The European Union’s Promotion of Minority Protection in Serbia – Effectiveness of the EU in External Democratization in Sandžak

Since the Copenhagen Council in 1993, potential EU candidate countries such as Serbia need to fulfil the political cri­ teria of respect for and protection of minorities. National minorities in Serbia such as the Bosniaks are not yet fully respected which can give rise to political instability. This paper brings into focus the EU’s leverage in the democratization process of Serbia. How effective is the EU in promoting minority protection in Serbia? So far, positive signals are sent out by the formation of a Ministry for Human and Minority Rights and by National Minority Councils. Regarding minority protection, EU effectiveness primarily relies on political conditionality and norm convergence. While the membership perspective presents a strong incentive for Serbia to comply, norm convergence is hampered by the vague definition of the minority criterion.


Introduction
T he Copenhagen criterion of respect for and protection of minorities presents a milestone in the protection of minorities that had been convened between nation states. After the disastrous successor wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the European Union (EU) clearly conceived the security dimension of the Copenhagen criterion. With regard to its immediate neighbourhood, the EU judges the settling of inter and intrastate conflicts as indispensable for countries such as Serbia that are willing to join the EU. and reelected in 2008, Serbia has a proWestern leader that strongly advocates EU integration. During this rapprochement, the EU used its leverage to enforce democratic change. A good example for the EU's influence is the arrest of former war criminal Ratko Mladić in May 2011. His extradition to the ICTY presents one of the main conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to reach candidate status and improves significantly Serbia's membership perspective. With regard to the promotion of minority protection in Serbia, political conditionality and norm convergence play an important role. How effective is the EU's promotion of minority protection in Serbia?
This paper argues that the EU has been primarily effective in the adoption of a legal framework on minority protection. Political conditionality based on the membership perspective successfully caused compliance with EU demands for minority protection. However, implementation went only slowly. The monitoring by the EU progress reports did not take place continuously and lacks clear benchmarks. Here, socialization through norm convergence is hindered due to the loose definition of national minority by the EU. As the EU's leverage mainly focuses on the national level, it has been less successful in the Sandžak region. After presenting the main theoretical concepts underlying this study, the shortcomings in the EU's national minority concept will be discussed followed by the case study on the EU's effectiveness in the promotion of minority protection in Serbia and in particular in Sandžak.
Serbia forms a very multiethnic state that faces difficulties in the accommodation and protection of its national minorities. Here, the focus is on the Bosniaks, Muslim Slavs that live in the Sandžak region and present the second largest national minority in Serbia after Hungarians. The Sandžak region is not only marked by a high degree of unemployment, poverty and an underdeveloped infrastructure, but also by deep divisions in the Muslim community accompanied by violations within their community. Due to a continuing regional dispute and the neglect by the Serbian government and the international community, Sandžak could become the next powder keg in the region.

EU Political Conditionality and Convergence
Since the accessions in 200 and 2007, EU enlargement is strongly correlated to the external democratization of potential applicant and candidate states. The unprecedented entry of 10 postcommunist countries into the EU was accompanied by The European Union's Promotion of Minority Protection in Serbia -Effectiveness of the EU in External Democratization in Sandžak a strong political will in the EU for democratization of these countries and even more important the settlement of potential intra and interstate conflicts. 1 International relations as well as transition theory have dealt with external democratization as research object (see Burnell 2010, Grävingholt et al. 2009, Kubicek 2003, Kelley 200, Merkel 2010, Grimm 2009). By definition, external democratization relates to an external democratic actor that engages in the implementation of democracy in another environment than its own (Beichelt 2010, p. 8). Looking at transition processes, it is often impossible to neatly identify the influence of external actors. Democratic change is induced by a complex interplay of internal and external factors as well as a favourable political opportunity structure (see Tarrow 1998). So far, research on Serbia's external democratization process is still rare and empirical studies are needed in order to analyse the process and the actors involved in democracy promotion (for an exception see Wichmann 2007).
In general, different instruments and processes how democracy is brought about are discussed amongst academics ranging from control, coercion and conditionality to diffusion, demonstration effect, incorporation, contagion, convergence, consent, adaptation, socialization or learning. Here, political conditionality was singled out as prevalent instrument used by the European Commission as main actor in the EU enlargement process (Schimmelfennig 2008, p. 918). According to Kubicek, these different terms can be reduced to four categories as their explanatory power often overlap with each other: contagion, control, convergence and conditionality (Kubicek 2003, p. 7). Thus, adaption or incorporation, for example, are here regarded as subcategories to convergence. With regard to democracy promotion, control can be excluded as approach to the EU enlargement policy, given that the EU does not force a candidate country militarily to conduct reforms. Regarding contagion, Kubicek argues: "It is a "supply-side theory" […]. It neglects the agency and intent of international actors" (Kubicek 2003, p. 5). The concept of contagion assumes that democracy is passively brought about by the very existence of the EU as role model that does not act. When taking the actorness of EU and Serbian leaders into account, convergence and conditionality remain the only explanatory concepts for the EU's democracy promotion in candidate countries.

Norm Convergence
Convergence is here understood as an alignment of potential candidate countries with EU expectations and norms in an asymmetric process. As Kubicek formulates, this can be reached through a rationalist calculation by domestic elites in order to receive the benefits resulting from compliance with EU demands (Kubicek 2003, p. 6). As the promotion of minority protection seems to be first and foremost the promotion of a specific international norm, this paper takes into consideration convergence by norm adaption. In this sense, convergence means the adaption to democratic norms through socialization and incorporation. 2 This means that decision makers act accordingly to what they think is appropriate. Thus, it changes actors' belief (Kelley 200,p. 28). The more protection of minorities is acknowledged as common good and argued with in political life, the more politicians will be judged based on the respect of this norm and adjust their behaviour along these expectations (logic of appropriateness). In theory, norm adaption can take place through different channels such as intensive dialogue between the EU and Serbia in this case, causing spillover effects from the rhetorical level to real action. Moreover, transnational networks bringing together civil society from within the EU and Serbian nongovernmental actors can promote democratic norms. Norm adaption is also successful if the respective norm minority protection resonates in the Serbian society and does not face opposing norms such as strong nationalism (Checkel 2001, p. 563). The receptivity for new norms is higher if society and politics are in transition as there is a window of opportunity for reform and new democratic actors.

Political Conditionality
Political conditionality plays a major role in the promotion of minority protection as earlier studies on the 200 and 2007 enlargement have shown. Here, the prospect of membership has triggered reform regarding the integration of the Russian speaking minorities, for example in Latvia and Estonia (Kelley 200,p. 17). While convergence is based on a social constructivist perspective, conditionality refers to rational choice theory. Thus, political actors comply with EU demands on the basis of a cost/benefit calculation. Hereby, the prospect of membership delivers a strong incentive for compliance with EU conditions that are held against potential domestic costs (Schimmelfennig 2008, p. 920). Candidate countries comply as they expect an increase in economic and social welfare (logic of consequentialism). Political conditionality is twofold: positive (rewards) and negative (sanctions, exclusion) conditionality induce compliance. However, conditionality is successful provided that rewards/carrots and sanctions/sticks are credible and the concerned country has no alternatives. Importantly, Vachudeva points to the costs of exclusion from membership, which can be marginalization, a lack of market access and of foreign investment, and difficulties to participate in the global economy (Vachudeva 2005, p. 65).
Studying the EU's promotion of minority protection in Serbia, the author combines social constructivism and rational choice theory. The EU membership perspective offers the framework for compliance in various policy fields while the intensified dialogue on different levels between Serbia and the EU causes a socialization effect. Following Judith Kelley's reasoning, the membership incentive plays a crucial role for the democratization effort of Serbia while socialization and norm convergence rather guide EUSerbia relations (Kelley 200,p. 26). Taking this into account, two hypotheses are formulated that were tested in the study based on the EU's progress reports and the assessments of international organizations on the ground: i) The EU is effective if minority protection as a norm is a clear, coherent and consistent EU standard and does not contradict with concurring norms (social constructivism).
ii) The EU is effective in the promotion of minority protection, if the external incentives for democratic change such as the membership perspective are credible and exceed the cost of compliance (rational choice approach).
Beginning with the first hypothesis, the following chapter takes a closer look at the EU minority concept and the development of the Copenhagen criterion minority protection.

History of the Minority Criterion
The question of how to accommodate national minorities often emerges after wars and in transition periods. The subject of national minorities has always been an issue to international concern as it often straddles borders.

Looseness of the Term National Minority
Equal to all agreements is the loose term of national minority that is not clearly defined. The explanatory report to the FCNM even explains: "It should also be pointed out that the framework Convention contains no definition of the notion of "national minority". It was decided to adopt a pragmatic approach, […]." (FCNM Explanatory report 1995, p. 13) The answer to what ethnic group is to be treated as a national minority is contextspecific and therefore also a political decision. Differences in the understanding of a national minority and its accommodation amongst the EU member states are overt if one takes into account that a few member states have not signed and ratified the FCNM. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 contained all political and economic Copenhagen criteria except the criterion on minority protection. Authors such as Sasse, Hughes and De Witte speak of a double standard that is applied to candidate countries (Sasse and Hughes 2003, p. 11;Sasse 2008, p. 8687;De Witte 2002, p. 139). De Witte points out the incongruence between the internal and the external use of the norm minority protection (De Witte 2002, p. 155). The Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 brought change as it gave the Charter of Fundamental Rights a legally binding character, except for Poland and the United Kingdom that opted out. The Charter sets out that any discrimination based on membership of a national minority shall be prohibited (Charter of Fundamental Rights Art. 2, § 1). However, an explicit protection of national minorities is not mentioned as demanded in the Copenhagen criteria for new member states, and the norm remains relatively in flux from a legal standpoint.
Looking at the practice of minority protection during the 200 and 2007 enlargement process the EU seems to favour a consociationalist concept of minority accommodation based on regionalization and decentralization. This means that ethnic or other societal groups should be involved in powersharing. While the concept is in favour of a high degree of cultural autonomy for each group based on the principle of subsidiarity, it tries to prevent any claims for territorial autonomy. The idea of consociationalism for national minorities aims first and foremost at the maintenance of security and stability and the prevention of conflicts in ethnically divided societies (Skovgaard 2009, p. 18).
The missing definition of the norm minority protection complicates the application of benchmarks and indicators to measure and enforce democratic reform. So far, regular reports and opinions of the European Commission and, in extreme cases, the abandonment of the accession process dispose means to put pressure on a candidate country. In the following, the case study on Serbia and in particular on the Bosniak minority presents the difficulties of measuring the effectiveness of the EU's promotion of minority protection in practice.

The EU's Leverage on Minority Protection in Serbia
In the last 10 years the EU established tight relations with Serbia and closely accompanied its democratization process. Besides norm convergence through increased facetoface dialogue, the EU primarily used the membership incentive to induce democratic reform, also in the field of minority protection. Despite a certain enlargement fatigue after the last accession round, conditionality remains the concept of success for external democratization. The membership perspective is still credible as the EU regularly confirmed it (see the Feira, Zagreb and Thessaloniki European Councils); the more so as Serbia has no alternative and the costs of exclusion, such as lack of financial transfers and market access, are too high. However, the preaccession process takes longer due to war legacies that need to be solved and the EU avoiding to set a clear timetable for accession. In trying to compensate the missing timetable, the EU delivers shortterm incentives such as visa liberalization, which leads to a "creeping process towards membership" as Renner describes it (Renner 2009, p. 63). In the field of minority protection the EU mainly uses country progress reports as a monitoring tool to enforce democratic reform. In this regard it is crucial to distinguish between the EU's effectiveness against its own benchmarks and against the domestic background.

The EU's Effectiveness against its Own Benchmarks
As the EU progress reports cover a whole range of different topics from economic to juridical issues, minority protection forms only a small part of the overall assessment. Secondly, on a formal level the nondiscrimination of persons belonging to an ethnic or other minority is reached, too. Nonetheless, discrimination of minorities in practice, in particular the Roma, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugees, persist, as Serb nationalism is still very strong and exclusive (Schimmelfennig 2008, p. 930). Regularly, the Commission criticized the slow implementation of minority protection laws and points to the fact that penalties for discriminatory practices in media and in the labour market are rarely imposed. But Sandžak is not explicitly mentioned in this context (EU progress report 2007, p. 1). With regard to the reconstitution of rights of Bosniaks by condemning war criminals, the Commission indicated shortcomings in its first progress reports. Nevertheless, this critique has not been taken up seriously in the following progress reports, although the problem persisted. Crimes committed during state terror in the 1990s include burning, robberies, murders, different kinds of The Republic National Minority Council headed by the Prime minister met only a few times since its establishment. Equally, a law on the regulation and constitution of the National Minority Councils was only adopted in 2009 and first elections were held in June 2010.
Thirdly, the EU favours the regionalization and decentralization as it corresponds much with its own constitution and enables minority representation. Exchange with EU and member state bodies on lower and regional levels through the EU twinning program or the Committee of the Regions increases adaption to European norms such as minority protection. Serbia is marked by a high degree of centralization. In this respect, some reforms have been made such as the Law on Local SelfGovernance which was elaborated with the assistance of OSCE and CoE in 2001 and which introduced direct elections for the municipal assembly.
In 2009  Finally, the EU progress reports regularly mention that reforms advance significantly in the field of minority protection: "Good progress has been made in the protection of minorities" (European Commission 2010, p. 16). Against its own benchmarks, the EU has been rather successful when judging the overall situation of minorities in Serbia. In contradiction to this general assessment, the reports notice in detail an aggravating situation in Sandžak. Accordingly, the EU has been less effective with special regard to the Bosniak minority

The EU's Effectiveness against the Domestic Background in Sandžak
Regarding the protection of the Bosniak minority, there is still need for improvements despite some democratic progress. The Serbian state adopted the legislation on minority protection but lags behind in its implementation. In particular in Sandžak, the state did not enforce minority rights and has rather been absent. In order to measure democratic reform and the impact of the EU in Sandžak, three indicators are deployed:

1) Legal protection and nondiscrimination
2) Political representation 3) Cultural autonomy (language use and free expression of culture and religion, education in and on the minority language) Firstly, minority rights have been distinctively improved over the last ten years. and religion, education in and on the minority language was adopted. Yet, there is a lack of capacity to transform the requirements for minority protection into reality. Some irregularities were noticed during the election of the Bosniak National Council in June 2010 when election material was not translated properly into Bosnian language (YIHR 2010, p. 2 B92 31.10.2010). .
The regional engagement of the EU in Sandžak is very limited. Turkey appears to be a more present actor in conflict resolution in Sandžak. Interestingly, Mufti Zukorlić as one of the main ć as one of the main as one of the main regional actors refers to European standards in the dispute on Serbian districts, for example. The question is whether this is an effect of norm adaption or a distortion of facts in order to exploit the legitimacy of the EU. Here, it will be interesting to see who can successfully use the normative power of the EU for own interests, whether Belgrade or Mufti Zukorlić. ć.

Conclusion
The EU's promotion of minority protection has been primarily effective in the adoption of a legal framework on minority protection and against its own benchmarks. The regional engagement of the EU is very limited and, its leverage on minority protection in Sandžak relies mainly on a trickle-down effect. In the context of the Stabilization and Association Process, the EU has two instruments at its disposal: political conditionality through the membership incentive and convergence through socializationbased methods. Effectiveness relied here mainly on the credibility and benefits of EU membership exceeding the cost of compliance. Socialization functions less effectively as it is hindered by the vague definition of the minority criterion, and it may be a longterm effect that cannot be evaluated right now. In the concrete case study, Serbia complied formally with EU demands and adopted all relevant international conventions on national minorities. Nevertheless, implementation went slowly. Strong Serb nationalism and a very centralized state structure explain this reluctance as it functions as a counter norm to minority protection. Although there is a majority supporting EU membership (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2009, p. 2), Euroscepticism exists (Renner 2009, p. 53). Moreover, the EU's monitoring has been less continuous over time and lacks consistent benchmarks. The lack of coherence and the indecisiveness of the minorityCopenhagen criterion contribute to difficulties in translating the norm into the domestic context. Anyhow, the Copenhagen criterion presents a milestone in the protection of minorities and is a useful tool to the EU to settle interethnic and interstate conflicts before accession. Having this in mind, the EU should enforce more strongly the protection of the Bosniak minority and the improvement of the socioeconomic situation in Sandžak. Continuous and targeted monitoring based on clear benchmarks would increase the effectiveness of the EU's promotion of minority protection. Similarly, the EU could deploy more extensively accession conditionality with regard to actually implementing minority protection. This potential may be further used when accession negotiations are opened. Serbia is strategically an important partner in the Western Balkans and more attention should be paid to its internal developments (Petrisch 2009(Petrisch , p. 1121. The neglect of Sandžak by the Serbian government and the reluctance of the EU to engage in Sandžak's issues, all does not help to solve the regional problems that might cause serious trouble in the future.