

Indonesian Decolonisation and the Dutch Attitude Towards the Establishment of the EEC's Association Policy, 1945-1963

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The massive decolonisation process of the post World War II era and the dismantling of the West European colonial empires coincided with the establishment of the European Union's predecessors and their policies, like the association policy and the European policy regarding development aid. Recent research has shown that (neo-)colonial concepts played a larger role in ideas about European collaboration in the 1950s than had been previously assumed. However, this recent international discussion is almost exclusively based on the French aim of stemming the tide of decolonisation by including imperialist concepts in plans for European integration. In contrast with the French case, the Dutch case is highly ambivalent. On the one hand, Dutch enthusiasm for the European project in the 1950s was a consequence of the political decolonisation of the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia. On the other hand the Dutch had started a new colonial project in the remaining part of the Dutch East Indies empire, West New Guinea – later known as Irian Jaya or Papua Barat –, that by this point was claimed by Indonesia. The eventual association of West New Guinea with the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Europeanisation of development aid to West New Guinea could be used as instruments for maintaining Dutch colonial rule in South East Asia.

As this article will show from a Dutch perspective, the establishment of the association policy and of the European Development Fund of the six member states of the EEC was agreed upon against the equivocal background of French neo-colonial interests and the Dutch (post-)colonial re-orientation. Moreover, the Dutch attitude towards the EEC's association and development policy initially seems to have had strong features of post-colonial self-righteousness, caused by a sense of colonial exceptionalism and resentment about the decolonisation process.¹

Decolonisation

Until recently, colonialism, neo-colonialism and post-colonial resentment were generally excluded from EU history. The “grand narratives” of the early European integration process that started shortly after the end of the Second World War have shifted from the narrative of the “European saints”, such as Jean Monnet, who made peace in Europe possible, to the “Milwardian” narrative of European integration as a way to “rescue” the member states by providing them with the means to build up national

1. I am grateful to Brian Shaev, Russell Foster, Fernando Guirao, Jan van der Harst and Wilfried Loth for their comments on an earlier version of this article.

welfare systems.² Nowadays, most scholars agree that the reformist nature of Europeanist ideas could well be combined with conservative traditions of thought, like romantic internationalism,³ technocratic corporatism⁴ and colonialism.⁵

French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's declaration of 9 May 1950 was indeed a combination of various objectives. The spirit of European colonialism resounded in Schuman's announcement that the future European community would acquire more (financial) means for its most prominent task: the development of the African continent, which at that moment was for a large part under French administration. A few years later, the governments of the French Fourth Republic obviously regarded the EEC as a means to maintain the French colonial empire (the *Union française*). In 1956, during the negotiations on the EEC, the French (and the Belgians) insisted that the Common Market had to include French and Belgian Africa, as a condition of French entry. Their African overseas countries and territories were to receive money from a European fund to bring about development. In fact, the French relaunched a concept from the interwar years: that of a "Eurafrican" space.⁶ Some historians even argue that European (neo-)imperialism played a formative role in shaping an imagined community of Europe.⁷

2. G. GARAVINI, *Review of P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*, Bloomsbury, London, 2014, in: *H-Soz-Kult*, 31.03.2016, <http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher-24816>.
3. M. DURANTI, *The Conservative Human Rights Revolution: European Identity, Transnational Politics, and the Origins of the European Convention*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
4. See for example: A. COHEN, *De Vichy à la Communauté européenne*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2012; R. DE BRUIN, *Projector or Projection Screen? The Portuguese Estado Novo and "Renewal" in the Netherlands (1933-1946)*, in: C. REIJNEN, M. RENSEN (eds), *European Encounters. Intellectual Exchange and the Rethinking of Europe 1914-1945*, Rodopi, Amsterdam/New York, 2014, pp.87-100.
5. See for example: M-T. BITSCH, G. BOSSUAT (eds), *L'Europe unie et l'Afrique. De l'idée d'Eurafrrique à la Convention de Lomé I*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005; P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*, Bloomsbury, London, 2014; L. KOTTOS, *Europe between Imperial Decline and Quest for Integration: Pro-European Groups and the French, Belgian and British Empires (1947-1957)*, PIE Peter Lang, Bruxelles/Brussels, 2016; G. MIGANI, *La France et l'Afrique sub-saharienne, 1957-1963. Histoire d'une décolonisation entre idéaux eurafricains et politique de puissance*, PIE Peter Lang, Bruxelles/Brussels, 2008; K. MULLER, *Shadows of Empire in the European Union*, in: *The European Legacy*, 6(2001), pp. 439-451; M. NIËNHAUS, *Europese toekomst gefrustreerd door koloniaal verleden. Nederland, Frankrijk en de positie van de overzeese gebiedsdelen binnen de Gemeenschappelijke Markt tijdens de onderhandelingen over de Verdragen van Rome (mei 1956-maart 1957)*, in: *Skript*, 33(2011), pp. 17-28; J. NORDBLAD, *The Un-European idea: Vichy and Eurafrica in the Historiography of Europeanism*, in: *The European Legacy*, 19(2014), pp.711-729; P. PASTURE, *Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2015, pp.185-195; A.-I. RICHARD, *Europa vóór de Europese Gemeenschap van Kolen en Staal. Nederlandse civil society organisaties in het interbellum*, in: *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 130(2017), pp.21-45; B. SHAEV, *The Algerian War, European Integration, and the Decolonization of French Socialism*, in: *French Historical Studies*, 41(2018) (to be published); L. SICKING, *A Colonial Echo: France and the Colonial Dimension of the European Economic Community*, in: *French Colonial History*, 5(2004), pp.207-228.
6. P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, op.cit., p.147.
7. J. NORDBLAD, op.cit., p.726.

However, the Dutch were reserved in their response to a French proposal that would open the market of the six founding members to non-European countries and territories that had “special relations” with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The decolonisation of Indonesia in 1949, after a bloody war between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, had forced the Netherlands to re-orient economically through industrialisation. For this reason, the Dutch Foreign Minister Wim Beyen took the initial step towards a European common market. The reticence of the Dutch Labour Prime Minister Willem Drees with regard to the association of French and Belgian Africa was caused by fear of getting involved financially and politically in another decolonisation war, this time in Algeria. Nonetheless, the Dutch attitude towards European integration initially also seems to have been influenced by post-colonial feelings of indignation and self-righteousness, both in the geopolitical field (towards Indonesia and the US) and in the economic field (towards France).

In this article, I will first explore the subject of the Dutch colonial “civilising mission”. Then I will discuss the Dutch indignation caused by international interference in the Indonesian decolonisation. Finally, I will show how this colonial history affected the ambivalent Dutch attitudes towards the European association policy and the establishment of the European Development Fund.

“Guide country”

Before the Second World War, The Netherlands regarded itself as pre-eminently fit to manage ethnic and religious variety in the Dutch East Indies. This “ethical imperialism” was connected with a self-image of the Netherlands as a “model coloniser” that was comprised of a combination of the notions of the Netherlands as the originator of international law, the patron of neutrality and the advocate of free trade.⁸ Dutch foreign policy rested on the traditional conviction that the Netherlands as a small nation with a large colonial empire in South-East Asia (the Dutch East Indies), South America (Surinam) and the Caribbean (the Dutch Antilles) needed international partners for its economic and political well-being. Free trade was seen as a case of morality. Unlike the French protectionist economic policy in most of the African colonies, the Dutch economic “open door” policy, a free trade policy, in Indonesia had resulted in an extensive trade between the Dutch East Indies and the extra-European world, especially with the United States. In an effort to encourage the investment of foreign capital in Indonesia, a report of the Netherlands chamber of commerce in New York in 1924 announced that Holland wished to provide economic access to her overseas territories to:

8. B. STOL, *Trouwe koloniale bondgenoten. Nederland, België en de Europese dekolonisatie, 1945-1963*, in: R. COOLSAET, D. HELLEMA, B. STOL (eds), *Nederland-België. De Belgisch-Nederlandse betrekkingen vanaf 1940*, Boom, Amsterdam, 2011, pp.78-108.

“those nations which have no colonies of their own, and in this way [Holland] demonstrates to a narrow-minded, egotistic world the practical solution to conflicts in the colonial sphere”.⁹

At around the same time, count Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi propagated the establishment of a European customs union between continental European countries, including their colonies, in response to the threatening decline of European global power. In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s eyes, the European continent would have to form one large economic entity, together with its colonies, that would eliminate internal tariff barriers. It was relatively easy to fit “overseas France” into the geographically “elastic” project of European integration, whereas in the Dutch case the special economic relations between the metropole and the overseas territories in South-East Asia were considered obstacles for participation in a European customs union. In contrast to the French case, the interests of Dutch colonial enterprises could not easily be reconciled with the building up of tariff walls around the borders of a “greater Europe”.

In the early 1930s, Dutch Europeanist organisations discussed the pooling of the colonies under one central European authority.¹⁰ On 6 December 1930, the Dutch captain of industry Ernst Heldring wrote in his diary, after a meeting with Coudenhove-Kalergi, that this pooling would be a good idea, but only on the basis of British participation, free trade and an open door policy, and not on the basis of cartelisation and tariff walls against imports from the US, like French industrialists wanted.¹¹ In general, European economic integration was regarded as the second-best option after the failure of global free trade.

Like many of their contemporaries, Dutch captains of industry were both imperialists and Europeans. Even the British Socialist Ernest Bevin suggested in 1938 that the great colonial powers of Europe should pool their colonial territories and link them up with a European Commonwealth.¹² However, shortly after 1945, by which time Bevin had become British Foreign Secretary, the Dutch regarded economic collaboration in the colonial field as even more complex than collaboration on the European continent, partly because the Dutch economic-liberal approach by now had become dissociated not only from French statism, but also from British “state socialism” under Labour rule.¹³

Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia came to an end when, during the Second World War, Indonesia was occupied by Japanese forces. Only a few days after the surrender

9. As cited in F. GOUDA, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942*, second edition, Equinox, Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur, 2008 [1995], p.42.

10. A.-I. RICHARD, op.cit.

11. J. DE VRIES (ed), *Herinneringen en dagboek van Ernst Heldring (1871-1954)*, Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, Utrecht, 1970, p.903 (6 December 1930).

12. B. GROB-FITZGIBBON, *Continental Drift: Britain and Europe from the End of Empire to the Rise of Euroscepticism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, p.28.

13. See Published sources on the Dutch-Indonesian relations 1945-1950, Memorandum Hirschfeld, 20.07.1946; Dutch ambassador Moscow (Tony Lovink) to Foreign Minister (Pim van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 07.04.1947: <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/retroboeken/nib/>.

of the Japanese occupying forces in Indonesia, in August 1945, the “Republic of Indonesia”, led by Achmed Sukarno, was proclaimed. Many Europeans living in Indonesia, who had been forced to live in Japanese concentration camps during the occupation, were killed by *pemudas*, who were young, fanatic supporters of independence. The war that followed would cost around 100.000 lives. On the Republican side, the war had features of a civil war, for instance between Communists and non-Communists and between Islamists and the Republican forces. It would also cost the lives of tens of thousands of people that supported the Dutch East Indies: “Europeans”, “Indo-Europeans” and Moluccan soldiers in the colonial army.

Marshall Aid and Indonesian decolonisation

In 1946 one of the key groups within the Dutch Labour Party published a brochure that stated that there was a global force at work in the development of a political one-world system. However, the transition phase would be dominated by state conglomerates or blocs of states. No individual country would be able to hold on to its sovereignty. According to the brochure, the peoples of India, Indo-China and Indonesia also had noticed this global development and they knew that the US and the Soviet Union had become more important powers than the British Empire, France and the Netherlands. The brochure wrongly concluded that the Dutch would be forced to abandon their colonial mentality because, politically speaking, the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia was of more importance in the post-war world order than the Netherlands.¹⁴

Nevertheless, the Dutch opted for a decolonisation along Dutch lines. From 1946 onwards, they tried to establish a federal structure in Indonesia in order to gradually transfer the sovereignty of the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia to a future United States of Indonesia. Federalism in Indonesia had been advocated since 1918, but it was only prominently placed on the agenda at the early post-war “federalist moment”, partly

14. J.G. V/D PLOEG, *Het Indonesische vraagstuk. Syllabus III Nederlandse Volksbeweging*, Rotterdam, 1946. The truth was that for the US Truman administration, the recovery of the Dutch economy in a European context was paramount because of the emerging fear of the Soviets’ bad intentions in Europe. See F. GOUDA, with Thijs BROCADES ZAALBERG, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2002, p.26.

for pragmatic reasons.¹⁵ This federation policy should protect the people of the remote areas in Indonesia from being dominated by the centre (the Republic, which controlled large parts of Java and Sumatra). Negotiations were started with the Republic of Indonesia, but were hampered by the Dutch claim that their negotiating partner should be regarded as one of several states in this federation, whereas the Indonesian Republic regarded itself as the representative of Indonesia as a whole. The Indonesian Republic interpreted the Dutch policy as a divide and rule strategy. The hardliners within the Republic (especially the armed forces) did not accept the establishment of an interim government and a gradual independence on Dutch conditions.

In April 1947 the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia were heading towards a serious balance of payments crisis, as was the metropole itself. A loss of the colony would mean a fatal blow to Dutch credit-worthiness. The government's adviser Hans Max Hirschfeld advised military action against the Republic by the "legal authorities" in Indonesia supported by Dutch armed forces. After this "First Police Action" of July 1947 (or first "agressi Belanda" as it is called in Indonesia), guerrilla warfare broke out. By now, hardliners on the Dutch side wanted to dissolve the Republic, even if this would challenge the United Nations, which had called for a cease-fire, and risk an open confrontation with the US and the United Kingdom. In case the colony would have to be abandoned, at least the Dutch people would not blame their own government for it, the hardliners argued. More or less at the same time as this looming collision, the Conference on Economic Cooperation in Paris tried to formulate a West European answer to the American offer of "Marshall Aid". At this conference, Hirschfeld represented the Benelux countries.¹⁶ During the development of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Aid), he would be one of the main advocates of German participation, and one of the architects of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).¹⁷ The Americans fruitlessly hoped that he would be given permission by the aided countries to act as the OEEC's first secretary-general.¹⁸

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15. For the Dutch East Indies, see E. HENSSEN, *Gerretson en Indië*, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen, 1983, pp.43-45; N. EFTHYMIOU, *Vooroorlogse lijnen naar het akkoord van Linggadjati*, in: *Pro Memorie*, 9(2007), pp.149-171; R. DE BRUIN, *Elastisch Europa. De integratie van Europa en de Nederlandse politiek, 1947-1968*, Wereldbibliotheek, Amsterdam, 2014, p.177; J.J.P. DE JONG, *De terugtocht. Nederland en de dekolonisatie van Indonesië*, Boom, Amsterdam, 2015, pp.289 and 301. For the British Empire, see M. COLLINS, *Decolonisation and the "Federal Moment"*, in: *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 24(2013), pp.21-40. For the French Empire, see F. COOPER, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ and Oxford, 2014, pp.37-38.
 16. J. RHIJNSBURGER, *The Political Biography as a Vehicle for the Political Scientist: Dr. H.M. Hirschfeld and the Dutch National Interest, 1931-1952*, in: *Journal of Political Science*, South-Carolina Political Science Association, Clemson University USA, 20(1992), pp.133-151.
 17. M. FENNEMA, J. RHIJNSBURGER, *Dr. Hans Max Hirschfeld. Man van het grote geld*, Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2007, pp.168-170 and 185-186.
 18. A.S. MILWARD, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*, Methuen, London, 1984, p. 174.

The Dutch used the European Recovery Program as a political instrument during the war in Indonesia. As a result of Hirschfeld's influence, the Indonesian overseas territories were incorporated in the European Recovery Program, which enabled the Dutch to put pressure on the Indonesian Republic. For the Dutch, the Marshall Aid for the Netherlands via Indonesia (including the territories controlled by the Republic) was a means to test whether or not the Indonesian Republic was willing to cooperate in a decolonisation process along the lines of the Dutch.¹⁹ According to the historian Frances Gouda, it "buttressed The Hague's ability to impose a strict economic embargo on the independent [Indonesian] Republic in Yogyakarta".²⁰

For the Americans, the Marshall Aid to the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia was a means to put pressure on the Dutch.²¹ The money spent on Indonesia was considered by the US officials as a contribution to the recovery of the Dutch economy. The second Dutch "Police Action" against the Indonesian Republic of December 1948, in which the leaders of the Republic were captured, was regarded by the Americans as an "incredible piece of Dutch stupidity". They initiated a resolution in the UN's Security Council aimed at restoring the *status quo ante bellum*, and Washington suspended Marshall Aid to the Dutch colonial administration. This largely symbolic measure had a severe psychological impact on the Dutch community, since Marshall Aid to the Netherlands became endangered as well.²²

As it proved impossible to form an interim government with "moderate" republicans and Indonesian federalists after the second "Police Action", an attitude of "abandonism" gained ground among leading Dutch politicians. This resulted in a new Dutch policy for a quick termination of official Dutch colonial rule over the Indonesian archipelago, with the exception of (the ethnically different) West New Guinea, to take effect on 27 December 1949.²³ A Union was established between the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, consisting of the Netherlands and its remaining overseas dependencies (Surinam, the Dutch Antilles and West New Guinea). Sovereignty was transferred to the United States of Indonesia. However, in the following months all the federal states of the United States of Indonesia were dissolved and absorbed by the Republic. In August 1950, Indonesia became a unitary state.

This tendency towards Republican, "Javanese" centralism led to "Islamist" and "nationalist" rebellion in several parts of the archipelago, for instance on the Moluccas, an island group in the far East of Indonesia. This Moluccan revolt was supported by some conservative Dutch politicians. In 1952, Dutch Labour politician Geert Ruygers' opinion was characteristic of the attitude of progressive politicians towards the "obsolescence" of nationalism and regional separatism, when he qualified the

19. M. FENNEMA, J. RHIJNSBURGER, op.cit., pp.195-196.

20. F. GOUDA, T. BROCADES ZAALBERG, op.cit., p.29.

21. P. VAN DER ENG, *Marshall Aid as a catalyst in the decolonization of Indonesia, 1947-1949*, in: *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 19(1988), pp.335-352 (reprinted in: J.D. LE SUEUR (ed.), *The Decolonization Reader*, Routledge, New York, 2003, pp.123-138).

22. F. GOUDA, T. BROCADES ZAALBERG, op.cit., pp.40 and 298.

23. J.J.P. DE JONG, op.cit., pp.202, 215, 216, 302 and 303.

claims for national sovereignty and the “nationalist hysteria” in some of the multi-national former colonies as phenomena that were not in line with the spirit of the time.²⁴

“Inevitability” of European integration

Partly because of Indonesian decolonisation, the Dutch government aimed at a partial economic redirection from Indonesia to the European continent and from trade to industry. The creation of a strong West German economy was a condition for these aims, but at the same time a restoration of (West) German political power was strongly feared. European integration could reconcile these two opposites.

The Dutch Parliament had traditionally kept aloof from colonial and international politics, leaving the advancement of the “national interest” abroad to the Foreign Affairs Department. However, this changed in the late 1940s, partly because of the feeling that the United Nations, dominated by the US and the Soviet Union, violated international justice because of its interventions in the Indonesian war. Dutch politicians, who felt that the legal authorities in Indonesia were “overthrown” by the UN, interpreted this as a disruption of international justice by the new great powers. Only through the integration of Europe could the West European countries protect themselves against similar “violations of international justice” in the future, according to one of the Dutch MPs.

Post-war European integration was presented by Dutch politicians both as part of, and as an adequate administrative response to, a process of growing global interconnectedness, in which the European empires had steadily lost their hegemony. This core belief was explicitly put into words by the Labour MP Evert Vermeer. In a personal letter to a fellow MP, the former Protestant Prime Minister Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, who had turned against the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia and was a staunch opponent of the European Defence Community, Vermeer made clear that he himself was not a European enthusiast who regarded Europeanisation as a panacea for all the illnesses of modernity. Nevertheless, he claimed, the West European position in the world was in decline to such a degree that the national sovereignty of West European states had already become a fiction. According to Vermeer, the West European nation states had no choice other than to unite, if they did not want to “capitulate” to one of the two new global superpowers. Many Dutch politicians of the 1950s seemed to think of European integration as not only a necessity but also a historical inevitability.²⁵

Public support for European integration was enormous. Popular enthusiasm in the Netherlands for the European cause in the 1950s is indicated by a consultative ref-

24. R. DE BRUIN, *Elastisch Europa...*, op.cit., p.63.

25. R. DE BRUIN, *Elastisch Europa...*, op.cit., pp.81 and 178.

erendum held on 17 December 1952 in Delft and Bolsward, two towns with populations politically and religiously representative of the Netherlands as a whole. The vast majority of the voters voted in favour of the idea of a European government, overseen by a democratically elected European Parliament. After the dissolution of the “exemplary” Dutch East Indies empire, many Dutch regarded the post-war Dutch consensus-based democracy as a model for the European Communities.²⁶

The author Willem Frederik Hermans connected the processes of European integration and decolonisation in his satirical novel *I am always right* (1951). In this malicious novel, the bitter protagonist named Lodewijk Stegman is shipped as a soldier from Indonesia to the Netherlands after the lost war in Indonesia. His prospects are dim. Stegman’s academic study in Indology, interrupted when he was drafted, had become useless. In his angry monologues he charges the ignorant Dutch people who had been too lazy to read the newspapers and to fully grasp their dependency on the great powers. On board, he meets Nico Kervezee, who plans to establish a new political party that, once in power, will dissolve the Dutch state and create a “scientific” European dictatorship, since that is the only remedy for ignorant Dutch provincialism. The novel continues with their scheme for establishing the party through the revenues of a football magazine (“Football – Europe!”), which fails before even getting off the ground.²⁷

“Second colonial occupation” in West New Guinea

Dutch indignation about the foreign intervention in Indonesia was still fresh in 1954, when the first meeting of the Bilderberg group took place in the hotel De Bilderberg in the small Dutch town of Oosterbeek.²⁸ This first Bilderberg conference was an informal meeting of West European and American non-Communist politicians, business leaders and trade union officials called with the purpose of removing sources of friction between the United States of America and its West European military allies in the Cold War. The initiative for the conference was taken by the Polish politician-in-exile Joseph Retinger, a prominent member of the Mouvement Européen who also

26. R. DE BRUIN, *The “Elastic” European Ideal in the Netherlands, 1948-1958. Images of a Future Integrated Europe and the Transformation of Dutch Politics*, in: M. BEERS, J. RAFLIK (eds), *Cultures Nationales et Identité Communautaire: un Défi pour l’Europe?*, PIE Peter Lang, Bruxelles/Brussels, 2010, pp.207-216.

27. W.F. HERMANS, *Ik heb altijd gelijk*, Van Oorschot, Amsterdam, 1951; R. DE BRUIN, *Elastisch Europa...*, op.cit., pp.61-63.

28. The American political scientist Arend Lijphart characterised it as a “trauma”. See A. LIJPHART, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 1966. This psychological metaphor has often been criticised as a distorted image. See J. FORAY, *The Trauma of Liberation: Dutch Political Culture and the Indonesian Question in 1945*, in: *Historical Reflections*, 41(2015), pp.79-94; B. STOL, *Een goede kleine koloniale mogendheid. Nederland, Nieuw-Guinea en de Europese tweede koloniale bezetting in Afrika en Melanesië (ca. 1930-1962)*, unpublished PhD thesis, Utrecht University, 2017.

had been the driving force behind the organisation of the European Congress in The Hague of May 1949.²⁹ The organisation of the Bilderberg conference was put into the hands of Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands.

After a constitutional meeting in Paris in September 1952, reports about the general feeling towards the US in West European countries were sent in by influential politicians like the French Prime Minister and former Vichyite Antoine Pinay, the French Socialist leader and future Prime Minister Guy Mollet, the Belgian Catholic politician, Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland, and the future British Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell.³⁰ In this run-up to the conference the US was especially reproached for the Americans' "naïve" and "ignorant" attitude towards "what they called colonialism". The Belgians claimed that they were shocked by this negative attitude. To the French the initial American support for the policy of decolonisation seemed illogical and incompatible with the aim of rolling back Communism.³¹ While the Americans at first had put pressure on the Dutch "to give up Indonesia and replace it with chaos", on the British to leave India and Burma and on the French to leave Indo-China, now in 1952 the Americans seemed "scared of what they have done in the Far East". For instance, France was being supported financially by the US in the Indo-China war. To the Europeans this switch in US policy towards the European position spelled a lack of political foresight.³²

At the conference of 1954, Hirschfeld, who was the first to speak after the opening of the conference, referred to the intervention of the UN in the Indonesian war.³³ He recollected his personal experiences in the Dutch East Indies in 1925, claiming that back then the Indonesian archipelago had not been an underdeveloped country. According to his view, agrarian legislation had protected the "natives" against feudalism, good public health had led to a great increase in the population, education results had compared favourably with those of similar countries, a system of roads had made it possible for law and order to be maintained and economic development to proceed, corruption was non-existent, the army was ten times smaller than the Indonesian forces of 1954 and, in the economic field, the Netherlands maintained an open-door policy, which had not been achieved in any other colonial territory in the world.³⁴ Prince Bernhard seemed to agree. He remarked that America and some European countries did not fully realise:

29. P. RIJKENS, *Handel en Wandel. Nagelaten gedenkschriften 1888-1965*, Ad Donker, Rotterdam, 1965, p.135; A. PIECZEWSKI, *Joseph Retinger's conception of and contribution to the early process of European integration*, in: *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire*, 17(2010), pp.581-604.

30. P. RIJKENS, op.cit., p.138.

31. DNA [Dutch National Archives, The Hague], Bilderberg Conferences, No. 5, Note Colonialism; DNA, Bilderberg Conferences, No. 1, Report No. 2 on American attitudes towards relations with Europe, December 1953, pp.8 and 9.

32. DNA, Bilderberg Conferences, No. 1, Draft report on American-European relations [1952], p.4.

33. DNA, Bilderberg Conferences, No. 3, Report 1st meeting, 29.05.1954.

34. *Ibid.*, Report 4th meeting, 30.05.1954, p.3.

“the lack of administrative brains in certain colonial territories, which made them unfit for self-government at least until they had been taught to run their own country”.³⁵

This view was typical of the Dutch patronising type of colonial racism.

According to George W. Ball, an American diplomat who played an important role in distributing Marshall Aid and who helped draft the Schuman Plan, Europeans tended to think that if the economic and social level of colonial peoples were raised, political progress would then slowly follow. Americans, on the other hand, laid greater stress on the speed of political development. An analysis of this encounter between American and West European participants in the Bilderberg conference shows that the Netherlands’ “exemplary” colonial policy had made hardly any impression. In the view of the Americans “a very strong wind of nationalism” was “blowing across the world”. Under these circumstances, the Americans argued that the demands for independence perhaps did not conform to any degree with the extent of preparation for independence, but the Europeans were too patient. In the great nationalistic storm they would all be swept out of Asia and Africa, with most unfortunate results.³⁶

Meanwhile, the Dutch had redirected their messianic drive to the development of West New Guinea (some historians speak of a “development project under a colonial flag”, others call it a “second colonial occupation”), in an attempt to prepare it for independence and to prevent Indonesia from taking control of the country.³⁷ They presented an open door-policy especially for American and Australian investors.³⁸ A dispute soon arose with the Indonesian government. As one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement after the Bandung Conference of 1955, Indonesia successfully framed this dispute as part of a broader dispute between decolonised states and the “neo-colonial” West and as a latent threat for world peace.³⁹ As a result of these growing tensions, Indonesia left the Netherlands-Indonesian Union in 1956. Those “Belanda’s” who had stayed in Indonesia after 1950 and had held on to their Dutch nationality eventually were forced to leave Indonesia on 5 December 1957 (“Black St. Nicholas”). At around the same time Sukarno nationalised the Dutch companies in Indonesia. In the following years, the Dutch came to the brink of war with Indonesia numerous times.⁴⁰

35. Ibid., pp.3 and 4.

36. Ibid., pp.3-9.

37. J.J.P. DE JONG, op.cit., p.309; P.J. DROOGLEVER, *Een daad van vrije keuze. De Papoea's van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht*, Boom, Amsterdam, 2005, p. 289; B. STOL, *Trouwe koloniale...*, op.cit., pp.88-90.

38. P.J. DROOGLEVER, op.cit., p.284.

39. H. MEIJER, *Den Haag-Djakarta. De Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen 1950-1962*, Spectrum, Utrecht, 1994, p.457.

40. C.L.M. PENDERS, *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia 1945-1962*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2002, pp.368-375.

The European Common Market, the “Eurafrican relaunch” and West New Guinea

In the 1950s, the European partners spoke with one voice in their criticism of US policies with regard to decolonisation processes. After the American resistance to the “neo-colonial” Anglo-French military intervention in the Suez in November 1956, the Dutch government regarded the establishment of the EEC as a means to strengthen the West European position within NATO.⁴¹ In 1957, France supported the Netherlands “jusqu’à l’extrême limite du possible” against Indonesian attempts to force UN negotiations about the transfer of power in West New Guinea.⁴² The Belgians had always been loyal political allies in this field.⁴³ To what extent were they also unanimous with regard to the inclusion of neo-colonial concepts in future plans for European integration?

The Schuman Plan of 9 May 1950 for a European Coal and Steel Community had alluded to the fulfilment of Europe’s essential task to develop the African continent. However, the ECSC had offered little in practice.⁴⁴ In 1956, during the negotiations on the EEC, the French, half-heartedly supported by the Belgians, rather unexpectedly insisted that the Common Market had to include French and Belgian Africa, as a condition of French entry.⁴⁵ In fact, the French relaunched the old concept of a Eurafrican space.

The leader of the influential Dutch Catholic Party initially regarded the French request as an instrument for maintaining Dutch colonial rule in West New Guinea.⁴⁶ However, Dutch Labour Prime Minister Willem Drees showed not the least bit of enthusiasm. He feared that an eventual association of West New Guinea would hamper the growing trade between West New Guinea and the neighbouring countries. Secondly, there was irritation that the Netherlands was not involved in the preliminary discussions between French and Belgian officials. Thirdly, according to Drees, it was not a matter of course that European continental economic integration would result in the establishment of “Eurafrique”, as he referred to it. Drees seemed to have been fearful of getting involved in the decolonisation war in French Algeria, with the Indonesian “nightmare” fresh on his mind. Finally, and most of all, there were objec-

41. D. HELLEMA, *1956. De Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van de Hongaarse revolutie en de Suezcrisis*, Mets, Amsterdam, 1990, p.148.

42. B. STOL, *De enige zekere bondgenoot. Nederland, Frankrijk en de zwanenzang van het Europese kolonialisme (1950-1962)*, in: *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 122(2009), pp.18-33.

43. B. STOL, *Trouwe koloniale...*, op.cit., pp.78-108.

44. P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, op.cit., p.127.

45. K. MULLER, *Shadows of Empire...*, op.cit., p.442; Idem., *Incompatible Blocs? European integration versus colonial obligations*, in: F. OSWALD, M. PERKINS (eds), *Europe – Divided or United? Proceedings of the twelfth biennial conference of the Australasian Association for European History*, Southern Highlands Publishers, Canberra, 2000, pp.73-87.

46. DE BRUIN, *Elastisch Europa...*, op.cit., p.105.

tions against the proposed development fund, out of fear of investing scarce money in an increasingly unstable area.⁴⁷

The Dutch cabinet was divided on the matter. Staunch supporters of European integration like Minister Sicco Mansholt (Labour Party, who later became the first European Commissioner for Agriculture), Minister Marga Klompé (Catholic Party) or Minister Jelle Zijlstra (Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party) had fewer objections than had Drees himself. On the one hand, there were fears that the African countries would follow in the footsteps of the Bandung countries and accuse the EEC of neo-colonial power play in case it would wait too long with the association of these regions. On the other hand, the cabinet interpreted the inclusion of French dependencies as a disadvantage to other developing areas, whose products were likely to be cheaper than those from French dependencies, which were to be protected economically. Furthermore, the Dutch government did not want to capitulate to what was characterised as the “myth of the Union française” and its protectionist economic policy.⁴⁸ It accepted the establishment of a European Development Fund only after the establishment of a global development organisation within the framework of the UN (SUNFED) seemed to have run ashore.⁴⁹

The other member states were not very enthusiastic either about establishing a common development fund and paying for the colonial policy of France. However, as a consequence of the Suez Crisis and of the defeat of the Hungarian uprising by the Soviet Union in 1956, the willingness, especially West Germany’s willingness, to compromise increased. According to the historian Michael Sutton, the West German Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer looked upon the President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser as an “ill-mannered Hitler” and was appalled by the turn of events representing the Suez crisis.⁵⁰ The German Federal Republic had no confidence in the lasting protection of the US and saw in European integration a safeguard against Communism from the East. Thus, Adenauer supported the Franco-Belgian initiative for geopolitical reasons and therefore West German officials tried to reach a compromise: a European Development Fund was to be established under the control of the European Commission.⁵¹ Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, which had been granted socio-economic and monetary self-government in 1954, and West New Guinea, would be allowed to acquire subsidies from the development fund. At the summit of the heads of government of “the Six” in Hôtel Matignon on February 19th and 20th 1957, Drees’ willingness to compromise on the financial contribution by the Nether-

47. Digitised sources on the Netherlands and the integration of Europe 1950-1986, Memorandum Minister of Foreign Affairs a.i. (Prime Minister Drees) to members of Cabinet, 29.11.1956: <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00544.pdf>.

48. *Ibid.*, Proceedings Cabinet Meeting, 18.01.1957: <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00359.pdf>.

49. P.A.M. MALCONTENT, J.A. NEKKERS, *Inleiding*, in: Idem. (eds), *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1999*, SDU, Den Haag, 1999, pp.11-60.

50. M. SUTTON, *France and the Construction of Europe, 1944-2007: The Geopolitical Imperative*, second edition, Berghahn, New York/Oxford, 2011 [2007], pp.80-81.

51. Digitised sources on the Netherlands and the integration of Europe 1950-1986, Proceedings Cabinet Meeting, 11.02.1957: <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00363.pdf>.

lands was stretched to the limit.⁵² Drees was reassured that the Netherlands' Overseas Countries and Territories would receive the exact amount of money from the development fund that the Dutch contributed to the common pot.⁵³ However, for the latter, the costs of this development fund would soon exceed the benefits.⁵⁴

In the Dutch cabinet's hesitations towards the Franco-Belgian proposal of neo-imperial trade preferences, a clash was visible between the French protectionist colonial policy and the Dutch "open door"-policy in the colonies. In general, the Dutch cabinet's views on French protectionism were broadly shared in the Netherlands. The influential Socio-Economic Council in the Netherlands preferred direct subsidies to price and market guarantees to promote the economic and social development of the overseas countries and territories: price and market guarantees should be phased-out.⁵⁵

Initially, only the Netherlands New Guinea was listed as one of the Dutch overseas territories in the EEC treaty. Because of their trade relations with the extra-European world, the governments of the Dutch Antilles (strongly dependent on its oil industry) and Surinam (strongly dependent on its bauxite industry) initially did not expect any economic benefits from the preferential trading arrangements. Nevertheless, an association agreement was signed with both the Dutch Antilles and Surinam in 1962. The Dutch Antilles were added to the list of the overseas countries and territories. The official status of Surinam caused some difficulties, but eventually the EEC treaty as a whole was applied to Surinam.⁵⁶

On July 20th 1963, a new association agreement was signed between the EEC and eighteen African countries that had recently gained independence: the Yaoundé agreement. Although economic relations with "developing" third countries, especially the members of the British Commonwealth, were a matter of concern for the Dutch government, the Dutch Foreign Office regarded the free trade area between the EEC and the associated countries as "no big deal in practice" in the economic field.⁵⁷ The main political objections against association and funding of French overseas dependencies had by now become obsolete due to the African decolonisation process, and especially the creation of an Algérie algérienne on 1st July 1962.

52. A.G. HARRYVAN, *In Pursuit of Influence: The Netherlands' European Policy during the Formative Years of the European Union, 1952-1973*, PIE Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009, p.236.

53. DE BRUIN, *Elastisch Europa...*, op.cit., p.105.

54. P. MALCONTENT, J. NEKKERS, op.cit., pp.11-60.

55. Digitised sources on the Netherlands and the integration of Europe 1950-1986, Advice on association policy Dutch Socio-Economic Council, 14.03.1962: <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01563.pdf>.

56. Digitised Historical Archives of the European Union, COM(1961)111, Vol. 1961/0044, "Assoziierung von Surinam mit der Gemeinschaft", 12.07.1961: http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/9551fa62-728e-410a-9fd8-42690c4e5c59.0001.01/DOC_1.

57. Digitised sources on the Netherlands and the integration of Europe 1950-1986, Memorandum Minister of Foreign Affairs to members Ministerial Committee on the independence of Surinam, 06.12.1974: <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S02773.pdf>.

At around the same time, the US strongly encouraged the Netherlands to transfer its administration over West New Guinea to Indonesia. In 1962, negotiations resulted in an agreement that transferred the control of West New Guinea to a UN temporary executive authority. From 1st May 1963 onwards, the administration was assumed by Indonesia until a referendum could be organised in which the inhabitants of Papua Barat would decide whether they opted for independence or unification with Indonesia. Instead of a referendum, a consultation of special councils was organised by Indonesia in 1969. The outcome of this consultation (unification with Indonesia) is still very much contested. Over the last decades, Indonesia has regularly been accused of “Javanising” the region.

Conclusion

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the Netherlands prioritised its colonial position above engaging in common European initiatives.⁵⁸ The Netherlands became one of the engines of the European integration process, but only after it had lost hopes of being able to hold on to its colonial crown jewel: Indonesia. This shift in Dutch policy after 1949 is indicative of the Dutch post-war attitude. Dutch politicians across the political spectrum recognised that the era of European dominance was in decline and that as a consequence the former empires had to collaborate with one another. This attitude was related, first, to the economic redirection of the Dutch economy from Indonesia to Europe; and second, to the necessity of creating a strong West German economy without the restoration of (West) German political power.

Although some Dutch politicians initially seemed to have had a keen eye for the utility of the EEC’s association policy and the European Development Fund as a means to remain present in the remaining former imperial regions, the EEC’s association policy, which would open the market of the six founding members to non-European countries and territories that had “special relations” with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, was regarded rather hesitantly before being accepted. There were fears of financial and political involvement in new decolonisation wars. Moreover, the Dutch hesitations towards the Franco-Belgian proposal of neo-imperial trade preferences showed a cleavage between different colonial economic traditions and convictions: the French protectionist colonial policy and the Dutch “open door”-policy.

Two fundamentally West European endeavours of the twentieth century, “enlightened” imperialism and the post-war establishment of a European common market were entangled in a more ambivalent manner than is shown by the case of Eurafrica. Therefore, the scope of research on the post-war and post-colonial re-ordering of Western Europe and its overseas (former) colonies should arguably be larger than the Franco-Belgian case, and should also include the dissolution of the Dutch empire

58. P. PASTURE, *op.cit.*, p.186.

between 1949 and 1975, the disintegration of the British empire, the dissolution of the Portuguese empire in 1975, and perhaps to a lesser extent also the Italian and Spanish cases.⁵⁹

59. See the personal story of the Portuguese activist and journalist A. DE FIGUEIREDO, *The empire is dead, long live the EU*, in: S. LLOYD-JONES, A. COSTA PINTO (eds), *The Last Empire: Thirty Years of Portuguese Decolonization*, Intellect, Bristol/Portland 2003, pp.127-143.