“Europe”, Europeanizations and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography

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Through the course of a sequence of different chapters, this article, which is based upon the research literature, will provide answers to the following questions: (I.) How is the history of Europe recounted and how was Europeanization defined? (II.) What can “Europe” and Europeanization mean for European integration studies? (III.) How is Europeanization related to European integration, and how does it differ? (IV.) Within these contexts, it seems to be useful to present theses on the role played by nation-states with regard to European integration. (V.) It is also necessary to be acquainted with accesses and orientations for future integration historical research tasks. (VI.) There is the further need to indicate observations of changes and developments as well as perspectives of integration historiographies in order to then (VII.) present approaches to different forms of Europeanization. (VIII.) Finally, different reasons or Europeanizations explaining Western Europe's integration and the unification of Europe within the context of EU-Eastern Enlargement will be presented. Some preliminary thoughts and terminology shall be presented to begin.

I. Preliminary thoughts and terminologies

Peter Burke referred to the conceptual history of “Europe”. It is geographically more than just the European Union of today. As an idea, space, program, and imagination of policy, it dates back further in time than the appearances of present-day and contemporary history that have been entrusted to those in our day. It is present in European history in the Early Modern Era. Within that context, “Europe” is certainly to be seen more in its variety than as a “unit” which in any case was striven for and desired. Its history, the integration of its Western sections after World War II, and its unification in particular in the first years of the twenty-first century are not isolated, linear, and teleological courses, but rather complex, multidimensional developments that are not free of setbacks – which are open-ended and not conclusively irreversible. “Europe” is to be comprehended not as a closed space, but rather in a cross-border, international, transnational, and intercontinental meaning, that is, in its internal heterogeneity and variety as well as in its global embeddedness and effect (actions and reactions).

The end of ideologies had already been announced by Peter Bender at the beginning of the 1980s. At that time “Europe” still seemed to be Europeanized itself.  

“Europeanization” means “becoming European” and “becoming Europeanized” with a double meaning and a double goal. This meaning and goal specifically have both an outward and an inward context – that is, being oriented toward European forms of culture and living, whereby what is concerned is the long-term transfer of European cultural values and political ideas to other continents (also including the “dark sides” of colonialism and imperialism) and vice versa from other continents of the world, but also the alignment and adoption of forms of culture and living within Europe via cultural exchange and traveling (“bottom up”) as well as the acceptance and standardization of European legal forms, directives, and political content by the individual member states of the European Union. In fundamental terms, it concerned arranging things according to a European pattern or even model, or else implementing things according to European Union (EU) procedures, be it at the political, institutional, legal, or economic level (“top down”) – sometimes even against the will of the nation-states. 

Starting out from a social constructivist approach, “Europeanization” is not a single, linear, teleological working process that is a strong approach every time. It has no fixed political boundaries or geographical limitations. “Europeanization” cannot be reduced to “Europe”. It went and goes hand in hand with macro-processes.

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may add that the term “Europeanization” is therefore not based only upon European integration policy, but rather it goes much further back historically and also ranges significantly beyond “Europe” and the EU geographically.

What is typical for Europe’s history and the forms of Europeanization that result from it? Antiquity as the cultural starting point; Athens, Rome, and their pre-histories as well as the Renaissance as the mediator of Antiquity; “external” influences, defense reactions, “unity” as a vision and as a conveyer of meaning, architecture and art, the constancy of heterogeneity, the secularization of political legitimation, the division and separation of powers, cultural and spiritual diversity as engines of productivity, modernization, and rationality, but also “just wars”, crusades, and empires; the exploration of the seas and the birth of naval powers, and the great ideologies (conservatism, liberalism, nationalism, socialism, Marxism-Leninism, colonialism, and imperialism) – these forces and tendencies all stand for European patterns of thought and manifestations.

Less common is the term “European studies” as embodied by its German term Europäistik, which encompasses the studies of, research on, and the scholarship of Europe. The term Europäistik appeared in the 1970s, first of all in linguistics as it was introduced by the linguist Harald Haarmann, who oriented linguistics toward a European model of political unity.\(^8\) On the other hand, the term and the research associated with it also point beyond Europe, because the worldwide transfer of European cultures, technologies, and sciences is connected with the globalization of European languages and technical terminologies (Greek, Latin, French, English, and Spanish). In the 1990s, the historian Wolfgang Schmale made the term Europäistik applicable to, and thus fruitful for the field of historiography.\(^9\) European studies start out from a pluralistic understanding of scholarship which is not just interdisciplinary, but also multidisciplinary. In contrast to the (large and long) history of “Europe”, the (smaller and brief) history of European integration is rather primarily a phenomenon of contemporary history. The history of European integration is also closely connected with that of the nation-states. Therefore, we should not forget to focus on that later on (see IV).

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II. What do Europe and Europeanization mean for the European studies of historiography?

According to the author of this article, there are five trends which already exist, both in the present and for the future, which can be recognized in various respects:

1. The transition from national and state-centred historiography to dimensions that are more European and comparative and more community-oriented at an international level and thus also have multi-perspective dimensions.

2. The expansion of perspectives in connection with content, geography, and material, and those that are specific to individual institutions or protagonists in the sense of an overall community comprehension, understanding, and analysis of Europe’s history and its integration.

3. The surmounting of a purely additive historiography that leaves individual findings isolated with respect to each other, and the forward movement toward an integrated, interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and overall community historiography in the sense of a general discipline of European historical research, which means a melting away of the borders of the individual disciplines (such as those of history, political science, and social sciences) as well as the erosion of the intergovernmentalism of historiography, which will tend to move away from a national historiography and toward an integrated one, that is, toward an internationality and supranationality of the historiography beyond the nation-state.

4. The end of the fixation upon one theory and upon one theoretical dogma (such as “history as an historical-critical social science” or “neorealism”) as well as greater openness toward an eclecticist interplay of different theories and of new tendencies in the direction of a dissolution of boundaries in nationally characterized historiographies – the keywords are “Europeanization”, “internationalization”, “globalization”, “transnationalism”, “comparative literature”, “culture transfer”, and “net-
work research", which in and of themselves, however, still require a differentiation, a definition of criteria, and a clarification of methods.

5. The pushing to the front of the new and young generations (HEIRS, RICHIE) which are maturing into the future bearers of an even more international, comparative, and multidimensionalised historiography and, in so doing, have already begun to initiate future-oriented international or indeed intercontinental comparisons of policy, culture, and perception, or even to retrospectively tackle the history of integration historiography in terms of research history.

III. How is Europeanization related to, and how does it differ from European integration?

In my opinion, five answers can be provided to the questions posed above:

1. Europeanization is not the same thing as European integration. Not only does Europeanization date further back and is older than European integration, it has also encompassed, and continues to encompass, more in geographical terms than the different forms of integration (the ECSC, EEC, EC or EU).

2. Europeanization represents several developments which at times are contemporaneous and at times run unequally in that they proceed differently in terms of extent, pace and effects. Therefore, the term ought to be used not in the singular, but rather in the plural.

3. In the sense of a longue durée from the Middle Ages to modern times, Europeanizations were the historically relevant preconditions for the European integration-Europeanizations that took place after 1945.

4. European integration itself triggered dynamics that went on to range further, making possible additional effects of Europeanizations by integration. Therefore, after the Second World War, a distinction must be made between historically older, general Europeanizations that were already present and new contemporary Europeanizations that were dependent upon community policy.


5. In conclusion, Europeanizations as backgrounds, pre-conditions, consequences and effects are of importance for the understanding of the origins and developments of European integration.

IV. Five Theses on the History of Nation-States and Their Policies in Europe

Before further observations are made and theses formulated, it has to be established that nations and states also did not just move within a sort of container-like “Europe”, but rather also engaged in international relations and beyond which likewise had transnational dimensions. Nations and nation-states are therefore to be seen both within the framework of internal nationalism and within the context of internationalism and transnationalism. Nations are benchmarks and continue to be reference points – there can be no discussion without them when carrying out research on European integration policies.

Thesis 1: The nation-state as a modern territorial state and a separate legal entity had been understood as being expressed in Europe since the Early to Middle Modern Era. Weakened again and again by recurring wars in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries and unsettled, ultimately to the core, by the two world wars in the twentieth century, after 1945 it gradually achieved dominance once again – the brief span of time of its weakness from 1951-52 to 1957-58 was made use of for decisive steps in supranational Western European integration (the European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC, and the European Economic Community – EEC). Since that time and up to this very day, it continues to be a benchmark in the world of the twenty-first century. “National policy”, “national domestic policy”, “national foreign policy” and “national policy toward Europe” continue to carry great weight within the context of general history, contemporary history and historiography.

Thesis 2: After World War II, integration served as a necessity for the economic and political reconstruction of the nation-states of Europe to serve the European salvation of the nation-states whose very existence was threatened (Alan S. Milward). After 1945, states and parties defined themselves more than ever with “Europe”, which served them as an economic aid for self-help and a means of political legitimation.

Thesis 3: National interests in Europe constituted not only the relationship to states
that were outside the communities, but also that of the community members with each other and with the corresponding community form. National policy toward Europe extended through all of the policies of the various states and continues to be in existence. National policy toward Europe always had a role in deciding the integration policy starting from the Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Program – ERP)\(^{20}\) to the ECSC and from the EEC to the EU, that is, it supported, fostered and strengthened them but also muted, weakened and threatened them.

Thesis 4: This led to an awareness of national interests up to a nationalization of policy toward Europe (including) on the part of the members, if what was concerned consisted for example in the weighing of votes within the Council of Ministers, the assigning of the competencies of bodies, the distribution of seats in the European Parliament or budget issues, payment of contributions and, in the end, the distribution of funds.

Thesis 5: In spite of Europeanizations, internationalism, transnationalism and supranationalism, nation-states have been and continue to be the starting point and bearer of European integration history and policy – having grown from dynasties, ruling families, heads of state, heads of government, and party leaders with all of their various formations.

V. Accesses and Orientations

For a long time, conscious European studies of historiography have only been present on a limited basis. To a certain degree, historical research still strongly circulated in national courses under the gradual consideration of European and international dimensions. Research on the topic area of European unification clearly illustrates the complexity of the subject matters, while critical observers already have the collapse of the EU in mind and wish to write about European integration as a history of breakdown and failure.\(^{21}\) For Walter Laqueur, Europe in the early 1970s was still like a phoenix that had risen up “out of the ashes”\(^{22}\) and in the early 1990s was “on the road to being a world power”,\(^{23}\) while in the meantime, the same author then counted “the


last days of Europe”.24 In reality, the development of community Europe was subject to wide economic fluctuations and continued to still be underway. Contemporaries and historians, of which we are both, found themselves to be under the direct impressions of a dynamic of integration policy crises, setbacks and new approaches, from which it is not easy to completely liberate oneself.25

An assessment draws attention to fields in which changes have already taken place in the substitution of national history by European historiography: the history of ideas, policies and economies, and to a still small extent the history of cultures and literatures.26

Just how fluid and open Europe’s borders were is shown by the studies by Karl Schlögel, who initiated the reflections on new European spaces – the discussion began with a “spatial turn”.27 Of course, the question is raised, to motivation of which has a basis that is more political than scholarly, as to the consideration of previous spaces. In any case, Schlögel’s studies drew attention to the loss and the cutting out of a space from the historical image of Europe (from which it still suffers today), but also to the return of the Central and Eastern parts of the continent to the European horizon.28

In addition to limitations in terms of topic and content, historiographies had long gone forward with multiple geographical limitations. In terms of the history of nation-states, what was preferred were the first six more or less supranationally oriented integration partners (the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux

countries), but also the “obstreperous” and “abstinent” outsiders in terms of integration policy such as the United Kingdom, which as a casus sui generis has been and continues to be of general interest with regard to integration history.

We are speaking here about European Integration History and not yet of International History as a more broadly intended perspective of history. In these overall representations thus far, the importance of the smaller and middle-sized countries and their interaction within the framework of the European communities have been taken into consideration far less than the “majors” (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom). There has been and continues to be a need to catch up – no matter whether national histories may be good or bad. In contrast to the older research that had been dedicated to the period of governments and/or communities in exile and the history of ideas as well as the founding states and founding fathers of the ECSC and the EEC, more research in integration has concentrated on the determination of the role of the so-called “non-six” or “outer seven” – that is, the seven founding EFTA countries – which for a long time have for the most part remained outside of consideration. Furthermore, a modern overall representation of EFTA is lacking. Integration history is a young branch of the contemporary history research that has traditionally been

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oriented toward the history of nation-states. Lacks and deficiencies are therefore not astonishing. Different historiographic accesses to the topic area can be indicated:35

1. The greater time horizon-specific access, which looks far back into the European past, inquiring about the large and long history of “Europe” and its origins, pursuing various associations, conceptions, images and ideas of Europe from the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Era through the world wars of the twentieth century to the present in its longue durée.36 The question is raised as to when the history of European integration begins and where its origins lie? A structural approach argues that international organizations founded in the nineteenth century and their successors in the interwar period were essential preconditions for European integration after 1945.37 A biographical working thesis is that it was Jean Monnet in the period after the First World War with his frustrating and painful experiences within the context of the League of Nations. Monnet thereupon dedicated himself for a long time to his private business interests, and only much later was he a generator of ideas, a source of inspiration and a realizer all in one: he developed the so-called “Schuman Plan”, which ought to be called the “Monnet Plan”, and implemented it as president of the High Authority of the ECSC (1952-55). With Monnet, the path


was paved from the conceptualization of Europe to its institutionalization. This history does in fact refer back to the period between the wars. For Monnet, the experience with weak international organizations such as that of the intergovernmental League of Nations, for which he served as Deputy Secretary General (1920-23), and the necessity that grew out of it for the creation of supranational institutions, close French-German cooperation and transatlantic measures of support were the preconditions for a lasting interdependence of the European states and the basic constants for his “Action Committee for the United States of Europe” (1955-75). Monnet won over around thirty responsible representatives from different Western European states from among Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Liberals out of some twenty political parties and ten powerful non-Communist trade unions as think tanks in order to instigate new integration activities.

2. The contemporary overall context-oriented or superpower-specific access clearly shows that there were neither complete forms of a supranational community nor fully sovereign states. The de facto presence of the two hegemonic powers, the USA and the USSR, in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe more or less allowed for only restricted manoeuvring room for action for the nations and nation-states that were concerned. European history after 1945 was also Soviet-Rus-


sian and US-American history in the sense of influences on policy, society, economics and culture.40

3. In Western Europe, national policy toward Europe was to a large extend dependent upon the United States and it continues to be so to a certain degree to this very day.41 That is also shown by the security policy access, which attempts to keep in view the reciprocal relations, networkings, commitments and dependencies between the European nation-states and NATO.42 In terms of sources, though, it has hardly been possible so far to open these up and reappraise them, a fact which is tied to the lengthy denial of access to the NATO archives in Brussels which still continues. In that regard, there has until now been access above all else to political science literature43 and only for the beginnings of historically oriented works.44 Within that context, the USA played the role of a military hegemon – with the Eastern enlargement of NATO, these perspectives then even opened up for the whole of Europe.45

4. The community institutional access that is thus also participant-specific leads us to recognize that what is concerned is also the investigation and documentation of

the work of the EU institutions\textsuperscript{46} and bodies (the European Commission,\textsuperscript{47} European Parliament,\textsuperscript{48} European Council\textsuperscript{49} and European Court\textsuperscript{50}) as well as its representatives at the member level. Within that context, supranational integration could at first only


be experienced by a small circle of European elites and at the time, it was also only possible on a sector-by-sector basis (such as with the ECSC or EURATOM). The EEC and the EC as well as the EU remained characterized by mechanisms of intergovernmental decision.

5. The outsider-specific access with a variance of interpretations on integration policy is dedicated to states and their representatives that belonged to international or intergovernmental organizations and attempted not only to keep a distance from community Europe, but also successively managed to refrain from participating in Western European integration.

6. The identity-specific and whole European access includes for example comparative examinations at the social, cultural and policy history levels of a “Small Europe” and a “Large Europe” through the example of the EEC/EC and the EFTA states and it raises questions of identity. This also includes research on the Council
of Europe, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the succession process as well as its activities and effects on Central and Eastern Europe.

7. The conceptual-historical and mentality-historical access of community policy and opting out policy is dedicated to the classic opting-out countries such as Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in the areas of policies on fundamental rights, security, social policy, economics, currency and monetary policy, and thus the classic representatives of a partly national policy toward Europe. Within this context, it is necessary to introduce a critical conceptual reflection of the terms and vocabulary of the history of European integration. Designations such as “Common Market”, “Common Foreign and Security Policy” or “Economic and Monetary Union” did not and still do not correspond to truth in labelling.

8. The small state-specific versus large state-specific access: the problem area that was discussed in the 1950s and 1960s of “Small Europe” and “Large Europe” went right across the small states that belonged to the EEC or EFTA. European contemporary history has its ups and downs in the relations between small states and large states. After 1945, small states had the choice between three solutions: neutrality that was chosen conventionally or freely, alliances with neighbouring states or European integration. They were to have an immunizing effect against dependencies, mediatizations and satelliteizations. After World War II, with the help of NATO and the EEC, small states were able to make use of transatlantization and Europeanization to protect

their integrity, gain security and indirectly receive guarantees for their international status.\(^\text{64}\) That also had identity-specific and societal impacts.

9. **The synthetic theory access** or the triumph of intergovernmentalism? The various attempts at the interpretation of European integration may seem to compete with each other, starting out from contemporary integration theory\(^\text{65}\) – be it of “constitutionalism”, “idealism” or “federalism”,\(^\text{66}\) of “functionalism” or “neofunctionalism”\(^\text{67}\) with its spill-overs of the expansions of markets as an engine of integration including for adjacent sectors, or of “neorealism”\(^\text{68}\) and “intergovernmentalism” with pragmatic, realistic and diplomacy-history components.\(^\text{69}\) In actuality, though, they supplement each other and behave in a complementary fashion. They also reflect national policy toward Europe. For the explanation of European integration, the most prominent representative of the liberal intergovernmentalism theory, Andrew Moravcsik,\(^\text{70}\) makes reference not only to national and international relations of exchange, but also to domestic mechanisms for negotiations. Thus he also addresses the association history and social history dimensions of the history of European integration which leads to the investigation of lobby-specific needs and stratum-relevant expectations.


\(^\text{70}\) A. MORAVCSIK, op.cit., pp.18-85, 472-501.
An integrated, synthesizing history of (Western) Europe, which links and connects Hartmut Kaelble’s society history of Europe\textsuperscript{71} and Europeans\textsuperscript{72} with Wilfried Loth’s history of the Cold War and political integration,\textsuperscript{73} continues to remain a challenge. This also has to include the gender diversity dimension.\textsuperscript{74} The loss of relevance of the nation-state principle in the policies of the second half of the twentieth century went hand in hand with the reduction in importance of national economies as entities that appear more or less closed. Thus it is not only for historical research that the question is raised as to how country-specific or “national” the histories of the so-called “national economies” really were. As a rule, it is only with difficulty that these can be assigned to political-territorial units; rather, they have grown historically, cross borders, presuppose natural boundaries and are regionally oriented.\textsuperscript{75}

The history of the integration of Western Europe has been and indeed continues to be shaped by the “long shadow of intergovernmentalism” as well as by the “dualism of supranational law and intergovernmental policy” as well as by a “combination of federal and confederate elements”.\textsuperscript{76} Within that context, nation-state policy continues to play an important role, as was to be observed in 2008-09 with the attempts at dealing with the worldwide banking and financial market crisis as well as with the balance of payments deficit and state debts crisis starting with 2010. Within the framework of the rescue package policy towards Greece in 2010-15, a multi-level actor approach could be observed via the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), EU member states and the International Monetary Funds (IMF). This was expressed in historiography with an obstinate dominance of neorealism. The states were in fact also weakened by the crises, but they returned to the political stage as crisis managers. The EU Commission, especially under José Manuel Durão Barroso, apparently played a secondary role as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{74} K. REICHEL, Dimension der (Un-)Gleichheit. Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten in den sozial- und beschäftigungspolitischen Debatten der EWG in den 1960er Jahren, Steiner, Stuttgart, 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{75} É. BUSSIÈRE, M. DUMOULIN, S. SCHIRMANN (eds), Économies nationales et intégration européenne. Voies et étapes, Steiner, Stuttgart, 2014; A. PUDLAT, Schengen. Zur Manifestation von Grenze und Grenzschutz in Europa, Olms, Hildesheim et al., 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{76} F. W. SCHARPF, Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch?, Campus, Frankfurt a.M., 1999, p.52.
\end{itemize}
the initiator of legislation, the provider of impetus and the custodian of treaties. The history of European integration is a history of crises, which necessitates a focusing on political decision-makers. Political history will therefore remain. But a pure history of diplomacy will be lost – not least because of the loss in relevance of classic diplomacy.

VI. Changes, developments, and perspectives of the historiography of Europe and of integration in the sense of the emergence from the shadow of nation-state dominance

Different observations and findings can be indicated:

1. Archive-supported historiography on European integration only began gradually and cautiously in the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s, while international law experts and political scientists started much earlier with research on Europe and its integration. With the EU-Maastricht Treaty, the breakthrough with contemporary historical research into integration took place after the officially proclaimed end of the Cold War in Europe. The Journal of European Integration History, which was founded in 1995, was simultaneously the evidence and the product of this trend. That journal can be seen as an expression of the internationalization of historians dealing with Europe and integration. Up through the 1990s, every (Western) European country as a rule had at least one and normally two to three established historians (Jean Monnet Chairs) dealing with Europe and its integration at the university level, even including those countries which did not even belong to the EC or EU yet. That changed at the latest at the end of the 1990s with new generations of young historians.

79. In Germany, Jean Monnet Chairs were held by the following German historians: Franz Knipping (University of Wuppertal), Wolf D. Gruner (University of Rostock), Klaus Schwabe (RWTH University Aachen) and Wilfried Loth (University of Essen-Duisburg). The current Jean Monnet Chairs are Gabriele Clemens (University of Hamburg), Jürgen Elvert (University of Köln), and Jürgen Mittag (German Sport University Cologne).
80. Enormous activities were developed by the History of European Integration Society (HEIRS), see http://hum.port.ac.uk/heirs/index.html (January 2016) and the Réseau International de Jeunes Chercheurs en Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (RICHIE), see http://www.europe-richie.org/ (January 2016).
2. First of all, studies were done and works were published with a national approach on the basis of the individual states in their relations with the European community forms. They were greatly oriented toward diplomacy history, policy history, and in particular national history, if not being state-centred, and in any case they concentrated upon state interest policy and security policy, that is, they were dedicated to issues such as how these states attempted to achieve national sovereignty goals, how they ensured their independence or strove for maintaining their neutrality, how they carried out orientations such as regional ones, how they headed for forms of international cooperation (Organization for European Economic Co-operation 1948, Council of Europe 1949) and stronger cores of integration (such as the ECSC, 1952 and the EEC, 1958), or how they developed alternative and more peripheral forms of integration (such as EFTA, NORDEK, or UNISCAN).

3. For a long time, literature suffered from a deficit of large-scale, condensed and summarizing works on the overall history of Europe and on European integration, but in recent times, they are no longer a rarity. Monographic overall studies as large overviews on the policies toward Europe and integration in individual states that were drawn up on a source-saturated, empirical basis are, however, still a scarce commodity for many countries. Detailed studies dominated which focused on special aspects of a few years or one decade.

4. Publications on a multi-archival basis achieved a growing emphasis on more broadly targeted integration history monographs, anthologies and articles which were


able to overcome that dominance of national accesses and state-centred perspectives – including in part through new and increased accesses to community and private archives, but also those of the state as well as materials from estates. This was also thanks to sources that were available as a result of digitalized archives and Internet documentations.84

5. In addition to representatives of states and governments, the focus was also on other decision-makers and participants, and thus parties,85 media, lobbies, networks,86 pressure groups such as economic circles and entrepreneurs,87 trade unions,88 local authorities, cities, communities, and regions as well as specific interest groups such as non-state protagonists like youth campaigns89 were included. Within that context, research on European integration profited from a strengthened and sharpened consciousness of “soft power” that was also able to include the “poor”, “powerless”, “weak” and thus the so-called “soft” factors of history, as well as international relations and the movement for European unity through which outsiders,

critics, opposition forces, and opponents (such as the Communist parties) as well as the losers with integration also won attention.

6. As a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain, the officially proclaimed end of the Cold War in Europe and the opening at times of (Soviet) Russian archives, research on the East-West conflict received a massive, important impetus. This, in turn, contributed to place the historiography of integration in a greater and broader context, whereby the role of the superpowers and their Cold War agencies, intelligence services, etc. was reflected more critically and, within that context, direct and indirect effects upon the policy, society and economy of the nation-states were recorded.

7. In a process of re-examination, the branches of history experienced a greater theory orientation starting with the 1970s and 1980s, influenced by political science and its formations of theories on international relations and its political decision making processes. From this, the traditional histories of diplomacy, policy, and states were also included and brought up for discussion. Since that time, the consciousness of the necessity of theoretical reflections has increased in the fields of European


integration historiography. Concepts such as “intercontinentalization”, “modernization”, “transatlanticization”, “westernization”, and “globalization” inspired a (political) historiography that was more oriented toward social, societal, cultural and economic history as well as community and security policy history. As a consequence of this, these changes also had a reaction upon the historiography of a nationally oriented and state-centred representation of European history which became more and more aware of its own deficits.

8. Beginning in the 1990s, studies that were arranged comparatively increased in integration research as far as jurisprudence, political science, and history are concerned – above all if the Nordic states, the Neutrals or the Southern European countries are considered, but also on the level of currency and traffic studies. Additionally “widening” and “deepening” were understood from the end of the 1990s as one of the new tasks of integration historical research.

9. Starting with the twenty-first century, a sort of renaissance of growth can be noticed in intellectual history, the history of ideas, and constitutional history in the historiographies and political science of European integration – from their beginnings up to more recent developments – which is correlated with the process of developing


a EU-“Constitution” from 2001 to 2005 and the historical dimension and the debate about the formation of a political union from 2008 to the present. What began was, for instance, the investigation of the exchange of ideas on national concepts of Europe within the framework of the political parties and their transnational networks of cooperation.

Ideas in general and federalism in particular then once again played a more important role as subjects of study, above all in order to analyse also political cultures, their images (self-perceptions) and values as well as national ideologies, and thus to determine the thinking, acting and rhetoric of the political elite as to their reinterpretations of history and identities (including in the constructivist sense of history).

10. Especially in periods of crisis contributing to a widening of the research agenda and as a result of growing public and societal pressure, the nation-states and com-


102. M. GEHLER, M. GONSCHOR, H. MEYER, H. SCHÖNNER (eds), Mitgestalter Europas. Transnationalismus und Parteiennetzwerke europäischer Christdemokraten und Konservativer in historischer Erfahrung, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, St. Augustin, 2013 (also see http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.34105/).


munities were compelled to react. Applications for accession\textsuperscript{106} were from time to time the result of national crises, and steps toward reforms of EC and EU institutions were from time to time the consequence of international crises. They triggered public debates about fundamental reorientations of states and their societies, but also those of the Communities or the Union\textsuperscript{107} and they also produce Euro-scepticism\textsuperscript{108}.

11. Due to the wars of interventions against Serbia (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and the Iraq (2003), classic issues in foreign policy arose in a more and more intense manner in the research which corresponded to the increased necessity and the growing importance of the common foreign, security and defence policy (Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP and Common European Security and Defence Policy, CESDP) of the European Union, which also awakened public interest and triggered criticism\textsuperscript{109}. In the meantime, it has not only been argued that the EU is a global protagonist\textsuperscript{110}, but rather it has already been discussed for a long time as to whether what is represented by the EU is a revolutionary process\textsuperscript{111} or in fact a new sort of


pluricentric Westphalian, declining or postmodern empire and, within that context, a challenge for the USA.

12. The EC presidencies that began in the sense of summit conference diplomacy in 1969 with the Hague and then strengthened throughout the 1970s, starting with the European Council in Paris 1974, along with the EU presidencies that followed here-upon, had already become the subject of study in the research, but since then they have become so more and more. They were examined with regard to the transition from national domestic and foreign policy – that is, nation-state policy – to European internal and foreign policy as well as to a globalized policy of European states. Within that context, both individual analyses and comparative analyses of the EU presidencies are particularly illuminating because they attempt to examine the domestic and foreign policy levels as well as the community policy level of European multilateralism or of integration policy supranationalism. The agenda of these presidencies contained issues of labour market, employment and social policy and consequently issues that were relevant to social history and, recently, the fight against terrorism and the dealing with the “refugee crisis”, which in fact is a crisis of solidarity among the EU member states.

VII. An historiography of varied Europeanizations

Findings and results thus far can be summarized into nine theses:

1. The Europeanization of external nation-state policy toward Europe by means of orientation towards Brussels: Up to now, national policy toward Europe has been

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one of the main topics of research in history of European integration. Nation-state references therefore clearly dominated before community history studies, whereby this development could be explained in terms of archive access, the logic of first attempts, the nature of the topic and the rationale of the content. It was also quite sensible as a first step in terms of research strategy. With this kind of reconstruction of the historiography of national policy toward “Europe” and its institutions, it can be recognized that value was placed primarily upon the goals, intentions, interests, motives, reasons, strategies and goals of nation-state-policy and government-policy diplomats, political decision-makers and observers. Through their orientations towards Brussels, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Strasbourg, etc., a gradual Europeanization of national policy representatives toward “Europe” and members of the communities came into existence.117

2. The Europeanization by means of internal community and union policy – integration by means of the adoption of the common body of law (“acquis communautaire”): The consequences of community policy and its external impacts for the additional dynamics of European integration and the societies of Europe have slipped from sight through the focusing on the nation-states’ policies toward Europe. For the longest time, national and European interests – that is, state and community-specific interests – have grown together more intensely and can no longer be strictly separated from each other anymore, if in fact it had ever been possible to do so.118 A Europeanization began by means of an increasing convergence of community law and common regulations (acquis communautaire) in the individual member states of the Communities and the Union.119

3. The modernization and protection of the national economic, industrial and social systems by means of Europeanization: For the evaluation of the motives of national policy toward Europe, it can be pointed out that the main arguments were the restoration, protection, renewal, and stabilization of state and at least the economies, industries, societies, and social systems (for example, agricultural policy for France’s policy of European integration). Added to this were changing areas of interest as well as new perspectives and options in the foreign trade policies, participating in endeavours at the economic dynamics of the EEC, or not being excluded from the “Common Market” and profiting from it (the UK’s “integration policy” would be an example of this).

4. The Europeanization by means of the search for security guarantees as well as by means of winning reliable partners and the policy of the Europeanization of the neighbourhood: For the Benelux countries, which were shaped by the painful e-

riences of the violations of neutrality from both world wars and which had belonged to the Oslo Group of states, it was an existential matter between NATO and EEC membership to have guaranteed protection against further aggression and annexation. In that sense, states seeking protection obtained security via Europeanization and transatlantization. In addition to reasons of economic, trade, sovereignty and neutrality policies, the aspects of neighbourhood policy and security policy also played a substantial role for national policy toward Europe. Due to the conflicts and crises of Cyprus, Kosovo and Ukraine, the EU’s accession, association and neighbourhood policies from 1999 to 2015 cannot be viewed as a successful enterprise of Europeanization.\textsuperscript{120}

5. Europeanization by means of communication, legitimation, and the sense of public sphere: There were debates about the future of Europe not only as a consequence of the two world wars that had started from European soil, but rather above all also with regard to European integration, its institutions, structures and their geographical range as well as content.\textsuperscript{121} We can observe a politicization of Europe and also a Europeanization of politics. As a result of this, citizens’ discourses, political communication\textsuperscript{122} and a Europeanization of the discussions came into being. In the end, “public spheres and spaces” were increasingly spoken of in that regard.\textsuperscript{123} They and the communication that took place within them became more and more important because in the end, it concerns a matter of existence, namely, the legitimation of the EU.\textsuperscript{124} What is meant here are the broad opinion, the media opinion and the parlia-


mentary published opinion, because we are still removed from a truly European public.

6. The Europeanization of Europe by means of the opening of Central and Eastern Europe: The revolutionary years of radical political change 1989-91 – including the breakup of the actually existing Socialist forms of rule in Central, Eastern, and South-eastern Europe and the end of the USSR – have still been grasped by the historiography recently, but they have to be studied in a detailed historical analysis on the effects of their European history and integration history dimensions on a comparable national level, that is, including the effects of the ideological, political, and social history dimension. Twenty-five years after these epoch-making breaks, the first large and comparative historical analyses are possible. With regard to mass education and adult education as well as above all else with a view toward school education in the sense of political training for future-oriented didactics in contemporary history, they are more necessary than ever.

7. The Europeanization by means of the culturalistic shift and the culturalization of the EU: The anthropological and culturalistic change of the humanities and the social sciences also left behind tracks in the historiography of Europe and of integration. Issues of experience, individual memories and the collective memory, identity and mentality awakened the interest of research. Starting out from the Europeanization of cultures, a culturalization of Europe occurred with that EU which in the meantime had also understood culture as “goods” and “political capital”. That makes the demand clear for access to integration history in terms of cultural diplomacy, policy, history and cultural studies.

128. Sport history as mass culture, such as soccer, remains a new field of research, see W. PYTA, Geschichte des Fußballs in Deutschland und Europa seit 1954, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2013; W. PYTA, N. HAVEMANN (eds), European Football and Collective Memory, Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2015.
culture still exists, but a cultural history of European unification or of the European Union is a desideratum for the future in the sense of “European studies on integration research”.

8. The Europeanization by means of economy and the economization of politics: In order to clarify the importance, weighting, and reciprocal relationship of politics and economics in the national, European and integration histories, fundamental issues that to a large extent are unsolved still remain and thus so does a demand that is oriented toward basic research. Against this background, as an allusion to the remark by former US President Bill Clinton, “It’s the economy, stupid!” the priority actually has to be “economy first” and the writing of a history of Europe from the perspective of need, demand and consumption. A Europeanization of consumers and their behaviour had started to take place via goods and products.

9. The Europeanization of everyday life by means of impact and consumption: A stronger integration of the history of everyday life and the history of the citizens who were affected by the unification of Europe (in order to demonstrate the area of conflict between “above” and “below”), but also a stronger integration of economic history that is not seldom separated from it or even isolated into the history of European integration, appears to possibly be more urgent and more necessary than the further fulfilment of the need for the profiling of the historiography of European integration on a cultural studies basis.


VIII. Europeanizations as reasons for the integration of Western Europe and the uniting of all of Europe

According to the findings that have been cited, it should have become clear that different forms of Europeanizations took place which contributed to the first phase of Western Europe’s integration (1947/48 to 1957/58) and European unification (1989 to 2004/07) on an EU-membership level. In a book review, Wilfried Loth found that ideas and institutions alone did not lead to the uniting of Europe.\footnote{134} The development was actually more complex than the triple jump “ideas – institutions – uniting” of a book title suggested.\footnote{135} But this tripartite presentation demonstrated that nevertheless constructive initiatives (ideas) and permanent bodies (institutions) were an indispensable component of a so called non-reversible development. At the core, what was concerned for the periods starting in 1945-47 and 1989-91 were unique alignments consisting of a combination of five factors, all of which worked together:

1. At the helm was a generation of political decision-makers in the second half of 1940s (and also later on in the first half of the 1950s) who were molded by experiences in two world wars and by resistance against authoritarian governments and totalitarian dictatorships\footnote{136} (Europeanization by violence, war\footnote{137} and resistance experience) who came to the conclusion that only cooperation could lead to a democratic, community and humane Europe based upon fundamental rights. This was expressed by the founding of the Council of Europe in 1949 and the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, formally: the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) in 1950 (entering into force in 1953).

2. The advance of the Red Army into Central and Eastern Europe, in connection with the takeover by Communist regimes (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland) as well as the danger of the spread of that ideology and its parties in Western Europe made joining together, including against the Soviet Union and its allies (Europeanization by Communist and Soviet threat), appear necessary, which became recognizable in the founding of the Brussels Treaties in 1948 and NATO in 1949 (Europeanization by treaty-making and transatlantization).

3. A completely defeated and prostrate Germany, which in the West in any case was prepared for rehabilitation, reconstruction, reparations and cooperation with France (Konrad Adenauer-Robert Schuman) also offered opportunities (Europeanization by colonization).

\footnote{135} M. GEHLER, Europa …, op.cit., pp.539-553. 
4. Within the framework of a globally oriented system of economic and monetary order through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Europeanization by internationalization and globalization), American reconstruction assistance (European Recovery Program, ERP) (Europeanization by Americanization [?]) for Western Europe created a first alliance for the liberalization of trade and payments, which became possible with the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1948 and the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, forming starting points for currency convertibility in the form of the European Monetary Agreement (EMA) in 1958 and the customs union of the EEC in 1968 (Europeanization by market economy).

5. The increasing process of the emancipation of the former European colonies as a result of the Second World War affected four out of the six founding states of the ECSC and the EEC (first and foremost France, but also Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands) and favoured the concentration on intra-European cooperation and its intensification (Europeanization by decolonization).

Thus in the first decade after the war, conditions and foundations were present which made integration in Western Europe possible and could offer the opportunities for a possible later uniting of the entire continent. The political uniting of the continent became possible starting from 1989/90 by means of the opening of the East and the end of the USSR in 1991. It was prepared in the wake of the establishment of the Single Market in 1993, and it was set as a goal in the course of the second half of the 1990s. Against the background of the five aspects named above, it reads like an analogy that has been shifted in time in an almost mirror-image manner – a circle that was to close. Once again, it consists of a combination of five factors that worked together:

1. The generation which acted substantially in a political manner in the second half of the 1980s in Europe still had a personal reference to the period of dictatorships and to the Second World War, or else it still experienced the Cold War and the division of the continent itself as active politicians (Europeanization by Cold War and dictatorship experience within a divided Europe).


2. At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union found itself in a unique condition of financial and economic weakness. That is why under Mikhail Gorbachev it loosened its grip on the “brother states” of Central and Southeastern Europe, before it was itself to experience a never-before-imagined rapid implosion in 1991 which was also associated with the end of its system of organization of the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact (Europeanization by communist defeat and Soviet implosion).\textsuperscript{142}

3. The Federal Republic of Germany determinedly took advantage of the chances that were offered for unity with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but in any case the new Germany preserved its ties to the West (NATO), remained true to its (payment) obligations within the context of European integration and continued the cooperation with France within the framework of a new EU\textsuperscript{143} (Europeanization by continuous forced integration) – in spite of both new and continuing differences in opinion (in the issues of the speed and extent of the EU’s “Eastern Enlargement”,\textsuperscript{144} the French project of the “Mediterranean Union” and with the actions for managing the financial market, currency, and economic crises).

4. The “Eastern Enlargement” of NATO that was carried out with the determination of the USA to include the Central and Southern countries of Eastern Europe starting from the late 1990s anticipated and flanked the EU’s “Eastern Enlargement” and formed an essential geostategical and security policy precondition for EU-Europe’s political unification (Europeanization by NATOization of the future EU). This also caused new dangers of destabilization in the Eastern parts of the continent (Georgia conflict 2008; Russian-Ukrainian war 2014-15).

5. The changed forms of rapidly transforming globalized economic development with new competitors on the world markets in the wake of the decolonization of postcolonialism (such as the Arab Spring 2011) compelled the Europeans as the former colonial powers to continue to preserve their cohesion (Re-Europeanization by

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new forms of decolonization and globalization) and, in the wake of recent challenges and current conflicts, to blaze new trails for the management of crises and the solution of problems, including at the intergovernmental institutional level like the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) of 2010, the European Fiscal Pact (EFP) of 2012, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of 2012 and the European Banking Union (EBU) of 2014 (Europeanization by reinvented intergovernmentalism and institutionalization).

What may be said in conclusion on the background of and reasons for the two developments within the context of Europeanization and European integration? As much as research has endeavoured to portray thus far, to trace back to the Middle Ages the roots and structures of “Europe’s separate path” (Michael Mitterauer), or to view the Modern Era along with modernism as the explanation model for European integration (Guido Thiemeyer) or even the principle of rationality (Max Weber and Silvio Vietta), which are worthy of note as socioeconomic and development-dependent backgrounds and intellectual history preconditions, it was indeed primarily reasons related to the political situation and reasons that were time-specific – that is, those of contemporary history – which made possible the integration of Western Europe (1948-1968) including the EEC-Customs Union and, in the end, also the unification of Europe (1989 to 2004/07). In the methodology – that is, the procedures – a role was played from the Middle Ages or from the Modern Era that was not inconsiderable by the division and separation of powers in Central European experiences and traditions and by the industry (industrialization), modernism (modernization), and rationality (rationalization) of Western European experiences and traditions. These trends can also be subsumed under the code word “Europeanizations”.

The most exciting and thrilling paradigm shift was experienced by Germany within the framework of the sixty-five years of unification development from the Marshall Plan (1947/48) to the Fiscal Pact (2012). Originally, the integration project served as its control and integrating primarily under French direction (1950-90), while today it serves the safeguarding and protection of the cohesion of the EU, whereby the crisis management took place essentially under German direction (1992-2015). It is not only national foreign policy but also Germany’s politics which have experienced Europeanizations. And conversely, in contrast to the old Bonn Republic, the new united and enlarged Berlin Republic – along with the EU that to a large extent

146. G. THIEMEYER, Europäische Integration. Motive, Prozesse, Strukturen, UTB, Cologne et al., 2010.
is sponsored (financed) by it – has not only taken on the characteristic of a central power of Europe, but rather more than ever has also stepped up to the world political stage as a trade and economic power and has also taken on the role as the guardian of Europe’s currency. What can be observed is a double German Europeanization: Germany was and is Europeanized, and its integration policy Europeanizes other member states.

IX. Final Remarks

In a double sense, “Europeanization” means to both Europeanize someone or something and to be Europeanized. Because it includes actions, adaptations, and reactions (in the words of Arnold J. Toynbee, “challenge” and “response”), the term should be used in the plural. Europeanizations have to be seen as a highly complex process on different levels with various types. As has been demonstrated, a multitude of Europeanizations have existed and continue to exist. It is a task of the historiography of Europe as well as historical research in European integration to reconstruct multiple Europeanizations: firstly in a general approach to pre-European integration history and secondly in a manner that is more oriented toward contemporary history and case studies (related to different phases from the ERP to the EU). One thing seems to be clear: deep-rooted Europeanizations of an older type have been mixed with EU Europeanizations of a more recent kind that are still ongoing and progressing. It will be up to future research to differentiate them, because the dynamics of European integration succeed in activating older Europeanizations while also developing new ones.
