

After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force

Molly Clever and David R. Segal*

Abstract: The U.S. ended the use of military conscription in 1973 and implemented an all-volunteer force (AVF), necessitating a reduction in the size of the active duty force and requiring the military to compete with the civilian labor market for personnel. Manpower policy shifted towards a free-market model of military organization with fiscal inducements becoming the primary incentive for voluntarism. We explore the consequences of this shift for the current U.S. military, including financial, manpower, and personnel considerations. We conclude by discussing the lessons the U.S. experience holds for other countries transitioning to an all-volunteer force.

Keywords: Conscription, all-volunteer force, personnel policy, United States of America
Wehrpflicht, Freiwilligenarmee, Personalpolitik, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika

1. Introduction

In 1973, the United States formally ended its use of military conscription and implemented an all-volunteer force (AVF). This transition resulted in a force of reduced size that could compete with the civilian labor market, requiring notable transformations in military organization, manpower policy, and the demographic composition of personnel. In this article, we explore the consequences of ending conscription in the United States since 1973. We begin by providing a brief historical background outlining the immediate causes and consequences of the shift from a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers to an all-volunteer force in the early 1970s. We then discuss the implications of this shift for the current U.S. military, focusing on financial and manpower considerations as well as the demographic composition of military personnel. The end of conscription in the United States resulted in a free market model of military organization which was more expensive to maintain, but also more professionally oriented and demographically reflective of American society. The U.S. experience certainly does not represent a universal pattern by which all countries transitioning to an AVF will follow; however, there are several important lessons that can be used to better understand the issues other countries have faced and may face. We conclude by discussing some of these issues, including changes in the cost, organizational requirements, and personnel composition of the military that are likely to

affect most countries transitioning from a conscription-based to an all-volunteer force.

1.2 Background

For much of its history, the U.S. military consisted of a small standing force of military professionals that was supplemented by the mass mobilization of militia members and conscripted men in times of war. Although formed in the tradition of the citizen soldier, the U.S. military only relied on conscription for relatively brief periods throughout its history, with the military participation ratio (MPR) – the percentage of the total resident population serving in the active duty military – rarely approaching 3 percent¹ (see Figure 1). However, the mass mobilization model became increasingly problematic in the 1960s as America's assumption of the role of superpower, the dynamics of conflict in the Cold War era and changing social trends put into question the viability of conscription.


First, the increasing complexity of military technology necessitated a different kind of force than was available through conscription. Beginning in the Second World War, the growing reliance on air power and advent of nuclear technology fundamentally altered the perception of threat. The possibility that a bomb with the power to destroy large segments of a society could be delivered without the deployment of a large-scale ground force meant that military threat was now ever-present. If diplomacy broke down, there would not be time for the government to select, train, and deploy its citizen soldiers; rather, a trained force would need to be ready for action at the very moment of perceived threat. In addition, the technologically advanced nature of these new weapons and delivery systems meant that it was no longer possible to pull the citizen soldier from his civilian job and prepare him for battle in a matter of months. Instead, the need to 'equip the man' rather than 'man the equipment' meant that soldiers needed to undergo more intensive and costly training, requiring longer periods of service to make the expense of the

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1 Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

training worthwhile.² For many military specialties, the period of required training exceeded the period of conscripted service. Additionally, the technologies of the nuclear age allowed for both a centralized level of control as well as an organizational climate of detached and rational decision making.³ As a result,

Figure 1: Participation in the U.S. Armed Forces, 1800-2010
Percent of total U.S. Population



Sources: DoD Personnel and Military Casualty Statistics, 2000-2011 (<http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm>) and the following U.S. Census Bureau publications: *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (1975) (<http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html>), *Historical National Population Estimates 1900-1999*, *Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008* (<http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html>)

the goals and central tasks of the armed forces shifted to include greater peace-keeping and constabulary roles. Changes in weapons technology and mission orientation during the Cold War thus required a quickly responsive standing force of greater size than existed in the prior peacetime force, but smaller than the mass mobilization witnessed during the World Wars. In addition to changing technological and organizational needs, cultural and political shifts in 1960s civilian society put into question the moral value of the draft. Although in principle conscription was guided by the notion of universal service, in which all (male) citizens held equal obligations to the state, the reduction in the size of the standing force needed during the Cold War and the Vietnam conflict and the coming of age of the baby boom generation meant that not everyone had an equal chance of serving. Those exempted from service tended to occupy the upper strata of society, namely those who attended college, a pattern which exacerbated the public perception that the burden of the Vietnam War fell most heavily on racial

minorities and the working class. Dissatisfaction with the draft existed across the political spectrum, with both conservative and liberal political advocates employing moral justifications for its discontinuation.⁴ Political conservatives argued that the draft represented a governmental intrusion on individual liberty and questioned the effectiveness of a military composed of reluctant conscripts. Liberals and anti-war advocates saw the draft as a manifestation of broader social inequality, and the burning of draft cards became a publicly visible symbol of anti-war sentiment as well as cultural resistance more broadly.

In response to these shifting organizational and social demands, President Nixon set up a commission in 1969 to evaluate the feasibility and appropriate measures necessary to implement an all-volunteer force. The resulting Gates Commission Report (1970) recommended that an AVF supported by a stand-by draft was preferable to the status quo of a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts, and that such a force could be fiscally viable and meet the

nation's security needs. Critics of the proposed AVF suggested that a volunteer force would erode patriotism by distancing citizens from their national obligations, require the military to drastically lower its enlistment standards to meet manpower requirements, and draw volunteers only from those segments of society who were disadvantaged in the civilian labor market. The result, argued critics, would be a force that was too far removed from the broader society to be effective.⁵

The Gates Commission Report, however, suggested that free market dynamics would create an effective fighting force. By maintaining high enlistment standards while offering wages that were competitive with the civilian labor market, the military could attract high quality recruits who would choose military service as a favorable employment opportunity as well

2 Segal, David R. 1989. *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

3 Janowitz, Morris. 1960. *The Professional Soldier*. New York: The Free Press.

4 For an analysis of the historical context surrounding the end of the draft, see Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009. Also see the works of Milton Friedman for libertarian arguments against the draft, including his essay "Why Not a Volunteer Army?" in *The Draft: a Handbook of Facts and Alternatives*, ed. Sol Tax, University of Chicago Press, 1967.

5 For an overview of the arguments for and against the end of the draft, see *The Draft: a Handbook of Facts and Alternatives*, ed. Sol Tax, University of Chicago Press, 1967.

as serving out of a sense of duty to their country. The report also anticipated that personnel demographic composition and quality would not differ significantly from that of the conscription-based force. The resulting all-volunteer force was officially implemented by the Department of Defense (DoD) in July of 1973.

2. The Free-Market Military

One significant consequence of the shift to an AVF was the introduction of a free-market model of military organization, transforming the relationship between citizen and state in important ways. Conscription had emerged as a model of military organization in conjunction with the rise of nationalist states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, centered on the notion that states and citizens existed in a mutually obligatory relationship in which the state owed protection to its people, and its citizens owed military service to the state in times of crisis.⁶ By identifying fiscal inducements as the primary incentive for military service, the advent of the AVF signaled a drastic reconfiguration of the relationship between citizen and state as largely economic in nature, rather than political.⁷ The result was a military that was an employer, subject to labor market dynamics. Within this broader shift in civil-military relations, the advent of the AVF had important implications for the financial, manpower and organizational requirements of the military.

2.2 Financing the All-Volunteer Force


The most immediate consequence of implementing a force based on market dynamics was that the military now had to compete with civilian employers, requiring an immediate

increase in basic pay. In 1968, the monthly pay and housing allowance for incoming enlisted personnel without dependents amounted to 75 percent of the federal minimum wage; in 2011, it was 166 percent (see Figure 2). In addition to basic pay, attractive benefits were also needed to draw in and retain quality personnel. Military retirement and health care benefits in particular offered significant advantages over benefits available among many civilian employers, but these benefits were also expensive to maintain for a force with personnel who now served longer and was more likely to have dependent family members, trends which will be outlined in more detail below.

The military retirement system allows service members to collect retirement benefits of 50 percent of base pay after twenty years of service, and 75 percent of base pay after thirty years of service, meaning that a soldier who enlisted at age 18 could be eligible for retirement by age 38, and an officer commissioned at age 22 could be eligible for retirement by age 42. Although

Figure 2: Military Compensation for Incoming Enlisted Personnel as a Percent of Federal Minimum Wage*

* Monthly military pay and housing allowance for entry-level enlisted personnel without dependents / Monthly federal minimum wage pay for full-time worker



Sources: U.S. Department of Labor History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates 1938-2011 (<http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm>) and Defense Finance and Accounting Services Military Pay Tables 1949-2011 (<http://www.dfas.mil/dfas/militarymembers/payentitlements/militarypaytables.html>)

the majority of service members do not serve long enough to collect retirement benefits, the proportion of those who do has steadily risen over the course of the AVF. Retirements made up less than 10 percent of all active duty separations through the 1980s, reaching 15 percent in the mid-1990s.⁸ Since 2003, however, the retirement figure has increased to nearly half of all officer separations and one fifth of all enlisted separations.⁹ Increasing numbers of retired personnel, along with increased life expectancy, has led to higher spending on retirement pay. In essence, the military pays former service members a retirement

6 See Kestnbaum, Meyer "Citizenship and Compulsory Military Service: The Revolutionary Origins of Conscription in the United States." *Armed Forces & Society* 27(2000): 7-36 and "Mars Revealed: The Entry of Ordinary People into War among States" in *Remaking Modernity: Politics, Processes and History in Sociology*, edited by Julia P. Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005.

7 Janowitz, Morris and Charles C. Moskos, Jr. "Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978." *Armed Forces & Society* 5(Jan. 1979): 171-218.

8 Korb, Lawrence J. and David R. Segal. "Manning & Financing the Twenty-First-Century All-Volunteer Force," *Daedalus*, 104,3 (Summer 2011):75-87.

9 DoD. "Profile of the Military Community," 2009 *Demographics Report*. (http://cs.mhf.dod.mil/content/dav/mhf/QOL-Library/PDF/MHF/QOL%20Resources/Reports/2009_Demographics_Report.pdf).

stipend for more years than it paid them to serve on active duty. In 1972, the military spent \$3.8 billion on retirement pay (or approximately \$18.2 billion in 2006 dollars) and in 2006 \$42.2 billion on retirement pay.¹⁰ The military health care program, TRICARE, also offers an attractive incentive for service members and their families. Health care premiums for service members and retirees have not been increased since 1995, with rates at \$19 a month for an individual or \$38 a month for a family, a rate much lower than the average premiums paid by civilian workers at about \$75 for an individual or over \$300 for a family per month.¹¹ While attractive, these benefits are also expensive to maintain. In FY2010, the Department of Defense budgeted \$47 billion for health care costs and nearly \$50 billion for retirement pay. Together these benefits accounted for approximately 15 percent of the total defense budget.

2.3 Manning the All-Volunteer Force

The initial blueprint laid out by the Gates Commission Report planned for a standing force of between 2 and 3 million personnel, a number much higher than has proven affordable. In addition to the financial considerations of maintaining an AVF, the drawdown after Vietnam and the declining Cold War threat in Europe led the Pentagon to reduce the size of the active duty force. In 1993, total military personnel dropped below 1.5 million personnel for the first time since the start of the Vietnam War and remained steady at about 1.2 million personnel since the mid-1990s.

Manpower considerations were central to the debate surrounding the end of conscription, and many doubted whether an AVF could attract sufficient numbers of well-qualified recruits to maintain an effective fighting force, particularly in times of low unemployment. The DoD took steps to protect the force against potential manpower shortfalls, including integrating reserve and active duty components, civilianizing as many support functions as possible, and maintaining the Selective Service system.

The integration of reserve and active duty forces has meant that reservists (including federal reserves and the state-based National Guard) have played a greater role in military conflicts since the 1990s than during the decades preceding the AVF. Although reserve components had been activated during the two World Wars and the Korean War, political considerations along with the large pool of available manpower in the baby-boom generation led the DoD to largely avoid the deployment of reservists in the Vietnam era.¹² By integrating the reserve and active components as part of one Total Force, the reserve component became a means to supplement and alleviate active component deployments in the case of prolonged conflict. In the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, reserve components

have made up approximately one-third of all deployments.¹³ The Army has held the greatest share of combat deployments in these operations, and the Army reserve components have been utilized to a much greater extent than the reserves in other branches.¹⁴

The privatization of many support roles has also meant that civilians began to play a greater role in military operations. While civilians have always played a role in U.S. military support and combat operations, their numbers and roles have expanded considerably since the advent of the AVF.¹⁵ The reduction of the size of the active duty force as well as the reliance on volunteers who joined the military in order to work in specifically military functions led the DoD to increasingly civilianize support functions. The use of civilian contractors in combat zones has also increased in the past decade as manpower constraints in the context of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have necessitated greater use of private security forces. Between 2003 and 2007, approximately 190,000 private contractors worked in the Iraq theater, roughly equal to the number of military personnel who served in Iraq in the same period of time (see Figure 3).¹⁶ Private contractors in war theaters perform a wide range of roles including support functions such as administration, repair, cleaning, food services, and construction. However, it is the use of private security and military forces that has garnered the most media attention.¹⁷ For some, the use of private forces is seen as beneficial to the U.S. government, because such forces can more effectively integrate advances in information technologies from the civilian economy as well as manage the complexities of post-Cold War conflicts with fewer military personnel.¹⁸ Many, however, have raised concerns over the government's ability to control the use of political violence in an environment where governments become increasingly dependent on privatized and for-profit military forces.¹⁹ Particularly since the 1990s, a global industry of private military firms (PMFs) has arisen, employing "corporate warriors" and offering military and security services that have been traditionally viewed as solely public sector responsibilities under a for-profit business operation.²⁰ The profit that can be made by these firms is quite

13 Ibid., also see Michael Waterhouse and JoAnne O'Bryant "National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet," *Congressional Research Service*, 2008.

14 Bonds, Timothy M., Dave Baiocchi, and Laurie L. MacDonald. 2010. *Army Deployments to OIF and OEF*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

15 For further discussion on the privatization and civilianization of military roles, see the volume *Private Military and Security Companies*, edited by Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007.

16 Congressional Budget Office. "Contractors' Support of US Operations in Iraq." Publication no. 3053, 2008. The Department of State reported to CBO that 40 percent of its private contractors in Iraq performed security functions.

17 The largest private security firm used by the US government, Blackwater, ultimately changed its name to Xe after media investigations and Congressional hearings led to widespread public outcry about the firm's alleged misconduct in Iraq.

18 Eliot Cohen, "Defending America in the Twenty-First Century," *Foreign Affairs* 79,6(Nov/Dec 2000): 40-56.

19 One oft-cited example of these concerns involves the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians by contractors with the firm Blackwater in September of 2007 which prompted a dispute between the Iraqi criminal courts and the U.S. State Department, which ultimately granted the shooters immunity. For further discussion of the concerns about government control of private security forces, see Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: the Consequences of Privatizing Security*. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Also see Lindsay P. Cohn "It Wasn't in My Contract: Security Privatization and Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 37,3(2011):381-398.

20 Peter Warren Singer. *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.

10 Henning, Charles A. "Military Retirement: Major Legislative Issues," Congressional Research Service 2006, (<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IB85159.pdf>).

11 Kaiser Family Foundation, "Employer Health Benefits: 2010 Annual Survey," (<http://ehbs.kff.org/>).


12 Segal, David R. and Mady Wechsler Segal, "U.S. Military's Reliance on the Reserves," *Population Reference Bureau*, 2005.

high. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that State Department spending on private security contractors ranged from \$6 billion to \$10 billion over the period 2003 to 2007.²¹ The use of private contractors to fulfill traditionally military roles is preferred by the DoD as a cost-effective means to manage the manpower constraints that face the AVF. CBO estimated that the daily costs of utilizing light infantry versus contracting private security forces would be roughly equivalent. However, because the contract with the PMF would end when the conflict ended, while military personnel would stay in the force structure during peacetime, contracting private security firms could be a cost-effective means of supplementing much needed security and support functions during wartime.²²

repeated deployment of active duty troops, reduced dwell time between deployments, greater reliance on reserve components, and the use of private contractors for some security roles rather than consider the activation of the Selective Service.

Manpower constraints have been a consistent concern for the AVF, and during its early years and during the protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan the military has had to reduce enlistment standards in order to meet recruitment and retention goals. Recruit quality, as measured by high school completion and scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), dropped substantially in the first five years of the AVF, leading many to argue that the draft should be reinstated. Personnel quality steadily improved, however, with more than two-thirds

Figure 3: Proportion of Contractor and Military Personnel in U.S. Military Conflicts



Concerns over manpower needs in the case of protracted or manpower intensive conflicts also led the DoD to maintain the Selective Service system, which required all men to register for the draft at age eighteen. The maintenance of Selective Service was intended to reduce potential strain on the active duty and reserve volunteers by providing a manpower pool that could be called upon in case of significant conflict. However, the unpopularity of the draft during the Vietnam era and the conditions under which the draft was discontinued has made it politically unfeasible to activate the Selective Service. In the course of U.S. operations in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003, political and military leaders have preferred to confront manpower constraints with policies of stop-loss,

of incoming enlisted personnel in 2009 classified as high quality (Figure 4).²³ Today's force is also better educated than their civilian counterparts. In 1977, 71.5 percent of incoming enlisted personnel had high school diplomas, compared with 79 percent of their civilian peers aged 18 to 24 years. By 2009, 92.5 percent of incoming enlisted had high school diplomas, compared with 83 percent of their civilian counterparts.²⁴

²¹ Congressional Budget Office, p. 13.

²² Ibid.

²³ DoD defines high quality personnel as individuals who have a high school diploma and rank in tiers I through IIIA on the AFQT.

²⁴ DoD "Population Representation in the Military Services," 2009.

3. Diversification of Military Personnel

Perhaps the most visible consequence of the end of conscription in the U.S. military was the diversification of military personnel. Despite the Gates Commission’s prediction that the demographic characteristics of military personnel would not be drastically altered under the AVF, and overall lack of attention to women’s service, today’s military personnel include more racial and ethnic minorities, women, and personnel who are married and have children than the draft-era force. Today’s military is also older on average and serves longer (see Table 1). In addition to becoming more demographically reflective of American society, the implementation of the AVF has led to the proliferation of the military family as integral to the overall health of the force.

Table 1. Basic Characteristics of Enlisted Service Members: 1973 and 2009

	1973	2009
Active Duty Enlisted Force	1,920,600	1,176,100
Mean Age	25.0	27.2
Mean Months of Service	69.8	80.4
% African American	14.0	18.5
% Hispanic	1.2	11.7
% Female	2.2	14.1
% Married	40.1	53.1

Source: DoD, “Population Representation in the Military Services,” FY 2002, 2009

3.2 Racial and Ethnic Diversification

Racial and ethnic minorities have served in every American war, but were typically assigned to racially segregated units. Faced with high numbers of African American recruits during the mobilization for the Korean War and bolstered by research showing that racially integrated units performed better than segregated units, the Army began integrating units in 1950 and officially abolished racially segregated units in 1954. Together with the desegregation of public schools after the Brown vs. the Topeka Board of Education Supreme Court decision in 1954, the end of racial segregation in the military and public education paved the way for the Civil Rights Act a decade later. Because of the discrimination faced by minorities – and African Americans in particular – in the civilian labor market, critics of the AVF in its early years were concerned that the military would become dominated by minorities and thus become further disconnected from civilian society.²⁵ The Gates Commission Report suggested that the racial composition of the military would not be drastically altered from that of the draft-era force. As it turned out, both the critics and the Gates Commission’s predictions were wrong: the composition of military personnel did change with the advent of the AVF, but did not become an overwhelmingly minority force. Although some groups,

25 For a discussion of these issues, see Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr. “Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force”, *Armed Forces & Society* 19 (Nov. 1974); also see Alvin J. Schexinder and John Sibley Butler “Race and the All-Volunteer System: A Response to Janowitz and Moskos” *Armed Forces & Society* 2,3 (May 1976):421-32.

particularly African American women, have consistently been overrepresented, the AVF is far from a minority-dominated force and the AVF is more demographically representative of American society than the draft-era force.

The share of non-white incoming enlisted personnel increased from 23 percent in 1973 to nearly 30 percent in 2009, with the Navy having the highest share of minority personnel (37 percent) and the Marines the lowest minority share (23 percent).²⁶ Increasing Hispanic representation in the military has also reflected the growth of this population in the U.S. more broadly. In 1973, less than 5 percent of incoming enlisted personnel were Hispanic, increasing to 16 percent in 2009. Although Hispanic representation in the military still lags slightly behind representation in the civilian labor force, the representation of Hispanic personnel in the enlisted and officer ranks is expected to continue growing.²⁷ The youthfulness of the Hispanic population in the U.S. has made it a central focus of military recruiters, particularly in the Marine Corps, which places a premium on youth.²⁸

Racial and ethnic diversity among officers has lagged behind that of the enlisted force, but minority representation has improved in recent years. In 1990, minorities comprised 9 percent of all officers, by 2009 minority representation among the officer corps more than doubled to 22 percent. Minority representation in the officer corps is now largely similar to that in the comparable civilian population, where minorities comprise 20 percent of civilian college graduates aged 21-49.

3.3 Women

The lack of attention given to women’s service in the Gates Commission Report and its assertion that the composition of the force would not be drastically altered with the end of the draft carried the implication that women were not expected to play a significant role in the AVF. Women’s participation in the military has historically expanded and contracted with wartime mobilization needs, but never exceeded more than two percent of the overall share of military personnel prior to the 1970s.²⁹ In the 20th century, women were officially restricted from combat-related occupations and typically restricted to nursing and administrative support occupations, with some notable exceptions during the Second World War.³⁰ While women are still a minority in the military, their share of

26 Self-reported minority categories include Black or African American, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaska native, multi-racial, and other or unknown race. See DoD “Demographic Profile of the Military Community: 2009.”

27 Segal, Mady Wechsler, Meredith W. Thanner, and David R. Segal “Hispanic and African American Men and Women in the U.S. Military: Trends in Representation” *Race, Gender and Class* 14,3(2007):48-64; also see Mady Wechsler Segal and David R. Segal “Latinos Claim Larger Share of U.S. Military Personnel,” *Population Reference Bureau* (Oct 2007).

28 See Beth J. Asch et al. “Military Enlistment of Hispanic Youth: Obstacles and Opportunities,” RAND 2009.


29 Mady W. Segal “Women’s Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present, and Future,” *Gender & Society* 9,6(1995): 757-75.

30 Approximately 265,000 women served in WWII, including in such non-traditional occupations as parachute rigging, aircraft mechanics, and weapons instruction. Several hundred women also served as Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs), ferrying military aircraft to overseas theaters of operations. See David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal “America’s Military Population” *Population Bulletin* 59,4(Dec. 2004), as well as Segal (1995).

military personnel has risen from around 2 percent in the early 1970s to approximately 15 percent in 2009 (see Figure 5).

In addition to wartime mobilization needs, women's military participation is affected by social, cultural, and political factors, including both enabling and driving factors.³¹ Along with the redefinition of the relationship between citizen and state, which had historically been defined in terms of men's military obligations as citizens, the transition to a force driven by market dynamics also led more women to seek out the military as a favorable employment opportunity. At the same time, the changing economic conditions of American society were pulling more women into the workforce, while the transforming cultural and social conditions surrounding the women's liberation movement enabled women to view the military as a more viable employment option. As women's participation in the military grew, the numbers of occupations open to them have also expanded. Before the implementation of the AVF, only 39 percent of Army occupations were open to women. After 1980, over 90 percent of occupations were open to women.³² While women are still officially barred from close combat units, the increasing ambiguity of battle lines in current conflicts has meant that many female soldiers face the dangers of combat while being restricted from the front-line tactical assignments that lead to advancement to top leadership positions. In response to these changing conflict dynamics, the broader cultural shifts

Figure 4: Racial Composition of Active-Duty Military and Comparable Civilian Population, 2009



Source: DoD "Population Representation in the Military Services," FY 2009

* All other races include those who identify as American Indian and Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, those who identify as two or more races, another race, or unknown.

31 Enabling factors refer to cultural and political trends that influence women's participation in the military over time, for example, women's declining fertility and increased labor force participation in the U.S. since the mid-twentieth century as well as a shift in mission orientation of the military to greater constabulary and peace-keeping roles. Driving factors refer to more specific legal and policy rulings that affect women's participation in the short term, such as the opening of particular military roles and occupations to women. See Michelle Sandhoff et al. "Gender Issues in the Transformation to an All-Volunteer Force," pp. 111-131 in *The New Citizen Armies: Israel's Armed Forces in Comparative Perspective*, ed. by Stuart Cohen. Routledge, New York, 2010.


32 Segal and Segal. "America's Military Population," 2003.

towards social inclusion, and growing recognition of the need for leadership diversity, the Military Leadership and Diversity Commission recently recommended that the DoD end its combat exclusion policies.³³


3.4 The Military Family

The common phrase "if the military wanted you to have a family, it would have issued you one" reflects the traditional perception of the military largely as a force of young, unmarried men. Particularly in the enlisted ranks, the draft-era force consisted primarily of young men who served for a brief

33 The Military Leadership and Diversity Commission. *From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military*, Final Report: 2011. (<http://mldc.whs.mil/index.php/final-report>).

Figure 5: Women's Share of Enlisted and Officer Personnel, 1973-2009

Source: DoD "Population Representation in the Military Services," FY 2009

Figure 6: Family Status for Enlisted and Officers by Service Branch, 2010 (%)

Source: DMDC Active Duty Family Marital Status Report, 2010

period of time and delayed family formation until service was completed. The "military family" at this time typically referred to the wife and children of senior officers who were expected to play a supporting role in their husband or father's career. The meaning and significance of the military family has changed substantially with the AVF, and military family members now outnumber military personnel and represent a diverse range of family forms.

In contrast to the largely unmarried force of the draft era, today's military personnel are more likely to be married and have children than their civilian counterparts, particularly at younger ages. For example, while 36 percent of junior enlisted men (ranks E1-E4) are married, only 24 percent of their civilian counterparts, particularly at younger ages. For example, while 36 percent of junior enlisted men (ranks E1-E4) are married, only 24 percent of their civilian peers aged 18-24 with comparable earnings are married. By age 30, 75 percent of active duty men and 59 percent of active duty women are married, while only slightly more than 50 percent of men and women in the civilian workforce are married.³⁴ The diversification of family forms and greater participation of women in the workforce in American society broadly has also been reflected in military families, with increasing numbers of single-parent families and dual-service marriages which face particular challenges given the demands of the military lifestyle.

The military and the family can be considered "greedy institutions" in that both place significant demands on participants' commitment, time, and energy and seek to limit participation in other roles.³⁵ Because of the greedy nature of both

institutions, service members and their families potentially experience high levels of work/family conflict and personal strain. The combination of demands of the military lifestyle, including the risk of injury and death, long separations from

34 DMDC Active Duty Family Marital Status Report (2010), March 2010 Current Population Survey.

35 Mady W. Segal, "The Military and the Family as Greedy Institutions," *Armed Forces & Society* 13,1(1986): 9-38.

family during deployment, and frequent geographic relocation are a potential source of strain for both service members and their families. Satisfaction with military life among the families of service members can have a powerful effect on the service members' own satisfaction with the military and affect decisions to stay in or separate from the military. To attract and retain quality personnel, military policy and benefits have adapted to better accommodate the needs of the families of service members, including organizations and programs to assist families in relocation, spousal employment, and education.

4. Conclusions

The end of the draft and the implementation of an all-volunteer force in the United States have resulted in substantial changes to the organization and personnel of the U.S. military. By transforming the military into an employer subject to market dynamics, the meaning and organization of the military underwent substantial transformations. Fiscally, the move to an AVF required a much smaller but more expensive standing force that must compete with the civilian market for quality personnel by offering attractive pay and benefits. While budgetary considerations were a top concern in the initial plans for the AVF and remain a central issue in national defense planning, the consequences of ending the draft also had far-reaching social and cultural implications. Ideologically, the shift to an all-volunteer force signaled the reconfiguration of the relationship between citizen and state from one of political obligation to a combination of fiscal inducements and civic service. Rather than fulfilling a social obligation of citizenship, military service became primarily an occupation held in high esteem for the socially valued service it provides. By moving away from a citizen-obligation model of service and relying solely on volunteers, the military opened as a viable employment opportunity to those whose status as citizens had historically been second-class and who faced widespread discrimination and unequal pay in the civilian labor market, namely, women and racial minorities. The political and technological environment that precipitated the AVF also had important organizational consequences. The need for a smaller force with personnel who required more extensive training and served longer resulted in the growth of the military family as an integral part of military organization. Military family members have outnumbered service members through most of the AVF's history, a trend which is unlikely to change in the near future.

After conscription, the all-volunteer U.S. military became a force that was more professionally oriented and more reflective of American society, including its family and demographic diversity. Some of the changes we have discussed would probably have taken place if the United States had not ended military conscription in 1973. Increasingly complex technology would have shifted the balance between conscripts and volunteers in favor of the latter, and the changing demography of the labor force and patterns regarding the employment of women would have changed the diversity of the force. Nonetheless, there is

no question that the end of conscription did change the nature of the American armed forces in significant ways.

The extent to which the U.S. experience will be reflected in the transition away from military conscription in other countries is certainly debatable. The unique historical and social contexts, in which such a transition occurs, necessarily impact the specific form that a volunteer force will take. For example, the U.S. AVF was formed in the context of the challenges faced by the military in Vietnam and broad cultural transformations in the 1960s. Countries that end conscription in the absence of protracted conflict and social resistance to the draft would likely not face the same set of considerations. The changing technological demands and geopolitical security environment in the Cold War era also influenced the organizational form that AVF would take. Those countries that adapt their military forces to these changing technological and organizational demands without ending the use of conscription will face a different set of organizational considerations as they develop a non-conscription based force in the current geopolitical security environment.

Despite the differences in historical, social, and geopolitical context, the U.S. experience has important lessons for other countries considering a transition away from conscription. An all-volunteer force is almost certainly going to be a more expensive force. To attract and retain quality personnel in competition with the civilian labor market will require higher pay, better housing, medical and retirement benefits. In addition, because an all-volunteer force relies heavily on the long-term retention of quality personnel, the provision of long-term benefits such as health insurance and retirement can lead to fiscal challenges in some economic environments. The long-term retention of personnel means more military families, and the costs of supporting spouses and children through the challenges of the military lifestyle.

Organizationally, a smaller force size would in turn require plans for supplemental forces in the case of extensive or protracted conflict. Given the legacy of Vietnam and the social and political resistance to any reinstitution of the draft, political leaders in the U.S. have avoided the activation of the Selective Service in favor of alternatives such as greater reliance on the reserve component, increasing the operational tempo of the active force, and the use of private contractors for support and some security functions. While all of these options carry their own sets of political and social dilemmas, other societies may be less resistant to the use of periodic short-term conscription and prefer this option to increasing the deployment strain on the volunteer and reserve forces and utilizing private contractors.

Ending conscription is also likely to substantially alter the demographic composition of military personnel. A volunteer military is likely to draw disproportionately from those groups that are disadvantaged in the civilian labor market. In the U.S. experience, African American and Hispanic participation increased, and military service is seen as an opportune path to citizenship for many immigrants. Racial and ethnic tensions between majority and minority groups as well as immigration and citizenship policy may impact specific personnel policy decisions in planning for an all-volunteer force in some

countries. Although some may see increasing minority and immigrant participation in the military as contributing to future social conflict, the U.S. experience has demonstrated that greater racial and ethnic integration can improve unit performance and put the military at the forefront of progressive institutional reform. The recent repeal of the 'Don't Ask Don't Tell' policy, banning homosexuals from openly serving in the military, further exemplifies how an all-volunteer force can be both a signal of and impetus for transforming social attitudes towards previously marginalized groups. These trends of increasing diversification of an AVF means that those countries that have not historically drafted women will

likely see a substantial increase in women's participation in a volunteer force. The extent of women's participation, however, will be affected by enabling factors, such as the cultural values regarding women's work and fertility rates, as well as driving factors, such as policies regarding women's occupational roles within the military.

Ending conscription is certain to bring substantial changes to the cost, organization, and personnel composition of the armed forces. While all of these issues may pose challenges to the effectiveness of the force, they also present the potential for building a strong, professional force that is more demographically representative of the nation it serves.

Tourismus in Konfliktregionen



Die Erwartungen an Unternehmen haben sich gewandelt. Unternehmen wird zunehmend Verantwortung für gesamtgesellschaftliche Herausforderungen wie die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte oder den Schutz von natürlichen Ressourcen zugeschrieben. Damit kommt es nicht mehr allein auf die ökonomische Performanz an – vielmehr zählt auch, wie ein Unternehmen seine Gewinne erwirtschaftet. Dies gilt insbesondere für das Verhalten von Unternehmen in Konfliktregionen.

Frieden ist für prosperierenden Tourismus essentiell. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht dieses Werk, ob und unter welchen Bedingungen transnational sowie lokal operierende Unternehmen der Tourismusbranche zu Frieden in Israel und den palästinensischen Gebieten beitragen. Die systematisch vergleichenden Fallstudien deutscher und palästinensischer Reiseanbieter zeigen, dass der Branchentrend wesentlich vom staatlichen Schatten der Hierarchie bestimmt wird. Für das Engagement der Vorreiterunternehmen ist hingegen deren Reisekonzept maßgeblich. Es wird deutlich, dass sich auch Unternehmen der Tourismusbranche ihrer Verantwortung sukzessive bewusst werden und damit zunehmend relevante Akteure im Rahmen von Global Governance darstellen.

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