Katja Möhring, Céline Teney, Christopher Buss, Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? An empirical analysis of determinants of support and rejection among German citizens in:

SozW Soziale Welt, page 121 - 143

SozW, Volume 70 (2019), Issue 2, ISSN: 0038-6073, ISSN online: 0038-6073, https://doi.org/10.5771/0038-6073-2019-2-121

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Katja Möhring*, Céline Teney** and Christopher Buss*** Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? An empirical analysis of determinants of support and rejection among German citizens Abstract: After a long and controversial debate, a statutory gender boardroom quota was introduced in Germany in 2016. We examine the determinants of support for this quota among citizens aiming to identify the social groups that approve the most and those that resent the most the quota law. The approaches of self-interest, political orientation, and exposure are used to understand variation in support from a theoretical perspective. Based on data from the German Internet Panel (GIP) surveyed in March 2017 (N=2544), individual-level and workplace-related determinants of support for the boardroom quota are analysed. Our results show a general gender gap in support for a quota with greater support among women, but reveal differences within the target group of women and within the non-target group of men. These differences demonstrate that the interplay of gender and position on the labour market is pivotal for attitudes towards affirmative action in favour of women. The quota is most supported by single women in upper management positions, while most opposed by married women and young men. This leads to the conclusion that opposition to the gender quota is greatest among those who are disregarded by the regulation or might see their prospective labour market chances to be threatened. Keywords: Attitudes; Boardroom Quota; Affirmative Action Policies; Political Sociology; Gender Equality Wer unterstützt die Geschlechterquote für Aufsichtsräte? Eine empirische Analyse der Determinanten von Unterstützung und Ablehnung in der deutschen Bevölkerung Zusammenfassung: In Deutschland wurde nach langer, kontroverser Diskussion 2016 eine gesetzliche Geschlechterquote für Aufsichtsräte großer Firmen, die soge- * Prof. Dr. Katja Möhring, Universität Mannheim, Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften, Schloss, 68131 Mannheim, E-Mail: moehring@uni-mannheim.de. ** Prof. Dr. Céline Teney, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Institut für Soziologie, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, E-Mail: celine.teney@sowi.uni-goettingen.de. *** Christopher Buss, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 884 “Politische Ökonomie von Reformen”, B6, 30-32, 68131 Mannheim, E-Mail: me@christopher-buss.de. SozW, 70 (2) 2019, 121 – 143 DOI: 10.5771/0038-6073-2019-2-121 nannte Frauenquote, eingeführt. Wir untersuchen die Determinanten der Unterstützung dieser Quote in der deutschen Bevölkerung mit dem Ziel, Gruppen in der Gesellschaft mit einer besonders hohen oder niedrigen Unterstützung zu identifizieren. Theoretisch beziehen wir uns dabei auf Ansätze zu Rational-Choice, politscher Orientierung und Intergruppenkontakten. Auf der Grundlage der Daten des German Internet Panel (GIP) vom März 2017 (N=2544) analysieren wir individuelle und Arbeitsplatzspezifische Determinanten der Unterstützung für die Geschlechterquote. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen wie erwartet eine starke Diskrepanz in der Unterstützung zwischen Männern und Frauen mit stärkerer Unterstützung durch Frauen. Daneben werden Unterschiede innerhalb der Gruppe der Frauen wie der Männer deutlich, die auf die Bedeutsamkeit des Zusammenspiels von Geschlecht und Position auf dem Arbeitsmarkt hinweisen. Die höchste Unterstützung findet sich unter alleinstehenden Frauen in gehobenen Führungspositionen, während verheiratete Frauen und junge Männer die geringste Unterstützung aufweisen. Daher schlussfolgern wir, dass die Geschlechterquote auf die stärkste Ablehnung bei jenen stößt, die sich durch diese Maßnahme entweder ausgegrenzt fühlen oder ihre zukünftigen Arbeitsmarktchancen gefährdet sehen. Stichworte: Einstellungen; Geschlechterquote; Gleichstellungspolitik; Politische Soziologie; Geschlechterungleichheit Introduction Group-based policies, so-called affirmative action, are increasingly promoted by the European Union and implemented by national governments in Europe to achieve gender equality on the labour market, especially in positions of leadership. While these measures are intended to guarantee a more equal access to highly valued positions and economic power, they may cause resentment among those excluded from the measures. Individuals who belong to the better represented groups in business leadership may perceive their established positions to be threatened by the implementation of such measures. This is indeed one of the most consistent findings provided by the literature on the determinants of public support for affirmative action policies (Bobo 2000; Harrisson et al. 2006). In Germany, the public discussion around the implementation of the boardroom quota has been controversial. The final implementation of a statutory quota was preceded by several years of debate among politicians, interest groups, and the greater public. Even after its implementation, the quota remains a contested issue with conservative interest groups and right-wing parties opposing the legislation. Although the quota law targets at a very small group of women—it applies to only around 100 companies in Germany—it is perceived as flagship policy of the so-called “Gender Mainstreaming” agenda (Kirsch 2017) and is intended to create positive spill-over effects and generally enhance gender equality on the labour market 1 122 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss and women’s access to leadership positions (Noon 2010). Hence, it stands for a variety of measures aiming to increase the share of women and underrepresented groups in prestigious positions, for example through quotas in application processes. Previous studies in this field have so far concentrated on the U.S. context and attitudes of U.S. Americans towards (real or hypothetical) affirmative action policies programmes for ethnic minorities, in particular for the Afro-American minority (e.g. Harrison et al. 2006, Krysan 2000 for a review). The existing literature studying the determinants at the individual level of public support for and opposition to affirmative action policies in favour of women in a non-U.S. context remains sparse apart from two recent studies on public opinion towards legislative gender quotas in South America (Barnes/Córdova 2016) and towards gender quotas on company boards in Europe (Möhring/Teney 2019). Providing studies on the individual factors influencing attitudes towards affirmative action policies for women beyond the U.S. context therefore remains a research gap and composes an important endeavour for both the academic and public debates. The main objective of this study is to investigate individual determinants of support for the mandatory gender quota for company boardrooms. Based on data from the German Internet Panel (GIP) surveyed in March 2017, individual-level and workplace-related determinants of support for the boardroom quota are analysed. The aim is to identify the social groups that approve the most and the social groups that resent the most the quota law. The results show a general gender gap in support for a quota with greater support among women, but reveal differences within the target group of women and within the non-target group of men. These differences demonstrate that the interplay of gender and position on the labour market is pivotal for attitudes towards affirmative action in favour of women. The quota is most supported by single women in upper management positions, while most opposed by married women and young men. This leads to the conclusion that opposition to the gender quota is greatest among those who are disregarded by the regulation or believe their prospective labour market chances to be threatened. Our article proceeds as follows. We will first describe the policy background and the specific characteristics of the boardroom quota in Germany. Then we will outline the theoretical approaches of self-interest, political orientation, and exposure to derive hypotheses for the determinants of support among German citizens. Next, we present the data and methods used and the results of the regression analyses. We conclude the article with a summary of the main results, highlight policy implications and describe the limitations of our study. Policy background: The gender quota for boardrooms in Germany A legal gender quota for boards of listed companies was finally introduced in Germany in 2016 following more than 15 years of debate about gender equality in lea- 2 Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 123 ding positions (Kirsch 2017). While the employment rate of women has strongly increased over the last decades, gender inequality is still predominant on the German labour market. For example, Germany has one of the highest unadjusted gender pay gaps (2015: 21%; Kirsch 2017). Following the traditional male breadwinner / female additional earner model, women in Germany still tend to drop-out from the labour market or work part-time after childbirth due to their role as primary carers in the family. Women are also highly underrepresented in top leading positions: only around 10% of executive board members in the 100 largest companies were female in 2018 (Holst and Wrohlich 2018). The share of women in supervisory boards, for which the statutory quota applies, has risen from 9.8% in 2008 to 28.4% in 2018 (Holst and Wrohlich 2018). In contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries, company leadership in Germany mostly comprises a two-tier structure with an executive board and a supervisory board. The German gender quota law applies only to the supervisory board of external nonexecutive directors (Gabaldon/Mensi-Klarbach/Seierstad 2017; Kirsch 2017). It defines a statutory gender quota of 30% for supervisory boards of listed companies. The quota is mandatory, which means that positions remain vacant if the quota is not met (the “empty chair” sanction). Around 100 companies are currently affected by the quota.1 The German gender quota law follows a non-binding resolution by the EU parliament in 2011 asserting that boardroom quotas should be implemented in all EU member states to raise the level of female board representation to 30 percent by 2015 and 40 percent by 2020 (Armstrong/Walby 2012). Theory: Determinants of support for the quota For understanding the determinants of support for affirmative action policies towards women in business leading positions, three distinct theoretical perspectives are considered. Starting from an interest-based approach, we discuss which social groups benefit from the statutory quota, and which social groups might be harmed by it. Accordingly, gender appears to be the central determinant of quota support. Although the boardroom quota affects very few women directly, a much larger group of women may benefit when we follow the argumentation that a quota may create positive spill-over effects also resulting in better chances for women to be promoted or hired to lower-level positions of leadership (Matsa/Miller 2011; Kunze/Miller 2014). However, the chance to profit, even indirectly, from the gender quota varies among women according to their labour market status and job position. Women with a high potential to reach leading positions have a higher likelihood to benefit from the quota law because of spill-over effects. For men, on the contrary, the boardroom quota constitutes a possible threat that increases the closer men are to leadership positions. 3 1 These companies are listed stock corporations and European companies (SEs) with more than 2,000 employees that are subject to full co-determination (Kirsch 2017). 124 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss Previous research has furthermore highlighted two other theoretical mechanisms that go beyond self-interest explanations. Firstly, individuals’ views of specific policies are influenced by their general political orientation as well as their perception of the status-quo in society (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart/Norris 2003; Möhring/Teney 2019; Paxton/Kunovich 2003). Secondly, another mechanism that has been used in previous research to explain attitudes towards affirmative action is exposure (Bolzendahl/Myers 2004). As this study focuses on regulations aiming to foster gender equality in leadership positions of corporate organizations, exposure relates to the gender composition at the workplace and individuals’ experiences with female supervisors. In the following, these three different mechanisms will be discussed and related to factors that are assumed to determine support for affirmative action. Interest-based explanations As already mentioned, previous research on public opinion on affirmative action policies has consistently pointed to the relevance of interest-based explanations for understanding differences in the level of support of such policies (see e.g., Harrison et al. 2006; for an overview and Barnes/Córdova 2016; Möhring/Teney 2019 for more recent studies). Based on the rational choice theory, this interest-based perspective postulates that citizens who are likely to (or who expect to) benefit from a policy tend to be more supportive of this policy (Mau 2003). This explanation can be transposed to attitudes towards affirmative action policies, which are designed to provide a group-based solution to a group-based problem (i.e., unequal treatment based on membership in specific demographic groups) (Harrison et al. 2006: 1015). Accordingly, we would expect individuals who belong to the affirmative action policy’s target group to be in favour of the policy to a larger extent than citizens who belong to a non-target group. Indeed, members of the target groups tend to be more supportive of such policies that are believed to help their own demographic group (Harrison et al. 2006). By contrast, individuals who do not belong to the target group tend to be stronger opponent to such affirmative action policies because they are likely to perceive members of the target groups as competitive threats for valued (but scarce) social resources, privileges and statuses (Bobo 2000). This leads us to draw the first hypothesis: support for the boardroom quota is stronger among women than among men (Hypothesis 1). The gender quota for boardrooms however represents a very specific regulation that is targeted at a minority of women who have access to the top leading positions in the business world. Defining the target group as only those women who are theoretically eligible for these positions would yet be insufficient. Considering spill-over effects that might be generated by a more gender equal leadership in companies, e.g. female-friendly hiring and promotion policies and a strengthening of work-life balance measures, more female employees than those directly affected by the quota might consider themselves as beneficiaries or identify with the target group of the quota. Therefore, a woman’s labour market chances and job position determine how 3.1 Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 125 strongly she might potentially benefit from the quota law: women in leadership positions are expected to be highly supportive of the gender quota. On the contrary, for men in upper management positions, a quota law increases competition for promotion possibilities and might thus intensify the perceived group-threat. Therefore, we assume that among women, being in a leadership position is positively correlated with support; while among men, it is negatively correlated (Hypothesis 2). On the other hand, gender equality measures as affirmative action policies in hiring procedures might cause resentments especially among those men who did not achieve a stable and secure position on the labour market yet, i.e. young labour market entrants. Younger birth cohorts were socialized in times when gender equality measures were understood as self-evident and gender inequality on the labour market continuously decreased. Disadvantages for women on the labour market in terms of career prospects and earnings mostly emerge after they became mothers (Budig/England 2001; Staff/Mortimer 2011). Thus, younger individuals, who did not establish their own family yet, might not have experienced discrimination of women themselves or in their personal network, and therefore, might perceive a quota law as unnecessary. In addition, men at the beginning of their career are affected by competition with female co-workers for access to prestigious career tracks. Therefore, we assume that men oppose the boardroom quota the more the younger they are (Hypothesis 3), while we do not expect a strong relationship between age and support for women. Young as well as older women are expected to be supportive of a quota because all might expect to profit from measures enhancing gender equality – either directly or indirectly through assumed spill-over effects. So far, we have argued that support of and opposition to gender quota will be determined by men’s and women’s own probability to achieve leading positions in the future, as defined by their labour market status and human capital resources. This interest-based perspective might however not only be limited to the own position, but may include the position of the spouse on the labour market. Indeed, women might not only identify with the target group of the policy, but also with their spouses’ perceived threat to lose resources as a result of the introduction of such policies. In addition to a potential perception of group threat, men might as well favour quotas to some extent if their wives are likely to benefit from it. Previous research has indeed pointed to a class-dependent mutual influence of spouses in their political behaviour. Several studies showed that wives are more likely than husbands to vote and endorse political orientation corresponding to the social class position of the other spouse (de Graaf/Heath 1992; Jennings/Stoker 2001; Edlund 2003). Transferring these findings to support of a boardroom quota, we can assume that own attitudes towards a gender quota will be partly influenced by the position of the spouse on the labour market. However, we cannot expect that all individuals with a spouse endorse attitudes towards gender quotas reflecting the interests corresponding to their spouse’s labour market position regardless of their own position. Rather and by following the interest-based approach, this mechanism 126 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss should depend on the power structure within the household: only those with a higher financial dependence on the spouse, i.e. who are not the main households’ breadwinner, are expected to endorse attitudes reflecting the interests of their spouse. Hence, spouses who have a weaker position on the labour market than their partners will be more likely to stronger consider the interest of their household. Thus, spouses who are not the main household’s breadwinner are expected to endorse attitudes towards gender quota corresponding to their partners’ interest. This view is supported by the theoretical perspective of new household economics: here it is argued that women’s specialization on unpaid care-work in male breadwinner couples reflect their preferences to not pursue a career (Longarela 2016; Himmelweit et al. 2013). Consequently, women in these constellations will not be interested to support policies that target gender equal opportunities on the labour market. Accordingly, not being the main household’s breadwinner is negatively associated with support for the gender quota among women and positively associated with support for the gender quota among men (Hypothesis 4). It should be noted that male breadwinner and one-and-a-half earner constellations are currently the most frequent arrangements in German households (Trappe/Pollmann-Schult/Schmitt 2015). This implies that the number of male respondents who are not the main household’s breadwinner might not be sufficient to robustly test the second part of the hypothesis. Ideological and political orientation explanations Not only the (perceived) benefit or threat resulting from affirmative action policies affects attitudes towards these regulations. Individuals’ views on the gender quota are also framed by their political orientation and attitudes towards gender equality in general. More particularly, the role of the self-positioning in the political space and the perception of gender equality in explaining differences in support for gender quotas need to be incorporated when explaining support. With respect to the first dimension, a left-wing political orientation stands for the endorsement of libertarian values, including gender equality, as well as for a greater acceptance of state intervention into the economy (Inglehart/Norris 2000). Hence, those who define themselves as having a left-wing political orientation will be more supportive of the quota, as such policies aim to redress gender inequality and require a direct intervention of the state in the economy. This is in line with the fact that the introduction of a statutory gender boardroom quota in Germany was supported by the leftwing Social-Democratic Party (SPD), while it was long opposed by the conservative Christian-Democratic Party (CDU) (Spiegel Online 2014). Furthermore, the political orientation is likely to play a stronger role in the attitudes towards gender quotas among men, while self-interest motivations are assumed to be weighted more heavily in women’s support of such policies than their own political orientations. Therefore, we assume that having a left-wing political orientation is associated with more support for the quota among men, while political orientation is less relevant for women’s support (Hypothesis 5). Furthermore, previous research has shown that 3.2 Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 127 individuals relate their gender role attitudes and their judgment about policies aiming at redressing gender inequality to the actual status quo in their society (Eicher et al. 2015; Möhring/Teney 2019). We can therefore assume that individuals who perceive the labour market as unfair for women are more supportive of the quota (Hypothesis 6). Workplace-related explanations The last theoretical perspective on which we will draw hypotheses deals with workplace-related explanations or the so-called mechanism of exposure. The latter predicts that everyday experiences of individuals (intergroup contact) influence their values and political attitudes. Accordingly, regular interactions with members of the target group in the work place are likely to contribute to the reduction of stereotyping and prejudice, hence, are likely to increase support for gender equality (e.g. Bolzendahl/Myers 2004). The interaction with colleagues and supervisors from both genders in the workplace is therefore crucial for the support of affirmative action measures. Exposure to women at work is indeed associated with a reduction in bias against female leaders among men (Finseraas et al. 2016; Boisjoly et al. 2006): men who witness work situations in which women suffer from unequal treatment will tend to acknowledge to a larger extent the existence of gender inequality and are thus likely to show more support for policies aiming at improving equal opportunities. Moreover, men who have women as superiors can make positive experiences with female leaders, which may decrease their prejudice. However, negative experiences with female supervisors or colleagues might lead to a reverse effect, i.e. the rejection of a gender quota or the feeling that additional affirmative action measures are not necessary. Therefore, the relationship of workplace exposure and support for a gender quota among men is expected to be ambiguous and, therefore, no definite hypothesis can be formulated. Data & Methods The data for the empirical analysis was provided by the German Internet Panel (GIP), a probability-based longitudinal online survey which focuses on political and economic attitudes and reform preferences through bimonthly online interviews. The respondents are representative of both the online and the offline population aged 16-75 in Germany (Blom et al. 2015). Data collection took place in March 2017; our analysis sample comprises 2544 individuals. The main dependent variable concerned the respondent’s attitudes towards a binding quota for women in advisory boards. The question translated from German reads as follows: How do you evaluate a binding women’s quota for advisory boards of big companies listed at the stock market? The response scale for this question ranges from 0 (completely oppose) to 4 (completely support). 3.3 4 128 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss Our first hypotheses focus on respondents’ socio-economic characteristics such as age, leadership position and marital status. Age is included in years and divided by the factor 10 to facilitate comparison of the small effect sizes. Leadership position is measured in three categories – no leadership, leadership in middle management and leadership position in the upper management. Marital status was recoded to a binary variable that distinguishes between individuals who are married or live with their partner (1) and all other respondents (0). Our second set of hypotheses concerns the role of ideological dispositions and respondents’ assessment of gender equality on the labour market in shaping attitudes. Political ideology was measured by self-assessment on an 11-point scale, ranging from left (0) to right (10). In addition, respondents were asked if they believe the labour market chances of men and women to be equal or if one gender has an advantage. Third, attitudes towards women’s quota might be affected by the gender balance at the respondent’s workplace. Therefore, three dimensions of gender composition at the work-place were considered: share of female co-workers in the whole company, of female colleagues in the working group, and of female supervisors, each measured with a 5-point scale ranging from predominantly male (1) to predominantly female (5). Because these measurements are not continuous, we recode them to binary variables indicating a male predominance (reference category) or female predominance. Several sociodemographic characteristics were included as control variables in the regression models that have shown to be correlated to political attitudes in previous studies: education (5 categories), employment status (3 categories), residence in East Germany, and household income. Income was adjusted to the number of persons in the household and included as a logarithm to account for outliers with a very high income. Table A1 in the Appendix includes descriptive summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables. For the regression analyses, the continuous variables age, income and political ideology were centred and missing values for the latter two were imputed with group means based on education and gender. For leadership position and gender composition at the work-place, separate categories for missing values were introduced because these questions were only addressed to persons active on the labour market. We used OLS regression models to test for individual determinants of support for a boardroom quota. To examine differences between men and women, we included interaction terms between gender and the main variables of interest: age, leadership position, marital status and political ideology. Significant interaction terms indicate that the main effects are either stronger (positive interaction term) or weaker (negative term) for women than it is for men. When interaction terms are included, the main effects refer to the predicted affect for men. To facilitate comparison between both genders, we provided a visualisation of the results and estimated separate regression models for men and women (see Table A2 in the Appendix). We ran logistic regression models as robustness check because the dependent variable is not Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 129 strictly continuous with a cut point between answer category 4 (rather support) and category 3 (neither nor); these models show substantially the same results. Results Interest-based explanations To test our hypotheses, we ran several OLS regressions on the support for the gender quota. Model 1 in Table 1 presents the baseline model that includes sociodemographic characteristics of the survey respondents. The results provide (unsurprisingly) strong support for our initial hypothesis that women are more in favour of the gender quota than men. The size of this effect is about a half point on the five-point scale, by far the strongest effect we could find in our analysis. Descriptive analyses already show a gap in support between men and women of 0.56 points on the five-point-scale (see Table A.1). The regression models confirm that this gap is mostly not explained by possible composition differences between the group of men and the group of women, but therefore refers more to a gender difference in quota support. In line with the assumed interest explanation (see Hypothesis 1), the main target group of the affirmative action policy turns out to be its strongest proponent. Table 1: Linear regression models of support for a gender boardroom quota 1 Base model 2 Interactions 3 Values 4 Workplace Female 0.538*** 1.093*** -0.189 0.530*** (11.55) (7.28) (-1.34) (10.60) Age (10 years) 0.105*** 0.151*** 0.0801*** 0.107*** (5.79) (6.14) (4.64) (5.85) Leadership position (ref: no) Middle management -0.0860 -0.169* -0.0453 -0.0808 (-1.35) (-2.12) (-0.75) (-1.26) Upper management -0.167* -0.367*** -0.0795 -0.143 (-2.18) (-4.07) (-1.09) (-1.84) Empl. status (ref: employed) Unemployed 0.156 0.181 0.101 0.161 (0.99) (1.16) (0.67) (1.02) Not on labour market -0.00474 -0.00490 -0.0122 -0.00327 (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.24) (-0.06) Education (ref: lower sec.) Middle school -0.0628 -0.0551 -0.0734 -0.0618 (-0.88) (-0.78) (-1.09) (-0.87) Upper secondary -0.202** -0.220** -0.229** -0.203** (-2.61) (-2.86) (-3.12) (-2.62) Tertiary -0.178* -0.191** -0.240*** -0.177* (-2.42) (-2.60) (-3.40) (-2.39) 5 5.1 130 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss 1 Base model 2 Interactions 3 Values 4 Workplace Other 0.0655 0.0773 0.0931 0.0582 (0.36) (0.42) (0.53) (0.32) Married -0.0611 0.0698 -0.0549 -0.0627 (-1.22) (0.96) (-1.15) (-1.25) Income (log) -0.100* -0.0851* -0.0701 -0.101* (-2.31) (-1.96) (-1.70) (-2.32) East Germany 0.0128 0.0132 0.00576 0.0163 (0.23) (0.23) (0.11) (0.29) Interactions female*age -0.00991** (-3.13) female*middle manag. 0.127 (1.01) female*upper manag. 0.564*** (3.48) female*married -0.265** (-2.67) female*ideology 0.0969*** (3.97) Political ideology -0.130*** (-8.24) Chances on LM (ref: same) Men have more chances 0.665*** (12.16) Women have more chances -0.572** (-3.24) Workplace gender balance (ref: more men) More female co-workers 0.0489 (0.69) More female superiors 0.0682 (0.90) More female colleagues -0.0621 (-0.88) Constant 2.393*** 2.364*** 1.996*** 2.388*** (31.98) (29.09) (24.31) (31.49) Observations 2544 2544 2544 2544 R² 0.0848 0.0982 0.1795 0.0865 Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Categories “missing” are omitted from the output for leadership position, female Co-worker, female superior and female colleagues. Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 131 Several other characteristics show a significant relationship with the dependent variable as well. Age correlates positively and significantly with support for the quota: the older the respondent, the stronger the support for the quota. By contrast, unemployment, being married and East German origin are seemingly unrelated. A high social status is associated with a sceptical position towards a mandatory quota as upper secondary and tertiary educational degrees, high income and positions in the upper management show a significant negative relationship. However, we argued that the effects of some of these characteristics differ between men and women. To test this proposition, we included interaction terms between gender and some of the main effects, namely age, holding a leadership position and being in a long-term love relationship (Model 2). The main effects refer to the male population, while the interactions indicate diverging effect sizes and directions for women. For the sake of clarity, we present the results of separate regressions for men and women in Table A.2 in the appendix. In Hypothesis 2, we assumed that being in a leadership position is positively correlated with support among women but negatively correlated among men. According to our hypothesis, women in leadership positions should show a higher support for the quota because they are the main beneficiaries. Men in the upper management, in contrast, might see the quota as a threat to their career chances. In line with this argument, the interaction term between being female and leadership position is positive and highly significant. Figure 1 illustrates the opposing directions of the coefficients for the category “upper management position” among men and women. Men holding an upper management position oppose the boardroom quota to a significantly larger extent than men holding middle management positions or positions without leadership. By contrast, women with an upper management position have a significantly stronger support for a boardroom quota compared to women holding positions with lower responsibilities. These results confirm therefore Hypothesis 2. 132 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss Figure 1: Support for a gender quota by leadership status and gender Source: Own estimations based on GIP 2017. Note: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals. In our third hypothesis, we assumed that opposition to the boardroom quota is stronger among younger men than among older men. We argued that young men oppose the quota more strongly because they still need to achieve and establish a secure position on the labour market, and therefore, perceive a stronger competition with women. Our results confirm that young men show a strong tendency to oppose the quota (see the main age effect of Model 2 in Table 1, which refers to the age coefficient for men). There is a positive and significant relationship between age and support for a quota for both genders, but this relationship is about two times stronger for men than it is for women. Figure 2 presents the predicted effects of age on support for boardroom quota by gender from Model 2. The gender gap in support for the gender quota is the strongest among the youngest generation of respondents and decreases with respondents’ age. Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 133 Figure 2: Predicted effect of age on support for a gender quota, by gender Source: Own estimations based on GIP 2017. Note: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals. Our last hypothesis related to the interest-based explanation concerns the role of household’s main breadwinner in mitigating the gender gap in support for a gender quota. According to our Hypothesis 4, not being the main household’s breadwinner should be negatively associated with support for the gender quota among women and positively associated with support for the gender quota among men. To test this hypothesis, we restricted our analysis to the sample of respondents (men and women) who are in a long-term relationship. Table 2 presents the corresponding regression results. If we look at the separated models for men and women, we see that a high personal income share in the household income is negatively and significantly associated with support for women quota among men, while this variable remains insignificant among female respondents. We plotted the predicted effect of personal income share on support for quota by gender in Figure 3. Accordingly, the higher men’s personal income as a share of the household income is, the more they oppose a gender quota. Thus, men who are household’s main breadwinner oppose the boardroom quota to a significantly larger extent than men who are not the main breadwinner. Moreover, men who contribute up to 40% to the household income do not differ from women in their support for women quotas. Thus, the significant overall gender gap in support for gender quotas can be explained by the fact that a majority of our male respondents remains the main breadwinner. It should be noted that only a minority of our male respondents is not the household’s main breadwinner, as indicated by the 134 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss large confidence intervals at the lower end of the predicted effect for men in Figure 3. Moreover, our male respondents who are not the main breadwinner are also very likely to differ from the male main breadwinners in their attitudes towards family values and gender roles. Thus, these results should be interpreted with caution. Table 2: Attitudes towards women's quota (sample restricted to married people and people in partnership) 1 Interaction 2 Female 3 Male Female -0.0569 (-0.37) Age (10 years) 0.0206 -0.0318 0.0585 (0.73) (-0.89) (1.24) Leadership position (ref: no) Middle management -0.163* -0.148 -0.229* (-2.03) (-1.12) (-2.22) Upper management -0.181* 0.277 -0.400*** (-1.97) (1.70) (-3.43) Empl. status (ref: employed) Unemployed 0.426 0.129 0.688 (1.70) (0.40) (1.77) Not on labour market 0.146* 0.0359 0.251* (1.97) (0.39) (2.00) Education (ref: lower sec.) Middle school -0.0468 -0.0256 -0.0773 (-0.57) (-0.23) (-0.66) Upper secondary -0.0965 -0.00593 -0.186 (-1.01) (-0.04) (-1.40) Tertiary -0.191* -0.284* -0.133 (-2.17) (-2.17) (-1.12) Other 0.287 0.194 0.416 (1.21) (0.63) (1.17) Income (log) -0.145* -0.154 -0.128 (-2.31) (-1.73) (-1.45) East Germany -0.0248 0.0647 -0.121 (-0.33) (0.64) (-1.10) Income share (0-1) -0.502** -0.00608 -0.495** (-2.90) (-0.05) (-2.65) Interaction female * income share 0.524* (2.50) Constant 2.773*** 2.736*** 2.790*** (17.97) (23.14) (15.86) Observations 1521 706 815 Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 135 Figure 3: Predicted effect of personal income share of household income on support for a gender quota by gender (sample restricted to married respondents and respondents living in partnership) Source: Own estimations based on GIP 2017. Note: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals. Political orientation and perception of gender equality We now turn to our hypotheses based on respondents’ political orientation and perception of gender equality on the labour market. According to Hypothesis 5, having a left-wing political orientation is expected to be associated with a larger support for the quota among men, while political orientation is expected to be less relevant for women’s support. As we expect the political orientation to have a much stronger effect for men than for women, an additional interaction term is included in the model. The results for testing this fifth hypothesis can be found in Model 3 in Table 1 and are visualized in Figure 4. In line with our expectations, a right-wing political ideology – which is associated with more conservative gender roles – leads to a stronger opposition to the quota among men. For women, however, political orientation does not play an important role in determining their support of a quota (see Figure 4). This latter result implies that a broad support for the quota exists among women across the political spectrum. One explanation for this finding is that women’s position towards the quota is much more determined by personal experi- 5.2 136 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss ences of workplace discrimination and calculations of self-interest than by a general political ideology, thereby lending support to Hypothesis 5. Figure 4: Support for a gender quota by political orientation and gender Source: Own estimations based on GIP 2017. Note: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals. Next, we turn to our sixth hypothesis that claims that individuals who perceive the labour market as unfair to women are more supportive of a gender quota. 67 percent of men and 89 percent of women think that men are given an advantage on the labour market (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). In line with our expectations, these respondents are more in favour of the quota than those who perceive that women are treated fairly on the labour market. Workplace Lastly, we put forward the argument that men’s exposure to female colleagues in the workplace may influence their willingness to support the quota either in a positive or negative way. To test this, we included the share of female co-workers, colleagues and supervisors in our models. While none of the main effect for any of the three variables measuring workplace gender balance is significant (see Model 4 of Table 1), the separate regression for men shows an interesting result (see Model 4 in Table A.2 in the Appendix): a higher share of female supervisors is significantly positively related to men’s willingness to support the quota, but there is no such relationship 5.3 Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 137 for the share of female colleagues. For women, in contrast, the share of female colleagues and supervisors doesn’t affect the support for a quota. The significant relationship for men might signal an exposure effect (i.e., men becoming more in favour of a quota if they have a female boss), but might also be induced by selection into teams with female supervisors of those men who already hold a favourable view of gender equality measures. Since our data is cross-sectional, we cannot further examine the determinants of this relationship. Discussion Our aim was to identify which groups of individuals and employees approve the boardroom quota for women and which social groups oppose it. We could derive several hypotheses from an interest-based framework. Not surprisingly, our results show a gender gap in support for a quota with a stronger support among women, but also reveal interesting differences among women and among men. These differences highlight the interplay of gender and position on the labour market for understanding attitudes towards affirmative action policies. The boardroom quota is mostly supported by single women in upper management positions, while mostly opposed by young men in upper management positions. A further interesting finding derived from the application of the interest-based framework concerns the fact that men who are not the main household breadwinner tend to support the boardroom quota for women to a much larger extent than their breadwinner peers. Thus, the interest-based explanation for understanding gender quota support seems to apply at both the individual and household levels. Based on these findings, we conclude that opposition to the gender quota is greatest among those who are disregarded by the regulation or might see their (prospective) labour market chances to be threatened. In order to generate a broader societal consent for affirmative action policies, policy makers should therefore combine such regulations targeting underrepresented groups with other more encompassing policies aiming at enhancing labour market chances of individuals in insecure positions regardless of their group membership. Especially younger labour market entrants and those less qualified, who face difficulties in finding good jobs and often end up in fixed-term contracts or the low paid sector, might feel threatened by affirmative action measures that define them as non-target group. Therefore, politicians have to tackle the general insider-outsider divide on labour markets in addition to ensuring equal chances for specific groups. Two further findings of our study can be related to policy implications. First, support for a boardroom quota is widespread among women regardless their age, their status as household’s main breadwinner or their political orientation. Thus, not only left-wing oriented women who generally support state intervention to redress inequality, and not only women earning most of household’s income, and not only younger women who would be the likeliest beneficiary from such affirmative action 6 138 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss regulations support the boardroom quota. This finding implies that policy makers can build on broad support for the quota among women across the political spectrum and across various socio-economic and labour market positions. This result might also explain why the quota in Germany was initially proposed by parties on the political left, but received broad support from female MPs across the political spectrum (Der Westen 2011). The last noteworthy finding we want to discuss concerns the role of the perception that women are unfairly treated on the labour market: both male and female respondents were significantly more likely to support the gender quota if they perceive that women have a disadvantage on the labour market. On the one hand, it is not surprising that perceived labour market disadvantage is related to support for regulations aiming at redressing this disadvantage. On the other hand, this also implies that support for affirmation action policies is likely to decline the better underrepresented groups are integrated on the labour market. Another (cross-national) study on support for women boardroom quote highlighted indeed that citizens from countries with above average gender equality on the labour market (i.e. Scandinavian countries) are the ones the least supportive for gender quotas (Möhring/ Teney 2019). This finding is of particular relevance for policy makers and actors from the civil society aiming at promoting affirmative action policies. We provide the first study that examines the determinants of support for boardroom quotas among citizens after the introduction of the statutory binding quota. However, our study is also confronted by several limitations. Our study investigates support for affirmative action for a specific field (economy) and a specific group (women in top leading positions). Therefore, it cannot be generalized to other measures with different target groups and other fields. Furthermore, due to the use of a cross-sectional design, we are restricted to describing correlations and cannot conclude on causal effects of quota support. Unfortunately, data on attitudes before and after the boardroom quota was implemented in Germany does not exist. References Armstrong, Jo & Walby, Sylvia (2012): Gender Quotas in Management Boards. Brussels: European Parliament’s Committee on Gender Equality. Barnes, Tiffany D. & Córdova, Abby (2016): Making space for women: Explaining citizen support for legislative gender quotas in Latin America. Journal of Politics 78(3): 670-686. Blom, Annelies G., Gathmann, Christina & Krieger, Ulrich (2015): Setting up an online panel representative of the general population: The German internet panel. Field Methods 27(4): 391-408. Bobo, Lawrence (2000): Race and Beliefs About Affirmative Action: Assessing the Effects of Interests, Group Threat, Ideology, and Racism, in David O. Sears (Ed.), Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America. Chicago London: University of Chicago Press. S. 137-164. Boisjoly, Johanne, Duncan, Greg J., Kremer, Michael, Levy, Dan M. & Eccles, Jacque (2006): Empathy or antipathy? The impact of diversity. American Economic Review 96(5): 1890-1905. Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 139 Bolzendahl, Catherine I. & Myers, Daniel J. (2004): Feminist attitudes and support for gender equality: Opinion change in women and men, 1974-1998. Social Forces 83(2): 759-789. Budig, Michelle J. & England, Paula (2001): The wage penalty for motherhood. American Sociological Review 66(2): 204–225. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657415. Dirk De Graaf, Nan & Heath, Anthony (1992): Husbands' and wives' voting behaviour in Britain: Class-dependent mutual influence of spouses. Acta Sociologica 35(4): 311-322. Der Westen (2011): Bundestagsabgeordnete fordern in "Berliner Erklärung" Frauenquote für Aufsichtsräte (15.12.2011). Retrieved from https://www.derwesten.de/wirtschaft/bundestagsabgeordnete-fordern-in-berliner-erklaerung-frauenquote-fuer-aufsichtsraete-id6165492.html (accessed: 01.02.2019). Edlund, Jonas (2003): The influence of the class situations of husbands and wives on class identity, party preference and attitudes towards redistribution: Sweden, Germany and the United States. Acta Sociologica 46(3): 195-214. Eicher, Véronique, Settersten, Richard A., Penic, Sandra, Glaeser, Stephanie, Martenot, Aude & Spini, Dario (2015): Normative climates of parenthood across Europe: Judging voluntary childlessness and working parents. European Sociological Review 32(1): 135-150. Finseraas, Henning, Johnsen, Åshild A., Kotsadam, Andreas & Torsvik, Gaute (2016): Exposure to female colleagues breaks the glass ceiling – Evidence from a combined vignette and field experiment. European Economic Review 90: 363-374. Gabaldon, Patricia, Mensi-Klarbach, Heike & Seierstad, Cathrine (2017): Gender Diversity in the Boardroom: The Multiple Versions of Quota Laws in Europe, in Cathrine Seierstad, Patricia Gabaldon & Heike Mensi-Klarbach (Hrsg.), Gender Diversity in the Boardroom. Cham: Springer International Publishing. S. 233–254. Harrison, David A., Kravitz, David A., Mayer, David M., Leslie, Lisa M. and Lev-Arey, Dalit (2006): Understanding attitudes toward affirmative action programs in employment: Summary and meta-analysis of 35 years of research. Journal of Applied Psychology 91(5): 1013-1036. Himmelweit, Susan, Santos, Cristina, Sevilla, Almudena & Sofer, Catherine (2013): Sharing of resources within the family and the economics of household decision making. Journal of Marriage and Family 75(3): 625-639. Holst, Elke & Wrohlich, Katharina (2018): Spitzengremien großer Unternehmen: Geschlechterquote für Aufsichtsräte greift, in Vorständen herrscht beinahe Stillstand. DIW-Wochenbericht 5(1/2): 3-17. Inglehart, Ronald (1977): The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald & Norris, Pippa (2000): The developmental theory of the gender gap: Women ´s and men´s voting behavior in global perspective. 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Paxton, Pamela & Kunovich, Sheri (2003): Women’s political representation: The importance of ideology. Social Forces 82(1): 87-114. Spiegel Online (2014): Union fürchtet wegen Frauenquote um die Wirtschaft (14.10.2014). Retrieved from https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/frauenquote-cdu-und-spd-streitenueber-einfuehrung-a-997079.html (accessed: 18 June 2019). Staff, Jeremy & Mortimer, Jeylan T. (2011): Explaining the motherhood wage penalty during the early occupational career. Demography 49(1): 1–21. Trappe, Heike, Pollmann-Schult, Matthias & Schmitt, Cristian (2015): The rise and decline of the male breadwinner model: Institutional underpinnings and future expectations. European Sociological Review 31(2): 230–42. Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 141 Appendix Table A.1: Descriptive sample statistics Men & women Men Women Support women's quota 2.47 (1.18) 2.20 (1.24) 2.76 (1.04) Female 0.48 (0.50) Age 48.20 (15.51) 49.52 (15.50) 46.78 (15.39) Married 0.58 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.56 (0.50) Income (1000E per HH member) 1.33 (0.71) 1.39 (0.76) 1.27 (0.65) East Germany 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.40) Political ideology 5.55 (1.80) 5.74 (1.92) 5.34 (1.63) Leadership position No leadership 0.57 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47) Middle management 0.17 (0.38) 0.22 (0.41) 0.12 (0.32) Upper management 0.11 (0.32) 0.16 (0.37) 0.06 (0.24) Missing 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) Employment status Employed 0.64 (0.48) 0.66 (0.47) 0.63 (0.48) Unemployed 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.14) Not on labour market 0.33 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.36 (0.48) Education Lower secondary 0.17 (0.37) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.36) Middle school 0.29 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44) 0.32 (0.47) Upper secondary 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43) Tertiary 0.30 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 0.28 (0.45) Other 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) Chances on labour market Same chances 0.21 (0.41) 0.31 (0.46) 0.11 (0.31) Men more chances 0.77 (0.42) 0.67 (0.47) 0.89 (0.32) Women more chances 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.16) 0.00 (0.07) Gender balance workplace More male supervisors 0.56 (0.50) 0.72 (0.45) 0.39 (0.49) More female supervisors 0.30 (0.46) 0.14 (0.35) 0.46 (0.50) Missing 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34) 0.15 (0.35) More male supervisors 0.73 (0.45) 0.78 (0.41) 0.67 (0.47) More female supervisors 0.13 (0.33) 0.07 (0.26) 0.18 (0.39) Missing 0.15 (0.35) 0.15 (0.35) 0.15 (0.35) More male colleagues 0.60 (0.49) 0.72 (0.45) 0.46 (0.50) More female colleagues 0.25 (0.43) 0.14 (0.34) 0.37 (0.48) Missing 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35) 0.17 (0.37) Observations 2559 1321 1238 Source: Own estimations based on GIP 2017; Standard deviations in parentheses. 142 Katja Möhring/Céline Teney/Christopher Buss Table A.2: Linear regression models of support for a gender boardroom quota; gender separated Model 1 1 3 3 4 4 Male Female Male Female Male Female Female 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Age (10 years) 0.14*** 0.06** 0.10*** 0.05* 0.14*** 0.06* Leadership position (ref: no) Middle management -0.15 -0.05 -0.10 -0.03 -0.13 -0.05 Upper management -0.35*** 0.18 -0.22* 0.21 -0.30** 0.18 Empl. status (ref: employed) Unemployed 0.32 -0.06 0.18 0.02 0.32 -0.05 Not on labour market 0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 Education (ref: lower sec.) Lower secondary -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 Upper secondary -0.36*** -0.09 -0.37*** -0.08 -0.36*** -0.10 Tertiary -0.19 -0.24* -0.23* -0.24* -0.19 -0.24* Other 0.08 0.16 0.22 0.14 0.05 0.17 Married 0.08 -0.19** 0.05 -0.17** 0.08 -0.19** Income (log) -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 East Germany 0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 Political ideology -0.13*** -0.03 Chances on LM (ref: same) 0.00 0.00 Men have more chances 0.67*** 0.60*** Women have more chances -0.58** -0.17 Workplace gender balance (ref: more men) More female co-worker -0.07 0.10 More female superior 0.28* -0.05 More female colleagues -0.01 -0.08 Constant 2.34*** 2.99*** 1.96*** 2.42*** 2.33*** 2.99*** Observations 1366 1264 1321 1238 1366 1264 R² 0.0683 0.0226 0.1989 0.0621 0.0739 0.0248 Source: Own estimations based on GIP 2017; t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Note: Categories “missing” are omitted from the output for leadership position, female Co-worker, female superior and female colleagues. Who supports gender quotas for company leadership? 143

Abstract

After a long and controversial debate, a statutory gender boardroom quota was introduced in Germany in 2016. We examine the determinants of support for this quota among citizens aiming to identify the social groups that approve the most and those that resent the most the quota law. The approaches of self-interest, political orientation, and exposure are used to understand variation in support from a theoretical perspective. Based on data from the German Internet Panel (GIP) surveyed in March 2017 (N=2544), individual-level and workplace-related determinants of support for the boardroom quota are analysed. Our results show a general gender gap in support for a quota with greater support among women, but reveal differences within the target group of women and within the non-target group of men. These differences demonstrate that the interplay of gender and position on the labour market is pivotal for attitudes towards affirmative action in favour of women. The quota is most supported by single women in upper management positions, while most opposed by married women and young men. This leads to the conclusion that opposition to the gender quota is greatest among those who are disregarded by the regulation or might see their prospective labour market chances to be threatened.

Zusammenfassung

In Deutschland wurde nach langer, kontroverser Diskussion 2016 eine gesetzliche Geschlechterquote für Aufsichtsräte großer Firmen, die sogenannte Frauenquote, eingeführt. Wir untersuchen die Determinanten der Unterstützung dieser Quote in der deutschen Bevölkerung mit dem Ziel, Gruppen in der Gesellschaft mit einer besonders hohen oder niedrigen Unterstützung zu identifizieren. Theoretisch beziehen wir uns dabei auf Ansätze zu Rational-Choice, politscher Orientierung und Intergruppenkontakten. Auf der Grundlage der Daten des German Internet Panel (GIP) vom März 2017 (N=2544) analysieren wir individuelle und Arbeitsplatzspezifische Determinanten der Unterstützung für die Geschlechterquote. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen wie erwartet eine starke Diskrepanz in der Unterstützung zwischen Männern und Frauen mit stärkerer Unterstützung durch Frauen. Daneben werden Unterschiede innerhalb der Gruppe der Frauen wie der Männer deutlich, die auf die Bedeutsamkeit des Zusammenspiels von Geschlecht und Position auf dem Arbeitsmarkt hinweisen. Die höchste Unterstützung findet sich unter alleinstehenden Frauen in gehobenen Führungspositionen, während verheiratete Frauen und junge Männer die geringste Unterstützung aufweisen. Daher schlussfolgern wir, dass die Geschlechterquote auf die stärkste Ablehnung bei jenen stößt, die sich durch diese Maßnahme entweder ausgegrenzt fühlen oder ihre zukünftigen Arbeitsmarktchancen gefährdet sehen.

References
Armstrong, Jo & Walby, Sylvia (2012): Gender Quotas in Management Boards. Brussels: European Parliament’s Committee on Gender Equality.
Barnes, Tiffany D. & Córdova, Abby (2016): Making space for women: Explaining citizen support for legislative gender quotas in Latin America. Journal of Politics 78(3): 670-686.
Blom, Annelies G., Gathmann, Christina & Krieger, Ulrich (2015): Setting up an online panel representative of the general population: The German internet panel. Field Methods 27(4): 391-408.
Bobo, Lawrence (2000): Race and Beliefs About Affirmative Action: Assessing the Effects of Interests, Group Threat, Ideology, and Racism, in David O. Sears (Ed.), Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America. Chicago London: University of Chicago Press. S. 137-164.
Boisjoly, Johanne, Duncan, Greg J., Kremer, Michael, Levy, Dan M. & Eccles, Jacque (2006): Empathy or antipathy? The impact of diversity. American Economic Review 96(5): 1890-1905.
Bolzendahl, Catherine I. & Myers, Daniel J. (2004): Feminist attitudes and support for gender equality: Opinion change in women and men, 1974-1998. Social Forces 83(2): 759-789.
Budig, Michelle J. & England, Paula (2001): The wage penalty for motherhood. American Sociological Review 66(2): 204–225. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657415.
Dirk De Graaf, Nan & Heath, Anthony (1992): Husbands' and wives' voting behaviour in Britain: Class-dependent mutual influence of spouses. Acta Sociologica 35(4): 311-322.
Der Westen (2011): Bundestagsabgeordnete fordern in "Berliner Erklärung" Frauenquote für Aufsichtsräte (15.12.2011). Retrieved from https://www.derwesten.de/wirtschaft/bundestagsabgeordnete-fordern-in-berliner-erklaerung-frauenquote-fuer-aufsichtsraete-id6165492.html (accessed: 01.02.2019).
Edlund, Jonas (2003): The influence of the class situations of husbands and wives on class identity, party preference and attitudes towards redistribution: Sweden, Germany and the United States. Acta Sociologica 46(3): 195-214.
Eicher, Véronique, Settersten, Richard A., Penic, Sandra, Glaeser, Stephanie, Martenot, Aude & Spini, Dario (2015): Normative climates of parenthood across Europe: Judging voluntary childlessness and working parents. European Sociological Review 32(1): 135-150.
Finseraas, Henning, Johnsen, Åshild A., Kotsadam, Andreas & Torsvik, Gaute (2016): Exposure to female colleagues breaks the glass ceiling – Evidence from a combined vignette and field experiment. European Economic Review 90: 363-374.
Gabaldon, Patricia, Mensi-Klarbach, Heike & Seierstad, Cathrine (2017): Gender Diversity in the Boardroom: The Multiple Versions of Quota Laws in Europe, in Cathrine Seierstad, Patricia Gabaldon & Heike Mensi-Klarbach (Hrsg.), Gender Diversity in the Boardroom. Cham: Springer International Publishing. S. 233–254.
Harrison, David A., Kravitz, David A., Mayer, David M., Leslie, Lisa M. and Lev-Arey, Dalit (2006): Understanding attitudes toward affirmative action programs in employment: Summary and meta-analysis of 35 years of research. Journal of Applied Psychology 91(5): 1013-1036.
Himmelweit, Susan, Santos, Cristina, Sevilla, Almudena & Sofer, Catherine (2013): Sharing of resources within the family and the economics of household decision making. Journal of Marriage and Family 75(3): 625-639.
Holst, Elke & Wrohlich, Katharina (2018): Spitzengremien großer Unternehmen: Geschlechterquote für Aufsichtsräte greift, in Vorständen herrscht beinahe Stillstand. DIW-Wochenbericht 5(1/2): 3-17.
Inglehart, Ronald (1977): The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald & Norris, Pippa (2000): The developmental theory of the gender gap: Women
´s and men´s voting behavior in global perspective. International Political Science Review 21(4): 441-463.
Inglehart, Ronald & Norris, Pippa (2003): Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge and others: Cambridge University Press.
Jennings, M. Kent & Stoker, Laura (2001): Political Similarity and Influence Between Husbands and Wives. Working Paper 2001-14. UC Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies. Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9s54f2mc (accessed: 01.02.2019).
Kirsch, Anja (2017): Women’s Access to Boards in Germany—Regulation and Symbolic Change, in Cathrine Seierstad, Patricia Gabaldon and Heike Mensi-Klarbach (Ed.), Gender Diversity in the Boardroom. Cham: Springer International Publishing. p. 205–232.
Krysan, Maria (2000): Prejudice, politics, and public opinion: Understanding the sources of racial policy attitudes. Annual Review of Sociology 26: 135-168.
Kunze, Astrid & Miller, Amalia R. (2014): Women helping women? Evidence from private sector data on workplace hierarchies. NBER Working Paper No. 20761. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20761 (accessed 1 November 2016).
Longarela, Iñaki R. (2017): Explaining vertical gender segregation: A research agenda. Work, Employment and Society 31(5): 861-871.
Matsa, David A. & Miller, Amalia R. (2011): Chipping away at the glass ceiling: Gender spillovers in corporate leadership. American Economic Review 101(3): 635-39.
Mau, Steffen (2003): The Moral Economy of Welfare States. Britain and Germany Compared. London: Routledge.
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Abstract

Soziale Welt is one of the important journals within German sociology and is even read in foreign countries. It includes empirical and theoretical contributions from all areas of the subject and tries to portray the development of sociology and to give a new impetus. In addition to the quarterly published issues, there are special issues with a unified theme.

The journal "Soziale Welt" is aimed at sociologists, social scientists, and at generally interested readers.

Website: www.soziale-welt.de

Zusammenfassung

Die Soziale Welt ist eine der großen, auch im Ausland gelesenen Fachzeitschriften innerhalb der deutschen Soziologie. Sie bringt empirische und theoretische Arbeiten aus allen Bereichen des Faches und versucht auf diese Weise, die Entwicklung der Soziologie einerseits zu spiegeln und ihr andererseits auch neue Impulse zu geben. Dies geschieht neben den viermal pro Jahr erscheinenden regulären Heften auch durch die Arbeit an Sonderbänden mit einheitlicher Thematik.

Die Zeitschrift "Soziale Welt" wendet sich an Soziologen, Sozialwissenschaftler, Interessierte allgemein.

Homepage: www.soziale-welt.de