association, below).

3.2 The accession process – Turkey an exceptional case?

The accession process is the most institutionalised framework of EU-Turkey relations. At the same time it contains several critical issues that render this institutional path less straightforward than one would expect. Article 49 TEU provides the framework for accession by establishing the conditions of eligibility to apply for EU membership and the procedure for becoming a member. These provisions became relevant when the European Council granted Turkey status of an accession candidate at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. The roadmap for Turkey’s EU accession process was defined by the ‘EU-Turkey Accession Partnership’ adopted by the European Council on 8 March 2001, and the ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis’ (NPAA) adopted by the Turkish government. At least since 1996 Turkey has been receiving funds under diverse instruments. Since its candidacy, the EU politically, technically and financially supported Turkey to fulfil the accession criteria under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).

Accession negotiations finally started on 3 October 2005, after Turkey had met the Copenhagen political criteria sufficiently and the European Council decided unanimously to open negotiations on 17 December 2004. A Negotiating Framework sets out the method and the guiding principles
of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{37} In this context, as a candidate country, Turkey needs to align a considerable part of its national legislation with EU law (\textit{acquis communautaire}), which is grouped into 35 chapters. Negotiations are preceded and accompanied by a series of meetings between the European Commission (EC) and the candidate country. This ‘screening process’ involves a detailed examination of the candidate’s conformity with the acquis. In an annual monitoring the EC identifies the candidate country’s progress in the relevant policy fields. On the basis of a positive assessment the Council decides unanimously to open the respective chapters. The acceding country ultimately joins the Union after all chapters have been negotiated and closed, an accession treaty has been drafted and approved by the European Council with unanimity and by the EP with absolute majority as well as signed and ratified by all parties of the treaty.

Although evidently, the overall aim of the process is full membership to the EU, according to the candidate countries’ negotiating frameworks “negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand”\textsuperscript{38}. In the Turkish case, it further states that “if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.”\textsuperscript{39}

This means that possible alternative pathways to membership were somehow sketched from the very beginning reflecting a certain ‘enlargement fatigue’ within the EU, which aroused after the enlargement round of ten central and eastern European countries plus Malta and Cyprus. The term refers to the unwillingness of granting EU membership to any additional country.\textsuperscript{40} EC President Jean Claude Juncker for example stated at the start of his term in 2014 that there will be no enlargement under his mandate until 2019. In this context, EU institutions and member states stress the importance of the EU’s “capacity to absorb new members, while

\textsuperscript{37} Turkey Negotiating Framework. 2005.
\textsuperscript{39} Turkey Negotiating Framework. 2005, No. 2.
\textsuperscript{40} Szolucha, Anna. The EU and Enlargement Fatigue: Why has the European Union not been able to counter enlargement fatigue? In: Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2010, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 107-122.
maintaining the momentum of European integration.” The EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, although only vaguely defined as the aim of the Union to remain “able to function politically, financially and institutionally as it enlarges, and to deepen Europe’s common project”, has been added to the catalogue of criteria for any further enlargement.

Compared to the other accession countries of the Western Balkans, whose accession perspective is more credible and has just been reemphasised in the enlargement strategy for 2025, Turkey represents a particular case in view of the EU’s absorption capacity. Representing 13.5 per cent of the EU’s total population including the United Kingdom (UK), and 15 per cent if the UK exited the EU, Turkey’s accession can be expected to have a major effect on the EU’s decision-making capacity, not only regarding Turkey’s influence in the Council but also in the EP, where Turkish MEPs would constitute the second largest national group after Germany. In terms of the EU’s economic and financial capacity, Turkey’s accession would influence the redistribution mechanisms in the EU. The Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, is expected to be one major point of contention. Therefore, as a precaution, the negotiating framework foresees in addition to long transitional periods, derogations and specific arrangements also clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures. Such permanent safeguard clauses would be considered in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture.

42 Council of the European Union. European Council Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, 10633/1/06 REV 1, 15/15.06.2006, par. 53.
43 European Commission. A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2018) 65 final, Strasbourg 06.02.2018.
45 Turkey Negotiating Framework, 2005, no. 12.
3.3 *Striking the balance between accession and association*

With view to the faltering accession talks, Ankara and Brussels have made several attempts to revitalise the accession process along more functional lines maintaining the dialogue through bilateral cooperation.

After a period of stagnation in accession negotiations, the ‘Positive Agenda’ was launched in May 2012 by Stefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Turkish Minister for European Affairs Egemen Bağış, to complement and enhance Turkey’s accession process. Cooperation should have been fostered in several areas of joint interest, such as the alignment with the EU legislation, political reforms and fundamental rights, visa, mobility and migration, trade, energy, counter-terrorism or dialogue on foreign policy. Regular exchanges and technical meetings between EU and Turkish officials on working group level were established to identify the efforts required to meet the opening and closing criteria for the relevant chapters. However, the anticipated revitalisation of the accession process failed.

In the wake of the refugee crisis a new attempt constituted the ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ on 29 November 2015, which was announced by the Heads of State or Government and Turkey aiming at overcoming common challenges. For this purpose, both sides agreed to have high-level dialogues on key thematic issues in a structured and more frequent way and to have regular summits twice a year providing a platform to assess the development of EU-Turkey relations and international issues.46

The meeting on 29 November 2015, which constituted already the first EU-Turkey summit between the Heads of State or Government of the EU member states and Turkey, aimed at activating the joint action plan on migration agreed upon on 15 October 2015.47 Two additional EU-Turkey summits took place on 7 and 18 March 2016 in order to negotiate the EU-Turkey statement on migration, which has become known as the “EU-Turkey refugee deal”.48 Although, the plan was to convene such EU-Turkey

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summits twice a year, there has been no further summit since March 2016, with the exception of the “mini-summit” of Varna which was convened on 26 March 2018 between European Council President Donald Tusk, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, and Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who was holding the Council’s Presidency. The failed coup attempt that took place in Turkey on 15 July 2016 and the developments in its aftermath interfered with these plans.

Against this backdrop of further deteriorations of the overall relations bilateral (ad hoc) cooperation in individual policy fields could provide a way out of this situation of stalled accession negotiations. In this context, the European External Action Service lately acted on the intention to cooperate specifically in various fields of mutual interest, such as energy, security, countering terrorism, migration management, economic and trade relations, but also transport and agriculture. To this end high level dialogues in three main policy areas had been established. The record of this format, however, is almost as weak as the one of the EU-Turkey summits.

Following the decision of 29 November 2015, the first high-level economic dialogue met on ministerial level in Istanbul on 25/26 April 2016. A second meeting was held in Brussels on 8 December 2017. The high-level political dialogue has convened four times since 2015 dealing with issues related to the refugee crisis as well as CU, counter-terrorism, the rule of law and the current state of play in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. So far, two high-level energy dialogue meetings have been held between the end of 2015, in the context of the Paris Climate Conference COP21, and 2016 (Istanbul, 28 January 2016).

Also at the bilateral level, German and Turkish governments took the decision to intensify and elevate their dialogue. The aim was to create a more institutionalised framework of bilateral communication in addition to EU-Turkey summits and the possibilities of constrained exchanges during meetings of joint multilateral forums such as the G20, the Council of Europe or NATO. The foreign ministries of Germany and Turkey had already established a German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue format in 2013. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs were to meet annually to facilitate a reinforced dialogue on international topics. After the refugee crisis this format was elevated when on 22 January 2016 the first bilateral German-Turkish inter-

governmental consultations took place at the level of Heads of Government. This represents a forum for regular consultations at the highest level, which the German government entertains only with a limited group of other countries. The German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue is, hence, supposed to convene the foreign ministers and the heads of state or government annually on a rotating basis. The series of incidents in the bilateral relationship since 2016, however, have also affected this dialogue-format. Although, in 2017, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, met his counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu at several occasions formally and informally in Germany and Turkey this was not part of the strategic dialogue. Whether this format will be continued in institutional terms including governmental consultations in 2018 will depend on the state of play in the bilateral relationship.

To sum up, this brief overview highlighted that despite the positive spirit and motivation facilitated by the common challenge that materialised in the refugee crisis in 2015, the initiative to establish dialogues at the highest possible level did not produce the expected results. Apart from a few high-level dialogues and EU-Turkey summits the proposed meetings have hardly developed into an institutionalised and structured cooperation framework nor have the accession negotiations been reenergised in a sustainable way. Additionally, at bilateral level between Germany and Turkey the refugee crises triggered a straw fire rather than sustainable intensification of institutional relations.

4. EU-Turkey pathways – where do we stand?

The accession negotiations – although not revitalised yet – and the association framework describe still the most institutionalised forms of the relationship. Apart from that, bilateral forms of cooperation in fields of mutual interest can be witnessed. This chapter will examine where these different institutional paths have led the EU-Turkey relationship and highlight the potholes and (potential) dead-ends.

Due to their highly political character, Turkey’s accession negotiations have faced multiple setbacks and obstacles from the very beginning – ranging from vetoes and open opposition to Turkish EU membership of core EU countries such as Austria, France and Germany, and the subliminal dispute over Cyprus, to crises both in the EU and Turkey culminating in the debate about temporary suspension.

Vetoes by the Council and individual member states alike, in particular France and Cyprus, have hindered and slowed-down Turkish accession talks due to unanimity in the Council from the very beginning. Until today, 16 out of 35 chapters have been opened, of which only one has provisionally been closed (Chapter 25 – Science and Research). 14 chapters are blocked – eight by the Council and additional six by Cyprus.

**Table 1: Accession negotiations – where do we stand?**

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<td>1. Free movement of goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Council (2006-12-11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Freedom of movement for workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus (2009-12-08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Council (2006-12-11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Free movement of capital</td>
<td>2008-12-19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Public procurement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Company law</td>
<td>2008-06-17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Intellectual property law</td>
<td>2008-06-17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Competition policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Financial services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Council (2006-12-11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Information society and media</td>
<td>2008-12-19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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51 Chapters 1 – Free movement of goods, 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services, 9 – Financial services, 11 – Agriculture and rural development, 13 – Fisheries, 14 – Transport policy, 19 – Social policy and employment, 30 – External relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council (2006-12-11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France (2007-06-25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy</td>
<td>2010-06-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council (2006-12-11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Transport policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council (2006-12-11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus (2009-12-08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Economic and monetary policy</td>
<td>2015-12-14</td>
<td>France (2007-06-25; lifted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015-12-14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Statistics</td>
<td>2007-06-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Social policy and employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Enterprise and industrial policy</td>
<td>2007-03-29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Trans-European networks</td>
<td>2007-12-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Regional policy and coordination of structural</td>
<td>2013-11-05</td>
<td>France (2007-07-25; lifted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>instruments</td>
<td></td>
<td>2013-02-12)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Germany (postponed opening in</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June 2013 to November 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Judiciary and fundamental rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus (2009-12-08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Justice, freedom and security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus (2009-12-08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Science and research</td>
<td>2006-06-01</td>
<td>2006-06-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Education and culture</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus (2009-12-08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>2009-12-21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Consumer and health protection</td>
<td>2007-12-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Customs Union</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council (2006-12-11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>External relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council (2006-12-11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Foreign, security and defence policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus (2009-12-08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Financial control</td>
<td>2007-06-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Financial and budgetary provision</td>
<td>2016-06-30</td>
<td>France (2007-06-25; lifted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2016-03-18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>France (2007-06-25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Other issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation.
Already the opening of negotiations with Turkey was contingent on political preconditions - Turkey was asked to sign a Protocol to the Ankara Agreement that extended the CU to all new EU member states including Cyprus. In its December 2004 conclusions the European Council welcomed Turkey’s decision to sign this Protocol, but in July 2005 Ankara excluded Cyprus from the CU through an Additional Protocol. After negotiations had officially been opened, therefore, the Commission recommended to suspend all chapters on aspects of freedom of movements of goods. The Council adopted the Commission’s recommendation unanimously in its 2006 summit resulting in the direct blockage of the opening of eight chapters. Hence, the Cyprus issue became a defining milestone in the accession negotiations considering that besides the blocked chapters by the Council Cyprus unilaterally vetoed additional six chapters in December 2009. Furthermore, the Council followed the recommendation of the Commission that no chapter shall be provisionally closed until Turkey applies the Protocol.

In addition to the Cyprus issue, intermediately, due to open prejudgement of Turkey’s accession, France vetoed five chapters that were directly linked to full membership. Nicolas Sarkozy, French President from 2007 to 2012, made his opposition to Turkey joining the EU a central element of his presidential campaign and presidency. France only lifted its vetoes on Chapters 17, Economic and Monetary Policy, and 33, Financial and Budgetary Provision, in 2015 and 2016 respectively under the presidency of François Hollande. It thereby effectively froze negotiations for nearly a decade. After France had lifted its veto following the victory of François Hollande in 2012 French Presidential elections, it was Germany that, supported by Austria and the Netherlands, convinced the member states to postpone the opening of Chapter 22 on regional policy until the release of Turkey’s progress report 2013, which was scheduled for after the German federal elections.

EU–Turkey relations became a key subject of 2017 German federal elections. Following the TV-debate between Martin Schulz and Angela Merkel, in which Schulz said he would end talks with Turkey about joining the EU and Merkel promised to discuss possible steps together with the Heads of State or Governments of EU member states. The European Council tasked the Commission in its October 2017 conclusions to reflect on whether to cut and re-orient pre-accession funds, a request which was shared by the EP in its resolution of 25 October 2017.\(^{57}\) Funds allocated for Turkey under IPA I (2007-2013) and IPA II (2014-2020, EUR 4,453.9 million) may be changed with qualified majority vote in the Council on proposal of the Commission. The breach of democracy, rule of law and human rights are accepted as reasons to cut the funds (see Regulation No 236/2014)\(^{58}\). In November 2017, the member states took the decision to cut this assistance for Turkey in 2018 by up to 175 million euros.\(^{59}\)

Finally, multiple crises both on the European and Turkish side have affected EU–Turkey relations such as the financial and economic crisis since 2008/9, a changing geo-strategic environment especially during the Crimea crisis and Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in 2014, as well as the refugee crisis in 2015 threatening internal solidarity and fostering populism in the Union. With the British referendum, the UK – a EU member that always has been a promoter of Turkish accession – will leave the EU. At the same time, Turkey has slowly moved away from the EU’s political criteria. In November 2016, the EC attested Turkey massive setbacks in their annual Turkey report.\(^{60}\) According to the report several key pieces of legislation adopted regarding the rule of law and fundamental rights were not in line with European standards. There has been backsliding in Turkey’s judicial system, in particular with regard to the independence of the judiciary as well as in the area of freedom of expression.

With its non-binding resolution on 24 November 2016 calling for the temporary freeze of negotiations the EP opened a debate about the suspensi-
sion of the negotiations. In fact, in the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded (Art. 2 TEU), the Commission can, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the member states, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption. After having heard Turkey, the Council would decide by qualified majority on the suspension and on the conditions for their resumption. Whereas the tool of suspension in general could be understood as a threatening gesture and a warning message towards a country’s temporary backsliding on accession criteria, in the Turkish case it threatens to substantially affect the EU-Turkey relationship. Re-opening of accession negotiations would require a unanimous decision by the accession conference. In light of the veto positions of several member states that do not only refer to the current state of democracy in Turkey it is highly unlikely that EU member states could reach consensus on lifting the suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey. Thus, suspension of accession negotiations would de-facto break off the accession process altogether. Currently, respective demands represent a political tool but it is unlikely that the Commission would risk officially leaving the path of enlargement. It rather puts them practically on hold by not opening any new chapters.

4.2 Cooperation, association and integration in the policy areas of trade, energy, security and migration

These days, the accession path seems to head towards a dead end. This increases the relevance of alternative paths of the relationship in terms of cooperation and association. Although the CU and high-level dialogues are the focal elements of such paths their record seems to be mixed, too. The general question is whether such paths would lead towards a pure transactional relationship and whether this would benefit the relationship.

Bilateral economic relations are developing in a positive way. With the CU for industrialised products, realised in 1996, Turkey and the EU eliminated trade barriers, quotas and customs duties and Turkey adopted most of the EU acquis. The benefits of the CU became immediately evident: in the

61 Turkey Negotiating Framework, 2005, No. 5.
mid-1990s the share of EU exports to Turkey rose from about 3 per cent to about 5 per cent and the share of EU imports from Turkey from about 2 per cent to 3 per cent respectively. Turkey’s imports from the EU15 increased by about 230 per cent during this period (from about EUR 17 billion to EUR 56 billion). Between 1996 and 2014, Turkey’s exports to the EU increased by about 400 per cent (from about EUR 8.5 billion to EUR 42 billion).63

The scope of the CU is however limited to products other than agricultural products, as defined in Annex I of the Amsterdam Treaty, and coal and steel products, which are subject only to preferential agreements. In its current form, it does not address services or public procurement. As such the CU constitutes an example of a bilateral agreement with the EU incorporating Turkey into the internal market in a limited, asymmetrical fashion, where Turkey has only consultation instead of voting and participatory rights in the Council.64 While Turkey is obliged to open its market to third countries with whom the EU has free trade agreements, Turkish companies cannot claim any of the benefits that are negotiated for European exporters to third countries in return, since EU trade agreements are negotiated at the EU level and non-members have no right to participate in agreements.

Addressing this asymmetry, in its 2014 Enlargement Strategy, followed by a Memorandum of Understanding in May 2015 and again reaffirmed in December 2016, the Commission proposed to upgrade and modernise the CU. It would allow Turkey to participate in CU relevant committees and establish consultative mechanisms and extend the scope of the agreement to agriculture and services. In summer 2017, shortly before the German federal elections, the German government called for the suspension of the preparatory work on negotiations due to the domestic political situation in Turkey.65 The coalition agreement of the new government of SPD, CDU and CSU confirms this stance by clearly stating that the German govern-


ment would support an upgrading of the CU only if Turkey fulfilled “all of the respective requirements.”  

So far, the CU has enabled Turkey to participate in European trade policies and to adapt liberal market standards. However, without an improvement of the political climate in EU/German-Turkish relations it is highly unlikely that the modernization of the CU will be further pursued, even though economic studies expect positive trading effects for both parties.

In the field of energy bilateral cooperation mainly focuses on the field of energy security given that both parties are heavily dependent on external hydrocarbons. Turkey’s and the Union’s energy security are strongly linked to each other and market integration has become more relevant. Turkey’s location has made it a key country in the European efforts to establish a southern corridor for natural gas transit from diverse sources. Since the late 1990s, Turkey has been referred to as an ‘energy bridge’, ‘transit country’ or ‘energy hub’ to Europe by Turkish and European officials. As of 2020, the two pipeline projects Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) will deliver Azerbaijani gas through Turkey to Europe in the framework of the Southern Gas Corridor. Institutionally Turkey is part of the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Coun-

cil, founded on 12 February 2015, to steer the implementation of the project.

Hence, it comes as no surprise that energy has been an integral part of the Positive Agenda as well as the high-level dialogues. Turkey is among the five strategic partners (besides Algeria, Canada, Norway and the U.S.) with whom the EC has established such a high-level energy cooperation framework indicating the mutual interest and the ongoing activities to intensify energy cooperation. The initiative aims to increase bilateral exchanges at ministerial level, accompanied by regular meetings at the council, committee and subcommittee levels.

Turkey has compiled selectively with EU energy rules, e.g. in the electricity sector. Due to its privatization of power generation and distribution private investments have increased, doubling capacity from 2007 to 2014. Even though Turkey technically aligns with most of EU regulations, Chapter 15 cannot be opened due to the Cypriot veto. One could argue that the Energy Community would provide an alternative institutional framework. From the outset in 2006, the EC encouraged Turkey to join. However, Turkey has repeatedly refused membership, since the contracting partner commit themselves to implement the relevant acquis on energy, environment and competition and thereby to accept the energy ‘acquis’ without becoming a full EU member. To date, Turkey has an observer status.

In the field of security and defence policy EU-Turkey military cooperation mainly has taken place through the NATO-EU cooperation scheme. Turkey is the second largest standing military force in NATO, after the US Armed Forces, and the 8th most powerful military force in the world. Turkey participated in nine out of 30 only EU-led operations with significant participations in the Balkans.

Moreover, institutionalized ties between the EU and Turkey existed in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) which was initiated

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73 Ibid.
in 1948 by the Brussels Treaty and modified in 1954 to create a permanent guaranteed defence relationship between France, Germany, the Benelux states, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK. Turkey became an associate member in November 1992 together with Norway and Iceland. Hence, Turkey was allowed to contribute to the military staffs of WEU’s Planning Cell and to the WEU core budget. During its partnership with the WEU, Turkey enjoyed full membership to Western European Armament Union (WEAO) and Western European Armament Group (WEAG). Acting as an intermediary between EU and NATO, theoretically, the WEU would have allowed to use NATO military assets for missions under an EU political lead even though this potential was never used.

Following the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, in 2011, the WEU was officially dissolved and non-EU allies lost their status. The regular high-level political dialogues provide channels of communication on security issues and foreign policy; however Turkey as non-EU member is excluded from a deeper institutional, military cooperation within the newly established Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (TEU Art. 42.6, Art. 46) to deepen defense cooperation amongst a number of EU member states. In line with these treaty provisions it is only possible for other member states to join at a later stage. NATO remains the most important forum for EU-Turkey military cooperation.

In the field of migration and particularly during the so-called refugee crisis Turkey represents a ‘key strategic partner’ with whom the EU was and still is “determined to confront and surmount the existing challenges in a concerted manner.” Turkey is, with more than 3 million registered Syrian refugees, the main destination country in the region. At the same time, it is the main transit country because some of the Greek islands are situated only less than four sea miles off the Turkish coast. The steep increase in the migratory flows in 2015 propelled migration high onto the agenda of EU-Turkey relations. Consequently, both sides engaged in attempts to further institutionalize their relationship in the field of migration policy – and beyond.

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76 The member states who signed the joint notification are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

Between September 2015 and March 2016, the EU decided on a set of priorities of its asylum and migration policy and a series of actions with Turkey. In October 2015 the Commission, represented by Vice-President Frans Timmermans, negotiated with the Turkish authorities and government representatives a joint action plan on how to address the refugee crisis. On 29 November 2015, an EU-Turkey statement activated this action plan by integrating its measures into a more comprehensive framework and establishing the Refugee Facility for Turkey (an EU fund amounting to 3 billion euros, with 2 billion euros being compensated from the EU member states and the rest from the EU budget). These measures did not show sufficient effect on the numbers of refugees arriving on the Greek islands in the following months. In March 2016, hence, the EU and Turkey agreed on additional measures in order to address the refugee crisis. The key elements of the EU-Turkey statement on migration, which is known as the ‘EU-Turkey refugee deal’ of 18 March 2016 includes the return to Turkey of each irregular migrant arriving on the Greek islands after 20 March 2016, the resettlement of a Syrian refugee from Turkey to the EU for every Syrian being returned from Greece to Turkey (the so-called 1:1 mechanism), the enhancement of necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration by Turkey, the provision of additional 3 billion euros for the Refugee Facility for Turkey and the improvement of humanitarian conditions inside Syria. A Steering Committee composed of representatives at senior officials’ level from EU member states and Turkey under the chairmanship of the Commission meets regularly. The eighth meeting has taken place on 8 November 2017.

Although the refugee deal was effective in terms of decreasing the numbers of refugees it is also highly contested. First, the deal itself is in strict legal terms not a legally binding document because it is a statement by the heads of state or government from the EU member states and Turkey and not an agreement. Second, the implementation record is rather poor. So far, over 12,476 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to EU Member States; 2,146 irregular migrants have been returned from Greece.

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78 As previously indicated, this comprehensive framework included the agreement to re-energise accession negotiations, accelerate the process of visa liberalisation (with the aim of concluding them by October 2016), prepare the upgrade of the CU and engage in strategic and high level dialogues at ministerial and governmental level in various strategic policy areas.
to Turkey. Additionally, as the majority of the irregular migrants returned voluntarily to Turkey or were not of Syrian origin, the 1:1 mechanism has not taken effect. Third, the operational funds of 3 billion euro for the Facility for 2016-2017 have been fully committed and contracted, with 72 projects rolled out. More than 1.94 billion euros has been paid out, with the balance to be paid in the course of implementation of Facility projects through to mid-2021. This complies with the project funding scheme of the facility. Out of the operational budget of 3 billion euros for 2018-2019, 450 million euros have been committed. Nevertheless, Turkey continuously complains that the EU would withhold the fund that it has promised to pay.

In spite of this criticism and Turkey’s repeated threat to cancel the deal on its side this institutional framework has created a stable framework for the functional cooperation between the EU and Turkey in the field of migration. It has, however, failed to enhance institutional cooperation in terms of accession negotiations and visa liberalisation.

5. Conclusions – Turkish accession to the EU: an empty but lasting promise?

In light of this analysis, what findings can we derive for a) the path-dependence in EU-Turkey relations and b) Germany’s role in the institutional relationship?

Turkey represents an exceptional case in the EU’s enlargement policy: It is an accession candidate, while at the same time the EU and its member states realise that strategic cooperation with Turkey as key strategic partner could represent the true added value in the relationship, all the more given the current political developments in Turkey that stir the country away from the political accession criteria.

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However, the accession process is the most institutionalised form of EU-Turkey relations and strong path-dependence can be identified with regard to this process. The decision to grant Turkey accession candidate status and to open negotiations in general should have settled the question of Turkey’s EU membership. Although, the negotiation framework contains several fall-back options, the accession framework is ‘sticky.’ In 2005, the new German government that did not fully support Turkey’s accession aspirations for example decided to abstain from challenging the decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Additionally, the EU and Turkey repeatedly attempted to re-energise the accession process. Today, while the political debate discusses options of suspending the accession negotiations on a technical level, the Commission reassures that this procedure should not be cancelled.

Strong path-dependencies, however, do not imply any guarantee for further progress or even completion. Veto points with regard to Turkey’s potential EU membership are increasing. If the UK exits the EU, one of the strongest promoters of Turkish accession will have left. With German-Turkish relations in disarray an additional and strong veto player might enter the picture. Additionally, any attempt to re-energise accession negotiations has not been successful, so far.

Forms of transactional cooperation in various policy areas exist and although the modernisation of the CU is currently put on hold these policy areas are the ones where future progress in the EU-Turkey relationship seem to be most likely – which might eventually open-up newly institutionalised paths in EU-Turkey relations.
With or Without Turkey? The Many Determinants of the Official German Position on Turkey’s EU Accession Process¹

Ebru Turhan

1. Introduction

Germany and Turkey are unique partners which are tied to each other by means of a complex interdependence in economic, political and societal spheres. This spans from trade and direct investment partnership and regular collaboration under the umbrella of many international organizations and alliances such as the Group of Twenty (G20), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the anti-IS coalition to efforts to eliminate shared concerns related to cross-border terrorism and the multidimensional consequences of the refugee crisis as well as joint actions within the framework of the EU’s various military and civilian missions. Official German position on Turkish membership in the European Union (EU) and its prolonged accession process constitutes an important aspect of German-Turkish relations, as well, and nurtures the already complex state of bilateral dialogue between both countries, as each dimension serves as a setting for the exchange of diverging and converging German and Turkish preferences and interests. Germany’s official standing on Turkey’s EU accession process has been of key importance for both Turkey and the member states of the EU as a result of the institutional engineering of the EU’s enlargement politics. Important decisions concerning a candidate country’s accession process are taken by the European Council and the Council of the EU.

which is also known as the Council of Ministers. Although the European Council and the Council of the EU are “obliged to act in the general interest of the EU” and thus, serve a rather supranational purpose, the intergovernmental drive suppresses to a great extent the supranational components within these two EU institutions as a result of the most direct and upfront representation of national governments, and hence, domestic preferences by the European Council and the Council of the EU.

The European Council and the Council of the EU have indeed always been at the forefront of the EU’s decisions with regard to Turkey’s EU accession process. While the European Council gave the political decisions on the confirmation of Turkey’s candidate status and the launch of accession talks with Turkey in October 2005 during its 10-11 December 1999 Helsinki and 16-17 December 2004 Brussels gatherings, respectively, based on the criteria defined by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, the Council of the EU played a critical role in Turkey’s accession negotiations rather than the pre-negotiation phase and has served as “the master of technicality of the accession negotiations” by unanimously deciding on the opening and closing of negotiation chapters based on the recommendation of the European Commission (EC). Between 2005 and 2019 the Council of the EU opened 16 chapters in Turkey’s accession talks with the EU and temporarily closed one negotiation chapter. The Council of the EU has likewise got the right to take interim decisions on the progression of a candidate’s accession process and suspend the opening of particular chapters if it detects a significant and persistent breach in the candidate state of the opening benchmarks of these chapters. On that note, the Council of the EU decided in December 2006 to suspend negotiations with Turkey on eight chapters and not to close any chapters as a result of problems with regard to Turkey’s fulfilment of its responsibilities stemming from the Additional Protocol, which is related to its extending of its Customs Union (CU) with the EU to ten new member states including Cyprus.

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5 Council of the European Union. Press Release. 2770th Council Meeting General Affairs and External Relations
Although the majority of decisions concerning the EU’s widening are taken under unanimity rule, and thus provide each member state with veto power, economically and politically more powerful member states of the EU serve as leading players in the decision-making processes of the intergovernmental institutions of the EU and suppress the veto power of smaller member states, as the latter incline towards “bargaining in the form of ‘package deals’ where they can give priority to a few issues of importance, setting aside others.”

In this vein, various studies have shown that as a result of being the top economic power in the EU and commanding a high level of administrative as well as political stability, Germany has been acting both as a leading initiator as and key shaper of the majority of strategic decisions taken in the realm of the European integration process.

The EU’s enlargement politics vis-à-vis Turkey, which has been mainly determined during the gatherings of the European Council and the Council of the EU, has been to a great extent shaped by the preferences of successive German governments, as well. The shift from a conservative-liberal coalition government to a more Turkey-friendly social democratic-green coalition government in 1998 and the German federal government’s strong insistence on the launch of accession talks with Ankara during the British presidency on 3 October 2005 despite the French objections played a key role in the confirmation of Turkish candidacy at the 1999 Luxembourg European Council and the 2004 joint decision of the European Council to launch of accession talks with Ankara in October 2005.

Throughout the negotiation phase the German influence in the Council of the EU has been particularly evident in its temporary veto on the launch of talks in Chapter 22 related to regional policy and coordination of structural instruments in 2013, and more recently, in Germany’s call to cut the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) provided to Turkey within the framework of its EU accession process as a result of Berlin’s complains about

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Turkey’s adherence to democratic procedures and fundamental rights as well as the detention of German citizens in Turkey. The call eventually culminated in the 20 October 2017 decision of the European Council to task the EC to elaborate on whether to cut and re-orient the IPA and the subsequent 18 November 2017 verdict of the EP and the Council of the EU to cut the funds by 105 million euros and freeze the use of another 70 million euros.

What are the leading determinants of the official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process? Relying on the key premises of rationalism and constructivism - two important theoretical approaches to the study of the EU’s widening - this paper defines efforts for pursuit of interests (PI) and norm compliance (NC) as the explanatory variables applicable to the study of German preferences with regard to Turkish membership in the EU. In terms of PI, the paper makes a distinction between the pursuit of “security and power” related interests and “absolute welfare” related ones. As far as NC is concerned, drawing on Habermasian thought, a differentiation is made between compliance with “moral” norms and “ethical” norms affecting official German position on Turkish accession process. Following this introductory part of the paper, the second part lays out key premises of rationalism and constructivism and defines the explanatory variables applicable to the study of German preferences with regard to Turkish membership in the EU, in general and Turkish accession process, in particular. Focusing on both the pre-negotiation phase and the official negotiation phase, the paper then scrutinizes the explanatory power of PI and NC in justifying positive and negative German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process through the careful examination of the official statements, press releases and public speeches of leading representatives of successive German governments. Here, attention is also directed at the internal dynamics of both Turkey and Germany as well as the implications of more recent developments such as the Eurozone crisis and the

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9 Paul, Amanda/ Schmidt, Juliane. Turkey’s relations with Germany and the EU: Breaking the vicious circle. EPC Policy Brief, 2 October 2017.
European efforts to manage the flow of refugees for the formation of Germany’s Turkey policy. The final part of the paper discusses the explanatory capability of PI and NC in elucidating the construction of Germany’s preferences pertaining to Turkish membership in the EU.

2. **Theorizing the formation of official German attitude towards Turkish accession to the EU**

The rationalist-constructivist dichotomy and the contribution of these two theoretical approaches to understanding the widening process of the EU have played a central role in debates in the field of European studies.\(^{13}\) Whereas a paradigmatic dispute exists between rationalism and constructivism due to the application of two different logics of social action - logic of consequences vs. logic of appropriateness\(^{14}\) - recent research emphasizes the need to view these two approaches as “complementary rather than contradictory.”\(^{15}\)

Rationalism relies on the illuminating capability of PI in order to explain interstate cooperation in the international system. The application of a differentiation between realism / neorealism and neoliberalism / liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) to the study of rationalist approaches brings along a distinction between “power and security” maximization and “absolute welfare” maximization. The classical realists argue that states are rational and unitary actors, who define their interests in terms of power through the evaluation of the position they acquire in the international system in comparison to other states. Morgenthau underlines the primacy of the maximization of states’ security-related interests arguing that “the

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\(^{14}\) “Logic of appropriateness refers to actors’ efforts to “do the right thing”, while according to rationalism’s “logic of consequentialism” actors tend to maximize their preferences.

survival of a political unit, such as a nation, in its identity is the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis other states.”

Accordingly, realists lean towards a rather cynical view of interstate cooperation. The formation of alliances, i.e. the establishment of interstate cooperation, could just be realized, “when two or more competing nations seek either to increase their own strength by adding the power of the other nation to their own, or by withholding the power of other nations from their enemy.” The classical realism has been later amended by the neorealist school. Neorealism provided the study of international relations with the concept of anarchy, which relates to the lack of a dominant authority in the international system, leading to states’ counting on their own resources for survival and their fixation with their sovereignty, security as well as with how much power they possess compared to other states in the international system.

Regarding German attitude towards Turkish membership in the EU, main assumptions of classical realism and neorealism imply that German efforts for the pursuit of security and power related interests would play a key role in the formation of official German position pertaining to Turkish accession process. Successive German governments are likely to support Turkey’s EU bid, if the acceleration and successful finalization of Turkish accession process would foster German power position in the international system, eliminate security threats, and/or counterbalance the power of an external competitor.

Whereas realist approaches to the study of international relations place strong emphasis on the presence of security and survival-related conflicts at any time in the international system, another strand of rationalism, neoliberalism, rather deals with the existence of issue-specific, and in particular, economic interdependence among the states in the international system.

According to the neoliberalist thought, globalization trends bring along rapid growth of international trade and foreign direct investments (FDIs)

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as well as extraordinary flow of information among states and societies. These trends lessen the effectiveness of states’ national monetary and financial policies. Accordingly, the coordination of policies between the states, namely, interstate cooperation, becomes inevitable\textsuperscript{20}, throughout which states seek to maximize their absolute gains remaining mostly indifferent to any economic gains made by other states.

Another rationalist approach to studying international relations and EU enlargement, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) also focuses on the issue-specific (and, in particular, economic) interstate interdependence in the international system to explain policy coordination and cooperation among states. What differentiates LI from the neoliberalist school of thought is its strong emphasis on the impact of domestic politics on the formation of states’ preferences and interests. By offering a sequential analysis of a liberal theory of domestic preference formation and an intergovernmental study of interstate strategic bargaining, LI defines the demand and supply aspects of international cooperation.\textsuperscript{21} According to LI while the demand for interstate cooperation is determined by the governmental preferences that are above all shaped by the interests and preferences of the most powerful and influential societal actors, the supply of integration (i.e. final outcome with regard to policy coordination) takes shape following a strategic interstate bargaining process. Neoliberalism and LI have differing views on the role of domestic politics in the formation of states’ preferences. However, both theoretical approaches regard cooperation as a means for states to maximize their issue-specific absolute gains. According to both approaches, survival still remains the most fundamental goal of all states.\textsuperscript{22} However, in case of absence of any threat to states’ security, welfare related motives are likely to define the scope, conditions and limits of interstate cooperation.

When transferring the main assumptions of neoliberalism and LI to the study of the key dynamics behind German attitude towards Turkish membership in the EU, German economic interests emerge as a key factor, which are likely to shape official German position on Turkey’s EU accession process. In the absence of any threats to Germany’s security, the con-

\textsuperscript{20} Cooper, Richard N. Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies. World Politics, 1972, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 177-179.


tribution of Turkish EU membership / the acceleration of Turkish accession process to the maximization of Germany’s absolute welfare gains is likely to determine the German support for the process. Here, particularly, influential societal actors such as the business interest groups are likely to put pressure on the German federal government for the formation of official policies in accordance with the preferences of German business world.

While rationalist approaches put emphasis on the role of PI in international relations, social constructivist studies argue that political behaviour and preferences are shaped by various norms. In this vein, constructivists refer to global politics as a continuous social construction founded on varying as well as shifting perceptions, understandings, ideas and values of agents. As such, normative interpretations and understandings about life construct social reality from which interests originate. To put it in Adler’s words: “the manner in which material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” Thus, constructivists handle norms as independent variables and highlight their major role in the formation of actors’ interests and preferences.

By making a cherished and widely cited distinction between “moral” and “ethical” norms, Habermas contributes to a more concrete classification of norms affecting preference formation. Moral norms are regarded as universalistic principles founded on the objective interpretations about lifeworld and involve universal principles of democracy, human rights and rule of law. Ethical norms, on the other hand, address subjective observations of the world based on collective identities stemming from various components such as religion, ethnicity, nationalism, history and memories. Thus, whereas actors who go with ethical discourses are usually making use of a “logic of appropriateness”, and attach great value to “the right thing to do” based on “their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings (“culture” in a broad sense)”, participants in moral discourse disconnect themselves from all perceptions of a socially constructed ethical reality focusing on universal values like human rights,
democracy and rule of law, when defining their preferences with regard to a particular situation. The Habermasian distinction between moral and ethical interpretations of lifeworld lead to the classification of the EU either as a “value-based” or a “rights-based post-national” community. The EU as a “value-based” community would regard the collective identity as the basis of its existence and evolution. In a “rights-based post-national” union, on the other hand, the attention is directed at the members’ application of universal principles.

In light of their key assumptions and premises, social constructivists regard enlargement of the EU as a response to member states’ efforts for attention to NC. Drawing on the Habermasian distinction between moral and ethical norms, it could be argued that in a socially constructed world order, Germany would support Turkey’s EU accession process, if Turkey complies with the liberal democratic values of the EU and/or if Germany would regard Europe’s “collective” identity compatible with the one of Turkey, i.e. if it would perceive Turkey a natural part of Europe.

3. Germany and Turkey’s EU accession process: power and security maximization

Germany and Turkey have been exceptionally close partners for decades in regard to foreign policy and security matters. In an attempt to study the impact of Germany’s pursuit of its security and power related interests on the formation of official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process this chapter analyses the official statements, press releases and public speeches of leading representatives of successive German federal governments on Turkish accession process with a particular focus on their timing and relation to important security threats and changes in the structure of the international system and the regional settings. The chapter takes a close look at the pre-negotiation phase in EU-Turkey relations, thereby focusing on the confirmation of Turkey’s candidacy status and the decision to launch accession talks with Turkey, and scrutinizes also the negotiation phase by analyzing the shift in German position on Turkish accession process in view of the Arab Spring and the refugee crisis.

3.1 From Luxembourg to Helsinki

The European Council rejected Turkey’s candidacy status and its inclusion in the then enlargement wave together with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) at its December 1997 Luxembourg Summit. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had acted as one of the leading opponents of Turkish candidacy during the Luxembourg gathering of the European Council.\(^{28}\) Accordingly, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz deemed Kohl responsible for the EU’s decision\(^{29}\), which took bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany to a particularly low level by the start of 1998. In the weeks and months leading to the Luxembourg European Council, the German government representatives had not made any statements, which had pointed to the potential contribution of a Turkish candidacy to European / German PI in security and power maximization terms. This is not surprising, given that despite the rise of severe security threats in the European periphery with the Bosnian crisis, until the outbreak of the Kosovo war in 1999, Germany and the remaining member states of the EU did not pay much attention to their role as a security provider in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU and to the development of the EU’s own crisis management and prevention operations, particularly by means of access to NATO assets and capabilities and cooperation with key partners in the region.\(^{30}\) Thus, throughout the Bosnian war and ahead of the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, Turkey’s significance for the promotion of stability in the European periphery and its central role in the delivery of NATO assets to EU-led operations – as a non-EU NATO member – remained largely undiscovered.

The 1998-1999 Kosovo crisis and the subsequent NATO intervention pointed out that the EU needed to advance its geopolitical agency and its defence capabilities for the accomplishment of peace and stability in the European periphery. The eruption of the Kosovo conflict despite conventional prevention measures taken by the EU including press releases and economic sanctions on former Yugoslavia and the containment of the crisis following the US-led NATO intervention in the EU’s backyard pointed to

the need to enhance security and defence policy related coordination among the EU’s member states. Europe’s experience with its immediate neighbourhood alarmed the EU leaders about the need for autonomous defence capabilities and a more effective coordination of both policies and operations with the NATO as “the Kosovo episode proved devastating to Europe’s continental dignity and pride Europe – and the EU in particular – was humbled, even humiliated. As the crow flies, Kosovo is a mere few hundred miles from Italy, Greece and Austria.”

In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, the EU’s efforts to become a more effective and influential actor in the promotion of peace and security in the European periphery accompanied by the initiation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to effectively combine European civilian and military capabilities for crisis situations, on the one hand, and cooperate with the NATO, on the other, fostered Turkey’s role as a crucial strategic partner. As a non-EU NATO member, Turkey’s consent to the EU’s use of NATO’s assets and capabilities in crisis management situations seemed to be the key to the successful application of the ESDP.

Then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who acted as one of the leading proponents of the acknowledgement of Turkish candidacy at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, highlighted in his official statements Turkey’s significance for the promotion and safeguarding of peace, security and stability in Europe as a key NATO partner, while linking this particularity also to the strengthening of Turkey’s EU perspective. A few days ahead of the Helsinki Summit, Schröder, for instance, stressed that “we cannot on the one hand keep stressing Turkey’s strategic significance for Europe, placing great burden on it within NATO, […] if on the other hand we are not also ready to offer it a clear European perspective going beyond the simple customs union.”

In a similar vein, the German Chancellor pointed out following the announcement of Turkish candidacy that although the country had a long way to go in regard to full membership in the EU, Turkey’s EU path would be vital for stability in the region.

33 Agence France Presse. Germany wants Turkey to become EU candidate, 3 December 1999.
34 Die Welt. Türkei-Entscheidung empört die Union; Glos spricht von einem Bären- dienst - Gerhard Schröder verteidigt Beitrittskandidatenstatus, 13 December 1999.
3.2 Changing understanding of security post September 11

Following the confirmation of Turkey’s candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkish accession process ran smoothly without any major hitches. In contrast to the pre-Helsinki era, on the eve of the December 2004 Brussels European Council, which confirmed the launch of official accession talks with Turkey in October 2005, security-related motives dominated official German statements in regard to Turkish membership in the EU. Ahead of the Brussels Summit key representatives of the German federal government made regularly reference to Turkey’s increasing value as a security provider for Europe and its wider periphery. The testimonials took particular account of changing systemic conditions following the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States (US). The attacks had indeed led to the rise of a more multifaceted concept of threat perception by the EU and its member states, which pointed to the likely implications of global security risks for the internal security of the states, and highlighted the need for enhanced dialogue between Europe and the Muslim world. Europe’s changing perception of the security challenges and their elimination was above all reflected in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) of the EU. The ESS spoke of future security threats as the products of globalization, which diminishes the well-defined barriers between internal and external dimensions of security. The need for the enhancement of dialogue between the EU and the Muslim communities for the minimization of the negative externalities of regional security risks, on the other hand, was underlined in the conclusions of the extraordinary European Council gathering post September 11: “…the fight against the scourge of terrorism will be all the more effective if it is based on an in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being.”

Changing perception of security threats and the maintenance of Europe’s security in the post September 11 era nurtured Turkey’s valuable position at the crossroads between the East and the West in political, econo-

https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article592563/Tuerkei-Entscheidung-empoert-die-Union.html [16.05.2019].


mic and social terms. It did so by fostering Turkey’s role as a potential-bridge builder between the Western and Muslim communities, which would contribute to the improvement of the dialogue between the two societies and to the transfer of universal democratic values embraced by the West to the Middle East, in particular by means of Turkey’s own EU accession process.\(^{38}\) Turkey’s enhanced value as a security provider for Europe post September 11 and the significance of its accession process for the maintenance of security in Europe and its wider neighbourhood was emphasized in German statements ahead of the December 2004 Brussels European Council. On the eve of the Brussels Summit, Schröder referred to Turkey as “an anchor of stability in the region”\(^ {39}\), while then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stated that Turkey’s EU membership would strengthen the Union against international terrorism.\(^ {40}\) According to Fischer, the diffusion of liberal democratic values to the Muslim world by Turkey was only going to happen following Turkey’s own reform process: “...If the modernization process in Turkey is successful, Turkey’s much-cited function as a bridge towards the Central Asian states and to the Middle East could become a reality.”\(^ {41}\) Thus, German support for the official launch of accession talks with Turkey overlapped to an important extent with Germany’s efforts for security-related PI in the post-September 11 era.

3.3 *Arab Spring and the refugee crisis*

The linkage between German support for the acceleration of Turkey’s EU accession process and efforts for PI in regard to security concerns has been also evident following the start of accession talks with Ankara in 2005, and particularly after the rise of the regional turmoil in the European periphery with the social uprisings in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which kicked off in 2011 and came to be known as the Arab Spring. Following the onset of the Arab Spring Turkish and German


\(^{39}\) Associated Press Worldstream. Turkish, German leaders confident of EU green light for Ankara, 3 October 2004.

\(^{40}\) Associated Press Worldstream. Fischer: Turkey’s EU membership would strengthen the block against terrorism, 20 October 2004.

foreign ministries signed the German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue Mechanism in May 2013 that aims to foster bilateral dialogue on key international issues including the turbulence in the Arab world and the Middle East, fight against international terrorism and organized crime as well as supply of energy security in Europe. The bilateral strategic dialogue, which seeks above all PI in security terms, referred to Turkey’s EU accession process as “beneficial for both sides.”\textsuperscript{42} The joint emphasis of Turkish and German foreign ministries on the significance of the Turkish accession process on the occasion of the launch of the bilateral dialogue mechanism came in fact a few months after the German Federal Foreign Office had stressed in February 2013 that the EU needed to resume talks with Turkey without losing further time.\textsuperscript{43}

The support of the German Federal Foreign Ministry for Turkey’s accession process was also backed by similar PI-related statements of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) high-level members and CDU-near experts following the outbreak of the regional turmoil in Europe’s periphery.\textsuperscript{44} For instance, Hans-Georg Pöttering, former President of the European Parliament (EP) and then Chairman of the CDU-near Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) emphasized in a statement he made in February 2013 the likely opening of two new chapters in EU’s accession talks with Turkey in the coming months, while making reference to PI related goals in the same statement such as bilateral cooperation opportunities in the resolution of the conflict in the Middle East and the adoption of a common successful development policy vis-à-vis Africa.\textsuperscript{45}

In line with this statement, Chancellor Merkel announced her support for

\textsuperscript{43} Anadolu Agency. Germany Warns EU over Turkey, 21 December 2012.
the opening of a new chapter in Turkey’s accession talks with the EU at the end of February 2013, despite her personal reservations.\footnote{Hudson, Alexandra. Merkel Backs New EU Talks for Turkey but has Doubts. In: Reuters, 23 February 2013.}

German federal government adopted a similar policy in 2015 vis-à-vis Turkish accession to the EU taking into consideration the escalation of the unprecedented influx of refugees to Europe as a result of the escalation of the Syrian conflict. Despite her personal sceptical stance towards Turkey’s full membership in the EU accompanied by her reluctance to make any official declarations on this issue at all between March 2014 and September 2015\footnote{Following her February 2014 statement that emphasized her skeptical position on Turkey’s full membership in the EU, the German Chancellor did not make any official declaration on Turkey’s EU accession process until October 2015. See for the 2014 statement, Zeit Online. Merkel verweigert Erdoğan die volle Unterstützung", 4 February 2014, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-02/merkel-erdogan-eu-mitgliedschaft-terkehr-wahlkampf [01.09.2018].} and notwithstanding the de facto frozen status of accession talks with Turkey\footnote{The last chapter in EU-Turkey accession talks was opened in November 2013.}, German Chancellor Merkel granted her sudden support for the acceleration of Turkish accession process during a visit to Turkey in exchange for stronger collaboration between Turkey and the EU in regard to the management of refugee influx to Europe.\footnote{Deutsche Welle. Germany ready to support Turkey’s EU accession process, says Merkel, 18 October 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/germany-ready-to-support-turkeys-eu-accession-process-says-merkel/a-18789797 [01.09.2018].} While Germany had become the prime destination for Syrian refugees, Turkey had gained popularity as a transit and destination country since the onset of the Syrian War, as well.\footnote{Turhan, Ebru. German-Turkish cooperation on irregular migration a must, In: Hürriyet Daily News, 30 November 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=91844&NewsCatID=396 [01.09.2018].} Accordingly, Turkey emerged as a crucial actor for the management of the refugee influx to Germany, particularly after it became clear that the majority of the EU’s member states were reluctant to “show solidarity with regard to the implementation of an EU-wide relocation and resettlement procedure”\footnote{Turhan, Ebru. The Implications of the Refugee Crisis for Turkish-German Relations: An Analysis of the Critical Ebbs and Flows in the Bilateral Dialogue. In: Marmara Üniversitesi Öneri Dergisi, 2018, Vol. 13, No. 49, p. 196.} and thus, demonstrate willingness to share burden with frontline member states such as Greece and Italy for an EU-wide management of the refugee crisis within the Union’s own borders.

The member states’ reluctance to take solid responsibility to handle the crisis culminated in Germany’s search for external partners for the man-
agement, containment and reduction of irregular migration flows outside the EU’s borders. In light of Berlin’s evident dependence on Ankara in regard to the management of the refugee crisis Merkel suddenly acted as the leading proponent of opening new chapters in Turkey’s accession talks with the EU, which came into reality with the conclusions of November 2015 EU-Turkey Summit and March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement (also known as the “refugee deal”) within the framework the “package deal” between Turkey and the EU concerning cooperation on the handling of the refugee crisis. In view of her eagerness to develop a containment strategy for the crisis it should not come as a surprise that Merkel also played a crucial role in the formation of the “refugee deal”.

In a nutshell, in view of German efforts for the pursuit of (particularly security related) interests official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process experienced a temporary, yet clear shift, once again, just as it did following the emergence of the Arab Spring.

4. Germany and Turkey’s EU accession process: absolute welfare maximization

Economic relations between Germany and Turkey have been quite at the forefront of the bilateral dialogue between both countries. Germany serves as Turkey’s leading trading partner and as the second biggest foreign direct investor in Turkey after the Netherlands with the operations of more than 7000 German companies or companies with German capital in the country. On the other hand, Turkey acts both as an important export market and a base for the regional operations of German companies, particularly in the MENA region. The economic relations between Germany and Turkey were above all boosted following the start of accession talks with Turkey in October 2005, which consolidated Turkey’s economic stability due to Turkish efforts to implement the Copenhagen economic and political criteria. In this vein, it makes sense to study the impact of Germany’s economic interests and preferences on the formation of official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU bid by examining the shifts and continuities in Germany’s position in view of changes and continuities in Turkey’s level of adherence of Copenhagen economic criteria, Turkish-German economic relations and the overarching status of Turkish economy.

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52 Turhan. Turkey’s EU accession process: do member states matter?.
53 Ibid.
4.1 Turkish economy and German position on Turkey’s EU accession process throughout the pre-negotiation phase

As far as German support for the approval of Turkey’s candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, just two years after its rejection at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, is concerned, a comparison of 1998 and 1999 European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey in regard to Turkey’s fulfilment of the Copenhagen economic criteria reveals that German efforts for absolute welfare maximization did not play a key role in the formation of German preferences regarding the Helsinki conclusions. According to the key findings of the reports, during 1998-1999, Turkey did not make any significant progress in various key indicators related to the existence of a functioning market economy such as economic policy essentials, currency stability, real GDP growth rate, sufficiently developed financial sector and liberal trade regime. The 1995-1999 era in Turkey was particularly characterized by continuous early elections and weak coalition governments, which prevented the implementation of much needed economic reforms and effective fight against key challenges including increasing public deficit-to-GDP ratio, constant currency fluctuation as well as an unstable growth model in Turkey. According to the Progress Reports, Turkey’s capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces, was not fostered either during 1998-1999. In regard to key indicators such as structural transformation of Turkish economy, sufficient investment in human and physical capital as well as state interference in the economy, the reports indicated critical deficiencies, lack of progress and the need for urgent improvement.

In September 1997, a few weeks prior to the Luxembourg decision concerning the rejection of Turkish candidacy, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel had referred to the vulnerable condition of the Turkish economy as

54 The existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.
55 Turhan. The European Council Decisions Related to Turkey’s Accession to the EU: Interests vs. Norms.
one of the leading hurdles to Turkish membership in the EU\textsuperscript{58}, and, thus, linked German objection to Turkey’s candidate status to economic considerations. Ahead of the 1999 Helsinki Summit, on the other hand, where Germany acted as one of the leading proponents of approving Turkey’s EU candidacy, key representatives of the German federal government did not make any statements pertaining to Turkish economy. This is surprising given that during 1997-1999 Turkey did not make any significant progress in the fulfilment of key benchmarks related to the Copenhagen economic criteria. This indicates that other considerations must have triumphed over German economic considerations in Helsinki.

Contrary to the 1999 decision, German considerations for PI in economic terms, played an important role in the formation of the official German position on the opening of the accession talks with Turkey, which was decided at the December 2004 Brussels European Council. Ahead of as well as throughout the summit, key representatives of the German federal government put strong emphasis on the significant progress achieved in Turkey’s fulfilment of the Copenhagen economic criteria since the acknowledgement of the Turkish candidacy, praised the dynamism of the Turkish economy and highlighted the welfare-related benefits of Turkish full membership in the EU both for Germany and the remaining member states\textsuperscript{,59} Chancellor Schröder, for example, stated that Germany had more to lose than gain from Turkey’s exclusion from the EU, emphasizing that Germany had already acted as Turkey’s foremost trading partner\textsuperscript{60} and that a credible EU membership perspective was going to further foster the bilateral trade relationship between both countries\textsuperscript{.61} In a similar vein, Foreign Minister Fischer expressed, just a few days ahead of the summit, it was in the interest of the EU to start the accession negotiations with Turkey in light of the progress it had made, referring to the economic and political reforms Turkey had accomplished following the confirmation of its candidate status\textsuperscript{.62}

\textsuperscript{58} Agence France Press. Turkish PM Yılmaz to visit Germany: EU discussions expected, 9 September 1997.
\textsuperscript{60} Agence France Press. Germany’s Schroeder happy at go-ahead for Turkey’s EU talks, 17 December 2004.
\textsuperscript{61} Associated Press Worldstream. Schroeder to raise exchange rate issue at G-8 summit, 30 December 2004.
\textsuperscript{62} Agence France Presse. Germany warns against watered-down EU offer to Turkey, 13 December 2004.
German support for the acceleration of Turkey’s membership process following the acknowledgement of Turkey as a candidate country for EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki European Council is not surprising given that just during 1999-2004, the German-Turkish trade volume increased from € 11.5 billion to € 19.8 billion as a result of the deep economic reforms undertaken by Ankara, which culminated in enhanced economic growth, domestic demand and fostered Turkey’s status as a location for direct investments. These reforms have also been praised by the European Commission in its 2000-2004 Progress Reports on Turkey. Ahead of the 2004 Brussels Summit, the German business world acted in concert with German political circles and demonstrated clear support for the opening of accession talks. This was for instance reflected in the joint press release by the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and its Turkish counterpart, Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD). The joint press release emphasized that the December 2004 European Council needed to act in accordance with the earlier commitments, if Turkey met the Copenhagen political criteria.

4.2 Germany’s Turkey policy during the Eurozone crisis

The linkage between German efforts for pursuit of economic interests and German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process was in particular evident during the Eurozone crisis, which broke out in late 2009 and triggered substantial losses in European economies. Although the German economy was not hit at its core by the Eurozone crisis, it did not remain unaffected by the Eurozone’s problems, either, due to the complex economic interdependence among the member states of the Union. Germany has been for many decades realizing most of its trade with the member states of the Union. Most of these member states had been quite negative-

63 Destatis. Aus- und Einfuhr (Außenhandel): Deutschland, Jahre, Länder, https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online;sid=912476923B1CC8C0D060953B4B45491,G0_1_2;operation=previous&levelindex=2&levelid=1538072632726&step=2 [27.09.2018].
64 Turhan. The European Council Decisions Related to Turkey’s Accession to the EU: Interests vs. Norms.
65 TÜSİAD. BDI-TÜSİAD Joint Declaration: BDI and TÜSİAD call for dependable steps to support the European perspective of Turkey, 21 April 2004.
ly affected by the crisis and their citizens’ purchasing power had immensely decreased, which had important implications for German export volume and, thus, economic growth rates. The Eurozone crisis effect was particularly evident in the later stages of the crisis. While the German economy recorded 4.1 percent and 3.7 percent growth in 2010 and 2011, respectively, it grew only at an unimpressive 0.5 percent both in 2012 and 2013. Turkish economy, on the other hand, grew at 4.8 percent and a remarkable 8.5 percent in 2012 and 2013, respectively. During the first quarter of 2013, German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Turkey, accompanied by a high-level business delegation. One day prior to her visit to Ankara as well during bilateral talks in Turkey, Merkel highlighted her support for the opening of a new chapter in EU-Turkey relations after three-year hiatus, despite her personal doubts about Turkey’s full membership in the EU.

Merkel’s statement was accompanied by the call of the German industry for a quick decision on Turkish membership in the EU in light of the debates on the future of the EU. For the German industry, Turkey had become an essential market following the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis. While German exports to the Eurozone had dropped from €420.9 billion in 2011 to €401.9 billion in 2013, the total value of German exports to Turkey had increased during the same period from €20.1 billion to €21.4 billion despite the global financial crisis.

Germany’s Mercedes-Benz

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recorded in 2013 a Europe-wide sales growth in Turkey with a 57.3 percent annual sales growth despite the sovereign debt crisis.\footnote{Daimler. 2014. Mercedes-Benz on record course, https://media.daimler.com/marsMediaSite/en/instance/ko/Mercedes-Benz-on-record-course.xhtml?oid=9916847 [15.09.2018].} In a similar vein, in the middle of the Eurozone crisis, leading German companies such as E.ON or Metro called Turkey one of their essential countries for investment.\footnote{Financial Times. Eon pushes into Turkey with Enerjisa deal, 4 December 2012; Bild Zeitung. Türken hängen China ab, 15 October 2011.} Hence, the support of the German political elite and the business circles for the revitalization of accession talks with Turkey, coincided with the German efforts for absolute welfare maximization in the crisis era.

4.3 German position throughout the 2018 economic turmoil in Turkey

The apparent interdependence between Germany and Turkey in economic terms and its impact on the formation of German-Turkish dialogue has been particularly evident following the rise of an economic turmoil in Turkey late July 2018 in view of the transformation of the political tensions between Turkey and the US into significant economic afterquakes. As a result of economic sanctions imposed by US President Donald Trump on Turkey doubling tariffs on Turkish steel imports to 50 percent and aluminium imports to 20 percent\footnote{Gall, Carlotta. / Ewing, Jack. Tensions Between Turkey and U.S. Soar as Trump Orders New Sanctions. In: The New York Times, 10 August 2018.}, pessimistic expectations about the economy accompanied by the continuous weakening of Turkey’s EU perspective, Turkish Lira had fallen almost 25 percent against dollar in only four days throughout August 2018.

In the wake of unprecedented currency slide in Turkey, German Chancellor Merkel made a swift public statement in which she emphasized Germany’s interest in having an economically prosper Turkey while also indicating the need for a politically independent central bank in the country.\footnote{Yetkin, Murat. An important detail in the Turkish currency crisis. In: Hürriyet Daily News, 14 August 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat-yetkin/an-important-detail-in-the-turkish-currency-crisis-135760 [10.09.2018].} Germany’s interest in preserving economic stability in Turkey in view of the strong economic interdependence between both countries particularly as a result of high trade volumes and the operation of more than 7000 German companies in Turkey most of which also run their regional operations...
from Turkey. This interdependence and German economic interests culminated in a cautious rapprochement between both countries starting from September 2018 which has been reflected in the realization of various official visits led by the heads of state or government or relevant ministers accompanied by high-level business delegations. However, it should be stated that the rapprochement did not lead to the emergence of a positive official German attitude concerning Turkey’s EU accession process. In fact, key representatives of German federal government refrained from making any explicit statements on Turkey’s EU accession case. That the German position on Turkish accession process did not experience any temporary shift despite converging interests just like previous times points to the increasing importance of non-utilitarian, normative factors in the formation of German-Turkish dialogue on Turkey’s EU perspective. It shows that the divergence between Turkey and Germany in the definition and perception of key moral norms reached such a critical level that interests could not act as the dominant variable (just as they did in the past) in the formulation of Germany’s stance towards Turkey’s EU accession process.

5. Germany and Turkey’s EU accession process: ethical norms compliance

Turkey’s compatibility with Europe’s collective identity, which is in fact not fixed and described by a leading European organization, Council of Europe (CoE), as “a constantly shifting kaleidoscope”\textsuperscript{77}, has been an important aspect of the debates on Turkey’s EU accession process within German political circles. Throughout the Cold War, Europe’s dialogue with Turkey had been mainly identified within a geostrategic context\textsuperscript{78} and by making use of a raison d’état, which constructed a European identity based on the safeguarding of Western Europe’s existence and the promotion of liberal democratic values. Thus, throughout the Cold War era, the Western bloc took mainly into account Turkey’s active participation in the European security architecture, while leaving ethical norms related parameters rather aside. The end of the Cold War era, on the other hand, reminded the Western block of the existence of ethical norms-related parameters such

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{78} Eralp, Atila. Turkey and the European Community in the changing post-war international system. In: Canan Balkir / Alan M. Williams (Eds.). Turkey and Europe. London and New York, 1993, pp. 24-44.
\end{flushleft}
as history, culture, traditions and religion in order to define European-ness.79 While throughout the evaluation of Turkey’s first membership application in 1987 by the then EEC, discussions on Turkey’s compatibility with the European identity in view of ethical norms did not widely happen80, in the post-Cold war era, Turkey’s 1997 application for full membership in the EU culminated in the rise of both European and German discussions on Turkey’s European credentials, which took into account various parameters such as ethnicity, history, traditions and religion.

5.1 The shift from the “Black-Y ellow” to the “Red-Green” coalition: implications for the perception of Turkey’s “Europeanness”

Particularly, ahead of the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council, it became apparent that German considerations for identity-related NC acted as an important dynamic for the formation of the official German attitude towards Turkish candidacy. In March 1997, the European People’s Party (EPP), a dominant member of which has been then German Chancellor Kohl’s CDU, announced its strong objection to Turkish candidacy after an assembly. During the EPP meeting, Kohl convinced the remaining EPP leaders about the rejection of Turkey’s candidate status in Luxembourg with the following kinship-related argument: “From my geography lessons at schools, I cannot recall being told that Anatolia was part of Europe.”81 Following the EPP assembly, it was declared that “Turkey is not a candidate to become a member of the European Union, short term or long, because of the fundamental civilizational difference of Turkey.”82 The statement seemed to have confirmed the EU’s perception as a “Christian club” by conservative European political circles and pointed to the formation of the Kohl government’s official position on Turkey’s EU membership in view of the assumption that Turkey was never going to be compatible with the so-called European collective identity.

While the shift from Christian democratic / liberal to Turkey-friendly social democratic / green coalition government in 1998 brought about sig-

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80 Ibid.
81 Paterson, T. Germany shuts door to Europe on the Turks, In: The European, 3 April 1997.
significant changes in the official German attitude towards Turkish membership in the EU, it is interesting to observe that the compatibility of Turkey’s identity with Europe’s collective identity was still questioned by the key representatives of the social democratic / green coalition government, however, this time, often inexplicitly. Ahead of the 1999 Helsinki European Council, which provided Ankara with candidate status with the strong support of the then German federal government under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, successive statements of key German government representatives neither put emphasis on Turkey’s belonging to Europe as an inherent member nor on a sense of kinship that linked Europe to Turkey. The statements rather included the significance of Turkey’s transition to a European country as well as its anchorage to Europe and its collective values.  

On the eve of the Helsinki Summit Chancellor Schröder underlined the importance of Turkey’s EU accession process for Turkey’s transformation into a European country by stating “we want a European Turkey, we therefore want to offer Turkey a credible European perspective.” While Schröder and his Foreign Minister Fischer referred to the accession of the CEEC to the EU as the reunification of Europe, and thus regarded the CEEC as Europe’s integral part, they rather supported Turkey’s “Europeanization” and rapprochement with Europe through the medium of the accession process. Schröder government repeatedly made use of similar statements ahead of the 2004 European Council pointing out the significance of Turkey’s changeover to a European country and its anchorage to the European model of democracy for the maintenance of security in Europe and its wider periphery post September 11. Statements like “we cannot do without a European Turkey to fight international terrorism” or “a European Turkey will be a different Turkey” regarded Turkey still as the “Other”, which needed to be transformed into the “Self”. What differentiated the red-green coalition from the Kohl government was the assumption

84 Agence France Presse. Germany wants Turkey to become EU candidate, 3 December 1999.
86 Agence France Presse. Turkey’s EU membership may be 10 to 15 years away: German FM, 2 September 2004.
87 Associated Press Worldstream. Turkey moves closer to opening membership talks with EU after dispute resolved over penal code reform, 23 September 2004.
that Turkey’s compatibility with Europe’s collective identity could be achieved by means of the accession process.

5.2 Germany’s perception of Turkish identity throughout the official negotiation phase

Following the launch of the accession talks with Turkey in 2005, German federal government continued to perceive Turkey as Europe’s “Other” that should be closely linked to the “Self” through enhanced dialogue by means of the accession process. Gradually, Turkey was going to resemble the “Self”. German perception of Turkey’s compatibility with the European identity post 2004 was reflected in the new coalition agreement that was signed by the CDU and its coalition partner, Free Democratic Party of Germany (FDP) following the 2009 federal elections. The coalition agreement stated that if the EU was not going to be capable of absorbing Turkey as a new member or if Turkey was not going to fulfil the obligations for full membership in the EU, then Turkey needed to be “tied in as closely as possible to European structures in a way that further develops its privileged relationship with the EU.”

If Turkey was to be ‘anchored’ to the European structures, there must have been significant doubts over its European identity. Following his first months in the office, then Foreign Minister and FDP leader Guido Westerwelle hinted at Germany’s continuing doubts over Turkey’s natural compatibility with the European identity throughout the accession process when he stated during an official visit to Turkey that “Turkey’s direction is Europe.”

When the European refugee crisis reached its peak in late 2015 and Turkey’s role in its management became vital both for German and European leaders, temporary shifts have been observed in the perception of Turkey’s Europeanness by some conservative German politicians. Peter Altmaier, then Chief of Staff of the German Chancellery and official coordinator of Germany’s refugee policies as part of his position as the Federal Minister for Special Affairs, for instance, stated that Turkey had been behaving more European than some EU member states. Altmaier’s testimonial is in line with the strong link between the foreign policy making and

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88 The Daily Star. German FM urges Turkey to continue EU reforms, 8 January 2010.
89 BBC Monitoring Europe. Turkish paper questions British, German support for Turkey’s EU bid, 2 August 2010.
the constant re-construction of the identity. Foreign policy contributes to
the framing of the difference, i.e. the “Other” and, thus, the diagnosis of
the key features of the “Self”, while also defining how to approach the
“Other.” 91 Throughout the refugee crisis and the European efforts for the
conclusion of a “deal” between Turkey and the EU in handling irregular
migration flows, a foreign policy related rapprochement had been ob-
served between Turkey and Germany, which was reflected in a temporary
and partial shift in the definition of the “Other”, Turkey, by some German
Christian Democrats.

6. Germany and Turkey’s EU accession process: compliance with moral norms

The careful examination of official statements, press releases and public
speeches of leading representatives of successive German governments re-
veals that Turkey’s compatibility with moral norms (i.e. its adherence to
universal principles of democracy, human rights and rule of law) had ha-
bitually affected the formation of the official German attitude towards
Turkey’s EU accession process. Yet, throughout Turkey’s extended EU ac-
cession process, there has been times when Germany called for the acceler-
ation of Turkish accession process despite having criticized Turkey’s adher-
ence to the Union’s liberal democratic principles.

6.1 From Luxembourg to Helsinki to Brussels: The fluctuating impact of moral
norms on the German position

German federal government acted as one of the leading opponents of
Turkey’s candidate status in 1997, while it served in 1999 as a leading sup-
porter for granting Turkey the candidate status. However, both during
1997 and 1999 key representatives of German federal government harshly
criticized Turkey’s level of compliance with the moral norms promoted by
the EU. Germany took a critical stance above all towards the issues of hu-
man rights and the peaceful settlement of conflicts with other member
states. Ahead of the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, Foreign Minister Kinkel
for instance stated that “the EU cannot bring countries with territorial dis-

91 Campbell, David. Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics
putes into the union”\textsuperscript{92} pointing to Turkey’s existing problems with Greece. In a similar vein, in September 1997, he referred to human rights, Kurdish question and economic challenges as key hurdles to overcome for Turkey’s complete integration into the EU.\textsuperscript{93}

Although the succeeding red-green coalition government served as one of the leading supporters of Turkish candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, it followed in the footsteps of the Kohl government in criticizing the situation of democracy, human rights and rule of law in Turkey. Prior to the Helsinki Summit, Foreign Minister Fischer criticized Turkey’s adherence to the Union’s moral values during a visit to Turkey by referring to human rights as “the most important among the EU’s common values”\textsuperscript{94}, whereas Chancellor Schröder argued only few weeks ahead of the European Council gathering that Turkey needed to take more steps to improve its record in regard to human rights.\textsuperscript{95} That the German government significantly changed its position on Turkey’s EU accession process between 1997 and 1999 despite its enduring concerns about Turkey’s respect for the Union’s moral norms hints at the existence of other key dynamics behind the German support for Turkey’s candidacy at the Helsinki Summit.

Whereas in 1999 Turkey’s level of compliance with the moral norms praised by EU appeared not to have played a significant role in the formation of the official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process, the significant progress Turkey made in the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria - i.e. adherence to democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities - during 2000-2004 seems to have acted as an important dynamic behind the German support for the 2004 December European Council decision to open the accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. Statements such as “[I]t is in all our interests to decide on starting negotiations in the light of the progress which Turkey has made”\textsuperscript{96} and “if this dynamism is maintained, if there is a breakthrough on Cyprus and if there is progress in implementing the most

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Associated Press Worldstream. Difficulties remain in Turkey’s bid for EU membership, 29 January 1997.
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Agence France Presse. Turkish PM Yilmaz to visit Germany: EU discussions expected, 9 September 1997.
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Associated Press Worldstream. German foreign minister stresses human rights issues on visit to Turkey, 22 July 1999.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Associated Press Worldstream. AP Photos ATH110 to ATH114, 4 October 1999.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} Agence France Presse. Germany warns against watered-down EU offer to Turkey, 13 December 2004.
\end{itemize}
important reforms, then things will develop positively” indicate the link between German position on Turkish membership in Helsinki and Turkey’s increased level of NC.

6.2 Official negotiation phase: moral norms, the German veto on Chapter 22 and the bilateral relations post-coup attempt

Turkey’s level of adherence to the Union’s moral norms have been utilized as a justification for the official German attitude towards Turkish accession process throughout the official negotiation phase, as well. Perhaps one of the best examples for the employment of moral NC-oriented arguments to legitimize Germany’s position on Turkish membership in the EU has been Germany’s fluctuating attitude towards the opening of Chapter 22 in Turkey’s accession talks with the Union. In February 2013, one day prior to the start of her visit to Turkey, Chancellor Merkel had declared her support for the opening of a new chapter in EU-Turkey relations. In a similar vein, Foreign Minister Westerwelle had called for the acceleration of Turkish accession talks stating that “[I]f we don’t pay attention, the time will come when Europe will be more interested in Turkey than Turkey is interested in Europe.” In light of Germany’s positive attitude towards the progression of accession talks with Turkey, both Ankara and European capitals expected a smooth opening of Chapter 22 in June 2013 during the EU-Turkey Intergovernmental Conference. However, on 20 June 2013 Germany conveyed EU leaders that it was going to block the launch of talks on Chapter 22.

Berlin’s veto coincided with the German-Turkish divergence on Ankara’s dealing with the Gezi Park demonstrations, which had started in late May 2013. According to Merkel, Ankara’s response to the protests had not been in line with Germany’s idea of moral norms and values. In accordance with this statement, a spokesperson of the German Foreign Affairs Min-

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97 Agence France Presse. Denial of EU accession talks would be huge blow for Turkey, Erdogan warns”, 22 January 2004.
100 Financial Times. Germany blocks Turkey’s bid to join EU, 20 June 2013.
istry underlined that the timing of this chapter’s opening was a ‘technical issue’ and not directly related to the German-Turkish dispute over the handling of the protests. Nevertheless, he added, “[t]here is of course an overall political context, and as is always the case in life, everything is ultimately connected with everything else.” Following minilateral talks Germany, Turkey and the EU found the middle ground agreeing on the launch of the talks on Chapter 22 in the aftermath of the presentation of the Commission’s progress report on Turkey in October 2013. Despite the normative argumentation of the German federal government, it should not be forgotten that Merkel government changed its position on the opening of the Chapter 22, only a few months ahead of the German federal elections, the polls on which had not provided a clear picture in regard to winners and possible government constellations.

Following the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, key representatives of the German federal government have increasingly made use of NC-related arguments when stating their position on Turkey’s EU accession process. Severe differences between German and Turkish governments’ positions on the actions needed to be undertaken after the coup attempt have deteriorated the relations between the two countries. In the post-coup era, former German Foreign Minister and current President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has been one of the most active voices in the EU in openly discussing Ankara’s post-coup policies. Between 16 July 2016 and 15 December 2016 Steinmeier made more than 20 official statements (press releases or press conferences) on the post-coup developments in Turkey in front of cameras and under the watchful eyes of the public and the media. Whereas his remarks during the first couple of weeks in the aftermath of the attempted coup have been quite cautious, Steinmeier later increased his criticism of Ankara’s post-coup actions by regularly making recourse to NC oriented arguments, and relating those to the future of Turkey’s EU accession pro-


cess. For instance, he emphasized in November 2016 that Ankara needed to decide which path it was going to follow while keeping in mind what this choice was likely to mean for Turkish EU accession process.\textsuperscript{104}

As a result of the growing divergence between Turkey and Germany with regard to the definition and perception of moral norms and ideals the German federal government lately emerged as a visible and leading veto player in the formation of EU-Turkey dialogue, in general, and Turkish accession process, in particular. Germany’s veto role was reflected in its veto on the launch of negotiations on the update of the CU between Turkey and the EU until the improvement of Turkey’s compliance with the Union’s moral norms and principles\textsuperscript{105}, its call for the reduction of the pre-accession assistance funds (IPA) provided to Turkey\textsuperscript{106} and the 2018 coalition agreement of the recent CDU/CSU-SPD government which emphasized the government’s clear and strong reluctance to the opening of any new chapter in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations until the situation regarding democracy and rule of law was going to be improved in the country.\textsuperscript{107}

7. Conclusion

The relations between Turkey and Germany are dynamic and multidimensional. The complexity of the bilateral dialogue between the two countries brings along the need to examine the impact of various factors on the formation of official German position on Turkey’s prolonged EU accession process. This paper drew on the key assumptions of rationalism and constructivism and examined the explanatory capacity of various types of PI and NC in elucidating the formation of Germany’s preferences pertaining

\textsuperscript{104} Die Welt. Steinmeier droht der Türkei indirekt mit Abbruch der EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen, 4 November 2016.


\textsuperscript{106} Deutsche Welle. Turkey: Angela Merkel calls for reduced EU funds, 19 October 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-angela-merkel-calls-for-reduced-eu-funds/a-41038798 [01.08.2018].

to Turkish accession to the EU. The findings of the paper indicate the need to view the German efforts for PI and NC as complementary rather than conflicting ways of understanding the construction of official German attitude towards Turkey’s prolonged EU accession process. They reveal that all four explanatory variables that guide rationalist and constructivist schools in their research into EU enlargement, i.e. security and power maximization, absolute welfare maximization, ethical norms compliance and moral norms compliance, have played to a significant extent a role in the construction of Germany’s Turkey policy, as far as Turkish accession process has been concerned. In this vein, both rationalist and constructivist schools prove to be useful for the elucidation of the key dynamics behind the German preferences pertaining to Turkey’s EU bid.

Yet, the study has had two particularly noteworthy findings which may prove valuable when conducting prognoses on the future of German-Turkish relations, in general, and the formation of official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU bid, in particular. Firstly, the analysis has demonstrated that throughout Turkey’s extended EU accession process there have been times, when the German position experienced sudden and sharp U-turns and when the federal government started to support the acceleration of Turkey’s EU accession process despite its concerns over Turkey’s compliance with the Union’s liberal democratic norms and despite missing statements about the compatibility of Turkish identity with the one of the EU / Europe. German support for the confirmation of Turkey’s candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki European Council and its call for the acceleration of Turkish accession process throughout the refugee crisis and the Eurozone crisis despite the lack of NC related argumentation in these periods show that there have been many times in the contemporary history when German efforts for PI have gained momentum and trumped normative dynamics and considerations. The findings of this study indicate the primacy of Germany’s security and welfare related interests over normative considerations as far as the construction of Berlin’s policies concerning Turkey’s accession to the EU are concerned. They have shown that successive German governments supported the acceleration of Turkey’s accession process or took a positive stance towards the issue mainly at times when enhanced cooperation and relations with Turkey proved to be useful for the pursuit of German interests and preferences. Thus, Germany’s enlargement policy vis-à-vis Turkey actually lacked a certain degree of normative consistency as its support for Turkish accession process did not always emerge at times when Turkey’s level of NC with the EU demonstrated improvements.

Having said that, the study also has another interesting finding. The analysis demonstrated that in recent times and particularly throughout the
German-Turkish rapprochement following the rise of economic turmoil in Turkey, the German position on Turkish accession process did not experience any temporary shift despite converging interests and an improvement of bilateral relations, and German government representatives refrained from giving statements on Turkish accession process. This development accompanied by the negative tonality of the German federal government’s coalition agreement concerning Turkey’s EU bid indicates the increasing importance of non-utilitarian, normative factors in the formation of German-Turkish dialogue on Turkey’s EU perspective. It shows that the discrepancy between Turkey and Germany in the definition and perception of universal values and principles reached such a decisive level that interests could not act as the dominant variable (just as they did in the past) in the making of Germany’s position on Turkey’s EU accession process. Thus, normative considerations are likely to play the key role in the evolvement of the EU’s attitude towards Turkey’s accession process, in general, and the formulation of official German position, in particular.
Reluctant Multilateralists? How Brexit Can Affect German-Turkish Relations

Thomas Krumm

1. Introduction

In an increasingly interdependent world, a loss of influence in international politics or, from a theoretical perspective, limited sovereignty, is sometimes hard to accept. Nostalgic idealisation of the ‘good old days’ may be more a reaction to the complexities of ‘globalisation’, than a response. Policy-making in highly integrated international organizations such as the European Union (EU) can then become a challenge for nation-state focused political identities, such as those still prevalent in the United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey. For both of them the year 2016 gave rise to fundamental realignments of their EU policies.

For Turkey, despite expectations raised by the 29 November 2015 “EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan” on migration,\(^1\) the visa liberalization and the accession talks have been affected following the EU-Turkey Statement (also known as the “EU-Turkey refugee deal”) of 18 March 2016 by the deteriorating relations between Turkey and member states with a high share of Turkish-origin migrants, such as the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany. As a possible explanation, Turkish election and referendum campaigns in these countries as well as a general shift in Turkish foreign policy making towards a ‘Eurasian’ perspective contributed to irritations.

Despite the visible rift between Turkey and these EU members, the implementation of the refugee deal accompanied by the readmission agreement and EU financing of refugee projects in Turkey has worked sufficiently well, pointing at prevailing pragmatism on both sides in the face of overlapping interests. On the other side, Brexit as well as conflicts with some EU members have challenged Turkish policy-making vis-à-vis the EU with the task of developing new strategic perspectives. From the Turkish perspective, Brexit appears to entail both a loss of a supporter inside the

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EU and a new opportunity to expand its network of bilateral or selective (also ‘exclusive’ or ‘new’)\textsuperscript{2} multilateralism. From a British perspective, maintaining access to the common market is a priority, which however contradicts with tougher immigration rules, a major demand of the Brexit campaign. Beside these more ‘technical’ details, Brexit is already affecting the internal and external relations of the EU.

This paper argues that despite a possible increase in German influence within the EU due to the Brexit, Germany will become less important for Turkey (as a strategic partner, for instance). Contrarily, while Britain will lose its influence on EU policy-making, it will become more important for Turkey as an economic and a political partner in bilateral relations. However, political partnership between the two is likely to be focused more on specific topics, whereas German-Turkish relations will continue to be based on a broader spectrum of topics, illustrating a tendency of issue linkages between human rights and democratic standards and economic and trade issues.

In fact, the UK and Turkey have more in common than the realignment of their EU policies in recent years. Both have ‘special relationships’ inside and outside the EU and pursue special interests\textsuperscript{3} at Europe’s periphery, sometimes with an ambiguous sense of European identity. Both can be characterized as awkward or reluctant partners in EU policy making\textsuperscript{4}, with some sense of ‘exceptionalism’ at both sides.\textsuperscript{5} However, whereas in terms of population Turkey outnumbers both the UK and (soon) Germany, in eco-


\textsuperscript{3} To better understand Britain’s Turkey policy in the EU, one should also keep in mind Britain’s ‘special interest’ in European integration, which was less focused on the political than the economic dimension and the common market, and which showed scepticism towards political deepening and further transfer of sovereignty to Brussels. Historically, the UK’s starting point with European integration was not the then European Communities (‘inner six’) but the European Free Trade Organization (EFTA, ‘outer seven’), see Kitzinger, U.W. Europe: The Six and the Seven. In: International Organization, 1960, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 20-36; Gowland, David. Britain and the European Union: Belonging Without Believing. London, 2016. The first two attempts to join the EC were vetoed by France, until de Gaulle finally passed away in 1969.


\textsuperscript{5} For Turkey please see: Mardin, Serif. Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes. In: Turkish Studies, 2005, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 145–165; for the UK see for instance Tierney,
nomic terms Turkey is considerably lagging behind large members (Table 1) and appears to be stuck in the ‘middle income trap’. In the UK, a decoupling of economic development between the growth regions such as London and ‘the rest’ has contributed to the high degree of discontent in the latter. In the results of the Brexit referendum from 23 June 2016 with its slim 51.9 to 48.1 per cent majority, some cleavages can be found: age (young-old), territory (north-south) and urbanization (urban-rural), as well as unemployment, skills and mobility. The highest level of EU-support can be found in London and also in Scotland. There, nationalist motives led to support for the ‘remain’ camp and in Northern Ireland, a mix of unionists and nationalists voted for Brexit.

Much has been said about the British Brexit decision; however, less so far on its implications for (recently more troubled) German-Turkish relations. Thus, the aim of this paper is to examine the possible consequences of the Brexit for German-Turkish relations. In EU policy-making vis-à-vis Turkey, Britain often counterbalanced the more sceptical positions of France and the Republic of Cyprus, while German politicians from the CDU/CSU circulated until recently mitigating ideas of a ‘privileged partnership’. For Britain as well as for the EU, Turkey’s geostrategic location has been of great interest. Bilgin and Morewood even argue that this geographical location (i.e which helped to contain Russia) rather than other political motives in the past determined British policies towards the Ottoman Empire:

“After the beginning of the Ottoman decline in the late seventeenth century, Turkey had always been compelled to look to one of the Great Powers to support her against Russia. Turkey had generally obtained this support either from Britain or Austria-Hungary and later from


7 “The Brexit referendum showed the increasing discrepancy between the young and more progressive voters who opt for inclusive integration strategies and the older and more conservative voters who do not want to take responsibility for region-wide problems, such as rescue packages and migration flows.” Ünay, Sadık. Making sense of the Brex-shock. In: Daily Sabah 25.06.2016, p. 9.

Germany, but mostly it came from Britain. Except during the Great War which brought Britain and Turkey into two opposite camps, the traditional British policy was to support Turkey as a barrier against Russian expansion southwards.”

Historically, Turkey (and Greece) became significantly more important for the Western Allies with the rise of the Cold War and Turkey’s geostrategic position at the south-eastern flank of Europe (and NATO). Subsequently, containment of Soviet expansionism “became a major factor in Anglo-Turkish relations”,\(^9\) in addition to the British economic and strategic interests in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.\(^{10}\)

Later, Britain has pursued a moderating role in the conflict between Greece and Turkish Cyprus, when Cyprus was a British Crown colony. With considerable Greek Cypriot forces, esp. the ‘EOKA’ paramilitary movement striving for ‘enosis’ (unification with the ‘motherland’ Greece), Turkish Cypriots started to organize for a separation (‘taksim’) from the Greek Cypriot majority community. In the troubled second half of the 1950s, Britain directly involved Turkey in reconciliation talks, which finally led to Cypriot independence and to the 1960 power sharing constitution. In the wake of this process, it was the British government that acknowledged the Turkish Cypriots’ right of self-determination, upsetting the ‘enosis’ movement under Archbishop Makarios. “From this moment, the Turkish Cypriots were officially and affectively upgraded from minority status to a full community”\(^{12}\), without however being acknowledged as a state. Recently, Britain has been involved in the Cyprus reunification talks as a guarantor state, along with Turkey and Greece. Turkey, on the other hand, nowadays acts as a regional power with a considerable element

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9 Bilgin/ Morewood, Turkey’s Reliance on Britain, p. 24.
11 In the early post-war time, “the Soviets began to put pressure on Turkey and Iran and directly or indirectly supported the communist movements in Syria, Iraq and Greece. In the case of Turkey, Moscow demanded the cession of some its eastern territories and of its bases in the Turkish Straits” (Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, p. 227). The Cold War largely overshadowed regional relations in the subsequent time, and the military presence of Western troops in the region as well as Turkish (and Greek) NATO membership contributed to further incite Arab nationalism, under which Western perceptions of interests and threats were rejected and own interests pursued by playing Westerners and Soviets off against each other.
of national interests in its foreign policy decisions. The Russian-Turkish UN draft resolution regarding a truce and interim government in Syria that was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on 30 December 2016 illustrated both the rising Turkish influence as a regional power and a preference for bilateral (in this case Russian-Turkish) action.\(^\text{13}\) In addition, the Astana talks (Russia, Iran, Turkey) or the four-way Syria summit in Istanbul in October 2018 illustrate a preference for small formats.

This paper takes into consideration the different aspects of ‘lateralism’ such as uni-, bi- and multilateralism with a special focus on international (free) trade.\(^\text{14}\) It argues that with Brexit the UK will become a more relevant actor for bilateral and ‘selective’ multilateral agreements regarding Turkey, while Germany seems to remain committed to classical (or inclusive) multilateralism which is the preferred manner of EU (foreign) policy-making.\(^\text{15}\) Turkey and Germany seem to apply different styles of international policy-making, which partly result from their different institutional and regional environment and dissimilar experiences in terms of international political ‘socialization’.\(^\text{16}\) Thus, Turkey prefers to address foreign policy issues in a bilateral or selective multilateral mode (also described as ‘club governance’),\(^\text{17}\) while German foreign policy making is adapted to balance European interests in a broader multilateral mode. This does not

\(^{13}\) For bilateral Russian-Turkish relations see Öniş, Ziya/ Yılmaz, Şuhnaz. Turkey and Russia in a shifting global order: cooperation, conflict and asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region. In: Third World Quarterly, 2016, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 71-95.


\(^{15}\) However, as an exception the unilaterally introduced ‘open door’ refugee policy of 4 September 2015 by Chancellor Merkel in the face of tens of thousands stranded Syrian refugees at the Balkan route should be mentioned; for details see Krumm, Refugee Agreement.


\(^{17}\) Varwick, Multilateralism, p. 317.
exclude bi- or even unilateral policy making by Germany (for instance, suspension of Hermes export guarantees, travel warnings for German tourists, and reduction of public development banks’ (KfW) funds for Turkey were options mentioned by former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel in the summer of 2017) or inclusive multilateralism by Turkey. For example, Turkey had experiences with multilateralism especially during the Cold War and later in world market integration. However, beyond specific areas such as international security and economy, tendencies to bi- or even unilateralism are strong. This can be illustrated in the call of an unnamed German official for a ‘de-bilateralisation’ of the Turkish-German quarrels after the imprisonment of a German human rights activist by Turkish authorities in August 2017.\(^{18}\) However, support for the ‘de-bilateralisation’ of the disputes between both countries and the search for solutions within a multilateral framework was moderate among EU circles. Even NATO was initially unwilling to get involved in the Turkish-German quarrel and called it a bilateral issue after Turkey blocked German parliamentarians from visiting stationed soldiers at the Incirlik airbase.\(^{19}\) We argue that with such differences in ‘lateralism’ continuing, disappointments at both sides are likely to continue. However, with Brexit, the UK might come closer to bilateral or selective multilateral forms of policy-making as preferred by Turkish officials. Also within the EU, smaller, regionally focused and more selective ‘coalitions of the willing’\(^{20}\) may become more important for policy coordination and possibly open up new channels of influence for Turkey towards European integration.

2. **Don’t mess with Merkel? EU internal and external relations post Brexit**

In this section, we assess the likely impact of the Brexit on internal and external relations of the EU and its member states. We expect that Brexit will

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lead to a shift of power from north to south and from the ‘periphery’ to the centre, namely to France and Germany. While the EU will get smaller, the differences of power and influence between the remaining members are likely to become more accentuated. For instance, it has been argued that the Brexit-majority was also a result of British concerns of the “unstoppable rise of the influence of Merkel’s Germany at the heart of the European project, following the massive financing needs created by the euro-crisis via bailout packages for Greece and the southern Europe.”

The adoption of a quote by Margaret Thatcher regarding German reunification to the post-Brexit situation could read from a German (and French) perspective: “the EU got smaller, but we didn’t.”

Bulmer describes a clear shift in the balance of power within the EU in favour of Germany, with Chancellor Angela Merkel being a pre-eminent figure in the European Council. According to the observations of the Financial Times (FT), the Brexit vote could accelerate a changing of Washington’s most important European partner, handing over this role from the UK to Germany. Already before the Brexit referendum, the United States (US) had an increased interest in Germany “as its go-to ally in Europe – and that process is likely to accelerate as London’s influence in the region diminishes”, the FT estimated on June 27, 2016. It saw the importance of Germany as “bound to rise – at the UK’s expense.”

France is also going to benefit from the realignment, as the US administration has already worked more closely with France in the last two years on security, marking a stark contrast to the frozen relations seen after the US-led invasion in Iraq. Likewise, “Italy also has started to enjoy a higher profile in Washington, partly because of its role in diplomacy in Libya.”

21 “France was also not at all happy with the ever growing and disproportional influence of Germany in the EU, but Holland’s weak administration did not possess the political and foreign policy instruments of follow an effective balancing strategy”. Ünay, Making sense of the Brex-shock, p. 09.


25 Significant differences between Germany and the US in international relations are reflected in Germany’s scepticism regarding the use of military and security means as well as both countries’ differing “views on fiscal policy and the role of austerity in Europe – a division that was apparent during Greece’s economic crisis.
Realignment (in terms of strategic role taking) can imply that other EU members (for instance Poland, Hungary or other Visegrad countries) are likely to take up sceptical positions towards further European integration, which were previously held by Britain. This means a shift of opposition towards the Franco-German axis to the East (and South) of the EU. Bulmer\(^{26}\) sees a shift of the integrationist ‘cleavage’ from the ‘supranationalists versus intergovernmentalists’ to one of ‘intergovernmentalists versus nationalists’. He observes the emergence of a range of governments with a strong emphasis on their national interests, similar to the Cameron governments in the UK.\(^{27}\) On the other side, it should be noted that southern European governments are often less reluctant towards further transfers of sovereignty to Brussels as part of broader negotiation packages. Following the Brexit they are likely to become more interested in policies such as a less austere form of financial and debt management, economic demand stimulation, common social policies as well as integrated asylum and refugee policies, which were strongly opposed by the UK. Italy and Greece are the most promising candidates in this regard.

After Brexit, it will be more up to Germany to bridge diverging approaches to what the proper task of the EU is. This might also affect the Franco-German axis. Brexit will most likely contribute to a rebalancing of power between the remaining large players, France and Germany, probably in favour of the latter due to its territorial proximity to the northern and eastern members (whereas France is closer to the southern and Iberian members). Regional policy-coordination as already practiced by the Nordic countries for instance might become more important; respective forums can be used to counterbalance the (perceived) German dominance. This might be an especially interesting option for the Visegrad countries, with Hungary under the Fidesz and Poland under the PiS government acting as a specific ‘axis’ among the Eastern European members. Given the expected increase of the influence of the Franco-German axis due to Brexit, German and French domestic elections will continue to affect EU policy-making.

and that could flare up again in France, Italy and other European countries push for greater public spending as a response to rising populism”, ibid.

\(^{26}\) Bulmer, Power shift in the EU?, p. 5

\(^{27}\) Palmer argues that the UK and other conservative governments side-lined themselves in EU decision making, e.g. by splitting from the European People’s Party (EPP) fraction in the European Parliament; see Palmer, Morgan. Are pride and vanity the fall of Britain? Istanbul: IPC-Mercator Policy Brief, 2016.
Such tendencies of regional cooperation and integration have been analysed under the label of ‘differentiated integration’ and might become even more important. During the refugee crisis of late 2015, a ‘coalition of the likeminded’ had already been formed in South-eastern Europe, reaching from Austria to non-member state Macedonia, and it decided autonomously to ‘close’ the Western Balkan refugee route. Another example is the emergency meeting of 25 June 2016 by ministers of the six founding members (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg) in Berlin. Upon invitation from Chancellor Merkel, they discussed the situation after the Brexit referendum – indicating a ‘regression’ to the early beginnings of the European project. In this context, the resurgence of nationalist and xenophobic positions in a range of European states can also contribute to more ‘defensive’, moderate foreign policies. Eurosceptic parties such as the Front National in France and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany manage to maintain a relatively high level of popular support. However, the rise of such fence parties follows different patterns from north to south. Whereas in northern and continental Europe, right-wing protest parties are on the rise, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, the Front National in France and the AfD in Germany, in Spain (Podemos), Italy (Five Stars) and Greece (Syriza) left-wing populism has gained much more momentum than right-wing protest in recent years.

Regarding the impact of Brexit on the Western Balkan states, Florian Bieber sketches a gloomy scenario: “With the transformative appeal of the EU largely gone and its ability to act reduced, others will fill the void. In the short- and medium-term, this appears likely to empower semi-authoritarian leaders who will pander to the highest bidder, be they Turkey, Russia, China, or other powers or investors (including individual member states). Social movements, media and independent institutions will have fewer external allies to rely on.”

His argument is that a weakened and self-absorbed EU has reduced capacity to offer transformation support to foreign governments and non-governmental actors concerning the realization of market economy and liberal democracy. Drawing on this argumentation, it could be assumed that following Brexit Turkey would engage in

strengthened functional bilateral ties for instance with Russia\(^{30}\), China, Japan, the UK, but also with Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran to fill the void of a self-absorbed EU. However, given the entrenched level of conflicts and the multi-faceted cleavages between different powers with an interest in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood, neither a fast solution of the Syrian conflict nor a new balance of power appears to be likely. Russia, Iran and Turkey have gained some advantages at least in the short run; for maintaining them in the long run, a more multilateral strategy would be needed.

3. **Shopping around for alternatives? Turkey’s European and regional ambitions post Brexit**

Turkish foreign policy under its foreign, and later prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has been described as ‘neo-Ottoman’; a mixture of political folklorist and a neo-imperial rhetoric, summing up to a consciousness of a continuing ‘historical mission’ and bridging the gap between the old Ottoman Empire and the new Turkish Republic by appealing to national self-consciousness.\(^{31}\) According - not only - to international observers, this policy has shifted Turkey to some extent towards international and regional isolation. Turkey “has found itself increasingly isolated internationally and bereft of allies in a hinterland going up in flames”, commented the Financial Times.\(^{32}\) A typical example has been the evolution of the Russian-Turkish dialogue. Russian military support for the Syrian government initially led to a cooling down of the relations, as far as Ankara was concerned, and the downing of a Russian fighter jet violating Turkish airspace by Turkish F16 in November 2015 led to harsh sanctions from Russia in the fields of tourism and trade. However, already in mid-2016, after the resignation of Prime Minister Davutoğlu and in light of rising tensions with the EU, a much more pragmatic policy towards Russia was kicked off. The rapprochement with Russia was accompanied by a rapprochement with Israel,

\(^{30}\) Turkey did not participate in the international sanctions against Russia after the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russian forces in March 2014.


\(^{32}\) Turkey seeks a way out of international isolation. In: Financial Times, 29.06.2016, p. 10.
and also with Egypt to a limited extent, and was not only driven by economic considerations but also a new pragmatism.

Relations with Israel deteriorated after the ‘Gaza flotilla raid’ in 2010, during which 10 Turkish human rights activists were killed by Israeli troops. Relations with Egypt had deteriorated after the military coup against former president Mohamed Morsi (then leader of the Muslim Brotherhood) in July 2013. In a similar vein, since about 2012, foreign direct investments from EU members in Turkey have been stagnating or decreasing (to about two thirds in recent years), while investments from the Near East and Asian regions have been increasing. European and US-American hesitations may be a result of Turkey’s entanglement “in proxy wars with Damascus, Moscow and Tehran in Syria” and its role “as a pipeline for jihadis. The effect has been not only to demolish a carefully constructed system of regional alliances but also to inflame ethnic and sectarian divides at home”, the Financial Times commented critically. However, Turkey’s geostrategic significance became more interesting as a centre of stability and growth in the region after the tumultuous ‘Arab Spring’ and later in the fight against the Islamic State (IS), despite its late opening of the Incirlik NATO airbase only in July 2015 to the anti-IS coalition.

According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), a less compromise-ready attitude in Turkish foreign policy making emerged in the investigation period between 2013 and early 2015, as challenges of its ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy became obvious in regional relations. “Its relations with the European Union, too, have palpably cooled. There is little question that Turkey faces significant challenges both domestically and internationally”, the BTI concluded.

The next Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım followed a more pragmatic approach after taking office in May 2016 and declared the new government wanted to increase the number of its friends and reduce those of its enemies. The focus of the new cabinet in foreign policy was to “seek ways out of international isolation” by means of a new “pragmatism in efforts to mend fences.” In short time, the new government introduced fol-

33 Financial Times, 29.06.2016, p. 10.
34 In contrast, in the Iraq war of 2003, the Turkish Parliament decided on March 1 not to open its airspace for US military attacks on Iraq.
37 Financial Times, 29.06.2016, p. 10.
lowing important policy changes for instance regarding Israel and Russia: “[I]t has signed an agreement with Israel putting to rest the festering dispute over the killing in 2010 by Israeli troops of Turkish activists on an aid flotilla to the Gaza Strip. Israel will pay compensation to the families. Turkey will regain humanitarian and trade access to Gaza. Both sides come out better.” Such improvements focus mainly on economic and security issues and can be characterized as “compartmentalization of bilateral relations, insulating economic interests from political disputes.”

About a year after the failed coup attempt, the phrase of ‘shopping around for alternatives’ was quite often used in pro-government outlets, however, without going into details. For instance, an article in the pro-government Daily Sabah read, “Europe’s road map, by extension, will determine Turkey’s course of action. Having publicly endorsed the remain campaign ahead of Thursday’s historic vote, the Turkish government now must decide whether to continue membership talks with a notably weaker and confused organization or start shopping around for alternatives.” This phrase indicates a strategy similar to that of some Arab countries in the Cold War, to ‘play off’ the superpowers against each other, in order to maximize their own national interests and benefits. However, in contrast to the Cold War period, the available alternatives are now less clear. Despite a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2016 and a limited rapprochement after the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey in late 2015, Russian-Turkish relations are historically preloaded. Regarding Egypt, the optimistic outset of relations with the Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi (former Muslim Brotherhood leader) since June 2012 were smashed in July 2013 by army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi by means of a military coup.

In terms of regional integration, the Arab world south of Turkey has less to offer compared to the EU. Iran, Turkey’s eastern neighbour, raised some (economic) hopes after the lifting of sanctions due to the P5+1 brokered

38 Financial Times, 29.06.2016, p. 10.
40 EU allowed Brexit by turning back on Turkey. In: Daily Sabah, 25.06.2016, p. 8. Another frequently used pattern of interpretation is accusing European leaders of double standards, as illustrated in the following section in the Daily Sabah: “By subjecting Turkey to double standards, European leaders including Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy alienated a potential ally with regional clout, fuelled fears about an impending Muslim invasion of Europe and ultimately created the monster of right extremism that now comes back to haunt the continent.” In: Daily Sabah, 25.06.2016, p. 08.
nuclear deal; however, as a result of practical problems such as banking issues, expectations of a speedy recovery of Iran that would spill-over to Turkey have not been fulfilled. The Russian-Turkish-Iranian rapprochement that emerged during the evacuation of eastern Aleppo seemed to be driven by partially overlapping tactical interests rather than shared values. In other words, the alternative to an EU rapprochement can best be described as ‘laborious bilateralism’ with little to contribute to overcome, for instance, the ‘middle income trap’ as well as the formation of sound institutions.

‘Shopping around for alternatives’ becomes clearer in the context of the concept of ‘strategic depth,’ as developed by former foreign and Prime Minister Davutoğlu. Its core assumption is that Turkey is not a part of the European periphery but a geostrategic key state between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Thus, it should pursue its national interests by means of its geographical location and its historical relations with the neighbours to increase its regional power. With regard to foreign policy, this was translated into a ‘zero-problem-with-neighbours’ approach as well as into broadening strategic options instead of solely focusing on the EU or the US. Indeed, recent developments in Turkey’s international relations seem to confirm such a re-evaluation of strategic orientation, shifting priorities away from the EU and the US. Ayata observed a more active Turkish foreign policy following the ‘Arab spring,’ with the government aiming to play a central role in the transformation process of a number of countries.

A similar ‘pro-active’ strategy on the basis of military means can recently be observed in the 2016 ‘Euphrates Shield’ operation (Fırat Kalkanı Harekâtı) in northern Syria. Despite some setbacks, as with Egypt under al-Sisi, Turkey managed to considerably increase its influence as a regional power.

41 Presidential visits to Somalia for instance (as realized in January 2015 and June 2016) might contribute to development aid and symbolising Islamic solidarity but can hardly be considered an ‘alternative’ to Europe.
43 Ayata, Bilgin. Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World: Rise and Fall of a Regional Actor? In: Journal of European Integration, 2015, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 95-112.
and even global power.\textsuperscript{45} For the concept of strategic depth, this means for instance a limitation of multilateralism, as the partisan composition of foreign governments (still) affects Turkey’s ability (or willingness) to cooperate, as can be illustrated in the case of pre- and post-Morsi Egypt. Likewise, Turkish ambitions to become an ‘energy hub’ for central Asian and Eastern Mediterranean gas resources to be delivered towards Europe can be understood in this context. Taking advantage of its geo-strategic location and connecting multiple links between different regions also applies to Turkish air traffic policy (the construction of the third Istanbul international airport, for instance).

As far as the possible impact of Brexit on Turkish foreign policy making is concerned, it can be assumed that it is likely to broaden Turkish foreign policy options towards Europe. While Turkey’s EU accession negotiations have gradually sailed into more and more troubled waters, the British exit from the EU offers a chance for Turkey to intensify functional, sector specific collaboration with the UK in specific areas such as trade or security. This functional, sector focused bilateral (or ‘light’ multilateral approach) contrasts with the ‘deeper’ approach of the EU integration process, with which both the UK and Turkey appear to be not happy. Functional, sector focused cooperation requires less sharing of sovereignty and thus less direct interference of international politics with national policy making. For countries like the UK, Turkey, and also Switzerland, with a strong focus on sovereign decision making at the national level, ‘club governance’ founded on a lower degree of political integration is an attractive alternative to the EU.

Despite increased international criticisms of Turkey’s rule of law and freedom of press records especially after the July-15 coup attempt, British politicians gave encouraging signals during their latest Turkey visits. At the end of September 2016, one “month after winning a competition for an offensive poem about the Turkish head of state, the British foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, was on a mission to rebuild bridges during his first official visit to Ankara”\textsuperscript{46}, announcing to support Turkey’s EU accession bid. Less focused on symbolic politics, British Minister of State for Internation-


al Trade, Greg Hands, visited Ankara in early October 2016, prioritising increased bilateral trade in the sectors of defence, large infrastructure projects, health, nuclear energy and finance. Hands emphasized that “the U.K. administration will make moves to attract Turkish and other foreign companies from all parts of the world to invest in the country and create jobs there, as well as to encourage British investors to invest in Turkey.” Similar to the visits of Johnson and Hands, in October 2016 the Turkish Prime Minister Yıldırım also expressed his expectation of improved relations with the post-EU UK.  

4. Reluctant multilateralists? Bi- and multilateral styles of policy-making in Britain, Turkey and Germany

For self-conscious regional and global powers, it can be ‘rational' to pursue interests much more in uni- and bilateral than in multilateral modes. Multilateralism can even be seen as an exception to the rule of uni-and bilateralism that only emerges under certain conditions (e.g. in cases related to security and economic issues). Against this background, the multilateralism of European integration can be read as a response to the long history of European conflicts. Unilateralism shares many premises of the (neo)realist theory of international relations (such as anarchy and zero sum games between states), whereas multilateralism focuses on interdependence and the role of norms and institutions, which are typical for the several forms of the liberal (institutional) approach to international relations. Thus, the bilateral-multilateral ‘cleavage’ in foreign policy making is also a conflict

47 Ergin, Barış. Britain’s Hands sees better economic relations with Turkey after Brexit. In: Daily Sabah, 8 October 2016, p. 3.
48 “The U.K. is a major trade partner with Turkey, and bilateral trade between the two has been of great benefit to Turkey, as the country’s exports to the U.K. exceed the imports from the country. At the end of 2015, Turkey’s exports to the U.K. were around $10.5 billion, while the import level stood at $5.5 billion.” http://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2016/10/17/pm-yildirim-sees-better-relations-with-britain-after-brexit.
between (neo)realist and liberal-institutional approaches. International organizations of regional scope are much less successful in the Middle East than in Europe. In the Near and Middle East, a strong sense of national ‘individualism’ and regional rivalry even limits sector specific, functional cooperation\textsuperscript{50}. With regard to its Middle Eastern neighbours, Turkey seems to have adapted a strategy of ‘self-conscious bilateralism’, which might be a first choice given the complexities of this region.

However, policy making in and with the EU is unique as currently 28 member states have their say and, in still a number of policy fields have to form a consent by means of a compromise in order to prevent gridlocks. Thus, EU policy making is genuinely multilateral, which poses a challenge especially to the larger members such as France and Germany to sufficiently take into consideration the positions of others, especially those of smaller member states. This is done less from an altruistic motivation but rather to avoid the veto of others and to reach a decision. Thus, even the smallest member or a seemingly least important issue can trigger a veto by one of the members and derange or even crash the whole policy process on a certain topic. Especially for the larger member states, this can be a challenge concerning their patience and lead to a ‘socialisation’ into multilateralism by trial and error. Smaller accession candidates (for instance in Western Balkans) might adapt more easily to this type of policy making than larger accession candidates with a longer tradition of ‘self-conscious’ bilateralism as in the case of Turkey. Thus, for bigger states at the periphery of the EU, such as Turkey, but also Poland and the UK, EU-style multilateralism might be more challenging to learn and adapt to. As a grand regional power, Turkey seems to prefer exclusive bilateral relations in which, similar to the US, it often serves as the bigger partner.

In contrast, France and Germany have had more time (and opportunity) to get used to multilateralism. In multilateralism, learning to balance power and interests and to compromise is a most important lesson. For Turkish-German relations this could mean that a Turkish preference for bilateralism, as might have emerged in dealing with its immediate Eastern neighbourhood, might lead to irritations in Germany and within the EU if one-to-one transferred to Turkey’s relations with the EU. This could also mean, as far as EU-Turkish dialogue is concerned, Turkey is focusing on selected member states that are perceived as key actors or agenda setters for a certain policy area in order to pursue own interests. For instance, regarding

the Turkish EU membership bid, Turkish foreign policy focuses much more on Germany and the UK as potential agenda setters, and much less on traditional veto players\textsuperscript{51} such as France and Cyprus.

On the German side, multilateralism has been one of the key parameters of the foreign policy making. However, it has been also argued that in recent decades, especially since the German reunification, Germany’s understanding of multilateralism has changed and become more instrumental and self-oriented. In this vein, the maintenance of status and influence has become more important, whereas normative and moral justifications of multilateral foreign policy have been in decline. This change became most visible in the sometimes briskly tone of former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, but lately also under the Merkel governments. The shift was not limited to rhetoric but also had substantial impact on German policy making.\textsuperscript{52} From a multilateral perspective, Turkish interests have to be balanced and compromised with those of France, Poland, and Cyprus for instance. Such a need for the balancing of various interests and preferences is less given in the bilateral mode of policy making, in which deteriorating relations with one partner do not directly affect the quality of relations with other countries. In the multilateral mode of the EU policy making, however, third countries are more likely to ‘suffer’ from a blocked policy process because of deteriorating relations with / between some member states.

As argued above, Brexit will most likely lead to a shift in the balance of power among the remaining EU members, making the Franco-German axis (and especially Germany) more pivotal, and contribute to centrifugal tendencies among the remaining members and their different regional interests. For the Franco-German axis, balancing these different regional interests and dynamics might become more difficult than in the past. In other words, as more eyes and ears will be directed towards Paris and Berlin, Turkish expectations from Paris and Berlin about mitigating the different interests might increase and at the same time contribute to disappointments about their ‘leadership’. This could already be seen in the cooling down of the bilateral Turkish-German relations after the German Bundestag elections in 2017.

\textsuperscript{51} See Tsebelis, George. Veto Players. 2002, Princeton for the ‘Copernican turn’ in institutional analysis with the shift of the analysis from agenda setters to the decision making processes of veto players, that is, of actors, whose consent is needed for a change of the political status quo.

destag adopted on 2 June 2016 the Armenian “genocide” resolution, and also in the German (European) reactions to the mass arrests, detentions and suspensions after the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016.

In addition, the discussion between the European Commission and the Turkish government on the broad definition of ‘terrorism’ in the context of the visa liberalisation talks illustrate the importance of sovereign decision making in the eyes of Ankara. This emphasis on sovereign decision making is a phenomenon to be observed also in some eastern European governments, for instance in Poland and Hungary. To sum up, Germany attracted a broad range of Turkish expectations in the past. However, different preferences in ‘lateralism’ may contribute to ongoing misunderstandings. In a bilateral orientation in international policy making, disappointments are more easily directed especially towards the other side. With Brexit, a pragmatic, mitigating partner regarding Turkey’s relations with the EU would be missing.

5. Conclusion

British and German policy-makers have different visions about the future of the European integration. After Brexit, a shift of the EU’s political centre towards the South is a most likely consequence, giving Germany a more central role in finding and negotiating compromises concerning European policy making between the different regions and member states. Given the multilateral mode of EU policy making, being disappointed by the “reluctant hegemon”\(^{53}\) seems to be unavoidable. In this sense, Germany might attract a wider range of expectations, including fury and disappointment. Turkish reactions to the stalling visa liberalisation talks as well as Turkey’s EU accession talks point to this direction. As argued above, Brexit might also lead to a reformation of the ‘opposition club’ against the Franco-German axis within the EU, formerly played particularly by the UK and now to be relocated to the south or east. Given its complaints about deteriorating human rights and separation of powers (justice, media) records in Turkey, Germany might become less important

as an agenda setter for Turkey’s affairs with the EU, as the doors to full membership are rapidly narrowing.

To sum up, Brexit contributes to the vanishing of Turkey’s EU membership perspectives and leads to a (further) increase of German influence in EU policy-making, which is likely to some extent to be balanced however by Germany’s need to look out for alliances in order to maintain its influence.\textsuperscript{54} Germany’s increasing influence in the EU is likely to further decrease Turkey’s already rapidly declining chances of entering the EU. However, as the Customs Union issue illustrates, Germany might still surprisingly act as an important veto player regarding Turkey’s dialogue with the EU, while its relevance as an agenda setter for Turkish ambitions might continue to decrease. Contrarily, in the field of migration and refugee politics and also in terms of regional military strategy, Turkey has become more important as a ‘gatekeeper’ at the south-east flank of the EU, with special importance not only for Greece but also for Germany as a preferred destination and transit country (not only) for Syrian refugees. Forms of sectoral (e.g. economic, migration or security related) cooperation combined with non- or low profile political cooperation as favoured by British policy makers, will become more interesting for the UK as well as for Turkey. Thus, Brexit opens doors for a broader variety of ‘special relationships’ between the EU and a range of peripheral non-member states, including Turkey. The institutional arrangements of sectoral cooperation, which will be formulated for the British case, are likely to offer also some ideas for the future of EU-Turkish relations.

\textsuperscript{54} Bulmer, Power shift in the EU?, p. 7.
PART 2

German-Turkish Dialogue in consideration of Foreign and Domestic Politics
Shaping Geopolitical Destiny and Coping with Global Complexity: Germany and Turkey as Central Powers in International Politics

Ludwig Schulz

1. Introduction

In recent years, the foreign policies of Germany and Turkey have apparently been caught by identity crises. Since the eruption of the Eurozone crisis in 2010, the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, Germany has found itself in the dilemma of being unintentionally pushed into the position of a leader and hegemonic power in Europe, a role it traditionally refused to claim. Turkey, in contrast, has been overrun by turmoil and crises in its regional surrounding, calling into question the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ approach that had apparently been guiding its foreign policy since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took over in 2002. In view of discussions about both countries’ foreign policy identities and the crises they lately found themselves in, it will be argued in the following that the concept of ‘central power’ well serves as a pattern for both countries’ foreign policy identities, if it is designed, reflected and practiced appropriately.

Germany and Turkey do already share the conceptual notion of a ‘central power’, which, however, has so far been under-studied in theoretical and empirical foreign policy research. In Germany, during the mid-1990s one of the leading historians of the country, Hans-Peter Schwarz (1934-2017), developed the concept of ‘central power’ as a prototype to be applied to the reunified Federal Republic and its international position within and beyond Europe. Only a few years later, then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem and, even more prominently, one of his successors in office and later Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu adapted the concept to the case of Turkey aiming at bringing it into reality. In the fol-

1 The conceptual term should neither be confused with ‘central state’ as an expression of a unitarian, centralized state entity in opposition to federal state entities, nor with the alliance of the so-called Central Powers of World War I, made up from the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.
lowing, after outlining both cases it will be argued that the concept of ‘central power’ serves well to the understanding of both countries’ foreign policy identities and performances. For German and Turkish foreign policy makers and observers, the concept, if properly understood in accordance with Schwarz’s empirical prototype, may give orientation and lay the foundation for foreign policy strategies that meet the needs of today’s challenging international politics. However, if not used properly, the concept has also some ambiguous value that may lead to repercussions for foreign policy behaviour and can potentially foster an existent identity crisis.

2. The Prototype: Hans-Peter Schwarz’s concept of Germany as Europe’s Zentralmacht

The conceptual term ‘central power’ (Zentralmacht) was introduced in 1816 by the German diplomacy historian Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren (1760-1842). Heeren adopted the term within the framework of Germany’s, i.e. the then Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation’s, position and role in Europe.² It took almost 180 years until the term was rediscovered by one of the leading and most respected German historians, Hans-Peter Schwarz.³ He published his monography “Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne” [Europe’s Central Power. The return of Germany at world stage] in 1994 at a time when, after the reunification and Germany’s return as a fully sovereign state to international politics, a debate had erupted about the country’s foreign policy and its new role in European and global politics.⁴

² In his monography “Der Deutsche Bund in seinen Verhältnissen zu dem Europäischen Staatsensystem” [The German Confederation in its Relations with the European System of States], published in 1816, Heeren characterized the German Empire as a ‘Centralstaat’ (‘central state’ or – translated more appropriately – ‘central power’) without which the modern European system of nation states could not have evolved as it did.

³ Schwarz, who, beyond numerous other books, had published a biography on Helmut Kohl in 2012, passed away on 14 June 2017, two days before the former German Chancellor. For an epitaph see e.g. Jesse, Eckhard. Nachruf auf Hans-Peter Schwarz – Ein Zeithistoriker allererster Güte. Cicero, 29.06.2017, https://www.cicero.de/kultur/nachruf-auf-hans-peter-schwarz-ein-zeithistoriker-aller-erster-guete [01.09.2017].

As in the literature a comprehensive and widely acknowledged typology of various concepts of ‘power’ regarding the study of states as primary actors in international affairs and ‘their’ foreign policy identity is largely missing - particularly one which takes the concept of ‘central power’ into consideration -5 Schwarz’s elaboration on Germany as a ‘central power’ can be considered a qualitative introduction to the prototype of the concept. In line with Heeren’s early observation, Schwarz argues that the reunified Germany has become again the ‘Zentralmacht’ of Europe. This conceptualization refers not just to the recognition of Germany’s geographical position in the centre of Europe and its significant demographic, economic and social capacities; but it also serves as the acknowledgement of the country’s particular power to influence the political order of the continent.6 By critically analysing the modern political, economic and social history of Europe in general and Germany’s constructive as well as destructive role in the European history in particular, Schwarz argues that the reunified Germany has risen to a position of peculiar responsibility for the continent – a development that central powers such as Germany should be aware of throughout their foreign policy making and their conduct of international affairs:

From its central position there follows the task of getting engaged [Gestaltungsaufgabe] which can be mastered or missed. […] German decisions or non-decisions have the most powerful effects on the whole European environment. The weakness of a centrally placed state has just as serious repercussions as its calm power of engagement

5 In the scientific discourses on foreign policy identity and international relations a variety of most often undefined concepts such as ‘world power’, ‘great power’, ‘emerging power’, ‘small power’, ‘pivot state’, ‘cusp state’ etc. can be found. Although within the scope of this chapter only a limited systematic comparative analysis of the conceptual term and notion of ‘central power’ can be given, it is generally argued that an attempt to establish a widely accepted typology could serve to the theoretical understanding and empirical explanation of foreign policy identity and international relations; see, in epistemological and methodological terms in general, Elman, Colin. Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics. In: International Organization, 2005, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 293-326, or Kluge, Susann. Empirically Grounded Construction of Types and Typologies in Qualitative Social Research. In: Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung, 2000, Vol. 1, No. 1, Art. 14, http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1124 [01.09.2017].

6 For another assessment in English language similar to Schwarz’s one see Zimmer, Matthias. Return of the Mittellage? The Discourse of the Centre in German Foreign Policy. In: German Politics, 1997, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 23-38.
[Gestaltungskraft] or even irritating arrogance, of which the Germans
themselves as well as the neighbors in the more distant past have got-
ten enough.  

Schwarz emphasizes that in order to abandon previous hegemonic ambi-
tions, the reunified Germany must balance between its post-World War II
tradition of political reticence (Zurückhaltung) and its capability for con-
structive engagement (Gestaltung) both within the Western security camp
as well as in Europe within the framework of efforts to form the union of
integrated European nation-states (Europäischer Staatenverbund; in other
words, the European Union). In order to do so, Schwarz urges that “[…] Germany must learn to act again as a sovereign and great state, of course embedded in the European Union, without the Wilhelminian loudmouth, in the framework of the well-tested system of interdependencies and by taking care of decades-old partnerships.”

By using the notion of central power, Schwarz not only indicates the
very fact of Germany being geographically located at the heart of Europe
and heavily equipped with demographic, economic, social and cultural ca-
capacities, thus resulting in a position to directly and sustainably influence
developments in its environs. He also elaborates on the normative argu-
ment that Germany’s ‘natural’ hegemonic tendencies can and must be con-
trolled by international power structures (such as the transatlantic order or
the European integration process) as well as by Germany’s self-interests.
Regarding the latter aspect, Schwarz argues that it would be “totally coun-
terproductive [for Germany; L.S.] to proclaim a leading role” as this
“would provoke anti-German coalitions within and outside the European
Union.” Due to Germany’s destructiveness in the past and the need to bal-
ance between the other powers on the continent, he further urges that pol-
icy-makers must “understand that Germany is doomed to shape the Euro-
pean Union without talking much about it.” Schwarz insists on a smart
strategy of leadership: “Germany must lead, but without being perceived
as dominating.” To underline this he quotes from a speech by former Fed-
eral President Richard von Weizsäcker: “It is not Germany’s task to divide
the peoples [Völker] but to assembly them. It is its role to create consensus

7 Schwarz, Zentralmacht, p. 11; translation: L.S.
8 Ibid., p. 46; translation: L.S.
9 Ibid., p. 93; translation: L.S.
10 Ibid., p. 125; translation: L.S.
– to let the multitude of nations in its environment feel that they cannot live without each other, [but] that they need each other.”

3. **German central power in action: first rejected, then embraced?**

Schwarz revitalized the concept of Germany as a central power at a time when the country’s European and international standing was unclear and its foreign policy was confronted with major challenges: 

By the end of Germany’s division and the Cold War respectively, the Federal Republic (West-Germany), under the leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-1998), not only had been engaging in negotiating the terms of the reunification with the Eastern German Democratic Republic (GDR), the four victorious powers of the World War II, and its eastern neighbours Poland and Czechoslovakia. By the turn of the 1980’s to the 90’s, Bonn had also been making efforts to shape the European integration process in accordance with its ideas and interests: It was striving to create a common market, a common currency and – intentionally – a political union, each of them partly in consensus, partly in confrontation with the interests of other major European powers, especially France and the United Kingdom (UK), but also the BeNeLux group of countries, each of which had reservations against a strong German power position on the continent. In addition to that, with US-President George Bush’s announcement of a ‘new world order’ in 1990 and the subsequent US-led intervention in Iraq, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of war in the Caucasus and the Balkans, resulting in an unpredicted wave of refugee flow to Central Europe, the post-Cold War international security order became highly volatile and uncertain. Under such conditions, seen from today, it seems comprehensible that the ambitious concept of ‘central power’ in that peri-

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od did not (yet) match with Germany’s still dominating culture of restraint and its (self)image as a reluctant actor in international affairs. Alternative concepts of the time - most prominently Hanns W. Maull’s ‘civilian power’ approach, which was well received especially in politically leftist circles -, had gained comparatively more ground in political and public discourses. Apparently, the idea and discursive notion of a ‘civilian Germany’ created a better ‘feeling’ in the hearts and minds of German policy-makers and the German public favouring the country’s passive stance on international affairs, illustrated by its traditional ‘checkbook diplomacy’, or its reluctance to get actively engaged in armed conflicts and peace missions.

By the turn of the millennium, however, things gradually changed in terms of both German foreign political activism as well as political and public discourses. Facing the outbreak of conflict in Kosovo in 1998/99, and later in Afghanistan and again in Iraq, the coalition government of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Alliance90/The Greens under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) proclaimed ‘a new normality’ and a ‘new self-confidence’ of the ‘new Berlin Republic’ in international politics.

15 German Political Scientist Hanns W. Maull developed the concept of ‘civilian power’ in the early 1990s with respect to German and Japanese foreign policy identities after the World War II. He and his followers have been emphasizing the increasing relevance of economic and soft power means in German foreign policy making, and, beyond others, analyzed how German foreign policy helped shaping the civilian face of the emerging EU foreign and security policy. See e.g. Maull, Hanns W./ Harnisch, Sebastian. Germany as a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic. Manchester, 2001.
eign policy making in order to pursue national interests. For example, the
government opted more frequently for sending Bundeswehr soldiers
abroad for peace-keeping and ‘out of area’-missions under the umbrella of
the UN or NATO; it rejected the Bush Jr. administration’s campaign for an
international intervention against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; and it took a na-
tional interest-based stance on various issues related to the European inte-
gration process, especially regarding Nice Treaty, the Union’s enlargement
to the east (which Germany was much in favour of, not least for national
economic interests) or Berlin’s demonstrated reluctance to meet the Maa-
stricht criteria for monetary stability (while insisting on the fulfilment of
the criteria, when other EU members failed to meet them).

While observers emphasized that the self-confident attitude of the
Berlin Republic could lead the country into isolation as a result of its
neighbours’ reservations – a scenario which Schwarz had included in his
conceptualization by elaborating on the case that a central power would
reject its responsibility and obligation to cooperate, it was in those years
that Germany started to invest in its capacities and capabilities as a central
power: It created a ‘ring of friends and allies’ geographically around it by
means of NATO membership and the EU enlargement; it put forward do-
meric economic reforms in order to prepare the country for the enlarged
European market and the economic globalization; and it sat ‘at the back
seat of the Franco-German tandem’ (a metaphor frequently used at that
time) or ‘led from behind’ in Europe and – where it was possible – also in
global affairs by making use of its soft power means of commercial, cultur-
al, or humanitarian policies.

Although Schwarz’s concept during those years did not receive official
governmental recognition, as he was more considered to be a writer of
conservative providence, it was kept alive especially by conservative circles
in politics and academia – until obviously being re-invoked when an iden-
tity crisis started to shake the German foreign policy after 2010, and when

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18 See e.g. Wessels, Wolfgang. Germany in Europe: Return of the Nightmare or to-
wards an engaged Germany in a new Europe?. In: German Politics, 2001, Vol. 10,
No. 1, pp. 107-116.
19 Schwarz, Zentralmacht, p. 10.
20 See e.g. Hacke, Christian. The Foreign Policy of the Schröder/Fischer Administra-
tion in Historical Perspective. In: American Foreign Policy Interests, 2005, Vol. 27,
No. 4; further in detail see Gehler, Michael. Deutschland als neue Zentralmacht
Europas und seine Außenpolitik 1989-2009. In: Michael Gehler/ Paul Luif/ Elisabeth
Vyslonzil (Eds.). Die Dimension Mitteleuropa in der Europäischen Union.
Hildesheim, 2015, pp. 25-78 (34-51).
analysts and observers created a kind of ‘bottom up’ discursive movement to bring the concept again to the surface of public debates. Following the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis in Europe, and due to Germany’s key role as Eurozone’s economic engine, Berlin under the Chancellorship of Angela Merkel (since 2005) found itself increasingly in the kind of dilemma, which Hans-Peter Schwarz had predicted for central powers such as Germany: In an era of crisis, Berlin was thrown into a position in which it had to decide either to remain a reluctant hegemon, a dominant power unwilling to lead, for example, by deliberately criticizing Greece, Italy, France and others from a position of apparent economic superiority; or to serve as a benevolent hegemon by showing solidarity and taking responsibility for the European collective, and, thus, finding itself in the midst of a debate about debt cuts and Eurobonds, which it did not favour at all. However, as a central power that became more and more integrated in Europe, self-isolation and complete withdrawal from responsibility was no more an option for Germany. Instead, facing the complexity of the crisis, Berlin has pursued a partly pragmatic, partly normative policy that tried to balance the needs of the Greek, Italian and other Eurozone economies (at the expense of, especially, German savings interests), respected the Maastricht criteria of monetary stability, and strengthened the Eurozone’s resilience against global financial turbulences, while at the same time upholding its own economic boom.

In addition to the challenges posed by the Eurozone crisis, Germany was pushed into a new role with the manifestations of the civil wars in


Libya and Syria and one of its devastating consequences, the so-called European refugee crisis of 2015/16, as well as with the conflict in Ukraine, which had led to serious worries about the future of the European post-Cold War security order. These conflicts have further challenged German foreign policy identity, raising doubts about the country’s predictability as a partner and ally. Against this background and with respect to a growing debate in academia, civil society and the media about Germany’s role in a world order in turmoil, as well as with respect to German public’s rising interests in and concerns about German foreign and security policy, the country’s political executive from 2012 onward decided to start revising the key parameters of Berlin’s foreign and security policy by being implicitly inspired by the notion of central power.

Subsequently, building on an innovative approach of conceptual deliberations with representatives from domestic and foreign politics, business, academia and civil society, the Auswärtige Amt (Federal Foreign Office)...

27 On the one hand, the German Foreign Office published in 2012 the concept of “new power centers” (Gestaltungsmächte) that included countries such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, with which Germany - implicitly considered a Gestaltungs- or Zentralmacht by itself - should increase interaction and cooperation; see Foreign Office. Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility. Berlin, 2012. One the other hand, see the ‘concerted action’ of a series of speeches on a changing and more assertive German foreign and security policy, held at the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014, starting with the one of Federal President Joachim Gauck, Gauck, Joachim. Speech to open 50th Munich Security Conference. Munich. 31.01.2014, http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/JoachimGauck/Reden/2014/140131-Munich-Security-Confere nce.html [24.02.17] followed by unisonous speeches at the same event by Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen.
launched a process called ‘Review 2014’ that resulted in a large-scale revision of foreign policy related parameters and an institutional reform which included the enhancement of crisis management capacities.\textsuperscript{28} Similarly, the Federal Ministry for Defence for the first time included a variety of actors from the security sector, business and civil society in deliberations on Germany’s security environment and necessary responses.\textsuperscript{29} In 2016 this deliberation resulted in the new “White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr”, the aim of which is to “define[] Germany’s ambition to play an active and substantial role in security policy”, and to “define[] Germany’s strategic priorities and [to translate] them into key areas of engagement for German security policy [on the basis of our (Germany’s) values, national interests and an analysis of the security environment]”.\textsuperscript{30} In line with the ambitious (and ambiguous) conceptual spirit of a central power, the new White Paper not only outlined Germany’s de facto position as a leader and central power in Europe, but also expressed self-awareness about the country’s responsibilities and its limitations in a complex international environment:

> Germany is highly interconnected with the rest of the world and – due to its economic, political and military significance, but also as a result of its vulnerabilities – has a responsibility to actively participate in shaping the global order. Germany is increasingly regarded as a pivotal player [original German text: als zentraler Akteur] in Europe. With this new reality more options arise to exert influence but also increased responsibility. […] Germany is prepared to provide a substantial, decisive and early stimulus to the international debate, to accept responsibility, and to assume leadership. This includes a willingness to contribute to the management of current and future security and humanitarian challenges. We are, however, aware of the limits of our capabilities. Our increased role in international security policy will not, however, lead to automatic outcomes or obligations that run counter to our values and interests or overstretch our capabilities.\textsuperscript{31}


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 22.
Thus, the concept of Germany as a central power both implicitly and explicitly has been acknowledged as a strong element of contemporary German foreign policy identity by policy-makers and observers. It could be considered suitable to guide German foreign policy making and practice in an international and global environment that has become “more heterogeneous, complex, conflict-laden and unclear.” In this vein, usually with a strong emphasize on Germany’s embeddedness in and responsibility for Europe’s destiny, the concept of a central power, thus, can claim discursive hegemony in the contemporary foreign policy discourse. In addition, Germany’s identity as a central power seems to manifest itself in foreign policy making and practices such as the country’s performance in global politics (within the UN, G7/G20, or OSCE frameworks), the sustainable management of the Eurozone and the European refugee crisis (including the controversial ‘refugee deal’ with Turkey), in Berlin’s role as a driving force in the implementation of NATO’s Framework Nations Concept – and, last but not least in the reception of Merkel’s leadership (and Ger-

32 Gehler, Deutschland, p. 72; translation: L.S.


Schwarz’s dictum on central powers


36 See e.g. the contributions in Mölling, Christian/ Schwarzer, Daniela (Eds.). Foreign Policy and the Next German Government. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. Berlin, 2017.

which should be ‘leading without being perceived as dominating’ may have become a *Leitmotiv* for German foreign policy identity and practice, and it is apparently credited by both critical scholars and by a large segment of the German public alike.\(^{38}\)

Compared with the German prototype, and the bottom-up evolution of a renewed German foreign policy identity (and subsequently reformed institutional capacities and capabilities), the case and notion of Turkey as a central power underwent a partly similar, partly different evolution until it reached a prominent status in the political and public discourses with respect to the country’s international position and its role and self-understanding in global politics. The main procedural differences lie, firstly, in the top-down approach of the introduction of the concept into the political and public discourses by high-ranking political figures. Secondly, in recent years, the country’s attempted rise to the position of a central power has been challenged by numerous crises in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood, namely the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, the progression of which have been evolving counter to Ankara’s interests, as well as tensions and conflicts in domestic politics, which threw Turkey’s political stability and identity into troubled waters. It will be demonstrated in the following how the notion of Turkey as a central power has been unfolding in the past two decades without securing a sustainable status in the discourse yet. However, Ankara seems (again) rather reluctant to accept that becoming a central power must go along with accepting self-limitation and creating mutual gains and win-win-situations.

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4. Central power à la turca: İsmail Cem’s and Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision of Turkey as a global “Merkez Ülke”

For most parts of the 20th century the official Turkish foreign policy identity and practices rested on three pillars: 1) the paradigm of Kemalist modernization or ‘Westernization’, 2) the country’s ‘status quo orientation’ regarding its political independence, territorial integrity, and regional power balances, and 3) its identification as either a ‘front state’ or ‘buffer state’ at the periphery of ‘the Western world’, or as a ‘bridge’ between the Western countries and ‘the East’. Whereas throughout the Republic’s history there had been attempts to revamp the country’s official (and unofficial) foreign and security policy paradigm, especially in the course of the late 1990s the notion of Turkey as a central power increasingly gained prominence: At first, it was the journalist and social democratic politician İsmail Cem (1940-2007), who promoted during his tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs between the years 1997-2001 a shift from an one-sided Westernism and the notions of a ‘buffer’ or ‘bridge’ towards a new understanding of Turkey’s international position as both a European and Asian country,

40 Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic the Kemalist elite – the military, the diplomatic bureaucracy, and mainstream political parties – had been practicing foreign policy in line with the official principles by which Ankara was supposed to realize Atatürk’s dictum of ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’; which mainly meant positioning the country as a well-respected member in the midst of the international (or rater the Western) community of states; see e.g. ibid. However, an unofficial counter-narrative and identity always existed since the early years of the Republic, too. This narrative has been marked, on the one hand, by the fear from losing sovereignty and territorial integrity by subversive interference from outside, mainly by Western powers (the so-called Sèvres syndrome, referring to the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, which sealed the empire’s defeat in World War I and its subsequent partition), and on the other hand by a strong nationalistic notion of defence, struggle for independence and, partly, self-isolation, manifested by the popular proverb that ‘the Turk has no friend but the Turk’; see e.g. Jung, Dietrich. The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies. 2003, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07-09/jung_sevres/jung_s evres.html [01.09.2017]; Schmid, Dorothée. Turkey: The Sèvres syndrome, or the endless war. IFRI Franco-Turkish Paper No. 13. Paris, 2015; Hale, William. Turkish foreign policy since 1774. 3rd ed., London, New York, 2013, p. 162. This latter narrative, as will be seen below, nowadays challenges and misguides the concept of central power in light of the recent developments in Turkey’s domestic and foreign affairs.
which is located at the brink of the two continents and could, thus, create synergies.\textsuperscript{41} Cem argued in favour of the idea of a Turkey that would be able to become a global power by transcending regional boundaries, by making use of its multiple identities, its historical and cultural richness due to its cosmopolitan imperial Ottoman history, by creating positive linkages and rebuilding trust and friendship with neighbouring countries and societies, as well as by pursuing (ambitiously, but not obsessively)\textsuperscript{42} its commitment to become a member of the EU. In one of his assessments on Turkey’s acclaimed role in the future, Cem implicitly referred to Turkey’s position as a central power that had a mission to take responsibility as a global power:

This is how Turkey is embracing the 21\textsuperscript{st} century:\textsuperscript{43} In the aftermath of the Cold War, changing circumstances have bestowed upon Turkey a special responsibility to make active contributions to the preservation of regional and global peace and stability. Turkey is doing her best to live up to this historic task, with a clear vision for the future. There are two major objectives that drive our vision for the future. The first goal is to make Turkey an integral part of the European integration process. Historically, geographically and economically, Turkey is already a European country. It is therefore quite natural that she should become a full member of the European Union, sooner rather than later. [...] The second, but equally important goal, is to transform

\textsuperscript{41} On this and on the following see e.g. Cem, İsmail. Turkey: Setting Sail to the 21st Century. In: Perceptions, 1997, Vol 2, No. 3, pp.1-4; or Cem, İsmail. Turkey in the New Century: Speeches and Texts presented at International Fora (1995-2001). 2nd ed., Mersin, 2001. Quoting from one of Cem’s speeches, Yanik explains the ‘Neo-Ottoman’ spirit in Cem’s approach, which doesn’t sound unfamiliar to Federal President von Weizsäcker’s words on Germany’s responsibility to ‘assembly the peoples of Europe: “For Cem, Ottoman tolerance had been the key in the past and would be the key to reconcile all civilisations today and in the future. His new approach to foreign policymaking aimed to: ‘reconcile all civilizations that existed in our geography and history with each other and also with present-day Turkey. [...] The starting point of this approach is tolerance.” (Yanik, Lerna K. Bringing the Empire Back in. The Gradual Discovery of the Ottoman Empire in Turkish Foreign Policy. In: Die Welt des Islam, 2016, Vol. 56, pp. 466-488 (484).)

\textsuperscript{42} Cem argued that Turkey’s EU bid should not follow the traditional attitude of what Turkey would gain from EU accession, but it should rather try to give an added value to the EU. In this respect, he referred to Turkey as “a destination” rather than a “bridge”; see Cem, İsmail. Turkish Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons for Turkey at the Beginning of a New Millennium. In: Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2002, Vol 1, No. 1, pp.1-7 (4f.).
Turkey into a pivotal and prosperous country at the center of the vast geography we call Eurasia. [...] The political, economic and security initiatives Turkey has launched, which encompass diverse regions, will also be instrumental in attaining this target. A much stronger Turkey capable of creating a constantly growing zone of stability and welfare around her is certainly in everyone’s best interest. These two goals are not at all contradictory: in fact, they complement and reinforce one another. They are also realistic goals that Turkey can achieve by using her historical/cultural assets as an axis of her development. [...] I believe that Turkey has the will and the capacity to make this vision come true, and is, indeed, on a sound course towards becoming a truly ‘world state’ in the 21st century.43

While serving as Turkish foreign minister at the turn of the millennium, Cem was able to initiate steps to make his vision come true, for example, when Ankara after decades of strained and partly even hostile relations re-engaged with many of its neighbors such as Greece, Syria, Iraq, and Russia, or when it effectively tried to make sure that its long-term goal to become a fully integrated member of the EU was going to be achieved (despite the setback of the European Council summit of Luxembourg 1997, where Turkey’s candidacy status was rejected).44 Apart from that, Cem’s major impact on Turkish foreign policy making has been to prepare the discursive ground for the foreign policy discourse of the following AKP era.

This period (ongoing for the time of writing, as the AKP and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have been re-elected in the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections), was in foreign political terms and for its most part strongly influenced by the international relations scholar Ahmet Davutoğlu (b. 1959), who went into politics to serve at first as chief advisor for foreign policy to the successive AKP governments (2002-2009) and then as Foreign and Prime Minister between 2009 and 2016. From at least 2004 onward, Davutoğlu made public his vision of Turkey transforming into a ‘merkez ülke’, a ‘central country’ (or more appropriately translated as a central power), which makes use of its potentials to become a key player in regional and global politics. In his understanding – and thus similar to Cem’s vision – Turkey, due to its geographical position, its intra-regional historical and cultural embeddedness and its potentials in political, econo-

43 Ibid., pp. 3 f. and 6.
44 For an assessment on Cem’s term as Minister of Foreign Affairs see Örmeci, Ozan. Ismail Cem’s foreign policy (1997-2002). In: SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences, 2011, Vol. 23, pp. 223-245.
mic and social terms, could become a central power of unique significance for the surrounding regions as well as for the world.\textsuperscript{45} In one of his later assessments, Davutoğlu explains his vision of Turkey’s foreign political identity and potential in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. In his view, being a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it [= Turkey] may be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs.\textsuperscript{46}

According to Davutoğlu, in the past, the Turkish Republic had defined itself inappropriately in a “defensive manner,” not least due to the multitude of conflicts and crises that surrounded the country throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{47} He argued that Turkey’s citizens and the world needed to acknowledge that the country could not rest upon its traditional pillars, especially those that foster Turkey’s use for Western interests as a front state or bridge, as Turkey “occupies a center of attraction in its region […]”. In terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea coun-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{45} See Davutoğlu, Ahmet. Türkiye merkez ülke olmalı. In: Radikal, 26.02.2004, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/turkiye-merkez-ulke-olmali-702116/ [24.02.17]. In the following see also Davutoğlu, Ahmet. Turkey’ foreign policy vision: An assessment of 2007. In: Insight Turkey, 2008, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 78-96. Davutoğlu’s approach builds on his various streams of political philosophy and science concerning Turkish, Islamic, Western, and international political, cultural and social affairs, partly with an outspoken religious-conservative, with a geopolitical and Neo-Ottoman, with a liberal-economic, or with a critical-postcolonial notion. See also his monography that laid the historical and geopolitical analytical foundation of his ‘central power’ approach, Davutoğlu, Ahmet. Stratejik derinlik. Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu [Strategic depth. Turkey’s international position]. Istanbul, 2001. All receptions of Davutoğlu’s work so far missed out to analyze the notion of ‘central power’, which he stressed as Turkey’s ultimate goal: “[…] In this process, Turkey will face a responsibility to create a new and meaningful whole between historical depth and strategic depth and to make this whole vital in geographical depth. If Turkey can do this as a pivotal country, it will become a central country [merkez ülke] that realizes geopolitical, geo-cultural and geo-economic integration.” (Ibid., p. 563; translation: L.S.)
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Davutoğlu, ‘Turkey’ foreign policy vision, p. 78.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
As a consequence, Davutoğlu outlined the need for a Turkish foreign policy that incorporated the country’s central position:

Given this picture, Turkey should make its role of a peripheral country part of its past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighboring regions. Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs.

In order to accomplish the transformation to a central power, a comprehensive foreign policy strategy designed by Davutoğlu had been implemented by means of a multidimensional approach and new principles (such as a ‘zero problems with neighbours’, ‘360 degree diplomacy’, ‘equidistance’/ ‘open channels’ or the ability to talk with any country or actor in global politics, or ‘rhythmic diplomacy’) which decision-makers and diplomats should follow when conducting foreign policy. Furthermore, Davutoğlu urged that “the activities of civil society, business organizations, and numerous other organizations [should be] operating under the guidance of the new vision.” By doing so, he ultimately envisioned Turkey as “the rising actor in the region [that] will be sensitive to the concerns of other regional players.” In that respect, it would not only progress with its constructive relations with the US, the EU or Russia. Rather, Davutoğlu carried forward throughout his tenure in politics his vision that “[a]fter all, […] Turkey’s engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from EU to OIC will be part of a holistic approach to foreign policy. These initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish republic.”

48 Ibid., p. 78. In line with Cem, Davutoğlu rejects the metaphor of the ‘bridge’ or a ‘front state’ at the periphery of the ‘Western world’; see ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 79.
50 Ibid., p. 83.
51 Ibid., p. 96.
52 Ibid. Two means to institutionalize this ‘visionary’, ‘360 degree’ foreign political approach were to increase the numbers of Turkey’s missions (embassies, general consulates etc.) abroad, from 163 in 2002 to 237 in 2017 (in 241 locations; T.C. Dışişler Bakalığı. 2017 Yılı İdare Faaliyet Raporu. Ankara, 2017, p. XI); and, in parallel, to expand trade relations with numerous countries world-wide. On the latter aspect see Kirişçi, Kemal. The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State. In: New Perspectives on Turkey, 2009, Vol. 40, pp. 29-57.
5. The rise of Turkish central power – and its struggle against turmoil

During his term as chief foreign policy advisor and later as Foreign and Prime Minister from 2002 to 2016, Davutoğlu in numerous speeches, articles and occasions elaborated on his vision and mission of turning Turkey into a central power with global outlook by means of his strategic foreign policy making (frequently referred as the ‘Davutoğlu doctrine’ or ‘strategic depth doctrine’ in reference to his monography, but also often mistakenly reduced to the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ principle without emphasis on its overarching central power ambition).⁵³ Along with the achievements and successes of the successive AKP governments concerning domestic politics in terms of the realization of economic and political initiatives and reforms, the Turkish foreign policy underwent an extraordinary transformation during those years. Moreover, it can be claimed that the Davutoğlu doctrine gained a hegemonic position in the elite discourses on Turkish foreign policy,⁵⁴ and his conceptual approach to foreign policy making and practice had been well received by many observers and analysts (yet, definitely, not by all).⁵⁵

A selection of the major decisions taken, steps made, and successes accomplished can show the Turkish government’s adoption of a proactive, 360 degree diplomacy in line with this new foreign policy strategy:⁵⁶

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⁵³ Davutoğlu, Ahmet. Teoriden Pratige. Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar. İstanbul, 2014; see also İşiksal, Turkish foreign policy, 16ff.
⁵⁴ Evidence for this claim may be the observation that even the main opposition party’s concept for Turkey’s foreign policy made use of the notion of merkez ülke, see Konuralp, Okan. CHP Genel Başkanı Kılıçdaroğlu partisinin yeni vizyon projesini açıkladı. In: Hürriyet, 21.05.2015, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/chp-genel-baskani-kilicdarooglu-partisinin-yeni-vizyon-projesini-acikladi-29063183 [24.02.17]. Generally spoken, in the last 15 years no alternative concept for the Turkish foreign policy has received as much prominence as did the Davutoğlu doctrine.
⁵⁶ A detailed discussion on each of these aspects goes beyond the scope of this analysis. For comprehensive assessments of the successes as well as the failures of the Turkish foreign policy in the Davutoğlu tenure, see, beyond many others, Aras, Bülent. Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited. In: Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2014, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 404-418; Grigoriadis, Ioannis
- By shifting from the traditionally rigid policy paradigm on the Cyprus issue towards a more flexible stance regarding a final solution on the island in 2004, the AKP government speeded up the start of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations in 2005. Other catalysts of the kick-off of the negotiation process were the implementation of major democratic reforms concerning Turkey’s political system, the rule of law and human rights regime and the establishment of an adequate framework (including a pro-active stance on external trade) to support the country’s (neoliberal) economic boom;

- Ankara was able to keep the country closely aligned with the US (as reflected in Turkey’s active commitments to the UN/NATO mission in Afghanistan, then US-President Barack Obama’s speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 2009, or the creation of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which both countries launched under the UN umbrella in 2011) despite frictions in bilateral relations as a result of Washington’s ‘Global War on Terrorism’, or the US-led intervention in Iraq and its subsequent, destabilizing developments in Turkey’s neighbourhood (such as the misdescription of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria as part of the ‘axis of rogue states’ or the mismanagement of the transitional period in post-Saddam Iraq);

- Davutoğlu and the AKP undertook efforts to render the rapprochements with traditionally difficult neighbours such as Russia and Greece, Syria and the Arab countries sustainable, for example, by setting up high-level strategic cooperation formats with numerous governments, or by making use of a multi-vector, rhythmic and mediation/facilitation oriented diplomacy concerning regional disputes in the surrounding regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Near and Middle East, or in Afghanistan/Pakistan (Istanbul Process);

- Ankara has been increasingly able to create the image and geography-based narrative of Turkey as a crossroads of civilizations, as a trading state and a hub for travellers, logistics, or energy by massively investing both in public diplomacy and tourism as well as in the expansion of its airports, railway, ports and pipeline networks and by considering the
country’s participation in the New Silkroad Initiative, which aims at connecting trading and travelling routes between Europe and Asia;
• In addition, Turkey created the image of a member of the international community that assumes global responsibility, for example by co-founding the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ to counter global discourses of intercultural and interreligious hatred, by gaining for the first time in 50 years a non-permanent membership at the UN Security Council in 2009-2010, by entering the club of the twenty major economies (G20); by its role as a key actor in various international organizations and regimes as such as NATO, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative or the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States, or by initiating the first World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 along with receiving world-wide respect for its open-door policy towards refugees.57

Not only in light of this increasing pro-activism and appearance as a central power, but also with respect to its capacities and capabilities in terms of rhythmic and public diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, development aid and humanitarian assistance, the Turkish foreign policy under the influence and guidance of Davutoğlu did professionalize.58 In addition, the processes of Turkish foreign policy making were opened to business associations, civil society groups, academicians and the broad public in order to enhance the policy’s effectivity, transparency and democratic account-
ability. In general, Turkish foreign affairs in the Davutoğlu era changed tremendously and supported a perception of Turkey, at least until the so-called Arab uprisings of 2011, as a key player that could positively influence political, economic and social developments in its geographical surroundings. Turkey has more and more shown the face of a central power by taking over regional and global responsibilities as an active member of the UN, NATO, and the G20, and, thus, by managing international engagements or, using Schwarz’s term, Gestaltungsaufgaben, constructively.

Seen from today, however, it is well known that all things did not evolve as Davutoğlu wished. A major line of critique, both domestically and internationally, accused Davutoğlu of being either idealistic and naive, or a protagonist of a Neo-Ottomanist and Islamist agenda (he at least once seemed to prove that right, when he publically claimed for a renewed and glorious Ottoman influence over the Balkans in a speech in Sarajevo in 2009, which the audience openly criticized). But more importantly, although Turkey in many aspects was indeed able to increase its significance as a regional and global player, Turkish domestic and foreign policies of the 2010s became highly complex and vulnerable to both internal and external political, economic and social shocks. Already before the Arab Spring, Turkish foreign policy makers had been criticized for not succeeding with many of their initiatives, such as the mediation efforts between Israel and its neighbours or the reconciliation process with Armenia.


was blocked by the deadlocked dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the ‘One minute’ incident at the World Economic Forum in Davos 2009, when then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan refused to continue a debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres due to Israel’s war on Gaza 2008 - signifying a break with Davutoğlu’s ‘open channels’ principle - was followed by a deterioration of relations with Israel, culminating in the so called ‘Mavi Marmara incident’ in 2010, with normalization between both countries only to be achieved six years later.

Furthermore, Ankara’s ties with many capitals in the region and beyond got run over by developments in both international affairs and domestic politics throughout the 2010s. On the one hand, from 2011 onward various developments challenged the Turkish leadership’s political interests and ambitions as a central power, and, thus, resulted in misperceptions and miscalculations: So had Ankara’s hopes on Egypt quickly faded away, when the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt did not pursue a less ideological and confrontational course of action after the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011, but in 2013 had to face the Egyptian armed forces’ coup against then President Mohamed Morsi and the counter-revolution by field marshal and incumbent President Abdel-Fatah as-Sisi. Similarly in 2011, Davutoğlu and Erdoğan misread Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s evident intentions, as the latter finally refused to meet the people’s demands for reforms, but chose instead to fight for the survival of his regime by any means. Moreover, Ankara was increasingly accused of having made wrong decisions against its own foreign policy principles. For example, it abandoned the principle of equidistance and open channels, and broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt and Syria, but sided instead with the Muslim Brotherhood and Sunni rebel groups in the wake of the Arab uprisings, in general and the escalating warfare in Libya, Syria, Iraq, in particular. Or, most prominently, it had to realize its vulnerability from being in the centre of a multi-dimensional geopolitical theatre of conflict, when in 2015 Turkey had to face a severe deterioration of ties with Moscow and consecutive sanctions against its economy, after having shot down a Russian military jet at the side-lines of the conflict in Syria.

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62 On this and the following see Yeşilyurt, Nuri. Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective. In: All Azimuth, 2017, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 65-83.
In recent years, Turkey appeared to fall even further into a kind of political isolation as European and Western partners increasingly started to criticize the country’s course of domestic politics, which they considered to be running against Turkey’s commitment to liberal democratic norms and values. Following various incisive developments in domestic politics in recent years, such as the crack-down of the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul in 2013, Turkey’s refusal of military support to the Kurdish (alleged PKK-led) forces fighting the so-called Islamic State in Kobane in December 2014/2015, the re-escalation of the conflict between the state and separatist terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) since 2015, and especially the long process of the state of emergency in the wake of the averted military coup attempt of 15 July 2016, governments and observers in Europe and the West more and more openly condemned the deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, the freedom of media and opinion in the country. The Turkish leadership rejected all criticism as biased and malevolent, claiming especially a misunderstanding or even malice on behalf of the Europeans, who had not taken into consideration Turkey’s extraordinary insecurity, which the country had found itself in due to a multitude of risks stemming from terrorism and extremism. In this respect, the EU-wide dispute over the so-called ‘refugee deal’ between Ankara and Brussels (and Berlin), the European Parliament’s (EP) November 2016 call on the European Commission (EC) and the Council to suspend the accession talks with Ankara, the Council of Europe’s vote to monitor Turkey’s rule of law in 2016-2017, and the rhetorical exchange of hostilities between Ankara and several EU capitals during the referendum and election cam-

paigns in 2017 can be considered as signs of a dramatic shift in Turkey’s relations with Europe and EU member states, respectively.\(^66\)

In retrospective, Turkish foreign affairs between 2011 and 2016 seem to have fallen victim to turbulent developments in regional and domestic politics, exacerbating the identity crisis the country found itself in at a time when claims about Turkey’s isolation became more and more public\(^67\) – a situation resembling Schwarz’s warning about a central power that, instead of accepting self-limitation and trying to create win-win-situations, opts for an hegemonic stance in its international relations and, thus, encounters resistance. Furthermore, observers and analysts have been emphasizing the expectations-capabilities-gap in Turkish foreign policy, criticizing ideological biases as well as the abolishment of formerly successful principles such as equidistance, open channels and rhythmic diplomacy.\(^68\) And not few of them have, thus, been considering Davutoğlu’s foreign policy of his last years in office largely a failure, welcoming his ousting as prime minister in June 2016.\(^69\)

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66 See again the references in footnote 63.
With Davutoğlu’s diminishing and finally vanishing influence on Turkish foreign policy making and the public discourses about it, also the notion of Turkey as a central power has lost some of its strengths, yet without completely disappearing. However, it is increasingly being challenged by an (unofficial) discourse about Turkish foreign policy and identity which is marked by the old, but strong notion of self-consciousness, assertiveness, securitization, and even self-isolation. An example for this may be İbrahim Karagül, columnist and editor in chief of the conservative Yeni Şafak Daily, who in early 2017 expressed his understanding of Turkey as a central power by focusing on Turkey’s ‘well-known’, yet ‘not clearly defined’ internal and external enemies. As exemplified in the following quotation from one of his columns, he alters the concept’s original meaning by reaffirming Turkey’s apparent and unmediated leadership ambition. While even claiming that conflicts would result from Turkey’s rise, it could, however, overcome them by acting alone instead of opting for cooperative solutions:

[...] Turkey is a central power, it is now one of the primary countries in the global power domain; it is undergoing a very deep change and expanding its area of movement and rapidly becoming even stronger. This is leading to very serious conflicts. It is causing shifts of power, shrinking the area of movement of many countries and creating tensions between center countries. Because a new actor, a new center of attraction, a new power that will be a role model for its surrounding region is overwhelmingly gaining prominence. [...] A country’s awakening, rise, becoming a shining star, grabbing a central position in the world of the future and challenging to achieve this purpose, where necessary, frightens some and makes them anxious. [...] Turkey is now a country that is so active, knows itself and has drawn its own path that it cannot be condemned to a certain alignment or go under the control of a chain of alliance, let alone a certain country. [...]  


70 See again footnote 39.

Although this sort of securitizing discourse has been gaining ground in recent years, the former, more inclusive notion of the concept of central power is still - and despite ongoing disputes and conflicts in Turkish foreign policy - maybe again increasingly used in Turkish political circles. For example, it is reflected and declared publicly by policy makers such as Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:

Turkey’s basic foreign policy tenets such as: respect for international law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, active roles in international organizations and a focus on humanitarian diplomacy, remain unchanged. We intend to consolidate all of them [...] . Our NATO membership, our strategic relationship with the U.S., accession process to the EU, our friendship and cooperation with Russia and countless others, the 360-degree policy of promoting peace and cooperation in multiple geographies and our active engagement with global and regional or functional issues in key forums such as the G20, OIC and others, all derive from such tenets. [...] we will make an energetic effort to promote each of these fundamentals making use of various tools at our disposal [such as Turkey’s membership in international organizations and informal partnerships etc.; L.S.].

Thus, Turkey’s ambition to become a central power in conventional terms has not (yet) gone astray completely. The core idea of Turkey as a key player in the geopolitics of Europe and transatlantic relations, in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and beyond, as well as the notion of its regional and global responsibility remains in place in contemporary discourses on Turkish foreign policy. Yet, what can be seen from the two different statements illustrated above is that Turkey entered an identity crisis since the end of the ‘Davutoğlu era,’ and has not yet found a new solid ground, despite the growing discourse of ‘New Turkey’ since the 2017 referendum and the 2018 elections. This identity crisis challenges Turkey’s transformation into a central power in true terms, i.e. into a power that can ‘lead without being perceived as dominating,’ that can build sustainable bridges and partnerships, create win-win-situations and trigger stability and progress in its regional environment. It seems that in order to become a central power in conventional terms, and to unfold its full potential as

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ibrahimkaragul/july-15-was-going-to-be-the-start-of-world-war-iii-2034674 [each one 24.02.17]

such a central power, Turkey should invest more in trust-building mechanisms and modes of cooperation and conflict resolution as well as in the enhancement of the country’s democratic credentials and accountability.

6. Conclusion and outlook

The analysis of the evolution of the concept of ‘central power’ in the cases of German and Turkish foreign policy demonstrates first and foremost that the concept, although being widely ignored so far, may have implicitly or even explicitly been playing a key role in the making and practice of foreign policy in both countries since the mid-1990s. However, simply put, the notion of ‘central power’ also is what governments make of it.

In the German case, the concept was developed as a prototype by Hans-Peter Schwarz, an historian and well-respected scholar who - in contrast to Ahmet Davutoğlu who literally introduced the term to the Turkish case - did not pass over the boundary between academia and politics, and, thus, did not have any direct influence on the making of foreign policy in reunified Germany. The concept, hence, has rather indirectly and in a bottom-up manner inspired and influenced German policy-makers and opinion-shapers only occasionally at a time, when the *Zeitgeist* of multiple crises was apparently calling for a conceptual framework that could serve as an orientation guide and benchmark for the making of German foreign policy under critical conditions. At times of turmoil, such as with the Eurozone crisis, the conflict in Ukraine, or the refugee crisis, Schwarz’s concept was re-invoked as a prototype for analysis and as a normative framework that calls for a German foreign policy that is both more active and assertive as well as aware of the country’s peculiar responsibility towards the European political order and stability. Because of its demographic, economic, social and cultural capabilities, and due to its geographic and geopolitical location in the centre of Europe, Germany plays a special role that can easily turn into a hegemonic, dominating one. Yet as a protagonist of the European integration process, a key partner in the transatlantic alliance and as a *Gestaltungsmacht* of the global order based on multilateralism and institutionalism, Berlin – at least in the eyes of mainstream policy-makers and observers – should always be able to balance its hegemonic tendencies with a strong commitment to collective interests and constructive engagement, both within Europe and beyond. Official documents and guidelines as well as the mainstream public discourse on German foreign and security policy reflect the country’s identity as a central power, indicating Berlin’s awareness about the country’s responsibility to consult with and to cooper-
ate with partners, neighbours and friends. However, at times of increasing complexity, insecurity, conflicts and crisis, it is still challenging for Germany to ‘lead, without being perceived as dominating’ and to remain committed to partnership and solidarity. In this respect, Schwarz’s perception of Germany as a Zentralmacht is likely to serve as a concept that will inspire German foreign policy making in the foreseeable future – not only, but first and foremost, due to its commitment to constructive engagement and credible partnership.

In the case of Turkey, on the other hand, the concept of the central power underwent a less ‘smooth’ evolution in the country’s political discourse. The concept was put forward top-down into the making of Turkish foreign policy by two prominent policy-makers, İsmail Cem and Ahmet Davutoğlu. Their strategic intention was, firstly, to formulate a new, active and geopolitically encompassing Turkish foreign policy approach which should be different from the old static foreign policy approach, which fulfilled mainly the needs of Turkey’s Western allies, but limited Turkey’s own capabilities in regional and global affairs. Their new approach was supposed to challenge the traditional, passive and Western-oriented Turkish foreign policy making, to serve Turkey’s interests in the 21st century and to enhance Turkey’s position in the international arena as a ‘merkez ülke’. As such, the concept implied a strong normative and strategic notion on Turkish foreign policy making and performance from the very beginning.

As such, during Davutoğlu’s tenure as AKP foreign policy advisor and Foreign and Prime Minister (2002-2016) the concept of central power became the core aspect and the ultimate aim of his and the successive AKP governments’ foreign policy at least until 2013. Similar to the concept’s understanding in the German proto-case, Ankara’s foreign policy was designed to correspond with and make use of the country’s to be developed hard-, soft- and smart power-capacities and capabilities in the realm of inter- and transnational politics. The aim was to sharpen Turkey’s profile as an active, engaging and problem-solving actor, who takes responsibility by enhancing partnerships and seeks to provide order, stability, and security for itself and its vast geographical surrounding. In addition, governments in Turkey as well as in Germany most of the time have been rather (but not always) cautious about pushing forward with hegemonistic rhetoric that could provoke irritations or even hostile reactions. Despite many setbacks when trying to implement the central power-aimed foreign policy strategy and despite the fact that the concept is challenged by old, securitizing narratives of Turkish foreign policy identity, which paradoxically favour both leadership and self-isolation, it has become obvious in this analysis that the
concept has gained much prominence in the Turkish foreign political discourse and can still, after Davutoğlu’s departure from politics, be considered an implicit guiding concept for Turkish foreign policy making.

To sum up, the examples of Germany since the 1990s and Turkey before and during the AKP era show conceptual similarities as well as differences in terms of the conceptualization and foreign political application of the concept of central power. For future research, a more nuanced comparative analysis of these and other cases would enhance the concept’s characteristics and applicability. But essentially, if properly understood in accordance with Schwarz’s prototype, the concept may not only offer a sound interpretivist approach to empirical research on foreign policy identities and performances; but it may also provide orientation and lay the foundations for a foreign policy strategy that meets the needs of today’s challenging global politics as it normatively calls for a country’s leadership by appealing to its responsibility and social embeddedness as a member of the international community and as a key player in regional and global affairs.

Ludwig Schulz
Germany’s Domesticated European Policy: Implications for the EU and Turkey

Ebru Turhan

1. Introduction

German power and influence in the European Union (EU) have long been serving as hot topics for academic, political, economic and public discussions in Europe. Germany’s central and steadily evolving role in the European integration process has been a key raison d’être for the study of its influence in the Union. Germany served as a leading actor in the kick-off of the supranational integration process in Europe, in general, and the construction of a sui generis modus operandi for the EU with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), in particular. In consideration of Germany’s post-war rapid recovery, European and (particularly) French political circles found it convenient and necessary to benefit from the resurgent German power within a multilateral context and control it through political and institutionalized structures, at the same time, which brought forth the launch of the European integration process. Morisse-Schilbach argues that Germany’s taming at that time became possible through its anchorage to “its European partners through the intermediary of international institutions. At the same time, it also became clear to


European leaders that the only way to benefit from these close linkages to former enemy Germany was – paradoxically – to let it become strong and powerful once again (in economic terms).\(^3\)

Today, German economic power represents only one (important) aspect of Germany’s “aggregate structural power”, which concerns “a state’s total amount of resources and capabilities.”\(^4\) Other components such as its population, its central geographic location in Europe, the administrative capacities of its public sector\(^5\) accompanied by its export-oriented economic model, technology-based exports\(^6\) as well as its military strength and contribution to the EU’s civilian and military missions undertaken within the framework of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)\(^7\) help Germany exercise considerable influence within the EU institutions and decision-making processes by means of its European policy. Germany’s European policy could be broadly described as “Germany’s approach to European integration within the EU and to European relationships more broadly.”\(^8\) Thus, German European policy primarily deals with Germany’s both attitude towards and influence in addressing challenges and potentials for (further) policy coordination at the supranational level. Then again, taking into account the steadily increasing interdependence between Germany/the EU and non-member states, and consequently, the blurring of boundaries between foreign and domestic affairs, Germany’s European policy also concerns the development of relationships with third countries located in Europe or its immediate neighbourhood to minimize likely negative externalities for Germany / the EU.

In recent years, the multiple and complex crises the EU and its member states challenged with, inter alia, the Eurozone and the refugee crises and the Brexit process, have led to even increased focus on the making and key

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\(^7\) For instance Germany is one of the five member states that declared that their national Operations Headquarters (OHQ) serve as OHQ for autonomous EU operations. See for details, Glume, Gaia. Chain of command – command and control for CSDP engagement. In: Jochen Rehrl/ Galia Glume (Eds.). Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations. 2015, Vienna, p. 33.

parameters of Germany’s European policy as well as on the implications of the changes and continuities in Germany’s European policy for European integration process. It has been argued that in the crisis eras as a result of its aggregate structural power accompanied by a leadership vacuum at the EU level Germany was “pushed somewhat reluctantly centre stage to become Europe’s reluctant hegemon”\(^9\), thus, taking on a new leadership role within the EU through a revised European policy. As a result of her readiness to take unilateral actions and push forward the finalization of EU-wide policy coordination German Chancellor Angela Merkel was described as “Europe’s conscience and leader”\(^10\) and as “EU power-broker.”\(^11\) Throughout the crisis eras, the German Chancellor was also called “the Iron Chancellor”\(^12\) or “Frau Germania”\(^13\) in view of her strong efforts to defend the national interests and preferences.

How did Germany’s European policy evolve over time? What have been the major implications of important U-turns in the making and key parameters of Germany’s European policy for European integration process, in general, and Turkey-EU relations in particular? In an attempt to answer these questions, this study establishes a direct linkage between Germany’s European policy and German influence in the EU and focuses on the two crises, which acted as litmus tests for the future of the European project: the Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis. Following this introductory part, the second part of the paper examines the evolution of Germany’s European policy and German influence in the EU by focusing on the time period covering post-World War II through Gerhard Schröder’s term in office as chancellor in order to illustrate major shifts and the emergence of new trends in the making of Germany’s European policy and German influence in the EU. Hereby the paper identifies above all the rise of a particu-
larly significant and visible trend: the gradual domestication of German European policy making. Focusing on the domestication trend it then analyses the construction and key parameters of Germany’s European policy throughout the Eurozone and refugee crises and their implications for the EU-Turkey dialogue. The final part of the study summarizes the findings of the previous chapters and provides an outlook on the likely impact of Germany’s European policy on Turkey’s relationship with the EU in the future.

2. Evolution of Germany’s European policy and German influence in the EU

Germany’s European policy and the metamorphosis of German influence in the EU have been tremendously discussed in academic, political and public spheres. A solid connection exists between Germany’s European policy and its influence in the EU considering “one of the key determinants of the future character and functioning of the EU is German Europa-politik (European policy).”14 Thus, as Germany’s European policy evolves, so too do its actorness within the EU and the key parameters of the EU’s policies vis-à-vis third countries located in Europe or its immediate periphery. The metamorphosis of German impact in the EU as a result of evolving key parameters and principles of its European policy has evolved in four distinct periods enabling a transition from “reflexive multilateralism” to “normalization” to “partial unilateralism”: the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany; German reunification; Gerhard Schröder’s term as Chancellor and the outbreak and management of the Eurozone crisis.15

In the post-World War II era, the newly established Federal Republic started to function based on both internal and external restraints. Its temporary occupation by the Allied Powers and its decentralized institutional architecture culminated in Germany’s portrayal as a “semi-sovereign”16 or

“pre-sovereign” state. These limits of Germany’s sovereignty accompanied by Europe’s partial distrust in post-war German influence in the EU fostered Germany’s “foundational commitment to European integration” and its sense for “reflexive multilateralism”, which could be defined as Germany’s pledge for shared European goals and the subordination of Germany’s national interests. Germany acted in concert within a multilateral context, and mostly, in close cooperation with France. Still the Franco-German tandem functioned quite different when compared with recent times as it enabled a partnership where France served for a while as the dominant partner. This approach also provided the EU with institutional solutions derived from the German model. Paterson observes that “[…] As the Federal Republic consolidated itself it began to feel confident enough to launch initiatives and eventually to export its own institutional models to the European level.”

After the German reunification Germany’s aggregate capabilities were fostered by the additional population, and strategic geographical location. However, Germany did not immediately change the main parameters of its European policy. It maintained its pledge for multilateralism and European integration process, and the established modus operandi of the Franco-German partnership continued. Unified Germany did not go “back to the future” becoming a “tamed power” that maintained its commitment to multilateralism and European integration as well as to the traditional pattern of the Franco-German alliance.

Next to persistent dedication to multilateralism, the post-reunification era witnessed the rise of a new development, the “domestication” of Germany’s European policy, which could be described as domestic actors’ increasing interest in / impact on the formulation of foreign policies. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty transferred various competences of the member states to the supranational level. The advanced steps in the process of European integration warned societal actors about the negative externalities which were likely to arise from increased interdependence and enhanced policy coordination at the EU level. Accordingly, domestic actors started to call for greater involvement in the making of Germany’s European policy. As a result of increased pressure from German Länder (states), the Article 23 of the Basic Law was revised to safeguard Länder’s contribution to EU policy-making in policy areas which fall within their legislative competences. Furthermore, the active contribution of the Bundestag (German federal parliament) to the formation of key EU decisions was ensured by a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).

Gerhard Schröder’s term as Chancellor, from 1998 to 2005, bolstered the domestication of Germany’s European policy. Schröder proclaimed a “new normality” in Germany’s dialogue with the world - a motto he used during and after the 1998 election campaign. The principle of “new normality” founded Germany’s foreign policy parameters predominantly on the pursuit of national interests and a stronger representation of the preferences of dominant societal actors such as German industry in Brussels. The increasing domestication of Germany’s European policy was particularly reflected in the formation of the Schröder government’s Russia policy in accordance with specific business interests, and Schröder’s efforts to delay the EU Directive on End-of-Life Vehicles in order to safeguard the interests and preferences of the key representatives of the German car industry.

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3. The Eurozone crisis, domestic politics, Germany’s constrained European and Turkey policies

The Eurozone crisis, which broke out in late 2009 and greatly affected most of the European economies, amplified the already existing asymmetrical interdependence between Germany and the rest of Europe directing the attention to Germany’s European policy in the crisis era. Throughout the Eurozone crisis, Germany had preserved trade surpluses rather than trade deficits in contrast to many European countries.28 Between 2005 and 2012, Germany’s unemployment rate had steadily declined from 11.1 percent in 2005 to 6.7 percent in 201229, while its economy had grown on average by 2.1 percent between 2010 and 2013.30 Accordingly, European political circles expected a German leadership that would settle for “transfers of resources – and, if necessary, of power – required to sustain the long-term viability of the European integration project.”31

The Angela Merkel government failed to accommodate the European anticipations by attaching tough conditions to German aid and managing the crisis with a readiness for Alleingang (solo actions). German readiness for Alleingang had been evident in unilateral actions such as the refusal of debt mutualisation in the EU with the introduction of Eurobonds and the bolstering of domestic spending in insolvent countries, its initial reluctance to contribute to a € 750 billion aid package before having set precise rules for financial help and integrated the International Monetary Fund (IMF) into the troika of creditors, and unilateral statements such as “Greece shouldn’t have been allowed into the Euro.”32 In doing so, the German federal government contradicted with the governments of the other three major Eurozone states, France, Italy and Spain, who demanded the Europeanization of sovereign debt and easy access to additional liquidity

32 The Telegraph. Angela Merkel: Greece should never have been allowed into the euro, 27 August 2013.
under minor conditionality. Germany’s controversial role in the crisis culminated in its portrayal as a “reluctant hegemon” that gave precedence to domestic considerations over unconditional dedication to the European project, or a power that started to lose its “benign hegemon” status.

A closer look at the domestic politics of Germany’s European policy discloses the key determinants of strict German conditionality throughout the crisis era and points to increased domestication of Germany’s European policy with enhanced interest shown by domestic actors in the pursuit of their interests and preferences. Following the emergence of the crisis the FCC rose as the leading actor in the assessment of the compatibility of EU-wide policy coordination with the German Basic Law and national sovereignty. The court addressed these issues particularly in its 2011, 2012 and 2014 decisions regarding the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and its successor the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which has been financing bailouts of member states since September 2012. The rulings upheld the legitimacy of these mechanisms, while demanding a clear description of aid packages, limiting the volume of national liabilities to €190 billion, and ordering the German government to get approval from the parliamentary budget committee for Germany’s participation in future bailout funds. The possibility of negative rulings by the FCC over the legality of bailout mechanisms became a great concern both in other European countries and Germany, and constrained the policy options of the German federal government.

German public opinion’s increasing distrust in the institutions of the EU and supranational efforts to solve the crisis also imposed restraints on Berlin’s room for manoeuvre. According to the Spring 2012 Eurobarometer survey, 61 percent of Germans distrusted the EU and 58 percent be-

37 Alexander, Harriet. German Constitutional Court hearing will be day of judgment for the euro. In: Telegraph, 8 September, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9530291/German-Constitutional-Court-hearing-will-be-day-of-judgement-for-the-euro.html [05.08.2018].

150
lieved that the EU had not acted effectively in its battle against the crisis. Public concerns over the handling of the crisis through interstate policy coordination at the supranational level have been reinforced by the call of many member states for policies that would encourage domestic spending for the vitalization of struggling economies - an approach contradictory to mainstream German vision of budget consolidation through less government spending and increased taxes. According to the 2013 survey of the PEW Research Centre, 67 percent of Germans believed that the best way to solve economic problems was the reduction of the public debt. Increasing public distrust in the progression of the European project was reflected in the success of the Eurosceptic political party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), at the 2013 federal elections. AfD was formed only seven months prior to the elections. The party surprisingly won 4.7 percent of the vote and just fell short of holding parliamentary seats by a very slight margin. The public distrust in the Eurozone’s crisis management accompanied by the Eurosceptic political landscape reinforced German conditionality on the realization of supranational policy coordination to steer the crisis.

In the crisis era, key representatives of the German business world did also not refrain from openly declaring their preferences concerning the handling of the crisis. Markus Kerber, Chief Executive of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), stated, for instance, “The Federal government should stick to its philosophy: no service without service in return.” In a similar vein, the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) argued in a position paper that the crisis could only be solved, if the Eurozone members were to reduce their debt levels and enhance their competitiveness - an argument that was wholeheartedly endorsed by the German federal government. German government’s stance towards the crisis has been in line with the expectations and preferences of the German business world. When German media seized on a report in October 2013 which claimed that Germany’s wealthy Quandt family, a ma-

38 European Commission. Standard Barometer 77. Spring 2012, p. 92
39 Dullien, Sebastian/ Guerot, Ulrike. The Shadow of Ordoliberalism: Germany’s Approach to the Euro Crisis. ECFR Policy Brief, September 2012, p. 3.
major shareholder in BMW, had donated €690,000 to Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), a family spokesperson justified this donation with “the very successful effort of the chancellor in resolving the Eurozone crisis.”

The Eurozone crisis thus fostered the domestication of Germany’s European policy. In view of negative policy externalities that were likely to arise from enhanced policy coordination at the supranational level in response to the Eurozone crisis, societal actors such as the FCC, public opinion and the business world defined their preferences and interests precisely. The crisis provided a window of opportunity for domestic constituency to determine the content and boundaries of Germany’s European policy, making Germany and Chancellor Merkel a ‘constrained leader’ in the EU. With that being said, a constrained German European policy driven by the preferences of societal actors boosted Chancellor Merkel’s popularity. At the peak of the crisis, 70 percent of Germans felt Merkel was the best person to save the Euro.

With the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, Germany’s Turkey policy became also increasingly domesticated and was influenced by domestic factors and actors. As already discussed in the Chapter 2 of this edited volume, the German federal government suddenly took a positive stance toward the opening of a new chapter, Chapter 22, in Turkey’s accession talks with the EU following the arrival of the negative externalities of the Eurozone crisis in Germany early 2013. The German call for the acceleration of Turkish accession process came during an official visit to Turkey accompanied by a high-level business delegation and at a time when key representatives of the German business world demonstrated a positive attitude towards the acceleration of the accession process in view of their efforts to enhance the economic dialogue with Turkey.

The domestication of Germany’s Turkey policy accompanied by Germany’s readiness for Alleingang in order to satisfy domestic constituency was particularly reflected in another sudden shift in German position on Turkey’s EU bid in early June


2013, when ahead of the upcoming federal elections the Merkel government suddenly put a unilateral veto on the opening of Chapter 22, which was only supported by the Netherlands and Austria and represented a contrast to the position of the remaining member states. The domestication of Germany’s Turkey policy ahead of the federal elections and the subsequent unilateral actions of the German government was criticized by Sweden’s former Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, as follows: “German elections are a good thing, but it cannot be an excuse to postpone everything else in Europe.”

4. The refugee crisis, Germany’s European policy and the making of the EU-Turkey “deal”

Following the wane of the Eurozone crisis, the exacerbation of the European refugee crisis in late spring 2015 as a result of the extraordinary influx of refugees particularly from Syria to Europe in light of the increasing violence and turbulence in Syria directed one more time Europe-wide attention to official German position on the management of another EU-wide crisis. The Syrian refugee crisis had in fact started off as a crisis of the European periphery and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in late spring 2011 with Syrians finding refuge in neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan and remained largely a “Middle Eastern” crisis until the summer of 2015. While in 2014 there were approximately 128,000 Syrian applicants for international protection in EU member states, Syria’s neighbours Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt had accepted more than 3.8 million Syrian refugees as of December 2014. However, with the Syrian refugees increasingly leaving the coun-

tries neighbouring Syria to seek safe heaven on EU soil despite long and dangerous journeys culminated in the transformation of the crisis gradually into a European one. Following the death of almost 850 Syrian refugees as a result of the shipwreck off the Italian island of Lampedusa on 19 April 2015, the term "European migrant crisis" has been increasingly integrated to the statements and analyses of the European political, academic and media circles.\textsuperscript{51} Whereas the EU attempted to manage the crisis initially with the adoption and application of collective measures, the very little interest shown by many member states in the implementation of collective commitments brought along an authority vacuum about the management of Europe’s refugee crisis. This authority vacuum was later filled by Germany and a similar situation to that of the Eurozone crisis emerged in the European political landscape.

Following Lampedusa incident the European Council held an extraordinary meeting on 23 April 2015 in Brussels, where it endorsed the commitment of all member states to reinforce their presence at the sea for preventive measures and establish a voluntary project on resettlement with the aim to relieve the burden on the shoulders of frontline member states such as Italy and Greece.\textsuperscript{52} Likewise, the ordinary 25-26 June 2015 European Council endorsed its commitment to accomplish temporary and exceptional relocation from frontline member states to other EU countries within the next two years and to grant additional financial aid to the frontline countries.\textsuperscript{53} The temporary relocation system endorsed by the European Council aimed at the temporary put-down of the Dublin System, which highlights that refugees are obliged to seek asylum from the first EU member state they arrive at, and arranged the distribution of refugees on the basis of the member states’ aggregate structural capacities such as their GDP, unemployment rate and population.\textsuperscript{54} However, despite these European Council conclusions and the succeeding resolutions of the Council concerning the relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers only few countries then

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{51} Anghel, Suzana Elena/ Drachenberg, Ralf/ Finance, Stanislas de. The European Council and crisis management. 2016, Brussels.
\end{thebibliography}
acted in line with the commitments made. Alongside the EU-wide lack of desire for burden-sharing regarding the redistribution of asylum seekers, the Hungarian announcement of July 2015 to launch the construction of a border fence to stop the flow of refugees hinted at the EU’s inability to set a common policy on asylum and the ineffectiveness of the Dublin System as it placed “a disproportionate amount of pressure on frontline EU member states holding the common EU external land and sea borders.”

4.1 German Alleingang, the domestication of the refugee crisis and Germany’s constrained leadership in the EU

German readiness for Alleingang did once again emerge as a result of the EU’s incapability to set joint minimum standards accompanied by the lack of member states’ commitment to relocation, and reflected in Germany’s unilateral suspension of the Dublin regulations for the Syrian refugees in the summer of 2015. With this suspension Berlin refrained from its right to send back Syrian refugees who crossed to Germany from frontline member states. With such move, Germany aimed at a) easing the dramatic situation of the Syrian refugees; b) bypassing the tiresome and mostly Sisyphean Dublin procedure; and c) enhancing solidarity among the member states and encouraging the implementation of the commitments related to relocation. However, Germany’s unilateral action did neither culminate in the improvement of EU-wide commitment to relocation, nor did it foster the harmonization of asylum policies between different member states. By the end of November 2015, only 184 asylum seekers were relocated from Greece and Italy to other member states, which

55 Ibid. p. 13.
could not be regarded as a success considering the preliminary target of 160,000. The EU-wide differentiated approach to the management of the refugee crisis was further fostered in September 2015 when the Hungarian government decided to close its border with Serbia stopping the flow of Syrian refugees into the EU for international protection which greatly conflicted with the Schengen regulations.  

Next to the EU-level controversy over the management of the refugee crisis and consequently the emergence of an authority vacuum within the EU, the domestic considerations led to further unilateral actions of the German federal government. Germany’s decision to unilaterally abandon its rights stemming from the Dublin System, coupled with its economic power turned it into the top destination for Syrian refugees with around 160,000 having arrived just in August 2015, 230,000 in September 2015 and 180,000 in October 2015. On 14 September 2015 then Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel stated that Germany was likely to take in around 1 million Syrian refugees exceeding the previous forecasts. The unprecedented flow of Syrian refugees to Germany accompanied by the majority of the European states’ hesitance to apply an open-door policy greatly decreased the popularity of Chancellor Merkel in the eyes of the German public opinion, at a time when Germany had been moving towards elections in three German federal states in March 2016 and a federal election in September 2017. According to the November 2015 opinion poll ZDF-Politbarometer, 52 percent of all Germans disapproved Merkel’s migration policies, while in the eyes of the German public opinion Merkel came after then Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble and then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in terms of popularity. Merkel’s attitude towards the management of the refugee crisis also attracted heavy crit-

60 Ibid.
63 Tagesspiegel. Drei Millionen weitere Flüchtlinge bis 2017, 600,000 allein im Winter, 5 October 2015.
icism from the key representatives of her CDU. Around 130 party officials and politicians of the CDU signed an open-letter that starkly criticized Merkel’s open-door policy vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees.66

Merkel’s decreasing domestic popularity was also accompanied by a diminishing approval rate for her CDU. According to a Forsa poll CDU’s approval rate by domestic constituency had decreased from 43 percent to 36 percent between August 2015 and November 2015.67 During this period, Germany’s anti-immigrant political party AfD had nearly tripled its votes from 3 percent to 8 percent.68 The speed at which CDU lost a remarkable part of its voters to AfD, a party that organized mass protests against the increasing number of refugees in Germany, was mainly attributed to the Merkel way of dealing with the migration crisis. Close observers of German domestic politics even claimed that it was going to be extremely difficult for the German Chancellor “to survive another year if immigration continues at 2015 levels.”69 Merkel’s and her party’s room for political manoeuvre was further constrained by the clear preferences and statements of another key domestic actor, the German business world. Leading representatives of the German business world particularly put emphasis on the economic consequences of Merkel’s open-door policy by means of public statements and press releases. Hans-Werner Sinn, the renowned then president of the Ifo Institute, one of Germany’s leading economic think-tanks, had doubled the cost estimate for the accommodation of Syrian refugees in Germany from €10 billion to €21.1 billion.70 In a similar vein, according to the Cologne Institute for Economic Research (IW), a research institute closely connected to the BDI, leading lobbying organization of the German industry, the social benefits for the Syrian refugees in 2016 were going to equal around 50 percent of the so-called Hartz IV unemployment bene-

68 Ibid.
fits for the German citizens.\textsuperscript{71} Likewise, Ulrich Grillo, the President of the influential BDI, stated that Germany was experiencing an uncontrolled refugee flow and had to deliberate on the ways to redirect the flow and integrate the refugees it already hosted into the society.\textsuperscript{72}

The brief analysis demonstrates that the refugee crisis and German federal government’s temporary open-door policy vis-à-vis the refugees further fuelled the domestication trend in the making of Germany’s European policy. In view of the negative externalities that were likely to arise from the refugee crisis, the lack of an EU-wide approach and Germany’s consequent open-door policy, key societal actors defined their preferences and interests precisely constraining the policy options of the German government, in general, and of Chancellor Merkel, in particular. In view of negative externalities that were expected to emerge from remarkable and incalculable flow of refugees Germany societal actors paid particular attention to German government’s actions in regard to this issue. This made Germany a “constrained leader” in Europe in efforts to find an alternative solution for the refugee crisis and to finalize an EU-Turkey “deal” to steer the flow of irregular migration.

\section*{4.2 German influence in the making of the EU-Turkey refugee “deal”}

Following the exacerbation of the war in Syria the so-called “Aegean route” between Turkey and Greece served as the main gate to the EU for refugees from Syria and Turkey accordingly became a key actor in the handling of the crisis outside the borders of the EU and its member states. In view of the EU’s inability to agree on a common approach towards the management of migration flows and the situation of already existing refugees within its borders Merkel shifted her attention to Turkey for the management of the crisis outside the borders of the EU. On 7 October 2015 during a speech at the European Parliament (EP) Merkel called the EU-Turkish partnership a necessity for the successful handling of the refugee crisis.\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{72} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}

158
Merkel then put particular emphasis on the creation of a “reward mechanism” for Turkey in exchange for Ankara’s possible collaboration with the EU and unilaterally declared the EU’s intention to accelerate Turkish accession process with the opening of new negotiation chapters in the aftermath of a European Council meeting held in mid-October 2015. The sudden shift in Merkel’s position on Turkey’s EU bid came as a surprise as only a week ago she had publicly emphasized her objections to Turkey’s full membership in the Union. Merkel’s change of mind in relation to Turkish accession to the EU occurred exactly three days ahead of her visit to Turkey. During bilateral talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, she discussed the framework of and conditions for EU-Turkey cooperation on the management of the refugee crisis, and echoed her support for the re-energization of Turkey’s EU accession process.

After her Turkey visit Merkel played the leading role in the identification of the scope and conditions of EU-Turkey collaboration on the management of the refugee crisis and the “reward package” that was going to be provided to Turkey in exchange for its cooperation on the issue. Ahead of the 29 November 2015 EU-Turkey Summit, which activated a joint action plan on the management of the irregular migration flows and defined the key elements of the “reward package”, Merkel held various bilateral and minilateral meetings. Merkel a) met with the President of the EC, Jean Claude Juncker and Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades in order to discuss possible negotiation chapters that could be opened in Turkey’s accession talks with the EU; b) summoned a mini-EU Summit with the lead-

78 Jansen, Michael. Cyprus gets assurances on Turkey from EU leaders. In: The Irish Times, 23 October 2015.
ers of the “Balkan route” member states and the non-EU “Balkan route” states on 25 October 2015 to agree on a plan to stop the influx of refugees. During the mini-summit the German Chancellor emphasized Turkey’s strategic importance for the management of the refugee crisis, as follows: “Cooperation with Turkey is the only way to succeed in making illegality legal and to share the burden better between Turkey and Europe”79 and c) met with President Erdoğan, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Antalya on 16 November 2015 and discussed above all the conditions of the EU-Turkey cooperation.

The EU-Turkey Summit of 29 November activated a joint action plan on the management of irregular migration and approved the launch of accession talks on Chapter 17 related to economic and monetary policy in accordance with the initial agreement between Merkel and Anastasiades. The bilateral summit furthermore endorsed the initiation of regular bilateral summits twice a year, the supply of a €3 billion financial aid for helping Turkey hosting the Syrian refugees and the launch of high-level political and economic dialogue mechanisms between both parties.80 German Chancellor’s key role in the formulation of the conclusions of the 29 November EU-Turkey Summit was also reflected in the statement of then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who thanked ahead of the summit to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, Juncker and Merkel for their “attitude open to cooperation.”81

The conclusions of the 29 November 2015 EU-Turkey Summit were revised by the bilateral statement announced following the 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey Summit82, which partially redefined the scope and conditions of EU-Turkey cooperation on the management of the refugee crisis and moderately amended the “reward package” granted to Turkey. The revised scope and rewards of the collaboration were largely formed by Berlin through various closed-door meetings with relevant stakeholders. Between December 2015 and 18 March 2016, Chancellor Merkel

80 European Council. Meeting of Heads of State or Government with Turkey – EU-Turkey Statement, 29 November 2015.
a) consulted with then Prime Minister Davutoğlu on 17 December 2015 during a mini-summit on migration in Brussels and met him again on 22 January 2016 within the framework of the very first German-Turkish intergovernmental consultations as well as on 8 February 2016 during her visit to Turkey in order to discuss the ultimate framework of the EU-Turkey “deal” on the management of the refugee flows;

b) met with then French President François Hollande on 4 March 2016 in Paris, where both leaders declared consensus as to how to deal with the refugee crisis. On the same day, Tusk paid a visit to Ankara, where he held talks with President Erdoğan and stated that, for the first time, a “European consensus” was emerging over the methodology to handle the crisis;83

c) convened a trilateral meeting together with Davutoğlu and Mark Rutte, Head of the then Dutch Presidency of the Council, on 6 March 2016 to prepare some amendments to the draft deal between Turkey and the EU ahead of the EU-Turkey Summit of 7 March 2016;84

The trilateral proposal of 6 March 2016 incorporated an additional €3 billion aid package for Turkey, the initiation of visa-free regime for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016 instead of October 2016, the take-off of talks on chapters unilaterally frozen by Cyprus and the resettlement of one Syrian refugee in the EU for every Syrian refugee being returned to Turkey from the EU.85 One aspect of the trilateral proposal, the opening of chapters unilaterally frozen by the Greek Cypriot government, attracted heavy criticism from Cyprus, which led to a minor reshaping of the 6 March trilateral proposal after the 7 March Summit that ended without any deal. The trilateral proposal, which was strongly backed by the German federal government and included the opening of accession chapters frozen by Cyprus (such as Chapters 23 and 24),86 was to a great extent endorsed by the EU-Turkey Summit of 18 March 2016 with an EU-Turkey Statement

which was later labelled by political, academic and media circles as the EU-Turkey refugee “deal”. The summit did not approve the opening of chapters unilaterally blocked by Cyprus while endorsing the launch of talks on Chapter 33 related to financial and budgetary provisions – a chapter previously blocked by France – and favouring the remaining elements of the trilateral proposal of 6 March.

5. Conclusion: a constrained leader’s constrained European and Turkey policies

The making of Germany’s European policy has become increasingly domesticated with the progression of the European integration process and, consequently, with competence transfer from the national to the EU level and increased policy coordination at the supranational level. Specifically, various domestic actors in Germany started to thoroughly evaluate the consequences of steps towards further integration in the EU for the pursuit of their interests. In this vein, they started to identify their preferences more accurately and constrain the policy options of successive German governments. The analysis has demonstrated that the domestication of Germany’s European policy particularly intensified throughout crisis eras in Europe when key societal actors shifted their attention more than ever towards negative externalities that were likely to happen as a result of enhanced policy coordination at the supranational level or that were likely to emerge as direct implications of external developments for domestic economic, political and societal landscapes. The domestication of Germany’s European policy accompanied by Germany’s gradually evolving aggregate structural capabilities and the existence of a power vacuum within the Union throughout crisis eras fostered also the emergence of another trend in German foreign policy-making, namely, German readiness for Alleingang (solo actions) in accordance with national interests.

Throughout the Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis the increasing domestication of Germany’s European policy making was reflected in regular statements and announcements made by key domestic actors, public opinion polls and the German government’s subsequent adoption of policies consistent with the demands and interests of the above mentioned actors. The Eurozone and refugee crises provided a window of opportunity for domestic constituency to set the pattern and boundaries of Germany’s European policy turning Germany and Chancellor Merkel into a “constrained leader” in the EU. As far as Germany’s relations with Turkey are concerned, throughout the crisis eras the constrained leader’s Turkey policy
became also predominantly dependent on key domestic actors’ preferences and interests.

When the economic afterquakes of the Eurozone crisis also arrived in Germany in 2013, the German government pursued a rather inconsistent and domesticated Turkey policy by first supporting the launch of talks on a new chapter in Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU in view of German business world’s interest in deepening economic ties with Turkey, and by afterwards putting a unilateral veto on the opening of the new chapter ahead of the German federal elections, when German public opinion transformed itself into the most important domestic actor throughout the campaign era. Thus, trends of domestication and unilateralism in Germany’s Turkey policy went hand in hand throughout the Eurozone crisis. A similar development took place throughout the German efforts to find ways to manage irregular migration flows to Europe / Germany and to minimize the negative externalities of the refugee crisis for the pursuit of German national interests. In view of the power vacuum in the EU, lack of a common approach to the handling of the crisis and commitment to EU-wide burden sharing as well as domestic constituency’s dissatisfaction with Germany’s open-door policy, the German government’s policy options became extremely constrained. Merkel shifted her attention to Turkey for a swift management of the crisis outside the borders of the EU and played the key role in the formulation of the scope and conditions of the EU-Turkey “deal” by means of bilateral and minilateral meetings and unilateral statements.

In view of increasing interdependencies between the EU and third countries in the management of negative externalities as a result of a constantly evolving global environment it could be expected that Germany’s European policy and its policies vis-à-vis a key strategic partner, Turkey, are likely to become even more domesticated in the future. This may bring about enhanced complexity, sharp and temporary U-turns as well as increased readiness for unilateralism in German policy making towards Turkey and its EU bid.
German-Turkish Relations at Continuous Crossroads –
Political and Structural Factors

Yaşar Aydın

1. Introduction

The relations between Turkey and Germany have been in recent years dominated by conflict, mistrust and uncertainty. Turkish politicians’ efforts to campaign in German cities about the Turkish constitution referendum of 16 April 2017 intensified diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Germany, which had been steadily increasing since the official recognition of the Armenian “genocide” by the German federal parliament in June 2016. Some local authorities of German cities did not allow – on the ground of deficient safety conditions of the relevant meeting halls – the Justice and Development Party (AKP) close UETD – Union of European Turkish Democrats to organize campaigns for the Turkish constitutional referendum. On 7 March 2017 in Hamburg, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu had to relocate his speech to Turks residing in Germany to the residency of the Turkish consulate.\(^1\) The verbal battles between politicians of both sides reached a new dimension as the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Germany of “fascist actions reminiscent of Nazi times.”\(^2\) On the other hand, German politicians and media also added fuel to the flames. Some members of the German parliament (MPs), for example, promoted no-vote in the referendum, while others invited Turks in Germany for “loyalty” to the German Basic Law. Besides, almost all German political parties in the federal parliament have voiced their support for preventing Turkish ministers from campaigning in Germany.\(^3\)

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3 See for example the interview with MP Andrej Hunko (Die Linke). In: Birgün Gazetesi, 07.03.2017, (http://www.andrej-hunko.de/start/aktuell/3478-i-hope-for-a-
After the constitutional referendum of 16 April 2017, tensions continued as Turkish officials blamed Germany for not acting appropriately against the PKK militants and the sympathizers of the Fethullah Gülen movement, which according to official Turkish statements played the primary role in the coup attempt of 15 July 2016. As Germany gave asylum to “coup-linked” Turkish soldiers, “another war of words” emerged between Germany and Turkey over access to the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey. Ankara had prevented a delegation of German lawmakers from visiting the country’s soldiers stationed at the Turkish air base, which had been used by Germany as part of its work under the umbrella of the international coalition to defeat the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). The then German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel criticized the Turkish action and called US diplomats to mediate between the German and the Turkish governments. Meanwhile, Berlin decided to relocate the German soldiers and Tornado combat aircrafts to Jordan.

However, diplomatic tensions did not start with Turkish campaign efforts for constitution referendum in Germany. After relatively good bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany in the term of office of Schröder-Fischer government, which openly supported Turkey’s EU accession ambitions, the relations cooled off due Chancellor Angela Merkel’s advocacy of “privileged partnership.” However, the privileged partnership was only the party position of the Christian Democrats, but not the pos-
ition of the federal government. It was rather symbolic politics to secure intra-party coherence and mobilization capacity throughout the elections.\(^8\)

In June 2013, the Chapter 22 on “Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments” was postponed by pressure from the German federal government that was justified by Berlin with the actions of Turkish police against the Gezi-Park protesters.\(^9\) However, in 2015, Chancellor Merkel started to readjust her Turkey policy by supporting closer dialogue between Turkey and the EU and stimulating Turkish accession talks with the EU. Merkel also visited Turkey several times for official talks throughout the refugee crisis. All these show the continuing importance of Turkey for Germany which is also underlined by veteran politicians and foreign policy experts:

“Without Turkey, the European influence there [in the Near East, Y.A.], but also in the wider region spanning to Central Asia, equals almost zero.” (Joschka Fischer)\(^10\)

“With Turkey in the EU you could have solved today’s problems. [...] We should have accomplished that Turkey put its hope in the European Union. We have not realized this - and now we have a problem.” (Herfried Münkler)\(^11\)

However, despite this significant interest in Turkey’s geostrategic position, both by European and German political circles, German-Turkish contemporary relations have reached a new historical low in early 2018, since the Second World War. In the following, the causes of this situation will be

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\(^11\) Herfried Münkler, Interview Deutschlandfunk, 21.02.2016. (Translated from German).
elucidated in efforts to answer following questions: What are the short term political reasons for the continuous diplomatic tensions between Germany and Turkey? What long term conflicts have been evident in the sphere of German-Turkish bilateral dialogue? This book chapter starts with a short historical review of the bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey. It then continues with the analysis of German and Turkish key common interests and contentious points. In the next part, the leading structural factors\(^\text{12}\) in the diplomatic tensions and conflicts between Turkey and Germany will be discussed. The chapter concludes with an outlook on the prospective future of German-Turkish relations.

2. Bilateral relations, conflicts and their drivers

2.1 The historical context of German-Turkish relations

The relations between Turkey and Germany have a long history, which neither has been uniform nor free of conflicts. Initial contacts between Germans and Turks started during the reign of the Holy Roman Empire and the Seljuk Empire and continued later throughout the Ottoman Empire. During the premodern times the relations were dominated by power struggle, war and battle for domination of Europe on the one hand,\(^\text{13}\) cultural and societal exchanges via trade and diplomacy, on the other.\(^\text{14}\) The perception of the Turks in premodern German countries was characterised by the fear of the Ottoman expansion, which had reached the gates of Vienna.\(^\text{15}\)

\[^{12}\text{By structure, I understand an arrangement of interrelated elements in a system and by structural factors, I refer to the patterns of relations between Germany and Turkey which are historically grown and sustained by the structure of international system.}\]


After the defeat of the Ottoman army by the siege of Vienna in 1683, fear of Europeans and Germans turned into a feeling of superiority.\textsuperscript{16}

In modern times, the relations between the Turks (Ottoman Empire) and Germans (Prussia, German Empire and the Habsburg Empire) have been characterized primarily by cooperation in the spheres of economy, military and diplomacy. In the first half and the last quarter of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Prussian officers supported the modernisation of the Ottoman army and laid the basis for the later German-Turkish “military brotherhood.”\textsuperscript{17} As of 1830s, the Ottoman government positioned the German Empire alongside Great Britain and France in order to prevent the Russian military expansions in the Balkans and the Caucasus. This constellation changed in view of the geostrategic shift, which occurred in the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. As both the Great Britain and France were concerned about the ascent of the German Empire into a European great power during the terms of office of Otto von Bismarck in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, they started to approach Russia in order to counterbalance Germany. This led the Ottoman Empire to seek the cooperation with the German Empire, which ended in a special relationship between a mighty (Germany) and weak state (Turkey), asymmetrical in the share of power, however not characterised by complete subjugation as it was common for the relationship between the empire and its colony.

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of the German Empire. After the defeat in the Great War, the German Empire was replaced by Weimar Republic and the Ottoman Empire by the Republic of Turkey, and both countries lost their “colonies” and their distant provinces, respectively. Weimar Republic was troubled by the consequences and burdens of the Treaty of Versailles, which culminated in the strong limitation of the German army, significant area losses to France, Poland, Denmark and Czechoslovakia, exclusion from the League of Nations and high reparations.\textsuperscript{18} The republic fell also prey to a totalitarian

and aggressive Fascism. On the other hand, the young Republic of Turkey focussed on its sovereignty, political and cultural reforms and economic development. Military cooperation and trade between Turkey and Germany continued even after the First World War and the Nazi takeover in 1933.\textsuperscript{19} Turkey exported to Germany chromite and mineral and imported from Germany especially military equipment. With the Claudius trade agreement between two countries, Turkey exchanged chrome against military equipment.\textsuperscript{20}

After the Second World War, trade between Germany and Turkey expanded rapidly. Germany already became in the 1950s the major trading partner of Turkey.\textsuperscript{21} Turkish government financed its sugar and cements industries, oil pipeline that spanned from Iraq to Turkish city Iskenderun at Mediterranean Sea, as well as an ironwork and steelwork with German credits. Alongside the expansion of bilateral trade and business, political relations progressed as well, which had been reflected in the high-rank political visits and exchanges between Germany and Turkey. In 1954 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and in 1957 President Theodor Heuss visited Turkey, while in 1958, Turkish President Celal Bayar met his counterpart in Germany. Germany also supported the Association Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC) (also known as the Ankara Agreement)\textsuperscript{22}, which was signed in 1963 and provid-

\textsuperscript{22} After Turkey’s application for association with the European Economic Community on 31 July 1959, Ludwig Erhard, German Federal Economy Minister, declared in a statement the entry of Turkey in the European Economic Community as a necessity and promised to support Turkey’s application, see Erhan, Çağrı/
ed the framework for the co-operation between Turkey and the European Union (EU).\textsuperscript{23}

After Germany entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955, Turkey and Germany started trade in military equipment and weaponry. Subsequent to the Cyprus crisis in 1967 Turkey expanded its military budget and rearmed extensively. After the landing of Turkish military forces on the northern part of Cyprus in 1974, the United States (US) enforced a weapons embargo upon Turkey, which Ankara tried to compensate with imports from Germany. Germany provided Turkey with Leopard tanks and armoured personnel carriers, U-boats, warships, naval helicopters etc. German military exports into Turkey continued even after the Coup d’état of 12 September 1980. However, after the Coup d’état tensions between Germany and Turkey arose due to human rights violations during the military dictatorship and later after the transition into democracy under the leadership of Prime Minister Turgut Özal (see exemplarily Ernst 2002).

Beyond these historical, political, economic, military and social ties and relations, what about the current state of play in German-Turkish dialogue? Are there vital common interests, upon which both countries could rely in their bilateral relations that have been facing “one of their greatest challenges of the modern era”\textsuperscript{24}? To answer these questions, the next subchapter will discuss the current common interests Germany and Turkey possess.

2.2 Areas of common interests

Turkey and Germany are, despite several points of contention which will be discussed in the subchapter 2.3, close allies within the framework of


\textsuperscript{24} German-Turkish relations face ‘biggest challenge of modern era’ Minister. In: Middle East Eye. 01.03.2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/germany-summons-turkish-ambassador-over-arrest-bild-journalist-1386230129 [10.03.2018].
NATO and in the fight against ISIS-terrorism. The partnership between the two allies encompasses many political, economic and social fields, as both countries share vital ties and interests. The importance of the interaction between the governments of both countries motivated also the kick-off of the bilateral German-Turkish intergovernmental consultations in Berlin on 22 January 2016 between Chancellor Angela Merkel and then Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Some of the common areas of interest in the sphere of German-Turkish dialogue are as follows:

- **Energy sector**: Turkey is located at the crossroads of Europe, the region with the highest demand for energy worldwide, and the regions of the Near East, Caucasus and Central Asia, which own the richest fossil energy resources. Due to the withdrawal from the nuclear energy programme and coal extraction, Germany’s need for fossil energy such as oil and natural gas has been gradually on the rise. Therefore, Germany is interested in binding (integrating) Turkey into the European Energy Community. Turkey on the other hand, is interested, due to its increasing demand for energy, to minimize its dependency on Russia and Iran. Huge potentials in regenerative (renewable) energy sources make Turkey important for German energy sector. For German companies, there is a broad space for investment, for example, in helping Turkey to expand its renewable energy facilities.

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26 In an announcement in May 2011 Germany’s coalition government declared its intention to phase out all the nuclear power plants by 2022. Die Bundesregierung. Bundesregierung beschließt Ausstieg aus der Kernkraft bis 2022. https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/StatistischeSeiten/Breg/Energiekonzept/05-kernenergie.html [04.02.2018]. For more detailed information about the reasons for Germany’s withdrawal from nuclear energy as well as its consequences for Germany and Europe see Wettmann, Reinhart W. Germany’s withdrawal from nuclear energy: Reasons and strategies behind a new energy policy. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2011, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/buros/london/08424-20111007.pdf [05.02.2018].


rum is an important dialog-platform for agents (representatives) from politics and economy, which can open up new spheres of activity and cooperation.

- *Turkey as a business location:* Turkey is an important business location for German companies and a leading market for the export of technology- and knowledge-intensive German goods. The top export destination of Turkey is Germany (15.4 Billion US-Dollar), while the second top import origin is also Germany with 22.9 Billion US-Dollar after China with 24.4 Billion US-Dollar. The five most important imports of Turkey from Germany are automobile, automotive body parts and accessories, aircraft and spacecraft, piston engines and diesel engine, and engine parts. The five most important exports from Turkey to Germany are engine parts, automotive body parts and accessories, t-shirts and undershorts, automobile, and prepared fruits and nuts. German direct investments amounted to 430 billion US-Dollars in 2016; in 2013 they were even 1.970 billion US-Dollar worth. In Turkey, 6846 German companies have been active and in 2016, while 3.9 million Germans visited the country.

From the Turkish perspective the German market is also irreplaceable for the Turkish industry, which obtains a great part of its pre-products and intermediate goods (such as automotive components, synthetic

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29 The annual German-Turkish Energy Forum is a platform for “the dialogue between representatives from politics and business of both countries in the energy sector”, Die Bundesregierung. Merkel: Gemeinsames strategisches Interesse. 04.02.2014, https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2014/02/2014-02-04-besuch-tuerk-mp-erdogan.html [08.03.2018].

30 See for example Gurses, Ercan. Germany’s Siemens wins tender for Turkish wind power project. In: Reuters. 03.08. 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-energy-windpower/germanys-siemens-wins-tender-for-turkish-wind-power-project-idUSKBN1AJ1F] [08.03.2018].


32 Ibid.

material, electric equipment etc.) for its export goods as well as machines, technology and know-how from Germany.  

- *Political Stability in the Middle East*: The Middle East region is of great importance to Germany both economically and politically. As a country with an export oriented economy Germany has vital interests in the countries of the Middle East as important markets for industrial goods to which Germany needs unlimited access. These countries are also of strategic importance for Germany as suppliers of energy and raw material. From this perspective, instability in the Middle East is counterproductive for German economic interests. Therefore, Germany has also a vital interest in Turkey as a bridge or respectively as a springboard to the other markets in Middle East. Turkey also offers important political, military, economic and cultural potentials for stabilizing the region. This is also why Germany welcomed the active economic policy of Turkey in the region, its increased trade relations with the countries of the Middle East, and its conflict-solving/mediating foreign policy in the past decade. The outstanding importance of the political stability of the Middle East for Germany’s security concerns opens up common fields of action and cooperation possibilities for the German government: supporting and advising Turkey throughout the implementation of its regional foreign policy initiatives, mediating between Turkey and Israel in order to improve the bilateral relations between the two countries as well as facilitating between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. Turkey and Germany are also both interested in a nuclear-free Iran, a stable Iraq and Afghanistan, a Western-oriented Syria and peace between Israel and Palestinians, as well as an effective fight against international terrorism. Another common interest is counterbalancing Russia, which carries out an expansionist policy in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Structuring of the Immigration Society: Germany's social and economic sustainability depends on, among other things, a qualified immigration, which can only be achieved by increasing the attractiveness of Germany as a place to work and live. To this end, the German migration policy must create the necessary socio-political and juridical conditions, namely eliminate all obstacles that hinder migrants from successful integration and comprehensive participation in the social and political life. The integration of Turkish migrants, too, requires a coordinated approach between the German and Turkish governments, as Turkey holds an effective key to a successful integration policy because of its strong emotional and cultural connections to the Turks in Germany as a home state or ‘protective power.’ Germany expects Turkish politicians to continuously support the goal of integration with their statements. On the contrary, Ankara is interested in the integration of Turks into the German society because it assumes that their degree of integration will remain a key factor in the discussion of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Besides, Turkish government attaches great importance to the economic success, the social upward mobility and the “multicultural contribution” of the Turks residing in Germany and the rest of Europe. It advocates a complete integration of the Turks into their respective European countries of immigration due to the perception of the Turks in Europe as “representatives of Turkey” and their success as a proof for the compatibility of Turkey with the EU. The Blue Card scheme introduced by the Turkish government is, for example, a great encouragement for Turks in Germany to accept German citizenship without giving up their Turkish citizenship rights such as unlimited residence, working permit etc. – except the obtaining of voting rights and the right to become civil servant as well as the duty of military service.

Refugee Crisis: Turkey, hosting more than three million refugees from Syria, serves as a hub of regular and irregular international transit migration to Europe. In view of the refugee crisis in Europe, Germany is interested in working together with Turkey to limit the number of refugees migrating to Europe. The number of refugees who entered Germany annually increased from 202 thousand in 2014 to 476 thousand in 2015.

36 After a meeting with then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2010, Chancellor Merkel called for a joint commitment in order to improve the integration of Turks into Germany. Die Bundesregierung. Deutschland und die Türkei: Partner in Europa. 31.03.2010, https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Reiseberichte/tr-eu-parnter-europa.html [01.02.2018].
sand in 2015 and reached its peak in 2016 with 745 thousand. This situation also triggered anti-refugee reactions in parts of the German society, which were further exploited by the right-wing movement PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) and right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) that recently increased its votes in the elections in various German states (Bundesländer) and alarmed the German federal government as well as Chancellor Merkel about a possible defeat at the September 2017 federal elections.\(^{38}\) This led Merkel to cooperate with Turkey in order to restrict the flow of refugees from Syria to Germany via Turkey. As a result, “[s]tronger German-Turkish cooperation on the management of irregular migration in Europe and its wider periphery seems to be necessary as both countries have become key actors in the accommodation of Syrian refugees and the management of the influx of migrants.”\(^{39}\)

- **Fight against terrorism:** Both countries have become primary targets for national and international terrorist groups: Turkey for PKK and ISIS, whereas Germany mainly for ISIS. Islamic terror networks in Europe and the Near East have been for some time seeking to misuse Turkey as a transit country for their operations in Germany and the rest of Europe. Therefore, in the eyes of the German federal government, the Turkish government is expected to share valuable information on these networks and cooperate with Berlin in the fight against international terrorism.\(^{40}\)

Against the backdrop of these common interests and historical ties between Germany and Turkey the question on the key drivers of the current tensions between the two countries becomes even more interesting. In the

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38 In federal elections in September 2017, AfD entered the German federal parliament Bundestag and became the third-largest party and after the formation of the grand coalition the main parliamentary opposition.


following, the main points of contention and conflict between Germany and Turkey will be discussed.

2.3 Points of contention

Besides common interests, there are also points of contention, which, to a great degree, result in view of unforeseen events such as the emergence of the Gezi Park protests in 2013, the Boehmermann crisis in the spring of 2016\textsuperscript{41} or the coup attempt in the summer of 2016, which deeply affected the German-Turkish relations. Recent tensions between Germany and Turkey have their origin in several contentious points.

- \textit{The case of Deniz Yücel:} On 14 February 2017, Deniz Yücel, a Turkish-German journalist working for the German newspaper \textit{Die Welt}, was formally arrested on the order of a Turkish judge on the grounds of charges of conducting terror (PKK) propaganda and incitement to hatred.\textsuperscript{42} Turkish opposition and human rights groups have condemned his arrest as an “assault on freedom of expression” and an attempt at “intimidating foreign press” in the country.\textsuperscript{43} German decision makers criticized the arrest of Deniz Yücel and Chancellor Merkel urged Ankara to release the correspondent. Berlin had previously criticized the imprisonment of journalists and the massive closure of Kurdish and

\textsuperscript{41} In the spring of 2016, an obscene poem by the German TV comedian Boehmermann about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “has sparked a diplomatic crisis between the two countries.” For further information see, Erdoğan fights for inquiry into German TV comic to be reopened. In: The Guardian. 10.10.2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/10/erdogan-fights-probe-german-tv-comic-reopened-turkish-president-jan-bohmermann [02.02.2018].


\textsuperscript{43} See for example CHP (official Website). Yarkadaş: Deniz Yücel’in Tutuklanmasına Kılıf Aranıyor. 02.03.2017, https://chp.org.tr/Haberler/4/yarkadas-deniz-yucelin-tutuklanmasina-kilif-araniyor-54042.aspx [02.02.2018]. The arrest of the Turkish-German journalist was also criticized by Mustafa Yeneroğlu, Member of Parliament AKP, see, AKP’li vekilden Yücel’in tutuklanmasına eleştiri. Deutsche Welle. 28.02.2017, http://www.dw.com/tr/akpli-vekilden-%C3%BCcelin-tutuklanmas%C4%B1na-ele%C5%9Ftiri/a-37744495 [02.02.2018].
other opposition media. After more than one year, Yücel was released on 16 February 2018.

- **Deficient solidarity after the coup attempt:** A clear cooling of the German-Turkish relationship had occurred after the coup attempt of 15 July 2016. Turkish politicians complained about the “lack of solidarity” of the German government. Although the federal government had emphasized that it clearly stood behind Erdoğan and criticized the coup attempt, Ankara, however, complained that no high-ranking German representatives visited Turkey to express support and solidarity following the attempt.

- **Proceeding against the Gülen-Movement:** One reason for the relative restraint of the German federal government to express solidarity with the Turkish government was, from the German perspective, the proceeding of the Turkish government against the clandestine socio-political network of the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who is held responsible for the implementation of the coup attempt and classified as a terrorist organization (also known as FETÖ). Criticism from Germany about the dismissal and imprisonment of suspected Gülen supporters in the state service as well as the arrest of the Kurdish opposition leaders countered the Turkish government angrily. The recognition of asylum applications of about 40 Turkish officers by Germany, whom the Turkish government had ordered back after the coup attempt, also caused significant disputes between two countries and led to Turkish claims about Germany becoming a port for terrorists.

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47 The German government does not officially agree with the position of the Turkish government that the Gülen movement was responsible for the coup attempt on 15 July 2016. Bruno Kahl, President of the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst), declared in March 2017 the preacher Fethullah Gülen as not responsible for the coup attempt, see, Prediger Gülen nicht für Türkei-Putsch verantwortlich. In: Handelsblatt. 18.03.2017, http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/bnd-chef-bruno-kahl-prediger-guelen-nicht-fuer-tuerkei-putsch-verantwortlich/19537014.html [05.03.2018].
• **Reciprocal allegations:** In Germany, several imams of the Mosque Federation Ditib (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği) were accused of gathering information on Gülen supporters on behalf of the Turkish religious authority (Diyanet). Diyanet summoned six imams as “signs of goodwill” to Turkey, but denied any wrongdoing, and criticized the fact that the German judiciary searched several homes of Islamic clerics. On the other hand, Turkish authorities decided to hold Peter Steudtner, a renowned German human rights expert, under arrest, accusing him of having links to terrorist groups. All these reciprocal reactions by Germany and Turkey about each other have been leading to bilateral mistrust and to severe diplomatic tensions.

• **Refugee crisis:** With regard to this issue, the German federal government is rather cautious in its criticism, as it is significantly dependent on Ankara. At the initiative of Chancellor Merkel, the EU concluded a “deal” with Turkey in March 2016, which foresees the readmission of all refugees entering the Greek Aegean Islands via Turkey by Ankara. Although the cooperation still continues, Turkey has frequently complained about the reluctance of Brussels to deliver financial support granted to Turkey in order to improve the living conditions of more than three million Syrian refugees hosted by Turkey. Ankara also criticized the lack of progress in granting visa liberalization to Turks which was also linked to the readmission process between Turkey and EU. However, the EU calls for a revision of the Turkish anti-terrorism legislation for visa liberalization, which is still a work in progress.

Beyond these contemporary differences and points of contentions, what structural factors do exist behind the tensions between Germany and Turkey?

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3. Long-term conflicts of interests behind current contentious issues

Besides the ongoing and more recent contentious points, which we have discussed in the last subchapter, there exist longstanding and structural factors, which create frictions in German-Turkish relations. The bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey are structured by power asymmetry, economic, political and social interdependence and transnational interconnections. Even if Ankara and Berlin would overcome the contentious points illustrated above, tensions between both countries will remain due to the longstanding and structural factors, which will be discussed below.

3.1 German-Turkish relations: conflicting interests

As far as the bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany are concerned, there exist also long-term conflicting interests in various issue areas. Conflicting interests and preferences are very evident, for instance, in the Balkan region. Both countries try to extend their influence in this region as key players: Germany by trying this with the perspective of Balkan countries’ integration into the EU; Turkey by highlighting the Islamic identity and the remembrance of the common Ottoman past and by means of the operations of the Turkish development agency TIKA. Turkish actions and preferences thus have the potential of colliding with the interests and preferences of Germany.

Another controversial issue area, where a long-term divergence between German and Turkish preferences and interests tends to appear, is a possible EU-membership of Turkey, which would not fit in with the German interests and the goal of being a “leading power” of the Union. Germany is the most powerful country in the EU and plays a vital role in shaping the politics of the Union, in the management of multiple crises the EU has been recently challenged with as well as in counterbalancing the conflicting interests of different member states. In case of a possible EU membership of Turkey, Germany will no more be the most populous country of the EU in the future, which would relativize its formal institutional power.

3.2 Shift of power

The bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany had been long characterised by an asymmetrical distribution of power. Germany was in economic, political, cultural and militaristic terms the partner with the ability of imposing its interests. A good example has been the Anwerbeabkommen (labour recruitment agreement) of 1961, which took rather the interests of Germany and German economy into account. Asymmetrical distribution of power between two countries was also reflected in diplomatic relations as Turkish diplomats frequently expressed their dissatisfaction with this inequality in German-Turkish bilateral dialogue. One undoubted reason for this – in addition to the inequality in structural power – has been the human rights situation in Turkey, which facilitates German interference in Turkish internal affairs due to Turkey’s EU candidacy. However, since the early 2000s, Turkey’s power in international relations and the country’s economic weight has been increasing gradually. Therefore, today Turkish diplomats and decision makers appear more offensive and self-confident vis-à-vis their German counterparts. Furthermore, the AKP government also tries to establish diplomatic symmetry between Turkey and Germany by activating the Turkish diaspora in Germany.\textsuperscript{52} This is a central structural aspect, which causes frictions in bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany.

3.3 Transnationalism

The labour recruitment agreement of 1961 kicked off migration movements from Turkey to Germany, which still continuous, however, nowadays rather in both directions. In the last half century a Turkish community emerged in Germany, which comprises of three million people with various ethnic, cultural, political and religious backgrounds. Besides, in Germany a strong and differentiated landscape of migrant organisations has arisen, which are active in Germany and additionally maintain strong connections to Turkey. In a similar vein, annually between four and six million Germans visit Turkey, whereas thousands of German retirees permanently live in Turkey. These reciprocal flows of persons create several transnational bridges between the two countries, which, however, also contribute to the blurring of the distinction between German domestic and foreign af-

\textsuperscript{52} Aydin, Die neue türkische Diasporapolitik, 2014.
fairs. German domestic issues, such as the integration issues of Turks into the German society or the regulation of double-citizenship, turn into foreign affairs, as they serve as a topic of the diplomatic dialogue and negotiations between Germany and Turkey. On the other hand, issues such the Turkish EU accession process or the Turkish foreign policy towards Syria turn into a matter of German domestic politics and trigger critique towards Turkish community in Germany. In short, political and social transnationalisation creates further diplomatic frictions and tensions between the two countries.

3.4 Turkey-sceptic public opinion

Since the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, scepticism against Turkey has increased significantly in the German public sphere as a result of questions regarding the handling of the situation, the safeguarding of democratic credentials and political and economic stability in Turkey as well as wide-ranging news coverage in the German media. According to a survey, 56 percent of the Germans do not approve the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU, and 68 percent of Germans are against a Turkish accession to the EU. The Turkey-sceptic public opinion undoubtedly constraints the policy options of German federal government. There are also MPs of Turkish origin in German parties who exert criticism towards the Turkish government and expect from the German government the exertion of more pressure on Ankara. Critical Turkish journalists and civil society activists also vehemently criticise Berlin for supporting Turkey politically and financially. Therefore the German federal government will hardly be ready for a closer partnership with Turkey as long as significant constraints on the formation of its policies vis-à-vis Turkey will persist. On the other hand, in Turkey scepticism against Germany and German federal government has been on the rise particularly since the Armenian Resolution of the German federal parliament in 2016, which constraints the policy options of Ankara, as well.

Concluding remarks and prospects

Relations between Germany and Turkey, which have a long history with ups and downs, have been at a low point for some time. A series of contentious issues in political, diplomatic and social realms are responsible for the bilateral tensions between the two countries. However, there are also several longstanding structural factors and conflicting interests, which further accelerate diplomatic frictions. As a country with an export oriented economy, Germany is not rich in raw materials and energy sources. Besides Germany is a highly globalized country, which is dependent on the liberal political global order with open societies (democracy, rule of law, human rights) and open markets (free trade, globalization). Turkey, on the contrast, appears to have lost to some extent its political stability in the wake of dramatic domestic (power struggle between the governing party AKP and secular elites and military, escalation of the armed struggle with the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK and coup attempt) as well as regional developments (revolts and counter actions in Arabic countries, the radicalisation of political Islam and ascent jihadism and Kurdish nationalism). This minimizes the chances of furthering the potential of the strategic partnership between Germany and Turkey, which would be advantageous for both countries. Nevertheless, there is also ground, due to common economic, political and geostrategic interests, for such a strategic partnership.

Another disturbance factor in German-Turkish dialogue is the institutional architecture of the EU, which relates the institutional power of a member state – among many factors – also to its population size. As the population size of Turkey will surpass in couple of years that of Germany, there is no strong incentive from the perspective of Berlin to have Turkey in the EU even if the Turkish government would fulfil all predefined and necessary economic and political conditions for accession.

As both countries need each other in economic, political and geostrategic terms, German-Turkish relations will continue, yet with ups and downs. Due to the domestic developments in Turkey and the Turkey-sceptic public opinion in Germany as well as due to above mentioned points of contention and conflicting interests a normalisation of the bilateral relations is likely to take place only very slowly with the likely emergence of new bilateral tensions in between. Despite Erdoğan’s bridge-building visit to Germany in September 2018, the diplomatic spat between two countries continues to be there.
PART 3

German-Turkish Transnational Space
Turkish Electoral Campaigns in Germany and the Wider Western Europe as Transnational Practices

Deniz Kuru

1. Introduction

In a world that has been once again reshaped by recent migratory movements towards Western Europe, and most visibly to Germany, it becomes even more urgent to understand the consequences of these population changes in a way that does not remain bounded by methodological nationalism. The significance of transnational approaches has to be acknowledged as one of the most promising tools to use when dealing with the home countries, host countries and the spaces that are formed in-between.

This chapter will focus on the way Turkey’s formerly domestic electoral campaigns have taken a new turn, namely gone beyond their internal dimension. This turn is a consequence of the recently introduced possibility of voting abroad for Turkish citizens living outside of Turkey. The most affected group of Turks who have the most direct access to such a possibility are those located in Western Europe, especially Germany. The reason is that it hosts more than two million Turkish citizens, 1.4 million of them eligible to vote. At the same time, there are a great number of Turkish diplomatic-consular offices in Germany, generating the necessary infras-


2 In this text, abroad voting, external voting, expatriate voting and elections will be used in an interchangeable manner. What is meant it that citizens living outside of their home state are allowed to vote while living in their host states (voting thus either physically in the home state’s diplomatic-consular offices or in places set up by these authorities or in the form of postal votes). In both cases, there is no need to reach the home state. This difference is explained in the specific Turkish case later in the text.
structure for abroad voting. Therefore, my major focus will be Germany, with less detailed comparisons to the French and Austrian cases.

This work has the aim of connecting three rather separate areas of study and approaches that exist within political science. The first concerns elections and more specifically, electoral campaigns. The second dimension relates to transnationalism, while the last point pertains to the recent “practice turn” in International Relations (IR). What is meant by the idea of bringing them together? The goal is first to emphasize the recent and significantly growing tendency of states to grant their citizens living abroad with electoral rights. Based on this, there emerges a new possibility to transcend nation-state-based narratives by underlining the different ways in which elections and electoral campaigns (run abroad for citizens living abroad) are being transformed into transnational processes. In these spatial shifts, citizens living abroad, those who have left their home countries for various reasons, including economic and political emigrants, are the new objects of home-based elections. The reason thereof lies in their numerical significance as well as the socio-technical changes that further enable such a dynamic to arise.

Stated shortly, in times of globalization, it is becoming easier to not leave one’s homeland behind. In addition to its usual configurations that deal with family ties, socio-economic connections or cultural affiliations, the constant possibility of following “domestic” politics of the home country provides the citizens abroad with an additional political consciousness that relates them to their country of origin. This means that, for instance, the problems of Turkey can also become a point of concern for its citizens living in Germany, even in cases when the subject one talks about belongs to the third generation.3 The study will thus aim to show the dynamics that emerge as a result of transnational interactions and that involve Turkish politicians and political parties, Turkey’s expatriate voters in Germany and the wider Western Europe and the way the host state politicians and/or their public reacts to these new dynamics. It will explain the reasons of diverging reactions as well as how one-time actions, in line with practice turn’s elaborations, tend to become practices that take a transnational feature.

3 For the different ways through which immigrants with Turkish background relate to Turkish politics see Ostergaard-Nielsen, Kristine E. Transnational political practices and the receiving state: Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands. In: Global Networks. 2001, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 261-281.
2. *Setting the stage: Practices and elections with expatriates' voting explained*

What is the practice turn about? It is primarily a means to deal with everyday actions that go beyond the approaches provided by elite-focused studies. Under this alternative look, our attention turns to the practices that form our daily life. In the case of an international organization, for instance, it is not the official declarations that present the focal point, but rather the endless discussions on the corridors, during a dinner or in the lobby, as well as the ways in which quotidian relationships form new means of interactions for official delegates. This means that it is not only institutions, structures or mechanisms that matter but also the varying manners in which people engage in practices that shape the society (or the organization) in which they live.

One of the leading assumptions in the practice turn is that “what most people do, in world politics as in any other social field, does not derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection…” This means that “practices are the result of inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear ‘self-evident’ or commonsensical.” In this regard, habits as well as contingency become meaningful aspects to take into consideration. Furthermore, they “are competent performances.” Practices present us with “socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.” However, in their joint elaboration on practices, Adler and Pouliot also provide a tripartite distinction between behaviour, action and practice, underlining the fact that these are often used in an interchangeable manner. The authors are careful to offer a conceptual differentiation. Action is thus shown to be “behavior imbued with meaning.” When actions are patterned, however, one could speak of practices. This is the case when they

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7 Adler/ Pouliot, p. 5.
are “embedded in particular contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through learning and training.”

In the context of transnationalism, a major building block used in this study, there exists the important work of Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen who explicitly deals with migrants’ transnational political practices, turning her attention also to Turkish migrant community in Europe. Although she even refers to transnational election campaigns, emphasizing their relevance to general transnational practices, her approach differs from the study here as Ostergaard-Nielsen does not refer to practices as we understand them within the context of the practice turn in IR. Transnationalism plays in the present juncture the function of underlining the interwoven nature between the domestic and international spheres, presenting us with a third level that ties home and host states through the former’s citizens and the latter’s residents, at times with overlaps in the form of dual citizenships.

Before turning our attention to Turkish electoral campaigns in Germany, and the wider Western Europe, and the various ways in which they were perceived and led to reactions, a global overview of voting abroad is useful. In this regard, it is also important to highlight the related, but rather neglected dimension, of electoral campaigns abroad. In times of continuous expansion of transnational dynamics, the further impact of migratory movements, coupled with the nation-states’ increased willingness to grant their citizens living abroad the right to vote in home country elections (and, at times, also referenda) brings as a result a new type of electoral practice: political parties organize pre-electoral events also outside of the borders of the nation-state in which they operate.

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8 Ibid.
9 Ostergaard-Nielsen. Transnational political practices and the receiving state: Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands, p. 762.
11 In this regard, organizations like the pan-EU political parties that run in the European Parliament (EP) elections present a rather distinct case. However, even if one acknowledges the transnational features of the EP campaigns, the fact that the 28 European Union member states have their usually separate party lists - only later combined under the pan-European political party banners - means that even these elections have a state-bounded structure.
The number of states that have granted their citizens to vote abroad has risen. However, this does not mean that all the expatriate citizens would vote within the host country in the election space provided within the diplomatic or consular offices or other places secured by these offices. Countries such as Mexico, for instance, require their citizens living abroad to use postal voting, a process that itself generates some lengthy bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{12} In the case of Turkish expatriate voting, similar challenges marked the 2014 presidential elections, as the regulations of Turkey’s Higher Electoral Council produced many difficulties for voters abroad because people were expected to vote on pre-designated days within given time-slots (so-called rendezvous appointment). After this strict rule was changed, the 2015 parliamentary elections showed a much greater participation,\textsuperscript{13} increasing the importance of votes cast abroad.\textsuperscript{14} However, like the electoral campaigns of Turkish political parties, the voting process was also open to critique, as tens of thousands of Turkish citizens would wait in line, making their presence visible to the local public in Western Europe. In Japan, there erupted even some fights among various politically motivated groups, forcing the local police to intervene.

There are already some examples for this practice, with various political parties having organized branches in countries that host larger numbers of their citizens. For instance, the Croatian Democratic Union (CrDU), the political party that led the country for a decade after it gained independence, had established CrDU Germany and similar units to promote its policies and gain the support of Croats living abroad, even from those that...
lacked citizenship. The consequent legislative regulations would in turn allow Croatian citizens abroad the right to vote in Croatian parliamentary and presidential elections.

In the following case study of Turkish electoral campaigns in Western Europe, with a particular focus on Germany, there will be a special emphasis on the then Prime Minister (and current President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 2008 speech in Cologne to some twenty thousand Turks living in Western Europe. The elaboration of this event will show how this one-time event set the stage for the later electoral practices concerning Turkish elections of the 2015 and 2016. In this context, the goal is to highlight how actions turn to practices and how the path for this is opened by various actors being involved, to wit, Turkish citizens in Germany, Turkish politicians, and the local public opinion.

The idea of tying electoral campaigns to citizens abroad and then to the multiple ways in which these campaigns are run paves the way for understanding the changing forms of elections. Stated differently, national elections are no longer merely national.Increasingly, the elections and the preceding campaign performances gain a transnational character, as more and more countries allow their non-home-based citizens to vote in their elections. This development is also in line with the growing tendency of states to allow dual (or even more, i.e. triple, etc.) citizenship. The results of such dramatic advances in citizenship rights are also visible, in turn, in the host countries. Some countries (most famously, Canada) have even gone as far as to ban other states from organizing elections on their soil.  

15 The old questions of “dual allegiance” seem to be not forgotten so easily.  

When connecting electoral campaigns to citizens residing in another state, there emerges a new dimension that has rarely been discussed. This concerns the (re)action of the host state, its citizens and the public opinion therein. Unlike Canada, most host states accept that other countries’ elections also take place on their territory, usually in these (home) states’ diplomatic and consular representations. However, the literature on this phenomenon has widely neglected one significant dimension. This concerns the novelty of electoral campaigns abroad. Even though many countries host elections of other states within their boundaries, the shift to pre-election campaigning has been a recent development. First of all, it is impor-
tant to define what is meant by the concept of electoral campaigns abroad. In the present context, it refers to the pre-election visits conducted by the home country politicians and their probable locally present party representatives and candidates to various sites (re)presenting instances of the migrant community, meetings held in open air and non-open air forms, speeches given in these gatherings as well as the use of medial means of campaigning, including TV programs or internet-based social media communication.\textsuperscript{17}

Due to their significant migrant communities, Western European countries like Germany and France, among many others, find themselves confronting the new reality of non-homegrown electoral campaigning. By analysing these campaigns with regard to the dimension of practices, this chapter will explain the ways in which various advantages or threats can be perceived at the transnational interstices.

When thinking of transnational practices in the context of electoral campaigns involving non-citizens and dual citizens within the host state, there are at least three dimensions that could be considered. The first option is that host state political parties are interested in reaching the double citizenship holders, those who have an immigrant background. In countries with high numbers of such voters there exist specialized campaigns to reach these strata of voters. The second option is the specific case of European Parliament (EP) elections that have, to a certain extent, a transnational character. Practically, non-citizens are also allowed to vote in these elections so that the local parties can also try to reach them in their campaigns. However, this is a rather insignificant dimension of EP electoral campaigns, as even the citizens of the host state show only limited interest in the election, and the local political parties are running, compared to national elections, a limited campaign.\textsuperscript{18} The third option is that of non-citizens (or dual citizenship holders) living in the host state who become the subjects of interest for the political parties of home states. Depending on the number of citizen-voters living abroad, various countries have seen a growing engagement of their parties outside the state borders, most intensively at times of electoral campaigns. In line with the trend towards pro-

\textsuperscript{17} This should not mean that there do not exist previously set-up Turkish political organizations that tie domestic political parties to the Turkish citizens’ concerns living abroad. See Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001 for such a history in the case of Turkish migrant community in Germany and the Netherlands.

\textsuperscript{18} In this regard, even the new tendency of European parties to present leading candidates, including famous European politicians like Jean-Claude Juncker or Alexis Tsipras, did not generate the expected influence on voters’ interest.
Providing citizens living abroad with voting rights in their home country elections, these political parties also introduce their campaign practices to other countries. At times of globalisation dynamics, nation-states extend voting rights as they see as a possible way in which to hold their citizens connected to the homelands from which they have emigrated. This form of direct political involvement is seen as a potential source of keeping the citizens even loyal to their other state, giving them thereby a feeling of staying in connection with their co-citizens.\footnote{On various reasons of states’ move to this direction and the wider meanings of expatriate voting see Tager, Michael. Expatriates and Elections, pp. 35-60; Lafleur, Jean-Michel. Why do states enfranchise citizens abroad? Comparative insights from Mexico, Italy and Belgium. In: Global Network, 2011, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 481-501 and also Bauböck, Rainer. Expansive Citizenship – Voting beyond Territory and Membership. In: PS, October 2005, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 683-684.}

The decision to allow Turkish citizens not residing in Turkey the right to vote in countries where they live presents a difficult choice for the political parties. A widely known phenomenon in Turkey concerns the political preferences of abroad-citizens, leading the parties to know what kind of results they should expect. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) builds on a strong power base in Western Europe and has organized its supporters under the umbrella of the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) that has offices across Western Europe. The expectations were confirmed when the more conservative voters gave a significant support to AKP. For instance, in June 2015 parliamentary elections it received 50 percent of votes cast abroad, while gaining only 41 percent in Turkey. Interestingly, a similar disproportionality emerged in the case of the Kurdish nationalist Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) which received 20 percent of votes among the abroad-citizens, a significantly higher amount of votes compared to its Turkish domestic score of 13 percent.\footnote{For domestic and abroad results see, respectively, http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/SecmenIslemleri/Secimler/2015MV/A.pdfhttp://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/SecmenIslemleri/Secimler/2015MV/B.pdf [24.01.2017].}

3. Transnational electoral campaigns: The Turkish case

The case in this study will be Turkish electoral campaigns starting with the 2014 presidential election. Some example will come from the campaigns of the double parliamentary elections in 2015. The analysis will focus on the
German case, but also compare the situation in Germany with two neighbouring countries, namely France and Austria. Such a comparative approach will enable also to observe the inter-country differences in two important dimensions. First, based on the above explained framework that builds on the practice turn, the focus will be on the local communities of Turkish citizens and the various ways in which Turkish politicians tried to reach them on the spot. This spatial dimension carries much weight, and relates also to the second level, that of the host country (re)actions, either in the form of politicians’ comments or that of the national public opinion in the host country. These aspects, in their sum, point to the rather imminent requirement of taking a transnational approach when analysing these electoral campaigns, both with regard to their practices and the ensuing, and from country to country differing, reactions.

Until the 2014 presidential elections, Turkish citizens living abroad had the right to vote in Turkish elections, but they could only make use of this right at Turkey’s own border crossings including major airport terminals with international flights within Turkey. The numbers were very low, and made it for Turkish political parties ineffective to undertake campaign organization in Western European countries. It was only through the later implementation of a more broadly accessible voting right, following the 2012 changes in the law that made it possible for Turks in Europe (and many other regions) to vote in the closest Turkish consular office. In cases of high Turkish voter concentration, the diplomatic and consular officials also arranged other places where one could vote.21 These legal changes dramatically altered the actual number of Turkish citizens who would be able to use their right to vote abroad.22

In the three countries considered, it is important to look at a number of elements before referring to their country-level reactions to Turkish electoral campaigns. The factors that need to be taken into account are the size of the Turkish migrant community, the diversity of these Turkish citizens who are eligible to vote in Turkish elections, the historical background of Turkish presence in the country, the extent of assimilation to the host society, the legal framework that enables or hinders dual citizenship and there-

21 These included, for instance, the Olympic Stadium in Berlin, Fraport-Arena in Frankfurt and in many cities huge fair spaces. For detail, see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Zur Präsidentenwahl ins Olympiastadion, 28.07.2014.

22 In 2014 presidential elections, the number of expatriates voting at Turkish customs gates was still higher than those in abroad offices. Only with 2015 parliamentary elections did they start making a visible impact, going from 8 to some 40 percent of registered voters abroad. See also fn. 14.
fore the percentage of people with Turkish descent who are still citizens of Turkey, the relationship between the host state and the Turkish state, as well as possible interactions between the Turkish migrant community, some other communities and the Turkish state. These factors are useful in explaining the differing reactions to Turkish electoral campaigns in these three Western European countries.

With regard to Turkish community size, Germany is a distant first in terms of numbers. However, in terms of percentage of people with Turkish background, Austria can be seen to be on a similar level. It is important to note, in this context, that Turkish migrants hold in both countries the position of the biggest non-titular nation. The French case poses a different model as Turkish citizens in France do not make up the largest ethnic group among the migrant communities.

Although this study uses the signifier “Turkish” in order to refer to all migrants who have a Turkey background and usually Turkish citizenship, in many instances it is of much relevance to consider the diversity of the Turkish community in Western Europe. Therefore, ethnic differences (ethnic Turk, Kurd, etc.), religious variation (Sunni Muslim, Alevi, etc.) as well as political divergences (secular, religious-conservative) play a major role within Turkish migrant community and make it rather difficult to talk of a homogenous Turkish community at all. This situation, however, also turns Turkish electoral campaigns abroad to an even more complicated matter, as political sensitivities among the Turkish migrant community with its diverse groups and the host state and the local public generate more diverse reactions to events taking place in the period leading to elections.

The historical dimension necessitates looking not only at the decade in which Turkish migration to the given country started to take a decisive size, but also the social and historical ways in which Turkey and Turks have been perceived by the given country. In the case of Austria, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and its wars has played the most visible role, whereas Germany and France have been, at different points in history, close part-

ners of this empire that was replaced by a new Turkish nation-state in the 1920s.

The demographic conditions of the migrant community as well as the legal framework that allows or rather discourages dual citizenship also determine the way electoral campaigns are perceived in the host states. Germany is most famous for its rather strict citizenship laws that only in the last two decades have seen a major shift to a more liberal direction that allows an easier and more comprehensive citizenship process, whereas France follows a non-ethnic approach in granting citizenship. The bigger size of Turkish migrants in Germany and Turkish critique at what are perceived as German assimilationist policies further complicate the matters. Most importantly, however, the changing dynamics between Turkey and the host state can play a significant role in generating diverging perceptions about Turkish transnational political activities in Western European countries.

The practices that make up an electoral campaign abroad are not necessarily perceived in the same way by the host state politicians, or the local public opinion reflected in the press coverage. The practical extension of voting rights to Turkish citizens living abroad coincided with a period in which the earlier Western support for the successive AKP governments and its leader was in decline. This became especially visible in the months leading to the first Turkish electoral campaign abroad, at the time of the 2014’s presidential elections (itself a first experience for all Turkish citizens, as the president used to be selected by parliamentarians in the preceding periods). This campaign was intensively fought also in Western Europe, coinciding with significant anti-Erdoğan sensibilities in the host state politicians and the local public. Questions were raised, for instance, whether it was at all a good idea to allow such Turkish political campaigns to be run within Germany. At the same time, the closer ties between Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Erdoğan’s AKP, most visible in the years of Gerhard Schröder’s chancellorship, took a turn to the worse.

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24 When Erdoğan planned another visit to Cologne in 2014, there emerged preparations for a big protest. The German Foreign Minister Steinmeier had to defend Erdoğan’s planned event. In the early years of AKP governments, there were no such big scale protests. See Zeit Online. Steinmeier verteidigt Erdogans Auftritt in Köln, 19.5.2004, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-05/erdogan-wahlkampf-koeln-proteste-kritik [11.12.2016].

coupled with the German Greens’ strong critique of Turkish government’s reaction to the events related to Gezi Park.\textsuperscript{26}

In all three countries, the Turkish migrant community exists next to many other such communities, creating conditions that generate various contacts between Turks, other migrants and the titular nation’s citizens. France, with its significant Armenian community provides the clearest example of community relations between Turkish and non-Turkish migrants that also include Turkey. This means that many developments taking place in France and affecting the Turkish community relate at one point to the French-Armenian community and thus mean new tensions or crises leading to Turkey’s own interventions.

4. \textit{Practicing electoral campaigns transnationally}

One important part of campaign practices comes in the form of meetings. These can be small or large in scale, and can also take the form of (protest) marches. The logistics of these campaign-related practices also carry significance, as countries such as Belgium or cities like Strasbourg can be used as favourite locations for these events, as they are located at the vicinity of various cities and regions that have larger Turkish migrant communities. However, approached from a practice perspective, it is important, in this context, to understand the relevance of spatial choices.\textsuperscript{27} This means that the way host state officials or public will react to such gatherings will be much influenced by the venue selected for this type of campaign-related events. In this regard, the Cologne speech of the then prime minister Erdoğan in 2008 (although not part of an electoral process per se) was much debated by the German media and the political elite due to his direct critique of German citizenship and migration policies.\textsuperscript{28} Therefore, his later meetings, organized and supported by the pan-European party organization of Turkey’s governing AKP, caught a significant amount of attention from German press\textsuperscript{29}, seeing at times the turning Germany into a Turkish political battlefield.

\textsuperscript{26} See the detailed discussion below.
\textsuperscript{27} See Neumann, Diplomatic Sites.
\textsuperscript{28} For more details, see the discussion below on his 2008 Cologne speech.
\textsuperscript{29} See for example the RPP leader’s election campaigning in Germany, Spiegel Online, Wahlkampf gegen Erdogan in Deutschland, 20.02.2017, www.spiegel.de/politik/Deutschland/terekischer-oppositionsfuehrer-kemal-kilicdaroglu-spricht-in-essen-a-974028.html [07.06.2017].
An aspect that should not be left out of sight concerns the new nature of Turkish electoral campaigns abroad: the active campaigning of all major political parties, and thus not limited to the AKP. The main opposition party secular centre-left Republican People’s Party (RPP) as well as the Turkish and Kurdish nationalist parties, Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and PDP, respectively, all showed signs of active campaigning in various European countries. In this regard, the campaign practices were once again determined by the differing features of local Turkish migrant communities. As the later electoral results in June 2015 parliamentary elections would show, the (pro-)Kurdish nationalist community had a bigger impact in France, visible in the PDP’s success in gaining 30 per cent of the votes cast by Turkish citizens there (although the AKP got 51 per cent and thus left PDP on the second place).

The French reaction with regard to the Turkish pre-electoral campaign practices was the least visible one when taking the press and political impact into account. The most important factor explaining the rather overlooked nature of Turkish campaigns was the relative smallness of Turkish migrant community in France. During Erdoğan’s 2014 visit, just before the official presidential campaign reached Lyon, there were only some minor reports on protest plans that erupted within a divided Turkish migrant community, furthered by the reaction of some Armenian societies there. This is explainable with regard to the relative size and position of Turkish migrants within France. Unlike Germany, the Turkish-background citizens and residents do not make up a significant proportion of the country’s population and therefore, there was no visible reaction from major political forces, with the exception of local Communists and their allies in the case of Lyon.

In the case of Austria, although the Turkish campaign events had a rather smaller scale, the reaction of the Austrian politicians was quite considerable. The reasons could be found less in the size of the Turkish community (which is similar to German rates) and more in the historical antagonism between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. The historical legacy of Austrian liminality vis-à-vis the Ottoman armies would also make part of the explanation in this case. Erdoğan’s visit in the same period with his Lyon event led to a high-profile protest, in the person of then Austrian Foreign Minister. Sebastian Kurz saw in such meetings a way of carrying

den of Turkish politics into Austria, saying that Austrians “do not need this, do not want this and reject this.” The gathering in Vienna had a crowd of more than 13000 Turks who came to listen to the Turkish Prime Minister. In all the three countries studied, this was the most visible reaction coming from a government official. In this case, the major explanation could be found in the Austrian domestic politics, shaped by the Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) significant threat for the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), the centre-right party to which Kurz belongs. Against the anti-immigrant and populist voices of far-right FPÖ, the Foreign Minister was able to see in the Erdoğan speech and the big gathering a means through which he could be seen as acting decisively in line with some more nationalist expectations in Austria. The period leading to the event was also controversial, with the UETD facing difficulties in finding a proper venue for the event. Kurz even warned Erdoğan in advance, suggesting he should not interfere with Austrian policies, and support the integration of Turkish migrants into the Austrian community.

One major difficulty perceived in the German and Austrian cases was the possibility of intra-communal fighting that could emerge due to the divergences among Turkish citizens living there. As stated earlier, multiple cleavages play a role in this regard, including ethnic Turkish-ethnic Kurdish, religious-secular, Sunni-Alevite, or more nationalist and pro-integration segments. The fact that Turkish politics itself presents a quite polarized picture made things only more difficult. The domestic socio-political conflicts could be easily exported to Europe during the electoral campaigns. That was the assumption in Germany and Austria.

While meetings are probably among the most visible practices involved in pre-electoral campaigning, it is still their spatial dimension that plays a major role. The fact that Turkish political parties are campaigning on non-Turkish soil could by itself pose a threat for some nationalist sections of the local population and the politicians who try to reach that segment of the population. However, it is important to understand that meetings are not always perceived the same way. The organizer and the extent of the gathering as well as the messages shared in these events matter. At the same time, the local, non-Turkish population can also react to the ways in which

certain symbols are displayed. That thousands of people (an increasing share of them also double citizens, not merely citizens of Turkey) carry another state’s flag in a German conference hall, for example, divides the public by generating certain questions about loyalty, nationalism, and broader issues concerning citizenship and the expectations arising from one’s contemporary notions of being a citizen. Similarly, the speeches given there matter, especially if it is a politician belonging to the Turkish government.

The reason of visible German, rather negative, reaction was due to the difference that the two countries’ electoral practices had. AKP’s big-scale meetings included as the main speaker the party leader Erdoğan in his simultaneous capacity as Turkish Prime Minister, raising the stakes of the whole campaign. In comparison to German political parties and political leaders’ small-scale open-air activities, the AKP strategy of organizing huge rallies in sports or entertainment facilities was something so different that this transnationally-run Turkish electoral campaign could not but attract the attention of the German media. In this regard, it is useful to point to the performative nature of these campaign practices. This means that transnational electoral campaigns, in their practices and performative dimensions, contain more than one single interpretation. Turkish political parties and their officials could have in mind one practice that could be rather normal, and perceived as a mundane campaign practice within Turkey. However, this same aspect could have a much different meaning in the eyes of migrant Turkish community, but also for the broader public of the host state and its politicians. As a concrete case, the thousands of Turkish flags waved in the AKP meetings and Erdoğan’s fiery speeches praising the Turkish nation as such, while simultaneously criticizing German policies vis-à-vis the Turkish migrants there, at times, lead to completely divergent perceptions. For a Turkish domestic audience, watching these scenes on a TV screen, these are an ordinary part of Turkish electoral politicking. However, the Turks who participate in these meetings find in the same event a means of reconnecting to their homeland without leaving their work and life worlds in Germany. The third receiver of these events and of their performative practices, namely the broader German public opinion and the local press there, on the other hand, see in these flags, and nationalist speeches something that can disturb them.33 In this context, it is use-

ful to note that the audience that reacts negatively does not have to be necessarily a nationalist one, as also the liberal segments of German society would have their own interpretation of these gatherings that carries its own negative evaluations.

One of the assumptions in the practice turn is that practices have also their origins in various actions that later take a more or less permanent character. In the case of Turkish electoral campaigns, one could see also this dynamic at work. The AKP-organized events of the pre-2014 period as well as Erdoğan’s various trips to Germany and the speeches he gave there, most famously in 2008 in Cologne, could be interpreted, in this regard, as the actions that would only later take a further dimension when the electoral campaigns turned these actions into visible practices. Henceforth, the German public opinion was able to see that recurring Turkish electoral cycles would generate similar pre-electoral campaign practices, turning Germany into an extended battlefield of Turkish politics. Approaching the campaigns in this way allows us to see the processes that turn intermittent actions into mundane practices. In this context, the mundanity does not refer, obviously, to the German acceptance of these campaigns, but to the reality that they have become a usual part of transnational electoral processes involving Turkish political parties, Turkish voters in Europe and the local public and its reactions.

In the case of Erdoğan’s 2008 speech in Cologne Arena, the German media paid particular attention to the fact that no German politician had for a long time managed to gather twenty thousand people for such a political event. According to Spiegel Online, Kennedy’s speech was delivered to half a million Berliners, while Kohl’s 1989-1990 speeches were able to attract some ten thousand people. Currently, it continued to emphasize, German leaders were happy if a few thousand people showed up. The details provided in the report also underline the way German public can perceive a Turkish political event: “… everyone has to stand up and sing the Turkish national anthem. Many people join in with the singing, and the applause at the end is deafening. Then comes the German anthem…” followed not by much singing but by “polite applause.”


35 Ibid.
In terms of practice-based explanations, this 2008 event serves as an example of action. The way the gathering was organized presents the different dimensions of an action: by UETD, in an important event space in Cologne, with huge participation, in a way that led to the domination of Turkish symbols, focusing on Erdoğan, the then Turkish Prime Minister and AKP leader. One time-events would later lead to a much repeated campaign event, not only in the process leading to the 2014 presidential elections, when Erdoğan once again gathered some 20,000 Turks in Cologne.36 The same pattern would be repeated at that event, confirming the practice-turn explanation that practices originate from patterned events.37 After Erdoğan became Turkish president, it was the new Prime Minister and AKP leader, Ahmet Davutoğlu who took over the electoral campaign in 2015, also extending his campaign meetings to Germany. As the 2015 parliamentary elections were, in turn, the first elections for the parliament in which a substantive number of expatriate voters could take part by voting within their respective country of residence, they gained in significance. This led the new Prime Minister to promise important benefits to expatriate citizens in case his party would win the elections. It was in this context that, in the weeks leading to the 2015 elections, thousands of Turkish citizens living abroad received letters signed by Davutoğlu. Many expatriate citizens voiced their concerns about the way in which their addresses were found. The probable answer pointed to the use of the governmental database that lists citizens living abroad.38 This provides another example of a transnational practice, namely the sending of propaganda material to citizens living abroad in a massive way.

5. *In lieu of conclusion: More migration, more rights, more transnational campaigns*

As the study aimed to underline, one-time actions can easily take a practice turn themselves, leading either to resignation by the others, or creating acceptance or rejection. The three West European countries studied differed in their reactions. In France, Turkish transnational electoral practices

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seemed not to generate much concern on a national level, whereas in the small Austrian republic there emerged a rather significant debate, including at the time of a coinciding bilateral meeting between Erdoğan and Kurz. Although the speech was not officially part of the coming presidential campaign, it was clear that the Prime Minister aimed to consolidate his support base also in Austria, where he and his party would gain their best results in the 2014 and 2015 elections. The German case, on the other hand, functioned as a third type, where domestic debate was followed by official governmental support for Erdoğan. This, however, would change in 2016, leading to new debates in the transnational political sphere that includes the two countries and the Turkish immigrant community as a binding player. 39

This study aimed to connect the literatures on elections, especially their campaign dimension with transnationalism and the practice turn. The emerging framework aimed to bring together literature distributed within Comparative Politics and IR as well as to tie it to the growing relevance of transnationally focused approaches. In times of new migratory dynamics that reshape our world and also the European continent in a most visible manner, it is important to understand the further significance transnational electoral processes will take. With more states allowing their expatriates the right to vote, and with more states becoming hosts to a growing number of immigrant communities, the possibility of ever more diverse and also even more debated transnational electoral practices is on the rise.

Further research is needed in areas of the comparative study of transnational electoral rights and the ensuing campaigns. While this study provided some initial signposts explaining the diverging outcomes with regard to the host state and public (re)actions to transnational election campaigns, it would be most useful to consider also the possible differences that emerge

39 Just before the April 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum, the bilateral conflict reached a new stage, leading to a de facto ban on Turkish campaigning in Germany. This recent development merits its own study and shall underline the processes that lead to “de-practicing,” that is, the way certain established practices lose their standing ground and become questioned by one or more sides. This presents, at the same time, a certain challenge to the general practices literature (not unlike the recent focus in norms literature on the not merely positive/progressivist aspects associated with norms diffusion – for a recent discussion on this see especially the articles by Hurd, Ian/ Großklaus, Mathias. In: Contemporary Security Policy, 2017, Vol. 38, No. 2. Similar issues followed the 2018 Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections, with AKP accusing German federal and local authorities of hindering its campaign work there, while allowing the opposition parties active campaigning within Germany.
as a result of inter-regional variations, as well as inter-polity distinctions. For this to be undertaken, a broader cross-national approach is necessary, one that would take, in a detailed manner, geographical and regime-type variables into account. The interactions in the case of democratic, democratizing, and authoritarian states would be relevant in this regard.

As the global changes lead to more possibilities of transnational electoral campaigns, this study aimed to show that the differing reactions and perceptions across host states, both in terms of the local public opinion and state actions, can only be understood when approaching the issue from a multi-angle perspective. The home and host states as well as the different status positions of the migrant community matter as well as historical contingencies and the repeated actions becoming (accepted, rejected or criticized) practices. With migrants’ dual-voting becoming a new topic of host and home state politicians, election-related practices will only matter more.40

40 See the footnote above on the speed with which the role and significance of such practices can change.
Creatively Displaced? The Impact of Neoliberal Urban Policies on Immigrants from Turkey in Berlin

Defne Kadıoğlu Polat

1. Introduction

About 2.5 million people with origins in Turkey are estimated to live in Germany today. Studies have shown that despite the fourth generation being born, German residents and nationals with roots in Turkey are still poorer, less educated, feel more discriminated, and are generally less satisfied with their life quality compared to Germans and other immigrant groups. Accordingly, they are the frequent subject of public and academic debate. The greater part of this debate is interested in the integration failures or successes of first-, second- and third-generation immigrants. Integration here is usually understood as approximation to national averages in terms of political participation, education, employment, crime rates and basic values, while the content of these values remains ambiguous. This study offers a methodological shift by refusing to take ethnic and cultural identity as a starting point: it is argued that we can gain a better understanding of Turkish immigrants’ social inequality in Germany by employing a spatial lens. Accordingly, rather than looking at the relative inequality of Turkish immigrants in Germany from the perspective of (failed) inte-

3 In discussions around the non-integration of immigrants and their descendants it is frequently referred to Germany’s Grundwerte (basic values) which particularly Muslim immigrants should adhere to. The content, however, is variable and ambiguous. Basic values in the German public discussion can mean anything from identifying with Germany as one’s home country to not wearing a headscarf.
This work looks at how the economic and social transformation of German cities in the last decades has affected Turkish immigrants’ livelihoods and how neoliberal urban governance might be connected to their relative inequality.

More specifically, this study engages with the effects of gentrification—defined as the transformation of working-class neighbourhoods for middle- and/or upper-class use[4]—on Turkish immigrants residing in a low-income neighbourhood in Berlin. It shows that European Union (EU)-supported urban policies in the German capital have accelerated and assisted the gentrification of neighbourhoods that have previously been marked as ‘Turkish’ or ‘Muslim ghettos’. By means of a case study about the Neukölln district, it is discussed how the classification of immigrant-heavy areas as ‘problematic’, on the one hand, and Berlin’s marketing as a creative and multicultural world city, on the other, have driven local urban policies that have facilitated and accelerated the gentrification of the capital’s inner city. It will be argued that gentrification, rather than ameliorating the life quality of Turkish and other immigrants in the quarter, has added other problems such as rent pressure and loss of the local infrastructure.

The study will first provide a brief background on Berlin’s neoliberal restructuring and then discuss its effects on low-income Turkish immigrants. It will then proceed with the empirical case study. Subsequently, it will be shortly debated how recent developments in Germany might affect competition for housing among different groups of immigrants and further fuel the stigmatization of immigrant-heavy neighbourhoods. In the conclusion it will be suggested that while Berlin is discursively constructed as a diverse and multicultural capital, increasing competition for housing and the gentrification of immigrant-heavy quarters are defeating the purpose of sustaining and supporting ethnically diverse neighbourhoods and ultimately improving the life chances of Turkish immigrants and their children.

2. EU regions, locational competitiveness and housing in Berlin

After reunification there has been an emphasis on how Germany can boost its attractiveness for investors through strengthening the individual competitiveness of its different regions. According to human geographer Neil Brenner this so-called “locational debate” (Standortdebatte) must be read

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against the political concept of “Europe of the Regions” through which “the regional scale is now widely promoted as the key territorial arena for economic competitiveness while the European scale is increasingly seen as the ‘natural zone’ for economic competition.”

This “reterritorialization” has fostered competition between different regions and cities for attracting capital investment. Länder (states of the Federal Republic of Germany) authorities as well as city municipalities, even district municipalities have been engaged in adjusting their polices and institutional frameworks to appeal to investors. Accordingly, various “locational politics” have emerged. Regions, cities and even individual districts are now competing at the national as well as at the European level. Berlin is not only measured against London or Paris but also against Hamburg and Munich. As will be further explicated throughout the empirical discussion, some local authorities in working-class districts that inhabit relatively high shares of immigrants and that are publicly conceived to be ‘problematic’ in this context have attempted to re-conceptualize their districts as attractive destinations for lovers of ethnic and cultural diversity.

In terms of urban policies this has entailed that many German cities, particularly bigger ones that are the potential economic engine of their region, have been restructured in order to appeal to investors and tourists rather than to their local populations. They have become “entrepreneurial.”

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7 Brenner, Building ‘euro-regions’ locational politics, p. 329.

8 So does Neil Brenner underline that while the traditional aim of spatial planning in Germany has been to equalize the living conditions across the country, since the 1990s the emphasis in documents issued by the German Department of Spatial Planning, Construction and Urban Development such as the Raumordnungspolitischer Orientierungsrahmen (Framework for Spatial Planning Policy Orientation) of 1992 or the Raumordnungspolitischer Handlungsrahmen (Framework for Spatial Planning Policy Implementation) of 1995 has increasingly been on urban centers as growth engines for the regions and the country as a whole. See Brenner, Building ‘euro-regions’ locational politics, p. 331.

Berlin after reunification has been seen as growth engine for its own region, in particular, and for Germany in general and has accordingly developed into one of the most rapidly changing landscapes of Western Europe. The city has become the stage for large construction projects, such as techno parks, finance centres and high-class residences. The housing sector has obviously been tremendously affected particularly because Berlin’s housing market is exceptional in the sense that most of the population is concentrated in the centre. Moreover, the rate of owner occupation is significantly low, though recently increasing: less than 20 per cent of the total housing stock is owner-occupied, making the local population more vulnerable to a tense housing market. The reason for Berlin’s particular residential structure is that public involvement in the housing sector has been more intensive and prolonged in the capital since its isolated status led to high subsidies from the federal government. After reunification, however, social housing has been subject to deregulation. By 2006 about half of Berlin’s social housing stock had been sold to private realtors. This is dramatic if we consider that 60 per cent of Berlin’s households would qualify to benefit from social housing given their low income. Yet 85 percent of Berlin’s 1.6 million strong rental housing stock is now privately owned and only partially price-controlled.

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10 See the Raumordnungspolitischer Orientierungsrahmen of 1992 (Framework for Spatial Planning Policy Orientation) which named Berlin-Brandenburg as one of six “European metropolitan regions” with a crucial role in enhancing Germany’s economic competitiveness, in Brenner, Building ‘euro-regions’ locational politics, p. 331.
15 During the writing process of this paper a new law was passed by the Berlin Senate that as of 2016 foresees more financial support for residents of social housing for which public funding has been terminated as well as new construction of publicly owned housing. I will not dwell into particularities, for now it suffices to say that while this law certainly is a way of helping working-class residents stay put in gentrifying areas, it will most likely only be a temporary solution that would postpone the problem.
While the Berlin Senate, at least until recently, claimed that there is still considerable housing vacancy, the BBU Verband Berlin-Brandenburgischer Wohnungsunternehmen e. V. (Federation of the housing companies and housing cooperatives with their place of business in the city of Berlin and in the federal state of Brandenburg) maintained that vacancy sank to 2.3 per cent and even down to 1.5 per cent in inner city boroughs in 2012, indicating housing shortages as of today.\textsuperscript{17} The German political scientists Margit Mayer accordingly claimed that Berlin could no longer be taken as an example of an integrated city and argued that while the German capital does not share many of the preconditions we observe in other global cities such as suburbanization\textsuperscript{18}, there is strong evidence that a convergence of Berlin with some second-order global cities such as Los Angeles, Frankfurt, Chicago, Zürich or Shanghai is taking place, with signs of increasing economic and social inequality.\textsuperscript{19}

Gentrification, the remake of typically inner city working-class neighbourhoods for middle- and upper class use, is probably the most striking manifestation of this increasing spatial polarization. By definition the low-

\textsuperscript{16} Partially price-controlled means that there is usually a limit on what the house owner can demand from a new tenant and that there is a limit on rent increase for already-residing tenants. For newly leased apartments landlords could in the past go 20 per cent over the average rent for the neighborhood. In 2015, however, a new law was passed by Conservatives and Social Democrats that lowered this rent increase to ten per cent. This new law is only valid for areas with a ‘tense tenant market’, on which the individual Länder would have to decide and is not valid for new buildings or buildings that have been extensively modernized (one-third of the building-price reinvested for modernization). Also, the rent regulation is only supposed to be valid for the next ten years. See, Sozialer Wohnungsbau: Wegfall der Anschlussförderung. Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt. 2011, http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/anschlussfoerderung/ [15.09.16].


\textsuperscript{18} Suburbanization connotes a population shift from central parts of the city to the suburbs with the inner city increasingly turning into a non-residential area, typically for business and tourism. As pointed out, this is not yet the case for Berlin whose population is still heavily concentrated in the centre.

The higher-priced housing segment is most affected by gentrification, which is exactly the segment in which the majority of Turkish immigrants and their families still have to compete. While ethnic segregation in Germany in general remains low, especially compared to countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom, particularly Turkish immigrants have some distinct housing patterns. They are more likely to concentrate geographically than other immigrant groups that have arrived in the guest worker recruitment period. Moreover, a difference that still persists is that immigrants from Turkey from that period are more likely to live in very old housing stock built before 1918 and are more prone to live in overcrowded apartments. This is firstly due to their relatively low economic status. Secondly, discriminatory practices in Turkish immigrants’ defining period of settlement (such as moving bans into certain districts in Berlin up until the 1990s) have contributed to these dominant residential patterns. Lastly, continuing discrimination of immigrants in the German housing market still limits the housing choices of Turkish immigrants. Unfortunately the integration debate on Turkish immigrants and their children typically does not address their housing situation and how it has affected and still is affecting their prospects in Germany. Instead, emphasis on the responsibility and (bad) intentions of those living in presumed ‘Turkish ghettos’ has been the primary topic of public debate and, as it is further discussed, policies have been designed accordingly.

2.1 Poor but sexy: immigrants in Berlin under the banner of the creative city

Gentrification has evolved into one of the most pressing issues in Berlin over the last decade. The term is not only used in academic circles but has become part of the mainstream talk about the city, raising major concerns

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and criticism among different groups in society. Part of Berlin’s gentrification, so I argue, has been due to its construction as so-called “creative city”.

Economist Richard Florida has famously argued that outsiders and tolerance for them play an important role in constructing the image of the creative city. The existence of ethnic or gay communities or different subcultures, such as an art scene, can be utilized as important asset for neoliberal growth. Florida has developed several indices such as the “bohemian index”, the “gay index” and the “diversity index” arguing that cities that are high on these indices, i.e. that are home to high shares of artists, LGBTQI individuals and/or different ethnic/racial or religious minorities, have more potential for socioeconomic development because they attract a “creative class” of typically well-educated newcomers.

On a positive note, it has been argued that the creative city strategy is a less harmful route to economic growth that rather than excluding traditionally marginalized populations explores their economic and social potential through the celebration of difference. Critical scholars, however, have maintained that the problem with the creative city strategy is that minority communities are symbolically but not necessarily structurally included. Immigrants in the creative city, for example, are expected to contribute to their own material well-being by engaging in entrepreneurship but systematic inequalities are seldom addressed. This ironically encompasses the so-called creative class whose cultural capital frequently exceeds its economic capital. Accordingly rising rents may eventually lead to a displacement of the creative class itself. In other words, artists and other newcomers are instruments to gentrify the urban space but they are not the ones “who must be catered to.” Instead the goal is to boost the competitive edge of city and sub-city units in order to attract big capital even if that means that those whom the creative city image is attached to (ethnic and sexual minorities, artists, often students etc.) eventually have to leave. Thus, we can argue that the creative

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city strategy, despite of using softer methods and discourses tends to conceal the different interests and opportunities of those who are supposed to represent its image.\textsuperscript{29}

The use of the creative city strategy for Berlin is of course not coincidental but highly correlated with the fact that Berlin is already too late to occupy other niches in the global economy such as finance or scientific innovation. The failure to attract enough investment had left the municipality in 2001 with a major budget deficit and indicated the need to develop a new and relatively low-budgeted vision.\textsuperscript{30} The idea of Berlin as a Mecca for artists has particularly been vocalized and appropriated by former long-time mayor Klaus Wowereit, who declared in 2004 that the capital is “poor but sexy” (\textit{arm aber sexy}).\textsuperscript{31} “Poor but sexy” came to be the header of a series of new or reinterpreted symbolic meanings that are today attached to Berlin.

Nowadays, Berlin has a strong creative labour force with ten per cent of the working population being employed in culture-related industries generating a fifth of the capital’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\textsuperscript{32} Colomb\textsuperscript{33} argues that the creative sector in Berlin has shifted the attention from Mitte, Potsdamer Platz and Friedrichstrasse and their surrounding areas to the whole city as an “exhibition” space, making not all but at least the more centrally located boroughs of Berlin such as Prenzlauer Berg, Kreuzberg, Friedrichshain and more recently Neukölln, stakeholders in the new Berlin hype. Kreuzberg in particular was already an attractive destination for artists and social outsiders before reunification. Cheap rents and vacant houses led to an interesting and –for some– alluring mix between immigrants, working-class Germans, students, artists and last but not least a world-renowned squatter movement. After the fall of the Wall, Kreuzberg and its surrounding area –today also North Neukölln–have be-
come crucial touristic sites for staging Berlin’s creative hipness and simultaneously its cultural diversity.⁴

Local authorities accordingly frequently portray Berlin as a “multicultural world city.”⁵ Lanz postulates that this is a significant imaginative turn if we consider that over the last decades immigrants in Germany and Berlin were typically considered as “alien presence”, rather than as constitutive parts of an ethnically and racially diverse city. In the new century, so it seems, immigrants were suddenly considered a valuable resource that could be utilized to market and brand Berlin as up and coming global city. However, while promoting the idea of equality between different lifestyles and identities the endeavour for fostering Berlin’s locational competitiveness in Germany and Europe has put increasing pressure on low-income communities living in now gentrifying neighbourhoods. The Reuterkiez neighbourhood in the North of Neukölln, inhabited by a large share of immigrants, most of them with roots in Turkey, is a poignant example of this.

³. Reuterkiez: from ghetto to creative quarter

Similarly to the neighbouring Kreuzberg, Neukölln is historically a working-class neighbourhood. After the construction of the Wall along Neukölln’s borders many former residents left for boroughs further west and immigrants who started to arrive in Germany only a few years after the Second World War (to confront the labour shortage of the booming economy) moved into the vacant and ill-maintained housing. Most of these newcomers were from Turkey.⁶

After the reunification Neukölln turned into a central and hence more valuable area that was likely to possibly enhance Berlin’s economic profile. Accordingly, the mismatch between the district’s potential value and its poor immigrant residents became a concern for the city. Kreuzberg by

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³⁶ Lanz, Berlin aufgemischt, p. 206.
then had already entered a gentrification process, luring in students, tourists and creative workers who wanted to experience the “New Berlin”. Stephan Lanz has argued that with Kreuzberg’s construction and marketing as a hub of “dynamic multiculturalism”\(^{38}\) in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new ‘outside’ was created, leaving Neukölln, which is home to over 160 nationalities, the spot as
dystopia par excellence [...] in which all debated fears of society - disintegration, poverty, exclusion, youth degeneration, religious conflict, violence - discursively condense into one enormous social and cultural explosive substance and materialize spatially.\(^{39}\)

Throughout the late 1990s until the mid- to late 2000s particularly the Reuterkiez neighbourhood in the very north of Neukölln directly bordering with Kreuzberg remained a highly stigmatized area, an image that has been in a reciprocal relationship with weak economic indicators such as above average unemployment, school dropout rates and crime rates.\(^{40}\)

Today, Neukölln is still frequently conceptualized as a ‘problem district’ and even ‘ghetto’. However, North Neukölln and specifically Reuterkiez has been in a gentrification process since the mid-2000s, similar to the adjacent Kreuzberg. Studies have suggested that by 2011 Reuterkiez’s demographics had shifted towards higher income and higher status residents.\(^{41}\) From 2008 until 2014 rents have increased by 80 per cent, rising over the Berlin average.\(^{42}\) Holm has furthermore argued that Reuterkiez’s gentrification “stands for a new \textit{modus operandi} in Berlin’s gentrification circle” in which so-called ‘expats’ (skilled workers or professionals from first-world countries with high economic, social and cultural capital, often sent abroad by their companies) play a significant role as urban pioneers.\(^{43}\) In 2012 Reuterkiez accordingly received an increased share of migrants from

\(^{38}\) Lanz, Berlin aufgemischt, p. 251.
\(^{39}\) Lanz, Berlin aufgemischt, p. 251. [translated from German by author]
\(^{41}\) Gude, Sozialstrukturentwicklung in Nord-Neukölln.
\(^{43}\) The term “urban pioneers” is generally used in gentrification research to describe the first middle-class cohort that starts moving into an inner city low-income neighborhood and thereby signals to other members of the middle- and upper
other EU countries and North America while migration from Turkey has decreased resulting in a negative migration balance.⁴⁴ But how did Reuterkiez make the step from ‘ghetto’ to one of the most sought after neighbourhoods in the city?

As mentioned above, the pressure on regions and cities to enhance their competitive edge has led to the proliferation of more “entrepreneurial” city policies among EU member states. These policies typically prioritize the demands of investors and tourists over the demands of the local population, particularly if this population is low-income. In Berlin one route to economic growth has been to brand the city as particularly open to artists, creative workers as well as to sexual and ethnic minorities. However, as discussed above, critical scholars have maintained that this so-called creative city strategy, as it is referred to among urban planners and social scientists, actually deepens the already existing structural inequalities.

The nation-wide Soziale Stadt program (Socially Integrative City, short SIC), funded by the federal government, the Länder and communes as well as supported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is a prime example of this approach. The proclaimed goal of the program is to achieve sustainable development for so-called ‘disadvantaged districts’ in terms of their physical environment and the economic and social situation. More specifically, local participation, economy, employment and social and cultural infrastructure should be enhanced through the support of diverse community projects initiated by residents, private stakeholders, NGOs and the like. Every neighbourhood that is targeted by the program (about 300 in Germany) has a “district management” (Quartiersmanagement) whose function is to implement these goals at the local level.⁴⁵

While SIC resembles other community programs such as Empowerment class that the neighborhood is a viable place to live in. Typically pioneers are characterized by relatively low economic but high social and cultural capital, such as students, artists and other people of younger age. Also see: Zukin. Culture and Capital, pp. 129-147.


Zones in the United States or City Strategy in the United Kingdom, German scholar Volker Eick has maintained that SIC is a particular expression of the creative moments in the restructuring of the German economy in that it establishes “new or reorganize[s] pre-existing institutions and practices, which serve to reproduce neoliberalism” through the activation of community discourses. Emphasizing the connection between communities and economic growth, SIC attempts to mobilize civil society, particularly grassroots movements. The language used is one of solidarity and empowerment and the antidote used against exclusion is to boost the competitive potential of the targeted areas. Or as Eick puts it:

When mobilizing city space as an arena for market-oriented economic growth becomes the central goal of urban policy, urban forms of governance also become entrepreneurial. Such forms of governance target pro-growth strategies and include projects aimed at involving residents to enhance ‘security and order’ [...] [SIC] reconceptualizes economically poor urban neighborhoods as deprived and mainly migrant, with their residents viewed as being unemployable and dependent on welfare (Eick, 2005).

As Eick implies in this quote, the choice of districts that qualify as ‘disadvantaged’ within SIC is built on highly problematic premises. Local authorities themselves decide which ones of their neighbourhoods are ‘problematic,’ though the state in which the city or commune is located can accept or decline this choice. The evaluation is made on the basis of comparative data concerning such factors as housing vacancies, housing quality, the health and education level of residents and in particular the reception of social benefits and unemployment. Moreover, soft data is also included in the identification of problematic areas, such as negative image, subjective feelings of insecurity, and so on. An evaluatory study of SIC undertaken by a research team at Humboldt University in Berlin shows that “problem quarters” are frequently identified on the basis of the extent of immi-

48 Quoted in Eick, Preventive Urban Discipline, p. 69.
50 Eick, Preventive Urban Discipline, pp.73-74.
grant residential concentration.\footnote{Häussermann, Hartmut. Soziale Stadt. In: Lehrbereich Stadt- und Regionalsoziologie an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Ed.). Ergebnisbericht eines studentischen Lehrforschungsprojektes im Studiengang Sozialwissenschaften. Berlin, 2003/4.} Similar to other urban policy projects in Western Europe, local boosterism and regulatory policies are thus often geared at neighbourhoods in which the ethnic minority population is disproportionately high. The Humboldt University study, however, states that this argument is an “ecological fallacy”\footnote{Häussermann, Soziale Stadt, p.118}; the basic assumption is that the concentration of ethnic minorities leads to weak socio-economic indicators. Accordingly, a solution is sought in policies that aim at the de-concentration of immigrants and social mixing. What is, however, ignored is the relation between immigrants, legal status and class. The socio-economic gap between different neighbourhoods and boroughs within a city may be better explained not by the clustering of immigrants or minorities in these areas but with the clustering of socio-economically weak groups.

The obvious contradiction is that while diversity, in line with the idea of the “creative city”, is frequently described as a positive asset in municipal as well as in SIC documents, the co-habitation of ‘indigenous’ and ‘foreign’ people is at the same time depicted as “overwhelming”\footnote{Krings-Heckemeier, Marie-Therese/ Pfeiffer, Ulrich. Überforderte Nachbarschaften. Soziale und ökonomische Erosion in Großsiedlungen. In: Überforderte Nachbarschaften. Zwei sozialwissenschaftliche Studien über Wohnquartiere in den alten und den neuen Bundesländern, GdW Schriften, 1998, Vol. 48, p. 24.} for the ethnically German population. This contradiction emerges because SIC and the district managements typically base their projects and initiatives on the problems of non-immigrant Germans who are in one way or the other collectively organized and can thus voice their concerns more effectively. Accordingly SIC’s position towards immigrant-heavy neighbourhoods can at best be described as “completely unclear.”\footnote{IfS (Institut für Stadtforschung und Strukturpolitik). Die Soziale Stadt. Ergebnisse der Zwischenevaluierung. In: Bundesministerium für Verkehr-, Bau- und Wohnungswesen. Berlin, 2004, p. 225.}

Given Neukölln’s high share of low-income immigrants and its conceptualization as “problem district”, it is not surprising that until recently 11 of the 34 “district managements” in Berlin were located in Neukölln alone. A program applied under the umbrella of SIC in Neukölln’s Northern Reuterkiez neighbourhood is worth particular attention: based on the

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52 Häussermann, Soziale Stadt, p.118
“broken windows theory”\textsuperscript{55} - a theory that suggests that to prevent more serious crimes from happening in urban settings smaller felonies, such as vandalism, must be avoided first - and Florida’s thesis of the “creative city”\textsuperscript{56}, the neighbourhood’s district management in 2005 commissioned an interim use agency (Zwischennutzungsagentur). The interim use agency - which is still operating in different areas of Berlin supported by public funds - is a sort of real estate agency that among other things brokers vacant spaces to artists and other creative workers for short-term use under the terms of relatively moderate rents. The pronounced goal of the project in Reuterkiez was to “connect ‘urban pioneers’ with the local economy”\textsuperscript{57} and to thereby foster urban development in these areas. The project was implemented for two years between 2005 and 2007. Though representatives of the interim use agency have repeatedly denied to be agents of gentrification\textsuperscript{58}, the explicit use of the notion “urban pioneers”, which clearly belongs to the vocabulary of the academic gentrification discourse, suggests that SIC, with the help of the private sector, attempted to kick-off a class transformation in the neighbourhood.

And as indicated above, the agency was quite successful in its undertaking: rents in Reuterkiez have risen significantly, the consumption infrastructure has almost completely changed with hardware stores and Turkish coffeehouses being replaced by cafes, restaurants, record stores or boutiques. Once decried as one of the most problematic ‘immigrant’ neighbourhoods, not only of Berlin but of all of Germany, Reuterkiez today decorates tourist guides and has become one of major spots to highlight Berlin’s creative and multicultural edge while its long-term residents are confronted with rising rents.

As the field work\textsuperscript{59} of the author of this paper shows, among long-term residents with roots in Turkey gentrification has led to mixed feelings: while many residents appreciate the polished image of their quarter and


\textsuperscript{56} Florida, Creative Class.

\textsuperscript{57} Zwischennutzungsagentur Official Website, http://www.zwischennutzungsagentur.de/front_content.php [15.09.16].


\textsuperscript{59} Field work in Reuterkiez, Neukölln was conducted for approximately five months between November 2012 and February 2013 and included 46 semi-structured in-depth interviews with long-term residents with origins in Turkey and 17 social workers and members of civil society active in the neighbourhood.
the beautification of the streetscape as well as the liveliness young newcomers bring to their neighbourhood, a frequent complaint is that their life quality has not been enhanced. Their daily problems remain the same and are in some respects, such as in the case of rent increase, even aggravated. An important issue is schools: many better-educated newcomers avoid sending their children to local schools due to the high share of children with migrant background, which in turn means that the ideal of creating a socially more mixed neighbourhood as propagated by the SIC program is not fulfilled in the educational realm. Many inhabitants also voice that public authorities as well as German society in general have failed to acknowledge the positive sides of Reuterkiez in its pre-gentrification state, such as strong inter-ethnic local networks, and instead, have chosen to demonize the neighbourhood. The question that thus poses itself is for whom the change in Reuterkiez was initiated. There is no doubt that the quarter had its problems which were a concern to both non-immigrant and immigrant residents, but the fact that “urban pioneers” moved to Reuterkiez and opened cafes and boutiques seems not to have solved these problems. As of today, however, compared to Kreuzberg, collective action among Turkish immigrants in Reuterkiez or Neukölln against gentrification is still less prominent.

4. Gentrification and housing in conjunction with latest developments

There is certainly a need to at least briefly touch upon the current situation in Berlin’s and Germany’s housing market against the backdrop of the so-called refugee crisis and the rise of right-wing populism as promoted by the relatively new political party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD): approximately one million refugees have come to Germany since 2014, many of which are likely to stay at least for a couple of years or for good, though it is difficult to project clear numbers. Refugees’ integration into Germany’s housing market has been one of the most debated issues. Many cities experience heightened competition in the housing market and natu-

61 See the resident initiative “Kotti & Co” in Kreuzberg.
rally it is again the lower-priced segment that is most affected.\textsuperscript{63} Right-wing populist parties such as the AfD are as expected using these tensions to polarize the German society and gain protest votes. While the general claim of the AfD is that migrants and refugees deteriorate the life quality of non-immigrant Germans, particularly those of the ‘native’ German working-class, it is important to note that German economists suspect that most refugees compete with other low-income immigrant groups for jobs and housing, given that earlier immigrant groups in Germany usually still poses lower qualification for the job market and are - among other things due to lower income - more vulnerable to displacement.\textsuperscript{64} As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, in terms of social disadvantagement, Turkish immigrants and their descendants are particularly worth mentioning in this context.

Neukölln is an interesting case in this respect: while the district officially inhabits lower number of refugees compared to many other districts in Berlin (due to a lack of collective shelters), former district major and current Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth Franziska Giffey claims that the unofficial numbers are fairly high. Given the presence of a relatively large group of Arabic speaking immigrants in the north of Neukölln, many families temporarily house Syrian, Iraqi or North African refugees, with some of them maybe being relatives.\textsuperscript{65} If these refugees will be able to stay in the country they are likely to search for housing in Neukölln. In other words: Neukölln is currently an area in which competition for housing is likely to further rise with gentrifiers, long-term residents, immigrants and non-immigrants as well as refugees residing in close proximity. For Turkish immigrants in Reuterkiez, rent pressure might now come from ‘above’ (through middle class newcomers) as well as from ‘below’ (from new, highly vulnerable immigrant groups).

While the AfD and other right-wing political circles as well as parts of the German media are likely to further frame the current ethnic, social and


economic composition in Neukölln as a threat to social cohesion, others argue that the district is evidence of how living together with differences can work out. In the context of this paper, the question remains how the different socio-economic groups in the district will cope with rising competition in the housing market.

5. Conclusion

Immigrants and particularly immigrants from Turkey have for a long time been primarily perceived as problem in German society. Accordingly, inner city districts in Berlin that have historically been home to a relatively large share of low-income immigrants, have frequently been marked as ‘ghettos’. An example of this is the district of Neukölln, which was for a long time portrayed as uninhabitable and dangerous. In the new century, however, a series of new imaginaries became attached to Berlin including the notion of cultural, ethnic and racial diversity. Immigrants within this new imaginary are seen as useful resources whose everyday practices can be gazed upon and consumed by tourists and newcomers. Not surprisingly then, districts that were prior constructed as Turkish or Muslim ghettos, such as Neukölln, have increasingly found their way into tourist guides and are celebrated as exciting hubs to witness the emergence of a new and diverse metropolis. This symbolic inclusion of immigrants, however, has not tackled the structural inequality.

Accordingly, while Berlin celebrates its newly recognized diversity, neighbourhoods that are supposed to represent this diversity are subjected to urban policies that result in diffusing the local immigrant population. One example of this has been the interim project applied in Reuterkiez between 2005 and 2007: artists and creative workers were offered vacant spaces for relatively moderate rents in order to function as urban pioneers who ‘prepare’ the neighbourhood for middle class newcomers and tourists. The project was part of the nation-wide, publicly funded and EU-supported SIC program. This ready-made policy that has been largely inspired from creative city policies originating from other countries, however, has failed to take into account the experiences, perceptions and needs of low-income and particularly immigrant residents.

The result in Reuterkiez has been an accelerated gentrification process that today increasingly threatens long-term residents. Turkish immigrants are particularly under pressure since their choices in the housing market are constrained by factors such as discrimination, relative low-income, low degree of formal education and higher rates of unemployment when compared with working-class ethnic Germans and other immigrant groups that arrived in the guest worker period. Unfortunately SIC and similar initiatives do not sufficiently address these structural inequalities. Instead what is today increasingly expected of low-income immigrants is that they address their own material inequality by contributing to the economic growth of their neighbourhoods.

German public authorities and urban planners in particular need to be more considerate of local dynamics when designing urban policies targeting relatively marginalized areas. Only because a neighbourhood has been decried as ‘ghetto’ and conceptualized as ‘problematic’ does not mean that all residents perceive all aspects of their lives in the neighbourhood as actually ‘problematic’. Moreover, as discussed above, the question why particularly immigrant-heavy neighbourhoods in Germany often cope with variety of social problems deserves more scrutiny among local authorities. Among other things the link between stigmatization and social inequality is important: in light of the current rise of right-wing populism and the so-called refugee crisis it is crucial that policy-makers of German centre and left-wing parties would counter tendencies to further (or again) stigmatize areas such as Reuterkiez and Neukölln as ‘ghettos’ since these stigmatizations not only lower the life chances of inhabitants but are likely to provoke social tensions between different groups in the quarter, which might not occur otherwise.

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Educational Inequalities within the context of the Turkish Community in Germany: Family Background, Institutional Settings and Ethnic Boundaries

Çetin Çelik

1. Introduction

Since the post-war period expansion of education, increasing one’s average level of schooling, has become a Europe-wide phenomenon.¹ Today, a university degree is indeed seen as a precondition for accessing high status jobs and income. However, despite the increasing number of participation in education, students from immigrant backgrounds cannot generally benefit from the expansion of education as much as their native counterparts.² Among different immigrant groups, the descendants of Turkish immigrants are particularly disadvantaged both in education and the labour market in various European countries.³ They are, for instance, usually relegated to vocational school tracks and they drop out of schools more often than their native counterparts in the Netherlands.⁴ Only a quarter of Turkish pupils attend prestigious academic school types, while more than half of them attend less prestigious school types such as vocational schools in the Austrian educational system.⁵ Along the same line, they are more dis-

advantaged than native counterparts in the Belgian educational system. Various reports of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) revealed that the descendants of Turkish immigrants are underprivileged compared to both native and other second-generation immigrant groups at almost every level of the German educational system. Indeed, studies done in different points in time have systematically displayed that they achieve the lowest educational qualifications and leave school earlier than native and any other immigrant group. A most recent study focused on descendants of Turkish and Yugoslavian immigrants in Berlin and Frankfurt comparatively and demonstrated that Turkish children have higher school year repetition rate in primary and secondary school and are more often recommended for lower secondary school types.

While low educational performance of immigrant youth is a source of concern for integration in general, the situation is more alarming in Germany due to two reasons. First, unlike many other countries, the strong link between educational certificates and occupations does not allow immigrant youth to change or improve their occupational position in the labour market afterwards. That is, school certificates powerfully deter-

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10 Sürig, Inken/ Wilmes, Maren. The Integration of the Second Generation in Germany: Results of the TIES Survey on the Descendants of Turkish and Yugoslavian Immigrants. IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam, 2015.
mine very early both occupational position and life chances. Second, the
country’s economy that has gone through a strong restructuration process
constantly demands such soft skills as social abilities and communication
competences in the service sector. However, low certificate holders and
non-holders lack these skills. These two factors significantly put smooth in-
tegration of the Turkish second-generation into the labour market at risk
and thus increase the possibility of their marginalization in the society
compared to their first generation, who, as guest-workers, could find work
with similar or even lower qualifications.12

2. How to explain educational performance of Turkish second-generation

The research on immigrant incorporation has mainly focused on the ef-
fects of socioeconomic issues and structural factors in the educational per-
formance of second-generation immigrants. The research tradition on so-
cioeconomic factors has specifically examined the impact of low parental
education, occupation, income and cultural characteristics on educational
performance. Song, for example, investigated the educational performance
of Turkish second-generation in the educational systems of three European
countries, Germany, Austria and Switzerland.13 He found that parental ed-
ucation and occupational profile, and cultural capital, measured by the
number of books at home, are significantly lower for this group than na-
tive counterparts in the three countries. Lagana and others investigated the
differences in post-compulsory education pathways between natives and
second-generation immigrants in Switzerland.14 They uncovered that sec-
ond-generation Turkish immigrants are usually cumulated in lower voca-
tional school tracks and their early transition into working class occupa-
tions is entirely explained by socioeconomic factors. Salikutluk and Ste-
fanie studied the effect of traditional gender roles on gender disparities in

12 Solga, Heike. Ohne Abschluss in die Bildungsgesellschaft: die Erwerbschancen
gering qualifizierter Personen aus soziologischer und ökonomischer Perspektive.
Opladen, 2005.
13 Song, Steve. Second-Generation Turkish Youth in Europe: Explaining the Aca-
demic Disadvantage in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. In: Economics of Edu-
14 Laganà, Francesco/ Chevillard, Julien/Gauthier, Jacques-Antoine. Socio-Economic
Background and Early Post-Compulsory Education Pathways: A Comparison be-
tween Natives and Second-Generation Immigrants in Switzerland. In: European
They found that parents with Turkish migration background have lower aspirations for their daughters if mothers are not in the labour market, and that boys with Turkish migration background, who have traditional attitudes, achieve lower results in math, while they did not find any such gender difference regarding German parents and students. Compared to other European countries, there is stronger sociocultural focus on reasons for educational underachievement of children of Turkish immigrants in the German migration research literature. The causes for such a tendency might be traced back to the elements of ‘foreigner pedagogy’, Ausländerpädagogik, which was guiding principle of education in 1960s, and 70s. This principle aimed to integrate children of guest workers into the educational system while preparing them also for a possible return to their country of origin.

According to Ausländerpädagogik, the culture of Turkish immigrants is ‘pre-modern’ and resistant to ‘modern’ German culture. ‘Traditional’ Turkish students experience cultural conflict and often fail in the ‘modern’ German educational system. Consequently, school success is presumed to mean an inevitable generational conflict between traditional parents and modernized children as achievement forces students to live a life between the two cultures.
The research tradition that focuses on structural conditions mostly emphasizes the role of educational systems rather than socioeconomic factors. Kunz compared reading literacy between immigrants’ children in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. The results of the study suggest that the performance of children of Turkish immigrants from households in Switzerland, in which German is not spoken, is substantially higher than in Germany. The reason for this difference in favour of Switzerland, Kunz suggests, might be explained, among other things, by comparatively later tracking and higher amount of language lessons in the Swiss educational system. Pastzor studied educational pathways of Turkish second-generation immigrants to higher education in Austria. She shows that the early tracking in education significantly reduces the opportunities for Turkish immigrant youth from socioeconomically poor backgrounds. The patterns of educational pathways of second-generation Turkish immigrants in Europe show that national contexts and institutional settings matter considerably. They cumulate typically into lower vocational or the lowest secondary school types in the German, Dutch and Swiss educational systems characterized by early tracking. They enrol frequently into preparatory tracks for higher education, yet they drop out of schools more often in French and Belgian educational systems, which do not have the early tracking. The institutional explanations gained currency in Germany particularly as result of so-called 'PISA-Shocks' in 2001 and 2006. Macro issues such as systemic inequalities and school segregations have gradually come to be addressed as main mechanisms of social and educational injustice. The harming effects of the tracking after primary school on equal opportunities for students from different class and ethnic background have constituted an important research field. It has been argued that the early selection of students into different programs particularly hampers social mobility of students from underprivileged background as they cannot find

22 Tracking means separating students into differently organized, hierarchically ordered secondary school programs such as vocational and academic ones based usually on course grades and teacher recommendations.
23 Pásztor. Divergent Pathways.
enough time to compensate for their relatively weak socioeconomic resources and language skills.\textsuperscript{26}

These two research traditions on socioeconomic factors and structural conditions have made substantial contributions to the second-generation literature. They have demonstrated that Turkish immigrants lack necessary economic, social and cultural capital and certain types of educational systems handicap them. However, I appropriate genetic structuralism perspective\textsuperscript{27}, which means the structure of any social phenomenon is related to the larger structure of the social realities in which the phenomenon occurs, and argue that these two research traditions neglect the structures of larger social realities in which socioeconomic factors and institutional settings operate. In the following, I maintain that Turkish immigrants have been confronted with very strong and broad ethnic boundaries in their daily lives such as negative public discourses, exclusionary citizenship regime, de-industrialization process and the rigid tracking system. Socioeconomic factors and institutional settings are having constraining effects on the educational performance of second-generation Turkish immigrants in the context of these larger social realities. In the conclusion, I will show by referring to empirical studies that this group of youth is aware of these exclusionary broad boundaries and may partly withdraw from education in a strategic effort to cope with social exclusion. This part will also present a general reflection regarding the advantages of using a perspective that places socioeconomic factors and structural conditions with historical viewpoint within a larger general structure in terms of understanding educational performance of second-generation.

3. \textit{Ethnic boundaries and ethno-religious hierarchies}

Minorities or immigrant groups often find themselves in the symbolic hierarchy of ethnicities, races and religions of receiving countries. The social construction of these categories and their hierarchical order in symbolic systems are the results of long historical processes. This hierarchy is shaped by and transmitted through various institutional forces such as family, laws and media. This long-term process constructs finally an ever-changing but

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{26} Çelik, Çetin. The Process of Leaving School and Meaning of Schooling: The Case of Turkish School Leavers in Germany. Bremen, 2011.
\end{thebibliography}
more-or-less stable racial or ethnic order. The ethno-racial or ethno-religious hierarchies are vitally important because they structure the lives and life chances of individuals who are classified into certain groupings, as it was the case for Jews in Nazi Germany. Likewise, hierarchies as such in host societies play incredible roles in the adaptation and incorporation of immigrant groups as they show which immigrant group is welcomed or unwelcomed. As immigrant groups reform their identities in the context of the host society, such hierarchies also determine whether they develop adaptational or oppositional identities towards norms and values of host societies.

While ethnic or religious groups occupy different places in the symbolic hierarchies, their array may change depending on various events or dynamics at international and local levels. In other words, ethnic groups are not stable or ‘given’ categories but they are maintained through the vigorous boundaries. The boundaries that are demarcating groups are constantly being redefined on the basis of institutional frameworks, hierarchies of power, and political alliances. The permeability or hardiness of boundaries among groups may change in different social and historical contexts; they can be fluid, policed, crossable or movable. Sticking to the same example, while in the past the group boundaries between Jews and Christians were not crossable and strictly policed throughout the Nazi term, it is not so, today. Or, presently, the widespread sense of social insecurity caused by recent social and economic transformation and political processes can thicken the boundaries with Muslims in Germany, as Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) movement shows. Another contemporary example is the changing of ethnic boundaries between Kurds and Turks in Turkey with the end of the peace process between Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) forces and the Turkish government, Justice

Against this conceptual backdrop, I want to draw attention to the German ethno-religious hierarchy and its effects on second-generation Turkish immigrants’ modes of incorporation into education. In the ensuing section, I document the place of Turkish immigrants in the German ethno-religious hierarchy and the strong ethnic boundaries they are confronted with in their daily lives.

4. The major ethnic boundaries for Turkish immigrants in Germany

4.1 Exclusionary public discourses

To begin with, I maintain that two things have strongly determined the place of Turkish immigrants in German ethno-religious hierarchy. First is the massive labour migration of Turks to the country and second is the growing fundamental Islamism and Islamophobia at global level. Racialisation and ethnicisation of Muslim Turks occurred in Germany in parallel to many other Western countries. The flow of Muslim workers in massive numbers into these countries through bilateral agreements have ethnicised the labour force and established their image as proletarians. The first labour migration from Turkey to Germany was part of the international labour migration flow that was materialized from Mediterranean countries to Western Europe in 1960s. These international labour migrations were a matter of governmental policy, frequently regulated by intergovernmental bilateral agreements. The Second World War had destroyed Germany’s infrastructure and capital stock. However, with growth-promoting institutional reforms and regulations such as currency reform, tax reforms and credit policies, Germany entered a quick and impressive economic advancement and recovery in post-war years, often referred as ‘economic miracle’, Wirtschaftswunder. Between 1948 and 1952, industrial production increased more than 30 per cent and export increased 522 per cent from an almost bottom level. At the same time, the country’s GDP surpassed that

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of Holland, France, Belgium and Great Britain during 1950s with 7.8 per cent yearly average increase. This economic development produced incredible demand for labour. To meet the workforce needed, Germany and Turkey signed two treaties in 1961 and 1964.

These bilateral treaties regulated the entrance of hundreds of thousands of Turkish Muslim guests-workers who rapidly filled in unskilled occupations in industry and services. The arrival of them in enormous numbers with low skills have proletarised the image of Turks in the country and this resulted in the association of Turks with inferiority in the public’s view.

While Turkish immigrants were largely seen as a temporarily staying ethnic proletariat at the beginning of the labour migration, their public image has been gradually politicised due to further migration continuing with family reunions. With the rising rate of unemployment and public assistance recipients, they were portrayed as overwhelming the magnanimous German welfare state. This hostility found its expression most clearly in the Heidelberg Manifesto published by German university elites in 1981, which explicitly depicted the Turkish immigrants as underdeveloped occupiers, who are incapable of integration.

The negative images as occupiers and burden on the generous welfare state circulated more widely in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Large-scale migration from East to West Germany made the competition for resources even harsher. Under these circumstances, antipathy towards Turks led to physical and arson assaults, such as in Mölln in 1992 and in Solingen in 1993. These chains of events have sharpened the image of Turks as problematic ‘for-

38 Ramm, Christoph. The ‘sick Man’ beyond Europe: The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants in European Union Accession Discourses in Germany. In Graham Huggan and Ian Law. Racism Postcolonialism Europe. Liverpool, 2012.
eigners’, Ausländer, and strengthened their place at the bottom levels of ethnic hierarchy in German society. Turks were perceived as incapable of integration due their traditional proletarian and sub-proletarian characteristics.

While the Islamic background of Turkish immigrants had been perceived as an impediment to their integration, 9/11 has increasingly transformed and Islamized their image in the political and public discourses. While some media outlets and politicians made efforts after 9/11 to note that religion should not be blamed for Islamist terrorism, the rise of various incidents at international and local levels have made the public obsessed with Islam, and specifically with Muslims living in Germany. The fact that 9/11 attackers were Muslims who were undertaking education in Germany made the media and public further sensitive to the issue of Islam. The mass media have portrayed Islam as a threat to Western cultural values by referring to gender inequality and violence against women. These changes resulted in the Islamization of the image of Turks, which has shifted from traditional ‘problematic foreigner’, who is incapable of integration, to religious ‘other’, who is unwilling to integrate, a process that has placed the Turkish immigrants even in the lower levels in the German ethno-religious hierarchy.

4.2 Mono-ethnic citizenship regime

The above-mentioned public exclusionary discourses have gone hand in hand with Germany’s restrictive citizenship policy that has created additional obstacles to the structural and emotional integration of Turkish immigrants. Germany was long known for its strict and rigid naturalisation regime. Due to its mono-ethnic regime, citizenship was long based on

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the “principle of blood” and traditionally conceived as a privilege for ethnic Germans only.\textsuperscript{47} This approach prepared the ground for successive Turkish governments to use their power in the Turkish media to discourage integration and naturalization as a result of the fear of losing remittances.\textsuperscript{48} As it became clear that Turkish immigrants were not going to return to their country of origin, the German law, as part of the domestication policy, was modified in 1994 in a way that made the naturalisation process easier for both first and second-generation immigrants.\textsuperscript{49} While language criteria and identification with German culture made the naturalisation process difficult for the first generation, the naturalization rate rapidly increased from 0.4 per cent to 2.5 per cent among Turkish immigrants throughout the 1990s with this new, more liberal citizenship law.\textsuperscript{50}

The 2000 German citizenship law transformed the ‘principle of blood’ to the ‘principle of soil’ by lowering the residence requirement to eight years and abolishing the requirement of identification with the German culture.\textsuperscript{51} While this made it possible for children of immigrants to acquire German citizenship, this was possible only if they renounced their parents’ nationality.\textsuperscript{52} These comparatively inclusive reforms, particularly the reform in 1994, increased the naturalization rate of Turkish immigrants. However, the increasing naturalization strengthened existing concerns about the incompatibility between Muslim Turkish immigrants and Ger-


\textsuperscript{49} Özyürek, Esra. Being German, Becoming Muslim: Race, Religion, and Conversion in the New Europe.


\textsuperscript{51} In 2014, the citizenship law was further reformed with the so-called “option regulation” that allows Turks to hold dual citizenship under certain conditions. For the details, please look at Pusch, Barbara. Legal Membership on the Turkish Side of the Transnational German-Turkish Space. In: İbrahim Sirkeci and Barbara Pusch (Eds.). Turkish Migration Policy. Migration Series, Transnational Press London, 2016.

man society’s ‘Guiding Culture’, Leitkultur, and consequently, the integration of this group even stronger in political and public discourses.\textsuperscript{53}

These stigmatizing concerns were largely groundless due to various reasons. Primarily, although the naturalisation rate of Turkish immigrants increased with the law in 1994, it was still too low compared to other immigrant groups in Germany. The source of concern was the perceived growth of naturalization rather than real growth. Adding to it, naturalization was often an option only for assimilated Turks because it enabled them to reconcile their already achieved individual social status with their legal status.\textsuperscript{54} In other words, the socioeconomically wealthier Turkish immigrants, who could cross the ethnic boundaries with their social, cultural or economic capital, chose naturalisation to minimize their exposure to the ethnic boundaries. Despite its attractiveness for the wealthier members of the group, naturalisation has never been an attractive option for Turkish immigrants from socioeconomically underprivileged backgrounds because of mainly two reasons. First, the migrants enjoy almost the same rights with legal residents and therefore legal incentives to become a citizen are not strong.\textsuperscript{55} That is, while naturalisation functions to eliminate status inconsistency for individually assimilated wealthier Turks, it does not have such a function for socioeconomically poor members of the group. Second, the poor members of the Turkish immigrants already think that naturalisation would not minimize their exposure to the robust ethnic boundaries in German society.\textsuperscript{56}

4.3 Impoverishment due to the deindustrialization process

In addition to the exclusionary anti-immigrant public discourses and the discriminatory citizenship policies, Turkish immigrants have also experi-
enced substantial socioeconomic impoverishment due to the restructuring of the economy. Deindustrialization and the rise of the service sector increasingly brought about the need for soft-skills in the labour market and this structural process has particularly left the descendants of Turkish immigrants in a difficult situation as they have been comparatively lower skilled.\(^{57}\) The transformation of economy has put them into considerable socioeconomic destitution by reducing the needs for manual labours. The waves of termination or international translocation of companies in Ruhr area\(^ {58}\), in Bremen\(^ {59}\) and many other German cities particularly hit immigrant workers.

To exemplify, Turkish immigrants had been largely employed in shipbuilding sector in Bremen\(^ {60}\). There were two major shipyard companies: Bremer Vulkan was located in port of the city in North Sea and AG Weser was located at Gröpelingen, along the Weser River that runs through the city. With the deindustrialization of the German economy, these two major shipyard companies were closed down and more than thirty thousand immigrants, most of whom were Turkish, lost their jobs. In Bremen and many other states, the local governments responded to the restructuring process by activating ‘Professional Retraining Courses’, *Weiterbildung* or *Umschulung*, for manual workers in order to provide them with skills to work in the rising service sector.

Providing professional training was an appropriate and timely policy intervention and it led to the adaptation of many German blue-collar workers to the service sector. However, it did not work for Turkish immigrants equally well as they mostly could not take this training due to the language barrier. Most of these workers were not able to find positions in the rising tertiary sector and entered low-paid and insecure jobs provided by the temporary employment companies that mushroomed in 1990’s. Many of them became unemployed and retired early. This rapid impoverishment crystallized socioeconomic and residential segregation between Turks and Ger-

\(^{60}\) Çetin. The Process of Leaving School and Meaning of Schooling: The Case of Turkish School Leavers in Germany.
mans in many German cities such as Berlin, Cologne, Bremen and Stuttgart.61

4.4 Rigid tracking in the educational system as part of class struggle

The above-mentioned steady impoverishment has had dramatic effects on the educational attainment of the second-generation Turkish immigrants. In Germany, children enter primary school at around six years old. Because all children must attend the school closest to their home by law, socioeconomic and residential segregation reflects onto students’ profiles in schools.62 Many Turkish children attend schools that are equally homogeneous in terms of low socioeconomic status and ethnic background; that is to say the neighbourhoods and thus school environments are poor and primarily of Turkish descent. This is one of the reasons for the emergence of ethnically segregated schools especially in the industrial areas of large cities.63 Following primary school, students aged eleven or twelve are funnelled into differently organized and hierarchically ordered secondary school types: Hauptschule,64 Realschule,65 or Gymnasium66. The students, who are thought of having special needs and learning disabilities, are selected for ‘Special School’ Förderzentrum.67 Although it acquires a slightly

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64 The lower secondary school: it provides a basic general education as a basis of practical vocational training. The certificate of the lowest track, acquired after the ninth or tenth grade, leads to a minimum qualification such as blue collar professions.
65 Intermediate secondary school: it prepares students, most often, for administrative and higher manufacture jobs, stands as a better alternative to Hauptschule. The education here lasts from grade five or seven to grade ten and the certificate leads to a medium-level qualification like white collar jobs.
66 Academic track school: it, in combination with the Abitur (Maturity Certificate), traditionally, leads to university studies. It usually lasts eight or nine years.
67 Special school: during primary education, students who have learning disabilities or cannot meet the requirements of a regular school and thus, are thought of having special needs are selected for special schools designed for handicapped pupils. Subsequently changing the track and getting the chance of a higher school degree is very low. It is maintained that these schools might easily be abused for indirect

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Çetin Çelik
different character in some German states, tracking is generally decided in accordance with student grades, especially in language and math, school recommendation, parents’ choices and potential personality characteristics derived from consultations with the parents. Alongside these three main tracks, ‘Comprehensive Schools,’ Gesamtschulen, also emerged, which integrate these three tracks and facilitate movement between them in some German states. There are integrated comprehensive schools (joint-classes for all students) as well as additive and cooperative comprehensive schools, where the various types of secondary schools exist side by side on the same premises.

This early tracking in life results in a strong association between a family’s socioeconomic status and a child’s school achievement/educational performance. Therefore, the descendants of Turkish immigrants have dramatically accumulated in the less prestigious Hauptschule and come to be less represented in the more academic school type, the Gymnasium. This disproportional distribution of different ethnic groups in different school tracks has led to ‘ethnic segmentation’ in education. As moving among school tracks is difficult in practice, this early selection creates a fundamental institutional risk of social exclusion and dialectically cements and intensifies the social and spatial segregation already existing in society. The Turkish children from poor lower socioeconomic status are excluded from others in the early selection process and, thus, they are restricted to worse labour market opportunities. That is, the system reproduces existing power discrimination since language problems might be mixed up with cognitive deficiencies. Recently, this separation is eliminated or softened in some German states. This is one of the most debated issues regarding the children of immigrants.

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69 There is also Oberschule and it is very similar to Gesamtschule. For the minor differences between these school types, see: http://www.uwe-schuenemann.de/image/inhalte/file/Vergleich%20OBS%20IGS.pdf.


relationships in society by pushing disadvantaged pupils further down in the educational system. Wernstedt argues that this obvious unequal arrangement in education system persists because it is very much linked to general class struggle in German society.

Two thirds of German parents are in principle satisfied with a school system in which their children, going to Realschulen and Gymnasium, are separated from the children of socially disadvantaged families and foreigners. They want to secure the social opportunities for their children and believe that this works best through an early separation based on a differentiated school system.\textsuperscript{73}

This arrangement makes families’ cultural and material resources incredibly important for children’s educational performance and consequently, it obstructs the social mobility of the poor by privileging already privileged groups in the society.\textsuperscript{74}

5. Conclusions and discussions

The two research traditions on modes of immigrant incorporation has successfully revealed that socioeconomic factors and organization of the educational institutions influence educational achievement, and thus integration of second-generation immigrants. This chapter admits this but extends the scope of analysis by placing these factors within the structures of larger social realities. Broad ethnic boundaries such as negative public discourses, mono-ethnic citizenship regime, de-industrialization of economy, and rigid school-type tracking are the major realities in the context of reception that second generation Turkish immigrants interact with on daily basis.

The implications of the constant interactions with such an urban milieu has various undesirable effects on the subjectivities and self-identifications of second-generation Turkish immigrant youth in Germany, which influence their educational performance in schools. The research has repeatedly revealed that descendants of Turkish immigrants are mostly aware of the exclusionary public discourses and negative stereotypes about themselves. A nation-wide survey in 2004 demonstrated that perceived discrimination


\textsuperscript{74} Solga, Heike. Wie Das deutsche Schulsystem Bildungsungleichheiten Verursacht. WZB Brief Bildung, 2008.
is strong among members of this group and it increased from 1999 to 2003, most probably due to 9/11.\textsuperscript{75} A latest research also confirmed this finding further by showing that Turkish immigrants are mostly aware of their negative public image and that they have the highest perceived discrimination among minorities in Germany.\textsuperscript{76} The research on identity formation revealed that re-ethnicisation among disadvantaged young members of Turkish immigrant group is a case and it is strongly linked to feelings of unwelcome by and stigmatization in larger German society and institutions.\textsuperscript{77} More specifically, a very recent study explored how perceived discrimination causes reactive ethnicity and perceived denigration of ethnic culture leads to oppositional identity particularly in the case of the disadvantaged second-generation Turkish youth in Germany\textsuperscript{78}.

The aim of this chapter has been to stress the importance of taking into account socioeconomic factors and institutional dynamics when exploring the underlying reasons of low educational performance of second-generation Turkish immigrants. This builds on previous research that acknowledges strong ethnic boundaries, high perceived discrimination, and reactive and oppositional identity formation in this context. Surely, low parental education, occupation and income together with the institutionally discriminatory tracking system systematically obstruct this group. However, it becomes clearer, when they are placed within larger structures of social realities that this group of youth is already ready to withdraw from education in the form of class repetition, truancy, low academic performance and dropping out in an effort to cope with strong and robust ethnic boundaries they are confronted with on daily basis.


\textsuperscript{78} Çelik, Çetin. Having a German Passport Will Not Make Me German: Reactive Ethnicity and Oppositional Identity among Disadvantaged Male Turkish Second-Generation Youth in Germany.
Germany has “been there, done that”: Remembering the Engagement of Media in German Integration Strategies towards Turkish Immigrants and Beyond

Elif Posos Devrani

1. Introduction

The number of asylum applications to European Union (EU) member states has demonstrated a significant increase since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. Following the refugee flood triggered by the civil war in Syria, 627,000 official asylum applications were submitted to EU member states in 2014, according to Eurostat data.\(^1\) In 2015, the number of refugees in EU countries reached 1.2 million. There were 592,800 asylum applications filed in the first six months of 2016. Again according to data shared by Eurostat, the country that has received the most asylum application is Germany.

The EU member states are working on plans to overcome the refugee crisis and stop the refugee flow. However, in the academic world, integration policies, one of the most important issues to be examined in the ongoing crisis, are being debated. At this point, it is worthwhile to examine Germany’s experience in order to develop further steps toward mitigating this crisis. Germany defines itself as an immigration country following a process that has spanned many years. As an example, Germany has disseminated integration policies throughout all social and political spheres through the German National Integration Plan (\textit{der Nationale Integrationsplan}) that was presented in 2007 by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Within this long-term plan, media plays a significant role in implementing broadcasting policies parallel to the German immigration policy.\(^2\)

This study analyses how the media has been used as an integration tool within the integration policies of the Federal Republic of Germany since

the 1950s towards the Turkish immigrants and beyond. To this end, German integration policy, which also covers Turkish immigrants who came to Germany as guest workers and subsequently became the largest minority in the country, will be evaluated from a chronological point of view with a particular focus on the role of the German media. In this vein, this paper will examine how the media is instrumentalized in the everyday projections of German integration policies. Furthermore, it will be questioned if a mutual relationship exists between media policies and integration policies.

2. Theoretical points of departure

Before mentioning the use of media as a tool of integration in the case of Germany, it would be appropriate to take a look at the relationship of the media with society and state power. The studies that have been conducted on the effects of mass communication can be evaluated under two categories: mainstream and critical. In mainstream studies, the main social model is a pluralist-liberal one, and the media is functionally used to protect pluralist-liberal social values. In critical studies, however, the pluralist-liberal model is not the absolute target. Hence, in these studies, the role and function of media in maintaining social and power relationships are questioned. Althusser, one of the most important philosophers and ideology theorists known for his critical approaches on the role of mass media, claims that the state uses two types of apparatuses to create and shape ideology: repressive state apparatuses and ideological state apparatuses. For him, the repressive state apparatus acts like an organ, which is directed from a single centre, showing itself as an organic unit. Hence, elements like the police, courts, prisons, the army, etc. are organized under the political representatives of the governing class. On the other hand, the ideological state apparatuses (educational institutions, media, etc.), which aim to shape social consciousness, exist plurally and may have a relatively free material existence. The ideologies need to exist in daily routines, and their existence depends on their ability to be reproduced. The practices of ideological state apparatuses are needed for their reproduction. The dominant ideology usually targets the opposing ideology, referring to opposing ideas.

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5 Althusser. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, pp. 144-145.
in order to reinforce its own reproduction process. The aim is to keep its reproduction continuous and provide consistency, as, according to Althusser, no dominant class can achieve consistency within the government without practicing its hegemony on the ideological state apparatuses. On the other hand, Gramsci defines ideology as “the ruling ideas, which present the social cement which unifies and holds together the dominant social order” and states that “ruling intellectual and cultural forces of the era constitute a form of hegemony, or domination by ideas and cultural forms which induce consent to the rule of the leading groups in society.” Civil society, in Gramsci’s words, plays a similar role with Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses in establishing hegemony. Accepting media as a field in which hegemony reflects and reproduces its ideologies is a key point by which to examine the use of media in integration processes for the next parts of this study.

The use of media as a tool that immigrant-receiving countries use to transmit their ideologies - the same ideologies they adopt and then reproduce in their cultural policy and society - becomes more understandable in this view. Media can be accepted as a very important tool in both assimilation-oriented and multiculturalist-oriented strategies. In assimilation-oriented policies, media, which is used to translate dominant ideologies into private spheres and to impose the dominant cultural elements on minorities and immigrants in every moment of their daily life, is also used as an informing orientation program for immigrants about the daily rules of their new country and how they work. In the multiculturalist strategy, in contrast, media is a frame through which minorities and immigrant cultures can exist, introduce, and identify themselves. Geißler draws attention to the importance of three factors within the multiculturalist strategy, taking Canadian approach as an example:

- Living together by respecting differences,
- Equality of opportunities,
- Acceptance in every social field.

6 Althusser. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 146.
Geißler argues that some arrangements have to be made within the media, which he sees as one of the tools that would support these three factors in practice. These arrangements, again, are divided into three:

- The content presented in the media should not provoke prejudices about immigrants.
- Immigrants should be able to use the media of their new country in addition to media outlets they may create or they have in their own country. What is implied here is that immigrants should not be obliged to use only the dominant culture’s media, but the media should be arranged in such a way that it also appeals to immigrants, too.
- Immigrants should have an equal voice with the members of the dominant culture. Only in this way can they have the chance to properly express themselves. This is designed to change the use of media by immigrants and minorities.

Taking into account Geißler’s classification regarding the factors contributing to the formation of a multiculturalist society, the use of media as a tool in the government’s integration policies will be examined based on the example of Germany, whose current National Integration Plan has been questioned because of its policies on assimilation and multiculturalism. How the media is used as an appropriate tool for different integration policies, if the change in political conjuncture affects media—and also media studies—is analysed below.


The coming of Turkish workers to Germany as a substantial population dates back to the 1950s. Bremen and Hamburg, which were the first cities in which Turkish citizens arrived, hosted the very first Turkish workers who contacted their prospective employers through their own efforts towards the end of the decade. The first workers arriving in Germany were located in big cities, from which the opportunities in Germany could be easily communicated to prospective workers in Turkey. Reaching the liaison offices was also relatively easier in these cities. While news about the

11 Geißler, Was ist mediale Integration?, p. 12.
income and job opportunities in Germany spread in Turkey, the prohibition of passing to West Germany from East Germany further drove the need for labour in West Germany. West Germany signed the “Labour Recruitment Agreement” (Anwerbeabkommen) with Turkey on October 30, 1961. As a result of this agreement, Germany began to receive legal labour migrants with fixed contracts from Turkey known as Gastarbeiter, or “guest workers.”

The agreement was advantageous for both countries according to their own interests. It was thought that the agreement would not only cause a decline in unemployment in Turkey but also provide cheap labour to Germany. At the beginning, Germany accepted Turkish workers as a temporary solution and guaranteed the return of the workers to Turkey with the rotation article in the agreement, which it added later. Hence, the German government did not see it necessary to make any arrangements for their “guests” to adapt a German lifestyle as they were not thought to be permanent German residents. Turkey accepted Germany’s request for return as it was also thought that the workers’ experience in Germany would be beneficial in Turkey, and they can use their education and technical skills when they return in order to invigorate the Turkish economy. Similarly, the workers also saw themselves as temporary residents in Germany. In fact, some of them stayed with their suitcases packed in case they were called back to Turkey.

It was only when employers reacted against the article of rotation as they had to train new workers every two years from scratch and complained about the slowdown in production that the German Foreign Ministry declared with a verbal note that the rotation regulation would be suspended in 1964. However, still there was no attempts to integrate these immigrant workers, whose longer stay became certain decades ago. The German-Turkish labour migration process, which had been prolonged for an undetermined period of time, continues to be considered on the societal level as a temporary process; thus, neither Germany nor Turkey

made any attempt for the adaptation of Turkish citizens in Germany until 1970s.

There are some approaches arguing that, at the beginning, the country’s history of immigration had an important share in Germany’s decision to put the adaptation issue on the back burner. In contrast to other immigration-receiving European countries, Germany was quite inexperienced in communicating with immigrants whose language and religion are different from Germany’s because of its relatively passive attitude in the colonization period. Moreover, when West German migration before the 1960s is examined, it is seen that Germany opened up to German-originated Eastern European (Aussiedler) immigration and gave these people, who did not even speak German, citizenship rights. Germany’s attitude and national policy within the period in question can be interpreted as preferential to ethnic nationalism over civil nationalism. Hence, in this period seeing non-Germans as its own citizens, let alone embracing the “temporary” immigrants and starting an adaptation process, was impossible for Germany, whose national policy radically absorbed the importance of ethnic origin.

The Turkish workers who came to Germany as temporary labour migrants between 1961 and 1973 are considered first-generation immigrants. Most of them did not make any effort to adapt to German culture and did not experience hospitality beyond being welcomed with open arms at first sight. Turkish immigrant workers were staying in hostels that were arranged by employers, and they had to be in these dorms by 9:00 PM each night. As their social life conditions and accommodation were not so comfortable, Turkish workers departed from the Türkenheims slowly by moving into common houses. It was only after then that they began to move into their own houses and settle.

In this first period, no coverage in media about the Turkish workers and their new lives in Germany existed, which was a consequence of the lack of the attempts to create an integration policy.

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The perspective on labour in Germany changed after the 1970s economic crisis. The petroleum crisis that hit the world in 1973 forced Germany to revise its immigrant labour policy. By 1973, Germany, which accommodated 2.6 million immigrant workers, stopped taking immigrant labour due to its economic decline. The government’s decision was welcomed by German society as it saw immigration as the beginning of all unemployment and economic problems after the 1960s. A study by Delgado analysing 84 German newspapers’ content in 40 months confirmed the fact that German society and media had a negative attitude towards immigrants, especially Turks. However, Germany’s attempt to decrease the number of immigrant workers was not a desirable solution for either party. On the contrary, after 1973, family reunifications were still continuing, and the Turkish population was on the rise. Turkish workers began to prefer being immigrants to being guests. German authorities did not accept this, however, and no radical changes were made to Germany’s integration policy.

Children of first-generation immigrant Turkish workers are commonly described as second-generation Turks in Germany, and they show many differences compared to their parents. When second-generation immigrants started education at elementary school, intersections between German society and immigrants increased. This generation, although failing to break away from the norms of the first generation in domestic and neighbourhood life, went to German schools, learned German relatively better, adapted German culture and customs, and tried to exist in two different worlds. If we remember that, according to Althusser, education is also an ideological state apparatus, we can accept school as a public space. The neighbourhoods in which Turkish immigrants chose to live as a closed society - composed of people from the same ethnic origin, familiar acquaintances, and relatives - may be considered as a private space. Thus, it can be said that the private space expanded to include the neighbourhood as well. The second generation, which grew up in an environment that was self-enclosed and resistant to interaction with different cultures within the

21 Abadan-Unat, Bitmeyen Göc, p. 112.
private space, was exposed to assimilation-oriented practices in the public space.

When German state policy is examined, the first marks of assimilation-oriented practices in education that aimed to integrate immigrants began to be seen with this second generation. A quotation, which is made from the statements of an official from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, shows that the education of children with immigrant origin is a must for the stability of German society:

“The offering a good chance of development to the children and youth, who are 1 million in total, is not only a humanitarian issue, but also an issue of social stability of our country. The ones who can think about the categories of social process know that there is a social explosive attached to a time-cycled detonator.”

The conclusion from this quotation is that there are two paths for immigrant children and youth: to have an education within the conditions determined by the state or to become individuals dangerous to society. Social processes that are seen as abnormal or unpredictable are considered as potential dangers by the hegemony.

At the end of the 1970s, Federal Germany appointed its first foreigners’ consultant, Heinz Kühn. The report that Kühn completed and presented to the government in 1979 showed that Federal Germany had slowly begun to accept the reality of immigrants. Some of the attention-grabbing suggestions in the report are presented below:

- The necessity of accepting Federal Germany as a country of immigration,
- Revision of the law on foreigners and citizenship rights,
- Preparation of adjustment programs for immigrant workers and their families, particularly children and youth.

Although Kühn’s report was a first for the Federal Republic of Germany, and it put the truth and needs in a realistic framework, Germany did not reflect these suggestions on its immigrant policy immediately. On the contrary, in the year that Heinz Kühn’s report was published, Germany decided to constrain family reunification. The media did not pay so much attention to Kühn’s study; therefore, a high level of participation in the discus-

sions was not achieved. Considering immigrants’ citizenship rights in particular, Kühn’s report conveyed an attitude that was beyond German immigration policies at the time and closer to multiculturalism, centralizing the democratic participation of first- and second-generation immigrants, which Benhabib emphasizes in particular.24

In the 1970s and 1980s, the representation of immigrants in the German media was exceptional. Studies on the representation of immigrants in the media during this time period (e.g., Delgado’s study of guest worker depictions in the German press,25 Ruhrmann and Kollmer’s study on print media about the functions and consequences of reporting on immigrants,26 and Merten’s content analysis on German print media27) show that the portrayal of guest workers in German newspapers and televised newscasts reinforced negative stereotypes. Guest workers could be seen in German media as subjects instead of objects; they did not have a say in programs and news channels, which were not keen to represent them. Additionally, the coverage of guest workers was influenced by economic concerns, e.g., the unemployment rate. This was one outcome of the changing public point of view, which had previously judged the impact of guest workers on the national economy and labour market as a positive attribution, on Turkish labour migrants.28

5. After 1984: Ausländer are not going out!

In the 1980s, the phrase Ausländer, which means “foreigner” in German, began to be used in political conjunctures instead of the phrase “guest worker.” The word “immigrant” was deliberately avoided. According to Wengeler,29 while the word “guest worker” referred to the economic existence of the workers, the word “foreigner” referred to cultural differences

25 Delgado, Die Gastarbeiter in der Presse.
29 Wengeler, Martin. Multikulturelle Gesellschaft oder Ausländer raus? Der sprachliche Umgang mit der Einwanderung seit 1945. In: Georg Stötzel/ Martin Wengel-
and was commonly used while discussing integration problems and in citizenship debates. In 1983, the German Assistance Act for Returning Foreigners (Rückkehrförderungsgesetz), which encouraged the return of immigrants, was implemented under Prime Minister Helmut Kohl, who was known for his distant attitude toward immigrants. The law was not so appealing to immigrants, especially to Turkish workers: the foreign population was 4.4 million in 1983, fell to 4.3 million in 1984, but increased to 4.5 million in 1985. Turkey’s political conjecture during the 1970s and 80s, i.e., years of economic problems and the 1980 military coup, played a great role in the reluctance of Turkish workers to return to Turkey.

This change in the projection of the German government’s immigration policy could be seen in media coverage, too. Kosnick’s claim that accepting the permanence of guest workers who were not settled and were not expected to settle as immigrants was a turning point for Germany. She states that this “acceptance” changed the format of foreign-oriented programs. These programs, which were seemingly aimed at being helpful in orienting immigrants in Germany but in reality served to fulfil immigrants’ longing for their homeland, were supposedly designed to become tools of integration for immigrants, whose existence had just begun to be recognized by Germany. However, the studies made in this period show that minorities watched the programs in their own language to hear from their homeland rather than learning about the daily life in Germany. Kosnick claims that the German government welcomed this expectation, as it still saw minorities as immigrants who have the possibility of returning and encouraged the production of programs in this direction. According to Kosnick, this attitude of the German government encouraged the media to trigger homesickness and carried the subtext of “you can go back to your own country” instead of introducing daily life in Germany. In other words, while arguing for the acceptance of immigrants as minorities

32 Merten. Das Bild der Ausländer in der deutschen Presse.
33 Kosnick, Migrant Media. p. 323.
on paper, the German government was actually aiming to develop strategies to make immigrants go back to their homelands.

In the 1990s, after the fall of Berlin Wall and German reunification, political parties adopted differing views on immigration. According to Bauder, the long-established paradigm that Germany is a non-immigrant country began to weaken. In the 1998 federal election campaigns, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) claimed that immigration should be restricted. On the opposing side, however, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) supported limited and controlled immigration. After the elections, a coalition government was formed between the relatively left-leaning Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen) and the SPD, which did not prefer to follow up on their predecessor’s, the CDU, conservative foreign policies. The coalition’s moderate political conduct, efforts to implement the long-awaited immigration legislation, and attempts to legally define Germany as a country of immigration (Einwanderungsland) were one of the most significant turning points in German immigration policies. In 1999, the federal administration finally declared Germany as a country of immigration. After the acceptance of the notion “country of immigration” in the national political arena, it was accepted and used within German academia.

The wind of change simultaneously affected media policies. With the establishment of integration as more than mere orientation, the necessity

34 Bauder. Media Discourse and the new German Immigration Law. p. 97.
35 Ibid., p. 98.
38 Ibid., pp. 333-351.
to move beyond the understanding of ‘showing immigrants how to live in Germany’ arose. In other words, a new duty was defined for the German media outlets: introducing immigrants to the German population. Initially, media outlets took a rather easy path; by adding German subtitles to the programs intended for the immigrant population, they produced programs of interest for immigrants that would also be intelligible to the German audience. However, in time, it was realized that the program format should not only be intended for immigrants but also should contain content about the immigrant population.39

The hey-day of the video industry, the rise of trading volume after German unification, and the formation of not only ghettos but also cultural habitats initiated by immigrants further changed the picture.40 A study conducted in 1991 by Roters on Turkish immigrants and media usage offers two striking results. First, Turkish immigrants were active users of the developing video market and preferred videos from Turkey to the ones broadcasted on television. Second, the Turkish channel TD-1, a Berlin-based TV channel founded by a Turkish immigrant entrepreneur available through cable television, had a much higher rating compared to the Turkish programs broadcasted by state channels.41 By the mid-1990s, first, the inclusion of TRT-INT, the international broadcast of the Turkish state-run television station, into German cable television and, second, the availability of private Turkish TV channels through satellite broadcast caused a further decrease in the ratings of the German state TV channels.42 Moreover, the use of media in integration was far from what German officials would deem ideal, particularly due to the influences of Turkish channels that led to a distancing of the Turkish population from the norms of daily life that Germany was aiming to impose.

The Turkish channels consumed by most Turkish immigrants used a political discourse that juxtaposed German politics/interests. In this context, a revision of the format and content of the programs intended for immigrants was initiated for the programs broadcasted in German state TV

41 Roters, Wie Türken in Berlin die Medien nutzen, p. 100.
42 Kosnick, Migrant Media, p. 331.
channels. For instance, the program “Your Country, Our Country” (Ihre Heimat, Unsere Heimat) shown on ARD, the first public German TV channel, was renamed “Babylon” and began voicing the problems and demands of the immigrant population by immigrants themselves. A second example is the program “Neighbours” (Nachbarn), broadcasted on the network ZDF, that was renamed “Black-Red-Colourful” (Schwarz-Rot-Bunt) and hinted at multiculturalism by replacing the yellow stripe of the German flag with a multi-coloured stripe in the program’s credits. But, even if both programs could be considered as emerging from valid interpretations of the changes in immigrants’ media usages and the ways in which the German population received information about immigrants, due to the chosen broadcasting hours in relatively dead times and the unsecure positions of the programs, as they were the first to be discarded in the case of a broadcasting delay, the multiculturalism initiatives taken by the channels ARD and ZDF did not succeed in gaining major support among the broader public.43

In contrast to the television world’s struggle with multiculturalism and the rough course it encountered throughout the 1990s, the radio world had been quite successful. Berlin-based Radio MultiCulti, initially founded with the periodical financial support of the ARD, became a radio channel where music from all around the world in 18 different languages was broadcasted. Calling the immigrants of Berlin “Berliners” independent of their ethnic identities or citizenships and managing to unite Germans and immigrants in a different setting and under a different name, Radio MultiCulti created a new community in Germany and is considered as an example of successful intercultural broadcasting.

6. 2000s and the national integration plan

By the 2000s, the changes in the German government’s policies on immigrants and integration took an observable form. Despite the weak points/flaws it contains - namely that it is highly disadvantageous for non-skilled workers and highly advantageous for skilled workers - the 2005 immigration law is Germany’s most significant piece of legislation following the country’s declaration of being “a country of immigration” six years prior. The new law provides for the first time a legislative framework for control-

43 Kosnick, Migrant Media, p. 334.
ling and restricting immigration as a whole. Following this, the German National Integration Plan was prepared and put into practice by the Federal Government, the Länder (state governments and local governments) as well as a range of society actors keen to advance integration in 2006 and has since been revised annually in light of recent developments. At the first Integration Summit in 2006 organized by the Federal Republic of Germany, an annual working plan that incorporates all state institutions was prepared and issued. After the first summit with state organs, non-governmental organizations, academicians, and media executives, the Integration Summit, with a broader participant base in 2007, declared the German National Integration Plan (der Nationale Integrationsplan). The criteria for the success of the plan is defined by the German Government as such:

Successful integration means equal participation in social life and accepting responsibility. This requires efforts from government and society, as well as from the immigrants themselves. Good command of German, good education and acceptance in the labour market are paramount.

Of the three criteria defined for integration, while one is dependent on the job market that is tied to state and private sector dynamics, the remaining two conditions are to be fulfilled by the immigrants themselves.

The German National Integration Plan consists of 400 articles and ten separate subject headings, all of which include business plans with multiple shareholders. In line with the federal government’s agenda, the plan aimed to put into practice the participation of local governments, media,}

non-governmental organizations, private sector, and academicians. The plan relies on two principles:48

- Forming a communication environment that the immigrants are part of; rather than talking about immigrants, talking with them.
- Ensuring each individual could personally contribute to integration; ensuring that every concerned person and institution offers definite and material prospects about the process.

The German National Integration Plan, however, has not been able to garner substantial support from immigrants. Many immigration-oriented non-governmental organizations and federal / state government representatives of immigrant descent have in fact refused to participate in the Integration Summit. The reasons put forth by the refusing parties are the discriminatory clauses in the immigration law invoked prior to the German National Integration Plan and their interpretation of the use of language issues as means for assimilation in the Plan. While it is true that the National Integration Plan foregrounds the issue of language, the desired outcome is to increase immigrants’ levels of competence in German. According to the Plan, the availability of the platforms where Turkish is spoken enables the smooth diffusion of state ideology rather than enabling the Turkish population to extend their social ties in Germany. However, following the implementation of the German National Integration Plan’s 400 amendatory articles, which were to be carried out by the state organs and non-governmental organizations, change in immigrant integration became evident in the state organs and daily life. For the first time in Germany’s integration attempts, federal / state government institutions and the local authority associations attempted together to make a difference on the basis of the integration policies.49 Media, too, is considered among the shareholders responsible for contributions to the integration process and for the implementation of the changes offered. A closer look at the articles where media support is expected points to the clauses related to representation of immigrants, language, and the employment of immigrants:50


On the issue of language encouragement/incentives, the federal government and television channels will collaborate to produce progressive television programs for children of non-German descent. Collaborating with Turkish-language media, incentives will be initiated to encourage Turkish immigrants’ interest in the issue of education. Relevant media outlets are required to create awareness about violence against women and to teach/remind immigrant women subjected to violence of their rights. The inclusion of immigrants into media programs and training journalists and media workers of immigrant descent are required. Increasing the visibility of successful professionals from immigrant backgrounds would also enable their representation as role models. The Plan aims to cover issues of immigration and integration in a sustainable manner in the media and to develop suggestions based on immigrants’ status and perspectives by including regular statements regarding the subject. Research regarding the media’s depiction of immigrants in Germany will be conducted. This research will be undertaken by research institutes, universities, and the Federal Statistical Institute. The state will provide funding for this research.

In the clauses that directly refer to the media, three groups are identified as responsible: 1) Public media outlets, 2) Immigrant media broadcasting in Germany, 3) Academicians, research institutes, and universities. Another significant point regarding the clauses was that they have critical similarities with Geißler’s three factors that are essential for achieving multiculturalism.

When looking at the roles ascribed to public media organs by the government, we see that the media has been ascribed a central role in the issue of integration. After the first Integration Summit in 2006, German Chancellor Angela Merkel asked the public broadcasting institutions ARD and ZDF to offer suggestions for ways in which they could contribute to the integration process and to analyse the extent to which their programs’ resources and formats could be developed to aid the integration processes of foreign citizens.51 At the second Integration Summit in 2007, ARD and ZDF developed tangible and feasible suggestions that were then included into business plans outlined in the German National Integration Plan. After the summit, ARD, as the public media outlet with the most widespread

51 Die Bundesregierung, Der Nationale Integrationsplan. pp. 29,152.
broadcasting network, announced its duty within the framework of the
National Integration Plan:

ARD designates its mission as providing a picture of the daily lives of
the immigrant families as part of the social normality, and while doing
that, without repudiating the difficulties and risks, conveying the op-
opportunities of a culturally diverse society in a credible manner.52

Another point that ARD has clearly expressed and has included in its
broadcasting plan is to raise issues of immigration and integration in popu-
lar programs by presenting people of immigrant descent as leading charac-
ters in television programs to enhance the visibility of their lives, thoughts,
and cultures. ARD has projected its stance regarding immigrants and inte-
gregation to all broadcasting organs linked to it and has offered clear views
on the issue of integration in its policy statements. The second major shift
in ARD’s broadcasting policies during the years 2006 and 2007 was seen in
its removal of the “political independence” principle/policy in 2007. This
change invoked criticism that ARD had become an ideological apparatus
of the state.53 Another significant initiative of ARD was its efforts taken as
part of the project “Creating Heroes,” which aimed to increase the visibility
of editors, authors, and actors of foreign origin within the ARD as poten-
tial role models.54

ZDF also brought a comprehensive list of suggestions to the summit in
2007. Some significant suggestions that ZDF offered show the extent of the
network’s support for the media’s role in the German National Integration
Plan. ZDF deems itself responsible for the following:55

- Increasing the number of productions that address basic themes on im-
migration and integration,
- Increasing the number of the important roles played by people of im-
migrant descent,
- Initiating a new program format for the accentuation of the issues re-
garding foreign children’s language education and language compe-
tence as part of the programs intended for children in kindergarten,

[04.10.2015].
54 Wolf, Frederike. Interkulturelle Integration als Aufgabe des öffentlich-rechtlichen
Fernsehens. Die Einwanderungsländer Deutschland und Großbritannien im Ver-
• In addition to television programs, providing extensive information on integration through online broadcasting,
• Hosting participants of immigrant descent in discussion programs.

The German National Integration Plan is evaluated in the regularly conducted annual integration summits. Officials have stated that while some progress has been made in the business plan regarding the media, and that they are appreciative of collaborating with ARD and ZDF, conducting more long-term studies and sticking to the plan with patience are still required for the realization of all articles.\(^\text{56}\)

The expansion in immigration policies initially started by the Alliance 90/the Greens and SPD’s coalition government in the early 2000s and then furthered, though slowly, by the SPD/CDU/CSU coalition of the year 2005 have centralized the democratic participation of people of immigrant descent, which is particularly emphasized by Benhabib.\(^\text{57}\) However, a glimpse at the political actors in Germany presents an unprecedented level of polarization. On the one hand, politicians such as then president Christian Wulff have claimed, “Islam is part of the Germany,” \(^\text{58}\) which had never before been stated so overtly by a politician. On the other, politicians such as Chancellor Merkel and CSU’s president and current Federal Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer’s distant stance towards immigrants, as well as Seehofer’s statement that “Arab and Turkish immigrants should not be allowed in Germany”,\(^\text{59}\) has changed the course of the discussion on immigration policy among the public. Merkel, taking the political conjuncture at a time when she needs to avoid radical differences of opinion within the CDU/CSU, has put in efforts to soften Seehofer’s statement, but she also did not abstain from expressing that she thought that the multiculturalism approaches of Germany have failed.\(^\text{60}\) These mixed messages have not

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helped to define German integration policy as assimilation-oriented or multiculturalist-oriented.

The rise of interest in immigration studies in academia, which began in the 1980s, has continued into the 2000s, which have seen the enrichment of both quantitative and qualitative studies in various fields. Since the acceptance of the National Integration Plan, media has been considered as one of the key instruments of the integration process. As a result, academic studies have diversified to include the usage of media by immigrants (e.g., Trebbe\textsuperscript{61}) and media of immigrants (e.g., Sauer\textsuperscript{62}) in addition to the representation of immigrants in media (e.g., Bonfadelli\textsuperscript{63}, Beck-Gernsheim\textsuperscript{64}). The missing point within academic studies, however, has been the degree of immigrants’ activity in the German media. This point is crucial in terms of accepting the representation and existence of immigrants in multiculturalism-oriented studies, but it has been ignored in German academic studies within the scope of traditional media and remains to be studied in-depth. Although the employment of immigrants in media is present in the National Integration Plan, the question of how thoroughly this matter is applied and how much it succeeds is not yet answered tangibly in academic studies.

7. New challenges for integration strategies: the refugee flow

Since the beginning of the Syrian refugee flow following the advent of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Germany has faced new challenges to its refugee and integration policies. However, this time it was not alone at the table; the policies were decided communally with other EU member states.

The climate before and during the refugee crisis in Germany should be taken into consideration while discussing the possible effects and footprints of former integration policies. On the one hand, the decrease in the


working-age population in Germany and need for skilled labour has caused industry and employers’ associations to support labour migration. Their positive and encouraging attitudes toward labour migration made the issue more apparent in the media and consequently in the public sphere. Furthermore, state-coordinated integration policy, which started with the National Integration Plan, made a difference on both sides of the integration process: both in immigrants’ participation in the process and in changing German society’s attitude and perception of immigration and immigrants. On the other hand, despite these positive attitudes there had been a rise in far-right, anti-Islamic, and nationalist movements such as the group Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (in German, "Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes: PEGIDA") negatively reacting to the moderate refugee policies.

While the number of refugees in EU countries reached 1.2 million in 2015, 442,000 of the first asylum applications were received by Germany. The German government reacted to the huge refugee flow with two main policy changes in the political sphere: in October 2015, the first asylum package (Asylpaket I) was introduced, and the second package (Asylpaket II) came in January 2016. The boldest change the packages brought was the addition to the list of secure countries of origin. Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria were added to the list so that Germany has the right to reject a significant number of asylum applications from North Africa. Meanwhile, during the summer press conference on August 31, 2015, Chancellor Merkel made publicly clear that she saw the...
issue of refugees as a “task for the nation as a whole.”70 Her statement included the cause célèbre motto “We can do this” (Wir schaffen das)71 and showed that the government wanted to deal with the crisis not alone but with the support of the public.

In this climate, the culture of welcome (Willkommenskultur) and culture of recognition (Anerkennungskultur), which could be seen in political rhetoric in the beginning of the 2010s with the encouragement of the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF),72 began to be taken into consideration in the public sphere - even after minor negative reactions against the refugee flow. This could be seen as a proactive step by the government in order to prevent an increase in racist movements against refugees. Heckmann describes the phenomena Willkommenskultur und Anerkennungskultur as “a culture that recognizes the value of immigrants’ contributions to society and thus supports intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity, mutual respect, and social cohesion.”73 The state-coordinated integration policy shifted state-coordinated welcoming and recognition policy with the participation of individuals, organizations, and institutions. The German government used the internet and its own website74 very actively to keep the public posted on the refugee flow as it tried to cultivate a positive perception of refugees. With the help of social media platforms and new media tools, the wind of Willkommenskultur has taken place in the public sphere and daily life. A huge number of projects aiming to con-
tribute and enable refugees’ social and economic participation has been supported by the German government as well as foundations and institutions (e.g., ANKOMMER, Perspektive Deutschland, Willkommen bei Freunden-Bündnisse für junge Flüchtlinge, Refugees Welcome).

8. Conclusion

Becoming a “country of immigration” has been a long path for Germany, and it still has a long way to go. If we look at the first years of Turkish immigration, we see that the national policy viewed them as non-permanent guest workers. The education, living conditions, and media designed for and offered to immigrants were instituted with the idea that these immigrants would one day go back to their homeland. In other words, no one thought that Germany would permanently house a new ethnic minority thanks to its labour needs. This short-sighted point of view started to change in the 1980’s.

Today, Germany’s stance on integration policy, regardless of whether it is right or wrong, continues in a coherent fashion. In the annual Integration Summit organized for the evaluation of the German National Integration Plan, the outcomes of the formerly realized articles, and the path of the process are discussed. Neither opinion leaders’ or political parties’ statements and harsh attitudes about immigrants nor the acts of violence committed by or against immigrants have disrupted the National Integration Plan.

It is still questionable as to whether Germany’s history of integration within Europe, which should be considered as an ongoing process, will provide enough know-how for both itself and other EU member states in order to offer long-term solutions regarding the problems of the current refugee flow (e.g., managing effective integration policies, considering neighborhood integration strategies, etc.).

75 ANKOMMER. Perspektive Deutschland" is a project of Social Impact gGmbH, supported by KfW Stiftung and is under the patronage of Sigmar Gabriel, the Minister for Economic Affairs, http://ankommer.eu/EN/project [30.04.2017].

76 Willkommen bei Freunden- Bündnisse für junge Flüchtlinge is a program for teenage refugees and supported by Federal Ministry for Federal Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, https://www.willkommen-bei-freunden.de/ [30.04.2017].

77 Refugees Welcome is a project by Mensch Mensch Mensch e.V., which is also responsible for Pfandgeben.de and supported by "Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance - against Extremism and Violence" (Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz gegen Extremismus und Gewalt).
multiculturalism vs. assimilation policies). In analysing media’s use as an instrument for integration policies, while comparing Turkish immigrants and Syrian refugees, the difference between the mediatisation occurring within the periods when those policies were realized should be kept in mind. Furthermore, it can be said that Germany learned from its integration policy history and made proactive moves in order to change the perception of refugees, in which social media platforms and new media technologies help a lot. Even though it is often considered that new media technologies have changed the theories and practices of mediatisation, it can be said that there are many U-turns and milestones in Germany’s past from which today both Germany and the EU can draw inspiration.
CONCLUSIONS
There seems to be an ambiguity in German-Turkish relations. On the one hand, the political debates generally emphasize that these two countries have been “tied in friendship.”¹ On the other hand, the cyclical ups and downs in the relationship and particularly the downturn in the most recent years have worn out the mutual trust that such a friendship requires and that had been very strong during the 1950s.² This volume provides a detailed analysis and assessment of German-Turkish relations aiming at shedding light on this dilemma and its effects on the future prospects of this relationship. This analysis is guided by the general assumption that German-Turkish relations can best be described by the principle of ‘conflictual cooperation,’ according to which “cooperation in some areas coexist with instances of disagreement and even conflict in others”³, which creates a “high degree of interconnectedness, and pushes the relationship as close as possible to the extreme condition of complex interdependence.”⁴ Additionally, the relationship is described to have an intermestic nature in which internal and external issues in policy making overlap, which “increases the level of complexity in as well as the necessity for policy coordination and cooperation between both countries […] [because] one country’s foreign policy making typically has various domestic politics related consequences for the other party, while domestic developments in one

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¹ Schönlau, Anke. Tied in friendship? German narratives on German-Turkish relations in the pre-accession context (1959-1999), TRIANGLE Working Paper, forthcoming.
country is frequently leading to a recalibration of foreign policy making vis-à-vis the other country.”

The analysis focuses on three dimensions of German-Turkish relations, which are the European dimension, domestic and foreign politics and transnational dynamics.

In order to draw conclusions from this analysis for the future of German-Turkish relations we have to understand (1) why a train crash has not taken place despite the latest downturn, (2) what the main challenging dynamics in the relationship are and (3) how the European Union (EU) framework affects bilateral relations between the two countries.

1. No train crash but a roller-coaster ride

All chapters in this volume confirm and further explain the general observation that Turhan outlines in her introductory chapter: German-Turkish relations repeatedly witness “U-turns” in terms of developments that require fundamental adjustments in the bilateral relationship. A general finding is that the latest U-turn – the failed coup attempt of July 2016 – marked the beginning of a period of continued conflict and estrangement between both sides. A few examples are the trends of De-Europeanisation in the Turkish system, a number of German citizens with Turkish backgrounds being taken hostage for alleged relations with terrorist groups, harsh accusations of both governments against each other including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s comparison of Germany’s political actions to the ones of the Nazi regime, the European Parliament’s (EP) repeated demand for suspending Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU, and Germany’s veto on modernizing the EU’s Customs Union (CU) with Turkey.

Within each analytical dimension of this volume one can identify reasons why the latest trends clearly represented a downward spiral but did not cause a train crash in the relationship. Instead, since 2018 bilateral relations have been in a state of slow rapprochement.

In terms of transnational dynamics both countries have been closely interlinked. These ties date back centuries and are particularly strong in economic, societal and political spheres. As Schröder and Tekin highlight, a recruitment programme for Turkish workers of the early 1960s, family reunification schemes and the asylum track strongly influence the societal

5 Turhan. German-Turkish Relations – Intermestic, Interdependent, Intricate, in this volume, p. 21.
dimension, still today. Almost 2.9 million inhabitants of Germany have a Turkish migration background and more than half of them have also obtained German citizenship. Germany is thus home to the largest total number and greatest share of the estimated 5.5 million people with Turkish roots living in Western European countries. Strong cultural links to Turkey that prevail even among the third-generation influence the political dimension of the German-Turkish relationship. Concepts of integration, Turkey’s diaspora politics, the provision of religious services, extra-territorial voting and election campaigning are critical questions of the bilateral political agenda.

The exceptional connection between Germany and Turkey also finds expression in economic terms. As the destination country for 9.8 percent of Turkey’s total exports in 2016, Germany has received almost 20 percent of Turkey’s total exports to the EU and has hence been the country’s leading trading partner. Turkey in turn has accounted for 1.7 percent of Germany’s total trade. Moreover, Germany is the second largest foreign direct investor in Turkey. An estimated 7,100 German companies and Turkish com-

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8 See also Kuru, Deniz. Turkish electoral campaigning in Germany and the wider Western Europe as traditional practices, in this volume.

panies with German capital participation are engaged in the Turkish economy, while almost 100,000 businesswomen and businessmen of Turkish origin generate an annual turnover of 50 billion Euro in Germany.\textsuperscript{10}

In the foreign policy dimension Turkey’s geostrategic considerations determine the need for continued cooperation.\textsuperscript{11} Due to its geographical position Turkey represents the (EU’s) “gateway to the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{12} This creates mutual interests in the realm of security and stability that demands German-Turkish cooperation. In addition, the European dimension extends the bilateral relationship to form a triangular one between Turkey, Germany and the EU. Germany’s position on Turkey’s accession aspirations can create U-turns such as the change in government in Germany in 1998 that was one of the factors among others that led to Turkey being granted accession candidate status in 1999, or Germany’s veto on modernizing the CU for political reasons that formed part of an official reorientation in Germany’s Turkey policy in summer 2017.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, the state of the bilateral relationship influences directly or indirectly EU-Turkey relations.

Such interconnectedness in these three dimensions creates common interests on both sides that holds up some levels of cooperation in spite of any existing conflictual trends. Aydın in this volume highlights three examples of areas of common interest. In the energy sector, Turkey is located at the crossroads of the region with the highest energy demand (Europe) and the region with the highest amount of fossil energy resources (Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia). Turkey is especially interested in minimizing its dependencies on Russia and Iran by means of various tactics such as the development of the renewable energy infrastructure. German companies could be interested in Turkey’s potential regarding investments in the renewable energy sector. Another common interest is stability in the Middle
East in terms of economy and security regarding nuclear politics in Iran, a western oriented Syria or peace between Israel and Palestinians. Concerning immigration strategies – the third area of common interest – both, Germany and Turkey, are interested in well integrated migrants. Alongside these three areas of common interest described by Aydın, economy positions itself also at the heart of the German-Turkish interdependence preventing a train crash in the bilateral relationship. When Turkey’s economy started to crack down in 2018, Germany immediately considered providing economic support, 14 which represented the beginning of a rapprochement between Ankara and Berlin after a long period of almost frozen relations. Hence, the economy is the thematic dimension in which you find the greatest scope of mutual interest. 15

Thus, there are conflicts that minimize the chances for a closer relationship which would be advantageous for both parties, but at the same time there are economic, political and geostrategic interests that build sufficient common ground for keeping the roller-coaster ride on track and slowing it down now and again to a convenient speed.

2. Challenging dynamics in the relationship

The analysis presented in this volume has also dealt with certain dynamics that might challenge this steady state of conflictual cooperation in German-Turkish relations. Turhan in this volume discussed the impact of norms versus interest driven actions. Although German politicians usually take a normative stance when assessing developments in Turkey and in EU-Turkey relations, security and welfare related interests often seem to be more important for Germany’s Turkey policy. The so-called Euro crisis and migration/refugee crisis are prominent examples for such prevalence of Germany’s rational actions over normative considerations. Particularly dur-

15 This also applies to the EU-Turkey relationship, see Saatçıoğlu et.al. FEUTURE Synthesis Paper: The Future of EU-Turkey Relations: A Dynamic Association Framework amidst Conflictual Cooperation, March 2019, https://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/de/publications/feuture-synthesis-paper/ [05.04.2019].
ing the migration crisis Germany took “refuge in leadership”\textsuperscript{17} in order to strike a deal with Turkey for solving the crisis. This included visits to Turkey by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, right before the snap elections in Turkey in November 2015 when Turkey’s De-Europeanisation had already started. This ambiguity between interests and norms driven actions increases mutual distrust entrapping Turkey and Germany in a ladder of escalation affecting the relationship, because the actors involved become trapped in a blame-game of ‘take-it-or-leave-it’-positions.

The fact that in the year 2017 there were important elections on both sides – the constitutional referendum in Turkey on the constitutionalisation of the presidential system in April 2017 and general elections in Germany in September 2017 – increased the level of politicisation of the bilateral relationship and hence its intermestic dimension. Ankara’s extra-territorial campaigning for the constitutional change in Germany was not well perceived by German policy makers and media as Kuru describes in great detail in this volume. The harsh reactions by local authorities in German cities added fuel to the blame-game between the two countries, eventually culminating in the Nazi-comparison mentioned above. In summer 2017 this and the detention of an increasing number of German citizens in Turkey – the most prominent cases being Deniz Yücel and Peter Steudtner – caused the German government to redefine its Turkey policy by re-evaluating Hermes-Bonds for German investments in Turkey and increasing the levels of travel warnings for German citizens.\textsuperscript{18} Both the bilateral relationship between Germany and Turkey as well as EU-Turkey relations were hence highly politicised and all party manifestos for the general elections explicitly dealt with this issue laying out a general critical positioning vis-à-vis Turkey. How much bilateral relations were strained became most obvious when the candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Martin Schulz, surprised everyone when he promised in a TV debate prior to the elections to cancel the EU’s accession negotiations with Turkey if he were


to be elected Chancellor. It should be emphasized that the SPD has traditionally been the most supportive party of Turkish accession so far.\textsuperscript{19}

The large Turkish diaspora living in Germany increases the potential for politicisation and hence fosters intermestic dynamics. Furthermore, it brings about additional challenges for German-Turkish relations. Kadioğlu Polat, Çelik and Devrani discuss in this volume different aspects of integration policy in Germany such as the impact of neoliberal urban policies on immigrants from Turkey in Berlin, educational inequalities and the role of the media. On the one hand, according to Çelik, particularly, media and the exclusionary public dialogue that it fosters, play a role in constituting hierarchies in society that would stigmatise the Turkish and/or Islamic population. On the other hand, Devrani indicates the positive function that media can play for immigrants as an important tool for information and a frame through which immigrant cultures could exist and be introduced to the wider public. Kadioğlu Polat discusses the issue of gentrification and its challenges to neighbourhoods with a large migrant community such as Neukölln as well as the insufficiencies of European programmes aiming to counteract social inequalities in this context. In the end, this also only adds to the stigmatisation of the migrant community and their neighbourhoods.

Generally, the interconnectedness of Germany and Turkey represents the foundation of this close relationship, while at the same time it is exactly this interconnectedness that lies at the heart of the challenging dynamics of these relations. In the most recent years these dynamics have fed into a downward spiral of mistrust and negative narratives as well as actions vis-à-vis one another.

3. Triangulation of the relationship: Germany, Turkey and the EU

The relationship will get even more complex, if we broaden the picture to include the EU. In fact, it is very difficult to analyse and assess German-Turkish relations without the European context. Decisions on EU-Turkey relations generally require unanimous votes among the Member States that render Germany important for EU-Turkey relations. Particularly the

\textsuperscript{19} See also Soler i Lecha et.al. It Takes Two to Tango. Political changes in Europe and their Impact on Turkey’s EU bid. FEUTURE Online Paper No. 17, April 2018, https://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user_upload/Online_Paper_No._17_D2.2..pdf [05.04.2019].
Migration crisis highlighted a partial misconception by the Turkish leadership regarding the division of competences in the EU. Turkish leaders apparently increasingly perceived Germany as the sole representative of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey at the political level. This means that the so-called refugee deal must have been a result of also bilateral negotiations between Berlin and Ankara based on their (at the time) close relations.

A general question overshadowing both, the EU-Turkey as well as German-Turkish relationship is the one of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Schröder and Tekin in this volume provide a detailed analysis of the different institutional formats of EU-Turkey relations. Germany has only been a strong advocate for Turkey’s EU membership in the years of the coalition government of the SPD and the Green Party while the CDU-led governments ever since have only played by the rules of *pacta sunt servanda* in terms of not vetoing the procedures and frameworks that had been established before. Germany can hence be perceived both as a facilitator and veto power in the rapprochement between the EU and Turkey as Turhan outlines in this volume.

Germany’s influence within the EU might even increase further, once the United Kingdom (UK) would leave the EU. Furthermore, according to Krumm’s analysis in this volume, through Brexit Turkey loses one of its strongest advocates for its membership in the EU. At the same time, Brexit could also imply benefits to the EU-Turkey relationship. Alternatives to full membership within the framework of a more sectoral approach to cooperation could become more attractive for Turkey if a successful and attractive model for the UK’s relations with the EU after Brexit could be established.

This assumption was shared by former German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, who stated in 2017 that Brexit could represent a blueprint for the EU’s relations with important third country partners like the Ukraine or Turkey. In the meantime however, different analyses have highlighted that there is no such thing like a ready-made model to simply pick from the shelves for the future of EU-Turkey relations, because the

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EU’s relations with third countries and particularly with Turkey demand a tailor-made design.\(^{22}\)

On the one hand, the close bilateral ties between Germany and Turkey can be beneficial for the EU-Turkey relationship as witnessed during the migration crisis. If one applies the concept assessed by Schulz in this volume this was possible because Germany acted in line with the central power concept by accepting that foreign policy requires self-limitation and the creation of mutual gains and win-win situations.\(^{23}\) On the other hand, the relationship also creates great potential for conflict – something that you encounter in all close relationships – and there is the potential for deception. It is interesting to note, that Turkey absolutely refuses to accept the German concept of ‘privileged partnership’ for its relations with the EU although Erdoğan could endure listening to French President Emmanuel Macron openly dismissing Turkey’s prospects for EU accession and suggesting to rethink new formulas of dialogue during a joint press conference.\(^{24}\) Furthermore, this caused no backlash from the Turkish side, which shows that Turkish-French relations are of a different quality than German-Turkish relations. The former focuses on transactional cooperation in the areas of mutual interest, which allows a decoupling from the EU accession process.\(^{25}\) The opposite is true for the German-Turkish relationship which this volume has highlighted in great detail.

4. *Thinking ahead and squaring the circle*

We can draw three main conclusions for the future of the German-Turkish relationship also in view of the future research agenda:

First, the German-Turkish relationship has repeatedly encountered sharp ups and downs and there is no doubt that this will continue in the future. The main reason for this is the high degree of interconnectedness in terms of the political, economic and societal spheres and the mutual interests on


\(^{23}\) For an assessment on Germany’s role in the migration crises see also Reiners/Tekin. Taking Refuge in Leadership? Facilitators and Constraints of Germany’s Influence in EU Migration Policy and EU-Turkey Affairs during the Refugee Crisis (2015–2016).

\(^{24}\) Elysée 2018. in Soler i Lecha et.al. It Takes Two to Tango. Political changes in Europe and their Impact on Turkey's EU bid.

\(^{25}\) See Ibid., p. 16.
both sides. This renders the object of analysis a moving target, which rep-
resents a challenge for the execution of topical analyses and the for-
mulation of policy recommendations. Furthermore, due to the intermestic na-
ture of the relationship it would be too short-sighted for the analysis and
assessment to focus only or mostly on the internal developments in Turkey.
Instead, research should also focus on developments in Germany and with-
in the German-Turkish-EU triangular relationship.

Second, the German-Turkish relationship demands intensive and contin-
uous political dialogue in order to meet the challenges generated by the in-
termestic nature of the relationship. There is the format of the structured
dialogue based on an initiative of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Guide Westerwelle. In 2015 decision was taken to upgrade this annual
meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs onto the highest political level
within the format of bi-annual intergovernmental consultations between
the heads of state or government of the two countries. Yet, after the first
intergovernmental consultation the relationship between Germany and
Turkey hit rock bottom and this format seemed to have been taken to its
grate right after its birth and has not been revitalised since. However, there
are various thematic high-level dialogues that keep up sufficient levels of
political dialogue and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs have also met again.

Third, the two countries have to find a way of braking the vicious circle
of the blame-game that enhances mistrust on both sides. No one, and par-
ticularly governments, like to be told what to do by their peers. At the
same time, German-Turkish relations just like EU-Turkey relations are
found on a set of norms and values that cannot be sacrificed to interest-
based actions. One possible way out is the concept of ‘principled pragmat-
tism’ that Nathalie Tocci developed for the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS)
and that can also be applied to the “future of EU-Turkey relations.”26 This
concept “looks at the world as it is and not as it [the EU or Germany]
would like to see it… that entails a rejection of universal truths, an empha-
sis on the practical consequences of acts and a focus on local practices and
dynamics...” This however, does not imply that one should give up on
norms altogether. Instead, the pragmatism “should be principled [which
means] while different pathways, recipes and models are to be embraced,
international law and its underlying norms should be the benchmark of

26 Kaldor, Mary. Principled pragmatism: defending normative Europe. 12 December
2019,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/principled-pragmatism-
defending-normative-europe/ [05.04.2019].
what is acceptable within the relationship and what is not.” 27 This would require both sides to focus their cooperation on areas of mutual interest, giving justice to the intermestic nature of the relationship.

27 Ibid.
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accession negotiations 32, 34, 37, 50, 57, 60, 66, 85, 88
Ahmet Davutoğlu 100, 113, 126, 128, 131, 140, 141, 159, 160, 172, 203
Alliance 90/The Greens 253
Alternative für Deutschland 99, 176, 221
Althusser 244, 245, 249
Anerkennungskultur 263
Angela Merkel 12, 15, 34, 49, 72, 78, 86, 88, 97, 102, 120, 124, 145, 149, 158, 166, 172, 243, 258, 263
Arab Spring 12, 25, 67, 71, 74, 101, 125, 134, 137, 243, 262
ARD 255, 258
assimilation 195, 245, 246, 250, 257, 261, 265
asylum 17, 32, 35, 55, 98, 154, 155, 166, 178, 243, 262
Ausländer 251
Aussiedler 248
Austrian People’s Party 200
Balkan region 180
Bilateral relations 42, 168
Binali Yıldırım 18, 101
Brexit 23, 26, 91–93, 95–100, 102, 104, 105, 107–109, 144
business 15, 21, 36, 66, 77–80, 121, 130, 133, 148, 151, 152, 157, 163, 170, 173, 211, 256, 258, 260
candidate 11, 31, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 56, 57, 59, 60, 69, 70, 75–77, 81, 82, 84, 89
CDU 16, 34, 37, 51, 52, 72, 81, 83, 88, 93, 152, 157, 166, 253, 260
citizenship 21, 24, 26, 36, 166, 175, 182, 192, 193, 195–198, 201, 230, 234–236, 240, 248, 250–252
Cold War 80, 94, 96, 102, 117, 121, 127
Cologne speech 198
complex interdependence 11, 18–20, 23, 59
constitutional referendum 14, 165, 166, 204
corruption 11, 211
coup attempt 14, 17, 22, 23, 32, 44, 86, 87, 102, 104, 108, 136, 166, 177, 178, 182, 183
creative city 212–214, 217, 219, 220, 223
CSDP 144
Customs Union 13, 14, 31, 40, 47, 51, 60, 88, 109

287
democracy 49, 50, 66, 82, 84, 85, 88, 99, 136, 171, 183
der Nationale Integrationsplan 256
diaspora 17, 24, 36, 181
differentiated integration 99
direct investments 77, 173
disadvantaged districts 217
discrimination 212, 224, 239–241
district management 217, 220
diversity 195, 196, 209, 213, 215, 219, 223, 263
domestic actors 21, 148, 150, 162
domestic policy 23
domestication 143
Donald Trump 15, 79
Donald Tusk 44, 62, 160
Dublin System 154, 156
economic interests 119, 174
educational performance 27, 226, 227, 230, 239–241
Egypt 101–103, 129, 135, 153
Einwanderungsland 253
energy 21, 38, 39, 43, 44, 50, 52, 53, 72, 104, 105, 132, 172–174, 183
enlargement 11, 15, 37, 41, 42, 50, 56, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 68, 89, 119
ethnic boundaries 26, 207, 230, 232, 236, 240, 241
ethno-religious hierarchies 230, 231
EU-Turkey Statement 13, 43, 56, 74, 91, 160, 179
European Council 13, 15, 34, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 48, 49, 59–62, 64, 68–71, 75–77, 81, 82, 85, 97, 128, 144, 154, 159, 160
European People’s Party 81, 98
European policy 23, 24, 27, 108, 144–150, 152, 153, 158, 162, 163
European Stability Mechanism 150
Eurozone crisis 12, 62, 77, 78, 89, 113, 120, 140, 145, 146, 149, 152, 153, 162, 163
federal elections 48, 49, 51, 83, 87, 151, 153, 163, 176
FETÖ 17, 178
first generation 227, 235, 249
first generation immigrants 248
foreign direct investments 21, 64, 101
foreign policy strategy 141, 142
Franco-German axis 98, 107, 108
Freedom Party 200
G20 20, 44, 59, 123, 124, 133, 134, 139, 160
Genetic structuralism 230
gentrification 27, 208, 212, 213, 216, 220, 224
Gerhard Schröder 11, 37, 69, 82, 107, 118, 145, 146, 148, 197
German companies 21, 23, 36, 74, 79, 172, 173
German federal government 16, 22, 24, 25, 61, 66, 70, 73, 76, 80, 82–84,
Index

Integration Summit 256–258
Interdependence 19, 20, 64, 65
intergovernmentalism 34, 60, 63, 65, 150
international system 19, 63–65, 67, 80, 124, 168
ISIS 166, 172, 176
Israel 100–102, 134, 174
İsmail Cem 113, 126, 141
joint action plan 43, 55, 159, 160
Jürgen Habermas 62
Kreuzberg 214–216, 221
labour migration 232
Labour Recruitment Agreement 247
Länder 77, 78, 148, 209, 211, 217, 256
Leitkultur 236
Libya 16, 97, 121, 135
locational politics 209, 210
Luxembourg European Council 61, 68
mass communication 244

German integration policy 244
German-Turkish Energy Forum 20, 173
German-Turkish intergovernmental consultations 18, 20, 45, 161, 172
German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue Mechanism 12, 18, 72
Gezi Park 12, 86, 136, 177, 198
ghetto 215, 216, 224
Gramsci 245
guest worker recruitment 212
guest workers 228, 244, 247, 251, 252
hegemony 120, 123, 245, 250
Helmut Kohl 68, 114, 117, 252
Helsinki European Council 11, 69, 75, 77, 82, 89
housing market 210, 212, 221, 223, 224
identity formation 241
immigration 92, 157, 175, 243, 248–253, 255, 257–262, 264

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Index

Middle East 13, 18, 38, 71, 72, 94, 100, 106, 132, 135, 137, 139, 153, 171, 174
migration 12, 13, 22, 26, 35, 36, 43, 44, 50, 54–56, 73, 74, 84, 91, 93, 109, 156–161, 163, 175, 176, 181, 196, 198, 203, 217, 228, 232, 233, 247, 248, 250, 260, 262, 263
moral norms 80, 84–86, 88, 89
multiculturalism 216, 246, 251, 255, 258, 260, 261, 265
multilateralism 26, 92, 95, 104–107, 140, 146–148
Muslim Brotherhood 101, 102, 135
National Integration Plan 25, 243, 246, 256–262, 264
national interests 162
Nationalist Action Party 199
naturalisation 234–236
negative externalities 12, 13, 15, 22, 70, 144, 148, 152, 158, 162, 163
neoliberal growth 213
neoliberalism 19, 20, 63–65, 209, 218
neorealism 63, 64, 117
Neukölln 26, 208, 214–216, 219–224
PEGIDA 176, 231, 262
Peoples’ Democratic Party 194
PKK 13, 21, 136, 166, 176, 177, 183, 231
practice turn 188–190, 195, 202–204
presidential election 194
privileged partnership 31, 37, 93, 166
public diplomacy 132, 133
public opinion 16, 24, 150, 152, 156, 162, 163, 182, 183, 192, 195, 197, 201, 202, 205
Radio MultiCulti 255
rationalism 26, 62–64, 88
realism 63, 64, 117
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 14, 15, 35, 102, 128, 135, 159, 165, 175, 177, 192
refugee crisis 13, 32, 37, 38, 40, 43–45, 49, 54, 55, 59, 67, 71, 73, 74, 83, 89, 99, 113, 121, 123, 124, 140, 145, 153, 155–163, 167, 175, 221, 224, 243, 261
refugee deal 24, 43, 55, 56, 74, 91, 123, 136, 158, 182
Republican People’s Party 199
reunification 35, 82, 94, 97, 107, 114, 117, 146–148, 208, 210, 214, 215, 250, 253
Reuterkiez 215, 216, 219–224
right-wing populism 221, 224
Rückkehrförderungsgesetz 252
rule of law 18, 44, 49, 50, 66, 84, 85, 88, 104, 132, 136, 183
Russia 38, 93, 95, 99, 100, 102, 121, 128–130, 132, 139, 148, 169, 172, 174, 235
Sebastian Kurz 199
segregation 210, 212, 237–239
Sigmar Gabriel 20, 38, 45, 96, 156, 166, 264
social housing 210
social inequality 207, 211, 224
SPD 16, 35, 37, 51, 52, 88, 118, 197, 253, 260
strategic depth 103, 104, 129, 131
supranational 24, 60, 143, 144, 148, 150, 152, 162
Syria 13, 16, 17, 38, 55, 94, 95, 101, 103, 121, 128, 132, 135, 153, 158, 174, 175, 182, 243, 262
terrorism 17, 23, 39, 43, 44, 59, 70–72, 82, 108, 136, 172, 174, 176, 179, 234
the German Assistance Act for Returning Foreigners 252
the second generation 249
tracking 26, 229, 230, 238–241
transatlantic relations 139
transnational electoral campaigns 25, 201, 205
transnationalism 188, 190, 204
Turgut Özal 171
Turkish Democrats 165, 194
Turkish immigrants 21, 25, 27, 207, 208, 212, 221, 222, 224, 225, 227–230, 232–241, 244, 249, 254, 258, 260, 265
Turkish migrant community 190, 193, 195, 196, 198, 199
UK 23, 26, 42, 49, 54, 57, 91, 92, 95, 97–100, 104–109, 117
UN 123, 134
unilateralism 96, 146, 162, 163
United States 64, 70, 84, 97, 171, 212, 218, 233
urban pioneers 216, 220, 221, 223
urban policies 26, 208, 209, 223, 224
veto 12, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24, 34, 38, 48, 50, 53, 57, 61, 86–88, 106, 107, 109, 153, 163
visa liberalisation process 13
voting abroad 187, 190
Willkommenskultur 263
ZDF 156, 255, 258–260