Assessing Yugoslavia’s Place in Western European Stabilisation Policies in Southern Europe, 1974-1976

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Cold War and European integration historians have recently devoted much attention to the prominent role played by the major Western European powers – in primis France and the Federal Republic of Germany – in supporting the political stabilisation of the Southern European scenario during the years of Gerald Ford’s US presidency (1974-1976), a critical historical juncture marked by the demise of Richard Nixon’s “imperial presidency”, the fall of three dictatorial regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and the electoral rise of the Communist Party in Italy.¹

The present work adds another element to this picture, dealing with Western European stabilisation policies towards Yugoslavia during this troubled period. It argues that the major Western European powers aimed at consolidating the link between this country and the Western system through the power of political and economic attraction exerted by the European Economic Community (EEC), because they considered this link to be a major element in safeguarding the stability of the Mediterranean arena. This study is structured around three major sections. The first contextualises the Yugoslav case within the Southern European crises of 1974. The second provides an overview of the peculiarities characterising Yugoslavia’s international position and the political constraints affecting Yugoslavia’s relationship with its Western European partners. It also emphasises the attempts of Yugoslavia’s Prime Minister, Džemal Bijedić, to overcome such political limitations and look for a closer relationship with the EEC. Lastly, the third section shows how uncertainty regarding Soviet policy after the death of Yugoslavia’s leader, Josip Broz “Tito”, led the major Western powers – the US, France, West Germany and Great Britain – to devise a quadripartite strategy which identified the strengthening of EEC-Yugoslav relations as a means of guaranteeing the stability of NATO’s Southern flank.


1974: turmoil in Southern Europe, turmoil in Yugoslavia

Between April and July 1974, the Southern European scenario was marked by a veritable political turmoil, due to the outbreak of the “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal and the collapse of the Colonels’ regime in Greece. Both events were characterised
by the conundrum regarding the outcomes of the transition processes. From a Western viewpoint, political discontinuity opened the question of the future orientation of the new leaderships which were to be installed in these countries and, first and foremost, the role leftist and pro-Soviet forces might play in such fluid and uncertain scenarios. The decision adopted on 14 August 1974 by the newly appointed Greek leader, Konstantinos Karamanlis, to withdraw his country from NATO’s military command as retaliation against the Atlantic Alliance’s incapacity to prevent the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, brought the issue of Western security in Southern Europe into sharp relief.  

The same applied for Portugal which, just like Greece, had represented an asset for the Alliance’s defensive interests in the Mediterranean since the early Cold War years. The prominent role played by leftist forces within the army during the crucial weeks of the “Carnation Revolution” seemed to imply the neutralisation of the country or even its rapprochement to the Soviet bloc, triggering a domino effect in the rest of the region. In addition, the Portuguese events hugely influenced the Spanish scenario, leading to harsh repression against political dissidents and the contemporary flourishing of democratic opposition to Francisco Franco’s regime, grouped within a Junta Democrática dominated by the Spanish Communist Party of Santiago Carrillo.

Uncertainty regarding the process of transition also involved Yugoslavia. Its leader, Josip Broz “Tito”, had ruled the country since the end of World War II and was himself the living symbol of the Yugoslav regime. In 1974, he was 82 years old (like Francisco Franco, he was born in 1892) and in precarious health. This year represented a veritable turning point in Yugoslavia’s history, as it marked the entry into force of a new constitution (21 February 1974) re-designing the relationship between the individual republics and autonomous provinces and the federal government in Belgrade. Whereas the new constitutional charter reinforced the leading role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and the Army, it expanded the powers of economic and political coordination of the single republics and autonomous provinces, thereby hindering the coordinative role of the central government. This constitution did nothing but confirm Western traditional concerns about the future of Yugoslavia. Centrifugal tendencies had indeed emerged in 1968 in Kosovo and in

1970-71 in Croatia, and they highlighted the precarious equilibrium on which the Yugoslav federation was built. The question of Yugoslavia’s transition after the death of Tito posed a real challenge to the West. One of the greatest fears of Western diplomacies regarded the possibility that Moscow could attract the post-Titoist leadership back to the Soviet Union, healing the wound opened by the 1948 Tito-Stalin split.6

Another element which made the Yugoslav case similar to those operating in Greece and Portugal was Yugoslavia’s uncertain position within the Western security system. In effect, after its expulsion from the COMINFORM in June 1948, Yugoslavia had become one of the major pillars of Western containment strategies in the region, constituting, together with Greece and Turkey, a shield preventing the expansion of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean through the Balkans. It was not by chance that, in 1954, Belgrade had concluded a military treaty – the “Balkan Pact” – with Athens and Ankara, two members of NATO.7 Although Yugoslavia’s non-aligned credentials – the pillar of the country’s foreign policy – prevented any perspective of Yugoslavia’s integration within the Alliance, Yugoslavia’s independence and unity were nevertheless valued as precious assets by the Alliance members. The increased expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East and North Africa after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war had increased the strategic value of the Balkan peninsula as defence against the expanding Soviet influence in the Mediterranean area.8 The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 had reinforced these views and aroused Western concerns about the potential application of the “Brezhnev doctrine” of limited sovereignty to other Socialist countries, first and foremost Yugoslavia.9 The Prague events had indeed strengthened Yugoslavia’s ties to the Western security system and revived the perennial question: “After Tito, What?” Although after 1968 the Atlantic Alliance had abstained from overt declaration in support of Yugoslavia, which might have provoked an undesired confrontation with Moscow over the status quo in the Balkans, Yugoslavia was brought closer to the Western system through the conclusion of two trade agreements with the EEC signed in March 1970 and June 1973.10

However, in 1974, Yugoslavia came into direct confrontation with its Western partners. A first clash was determined by the pro-Arab attitude adopted by the Yu-

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goslav leadership during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Belgrade’s decision to allow Soviet flights over the Yugoslav territory for military assistance to the Arab countries severely damaged its relationship with the US administration led by Richard Nixon.\textsuperscript{11} A second dispute involved Yugoslavia’s Western European partners, due to a border controversy between Rome and Belgrade. The Yugoslav government had decided to close the border question with Italy over the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) envisaged by the Peace Treaty signed in Paris in February 1947 – resolved \textit{de facto} but not \textit{de jure} by the Memorandum of understanding concluded in London in 1954 – by erecting signs reading “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republic of Slovenia”, at three frontier crossing points between zones A and B of the FTT, the sovereignty of which was a matter of dispute between Rome and Belgrade. The Yugoslav move aimed at resolving this controversy through a \textit{fait accompli}, increasing the government’s internal consensus during the delicate phase of constitutional reform.\textsuperscript{12} However, this choice provoked a harsh reaction on the part of the Italian government which, in March 1974, responded with an official memorandum which, in turn, proclaimed Italian sovereignty over the zone B of the FTT. The Italian response offered the Titoist leadership the opportunity to proclaim its anti-Western credentials publicly: the Italian note was depicted as a NATO-sponsored attempt at undermining Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{13}

From the viewpoint of Western diplomacies, this Yugoslav move had a twofold purpose. First, it served to counterbalance an anti-Cominformist campaign carried out in 1973 which had involved the arrest of several people accused of pro-Soviet propaganda. The second was to create a feeling of external threat which would reinforce internal cohesion at this critical internal juncture.\textsuperscript{14} The consequence was a cooling of the relationship between Yugoslavia and NATO, which confirmed Belgrade’s reticence towards any public interference of the Alliance in its internal affairs. It was not by chance that Tito publicly welcomed Karamanlis’ decision to withdraw Greece from NATO, which was blamed by the Yugoslav leadership for being involved in the Colonels’ decision to intervene in Cyprus. As stated by the Yugoslav dictator in a public speech made in Slovenia in September 1974, the \textit{putsch} had been organised by the CIA and the Atlantic Pact:

“The aim was to kill Makarios because Cyprus was a non-aligned country, and Makarios is one of the founders of the non-aligned policy. He had to be removed and Cyprus turned into a base of the Atlantic Pact”.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} ASPR, Dossier 130, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Telegramma in partenza N. 1199/c, Rapporti italo-jugoslavi: questione Zona B, Roma, 23.03.1974.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} AMAE, Série Europe 1971-1976, Dossier 3760, Le Maréchal Tito et l’OTAN, Bruxelles, 17.09.1974.
\end{itemize}
A special case deserves special solutions

The two elements highlighted above – the question of Yugoslavia’s succession and the latter’s troubled relationship with NATO – seemed to herald a new scenario of instability in Southern Europe. Yet the Yugoslav case was characterised by a number of features which made it a special case requiring special solutions. It differed from the Greek and Portuguese scenarios for two main reasons: the lack of a democratic alternative for the future of the country’s political system; and the absence of any perspective of political integration within the Community system.

Indeed, the process of political transition in Greece and Portugal was facilitated by the presence of pro-Western actors in favour of a democratic turn. In Greece, Konstantinos Karamanlis’ “Nea Dimokratia” represented a real discontinuity from the country’s dictatorial past and a shield against the left and neutralist forces, in primis the radical PASOK led by Andreas Papandreou. Soon after arriving in Athens from his Parisian exile on 24 July 1974, the Greek leader demonstrated his will to reactivate the association agreement signed with the EEC in 1962 and, at the same time, to favour Greece’s return to the system of liberal democracy characterising the nine members of the Community (henceforth, the Nine). The same applied to Portugal. Although the “Carnation Revolution” ushered in a chaotic transition, characterised by the active presence of the army in internal political dynamics, the Socialist Party led by Mario Soares was to emerge as a democratic alternative able to oppose the Communist Party and radical factions in the Army. The rise of democratic and Western-oriented political forces in Greece and Portugal facilitated – and was in turn facilitated by – the role of external actors in supporting democratic transitions. Support to pro-Western parties was a political asset which was publicly exploited by the ruling parties in France and West Germany. This clearly emerges when we consider the role played by the French President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, in supporting the democratic credentials of Karamanlis in Greece since the very end of the Colonels’ regime, and the prominent support offered by the German Social-Democratic Party to the Portuguese Socialists, which was to be replicated in the Spanish arena after the death of Franco in November 1975.

The presence of democratic and pro-Western alternatives favoured the re-activation of the EEC’s links with Greece and Portugal. Giscard d’Estaing and the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, were well aware of the long-term economic

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costs stemming from the integration of these countries’ backward economies within the EEC market and their competitiveness in the fields of agriculture and labour force. But they were also aware that the strategic advantages of favouring the Greek and Portuguese rapprochement to the EEC, thereby preventing the spread of political instability in the Mediterranean, were greater than the economic drawbacks of a new Community enlargement in this region.\textsuperscript{19} As regards Greece, both Paris and Bonn were to express their open support to Athens’ application to join the EEC (officially presented in June 1975). Also London, despite its reticence concerning the troubled course of Greek-Turkish relations, recognised the political value of Greece’s European perspective and its positive effect in the consolidation of the new regime. The French, German and British attitudes were to shape the course of EEC-Greek relations, leading to the Council’s decision of 9 February 1976 to open negotiations with Greece.\textsuperscript{20} The European perspective was also a crucial element in supporting pro-Western orientation of the Socialist Party in Portugal after the failure of the military coup of 11 March 1975, promoted by the conservative wings of the army. In this circumstance, the political and economic support promised by the German Federal government, which included the activation of multilateral financial loans through the European Investment Bank (EIB), was to prove determinant in convincing the moderate forces in Portugal of the economic and political importance of its Western European partners.\textsuperscript{21}

The two elements highlighted above did not affect the Yugoslav case. First, the 1974 constitutional reform was not based on any perspective of regime change. On the contrary, continuity was to be the catchword of Tito’s future succession. Any political change influencing the non-aligned policy and the self-management system could have undermined the historical fundaments of the Yugoslav federation and thus altered the geopolitical status quo in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{22} Western diplomacies were therefore unable and, at the same time, unwilling, to look for a political alternative in Yugoslavia, which was to be preserved formally as a bridge linking the European blocs. The Yugoslav system itself, based on tight control of political opposition – as clearly emerged during the repression of the “Croatian Spring” in 1971 and the anti-Cominformist campaigns of 1973 – prevented the emergence of political alternatives. In addition, the early 1970s had been marked by the end of the “liberal” turn adopted by the Central Committee of the LCY in 1965, which had aimed at modernising the country’s industrial system and opening up the country to the international market.\textsuperscript{23} This process, however, had been hindered by resistances within the “old guard” of the Titoist leadership, unwilling to support a process which, sooner or later, would spill over from the economic to the political sphere.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{19} E. KARAMOUZI, op.cit., pp.35-62.
\textsuperscript{20} A. VARSORI, L’Occidente e la Grecia..., op.cit., pp.48-77.
\textsuperscript{21} A.M. FONSECA, op.cit., pp.35-56.
\textsuperscript{22} S. PAVLOWITCH, op.cit., pp. 77-87.
The lack of any prospect of political change meant the lack of political appeal for support to the Yugoslav regime. This clearly emerges in the attitudes of the major EEC member states towards Yugoslavia’s economic relations with the Community market in 1974. Economic recession in Western Europe had in fact compelled the Council of Ministers of the European Communities to adopt a protectionist attitude in the sphere of trade with third countries, aiming at protecting the EEC’s internal production. One of the most important decisions was the adoption, in February 1974, of a ban on beef imports from third countries, including Yugoslavia. This decision seemed to contradict the policy adopted since then by the EEC member states, which in June 1973 had concluded a commercial treaty granting Yugoslavia substantial concessions for the export of beef towards the EEC market. This treaty had represented the means of offering a direct support to the Yugoslav regime in a context marked by political instability in Yugoslavia, due to the repression of the “Croatian Spring”. In signing this treaty, the major EEC member states – in particular France, West Germany and Italy – had decided to privilege their relationship with Belgrade rather than protect their own farmers, despite the opposition of the EEC’s agricultural lobbies.

However, the change in leadership in France and West Germany in 1974 and the simultaneous emergence of economic recession in Western Europe obliged the Council of Ministers to step back and favour the protection of the Community’s market from external competition. In fact, for policy-makers in Rome, Paris and Bonn, relations with Yugoslavia did not offer political advantages to be exploited in the electoral arena. From the Italian viewpoint, granting Belgrade trade concessions in a context of economic recession hindering Italian farmers’ interests would only be politically disadvantageous. In addition, Yugoslavia represented an awkward partner, due to the thorny question of Trieste. Since 1968, Rome had been involved in negotiations with Belgrade for the solution of the border controversy, which were kept secret from the media, for fear that Italian public opinion would react negatively to the government’s intention to recognise Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over the B zone of the FTT. Accordingly, between 1974 and 1975, Italian policy-makers had to adopt a low-profile strategy towards Yugoslavia. The same applied to Paris which, together with Rome, privileged the protection of its market to the implementation of the 1973 EEC-Yugoslavia trade agreement. Farmers’ protests in France, due to the decline in breeders’ returns caused by the economic recession, led the French government to put the Yugoslav question on the sidelines, and conduct a successful battle within the

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25. AJ [Arhiv Jugoslavije, Belgrade], KPR, III-b-2-a, Predsedništvo SFRJ, Služba za društveno-ekonomska pitanja, Informacija o situaciji na tržištu govedjeg i junećeg mesa u EEZ, Pov. br.48/1/74, Beograd, 14.03.1974.
Council of Ministers to ban beef imports from Yugoslavia.29 Between 1974 and 1975, Bonn too did not see any electoral advantage in reinforcing relations with Belgrade. Helmut Schmidt’s SPD was aware that relations with Yugoslavia were a very sensitive political issue at internal level, a fact which had emerged during the internal debate which had arisen throughout 1973 and 1974 during settlement negotiations of the question of World War II reparations to Belgrade through a DM 700 million loan.30 This arrangement, concluded in December 1974, was considered by the opposition parties – in primis the CDU and CSU – and large sectors of public opinion as a sign of the Federal government’s political surrender to Tito’s regime and a dangerous precedent, which might induce other Eastern European countries to request the same treatment.31

And yet another reason contributed to isolate the Yugoslav question from the Western European public arena: Belgrade’s reticence towards any plan of political and economic integration within the EEC. In fact, since the early 1960s, Belgrade had manifested its reserve towards any preferential (that is, discriminatory) agreement with the Community – as this would alter its non-aligned credentials and undermine its delicate economic equilibrium between the Community market and the COMECON (the Soviet-led organisation for economic integration in the Socialist bloc). Therefore, during negotiations for the 1970 and 1973 trade agreements concluded with the EEC, the Yugoslav representatives had asked for a non-preferential approach which, while preserving Yugoslavia’s formal non-alignment – excluded it from any perspective of economic and political association with the Community.32

Yugoslavia’s peculiar status highlighted the need to overcome the political limitations affecting Belgrade’s relationship with its Western European partners. It was Yugoslavia itself which, since mid-1975, had engaged in a process of gradual political rapprochement to its Western European partners. Its aim, sponsored by Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić and Foreign Minister Milos Minić, was that of strengthening the country’s relationship with the EEC as a means of overcoming the ban on beef imports – adopted at Community level – and anchoring itself to the Western European market. These goals were openly declared by Bijedić in June 1975 during an official visit paid to Belgrade by the President of the European Commission, François-Xavier Ortoli.33 The latter had been invited to visit Belgrade for the very purpose of solving the

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33. ECHA, BAC 97/1986/20, Mr. Ortoli’s visit to Yugoslavia on 12-15 June, 1975, Brussels, 19.06.1975.

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impasse in the economic relationship between Yugoslavia and the EEC member states. In addition, Bijedić wanted to avoid his country’s isolation from the Community market and open up new avenues for bilateral cooperation in the agricultural, industrial, financial and social fields. The need for increased cooperation had previously been stressed in an official memorandum from the Yugoslav government to the Nine on 10 June 1975. This memorandum highlighted the political importance of fixing its trade imbalance vis-à-vis the Nine which, since the outbreak of the oil crisis in late 1973, had provoked Yugoslavia’s gradual shift towards the COMECON, as between 1973 and 1974 Yugoslavia’s exports towards this market had increased by 64 per cent.34 During the meeting with Ortoli, Bijedić increased his pressure on the Community, claiming that Yugoslavia had counted on the Community to develop its economy. The Yugoslav representative was evoking the shadow of the Soviet Union over Yugoslavia’s future, stating that, should the EEC neglect Yugoslavia, the latter’s natural destiny would be an ever closer relationship with the Soviet bloc.35 Ortoli, who had just concluded his mission to Athens to prepare the ground for Greece’s application to join the EEC, was aware that Yugoslavia interpreted the EEC as a political entity which, in the long run, could favour its stability. He did not want Yugoslavia to lose its stake, and therefore urged the ambassadors of the Nine in Belgrade to favour a positive response on the part of their governments.36

Yugoslavia’s main request regarded the financial sphere: Belgrade wanted the EEC to replicate the financial loan accorded to Greece and Portugal through the EIB. Yet Belgrade’s demand was affected by Franco-German opposition to the opening of financial cooperation with Yugoslavia. What Paris and Bonn feared was the establishment of a dangerous precedent paving the way to similar requests by the plethora of EEC’s non-preferential commercial partners. At the same time, they wanted to avoid any increases in the Community budget and keep financial loans on a strictly national basis.37 Faced with these recalcitrant attitudes, the Yugoslav government stepped up political pressure. Through its representative in Community Brussels, Petar Miljević, it insisted that such an attitude would mean Yugoslavia’s gradual shift towards the Soviet sphere of influence.38 In Belgrade, the Ambassadors of the Nine were urged to press their governments to adopt a more open attitude towards Yugoslavia’s demands, reiterating that, for Belgrade, the concession of EIB

38. ECHA, BAC 97/1986/16, Note for Mr. Hannay, Record of a call by the Yugoslav Ambassador on Sir Christopher Soames, 01.07.1975.
loans was a matter of psychology, rather than economics. In other words, Yugoslavia was openly declaring its economic weakness.

In fact, the brazen attitude adopted by Belgrade only confirmed the views of the Nine’s representatives in Belgrade, according to whom Yugoslavia’s pleas for economic assistance from the EEC were sincere and that the country was undergoing a severe economic crisis with potential political repercussions. In a joint report submitted to the Secretariat-General of the Council of Ministers, they noted that the origin of Yugoslavia’s weakness lay in its 1974 constitutional reform, which had severely limited the power of coordination at federal level: with the prospect of the post-Tito era, the status of Yugoslavia’s economy was a real threat to the country’s political stability.

A quadripartite strategy through Community means

Yugoslavia’s pressures developed against a backdrop of increasing Western European presence in the Southern European scenario. As noted above, between late 1975 and early 1976, France and the Federal Republic of Germany had emerged as the main actors in the process of political stabilisation in Greece and Portugal. The US was not unaware of the strategic value of “European” prospects for these countries. Political realism characterised the attitude of the American administration led by Gerald Ford, inaugurating a policy of burden-sharing with its Western European partners who, as shown by the Portuguese case, had a power of political attraction which starkly differed from the Chile-style covert military interventionism that the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had originally envisaged to solve the Portuguese impasse. A National Security Council Memorandum issued in December 1975 summarised the attitude of the US vis-à-vis the Western European role in the Southern European scenario. It highlighted the important contribution of the EEC member states to orderly evolution of the Southern European arena “by means of the economic assistance they can provide and the political influence which, in varying

degrees, they possess”. This document epitomised what Piers Ludlow has recently defined as “The real years of Europe”, that is, a period of intense cooperation between the Ford administration and the French, West German and British governments. Within the framework of this cooperative atmosphere, they convened several four-party summits addressing the most sensitive international scenarios of the time, including Southern Europe.

The Greek and Portuguese precedents represented a starting point for the role of Western Europe vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. As concluded during a quadripartite meeting which took place in New York on 5 September 1975 between Henry Kissinger and his French, West German and British counterparts, Yugoslavia was then the only Southern European country exposed to direct Soviet intervention. Unlike Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy – where Enrico Berlinguer’s Communist Party was raising its electoral consensus – Yugoslavia’s “grey” position between the blocs made it a special and difficult partner, which meant that it was exceedingly difficult for the West to devise a strategy to support the country’s independence. During the meeting, Kissinger himself confided his anxieties to his partners:

“My nightmare is: If Yugoslavia were invaded and the President asked me ‘What note should we send?’ or ‘What should we do in the NATO meeting’ ‘What instructions should we send to our NATO Ambassador?’ I can’t get it clear in my own mind”.

Kissinger’s views were influenced by Gerald Ford’s mission to Belgrade on 4 August 1975, in the course of which the Yugoslav authorities had manifested the grave situation of Yugoslavia’s economy and asked for US support. Similar concerns were nurtured by Kissinger’s three Western European partners, who were equally confronted by the question of how to support Yugoslavia without provoking a Soviet counter-reaction in the Balkans.

The question of Yugoslavia’s independence was discussed two weeks later during a meeting held in New York on 24 September 1975. On this occasion, the representatives of the four countries devised a strategy based on low-profile support to the Yugoslav regime within the perspective of the country’s future transition. Such a policy would be based on bilateral contacts and intensification of diplomatic visits to


45. DNSA [Digital National Security Archives], 1679068645, Kissinger Transcripts, United States National Security Council, Staff, Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, 05.09.1975.

46. DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, 1679083366, Discussion with Gerald Ford and Josip Broz Tito, United States. Department of State, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, 04.08.1975.

47. DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, 1679068645, United States National Security Council, Staff, Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, 05.09.1975.
Yugoslavia. As stated by the British Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Alan Campbell, the goal was “to make it as embarrassing as possible for the Russians to intervene, by thickening up our relations as much as possible”. Within this framework, the Nine were to play a major role, based on intense bilateral relations at economic level and assistance in the financial field. Kissinger himself manifested the political difficulty for Washington to be directly involved in the Yugoslav question, after the controversies which had emerged during the Yom Kippur War and later escalated, due to Yugoslavia’s attitude in the Cyprus crisis and its direct support to the movement of national liberation in Angola in early 1975. Despite these strains, the representatives of the four agreed that Yugoslavia should maintain its non-aligned position – a precondition to safeguard the European status quo – without influencing Western political support to a change in Belgrade’s foreign policy: “We don’t want them in a pro-Western mode”, argued Henry Kissinger. Jean Sauvagnargues, France’s Foreign Minister, echoed Kissinger’s words, by stating that: “The key is to keep Yugoslavia as it is, with the West but not in the West”. Their aim was to avoid Yugoslavia’s economic dependence on the COMECON market, which would expose the federal leadership in Belgrade to pressure from Moscow. Kissinger concluded: “The more organic links we can establish in Yugoslavia, the better”.48

This was a long-term strategy. Indeed, the minutes of the quadripartite meeting show that the West’s major fears regarded the long-term trends of Soviet foreign policy. As concluded by the US Secretary of State:

“I don’t think there is a likelihood of the Brezhnev generation doing it [a direct intervention in Yugoslavia]. But none of us know what it will look like to the generation that hasn’t experienced war as a horror. They [the Soviets] still have an inferiority complex that is not warranted by strategic reality. I’m worried about when strategic parity sinks in. They have never pressed to the full extent of their capability”.49

According to Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger’s Foreign Policy advisor, during the Brezhnev era the West should prevent “a creeping realignment […] a gradual shift back towards the Soviet Union. Like Portugal seemed to be doing”. These views were summarised in the December 1975 National Security Council Memorandum devoted to Western security strategies in Southern Europe:

“Developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia could have an important impact on NATO's Southern flank. […] A precipitous unravelling of the Western position in Southern Europe might change Moscow's perception of the risks of meddling in Yugoslav affairs. And a collapse of Yugoslav independence could demoralize moderates in neighbouring states who would be sensitive to the advance of Soviet power nearer their borders”.50

The quadripartite meeting of 24 September 1975 definitively set the Yugoslav question within Western stabilisation policies in the region, highlighting the need for Atlantic coordination over this issue and the potential role played by the EEC to

49. Ibid.
anchor Yugoslavia to the West. After the meeting, Paris and Bonn did change their overall attitude towards Belgrade’s requests for financial cooperation through the EIB by lifting their vetoes, during the Council meetings of 9 December 1975 and 20 January 1976, respectively. As revealed by the minutes of these meetings, both the Quai d’Orsay and the Auswärtiges Amt took this decision, which paved the way for the implementation of projects of joint “European” interest for a total amount of 50 million units of account (mua), with the very purpose of strengthening Yugoslavia’s links with the West.\textsuperscript{51} West Germany’s Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was particularly sensitive towards the question of Yugoslavia’s non-alignment, due to the strong economic links between the countries and the huge presence of Yugoslav Gastarbeiter (many of them reservists in the Yugoslav army) within federal territory. Any turmoil in the Balkan country involving the Soviet Union would expose West Germany to Soviet pressures.\textsuperscript{52}

The Community’s role in Yugoslavia was again confirmed during two quadripartite meetings held in Brussels on 12 December 1975 and 23 January 1976, devoted to the deterioration of the process of détente in the African scenario, the advance of the Communist Party in Italy, the problem of post-Franco Spain’s relationship to NATO and, within the Southern European framework, the Yugoslav question. In both circumstances, Kissinger welcomed the decision adopted by the Council of Ministers in the financial field, and invited their Western European partners to increase trade relations with Yugoslavia as a means of binding Yugoslavia to the West.\textsuperscript{53} When, during the December meeting, he was asked by Alan Campbell to help “European” efforts at “thickening up’ our relations with Yugoslavia […] Because we stand a good chance here; this is a game we can win”, the US Secretary of State replied:

“And to raise the political stakes against Soviet intervention. As far as the US is concerned, we strongly endorse this and will conduct parallel efforts of our own”.

This was a strategic necessity. As argued by General Alexander Haig, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during the same meeting:

“Soviet hegemony or an attempt at hegemony over Yugoslavia would affect the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and in Italy and Greece, and in the Middle East because of the enhanced naval capacity in the Mediterranean. And the links into Turkey”.\textsuperscript{54}

Yet, for Yugoslavia, the decision on financial loans adopted by the Council in January 1976 was not enough. Belgrade wanted the Council of Ministers to formalise the decision on financial cooperation through a public declaration expressing the Nine’s


\textsuperscript{52} DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, 1679068813, Meeting of Quadripartite Group, United States, National Security Council. Staff. Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, 24.09.1975.

\textsuperscript{53} DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, 1679081814, Meeting of NATO Quadripartite Group, United States, National Security Council, Staff, Top Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, 23.01.1976.

\textsuperscript{54} DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, 1679070205, Meeting of Quadripartite Group, United States, National Security Council, Staff, Top Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, 12.12.1975.
confidence in Yugoslavia’s future stability. This was made explicit by Bijedić during his diplomatic tour in February 1976 to Brussels, Paris and London. Yugoslavia’s Prime Minister wanted a political demonstration that the EEC was ready to support Yugoslavia’s economy. As confided to Sir Christopher Soames, the European Commissioner for External Relations, he looked for: “a commitment by Europe to help acquire a modern industrial base”. This attitude followed the orientation of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, which regarded Yugoslavia’s Western European partners as fundamental counterparts to foster economic stability without compromising the country’s formal non-alignment. This request placed the Nine before a fait accompli: they had no alternative but to accept Yugoslavia’s request. The US had clearly manifested its support to EEC involvement in the Yugoslav scenario as a means of stabilising the federal government in a future perspective. The involvement of NATO was excluded, as it would represent a potential change in the balance of power in the Balkans. The Community was therefore requested by both Washington and Belgrade to keep Yugoslavia anchored to the Western system.

When Giscard d’Estaing, who had planned a diplomatic visit to Belgrade in early September 1976 to manifest France’s support to Yugoslavia’s stability according to the strategy elaborated at quadripartite level, was forced to postpone his visit due to a sudden deterioration in Tito’s health, the Yugoslav question was addressed by the US within the Atlantic framework. During a NATO council meeting held in Washington on 15 September 1976, Sonnenfeldt declared to his partners that Yugoslavia needed careful handling, as the possible demise of Tito was “one of the most worrying things on the world scene”, adding that this was a problem about which the Community needed to ponder on suitable action.

Tito’s illness had a domino effect. After the NATO Council meeting in Washington, Yugoslavia increased its diplomatic pressure, insisting on playing the best card at its disposal: the Soviet threat. This question was the leitmotiv of EEC-Yugoslav relations until the end of the year. As stressed by Yugoslavia’s authorities in bilateral negotiations with the representatives of the European Commission in Brussels, Belgrade expected the EEC to replicate in Yugoslavia the policy of economic

56. TNA, FCO 98/36, C.L. Booth to J.H. Figgis, The Yugoslav Prime Minister’s visit to France, Belgium and Luxembourg, Belgrade, 26.02.1976.
57. ECHA, BAC 97/1986/21, DG I, Note to Mr. Hannay, Summary record of a meeting between members of the Commission and the Yugoslav Prime Minister, chaired by Sir Christopher Soames, Brussels, 20.2.1976.
60. UKNA, FCO 28/2967, NATO Council meeting with Sonnenfeldt in Washington on 15 September, 27.09.1976.
assistance it was pursuing in Greece and Portugal. The Soviet threat was made explicit to the Dutch government, which held the presidency of the Council of Ministers, on 4 October during a bilateral summit in Belgrade and reiterated one month later during the visit of the British Secretary of State, Anthony Crosland, to Yugoslavia from 2 to 5 November 1976. Belgrade’s pleas were successful. The question of Soviet-Yugoslav relations dominated an unofficial summit held on 8 November 1976 in the office of Joseph Luns, NATO Secretary-General, at which all NATO member states’ permanent representatives were present. They all agreed that the passing of Tito would confront Moscow with a dilemma. On one hand, a smooth transfer of power would deprive the “Russians” of the most obvious opportunity to make a significant increase in their influence on the Balkan country and the Mediterranean basin; on the other, any overt interference would alter the European status quo and put their bilateral relations with the United States under strain. What the permanent representatives feared most was the growth of Soviet influence by economic pressures or support for any separatist faction in the country, if the Yugoslav internal situation seemed propitious. Faced with this delicate situation, which directly concerned the balance of power in Europe, they convened that NATO should not be directly involved in the question of Yugoslavia’s independence. On the contrary, in line with the policy adopted within the quadiptide framework, they agreed to strengthen Western economic links to Yugoslavia through the EEC.

This decision was sanctioned by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which on, 15 November, decided that the President-in-Office of the Council, Max van der Stoel, and the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Finn-Olav Gundelach, would visit Belgrade on 1 and 2 December 1976, to manifest the Community’s willingness to reinforce its relations with Yugoslavia. After the Council’s decision, Community and Yugoslav representatives started intense negotiations for the preparation of a political document to express the EEC’s political support to Yugoslavia. The urgency of rapidly concluding the declaration was dictated by the imminent inauguration of a new US administration led by Jimmy Carter, who had aroused Yugoslavia’s concern due to a statement made during his electoral campaign in late October, according to which the US should not intervene in Yugoslavia in the case of Soviet aggression. In addition, an official visit paid by Leonid Brezhnev to Tito on 15 November was described by Western diplomats in Belgrade as a manifestation of Soviet interest in re-establishing strong ties with Yugoslavia.

62. TNA, FCO 28/2972, Crosland to Belgrade, 12.11.1976.
63. UKNA, FCO 28/2967, NATO political consultation – Yugoslavia, 10.11.1976; AAPBD, 1976, doc. 322.
Eventually, the Nine agreed to sign a declaration proposed by the Yugoslav government which listed the areas in which bilateral cooperation should be increased (it included agriculture, industry, finance and labour). The document – which was signed by the two parties on 2 December 1976 as a joint declaration – had a political rather than economic value. As stated by Van der Stoel to Tito, the Community attached the greatest importance to Yugoslavia’s independence. The same was stated by Giscard d’Estaing, who met Tito in Belgrade one week later to put the French seal on the Joint Declaration.

Although the document was intended to be the starting-point of future bilateral relations, in fact it symbolised the last step of yet another Western strategy implemented through “European instruments”. From a formal viewpoint, it was issued by the EEC as such. However, underpinning the declaration lay the strategic goals of the United States and its major Western European allies, that is, the establishment of a Western link with pro-Western wings within the Yugoslav leadership, in primis Bijedić, in the perspective of the post-Tito era. Despite its general content, the 1976 Joint Declaration was to have considerable historical importance in the evolution of EEC-Yugoslav relations. It elected the Community as Yugoslavia’s major collective partner in the West and constituted the political cornerstone of all agreements concluded between the parties in the following years. In particular, it paved the way to the conclusion of the EEC-Yugoslav Cooperation Agreement signed in April 1980 – one month before the death of Tito – which, while reaffirming Yugoslavia’s non-alignment, represented a Western economic guarantee for the country’s entry into the much-feared post-Tito era.

Conclusions

In 1974, like Greece and Portugal, the Yugoslav federation was characterised by the conundrum regarding its future transition after the death of Tito and its troubled relationship with the US and the Atlantic Alliance. However, as far as the transition question was concerned, the Yugoslav case differed from the Greek and Portuguese for two main reasons: the lack of any democratic alternative for the country’s future,

67. AJ, KPR I-3-b/50, SSIP, Pov. br. 461732.
70. See A. VARSORI, Crisis and Stabilization..., op.cit.
71. DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, 1679082137, Meeting of Quadripartite Group, United States, National Security Council, Staff, Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, 08.12.1976.
and the absence of any perspective of political integration within the EEC. Accordingly, throughout 1974, Yugoslavia was marginalized within the Community’s stabilisation policies in Southern Europe. Yet, in 1975, faced with the Community’s prominent role in the Greek and Portuguese scenarios, Yugoslavia itself stepped up political pressure vis-à-vis the Nine members of the EEC, regarded in Belgrade as crucial partners to prevent the rise of Soviet influence in the perspective of the post-Tito era. Yugoslavia’s pleas, which confirmed the worried reports sent by the Nine’s representatives in Belgrade about the precariousness of Yugoslavia’s economic system, were integrated by the US request to its Western European partners to favour anchoring Yugoslavia to the Western system through the power of economic and political attraction exerted by the EEC. This strategy led to the opening up of financial assistance to Yugoslavia through the EIB and the signing in December 1976 of a Joint Declaration aimed at confirming Western support to Yugoslavia’s independence and stability.

All in all, Western goals towards Yugoslavia were similar to those pursued vis-à-vis Greece and Portugal: political stabilisation and anchoring to the Western system. Yet the overall aim was to keep Yugoslavia with the West, but not in the West. Indeed, in the case of Yugoslavia, what changed were the means by which the process of anchoring was implemented. The EEC could offer Athens and Lisbon (and, from 1977 onwards, to Madrid) the perspective of European integration. However, in the case of Belgrade, it could offer nothing more than the sanctioning of the status quo – in other words, the safeguarding of its formal non-alignment.
Demokratiequalität an Volksversammlungen und an der Urne