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Jürgen Altmann, New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace in:

S&F Sicherheit und Frieden, page 36 - 42

S+F, Volume 38 (2020), Issue 1, ISSN: 0175-274X, ISSN online: 0175-274x, https://doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2020-1-36

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T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T  | Altmann, New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace 36 | S+F (38� Jg�) 1/2020 DOI: 10�5771/0175-274X-2020-1-36 1. Introduction Throughout history new technology has enabled new kinds of weapons (Brodie and Brodie 1973). A technology edge of one side provided an advantage in war, but did not always guarantee victory. With the rise of science new technologies were developed ever more systematically. Systematic, large scale, organised use of science for warfare started in the Second World War and was scaled up drastically in the Cold War, mainly in the USA and the USSR (Thee 1988). Important milestones of new military technologies with marked effects on the international situation were: in the 1950s the hydrogen bomb, in the 1960s ballistic long range missiles, in the 1970s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, in the 1980s precision guidance, in the 1990s net centric warfare and in the 2000s uninhabited vehicles. In many cases, such innovations increased threats and reduced warning and reaction times, deteriorating international security and endangering peace (Müller and Neuneck 1991/92). The dangers associated with nuclear weapons motivated peace movements, and concerned scientists warned against the nuclear threat (Evangelista 1999). Over time – and with the experience of crises, in particular the Cuban missile crisis 1962 – in both governments the insight grew that an unconstrained quantitative and qualitative arms race was too dangerous, and arms control treaties became possible. Their negotiation and conclusion depended on the respective political situation. The end of the Cold War brought a wave of important arms limitation treaties (Goldblat 2002). Despite impressive successes, arms control did not block further military technological innovation; a qualitative arms race continued, with an increasing number of participating countries. Presently this arms race is accelerating, aggravated by the addition of strategic actors. This article intends to warn against the consequences of the new technological arms race, primarily among the major powers, but possibly also involving other countries. It takes a rather fundamental approach, emphasising arms control over export control.1 After a look at the scale of military research and development, a brief explanation of preventive arms control is given. Then, * This article has been double blind peer reviewed. 1 For export control of new technologies see e.g. Brockmann and Kelley (2018), Bromley and Maletta (2018). short overviews of the new military technologies are presented that are or will become relevant for international security, with exemplary references, from space weapons via artificial intelligence to enhanced soldiers. Finally, common traits are highlighted that will likely bring negative effects for international security and peace, and thus require preventive arms control. 2. Scale of Military Research and Development, and Predominance of the USA The USA is the global leader in military research and development (R&D). While the USA with around $700 billion per year covers around 40 per cent of the global total military expenditure, its share in military R&D is nearly two thirds, around $70 billion per year. The other official nuclear weapon states Russia, UK and France each spend less than one tenth of that (Altmann 2017). The unrivalled US expenditure derives to a significant part from the motive to maintain military technological superiority. While a long time, general policy,2 it has been re emphasised recently with the argument that China and Russia are catching up in high technologies (e.g. Work 2015). As a consequence, the USA is the forerunner in new military technologies; to know the trends, it is generally sufficient to look at the USA. This is alleviated by the unequalled openness of the USA about its military R&D.3 3. Military-Technology Assessment and Preventive Arms Control4 Will new military technology be good or bad for world peace? This question and others are investigated systematically in military technology assessment. It does a prospective analysis 2 E.g. “The DoD R&E [Department of Defense Research & Engineering] program needs to create, demonstrate, apply, and partner in the transition to operational use of technologies to enable affordable and decisive military superiority to defeat any adversary on any battlefield.” (US DoD 2007). 3 See e.g. the hundreds of pages of budget request justifications for research, development, testing and evaluation for the armed services and defence wide R&D institutions (e.g. US DoD 2019a). 4 Smit et al. 1992, Neuneck and Mutz 2000, Altmann 2006: ch. 5, 2008. New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace* Jürgen Altmann Abstract: New military technologies are being developed at a high pace, with the USA in the lead. Intended application areas are space weapons and ballistic missile defence, hypersonic missiles, autonomous weapon systems, and cyber war. Generic technologies include artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology and gene editing, and soldier enhancement. Problems for international security and peace – arms races and destabilisation – will likely result from properties shared by several technologies: wider availability, easier access, smaller systems; shorter times for attack, warning and decisions; and conventional nuclear entanglement. Preventive arms control is urgently needed. Keywords: Research, Development, Technology, Preventive Arms Control Stichwörter: Forschung, Entwicklung, Technologie, präventive Rüstungskontrolle * This article has been double blind peer reviewed. SuF_01_20_Inhalt_3.Umbruch.indd 36 24.06.20 14:14 S+F (38� Jg�) 1/2020 | 37 Altmann, New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace | T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T 4. Areas of Present Military Research and Development Following the motive to increase military effectiveness by new technology, the important actors, above all the USA, are doing R&D in various fields. Several of the activities (4.1 to 4.3) date back to precursors of the Cold War. Others have come up in the last two decades. In most cases the work is directed toward concrete military systems (4.1 to 4.4), here preventive arms control would be applicable directly. But there are also generic technologies that may enable many different military applications (4.5 to 4.8), here preventive limitations would present much higher difficulties, not the least because of dual use that may require inclusion of civilian applications.6 There are also synergies between the technologies. E.g. additive manufacturing can contribute to space weapons, missiles, autonomous weapon systems, and biological weapons. Artificial intelligence can support advances in most other areas. 4.1 Space Weapons7 and Ballistic Missile Defence8 Space weapons were curtailed to some extent by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 that prohibited weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Non nuclear anti satellite (ASAT) weapons were developed and tested, in the 1960s and 1970s in the form of rendezvous/follower satellites by the USSR. In the USA, with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s, interest focused first on beam weapons. However, they were shown later to have little chance of providing protection from a nuclear attack. Direct ascent ASAT systems were developed and tested by the USA in the 1980s. In recent years, China as well as India additionally have demonstrated an ASAT capability. Very recently, the USA has decided to build up a space force with the intent to expand “American superiority in space” since “[s]pace is the world’s newest warfighting domain” (US DoD 2019b). Which types of weapons and forces will be developed, remains to be seen. Since satellites fulfil central roles in warfare, ASAT weapons appear militarily attractive. Depending on deployment mode and target altitude, the travel time can be minutes to hours. In the 1990s, the USA brought ballistic missile defence (BMD) to the fore, with an extensive development and testing program. After abrogation of the ABM Treaty (2001/2002), it deployed BMD systems in several regions at sea and on land in Alaska and Romania. While the Russian ABM system has used nuclear armed interceptors, the US BMD interceptors rely on actually hitting the incoming reentry vehicles in midcourse while they fall along the gravity caused ellipse, using an infrared seeker and trajectory correction over some final 20 seconds before collision. For slower ballistic missiles of shorter ranges, terminal phase interceptors exist. Even though midcourse discrimination of the real warhead from a multitude of light weight decoys is not guaranteed, Russia and China are working on hypersonic glide vehicles in order to circumvent US BMD sites. 6 For a concrete example how this might be done see the recommendations for nanotechnology in Altmann (2006: ch. 7). 7 Pelton 2019, Bulletin 2019. 8 Korda and Kristensen 2019. of a potential new military technology or application. What could be military uses? How could operations look like? With answers to such questions, one then checks whether or not the potential new technology or application would fall under the criteria of preventive arms control. These can be classed into three groups: 1. Could the new technology create problems for arms control, for disarmament, or for international (humanitarian) law? 2. Could the new weapons or applications cause an arms race? Could they destabilise the situation between potential adversaries? 3. Could they cause problems for humans, the environment or society already in peace time? If an important concern shows up in one of the issue areas, considerations about preventive limits are in order. Preventive arms control limits or prohibits certain military systems or certain uses of technology before they are deployed. Legally, it can work at different phases: it can set rules for use, for deployment or for the prior stages of testing or of development (research mostly is not included because the results are unknown or could be used for many purposes). Many arms control treaties contain preventive elements. Prohibitions on use are contained in the Geneva Protocol on gas warfare (Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare), the Environmental Modification Convention and the Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol. Deployment is banned in the Outer Space Treaty and was limited in the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Development is included in the prohibitions of the Biological and the Chemical Weapons Conventions and, for the non nuclear weapon states, in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. The Partial and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaties explicitly focus on testing, but thereby they prevent research with actual nuclear explosions and hinder the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Despite such successes, most military technological advances went unimpeded. In many cases science has provided concepts for preventive limits and for verification, e.g. for space weapons or weapons usable fissile materials,5 but the relevant states considered their own military strength as more important, or there were other reasons that prevented cooperation, e.g. in the Conference on Disarmament (Caughley 2011). Convincing states that mutual limitation is in their own interest in an enlightened concept of national security – i.e. embedded in international security – continues to be a difficult but important task of scientists and other citizens who care for peace. Generally, preventive arms control focuses on (potential) military systems, not on generic technologies that can have different uses. Many dual use technologies are subject to export controls in order to prevent or slow down proliferation and military uses by other countries or non state groups. Except in the areas of chemical and biological weapons, export controls are asymmetric. In the interest of international security and peace, it would be better to exclude military uses of problematic technologies (old: e.g. nuclear, new: the ones discussed here) globally. 5 Fischer et al. 1984, Feiveson et al. 2014. SuF_01_20_Inhalt_3.Umbruch.indd 37 24.06.20 14:14 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T  | Altmann, New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace 38 | S+F (38� Jg�) 1/2020 They increase possibilities for surprise attack, in particular against nuclear strategic weapons and command and control systems. 4.3 Autonomous Weapon Systems10 In the last two decades, armed uninhabited air vehicles (UAVs) have proliferated widely; more than 30 countries have added them to their arsenals. Many have automatic functions, but the weapons are released under remote control by a human operator, requiring a communication link. Based on fast advances in sensors, computers and software, armed forces plan for the next step: autonomous weapon systems (AWS). AWS would – after activation – select and engage targets without further interaction with a human. An algorithm would search in sensor data for potential targets, classify them, select appropriate ones and attack them. Such AWS for complex environments do not yet exist, but there are precursors in close range weapon systems with an automatic mode and longer range missiles with target recognition systems. AWS would come in various sizes and forms, moving in air, on land, on or under water. Military advantages are obvious. Already remote control weapon systems remove the operator from the scene and thus from danger. Without a remote control link, AWS would be harder to detect, the link could not be jammed, and AWS could react markedly faster. Military disadvantages exist, too: control of events on the battlefield would suffer, and the systems could be hacked, but militarily, the advantages outweigh the problems. Once deployment of AWS would begin, an accelerating arms race can be expected, much faster than what can be observed with remote control armed UAVs at present. The main reason is that AWS are intended for combat against a competent adversary, not for very asymmetric scenarios. Significant doubts exist whether an algorithm will be able to comply with international humanitarian law. At least as problematic is the escalation dynamic that can ensue from the interaction between two fleets of AWS at short mutual distance, with only seconds of missile flight time between them. In a severe crisis both sides would intensely observe each other for indications of attack. In order not to lose one’s systems they would have to be programmed to shoot back fast – which in case of a false alarm could start a “flash war” by mistake. AWS would bring new possibilities for surprise attack, raising nervousness and the need to react faster. Armed uninhabited vehicles can form swarms. Attacking simultaneously or in waves from many sides, they promise higher probability of destruction and saturation of defences. While a swarm acting as a whole against a single target could be controlled by a human, the full advantage of swarm attack – with self coordination, adaptive assignment to different targets, and maybe emergent behavior – would only accrue if the swarm consisted of AWS. Swarm and swarm defence would thus constitute a subarea of an AWS arms race. Expert discussions about a prohibition or limitation of AWS in the context of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons have not led to a mandate for negotiations because militarily important states are opposed. 10 Bhuta et al. 2016, Altmann and Sauer 2017, Scharre 2018. The Trump administration has changed the goal of BMD from limited attacks from countries such as North Korea to any missile launched against the USA, including from Russia and China. If this goal will persist, R&D for defence in all flight phases will have to be intensified, including for defence against hypersonic missiles. 4.2 Hypersonic Missiles9 While supersonic flight refers to a velocity above the speed of sound (about 0.34 km/s at normal temperatures), the term hypersonic describes above five times the speed of sound (Mach 5). Hypersonic missiles were developed and tested in the USA after 2003 for the so called conventional prompt global strike. After tests in 2010 and 2011, the programmes were stopped. Russia had intensified its R&D already after the US SDI of the 1980s and has announced in 2018 that it has developed hypersonic missiles of both kinds: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles. China is active in research and has tested HGVs from 2014 on. The USA has started new programmes for both kinds in 2016. A hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV, also called boost glide vehicle) is accelerated by a rocket and falls along an elliptical trajectory through outer space. It reenters the atmosphere far in front of the target. Rather than falling down on a slant trajectory, the vehicle turns to horizontal in about 100 km altitude and glides through the atmosphere. The speed falls from about 6 km/s to about 2 km/s speed (Mach 20 to 6) while it slowly descends to about 30 km. A steep, guided descent toward the target follows. Alternatively, the vehicle stays below 100 – 200 km altitude all the time. In the gliding phase it can change its course by control flaps, covering many times 1,000 km. Total ranges far above the maximum ICBM range of 10,000 – 13,000 km are possible. HGVs make missile defence much more difficult: The ballistic phase is shorter and occurs at lower altitudes so that they rise above the horizon of ground based radars in the target region later – or only on final approach. The rocket launch flame can be seen by space based early warning systems. But even if the trajectory after burnout could be measured, only the reentry site could be predicted, no longer the target location itself. By flying curves in the second phase, an HGV can circumvent BMD sites and thwart prediction of the trajectory. The times for detection and for reaction are reduced markedly. Hypersonic missiles of the second kind, hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM), do not leave the atmosphere. Their supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) engines take in air, limiting the altitude to 30 km, and require initial acceleration, e.g. by air launch or booster rocket. With Mach 5 to 8 (1.7 to 2.7 km/s) they are 6 to 10 times as fast as traditional, subsonic cruise missiles, and 2 to 5 times as fast as supersonic combat aircraft. The range can be up to a few times 1,000 km. For attack over 1,500 km, e.g. from surface ships or submarines, HCMs take 9 to 15 minutes, leading to markedly shorter times for detection and reaction than with the 80 minutes flight time of subsonic cruise missiles. Both types of hypersonic missiles, HGV and HCM, principally can be equipped with conventional as well as nuclear warheads. 9 Acton 2013, 2015, Speier et al. 2017, Lele 2019. SuF_01_20_Inhalt_3.Umbruch.indd 38 24.06.20 14:14 S+F (38� Jg�) 1/2020 | 39 Altmann, New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace | T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T with nuclear weapons, aircraft, computers, and biotech“ (Allen and Chan 2017). Armed forces could apply AI in many areas: in logistics for supplies or maintenance, and in AWS for recognising targets and for classifying scenarios. Situation awareness from tactical to strategic levels would profit from finding patterns in data from many sensors and other sources. In battle management, AI could be used at least for decision support, later maybe for decision making. Enemy actions could be assessed and modelled. There is a big difference to machine learning in games: with fixed rules in a very restricted space, computers can easily generate millions of valid chess or go games to train the algorithms. In preparation for combat on the other hand, there will not be many actual high technology battles to learn from. Thus, simulation will have to play a big role. Whether the results will be similar to events in actual war is questionable at least. Making weapons and forces more dependent on AI opens possibilities for hacking and deception. More problematic would be the reduction of human control, in particular due to a much higher speed of decisions and actions. With respect to nuclear weapons, AI could be used for early warning, attack characterisation and preparation of a counterattack, principally also for the launch decision itself, e.g. to ensure a second strike even if human control is no longer possible. Including more information in situation assessment could improve human decision making and reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, but a greater role of AI could also increase it. A special problem would ensue if, by big data analysis, nuclear submarines or mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles could be located and destroyed in a first strike. Both systems are seen as guaranteeing a secure second strike capability. The fear that these deterrents are endangered would create strong crisis instability. Arms race instability could ensue from the intentions to prevent such a situation. 4.6 Additive Manufacturing13 In additive manufacturing (AM, often also called 3 D printing), solid parts are built up layer by layer from a material that can be in liquid or powder form and then solidifies by various mechanisms, e.g. cooling from a melt, light induced polymerisation or sintering. Inner cavities can be created easily. The materials include plastic, metals and ceramics, the strength approaches that achieved by traditional production technologies such as casting, forging and hardening. The process is slower, thus not well suited to mass production, but finds increasing use for low numbers of special components and prototypes or for casting or pressing moulds. In this way, together with computer modelling, development cycles can be shortened drastically. What can be produced depends firstly on the machine and the available material. Since the machines provide near universal capability, the product is defined secondly by the control code, the so called build file. Prohibited or limited products could be made if the software can be accessed, maybe illegally. Crude firearms have already been made by AM. Work is being done on ammunition and smaller missiles. 13 Fey 2017, Johnston et al. 2018, Brockmann/Kelley 2018, Brockmann 2019, Christopher 2019. 4.4 Cyber-War Preparations11 With the increasing use of information and communication technology (ICT) in the armed forces and the rise of the internet, the cyber realm has become a fifth area of warfare. Many states have founded cyber forces that not only act defensively, but also prepare offensive action. Attacking the information systems of enemy forces has become an integral part of war plans, to be used in conjunction with physical attacks. But cyber attacks can also be used on their own, outside of traditional armed conflict, opening a grey area between espionage and armed attack. Cyber attacks range from simple intrusion into the military or civilian computer systems of an adversary for gaining information to the destruction of the military or civilian infrastructure, with consequences far beyond the ICT systems. Indirect effects could strongly reduce the fighting capability or devastate the functioning of a society, with damages comparable to the effects of massive attacks using physical weapons. To deter such cyber attacks, military responses in the physical world have been threatened. International law manuals have been developed providing guidelines for when such reaction can be justified and how cyber operations in war should be conducted. Cyber war preparations increase mutual threats. Fear and mistrust are aggravated by secrecy. If prepared in advance by planting malware, cyber attacks could occur in seconds. This increases motives to respond equally fast, that is by automating the reaction, maybe including AI and learning. Thus, also here the possibility exists for fast escalation by interaction between two automatic/autonomous systems of attack and counter attack. Containing the cyber arms race and the associated destabilisation by arms control meets specific difficulties. Non state actors could use the same cyber weapons as armed forces, even though those of the latter will be much more sophisticated generally. However, once developed and known they can be used by nearly anyone without special training or infrastructure. Different from tanks or aircraft, cyber weapons can be multiplied easily, thus numerical limits cannot work. Their capabilities can be kept secret before they are used. Turning from espionage to attack is easy. Attribution to the real originator is difficult. Devising limits on cyber forces and methods for verification thus needs creativity. 4.5 Artificial Intelligence, Big-Data Analysis, and Machine Learning12 The field of artificial intelligence (AI) with its sub fields of big data analysis and machine learning has shown impressive progress in recent years, in games such as chess and go as well as in object recognition in images. At the same time, spectacular classification errors have been found as well as produced intentionally. The opacity of machine learning, in particular with deep neural networks, has led to calls for explainable AI. The USA, Russia and China see AI as a major component of their future military strength, by incorporating more information and enabling faster action. Future AI may be transformative “on a par 11 Lewis and Neuneck 2013, Schmitt 2017, Reuter 2019: chs. 4 7, 9 10, 12 13. 12 Geist and Lohn 2018, Horowitz 2018, Boulanin 2019. SuF_01_20_Inhalt_3.Umbruch.indd 39 24.06.20 14:14 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T  | Altmann, New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace 40 | S+F (38� Jg�) 1/2020 increased combat power, there will be strong military motives, and restraint may wane for fear of adversaries proceeding faster. Consequences for international security will depend on the extent and degree of enhancement, but because soldier enhancement would come in synergy with combat robots and AI, acceleration of battle tempo and shortening of decision times would be a probable outcome. 5. Problematic Traits of Coming Military Technologies Many of the military technologies described share properties that are likely to produce negative effects for international security and peace. Synergies between them will aggravate the problems. Wider Availability, Easier Access, Smaller Systems General purpose technologies such as information and communication technology, artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing and synthetic biology/gene editing are becoming cheaper, more widely distributed, and accessible for actors with fewer skills. Expensive state funded R&D institutions may be unnecessary for production of items for nefarious or hostile uses. Product properties in many cases depend on control software, software proliferation is inherently difficult to prevent. Dangerous goods or materials could be very small and hidden easily. They could be produced in small facilities by states as well as non state actors. International limitations on military uses of such technologies would need verification by on site inspections at any site at any time, and large scale monitoring of data traffic. Accepting such intrusiveness will probably be very difficult not only for armed forces, but also for enterprises and civil society at large. Shorter Times for Attack, Warning, and Decisions For weapons that need physical transport to a target, the time between launch and arrival depends on the speed of propagation and the distance. This time can be from seconds to hours (Table 1). Faster carriers shorten this time, e.g. hypersonic versus subsonic cruise missiles. The time for warning and reaction is shorter if detection and determination of the intended target region do not occur at launch. For example, the trajectory of a traditional ballistic reentry vehicle can be determined by radars looking into space. Predicting the target of a hypersonic glide vehicle, with about the same flight time, may only be possible late in the second flight phase. Remotely controlled uninhabited weapon systems may be close to potential targets with missile flight times of seconds only. The two way communication delay between a sensed event and the execution of the commanded action typically is a few seconds. Autonomous weapon systems, where the processing of sensor data as well as the selection and engagement of a target is done on board, would react without such delay, that is, much faster. Electronic transmission times over the internet range from fractions of a second to a few seconds. Thus, if a target computer has already been infected before, a For armed forces, several applications are foreseen: Replacement parts could be produced in the field, reducing logistics and allowing faster repairs. More relevant for international security could be mass production of small uninhabited weapon systems. Principally, missile bodies as well as energetic materials can be made. Uranium enrichment could profit from 3 D printed parts for centrifuges. AM could support a biological weapons programme. 4.7 Synthetic Biology and Gene Editing14 Genetic engineering started in the 1970s with very complex and expensive laboratory equipment but got increasingly accessible with ever faster and cheaper methods of DNA sequencing and then DNA synthesis, leading to biotechnology as a routine method of production. Synthetic biology, the fabrication of complex, artificial biological systems that fulfil certain tasks, maybe with non natural biochemical structures, was the next major innovation. Several methods and tools have become cheap and widely accessible so that hobby groups and students can do significant work. Relevant concern exists that individuals or small groups by chance or by bad intent could produce new harmful biological agents for which no antidote is known. Since 2012 genetic engineering has become drastically easier with the CRISPR/Cas915 method. This tool allows one to modify the genetic code in DNA molecules nearly arbitrarily (“gene editing”). This technology promises curing genetic and other diseases and faster advance in basic and applied research. However, as other fundamental technologies, it has a dual use character. One obvious military application would be the creation of new biological warfare agents, maybe causing diseases or modifying behaviour by acting on the brain. Such activity is prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with its nearly universal adherence, however, the Convention still lacks a compliance and verification scheme. Non state actors, on the other hand, could act outside of the BWC and against its bounds. Another potentially hostile application is possible with so called gene drives aimed at changing or even eradicating animal or plant populations in the wild. 4.8 Enhanced Soldiers and Body Manipulation16 Even if they are relatively far from being implemented, concepts of future soldier enhancement have gotten enough credibility that detailed discussions about conditions, consequences and ethical issues have begun (however, international security and preventive arms control are not yet on the agenda). Various possibilities are conceived of, from exoskeletons via changes of the biochemistry to brain implants. “Supersoldiers” by genetic modification and fully fledged cyborgs are being envisioned. Changes could affect body, mind and mood, possibly switched on or off, reversible or irreversible. Since such enhancements pose many fundamental questions, involving the societies at large, it is unclear if they will be introduced at all, and if so, in which of the possible forms. But insofar as they will promise 14 Nixdorff 2017, Himmel 2019, Frieß et al. 2020. 15 Clustered Regularly Interspaced Repeats/CRISPR associated protein 9. 16 Kott et al. 2015, Wigan 2017, Matthews and Schnyer 2019. SuF_01_20_Inhalt_3.Umbruch.indd 40 24.06.20 14:14 S+F (38� Jg�) 1/2020 | 41 Altmann, New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace | T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T 6. Conclusion Each of the the new military technologies that are in the making would reduce warning and decision times, increase possibilities for surprise attack and create corresponding fears and nervousness, with the associated risks of misperceptions, worst case assumptions and false alarms, not only by human decision makers, but also by algorithms. In synergy, these dangers would be multiplied. Preventive arms control is needed urgently; export control could limit proliferation to some countries and non state actors but would not solve the destabilisation problem between producer states. Limitations and their verification in space weapons, ballistic missile defence and hypersonic missiles can follow established arms control concepts. For autonomous weapon systems and cyber war preparations, innovative approaches are required that should be investigated in interdisciplinary research. Even though the present political situation does not bode well for it: Preventing the dangers may need nothing less than a comprehensive approach with a return to fundamental insights: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Conventional war between major powers carries a strong risk of escalation to nuclear war. Sustainable national security is possible only in the context of international security. Bibliography Acton, James M. (2013). Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Acton, James M. (2015). Hypersonic Boost Glide Weapons. Science & Global Security 23 (3), 191 219. Allen, Greg and Taniel, Chan (2017). Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Cambridge MA: Belfer Center, Harvard University. http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/ files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20 %20final.pdf (16 Febr. 2020). Altmann, Jürgen (2006). Military Nanotechnology: Potential Applications and Preventive Arms Control. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Altmann, Jürgen (2008). Präventive Rüstungskontrolle. Die Friedens-Warte 83 (2 3), 105 126. Altmann, Jürgen (2017). Militärische Forschung und Entwicklung. In Jürgen Altmann, Ute Bernhardt, Kathryn Nixdorff, Ingo Ruhmann und Dieter Wöhrle. Naturwissenschaft – Rüstung – Frieden – Basiswissen für die Friedensforschung. 2nd edition. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Altmann, Jürgen and Frank Sauer (2017). Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability. Survival 59 (5), 117 142. Bhuta, Nehal, Susanne Beck, Robin Geiß, Hin Yan Liu and Claus Kreß (eds.) (2016). Autonomous Weapon Systems – Law, Ethics, Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Boulanin, Vincent (2019). The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk. Volume I Euro-Atlantic Perspectives. Solna: SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/ publications/2019/other publications/impact artificial intelligence strategic stability and nuclear risk (11 Febr. 2020). Brockmann, Kolja (2019). Additive Manufacturing and Biological Weapons: Assessing Proliferation Risks and Challenges to Export Control. In Christian Reuter, Jürgen Altmann, cyber attack could be started in seconds time. Depending on the kind of attack, the effects may become visible only after some time; in this respect, biological weapons are similar where some diseases need time to break out. Artificial intelligence augmented battle management would increase the tempo of combat. Overall, the new military technologies would markedly accelerate events in war, reducing the time for decisions. In particular in a crisis there would be less time to double check whether an alarm is due to a real attack, was caused by a sensor, computer or algorithm malfunction, or was the result of an erroneous classification of data. Table 1 summarises the travel/propagation times for various weapon types; detection, warning and decision times are shorter. Table 1: Times from launch to arrival at target, or from start of attack to effects for various weapon types and typical distances.17 Weapon Type Distance/ km Speed/ km/s Time to Arrival/Effect Nuclear Conventional Subsonic long range bomber 5,000 0.3 6 h X X Supersonic fighter bomber 1,500 0.5 0.9 50 30 min X X Subsonic cruise missile 1,500 0.3 80 min X X Supersonic missile 10 0.5 1.5 20 7 s X X HCM 1,500 1.7 2.7 15 9 min X X ICBM 10,000 7 33 min X HGV 5,000 + 7,000 6 24 + 24 min X X SLBM 3,000 4.4 17 min X X Cyber attack (prepared) arbitrary seconds Conventional-Nuclear Entanglement Faster missiles with higher precision raise the chance and thus the motive to take out strategic nuclear weapons as well as command and control systems with conventional weapons. The same carriers could also carry nuclear weapons. Smaller nuclear weapons (though still in the Hiroshima class) are envisioned as means of threatening fast escalation to deter conventional attacks. As a consequence, for war among nuclear weapon states, there will be an increasing risk of escalation from conventional to nuclear weapons, as well as of understanding a conventional attack as nuclear relevant. In a severe crisis, launch on warning and pre emptive attack will become more probable. 17 These times are upper limits for detection and warning of attack. Entries are typical or average values, for ballistic missiles for trajectories with minimum energy. The sound speed in air at 20 °C is 0.34 km/s, at 50 °C (10 km altitude) 0.30 km/s. For ballistic missiles and HGV, the speed at burnout is given; due to the elliptical flight path the speed decreases up to the peak altitude, and the path is longer than the distance along the ground. For anti satellite weapons, the time varies between minutes and hours depending on the altitude and weapon type and deployment. HCM: Hypersonic Cruise Missile, ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, HGV: Hypersonic Glide Vehicle, SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. Jürgen Altmann, PhD, senior researcher and lecturer, head of Physics and Disarmament Group, Experimental Physics  III, TU Dortmund, Germany. Expertise: acoustic seismic detection, military technology assessment, preventive arms control. Recent projects on uninhabited and autonomous weapon systems. SuF_01_20_Inhalt_3.Umbruch.indd 41 24.06.20 14:14 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T  | Altmann, New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace 42 | S+F (38� Jg�) 1/2020 Schmitt, Michael N. (ed.). Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Smit, Wim, John Grin and Lev Voronkov (eds.) (1992). Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a and Changing World – Politically assessing and influencing weapon innovation and military research and development. Amsterdam: VU University Press. Speier, Richard H., George Nacouzi, Carrie Lee und Richard M. Moore (2017). Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation – Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons. Santa Monica CA: RAND. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2100/ RR2137/RAND_RR2137.pdf (11 Febr. 2020). Thee, Marek (1988). Science and Technology for War and Peace. Bulletin of Peace Proposals 19 (3/4), 261 292. US DoD (Department of Defense) (2007). Department of Defense Research & Engineering Strategic Plan. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRD oc.pdf&AD=ADA472100 (11 Febr. 2020). US DoD (Department of Defense) (2019a). Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency – Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 1 of 5 – Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide. https://www.darpa. mil/attachments/DARPA_FY20_Presidents_Budget_Request.pdf (11 Febr. 2020). US DoD (Department of Defense) (2019b). Trump Signs Law Establishing U.S. Space Force. By Jim Garamone, DOD News, Dec. 20. https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/ Article/Article/2046035/trump signs law establishing us space force/ (13 Febr. 2020). Wigan, Marcus (2017). Ethics and Brain Implants in the Military. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 36 (1), 65 68. Work, Robert (2015). Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, 14 December. https://www.defense. gov/News/Speeches/Speech View/Article/634214/cnas defense forum. Malte Göttsche, Mirko Himmel (eds.). SCIENCE PEACE SECURITY ‘19 – Proceedings of the Interdisciplinary Conference on Technical Peace and Security Research. Darmstadt: TUprints. https://tuprints.ulb.tu darmstadt.de/id/eprint/9164 (11 Febr. 2020). Brockmann, Kolja and Robert Kelley (2018). The Challenge of Emerging Technologies to Non-Proliferation Efforts – Controlling Additive Manufacturing and Intangible Transfers of Technology. Solna: SIPRI, April 2018. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018 04/ sipri1804_3d_printing_brockmann.pdf (18 Febr. 2020). Brodie, Bernard and Fawn M. Brodie (1973). From Crossbow to H-Bomb. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Bromley, Mark and Giovanna Maletta (2018). The Challenge Of Software and Technology Transfers to Non-Proliferation Efforts – Implementing and Complying with Export Controls. Solna: SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018 04/sipri1804_itt_software_ bromley_et_al.pdf (18 Febr. 2020). Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2019), Special Issue Space, 75 (4). Caughley, Tim (2011). The Conference on Disarmament – Breaking the Ice. Geneva: UNIDIR. https://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/breaking the ice in the conference on disarmament a wrap up 376.pdf (13 Febr. 2020). Christopher, Grant (2019). Additive Manufacturing and the Military: Applications and Implications. In: Christian Reuter, Jürgen Altmann, Malte Göttsche, Mirko Himmel (eds.). SCIENCE PEACE SECURITY ‘19 – Proceedings of the Interdisciplinary Conference on Technical Peace and Security Research. Darmstadt: TUprints. https://tuprints.ulb. tu darmstadt.de/id/eprint/9164 (11 Febr. 2020). Evangelista, Matthews (1999). Unarmed Forces – The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War. Ithaca NY/London: Cornell University Press. Feiveson, Harold A., Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian and Frank von Hippel (2014). Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Fey, Marco (2017). 3D Printing and International Security – Risks and Challenges of an Emerging Technology. Frankfurt/M.: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. https://www. hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif144.pdf (11 Febr. 2020). Fischer, Horst, Reiner Labusch, Eckart Maus und Jürgen Scheffran (1984). Entwurf eines Vertrages zur Begrenzung der militärischen Nutzung des Weltraums. In Reiner Labusch, Eckart Maus und Wolfgang Send (Hg.). Weltraum ohne Waffen – Naturwissenschaftler warnen vor der Militarisierung des Weltraums. München: Bertelsmann. Frieß, Johannes L., Anna Rössing, Gunnar Jeremias and Bernd Giese (2020). Application Scenarios for Gene Drives and new Biotechnology? Sicherheit + Frieden 38 (this issue). Geist, Edward and Andrew J. Lohn (2018). How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War? Santa Monica CA: RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/ PE296.html (11 Febr. 2020). Goldblat, Jozef (2002). Arms Control – The New Guide to Negotiatons and Agreements. Oslo/Stockholm/London etc.: PRIO/SIPRI/Sage. Himmel, Mirko (2019). Emerging Dual Use Technologies in the life sciences: challenges and policy recommendations on export control. EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers 64, Stockholm: SIPRI. https://www.nonproliferation.eu/emerging dual use technologies in the life sciences/ (11 Febr. 2020). Horowitz, Michael C. (2018). Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power. Texas National Security Review 1 (3), 37 57. Johnston, Trevor, Troy D. Smith, J. Luke Irwin (2018). Additive Manufacturing in 2040 – Powerful Enabler, Disruptive Threat. Santa Monica CA: RAND. https://www.rand.org/ content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE283/RAND_PE283.pdf (11 Febr. 2020). Korda, Matt and Hans M. Kristensen (2019). US ballistic missile defenses. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:6, 295 306, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1680055. Kott, Alexander, David Alberts, Amy Zalman, Paulo Shakarian, Fernando Maymi, Cliff Wang and Gang Qu (2015). Visualizing the Tactical Ground Battlefield in the Year 2050: Workshop Report. ARL SR 0327, Adelphi, MD: US Army Research Laboratory. http:// www.arl.army.mil/arlreports/2015/ARL SR 0327.pdf (11 Febr. 2020). Lele, Ajey (2019). Hypersonic Weapons. In Ajey Lele. Disruptive Technologies for the Militaries and Security, Singapore: Springer Nature. Lewis, James A. and Götz Neuneck (2013). The Cyber Index – International Security Trends and Realities. Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research. http://www.unidir. org/files/publications/pdfs/cyber index 2013 en 463.pdf (11 Febr. 2020). Matthews, Michael D. and David M. Schnyer (eds.) (2019). Human Performance Optimization: The Science and Ethics of Enhancing Human Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Müller, Erwin and Götz Neuneck (eds.) (1991/1992). Rüstungsmodernisierung und Rüstungskontrolle – Neue Technologien, Rüstungsdynamik und Stabilität. Baden Baden: Nomos. Neuneck, Götz und Reinhard Mutz (Hg.) (2000). Vorbeugende Rüstungskontrolle – Ziele und Aufgaben unter besonderer Berücksichtigung verfahrensmäßiger und institutioneller Umsetzung im Rahmen internationaler Rüstungsregime. Baden Baden: Nomos. Nixdorff, Kathryn (2017). Biologie. In Jürgen Altmann, Ute Bernhardt, Kathryn Nixdorff, Ingo Ruhmann und Dieter Wöhrle. Naturwissenschaft – Rüstung – Frieden – Basiswissen für die Friedensforschung. 2nd edition. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Pelton, Joseph N. (2019). Space Weapons, the Threat of War in Space and Planetary Defense. In Joseph N. Pelton. Space 2.0 – Revolutionary Advances in the Space Industry. Cham: Springer Nature. Reinhold, Thomas and Christian Reuter (2019). Arms Control and its Applicability to Cyberspace. In Christian Reuter (ed.). Information Technology for Peace and Security – IT Applications and Infrastructures in Conflicts, Crises, War and Peace. Wiesbaden: Springer Vieweg. Reuter, Christian (ed.) (2019). Information Technology for Peace and Security – IT Applications and Infrastructures in Conflicts, Crises, War and Peace. Wiesbaden: Springer Vieweg. Scharre, Paul (2018). Army of None. New York/London: Norton. Handeln vor der Katastrophe als politische Herausforderung Mehr Vorsorge durch die Governance von Risiken Von Dr. Christine Prokopf 2020, 366 S., brosch., 79,– € ISBN 978-3-8487-6489-1 (Sicherheit und Gesellschaft. Freiburger Studien des Centre for Security and Society, Bd. 13) eLibrary Nomos Wie gehen wir als Gesellschaft mit zukünftigen Gefahren um? www.nomos-elibrary.de Bestellen Sie jetzt unter www.nomos-shop.de Handeln vor der Katastrophe als politische Herausforderung Mehr Vorsorge durch die Governance von Risiken Christine Prokopf Sicherheit und Gesellschaft. Freiburger Studien des Centre for Security and Society | 13 SuF_01_20_Inhalt_3.Umbruch.indd 42 24.06.20 14:14

Abstract

New military technologies are being developed at a high pace, with the USA in the lead. Intended application areas are space weapons and ballistic missile defence, hypersonic missiles, autonomous weapon systems, and cyber war. Generic technologies include artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology and gene editing, and soldier enhancement. Problems for international security and peace - arms races and destabilisation - will likely result from properties shared by several technologies: wider availability, easier access, smaller systems; shorter times for attack, warning and decisions; and conventional-nuclear entanglement. Preventive arms control is urgently needed.

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Abstract

S+F (Security and Peace) is the leading German journal for peace research and security policy. S+F aims to serve as a forum linking civil society and the armed forces in the areas of science and politics comprising of research analysis, insider reports and opinion pieces. Decisions on publication are made on the basis of the contribution made by a text to national and international discussions on peace and security issues; from scientific aspects of arms control, to questions of nation-building in post-war societies. Every issue of S+F is focussed on a particular theme. In addition to contributions devoted to the central theme, texts addressing general aspects of peace and security research are also published. Contributors can choose whether to have the text evaluated by the editorial team or by way of an external evaluation process (double-blind peer-review).

Articles of the journal S+F are entered in various national and international bibliographic databases. Among them are Online Contents OLC-SSG Politikwissenschaft und Friedensforschung (Political Science and Peace Research), PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) International Database, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts and World Affairs Online (by the Fachinformationsverbund Internationale Beziehungen und Länderkunde FIV / The German Information Network International Relations and Area Studies) (see also www.ireon-portal.de).

Website: www.sicherheit-und-frieden.nomos.de

Zusammenfassung

Die Zeitschrift versteht sich als Diskussionsforum für neuere Forschungsergebnisse und politische Entwicklungen auf dem Gebiet der Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik. Durch Analysen, Stellungnahmen, Dokumente und Informationen sollen kontroverse Auffassungen und brisante Themen einer sachlichen Diskussion zugeführt werden.

Homepage: www.sicherheit-und-frieden.nomos.de