

Perspectives on War

Disentangling Distinct Phenomena: Wars and Military Interventions, 1990-2008

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Abstract: Military interventions are a common element of wars between and within states. Yet, there is no agreement about how these two phenomena are related and about how to define and code interventions. Departing from the assumption that incorporating military interventions into the scientific study of war allows us to better assess the qualitative transformations of violence over time, we present and compare empirical developments and discuss different concepts of military interventions. In addition, we present our data on wars worldwide for the period from 1990 to 2008 and discuss in more detail the trends and events for 2008.

Keywords: War, armed conflicts, military intervention, data projects, quantitative conflict research, post-Cold War world
Krieg, bewaffnete Konflikte, militärische Interventionen, Datenprojekte, quantitative Konfliktforschung, Welt nach dem Kalten Krieg

1. Introduction

Reading the news on an arbitrarily chosen day confirms the destructive power of politics and the power of destructive conflicts: War is still a way of enforcing decisions and disseminating the values of armed groups. The current world of wars encloses a wide variety of different forms of organized violence, like international armed conflicts (the almost inter-state war in the Caucasus between Russia and Georgia), intra-state wars between rebel groups and regular armed forces in almost all world regions (foremost in sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South Asia), and armed conflict between non-state groups in areas of limited or even failed statehood (the sub-state war in Somalia).

Quite a number of these wars share a common characteristic: the risk of military intervention by states in order to contain continuing violence within areas of limited or failed states and to counter the spiral of state collapse, terrorism and gross war crimes. After the end of the Cold War, military interventionism has become an even more prominent tool of foreign policy, since territorial sovereignty and non-intervention as binding norms of global politics have declined. Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are striking examples for multilateral military interventions, while for example Somalia, DR Congo and Ivory Coast have experienced unilateral military interventions. The United States is not alone in using military intervention to shape world order, since other western democracies, like the United Kingdom, France or Germany, are involved in major military campaigns around the globe as well. But even though military intervention is a common element of inter- and intrastate conflicts, there remain significant theoretical and empirical deficits in understanding the phenomena at hand.

While many wars become subject to external use of force, wars and military interventions are empirically related, but conceptually not the same. Wars are best understood as extreme forms of military violence between at least two politically organized groups (see Bull 1977: 184; Vasquez 1993: 21-29). Military interventions, in contrast, represent a pattern of unilateral or multilateral conflict behaviour aiming to alter the course of a given armed conflict or war (see Rosenau 1968). Thus, analyzing wars in which external state actors intervene militarily as a totally different war type is inadequate. Ultimately, we assume that incorporating military interventions into the scientific study of war allows us to assess the qualitative transformations of violence over time, thus rendering a theoretically and practically important point of departure for clarifying the relation between external interventions and conflict dynamics. Yet, since this perspective on wars and military interventions is disputed, it is important to investigate the differences relative to other conceptions and to compare the different empirical worlds of wars and interventions that follow from distinct conceptual lenses.


By treating war and military intervention separately, it becomes possible to analyze the conflict behavior of intervening states autonomously. This is especially important since military interventions are the dominant and ubiquitous conflict behavior of states, especially democracies (see Pickering 2002; Chojnacki 2006b). To be sure, outside intervention in continuing conflicts by democracies is not a new phenomenon, as the Korean (1950–53) and Vietnam (1965–75) wars show. But since the end of the East-West conflict, a specific pattern of legitimization and explanation of the use of violence by democratic states has emerged: wars and intervention are fought in the name of human rights and democratization, justified normatively by the proposition that the global spread of democracies fosters international peace (Pickering/Peceny 2006) and as measures to end intra-state wars or to combat terrorist threats (see Zangl/Zürn 2003). From a security perspective, the premise is that authoritarian regimes, 'rough states', and failing statehood must be regarded as perils for a

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Figure 1: Yearly number of ongoing wars by type, 1990-2008



liberal international order (Rhodes 2003). From a normative perspective, interventions also have feedback effects on the intervening states and discourses about legitimacy, as exemplified in the literature about world society (cf. Wheeler 2000; Albert et al. 2000).

The first section of the article shortly introduces the *Consolidated List of Wars* (CoLoW) and examines the empirical trends for the period from 1990 to 2008, accompanied by a more detailed look at the world of wars in 2008. In the second part, we discuss different concepts of and perspectives on military interventions and present and compare our own data on military interventions with data provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) and the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung* (AKUF) at the University of Hamburg. Finally, we critically evaluate different prospects for military interventionism and discuss related problems and research desiderata.

2. The World of Wars

“Classical” conceptions of war are state-centric and do only record extreme forms of violence if at least one state actor is involved. During the last two decades, many observers have expressed their doubts about this basic assumption since many wars supposedly have been fought mainly by non-state actors (see, for example, Kaldor 1999). In order to capture conceptually and evaluate empirically these claims, Chojnacki (2006a) has developed a consolidated typology of war with ensuing data-gathering efforts. In what follows, we first present the basic

conceptual idea of this typology and the yearly number of ongoing wars from 1990 to 2008.¹ Second, we discuss the main trends and events for the world of wars in 2008.

2.1 Conceptualizing and observing war, 1990-2008

The *Consolidated List of Wars* (CoLoW) regards war as the most extreme form of military violence. Wars can be fought between at least two sovereign states (inter-state war), between a state and one or more non-state groups outside its territorial boundaries (extra-state war), between a government and one or more non-state parties within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state (intra-state war), or between mostly non-state actors within or across borders (sub-state war).² The conceptualization of war proceeds from the intensity of violence, the political status of the protagonists and the territorial expansion.

In order to operationally define the intensity of violence, the idea of a quantitative threshold is retained (Collier/Hoeffler

1 For a more thorough discussion of the different concepts and typologies of war, please consult the first part of the *Perspective on Wars* series (Chojnacki/Reisch 2008), which also presents our data for 1946 to 2007. This series will be continued in 2010, focusing on a different aspect of the scientific study of war. The dataset is available at <http://www.fu-berlin.de/peace-research>.
 2 Please notice that we also code as sub-state wars violent conflicts in which state actors (the still internationally recognized state authorities) participate militarily (for some time or over the whole course of the conflict), but since these state actors are so weak and only one among many violent actors in the war, we think it is plausible to assume that these wars do share similar conditions and dynamics. Examples are the wars in Somalia, Liberia, or the DR Congo.

2001; Small/Singer 1982). With regard to inter-state wars, the standard threshold of 1,000 “battle-related deaths” for the whole conflict among military personnel only is kept. However, a differentiation is introduced in order to grasp the specific character of extra-state, intra-state, and sub-state wars: these conflicts resulted in at least 1,000 military *or* civilian deaths over their entire duration *and* at least 100 deaths per conflict-year.³ In order to grasp the transition from one war type to another (Iraq since 2003 is such a case, see below), we scrutinize and record changes in the types of war on an annual basis.

As shown in figure 1, the majority of ongoing wars since 1990 (total N=84) have been intra-state wars (N=62), followed by sub- (N=15), inter- (N=4), and extra-state wars (N=3), respectively. In 1992, the yearly number of ongoing wars reached its highest value after the end of the Cold War, but declined thereafter to levels previously only seen in the 1970s. Unfortunately, the positive trend did not prevail: a rising number of war onsets at the end of the 20th and the beginning of 21st century, and the resurgence of violent conflicts in Angola, Russia (Chechnya), Sri Lanka and Turkey, lead again to a rising number of wars, stabilizing at about a total of 30 wars every year since 2004. A similar development could be observed for the relative importance of intra-state wars: it declined from 87 percent in 1990 to 75 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, the relative number of sub-state wars rose from 10 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 2002. Yet, while there has definitely been a rise of sub-state wars since 1990 (compared to the period from 1946 onwards), it is in no way feasible to talk about the decline of intra-state wars and the upsurge of a private, non-state, and “new” war scenario.⁴ Especially since 2002, so far, there is a peak of relative sub-state war occurrences, which have stabilized since at about 13 percent.

Though no definite trend can be detected, we can clearly observe the upsurge and peak at the beginning of the 1990s, followed by a steep decline and a relative increase in the total number of wars in 1998, which since then persist at a constantly high rate.

2.2 The world of wars in 2008

In 2008 two previously unrecorded intra-state wars in Pakistan and Kenya were reaching our definitional threshold for inclusion. In Pakistan, violence escalated in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. Pakistan’s army opened up new fronts against militias in November 2008 by pushing into the FATA after the Taliban and other Islamist militants surrounded Peshawar earlier that year threatening to extend their control

3 In order to rule out massacres and sporadic violence, the conflict accounted for at least at least 25 deaths on each side per year *and* 100 deaths per year altogether. The beginning year is the first year in which at least 100 people were killed. A war is rated as having ended only if the intensity of conflict has remained below the threshold of 100 deaths for at least two years, if actors give up violence or if an effective peace agreement is concluded. If fighting within a state occurs in distinct regions and between different rebel groups, multiple wars are coded.

4 Besides Kaldor (1999), the so-called “new war” hypotheses was also prominently stated by Münkler (2002). For work criticizing the conceptual and empirical bases see Kalyvas (2001) and Brzoska (2004).

to the centre of the NWFP. Beside this intra-state war, which started with first clashes in 2006, Pakistan was hosting the only sub-state war recorded for Asia.⁵ The wars in Pakistan are intertwined with the war in Afghanistan, where the only military intervention in Asia took place, and Taliban attacks on NATO supply lines as well as US attacks on Taliban targets, both in Pakistan, add a transnational dimension to these wars.

In addition to the wars in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Asia, which is still the world region with the most ongoing wars (N=13), experienced intra-state wars in India, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. While India saw the highest number of wars per country worldwide (N = 4), Sri Lanka saw a heavy escalation of fighting after the government pulled out of the 2002 ceasefire agreement and started an offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). A reversed trend was recorded for Myanmar and Nepal, where the violence dropped below 100 deaths per annum. Still, it remains to be seen on the basis of fatality numbers for 2009 if these intra-state wars actually ended in 2008.

The second new war recorded in 2008 occurred in Kenya, where post-election violence escalated into an intra-state war and reached the definitional threshold before talks were brokered and a power-sharing deal was reached between President Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga at the end of February 2008. The remainder of wars in Africa (nine intra-state wars and three sub-state wars) took place in Algeria, Burundi, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, and Sudan, with Nigeria and Sudan each experiencing two wars on their territories.

In Europe, the war in Chechnya changed in intensity and scope after the president of the Chechen rebels, Doku Umarov, issued a proclamation in October 2007, naming him the Emir of the new “Caucasus Emirate” - an Islamic state spanning several republics (Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria) in the Russian North Caucasus.⁶ While the violence in Chechnya dropped to previously unknown levels under the ruthless rule of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, the neighboring republic of Dagestan suffered under escalating street warfare in 2008 (International Crisis Group 2008: i). Yet, as of now the violent conflict in Dagestan does not cross our threshold for inclusion as a war.

The Middle East witnessed the only ongoing extra-state war, and with violence increasing in 2008 there is no end in sight for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, the Middle East saw a sharp increase of fighting in the war between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK) and a slight decrease of violence in the war in Iraq.

Like in 2007, the Americas are the region with the least number of ongoing wars (except for Australia/Oceania with no ongoing wars at all). Yet, with high levels of violence in Mexico, the intra-state war in Colombia might cease to be the only one on the American continent. With the involvement of the military and more than 5,000 people killed in drug-related violence

5 There was an additional major armed conflict ongoing on Pakistani territory, namely the one in the western province of Balochistan, for which it could not be ascertained that it reached the definitional threshold in 2008. It will therefore be treated as a critical case until more precise numbers will be available.

6 See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8089996.stm>, last access 9.8.2009.

in 2008 alone,⁷ what might be called the Mexican Drug War poses a special challenge to conflict researchers. Not only is it extremely difficult to discriminate between criminal and political violence, but splits in the groups/cartels and high levels of corruption pose daring difficulties on the attribution of casualties to the warring parties. As a consequence, we see the Mexican Drug War as a critical case that begs further attention and more analysis before its inclusion in the CoLoW dataset. Another critical case already mentioned in our data presentation last year, is the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia. Initially, the warring parties put the toll of the five-day fighting at about more than 2,000, but the numbers were revised later pushing the conflict below our definitional threshold.⁸

3. Concepts, Definitions, and Typologies of Military Interventions

Beyond the presented data on macro trends of wars, the CoLoW also tackles the conceptual and operational challenges posed by military interventions. Even though outside intervention in ongoing wars represents a frequent type of international state and non-state behavior which alters the course of violent conflicts, it is disputed whether it is useful to integrate military intervention into a typology of war and the ensuing data-gathering efforts. While some years ago there was still a gap in the empirical literature concerning military interventions, as the study of civil wars grew rapidly so has the literature about interventionism.⁹ But so far, there is no agreement about what actually constitutes a military intervention.

Recently, Pickering and Kisangani (2009) have provided an updated version of a dataset on military interventions, the *International Military Intervention* (IMI) dataset, initiated by Pearson and Baumann (1993). Basically, the authors count as intervening behavior every action “across international boundaries by regular armed forces” (Pickering/Kisangani 2009: 590), like border incursions, movements of troops and territorial conquest in the context of interstate wars or major crises¹⁰, or raids by states on rebel sanctuaries in a neighboring country. Fundamentally, this view is based on the principle of *sovereignty*: in every instance a state actor violates the principle of territorial sovereignty (with military personnel), a military intervention is counted. Hence, typologies of war that do code as inter-state war (or military crisis) behavior are coded as a military intervention. The value added to the study of war by these datasets is not clear since they just choose to re-label all war behavior instead of adapting to the existing research programs.

7 See <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexicodead9-2008dec09,0,1654684.story>, last access 9.8.2009.

8 See <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LL586406.htm>, last access 9.8.2009.

9 Among the most recent work on military interventions are Pickering/Kisangani (2009), Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008), Gent (2008), Gleditsch et al. (2007), and Cunningham (2006). Some authors that addressed the problem of military interventions empirically in a systematic fashion even before were Tillema (1991), Mason et al. (1999) and Regan (2000).

10 The most frequent used dataset for crises between states is the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, see Ghosn et al. (2004).

One argument made by proponents of the inclusion of border incursions and interstate behavior in the category of military intervention is that otherwise the sample of cases is too small to use quantitative techniques and, henceforth, analyses only of limited value (Gleditsch et al. 2007: 18). We strongly disagree with this view since it mixes different phenomena of conflict behavior for the sake of statistically significant tests: These empirical studies are presenting a distorted perspective on the world of wars and military interventions.

Therefore, we argue against the inclusion of acts of interstate war or just territorial movements by troops as this is inadequate to capture conflict dynamics. A better understanding of the processes of war would result from treating military intervention as a particular form of external conflict behavior, which then can be related to the respective types of war. Thus, the phenomenological basis of our understanding is not sovereignty but *conflict*: in every instance a state actor enters an ongoing war as an additional conflict actor (with military personnel), we count a military intervention.

What then is the distinct value of studying, counting, and inquiring about military interventions as separate conflict behavior? Incorporating military intervention into the scientific study of war in this manner enables us to assess the qualitative transformations of conflict over time, e.g. how forms and the intensity of violence change (if they do at all) or how the presence of foreign troops affects local social orders. Hence, for a more disaggregated perspective on the processes, conditions, and mechanisms of war, the disentangling of war and military interventions is a theoretically and practically necessary starting point. Still, our knowledge of the dynamics, duration, and outcome of wars (not to mention more fine-grained knowledge about mechanisms etc.) is very limited when it comes to the effects of foreign military interventions (but see Walter 2002 and Hoffman 2004).

An important conceptual issue is the differentiation of military actions and a permanent foreign military presence in a given country. If one would use the latter as the reference point for counting military interventions worldwide, the U.S. would have been intervening in 39 countries in 2006 alone, including a rather heavy intervention in Germany at 287 sites.¹¹ Thus, the permanent presence of a military basis of a foreign state actor in a country does not qualify as a military intervention as long as there is no war going on *and* no military action or at least “combat-readiness” by the foreign troops, as represented by statements of concern, threat of the use of force, or else can be determined (see Tillema 1989). The same holds true per definition for what some authors may call military occupations (see Edelstein 2004): in both cases we are not coding a military intervention as long as the external military state actor does not act militarily with troops in an ongoing war.

This is closely related to the problem of differentiating between military interventions and extra-state wars. We are talking about extra-state wars (see above), if the external actor (external to the territory) is one of the primary conflict parties. Hence, Israel/Palestine or Israel/Hezbollah are coded as extra-state

11 See Department of Defense (2006) for the data and Pearson (1974) for the conceptual issue.

wars, not as military interventions by Israel. Obviously, in some cases it is not an easy task to decide whether we observe a military intervention by a state or a type of war. Iraq since 2003 is a case in point. While the attack of the U.S. on Iraq does not pose a major problem for typologies of war (inter-state war), in the same year and in the second year of the engagement (2003 and 2004), we also observed an extra-state war: since there has yet not been a sovereign political entity governing Iraq except the U.S. Provisional Authority, the U.S. was one of the primary conflict parties waging war against non-state actors inside Iraq. Yet, from 2004 onwards Iraq is coded as an intra-state war between rival factions and government forces, with the U.S.-led coalition intervening militarily on the side of the Iraqi government.¹²

Considering all of the above, our definition can be stated as follows: Military interventions are defined as an active external violent interference (involving military personnel) in an ongoing war by at least one member of the state system (see Pickering 2002; Deutsch 1964). Typically, they are convention-breaking and authority-targeted affecting the balance of power between warring parties (see Rosenau 1969). In operational terms, military interventions consist of purposeful active fighting by regular forces (involving at least 100 military personnel)¹³ by at least one state outside of its own sovereign territory.¹⁴ To qualify as “purposeful active fighting”, the military personnel deployed (ground, air, or naval) must use direct force or be prepared to use direct force in the sense of “combat-readiness” (see Sullivan 2008; Tillema 1989).

Unintentional, accidental confrontations (inadvertent border crossings or single clashes between military personnel) are omitted as well as actions that are exclusively directed or assisted by intelligence services (such as certain counterinsurgency operations)¹⁵, non-combatant evacuation operations (humanitarian interventions in the classical sense of the term, see Finnemore 2003), disaster relief, monetary aid, military training and supplies, as well as the use of militias and private military companies by state actors. That said, UN-mandated peacekeeping or peace-enforcement efforts, whether enforced unilaterally by single states, coalitions of states or regional organizations (like NATO or ECOWAS), are included in our definition if they fulfill the operational criteria.¹⁶

In addition, we code unilateral military interventions by several state actors separately, even if they occur into the same ongoing

war (over the same time period). From a conflict theoretical perspective it is plausible to assume that different numbers of intervening actors, with their different agendas and aims, different troops size, and distinct repertoires of violence lead to different conflict dynamics. Hence, by counting unilateral and multilateral military interventions separately we lay the macro-empirical foundations for analyzing the specific conditions, dynamics and implications of wars with military interventions in more detail. Finally, the processes of horizontal escalation of a violent conflict can be assessed in this manner.

As already mentioned, there is no consensus whether and how to integrate military intervention into war typologies. While the *Correlates of War* (COW) project statistically records military interventions only by adding the criterion of external participation, UDCP/PRIO develop a new war type, the internationalized internal wars. These wars are similar to internal conflicts with the exception that the government, the rebels, or both receive support from other governments (see Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom et al. 2009). For theoretical reasons, however, and with a view to producing a sound classification, the strict distinction introduced by UDCP/PRIO between internal and internationalized conflicts is problematic. When external military interventions occur, wars which obviously share similar causes, conditions, and processes fall into different categories. But military interventions can take place in a variety of war settings, which is clearly the case when considering the Korean War (an inter-state war) or the conflict in Liberia in the 1990s (a sub-state war). Therefore, and in contrast to UDCP/PRIO, unilateral or multilateral intervention should not be treated as a type of war in its own right, but rather as a particular form of external conflict behavior, which can then be related to the respective types of war.

Similar to COW, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung* (AKUF) at the university of Hamburg codes whether there has been a military intervention by external state actors or not, with the additional information about the identity of the actor, start and end date, whether the intervention was biased and for whom (see Schreiber 2008).¹⁷ Still, there are serious methodological problems with the data project of the AKUF.¹⁸ Yet, other data projects on civil wars do not count or code military interventions at all, as is the case with the widely used dataset compiled by Fearon and Laitin (2003).

4. The World of Military Interventions, 1990-2008

To start with, in 2008 Africa experienced three out of the five ongoing military interventions. Affected by active military

12 For the coding procedure we exclude the theoretically interesting possibility that the presence of foreign military troops after an inter-state war may act as an incentive for violence and the eruption of civil war.

13 While the *Correlates of War* Project is using either a 1,000 military personnel participation or 100 death threshold to code a military intervention (see Small/Singer 1982: 219), and Sullivan (2008) half the number (500), most data-gathering projects do not make their quantitative thresholds explicit.

14 Since our basic observational unit is the ongoing war, we do not need additional operational criteria stating certain time frames for the ongoing intervention to be counted as such (for example, six months of permanent operation by the intervening actors, see Pickering and Kisangani 2009).

15 This is mainly due to the lack of information on such covert actions in cases in which they are not taking place in the context of a military intervention according to our definition.

16 We classify all interventions according to their organization of force control: If states deploy troops under their own command without additional support by troops from other countries, the intervention will be coded as unilateral (e.g. France in Cote d'Ivoire). If several countries deploy troops under a joint military command, the intervention will be coded as multilateral (e.g. NATO-Intervention in Afghanistan).


17 Another German data project by the *Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research* (HIIC) does not systematically record interventions at all, except for anecdotal inclusion in its yearly published conflict-barometer (see HIIC 2008). We have also excluded the *Correlates of War* data on war, which reflect external interventions, but in the currently available version only with a limited time span (-1997).

18 Both the AKUF and the HIIC make use of qualitative definitions of armed conflict, war and intensity (for example, “certain continuity” or “extensive measures”), which lead to very different interpretations of specific events and, henceforth, complicate the replication of the data. See Chojnacki and Reisch (2008) for a more thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of AKUF and HIIC.

involvement of third party interveners were the following: the wars in Chad (intervention by EUFOR/MINURCAT), the Democratic Republic of Congo (intervention by MONUC, which had lost a mission total of 35 people to hostile action by the end of 2008), and Somalia (intervention by Ethiopian forces). In the Middle East, more than 2,000 Turkish troops crossed the border for an eight-day invasion of northern Iraq in March 2008, after nearly four months of Turkish airstrikes against PKK bases on Iraqi territory. Of course, this was not the only presence of foreign troops in the context of the ongoing intra-state war in Iraq. Still, the coalition forces under the leadership of the United States, according to *The Brookings Institution's* Iraq Index, decreased its troop strength from 167,000 in January to 151,000 in December despite a slight increase in civilian fatalities in the first half of 2008.¹⁹ At the same time, according to official data by the NATO,²⁰ the ISAF forces in Asia's only ongoing military intervention in Afghanistan increased their troop level from 42,000 in December 2007 to 51,000 in December 2008.

For the whole period under scrutiny, we observed military interventions in 20 out of 84 ongoing wars, which means that almost a quarter (24%) of all wars was affected by this most extreme form of external conflict behavior. But looking at the data from a different perspective, only 72 (13%) out of 560 recorded war years²¹ experienced interventions, indicating that military intervention is a temporally more restricted phenomenon than war. Unlike intra-state wars, inter- and extra-state wars have been untroubled by military interventions since 1990. Meanwhile, 13 of 62 intra-state wars (21%) and seven of 15 sub-state wars (47%) saw the involvement of external actors with military means. Thus, sub-state wars are more than twice as likely to be candidates for external interventions compared to intra-state wars.

Figure 2: Military interventions by data project, 1990-2008



In general, as can be seen in figure 2 (the CoLoW graph line), there was an overall slight increase in military interventions from the beginning of the 1990s to the mid 2000s, which was mainly an effect of the multilateral interventions in

Liberia and Somalia. The upsurge recorded by all datasets at the end of the 1990s was due to what is oftentimes termed the 'First Great African War' and its aftermath, the wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaïre) and multiple unilateral interventions by its neighboring countries. Despite the decrease of unilateral interventions in the DR Congo from eight in 1998 to two in 2003, the general level of military intervention worldwide remained higher than before because of the multilateral interventions in Afghanistan, Chad and Iraq.

The comparison of the data is ever more interesting, the further one investigates the differences between perspectives of the data projects. Recurring topics in this regard are the variations in operational settings, war types and interpretation of available information. To begin with, the large differences between the datasets in the beginning of the 1990s, especially the peak of military interventions recorded by AKUF²², are due to the projects' lower (or to be precise, unclear) death threshold for a conflict to be coded as war (see figures 2). Thus, the conflicts in Moldova, Russia (Ingushetia) and Laos in the years 1990 to 1992 are described as wars by AKUF, unlike by the CoLoW and UCDP/PRIO²³. Yet, the dissimilar typologies of wars by the latter two data projects also lead to the gap between their observed military interventions in the same period: While the CoLoW records a total 12 military interventions for the period 1990-1992, UCDP/PRIO only counts five. The explanation is straightforward, since we observed one UN military intervention (Somalia) and two ongoing sub-state wars (Liberia and Somalia), while UCDP/PRIO does neither capture robust UN interventions (omitted by its operational definition) nor wars between mainly non-state actors.²⁴ Thus, this operational difference also explains the low number of wars with interventions in 1994 and 1995 in the UCDP/PRIO data (only Tajikistan²⁵), while the CoLoW (and also AKUF) are coding the already mentioned sub-state wars in Liberia and Somalia with its multilateral UN-authorized military interventions (see figure 3).

22 For the data comparison we use the information found at web page of AKUF: <http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/>, last access 09.08.2009. Unfortunately, the information has yet (14.08.2009) not been updated for 2008, hence the last year for which we can record military interventions from the perspective of AKUF is 2007.

23 For the following comparison the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset v.4-2009, 1946-2008 was used, available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm, last access 9.8.2009.

24 To be sure, UCDP/PRIO just started collecting data for conflicts and wars between non-state actors. But until now, there is only data available for the time span 2002-2006. In addition, UCDP/PRIO is not yet transforming non-state conflicts into its internationalized war category if there are external interventions by states.


25 It remains unclear, why UCDP is regarding the available information about military intervention in Tajikistan as sufficient to code it, though they are seriously skeptical themselves: "However, Russia's actual interference with the conflict on the side of the Tajik government has not been verified and the possibility that Russian troops were there for a peacekeeping purpose only cannot be excluded. This leaves Russia's true involvement in the conflict an unsolved question" (UCDP/PRIO 2009). Neither could we verify the information about Russian intervention.

19 See <http://www.brookings.edu/saban/~media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf>, last access 9.8.2009.

20 See <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html>, last access 9.8.2009.

21 A war year is every constellation of a given war and each year of its duration (e.g. the Second Gulf War lasted from 1990 till 1991 thus representing two war years).

Figure 3: Number of wars with interventions by data project, 1990-2008



Another visible difference is also due to these distinct operational patterns: From 1998 to 2000, the CoLoW records seven unilateral interventions in the factional fighting in the DR Congo, while UCDP/PRIO only captures four military interventions (with AKUF being closer to our observation with six unilateral interventions). Obviously, we were able to detect more state actors being military active in the war in the DR Congo during these years. In addition, we did also count the military intervention by the UN in the DR Congo, the MONUC, coming to a total of eight separate military interventions in this sub-state war.

It is also interesting to discuss the differences in the years 2002 and 2003 between the CoLoW and the two other data projects. On the one hand, AKUF and UCDP/PRIO stop coding the factional fighting in the DR Congo as a war in 2001, which we suppose is either due to their (implicit and explicit) battle-related death threshold criteria or because the fighting then mainly took place between rivaling non-state actors, constituting a case of what we term sub-state war. On the other hand, the conflict in Ivory Coast fulfills our criteria for being coded as an intra-state war (in line with the coding by AKUF), hosting two military interventions from 2003 to 2005 (by France and ECOWAS), while for UCDP/PRIO this is only a minor conflict not reaching the 1,000 battle-related death threshold. In addition, in 2002 we also recorded the transformation of the sub-state war in Afghanistan between Taliban, several warlords and clan militias, to the intra-state war between the Taliban insurgents and the government, with the United States and United Kingdom augmented by multinational coalition forces intervening in both wars.

Finally, another difference in the figures draws our attention to the comparably low number of total interventions and total wars with interventions measured by AKUF for 2005, which is the result of three differences relative to the other two datasets: First, both the CoLoW and UCDP/PRIO observe a military intervention by Myanmar into India (Manipur War). Second, the Ivory Coast fulfills CoLoW's coding threshold for another war and intervention year in 2005 (unlike for UCDP/PRIO and AKUF). And third, though Uganda and Azerbaijan remained beneath the AKUF coding criteria for wars in 2005, the conflict remained in the UCDP/PRIO dataset due to the lower threshold (25 battle-related deaths) applied. While Uganda has seen

military involvement by Sudan, Armenia is supposed to have been deploying troops to Azerbaijan, justifying the inclusion in the internationalized war category from the perspective of the UCDP/PRIO.

5. Conclusion

The comparison of three distinct data projects that observe and record military interventions in ongoing wars worldwide displays great varieties in their results. Thus, similar to the statement we put forth in the first article in the *Perspectives on War* series, that there are different worlds of wars, depending on coding procedures, conceptual considerations, and different information sources (see Chojnacki/Reisch 2008), we can now state that there are different worlds of military interventions as well. Obviously, the careful differentiation between types of war and military intervention allows for greater precision in the empirical domain, and it helps to identify commonalities and differences among the phenomena and their correlates, consequently giving a greater leverage in explaining these phenomena adequately.

The empirical trends in the world of wars and military interventions are accompanied by strategic innovations, which might produce new forms of intervention and alter the face of war. First, the risk of offensive ground operations is more and more assigned to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). A striking example is the targeted-killing of Taliban leaders with UAVs by the United States in Pakistan. According to data collected by Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, the number of U.S. Predator drone strikes on Pakistani territory rose from 5 in 2007 to 36 in 2008 with 31 strikes already recorded for 2009 by July 18, while deaths caused by these strikes rose from 317 in 2008 to 365 for 2009 as of July 18.²⁶ But the United States are not the only state deploying this technology in ongoing military interventions: since the beginning of August 2009 the German *Bundeswehr* is using surveillance UAVs in Afghanistan as well.²⁷ The use and development of these drones is part of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which creates new opportunities for both waging war and intervening militarily by improving efficiency, lowering the risk for the troops deployed and reducing costs in both political and moral terms (due to long-distance high-technology air war, precision-guided munitions, and special operation forces; see, for example, Müller/Schörnig 2001).

Second, since the end of the Cold War, an increasing multiplicity of Private Military Companies (PMCs) is directly or consultatively active in zones of military conflict. PMCs are used by states, international organisations or multinational corporations in order to seek to minimise the risks of their own military or civilian casualties and to fill the resource gap

26 See http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/07/us_predator_strikes_3.php, last access 9.8.2009.

27 See <http://www.ftd.de/politik/international/:Kampf-gegen-Taliban-Widerstand-in-Nordafghanistan-w%E4chst/547495.html>, last access 9.8.2009. Even non-state actors can add UAVs to their arsenal, as shown by the Hezbollah, which has been using UAVs occasionally to conduct surveillance in northern Israel since 2004. See <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1154525825097>, last access 9.8.2009.

in military capabilities (cf. Branović 2008). In many of today's wars, the private sector offers a broad spectrum of services ranging from combat support, logistic support of peace missions, military and policing unit training, army equipment and individual and property securing.²⁸ From the perspective of conflict research, the involvement of PMCs not only affects the conflict dynamics in wars, but also heightens the vulnerability of societal groups which cannot provide for their own security by private means (see Branović/Chojnacki 2009). A recent empirical analysis reveals that external military interventions (with the exception of UN interventions) increase the risk of mercenary involvement (Chojnacki et al. 2009a).

Taking into account technological advancement and the partial commercialization of warfare on the one hand, and the relevance and prevalence of armed conflict in strategically important areas of limited statehood on the other, there is little reason to assume that the number of military interventions will *decrease* in the future.

And yet there are countervailing trends as well, indicating that we will not witness an *increasing* number of military interventions. While in general we can observe less war onsets per year, thus reducing the opportunities for state actors to intervene militarily, there are at least three further plausible reasons in this respect: First, the most militarily active (democratic) states are currently involved in interventions that are neither popular in their respective electorates nor very successful in reaching their military and political aims. With the end of the Bush era, the dogmatic perspective on democracy as a panacea to reduce conflict, poverty, and repression worldwide (and to increase the security of the Western states merely as a by-product) has become – or, at least, is becoming increasingly – unpopular. Thus, one could expect an upcoming phase in which there will be less military interventions.

Second, there may be tougher budget restrictions in the future not only because of the current economic crisis and its still not fully comprehensible future implications, but also because of the already high national debts, especially of countries that are very active military interveners like the U.S. or Great Britain. It remains to be seen whether we will observe a budget allocation concentrating on new technologies (e.g. drones) and if this will, then, lead to new and different forms and types of war and military intervention or if this will merely constitute a substitute for other already applied means of violence.²⁹ Third, many of the rising powers in global politics, like China or India (not to mention Russia), are more interested in the sacred character of territorial sovereignty than in international norms, like human rights, or fighting terrorism abroad – which

is very true since many of these countries are occupied fighting wars on their own territories.

The reasoning about when, where and how military interventions are an appropriate instrument of national foreign policy or global order policy, and the moral and ethical dilemmas associated with that, remain clearly outside our considerations. Still, we think that researchers, philosophers, and politicians involved in thinking, arguing and deciding about foreign military interventions in ongoing wars should pay more attention to the overly not so optimistic results of peace and conflict studies. Overall, the literature suggests that military interventions tend to prolong intra- and sub-state wars, thus empirically contradicting the often stated goal of ending wars.³⁰ Even from a solely theoretical perspective, the entry of a third party should always make a conflict more complex and, hence, harder to resolve. Oftentimes, third party interventions even escalate the dynamics of violence, as can be seen, for example, in the case of the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia starting in 2006, which led to a tremendous increase in the intensity of fighting and battle-related deaths (see Chojnacki et al. 2009b).

And yet, we know little about the social and political dynamics of conflicts during and after military interventions occur. Theoretically, it is plausible to assume that foreign military interventions lead to distinct social transformations and political alliances, shaping the war and post-war local order beyond what is usually recognized as short-term to mid-term goals like democracy, stability and reconciliation (see Hoffman 2004; Vlassenroot/Raeymakers 2004).³¹ Still, whether these emerging local orders are better or worse for the affected populations in terms of stability, security and peace is not only a matter of the efficiency of governance and the quality of the provided (public) goods, it also depends heavily on the legitimacy of the established order.³²

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28 A promising research strategy to study systematically the phenomenon of security privatization is introduced by Branović (2008). In order to measure the delegation of security functions from the public to the private sector, he introduces a new data collection (*Private Security Database*, PSD), which focuses on contractual relationships between public and private actors and gathers data on a wide variety of tasks (e.g. logistics support, intelligence, demining) in pre-war, war and post-war situations.

29 For example, in the late 1990s the U.S. launched air strikes at various aims (e.g. Osama bin Laden, Iraqi air defense) with laser-guided munitions. Nowadays, as can be witnessed in Pakistan, drones will probably do the job. Still, the comparative precision and efficiency is an empirical question not yet investigated.

30 See Regan (2002), Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008), and Hoffman (2004). For results that are more optimistic about the effects of military interventions on ending wars see Walter (2002), Doyle/Sambanis (2000), and Lambach (2008). Yet again, different definitions of military interventions lead to very different results concerning their effectiveness.

31 For an analysis of the dimensions of social transformation during civil wars see Wood (2008).

32 For an interesting discussion about the role of and relation between efficiency of public goods deliverance and the legitimacy of the social order (and the forces of order), see Hechter (2009). A different theoretical perspective on the emerging orders is offered by Daxner et al. (2007), who are attempting to capture the specific dynamics of 'Intervention Societies' in the tradition of Pierre Bourdieu.

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Die neue US-Strategie für Afghanistan und Pakistan

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Abstract: The Obama Administration's new AfPak-Strategy implements the strategy change long asked for by security experts and the military. Striving to integrate military with non-military means, to engage neighbouring and regional powers, and emphasizing the development of Afghan security forces, AfPak offers a far better chance at progress in addressing the security challenges in and around 'Pashtunistan' than the non-strategy pursued by the Bush Administration. However, AfPak commits only limited additional military forces, sets very ambitious force-goals regarding the Afghan National Army and struggles to balance and integrate escalating military action with the civilian reconstruction effort. In particular AfPak offers little in terms of fighting corruption or providing alternatives to the poppy-economy. In escalating the anti-Taliban campaign in Pakistan, AfPak takes considerable political risks. Furthermore, AfPak seems to be undecided which strategic objective to give priority: 'The War on Terror' or sustained nation-building. Blending both and making the latter the prerequisite for the former has little appeal as an exit strategy.

Keywords: AfPak-Strategie, Aufstandsbekämpfung, Staatsaufbau, Krieg gegen den Terror
AfPak-Strategy, counterinsurgency, nation-building, war against terror

1. Entstehung der AfPak-Strategie

Nach einer zweimonatigen Überprüfungsphase verkündete Präsident Barack Obama am Freitag, dem 27. März 2009 eine

neue Strategie der USA für Afghanistan und Pakistan. Die sogenannte AfPak-Strategie gibt vor, welche Ziele die westliche Führungsmacht künftig in dieser Konfliktzone mit welchen Mitteln verfolgen wird. Sie hat erhebliche Auswirkungen auf beide betroffenen Staaten, die Region, das NATO-Bündnis und auch auf die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik für Afghanistan. Dieser Aufsatz stellt die Entstehung der AfPak-Strategie, ihre Ziele, Instrumente und Merkmale dar, arbeitet die Veränderungen ge-

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