**Migration in European Integration: Themes and Debates**

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In this paper, we analyse the ways in which European integration historiography has dealt and is still dealing with the problem of migration.

From the late 1950s until the mid-1980s, the European Communities (EC) were only concerned with the freedom of movement of Community workers and, later, of all persons. Conversely, the movement of persons from countries outside the EC was entirely a matter for national officials. With the gradual abolition of internal border controls between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, however, the European Communities, later the European Union (EU), became increasingly involved in managing external borders which, clearly, entailed cooperation in asylum and migration policies.

In the history of European integration, therefore, the internal and external movements of people may be viewed as two sides of the same coin. We thus decided to examine migration both in and to the EC/EU.

This paper is divided into four parts, corresponding to the main historiographical debates on the above topic. Part 1 describes the origins of the freedom of movement for workers in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and, later, the European Economic Community (EEC). Part 2 focuses on the relationship between the freedom of movement for workers and the establishment of a social policy at European level. Part 3 discusses the role of the EC in closing borders to non-Community workers after the first energy crisis, and also examines the implications of restrictive migration policies for the EC’s external relations and enlargement strategies. Lastly, Part 4 examines the origins of the Schengen system and its impact on the migration policies of the Member States of the European Communities, later to become the European Union.

**I. Origins of the freedom of movement for workers in the European Communities**

In the immediate post-war period, migrant flows in the European continent were matters of great concern to international organisations, particularly the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). However, political scientists and economists tended to disregard this large-scale phenomenon. Rianne Mahon, Stephen McBride, Richard Woodward, Peter Carroll and Ainsley Kellow, who focused on the OEEC and its successor, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), showed only marginal interest in migration policies. It is true that migration became more and more peripheral to the strategy of both the above organisations. The OEEC/OECD, which was initially expected to perform functions of cooperation or even integration as regards migration policies, over the years came to assume functions which involved coordination and, eventually, only the strict level of information.

In this context, the OEEC has been particularly neglected. In a volume on the OEEC/OECD recently edited by Kerstin Martens and Anja Jakobi, although a whole chapter is specifically devoted to migration policy, only five and a half lines of the 20-page contribution in fact describe the OEEC’s activity.

Par contre, historians have shown interest in the OEEC’s debates and initiatives about migration from a very early stage. The British economic historian Alan S. Milward was the first to recognise the importance of migration for the OEEC. In The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51 (1984) and, to a lesser extent, in The European Rescue of the Nation-State (1992), he carefully examined reports of negotiations on workers’ movements in the Technical Committee on Manpower of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), the precursor to the OEEC. Milward argues that two types of conduct conflicted with each other. The Italian government was very keen to encourage migration in order to reduce mass unemployment and the political and social risks associated with it. Since the freedom of international migration which had characterised the period before the First World War no longer existed, this policy implied agreements at European level, allowing Italian emigration without restrictions. This, according to Milward, was a major reason for the Italian government’s interest in European integration as a whole. Italian requests, however, met with fierce opposition from representatives of countries with labour shortages. Despite their interest in attracting foreign manpower, they really intended to maintain sovereignty over their respective labour markets.

Although the government in Rome made the same request in the “Commission Mixte Franco-Italienne d’Union Douanière”, French representatives made it clear that they accepted labour migration only on condition that it was closely controlled by the “Office national de l’immigration”. In their opinion, a customs union should not lead to disorderly flows of immigrants and to the loss of jobs reserved for nationals.

5. Ibid., pp.253-254.
These were the ideas on which one of Milward’s most brilliant disciples, Federico Romero, based his far-ranging theory. In his contribution to *The Frontier of National Sovereignty* (1993) and to an even greater extent in *Emigrazione e Integrazione Europea, 1945-1973* (1991), Romero emphasises the economic and political importance of the Italian government’s migration problem. In his opinion, the need to export surplus manpower and consequently to open Western European labour markets to its own migrants were essential for the Italian government’s policy in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Italian requests, in turn, were the main factors behind the OEEC’s efforts to liberalise labour movements between the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The OEEC, however, failed to achieve this goal. The governments in Central and Northern European countries were eager to import workers to sustain their booming economies, but they did not want to be deprived of the protection of the national labour force and maximisation of its employment. In Romero’s opinion, this was crucial to maintain the equilibrium between economic prosperity and political stability in all the immigration countries in Western Europe.

After a silence of about twenty years, this topic has recently aroused an unexpected revival of interest. In 2014, Yvette Sobral dos Santos produced a doctoral thesis under the supervision of Maria Fernanda Rollo, describing the emigration policy of the Salazar-Caetano regime, and placed considerable emphasis on the work of Portuguese representatives in the OEEC. In 2015, Roberto Ventresca, supervised by Antonio Varsori, wrote a Ph.D. dissertation on the relationship between De Gasperi’s governments and the OEEC. Although the study was not primarily concerned with migration, great attention was devoted to this aspect. Lastly, Emmanuel Comte conducted his doctoral research under the supervision of Éric Bussière. He examined the factors behind the formation of the European migration regime between the mid-1940s and early 1990s and offered an original re-interpretation of events, which openly challenges Romero’s conclusions. Although Comte recognises the important role played by Italian representatives, he clearly moves the focus from emigration to immigration countries, particularly France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

In the second half of the 1940s, the United States (US) Administration was preoccupied with the social tensions linked to Eastern immigration in West Germany and with the manpower surplus in the least developed members on the periphery of Wes-

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tern Europe. These tensions were liable to destabilise the countries involved and to jeopardise their participation in the Western camp in the context of the Cold War. As a consequence, according to Comte, the US committed itself to encouraging migration flows within the OEEC. However, the weak labour demand in immigration countries and the large number of emigration countries in the OEEC were both to undermine the position of that organisation in the field of migration.\(^{10}\)

After the failure of the OEEC to liberalise the movement of European manpower, more successful efforts were made during negotiations for the ECSC and the EEC. At the end of tenacious discussions, the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC in 1951 recognised the right to free movement for qualified workers in coal and steel sectors. The later Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC in 1957 recognised the right to free movement for all workers of the Community, with the sole exception of those in the public sector.

Ruggero Ranieri was the first to stress the significance of this point in negotiations on the Schuman Plan. Based on the pioneering studies by Frank Roy Willis, Ranieri notes that those who introduced the principle of freedom of movement for workers in the debates were mainly the Italian representatives.\(^{11}\) They were clearly interested in encouraging migration and favouring re-employment in the receiving countries of the forthcoming ECSC. However, that proposal met with strong resistance from all Italy’s partners, who wanted to maintain full control over their respective labour markets. A compromise, which limited free circulation to workers with recognised qualifications in the coal and steel sectors, was more in line with the concerns of labour-importing countries, rather than with requests from the only labour-exporting member.\(^{12}\)

Romero set this topic at the centre of his analysis. Drawing on the works of Kenneth Dahlberg and Ray Rist, he argues that Italy’s strong European inclination directly served its government’s policy for national growth and stabilisation, in which exportation of surplus manpower played a great part.\(^{13}\) The incorporation of the freedom of movement for workers into the Paris Treaty and above all the Rome Treaty, in turn, was largely the result of the pressure by Italian negotiators on their reluctant counterparts. According to Romero, however, the outcome was clearly inconsistent with Italian requests. The Italian representatives wanted rapid, complete liberalisation of labour movements, but in the end they only obtained limited concessions. Freedom of circulation was in fact interpreted only as a qualified, long-term goal, to be approached through a slow, carefully negotiated transition. This meant that, although the Italian representatives were the moving force, the final compromise in the Treaty


of Rome was put forward by representatives from the FRG. The government in Bonn
needed a flexible environment for workers’ movements, but it was also convinced
that migration flows had to remain determined only by immigration countries.\textsuperscript{14}

In his reconstruction of the history of European integration, \textit{The Choice for Eu-
rope} (1998), Andrew Moravcsik implicitly adopts Romero’s view. He argues that
recognition of the freedom of movement for workers within the EEC was the result
of a compromise between the government in Rome, which sought to export labour,
and the government in Bonn, which sought to import it.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, in \textit{Labor Mi-
gration in an Integrating Europe} (2005), Simone Goedings agrees with Romero’s
theory, although she puts more emphasis on the contributions made by the High Au-
thority of the ECSC and the Commission of the EEC, respectively.\textsuperscript{16}

Emmanuel Comte, instead, questions Romero’s interpretation. In line with his
broader re-assessment of the role of immigration countries, he argues that the eco-
nomic, political and geopolitical interests of the FRG were the great moving forces
behind negotiations on the free movement of Community workers in the 1950s. Italian
initiatives, in his opinion, only played a minor role.\textsuperscript{17}

II. Relationship between freedom of movement for workers and persons and the
establishment of “Social Europe”

At bilateral level, the Federal Republic of Germany granted Italian workers easy
access to its own labour market in the early 1960s. Meanwhile, within the EC, the
free movement of workers was largely achieved as early as the mid-1960s, thanks to
the adoption, in 1964, of Regulation 38/64 and Directive 64/240.

The legal framework governing free movement of workers was amended in 1968
with the adoption of Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 68/360. These documents
removed provisions authorising the suspension of free movement rights according to
national circumstances. They also rejected any discrimination between workers of
Member States on the grounds of nationality and established the right to the same
social and tax benefits as local workers. In addition, significantly, family members
of migrant workers were allowed to reside and work in the host country. Although
the Treaty of Rome limited itself to providing for workers’ rights, the very provisions
for family reunification brought a new dimension to the concept of free movement;
in particular, they highlighted new issues, including housing, education and health-
care, which went well beyond the sphere of economically active workers. In the 1970s

\textsuperscript{14} F. ROMERO, \textit{Emigrazione...}, op.cit., pp.67-84.
\textsuperscript{15} A. MORAVCSIK, \textit{The Choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maas-
\textsuperscript{16} S.A.W. GOEDINGS, \textit{Labor Migration in an Integrating Europe. National Migration Policies and
\textsuperscript{17} E. COMTE, op.cit., pp.121-138.
and 1980s, freedom of movement and residence were extended to the self-employed and, in the 1990s, they were explicitly granted to non-economically active persons, including students, pensioners and the unemployed, plus their families.\(^\text{18}\) In 2004, Directive 2004/38 simplified the legislative framework by unifying several provisions already accepted in previous directives, including Directive 68/360. In 2011, Regulation 1612/68 was replaced by Regulation 492/2011.

This evolution went hand in hand with a surge of interest in the social dimension of the free movement of workers and, more generally, of people. Between the mid-1990s and early 2000s, in particular, the relation between the implementation of the principle of freedom of movement and the origins of European social policy finally began to attract attention from experts in European studies from many disciplinary backgrounds.

Political scientists were in the vanguard in this respect. Linda Hantrais notes that one major reason for promoting the social dimension of the European integration process was to remove obstacles to intra-European mobility. At the same time, she argues that social protection rights, which had been a major issue for intra-European mobility, by the early 1990s were increasingly used as an exclusionary mechanism, limiting access to benefits and services for non-EC nationals. This, in her opinion, lent social justification to the description of the Community as “Fortress Europe”.\(^\text{19}\) Patrick Ireland essentially agrees with this interpretation. In his view, to a certain extent the building of “Social Europe” was a sort of spill-over of the implementation of freedom of movement for workers and later other persons. However, a series of political and structural factors led to a significant rift. The citizens of the EC/EU increasingly enjoyed freedom of movement and Union-level social rights. Third-country nationals, instead, continued to be subjected to national legislation and to intergovernmental arrangements and organisations outside the EC/EU structure. Although migration had generated undeniable pressures for common policies, it also posed the ultimate threat to efforts to forge a more inclusive “Social Europe”. More recently, Willem Maas has emphasised the importance of free movement rights and demonstrated that they were fundamental to the development of European citizenship. In his opinion, however, it is now easier for Europeans to lose their common rights than for non-EC nationals to acquire them.\(^\text{20}\)

Jurists, including Ruth Nielsen, Erika Szyszczak and Nicolas Moussis, greatly contributed to drawing attention to the link between freedom of movement and the establishment of a social policy at European level. Unsurprisingly, they place special


emphasis on the role of the Court of Justice of the EC/EU in developing the principle of free movement of economic agents into overall European citizenship.21

In the early 2000s, experts in European history and particularly European integration began to study this problem, their main aim being to explain when and why the European institutions started developing social policies.

Antonio Varsori, Lorenzo Mechi and Francesco Petrini argue that the origins of the European social policy coincided with the beginning of the process of integration in the 1950s. They also show that the developments of the late 1960s and mid-1970s created preconditions for a European social consciousness, if not a clear-cut European social model.

Both these turning points were closely associated with the development of freedom of movement. The wish to ensure effective rights to free movement was crucial to the inclusion of social provisions in the Treaty establishing the EEC. The common vocational training policy, in their view, clearly reflected Italian migration interests. The government in Rome wanted the Community to finance vocational training courses in order to strengthen the competences of peasants from Southern Italy; this, in turn, might favour their employability in the labour markets of EC receiving countries. Meanwhile, the abolition of discrimination based on nationality in the EC was largely due to the need to facilitate the free movement of workers. Sincerely preoccupied by their condition and under pressure from Communist opposition, the Italian government was interested in demanding the same rights and benefits granted to local workers also for Italian migrants.22 According to the above group of scholars, freedom of movement was also relevant to the European Social Action Programme, adopted in the mid-1970s, which included the important “Action Programme in favour of Migrant Workers and their Families”. This was never fully implemented, but a significant Directive on the education of migrant workers’ children was approved in 1977, making it compulsory to teach the children of migrant workers the language of the host country, in order to stimulate their integration. It also encouraged the teaching

of the language and culture of the country of origin, to facilitate reintegration in case of return.23

However, the importance of freedom of movement in the origins of European social policy was not universally accepted. In his influential reconstruction of the historical evolution of European social policy, La politique sociale européenne du Traité de Rome au Traité d’Amsterdam (1999), Jean Degimbe, formerly employed by the High Authority of the ECSC, the European Parliament and the Commission of the European Communities, puts special emphasis on the period between the mid-1980s and early 1990s. Much in the same way as political sociologists such as Mario Telò and political scientists such as Gerda Falkner, Degimbe considers this period as that of the birth of “Social Europe”.24

In his opinion, its roots were thus to be sought in events which had very little to do with the free movement of workers. The decisive factors were: Mediterranean enlargement of the EC, with the inclusion of countries with gross domestic products well below the EC average; the decision to establish a Single Market in Europe, associated with the complementary need to alleviate the socio-economic imbalances which liberalisation processes were expected to cause; and the appointment of Jacques Delors, a French left-wing Christian close to trade unions, as president of the Commission of the European Communities.25

III. Restrictive migration policies in the European integration process

Since its inception, the EEC committed itself to implementing the principles of freedom of movement and establishment for Community workers and to abolish any discrimination based on nationality. However, the EC’s Member States decided to follow a nationalistic approach to immigration from third countries. This dichotomy has been studied and reported in the literature in detail.

Between the mid-1950s and early 1970s, immigration countries did not so much cooperate as compete to secure the best immigrants and to sign the most advantageous labour immigration agreements with countries outside the EC. Meanwhile, requests from non-Community sending countries to grant social rights to their nationals


working in Community countries were denied. The EC simply lacked the competence and their Member States the willingness to open a multilateral dialogue on such a delicate question, although immigration from third countries became increasingly significant in the Community area.\textsuperscript{26}

Implementation of the principles of freedom of movement and residence for EC workers, only apparently paradoxically, coincided with a decrease in intra-Community population movements throughout the 1960s. As noted by Federico Romero, the possibility of freely entering, leaving and re-entering each EC nation’s labour market at any time meant that Community nationals increasingly planned their movements in relation to fluctuations in demand. This phenomenon, combined with the “Miracolo Economico”, significantly reduced migration flows from Italy, which then accounted for almost the entire number of intra-Community movements.\textsuperscript{27}

In the same period, immigration from outside the EC and even the European continent was substantially growing, in both absolute and relative terms. As noted by Stephen Castles and Mark Miller in their masterpiece \textit{The Age of Migration} (1993), a combination of “push-pull” factors resulted in mass immigration from the Southern Mediterranean region and former European colonies in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In the meantime, labour supply reserves in non-Community Southern European countries, especially Spain, were falling, due to their improved economic conditions.\textsuperscript{28}

James Hollifield argues that this process was directly related to the parallel change in Western European migration policies. As cultural and ethnic diversity increased and, consequently, anti-immigrant sentiments surfaced within European societies, the political classes of Europe realised that there was a need to contain immigration and, at the same time, to integrate immigrants. In addition, the surprisingly active role played by foreign workers in the protests that swept through Northern European industries between the late 1960s and early 1970s alarmed employers who had benefitted from the docility of immigrant employees. As a result, they began not to trust the immigrant workforce and reduced requests for more foreign workers.\textsuperscript{29}

Unlike the above author, Didier Bigo places more emphasis on economic factors. Recession and increased unemployment as a consequence of the 1973 oil shock drastically reduced the need for further immigrants. As a result, employers stopped insisting on liberal immigration policies, trade unions voiced more concern about the conditions of the local workforce, and political leaders tried to preserve social peace.

\textsuperscript{27} ROMERO, \textit{Emigrazione…}, op.cit., pp.89-131.
and consensus by preventing fresh immigration. Against this background, in the early 1970s, all the receiving Member States of the EC unilaterally stopped recruiting foreign workers and, in the late 1970s, began to encourage their voluntary repatriation. In exchange, efforts were increased to incorporate foreign nationals already settled in the host societies, not least by expanding family reunification schemes.

The role of the EC in this transition has generally been neglected in the literature. The implicit assumption was that restrictive migration policies were the result of national decisions and that international and supranational organisations did not exert any real influence on events. However, Marcel Berlinghoff recently questioned this and showed, in particular, that the European Commission and its committees for the free movement of migrant workers were crucial for the rise of a "migration problem"; this change in attitudes towards migration, in turn, was an important contributing factor to restrictive policies in the early 1970s. Berlinghoff does not question the fact that decisions were autonomously taken by national governments, but he does argue that the European Commission was responsible for promoting the discourse on migration as a political and socio-economic liability, which provided restrictive measures with the necessary justifications and legitimacy. In his opinion, without considering these reflections, it is hard to understand political changes.

In the same period when its Member States were unilaterally interrupting their recruitment programmes, the EEC, under pressure from the Arab countries, began to include the migration problem in its nascent foreign policy, especially Mediterranean policy. The governments of Southern Mediterranean sending countries were no longer allowed to negotiate the export of surplus manpower to European labour markets. They were therefore increasingly interested in the socio-economic integration of emigrants and brought this question to the fore in the main bilateral and multilateral Euro-Mediterranean forums in the 1970s and 1980s. The main forums of the 1970s, in which the problem of migration very frequently arose, included the Euro-Arab dialogue, which brought together the EC and the Arab League, and negotiations for cooperation agreements between the EC and Third Mediterranean Countries (TMC), conducted within the framework of the Global Mediterranean Policy.

The main forums in the 1980s, in which the problems of migration topped the agenda, encompassed the French-led “Initiative Française en Méditerranée”, which brought together Northern and Southern countries in the Western Mediterranean, and the Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Western Mediterranean, which involved the five Member States of the Arab Maghreb Union, i.e., Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, plus France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and later Malta.

The part played by migration in the early EC foreign policy was first analysed by Sarah Collinson in *Shore to Shore* (1996) and, to a lesser extent, in *Beyond Borders* (1993) and *Europe and International Migration* (1993). These studies did not aim at providing a thorough interpretation of events, but they are still important. They give accounts of the role played by the migration problem in the pre-Barcelona Mediterranean strategy of the EC and, more generally, in pre-Maastricht foreign policy cooperation. They also show that the political aim of containing migration flows in the 1970s and 1980s was a powerful incentive for the EC to take greater interest in Southern sending countries; it was also a reason for a deeper, more concerted commitment to promoting socio-economic improvements in developing countries, especially along the Southern shores of the Mediterranean.33

This pioneering work has long remained isolated. Quite recently, however, a number of scholars focusing on the external dimension of the EC from an historical perspective, including Giuliano Garavini, Katharina Eisele and Federica Bicchi, began to examine the migration problem in more depth.34 A recent issue of the *Journal of European Integration History*, devoted to Europe and the Mediterranean in the 1980s, is typical of this new trend.35

In addition to becoming a source of conflict and cooperation in relations between the EC and their members and TMC, between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, for the first time, migration also became a crucial bone of contention in accession negotiations. The migration problem was also a factor in the accession negotiations with Great Britain and Ireland in the early 1970s. The Italian government was particularly concerned about the forthcoming accession of Ireland, because of its large labour surplus. Italy consequently proposed to implement “administered” free movement of workers, a plan which was rejected by the other Member States.36 At the same time,


the possibility of an increased number of Community nationals coming to Britain was a subject which attracted much attention and high feeling throughout the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{37}

However, migration became a substantial problem only at the time of the Mediterranean enlargement. In many receiving countries, there were fears of a flood of migrants, once Greece, Portugal and Spain had joined the EC. The free mobility of Greek, Portuguese and Spanish workers was thus only introduced gradually and was not in fact completely accomplished until the early 1990s. Contrary to expectations, however, migrants from within the EC did not cause serious problems.\textsuperscript{38} The stimulating effects of trade and investments raised living standards and increased employment opportunities in the new Southern members of the EC. This induced the mass return of southerners to their homelands and even transformed these countries into a magnet for illegal migrants.

The importance of the migration issue in accession negotiations with Mediterranean countries was highlighted at a very early stage. In the early 1980s, François Duchêne and Juan Antonio Payno emphasised that the governments in Athens, Lisbon and Madrid were very interested in encouraging emigration to EC countries. At the same time, they noted that the free movement of labour from these countries was fiercely resisted, especially in the two Community countries which took in the largest numbers of migrants: West Germany and France.\textsuperscript{39} Very recently, several historians have turned to the study of the Mediterranean enlargement, putting even more emphasis on migration. In her study of the Greek accession to the EC, Eirini Karamouzi devotes much attention to the question of labour migration. In particular, she stresses the role of the FRG in opposing the free movement of Greek workers before the end of the longest transitional period decided for other sectors; in her opinion, this was essentially for reasons of domestic politics.\textsuperscript{40} Alice Cuhna and Charles Powell, similarly, give much consideration to migration in their respective researches on the Portuguese and Spanish accessions.\textsuperscript{41}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{straubhaar1984} T. STRAUBHAAR, \textit{The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC from the aspect of the free movement of labour in an enlarged common labour market}, in: \textit{International Migration}, 3(1984), pp.228-238.
\end{thebibliography}
IV. Interpretations of the Schengen System and its impact on national politics

The Schengen Agreement was signed shortly before the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC. It aimed at removing internal border controls while simultaneously introducing measures to harmonise and strengthen external border controls and to fight drug-trafficking, international crime and illegal immigration. The Schengen Agreement emerged as an intergovernmental initiative taken by a group of Community members outside the institutional framework of the European Communities. After the Amsterdam Treaty came into force, the Schengen Agreement, together with the Convention implementing it (CISA), were incorporated into the European Union acquis. This move paved the way for communitarisation of the migration policy, which still remains largely unaccomplished. Jörg Monar was probably the most persuasive author dealing with the complex relations and inherent tensions existing between intergovernmental and supranational dynamics. Andrew Geddes, instead, was probably the most capable of setting them in an historical perspective.

Apart from the reasons behind the incorporation of the principle of free movement for workers into the Treaties of Paris and Rome, the birth of the Schengen system is the most hotly disputed research topic in this field of study.

Mainstream thinking about the emergence of Schengen is provided by Andrew Moravcsik in *The Choice for Europe* (1998). In his economy-centered perspective, Schengen was primarily due to the will to liberalise trade in Europe. The French government, concerned that the FRG was setting standards on products aimed at blocking imports, and the government in Bonn, worried that France would close its borders because of its balance of payments problems, promoted a bilateral arrangement to simplify and eventually abolish border formalities. The French and German leaders then agreed to include in this arrangement the members of the Benelux Customs Union, i.e., Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, essentially because of commercial interests. The decision to sign an intergovernmental agreement was in turn part of a strategic game in which France and the FRG used the Schengen initiative to:


as a “threat of a two-tier Europe”, mainly directed at the United Kingdom, which opposed the establishment of a common travel area with continental Community countries.

Moravcsik’s model does not preclude the possibility that more strictly political considerations, such as national security, also played a role. However, it concludes that economic considerations definitely contributed to the creation of Schengen and that the decision to act outside the context of the EC was primarily intended to put pressure on Great Britain. Influential historiographical reconstructions of European integration, including Histoire de la construction européenne (1999) by Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, embrace this interpretation. Interestingly, however, the most recent volumes on the history of European integration tend to adopt more complex, multifaceted views: examples are Building Europe (2015) by Wilfried Loth and Storia politica e economica dell’integrazione europea (2015) by Elena Calandri, Maria Eleonora Guasconi and Ruggero Ranieri.

Although the German historian and political scientist Jörg Monar places more emphasis on security concerns, he basically agrees with Moravcsik, arguing that the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Convention implementing it were the direct consequence of the European Single Market project. The loss of control possibilities at internal borders, which was implicit in such a plan, in turn needed compensation at external borders. Monar also agrees with Moravcsik in arguing that Great Britain’s opposition to an agreement at Community level was the main reason why France, West Germany and the three Benelux countries resolved to act outside the EC. According to Monar, the Schengen founders perceived themselves as a sort of avant-garde; right from the start, accordingly, they had every intention of integrating the Schengen system into the EC as soon as it became politically possible.

Didier Bigo offers the most important alternative to this theory. Much in the same way as Monica den Boer, in Polices en réseaux (1996) Bigo distinguishes between the 1985 Schengen Agreement (Schengen I), which in his opinion was mainly due to economic worries, and the 1990 CISA (Schengen II), which was essentially driven

by security concerns.50 This shift, in Bigo’s opinion, was due more to the activities of those specialising in the security field, including police officials, border guards and security consultants, rather than to the rational strategies of political leaders. Security entrepreneurs played upon the collective anxieties and insecurities of European citizens regarding the immigration of non-Community nationals, the ultimate aim being to gain more power and visibility. By producing and reproducing a sense of fear, they created the conditions for a new “Europeanised” field of security. Similarly, Virginie Guiraudon argues that the Schengen agreements were the result of actions by various entities. These included not only high-level decision-makers, but also many local, national, trans-, inter- and supra-national agencies, institutions and groups actively involved in the security field.51 According to Bigo, moreover, the decision to act outside the EC was not due to a desire to bypass Great Britain’s opposition to a solution at Community level. He believes, instead, it was motivated by the wish to avoid interference from the EC institutions in such sensitive issues.52

More recently, Ruben Zaiotti has developed an original alternative theory. His argument, presented in Cultures of Border Control (2011), is that the emergence of the Schengen regime should be conceived in terms of the evolution of the culture of border control. In particular, the Schengen regime is the result of an historical transition from a nationalist approach to managing borders to a post-national culture of border control. Seen in this light, Schengen represents a substantial post-national reformulation of strictly national traditional concepts of sovereignty and territoriality in Europe.53 Unlike Zaiotti, the British historian Tony Judt interprets Schengen as a curiously provincial effort to open internal frontiers, while resolutely reinforcing the external borders separating the EC/EU Member States from countries outside the EC/EU. In his magisterial history of Europe, Postwar (2005), he even argues that, with Schengen, “civilised” Europeans had committed themselves to transcending boundaries while, at the same time, keeping “barbarians” out.54

In addition to their origins, the impact of the Schengen agreements and, more generally, Community migration policies on national dynamics is attracting increasing attention from researchers. With very few exceptions, which include analysis of the Dutch case by Marteen Vink, Europeanisation studies in the spheres of migration

and asylum tend to focus on the countries which were most greatly influenced by the EC/EU: that is, Southern and Eastern European countries. Writing about Spain, Wayne Cornelius argues that the development of its migration policy between the mid-1980s and early 1990s was almost entirely due to EC membership and, in particular, to the need to meet Schengen criteria. Instead, Joaquín Arango contends that the EC and Schengen were less influential in shaping Spanish migration policy. In his opinion, European institutions greatly influenced national legislation regarding border controls; however, domestic factors were decisive in its implementation and in the system of internal controls. Writing about Eastern European accession states in the late 1990s, Sandra Lavenex emphasises the burden placed on them to adapt to the requirements of the European Union acquis. These primarily included more effective measures against illegal immigration.

More recently, a group of scholars, including Pierre Monforte, began to investigate the effects of European migration and asylum policies on social movements. The main result of Monforte’s research was that pro-immigration and pro-asylum movements underwent a process of Europeanisation. In his view, since the late 1990s they constructed solidarities across countries, produced frames of European dimensions, and organized mobilisations which, directly or indirectly, addressed European power-holders.

Conclusions

Migration, both in and to the EC/EU, is a rich and still largely unexplored field of research for historians of European integration. It is therefore encouraging that so many scholars are currently working in this field of study.60

It is well-known that the archives of the institutions and Member States of the EU generally obey the 30-year rule covering access to documents. In the next decade, therefore, historians will be able to study new subjects, crucial to our understanding of European history in the twentieth century. Examples include: the role played by the opening of borders during and after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and subsequently German reunification; the part played by migration in the launching of the Barcelona Process and, more generally, the development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership; and the implications of the Schengen Area for the external relations of the European Union.

Historians of European integration can make great contributions to our understanding of migration flows and policies in the European continent in the period after the Second World War. Writing about migration dynamics without taking into account the process of European integration is in fact pointless and sometimes deceptive. The European Communities and, later, the European Union took initiatives which greatly affected how migrations took place and were regulated. These actions included implementation of the principle of freedom of movement for workers and, later, for people in general; the abolition of internal border controls and the establishment of external borders; cooperation in fields of migration and asylum; and externalisation of migration controls, which means the transfer of the control point from the border of the destination state to a point within the state of origin or transit.

At the same time, historians of European integration may benefit from better knowledge of migration problems over the last sixty years. In the 1950s, workers’ movements were essential in negotiations for the ECSC and EEC. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the migration of Community workers and their families was crucial to the establishment of social policy at European level. In the later 1970s and 1980s, immigration of non-Community nationals was an important factor in foreign policy cooperation and the enlargement of the EC. In the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of persons was an integral and essential part of the European Single Market project. In other words, neglecting migration when writing about the history of European integration can lead to poor and even misleading conclusions.

Research conducted by European integration historians so far may be said to have some substantial weaknesses, which should now be addressed.

Methodologically, most studies have not yet adequately considered the broader international context, the Cold War and the North-South confrontation in particular. In addition, most research tends to focus on political and institutional factors, to the detriment of economic, social, cultural and demographic dynamics; linked to this, non-governmental actors are rarely considered. In addition, most historians erroneously think they are self-sufficient. Instead, the intrinsically interdisciplinary nature of this topic requires collaboration with scholars from various backgrounds if all its complex and multifaceted aspects are to be thoroughly examined.

As regards content, instead, most studies are still too Euro-centric. This means that the voices of “others” are often neglected. There is a great need to understand something more about the opinions of non-Community migrants and the views of the governments of non-Community countries. It would also be useful to analyse in more detail the impact of European migration and refugee policies on the politics and economy of non-Community countries, together with their attitudes towards the EU and Schengen. In addition, little attention has been given to relations between the EC/EU and other international organisations which were active in this field. These include the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the OEEC/OECD, the Council of Europe, the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migrations (IOM). Much work still needs to be done in all these respects.