‘Lone Wolf Terrorism’. The Case of Anders Breivik
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Abstract: The terrorist attack on 22 July 2011 in Norway shocked the nation and the world. Anders Behring Breivik became the ultimate lone wolf terrorism case. This case study explores why terrorism is difficult to predict generally and more specifically the insight that the Breivik case provides about motivation and ideological worldview, counterjihad, terrorist craft and the lessons for preventing such attacks in the future.

Keywords: Lone wolf terrorism, criminal justice, extremism
Lone Wolf-Terrorismus, Strafverfolgung, Extremismus

Ever since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the expectation was that al-Qaeda was the only organization capable of inflicting indiscriminate, mass casualty terrorism events without any moral limits or bounds. Terrorism experts, intelligence agencies and governments were blindsided by the unexpected terrorist atrocity in Norway which shocked the nation and the world. This blind spot can be accounted for by the innate difficulty in predicting and anticipating how the next terrorist attack will look like. It is also due to the unique characteristics of Anders Behring Breivik, with the convergence of several factors that created this terrorist mindset and operation on 22 July 2011. This article explores these analytical dimensions from the scholarly literature on Breivik’s behavior in the court room while on trial.¹

1. Why Terrorism is Difficult to Predict

A number of reasons explain why terrorism is difficult to predict. The social and behavioral aspects of terrorism with a myriad of contexts, interrelated and interacting causes, dynamics and effects make it a “wicked problem.” As such, it is embedded in a dynamic social context and it requires synergistic analysis from political, social, religious and historical frames to capture the full complexity of the problem.² Isolating factors and extrapolating meaning is likely to result in a fragmented understanding of terrorism and its trajectory. History has a valuable role to play to discern themes and patterns, but, as we know, the future often does not follow a neat, linear or discernable path.

A second difficulty in predicting terrorism relates to the limits of inductive reasoning when considering “the possibilities of large, sudden and unexpected shocks to the system, what have been described variously as “Black Swans”³ or “Wild Cards.”⁴ These shocks produce major changes within society and invariably impacts on terrorism. As underlined by Radical Worlds 2020, “projection from what we know about the present to what we do not know about the future tends to be linear, and it seldom postulates major discontinuities or unexpected shocks to the current global system.”⁵ Some would argue that it appears that Black swan events are increasing with greater frequency. “We face a 21st century in which black swans are likely to arrive in flocks.”⁶

Additionally, the behavior of terrorist groups, their modus operandi and organizational learning capacity (either incremental or transformational learning) are directly a function of a complex interrelationship between their structure, efficiency of communication system, organizational culture, knowledge resources and the environment.⁷ The speed of change within technology and its interrelationship to society and complex adaptive social networks is another major factor that increases complexity and uncertainty. As the Iraqi insurgency has demonstrated, the various 160 insurgent cells within Iraq alternate between six principal detonation techniques – pressure plates, cell phones, command wire, low-power and high-power radio-controlled and passive infra-red – according to the various applied counter-IED antidotes.⁸ The feedback loop and adaptation speed by the insurgents is often within 48 hours through collective brainstorming and exchange of bomb-building techniques, emplacement and targeting data over the Internet. Conversely, it takes the U.S. forces months and even years to develop effective jamming and counter-IED technologies.⁹

A third factor characteristic of the greater complexity and uncertainty of the global strategic environment is the range of threats from incredibly diverse sources across local, regional and global levels. Criminal groups and computer hackers, domestic extremists, natural and man-made viral borne illnesses and religious extremists blur together within and across borders, thereby making threats less identifiable and predictable. Traditional threats are also increasingly interlinked with transnational threats, producing interdependencies with high degrees of unforeseen impacts.

¹ The author was present in the Oslo court during the testimony of Anders Behring Breivik in April/May 2012.
³ Nicholas Taleb, The black swan: how the improbable rules the world and why we don’t know it. (New York, NY: Random House, 2007).
and unexpected consequences. As argued by Phil Williams, the new global security environment is characterized by contextual complexity where every variable is interdependent and non-linear, the sum being greater than individual parts. This contextual complexity means that “small inputs can lead to dramatically large consequences” (butterfly effect); and transitions are a key factor at the core of complexity theory and known as “phase changers” or “tipping points” where “little changes can have big effects and can tip the system from one condition to another.”10 As illustrated by Williams, “the transition of a stable disease patterns to an epidemic” can be so-called “superspreaders”, such as the impact of A.Q. Khan on proliferation of nuclear weapons production and know-how to rogue states and potentially terrorist entities during the 1990s.11 Another potential superspreader (at least in his own mind) is Anders Behring Breivik and his potential influence through a terrorist “shock-and-awe” campaign in Norway on 22 July 2011, to create a potential cascading effect that ignites an unpredictable following, which rides off an increased rise in right-wing extremism and polarization within societies.

A fourth factor is the issue of so-called “atomization” of terrorism where lone wolves or solitary terrorist actors constitute an increased security threat. They are difficult to detect, as they often self-radicalize and do not have outside connections. Unlike the detection capability for terrorist networks, isolated violent extremists with a grievance and security awareness of how security services operate are able to harvest globalization and the Internet for ready-made ideologies for their grievances, bomb-making know-how, and materials and remote reconnaissance capability of available targets to strike. Research into 119 cases of lone-actor terrorists in Europe and the U.S. between 1990 until present reveal that in 83% of the cases leading up to a terrorist event “others were aware of the grievances that later spurred their plots into action”12 and “in 64% of cases, family and friends were aware of the individual’s intent to engage in a terrorism-related activity because the offender verbally told them.”13 The same study revealed that 53% were characterized as socially isolated, 46% learned tradecraft through on-line sources, and in 68% of the cases the terrorist consumed literature or propaganda of a wider movement.14 Another study of al-Qaeda-related lone actors revealed that only four out of 105 planned, prepared and executed attacks in Europe were completely “disconnected from organizations and identifiable networks of extremists.”15

The case of Anders Behring Breivik can be likened to the film The Perfect Storm, where rare weather systems and their confluence aligned to produce a rare weather front of dramatic magnitude. The making of Breivik was a “perfect storm” of personal and psychological background factors, social isolation, connections to a ready-made ideological belief-system on the Internet, the creation of a make-believe terrorist universe filled with symbolism, a monster-sized terrorist manifesto creating an echo-chamber, meticulous terrorist tradecraft and murderously ice-cold execution of multiple terrorist attacks. Breivik was also a lone-actor terrorist with no outside operational connections.

The multiple terrorist attacks against the Norwegian prime minister and government offices and then, hours later, the shooting spree by Anders Behring Breivik on defenseless political youths belonging to the Workers Youth League (AP) on the small island of Utoya shocked a nation and the world. First, a one-ton truck bomb, containing ammonium nitrate, parked underneath the central government offices killed 8 and injured 98. The attack could have resulted in the collapse of the building, but an underground garage absorbed and deflected part of the blast. Then, Breivik proceeded by car to the small island, dressed as a policeman and carrying bags with ammunition and took the small ferry across. There he opened fire with a semi-automatic 9mm Glock 34 gun and a semi-automatic Ruger Mini-14 for over an hour, killing 69 and injuring 60. Often, Breivik executed his victims at close range with shots to the head. 186 empty shells were later found on the island, but Breivik carried with him over 900 rounds of unused ammunition for the massacre.16

As immediate reaction to the terrorist modus operandi, the attacks were considered an al-Qaeda-related event. This resulted in some Islamophobic incidents in the streets of Oslo. These quickly seized when news was released about the offender being a blond Norwegian and not a Muslim immigrant. As Norway and the rest of the world were trying to come to grips with this tragedy, Breivik’s 1,600-page manifesto began surfacing in the virtual world. This bizarre manifesto contained in equal part an Islamophobic hybrid ideology, a terrorist handbook and a fictitious Knights Templar world order, as well as a highly narcissistic and lengthy personal account and a diary ending in a fictitious self-interview, obviously designed to control every conceivable media inquiry and angle after the atrocity to preserve his ‘grandiose’ self-image.

Presumably, Breivik and his ideological worldview were colored by the events of 11 September 2001, which acted as a moral shock and a catalyst for interpretation of the world around him. It was also clear from Breivik’s trial answers that the Balkan war and Serbia in particular had influenced his political orientation, as he claimed to maintain contact with a Serbian military man. What is certain is that Breivik can hardly be considered as intellectual, judging from his heavy cut-and-paste “counter-jihad” ideological framework
borrowed from the so-called Vienna doctrine, which plays such a central role in defining his enemies and actions.\textsuperscript{17}

2. The Manifesto

Breivik's 1,600-page manifesto, entitled 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence, provided a hybrid ideology based on the Vienna School of Thought, which revolves around resistance against multiculturalism and Islamification. 2083 refers to the 400th anniversary of the Battle of Vienna (1683), which was the decisive defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the defeat of Islam in Europe. The Vienna School of Thought revolves around cultural conservatism (anti-multiculturalism) and is against Islamification, the ‘Eurabia project’ and the Frankfurt School (neo-Marxism, cultural-Marxism; multiculturalism, but also against racism and anti-authoritarian ideologies including Nazi ideology. It is pro-Israel and for the defence of non-Muslim minorities in Muslim lands and it is a self-proclaimed defender of cultural dimensions of Christianity). Breivik blends these aspects together with selected facts and arguments that he copied from the Internet. From the manifesto, Breivik envisioned to spearhead a battle that would culminate in 2083 and be fought in three phases: the first carried out by small terrorist strikes; the second by guerrilla warfare; and the third phase would be a large-scale European civil war which would result in political and military control of Europe, the liquidation of traitors and the deportation of Muslims.

Breivik's manifesto contained also passages with striking similarity to other forms of extremism that have an apocalyptic worldview, including martyrdom, individual cosmic battle, history as a continuous chain of events, and a symbolic strike to ignite the revolutionary forces to gather strength. In some ways, many of these were similar to those embraced by al-Qaeda: martyrdom; handbook of terror; truce or hudna; and the psychological impact of “shock-and-awe" campaigns. By his own admission, Breivik strangely admired the operational trademark of al-Qaeda and he borrowed some of their most shocking tactics found on the Internet. Breivik's manifesto and his worldview had close ideological affinity to the “counter-jihad" movement, a stridently anti-Muslim Internet- and blog-based movement, , together with the English Defence League and other associated groups within the European Defence Leagues.\textsuperscript{18}

Both the prosecutors and the police maintain their strong belief that Breivik acted alone. However, it is important that his actions are not de-politicised or de-contextualised, but placed in a wider context. Öyvind Strommgen argues in his book, Det Mørke Nettet, that it is essential to understand the dangerous undercurrents of counter-jihad movements that flourish on the Internet. It was these chat forums and specialised sites, like ‘Gates of Vienna’ and Document.no, which steadily nourished Breivik with a constant stream of anti-immigrant, Islamophobic and xenophobic arguments and which provided a ready-tailored and adapted counter-jihad ideological framework.\textsuperscript{19}

Breivik saw himself as the lone warrior or martyr. His ideological patchwork was a new personal creation. As such, the ideology of Breivik, according to Thomas Hegghammer, does not fit “the established categories of right-wing ideology, like white supremacism, ultra nationalism or Christian fundamentalism", but rather, that it resembles “macro-nationalism" and a “new doctrine of civilizational war”.\textsuperscript{20} Ultimately, the Internet played a crucial role in creating this Breivik in terms of reinforcing idiosyncratic psychological and personal traits and as “an echo chamber", where his ideology was shaped with and by other likeminded armchair ‘extremists’ who similarly operated under the cloak of anonymity.\textsuperscript{21}

Breivik defined himself as “Cultural Conservative" and his enemies as “Cultural Marxists", who were identified as the media and the political establishment responsible for promoting multiculturalism, immigration policies and a culture of silencing the debate around these issues. They needed to be targeted, according to Breivik, as they were propping up and implementing the policies leading to a Muslim takeover of the West. Towards these ends Breivik wrote an execution list divided into three categories. The A-list contained high-profile politicians from Norway and other countries, alongside editors and journalists of major media outlets. The B- and C-lists contained essentially most other organizations, except for right-wing populist political parties.

In the manifesto, Breivik invented a special uniform, specialized insignia and an elaborate medal system to award those that carried out executions across the different categories of enemies. The base uniform, which Breivik is photographed in the manifesto, was an Internet-purchased U.S. Marine Corps jacket which was decorated with commemorations from U.S. previous war campaigns and five medals from the Temple Order.\textsuperscript{22} On the arm was an especially designed emblem of a skull with temple order insignia which was designated as ‘Justiciar Knight’.\textsuperscript{23} Breivik had also designed the ideal Temple Knight uniform, which looked like a fusion of the Crusades and a character out of the PC game Assassin’s Creed, and he devoted portions in the manifesto to dress, code of conduct and even what a tombstone of a ‘Justiciar Knight’ should look like. In many ways, significant portions within the manifesto were the creation of a fantasy world created and controlled by Breivik's vision. Of course, Breivik spent significant time,

\textsuperscript{17} Toby Archer, “Diffuse movement with Muslims as hate object” [Author's translation]. Svenska Dagbladet, 3 August 2011.


\textsuperscript{19} Sebastian Gjerdings, “Breivik and the lone wolf pack [Author's translation]. Information, 6 January 2012.


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Helen Lööw, “When violence becomes a way of life [Author's translation]. (Accessed 5 September 2011).


on average 7 hours, playing the game World of Warcraft, and during the Christmas period in 2010 leading up to the attack he spent up to 17 hours per day engrossed in the game.

Breivik is also obsessed in the manifesto with embellishing his biography and his career achievements, including successful financial market trades which generated vast sums of money. The reality, however, was different, with Breivik's business going into bankruptcy – Breivik created a company called E-Commerce Group in which he sold about 5,000 fake educational diplomas made by a forger in Indonesia. This business venture lasted until 2006 and generated NOK6 million, which he transferred tax-free to hidden offshore accounts in Antigua, Bahamas and the Baltic states. As he lived from this period on at home with his mother, this diploma-fraud business financed extensive foreign trips (26 trips since 2002) and the preparation phase for his terrorist actions.25

Breivik's obsession with his self-image was evident in his fantastic portrayal of his educational background in the manifesto, claiming that he had over 15,000 hours of self-study, the equivalent of two Master degrees. In fact though, Breivik had finished school after high school and had no university education. Breivik seems to have suffered from inferiority feelings when it comes to his educational achievements. Breivik, for the most part in his diary over his life and preparation phase, shows clear evidence of a grandiose self-image on many accounts as a model Judiciare Knight, with everything from his clothing labels to his watch brands on display. This diary portion of Breivik's manifesto is a chilling journey into the mind of a terrorist's and mass murderer's inner thoughts over time. The manifesto ends with a long, calculating self-interview with Q&A about every conceivable angle about himself and his ideology. This portion includes also difficult questions and media angles that he anticipates.

One of the curious aspects of the manifesto is that Breivik devotes entire pages to the idea of attacking a nuclear plant, seemingly having been influenced by Chernobyl. Through open-source research Breivik illustrates the ease with which he prepared the various facets of the terrorist operation. Breivik's obsession with his self-image was evident in his fantastic portrayal of his educational background in the manifesto. Breivik knew by heart the exact measurements of explosive ingredients, details of his weaponry and the order in which he prepared the various facets of the terrorist operation. In the manifesto, Breivik also speaks on counter-surveillance techniques and safe communication skills.

Breivik revealed a paranoia of detection by authorities. As such, this operational paranoia was revealed during his eight reconnaissance missions against the government headquarters, when he would only glance at the building briefly. He deliberately did not search on Google to avoid being 'flagged' by security. He compartmentalized different operational facets in silos from each other. He buried weapons over the border into Sweden, as he knew there would be jurisdictional operational problems in cooperation between the two neighboring countries, and he picked up packages in Sweden to break up any suspicion of activities if one aspect of the operation was detected.

The operational phases were divided over different time periods, where Breivik acquired components used in the terrorist operation. Breivik purchased the uniform and medals from September 2009 until May 2010, while he bought materials used during the attack between April 2010 and March 2011. He continued to acquire weapons and ammunition legally between May 2010 and June 2011, while he purchased the bomb-making ingredients between September 2010 and July 2011.26 The total cost for the entire operation was NOK 389,000 and in total Breivik made 112 purchases from 90 different businesses in ten countries. Breivik established a company called Geofarm in 2009 and rented a farm house north of Oslo which enabled him to legitimately order large quantities of fertilizers – six tons of ammonium nitrate which arrived in May 2011. He had meticulously tested the absorption rate of different brands of fertilizers. During 82 days in his farm he worked around the clock to grind down the fertilizer pellets and to build a workable device, which he test-detonated on 12 June. One mistake Breivik made was that he underestimated the time it took to convert fertilizer into workable material to make a bomb, as otherwise he would have made three devices.

The establishment of Geofarm also enabled Breivik to cleverly gain access to badly needed funds as his resources were fast dwindling. As he owned Geofarm without earning a salary, Breivik decided to pay himself three monthly salaries, which he in turn used to gain access to ten credit cards, and these he maxed out to gain access to funds. When he was arrested on 22 July 2011 he had NOK 40,000 in cash on him.

Breivik had also spent considerable time thinking through different alternative and back-up plans for the mission. On 22 July 2011 Breivik was delayed in launching the operation as he did not count on a spam-filter on his e-mail account, which prevented him from e-mailing out the 1,600-page manifesto to over 8,000 selected sympathizers on his e-mail address list. Instead, he managed only to send 1,003 e-mails. This significant delay of the operation probably saved many lives, specifically the former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland who was the speaker on the Utoya island. At the trial Breivik claimed that she was a principal target which he had planned to execute, aiming to cut her throat with a bayonet while

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filming it with a mobile phone and later distributing it on Youtube. The plan was not to kill a few but everyone on the island, as 564 youths were present when he arrived there.

Breivik’s alternative plans were illustrated by the fact that he had purchased a Honda Gorilla mini motorcycle, which was in the exploding van. He claims that it was to be used in case the plans needed to be altered or in case he needed transport quickly away from the area. Another alternative plan Breivik revealed was that he was going to hijack a propane gas tanker and explode it around government buildings. Alternatively, Breivik devised a plan to request a controlled explosion on his farm from local authorities in which he would kill the official and steal the dynamite. It is difficult to discern with certainty how real these back-up plans were as they were recounted during the trial.

4. The Arrest of Breivik and Its Aftermath

When Breivik was arrested he was wearing a police uniform, and during the interrogation he claimed he was the commander of the new Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici (PCCTS or the Knights Templar Order), which was an anti-Jihad crusader organization – an international military order – created in London in April 2002. Throughout his interrogation he claimed that there were two other terrorist cells at large, waiting to launch imminent attacks unless certain conditions were met: the immediate abdication of the Norwegian Prime Minister and his Cabinet as well as the Royal Family; and demands to wear a uniform at his trial, to have access to a computer, his manifesto and Wikipedia, and to receive a special diet (no halal meat), as well as not to be photographed or fingerprinted.27

Similarly, Breivik claimed that he had swallowed a detonation mechanism the day before being arraigned, which was designed to blow up several locations. In many ways this behavior is illustrative that Breivik was a masterful illusionist, weaving together fiction and reality in a cat-and-mouse game with the authorities, where Breivik was seemingly in charge. This was part of his duplicitous strategy to feign attacks (like the massive government headquarters bombing) to maximize success of the real priority operation (the island massacre). Another illustration of this approach is Breivik’s deliberate insertion of hidden “codes” in his manifesto which turned out to be GPS codes to major European cities.28

Breivik’s manipulative streak was evident from his efforts in prison to befriend and convert guards over to his side. As such, prison guards rotated frequently and were not allowed to be alone with him or discuss personal matters.

Breivik also presented himself at trial as an “author” intending to continue to write several more books and further his mission from prison. At the trial itself he interrupted the judge and prosecutors and said that the Norwegian judicial system (which he failed to recognize as legitimate) was pitiful, as the maximum sentence of 21 years was not enough for the heinous crimes he committed: the only outcome he said was acquittal or the death penalty.

Was Breivik alone on 22 July or part of a wider terrorist conspiracy? The Norwegian security service, Politiets sikkerhetsstjeneste (PST), concluded that Breivik acted alone and that a major international investigation had not produced any evidence that he acted in concert with other co-conspirators. In fact, PST issued a threat evaluation for 2012 after Breivik’s attack in which it concluded that the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism was the greatest and most challenging threat to Norway.29 Right-wing extremism had not grown and was not of the same intensity and scope as the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism.30 In fact, according to Europol TE-SAT reports on terrorism in the EU, the previous years had only witnessed a handful of right-wing extremist terrorist attacks reported by the Member States.31 Of course the most dangerous elements may be on the violent fringes of the EDL and other groups that see Breivik as an inspiration. Several intelligence services are concerned that Breivik’s actions may spawn “lone wolf” copy cats. This has already materialized in two cases, with alleged Breivik copycat plots in Poland and the Czech Republic.32 One of the most interesting dimensions to watch is the fact that Russian ultranationalists have elevated Breivik as their hero in purging foreigners from their land and openly displaying placards with his face.33 This development requires monitoring by Russian authorities and Western government.

One of the most central intelligence questions was the ability of Breivik to plan the operation for nine years without being discovered. Breivik did acquire aluminium powder, which is 1 of 14 chemicals that can be used for producing homemade explosives and is on an EU Project Global Shield watch list. It is clear that Breivik was flagged because of his transaction by Norwegian customs and Interpol, but PST decided to take no action as the transaction was so small.34 In fact the PST issued a report about its performance and admitted that it probably would have missed the transaction since it was so small. Another theoretical intervention point was when Breivik admitted to calling in a threat to a government department in March 2011, making threats to the Prime Minister and threats to shoot Labour Party members and discussing a manifesto. However, protocols how to handle threatening incidents and reporting procedures how to handle threat calls were disregarded and this information never reached the police.35

27 Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheim, *Psychiatric evaluation for the Court* [Author’s translation], Oslo Court, 29 November 2011. Available at http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/oslombyen/psykiatrik/vurdering/.
29 Eivind Aare, “PST: - Islamists still the most serious threat” [Author’s translation], Aftenposten, 17 January 2010.
30 Ibid.
31 “Extremist contacts will be mapped out [Author’s translation] (2011) Svenska Dagbladet, 26 July.
34 “Norwegian Security Service were tipped off about Breivik” [Author’s translation], Dagens Nyheter, 26 August 2011.
The 22 July Commission report produced a scathing evaluation of the different government agencies’ performance, which yielded far-reaching conclusions about pathways to strengthen the national and local crisis management machinery and integrate response mechanism more efficiently. One area where the Norwegians already know that the government performed with resilience was societal unity in the face of severe crisis. Prime Minister Stoltenberg’s political leadership and communication managed to crucially unite rather than divide people and provided a focal point for remembrance, unity and direction. It also provided the antidote against a polarization of society.

5. Conclusion

There are many unique features of the Anders Behring Breivik case but also lessons to focus on for the future. The first lesson is to expect the unexpected and not ignore the morphing of different types of extremism – in this case counter-jihad groups which create unpredictable constellations over the Internet. It is critical to focus more on counter-jihad milieus and the way in which extremists groups thrive off right-wing undercurrents in society.

The second lesson is the importance of using Breivik’s manifesto as a handbook for early-warning signals, as symbols and rites are important to become a ‘Templar.’ Law enforcement should invest some time in collecting these early warning indicators that are present in this manual in the same fashion as COPPRA law enforcement manual provide indicators and symbols of other forms of extremism.

The third lesson is that the Internet plays a critical role in creating Breiviks and influencing lone-actor terrorists, something that is difficult to detect. This echo chamber of similar extremist positions and arguments which are often conspiratorial feed off each other. The anonymity of the Internet is exploited without the risk of social stigma as it is a risk-free forum of self-assurance. Authorities must improve their abilities to understand the intersection of the global and local in Internet forums and how these forums work and function.

The fourth lesson is that stigmatization, racism and divisiveness can easily create a siege mentality. Breivik’s mentor Fjordman, who studied Arabic and was in Cairo on 11 September 2001, was shocked to see how locals celebrated the attack, and this became a catalyst for his uncompromising counter-jihad views and blogs. In other words, aggressively pointing fingers at particular communities regardless of their views, whether they are jihadi or counter-jihadi, can create problems as much as it resolves them.

As fifth lesson, it is important to invest in Active Shooter Protocol for local law enforcement to confront complex shooting incidents like Breivik or the Mumbai-style attacks. Research from school shootings in North America and Finland have shown the importance of taking command and seizing the initiative quickly in responding to incidents to avoid the loss of life. Most lone shooters buckle when confronted with armed response and most kill themselves and do not want to negotiate. Lastly, as recognized by the 22 July Commission, planning for the exact same scenario at another time is a recipe for disaster, as one will be blindsided again.