How Collective Is Our Defence?
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Abstract: After September 11, NATO has almost exclusively focused on out-of-area crisis management missions. It does little in practice to foster a «collective defence culture» on the new enlarged Europe’s own territory. This gap could in principle be filled by the EU, which already has a strategic concept to govern the use of European military and non-military assets for missions abroad. After the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, member states agreed to a «solidarity» clause to come to each others’ aid in cases of attacks and disasters, and there is a «mutual defence clause» in the new draft Constitution. Making a reality of an EU-based collective defence community is, however, complicated by differences between Europeans (as well as with the USA) about the use of military assets. Does Europe, in fact, still need «collective defence» at all in the new threat environment – if not in a practical, then perhaps in a normative sense?

Keywords: collective defence, new threats, NATO, EU, ESDP

When NATO was established in 1949, the British statesman Lord Ismay famously remarked that its mission was «to keep America in, keep Russia out and keep Germany down». The reason why most people would not see his language as gratuitously insulting is that Germany itself (and to a degree, Italy) actually wanted at the time to be ‘kept down’, in the sense of acquiring cast-iron safeguards against a new descent into nationalistic and aggressive military policies. NATO with its ‘all for one, one for all’ political philosophy, and its operational concept based on the multinational defence of (Western) German territory, offered to Germany in general – and the Bundeswehr in particular – a tailor-made pair of ‘golden handcuffs’ that allowed the Bundeswehr’s internal identity also to be re-built on entirely new premises. Its political legitimacy owed much to the fact that the victorious Allied powers who entered into NATO accepted exactly the same constraints and conditions upon themselves.

1. How integrated was NATO?

Even in its classic Cold War form, however, the NATO Alliance did not embody the non-national, integrated approach to defence as fully as might have been expected. First and most obviously, its mutual guarantees extended only to the immediate trans-Atlantic area. Allies could and did choose not to help each other in major conflicts outside Europe, from the Korean and Viet Nam wars through to Britain’s experience in the Falklands. Secondly, because the NATO strategic concept was essentially defensive and territorial, the way nations experienced the Allied military life depended largely on where their territories lay. The USA, UK, Canada and the Benelux countries had forces implanted in Germany, of which a significant proportion – unlike France’s stationed troops – served within genuinely multinational commands. A high proportion of Germany’s own forces were also integrated into the latter. The bulk of US forces, however, stayed in the continental USA or in the USA’s other (notably, Pacific) overseas commands and their only potential European role was as wartime reinforcements, which – as we know – were never actually required. Other, more peripheral and/or smaller European Allies retained defence policies essentially focussed on the protection of their own lands, generally making use of universal conscription and sometimes with an explicit ‘citizens’ defence’ philosophy. (In this light, the national defence ‘culture’ of a country like Norway seems in retrospect to have retained much in common with its non-Allied neighbours Sweden and Finland). Nothing, perhaps, better illustrates the diversity and flexibility of NATO’s ‘multinationalism’ than the fact that it could encompass two nations (Greece and Turkey) who had national force postures substantially directed against one another.

In functional terms, too, NATO made meagre progress – despite more than fifty years’ effort – in standardizing Allied countries’ levels of defence spending, military structures, and operational doctrines, or in persuading them to use ‘inter-operable’ equipment and communications. National defence traditions at political and popular level remained if anything even more diverse, ranging from the robust neo-imperialism of Britain and France to countries like Norway and Iceland who had themselves recently escaped ‘colonial’ status; from unabashed nuclear possessors to anti-nuclear campaigners; and through a wide range of regionally tinged variations in geo-political visions. After the end of the Cold War in 1989-90, NATO not so much missed the chance as did not even really try to control the stampede to cut defence spending, forces and equipment (the so-called ‘peace dividend’). It thus failed

3 In 1980, 276,000 of the USA’s total 2,022,000 forces were based in Europe (IISS Military Balance 1979-80).
4 They did participate in multinational reinforcement units (ACE Mobile Force, etc) and provided training grounds for other Allied forces. However, Norway and Denmark refused to have foreign forces, or nuclear assets, stationed on their territory in peacetime.
5 And Iceland which had no defence forces at all.

1 A role was also played by the Brussels Treaty of 1948 (succeeded by the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954) which allowed other European states to station forces in Germany and also contained limitations on German armaments.
2 Because France was not a member of the NATO integrated military structure. France did however develop a joint brigade with Germany, now under command of the Eurocorps (see note 10 below).
to use a historic opening to re-model its total forces in a more modern and coordinated way, even if it did impose a fairly consistent ‘model’ on the Central European countries seeking to enter it from outside.7

To express this in a more schematic fashion, we could say that some NATO members such as Britain, Germany or the Netherlands had a 3-level construct of defence identity and obligation during the Cold War: national (territorial) defence; collective NATO defence (in the European theatre); and global involvement (which took very different guises, eg for Britain and Germany). Neutral and non-aligned states could by definition only have a 2-level construct: national, and global (the latter normally in the form of peacekeeping). Some Allies like Norway, Portugal, Greece or Turkey were arguably rather close to this latter model in terms of the everyday experience of their soldiers and publics, even if there was genuine political substance to the sense of collective NATO obligations in between.8

2. European defence: from stalemate to relaunch

The one thing that no country could experience during this time was a ‘European’ level of organization and identity intermediate between the nation and NATO. After the attempt to build a European Defence Community using the EC-type ‘Treaty method’ broke down in 1954, Western European Union was established very much as a pis aller institution which never managed to generate its own integrative defence standards, multinational force structures, or even military operations9. NATO itself developed the notion of a European Security and Defence Identity which (from the Berlin Ministerial of 1996 onwards) could theoretically have led to operations by a subset of European Allies, but never did. Progress on European defence industrial coordination under NATO’s Eurogroup and Independent European Programme Group, and their successor in the WEU framework, the Western European Armaments Group, was to prove equally disappointing. All this was not really surprising because – aside from the fierce intra-European divisions over what European defence could or should mean – the Cold War agenda was so dominated by the ‘real’ defence threat from the Soviet bloc to Europe’s own territory. There was no way that any purely European defence community could have dealt with this on its own; and so long as it could not, most Allies were likely to see it as a vision at best distracting peace enforcement). Other tasks of military forces in crisis management (potentially including rescue and humanitarian missions, traditional peacekeeping, and multinational force structures, or even military operations9. NATO itself developed the notion of a European Security and Defence Identity which (from the Berlin Ministerial of 1996 onwards) could theoretically have led to operations by a subset of European Allies, but never did. Progress on European defence industrial coordination under NATO’s Eurogroup and Independent European Programme Group, and their successor in the WEU framework, the Western European Armaments Group, was to prove equally disappointing. All this was not really surprising because – aside from the fierce intra-European divisions over what European defence could or should mean – the Cold War agenda was so dominated by the ‘real’ defence threat from the Soviet bloc to Europe’s own territory. There was no way that any purely European defence community could have dealt with this on its own; and so long as it could not, most Allies were likely to see it as a vision at best distracting from and at worst competing with NATO’s mission of trans-Atlantic linkage10.

The first real breakthrough in European defence had to wait, in fact, not just for the end of the Cold War but for the end of a further decade in which its meaning had been gradually digested. In 1998-9, in the historically revolutionary framework of a French-British joint initiative, the (then) fifteen members of the European Union reached agreement to set up a European Security and Defence Policy based within the EU itself11. As conceived at the time, this was emphatically not a reversion to the EDC model of a completely integrated European force for the complete range of defence purposes. It was presented rather as a new and more politically charged attempt to do what WEU (and theoretically, ESDI) was supposed to have done: ie to let European forces deploy multinationally under their own command for purposes of altruistic crisis management, within the fairly modest range of the ‘Petersberg tasks’12. This modesty was well judged because it managed to reduce US fears of competition with NATO to manageable levels; to soothe those Europeans who were afraid of a ‘European army’13, and to let the four non-NATO EU countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) join in on an equal basis. It also managed to mask the very wide range of real motives both between and within European nations: some seeking a new ‘whip’ to enforce national improvements in defence capabilities, also for NATO’s sake; some specifically hoping that countries like Germany would improve their ‘burden-sharing’; some seeing a chance to inspire further reforms in NATO’s own planning from outside14; while others hoped to set European feet back on the ‘slippery slope’ towards a truly comprehensive and autonomous European defence. The one conviction that all 15 seem to have genuinely shared, especially after the experiences of the Kosovo campaign, was that some modern tasks of military crisis management were better done by Europeans in a specifically ‘European way’ and under their own control.

All these European ambitions, even the most cautious, hinged for success on improving European defence capabilities. It was, thus, entirely logical that ESDP’s goals were first formulated in terms of a desired (overall) number of deployable forces, and of the characteristics and capacities they should possess. What these forces might do, and why, was covered only by a few general and permissive sentences in the Helsinki European Council decisions of December 1999 and (in the ensuing planning process) by a set of purely generic mission profiles. ‘Finalité’ questions regarding the new policy were left aside: not just because they seemed less immediate, and not just because of the long-term European differences over NATO primacy versus ‘autonomy’, but also because no-one wanted to expose national divisions over sub-issues such as the geographical range for deployments, the type of mandate required or the maximum level of force to be used. The results of this prudence, however, were not destined to be equally conservative. Rather, by leaving a multitude of options open, the reticence

8 The ‘flank’ countries, and Spain before it joined the integrated military structure, may actually have relied more on the USA as their strategic protector than on NATO collectively.
9 The WEU only carried out some small-scale police and de-mining missions, and helped to coordinate European naval operations in the Persian Gulf in 1988-90 and in the Adriatic Sea in 1995. See <http://www.weu.int>.
10 One practical exception was the creation in 1992 of the Franco-German Eurocorps, later joined by Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain; it was, however, originally not very ‘integrated’ either in its culture and language or in practical respects like logistics. Some further, smaller ‘Euro-forces’ were created during the 1990s.
12 The ‘Petersberg’ definition dates from a WEU Ministerial text of 1992 and covers rescue and humanitarian missions, traditional peacekeeping, and other tasks of military forces in crisis management (potentially including peace enforcement).
13 The ‘European army’ has featured particularly often as a bugbear in the British domestic-political debate, mainly because of the assumption that it might come under the control of the European Commission.
14 In the event, the new NATO Capabilities Commitment which succeeded the earlier (and not very successful) Defence Capabilities Initiative in 2002 owed much to the example of the EU’s December 1999 Headline Goal.
of the Helsinki formulae allowed the pressures and demands of history to act directly on the ESDP’s development and to drive the speed and direction of its growth.

3. The new demands on Europe

The years 2000-2005 were, in fact, to bring momentous change to the environment for European defence. NATO’s and the EU’s parallel ‘Big Bang’ enlargements brought the whole territory of continental Europe within the ambit of Western-style collective security and opened the prospect of even greater geo-strategic transformations with the following tranche, including the potential EU entry of Turkey. There was a dramatic switch of focus after 11 September 2001 to ‘new threats’ such as terrorism and thus to ‘homeland security’ as a preoccupation, both for EU-Relations and for Europe’s own policy-making. NATO rapidly changed its strategy to focus almost exclusively on out-of-area operations linked with these new threats, moving both physical and planning resources away from Europe’s own territory and further reducing and changing the significance of its traditional ‘multinational’ structures15. At the same time, the experience of the US-led military operations in Afghanistan and then in Iraq served to convince most observers of the limitations of military force – above all, perhaps, for any realistic effort to master the policies where necessary.

and challenges, or to offer its own practical alternative to US document for the EU. The resulting text


19 First the NATO preambulion deployment in FYROM, which the EU short-ly after converted to a police mission, and then (at end-2004) the former NATO SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The third, remaining NATO mission is KFOR in Kosovo.

Council in December 2003 after a process of academic review and inter-governmental negotiation18. It at last provided a political philosophy, if only of a generalized kind, to govern the use of European military and non-military capabilities in the ESDP framework. It also underlined the need to use all the EU’s different resources (including its economic and commercial strengths, political influence and inspiration) for the pursuit of European strategic interests and goals world-wide. Meanwhile, the EU had carried out several actual ESDP operations of different kinds (military, police, and a judicial assistance mission in Georgia); had taken over 2 out of 3 of the peace operations initially commanded by NATO in the Balkans19; had set up a permanent civil-military planning cell for ESDP and a European Defence Agency to work on equipment questions; had set its members even tougher ESDP capability targets going up to 2010, and as one practical way of holding countries to the latter, launched the battle-groups initiative requiring 13 fully integrated units of 1,500 personnel apiece to be ready for worldwide deployment within as little as 5-10 days.

4. Back to the future: the EU and ‘real’ collective defence

As a result of these external and internal paradigm shifts, the ESDP initiative has arguably – much sooner than anyone expected – brought the Europeans back face-to-face with some of the same questions about a ‘real’ European defence that were on the table in the 1950’s. Just three of the issues – relevant to the present theme – that are now being opened up for debate (or are bound to emerge soon) will be highlighted here.

First, as regards collective territorial defence: the EU’s new draft Constitution now contains a statement of the member states’ ‘solidarity’ commitment to defend each others’ territory against external attack, but the effect of this is almost neutralized by clauses added to protect the national specificities of the non-allied members’ policies, and the primacy of NATO for Allied states. In practice, there has been no shift of focus in the daily work of ESDP towards drawing up plans for Europe’s own defence: and were this to happen, some very tricky issues indeed such as the relevance of nuclear deterrence and the role of French and British nuclear forces would surface at once. Where the real ‘slippery slope’ towards a true joint responsibility for European territory has been created is, rather, in the field of anti-terrorism and other aspects of human, internal or ‘homeland’ security. It is clear that the EU is already the competent organ for preventive and corrective security measures in fields like epidemic control, pollution dangers and industrial or nuclear accidents, export controls for non-proliferation, energy policy, aviation and transport security, crime-fighting, border security and immigration control. Since September 2001 it has rapidly increased its corpus of joint laws, structures and

15 The key decisions on converting the NATO command structure from a geographical to a functional logic, on capabilities commitments, and a NATO Response Force were taken at the Prague Summit of Dec. 2002.
16 For more on these trends see the Introduction by AJK Bailes to SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armament, Disarmament and International Security (OUP summer 2004).
policies for tackling the terrorist menace: and in March 2004, following the bombing incidents in Madrid, member states agreed to adopt at once another ‘solidarity’ clause that had originally been drafted for inclusion in the new Constitution20. This obliges all members to come to each others’ aid (when so requested) in the event of terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters, and to do so with all the necessary means at their disposal – not excluding military ones. If this clause is to mean anything in terms of concrete EU planning and behaviour, it must surely draw EU states down a path of joint threat assessment, network building and response planning where the further step to assume joint responsibilities in the (extremely unlikely) event of a military attack on the same territories could appear a very small one indeed.

Secondly, a further ‘collectivization’ of defence could be driven (or perhaps is already being driven) by an essentially military-technical logic of resource application. No European state can expect to raise its defence spending again and most states seem set on cutting it further. Total force manpower is also continuing to decline, not least as a consequence of structural changes – notably in the direction of less conscription and more ‘professionalization’ – that are themselves vital for liberating more ‘deployable’ resources. In this situation, the only way that added value in capability terms can be sought is by deepening the degree of European forces’ integration: facing up to the challenging issues of doctrinal, structural and equipment ‘harmonization’, of specialization, and of mutual dependence in a way that few if any of NATO’s European members were really made to face up to them before. The battle-groups and (at least, potentially) the European Defence Agency’s role in the equipment area may be seen as the harbingers of this tendency. It is one that from the beginning must raise particularly sensitive issues for those states (non-Allied and ‘flank’) that have not possessed an operative and permanent ‘multinational’ level in their defence identities before. For the EU as a whole, it could at a slightly later stage revive issues about who will actually have the ownership and leadership of the resulting collectivized, harmonized force capabilities – so that the challenge of the ‘European army’ may turn out, in fact, not to have been buried for good.

Thirdly comes the question of strategic ‘finalité’ in a more political sense, i.e. determining where the 25 EU members’ collective strategic interests actually lie, what the most important threats and constructive openings are for pursuing them, and what are the best instruments to use for the purpose. The ESS does provide broad answers to these questions but lacks specific directions for action (and allocation of resources), and makes proactive policy-making almost harder by the very range and complexity of the goals it defines. If the EU is to bear the greater de facto strategic responsibilities now being loaded upon it; is to develop more policy options of its own, rather than always being led by or reacting to the USA; and is to preserve its unity in face of the next set of divisive challenges that will doubtless come after Iraq, it will need a political equivalent to the process of military-technical standardization and integration mentioned above. The task is large at the inter-governmental level because of the genuine differences of outlook and priority between large and small, Northern and Southern, continental and maritime, ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europeans, which are further complicated when (as often) the EU must find a base for joint endeavours with non-member states. One need only mention the questions of how to define Russia’s strategic significance for Europe; whether ESDP missions should be confined to Europe’s near area or could be particularly useful in more backward regions; and what level of force soldiers may use under a European flag, to see just how sensitive the issues are. Beyond this, however, lie another set of tough questions about the use and control of the EU’s collective resources. In active interventions, what should be the balance and hierarchy between the EU’s military and non-military instruments and how can these various tools be best coordinated when working in a single country or region (as, currently, in Bosnia-Herzegovina)? In broader strategic terms, could one envisage the EU’s economic, monetary and trading strengths, as well as its influence as an aid donor, being harnessed to the service of a specific defensive or proactive security goal? The answers are particularly sensitive since the control of related policies and resources is currently divided within the EU’s own governance structure, with the lion’s share of all non-military resources (and finance) coming under the day-to-day control of the European Commission.

5. NATO and the EU: passing the torch?

Meanwhile, as already hinted above, the NATO of the early 21st century is effectively ceasing to plan and practise for a collective defence of Europe’s own territory. The number of foreign forces stationed on German territory has dropped much faster than the overall decline in the stationing countries’ manpower21; and while there may be talk of the USA’s establishing new military bases in Eastern or South-Eastern Europe, these should now be seen more as jumping-off points for a worldwide intervention strategy than as ‘human shields’ for protecting the Central Europeans’ own borders. The ten new members who have joined NATO since 1999 do not, in fact, have any NATO stationed forces on their territory22 and will not have any nuclear weapons stationed there in peacetime, so the day-to-day reality of defence as experienced and perceived by their own inhabitants remains overwhelmingly national in style. NATO’s large-scale troop exercises on European territory still provide an important exception, but the number of individuals involved has fallen from a total of some 174,000 in 1980 (3 exercises) to 24,950 in 2002 (2 exerc-

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21 Numbers per stationing country have dropped as follows between 1980 and 2003: Belgium, 25,000 to 2,000, Canada, 3,000 to zero, France, 36,000 to 3,000, Netherlands, 1 armed brigade and 1 recce battalion (manpower not given) to 2,600, UK, 64,000 to 17,100, and USA, 276,000 (Europe) to 98,000 (Europe). Within this last figure, the relative importance of US forces in Germany has also declined as a consequence of greater air emphasis on air and naval bases in Italy. Forces deployed in Germany by France have fallen from 7% to 1% of total French manpower in the same period; for the UK from 20% to 8%, and for the Netherlands from approx. 10% to 5% (although most Dutch ground forces remain committed to the German/Dutch Army Corps). Source: IESS Military Balance for 1979-80 and 2002-3.
22 There is a Danish/German/Polish corps designated as NATO’s Multinational Corps North-East, but it involves the presence of only 65 German personnel at its HQ in Szczecin, Poland.
cises in Norway and Poland).23 As for operations, NATO in the 1990's committed itself deeply to tasks of crisis management and post-conflict stabilization in the Western Balkans, but (as also noted above) it has now handed over its peace operations both in FYROM and in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the EU. Apart from the remaining Kosovo operation, the functions directly performed by NATO as a collectivity in the European security space are now dominated by more political processes such as the NATO-Russia dialogue, the pre-accession process launched with certain Balkan states, the next stages of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership directed at Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union, and (on a modest scale) some contributions to the analysis and combating of ‘new threats’.24

While there is much debate on the Alliance’s performance and credibility in its new global role, relatively little has been written and discussed about the implications of the subtraction of NATO’s military effort from the European theatre.25 There are interesting issues here at several levels. In general security terms, one might ask whether too much of the cold-war-type underpinning for Europe’s safety and independence has been removed too fast; whether the West’s effectively increased reliance on nuclear deterrence is an appropriate and proportionate answer for whatever residual threat still exists; and whether the USA’s strategic commitment – now overwhelmingly a political matter, rather than embodied in ‘human shields’ – is actually to be relied on in the light of recent policy and attitudinal changes.26 It could, of course, be argued that these questions are no longer acute given the great reduction in traditional threats to Europe compared with new global and trans-national risks, and that trying to cling to NATO’s traditional posture or refusing to re-direct the resources it used to absorb would now be against Europe’s own best-conceived security interests. Even if this is conceded, however, it does not answer the problem of what is to become of the inward-looking, political and civilizational purpose of NATO’s collective defence culture. Unless we assume that the need (in the nicest way) to ‘keep Germany down’ – and the equivalent for Central Europe’s states, so recently rescued from Communism – has disappeared for good, it may not be logical or safe to turn Europe into a territory where each state scrambles separately to summon up the will and resources to make a good showing in ad hoc operations anywhere else in the world. Such deployments cannot fully assume the role of NATO’s previous multinational units since they do not allow NATO nations’ militaries to work on each others’ territories, within permanent force combinations, for permanent and formally agreed collective policies and aims.27 The new ‘coalitions’ are as varied and potentially evanescent as the new ‘missions’ that call them into being. Moreover, some would argue that the increasing ‘professionalization’ of national forces called for by the new expeditionary focus is weakening their socially representative character and the reciprocal links between armies and ordinary citizens that used to be – inter alia – as a guarantee of the forces’ democratic culture. If, as some fear, the standards of forces’ conduct might suffer as a result (à la Abu Ghraib), the fact that they are transgressing without even the ‘excuse’ of national self-defence risks doubly darkening the reputation of whatever institution commands them.

If we conclude that a deficit now exists in the promotion and perpetuation of a ‘collective defence culture’ for the new enlarged Europe, could the EU fill the gap? There seems no purely conceptual reason why not. A strong motive for the creation of the European Communities was to make future war impossible between France and Germany. Since then, the EU’s development in many non-military fields has had the effect of ‘Europeanizing’ or ‘socializing’ successive policy-making elites, to a point where the latter may be dangerously estranged from their less ‘Europeanized’ ordinary citizens. In the enlargement context, also, the ‘invasive’ and harmonizing effect of joining the EU (with its tens of thousands of pages of common legislation) on the territory of the new Central European member states has been infinitely greater than that of NATO. In the security domain, aside from the anti-terrorism solidarity commitment and the integrative dimension of ESDP’s military plans as already alluded to, a ‘collectivizing’ tendency may be seen in the recent formation of a joint EU Gendarmerie Force (i.e. armed police suitable for overseas deployment), and the still ongoing debate on a common border protection force for the Union. In short, and in parallel with the argument already made about ‘solidarity’ commitments, the EU’s work in creating (consciously or unconsciously) collectively organized and collective-minded security communities in different dimensions has already gone so far that adopting policies explicitly directed to fostering a permanent multinational military community might seem a relatively small step.

Of course, nothing in Europe is ever quite that simple. Even if ESDP has moved a long way already down the slippery slope towards a ‘real’ defence community, the final step cannot be taken by stealth. The EU could not provide a new ‘culture’ for its nations’ forces unless it had explicitly taken on competence and drawn up plans regarding the whole range of them, not just those earmarked for potential crisis management tasks. This would be a moment for truth not just for the non-Allied members but for many NATO states, since it would amount to an admission either that the EU had moved into a space already vacated by NATO – ‘eating part of the Alliance alive’ – or that European interests now demanded a kind of joint NATO/EU occupation of this area of competence, despite the obvious risks of duplication and confusion (not to mention the likely political outrage from Washington). Other objections could be made from an alternative normative standpoint. Is this the right time in history to (re-)create a collective security culture centred upon the military function and limited to a given group of states – states, moreover, who are very far from being the world’s most unfortunate or most vulnerable? The early 1990’s hopes of pan-European ‘cooperative security’

23 A larger exercise due in 2003 had to be cancelled, revealingly, because of the Iraq war.
24 The discussions in NATO on a cooperative missile defence for Europe might be an exception, but they are being pursued with a lack of ‘profile’ that hints at the still very diverse degrees of enthusiasm among Allies.
25 It has, however, become a more open concern for the countries of Northern Europe and among some of the new Allies.
26 The credibility of NATO’s Article 5 (mutual defence) commitment was not helped by the USA’s virtually ignoring the invocation of Article 5 by other Allies to show their solidarity after 9/11.
27 The current Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has put his finger on the same difficulty when complaining that he cannot draw on a permanent, integrated pool of forces for such missions nor on a collective source of funding (in NATO’s non-Article-5 missions, costs ‘lie where they fall’).
superseding divisive alliances have barely outlived that decade; but the recently renascent concept of ‘human security’ teaches that privileged regions like Europe should focus on helping poorer communities that lack security in every dimension – i.e. by cutting back on their static military investments to re-direct resources towards civilian reaction capacities and crisis prevention. Similar conclusions may be reached from a different angle by those who do not want the EU to become ‘militarized’ or the life of European populations to be any more ‘securitized’ than at present. On this view, even if there is some ‘dirty business’ of collective defence still to be done, the EU should leave others to do it and should certainly not draw military forces and assets any further into its own internal security tasks. At stake are not only the EU’s predominately civilian traditions and peaceful norms, but also its image and legitimacy as seen by the rest of the world.

It is not the aim of this article to judge such positions but rather, to suggest that they deserve further debate and testing against the main line of argument developed above. It can hardly be denied that security realities will continue to invade European

29 This is a widely held view, for example, in Sweden, Denmark and Ireland.

1. Die usbekische Version von Good Governance: Autokratie


Ein Großteil der Bevölkerung lebt unterhalb der 1-Dollar-Armutsgrenze. Viele Indikatoren im aktuellen Human-Development-Report der UNO verweisen Usbekistan auf die unteren Plätze: Ob Kindersterblichkeit, Analphabetismus oder

Authoritative Demokratisierung in Usbekistan

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Abstract: The first globalisation decade began in 1992, when the country joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Full of optimism, Uzbekistan started into independence trying to reform under the flag of democracy and rule of law. It has reformed, however, without giving up experienced mechanisms of authoritarian rule and corruption from past decades. With this system-immanent contradiction, the country is an obstacle to its own political development. Under the banner of the anti-terror struggle, Uzbek leaders already in 1998 started a disastrous campaign against Islamic believers, who were striving for independence from the state-controlled religion practice. Not only Islamic extremists fell victim to the campaign but mostly ordinary Muslims. Consequently, the country seems to manoeuvre into political imbalance, more and more leaving democratic standards.

Keywords: Autoritarismus, Demokratisierung, Islamismus, Usbekistan

1. Die usbekische Version von Good Governance: Autokratie